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Towards a Framework of Deep Diversity: Identity and Invisibility in the Indian Diaspora in New Zealand

A thesis submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science & Public Policy at The University of Waikato by TODD NACHOWITZ

2015
A learned scholar with worldly fame, understands nothing, like a donkey laden with sandalwood.
— Kabir (Ramaint 32)

The day is short, the labour vast, the toilers sluggish, the reward great, and the Master of the house is pressing.
— Rabbi Tarfor (Pirke Avot 2:20)
The era of the ethnically homogeneous nation is over (Liu et al. 2005:11).

The last two decades of immigration have transformed our country and such diversity raises new questions at every level (Morris 2005:246).
Abstract:

Using the Indian diaspora in New Zealand as a case study, this thesis examines how state categorisation practices and nation building narratives have constructed and racialised migrant minorities, such as Indians, in particular ways. It does so through a review of the historical settlement narrative and census records that have tended to erase early ethnic minority presence from what is seen as a predominantly bicultural encounter.

Aotearoan colonial society has tended to render early Indian presence in New Zealand invisible. This pattern remains perceptible in the prolonged use of homogenising ethnic categories utilised throughout the history of the New Zealand census that obfuscate the extent of ethnic minority diversification with specific reference to the Indian community.

The thesis critiques state constructions of ethnic identity through (1) the presentation of alternative historical narratives that more appropriately demonstrate the presence of non-Māori non-European minorities at first contact; (2) an examination of minority reporting in the New Zealand census during the period of early European settlement; and (3) an analysis of data from a survey of the Indian community in New Zealand. The survey data on self-reported experiences of discrimination underscore the importance of ethnic self-identification and the use of more heterogeneous categories for appropriate minority recognition.

At a theoretical level, the thesis outlines a novel framework for diversity governance, known as deep diversity, which is informed by an interdisciplinary methodological and theoretical approach that draws on the disciplines of anthropology, demography, history, and policy studies. This framework rethinks current policy approaches that position minorities as beneficiaries of policies designed for their social uplift and integration into majority society, and instead places the onus of social integration on both minorities and majorities. The framework is applied to an analysis of qualitative data from historical sources that fundamentally question New Zealand’s existing bicultural settlement narrative; to quantitative data from both historical and contemporary census records; and to a self-administered predominantly web-based survey of 1,124 Indian respondents using a snowball sampling method.
This thesis presents an alternative historical settlement narrative that positions Indians as participating, along with Europeans, in first contact encounters with Māori in Aotearoa. Past and present census analysis also reveals the extent of historic Indian invisibility, and demonstrates continued state use of enumeration techniques that obscure and homogenise the diversity that exists within the Indian population. The survey results focus on the themes of identity and discrimination, the analysis of which offers insights about the importance of ethnic self-identification, the continued presence of discrimination, and the use of more heterogeneous categories for appropriate minority recognition. Specific survey results show that respondents, while identifying as ‘Indian’ on the census, favour terms that cite hyphenated nationality or ethnicity (e.g. Kiwi-Indian, Indo-Fijian) or regional, religious, linguistic and country of birth identifiers, as significant forms of self-identification. Results on discrimination demonstrate that 48.4% of survey respondents reported being the target of a discrimination event in New Zealand (86.9% of whom are migrants, while 13.1% were born in New Zealand). When queried about the presence of discrimination, 90.7% of respondents believe that racism and discrimination currently exist within New Zealand society, while only 9.3% believe that it does not exist.

Minority invisibility contributes to social discrimination, and helps perpetuate the shallow diversity management practices in use today. More attention to the importance of appropriate minority self-identification and accommodation, involving majorities in minority integration programmes, and institutional support for a shared national identity, could all help facilitate and promote vital social cohesion strategies in New Zealand. The deep diversity framework articulated in this thesis offers an alternative vision for diversity governance and social cohesion that is appropriate for western liberal democracies with highly pluralised societies such as New Zealand.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
MINORITY POPULATIONS AND DIVERSITY GOVERNANCE

We can see the diversity of human cultures behind us, around us, and before us. The only demand that we can justly make is that all the forms this diversity may take… may be so many contributions to the fullness of all the others (Claude Lévi-Strauss 1952:46).

1.1 Introduction

With the advent of globalisation and the proliferation of human migration, the impacts and implications of an ethnically and religiously diverse polity are under intensifying academic and public debate (Young 1998, Boston & Callister 2005, Boston et al. 2006, Rata & Openshaw 2006, Bromell 2008, Waters 2012). Much of the critical focus of this discourse has been on immigration policy and the political and socioeconomic consequences of increased immigration on the modern democratic state (Freeman 1997, Smith & Edmonston 1998, Castles 2004, Kerr & Kerr 2011, Pakulski & Markowski 2014). This is, however, a predominantly political discourse, and migration is merely one factor of many that contributes to a contested and increasingly complex national identity. Taken together, migrant, minority and majority populations within any given polity constitute an ethnocultural diversity in which state intervention is often necessary. Yet not all nation-states have policies that favour immigrants or minorities, and fewer still have proactive settlement and minority integration policies designed for plural and pluralising societies (Inglis 1996, Parekh 2006, Lentin & Titley 2011, Spoonley & Tolley 2012). Some states eschew minority integration policies that promote diversification in favour of those that advance either an assimilationist agenda, such as France,¹ or those that seek to remain homogenous in an emergent global economy,

¹ See Brubaker (2001), de Wenden (2003, 2012), Silberman et al. (2007), and Bienkowski (2010).
such as China, Japan and Korea. Others actively promote multicultural policies designed for the public accommodation and celebration of minority identities while simultaneously fostering the adoption of a majority national identity in which all members of society can participate.

These contrasting approaches can best be summed up as 1) majority policies that promote minority integration and assimilation into majority communities, and 2) multicultural policies that support diversity and promote minority accommodation. Such approaches to diversity management are largely dependent on the particular circumstances of individual nation-states, and are often the result of complex sociohistorical processes, shifting demographics, and the myriad geopolitical issues that nation-states confront. From a policy perspective, there are multiple ways of managing such diversity, and no single approach or method suits all situations (Rodríguez-García 2010, Vertovec & Wessendorf 2010, Spoonley & Tolley 2012). Still, there are commonalities at work, and a wide variety of multicultural approaches are under review in liberal democratic states, many of which have been thoroughly identified, evaluated and critiqued.3

As existing policy scholarship does not necessarily address which approaches are best utilised in specific conditions, many countries tend to experiment with strategies implemented elsewhere, sometimes resulting in failed attempts at minority integration or backlashes that tend to increase discrimination and decrease social cohesion. This thesis, therefore, provides a needed context for diversity governance in New Zealand and introduces a framework useful in the interpretation, design and implementation of practical policy scenarios and outcomes. Focusing

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on the Indian diaspora\textsuperscript{4} in New Zealand as a case study, this thesis examines how nation building narratives and state categorisation practices have constructed and racialised migrant minorities, such as Indians, in particular ways that reinforce prevailing stereotypes, and challenges minority representation in official state statistics through a historical review of its quinquennial census. Such an analysis reveals a repeated pattern of minority invisibility, erasure and misrepresentation of identity, and the continued proliferation of minority discrimination. State actions in this contested arena entrenches and perpetuates discriminatory practices and exclusion at structural and institutional echelons, and the experience of racism at community and individual levels. This thesis examines the institutional and historical contexts in terms of self- and state-defined identity and sets out a conceptual diversity governance framework designed to aid in the interpretation of existing policies as either shallow or deep. The framework offers a way to recognise policy approaches designed for the reduction of intolerance and the accommodation of minority rights within plural or pluralising societies.

Background

Operationally, there are two contrasting policy streams designed to manage diversity in liberal democratic states. One concerns the policies and legislation that incorporate migration, immigration and the appropriate settlement and integration of minorities (Penninx 1996, Zolberg 2006, Skeldon 2008, Kurthen & Heisler 2009), what I would term the migration complex. In addition to policies, per se, this stream includes the theoretical and empirical policy scholarship that addresses the movement of migrant groups into host societies and their appropriate settlement, acculturation and integration. But this literature is fragmented,

\textsuperscript{4} The use of the term diaspora here refers simply to the dispersion of any people away from their original homeland.
with distinct subgenres that address the wide ranging issues associated with the movement of populations. It includes immigration theory and practice, the right of nation-states to control their own borders, domestic security and foreign policy, and guidelines and policies that determine the appropriate settlement and acculturation of migrants.

The second policy stream comprises the scholarship addressing the philosophical and practical challenges of appropriate minority accommodation in plural societies (Taylor 1994; Parekh 2000a, 2006; Rex & Singh 2005; Kymlicka 2007, 2010a), framing it as a human rights and social justice issue. This literature questions state decisions to integrate and assimilate minority populations into mainstream society or allows accommodation in some, most, or all matters in which values diverge. This underscores a more pressing theoretical and practical challenge as sociocultural, historical, political and economic realities vary widely between states. While consensus remains elusive, there is robust debate on the merits and implications of accommodating the needs of heterogeneous populations, especially when such needs clash with majority values.5

These approaches are problematic for several reasons. First, research tends to focus on fragments of the migration complex rather than viewing its entire process. For example, separate bodies of theory, practice and policy exist for each of the distinct phases of migration (e.g. emigration, immigration, settlement and acculturation, integration, and citizenship). In so doing, an overview of the relationships and connections between the constituent elements is lost, and policy is fractured. Second, many policies are unnecessarily duplicated, being designed, implemented and managed

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5 This may refer to any of potentially multiple sets of values that majorities may have.
by different institutions with divergent agendas. Third, the question of appropriate minority integration is critical, but the literature is often written as if the migration complex is isolated from the underlying processes that might cause or contribute to migration, and such a separation should not be a factor in determining policy that incorporates minority populations into majority society. Instead, there is a belief that there are only two possible outcomes for states accepting immigrants—that minorities should either be assimilated or accommodated. Decisions therefore are primarily based upon what states and majorities require, rather than on what minorities need. The urgent questions for states to consider should ultimately focus on the extent of minority accommodation, and on who makes these decisions.

Most policy practices echo the dominant discourse and tend to take a segmented view of the migration complex, for instance viewing the polarising issue of immigration (e.g. whom to let in, which types of migrants to allow, and how many of each) as separate from settlement and acculturation. Other approaches view settlement policies as merely ways to help minorities better integrate or assimilate into host society. Still others focus on the assimilation versus accommodation debate. Disparate policy approaches yield neither conviction of purpose nor clarity of process, which can result in poor implementation, increases in incidences of discrimination, or more dramatically, in ethnic tension or unrest (Smith 1973, Easterly 2001, Kielstra 2010). Furthermore, migrants and minorities are often viewed as presenting unwieldy challenges for policymakers (Safran 1994, Hannum 1996, Cook 2003, Joppke 2004), whose directives often evoke targeted responses; even the language of policy evokes

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6 e.g. similar integration policies may be implemented by different government institutions, one designed to better integrate migrants into majority society (e.g. NZ’s Settlement Support), another for minority uplift (e.g. NZ’s Te Puni Kōkiri and the Ministry for Social Development), and another for the accommodation of minority rights (e.g. NZ’s Human Rights Commission); in particular, Chapter 8 in Boston et al. (2006:129-165) is especially instructive.
particular images—as if hurling policy missiles at ‘issues’ would make them disappear. If social cohesion is a primary policy objective, then more comprehensive and inclusive methods must be considered. What is lacking, therefore, is a common conceptual approach, an integrative framework that takes a more holistic view of the processes and results of migration and minority accommodation, and one that integrates minorities and majorities in diversity policy. This is a significant gap in the literature that this thesis addresses.

Here, it is necessary to draw a distinction between the use of the words *management* and *governance* and how I utilise these terms throughout. The term ‘diversity management’ is commonly used to refer to state and majority policies regarding migrant and minority populations. In reference to increasing cultural diversity resulting from immigration, Vertovec (2007:1027) states that “policymakers respond with various strategies for a kind of diversity management strategy that came to be called multiculturalism.” Yet ’management’ implies hierarchical top-down administration; that minorities must be managed by majorities (as if minorities are political pawns moved about in an attempt to achieve ‘social cohesion,’ the ultimate aim of the diversity discourse). This language is generally acceptable when determining how workplace diversity can best be managed by organisational or corporate hierarchical structures within an affirmative action context (Gilbert *et al.* 1999, Ivancevich & Gilbert 2000, Lorbiecki & Jack 2000, Wrench 2005), the source of the term. However, public policy on diversity would be better served by the use of the term *governance*. In its broadest sense, governance refers to “all processes of governing, whether undertaken by a government,

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7 See, for example, Sanchez & Brock (1996), Gilbert *et al.* (1999), Bassett-Jones (2005),

8 See also Vertovec (2010:84), Faist (2009).

9 See Munshi & McKie (2001) for an alternative view.
market, or network; whether over a family, tribe, corporation, or territory; and whether by laws, norms, power, or language” (Bevir 2013:1). Here, I use the term in the sense of participatory government, one that focuses on deepening democratic engagement through majority and minority citizen participation in the processes and policies of governing. I draw on Gaventa’s (2006:7) use of the term to refer to the “political project of developing and sustaining more substantive and empowered citizen participation in the political process than what is normally found in liberal representative democracy alone.” Diversity governance in this sense evokes images of mutually shared responsibility for the development, implementation and results of policies designed to attain or maintain high levels of social cohesion in plural or pluralising societies. Thus, I use ‘diversity management’ to refer to most existing forms of multicultural policy, marked by ad hoc, piecemeal, and superficial government responses to ethnic diversity, and ‘diversity governance’ to refer to more inclusive and participatory forms; but not interchangeably.

In order to outline a theoretical and practical approach to diversity governance, I use the term deep diversity, and compare it to the more established but shallow approaches of diversity management used today. The juxtaposition of two alternative strategies uses what Williams (1996:63) refers to as “oppositional categories” to contextualise existing policy, and provides a framework for analysing the distinct approaches evident in existing diversity management schemes. Deep diversity can be useful for explicating the various ideological, normative, and operational values held by particular diversity management schemes, the institutional approaches they take, the diverse implementation mechanisms they empower, and the relevant policy arenas in which they operate. In this thesis I argue that such an approach to diversity policy is not only feasible, but worthwhile in the New Zealand context, given its high percentage of
overseas-born citizens\textsuperscript{10} and presence of an indigenous ‘majority minority.’\textsuperscript{11}

\textit{Shallow} perspectives tend to view entire minority communities as a single ethnic category or group (e.g. ‘Asians’ or ‘Polynesians’), or as smaller national entities (e.g. ‘Indians’ or ‘Samoans’); \textit{deeper} interpretations make less generalised assumptions, and no one minority group can or should be labeled by its largest common denominator. This thesis argues that the terms \textit{Asian} or \textit{Indian},\textsuperscript{12} for example, most often used by states in the enumeration and management of diversity, are largely political monikers that tend to homogenise minority populations, rendering particular ethnicities virtually invisible. There are \textit{deeper} vertical designations of geographic, economic, linguistic or religious denotation, with which members of particular communities may choose to identify. This depth of diversity can best be articulated through the presentation of a case study on a prominent ethnic minority, the Indian diaspora in New Zealand, to highlight the importance of self-reported identity and incidences of discrimination.\textsuperscript{13} A deep diversity approach can examine the extent to which existing policies and enumeration methods can adequately account for subgroups that may exist within horizontal designations of ethnicity. Such an approach may help clarify whether or not policies designed for improving minority integration or social uplift should also focus on more complex self-reported identities than on the expedient political ones.

\textsuperscript{10} According to the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (2013:36-37), New Zealand ranked 4th amongst OECD nations, after Luxembourg, Switzerland and Australia. The 2013 New Zealand Census also showed that 25\% of the population is born overseas.

\textsuperscript{11} Here I use ‘majority minority’ to refer to the largest minority population within any given area.

\textsuperscript{12} \textit{Asian}, for example, is a Level 1 ethnic category used in the New Zealand Census, while \textit{Indian} is a Level 2 ethnic category. Both represent the use of vertical, or hierarchical, categorisation schemes.

\textsuperscript{13} I have chosen both identity and discrimination as two examples, of many, that emerged from the results of a survey on the Indian diaspora in New Zealand that I conducted between 2008-2013. Relationships between self-reported identity (e.g. race, ethnicity, birthplace, ancestral affiliation, generation in New Zealand, nationality, religion, residency status, language) and discrimination have been reported by numerous social scientists (see Sellers & Shelton 2003, Sellers \textit{et al.} 2006, Jackson \textit{et al.} 2012, Williamson 2013).
New Zealand’s Indian population, as one of many possible minority communities to examine, makes an ideal case study due to a number of historical processes and unique conditions. These include 1) the early and wide dispersal of Indian populations globally (Sastri 1959, Clarke et al. 1990, Motwani 1993, Parekh 1993, Peach 1994, Jayaram 2004, Lal 2006a); 2) the resultant geographic range of birthplaces and birth countries from which they emigrate (Kadekar 2005, Lal 2006a, Didham 2010), considering that most other migrant communities tend to have a higher degree of sociocultural and linguistic homogeneity and generally arrive from a single country or region of the world; 3) the direct immigration from India and settlement in New Zealand (Tiwari 1980, Zodgekar 1980, Leckie 2007); and 4) the extensive range of cultural, ethnic, social, caste, religious, and linguistic variation in the Indian population (Didham 2010, Zodgekar 2010) not evident in other migrant communities in New Zealand. The long history of the Indian diaspora in New Zealand, beginning with its earliest sojourners and comprised of both a well-established domestically-born minority and recent overseas-born migrants who hail from a wide variety of sending nations (Zodgekar 1980, 2010; Leckie 2007, 2010; Friesen & Kearns 2008; Bandyopadhyay 2010b), should allow an equitable position in New Zealand’s settlement narrative. Yet inclusion of non-Māori minority communities in Aotearoa’s earliest history has remained elusive.

demographic composition (Winkelmann 1999, Hoadley 2003, McMillian 2006, Bedford & Ho 2008). The 1986 Census reported 15,810 ethnic Indians before immigration reform, while the 2013 Census recorded 156,567 ethnic Indians (Statistics New Zealand 1986, 2013), an increase of 890.3% growth over the 27 intercensal years from 1986-2013. Those of Indian ethnicity are no longer just Gujaratis and Punjabis. There is a deeper heterogeneity not evident in the publicly released statistics.

Although census figures are one indicator of population growth, they do not portray the dramatic internal changes within minority communities. Moreover, existing scholarship on the Indian diaspora does not adequately address the significant geographic, economic, linguistic and religious demographic changes. This research uses a deep diversity approach in studying the Indian community, to seek an understanding of the scale of change. In so doing, this thesis examines the need for a more specific vocabulary that can acknowledge and recognise the heterogeneity that exists within these minority communities. This has implications for existing public policies designed for social uplift and integration, which tend to aggregate subgroup populations (Edmonston et al. 1996, Chapple 2000, Snipp 2003, Gardiner-Garden 2003, Kukutai 2004, Paradies 2006).

This is problematic as aggregate representation of subgroup populations often has the consequence of skewing the delivery of limited resources, especially in incidences where identification with multiple ethnicities and subgroups (e.g. Bhojpuri-speaking Indian Muslims, Indo-Fijian women) are involved. Such groups are more poorly represented than recognised minority populations and adequate representation may be unavailable. Despite the heterogeneity that exists within minority communities, asserting a multiethnic or subgroup identity is neither widespread nor commonplace, as ethnic loyalty and minority obligation often require that
anomalous individuals self-identify exclusively as either members of one minority group or the other, but rarely as belonging to multiple groups, or as belonging to the majority (Boladeras 2002:131; Kertzer & Arel 2002, Cowlishaw 2004:114, Paradies 2006). While reporting of multiple ethnicities in the New Zealand census has improved in recent decades with the introduction of ‘ethnicity’ questions and multiple tick boxes,\(^\text{14}\) it is still difficult for non-Māori minorities to report identification with subgroup communities within existing ethnic classifications. Existing policies for managing such diversity, and especially the institutional instruments for data collection on which such policies rely, have not kept pace with the extent and scope of recent demographic changes in minority populations.

Census reporting is not the same for all minorities. New Zealand’s indigenous Māori, for example, are prompted to provide *iwi*\(^\text{15}\) identification on the Census, a basic right bestowed as an indigenous peoples, while other minority populations lack similar choices that would allow for more accurate subgroup self-identification. Non-Māori minorities in New Zealand are thus not nearly as well recognised in the publicly available census data, are poorly recognised by state institutions, and potentially disadvantaged in receiving local or national government services. This may further marginalise already disenfranchised communities attempting more appropriate integration and access to publicly available resources. While the argument for special entitlements and rights for Māori, as an indigenous people, is well justified and established (Maaka & Fleras 2000, O’Sullivan 2006), public debate on

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\(^{14}\) The ability to tick more than a single box for ethnicity occurred for the first time in the 1989 New Zealand Census (Barber 2004:13).

\(^{15}\) Tribal.
establishing equitable policies for non-indigenous minorities that are discriminated against is lacking.

Moreover, tracking the incidence of discrimination within such subgroup classifications is virtually nonexistent. Quantifying the extent of discrimination in contexts such as the labour market, health care and renting is challenging and surveys tend to rely on self-reported experiences. When collected, discrimination data almost exclusively use the broadest ethnic or minority categorisations (e.g. Asians, women, homosexuals) and are rarely collected at the subgroup unit (Simon 2012). Indeed, precisely how multiethnic and subgroup communities are defined, in regards to laws and policies designed to prevent discrimination, is either elusive or ambiguous (Snipp 2003:584). Such information would be advantageous in better directing policies to specific populations or for more appropriate delivery of resources in highly plural or pluralising societies.

With increasing pluralism, it is vital for modern western democracies to deliver strong diversity governance that engenders more robust forms of social cohesion and endeavours to keep ethnic tension at bay. Resilient multicultural policies can have multiple effects and advantages: they may entice prospective migrants to help lessen employment shortages, and proactive settlement policies can help recent migrants better adjust to a new sociocultural milieu. They also lead minorities to more certain forms of belonging (e.g. permanent residency, citizenship) and to full participation in an inclusive national identity, strengthening social cohesion. Countries with weak multicultural policies may prevent or limit new migrant arrivals, may force potential migrants to search for more welcoming shores, or compel recent migrants to emigrate, increasing domestic skill shortages. More problematically, states that do little to
promote ethnocultural diversity or have weak multicultural and diversity institutions (i.e. those promoting forms of either social exclusion or the full assimilation of minority populations into host cultures) may experience increasing forms of ethnic tension and violence (Reitz & Banerjee 2007). Specific diversity and multicultural policies that encourage social inclusion and participation, and pathways toward citizenship, tend to strengthen social cohesion (Castles 1995). Unifying these disparate sets of policies into a framework for diversity governance should have positive ramifications for diminishing resources while improving social cohesion.

1.2 Research objectives

This thesis examines Indian participation in the history of Aotearoa, and considers their historic invisibility in New Zealand’s settlement discourse. It also queries and elucidates census representation(s) depicted in state statistics, and subsequently highlights significant changes to the Indian demographic through an analysis of recent census statistics and the presentation of survey data that supports the emergence of Indian identities not captured by existing state categories. Indian communities may therefore serve as examples for analysing state portrayal of minorities, which has implications for diversity governance. Throughout, I discuss the role that the conceptual framework of deep diversity may play in understanding issues of identity and invisibility through its application to the case study.

In sum, the primary research objectives of this study are:

1. to illustrate the historic and current treatment of Indians in existing scholarship through a reexamination of both historical accounts and census records related to the case study;

I define my use of the terms ‘Aotearoa’ and ‘New Zealand’ in Section 1.4.
2. to establish the importance of identity recognition of minorities by majorities, and the significance of ethnic self-identification for minorities;

3. to provide a brief demographic profile and statistical description of Indian ethnicity and self-identification based on the 2006 and 2013 Censuses, for comparison with the collected survey data;

4. to present survey data and respondent comments from the case study that demonstrate the divergence of self-identification from the census, and to indicate the extent of self-perceived discrimination;

5. to explicate a potential framework for diversity governance, known as deep diversity, which underpins the first four objectives.

The first four research objectives each provide an example in which a deep diversity framework may be applied to a minority case study, providing the rationale necessary for determining practices of diversity management or diversity governance. A critical look at historic accounts of the earliest Indian arrivals in Aotearoa may reveal different interpretations of known history relevant to Māori-European first encounter. Indeed, the possibility of the involvement of non-Māori non-European others in the exploration and settlement of Aotearoa has previously been poorly considered. Likewise, an examination of the census descriptions of early Indian settlement may also reveal previously unknown or earlier examples of structural discrimination and institutional marginalisation. In either case, notions of identity and invisibility remain central themes that I wish to explore. An examination of state-imposed categories and self-reported identity constructs may reveal a profound disconnect between how states interpret and categorise minorities and how minorities may envision themselves.

The current top-down approach is largely based on state identification and enumeration of minorities, primarily wielded through the institutional
mechanisms of a state census or other representative forms of population quantification, yet such categorisation tends to poorly describe populations.17 Existing state approaches serve to homogenise minority groups into what are perceived to be easily manageable ethnicities, while individual and group self-constructions of minority identity tend to recognise themselves as more widely heterogeneous. Such divergent approaches to identity have the possibility of complicating the delivery of state policies to particular groups.

To address the limitations of existing policy, I investigate the issues of discrimination and racism as reported by participants in a large, non-representative survey of Indians resident in New Zealand, most of whom were migrants. These are garnered from both respondent comments and survey data to determine the incidence of self-reported discrimination, despite the fact that policies designed for minority integration and migrant settlement are well-established in New Zealand society. I argue that identity issues are of primary importance to diversity governance, even where such policies are already taken seriously by both proactive government and nongovernment agencies empowered to promote minority integration, foster social justice, and promote human rights for the benefits of all members of society. The recurring and frequent incidence of discrimination and prejudice within society also raises the question of whether or not existing diversity management policies are achieving the desired effects for which they are intended. The continued existence of such phenomena, despite policies designed to counter their effects, strongly suggests that current diversity management strategies need to be reassessed.

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17 See Barber (2004).
A deep diversity framework utilises a bottom-up approach, rather than relying on top-down ‘management’ methods currently employed by state institutions empowered to ‘manage’ minorities or to improve integration outcomes. Such an approach can shift existing paternalistic models in which states work primarily to improve minority integration, to one that approaches diversity governance as a collaboration between migrant, minority and majority communities—integral in achieving a more socially cohesive and domestically secure state. Using a deep diversity framework, I unpack existing state interpretations of ethnic identity through both a deconstruction of historical sources that obfuscate minority identity and the census enumerations currently used in diversity management which tend to render ethnic subgroups invisible. Existing state-initiated diversity management is largely a reflection of historic top-down policies, what Williams (1996:74) refers to as a “managerialist notion of diversity.” It is therefore vital to reexamine state portrayal of ethnic minorities, through unearthing more inclusive histories and contextualising census classifications in order to achieve a more inclusive framework of diversity governance. Such varied approaches may shape state methods of managing multicultural populations. These objectives would therefore position the research as a critique of state-led diversity management policies.

This thesis, however, does not purport to provide solutions for vexing policy issues designed to manage increasingly diverse populations, nor does it provide a set list of specific policy recommendations for diversity governance in New Zealand. Rather, it outlines a conceptual framework within which existing sociohistoric contexts may be queried, existing policy may be examined, or new policy may be conceived, all within particular guidelines, and all in terms of the relative appropriateness of particular policy initiatives, considering the specific cultural, economic
and political circumstances within which particular policies may be framed. It does not provide a checklist of all the circumstances and nuances likely to be associated with New Zealand, or any other country for that matter. It does not evaluate existing policy in New Zealand, and does not provide a roadmap to social cohesion. While providing a global context is necessary in which to provide pertinent background information, the focus here remains fixed on New Zealand, and relevant examples are provided throughout. Its applicability in a global context is beyond the purview of this thesis. Furthermore, deep diversity is presented here as a work in progress, in its initial stages only, and is not to be considered as a complete package. Rather, in writing this thesis, it is hoped that what is presented can stimulate and encourage a wider discussion of the appropriateness of existing policy approaches, given the increasing pluralism faced by most modern western democracies today.

1.3 Contributions

This study makes three broad contributions to existing scholarship. The first is historical, utilising primary source material to extend the history of Indian presence and settlement in New Zealand. When I began preliminary research into the topic in 2006 there were few existing published source materials on the Indian diaspora in New Zealand. These included a number of scholarly articles in published journals, numerous book chapters, and a few books. Much of the remainder was difficult to obtain, such as the dozen Masters dissertations and PhD theses on themes related to Indians in New Zealand. Also, much of the existing

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20 e.g. Tiwari 1980, McLeod 1984 & 1986.

scholarship on ethnic minorities mostly focused on New Zealand’s other large ethnic minority, the Chinese population, currently New Zealand’s largest Asian population. More recently, there have been numerous publications over the course of my research, including the publication of a number of important books, book chapters, and numerous journal articles. Yet none of these consider the historical context of Indian presence at the very founding of the modern New Zealand state.

The second sets out to more appropriately describe the diversity that exists within the Indian diaspora in New Zealand. Current census data portray the diverse Indian community as largely homogenous. Census categories using publicly released state enumeration methods for non-Māori minorities (e.g. Indian) merely present a few select subgroups, while European and Māori subgroups are comprehensive and well-defined. This puts particular ethnic minorities and subgroups at a significant disadvantage. For example, publicly available census figures may sometimes enumerate those that have self-reported Level 2 ethnicities (e.g. ‘Gujarati’ or ‘Punjabi’), but lump the remainder of India’s myriad ethnic groupings into the category Indian nfd. As such, it is not currently

22 Though this may change: the 2013 Census reported 171,957 Chinese and 156,567 Indians, though the Indian population was growing at a much faster rate than the Chinese. If current trends continue, the Indian population would catch up and surpass the Chinese population by 2018.


24 See Leckie (2006, 2010); Bandyopadhyay (2006); Pio (2007b); Friesen & Kearns (2008); Ballantyne (2010); DeSouza (2010); Johnson (2010); Zodgekar (2010); Ip & Leckie (2011); Singh & Singh (2011); Watson (2011).


26 I’ve compiled a complete bibliography of published sources on the Indian diaspora in New Zealand, which can be found in Appendix J.

27 While ‘European’ and ‘Māori’ represent Level 1 classifications (i.e. the top tier ethnic categorisations) on the New Zealand Census, both are well described at further subgroup levels (e.g. at national and regional levels for all European communities, and at iwi levels for Māori), while ‘Indian,’ a Level 2 classification subsumed under ‘Asian,’ is not adequately described in publicly available census data. Statistics NZ also recognises the Treaty relationship, and the unique character of Māori statistical needs (Statistics New Zealand 2012b).

28 nfd = not further defined.
possible to gain a deeper understanding of the population, unless one is merely interested in the largest grouping Indian, itself a subgroup of the term Asian, which is most widely used in the reporting of census data. In contrast, it is relatively easy to freely download tables from Statistics New Zealand with the extraordinary range of European subgroups, birthplaces and languages. Likewise, Māori tribal affiliations are also similarly displayed and made available to the public through a wide variety of downloadable reports and spreadsheets. Like Asian, other ethnic minority terms in wide use by state institutions, such as Pacific,\textsuperscript{29} and MELAA,\textsuperscript{30} are horizontally categorised terms that obscure the subethnicities within. While Indian and Chinese are both classed as Asian, they could not be more distinct; yet majority society tends to amalgamate such populations, blurring boundaries and failing to recognise differences between populations. Such broad terms homogenise ethnicity and obscure deeper categorisations.\textsuperscript{31} The presentation of data collected through the survey will demonstrate the diversity hidden within state-constructed identities of minority communities that are not otherwise available, and hopefully show the relevance of releasing such data to end users where it is not currently available.

The third broad contribution examines the search for a more socially relevant approach to policy inquiry, one that outlines an alternative logic designed to return policy formulation, delivery, and evaluation to its normative roots. Public policy should not, as de Haven-Smith (1988:ix) notes, be thought of as a social experiment, “as some sort of projectile aimed at a ‘target’ population,” but rather one that is “better conceived as a multifaceted effort to mitigate complicated social problems, the causes of

\textsuperscript{29} referring to members of Pasifika minorities.
\textsuperscript{30} referring to those of Middle Eastern, Latin American and African extractions.
\textsuperscript{31} see Prewitt (2013) for a similar critique of the use of broad categories in the US census.
which are subject to dispute.” Deep diversity rethinks the current approach that positions minority populations as beneficiaries of policies designed for their social uplift and improved integration into mainstream society. It offers a more inclusive, practical framework designed for all constituents of multicultural societies, rather than one directed at minorities.

1.4 Definitions and notes on the text

Certain key terms and concepts used throughout are contested, and their definitions here are not so much an attempt to provide a definitive interpretation, but to briefly inform the reader of their intended meanings in this thesis. Māori words are presented in italics where they are not generally perceived to be a part of the English lexicon. This is done for the benefit of readers outside of New Zealand who may not be familiar with colloquial terms used in New Zealand English. In the first instance, these are translated in corresponding footnotes, generally sourced from Moorfield (2011). These terms are also presented using the more traditional macrons over elongated vowels, where needed, rather than resorting to the alternative system which doubled the vowel (e.g. ā for aa). I also follow the convention of non-capitalizing Māori words unless Māori usage specifically treats certain words as proper nouns, and hence capitalized. In this I again follow Moorfield’s usage, so nouns like Pākehā\(^{32}\) remain capitalised throughout, while similar words, such as tauiwi\(^{33}\) are not. Throughout, I make repeated reference to minority, indigenous, migrant and majority populations. These are defined below.

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\(^{32}\) Pākehā is a common Māori word in New Zealand English which refers predominantly to New Zealanders of European descent.

\(^{33}\) Here interpreted as the non-Māori, non-Pākehā population of New Zealand.
Minority populations: When referring to minority populations, I specifically mean those groups within society that do not belong to, or are not members of, the dominant (political) or majority (demographic) group, or those individuals or groups that are disadvantaged or marginalised in some way. Members of minority groups also share particular experiences that are commonly associated with identification as a minority. Such experiences may include, but are not limited to, bias, bigotry, chauvinism, discrimination, hatred, inequity, intolerance, partisanship, prejudice, racism, ageism, and sexism by members of a dominant group. Members of minority populations also sense a close affinity towards others within their group that share the same or similar experiences (Mossakowski 2003, Sellers et al. 2006, Yip et al. 2008).

In Multicultural citizenship Kymlicka (1995) argues that there are basically two distinct categories of minorities within modern western liberal democracies: polyethnic groups and national minorities. Polyethnic groups generally refer to minority immigrant populations that have voluntarily settled in new host countries. National minorities, according to Kymlicka (1995:11), refers to indigenous populations, or “historical communities, more or less institutionally complete, occupying a given territory or homeland, sharing a distinct language and culture.” In Kymlicka’s interpretation, national minorities in multiethnic states must be present at the founding of the modern nation, have a prior history of self-government, have a common culture and language, and must have institutions that support self-government. I will use the term minority to refer to Kymlicka’s polyethnicity, and the term indigenous to refer to what Kymlicka calls national minorities, as the latter is often used in European contexts and is not in common usage in New Zealand.
**Indigenous populations:** An indigenous population is one that originates in, is characteristic of, or occurs naturally in a particular region or country, and exists prior to the arrival of settler societies that followed or before colonisation. I follow Coates (2004) definition of *indigenous* as referring to those ethnic minorities who have been marginalized as a result of their historic territories becoming part of a formally declared state. Indigenous can variously refer to aboriginal, autochthonous, first-nation, native, and original populations within political states, or to the earliest or first known human inhabitants of a particular territory or locale. Hitchcock & Vinding (2004:8) further define indigenous populations as those that fulfill the following characteristics: 1) have arrived earlier in time in particular locales than other populations, 2) exhibit the voluntary perpetuation of their cultural distinctiveness, 3) have experience of being subjugated, marginalised and/or dispossessed in some way, and 4) self-identify as being indigenous. Following Kymlicka (1995), indigenous communities are usually considered minority populations in most western democratic states. My use of the term *indigenous* implies that all of these definitions are valid. In the New Zealand context, Māori are the indigenous population.

**Migrant populations:** Migrants are individuals who move from one location, usually their place of birth or country of origin, to settle in another place, region or country. They emigrate for a variety of reasons, but the most often cited ‘pull’ factors are improved economic opportunities, or the promise of a better lifestyle, climate or environment; while loss of land, poverty, war, and religious or political discrimination or persecution are the most often-cited ‘push’ factors that encourage individuals and communities to emigrate (Lee 1966, Schoorl et al. 2000).

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The term *migrant* can refer to both voluntary or involuntary migrants. Voluntary migrants are those that chose to move of their own volition, while involuntary migrants may refer to refugee populations, typically displaced by war, poverty, or religious or political persecution. *Migrant* can also refer to either domestic migrants (those that change location domestically within the borders of any particular state), or to international migrants (those that leave the country of their birth to reside in a country other than their place of birth). Migrants can be either temporary or permanent, choosing either to live in their new location for a short time before moving on again, or to settle permanently in their new location. I use the term *migrant* to refer to international migrant individuals and communities that have left their countries of birth to immigrate to New Zealand, either temporarily or permanently.

**Majority populations:** *Majority* refers to the members of the dominant group within any particular society that constitute a number that is greater than half of the whole. When referring to populations, a *majority* generally refers to the larger or dominant group of people that exist within a community, society, or nation that share the particular attributes, characteristics, customs, features, mannerism, qualities, and traits that make them the most prevalent group within the population. Majority populations generally possess a larger share of influence and power in the sociocultural, economic, political, and legal spheres, and exert control over the delivery of state resources, including health and educational services.

In the New Zealand context, *majority* most often refers to the European population that has been the majority ethnicity since the second complete Census\textsuperscript{35} was undertaken in 1858, which recorded 59,413 Europeans and

\textsuperscript{35} The first complete NZ Census took place in 1851, when Māori were still the majority population.
56,049 Māori present, at 51.5% and 48.5% of the population respectively.\textsuperscript{36} The European majority reached its zenith in the 1916 Census, when it made up 95.1% of the total New Zealand population.\textsuperscript{37} Based on my analysis of census records, in terms of the total population, the percentage of Europeans have been in decline since 1916. The 2013 Census currently records a European population comprising 75.3\%\textsuperscript{38} of the total population.

In some places throughout the text I also refer to \textit{host communities}. In such instances, \textit{host community} refers to the majority population that receives and helps support new migrant communities. It should not be confused with the term \textit{tangata whenua} (people of the land), which refers to Māori as indigenous and belonging to Aotearoa, and implies ‘hosting’ and ‘having guardianship responsibilities’ for non-Māori peoples in Aotearoa.\textsuperscript{39}

\textit{Other key terms}

\textbf{Diversity}: Diversity is defined as the state or quality of being different or distinct—that which embodies a noticeable heterogeneity. Following Boston & Callister’s (2005:35) usage, \textit{diversity} will be used both descriptively and prescriptively “as a term to depict or explain particular empirical phenomena and as a principle or criterion to guide action and policy.” Descriptively, \textit{diversity} is used to refer to particular defined categories or types of difference, such as cultural or ethnic diversity, or to denote divisions in a wide variety of contexts and disciplines in both the natural and social sciences. In the social sciences, diversity traverses multiple settings, as in business (e.g. workplace diversity, diversity

\textsuperscript{36} Statistics presented here are derived from the 1858 New Zealand Census.

\textsuperscript{37} Statistics presented here are derived from the 1916 New Zealand Census.

\textsuperscript{38} This consists of the census usually resident population count that stated an ethnicity, and does not include the 65,973 people (or 1.6% of the total stated population) who self-identified their ethnicity as New Zealander.

\textsuperscript{39} see (Moorfield 2011).
training), or law (e.g. diversity jurisdictions). When applied to cultural diversity, it refers to the wide variety of ethnocultural groups within any given area. Neighbourhoods, particular locales, towns, cities, regions and nation-states can all be referred to as being culturally or ethnically diverse, provided they meet the requirements of having multiple ethnocultural groupings; the same is true for organisations, businesses and sundry institutions. Cultural diversity is most often used interchangeably with plural/pluralism and multicultural/multiculturalism to describe a condition or sociopolitical state in which many cultures coexist and are able to maintain their cultural distinctiveness.

Williams’ distinction between the terms diversity, difference and division, which are not fixed categories, is relevant here.

The emphasis is not so much on the difference between subjects but upon understanding how those differences are constructed and how the categories are themselves constituted through difference. Identities are not, in this way, seen as fixed, but ambiguous, fluid and unstable, changing with the shifting power relations of time and place (Williams 1996:64).

Her take on these terms aligns well with the framework I employ—in which existing categories in use by state mechanisms are less crucial than the ways in which individuals and groups choose to self-identify. Williams describes diversity as a shared collective experience, which does not necessarily imply relations of subordination in regards to, for example, ethnicity, nationality, or religious affiliation. It is division which implies relations of subordination, not diversity itself, while difference is the condition or situation where diversity becomes the basis for resistance against subordination. Deep diversity, in an aspirational sense, would envision majority-minority distinctions less relevant in fully pluralised societies. Thus diversity is used in a positive sense to refer to the state or condition of being socially or culturally diverse. Prescriptively, diversity, as in diversity policy, is used to refer to a set of policy goals or guidelines put
into effect and used in the governance of multicultural populations in plural or pluralising societies.

Multiculturalism: The term *multiculturalism*, over the years, has had a number of varying definitions associated with it. These range from the very general: “a body of beliefs and practices in terms of which a group of people understand themselves and the world and organize their individual and collectives lives” (Parekh 2000a:2-3), to the more specific “multiculturalism is a system of beliefs and behaviors that recognizes and respects the presence of all diverse groups in an organization or society, acknowledges and values their sociocultural differences, and encourages and enables their continued contribution within an inclusive cultural context which empowers all within the organization or society” (Rosado 1997:2).

Ideologically, multiculturalism seeks to treat individual or group members of a minority culture as having the same rights afforded to members of the majority society. It implies that all minority communities in mainstream host societies should be granted equal rights in all spheres, without being expected to give up the sociocultural, linguistic, and religious elements that characterise their distinct cultures and set them apart from dominant society. Amongst governments that espouse a policy of multiculturalism, there is the expectation of conformity to certain key values held by the dominant society (Castles & Miller 2009). A certain amount of integration into the host society is therefore both encouraged and expected, and is a key component of modern multiculturalist policies in liberal democratic states that proactively ‘manage’ diversity. As a central theme of this thesis, my use of the term *multicultural policies* can best be explicated using Kymlicka’s definition as “an umbrella term to cover a wide range of policies designed to provide some level of public recognition, support or
accommodation to non-dominant ethnocultural groups, whether those
groups are ‘new’ minorities (e.g. immigrant and refugees) or ‘old’
minorities (e.g. historically settled national minorities and indigenous
peoples)” (Kymlicka 2007:16). This definition aptly fits the New Zealand
context.

**Aotearoa** and **New Zealand**: These terms both refer to the country now
known as Aotearoa New Zealand. Aotearoa, being the original Māori
name, means ‘Land of the long white cloud.’ In general, I often use
‘Aotearoa’ to refer to the country prior to 1840 and the signing of the
Treaty of Waitangi, and ‘New Zealand’ when referring to the modern
state.

1.5 Conclusion

Deep diversity explores issues of identity and the blurring of
subminorities that often render them invisible. This approach allows
examination of the problems of discrimination, tolerance and social
inclusion, which are arguably amongst the most important challenges
facing pluralist states today. As global mobility intensifies, populations
diversify. This has important ramifications for both plural and pluralising
nations that increasingly grapple with discrimination, prejudice, ethnic
tension, racism and violence, while simultaneously struggling to improve
health, education, employment, and immigration and settlement policies
that foster improved social cohesion. Maintaining an appropriate balance
amongst such competing pressures is a considerable challenge for any
nation, and successful public policies of inclusion are indeed potent
measures of a country’s social cohesion and domestic security.
Despite the significance of these issues, existing diversity management policies appear fragmented and systematically directed at what are perceived to be distinct policy arenas. Immigration policy is often limited by its narrow focus on employable skills and the number of migrants permitted entry to offset rising emigration. Settlement policies are usually only concerned with strategies that acculturate, assimilate or integrate migrant populations into majorities, yet raising majority awareness of minorities is often ignored. Such shallow policies most often target minority social uplift at the expenses of majority education. Current diversity management strategies thus appear issues-driven, emphasising the differences that separate rather than the similarities that bind. This thesis, therefore, offers an alternative framework for considering more appropriate forms of diversity governance for states with large minority populations, rather than existing forms of diversity management and the policies they engender.

This thesis is divided into three main parts, constituting the introduction, the findings and analysis, and the conclusion. Part I: Introduction, which includes Chapters One through Four, establishes the main focus of the thesis, outlines its research agenda, presents the theoretical framework, and contextualises the topic, all of which provide the necessary background for the presentation of the findings and analysis that follow. Chapter One provides an overview of the thesis and its research objectives, and sets the stage for the ensuing discussion. Chapter Two critically examines multiculturalism and the theoretical foundations of deep diversity, and describes a conceptual framework for diversity governance. Chapter Three outlines the various qualitative and quantitative methods undertaken in this study. Chapter Four discusses the New Zealand context in which the case study is situated.
Part II: Findings and Analysis, consists of Chapters Five through Eight, and contains the substantive chapters that present the research and directly address the research objectives. Chapter Five examines the invisible history of a minority population and emphasises the importance of accurate historical representation in establishing a distinct ethnic identity that can be situated within the larger national ethos. In so doing, it reframes the history of *tauiwi* in Aotearoa. The data presented in Chapter Five examine the historic treatment of non-Māori minorities by demonstrating that Aotearoan history has been written predominantly through the eyes of Māori and European historians, ignoring alternative contributions. The extent of Indian involvement in the exploration and colonisation of New Zealand’s history has not been previously addressed.

Chapter Six examines the minority history told through the state instrument of the New Zealand Census and the move from early Indian presence, discussed in Chapter Five, to that of Indian settlement, as sojourners settle, and initial instances of Indian appearance in the census record begins. It reveals the extent to which European control of census enumeration obscured the presence of the very earliest ‘settled’ Indians. The presentation of this material helps establish that past state treatment of ethnic minorities tends to render non-Māori minority and their subgroups invisible. Such an exegesis further demonstrates the invisibility of minority ethnic and religious populations in New Zealand and the power that states wield through such an instrument.

The demographic profile of the Indian population in New Zealand is provided in Chapter Seven, which presents recent Census results and discusses the statistical composition of the Indian population based on

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40 This lack of non-Māori minority history is only now just beginning to be addressed (see Ip 2003, 2009; Johnson & Moloughney 2006; Bandyopadhyay 2010; Voci & Leckie 2011), but even these volumes deal with recent history only and do not delve back far enough into the historical record.
both publicly available and requested data.\textsuperscript{41} Due to the February and June 2011 Christchurch earthquakes, the 2011 Census was unfortunately delayed until 2013, so this chapter is based largely on the 2006 data. The public release of ethnicity data from the 2013 Census took place in May and August 2014, so the most recent statistics were introduced while editing this thesis prior to submission. Chapter Seven explores the statistical results of those choosing to self-identify as “Indian” from both the 2006 and 2013 New Zealand Census, and critiques the state reportage of identity that emerges from existing categories of ethnicity, birthplace, linguistic and religious affiliation. Such an examination exposes the disparity between the current use of ethnicity as a classificatory tool in the census and the myriad ways in which minorities choose to identify.

Another research objective is tackled in Chapter Eight which presents selected results from my survey, portraying the importance of self-identification and the degree of self-reported discrimination experienced by survey respondents. It presents findings and analysis from the survey data that demonstrate the depth of self-reported identity not evident in the 2006/2013 Census and portray the continued discrimination experienced by Indian minorities, as evidenced through respondent comments on employment, engagement with majority society, self-reported racism and perceptions of personal safety.

Addressing any apparent disparities between the divergent foci of each Chapter in Part II is crucial in acknowledging the overarching themes of the thesis. In particular, the earliest minority history explored in Chapter Five, the historical treatment of minorities in the census scrutinised in Chapter Six, the demographic description of the current Indian population

\textsuperscript{41} The data from the 2006 Census was requested in 2012 under the auspices of an academic grant made by Statistics New Zealand.
in Chapter Seven, and the statistical examination of select survey results in Chapter Eight, upon initial reading may appear disconnected, and this warrants an explanation here. I address this linkage through an analysis informed throughout by the framework of deep diversity, which serves as the unifying thread that binds these contrasting chapters together. Throughout Part II, I analyse the twin themes of identity and invisibility, which provide the coherence necessary to relate the disparate elements evident in these substantive chapters. In Chapter Eight, discrimination, a dénouement of minority invisibility and the state’s homogenising of identity, becomes a critical analytical variable, highlighting the need for policy modification. As this thesis is multidisciplinary, the substantive chapters focus on anthropological, historical, demographic and statistical inquiry and analysis. This multidisciplinarity, which may appear to be disconnected, has fundamental components that contribute to the explication of deep diversity, explored throughout, and elucidated through the themes of identity and invisibility.

Part III concludes with a brief discussion of the policy implications of diversity in the New Zealand context, reflections on the value and significance of the framework of deep diversity and the analysis it facilitated, and ends with specific recommendations for future research.
CHAPTER TWO:

TOWARDS A FRAMEWORK OF DEEP DIVERSITY

Multiculturalism is not about minorities, for that implies that the majority culture is uncritically accepted and used to judge the claims and define the rights of minorities. Multiculturalism is about the proper terms of relationship between different cultural communities. The norms governing their respective claims, including the principles of justice, cannot be derived from one culture alone but through an open and equal dialogue between them (Parekh 2000a:13).

When we sit back and reflect on what people have said and written, we often discover better, deeper and more humane interpretations (Gee 2005:xi).

2.1 Introduction

For those in most liberal western democratic states today, living in a multicultural society has become an acknowledged and accepted element of everyday existence. Yet issues of race and ethnicity remain significant, and when they occur, they attract controversy. For example, this is being written against the backdrop of a recurring debate in New Zealand concerning immigration policy and the role that migrants play in society. A recent incident, concerning a racist Pākehā rant against a Pakistani taxi driver in Invercargill, highlights this debate. While the Pakistani driver remained calm and polite throughout the verbal onslaught, repeatedly informing his passenger that he was being recorded on video, the passenger describes the driver as an “Islam prick” and repeatedly tells the driver to “f*** off back to where you come from” (Powley 2013, Jones & Fuatai 2013). These types of incidents are common, and highlight the notion that, for majorities at least, diversity is often best understood in terms of general categories that are convenient and mutually comprehensible. Labels like Asian, European, Māori, and Polynesian, or black, white and brown, are most commonly used and understood. Yet such

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42 Statistics New Zealand (2012) reports that one in ten people aged 15 or over reported experiencing some form of discrimination in New Zealand within the previous year.
terms only serve to obscure the more relevant honorifics with which members of minority communities may choose to identify. Should we choose to look, we would encounter ever more subtle forms of diversity not worn on our sleeves.

Along with Asian cab drivers and white racists, governments and institutions are equally culpable of homogenising diversity. States, empowered by legislation, regularly enumerate their populations through a census or similar instrument, and in so doing categorise citizens and residents according to fixed lists of ethnicities and subgroups. Referring to British censuses conducted in India, Chakrabarty (1998:98) argued that “counting Hindus, Muslims, Sikhs and Untouchables became a political exercise,” which had the effect of simplifying and homogenising identities, even though people lived their lives in far more heterogeneous ways. The collection of such ethnicity data for the purposes of enumeration and the allocation of state resources has, generally, proved exceptionally problematic, and appears to have done more to increase awareness of the dilemmas inherent in such classification schemes than to resolve either the theoretical or practical issues (Cooper 1994, McKenney & Bennett 1994, del Pinal 2003, Barber 2004, Phillips 2007).

Official statistics do not merely hold a mirror to reality. They reflect presuppositions and theories about the nature of society. They are products of social, political, and economic interests that are often in conflict with each other. They are sensitive to methodological decisions made by complex organizations with limited resources (Alonso & Starr 1987:1).

Such complexities underscore the importance of the continual reevaluation of current enumeration methods for the reporting of ethnicity. They embody critical arguments both against officially sanctioned forms of diversity and for broader interpretation of diversity. It

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43 Morning (2008) reported that 63% of the national censuses of the 141 countries she reviewed incorporated some form of ethnic categorisation and enumeration, with their question formats varied by diverse conceptualisations of ethnicity (e.g. as ‘race’ or ‘nationality’).
seems that a new, or more nuanced, vocabulary is necessary to keep pace with rapidly altering demographies.

While states and majorities may value the status quo, minorities need to rethink existing power structures that may marginalise, alienate, and homogenise, even though they may reap some benefit from existing enumeration and apportionment procedures. These may not be enough. Kertzer & Arel (2002:2) claim that censuses do much more than simply reflect social reality, they play a crucial role in the construction of that reality. Creating group boundaries, however artificial, only reinforces and validates existing accepted hierarchies. Ethnic classifications are often superficial and camouflage deeper forms of self identification that carry significant implications for public policy. To complicate matters, many existing state policies only allow for the collection of a single ethnicity per resident (Morning 2008), as in particular health and education policies designed for ethnic minorities (Leather 2009). As national censuses are often seen as an arena in which ethnic minorities struggle for official recognition and equality (Kukutai & Didham 2012), such policies tend to subvert minority aspirations and the multiple identities with which individuals may choose to identify. Thus states wield power over ethnic minorities, an authority that is largely concentrated within state-supported institutions, and buttressed by policies and legislation too firmly established and structurally entrenched to easily adapt to rapid demographic change. This places already disenfranchised minorities at further risk of marginalisation, especially in the allocation of scarce government resources. While such a view may appear to situate minorities as passive agents and as victims of hegemonic state policy, it should be acknowledged that they possess considerable agency and capacity to resist and challenge dominant paradigms. Such ability is evident in increasing presence in the public sphere, petitions for cultural
or religious accommodation, and in increasing political representation (Park 2010).

As governments in multicultural democracies are increasingly being challenged to justify their collection of ethnic and racial data and the targeted policies they support (Hirschman 1987, Kukutai 2004, King-O’Riain 2007), minority populations recognise that their voices for greater inclusion are beginning to be heard by previously unresponsive governments (Jackson & McRobie 1998, Banducci et al. 2004, Narayan 2005, Park 2010). In many multicultural societies, the statistics gathered by various state instruments of enumeration now show sufficient diversity to be utilised for some minority advantage, as in the health and education sectors where modest gains have been made but much progress remains (Fleras 1989, Durie 1998, 2005; DeSouza 2006, 2009; Bishop et al. 2009). As a result of changing demographics, states need to be held accountable to more appropriate standards for identifying self-reported ethnicities, and to properly enumerate these.

The substantive chapters presented here demonstrate that ethnicity and identity cannot be easily categorised into the generic terms in use today. A more subtle approach to diversity and its governance is necessary; one that more adequately recognises that a deeper heterogeneity exists than that currently defined. The concept of deep diversity presented in this chapter articulates, first, a conceptual framework that facilitates new ways of interrogating historical data and assessing the suitability of existing approaches to diversity management. It demonstrates that existing histories and state enumeration methods aid in the perpetuation of structural and institutional discrimination—that such barriers must fall in order for the particular social, economic, health and education indicators that separate minority from majority to progress.
Second, deep diversity may also be useful in guiding policymakers in the
design and implementation of public policies that manage the
transformed demographies evident in western democracies today. As a
novel conceptual framework, it is hoped that some of the ideas articulated
in this initial formulation of deep diversity will help advance the ways
that policy is currently contextualised and actualised. Further, the use of
deep diversity as an evaluative public policy tool needs further
explication, which remains beyond the purview of this thesis. Existing
ways of theorising, designing and implementing policies for diversity
management no longer keep pace with the ethnic, religious and linguistic
changes occurring today. Such policies, therefore, must better adapt to the
realities of a briskly changing environment.

This chapter begins with a brief review of the literature of
multiculturalism, the context in which it is situated, and a discussion of its
relevant criticisms, all of which provide a necessary context for
introducing the concept of deep diversity. Next, the historical and
theoretical foundations of deep diversity are introduced, followed by a
framework for diversity governance that examines both shallow and deep
forms of multicultural engagement. Contextualising “oppositional
categories” (Williams 1996:63) in this way allows for an examination of
historical and present state treatment of minorities in order to help
identify the suitability of both current and future approaches to diversity.
The purpose of such a framework is not to examine existing legislation
and policy, but rather to analyse past and present methods in order to
provide a more contemporary conceptual framework for guiding
legislators and policymakers in New Zealand to create and implement
more appropriate governance strategies within a context of increasing
demographic plurality. Finally, the chapter ends with a concise definition
of deep diversity that draws on the elements discussed throughout the chapter.

2.2 The multicultural context: a brief review of the literature

John Rex, in his pioneering work on ethnic relations, laid out an early definition of multiculturalism in four parts, as being a society which “(a) is unitary in the public domain but which encourages diversity in what are thought of as private or communal matters; (b) is unitary in the public domain and which also enforces or at least encourages unity of cultural practice in private or communal matters; (c) allows diversity and differential rights for groups in the public domain and also encourages or insists upon diversity of cultural practice of different groups; (d) has diversity and differential rights in the public domain even though there is considerable unity of cultural practice between groups” (Rex 1985:4).

While Rex’s definition draws upon some of the early uses of multiculturalism as a term, it lacks an important element espoused by Castles & Miller (2009), that diversity gains meaning through communal ascription to key values held by the host society. Such practices might be through the shared experiences of migrant communities (e.g. migration to the host country, common settlement narratives, similar experiences in finding suitable employment, new educational experiences, political participation in the host country, gaining citizenship), or other minority populations (e.g. shared struggles for equal economic opportunities, improved political and social participation in society, better health and education outcomes). Elements common to all minority communities help

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44 Indeed, early Indian emigrants shared a special relationship with others aboard the boat leaving India. Known as जहाजी भाई (jahāzi bhāis) or ‘ship brothers,’ the term still retains meaning for those traveling together or undertaking similar pursuits. It implies camaraderie and companionship in communal endeavours. Kolff (2013:29) notes that its usage indicated an awareness that the old ritual distinctions evident in India were beginning to fade while simultaneously marking the emergence of a new shared group identity. See also Ghosh’s (2009, 2012, 2015) characterisations in his Ibis trilogy.
create a sense of sharing a common national identity with the host community, such as the sharing of events and experiences with majority communities (e.g. belief in a national identity or ethic; shared participation in national celebrations, elections, sporting events; shared conviction in key national values, principles or ideologies; trust in political institutions; profound belief in a founding document or constitution). Ascription to such norms can often aid the settlement, adaptation and integration of new migrants (Grant 2007, Ager & Strang 2008, Dhingra 2008, Doerschler & Jackson 2012) and can also enhance the wellbeing of minority communities in host societies (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al. 2006, Fischer & Boer 2011, Ward & Stuart 2012). For migrants, this also fosters a certain sense of pride of one’s new participation in national identity, and this is especially valid as one moves towards a greater sense of belonging to one’s adopted homeland and potential citizenship. For minority communities, a greater sense of belonging can foster increased participation in all levels of society (de Wit & Koopmans 2005, Parekh 2006).

Like Rex, Bauböck (1996:204-205) formulated a set of four definitions for multiculturalism: (a) a descriptive term for the existence of various culturally distinct groups within a society, (b) an explanatory concept that refers to the diversity of cultural groups, (c) a source of conflict and social disintegration, rather than an effect, and (d) a normative idea that refers to the positive value of a plurality of cultures within society. Kobayashi (1993) attempts to define multiculturalism in terms of a nation-state’s sociopolitical and legislative agenda—that multiculturalism can be exemplified as a demographic, institutional or structural phenomenon; demographic in that it describes a country’s ethnocultural and demographic diversity, institutional in that governments officially recognise and promote multiculturalism through official state policies, or
as structural in that multiculturalism is regulated by institutional policy and legal reform, which provides a basis for social change. Kymlicka (1995) distills multiculturalism as that which recognises the ethnocultural identities and differences of its residents.

There is an additional body of literature that defines multiculturalism in terms of its policy initiatives; policies that “endorse the right of different cultural or ethnic groups to remain distinct rather than promoting assimilation into a society’s cultural mainstream” (Jackson 2009). From this literature it is evident that there is no fixed definition or doctrine of multiculturalism. The concept is variously interpreted by different countries according to their sociopolitical and historical contexts and is approached using a wide variety of strategies:

Each country has a different definition of multiculturalism, different sets of public policies to deal with/respond to cultural difference, and correspondingly different definitions… (Sandercock 2011:50).

In practice, it has been formulated as official policy in several Western countries since the 1970s.45 Parekh (2000) discusses how the early 1970s marked the emergence of the multicultural movement in Canada and Australia, followed by the USA, UK, and other European nations. In the late 1960s Canada began to characterise the particular policies it was considering for a new mode of immigrant incorporation—those intended to promote tolerance and respect for cultural diversity—as multiculturalism (Kivisto & Faist 2010:161, Ley 2010). In 1971, Canada became the first country to adopt multiculturalism as an official state policy, thus affirming its commitment to the value and equality of all its citizens regardless of race, ethnicity, language or religious affiliation (Moodley 1983, Inglis 1996, Frideres 1997, Kymlicka 2003, Dewing 2009,

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Citizenship & Immigration Canada 2012). Australia followed suit by developing a similar multicultural policy, and the full introduction of official state policies were formalised in 1972 (Zubrzycki 1977, Foster & Stockley 1988, Castles 1992, Inglis 1996, McAllister 1997). Its multicultural policy remained intact despite opposition espoused during the Howard government with the release of the 1988 “One Australia Policy” (Maddox 2005), and later opposition in the mid-1990s from MP Pauline Hanson and her One Nation party (Ley 2010).

Other immigrant- and minority-friendly countries also introduced multicultural policies of varying degrees. In the UK, the fact that Britain is an immigrant nation with a multicultural society had been widely accepted (Singh 2003, Solomos 2003, Hadjetian 2008), prompting Tony Blair’s Labour government to introduce formal state multicultural policies (Blair 2006, Sommerville 2007, Shi 2008). Swedish multicultural policies, unlike Australia, Canada and the UK, were not based on a national identity of a nation of immigrants. Rather, large numbers of migrant populations from Finland, Yugoslavia, and substantial numbers from Africa, Asia and other non-European regions introduced new sources of cultural diversity into the Swedish population. This prompted the government to replace its earlier policy of assimilation with formal multiculturalist policies in 1975 (Skutnabb-Kangas 1983, Hammar 1985, Inglis 1996, Westin 1996).

In the Netherlands, an official national policy of multiculturalism was adopted in the early 1980s (Penninx 1996, Scheffer 2011), but these policies were later overturned due to rising opposition. Politician Pim Fortuyn, who rose to power on an anti-immigration platform, led the charge but was later assassinated in 2002 for his radical views. His anti-immigrant stance, along with fellow citizen and film director Theo van Gogh, also
murdered in 2004 (Anthony 2004), fomented debates on immigration and the role of multiculturalism in the Netherlands, which resulted in the open rejection of multiculturalism and the introduction of new policies aimed at assimilation. The Netherlands has now attracted international attention for the extent to which it reversed its previous multiculturalist policies, and its policies on cultural assimilation and integration have been described as some of the toughest in Europe (Entzinger 2003, Dutch Ministry of Justice 2004, Cohen 2005, The Economist 2006, Prins & Saharso 2010, Scheffer 2011). France also has adopted formal assimilationist policies that eschew multiculturalism and thus refuses to engage in ethnic enumeration (Simon & Pala 2010, Simon 2012, Léonard 2014). Other countries in the European Union (e.g. Germany, Denmark, Switzerland) have opted for less formal approaches and have enacted policies aimed, to varying degrees, at social cohesion and integration (Schönwälder 2010, Vertovec & Wessendorf 2010).

In the USA, there are currently no official multicultural policies at the national level, although there are formalised programmes over a wide variety of institutions (e.g. educational, state policies, commerce) that support and institutionalise diversity in both the education and business sectors (Naylor 1997, Takaki 2008, Nieto & Bode 2011). In Asia, numerous countries consider themselves multicultural, including India, Indonesia, Malaysia, the Philippines and Singapore, but none of these have instituted formal multicultural policies, although India has a constitution which formally enshrines rights and protections for minorities and particular groups. As in the US, these policies tend to focus on managing diverse populations in the educational, economic and development sectors. India is arguably the most diverse country in the world, with its cultural, linguistic, religious and ethnic diversity unparalleled amongst nations (Hardgrave & Kochanek 1986, Jalali 1997, Fearon 2003, Panda & Gupta 42).
2004). India’s diversity policies are most usually operationalised in public institutions, and in the political and policy solutions devised to address its cultural, linguistic, religious and ethnic inequalities. These have focused predominantly on affirmative action or preferential treatment of its lower castes and minority populations (Jalali 1997, Jayal 2006). All of these countries, to varying degrees, have established strategies and mechanisms for managing the increasing ethnic diversity found within their borders.

This variety of state responses to increasing pluralism is often determined and influenced by the particular historical, economic and political processes that have led to its increased diversity. By now, many of these policies have been in operation for decades and their outcomes and ramifications are well-documented. While some approaches demonstrate substantive positive outcomes for minority populations that are commonly recognised and similarly deployed in many western liberal democracies, other approaches have not been quite as effective.

2.3 Situating New Zealand: contextualising identity and discrimination

While the above discussion provided a necessary context, the following serves to situate New Zealand with reference to a global multiculturalism, presenting recent select incidents that raise questions about the management of diverse populations (with particular focus on the importance of identity and discrimination to the diversity discourse), and the variety of multicultural responses and diversity policies in effect today. As a point of departure, some nations that favour formal multicultural policies are asking pertinent questions of their intrinsic

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46 Although recent evidence, based on combining data on ethnicity and race with a measure based on the similarity of languages spoken by major ethnic or racial groups, puts African countries such as Chad and Togo as being amongst the most culturally diverse (Gören 2013).
worth. Such enquiries have prompted Kymlicka, a prominent Canadian proponent of such policies, to raise a critical question for policy practitioners today: “We now have close to forty years experience with various forms of liberal multiculturalism. Are they working well? Are they a ‘success’ that warrants their global diffusion?” (Kymlicka 2007:135). To address this question, this section examines some recent global events and specific New Zealand incidents that highlight the significance of identity and discrimination in managing plural societies.

To begin, some centre-right governments in several European countries—most notably in Denmark and the Netherlands—have recently reversed official national multicultural policies to return to those of assimilation and integration (Vasta 2007; Hedetoft 2010; Prins & Saharso 2010; Vertovec & Wessendorf 2010; Vincour 2010a, 2010b). Amid rising anxieties over international and domestic terrorism, similar events in a post-7/7 Britain have given way to an increasing debate over the role of immigration, the participation of ethnic minorities, and the appropriateness of multiculturalism as the model form of diversity management policy in the UK (Modood 2005; Grillo 2007, 2010). In Canada, critics of multiculturalism have recently “flocked to the new Reform Party which explicitly called for immigration restriction and a curtailment of multiculturalism” (Peskin & Wehrle 2012:262). The 2012 rise of the xenophobic right-wing extremist Golden Dawn party in Greece called for similar measures (Tsatsanis 2011, Behrakis & Babington 2012, Xenakis 2012:440). The 2011 Norway massacre of 77 people by Anders Breivik, protesting parties supporting multicultural policy, has also sparked similar debates, causing popular shifts towards anti-immigrant views (Jupp 2011). Indeed, this pattern is being repeated throughout western liberal democratic states (Cohen 2005, Kymlicka 2010a, Vertovec & Wessendorf 2010, Lesinška 2014). In recent years, increasing globalisation,
migration, domestic and international terrorism, and rising ethnic tensions have led several heads-of-state to publicly express uncertainty about their own multicultural policies: British Prime Minister David Cameron, German Chancellor Angela Merkel, Australia’s ex-prime minister John Howard, Spanish ex-president Jose Maria Aznar and former French President Nicolas Sarkozy have all voiced concerns about the effectiveness of their multicultural or immigration policies (Dempsey 2010a, 2010b; Vincour 2010a, 2010b; Zapata-Barrero 2010; Falloon 2011; Peskin & Wehrle 2012:262).

While other multiethnic states, like Canada, Australia and Sweden, continue to actively pursue multiculturalism as formal state policy, others, such as Germany, have not attempted to better integrate their national minorities and have remained quite ambivalent about multiculturalism. In 2010, German Prime Minister Angela Merkel commented that “this multicultural approach, saying that we simply live side by side and live happily with each other, has failed. Utterly failed” (Dempsey 2010a-c, Eddy 2010). While Germany’s attempt to integrate its national minorities cannot be regarded as on par with formal multicultural states like Australia and Canada, its admission is nonetheless revealing. Germany is not a settler society like the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand. Yet, like most modern nations with diverse populations, the absence of strong public policies designed to foster social cohesion is palpable. German attempts at integrating minority and majority populations have been half-hearted at best, as Germany had always expected its immigrant populations to return home.\(^48\) In reality, most nation-states do the minimum or almost nothing to encourage integration, and there is often

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\(^{47}\) All leaders of conservative parties.

\(^{48}\) German citizenship is based primarily upon the concept of *jus sanguinis*, by which citizenship is not determined by one’s country of birth, but rather by having one or both parents who are citizens of the state. January 2000 reforms, however, have made it somewhat easier for resident foreigners in Germany on a long-term basis to procure citizenship (Green 2000).
an unwritten expectation that their diverse peoples should simply co-exist
the best they can in the absence of formal public policies designed to
foster a more appropriate social amalgamation of their cultural and ethnic
minorities.

In New Zealand, high-profile public outbursts of racism by prominent
television personalities have also fueled the ongoing debate on identity
and discrimination. Certain incidents made headlines around the world,
prompting intervention by New Zealand’s Broadcasting Standards
Authority and the Human Rights Commission. In September 2003,
Television New Zealand (TVNZ) broadcaster, the late Paul Holmes,
referred to then United Nations Secretary-General Kofi Annan as a
“cheeky darkie” (Dye 2003). During an October 2010 broadcast, TVNZ’s
morning ‘Breakfast’ show co-host Paul Henry, while interviewing Prime
Minister John Key about then Governor-General Sir Anand Satyanand49,
asked if he would consider choosing “a New Zealander who looks and
sounds like a New Zealander” when his term finished in mid-2011
(Neville & Harper 2010). While Henry considers himself to be a “real New
Zealander,” Satyanand could never be one according to Henry, despite
Satyanand’s being born and raised in Auckland. In a single statement,
Henry affirmed the identity of European New Zealanders as constituting
the nation, while subjugating minority populations based solely on
physical features. Henry’s remark was squarely directed at all Indian New
Zealanders, suggesting that they cannot possibly be considered ‘New
Zealanders’ due to the colour of their skin.

Later the same week, Paul Henry, while discussing the 2010
Commonwealth Games in New Delhi, deliberately mispronounced the

49 Satyanand was born in New Zealand and is of Indo-Fijian descent.
name of Delhi’s Chief Minister, Ms. Sheila Dikshit with relentless “rollicking laughter” (Nash 2010). In the span of just a few days, Henry both raised the question of national identity and publicly ridiculed an individual on the basis of ethnicity. In both, he attempted to get European New Zealanders to laugh with him, while humiliating minorities. Paul Henry later gave a formal apology to the Governor-General, but the ‘Dikshit affair’ sparked an international diplomatic incident involving the New Zealand High Commissioner to India, Rupert Holborow, who was summoned to the Indian Foreign Ministry for a formal protest (Adams 2010, Ihaka 2010). Ironically, although Henry later resigned from his breakfast show at TVNZ, the incidents generated substantial publicity for Henry, increasing his prestige amongst the sizable population of New Zealanders with whom his remarks resonate.

The institutional responses to these high-profile incidents varied. Paul Holmes’ “cheeky darkie” comment ended with an apology and reprimand, but the Broadcasting Standards Authority refused to uphold the complaints made over the comment (Walsh 2003). The response to the Paul Henry incidents, however, were widely condemned. TVNZ at first defended Henry’s remarks, observing that he often said what many New Zealanders thought, but were afraid to speak out loud (Rudman 2010). The complaints about Henry’s comments were later upheld by the Broadcasting Standards Authority (Donnell 2010), citing breaches of the three separate standards of: good taste and decency (Standard 1), fairness

50 Ms. Dikshit is a career politician for the Indian National Congress and former member of the Indian Parliament. She was the elected Chief Minister of Delhi (1998-2013) by virtue of being the leader of the largest party in the Delhi Legislative Assembly. As Chief Minister of Delhi she stepped into the role of overseeing the Commonwealth Games in Delhi in 2010. She was recently sworn-in as the new Kerala Governor on 11 March 2014. She earlier represented India for the United Nations Commission on the Status of Women (1984–1989), and she and her colleagues were jailed in August 1990 for 23 days by the state government of Uttar Pradesh when she led a movement against the atrocities being committed against women. She has also served as the Minister of State for Parliamentary Affairs (Press Trust of India 2003, Government of Delhi 2013).

51 Paul Henry, after a brief hiatus on Australian television, is now back on air in New Zealand with a popular weekday night news magazine show on TV3.
(Standard 6), and discrimination and denigration (Standard 7), forcing TVNZ to backtrack on its original comments. TVNZ was also widely castigated for its initial public support of Henry, and for its cynical use of racist comments to boost publicity, viewership and profits (Drinnan 2010, Rudman 2010).

Capping a highly charged month of debate on identity and discrimination in October 2010, came the news that a “blonde, blue-eyed beauty queen” named Jacinta Lal, with a Fijian-Indian New Zealander father and a European New Zealander mother, was crowned winner of the Miss India-New Zealand Central beauty pageant, and was subsequently booed by some members of the Indian audience for “not being Indian enough” (Misa 2010, Vass 2010). In questioning her ethnicity based on physical features, Indian audience members mirrored the Henry/Satyanand affair, raising the question of what actually constitutes a real Indian?

Lal, after hearing that the story had made international headlines, made one of the few sensible comments in the wake of this controversy: “This issue has been blown out of proportion and has taken the focus off the inappropriate and offensive comments Paul Henry made on national television, which was the real issue” (Vass 2010). This news item clearly shows that prejudice and intolerance can occur not just between majority and minority populations, or between different ethnic groups, but within them as well. This incident underscores the theory that ethnic boundaries can equally be formed by exclusion as well as by inclusion (Barth 1969,

52 personal communication, TVNZ letter, 18 October 2010.

53 Similarly, a recent event occurred in the US in September 2013 when Nina Davuluri, an Indian-American, was crowned the winner of the Miss America 2013 beauty contest, sparking a post-pageant onslaught of anti-immigrant comments. Indian bloggers were also quick to point out that she would probably never have been selected as Miss India as her skin would be considered too dark (Ghosh 2013, Judkis 2013, Raj 2013).
Guibernau 2013, Wimmer 2013). Such anecdotes reveal both the importance of identity and the pervasiveness of discrimination, themes central to this thesis. While the Lal anecdote may be more about notions of authenticity policed from within (rather than about state-imposed categories), it nonetheless corroborates the perception that the ethnic term Indian is a construct that does not adequately embody the heterogeneity of the Indian population; and demonstrates, through exclusion, that a deeper understanding of identity is necessary if discrimination is to be more adequately addressed by public policy.

In another example of race-based discrimination, Richard Prosser, an MP representing New Zealand First,\textsuperscript{54} penned a prominent article, entitled “Enemy at the gates,” about limiting the rights of ethnic minorities in New Zealand:

> If you are a young male, aged between say about 19 and about 35, and you’re a Muslim, or you look like a Muslim, or you come from a Muslim country, then you are not welcome to travel on any of the West’s airlines (Prosser 2013:9).

He further stated that the rights of New Zealanders are being “denigrated by a sorry pack of misogynist troglodytes from Wogistan, threatening our way of life and security of travel in the name of their stone age religion, its barbaric attitudes towards women, democracy, and individual choice…If the belief systems of ancient history are so important to you, and the advances of the decadent West so abhorrent, go ride a camel instead.” Such derogatory remarks are offensive to most members of society and only serve to proliferate a message of hatred and social exclusion.

Prosser also found fault with his fellow parliamentarians alleging that “excessive tolerance, coupled with the twin evils of diversity and

\textsuperscript{54} New Zealand First is a political party, founded in July 1993 by Winston Peters, that is best known for its strong anti-immigration policies. The party garnered just under 7% of the vote in the 2011 elections, and held 8 seats in the New Zealand Parliament (Johannasson & Levine 2011, Peters & van Even 2011). In the September 2014 elections, New Zealand First achieved 8.7% of the party vote and currently holds 11 seats in Parliament, including Prosser.
multiculturalism, upheld and promoted by political correctness and other weaknesses of spirit and nationalism, mean that the citadel has already been breached, and that the terrorists have already won” (Prosser 2013:9). He clearly positions himself as a zealously resolute anti-immigrationist. Prosser was supported by the leader of the New Zealand First party, Winston Peters, who publicly stated that he would not apologise for Prosser’s statements, that he had been writing in his capacity as a columnist and not as an MP, that the views expressed were not those of the party, and that he would not ask Prosser to resign his position as a duly elected minister (Young et al. 2013). The declamation by New Zealand First leaves little interpretative leeway; New Zealand is certainly not immune to the possibility of the emergence of an extremist, right-wing political party, and white supremacist groups, such as the National Front and Right Wing Resistance, are currently active.\(^{55}\)

Such remarks from our elected officials discredit New Zealand’s international reputation (Bennett 2013) and point to the more destabilising issue of the structural discrimination that still exists within New Zealand institutions. The March 2013 review of New Zealand’s exemplary human rights record by the United Nation’s Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination cited the Prosser proclamation as an example that New Zealand still has much work to accomplish in removing any remaining vestiges of structural discrimination.

The Committee regrets the recent inflammatory remarks by a Member of Parliament vilifying persons from Central Asia or the Middle East based on their skin colour and country of origin as well as their religion, but welcomes the strong criticism of such statements by the Minister of Justice and Ethnic Affairs and the Race Relations Commissioner, among others, as well as the unanimous resolution passed by the Parliament.

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\(^{55}\) The Christchurch-based Right Wing Resistance (RWR) resurfaced in Oamaru in November 2013, to leaflet residents about recruiting armed militias to patrol the New Zealand coastline in order to ward-off an invasion of Asian migrants from “people smugglers in Indonesia” (Ashton 2013). It also distributed blatantly anti-Semitic propaganda via leaflets to suburban Hamilton mailboxes regarding a Jewish conspiracy in New Zealand in May 2015, of which the author has a copy. See <rwrnz.blogspot.co.nz> for their manifesto.
reaffirming the State party’s commitment to preserving an inclusive multiethnic society (UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 2013).

In its non-binding recommendations, the United Nations Committee strongly urged New Zealand to intensify its efforts to promote social cohesion through raising awareness of discrimination in order to combat existing stereotypes and prejudices against particular ethnic and religious groups. The continued recurrence of such incidents as mentioned above indicate that New Zealand is not doing enough to educate the majority about its minority populations.

While there are similarities between the Holmes, Henry, Lal and Prosser examples, their differences are also significant. While the Lal story was taken to the media, the Holmes and Henry incidents were perpetrated by the media, and Prosser’s comments were made by a sitting parliamentarian. Such incidents clearly demonstrate the perpetuation and impact of widespread discrimination and impede the efforts of public policy to stem the tide of social exclusionism in society. Both the Lal and Henry/Satyanand incidents raise issues of authenticity, the heterogeneity of minority populations, and the importance of identity in deeply multicultural societies. In the wake of such incidents, real questions emerge about what actually constitutes a real New Zealander or a real or legitimate Indian. Questions of legitimacy further problematise the prevailing construction and use of such ethnic categories.

The question of what constitutes a legitimate Indian is thorny, tangled in complex queries of birth country, language usage, and generations removed from Indian soil. Both here and abroad, the use of the term Indian has become a broad ethnic category, allowing anyone with ancestral ties to
the subcontinent to utilise the designation to varying degree. This homogenises the population, blurring the distinction, for example, between Gujaratis and Malayalees (who each speak distinct languages and have singularly dissimilar cultures), or between Indo-Fijians and South African-Indians who differ sociopolitically and historically from India-born Indians. The amalgamating nature of a broad ethnic construct may simplify census procedures but echoes shallow forms of diversity. The frames of reference used in Indian self-identification enable us to view a deeper ethnic diversity that puts the Lal story into sharper focus.

In a time of blurring boundaries and cultural hybridity, it is impossible to discern identity as anything other than self-constructed, although states often ascribe or impose ethnic identity on minorities. These particular incidents contextualise the importance of both the identity and discrimination discourses for majority and minority alike. They underscore an urgent need for remedial action, and more forceful public debate on the meaning and merits of immigration, minority participation, and increasing diversity. Given that such incidents occur with regularity, it should be evident that public policy has not kept up with recent demographic change. Has multiculturalism really failed, or is it merely the implementation of public policies? Perhaps the global backlash against diversity and multiculturalism is not so much due to the rapid increase in ethnic minorities in liberal western democracies (as the media, or some of our more ardent politicians, might have us believe), but rather to the manner in which existing diversity management policies are designed and implemented. If this is indeed the case, perhaps deeper forms of diversity governance might provide a more meaningful context. Such a context is

56 Likewise, the term European has similar connotations and homogenises white populations of European extraction.

furthered through a brief critical discussion of multiculturalism, below, which helps establish key weaknesses that a deep diversity framework hopes to address.

2.4 A review of critiques of multiculturalism

In its broadest sense, multiculturalism can be considered not only an acceptable, but a desired ideology and policy, especially if it promotes social cohesion and inclusion. Despite their promise, these policies have been the target of critique since multiculturalism was first mooted in the 1970s (Broudy 1975, Ivie 1979, Glazer 1981, Thomas 1981). More recent critiques have shown that particular states (e.g. Australia, UK, Netherlands) that previously espoused formal multiculturalism are now dismissing it in favour of policies more focused on civic integration (Vermeulen & Pennix 2000:20-22, Entzinger 2003, Joppke 2004, Neerup 2012).

Such a move is predicated on the rapid and sustained increase in migration and the corresponding rise of minority populations that had previously existed in small or insignificant numbers. First, there are more source countries now than when multiculturalism was first promoted as a state policy in some liberal democracies (Clyne 2009:44, Gochenour & Nowrasteh 2014:12). The recent growth in immigration has now altered the discourse; where previously it had generally been a question of accommodating minority or indigenous needs, state policies must now address the growing number of both immigrant and national minorities within their borders. Second, is the problem that distinct parallel institutions for ethnic minorities have arisen in most multicultural states. Separate educational systems, sociocultural networks, community and voluntary organisations, employment, and places of worship, all of which

Third, and most importantly, multicultural policies of minority accommodation and integration often did not address the problems of unemployment and economic marginalisation often experienced by minority populations. Whereas accommodation and integration have most often focused on cultural issues in the past, many now believe that employment and economic integration must form the basis for a new generation of immigration and multicultural policies (Joppke 2004, Scheffer 2011, Hansen 2012, OECD 2012). Since the recent and rapid migration increases of the past decades, multicultural critiques have begun to account for these factors and have instead begun to push for varying forms of increased civic and economic integration.

While multiculturalism has been disparaged by both the right and left, a common underlying critique is that it was implemented as a set of policies for the national accommodation of non-white minorities—a liberal response that often masked the discriminatory racialised and institutionalised histories of many Western receiving societies such as Canada, the US, Australia and the UK (Bannerji 1995, 2000; Hage 1998; Hesse 2000; Hall 2000; Sandercock 2011). Such a critique calls upon western receiving nations to not only address the atrocities of a racialised past (and present), or to acknowledge the devastating impacts of colonialism and institutionalised discrimination, but to move forward through apology, redress, and charting out a clear pathway that addresses historical injustices and lays out an inclusive, socially cohesive agenda.

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58 My use of the term ‘minority accommodation’ refers to the extent that multicultural societies and their resulting legislation and policies are willing to allow particular ethnocultural and/or religious practices to continue by state entities, especially when such practices attract considerable attention and challenge shared majority values.
This critique has emerged from a subordinate minority that, as a result of increasing ethnic diversity and heightened minority participation, has found its voice (Banducci et al. 2004, Sullivan 2010, Park 2010).

In contrast, there are some in majority communities who believe that the ideology and policies of multiculturalism are an affront to Western views and culture and should be debunked. Warder (1993) argues that multiculturalism has the potential to balkanise, weaken scientific advances and replace economic competition with quotas that support unskilled labour. For Schlesinger and Auster, the introduction of multiculturalist notions were seen as a move to totally unmake American culture:

The national idea had once been e pluribus unum. Are we now to belittle the unum and glorify pluribus? Will the center hold? Or will the melting pot yield to the Tower of Babel? (Schlesinger 1991:2).

Multiculturalism, in sum, is far more than a radical ideology or misconceived education reform; it is a mainstream phenomenon, a systematic dismantling of America’s unitary national identity in response to unprecedented ethnic and racial transformation (Auster 1992:43).

In contrast to these views, Hage (1998) argues that multiculturalism is actually a way of alleviating white guilt—that its policies do more for white society than they do for minority communities. Much of Kundnani’s work (2002, 2007, 2014) discusses how multicultural policies often have the reverse effect of increasing the wrath of the majority, resulting in a weakening of minority aspirations, and this warrants mention here. In a similar fashion, some critics have suggested that multiculturalism simply reflects prevalent colonial views—that ‘us-them’ dichotomies still persist within multicultural discourse (McLaren 1995, Goh 2008). Gouws & Stasiulis (2013:7) argue that colonial histories are fraught with discriminatory legislation aimed at indigenous populations, and that modern liberal democratic regimes have not managed to displace the colonial past but have rather incorporated it into the democratic
present. In such instances, identity politics, in which various minority identities jockey for recognition, is a direct consequence of persistent European hegemony.

Another critique of multiculturalism is that it does not differentiate between *which* groups may flourish. In the absence of any serious checks and balances, any group with any agenda may emerge and be given equal voice in an overcrowded democracy. This may sanction the proliferation of hate groups, allow the operation of armed anti-government militias, and enable particularly xenophobic or religious fundamentalist groups to survive and thrive. According to some, multiculturalism (and similar constitutional ‘freedom of speech’ acts) serve to give voice to a particularly dark side of human endeavour (McCann 2009, Simi & Futrell 2010). If the very essence of multiculturalism is the advent of equality for the myriad cultural, ethnic, linguistic, religious and ideological groupings, then the necessity for particular regulatory policies and institutions becomes ever more acute. In such instances, the state usually assumes the additional responsibility and financial burden for maintaining a tenuous balance between groups with radically opposed agendas, although in some instances, non-governmental organisations and entities may suffice.

More generally, critics of multiculturalism have often wondered if its policies are sustainable, or even desirable (Parekh 2000a, Nagle 2009, Vertovec & Wessendorf 2010, Lentin & Titley 2011). Some wonder if multiculturalism is too costly an expense to bear. Citing the mounting economic costs of diversity, Scheffer (2011:325) states that “tolerance is groaning under the burden of maintenance” and concludes “the multicultural drama now unfolding is therefore the greatest threat to social peace.” Citing the Dutch example, Scheffer argues that minority integration into mainstream society has failed, that integration policies
have been too liberal and have focused too much on the “retention of culture” of immigrants, and that multiculturalism ignored the formation of a minority underclass of people who did not feel connected to Dutch society and who were unable or unwilling to integrate into it (Scheffer 2000, Entzinger 2003). This unwillingness would, according to Scheffer, further stratify society. In Scheffer’s view, governments are too indifferent to the fate of minorities, and minorities are too apathetic in their efforts at integration (Scheffer 2000, Penninx 2005). More to the point, the most pressing problem for migrant communities in the Netherlands was unemployment and economic marginalisation (Joppke 2004). Scheffer’s outspoken views, eschewing policies of liberal admission and minority accommodation, helped swing the government’s former policies away from promoting cultural diversity towards one of full integration. According to Scheffer, the unconditional integration of minority populations through the intensive instruction in local language, culture and history is the way to make multicultural policies work (Scheffer 2000, 2011). Only once this is achieved can full economic integration be possible. One problem with this line of thought, however, is that it assumes that the ‘majority community’ is itself homogenous—that there is no internal diversity of gender, sexuality, ideology and values. Another assumes that improved economic integration will lead to equality; that racism somehow does not exist or is not a significant barrier to full participation and inclusion.

Scheffer, and those espousing similar strategies, desire nothing short of the full integration of minority populations into majority society. While this might appear as an appeal for minorities to uphold particular national values for the benefit of a greater national identity, it may negatively

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59 This, however, was not applied to many majority societies. Pākehā in New Zealand, for instance, were never expected to assimilate to Māori language and culture.
impact minority populations compelled to suppress distinctive cultural, linguistic and religious practices from the public sphere and relegate them to the private. Such an integration pathway may create a sense of alienation for subordinate communities. According to this discourse, majority populations want minorities to more fully integrate so that majorities might better accept, relate to, and employ minorities. This position assumes first that minorities stand apart from majority society, that they are already marginalised, and second, that minorities are the ones responsible for the grunt work of integration. Majority group members often expect minority populations to relinquish their individual and group distinctiveness, the very essence of their unique identity. Such a stance exemplifies the white anxiety of which Hage (1998) speaks, and is still present in race relations today.

Minorities in most countries are generally willing to integrate into majority society, but are unwilling to give up their cultural identity. Scheffer (2011) maintains that multicultural policies should vigorously promote the comprehensive integration of minority communities; that minorities either integrate fully into society or forever remain on its margins. Scheffer’s insistence conjures up pop-culture images from the Star Trek: Next Generation television series that aired between 1987-1994 of Borg domination and their “Resistance is futile—You will be assimilated” ultimatum, issued when confronting other space-faring alien races. The Borg model suggests that any politically formidable group can easily overpower smaller cultural groups (e.g. subordinate minorities) as being ‘irrelevant’ to their continued evolution. The Borg quest for ‘perfection’

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60 As an example, state policy in the Netherlands shifted the onus of integration on to minority communities in its 1994 policy “The integration of ethnic minorities,” which describes integration as purely the responsibility of minority communities, and as no longer being a state commitment (de Wit & Koopmans 2005, Phillips 2007:7).

61 In the Star Trek universe, the Borg are a cybernetic blend of humanoids and robots that have incorporated the technological and biological distinctiveness of each species they encounter and assimilate them into their own collective being in their search for ultimate “perfection.”
also raises the moral imperative of the appropriateness of majority communities that demand the total integration of minorities into their population. In so doing, the Borg rid themselves of all distinction between individual members of their society to further the needs of their collective. It should be noted that the Borg are eventually defeated by the particular distinctiveness and individuality posed by humanity. However implausible it may seem, Scheffer’s model may unknowingly commit any such society that demands universal adherence to strict integration to a similar fate.

Offering an alternative approach, Kymlicka (1995, 2007, 2010a) argues for full minority accommodation. Parekh (2000a, 2006, 2008) qualifies and clarifies this approach, stating that where minority values clash with majority culture, the values of the majority should prevail. To what extent then may Scheffer or Kymlicka be correct? Exactly how much integration is necessary to sufficiently maintain parity between civil harmony and social unrest in dominate and subordinate communities? How do states, and other agencies and institutions charged with maintaining diversity ascertain the tipping point and achieve equilibrium? A definitive answer may be elusive, but it is clear that a balance must be struck between policies of liberal immigration and total minority accommodation on the one hand, and total integration and state imposed assimilation on the other. Finding such balance will differ between countries (Spoonley & Tolley 2012), and depend upon the specific historical, political, sociocultural and economic circumstances of particular states. In New Zealand, which lacks formal multicultural policies, parity will need to be achieved between the state’s obligations to remain firmly grounded in its

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62 New Zealand, like the US, has specific institutions (e.g. Human Rights Commission, Office of Ethnic Affairs, Race Relations Commissioner) and particular policies and legislation (e.g. New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990, Human Rights Act 1993 and it numerous Amendments in 1994, 1999, 2001, 2007 and 2008) in place that support diversity and multiculturalism.
bicultural commitments and *tauiwi*-majority need for improved integration of minority populations. Indigenous Māori have already taken a lead role in working with *tauiwi* on issues of sovereignty (Tuffin *et al.* 2004), and there appears to be much room for potential Māori-Asian partnerships to develop (Chang 2009, Kukutai 2011b, Young 2011).

If a linear scale could be drawn with liberal immigration and full minority accommodation on one end (representing Kymlicka’s position), and total integration and assimilation at the other (representing Scheffer), deep diversity would fall closer to that of Parekh, lying centre-left with a decisively Kymlickian lean. Accommodating minorities should be an ongoing discussion, one that involves constant mediation and negotiation between subordinate and dominant positions, a robust deliberative context that would involve the active engagement of all parties concerned. There will be no definitive response that works in all circumstances, as each state will need to tailor such a balance to the particular conditions that make it unique. Nonetheless, a first step of active engagement would be to recognise that diversity is ever-present, in both minority and majority populations, and then to construct ways in which to engage that diversity.

In an active deliberative context of engagement, the notion of identity becomes critical to the diversity discourse. Identity, crucial to a deep diversity framework, can be instrumental in achieving social cohesion between minority and majority populations (Kearns & Forrest 2000:1001, Novy *et al.* 2012:1879). Putnam (2007) agrees, arguing that societies premised on a national identity are better able to overcome the downsides of increased migration and pluralism, and Miller’s (1995) claim that a strong national identity fosters trust and solidarity among fellow citizens, regardless of ethnicity or nationality (Reeskens & Wright 2012). It is a
defining human characteristic which interprets the social milieu(s)
navigated in the course of daily affairs. Yet identities are paradoxical, for
they often set individuals apart and weave them back together as
collectives. While identity may help define, for example, ethnocultural,
religious, and linguistic selves, and provide meaning and import to
existence, it can also marginalise and minoritise, disengage and isolate
from the dominant social order. Alternatively, minority identities may
help to shape and build associations comprised of those sharing similar
affinities, for example, members of the same ethnic or religious
communities, or those that hold a birth country in common. As
individuals, members of minority populations also hold majority selves,
those parts that aid integration and identify with wider society, such as a
shared national identity. This very nuanced complexity of identity
simultaneously differentiates and binds individuals together. A deeper
understanding of what identity represents, therefore, is a key element that
makes the active engagement of deep diversity effective.

Addressing both Scheffer and Kymlicka, minority integration should be
pursued, but not at the cost of relinquishing cultural identity. Doing so
only further widens the gap between subordinate and dominant, creates
resentment, and foments discord. Minorities should proactively be
accommodated and encouraged to express their diversity in both private
and public spaces, by participation in the design and implementation of
policies that facilitate engagement. While policy domains are not normally
the primary site of cultural expression, such displays may allow
minorities to contribute to society in ways that forced integration does
not. As such, minorities have a stake in contributing to majority society,
and are more inclined to be positively engaged in its economic, political
and social activities. Accommodation should thus be moderated in the
Parekhian sense through continued active engagement and deliberation.
Along with encouraging distinct cultural identities, states must work to actively cultivate and further a national identity in which minorities can participate. Such a national identity can be composed of the sharing of common histories and hardships (such as a shared colonialism or participation in armed conflict\textsuperscript{63}), communal connections to the land, the celebration of national festivals, and the backing of national sports teams in an international arena, for example.\textsuperscript{64} Linking minority policies to the promotion and participation in a shared national identity may help to reconnect and link the positive, yet vague, concepts of ‘diversity’ and ‘multiculturalism,’ which most often lack historical meaning, to notions of equality and social justice, which help evoke such histories. Majority populations may ultimately be more welcoming of migrants and minorities if common links are found and incorporated into a shared national ethos.

In addition to reaching back for historical commonalities, minority policies must also have an eye toward the future. A communal national identity would be meaningless to migrants without the articulation of clear pathways to citizenship. The US is currently grappling with such issues as it decides the fate of migrants who have entered the country without proper documentation (Ryo 2013, Thomas 2014). While many individual states have laws to deport such ‘illegal’ immigrants and their offspring, the federal government is attempting to pass legislation that would create new pathways to residence for qualifying undocumented migrants, and their children born in the US. This would empower formerly disenfranchised migrants through granting them legal status.

\textsuperscript{63} While such shared experiences can never be fully inclusive, they can, nonetheless, contribute to a shared national identity.

\textsuperscript{64} For more on the importance of national identity see Greif (1995b), Liu (2005), Parekh (2008), Bertelsmann Foundation & the Migration Policy Institute (2013).
allowing for greater participation in society rather than being marginalised, or having to work ‘under the table.’ Further, migrants that lack pathways to citizenship are most usually deprived of the core right of political participation (Bauböck 2006). Pathways to permanent residency and citizenship offer migrants well-defined trajectories and may contribute to a greater sense of belonging to one’s adopted nation. For most migrants, emotional, historical, social and economic ties to new homelands are known to intensify and solidify once citizenship is attained, and well connected migrants are more likely to be positive contributors to society in economic, political and cultural ways (Castles & Spoonley 1997, Kofman 2005).

Moreover, the ultimate cost of assimilation, the total integration of minority populations, implies another paradox—that diversity should somehow end in the creation of a new monoculture, consisting of a single shared homogenous national identity (not an ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic identity) that displaces the distinctness of heterogeneously diverse populations. Individuals in such populations might outwardly appear distinct, but would all subscribe to the normative values determined by a state-mandated national identity. Not only is such attachment unduly authoritarian and unrealistic in modern liberal democratic states, it does not buffer against the potential discrimination, for example, of Indians belonging to the New Zealand state. Caution should be exercised when states fail to accommodate minority needs and instead push a wholly integrationist agenda. The danger inherent in such oppressive approaches would imply the imposition of stronger state-imposed identities that would supersede individual and group minority identities.
Assimilation should therefore not be the end game of state policies that promote integration as a way of managing diversity. If a state views integrationist/assimilationist models as paramount for any of a variety of reasons (e.g. to promote social cohesion, reduce ethic tension), it should not be pursued with the intent that minority communities adapt to host societies in ways that exclude minority heritage, identity and culture from the public sphere. The implications of extreme state views towards assimilation eventually result in situations that suppress minority culture and heritage in favour of a dominant majority with a unified national identity with all sharing an analogous belief system. Ultimately, such a path towards inclusion may threaten social cohesion.

As an example, France has attempted to pursue such assimilationist policies with the introduction of legislation in April 2011 banning the public wearing of the *niqab* or face veil (Hamel 2002, Wiles 2007, Iqbal 2011). French law also forbids state employees from wearing Muslim headscarves, and other visible religious symbols like a Jewish yarmulke or Christian cross in public schools, welfare offices or other government facilities (Keaton 2013). Likewise, the Swiss ban on minarets as a blight on the architectural landscape (Stüssi 2008, Cumming-Bruce & Erlanger 2009, Langer 2010, Mayer 2011) points to similar ends. There are numerous examples of such exclusionist/assimilationist policies being debated, enacted or enforced around the world. The issue of the wearing of the *kirpan* (ceremonial dagger) by Sikh communities in North American schools (Bagga 2006, Stoker 2007), the Sikh wearing of turbans (Stromer 2005, Gohil & Sidhu 2008, Ahluwalia & Pellettiere 2010), the right to build and display the *sukkah* by Canadian Jews during the annual celebration of Sukkot (Barnett 2011), or the general wearing or display of religious symbols in the public sphere (Gereluka & Race 2007, Danchin 2008, Barnett 2011, SALT 2010) are all prominent examples of such policies.

Even grander schemes have been envisioned that attempt to reorient entire societies. The former Prime Minister of Malaysia, Mahathir bin Mohamad, while introducing the Sixth Malaysia Plan 1991, outlined a scheme known as Wawasan 2020 (Vision 2020), that called for the establishment of a united Malaysian nation made up of Bangsa Malaysia, or a single Malaysian race (Chin 1998, Teik 2003, Greider 2004).

Wawasan’s two major objectives for Malaysia are:

1) to reach the status of fully developed nation with an advanced industrialized economy by the year 2020, and 2) to create a sense of national identity called Bangsa Malaysia. While Bangsa Malaysia is a bumiputra—defined cultural principle which privileges many aspects of ‘buminess’ as the core of Malaysian national identity, it aims to move beyond ethnic insularity into a new ‘nationalist ideology’ in order to unite the multiple religio-ethnic components of national society, based on notions of a common Malaysian idea of territory, population, language, culture, symbols and institutions (López & Hassan 2004:4).

More than fostering a shared national identity, this course of action would appear to supplant ethnicity in favour of a unified national identity. Such Malay-centric ethnic rationalisation policies put minority Chinese and Indian populations in Malaysia at risk (Hing 1997, Teik 2003). In 2009, the concept of “One Malaysia” was introduced by Prime Minister Najib Razak as another rallying cry for national unity. This updated policy does not have the radical implications for national identity that the idea of Bangsa Malaysia carried (Gabriel 2009).

Such policies are ostensibly directed at improving settlement outcomes and aiding acculturation, but these legislative attempts to integrate minorities into mainstream populations often have an opposite effect.
Rather then improving integration, they raise issues for both minority communities and host populations that often lead to social exclusion and marginalisation—minority communities on the one hand often reject such attempts to regulate their ethnocultural heritage, while portions of majority communities are often inclined to react negatively. For both, the issue is often portrayed by the media in ways that slant the debate in favour of host communities, which now recognise an issue, with opposing lines of supporters and opponents drawn. Such media scrutiny often ends in resentment on the part of minorities, and varying levels of tolerance, indifference, discrimination or racism from majorities. Whether integration policies for minority communities, while complying with laws that promote public safety and welfare, are written in such a way that public displays of minority art, culture, language, history, architecture and religion aren’t opposed, but rather embraced and celebrated, is something that a framework for deep diversity hopes to address, by focusing on what *reasonable accommodation*\(^{65}\) might be, as opposed to the reactionary discrimination of, and opposition to, difference in the absence of individual or communal understanding of minorities.

Overall, state responses to increasing diversity have varied in this age of transnationalism and globalisation, due to changing circumstance and the inevitable need for context specific policy. Numerous responses have been developed by states that find themselves in varying historical, political, cultural and socioeconomic contexts that often dictate or determine which particular policy approach will be legislated. States are also forced to gauge public opinion, and politicians often score political points with their constituents by following majority lead. Whichever path is pursued,

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\(^{65}\) Here, and following, I refer to *reasonable* as that which would be considered fair and equitable, especially in terms of the extent to which majorities and minorities need to cooperate in order to achieve a just settlement and accommodation of any particular minority request. Also, following Wenar’s (2013) interpretation, while each side may believe that their position is correct, neither can force the other to accept that truth, even if they belong to a majority that has the power to enforce it.
multicultural policies and state handling of diversity will continue to be both varied and debated. Such critiques have led one commentator to claim that the old multiculturalism is dead and that a new one needs to spring to life (Alibhai-Brown 2001). While there is some pessimism about the theory, ideology and policies of multiculturalism, such critiques, and the debates they engender, suggest that alternative approaches are possible. In introducing one such alternative, this thesis next turns to an examination of the historical and theoretical antecedents in explicating a deep diversity framework.

2.5 Historical and theoretical foundations of deep diversity

This section outlines some of the critical historical and theoretical perspectives that have led to modern multicultural theories, and situates deep diversity within this context. These can be traced back to questions of social justice raised by early thinkers such as Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau and Mill, to the more contemporary works of Kymlicka, Parekh, Sandel, Taylor, Williams and Young. I will briefly mention the important aspects of their work that relate to multicultural theory and discuss their relevance to deep diversity. Such a discussion firmly grounds deep diversity as emerging from long philosophical and theoretical traditions of egalitarianism, social justice and tolerance that have informed contemporary theories of multiculturalism.

The ‘social contract’ and the foundations of modern multicultural theories

The question of political legitimacy and power has always been of paramount importance in discussing issues of social justice. In Occidental philosophy, the notion of a ‘social contract’ can trace its lineage back to the original covenant between God and the ancient Hebrews. In Oriental traditions, this concept can best be linked to the Buddhist emperor of
India, Ashoka, who, in the third century BCE, outlined the importance and need of toleration in society (Sen 2009:xii), and also to the later Mughal emperor of India, Akbar (1542-1605), who was a great defender of religious tolerance and protector of the separations between religion and the state (Habib 1997:4, Chandra 2007:252, Sen 2009:xiii). Early Greek philosophers began to codify these musings into moral and philosophical concepts (Strauss & Cropsey 1987, Irwin 2007) and early Roman jurisprudence laid down laws for healthy governance and good citizenship (Irani 1995, Stein 1999). Although these provided the necessary foundations for ethical values and the creation of a ‘just society,’ it wasn’t until the mid-seventeenth century that the idea of a ‘social contract’ in western philosophy began to emerge.

Hobbes helped establish the prominence of individual rights, equality, the belief that legitimate political power must be ‘representative’ and based on the consent of the people, and a liberal interpretation of law which leaves individuals free to do whatever the law does not explicitly forbid (Hobbes 1651/2010, Manent 1996:20–38, Lloyd & Sreedhar 2014). Locke later formulated the classic reasoning for religious tolerance. Three particular arguments were central to his thesis: 1) nation-states and their legal systems in particular, and their human actors in general, cannot reliably evaluate the truth or claims of competing religious viewpoints that are counter to the dominant belief; 2) even if they could, enforcing a single ‘true religion’ would not have the desired effect because belief cannot be enforced or compelled by violence; and 3) coercing religious uniformity would lead to more social disorder than allowing diversity (Locke 1689-1692, McGrath 1998:214-215).

Throughout, I use the accepted religion-agnostic designations BCE (Before Common Era) and CE (Common Era) to refer to the Christian references for BC (Before Christ) and AD (Anno Domini) respectively.
While Hobbes’s ideas had firmly established the notion of modern liberal democracy, Locke’s reasoning and arguments for tolerance form the basis of multicultural theory. His insights on toleration form the fundamental arguments for modern concepts of minority accommodation, which are founded on the application of fundamental human rights to all groups and individuals in society. While Locke may have been referring to the armed imposition of state-sponsored religion that was occurring throughout Europe before and during his time, the sociopolitical realities of today offer an updated interpretation suggesting that state-mandated assimilation and integration of minorities into existing social norms may likewise lead to social unrest. Locke therefore became an early advocate for minority rights. Locke and Rousseau both agreed that the social contract between citizens and their government was this: that in exchange for granting government authority and for relinquishing some of their freedoms, citizens are granted civil rights but are also obliged to respect and defend the rights of others.

There were a number of prominent points that emerged from this thinking that have especially important implications for modern multiculturalism. These can best be summed up in two significant ideals: 1) the strong belief that legitimate political power must be entirely representative and based on the will and consent of the people, and 2) that mutual cooperation and full respect be given to the rights of others. These themes set the stage for further advancement from ‘social contract’ to ‘social justice’ theories, and their legacy provides an important foundation for deep diversity.

‘Social justice’ as a basis for contemporary multicultural theory

In A Theory of Justice, Rawls (1971) posits a ‘fair choice’ option within which interacting parties would choose mutually acceptable principles of justice, envisioning a society of free and independent citizens holding
equal basic rights cooperating within an egalitarian economic system (Rawls 1971, Nagel 1973, Wenar 2013). Picking up where the social contract left off, Rawls perceives two basic principles of social justice. The first states “each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others” (Rawls 1971:60). The second states “social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that (a) they are to be of the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of society, and (b) offices and positions must be open to everyone under conditions of fair equality of opportunity (Rawls 1971:303). With his notion of distributive justice, Rawls defines an exceptionally profound principle that the most disadvantaged and marginalized in society should reap their fair share of the social capital it produces.

Members of any free society, according to Rawls, will have widely divergent worldviews, yet there can only be one law in each nation-state. Its members should therefore be expected to be reasonable in their interpretations and follow laws that are fair and acceptable:

> Our exercise of political power is fully proper only when it is exercised in accordance with a constitution the essentials of which all citizens as free and equal may reasonably be expected to endorse in the light of principles and ideals acceptable to their common human reason (Rawls 1993:137).

These ideas are later picked up and critiqued by Young (1986, 1989, 1990) and Fraser (1997, 2003), focusing on the notions of difference and discrimination and incorporated into the social justice and multiculturalism debate. The notion of reasonable interpretation therefore adds legitimacy to government and the laws it enacts. This same reasonableness should also prevent members from imposing their own beliefs on other law-abiding citizens. Though each may believe that s/he

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67 The assumption, however, that a “common human reason” exists, would be challenged by post-modernists, among others.
is right, no one can force other reasonable members of society to live by that truth, even if s/he belongs to a majority that has the power to enforce it (Wenar 2013). Rawls’ original work, and the critiques that they spawned\(^68\), are of relevance for the notion of deep diversity as they set out principles of equality and legitimacy for minorities who hold widely divergent beliefs and practices in modern liberal democracies.

\[\textit{A communitarian response to liberalism}\]

The last few decades have seen a dramatic rise in the incidence of international migration (Bedford & Ho 2008, Papademetriou 2013), and this has caused a shift from earlier ideals and themes to the discussions of the merits of multicultural approaches in modern liberal democracies. Following Rawls, other contemporaries\(^69\) have picked up on the preceding ideas and have constructed modern theories of multiculturalism that move beyond the notion of social justice to incorporate the effects of modern migration on nation-states, and the importance of national minorities that exist within them.

Taylor’s notion of \textit{reasonable accommodation} in the Canadian context of bicultural citizenship and Québec nationalism was largely influenced by Rawls, and has had an enormous impact on notions of identity, minority participation and political recognition. Taylor (1994) was the first to

\(^{68}\) Rawls, responding to earlier criticism that his conception of justice was similar to other existing theories (e.g. the utilitarianism of Hegel and Mill), and that it didn’t define a necessary distinction between the moral and political conceptions of such a theory (Nozick 1974, Wolff 1977, Walzer 1983, Sandel 1998, Sen 2009), later defined a doctrine of political liberalism and its legitimacy within liberal societies in an attempt to address these critiques (Rawls 1993/2005). Amartya Sen, for instance, recently critiqued Rawls’ beliefs about the distribution of social goods, instead substituting his belief that it is more important to focus on our ability to effectively utilise those goods to purse our ambitions, than on their distribution (Sen 2009). Sandel (1998) also enhanced Rawls’ theory by establishing that individual values and aspirations are equally important in our interpretations of the meaning of justice. Marxist critiques dismissed Rawls’ interpretation of justice as simplistic, as it tended to ignore the predominance of capitalistic society and market economies as the source of much injustice in the world (Wolff 1977).

identify the notion of ‘deep diversity,’ his particular attempt at a proposed solution to the problem of political fragmentation in a bicultural Canada. Deep diversity, according to Taylor, addresses the special calls for formal acknowledgment that come from minority communities within larger states. The question of recognition often addressed by Taylor includes demands for cultural recognition, claims for special privileges, appeals for special forms of citizenship rights and pleas for various forms of self government (Taylor 1994, Levy 1997, Redhead 2002). Deep diversity was therefore “an idea meant to promote multiple forms of belonging to a federated state” (Redhead 2002:2).

Someone of, say, Italian extraction in Toronto or Ukrainian extraction in Edmonton might indeed feel Canadian as a bearer of individual rights in a multicultural mosaic. His or her belonging would not “pass through” some other community, although the ethnic identity might be important to him or her in various ways. But this person might nevertheless accept that a Québécois or a Cree or a Dene might belong in a very different way, that these persons were Canadian through being members of their national communities. Reciprocally, the Québécois, Cree, or Dene would accept the perfect legitimacy of the mosaic identity (Taylor 1993:183).

Taylor’s vision of deep diversity is one of toleration, concurrently addressing the nature of political and sociocultural fragmentation that exists in states with national and ethnic minorities, and outlining a practical method for the political recognition of minorities in multicultural states.

The virtue of deep diversity is that it embraces an openness to the diverse array of collective and individual rights demanded by Canada’s various citizens while promoting allegiance to the national state. Deep diversity simultaneously promotes tolerance and cultivates commonality, thereby mediating political fragmentation by addressing both of the contrasting normative forces at work within it, recognising particularity and promoting unity (Redhead 2002:2).

Although originally conceived to deal with the issue of Québec nationalism in Canada’s bicultural society, Taylor has brought the question of minority rights (be they indigenous or exogenous), to the philosophical lineage described here. In applying his principles to the question of more recent migrant populations, the concept of deep diversity can be widened
to apply to multicultural societies impacted by the contemporary milieu of transnational migration and globalisation. Taylor also introduces the importance of the concept of identity in accommodating minority rights.

Taylor’s critique of Rawls\textsuperscript{70} helped formulate the notion of \textit{communitarianism}, a political philosophy that stresses that the communities in which we live are to be considered of equal importance as the individual, and whose central claim is precisely the necessity of attending to community in concert with liberty and equality (Zakaria 1996, Frazer 1999, Smith 2001, Kymlicka 2002). This requires the belief that there is more than individual rights, that the significance of the institutions that comprise civil society must be taken into account, and that, ethically, we are obliged to consider the social capital (the reciprocity, trust, and solidarity) that exists between them (Frazer 1999:21). Essentially, Taylor shifts the debate from the focus on individual rights (liberalism) to one encapsulating a civic republican focus on collective responsibility (communitarianism). Taylor’s critique also underscores the belief that the institutions and organisations formed by the individuals and groups that comprise civil society are equally responsible as are individuals, morally and ethically, for proper action in a ‘just society’ that benefits all citizens. It is therefore incumbent upon such entities to act with \textit{reasonable} authority\textsuperscript{71} in matters of a civil nature. State adherence to such reasonable demands by its civil institutions would ensure a ‘just society,’ regardless of place of birth, language spoken, culture lived, religion practised, or an individual’s identity and ethnicity.

\textsuperscript{70} Taylor was not alone in his criticism of Rawls. Sandel (1998, 2009) and Walzer (1983, 1987) also thought that Rawls paid little attention to the ideal of community, although none would label themselves communitarians (Bromell 2008:61, Bell 2013).

\textsuperscript{71} As earlier defined by Rawls (1993:137).
Sandel followed similar reasoning as Taylor in his critiques of Rawls, arguing that Rawlsian liberalism rests on an overly individualistic conception of the self (Sandel 1996, Bell 2013). A communitarian like Taylor, he places special emphasis upon national political communities and argues for measures that increase civic engagement and public participation (Sandel 1996). These critics of liberalism do not identify with the communitarianism to which their critics have accused them of subscribing (Bromell 2008:61, Bell 2013). Taylor, while rejecting the communitarian moniker, oddly prefers to identify himself as a ‘liberal’ (Gutmann 1994, Taylor 1994, Bell 2013), while eschewing liberalism itself. Sandel points out that the term ‘communitarian’ is misleading, as it implies that rights should rest on the values that exist within any given community (Sandel 1994, Bromell 2008:61) and prefers the label ‘civic republican’ rather than ‘communitarian’ (Bell 2013). Simply put, Sandel believes that liberals place importance on liberty and individual rights over the greater good, while communitarians hold that the greater good trumps the rights of individuals (Sandel 1996, Bromell 2008:6). Civic republicanism, on the other hand, emphasises the responsibilities of citizens as equally important as rights.

In Democracy’s Discontent, Sandel (1996) offers a civic republicanism grounded in the belief that citizens need to do much more than vote. According to Sandel, while liberalism protects an individual from involvement in majority decision-making, communitarianism, and specifically civic republicanism, teaches that an individual’s rights are the result of participatory self-government. Liberty is afforded to individuals as a result of participation in the greater good, rather than the other way around. Bromell clarifies that “the individual is free insofar as he or she is

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72 Liberalism here defined as the theory that individuals should be free to lead lives of their own choosing, without interference from the state.
a member of a political community that controls its own fate and a participant in the decisions that govern its affairs” (Bromell 2008:70).

The hope for self-government lies not in relocating sovereignty but in dispersing it. The most promising alternative to the sovereign state is not a one-world community based on the solidarity of humankind, but a multiplicity of communities and political bodies—some more, some less extensive than nations—among whom sovereignty is diffused (Sandel 1996:345).

In Sandel, the trajectory towards a full theoretical basis for deep diversity, from the early social contract, through social justice theory and liberalism, to communitarianism, appears nearly complete.

Multicultural citizenship: responses to the communitarian challenge to liberalism

What remains, however, in tracing a broad outline of the history of deep diversity, is bridging the theoretical gap between liberal/communitarian theories and the age of transnationalism, a time and place in which exceptional polyethnicity has emerged as the norm for liberal democracies. In the 2013 Census, 25.2% of the population was born overseas (Statistics New Zealand 2014), situating New Zealand amongst the most ethnically diverse countries in the OECD (Forbes 2012, Office of Ethnic Affairs 2014, Patsiurko et al. 2012). With overseas-born individuals now comprising one of every four persons, a critical mass has been reached suggesting that now is the time to review and improve existing diversity management practices. For Kymlicka, multiculturalism addresses the ways that a society might go about responding to its diversity by treating minority groups as equal citizens, with the recognition and positive accommodation of group differences required

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73 Of those stating a birthplace.


through what he terms “group-differentiated rights” (Kymlicka 1995, Song 2014). Kymlicka’s work focuses on developing and defending a liberal theory of multicultural citizenship as an alternative to communitarianism and provides a liberal framework for formulating the policies necessary for the just treatment of minority populations (Kymlicka 1995, Kukathas 1997, Bromell 2008:105). Such policies would allow for the recognition and accommodation that minority groups require in contemporary western liberal democracies (Bromell 2008:105). The type of multiculturalism required would demand a reevaluation of current practices, the transformation of biased patterns of representation that tend to marginalise particularly vulnerable groups (Young 1990, Taylor 1994, Gutmann 2003, Song 2014), and incorporating the importance of how minorities choose to self-identify.

While individual rights have been the mainstay of liberal theory, Kymlicka, like Taylor and Sandel, has argued for the recognition of both individual and group rights within modern nation-states:

A comprehensive theory of justice in a multicultural state will include both universal rights, assigned to individuals regardless of group membership, and certain group-differentiated rights or ‘special status’ for minority cultures (Kymlicka 1995:6).

He posits that group rights are a recent innovation in liberal western democracies, which have traditionally avoided assigning rights to specific ethnic, religious, linguistic and geographic groups. While Kymlicka (1995) acknowledges that Canada’s indigenous populations don’t share a common language and culture, and that the Québécois are themselves colonial immigrants, he does nonetheless argue that these minority groups deserve special state recognition and rights. In contrast to both ‘national minorities’ and the Québécois, newer immigrant minority populations are less deserving of such rights as they come to the state voluntarily and thus have some degree of responsibility to integrate to the norms of their new
nation. They also have the right to freely and publicly express their ethnicity and culture. Kymlicka states that ethnic minorities that exist within host societies reject assimilation into majority culture, and typically do not seek self-government or to be recognised as a separate nation within the state. Instead, they seek to negotiate fairer terms of integration into the host culture (Kymlicka 1995:67, 1995:98, 2001:30; Bromell 2008:123). While such migrants may want recognition for their distinct ethnic identity they specifically differ from national minorities in that they “seek only the accommodation of their cultural traditions, and do not wish to become separate, self-governing nations” (Kukathas 1997:408). This resonates with the New Zealand situation. Kymlicka (1995:176) concludes that disadvantaged groups often demand group representation rights, which itself should be seen as a positive step in liberal democracies, for it generally sends the message that minorities in polyethnic states seek affirmation for inclusion and participation in majority culture, rather than strive for withdrawal or separation from the host society. Deep diversity affirms such integration of both national minorities and migrants into host societies as it creates an inclusive polity rather than one of exclusion based on ethnicity or race.

Kymlicka concedes that majority cultures in host societies are not always sympathetic or supportive of this ethic; that dominant majority sensibilities do not always acknowledge ethnic minorities as positive contributors to society, nor might they support the proposition that minority populations can have a positive effect. In Canada, Kymlicka (1998:146) cites implacable opposition to full minority participation on the part of the non-aboriginal, non-francophone majority population. This would require convincing majority cultures of the merits of the just treatment of ethnic minorities. Existing shallow multicultural policies in this regard are often lacking. An updated governance policy based on
these ideals would, however, address state obligations to engage majority communities and institutions on the need for, importance of, and the benefits of minority participation.

Like Kymlicka, Parekh agrees that modern societies are dealing with diversity in ways never before seen. How modern states cope with this diversity is the focus of much of his work, thus taking Kymlicka’s theoretical work to more practical levels. Parekh discusses the terms in which both liberal and non-liberal societies might work together, and in so doing, picks up on Taylor’s original challenge of how dialogue can best be achieved between groups with radically divergent worldviews, e.g. the clash between religious extremism and liberal western democracies (Taylor 1994; Parekh 1997b, 2000a, 2008; Bromell 2008:106). Parekh further argues that multiculturalism is not just about western societies managing diversity in all its forms, but more importantly, it’s about recognising and implementing the proper terms for dialogue (Parekh 1997b, Bromell 2008:106).

Minority accommodation, belonging and national identity

In essence, Parekh, proffers: 1) the advantages of cultural diversity, 2) the importance of cultivating social cohesion, and 3) a practical focus on engaging diverse communities. First, Parekh states that cultural diversity is an inherently desired value in society.

Since human capacities and values conflict, every culture realizes a limited range of them and neglects, marginalizes and suppresses others. However rich it might be, no culture embodies all that is valuable in human life and develops the full range of human possibilities. Different cultures thus correct and complement each other, expand each other’s horizon of thought and alert each other to new forms of human fulfillment (Parekh 2006:167).

One of Parekh’s key insights is that plural societies represent diverse systems of meaning and beliefs about what constitutes the good life. As a
result, each culture needs others in order to better understand itself and to expand its own intellectual and moral horizons (Bromell 2008:167).

Second, if plural societies are to be socially cohesive they need a common sense of belonging and a strong national identity that explicitly recognises and affirms its diversity (Parekh 1997b:528-529). This does not necessarily demand adherence to any particular set of common goals, a shared sense of history, or cultural homogeneity, but rather an enduring commitment to the continuing existence and well being of society. Likewise, a political community cannot expect its members to develop a shared sense of belonging unless it also belongs to its members (Parekh 1999).

Third, the challenge, according to Parekh, is for societies to meet the demands of diversity, especially when cultures clash, which can both create difficulties in managing diversity and expose rifts in social cohesion.

Diversity furnishes the texture and variety of social life, thereby extending choice and opportunity. It can be a source of economic strength, cultural vitality, national pride and solidarity. But it can equally generate social conflict, ethnic tension and political instability (Boston et al. 2006:xi).

All heterogeneous societies include communities with practices that may offend majority values. Parekh (2006) offers as examples such cultural practices as polygamy, arranged marriages, first cousin marriages, male and female circumcision, methods for the slaughter of animals, dress codes, burial practices and the status of women, any or all of which might be unpalatable to the majority. It is in these particular contexts that Parekh provides the foundations for a just and operable public policy and sets the scene for a truly deep diversity. Parekh offers an important guideline, stating that where social conflict exists and resolutions are required for cultural practices deemed inappropriate or unacceptable to the majority, the overriding factor is that the operative public values of the wider
society should prevail (Parekh 2006:272-273). Kymlicka (2010b:83) furthers that there are necessary limits to minority accommodation, and claims should be evaluated on the basis of elevating core liberal values. Where claims do not specifically enhance individual freedom, equality of opportunity, democratic citizenship and effective participation, they become incompatible with liberal democratic norms and societies should not defend them. Here, Parekh and Kymlicka offer us practical principles for accommodation in deeply diverse societies.

This may be difficult to achieve, as societies are often confronted with policy dilemmas that arise from such juxtapositions. For example, New Zealand faced a particularly difficult situation over the Jewish practice of shechita, a method for the ritual slaughter of animals to make them kosher for consumption, which states that an animal must be killed with ‘respect and compassion’. The controversy emerged in May 2010 when David Carter, the then Agriculture Minister, overruled advice from the National Animal Welfare Advisory Committee to exempt shechita from a new animal welfare commercial slaughter code. Under the new code, which was made effective immediately, all commercially killed animals must be stunned before slaughter to ensure the humane treatment of the animals.77 While halal meats prepared for consumption by the Muslim population allow for such a stunning before slaughter, shechita does not, as the animal must be unharmed before slaughter, and the Jewish belief is that all stunning methods involve an unnecessary additional injury to the animal. Previously, shechita was considered exempt, just as it is under the US’s

76 Judaism, like Buddhism, teaches that all animals should be treated with compassion, and that humans must avoid causing pain to any other living being. However, it also recognises that animals may be killed as it fulfills an essential human need, and that all killing must be done so that the animal does not suffer needlessly.

77 What is in dispute here is that majority values hold that it is considered humane to first stun an animal before slaughter (so that it is unconscious before being killed), while the minority view is that the practice of stunning prior to killing involves an unnecessary additional injury to the animal.
Humane Slaughter Act. Minister Carter decided in May 2010 to annul all exemptions from the new legislation. This upset Jewish leaders and created a particularly difficult policy decision for New Zealand. The ban appeared to violate New Zealand’s Bill of Rights, which protects freedom of religion. The new code contravened provisions in the Animal Welfare Act which exempt certain religious practices from its purview, and the Human Rights Act, which protects against discrimination. After months of controversy and threats of legal action, Minister Carter had to back down only days before he was to be taken to court to justify his particular interpretation of the code (Fisher 2010, Harper 2010, Jerusalem Post 2010, Bouma et al. 2010).

What is important in this example is Parekh’s belief that plural societies must be willing to enter into previously unknown territory, traverse unfamiliar worlds of thought and belief with open minds and hearts and have an ability to live with unresolved differences (Parekh 2006:340). What should lie at the heart of engagement and form the basis for dialogue is a mutual respect between different ethnocultural groups. Phillips (2007:168), one of whose key arguments focuses on the significance of group differentiation and its importance in achieving an equitable representation, would agree with the significance of minority engagement and accommodation. She asserts that it is now widely accepted that states can actually harm their citizens by trivializing or ignoring their cultural identities (Phillips 2007:11). Taylor (1992) affirms that denying cultural recognition can be as damaging to minorities as denying them their civil or political rights.

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78 Phillips’ main emphasis, however, is on the problems of collective identity and values which may override any particular individual differences within groups.
The significance of a mutual commitment to a national identity, or a greater good, which Parekh refers to as ‘operative public values’, allows for negotiation between opposing policies to take place.

Operative public values are those that a society cherishes as part of its collective identity and in terms of which it regulates the relations between its members. They are embodied in its Constitution, such international human rights documents it has signed, its legal and political institutions, and the norms and practices governing the relations between its members (Parekh 2006:363).

What is important to Parekh is the dialogue itself, not so much the resolution. Both Kymlicka and Parekh agree that multiculturalism cannot and does not solve all issues that may arise and that living with disagreement is part and parcel of life in polyethnic societies. What Parekh offers to the concept of deep diversity are important operative principles to policy issues that provide an important conceptual framework for the formulation and implementation of public policies.

From theory to policy: addressing institutional and structural discrimination

While conceptual frameworks are essential for diversity governance strategies, in practice, one frequent outcome emerging from plural societies is the recurrence of discrimination. Yet minority discrimination is not merely the domain of individual actors, and is often associated with agencies that may impede equitable minority progress. For new policies to be effective it is vital that institutional barriers to minority rights be removed. In formulating a comprehensive approach, deep diversity would also need to address the institutional and structural obstacles that exist in society. The writings of Young and Pincus here become instrumental in advancing a policy framework that addresses these barriers. Young’s particular vision of social justice focuses on a concrete analysis of state hegemony over minority populations:
A conception of justice which challenges institutional domination and oppression should offer a vision of a heterogeneous public that acknowledges and affirms group differences (Young 1990:10).

Young emphasises issues of profound structural discrimination which often prevent minorities from achieving parity with majorities.

Pincus (1994, 2010, 2011) furthers Young’s argument by offering three types of discrimination: individual, institutional and structural:

Individual discrimination refers to the behavior of individual members of one race/ethnic/gender group that is intended to have a differential and/or harmful effect on members of another race/ethnic/gender group. Institutional discrimination, on the other hand, is quite different because it refers to policies of the dominant race/ethnic/gender institutions and the behavior of individuals who control these institutions and implement policies that are intended to have a differential and/or harmful effect on minority race/ethnic/gender groups. Finally, structural discrimination refers to the policies of dominant race/ethnic/gender institutions and the behavior of the individuals who implement these policies and control these institutions, which are race/ethnic/gender neutral in intent but which have a differential and/or harmful effect on minority race/ethnic/gender groups (Pincus 2010).

Pincus defines his use of the words ‘dominant’ and ‘minority’ in terms of the presence or absence of power to control, not in terms of their relative size. With institutional discrimination, the intent to discriminate is predominantly a conscious decision, while structural discrimination proceeds on the overt basis of neutrality. The notion of intent is paramount in distinguishing these two types of discrimination. Pincus offers the lending practices of US banks as an example of structural discrimination. When blacks and Hispanics are deliberately disadvantaged in receiving loans compared to whites, then institutional discrimination is at play. However, when banks act in race-neutral ways by considering ‘credit worthiness’ as the main criterion, then most blacks and Hispanics would still be disadvantaged because of their lower incomes and the fact that their creditworthiness is not as strong as it is for whites (Pincus 2010).

Likewise, the July 2012 change in New Zealand immigration law by the National government concerning family migration (Immigration New
Zealand 2012), while being race-neutral and promoted by National as a way to lessen the public burden of health care of the elderly, unfairly targets lower income minority groups from, for example, the Pacific Islands, India and China, as parents from these countries may be less able to support themselves in retirement as opposed to parents of migrants from, for example, the UK, Europe and North America. This change in policy, then, unfairly discriminates against ethnic minority groups. So clearly, seemingly ‘fair’ policies that purport to be ethnically and racially neutral or discrimination-adverse, are ultimately not.

While it is essential to distinguish between both institutional and structural discrimination, the distinction is less vital for deep diversity than the supposition that all types of discrimination need to be identified and recognised and taken into account when formulating policy. Pincus (2010) states that it is much harder to deal with structural discrimination than with institutional discrimination as the former is neither intentional nor illegal, but its effects can be just as insidious.

Generally, all types of discrimination exist where social exclusion is prevalent. Institutional and structural forms of discrimination are based upon preferential treatment of the majority, and prevent minority groups from fully engaging in majority society. This type of discrimination often excludes minorities from full participation in the economic, social and political life of the majority. Institutional and structural discrimination can also partly explain why certain minority groups in society may form a majority in state prisons, or why particular ethnicities are disadvantaged in the receipt of and access to health care, education and social services. Removing such barriers at institutional levels is of the utmost importance in promoting a just society. Group difference and distinctiveness should be acknowledged in all public policies in order to promote the full
participation of minority groups (Bromell 2008:190). Summarising Young (1990:11), where differentiation is stressed, equality no longer is identified with sameness, nor is difference associated with deviation.

Young (1990:15) defines social justice in terms of “the elimination of institutionalized domination and oppression.” Her point (1995:161) is that “difference does not mean otherness, or exclusive opposition, but rather specificity, variation, heterogeneity.” Social justice “requires not the melting away of differences, but institutions that promote reproduction of and respect for group differences without oppression” (Young 1990:47).

More succinctly,

The assimilationist ideal assumes that equal status for all persons requires treating everyone according to the same principles, rules, and standards. A politics of difference argues, on the other hand, that equality as the participation and inclusion of all groups sometimes requires different treatment for oppressed or disadvantaged groups (Young 1990:158).

Such a perspective would provide justification for opposing the policy approaches of Don Brash79 (2004), whose ‘one law for all’ rhetoric stereotypes and discriminates against minorities, promotes an assimilationist ideal, and manipulates the race discourse in an attempt to realign party support (Johansson 2004). Majority populations need to adjust to the reality of such politics of difference, by, for example, accepting the fact that Māori may require more days off work for fulfilling cultural responsibilities, that Muslims may wish to swap Easter for Eid, or that orthodox Jews wish to continue the traditional practice of shechita. While the majority may perceive these to be double standards, they are not, for they simply accept the reality of heterogeneity and minority accommodation. In essence, such accommodation challenges the so-called neutrality of ‘standards,’ which are inevitably culturally specific to the dominant group. If minority rights are to be valued and social cohesion

upheld as an ideal, policy must focus on promoting social inclusion by supporting both minority and majority national identities,\(^{80}\) and by removing institutional and structural discrimination. If not, assimilationist ideals are likely to prevail. By denying minorities the rights of particular ethnocultural, religious and linguistic expression, the state assumes a hegemonic stance, resulting in minorities less likely to contribute to the social, political, economic and educational spheres of majority society, and more likely to protest such measures, fomenting dissent. The lack of minority voice and participation would represent a withdrawal from majority values, threatening social cohesion.

This section has attempted to link historical ideals of social justice to modern theories of multiculturalism, juxtaposing a liberal focus on individual rights with a civic republican focus on responsibilities. Table 2.1 summaries the contributions each mentioned author has made to multicultural theory and deep diversity.

Table 2.1: Summary of contributions to multicultural theory.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author:</th>
<th>Dates:</th>
<th>Major works:</th>
<th>Contribution:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Thomas Hobbes</td>
<td>1588-1679</td>
<td>Leviathan (1651)</td>
<td>established the prominence of individual rights, equality, representative power, and the notion of modern liberal democracy; gave rise to the social contract theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Locke</td>
<td>1632-1704</td>
<td>Letters concerning toleration (1689–92), Two treatises of Government (1690)</td>
<td>formulated the classic reasoning for tolerance within society, which forms the basis for modern multicultural theory and the accommodation of minority rights; furthered social contract theory; defined the concept of the separation of church and state; considered the ‘father’ of modern liberal theory</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jean-Jacques Rousseau</td>
<td>1712-1778</td>
<td>Discourse on the origin of inequality (1754), On the social contract (1762)</td>
<td>outlined the basis for legitimate governance; put forth a framework for classical republicanism; strongly endorsed religious tolerance</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(^{80}\) It should be noted that minority identities and majority national identities are not necessarily mutually exclusive entities. While minority identities contain and subscribe to majority national identities, not all majority, or national, identities contain or subscribe to minority identities.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Author</th>
<th>Dates</th>
<th>Major works</th>
<th>Contribution</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>John Stuart Mill</td>
<td>1806-1873</td>
<td><em>On liberty</em> (1859), <em>Considerations on representative government</em> (1861), <em>Utilitarianism</em> (1863)</td>
<td>developed a conception of liberty that justified individual freedom over unlimited state control; furthered liberal political thinking, addressed the limits and nature of state power; argued that freedom of speech was a necessary condition for social progress; furthered a fundamental principle of citizen participation in society; utilitarianism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>John Rawls</td>
<td>1921–2002</td>
<td><em>A theory of justice</em> (1971); <em>Political liberalism</em> (1993)</td>
<td>posited the fair choice option; all citizens hold equal basic rights; notion of distributed justice; individuals should be expected to have a reasonable interpretation and follow laws that are fair and acceptable; not to impose one’s beliefs on others; furthered theories of social justice</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Charles Taylor</td>
<td>1931-</td>
<td><em>Multiculturalism:</em> examining the politics of recognition* (1994), <em>A secular age</em> (2007)</td>
<td>first to introduce the term deep diversity; introduced the notion of reasonable accommodation and recognition of minority populations; the importance of identity in accommodating minority rights; the rights of communities (communitarianism) are of equal importance as individual rights (liberalism); critiqued liberal theory from a communitarian perspective</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Michael Sandel</td>
<td>1953-</td>
<td><em>Liberalism and the limits of justice</em> (1982); <em>Democracy’s discontent</em> (1996)</td>
<td>critiqued Rawls’ liberalism as overly individualistic; takes a communitarian stance, but, like Taylor, is uncomfortable with the title; placed special emphasis on national political communities and argued for measures that increase civic engagement; favours the communitarian belief that the greater good trumps the rights of individuals; emphasised a civic republicanism that believes responsibilities are as equally important as rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nancy Fraser</td>
<td>1947-</td>
<td><em>Unruly practices: power, discourse, and gender in contemporary social theory</em> (1989); <em>Justice interruptus: critical reflections on the ‘postsocialist’ condition</em> (1997); <em>Redistribution or recognition? A political-philosophical exchange</em> (2003)</td>
<td>argues that social justice must be understood in terms of the equitable distribution of resources and the recognition and representation of minority groups; incorporated feminist, critical and post-structuralist theories into reinterpreting multiculturalism</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anne Phillips</td>
<td>1950</td>
<td><em>The politics of presence</em> (1995); <em>Which equalities matter?</em> (1999); <em>Multiculturalism without culture</em> (2007)</td>
<td>argues for greater representation and equality, and the importance of difference; challenges the narrow interpretation of contemporary liberal theory;</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
What emerges from such a review is a clearer understanding of the historical and theoretical foundations of multiculturalism and the issues of diversity governance that still must be addressed, e.g. the importance of identity and tackling discrimination. What follows outlines a conceptual framework for deep diversity that helps distinguish multiculturalism from a more robust understanding of diversity governance and minority accommodation. While Taylor’s original conception of deep diversity focused on minority recognition and the nature of political and sociocultural fragmentation in bicultural Canada, his priority focused on
the political recognition of non-national minorities in multicultural states that harbour significant national minority populations. His conception was thus seen largely as a way to politically engage minorities in more representative forms of government. Taylor also introduced the concept of minority allegiance to the national state as a way of ‘cultivating commonality’ to mediate the political fragmentation he saw occurring in the Canadian context. The present conception of deep diversity takes the notions of political representation, minority accommodation and national allegiance introduced by Taylor to a more comprehensive level by addressing ‘commonalities’ in terms of cultivating a shared national identity, unpacking existing state categories which tend to homogenise minorities, and incorporating minority discrimination and majority participation in the dialogue. These distinctions are crucial to contemporalising and contextualising deep diversity in an environment of increasing pluralism.

2.6 Shallow and Deep Diversity

Having discussed and critiqued multiculturalism, and having laid a theoretical foundation for an updated approach, a more fully articulated concept of deep diversity, beyond Taylor, can be addressed. Here, I consider both shallow and deeper interpretations of diversity management and governance that follow from the theoretical lines introduced earlier. Through outlining such a framework, I hope to highlight some interpretive problems that emerge when considering such juxtapositions

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81 Like Canada, with its significant Inuit and Native American populations, and New Zealand, with indigenous Māori, who now comprise 14.9% of the New Zealand population stating an ethnicity (Statistics New Zealand 2014).

82 Such as explicating shared minority and majority histories that have previously been unknown or have remained invisible (see Chapter Five).

83 See Chapters Six and Seven.

84 See Chapter Eight.
and demonstrate that deeper conceptualisations of plurality are possible and necessary in furthering diversity governance. The purpose here is not to analyse existing policy or write new guidelines, but rather to explore the possibilities inherent in conceptualising governance strategies that are more aligned with the pluralism found in liberal western democracies today. Deep diversity is thus not an attempt to create a single unifying theory to explain the migration complex, nor is it a predictive model used to anticipate particular settlement outcomes. Instead, it provides a conceptual framework for identifying and promoting policies designed to aid social cohesion. Deep diversity strives for a richer understanding of all cultures, customs, ethnicities, identities, languages and religions that comprise modern society. It aims to nurture a common and cohesive national identity while supporting group differentiation and minority accommodation that provides a basis for continued deliberative and active engagement.

Here, I appropriate Taylor’s ‘deep diversity’ to refer to a wider approach to multiculturalism and diversity governance that seeks to combine the theoretical and historical antecedents with more contemporary formulations of multiculturalism and its numerous critiques. Such an approach takes into account 1) the significance of cultural rights and sensible minority accommodation (while valuing its Parekhian limitations), 2) the emphasis on both minority and majority responsibilities (as most previous formulations of multicultural policy have focused almost exclusively on minority responsibilities to integrate), 3) the consequences of a failure to properly acknowledge and accommodate minority identity, 4) the cultivation of a sense of minority belonging to a national identity equally important to minorities and majorities, and 5) a focus on mitigating discrimination. All of these are best approached through policies of 6) active engagement between minority and majority
populations which lies at the heart of deep diversity and sets it apart from Taylor’s conception and previous iterations of multicultural policy.

Most multicultural states already have policies and practices designed to manage diversity within its borders. Most have laws that regulate the entrance of new migrants or policies designed to accommodate national minorities. Policies promoting cultural diversity are currently considered desirable for multicultural states (Young 1986, 1990; Taylor 1994; Kymlicka 1995, 2007; Parekh 2006, 2008; Phillips 2007), as they allow for greater participation in majority society, giving minorities a sense of value and inclusion. Multiculturalism promotes increased political participation and welcomes minority contributions to society, even if states don’t. Once such participation is achieved, majorities often declare their proactive stance on minority inclusion; having become multicultural is usually sufficient enough for the state to rest on its laurels. Once a state considers itself multicultural, it often perceives that little additional work remains besides maintaining status quo. Vigilance is relegated to the minimum while ‘maintenance’ supplants ‘furtherance’ as premium.

This perspective diverges from minority discourse, which generally struggles for appropriate political representation, the accommodation of its cultural and religious rights, economic parity, better health and education outcomes, reparations for historical injustice, social equity and respect. Minority advocates and representatives often feel that the burden of mainstream acceptance falls squarely on them—that a failure to constantly keep the minority agenda on the majority’s view screen may somehow render their work meaningless. From these competing discourses, it is clear that better cooperation and understanding between minority and majority populations is needed. These conflicting approaches emphasise the limitations of existing frameworks and render
current normative interpretations of diversity management outdated. New frameworks that focus on ‘governance’ over ‘management’ are required in order to advance the discourse.

For decades, ethnic and racial classifications have been conceived and used to segregate, build hierarchies and nurture racial and ethnic stratifications and inequalities (Simon & Piché 2012:1358). I have earlier stated that existing perspectives of diversity, as formulated by the various state entities discharged with their management, are often thinly described to pigeonhole minority groups into conveniently defined sets that conform to established traditions and give advantage to majority populations. Comprehensive, all-encompassing categories (like Asians, Polynesians), while favourable for state purposes and to state entities, tend to distort the heterogeneity that exists within such classifications. This deeper diversity is composed of both further group and individual identities that are often masked behind state-imposed labels. Such obfuscation can only serve purposes favourable to the state, and may prevent smaller minority groups from appropriate representation or accessing funding to improve educational, health and financial outcomes.

When cloaked behind a more encompassing term (e.g. Asian), the depth and breadth of minority populations is hidden to majorities, which are often content with shallow minority labels. Further description only exposes the extent of difference and spoils the status quo. Using such labels to describe minority communities also helps states feel secure, as they can easily identify, catalogue and manage such groups (Foucault 1977, Dean 2010, Lemke 2012). Further classification may instill trepidation, especially where majority members may have difficulty distinguishing between nationalities (e.g. Chinese from Korean), knowing the difference between Hindus and Muslims, or recognising the need for
non-majority languages. This majority angst is similar to the “white anxiety” of which Hage (1998) speaks.

Majorities, and the institutional structures that uphold their values, may actually prefer such state-imposed labels. They take reassurance in defining primary demographic divisions, rather than trying to grasp the breakdowns within expansive categories. Which is more readily comprehensible by majority society or more easily and conveniently explainable by the state? That 11.8% of the New Zealand population are Asian, or that, for example, 4.1% are Chinese, 3.9% Indian, or 0.2% Sri Lankan? How would majority sensibilities react if it was fully aware that Sri Lankans, for example, can be further divided along linguistic boundaries composed of predominantly Sinhalese and Tamilian speakers, or along religious lines of predominantly Buddhist, Hindu and Christian members? Such subgroups often embody distinct histories, languages, cultures and religions all veiled behind the term Sri Lankan, and further obscured by the term Asian. These distinctions also conceal further subsets based on, for example, gender, economic class, profession, age, sexual orientation and gender identity. One’s ethnicity does not always determine one’s country of birth, which leads to further divisions of, for example, Fijian-born Indians, India-born Indians, South African-, Malaysian-, Singaporean- and UK-born Indians, each harboring distinctive minority and national identities that are reflected in the country of their birth. Wouldn’t such recognition make majority populations overwhelmed and uncomfortable? What if each subgroup petitioned the state to be accommodated in some way or recognised and

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85 Ethnicity statistics are based on the 2013 New Zealand Census data released 15 April 2014.

86 Even so, it is important to recognise that such subgroups often coexist, intermarry, and often share a common national identity despite such differences.
granted minority rights? Adhering to fundamental divisions like *Asian* or *Polynesian* serves to keep the finer impacts of migration and diversity mysteriously vague and indeterminate from the majority, which furthers state purposes.

Since states often use such terms to apportion, monitor and track scarce resources, it is in their best interest to limit the number of officially sanctioned minorities. Further classification may only complicate disbursing limited funds available for addressing disparities in sectors like health and education. Such elementary classifications are often used to determine political representation, which majorities may prefer to limit. Further identification of minority subgroups might convey implicit recognition which states may be loathe to confer.

Such primary classifications, while perhaps beneficial for the state, tend to obfuscate complex identities, which may further disadvantage minorities. Majorities tend to fear what they do not know or understand (Hage 1998), and majority fear of increasing ethnic diversity has been shown to affect majority-minority relations (Outten *et al.* 2012). State policies that shield majorities from full minority recognition can therefore only be considered paradoxical. In limiting official recognition to particularly large regional or national minority groupings (e.g. *Asian, Indian*), state policy may only be diminishing majority ability to differentiate, as majority members may be unable to discern the difference between, for example, Sikh, Hindu or Muslim, by relying on skin colour as a distinguishing characteristic.88

87 It is worth noting here that achieving recognition is more likely to be successful if subgroups strategically adopt a pan-ethnic label such as Asian or Pasifika, or Latino/Hispanic in the US.

88 As an example, see Putnam (2000), Prosser (2013).
Alternatively, this trepidation can also cause majority populations to respond in unforeseen ways. The addition of the *New Zealander* category to the 2006 Census provides a good example. The movement to create such a category, composed of predominantly majority members (Kukutai & Didham 2012), may stem from either an unconscious majority desire to simplify and do away with ethnic categories altogether, or may appear as an attempt to create a stronger national identity, one based solely on nationality rather than ethnicity. Such movements only emphasise and reaffirm the dominant group’s perception that their interests are not reflected by official practices of ethnic enumeration (Simon & Piché 2012) and reify the ‘white anxiety’ of which Hage (1998) speaks.

Prosser’s (2013) philippic is a good example of a majority member feeding such angst by simplifying discrimination to its broadest possible category (i.e. dark-skinned males with accents). Knowing how to discern deeper ethnic categories (more than the state might allow, or that the majority might comprehend) may render a white individual’s character questionable for fellow *Pākehā* compatriots. Corollaries to this can be found in recent US elections where Republican Tea Party contenders, attempting to score additional political points with ‘middle America,’ (i.e. disgruntled white middle-class conservatives), have often portrayed their Democratic opponents as being ‘too educated’ or ‘out of touch’ with the US electorate (Marietta 2009). Such a ‘dumbing-down,’ as Prosser exemplifies, describes a pervasive sense of declining educational, cultural and political standards that only appeal to a lowest common denominator,

89 The campaign to tick the *New Zealander* box that proceeded the 2006 Census contained elements of both (Kukutai & Didham 2012 ).

90 Interestingly, the 2013 Census revealed a sharp decline in majority support for a *New Zealander* ethnicity: whereas the 2006 Census showed 11.1% of the total population that stated an ethnicity self-identifying as *New Zealander*, only 1.6% of the total stated population did so in 2013. This decline occurred despite the absence on both censuses of a specific *New Zealander* tick box; respondents to both the 2006 and 2013 Censuses had to specifically write in the term *New Zealander* to be counted as such. The absence of a similar campaign to encourage a *New Zealander* ethnicity prior to the 2013 Census may emerge as the reason for such a decline.
and serve to raise the self esteem of those espousing such jargon (Putnam 2000, Arden 2003, Sowell 2010). By advocating the banning of all young male Muslims, and all who ‘look Muslim,’ from flying on Air New Zealand, Prosser denigrates all Muslims—and possibly all those of a darker complexion—regardless of nationality or religion—to the position of potential terrorist. For Prosser, it is the colour of one’s skin that would serve to alert potential gatekeepers that terrorists are afoot. His ignorance is even more disturbing as a sitting MP.91 Such an example can only accentuate both the lack of, and the need for, diversity policies that target majority populations.

An analytical framework of deep diversity

According to the New Zealand Federation of Multicultural Councils (2014), existing state interpretations of diversity are in need a a major rethink. Their policy position paper released prior to the September 2014 national elections identifies key areas in which the management of growing ethnic populations can be improved. In some area, existing policies92 merely reinforce the status quo, provide limited forms of minority recognition, and are usually limited in their ultimate effectiveness. Such policies can be seen as having breadth but no depth in their design and implementation, and existing forms of institutional and structural discrimination may often impede their effectiveness. A deeper, more inclusive view of diversity must be embraced by state entities if multiculturalism, as a viable form of governance, is to move beyond mere majority toleration of minorities and into deliberative active engagement between stakeholders. In order to operationalise these concepts, the

91 Prosser, third on the New Zealand First Party List, was reelected to another term in New Zealand’s 51st Parliament during the 20 September 2014 national elections. He originally entered Parliament in December 2011.

92 In its policy statement, the New Zealand Federation of Multicultural Councils lists the following key areas for policy improvement: constitutional issues, ethnic affairs, race relations, settlement support, and refugees and asylum seekers (NZFMC 2014).
framework presented below views the normative, operative and ideological values of two successive diversity discourses: the first of the shallow variety, the type of approach extant today, and the second, of a deeper interpretation that shifts the balance from existing management approaches to more equitable governance strategies in which majorities and minorities equally determine the proper terms of engagement; a form of social détente between parties that share a common interest in social cohesion.

One of the defining characteristics of shallow forms of multicultural policy is their basis in the concept of tolerance, which supports existing forms of ethnocultural maintenance; that majority society should somehow tolerate national minorities and expanding migrant populations. Shallow forms of multicultural policy most often follow the pattern of two ships passing in the night. Existing multicultural policies are often ‘top down’—formulated, targeted and implemented (‘managed’) by majority government, directed solely at minority populations, and purposed with the task of better integrating minorities into majority society. According to Butcher (2008), existing multicultural policy is “sufficient if the only expectation upon the host society is to provide the services and resources to aid integration of migrants.” Shallow forms allow for varying degrees of accommodation and minority rights, but these are often characterised by proactive minority requests or demands for accommodation, a ‘bubble-up’ approach in which majorities are seen to receive, consult and grant or deny such appeals. This type of interaction is less one of engaged dialogue and more one that reinforces existing stereotypes of majority dominance. It perpetuates a status quo that majority (dominant) and minority (subordinate) are unequal partners in deliberative processes. Under this type of framework, minorities, while encouraged to participate in majority society, are minimally accommodated while structural and institutional
Table 2.2 Key values & assumptions of the diversity discourse: shallow and deep approaches.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>KEY VALUES:</th>
<th>SHALLOW APPROACH:</th>
<th>DEEP APPROACH:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Normative</strong></td>
<td>Diversity management strategies apply</td>
<td>Diversity governance strategies apply</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Assumption that minorities are not fully integrated and must be properly ‘managed’</td>
<td>Assumption that most minority populations are fully integrated, socially and economically</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Stresses the importance of toleration over accommodation</td>
<td>Stresses the importance of accommodation over toleration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Structural and institutional discrimination prevalent</td>
<td>Policies to address and remove structural and institutional barriers introduced</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diversity is mostly accepted and tolerated by majority society;</td>
<td>Diversity proactively encouraged and actively engaged;</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Most minorities recognised, some accommodation within limits</td>
<td>All minorities recognised, most accommodated within limits</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Superficial recognition of rights</td>
<td>Comprehensive recognition of rights</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minority political representation limited &amp; below census proportions.</td>
<td>Minority political representation exceeds proportions described in national census</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Ideological</strong></td>
<td>Society has a dominant monocultural or bicultural (homogenising) identity, but recognises existence of ‘others’</td>
<td>Society is proactively multicultural, multiethnic, multireligious and multilingual</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Scant government support for strengthening non-majority ethnicities, religions and languages</td>
<td>Active government support for strengthening minority ethnicities, cultures, religions and languages</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Migrant and minorities must adhere to an existing national identity</td>
<td>Migrants and minorities contribute to and participate in a national identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Pluralism considered something novel to be dealt with or controlled through policy and legislation</td>
<td>All forms of pluralism considered the normal state of affairs; co-governance strategies for diversity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>National identity based on exclusive majority ideology or biculturalism</td>
<td>National identity based on shared and inclusive multicultural identity and histories, built on bicultural foundation</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Social cohesion is a stated and achievable policy goal</td>
<td>Social cohesion replaced by more realistic notions of ‘civic solidarity’</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Operative</strong></td>
<td>‘Toleration’ is the operative principle, minority accommodation difficult</td>
<td>Active engagement and minority accommodation are operative principles</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Bigotry and racism prevalent in society; racist incidents occur frequently</td>
<td>Comity &amp; mutual respect of diversity prevalent in society; racist incidents occur, although infrequently</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Minorities politically dependent on majority</td>
<td>National minorities have proscribed amounts of political autonomy</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Diversity policies directed towards minorities and migrants only</td>
<td>Diversity policies co-governed by and for minority, migrant and majority equally</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy design and implementation is reactive</td>
<td>Policy design and implementation is proactive</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Policy evaluation undertaken by ‘management’ directive as needed</td>
<td>Policy evaluation ‘co-managed’ at regular intervals</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
barriers remain embedded, stifling already limited minority participation. Such discriminatory barriers are well entrenched, change averse, and slow to adapt to shifting demographies. In countries with sizable populations of migrants and national minorities, majorities, as dominant actors in shallow approaches to diversity, constantly struggle with balancing the aspirations of minorities with the needs of the majority.

In deeper forms of governance, majority tolerance of minorities is inadequate. Management approaches are replaced by governance strategies in which authority relationships are substituted with more balanced deliberative debate. Given existing structural inequalities in society, such exchange between stakeholders should initially focus on creating systems and processes which actively mediate and address such inequalities. In active engagement scenarios, minority and majority aspire equally towards more robust and attainable forms of civic solidarity. State policies are more proactive and minority communities more willing to engage in a shared civic culture. In terms of minority integration, deeper approaches would address both minority and majority responsibilities for mitigating discrimination, promoting both minority and national identities, and advocating more balanced forms of integration. In terms of settlement and integration, it aims to nurture a common and yet cohesive national identity while supporting group differentiation and providing policies that help minorities achieve equal human rights, participation, and access to citizenship, regardless of ethnicity, race, religion, language, or country of birth.

In examining this diversity discourse (Table 2.2), the two divergent approaches can be interpreted by viewing the various normative, ideological and operative assumptions associated with each. Normative assumptions generally affirm or establish what might be commonly held
beliefs about existing shallow and proposed deeper interpretations of diversity. Normative conceptions of shallow approaches contain a variety of fundamental assumptions. These include majority control of the discourse, the understanding that minorities are not yet fully integrated into majority society, that diversity must be carefully and ‘appropriately’ managed, and that policy formulation, implementation and monitoring needs to be continually undertaken in order to achieve social cohesion. It stresses the primacy of the toleration of difference over that of full minority accommodation. Normative assumptions of shallow interpretations embody a superficial recognition of minority rights. Under such guise, social cohesion is limited and broadly described, and discrimination and racism constantly tug at the social fabric that binds society, reaffirming the need for continued management. In disputing normative interpretations of shallow diversity, social cohesion remains a largely aspirational goal that is loosely defined. Under existing regimes, social cohesion may best be described as

the willingness of members of a society to cooperate with each other in order to survive and prosper. Willingness to cooperate means they freely choose to form partnerships and have a reasonable chance of realizing goals, because others are willing to cooperate and share the fruits of their endeavors equitably (Stanley 2003:5).

Under such a scheme, citizens share a collective belief in a common moral community that enables and engenders trust between them. This echoes Butcher’s (2008) comment that existing social cohesion policies “are sufficient if the only expectation upon the host society is to provide the services and resources to aid integration of migrants, for example.” Larsen (2013), however, demonstrates that the perceived trustworthiness amongst citizens is strongly influenced by the level of social inequality and how both poor and middle classes are represented in the mass media. Shallow interpretations of social cohesion are therefore reinforced by the structural and institutional inequalities that often perpetuate the aspirational nature
of diversity policies. As such, ‘social cohesion’ remains as nearly unattainable as ‘sustainable development’ is to shallow forms of the development discourse, or as unrealisable as ‘universal human rights’ are to weak social justice dialogues.

Stanley’s (2003) definition of social cohesion however embeds a glimmer of deepness: it implies the willingness of its citizens to cooperate in achieving mutually beneficial goals, yet it fails to define what constitutes such a common moral community. What is fundamentally missing is the notion of a shared national identity—something to which all members of society can belong and in which all may equally participate. Under existing practices of minority integration into mainstream society, minorities are encouraged to value majority mores above their own, often engendering exclusion; majorities remain aloof, while shallow management strategies request increasing tolerance as a virtue to be cultivated. Instead, majorities must be proactively engaged in removing inequalities, and minorities more willing to participate in a national arena, for deeper forms of social cohesion to occur. This is why a shared national identity is fundamental to the success of forming deeper associations rather than superficial ones, as a shared national identity can be the vehicle through which diverse members of a society bond. Normative approaches of deeper strategies differ in that governance includes partnerships between stakeholders; that minority and majority are equally responsible in establishing better outcomes for attaining more realistic forms of social cohesion, which I term ‘civic solidarity,’ emphasising minority accommodation over toleration. Such solidarity includes comprehensive minority recognition, and both minorities and majorities remain actively engaged in a national identity that welcomes and celebrates multiple forms of diversity.
Ideological values represent aspirational beliefs, principles and ideals that are currently accepted. Ideological values of shallow diversity approaches are based on the belief that society has a dominant monocultural or bicultural identity, but recognises the existence of minority communities. Shallow approaches believe that majority values dominate and direct policy. Social cohesion is merely an aspirational goal and policies are initiated to bring it about, yet the goal is rarely actualised. In deeper approaches, society is proactively multicultural, multireligious and multilingual, and these assumptions are shared by both minority and majority participants. Ideological notions of, and belief in, social cohesion are replaced by stronger and more achievable forms of civic solidarity. Discrimination and incidents of racism diminish as policy has been appropriately directed at all segments of society, and minority and majority are equally responsible for policy formulation, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

Operative values result from actualising normative assumptions and by putting policies into play. In shallow approaches, these are exemplified either by state imposition or by majority acceptance of particular normative assumptions and policy directives. Rarely are they defined by minority participation in the discourse. In an operative sense, minorities are seen as sole actors in a diversity sphere in which they are manipulated by majority players through policy initiatives designed to ‘better integrate’ them into majority society. This approach requires minorities to be responsible for their own integration through top-down policies disseminating majority language, culture and history in an attempt to improve their socioeconomic, health and education outcomes (cf. Scheffer 2000, 2011). In exchange for minority effort, majority populations are merely expected to remain tolerant of minority participation. In such scenarios discrimination and bigotry may remain prevalent, and incidents
of racism may continue to occur at regular intervals. In this model, pluralism is considered something new or novel, diversity management is implemented reactively instead of proactively, responding to demographic change—something that must be dealt with by majorities and controlled through state policy or legislation.

In contrast, the operative assumption of a deeper approach is one of active deliberative engagement, based on communitarian principles and the accommodation of minority rights. Comity and respect for all forms of difference are operative principles practiced by both minorities and majorities. Diversity policies are evenly directed at minority, migrant and majority populations and all are equally responsible for equitable forms of civic solidarity. While minority communities work towards integration, majority populations are the target of, and are responsible for, specific education policies designed to advance their understanding of minority language, culture and religion, and focus on the benefits of minority sociocultural and economic integration that would serve to mitigate the more drastic forms of racism and discrimination. By adapting such a framework, existing social cohesion policies can be more appropriately directed towards more attainable forms of civic solidarity.

2.7 Towards a concise definition of deep diversity

Now that all of the pieces are in place, it is possible to construct a more comprehensive definition of what I currently conceive deep diversity to be. To summarise, deep diversity consists of the following key points:

1. Broadly speaking, deep diversity is a conceptual framework that considers the normative, operative and ideological values of both shallow and deep interpretations of the diversity discourse; one that rejects shallow interpretations in favour of deeper ones. Such an
interpretation shifts the balance from existing diversity management approaches to more equitable governance strategies in which both majorities and minorities equally determine the proper terms of engagement; a form of social détente between parties that share a common interest in social cohesion.

2. *On reasonable minority accommodation:* Deep diversity recognises that denying appropriate cultural recognition can be as damaging to minorities as denying them their civil or political rights. It therefore encourages minorities to express their diversity in both private and public spaces, and supports reasonable minority accommodation, emphasising that where minority values clash with majority society, the operative public values of the wider society should take precedence. While there are necessary limits to minority accommodation, claims should be evaluated on the basis of elevating core liberal democratic values (Kymlicka 2010b:83). Where claims do not specifically enhance individual or group freedom, equality of opportunity, democratic citizenship and effective participation, they become incompatible with liberal democratic norms and societies should not defend them.

3. *On active engagement:* Such deliberation is best approached and moderated through deep diversity’s emphasis on policies that support continual active engagement between minority and majority populations, and of recognising and implementing more appropriate terms for dialogue. Deep diversity insists that such dialogue supplant existing shallow forms of toleration and consultation, and instead embody a mutual respect between all ethnocultural groups as a fundamental basis for engagement and negotiation, as the dialogue itself is more important to deep diversity than its resolutions or outcomes.

4. *On majority responsibility:* As majorities do not always acknowledge minorities as positive contributors to society, majorities must shoulder an equal share of the responsibility for minority integration. Deep
diversity thus emphasises both minority and majority responsibilities for minority integration into mainstream society, as shallow formulations of multicultural policy have focused almost exclusively on minority responsibilities to integrate, rather than on policies designed to educate majorities about a) the importance of, and need for, minority integration in social, economic and political spheres, and b) for increasing the ethnocultural, religious, linguistic and historical literacies of majorities about specific minority populations within society. Deep diversity therefore addresses state obligations to engage majority communities and institutions on the need for, importance of, and the benefits of greater minority participation in society, as well as to increase general majority literacy of minority populations. Such an approach might help mitigate the discrimination that currently exists within society.

5. **On mitigating discrimination:** Deep diversity recognises the significant barriers to integration that are currently faced by minority populations as a result of deeply embedded structural and institutional forms of discrimination. Such discrimination is based upon preferential treatment of the majority, and prevents minority groups from fully engaging in majority society. It is not merely the domain of individual actors, and is often associated with agencies that may impede equitable minority progress. This type of discrimination often excludes minorities from full participation in the economic, social and political life of the majority. For new policies to be effective it is vital that institutional barriers to minority rights be removed. ‘Deeply diverse’ policies would therefore need to address these obstacles.

6. **On the importance of self-identification:** Deep diversity recognises the importance of self-reported identity as being wholly determined by the individual or group in question, as opposed to being based on state interpretations only. Thus deep diversity has specific applications vital for states to consider when, for example, deploying instruments that enumerate or categorise populations (e.g. census), distributing
precious resources (e.g. funds designated for minority social uplift), or determining which minority groups should be politically recognised and engaged (e.g. establishing fair and equitable terms for engaging minorities and their representatives for negotiating recognition or accommodation). As discussed in Chapters Six and Seven, a deep diversity framework may prove useful in analysing hierarchical systems of classification that may prove useful to states, but do not necessarily conform to minority designations based on self-reported identities, such as in the state census.⁹³

7. On the importance of a shared national identity: If plural societies are to be socially cohesive they need a common sense of belonging and a strong national identity that explicitly recognises and affirms its diversity (Parekh 1997b:528-529). A deep diversity framework therefore considers a shared national identity as being of central importance, and as equally essential to minorities as to majorities, as societies premised on such an identity are better able to overcome the downsides of increased pluralism. A strong national identity thus fosters trust and solidarity between diverse citizens, regardless of ethnicity, religion, or country of birth, and is a key element that makes the active engagement of deep diversity both possible and potentially effective. Participation in a shared national identity can also aid minority political participation, reduce discrimination, and further social cohesion, as it can help cultivate a heightened sense of individual and group belonging to a particular state. In the New Zealand context, such belonging suggests the creation of a uniquely Indo-Kiwi identity, which is explored in Chapter Five. A deep diversity framework therefore requires that states actively work to cultivate and further a shared national identity in which minorities can not only participate,

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⁹³ Here, I do not mean to imply that existing classifications, as currently in use by the census, should be replaced by entirely self-reported identities. Instead, I merely point out that in the New Zealand context, existing categories do not accurately portray the diversity inherent within particular non-Māori minorities. Applying a deep diversity framework has first allowed particular issues to be identified, and may allow policymakers to address, and potentially implement, possible solutions to the equitable application of classificatory hierarchies across all populations.
but in which they can secure their future through transparent pathways to citizenship, which are clearly articulated and equally available to all who are eligible.

8. **On furthering social cohesion:** The conceptual framework of deep diversity is ultimately directed towards facilitating improved social cohesion. Reasonable minority accommodation, active engagement, shared majority responsibility, mitigating discrimination, self-identification, and the importance of fostering a shared national identity, as discussed in the substantive chapters that follow, are all areas of interest in which a deep diversity framework may operate and contribute.

### 2.8 Conclusion

Adapting deep diversity as a conceptual framework is possible at any stage of policy practice. What is required is a comprehensive shift from shallow forms to deeper conceptions of multicultural policies that include guidelines outlined above. Social cohesion is difficult to achieve, except perhaps in monocultural societies\(^94\) or paradoxically in ones which minorities are so assimilated into majorities that national identity supersedes or replaces minority identity, or the distinction between the two completely disappears.\(^95\) Deep diversity does not intend to abandon or replace existing forms of multicultural policy, but rather to enhance them in the ways outlined above with more realistic aspirations and implementable objectives. Existing multicultural policies are redeemable without going to the extremes of assimilation and integration posited by Scheffer (2000, 2011), or by promoting and imposing oppressive forms of unshared national identity as currently practised by a number of European countries that have rejected multiculturalism as a national

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\(^94\) Assuming that monocultural societies share homogenous values and ideologies.

\(^95\) cf. the *Borg* model referred to earlier.
policy objective (Brubaker 2001, Bienkowski 2010, Wihtol de Wenden 2012). A process of robust and deliberative active engagement and minority accommodation may lead to better and more achievable outcomes.

The conceptual framework of deep diversity introduced here is by no means complete—it is merely the beginning of an evolving theoretical framework that may eventually find use in formulating, interpreting, monitoring and assessing diversity policy in liberal western democracies. For now, it remains a work in progress and much explication remains. These cursory notions however form the basis for examining the data presented in the substantive chapters that follow suggest new ways of questioning and interpreting historical data and for assessing the suitability of existing approaches to ‘managing minorities.’ In its present form, I apply deep diversity for fresh insight in approaching existing source material, which enables new histories to be revealed; and in data collection, which allows for deeper questioning and explication of heterogeneity. The normative, ideological and operative assumptions inherent in shallow and deep approaches are applied in such a way as to demonstrate the importance of adopting deeper and more comprehensive positions on multicultural policies.
CHAPTER THREE:
RESEARCH METHODOLOGY

3.1 Introduction

The research methodology is formulated using three conceptual approaches in research design (interdisciplinary, mixed-methods, and case study). First, utilising method and theory from several disciplines in the social sciences, it combines anthropological, historical, demographic and policy methodologies to address core research objectives. Each offers distinct methodological approaches and applications of theory, data collection and analysis. While interdisciplinary methodologies may overlap, this research was undertaken by selecting appropriate methods from each discipline, creating a comprehensive methodological approach. Second, a mixed methods research design that blended both qualitative and quantitative techniques seemed appropriate given the objectives of this study. While Chapters Five and Six, the first two substantive chapters, deal specifically with qualitative methodologies, Chapters Seven and Eight are quantitative. The intent ensured that each approach reinforced the other, providing critical strength to the data, as well as a more robust analysis. Third, the research focuses on a single case study as best exemplifying the issues discussed in this thesis. These approaches to research design, as well as the disciplines in which they are embedded, are discussed below.

3.2 Approaches to research design

Interdisciplinary Approaches

There were four distinct disciplinary approaches that figured, in varying degrees, in this research: anthropology, history, demography and policy. The first, anthropological, provided an overarching perspective that
informed the research throughout and guided my interactions with both real subjects and engagements with historical material. As Harris notes (1995:2), “The distinction of anthropology is that it is global and comparative.” While other social sciences may examine particular aspects of the human experience, anthropology adheres to a more holistic and dynamic view of culture. As anthropology provides the “original multicultural approach to human social life” (Harris 1995:5), it integrates an ideal interrogative and interdisciplinary framework in which to examine a particular ethnocultural group within a larger multicultural context.

Anthropology also emphasises the importance of cultural immersion in order to provide valid and reliable description. As a researcher, my own knowledge of the Indian subcontinent spans several decades, which laid the groundwork for extensive networking within the Indian community in New Zealand. During the course of this research, Indian friends and colleagues would often pass on *sifārish* to other groups and individuals as a way of introduction, and having a proper *sifārish* allowed access to a wider variety of sociocultural and religious communities. My foundation in South Asian life, language and culture was also an important factor in choosing it as a case study. Such grounding not only guided everyday interactions, it was essential in designing a tenable survey tool. At an analytical level, an anthropological perspective allowed me to interpret findings in an unambiguous and objective way, rather than seeking to discern a truth, however deeply hidden. For anthropologists, the task of the researcher is, therefore, to

become familiar with a culture in the way one becomes familiar with a book or a poem, and then to read or interpret it as if one were a literary critic. The goal of these anthropologists is not to discover the scientific truth about a

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96 From the Urdu (سفارش) or Hindi (सिफारिश), meaning ‘recommendation.’
culture but to compose interpretations about the ‘other’—the other culture—that are elegant and convincing (Harris 1995:278).

Here, emic and etic perspectives in anthropology97 are particularly useful for unraveling the mystery that, emically speaking (i.e. from the perspective of the Indian community), heterogeneity is internally complex, while etically (i.e. for majority society) it remains externally abstruse. Anthropological perspectives allowed me to see through all that.

Second, anthropological perspectives are tied to, and compatible with, historical particularism, a theoretical trajectory first given voice by twentieth century anthropologist Franz Boas (1920), which argues that any society is a collective representation of its unique historical past. This was particularly appropriate for research design, as both the historical and contemporary structuring of identity by self and others was an important step in developing an awareness of deep diversity, within both multicultural and policy contexts. A historical approach to research design also requires great flexibility in carrying out its methodologies due to the

...constant changes in research technology and because of the many possible places in which historical documentation can be found. Though research is an intellectually challenging and rewarding experience, it is rarely easy and never a fast process Bombaro (2012:xiii).

While new technologies may make locating historical sources easier than before, they still require a critical reading, and a consideration of their origin. There are two main approaches for conducting historical research: original source materials and historian-produced texts based on their own research and interpretations. Source-based research is an inherently heuristic process, as the researcher must be creative in searching out material from a range of primary source materials, as well as following up on evidence of sources presented in other texts and bibliographies. These

97 These terms are used in the anthropological literature to describe perspectives from within (emic) and from without (etic). Originally based on the linguistic terms phonemic and phonetic described by Pike (1967), they were later appropriated by anthropologists (see Goodenough 1970:104-119 and Harris 1976:329-350) to refer to both insider and outsider perspectives.
considerations of material and source, along with the specifics of the particular historical approaches undertaken in this research are discussed in the Research Methods section below.

Third, contextualising a demographic approach became an important early consideration in research design. Over two centuries ago, Malthus (1798) observed that human histories were only written by and about the upper classes. The great omission from the historical record, he noted, was that of the non-elite general population, and thus he suggested a different history be recorded, derived from accurate statistical data. In so doing, Malthus established an agenda and method for “the diligent historical demographers and social historians of our time, whose labors are bearing rich fruit” (Brundage 2013:5). Quantitative measurements of the human population are therefore not only long-established, but a highly effective means of measuring variables in populations, and population censuses remain “the oldest and largest socioeconomic surveys conducted in any country, and the most frequent single source of cross-national comparative data, especially for studies covering all regions of the world” (Hakim 2000:27-8). As such, a demographic approach, based on both census and survey data, provided essential quantitative information that could be used to further the research objectives.

Fourth, a policy perspective has been significant throughout this research. While this study was originally conceived as predominantly demographic, it emerged during the course of the research that focusing on policy was the most useful way of expressing its findings, and the larger topics and issues that I wished to explore. The research, therefore, emerged as a critique of existing state multicultural policies, rather than as an anthropological ethnography, or historical or demographic piece on the Indian diaspora. Thus the policy aspect of the research provided the most
important, and challenging, part of research design. As a result, the research does not address specific policies, but rather focuses on wider issues that underpin the role of public policies in fostering a harmonious and ethnically diverse society. It is a study more about knowledge for appropriate action rather than the further development of social science knowledge (cf. Scott & Shore 1979:224-39, Hakim 2000:3-4, Majchrzak & Markus 2014), although the latter would be an added benefit if it helped reorient the way in which diversity management is currently practised.

In addition to the interdisciplinary orientations mentioned above, I included three additional approaches to research design that were fundamental to completing this study: grounded theory, mixed methods, and the application of a case study that would serve to integrate the different anthropological, historical, demographic and policy approaches.

Mixed Methods design

While existing publications on the Indian diaspora were instructive, most were historically focused, and none painted a deeper demographic picture of the population today. Therefore, a cross-sectional survey was designed to quantify the scope of the divergence between what a census communicates about a minority population (quantitatively) and what an actual community that interacts within a world not bounded by existing census hierarchies may convey (qualitatively). The scope of this project needed to be wider than merely reporting demographic disparities and change, which tends to be a largely descriptive endeavour. It also needed to more broadly reflect how changes wrought by recent immigration might impact historic, present and future state treatment of minorities.
The use of mixed methods research is not new. “The nature of most research conducted in the social sciences lends itself to use mixed methods research procedures” (Kemper et al. 2003: 273). Yin (2014:14) makes a strong case that multiple methods (e.g. a survey within a case study) are valid as they are not mutually exclusive. A mixed methods research design brings together disparate research methods to help the researcher describe or explain particular phenomena and answer specific types of questions generally not available when employing a single method. In combination, a mixed methods approach presents several advantages. First, the dimensions of the project are widened as data can be gathered that would not otherwise be procurable using a single method; second, a more complete picture of the phenomena can be obtained; and third, research goals may be more readily achieved (Morse 2003:189).

Research using quantitative data addresses some kinds of questions. For others, qualitative or mixed-methods research can best inform policy makers, especially when the relevant aspects of diversity include lived experience, complex interactions and subjective beliefs and attitudes (Boston et al. 2006:xiv).

The qualitative design of this study involved historical research and a review of the census record. Also, qualitative responses about identity and discrimination from the survey, along with contemporary examples of selected relevant events in the news media, provided a platform to address the problems imbedded in state minority treatment. The specific methods used are described in the research methods section below. For quantitative design, two specific methods were employed: a comparative analysis of both past and present census data, and statistical data collection using a questionnaire and its subsequent analysis using specialised software. Overall, a mixed methods design can increase a study’s reliability, especially if data collected from one method corroborates that collected from another.
Case Study approach

The selection of a single non-Māori minority to examine as a case study is in keeping with the general stance of anthropology. Thus, like ethnography, case studies have a way of illuminating theory while highlighting praxis. These practical applications can often “elucidate the unique features of the case” (Bryman 2008:54), emphasise difficult theoretical concepts, or give clearer meaning to analysis. Of all research designs, “case studies are probably the most flexible” (Hakim 2000:59). They not only explore a social entity, they can look at subsets or combinations of subsets: “Case studies take as their subject one or more selected examples of a social entity—such as communities, social groups, organisations, events, life histories, families, work teams, roles or relationships…” (Hakim 2000:59). A case study approach also allows for a variety of data collection techniques which support the use of mixed methods, justifying their use in social science research (Yin 2009:x, 2014). Ultimately, they allow for “a more rounded, holistic study than with any other design” (Hakim 2000:59). The application of case study approaches can also answer questions that seek to explain how or why particular circumstances or social phenomena exist (Yin 2104:4). Because the intent of this research is ultimately to inform policy through an understanding of the case study and the theoretical implications of deep diversity, the research design necessarily involved a case study approach.

These usually “begin with a question that often can be linked to emerging grounded theory” (Shulha & Wilson 2003:660). Thus, in keeping with the theoretical direction of this research, a case study of the Indian diaspora can serve as the medium to explore the historic and identity-marking complexities of a particular minority group to which a grounded theory approach can be applied. A case study approach utilising survey data and
quantitative analysis ultimately strengthens the arguments on the role of identity and the importance I ascribe to minority invisibility in both historical documentation and past and present census material.

3.3 Qualitative research methodologies

Two main research methods were applied to the qualitative data presented in this thesis, historical research and census analysis. Specific quantitative methods regarding the survey and its analysis, are discussed in Section 3.4.

*Historical research*

Although Hakim (2000:149) states that there should be no major changes of direction or methods during the course of a research project, reading early histories of Indian presence in New Zealand revealed that there were alternative narratives to be told. Interrogations of the historical authenticity of ethnicity tendered by both the New Zealand census and other historical documentation related to early Māori-tauīwi encounter established a new and important line of inquiry. Thus, the research expanded to include an analysis of historical documentation that recorded the very earliest European visits to Aotearoa. These included the ships logs and diaries of the captains, first mates and/or naturalists in my search for relevant passages or descriptions of South Asian presence aboard or ashore. Census documents were also used to discern a distinction between existing reductionist census models that homogenise non-Māori minorities and the breadth and depth of subgroups that exist within the study population.

Regarding the use of historical documentation, Bombaro (2012:125) defines primary source material as “documents, artifacts, images, and other evidence of an event created by firsthand witnesses.”
These must also be critically examined. Approaching such material is usually accomplished through a two stage method of external and internal critique. Chitnis (2006:38) states that the objective of external assessment is to restore a document [or artifact] to its archetype, while the objective of internal assessment is to determine its acceptability as verifiable. External critique questions the circumstances of the original document (e.g. author, date, place of composition) to determine its veracity, whereas internal critique examines and analyses the contents of the text for meaning and accuracy, establishing if presented facts can be accepted as true (Berg & Lune 2012:312-315). The point of external critique is therefore to establish the authenticity of the text while internal critique is designed to establish its credibility (Chitnis 2012:43).

Secondary sources are once removed from primary sources, and offer “a summary, analysis, commentary, or criticism of events in history based on the study of primary sources” (Bombaro 2012:85). Beyond secondary sources are tertiary sources, which generally include reference material that “summarizes and condenses the information found in primary and secondary sources” (Bombaro 2012:57). Historians can use all three types in their research and analysis, but despite an emphasis on facts, these texts must be viewed as a blend of objective and subjective writing. Historians have two essential mandates—to record the events of the past and to offer up an interpretation of those facts. Thus, while the substance of historical writing is objective and factual, the “life breath of history is interpretation, which also gives a definite viewpoint to a work of history” (Chitnis 2012:1). History can never be wholly objective, and an ideal work would be one that “combines subjectivity and objectivity in due proportion without upholding the one at the cost of the other” (Chitnis 2012:2). This
has particular meaning for minority history, which is often written and interpreted by dominant voices that can render minorities insignificant or invisible. This is the case in what little survives of early Māori-tauīwi encounter. However, while European interpretations clouded and distorted early Māori history, much remains intact through the importance Māori ascribed to preserving oral histories.

Brundage (2013:8) reports that there are efforts underway to “recover and develop the history of minorities,” especially for the attainment of economic and social equality. The research presented here is included in this category. European accounts of early Māori-European encounter “often serve to obscure the historical realities around the lives of the masses of the disempowered” (Brundage 2013:9). Thus, there were several challenges to coordinate in the historical chapter of this thesis, including the authenticity and credibility of source materials, and creating a balanced view of the historical subjects to ensure visibility. Relating historical anecdote back to the theme of identity, explored in Chapter Five, was another such challenge. The editorial cartoons presented in Chapter Four were useful in illustrating the background and historical context of minority discrimination. Juxtaposing the historical census data within the context of the editorial cartoons was particularly instructive, as it allowed me to interpret the implications of both state and media reaction to Asian immigration.

My examination of historical data comprised “a searching-out of underlying themes in the materials being analysed” (Bryman 2008:529), and aimed to elucidate the social phenomena of minority invisibility, state and media reaction to immigration, the importance of identity(-ies), and the complex social practice of discrimination, which are reflected in the handling of minorities and in the diversity management practices that
have perpetuated existing models of minority treatment rooted in a colonial past.

Careful scrutiny of early Māori encounter history, and the meticulous reading of the historical reportage of minorities in the New Zealand Census provided valuable data about early Indian presence. Since many extant texts on both Indian and Chinese history in New Zealand have relied on census records to confirm first presence, it was a revelation to find new information that had not been previously uncovered. Consequently, both historical and recent census data were utilised in such a way as to reveal an alternate picture than the one espoused by state institutions and media, and easily understood by majority society.

The use of early written accounts of initial Māori-European encounter also uncovered new information about non-Māori minority presence in Aotearoa. In conducting historical research, the historical documents consulted were fairly easily accessible through a standard university library system and is available to future researchers for renewed scrutiny. A search of the ‘PapersPast’ database98 produced over 82,000 original articles, editorials, and letters to the editor that directly referenced the word “Indian.” Many of these documents referenced court cases and other newsworthy items. Most early newspapers also reported the movements of ships in and out of local ports, detailing both the cargo, news of the occupants aboard, and how long the ship planned on remaining in port. The ‘Timeframes’ collection99 from the Alexander Turnbull Library yielded historical editorial cartoons, of which many were worthy of inclusion.100


100 Those included in Chapter Four have received the necessary copyright clearance from the Alexander Turnbull Collection of the National Archives, which stated that these were freely reproducible, as long as they were not used for commercial purposes.
The historical anecdotes presented were generally taken from captain and first mate logs and naturalists’ diaries from the earliest European voyages of exploration, provided evidence of South Asian sailors aboard incoming vessels. In particular, I used Dunmore’s 1981 English translation of the French journals of Surville & Labé, and Ollivier’s 1985 English translation of the journals of Marion du Fresne’s voyages to New Zealand in May-July 1772. These included both direct translation and the historians’ interpretations. In utilising these, I referred only to the translations and not the commentary, so I considered these as primary sources. Secondary sources were also utilised, as in Richards’ (1994, 2010) history of sealing in New Zealand, and others accounts of early historians (e.g. McNab 1907, 1914) and missionary accounts (e.g. Howard 1940). Salmond (1991, 1997) proved especially useful in providing the context within which both Indo-Māori and Indo-European encounter could be contextualised and discussed.

Census analysis

In utilising historical census material I employed the method of historical demography, which examines quantitative data collected about human populations in the past. Historical demography is not only a well-established social science practice (Hakim 2000:28), but a highly effective method as well. Census data also provides a benchmark for establishing minority settlement patterns and thus became a primary contributor of data for this research. Population censuses are also vital data sources as they are the oldest and largest socioeconomic surveys conducted by state governments, and secondary analysis of census data is well established in the social sciences (Hakim 1982, 2000:27, Kiecolt & Nathan 1985:33-34).

During the early stages of this research a thorough review of historical census documents was conducted, using each of the
quinquennial censuses held in the University of Waikato library, from the very first 1851 census up to and including the 1926 Census. I searched through the original published census records with a fine-tooth comb, reading each and every footnote in specific sections of the early censuses that covered birthplace, race,\footnote{I use the term ‘race’ here in the manner in which it was used in the early censuses, as the concept of ethnicity used today was poorly known at the time.} nationality and religious affiliation. This allowed me to create the ethnicity and religious affiliation tables presented in Appendices A and B which proved central to the analysis presented in Chapter Six. These became working documents from which I composed the historical narrative and thematic analysis that emerged from the data. I decided to stop my analysis at the 1926 threshold as the history of Indian settlement in New Zealand based on the census has been well-recorded from that point on by Leckie (2007) and others.

Such collation of the early census data allowed for, as Hakim (2000:28) comments, a renewed look at old records that can “overturn received wisdom and introduce a new perspective on the recent past.” Since most demographers do not collect their own data, the use of historical census material proved useful in advancing notions of historical state treatment of minorities in New Zealand. To be clear, analysis of this material is historical rather than demographic. Demographic analysis is applied to recent census and survey data and is discussed in Section 3.4 below.

3.4 Quantitative research methodologies

In order to establish inherent differences between the actual composition of the Indian population and the picture painted by recent census results, it was necessary to both utilise a statistical approach to recent census data
and to design and deploy a cross-sectional survey. These are discussed below.

**Statistical census analysis**

Viewing how official state statistics quantify and categorise ethnic minorities became the focus for the presentation of recent census statistics presented in Chapter Seven. The data is taken from both the 2006 and 2013 New Zealand Censuses, as the Christchurch earthquakes forced the delay in the 2011 Census. In the case of the 2006 Census, data was obtained from the freely downloadable spreadsheets from the Statistics New Zealand website. These, however, usually aggregate Level 2 and Level 3 ethnic categories into Level 1 ethnicities (e.g. European, Asian), and hence are only useful for broad generalisations. Data specifically on the Indian population therefore required a customised data request and subsequent grant from the Council of New Zealand University Librarians (CONZUL) and Statistics New Zealand (JOB-3357 and JOB-4081). As the 2013 Census data on ethnicity only became available in two waves occurring in May and August 2014 during the writing stages of the thesis, it was not possible to resubmit a second customised data request in time to do an updated analysis based on the 2013 Census data. Where possible, I have updated the 2006 data with the publicly available 2013 data, and where not, I have presented the 2006 data.

Analysis focused on providing a picture of the ‘Indian’ population as projected by the state. This centred on using the two largest ethnic identity variables (i.e. ‘Indian’ and ‘Fijian Indian’), and crosstabulating these with other census indicators in order to establish if there are any significant differences in subgroup populations. This is discussed in detail in Chapter

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102 This is discussed in Chapter One.
Seven. The results of this analysis were then juxtaposed against survey data presented in Chapter Eight.

Survey design, deployment, and data entry and analysis

The Indian population in New Zealand has never before been surveyed to the extent reported here, and there was a real need to be able to form a clear demographic profile to address some of the research objectives. While sufficient historical data exists, and recent census figures are available to quantify numbers, religions, and geographical spread (Statistics New Zealand 2006, 2014), information describing the composition of today’s Indian population, especially in terms of identity and ethnic subgroups, is sorely lacking. Therefore, a detailed questionnaire was deployed between 2008-2013 to collect both qualitative and quantitative data through the use of a self-administered, mixed-mode, web-based, survey of 1,124 members of the Indian population resident throughout New Zealand.

Validity was an early and pressing concern as the surveyed population does not represent a random sample. Procuring such a sample from a ‘sample frame’ was not possible, considering the resources available for thesis research. As a result, this determined the type of survey deployment that could be utilised (i.e. snowball sampling). While such methods are unrepresentative of the target population (Goodman 1961, Biernacki & Waldorf 1981, Atkinson & Flint 2001, Kemper et al. 2003, Browne 2005, Bryman 2008:184-185), the purpose was to explore key themes rather than

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104 e.g. discounting the population census (which would require doing a stratified random sample using meshblock census data, and considerable sampling expenditure and resources), no survey frame of the entire Indian population in New Zealand exists from which a random sample can be drawn.
provide a representative sample. This is further discussed below.

Reliability of survey data was also an important consideration (Hunter & Brewer 2003:581-582, Tashakkori & Teddlie 2003:706, Bryman 2008:31-33, Yin 2014:45-46). In order for the data to be reliable, it would need to be replicable, so in both planning the research and in carrying it out, the methodologies are presented so that they can more easily be replicated. This includes a copy of the questionnaire in Appendix H.

**Questionnaire design:**

Composing appropriate questions for the questionnaire included several considerations. First, it was necessary to ensure that these were succinct and clear enough that anyone in the target audience would understand the intent; second, it was important to anticipate prospective respondents’ queries and be able to account for these in the final version; and third, it was essential to show appropriate sensitivity for religious, political and personal questions. In terms of format, considerations included layout and selecting the most appropriate configuration for many of the questions. Proper layout included choices of horizontal or vertical presentations of responses, number of rows, providing enough options, the use of tick-boxes or radio buttons, and the use of closed- or open-ended questions.

These challenges were often resolved by a number of different techniques, which included further literature research on survey design,\textsuperscript{105} looking at similar survey questionnaires,\textsuperscript{106} and the trialling of a number of different versions of the same question on ‘pretesters’—those that had agreed to help during the design stage of the questionnaire. Pretesting was crucial in getting feedback about what worked, and what did not. Equally


\textsuperscript{106} See Spoonley et al. (2007), Department of Labour (2009).
challenging was determining which questions would comprise the deployed version. Both survey length and the amount of time it took to complete were significant concerns. Most questionnaires should be just long enough to get the answers being sought, yet short enough to keep respondents ticking boxes (Malhotra 2008). Early versions contained over a hundred questions and the initial drafts took pretesters a half hour to complete. The final questionnaire, by comparison, contained 79 questions with pretesters reporting an average time of 16 minutes to complete.

Next, some questions needed further finesse. A particularly onerous example was the question on identity.\textsuperscript{107} During the pretest, this was framed as open-ended, allowing respondents to best consider their answer. This allowed for a variety of responses that ran the gamut from predictable and pedestrian, to informative and quizzical, and on to comical and outrageous. Many were single word entries, like “Indian,” while others used the opportunity to expound on the meaning of life or left it entirely blank. Yet while the open-ended approach had many advantages, it was difficult to classify and code these types of responses.\textsuperscript{108} To change the question from open-ended to closed-ended required identifying lists of potential identity words (like \textit{mother}, \textit{Indian}, \textit{Muslim}, and \textit{professional}), and classifying certain sets of words that shared particular characteristics under broad headings such as gender, caste, religion, occupation, family, and ethnicity. These words were then randomly listed on the questionnaire with the intent of seeing what broad categories were representative of identity and hence important to respondents. The intent was to determine if generalizations such as “71.2\% of the surveyed population selected words categorized under the heading

\textsuperscript{107} See Question 11 in Appendix H.

\textsuperscript{108} This is one of the reasons why Statistics New Zealand doesn’t ask an open-ended ethnicity question on the census.
'nationality' (e.g. 'Kiwi' or 'Indo-Fijian')” or “8.6% of respondents felt that stating their caste was an important identifier” were possible. However, it was determined that listed words might be skewing respondents towards selecting particular characteristics that they might not otherwise have thought of or chosen unless prompted, referred to by Waters (2000:1736) as the “example effect.” This brought about a return to open-ended self-identification as preferable.

**Eliciting responses:**

An early consideration was determining how best to get potential respondents to complete. Examining the variety of response rates that could be expected from an array of deployment methods, many had high non-response rates (Kaplowitz *et al.* 2004, Heerwegh & Loosvelt 2008, Manfreda *et al.* 2008) but more recent methods, involving technology and mixed deployment, were beginning to appear in the literature (Bennet & Nair 2010, Fan & Yan 2010, Monroe & Adams 2012, Sauermann & Roach 2013) and showed promise in improved response rates. The question of incentives for achieving higher response rates was also explored. Most demonstrate elevated response rates when incentives to complete are offered (Cobanoglu & Cobanoglu 2003, Birnholtz *et al.* 2004, Gendall & Healy 2008). However, respondents would need to provide email addresses to receive an incentive, and this would compromise the ability to maintain confidentiality. I decided to preclude incentives and rely on respondent interest instead.

Recent studies on response rates of web-based surveys have often produced inconsistent results as factors affecting response rates have long been influenced by the varying contexts of each particular study (Sax *et al.* 2003). Shih & Fan (2008) show a mean response rate of 34%, with results for the individual studies in their meta analysis ranging from 7% to 88%.
In their meta-analysis of 45 studies, Manfreda et al. (2008) show results for web-survey response rates that range from 11.1% to 82.1%. On average, Cook et al. (2000) state that normal response rates for web-based surveys should run between 35-40%.

**Pretest:**

A pretest was conducted in October 2008 by soliciting 100 Indian friends and acquaintances to respond to the first draft of the questionnaire. In the first group of twenty emailed invitations, individuals were invited to provide feedback about the questionnaire regarding rationale, justifiability and clarity of question content, obvious absence of or repetition of content, question order, satisfaction level with response options, and total amount of time taken to complete the survey. The survey was then updated using the feedback, and another batch of invitations sent out. This process was repeated five times at roughly two week intervals. Reminders were sent one week after the initial request. Pretesting continued through March 2009.

**Selecting appropriate deployment methods:**

There are a wide variety of dispersal methods for questionnaires. As expected, each has advantages and disadvantages.\(^{109}\) There are traditional paper-based surveys (hard copy manually distributed and collected), phone surveys, emailed surveys which embed the questionnaire within the email or send it as an attachment (Donmeyer & Moriarty 2000), which recently become possible with minor technological advances,\(^{110}\) or a web-based survey sending a URL link directly in an email to potential respondents, which, like the email option, has also recently come into

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\(^{109}\) See Cobanoglu et al. (2001), Coderre et al. (2004), Kaplowitz et al. (2004), Fricker et al. (2005), Schillewaert & Meulemeester (2005), Wright (2005), Heerwegh & Loosvelt (2008), Manfreda et al. (2008).

\(^{110}\) Such as Google Forms, a part of the Google Docs suite available on the web.
wide usage in recent years. Hard copy was both the traditional method and has been shown to be effective, and could be disseminated in a variety of ways: posted by mail, distributed at specific events designed to attract target audiences, or given in person to individual potential respondents.

Regarding the limitations of each dispersal method, paper questionnaires are expensive and time-consuming to prepare, and the data would have to be manually entered from each collected questionnaire. With phone surveys recent research in this technique has shown alarming drops in response rates as newer technologies are introduced and improved. This line of inquiry has also been supplemented with recent research on how to decrease non-response rates (Steeh et al. 2001).

Emailed surveys are problematic in that the embedded format would not always remain constant (the received format being determined by the capabilities of a respondent’s email client), and length was an issue—it works well for brief surveys but becomes cumbersome with an extended questionnaire. Emailing surveys as PDF attachments meant that the receiver would have to not only print out the survey, but would also have to return it by post at their own cost. Furthermore, emailing potential respondents an embedded survey, or emailing them a direct clickable URL link, would require that receivers be fairly computer literate, which might alienate a portion of the target audience.

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111 See Cobanoglu et al. (2001), Kaplowitz et al. (2004), and Healey et al. (2005).

112 Costs of a paper questionnaire include printing and distribution costs, i.e. paper, photocopying, envelopes, and postage.

Biases also tend to be introduced when respondents who answer online questionnaires have different attitudes or demographic characteristics than those who do not respond. This is particularly the case for online questionnaires as many social groups are underrepresented among internet users, including people of limited income, members of particular ethnic or religious groups, older persons, and those with lower levels of educational attainment.\textsuperscript{114} Other studies suggest that there is very little variation between surveys conducted on-line and traditional paper-based surveys, or that the differential between offline and online populations is quickly closing and may be insignificant in the near future.\textsuperscript{115}

Each method however did have specific benefits. With hard copies many potential respondents could be mobilized by organising gatherings and giving presentations; those present could subsequently complete and directly return the questionnaire. Particular audiences that were under-represented could also be targeted, e.g. high-schoolers, elderly, Muslims, Sikhs, South Islanders, and low income earners. It would also be possible to ensure the inclusion of groups that were non-computer literate.

Regarding email, sending electronic messages to potential respondents was both economical and direct; in addition, specific individuals could be targeted with emailed cover letters intended explicitly for them, hopefully increasing response rates (Porter & Whitcomb 2007). PDF questionnaires (formatted as intended) could be attached or URLs could be included to effortlessly deliver respondents directly to the web-based survey. This latter method (web-based survey) would also dramatically reduce the amount of time spent performing the otherwise onerous data entry task. It also meant that respondents would not need to mail completed surveys.

\textsuperscript{114} See Grossnickle & Raskin (2001), Miller (2001), Ray & Tabor (2003), Wilson & Laskey (2003), and Wright (2005).

\textsuperscript{115} See Fricker & Schonlau (2002), Riva et al. (2003) and Gosling et al. (2004).
Recent research has shown that, in terms of response rates, web-based surveys are nearly as good if not better than traditional mail surveys (Baruch & Holtom 2008:15, Manfreda et al. 2008).

**Sample frame:**

The survey required creating a sample frame—a list of the target audience along with their mailing addresses for postal surveys, or a directory of email addresses for use in a fully systematic and randomized polling sample. Most social scientists prefer random samples (Kemper et al. 2003, Bryman 2008) as these are suitable for making highly probable generalisations about a population and can be utilised in numerous ways; for example, to make predictions, as a basis for sound policy decisions, or to compare with other populations. Having a sample frame of 40,000 would be ideal, as it would allow for random selection of a set of about 4,000 from the original list, and from that, a return rate of about 25% to get the minimum 1000 responses to meet this survey’s objective.116

In order to determine the best strategy for ensuring a stratified sample while using a snowball method, it was necessary to break down the census numbers and derive percentages for such variables as age, income, gender, marital status, religion, linguistic group, and birthplace. By repeating this process in the sample, it was possible to juxtapose the two to ascertain where the sample significantly differed from the census. It was then feasible to target specific groups to help balance the differential. This method helped me create a more-stratified sample in order to increase the reliability of the results. While the sample may not have been completely random, it better approximated randomness than snowball sampling alone could.

116 In order to have a statistically significant sample.
Random samples often employ methods like canvassing every fourth house or ringing every twentieth phone number in the book, which in this case was not only impractical, it was impossible. There is no available list of South Asians in New Zealand, or at least not an accessible or affordable one. While Statistics New Zealand might be able to compile such a catalog from the quinquennial census, it would be impractical and costly to make such a confidentiality-compromising request. The next step, thus, was to compile a list of my own. This included collecting business cards of contacts, social networking through personal contacts, networking at conferences, utilising email list serves and Indian business directories, advertising in targeted publications and web sites of Indian organisations, and making personal contact with the secretaries of the numerous Indian organisations (which had the benefit of authenticating my email requests). All of these contacts were within New Zealand and all from within the public domain.

It was important to also be opportunistic as a researcher. While traveling, I found people by equally canvassing such establishments as dairies and taxi stands, Indian restaurants and doctor’s offices hoping to find proprietors, cooks, drivers, anyone from the subcontinent willing to take the survey. This provided many opportunities for gupshup and guftagu,\footnote{Gupshup (गूपशूप, کھپشپ) means gossip, guftagu (گفتگو, کھفتگو) is general conversation.} important South Asian social mechanisms for building rapport and establishing credibility. I had also created a small paper business card with information on the survey and the URL for easy access.

I also assembled small baskets with hundreds of cards and distributed these throughout Indian restaurants and shops selling Indian groceries in Auckland, Hamilton and Wellington, asking shopkeepers to leave these on the counter so that customers might take one at checkout. These baskets
were even deployed in South Island locations by an enthusiastic respondent willing to help.

Figure 3.1: The business card advertising the web-based survey.

![Business Card Advertising Web-Based Survey](image)

**Indian in New Zealand**

*Participate in an anonymous online survey at the University of Waikato from your computer at home by visiting:*

<http://indiandiaspora.wikispaces.com>

Todd Nachowitz, PhD candidate
Department of Political Science & Public Policy
University of Waikato
email: tn37@students.waikato.ac.nz

Figure 3.2: Basket and cards left on checkout counters at Indian dairies & restaurants.

![Basket and Cards Left on Checkout Counters](image)

In 2008, I created a web site focused on the Indian diaspora in New Zealand. The site, consisting of four pages, contains a page that introduces the research, another that introduces the survey (with a link connecting visitors directly to the questionnaire), a third page of known Indian groups, organisations and associations, and a fourth listing

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published references on the Indian diaspora in New Zealand.\textsuperscript{119} Both the list of known published sources and the list of Indian organisations were picked up by Wikipedia and now appear as External Links on their “Indian New Zealander” page.\textsuperscript{120} Those Googling “Indian diaspora in New Zealand” or similar terms are directed to both the Wikipedia page and my web site. I continue to update these web pages regularly. This method continues to shepherd those proactively searching for information to find my web site, and ultimately find the survey. New contacts translated into additional survey respondents that I might not have otherwise been able to reach.

Contacts from all sources were compiled into an alphabetical list of email addresses without names attached, resulting in over a thousand unique email addresses in my target population. This list became a key step in finding prospective survey respondents. Names from New Zealand’s major phone books (hard copy and web-based) were also used to compile a list of potential names and postal addresses. However, by selecting obviously South Asian surnames (e.g. Singh, Patel, Fernandez, Khan, Sharma, Gupta) to which postal questionnaires could be sent immediately introduced bias and could potentially skewed the sample, either through oversubscription to particular names that might invoke certain caste or religious affiliations, or by not having any feasible way of determining if, for example, all Hussains were from India and not from Pakistan. Nonetheless, it was helpful as an additional means of enlarging the sample frame and may have slightly increased overall numbers. In particular, it enabled contact with additional numbers of Sikh respondents, as comparisons with the 2006 Census showed that members of this community were under-represented in the survey. It may also serve

\textsuperscript{119} see Appendices J & K.

\textsuperscript{120} See <en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Indo_Kiwi>. 
as a respectable illustration of a methodological situation in which ends might justify means.

**Questionnaire deployment:**

Four basic deployment strategies were eventually employed: the web-based questionnaire, mail-based questionnaire, presentations with survey distribution; and table displays at conferences and relevant gatherings. How best to introduce the survey for each type of deployment technique required consideration. Additionally, it was important to consider disparate approaches for each deployment method in order to maximize response rates. Confidentiality and the anonymity of survey respondents was always a primary concern. Respondents taking the web-based survey remain anonymous as no identifying information was solicited, and Survey Monkey, discussed below, only records a respondent number and the date on which the survey was submitted. Collected hard-copy surveys were also anonymous and individual respondents were identified by a Respondent Number written onto the top left corner of the first page of each returned survey.

**Web-based questionnaire:** Here, an internet-based survey company, Survey Monkey, was used. It allowed great flexibility in terms of design, proved extremely useful in gathering data, and provided simple statistical analysis (percentages) of the results. Each potential respondent was asked to click on a link delivered in an email invitation to take part in the survey, which would bring them directly to the questionnaire. Information that introduced the survey and the researcher was also provided, including information on the ethics approval received from the University of Waikato prior to deployment. For many questions Survey Monkey had

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been set up with a list of possible responses provided in dropdown menus so that responses could be easily selected, thereby limiting possible spelling errors and ensuring data consistency. The ‘snowball’ sampling method asked potential respondents to forward the email invitation to other friends, family and colleagues in their personal networks who might be interested in completing the survey. Survey Monkey also allowed for a ‘thank you’ screen to be displayed at the completion of the survey where an additional opportunity for respondents to forward the survey link on to others in their network was provided.

For all its benefits, there was one issue with Survey Monkey, the “enable Java Script” problem, that had first appeared during the pretesting phase. When a few pretesters did not complete the questionnaire, it appeared to be because of an “exit this survey” link on each questionnaire page (so that respondents would always have an ‘opt out’ option). However, in the actual deployment period, a pattern emerged: most respondents were ‘opting out’ at the same page in the survey. Finally one pretester reported she could not complete the questionnaire past question #12. Apparently, when accessing the survey from an older computer, or from one with a browser that does not have “Java enabled,” the remainder of the survey would be blocked. This resulted in lost or incomplete data on 16% of those that navigated to the site and began the survey. In order to mitigate this problem, explanatory notes were placed in the emailed invitations, on my web-site, and on the introductory page of the web survey.122

*Paper version questionnaire:* A hard copy version was also created for distribution at presentations, conferences, or to individuals. The paper

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122 The note reads: “Having some difficulty completing the survey? Some older computer browsers may present some problems. If so, make sure that you are using the latest version of your browser. Also, check your browser’s settings and make sure that it is configured to enable Java Script. This should fix the problem. If, after enabling Java Script and rebooting your computer, you are still experiencing this problem, you can try completing the survey using another, newer, computer.” On the web site I also provided the option, and a link, for respondents to download the pdf version of the survey.
version of the questionnaire needed to be adapted from the web-based version in order to be usable. However, there were certain biases that were introduced by having two versions, most notably that the web-based survey compels respondents to provide answers by not allowing them to proceed without first entering a response, thus improving the overall number of replies for individual questions. With the paper version, respondents could skip questions or miss out whole pages.

The second bias arose from the necessary avenue for data collection that precluded pure random sampling. In order to lessen sampling bias during the data collection stages, the use of stratification techniques that would allow under-represented groups (e.g. Muslims, Indian Christians, the young and elderly) to be targeted by using additional deployment methods was incorporated. For example, giving presentations to Indian groups in a wide variety of regions and from a variety of backgrounds (e.g. religious groups, sociocultural organisations, Indian sporting events) created the opportunity to administer the questionnaire.

*Live presentations:* Throughout the research, period attending and speaking at numerous conferences and gatherings enabled networking with additional individuals and groups. An opportunity to speak at the annual gathering of Indian businesspeople in Auckland in 2011 provided additional access to the Indian entrepreneurial community. The presentation consisted of a combination of historical information on the Indian diaspora in New Zealand and census data on the Indian population. This provided a constructive backdrop for introducing the research and distributing the questionnaire. These had the added benefit of connecting with geographically spread sociocultural and religious groups (e.g. Indian seniors; *mandir*, *masjids* and *gurdwaras* for particular faith and cultural celebrations). Each additional presentation opened up new opportunities for survey respondents.
Obtaining permission to set up unstaffed tables or countertop displays at key locations that would draw large numbers was another important deployment method. A poster briefly introducing the research was displayed, and a table or countertop held a stack of questionnaires, pencils, and a large box into which completed questionnaires could be dropped. This set up would often be left in place for 1-3 weeks, returning later to collect the materials and completed questionnaires. This form of presentation worked well in locations like mandirs, masjids, and community centres. In some instances (e.g. conferences, community events and gatherings), I staffed a table beside the display in order to meet and talk with people interested in the research.

**Summarising responses:**

Snowball sampling methods cannot be appropriately compared with sampling based on a survey frame with a known number of invitations sent, as researchers have no way of knowing or tracking how many additional invitations may have been forwarded to others by the primary recipients. It is therefore impossible to determine acceptable response rates for this type of sampling. Having sent out approximately 1,000 email invitations, a total of 1,124 responses were received by the time the survey closed, in early 2013.¹²³

**Data entry and analysis:**

While Survey Monkey proved extremely useful as a delivery and collection tool, it was poorly equipped to analyse received data. For data entry and analysis, SPSS was used.¹²⁴ SPSS is widely employed in the

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¹²³ The survey remained open for long as it was necessary to reach a minimum of 1000 responses in order for the survey results to be statistically significant.

¹²⁴ This included SPSS versions 18 through 22 over the course of the research.
social sciences, and though frequency of use is not always the best method for selecting an appropriate path (Frost 1916), many social scientists still use SPSS for their statistical needs. Though cumbersome, it did not have as steep a learning curve as more highly regarded statistical packages (like Stata or R) and it allows researchers to apply particular statistical formulae to help determine correlation between variables as well as confidence intervals.

While data can easily be exported from Survey Monkey into an Excel spreadsheet, it can only export information for a limited number of variables that cannot exceed a set number of columns, otherwise the exported data becomes segmented into additional spreadsheets. Since the exported data included both the questions and every possible response, there were huge numbers of columns in the exported spreadsheets. For example, Question 16 asked for a respondent’s birth country with 193 countries listed as potential answers; Survey Monkey would export each potential response as a separate column, enumerating the results for any particular country in the appropriate cell. Only a small number of columns, in this case 23, contained results of the exact number of respondents for each particular birth country; despite this, for Question 16 alone, all 193 columns of data were exported. As there were a total of 79 Questions in the questionnaire, exporting individual columns for every potential response for each question required an unwieldy amount of data be exported as separate Excel spreadsheets. It was impossible to import this volume of data into SPSS. As a result, it was necessary to manually enter the data from each survey question for each individual respondent, which on average, took about 20 minutes each. This was done regularly, throughout the study period, for each of the 1,124 survey respondents.

125 This represents the number of member states with representation in the United Nations.
Once all of the data was manually entered into SPSS, analysis of the data could proceed using frequency and percentages to arrive at totals that could be compared with the census results for the Indian population in New Zealand. This was followed by simple bivariate analysis using cross-tabulation procedures (using the \textit{chi-square} function reserved for categorical data) executed by selecting two or more variables for comparison and choosing the appropriate menu function in SPSS. Missing data (i.e. respondents not answering any particular question) was removed from these calculations.

\textbf{Additional notes on the survey:}

Only a small portion of the survey results are presented in Chapter 8, and not all questions were answered by every respondent. Some questions were filters (e.g. birthplace, ability to speak a South Asian language). In these instances, filter questions would either direct respondents to a subsequent section, or to skip over if it did not apply to their particular circumstances. As a result, many of the questions have fewer numbers of the survey population answering them (e.g. n=846), as opposed to the total surveyed population (n=1124). Results are presented using frequency tables and charts, and an analysis is conducted by applying the chi-square statistic to crosstabulated variables to determine relationships.

\textbf{3.5 Other considerations}

\textit{Potential bias in research}

There are methodological biases and influences to be addressed. Foremost is the increasingly discredited notion that all research must necessarily be devoid of bias. Mulgan’s (2004:4) assessment, that “there can be no entirely value-free political analysis” is more germane than Durkheim’s sociological method and his statement that “all preconceptions must be
eradicated” (Durkheim 1938:31). Bias-free research is an impossible and ultimately undesirable ideal—it presumes that one’s actions are not political or that one’s behaviour in the field does not have any effect. It also fails to acknowledge that there can be multiple truths and innumerable perspectives. There may be a generation or two straddling this Durkheimian divide, but it is safe to say that social science research has progressed in the intervening years.

Borrowing from feminist methodologies, Mies’ (1993:68) notion of “conscious partiality,” or the idea that a researcher is aware of and accountable for his or her biases, values and assumptions, is worthy of attention. Feminist research has often been accused of harbouring such partiality (cf. Huber 1973, Denzin 1992:49-52), but most practical responses to these criticisms had earlier, and appropriately, come from feminist scholarship that aims to better situate the researcher within the field of investigation and overcome researcher bias (Oakley 1981, Ring 1987, Cannon et al. 1991, Ferguson 1993:168, Olesen 2013). Feminist standpoint epistemologies are particularly keen on exploring the social construction of research encounters (Stacey 1988, Reinharz 1992, Schwandt 1998:242):

Giving voice to women’s perspectives means identifying ways women create meaning and experience life from their particular position in the social hierarchy (Riger 1992:734).

Particularly, Harding’s (1991) standpoint methodology and Haraway’s (1991) informatics of domination question notions that while scientific methods are designed to remain objective, they rarely are, as academic investigation is inherently a subjective task, a researcher’s particular take on a given topic. Increasing general awareness of the subject matter is likewise of interest to a feminist approach, as it favours multiple perspectives and embraces additional views that supply new ideas and theories, contributing to a wider appreciation of a topic. This type of exegesis should be readily
identifiable in both the historical and census data presented in Chapters Five and Six, as both exemplify novel strategies of attacking and unearthing historical material. Haraway’s *Cyborg manifesto* (1991b) also resonates with her notion of multiple ways of being—as there is no single way of *being female*, it should be evident that there is no such thing as, for instance, *being Asian*; seemingly simple identity categories exist in infinitely more heterogeneous ways.

More recent discussions on bias have focused on the notion of reflexivity; that researchers should be both “reflective about the implications of their methods, values, biases, and decisions,” and that most research should be interpreted with “a sensitivity to the researcher’s cultural, political, and social context” (Bryman 2008:682). In other words, a researcher’s particular point of view is most usually framed by a specific set of attitudes, beliefs and values that may seep into and possibly blur one’s analysis and interpretation. If research is to be truly objective, specific research biases and predilections must be explicitly acknowledged in order to mitigate and minimise any potential effect.

In terms of reflexivity, while this research strives to be objective throughout, there is both evidence towards, and support for, all types of pluralism. The methodology used follows feminist perspectives that rely on consciousness raising in both majority and minority populations. Furthermore, as a researcher, it is vital that I acknowledge the personal and professional experiences of living and working in South Asia for over a decade, and my experiences as a member of a Jewish religious minority, have facilitated an overall empathetic view of minority experience, particularly, awareness of discrimination and the structural and institutional factors that perpetuate its entrenchment. In acknowledging this empathy, there is admission of implicit bias towards minorities.
Moreover, bias may be perceived in that there is a conscious intent to benefit the community studied; I contend that something be delivered back to the communities within which the work was conducted and this necessarily influences the research design.

*Ethics approval*

Ethics approval was sought and granted from the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences’ Human Research Ethics Committee at the University of Waikato. Written information about ethics approval, and how the research would be used, was provided for all respondents answering questionnaires.

One last introductory and background chapter remains before presenting the substantive chapters, that of providing the necessary context of diversity and discrimination within New Zealand, to which I now turn.
CHAPTER FOUR:  
DIVERSITY & DISCRIMINATION IN  
THE NEW ZEALAND CONTEXT

Ahakoa ki tāna anō kā, he tangata rata a Taiaroa ki te Pākehā, engari e noho āhua hihira ana ia ki te haere mai o tauiwi ki konei noho ai.

Despite saying that he liked the Pākehā, Taiaroa remained guarded about foreigners coming here to settle (Orange 1990:136).

4.1 Introduction

This chapter begins with a historical introduction to Māori-Pākehā-tauiwi relations, and illustrates how Māori-Crown relations set the context for the later incorporation of non-Māori minorities. In particular, it examines the Crown’s ambivalent policies that both sought to assimilate and simultaneously racialise Māori and non-Māori minorities as inferior others. This becomes clearer in the discussion of census history in Chapter Six. The bicultural/multicultural discourse is also introduced as necessary context for interpreting existing diversity management practices. The bicultural discourse, and Māori-Pākehā perspectives on it, helps distinguish New Zealand from other settler societies in its formulation of minority policies. The chapter ends with a summary of the historical context of discrimination and a brief review of human rights legislation. These are useful in providing a needed context for the historical expository and demographic analysis in which subsequent chapters are framed.

4.2 Māori responses to European arrival: immigration without consent

Indigenous Māori, as first migrants to a new land, grappled with uncharacteristic climates and geographies, searched for alternative

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126 Tauiwi refers to non-Māori and is often translated as ‘foreigner.’ Since Pākehā are provided for in the Treaty of Waitangi, it has come to refer to those not specifically mentioned in the Treaty. As such, it is often used to refer to non-Pākehā migrants.
sources of sustenance, and found novel resources upon which to build a new material culture that was wholly apart from their collective memories of Polynesia.\textsuperscript{127} With the successful negotiation of these hurdles, over a period of many centuries and remembered in the recounting of a colourful oral history and a collective whakapapa,\textsuperscript{128} Māori became known as tangata whenua, the people of the land.\textsuperscript{129} Like most other autochthonous populations around the globe, indigenous Māori were eventually subjugated by colonial settlement and dispossessed of their lands and taonga.\textsuperscript{130} In this sense, Māori, as Aotearoa’s original inhabitants, would view their European (Pākehā) colonisers as an immigrant population. Any general discussion of Aotearoan arrivals must necessarily take into account initial Māori views of, and responses to, early European arrival, as this has contemporary implications for the treatment of new migrant communities and ethnic minorities.

Māori reaction to European intrusion often depended upon the location, time, and size of settler populations. Where ratios favoured Māori, there was often peaceful cohabitation between them, often with small numbers of Pākehā living under the care and protection of their guardians, and intermarriage was common (Wanhalla 2008). Although there was some intermarriage “Māori and settlers lived in largely different worlds” (Chambers 2003:170). Where ratios favoured Pākehā in large numbers, the opposite was often true, and Māori response one of suspicion rather than invitation. This simple equation holds true for most cultures during first contact—once a population balance begins to shift in

\textsuperscript{127} see King (2003), Howe (2008), Moon (2013), McLauchlan (2014).

\textsuperscript{128} genealogy, lineage, descent.

\textsuperscript{129} Tangata whenua is most often translated as indigenous peoples of the land. It can also mean ‘host’ as in those that have the right of hosting visiting populations. Tangata whenua are also considered as the people who have authority in a particular place, as in Ko te tangata whenua te hunga pūpuri i te mana o te tūhia whenua (Royal 2012:4).

\textsuperscript{130} treasure, anything prized, applied to anything of considerable value. It can also be translated as property, goods, possessions, or effects.
favour of recent arrivals, positive relationships between the two wane and either one of two possible scenarios may ensue: the original inhabitants work collectively to oppose newcomers (e.g. Native American tribes opposing European expansion in the Americas), or the new immigrants/colonisers respond, often more forcibly than their indigenous counterparts, with the imposition of enforced political repression/oppression, often through violent means (e.g. British Rāj in India, apartheid in South Africa). As with most conflict, end results are never immutable and change when new elements are introduced.

Similarly, response to first contact in Aotearoa was unpredictable. Depending on the particular circumstances of the encounter, different hapū and iwi would have had different responses to European colonisation. At first contact, some Māori thought Europeans to be gods floating on magical vessels, others saw them as goblins with strange habits that ran off into the bush to hide (Salmond 1991, Bassett et al. 1998:21). Māori response might also have depended upon the early reactions of European captains at the time of contact, e.g. Abel Tasman’s initial misreading of first contact at Taitapu (Golden Bay) in December 1642 resulted in four unexpected European deaths (Sharp 1968:124, Wilson 2013a). After a time, Māori began to welcome new arrivals and met regularly for mutually beneficial trade. Overall, there “was general Māori acceptance of this small number of Pākehā, especially as they opened up routes for trade and access to technology and arms” (Kelsey 1984:22). The two populations “were in need of each other, and a spirit of tolerance and respect generally prevailed” (Owens 1992:31).

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131 Hapū refers to one’s kinship group, a clan, tribe, or subtribe, but most usually refers to a section of a larger kinship group.

132 Iwi is usually simply translated as ‘tribe,’ but more specifically can refer to one’s extended kinship group, tribe, nation, people, nationality, race. It generally refers to a large group of people descended from a common ancestor.
These first visitors were welcomed by the people of the land for the cornucopia of material goods they brought with them from the factories of industrial England. Economic welcome, trade and sexual congress were the equalisers in Māori New Zealand for the first forty years of European contact (Walker 1990:9).

In the early 1800s, Māori had mixed views about the arrival of Europeans. Chiefs would assess the possible benefits these newcomers might bring in terms of trade, tools and weapons. Initially, the Ngāpuhi chief Hongi Hika was in favour of British missionaries settling in New Zealand. This was not for religious reasons, but because he knew that an association with missionaries would increase his influence on other Europeans, bringing greater opportunities to trade for tools and weapons (Beaglehole 2006:53).

For some decades, Auckland settlers benefited from living reasonably close to many hard-working Māori who could supply fresh fruit, fish, pork and potatoes (Chambers 2003:148).

Māori at the time often viewed Europeans mostly as a means to an end—a nuisance to be tolerated as a conduit for acquiring new commodities that were in need at the time.\(^{133}\)

Likewise, Europeans needed fresh foods, primary resources and guides to explore the interior. As Banks tellingly wrote in his journal about Cook’s first expedition and penetration into the interior:\(^{134}\)

The noble timber, of which there is such an abundance, would furnish plenty of materials either for the building defenses, houses or vessels. The river would furnish plenty of fish, and the soil make ample return of any European vegetables sown in it...swamps which might doubtless easily be drained, and sufficiently evinced the richness of their soils by the great size of the plants that grew upon them, and more particularly of the timber trees which were the straightest, cleanest, and I may say the largest I have ever seen...we were never but once ashore among them, and that but for a short time on the banks of the River Thames; where we rowed for many miles between woods of these trees, to which we could see no bounds (excerpts from the diary of Joseph Banks, as recounted in Park 1995:29).

Cook’s journal is full of admiration for the timber and the fertility of the soil. It was a land full of promise, a kind land where settlers from Europe could build a comfortable life (Bassett et al. 1998:26).

It was during these early years that forging alliances was especially important for both parties. Māori needed access to guns and ammunition,\(^\)

\(^{133}\) e.g. nails, woolen blankets, guns.

\(^{134}\) This occurred in 1769 along the Waihou river near present-day Thames.
which was often the pivotal ingredient for determining outcomes amongst warring tribes. In exchange, Pākehā needed food, guidance and protection for their own survival.

As European settlement progressed, Europeans began to rely less on Māori and more on themselves. They established permanent settlements to provide food, shelter and entertainment for growing populations. These settlements:

…first saw the commercial possibilities of New Zealand, and for some decades New Zealand was in effect an Australian frontier. Without the planting of these colonies, it is unlikely that any trade in flax, timber, or sealskins could have developed (Chambers 2003:126).

Blacksmiths, furniture makers, and others were needed to supply and repair their possessions. Whalers and sealers arrived to exploit a growing demand for their products. Missions were established in order to proselytise, convert and civilise the ‘godless heathens’ to Christianity. God’s work often included the harvesting of timber and other resources necessary to support growing European populations. However, the discourse changed and Māori began to regard European settlement differently. Pākehā were increasingly scrutinized as exploiters of communal resources and as harbingers of new diseases that decimated Māori populations (Pool 1991). Māori began to think more in terms of resources lost to Pākehā rather than as beneficiaries of European fraternisation. Initially, European colonisation was merely immigration without Māori consent. Eventually, power shifted as European colonisers dispossessed Māori of their land, religion, and other valued institutions.

As no single political authority existed at the time of first contact, Māori were without a formal immigration policy, and lacked a unified identity, choosing instead to identify along hapū and iwi lines. As Europeans settled, Māori formed the Kingitanga (King Movement) in 1858, whose
primary purpose was to unify hapū and iwi in order to stall land alienation (Papa & Meredith 2012). While encounters occurred throughout Aotearoa over time, involving countless individual and collective actors with innumerable outcomes, it can be said that, if anything, Māori responses to initial European arrival and settlement were generally those of welcome and accommodation (Owen 1992). These initial engagements, and their numerous outcomes, would later help formulate a Māori response to tauiwi arrivals, customs and traditions based on values of kaitiakitanga and accommodation that are widely practised in New Zealand today.

With the dramatic increase of Europeans over the last 175 years, Māori have remained resolutely committed to a policy that strongly embraces bicultural relations, based on the principles outlined in the Treaty of Waitangi. Some Māori either reject biculturalism altogether or express ambivalence towards it (O’Sullivan 2007, Smits 2010). Those that reject it, do so on the grounds that it does little to empower self-determination (Fleras & Elliott 1992), that Māori cultural practices aren’t as deeply embedded into New Zealand institutions as they should be (Stavenhagen 2006, Smits 2010), or that the appropriation of Māori intellectual property has gone too far (Durie 1998). O’Sullivan (2007) argues that biculturalism serves to reinforce the status of Māori as “junior partners,” thus legitimising Pākehā hegemony. Others take this further by suggesting that bicultural policy merely reinforces the perception that Māori are perceived to be ‘a disadvantaged minority with special needs’ (Maaka & Fleras 2005, Smits 2010). Even so, Māori generally proceed with firmly rooted beliefs of welcome for non-Māori and continue to pursue relationships in good faith.

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135 guardianship, stewardship.
The foundations for New Zealand’s modern immigration policies and diversity management practices can therefore be found in practical Māori applications of accommodation, consultation and justice (Jackson 1995, Stéphanie 2011). As global migration grows, biculturalism may serve as the basis for a deeper understanding of more recent encounters with new migrants. This has helped foster a uniquely New Zealand approach to race relations. It is what sets New Zealand apart from other settler societies, and is largely responsible for policies of social cohesion and inclusion.

4.3 Biculturalism and multiculturalism: Māori, Pākehā and tauiwi

During the roughly 120 years between the time when Europeans outnumbered Māori in the late 1850s136 and the passing of the Treaty of Waitangi Act in 1975, Māori were largely dispossessed of their lands and marginalised by European colonisers. This era can best be characterised by widespread discrimination against Māori by Europeans practising an assimilationist policy (Pearson 1990, Thomas & Nikora 1992, van Meijl 2006, Sullivan 2010), a period in which Māori have tenaciously fought for their own cultural survival (Macdonald 1990, Vasil 2000, Walker 2004).

Except for a few court cases that mentioned the Treaty of Waitangi in the first few decades after its signing, the period between 1877 and 1975 was one in which the Treaty failed to exist in the eyes of the New Zealand courts (Ruru 2004:59-61). The historical treatment of Māori has largely

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136 Estimating Māori population figures prior to European arrival is a difficult affair, with estimates varying between 100,000 to 500,000, with significant and steady decline until the early 1900s (Pool 1977:24, 1991; Salmond 1997). Sutton (1986:315) estimated the 1858 Māori population at just over 60,000. The first official enumeration of Māori took place in 1857-1858 (Kukutai 2011a:36), undertaken separately from the official 1858 Census which recorded only Europeans. This enumeration of Māori estimated the 1858 population to be 56,049. The 1851 Census recorded 26,707 Europeans present in Aotearoa, and the 1858 Census recorded 59,398 Europeans present in Aotearoa. The 1861 Census recorded 99,021 Europeans and estimated the Māori population as 56,336. Based on these figures, I estimate that the European population surpassed the Māori population sometime between 1855 and 1859.
been an exercise first in institutionalised discrimination, followed more recently by social policies and practices designed to improve relations.

The first of these was Crown movement away from the practice of early assimilationist policies towards those of integration. Two Department of Māori Affairs reports (Hunn 1961, Booth & Hunn 1962) described this new relationship, in which Māori were expected to do most or all of the changing:

Integration denotes a dynamic process by which Maori and pakeha are being drawn closer together, in the physical sense of the mingling of the two populations as well as in the mental and cultural senses where differences are gradually diminishing (Booth & Hunn 1962:2).

In successive years, assimilationist and integrationist policies began to yield to more normative shallow approaches to diversity management that stressed tolerance above all else. This exercise between the two parties has been partially successful, measured by generally improving bicultural relations that emphasised the settling of historic grievances and traditional property rights (Thomas & Nikora 1992, Barrett & Connolly-Stone 1998, Poata-Smith 2004:59137). It wasn’t until the late-1970s—after the passing of the Treaty of Waitangi Act—that Māori-Pākehā attitudes began to shift, along with a commitment from the political leadership for new bicultural policies (Vasil 2000, King 2003, Hill 2010, Smits 2010), which were widely adopted and practised.

Maori leaders were seeking more than greater or total inclusion; rather, they aspired in effect to a bicultural society and policy that would enable them not just to retain their culture and have it recognized as familiar and legitimate but also to entrench it as foundational and of equal value to that of Pākehā culture and polity” (Hill 2010:296).

Biculturalism eventually became widely accepted as a strong policy directive (Vasil 2000, King 2003:465, Bartley & Spoonley 2005). As a result, the period between the early 1990s to the present has generally seen

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137 Poata-Smith, however, has been critical of the shift away from collaborative protest seeking social justice to iwi-driven cultural nationalism.
improvement in Māori-Pākehā relations (Barrett & Connolly-Stone 1998, Vasil 2000, Smits 2010) although diversity management policies appear stuck in both ideological modes of shallow approaches to diversity governance.\(^{138}\) What improvement there has been should not be interpreted as a reversal of past assimilationist policies. There have been numerous setbacks to these relations during this same period. Of note, the passing of the highly contentious Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 generally disenfranchised Māori (Ruru 2004, Charters & Erueti 2005, van Meijl 2006) and led the UN to independently report that:

The legislation appears...on balance to contain discriminatory aspects against Māori, in particular in its extinguishment of the possibility of establishing Māori title to the foreshore and seabed and in its failure to provide a guaranteed right of redress (UN Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination 2005).

Dissatisfaction with this legislation gave rise to the subsequent formation of a new Māori Party as a more advantageous political vehicle for Māori aspirations (Mutu 2005, van Meijl 2006). The June 2010 repeal of the Foreshore and Seabed Act and the announcement of a new bill to replace it (Finlayson 2010) has angered many Pākehā who feel that the government has given away too much.\(^{139}\) These examples, and the significant lack of equity between Māori and Pākehā health policies (Hefford \textit{et al.} 2005, Health Research Council 2010), and across a range of other socioeconomic indicators and policy outcomes (Teaiwa & Mallon 2005), show that there is still much progress to be made.\(^{140}\)

Appropriate mutual recognition of the terms of reference remain contested by both sides, and there is still uncertainty and confusion over

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\(^{138}\) See Humpage & Fleras (2001) for a critique of the government’s ‘Closing the Gaps’ strategy.

\(^{139}\) Repeal of the 2004 Foreshore and Seabed Act is one of the main policies of the Pakeha Party, launched in 2013, which seeks to end all special treatment for Māori, abolish Māori seats in Parliament, and put an end to Māori privilege (see Espiner 2013, Pakeha Party’s website at <www.pakehaparty.com>). The Pakeha Party is currently considering registration with the Electoral Commission as a registered political party (New Zealand Newswire 2013).

\(^{140}\) See Sibley & Liu (2004) on strong Pākehā opposition to the resource specific aspects of biculturalism.
how the meanings and definitions are best represented, and how they are to be understood, recognised, interpreted and operationalised. The various connotations of biculturalism, and the changing definitions by the parties involved, are nuanced, complicated, and open to oscillating interpretations that usually depend on where one stands. For instance, does biculturalism refer merely to the ongoing relationships between Māori and Pākehā, as played out in the public domain? Or does it concern bilateral agreements between Māori and the Crown? Are Pākehā to be best considered as non-Māori, or does the word imply only white European? Alternatively, are Māori and Pākehā considered opponents or partners in this relationship? Either way, biculturalism as a policy initiative can only be considered in its adolescent phase, and dissimilarities of understanding and purpose remain considerable. Though bicultural policies are not new, they are well established (Pearson 1991, Thomas & Nikora 1992, Vasil 2000, Rata 2005), and may be regarded as a contentious strategy based on the framework provided and upheld by the Treaty of Waitangi.

As biculturalism formalised in the 1970s, the first large wave of non-Māori minorities arrived from Polynesia and began to alter the cultural, economic, political and religious landscape in the main urban centres (Bedford & Larner 1992, Chambers 2003, Hill 2010, Moon 2013:130, McLaughlan 2014:198). By the 1990s Pacific populations on Niue, the Cook Islands, and Tokelau were smaller than those that resided in New Zealand, making Auckland the Pasifika capital of the world (van Meijl 2007, Alefaio 2008):

The number of Pacific Islanders in archipelagic New Zealand grew exponentially. In 1945 only 2200 Pacific Islanders were counted, yet by 2001 this number had grown nearly one hundred times to 202,000—6.5% of the domestic population (Salesa 2009:170).

During the years of favourable economic growth in the post-WWII period, New Zealand drew upon Pacific populations to fuel a growing economy,
and many came as unskilled labour in the 1960s and 1970s for jobs in the manufacturing sector (Gibson 1983, Bedford & Warner 1992, Ongley & Pearson 1995, Spoonley 2006). Yet while both Māori and Pasifika have made significant socioeconomic progress, they account for “some of the poorest health and education statistics, the lowest incomes, and some of the highest welfare dependency and incarceration statistics” in New Zealand (Teaiwa & Mallon 2005:211). The greater number of Pacific peoples who arrived during the post-war years began to strain existing social service capabilities, and by the mid-1970s, concurrent with the first oil shock and rising unemployment, had, by Crown accounts, generally overstayed their welcome (Bedford 1985, Bedford & Warner 1992). The New Zealand government began regulating their arrivals by adjusting the migration flows of Pacific peoples who did not have New Zealand citizenship by right (Bedford & Warner 1992, Bedford et al. 2000). In March 1974, prompted by large numbers of overstayers and an economic downturn, the Muldoon government began a series of “dawn raids” in which to weed out the overstayers. These raids continued into the early 1980s (de Bres & Campbell 1976, Bedford & Warner 1992, Wearing 2004).

From the time of the dawn raids through the late-1990s, biculturalism normalized, informed public discourse, and became the subject of considerable controversy (Ritchie 1992, Wetherell & Potter 1992, Spoonley et al. 1996, Barclay & Liu 2003, Sibley & Liu 2004). During this time, Māori grew roughly 94% and Pacific populations more than tripled between

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141 The average annual growth rates for Māori were highest between 1945-1966, before rapid fertility decline (Pool 1991, Kukutai & Rarere 2014).
1976-1996. This period also coincided with a new wave of immigration, seeing the arrival of the first non-European and non-Pacific migrants in great numbers.

Table 4.1: Percentage of the total population, by ethnicity (Statistics New Zealand 1976, 1996).

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<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>2,693,186</td>
<td>2,879,085</td>
<td>+6.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māori</td>
<td>270,035</td>
<td>523,374</td>
<td>+93.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>61,354</td>
<td>202,233</td>
<td>+229.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>24,967</td>
<td>173,502</td>
<td>+594.9</td>
</tr>
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Although Asians had been settled in New Zealand since the 1880s (McGill 1982, Brooking & Rabel 1995, McKinnon 1996, Vasil & Yoon 1996, Zodgekar 2010), their populations were small and relatively clustered. However, during the 1976-1996 period, Asian populations, consisting mostly of Chinese and Indians, more than quintupled. For all at the time, there appeared to be two conflicting discourses in effect: one, the clearly outlined policy of biculturalism beginning to take shape; the other, recently introduced immigration reform that created new waves of non-Māori minorities. There was thus biculturalism on the one hand, while foundations for a strong multicultural population were being laid on the other.


Net migration increases were largely fueled by these reforms (Poot 1992, 154). There were major changes to the definitions used to collect ethnicity statistics during this period that make exact tracking of these numbers problematic: “the Māori Affairs Amendment Act defined Māori for the purposes of the 1974 act as any person with Māori ancestry, rather than the census definition of half or more Māori descent. An attempt was made to accommodate this legislative change in the 1976 Census by including a two-part question, first asking for fractions of blood, then Māori ancestry. However, the two-part question caused some confusion among respondents, with a significant portion giving inconsistent answers to Part 1 and Part 2, or answering only one part of the question. As a result, the reported figures understated the population and were adjusted at an aggregate level to reflect historical trends” (Statistics New Zealand 2001:3). Even so, I use the 1976-1996 data merely as an illustration of the extent of growth in Māori and Pacific populations during this time.
Bartley & Spoonley 2005), and increased immigration of a skilled workforce was seen as essential to give the economy a much needed boost (Bedford et al. 1987, Trlin 1992). These policies were codified with the passage of the Immigration Act 1987. The Act, and the policy changes it implemented, rejected the essentially white New Zealand policy of assimilationist preference for immigrants from traditional source countries, and loosened immigration restrictions.

Immigrants are now selected on the basis of personal merit rather than national or ethnic origin. This is a significant departure from the bias in favour of the British and West Europeans which had shaped New Zealand migrant flows for almost a century. The change reflects a new public opinion that discrimination related to the accident of birth is no longer acceptable and an acknowledgment that diversity would enrich rather than weaken New Zealand society (Department of Statistics 1988:202).

The 1987 Immigration Act did not specifically endorse cultural diversity as a preferred policy outcome, but rather placed its emphasis on selecting skilled migrants needed for the New Zealand labour market (Brooking & Rabel 1995).

Recent immigration of non-Māori minorities has necessitated a rethink of biculturalism. Understandably, Māori are reluctant to relinquish it as a policy objective until the Articles of the Treaty are first realised (Walker 1995a, 1995b; Smits 2010), and appropriate restitution of historic grievances received. As a policy initiative, multiculturalism has no basis in the Treaty of Waitangi, and may be considered a potential threat to the promise of biculturalism. What might motivate Māori to embrace multiculturalism when biculturalism has not been fully achieved?143

It is better to accept the notion of a bicultural New Zealand, as preferred by Maori, than to create an unnecessary and damaging controversy by insisting on multiculturalism (Vasil 2000:1).

143 See Durie (2009) for his perspective on Māori-Crown relations beyond 2020, with particular emphasis on the relevance and applicability of the Treaty of Waitangi.
In an officially bicultural New Zealand, multiculturalism has often been seen as a threat to Māori—an attempt by Pākehā to dilute strengthening calls of Māori self determination (Johnson 2008).

The Treaty is specifically a Māori-Crown agreement. There were certainly other nationals here at the time of its signing in 1840, but the Treaty specifically excluded them as it only mentions Māori and the Crown (and its British subjects). As British subjects, this should have allowed Indians present at the time of the signing the right to remain. However, the introduction of subsequent Crown policies more clearly excluded Indians from full participation in the terms of the Treaty and full rights of entry.

Differing interpretations of the Treaty have not necessarily clarified the issue. For instance, there is the notion that Māori should embrace non-Māori not as Pākehā, but as tauiwi, to be considered as a single, yet multicultural, group. There is some basis for this in the Treaty if the Crown takes responsibility for representing later settlers:

The signatories to the Treaty of Waitangi in 1840 were the Crown and Maori. The Crown represented the Pakeha (British settlers) and Tau Iwi (later settlers) and the Maori represented all tribes and sub-tribes of New Zealand. Thus, the Treaty reaffirmed the aboriginal status of Maori and all subsequent cultures arriving in New Zealand were represented by the Crown as one party to the Treaty (Neill 2004).

A recent report by the Human Rights Commission appears to agree:

The Treaty of Waitangi is a fundamental reference point for race relations and human rights in New Zealand. The Treaty is also the founding document of the nation and applies equally to all. It recognises the right of everyone to belong in New Zealand and to enjoy equal rights (Human Rights Commission 2010a).

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144 e.g. French, Chinese, Indian, American.

145 Specifically, this refers to the Asiatic Restriction Bill 1896, The Immigration Restriction Act 1899, The Immigration Restriction Act 1908, and The Undesirable Immigrants Exclusion Act 1919, The Immigration Restriction Amendment Act 1920 (see Roy 1970; Bennion & Boyd 1994; Leckie 1985, 1995b; Murphy 2007; Beaglehole 2012), among others, some of which were specifically aimed at Chinese exclusion.
This is not so much an interpretation of the Treaty as it is a specific Māori belief that *tangata whenua* have the responsibility of guardianship (*kaitiakitanga*) over *tauiwi*, should welcome and provide guidance and assistance, rather than exclude them under the terms of the Treaty. This interpretation also has no basis in the Treaty, which provides a framework specifically within a bicultural context. Smits (2010:67) agrees, stating that there was no place in the “rhetoric of unity and assimilation for other minority ethnic groups, such as the Chinese, who were present in small numbers” from the 1860s.

Making biculturalism work has not been an easy task, as both Māori and *Pākehā* have grappled with race relations and issues of social inequality for their entire communal history (Barrett & Connolly-Stone 1998, Walker 2004). Some have even referred to the Treaty as a document that best exemplifies social injustice (Liu 2005:5). As bicultural policies began to have a positive impact on race relations (Smits 2010), the 1987 immigration reform brought increasing numbers of *tauiwi* to New Zealand. While Māori and *Pākehā* engaged in a predominantly biculturalist discourse, state mechanisms began to promulgate a potentially divisive multicultural agenda through the introduction and use of such terms as ‘equality’ and ‘multicultural’ when referring to Māori, *Pākehā* and *tauiwi*, which at the time had consisted of Pacific populations and a small but growing cadre of Asian immigrants (Race Relations Act 1971, Tauroa 1982, Fleras 1984). There have also been

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146 The Race Relations Act 1971 established the office of the Race Relations Conciliator and set up procedures for complaints about racial discrimination. Amendments to the Human Rights Act 1993 in 2001 merged the Race Relations Office with the Human Rights Commission. Both the Commission’s primary functions under the HRA are relevant to race relations: to advocate and promote respect for, and an understanding and appreciation of, human rights in New Zealand society; and to encourage the maintenance and development of harmonious relations between individuals and among the diverse groups in New Zealand society (Human Rights Commission 2014, Chapter 18; Race Relations Act 1971, see <legislation.knowledge-basket.co.nz/gpacts/reprint/text/1971/an/150.html>).
numerous attempts to portray a multiculturalist discourse within the wholly bicultural framework provided for in the Treaty of Waitangi (Bartley & Spoonley 2005, Hill 2010, Smits 2010), but Māori opinion, media accounts, and public sentiment suggest that Māori have remained wary of potential ulterior motives on the part of a predominantly Pākehā government intent on progressing multicultural policies at the expense of biculturalism:

Not only did multiculturalist policies ignore or downplay the special status of Maori under the treaty, they argued, but in both theory and practice such policies also neglected the cultural reality of New Zealand being primarily a nation of two peoples rather than of many (Hill 2010:302).

Hill’s comment reveals a fundamental unidimensional racial bias to the biculturalism that underlies the appeal of the bicultural/multicultural discourse. Clearly, more recent white European immigrants to New Zealand, from, for example, South Africa, Europe and North America, are both implicitly and explicitly accepted into New Zealand society as Pākehā, without question, while their Asian counterparts are not. Although white non-British European migrants to New Zealand have no formal historical ties to the Treaty, they do have a distinct advantage over Asian migrants who may be perceived as having fewer social and economic opportunities, for instance due to a perceived lack of fluency in English, a ‘difficult accent,’¹⁴⁷ or perhaps by not appearing to look or be ‘Kiwi’ enough.¹⁴⁸

There is a profound anxiety attached to these issues by all populations. Asian migrants may feel sorely disadvantaged as a result, even though many have native fluency. Persons of Asian origin born in New Zealand might experience anxiety over not being fully accepted as ‘Kwis.’ Māori experience a similar type of anxiety over migration issues, one associated

¹⁴⁷ This may also be true, to a lesser extent, for Eastern European migrants.

¹⁴⁸ See also Sibley & Liu’s (2007) work on ethnicity and nationhood.
with the loss of control over the bicultural discourse in the face of increasing immigration and the rise of polyethnicity (Kukutai 2008, Chang 2009). Continued immigration may therefore disadvantage Māori and undermine the promise that multiculturalism embodies: that Māori, Pākehā and tauiwi can live peaceably in a multicultural New Zealand under the terms of the Treaty. This is not always clear, as the various causes and manifestations of this anxiety may be distinctly manifested across diverse ethnic groups.

Complicating matters is the prevalent anxiety that white Europeans may fear about the increasing numbers of non-white immigrants, or of rising concern over the increased fertility rates of non-European populations. Hage (1998) termed this apprehension the “white nation fantasy,” referring to the rise of Pauline Hanson’s anti-immigrant One Nation Party in Australia. This suggests that Pākehā could likewise resort to unease and nationalistic concerns and perhaps try to construct themselves as the only ones worthy to lead:

It should be remembered, however, that worry can be the last resort of the weak. There are many people for whom worrying is the last available strategy for staying in control of social processes over which they have no longer much control (Hage 1998:10).

This may also account for the similar rise in France of the French National Front of Jean-Marie Le Pen and his daughter Marine, or the recent rise of the Golden Dawn party in the two elections in Greece in early 2012. Closer to home, Winston Peters’ New Zealand First party, also ran on an Asian anti-immigration policy that played largely on Pākehā fears that the Crown was giving too much away. Kerry Bolton’s satanic neo-Nazi group (van Leeuwen 2008) and Kyle Chapman’s rise of the National Front and Right-wing Resistance also share similar anti-Asian and anti-Africa immigration rhetoric (Spoonley 1987:157-158, Neems 2009, Newbold & Taonui 2012). Hage argues that the white nation fantasy is experienced by both white
racists and by members of the opposite extreme, the white multiculturalists:

I argue that both White racists and White multiculturalists share in a conception of themselves as nationalists and of the nation as a space structured around a White culture, where Aboriginal people and non-White ‘ethnics’ are merely national objects to be moved or removed according to a White national will. The White belief in one’s mastery over the nation, whether in the form of a White multiculturalism or in the form of a White racism, is what I have called the ‘White nation’ fantasy. It is a fantasy of a nation governed by White people, a fantasy of White supremacy (Hage 1998: 18).

Māori are also not immune to such appeals of race, and have often resorted to unilateral actions designed to assert their indigenous rights (Poata-Smith 1996, 2004). These usually focus on land rights, Treaty settlements, issues in Māori language and culture, and responses to incidents of racism. Annual Waitangi Day protests against misdeeds of Pākehā governments have been taking place regularly at Waitangi since the early 1970s. Of note, Ngā Tamatoa (the Young Warriors), protesting treaty injustices promulgated by Pākehā, disrupted regularly scheduled activities and attempted to destroy the New Zealand flag at the 1971 ceremonies (Hazlehurst 1993, Dominion Post 2007a, Minority Rights Group 2008). Annual protests at Waitangi have been a feature ever since (Hazelhurst 1995; Mansfield 2003; McAllister 2007, 2011). Even Queen Elizabeth suffered indignities in 1990, and 1995 celebrations ended in chaos when dignitaries were spat on, insulted and mooned by Māori activists:

At the 1990 celebrations, a Maori protestors hurled a black T-shirt in the face of Britain’s Queen Elizabeth II, who remains head of state of New Zealand although it has long been independent, as she drove past. The protests boiled over in 1995 when the Governor-General at that time, the Queen’s resident representative, and other VIPs were spat on, jostled and greeted with traditional Maori bare-bottomed insults. The New Zealand flag was trampled, and the German ambassador, then dean of the diplomatic corps, was insulted with anti-German slogans (Barber 1995).

Also of note are the considerable number of Māori grievances involving land. Of particular significance was the Ngāti Whātua occupation at Bastion Point from January 1977 to May 1978 (Temm 1990:64, Walker 1990:215), where Māori refused to relinquish one of their last remaining
parcels of land to the National government. Also noteworthy was the Māori struggle to regain possession of their land at Raglan, which included ceremonial burial grounds that Pākehā had appropriated during WWII for use as an airstrip. After the War, the land was not returned, becoming a golf course instead. Protesters, led by Eva Rickard in 1978, engaged through 1987, when the land was returned to Tainui Āwhiro (Thomas & Nikora 1992). For 79 days in 1995, Māori activist Ken Mair led Whānganui tribes to occupy Pākaitore (Moutoa Gardens) in support of their claim to the Whānganui River, an occupation which ended peacefully with the signing of a tripartite agreement between Māori, local, and national government (Moon 1996, Praat 1998).

More recent examples of Māori land activism came about after a 2003 Court of Appeal ruling that gave Māori the right to seek customary title to the foreshore and seabed, overturning the Pākehā assumption that it belonged to the Crown. Pākehā backlash (white nation anxiety?) had led the Labour government to propose drastic new legislation that would essentially secure Pākehā control over these areas. This led to the May 2004 hikoi149 from Northland to Wellington in which Māori protested the confiscation of land and resources they had customarily regarded as their own. The passing of the Foreshore and Seabed Act 2004 returned control of these areas to the Crown. This legislation however, was overturned with the passing of the Marine and Coastal Area (Takutai Moana) Act 2011, returning customary title to Māori (Finlayson 2010, Bess 2011, Boast 2011, Makgill & Rennie 2011).

There have been many significant high profile actions undertaken by Māori activists (Poata-Smith 2004). These include a January 2005 incident

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149 a long march or walk.
at a *pōwhiri*\(^{150}\) at a Waitangi Tribunal hearing at Te Urupatu in which Tūhoe activist Tāma Iti fired a shotgun at the New Zealand flag to let attending delegates “feel the heat and smoke, and Tūhoe outrage and disgust at the way we have been treated for 200 years” (Pouwhare 2005). In October 2007, the New Zealand Police and Armed Offenders Squad conducted a series of ‘terror raids’ on alleged paramilitary training camps in the Urewera ranges in the eastern Bay of Plenty. Property searches in Auckland, Waikato, Wellington and Christchurch were also carried out where suspected arms were stored. These operations targeted suspected terrorist training camps and weapons caches, yet yielded little result (NZ Herald 2007, Taylor 2007).\(^{151}\) Additionally, Gerard Teoi Otimi opened up his own immigration bureau and sold fake Aotearoa passports to Pacific overstayers for $500, although he was subsequently arrested, fined, and sentenced in 2011 to 18 months in jail (Hoadley 2003:527-528, Harvey 2011). Even so, the belief in and desire for a harmonious multicultural society is shared by Māori, Pākehā and *tauiwi* alike. Recent years have seen the institutionalisation of such proactive government organisations as the Human Rights Commission\(^{152}\) and Settlement Support.\(^{153}\) Māori positions on biculturalism have become more firmly entrenched, as bicultural issues first need addressing before multiculturalism can proceed.

With competing bicultural and multicultural discourses, Māori, Pākehā and *tauiwi* have had the opportunity to reexamine their respective world views. This reassessment is likely to continue and these discourses are likely to remain. Meanwhile, there is a lack of public debate on the nature

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\(^{150}\) a welcoming ceremony, usually performed on a marae.

\(^{151}\) These actions were later found to be unreasonable by independent inquiry (Independent Police Conduct Authority 2013).

\(^{152}\) The Human Rights Commission supports both a bicultural framework based on the Treaty, and a multicultural New Zealand.

\(^{153}\) Formed to help new immigrants acculturate and settle into life in New Zealand.
and meaning of *tauiwi* in regards to the Treaty. I would suggest that any debate on multiculturalism and diversity governance must include increased public discussion on the participation and inclusion of *tauiwi*, as this could help advance the debate on multiculturalism and diversity governance.

4.4 The historical context of minority discrimination in New Zealand

During the period that began with European arrival and settlement and continued with the exercise of nation building, early New Zealand, like other settler societies, was largely preoccupied with maintaining the dominion of its European settlers and with keeping New Zealand white. Public attitudes towards the relatively small number of Asian migrants that were present around the time of the signing of the Treaty were institutionalised by the Crown from the arrival of the Chinese who came to work the gold mines in Central Otago in the 1860s. Historically, some of the earliest publications on Asian immigration were a bigoted reaction to the initial waves of Asian settlers. Reeves (1901), Kelly (1911), Macdonald (1926), and the White New Zealand League (1927) all discuss the menace the new immigrants posed to a nascent and implicitly bicultural society. Wellington and Christchurch saw the formation of the Anti-Chinese League in the 1890s; in 1907 the Anti-Asiatic League emerged in Masterton and Palmerston North; and in the mid-1920s the White New Zealand League saw its beginnings in Pukekohe and Auckland (Sedgwick 1982, Lian 1988, Ip 1995, Palat 1996, Cormack 2007, Murphy 2007, Ward & Liu 2012).

In Pukekohe, Indian market gardeners became the target of a racist campaign begun by local vegetable growers who felt their livelihood was threatened. This led to the formation of the White New Zealand League in
1926-1927, a national movement that opposed both Indian and Chinese immigration (O’Connor 1968; Leckie 1985, 2007; Brookes 2007; Cormack 2007). The rhetoric coming from this newly formed organisation was particularly virulent, and perceived Indian and Chinese migrants as “a threat to the racial integrity and economic prosperity of European New Zealanders” (White New Zealand League 1927). At best, such anti-migrant sentiments called for a tightening of immigration policy; at worst they advocated segregation or repatriation. This literature paralleled similar anti-Asian propaganda of the late 19th and early 20th centuries emerging from other settler societies in Europe, North America, South Africa and Australia.

While bicultural relations had earlier constituted racial discourse, New Zealand became progressively xenophobic as Asian migration continued, and the rhetoric fanned by the formation and activities of anti-immigrant groups became increasingly vitriolic. Successive governments passed numerous anti-immigration laws targeting non-European migrants. Most were specifically designed to both maintain white European dominance and to keep Asian migrants from entering New Zealand. These include:

- The Chinese Immigrants Act 1881
- The Asiatic Restriction Bill 1896
- The Immigration Restriction Act 1899
- The Chinese Immigrants Amendment Act 1907
- The Immigration Restriction Act 1908
- The Undesirable Immigrants Exclusion Act 1919
- The Immigration Restriction Amendment Act 1920
- The British Nationality and Status of Aliens (in NZ) Act 1928
- The Immigration Restriction Amendment Act 1931
- The Immigration Amendment Act 1961
- The Immigration Act 1964.


See the 1921 census report on on ‘Race Aliens’ which notes the importance of maintaining racial purity in New Zealand, warning that the coalescence of white and coloured races was “not conducive to improvement in racial types” (Census and Statistical Office 1923:vi, Kukutai 2011a:38).
While the media published anti-Asian editorial cartoons, the public expressed similar attitudes through ‘letters to the editor.’ Both illuminate the racism that permeated public discourse. Their inclusion here provides evidence of how public sentiment reflected official Crown policies racialising minorities as inferior others. Wakelin (1853), for example, wrote to the *New Zealand Spectator*, requesting that Edward Gibbon Wakefield refrain from importing Chinese labour, describing Chinese migrants as “ignorant, slavish and treacherous.” In the *New Zealand Truth* (1927): “It is time, however, that New Zealand closed its doors to Asiatics, and in its advocacy of this policy, the White New Zealand League, which has recently been holding meetings in Wellington, has New Zealand Truth’s full support.” Editorial cartoons became a popular method for widely disseminating propaganda.156 These parodies were widely circulated in local newspapers and enjoyed wide support.

Figure 4.1: “Still they come” by John Blomfield (1873-1942), one of the more prolific editorial cartoonists of the time (Blomfield 1905).

Figure 4.1 portrays Chinese men leaping over a wall symbolizing the New Zealand border, aided by a pole labeled the “£100 poll tax.” Behind them

156 A representative sample of eight editorial cartoons were selected from dozens available that best represented public sentiment on Asian immigration at the time. More information on these, and many other such cartoons can be found in Ip & Murphy (2005).
are more Chinese scaling the supposedly unsurmountable boundary. They are watched in horror by Richard Seddon and Joseph Ward.\textsuperscript{157} The cartoon refers to the imposition of the poll tax on Chinese immigrants, the perception that £100 wouldn’t be enough, and the fear that too many Chinese were arriving. This extended caption appears underneath the original cartoon (Free Lance 1905):

Sir Joe: ‘Look, Dick. It’s up to us to do something.’
King Dick: ‘Yes, by Jove. The wall’s got to go up a bit higher. If a £100 poll tax won’t keep the yellow agony out then we’ll have to slap on another hundred.”

Underneath, the paper reports “twenty Chinamen arrived yesterday, and the Treasury benefited to the tune of £2000” (Free Lance 1905:7).

Figure 4.2 belies the great number of Indians feared to have arrived in the wake of a British memorandum stating “Indians already settled in the Dominions should be allowed to bring their wives, subject to the rule of monogamy, and minor children” (New Zealand Truth 1917).

Figure 4.2: “The Hindoo peril, small politicians open the door.”

\begin{figure}
\centering
\includegraphics[width=0.5\textwidth]{hindoo_peril.png}
\caption{“The Hindoo peril, small politicians open the door.”}
\end{figure}

\begin{quote}
This poem also appears underneath the editorial cartoon of the front page:

With much ado the door we locked
‘Gainst every black and yellow man;
The law it had a trigger cocked,
A “White New Zealand” was our plan—
But now Imperial Dunderheads
Want us that door to open wide.
Shall we comply?
Resounds the cry.
“No bloomin’ fear,” on every side.

(Source: NZ Truth, 2 June 1917, page 1).
\end{quote}

\textsuperscript{157} Richard Seddon was elected Premier of New Zealand between 1893-1906. Joseph Ward was New Zealand’s first Prime Minister between 1906-1912.
The first cartoon above portrays an Indian labourer painting a white map of New Zealand black, inciting the fear many white New Zealanders felt about impending ‘hordes’ of Asian arrivals. The anxiety that New Zealand was irrevocably being altered by ‘mass’ immigration was felt by many white residents, along with a coexisting inability to effect any preventative change. The scene in the second cartoon takes place inside a railway carriage or tram. All of the seats are occupied by Asian men, forcing the two Europeans, a worker and a digger, to stand. The worker turns to the digger and comments indignantly:

   Worker: “Well, digger, the only way for us to get a seat is to stop these blokes coming into the country at all.”
   Digger: “Righto Mate, if the government won’t do it, we can” (Glover 1920a).

This cartoon references both European-Asian racial tensions and the egalitarian ‘mateship’ that the use of the term ‘digger’ implies. With its ‘we’ll do it ourselves’ attitude, it encourages the public to act to prevent continued Asian immigration. It also attempts to enlist the public in an anti-immigrant campaign to goad government into passing stronger

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158 ‘Digger’ was a military slang term for soldiers from Australia and New Zealand (Dennis et al. 2008).
legislation keeping the ‘yellow peril’ at bay. The text appearing below this illustration notes: “The Auckland watersiders have decided to refuse to handle ships landing Chinese or Hindus, as a protest against the number of aliens that have been allowed to come into the country. The RSA Conference has also registered a protest” (Glover 1920a).

Figure 4.4 appeared in the Returned Soldiers Association’s *Quick March* magazine, the official organ of the RSA. They believed that the country, and the way of life they had fought and risked lives for, was threatened by unrestrained Asian immigration. It portrays a returned soldier, watching helplessly as an endless stream of ‘aliens’ disembark. The soldier, an ‘insignificant digger’ utters: “Well, whatever it was we fought for, it was neither high prices nor cheap labour. If these new style landing parties are going to continue it might be as well to set up an Expatriation Department for the benefit of ex-soldiers” (Quick March 1920, Leckie 2007:73). The feeling conveyed suggests that the rights of Asian migrants were given more importance than the rights of returned soldiers.

Figure 4.4: “And the aliens marched in bunch by bunch” (Quick March 1920).
Figure 4.5 portrays an unstoppable mass of Asians surging ashore while a lone, overwhelmed European attempts to sweep away injustice with a broom labeled ‘existing legislation.’ It underscores the belief Europeans felt that policy wasn’t maintaining a white New Zealand, and to prevent further unwanted migrants from entering the country. Europeans continued to pressure elected officials to pass yet stronger anti-immigration legislation. The 1920 Immigration Restriction Act\textsuperscript{159} proclaimed the principle of free entry for all of British or Irish birth or descent. Other nationalities were allowed entry only at the discretion of the Minister of Customs (Bellamy 2008:3). This Act further institutionalised discrimination against migrants from non-traditional sources and formalised a ‘white New Zealand’ policy:

\begin{quote}
The Bill is the result of a deep-seated sentiment on the part of a large majority of the people of this country that this Dominion shall be what is often called a ‘white’ New Zealand, and that the people who come here should, as far as it is possible for us to provide for it, be of the same way of thinking from the British Empire’s point of view (New Zealand Statutes 1920; Williams 1976, Leckie 2007, Murphy 2007).
\end{quote}

The Act gave Government complete control over who was able to enter the country, the culmination of four decades of legislation. It was perceived at the time to be the ultimate solution to New Zealand’s Asian problem (Murphy 2007:15).

\textsuperscript{159} Introduced to Parliament by the New Zealand Prime Minister, William Massey.
Yet Asian migration continued, public sentiment supporting renewed exclusion legislation grew, and the media continued publishing anti-immigration editorials and cartoons in the wake of WWI. Stronger immigration legislation no longer seemed sufficient and increased noise for Asian repatriation followed. The first cartoon in Figure 3.6 expresses this sentiment. Its caption reads “A Returned Soldiers’ deputation to the Mayor of Wellington suggested that His Worship should make strong representations to the Government to check their immigration and repatriate all Orientals now in the country” (Glover 1922). Here, a returned veteran sits on the ground with an ‘out of work’ sign, while exaggerated Asian stereotypes carry on with their work of market gardening, laundering, and selling fruit, vegetables and poultry. This parodies the Crown’s perceived lack of action in immigration regulation and portrays European fear of stalled legislation. The other depicts a European woman considering marriage to an Indian male, provoking Pākehā anxieties of unchecked immigration.
Begging the question “Would you want your daughter to marry that man?” it constructs Asian exclusion as an exceptionally personal issue.\textsuperscript{160}

What is striking about the media’s anti-immigrant rhetoric is that their reaction was out of proportion to the number of Asian migrants. Census figures show small numbers of migrants from non-traditional sources, and their proportions to the general population were infinitesimally small. While Europeans comprised 91.5\% of the population and Māori 4.0\% in the 1921

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Table 4.2: Census total population, by ethnicity (Statistics New Zealand 1851, 1891, 1921).\textsuperscript{161}</th>
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<td>1851 Census</td>
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<td>European</td>
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<td>Chinese</td>
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Census, the remaining 4.5\% of the population consisted of ‘half castes,’ Pacific peoples,\textsuperscript{162} Fijians, and very small numbers of Chinese, Indians, Lebanese, Syrians, and Japanese. Given such small percentages, it is noteworthy that the anti-immigration lobby, the media, and its sympathetic politicians defending a white New Zealand, created such a fervor when facing an adversary that barely registered.

Anti-immigration sentiments remained elevated over the following years and continued through WWII when New Zealand, inspired by the creation of the United Nations in 1945 and the acceptance of the

\textsuperscript{160} Below the cartoon is this caption: “The total number of Chinese who have arrived here since the beginning of the year is 372. In the same period 154 Hindus have landed at Auckland” (Blomfield 1920).

\textsuperscript{161} Māori were excluded from participating in the official state censuses until 1891.

\textsuperscript{162} The entire populations of the Cook Islands, the mandated territory of Western Samoa, and the Tokelau Islands were all included in the 1921 Census, comprising 3.8\% of the total population.
international human rights legislation championed by Eleanor Roosevelt, took on a somewhat more enlightened view of immigration, allowing roughly 5,000 European refugees into the country at the end of the war, and later filled its labour shortages from other Northern European countries (Leckie 1995a:147, McMillan 2006:641, Bellamy 2008:4, Phillips 2013:13). Post-war immigration regulations, however, remained staunchly discriminatory against non-European populations. A 1953 Department of External Affairs memo stated:

> Our immigration is based firmly on the principle that we are and intend to remain a country of European development. It is inevitably discriminatory against Asians—indeed against all persons who are not wholly of European race and colour. Whereas we have done much to encourage immigration from Europe, we do everything to discourage it from Asia (Department of External Affairs 1953, cited in Brawley 1993, Beaglehole 2012).

It wasn’t until the passage of The Immigration Amendment Act 1961 that the government took its first tentative steps away from discriminatory immigration policies by allowing, for the first time, both British and non-British migrants to be considered on the same footing (Beaglehole 2012). This was followed by the Race Relations Act 1971 which was deemed “the first general expression of the policy of full equality between the various racial and national groups” (Hill 2010:299).

Norman Kirk, who became Prime Minister in 1972, famously argued that New Zealand’s future lay in the Asia and the Pacific regions (Kirk 1973), suggesting that New Zealand needed an immigration policy that ignored prospective migrants’ race, colour and religion (Kirk 1975). Kirk’s speech inaugurated a series of events which culminated in a record inflow of Pacific immigrants163 and, coupled with Britain’s 1973 entry into the European Economic Community, triggered “a change in thinking about immigration” (McMillan 2006:642). These events set in motion an important immigration policy review in 1974 that ended “unrestricted

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access for British immigrants,” requiring all migrants to obtain necessary entry permits before emigration, and “reaffirmed the free access to New Zealand of those born in the Cook Islands, Niue, and Tokelau” (Bellamy 2008:7, Beaglehole 2012). As a result, Pacific migration reached its height and Samoans had emerged as the largest, non-European migrant group. Trade unions, fearing the loss of jobs to new Pacific migrants, now opposed Polynesian immigration (Hoadley 2003:524).

The 1974 review led to new Asian migration. Greater numbers of Indians and Chinese slowly began to trickle in through a door that had only just been widened with new policy designed to broaden and intensify New Zealand’s engagement with Asia-Pacific. Coupled with net migration outflows across the Tasman between 1977-1990, the 1974 review resulted in huge net migration losses due to New Zealanders flocking to Australia (Phillips 2006:41). The Immigration Policy Review 1986 symbolised a major change from the earlier focus on nationality and ethnicity as the basis for admission. Instead, those meeting specified skill requirements could be admitted regardless of nationality, race, or ethnicity. The resultant Immigration Act 1987 finally abolished the principle of traditional source countries and stimulated a rapid increase in Asian immigration (Bedford 2003, Hoadley 2003:523-525, Wearing 2004, Johnson & Moloughney 2006:3, Beaglehole 2012, Phillips 2013).

The period immediately following the Immigration Act 1987 saw moderate rises in both Māori and Pacific populations and phenomenal growth in Asian migration. This increase generated specific policy challenges (Office of Ethnic Affairs 2002, Peace et al. 2005, Grogan 2008) designed to ‘manage’ integrating migrants, and central and local government needed to devise robust systems to promote tolerance, tackle
racial harassment and counter negative media reporting. While the period of institutionalised racism formally ended with the Immigration Act 1987, discrimination continues to be experienced by minority communities in a white New Zealand society (Spoonley et al. 1984, 1991, 1996, 2007; Chen 1993; Walker 1995b; Ip & Pang 2005; Kolig 2010; Daldy et al. 2013). Specifically, the majority community was not adequately prepared for Asian encounters. Shortly after Kirk’s Singapore speech, Tiwari (1980:2), regarding reactions to Indian migrants, remarked that New Zealanders “have little contact with these people. Some know them merely at the formal level. The average New Zealander is indifferent, if luckily not hostile, in his acceptance and treatment of these people.” McGee (1962:204) earlier describes the “social rejection by New Zealanders” that contributed to the formation of “tight knit [Indian] communities in Auckland and Wellington” and, as a result, their “participation in outside institutions was at a minimum.” While Indian incorporation into majority society has advanced substantially, especially in business, education, sport, and in the celebration of cultural events like Diwali, further progress in majority attitudes towards minorities remains (McGee 1962: 205, Chen 1993, Ip & Murphy 2005, Liu 2005, Spoonley et al. 2007, Ward & Masgoret 2008).

Recent advances in human rights

Along with recent changes in immigration policy were concomitant advances in human rights legislation. During and immediately after WWII, New Zealand played a significant role in developing an international human rights framework. As a founding member of the

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164 Print media and television news, for example, can be encouraged to offer more balanced portrayal of minority populations (see Spoonley & Hirsh 1990, Munshi 1998, Spoonley & Trlin 2004, Spoonley 2005, Spoonley & Butcher 2009, Butcher & Spoonley 2011, Voci 2011).

United Nations, it helped draw up the United Nations Charter in 1945 and
draft the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, to which it
became a signatory (Aikman 1999, Human Rights Commission 2008). In
April 2012, New Zealand marked the 40th anniversary of its first piece of
human rights legislation, the Race Relations Act 1971, which became law
in April 1971.

The law was promoted by the then National Government to foster New Zealand’s
role in international forums as a keen and impartial advocate for human rights.
New Zealand had been a key player in the drafting and adoption of the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights by the United Nations in 1948 and this was a further
step on that path. To enhance New Zealand’s international aims the Government
sought to ratify the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination. To do that required enacting specific domestic laws and so
the first piece of race relations law was passed, but not without some anxiety (de
Bres 2012).

The Race Relations Act 1971 prohibited discrimination on the grounds of
race, nationality or ethnic origin. It also established the office of the Race
Relations Conciliator and set up procedures for complaints about racial
discrimination (Rishworth 2012).

In 1972 New Zealand ratified the UN Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and in 1978, it ratified the UN
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights and the International
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights. In so doing, New
Zealand became legally bound by international legislation to prevent
discrimination. By act of Parliament in 1978, New Zealand established the
Human Rights Commission through the Human Rights Commission Act
1977 and became empowered domestically to protect rights in accordance
with UN covenants and conventions. This Act supplemented the Race
Relations Act 1971 by including additional provisions for complaints
about discrimination on the grounds of marital status, sex, and religious
and ethical belief. New Zealand later ratified the UN Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women in 1985, an
international bill of rights for women that set up a national agenda to end such discrimination. In 1989 New Zealand ratified the UN Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (Geiringer & Palmer 2007; Human Rights Commission 2010a, 2010b, 2010c, 2014).

Domestically, New Zealand’s human rights obligations are not gathered in a single entrenched constitutional document. They are provided for, instead, in a range of different pieces of legislation and through common law (Human Rights Commission 2010b, US Department of State 2013). The Bill of Rights Act 1990 first set out the civil and political rights of New Zealand citizens and guaranteed freedom from discrimination and the rights of minorities. It states that persons who belong to ethnic, religious, or linguistic minorities shall not be denied the right, along with other members of that minority, to enjoy the culture, to profess and practice the religion, or to use the language of that minority (Bill of Rights Act 1990, Human Rights Commission 2010a:8).

The Bill of Rights Act, introduced in 1985 and passed in 1990 (Erdos 2007), was criticized internationally and domestically on the basis that it did not give judges the power to reject legislation that was inconsistent with the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, a multilateral treaty adopted by the UN General Assembly in December 1966, and which came into force in March 1976 (Principe 1993, McLean 2001). More controversially, while it includes provisions relating to minority rights, it does not specifically protect indigenous rights, and it fails to mention or reference the Treaty of Waitangi (Human Rights Commission 2010b:45).

The Human Rights Act 1993 established the Human Rights Commission, whose primary focus is to advocate and promote respect for human rights
and to encourage the maintenance and development of harmonious relations in New Zealand society. It consolidated the earlier Race Relations Act 1971 and Bill of Rights Act 1990. This Act specifically prohibits discrimination on the grounds of colour, race, and ethnic or national origins, and also (in specified circumstances) racial harassment and inciting or exciting racial disharmony. The Act also empowered and required the Human Rights Commission to “promote by research, education and discussion a better understanding of the human rights dimensions of the Treaty of Waitangi and their relationship with domestic and international law” (Human Rights Commission 2010b:45). This Act also extended the protections of New Zealanders from unlawful discrimination by including new grounds of discrimination—disability, political opinion, employment status, family status and sexual orientation. It applies to both individuals and government—but only in the context of employment, provision of goods and services, accommodation, education and access to public places (Rishworth 2012). Like the Bill of Rights Act 1990, the Human Rights Act 1993 does not prevent Parliament from enacting a law that is inconsistent with it. However, the Human Rights Review Tribunal may decide that a person has suffered discrimination through a particular law. It is then required to make a ‘declaration of inconsistency’ regarding that legislation (Rishworth 2012).

As with the Bill of Rights Act 1990, the Treaty of Waitangi was not mentioned in the Human Rights Act 1993. While Treaty settlement processes have been especially important in confirming and redressing Māori grievances, the Treaty itself has not featured in New Zealand’s human rights legislation (Geiringer & Palmer 2007, Rishworth 2012). Instead, human rights legislation provides for the principles of the Treaty to be given effect, but the Treaty is not directly enforceable in New Zealand courts. The courts’ adopted practice is to interpret legislation
according to the principles of the Treaty where appropriate, except where legislation states that this cannot be done.

The Human Rights Amendment Act 2001 made significant changes to the original Human Rights Act 1993. It consolidated the office of the Race Relations Conciliator with the Human Rights Commission and set out guidelines for the new Race Relations Commissioner. Provision was also made for the appointment of an Equal Employment Opportunities Commissioner. In this Amendment, the focus of the Human Rights Commission moved from being a predominantly anti-discrimination office to one advocating and promoting broader human rights (Human Rights Commission 2009b).

It is important to note that the roots of public activism on issues of diversity and multiculturalism began after two separate incidents of anti-Jewish vandalism. These took place three weeks apart in July-August 2004, in which scores of historic Jewish graves were smashed in separate incidents at the Makara and Karori Jewish cemeteries in Wellington, and spray painted with swastikas and other antisemitic messages (Barkat 2004, Sydney Morning Herald 2004, Levine & Gezentsvey 2005). Following these events,

> The New Zealand Parliament unanimously passed a resolution deploring these acts, recalling the terrible history of antisemitism culminating in the holocaust, and expressing unequivocal condemnation of antisemitism and all forms of racial and ethnic hatred, persecution and discrimination. A statement signed by Maori, Pakeha, Pacific, Asian and other ethnic community leaders, religious leaders, mayors and councillors, business and trade union leaders and community groups was tabled in the House supporting the resolution (Human Rights Commission 2012a).

In the aftermath of the Parliamentary resolution, a group of concerned individuals issued a call to action to Parliament’s forecourt on 23

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166 These included Joris de Bres, the Race Relations Conciliator at the Human Rights Commission, writers James & Helen McNeish, and David Zwartz, a Jewish community leader.
August. This led to a public seminar and the formation of the Diversity Action Programme (DAP) which was formally launched on 24 August 2004 (Ward & Lui 2012, Human Rights Commission 2012a), and is now celebrated annually.

The Diversity Action Programme brings together organisations taking practical initiatives to recognise and celebrate the cultural diversity of our society; promote the equal enjoyment by everyone of their civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights, regardless of race, colour, religion, ethnicity or national origin; foster harmonious relations between diverse peoples; and give effect to the Treaty of Waitangi (Human Rights Commission 2012b).

The DAP has since become a cornerstone of proactive race relations initiatives in New Zealand and now has over 250 member organisations, collectively and actively promoting cultural, religious and linguistic diversity, and harmonious race relations. Even so, the DAP remains unaware that at least one organisation that either actively discriminates, or is supported by larger umbrella organisations that discriminate, has made its way onto their list of participants.\textsuperscript{167} For example, the Hindu Council of New Zealand, a 2013 DAP member, has ties to the Vishva Hindu Parishad (VHP),\textsuperscript{168} which itself is linked with the Rāshtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS)\textsuperscript{169} and the Bhārtiya Janta Party (BJP).\textsuperscript{170} More recently, Mahesh Bindra, elected to New Zealand’s 51st Parliament in the September 2014 general elections and New Zealand First’s 11th List MP, was a member of the RSS in India. In an interview, Bindra states: “I come from a politically

\textsuperscript{167} A full list of participants in the Diversity Action Programme can be found at <www.hrc.co.nz/race-relations/te-ngira-the-nz-diversity-action-programme/participants-2013>.

\textsuperscript{168} The VHP, or World Hindu Council, is a Hindu religious fundamentalist organisation based in India on the ideology of Hindutva, advocating Hindu nationalism and exclusivism. Its main objective is “to organise and consolidate Hindu society and to serve and protect the Hindu Dharma” (Vishva Hindu Parishad 2014). The VHP operates under an umbrella of Hindu nationalist organisations known as the Sangh Parivar, which also includes the RSS and the BJP (Lochtefeld 1994, Katju 2010).

\textsuperscript{169} The RSS, loosely translated as the National Patriotic Organisation, is a right-wing, paramilitary, Hindu nationalist group based in India “founded in 1925 on a platform of Hindu nationalism and the subordination of non-Hindus” (Horowitz 2001:244), and is decidedly anti-Muslim (cf. Curran 1950, Atkins 2004:264).

\textsuperscript{170} The BJP, or Indian People’s Party, is one of the two major Indian political parties today, and is considered the political wing of the RSS (Noorani 1978, Malik & Singh 1994). The BJP, led by former Gujarat Chief Minister (from 2001-2014) Narendra Modi, won the Indian national elections in May 2014, becoming India’s 15th Prime Minister.
active family. My father was a senior functionary of Jana Sangh, which later formed today’s Bhārtiya Janta Party (BJP). My association with the Sangh Parivar goes back to the days when I became a Swayam Sevak of the Rashtriya Swayamsevak Sangh (RSS) at the age of 14” (Sharma 2014).

Most Hindu Council members in New Zealand do not overtly profess a connection with such fundamentalist and exclusionist organisations, proclaiming instead to only support Hinduism and Hindu ideals, and remain naïvely unaware of the profound implications of association with organisations espousing such extremist convictions. The fact that many Indian New Zealanders are unaware of their connection with Hindu fundamentalist hate groups like the VHP and the RSS has meant that there is no broader public awareness of these organisations, which are often seen as Hindu ‘cultural’ or ‘religious’ groups.

Finally, improvements in immigration policy and human rights legislation contributed to making New Zealand a desired destination for migrants, leading to further immigration. Recent research suggests that human rights law provides a viable framework for protecting migrant communities and that positive human rights and legal protection in destination countries makes certain nations with favourable human rights records and progressive immigration legislation more highly desired destinations (Motomura 1999, Adams 2002, Castles 2004b, Wexler 2008, Mazzeschi 2011). These elements, along with the rise of globalisation, the

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171 The author has witnessed, on several occasions between 2008-2013, Hindu Council members vehemently denying any connection with Hindu fundamentalism. This phenomena is critically examined in the US context in Kurien’s (2007) ethnography on an emerging American Hinduism. Appadurai (1990:301-2) also notes that “the overseas movement of Indians has been exploited by a variety of interests both within and outside India to create a complicated network of finances and religious identifications, in which the problems of cultural reproduction for Hindus abroad has become tied to the politics of Hindu fundamentalism at home.” Vertovec (2000:145) also mentions that right-wing Hindu nationalist organisations are known to gain much support from overseas populations. See also Bhatt (1977), Rajagopal (1977, 2000), Raj (2000) and Quddus (2005).

172 The Human Rights Commission’s Diversity Action Programme needs to more assiduously vet its applications for enrollment, as even well intentioned programmes may become potentially compromised by association with evidently fundamentalist organisations.
relative ease of international travel, and the international search for people with desired skills for domestic labour markets, have been contributing factors to the rise in ethnic and religious minorities in all settler societies.

4.5 Conclusion

This chapter scrutinised the Crown’s historically ambivalent policies towards Māori and non-Māori minorities, and examined marginalisation strategies both designed to assimilate and racialise minorities as inferior others. It also provided a necessary backdrop for understanding bicultural and multicultural relations and the particular historical dimensions of discrimination in New Zealand. I turn now to an examination of the pivotal notions of identity and invisibility in the following chapters. Both elements are crucial in establishing that the historic suppression of Māori and non-Māori minorities, and contemporary shallow diversity management policies, have been employed since first encounter and continue today. The unpacking of historic Māori-Pākehā-τauiwi relations provided here also provides a necessary context in which future τauiwi participation in a multicultural discourse ensues. Such contexts provide a necessary pretext for explicating a deeper framework for future diversity governance strategies in New Zealand.
CHAPTER FIVE:
IDENTITY AND INVISIBILITY:
EARLY INDIAN PRESENCE IN AOTEAROA, 1769-1850

In 1961, when I was traveling in the Caribbean, I remember my shock, my feeling of taint and spiritual annihilation, when I saw some of the Indians of Martinique, and began to understand that they have been swamped by Martinique, that I had no means of sharing the world view of these people whose history at some stage had been like mine, but who now, racially and in other ways, had become something other (Naipaul 1989:33).

He tangata atawhai nui ia ki te tāpae kai ki nga tāngata katoa me ka tae ki tōna kāinga; e kore rawa hoki e tukua e ia te tira manuhiri kia haere ana, āpānoa kia takoto he hākari māna ki ia tangata ki ia tangata o rātou, te iti me te rahi.

He was a generous person who provided food to everybody if they visited his village; he would never ever let a party of visitors leave until he had laid out a feast for each person, whether of lowly status or of importance.

(He Waka Maori o Niu Tirani 1874:95, in Moorfield 2011, manuhiri entry).

5.1 Introduction

Whether New Zealanders will ever arrive at an agreement on a singular definition of their national identity, what is clear is that the process of identity-making here is dynamic (Liu et al. 2005:11).

This chapter retells the history of early Indian presence in Aotearoa, and uncovers new evidence that precedes the previously known first date of Indian arrival to one much earlier than was previously established.

Through uncovering specific historical events relevant to Asian presence in Aotearoa, I present evidence of erasure and invisibility of minority others that advances state objectives of control and promulgates majority authority. Such a retelling of events that includes Indian presence at the time of Māori-Pākehā first encounter provides insights into the genesis and formation of a uniquely Indo-Kiwi identity, reflecting contemporary notions of what it means to be a New Zealander of Indian ethnicity.

Unpacking erased histories provides evidence of normative, ideological and operative forms of shallow diversity, which is the purpose of this

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173 See Wolfe (2006), for example, who, in many settler societies, discusses the erasure of indigeneity with the assertion of settler nationalism.
chapter. At the same time, minority and majority awareness of minority participation in invisible histories, such as presence at the very founding of the modern nation, may help relevant minorities reclaim association in a shared national identity that may aid social cohesion.174

A bicultural foundation for a national identity necessarily precludes non-Māori minority inclusion. Majority belief expects migrants to integrate175 into New Zealand society if they are to be successful (Ward & Lin 2005, Ward & Masgoret 2008, Grbic 2010), and this necessarily includes conforming to majority models and mores to varying extent. Non-Māori minorities are therefore expected to acquire the necessary historical, sociocultural and linguistic capabilities, and incorporate an understanding of the special nature of biculturalism, for successful acculturation. Yet no reciprocal expectation exists that majorities be required to learn anything about minorities. The burden of integration rests with minorities while majorities undertake management responsibility through policy strategising and immigration legislation tweaking. What is needed for minority partnership in a shared national identity (i.e. realising full inclusion) is the construction of a reimagined and realigned specifically Kiwi identity built upon bicultural roots, but which incorporates the shared imaginings of minority others. This must necessarily be appended to notions of an existing bicultural identity based on shared Māori-Pākehā colonial histories176 but likewise must be socially reconstructed from new minority appreciation of a shared Māori-Pākehā-

174 I do not wish to infer here that social cohesion requires any such association.

175 My use of ‘integration’ here follows from Berry’s (2000) acculturation orientation model and Ward & Lin’s (2005) usage in the New Zealand context, in which migrants both adopt to their new cultural identity and maintain their cultural heritage.

Ward & Lin (2008) have shown that biculturalism and multiculturalism are not mutually exclusive entities; they are compatible, and there is nothing to suggest that “gains in multiculturalism need be at the expense of biculturalism.”

As socially constructed entities, Pākehā explications of shared bicultural identities may be fundamentally different from Māori interpretations. For Pākehā, a shared identity may only reach back as far as European arrival in Aotearoa, with smatterings of history imagined in readily understandable pre-European terms, a wink-wink appellation that singularly validates the institution of colonialism and simultaneously erases any notion that Māori self-determination previously existed. Such histories are told by Europeans for European consumption and have no place in deeply diverse societies. Alternatively, Māori need not imagine histories as either existing in pre- or post-colonisation, or in terms of non-Māori others, their imaginings instead alive through whakapapa and seen as continuums stretching back from godly ancestors to the present day with no need to demarcate an a priori historical landscape. Like Pākehā, a uniquely tauīwi identity in Aotearoa can be established from first encounter, presuming that they can regain and repossess the knowledge and history of initial Māori-tauīwi encounter. Unlike Māori, tauīwi cannot fashion a distant past that stretches back a thousand years. They do however possess unique ancestries that reach back to lineal homelands, much in the way that whakapapa connects Māori to ancestral dominions in Hawaiki; although markedly dissimilar to the history of Pākehā presence, which has been one

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177 Historically, there have been attempts to strengthen identity formation between Indians and Pākehā during colonial times. Of note are the three successful tours of Indian hockey teams to New Zealand in 1926, 1935 and 1938, which helped solidify a shared interest in sport between Indian-New Zealanders and elite Indian Army teams selected by and touring with their British captains and chaperones. These tours received wide press attention in New Zealand and aided the formation of a shared Indo-British identity based on sporting preferences and a shared colonial history (see Watson 2005, 2011).
of ‘recreating homeland,’ making new reflect old through the Europeanisation of Aotearoan landscapes.178

Rooting tauiwi to Aotearoa should involve a decidedly different strategy, one that firmly grounds their own encounter history and provides a footing for a uniquely tauiwi tūrangawaewae,179 recovering lost (perhaps stolen?) histories. This is necessary for the coalescing of a shared multicultural identity under a deep diversity framework. In making such tauiwi histories available, non-Māori minorities are better situated to fashion an emerging, shared, and multicultural national identity that draws on the strengths of an imagined Māori-Pākehā-tauiwi triad. Each brings considerable provisions to the multicultural table. That is not to say that biculturalism will fail as a diversity strategy. Rather, advocating a more inclusive governance approach, based on currently existing variables and the actors at hand, seems a more appropriate course of action. Tāuiwi imaginings of a minority-Kiwi (e.g. Indo-Kiwi, Sino-Kiwi) identity180 brings them closer to integration with majority society, and the bicultural identity that a shared Māori-Pākehā history encapsulates.

A knowledge of and appreciation for the earliest roles of Indian sojourners to Aotearoa can validate and reinforce contemporary Indo-Kiwi identity formation and maintenance. This is not to suggest that identity exists as a continuum from earliest encounter to the present day, but rather that the concept of a reclaimed historical identity (based on the

178 One prominent example of this was the existence in colonial times of Acclimatisation Societies, who’s sole charge was to release invasive species (e.g. blackbirds, thrushes, pheasants, rabbits, stoats, weasels) in New Zealand that made British immigrants feel more at home, either through familiar birdsong or species that were available for hunting. For more on this topic, see King (1984), McDowall (1994), Clout & Lowe (2000), and Wilson (2004).

179 Moorfield (2011) defines tūrangawaewae as a place where one has rights of residence and belonging through kinship and whakapapa; domicile.

180 My survey results, partially discussed in Chapter Eight, present evidence of an emerging Indo-Kiwi identity inclusive of shared Māori-Pākehā bicultural histories.
knowledge that non-Māori non-European ‘others’ were present at the very inception of Māori-European encounter) may help inform and expand particular imaginings of contemporary tauiri identity—a claim debatable with respect to any community—presuming that all such identity constructions are subject to the vagaries of time and varying circumstance, as well as to other sociocultural, historical, environmental and political exigencies that may influence its formation and maintenance.

Retaining strong identity affiliations with one’s particular ethnocultural heritage is especially important for minorities, as these can often mitigate the impacts of peripheral presence at the margins of majority society, and are known to moderate the consequences of perceived and experienced discrimination (Noh et al. 1999, Mossakowski 2003, Yip et al. 2008). In deeply diverse populations\(^{181}\) it is equally essential to receive recognition from majority society (i.e. in the form of appropriate governance initiatives, accommodation and majority community support for minority populations) in order for a stronger national identity to emerge and cohere. A state with an inclusive national identity, one that engages the various individual and communal identities it encapsulates, and marked by an absence of conflict and inter-community antipathy, can be said to be a socially cohesive state (Friedkin 2004, Chan et al. 2006). Majority recognition and accommodation can therefore be vital in reducing instances of pernicious discrimination that appear within society.

Although clearly multicultural—in that peoples with globally diverse ethnicities, languages and religions now inhabit a modern New Zealand state—any particularly unique national identity that may emerge from its history should be one rooted in bicultural encounter, but also based on

shared experiences with non-Treaty peoples. Such a shared multicultural national identity is clearly emerging today (Greif 1995, Liu et al. 2005, Johnson & Moloughney 2006, Voci & Leckie 2011, Ghosh & Leckie 2015), although it tends to ignore the historical contributions of some tauiwi that have been present since the founding of the modern state, and renders virtually invisible or non-existent any such contributions made since the time of Māori-Pākehā or Māori-Asian first contact.\(^1\) As subalterns, their historical invisibility (along with Māori) renders them as essentially impotent actors in the sociopolitical affairs of a dominant society controlled by a majority realpolitik. Although non-Pākehā tauiwi participation in the political sphere is increasing,\(^2\) their effectiveness has yet to be substantially gauged. A thorough retelling of such minority histories, therefore, is not only relevant but indispensable if a shared Māori-Pākehā-tauiwi identity is to emerge. An evolution of and respect for such a comprehensive national identity can only happen if diversity governance moves away from its shallow roots to a deeper, inclusive understanding of collective multicultural histories.

\(^{182}\) There have been recent attempts to portray such a shared historical identity (see Brooking & Rabel 1995, Ng 2003, Johnson & Moloughney 2006b, Mayo 2011, Ghosh & Leckie 2015), but even these do not reach back past the founding of the modern state.

\(^{183}\) For example, Parliament has had numerous Asian minority MPs in Parliament in recent years: Ashraf Choudhary, a Pakistani-New Zealander, was the first South Asian Labour MP from 2002-2011. Kamvaljit Singh Bakshi (National 2008-present), born in India and migrated to New Zealand in 2001, became New Zealand’s first Sikh MP in 2008 (Bhandari 2008). Rajen Prasad, an Indo-Fijian, was the former Race Relations Conciliator from 1996 to 2001, and a former Member of Parliament (Labour 2008-2014). The September 2014 general election saw Mahesh Bindra, a New Zealand First list candidate from Mumbai, elected to Parliament. Pansy Wong (National 1996 to 2011), Chinese, was the first Asian member of Parliament, and between 2008-2010 was the Minister for Ethnic Affairs (Ip 2012b). Raymond Huo, a Chinese New Zealander, has been a Labour MP since 2008. Jian Yang was elected to Parliament as a National Party list MP in 2011 (Cheng 2011). Melissa Lee, Parliament’s first Korean MP, came to New Zealand in 1988 and has been a National MP since 2008. She is currently the Parliamentary Private Secretary for Ethnic Affairs. Lists of present and former MPs with their bios can be found on the New Zealand Parliament website at <www.parliament.nz/en-nz/mpp/mps>. Historically, Sir Julius Vogel (1835-1899), a practicing Jew, served as New Zealand’s eighth Premier from 1873 to 1875 and again in 1876 (Levine 2013), and the current Prime Minister, John Key, is half-Jewish (du Chateau et al. 2008). Sir Anand Satyanand, born and raised in Auckland and of Indo-Fijian origin, was the 19th Governor-General from 2006-2011 (Clark 2006). At a local level, Sukhi Turner, originally born in the Indian Punjab, migrated to New Zealand in 1973, and was elected Mayor of Dunedin, from 1995-2004 (Parasher 2001, Singh 2001). She was succeeded by Peter Chin, a descendant of earlier Chinese immigrants, who served two terms as Dunedin Mayor from 2004 to 2010 (Ip 2012a).
This chapter reexamines the history of Indian presence in New Zealand that begins much earlier than currently known and follows the story of their arrival and settlement in Aotearoa that precedes first Indian appearance in the census. Of particular note is the distinguishing nature of early Indian migration to New Zealand. What differentiates Indian arrival in Aotearoa from the other destinations of Indian émigrés during this period is that these voyages were predominantly voluntary, as opposed to the indentured servitude or *girmitiya* that characterized the overwhelming majority of Indian dispersal from South Asia through to the mid-1800s. This chapter discusses the early fears of Indian migrants and how these anxieties have changed through time, stressing the importance of identity maintenance for successful integration into majority society. The historical reinterpretation considers early Indian presence and identity formation, and examines early Indian presence during the exploration, sealing and timber voyages between 1769-1820. This analysis critically examines early Indian sojourners and settlers and extracts important themes in the genesis and formation of a uniquely Indo-Kiwi identity.

5.2 Crossing the *kalāpāni*

The roots of the modern Indian diaspora can be seen over 4000 years ago (Lal 2006a), and the first phase of their dispersal took place during the early rise of mercantile trading. Indian merchants were known to be involved in maritime trade throughout the Indian Ocean dating back at least 4000 years, and by 1500CE they had successfully plied the wider routes westward to the Mideast and East Africa, eastward to the Bay of Bengal and Southeast Asian ports where Gujarati merchants formed

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184 e.g. Indian migration to Fiji, the West Indies, South Africa and Southeast Asia.

significant trading communities (Chaudhuri 1985, Davalikar 1991, Qaisar 1999, Markovits 2000, McPherson 2006). Along with early maritime expansion were the established overland Indian caravan trade routes that extended into Central Asia, Iran and Russia (Dale 1994; Muzaffar 1994; Levi 2002, 2006), and overland to China (Liu 1988). This phase would have also included the great numbers of Muslim pilgrims on Hajj to Mecca (Metcalf 1990, Pearson 1996). Accounts from the 16th and 17th centuries describe huge ships leaving India, carrying 1000 or more pilgrims each, often sailing in fleets of at least six ships, making the voyage annually (Pearson 2006).

A second phase of Indian expatriation during the 1700s-1800s would have been the great labour migrations of slaves and indentured servants brought out to work rubber plantations and sugar cane fields (Tinker 1974, Carter 2006, Lal 2006b), and the large numbers of āyahs, lascar and Indian princes traveling to Britain and other locales during the years of the British Rāj (Visram 1986). Lal (1983) records 453,063 Indian indentured labourers shipped to Mauritius in the years 1834-1900, nearly 250,000 each to British Guiana (1838-1916) and Malaya (1844-1910), and many more to Jamaica, Grenada, St. Lucia, East Africa, South Africa, Surinam, Fiji, and the Seychelles. Many of these workers remained in the countries to which they were sent, and their descendants live there today. This second phase characterised the beginning of large scale Indian emigration in what would later became known as the Indian diaspora.

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186 a domestic servant or nanny, hired to look after children; nurse.

187 Originally from the Persian word لشکر (lashkar) which referred to a military camp or an army, and later made its way into the Hindustani vernacular as लशकर in Hindi and لشکر in Urdu. During British colonial times, lashkar referred to a seaman or soldier. It was rendered into English during the British Rāj as lascar.
However, not all Indians were keen to travel abroad. There was a deep-rooted Indian suspicion about leaving one’s homeland and traveling away from loved ones to foreign lands (Stiebel 2011, Lal 2006a). The sharing of food, sleeping quarters and clothes with members of other castes was often unthinkable. For higher caste Hindus there was a fear of where one could receive food, as loss of caste could result in accepting food from those of lower or no caste. There was also the fear of contracting a deadly illness or disease. Nugent (1992:31) writes that early 19th century voyages often took four to six weeks, “plenty of time for contagious diseases to ravage passengers and crew,” noting that diseases “frequently swept away 10 percent, and occasionally 25 percent, of the passengers during a crossing.” All of this was best avoided as non-traveling Indians looked upon those that traveled abroad with suspicion.

Known and feared by many as ‘crossing the kālāpāṇi,’ or ‘dark waters,’ “it was widely believed that in most circumstances only the desperate departed their homeland for strange places, and then, too, under compulsion or false advertising by those who enlisted them for various jobs” (Lal 2006a:10). The kālāpāṇi referred to the crossing of the Indian and Atlantic Oceans by thousands of economically disenfranchised Indian agricultural workers under “a pernicious system of indentured labor that lasted from 1838 to 1917” (Mehta 2010:1).

These Indians, the majority of whom were Hindu, were lured to foreign lands under the guise of enhanced economic prospects; many were duped by corrupt immigration officials and agents or maistrys working for the French and British colonials. In collaboration with the imperialist powers, these agents of empire perpetuated an inhumane system of contracted labour exploitation despite the official ‘abolition’ of slavery 1838 by the British and 1848 by the French. The beginning of kala pani as another premeditated form of economic servitude ironically coincided with the end of African slavery; the European sugar industry still needed a cheap and industrious work force on plantations in the Indian Ocean and the Caribbean to accommodate its continued obsession with sugar and its insatiable thirst for capitalist profit (Mehta 2010:1).
Crossing the kālāpāni was full of peril to the orthodox Hindu because it violated caste scruples (Lal 1981). This fear kept many Hindus from undertaking such long and arduous journeys (Crooke 1897:326, Tiwari 1980:6, Kivisto & Faist 2010:24). It held less terror for Muslims and Sikhs for whom the institution of caste was, in theory, irrelevant. Perhaps this is one reason why Muslim traders during the early mercantile period in the 16th century and Punjabi Sikhs during the time of indentured servitude were such willing recruits. There is no such fear for Hindus now. The third wave of Indian emigration would be characterised by an entirely different zeitgeist—the status and success of having worked and traveled overseas.

This wave of Indian migration occurs during the modern era of globalisation, extending roughly from the post-WWII period to the present, characterised predominantly by voluntary repatriation, mostly for economic reasons, better education, or to escape civil or familial unrest at home. During this phase, Indians have moved transnationally, across and between borders, and not exclusively from India. Many modern migrants are descendants of those that emigrated from India during the second phase and now travel in search of better jobs with better pay and new opportunities for themselves and for their children. They are mostly voluntary migrants, (except in certain circumstances, like Fiji, where many fled due to civil unrest). They move from Mauritius to the US, from India to the UK, and from Fiji to New Zealand. Historically, diasporic Indians came to New Zealand in small numbers, first as sojourners, then as settlers, and more recently as migrants in search of a higher quality of life and a better economic future.

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The original anxiety of ‘crossing the *kālāpāni*’ was distinctive of both the first and second phases of Indian migration overseas. These fears were often characterised by the apprehension of departure, the uneasiness of leaving loved ones behind, and the actual distress of the journey itself—the crossing into the unknown. There was also the concern that loved ones may never be seen again, since journeys were distant and the road back fraught with peril. While these fears have largely been relegated to history, a new anxiety has slowly emerged for migrant populations in this age of globalisation. These are not so much about the journey or the distance traveled, or the fear of not meeting loved ones again, as technology has made these aspects of the journey less troublesome. Today’s trepidations are more about what happens post-arrival, during relocation and settlement, and the life that new migrants can expect to have in their adopted country. Indian migrants to New Zealand, like most migrants moving into settler societies (Chandrasekhar 1982, Berry 1997, Portes 1999:465, Takaki 1998, Yip *et al.* 2008), experience anxiety about being accepted by majority society. How to fit in? Find suitable employment? Be accepted? Migrants hear news of discrimination and racism in the west, and are often concerned, as they move from inclusion in majority society at home, to exclusion as minorities in their adopted homelands. The expectation-reality disparities they face create new sources of anxiety and distress than that feared by the dreadful crossing of the *kālāpāni.*

Appreciating such anxieties is essential in considering the various elements that constitute the complex identities of

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189 As in Paul Henry’s comment about New Zealand’s former Governor-General, Anand Satyanand (Nash 2010), or in the public backlash after Nina Davuluri (a Telugu-speaking Indo-American born in Syracuse, New York) was crowned 2014’s Miss America winner (see Hafiz 2013, Yang 2013). In October 2014, another race relations row was sparked by an Immigration New Zealand official who, referring to Radio Tarana (a popular Hindi language radio station in New Zealand), made the comment that “New Zealand citizens/residents are unlikely to listen to an Indian radio station” in New Zealand (Tan 2014). In the era of globalisation, such xenophobic sentiment travels quickly overseas.

190 There are often additional sources of stress for new migrants, including anxieties about how children may grow up without adequate knowledge of the histories, cultures, languages and religions of their homeland.
both early Indian sojourners to Aotearoa and the Indian migrants of today.

Today’s migrants are more concerned with finding suitable employment, their ability to earn decent wages, and becoming accepted by majority society. Finding support amongst coethnics is often the first crucial step towards successful acculturation and integration. Yet often accompanying the excitement of beginning a new life abroad, is the angst of potential discrimination and racism, the awareness of which often precedes immigration and continues as a minority. The difficulty of maintaining distinct identities within majorities often adds to the apprehension that minorities experience. Despite the pernicious consequences of discrimination, recent studies suggest that ethnic identification can play an important part in allaying fears of perceived racism and discrimination (Noh et al. 1999, Mossakowski 2008, Yip et al. 2008). Having a sense of ethnic pride, being involved in and demonstrating a commitment for the sociocultural and religious activities and practices of one’s particular ethnicity, can be a strong coping strategy for migrants experiencing discrimination and racism in their adopted homeland. Portes et al. (1993:11, 2005) argue that strong coethnic ties act as protective shields against downward assimilation into a racialised ‘underclass.’ This strongly suggests that the importance of maintaining or strengthening one’s particular ethnocultural identity is essential for successful integration. The strong link between ethnic identity and improved mental health amongst migrants and minorities has significant implications for diversity governance and social cohesion. While ‘crossing the kālāpāni’ no longer holds the same meaning, it has been replaced by the spectre of discrimination and the anxieties associated with both maintaining one’s own identity and the difficulties of passing on one’s culture, language and religion to subsequent generations.
5.3 Early Indian presence and identity formation in Aotearoa

New Zealand is considered one of the last outposts of human habitation, with a shorter human history than any other country (Wilson 2009b). Although there is still debate surrounding the actual date of first arrival and settlement, there is general agreement that Māori arrival is estimated to have occurred during the 13th century, and recent evidence points that this settlement occurred more recently than previously thought. During the early period of classical Māori development a thriving indigenous culture developed, characterised by the making of practical tools, extensive trade throughout the islands, intertribal warfare, and the use of local resources for survival.

The first European explorer to the region, the Dutchman Abel Tasman, transited the islands in the summer of 1642-1643, although it wasn’t until James Cook’s and Jean François Marie de Surville’s first visit in 1769, more than 126 years later, that Europeans began to become aware of the land ‘down under’ (Owens 1992, King 2003, Dunmore 2012). Cook was the first to extensively map the newly ‘discovered’ territory and reported back to Europe its large cache of resources, especially of its flax, timber, seals and whales, which were, no doubt, of tremendous importance to his benefactors. Cook made two subsequent visits to New Zealand (1773-1774, 1777) and his reports led to the first European settlers, hungry to exploit its resource largess. The first of these to arrive were sealers, whalers and traders in the late eighteenth century, followed by

191 Holdaway (1996, 1999), however, proposes that Polynesian arrival occurred much earlier, around 2000 years ago, based on the radiocarbon dating of rat bones, and the assumption that these could have only arrived on Polynesian canoes. This is challenged by Higham & Petchey (2000) who state that the radiocarbon dating of recovered rat bones is unreliable and unreproducible. Hedges (2000) also states that the sample is too small and is inconsistent with other radiocarbon dating to accurately base a claim that Māori arrival occurred approximately 2000 years ago.

missionaries in the early 1800s, with settlers arriving in large numbers from the late 1830s onwards (Graham 1992, Owens 1992, McKinnon 1997, King 2003, Moon 2013). The signing of the Treaty of Waitangi in February 1840 between indigenous Māori and the British representative at the time, Lieutenant-Governor Captain William Hobson, ceded ‘sovereignty’ or ‘governance’ of the Māori chiefs to the British Queen, in exchange for which the chiefs and tribes retained their “full exclusive and undisturbed possession of their lands and estates, forests, fisheries and other properties,” along with the granting to Māori their rights and privileges as British subjects (Owens 1992). Although the meaning and intent of the Treaty is disputable due to the nature of its poor translation into Māori and misrepresentations of Māori understanding of what was agreed, the Treaty, nonetheless, secured British rule over Aotearoa, marked the genesis of the modern nation-state, and provided Māori with a tangible base for the settlement of later historic grievances against the Crown (Temm 1990; Orange 2011, 2012).

The reports of the initial visits of Cook and Surville in 1769, and in subsequent years, led to a rising awareness in Europe of the Antipodes and of the great store of natural resources available for exploitation. European sealing, whaling and missionary colonies were soon established, and contact made with indigenous Māori. Salmond (1991, 1997, 2003) provides detailed historical accounts of first contact between indigenous Māori and European explorers and settlers between the years 1642 to 1815. The early settlements of European sealers, whalers and missionaries soon gave way to more permanent settlements throughout New Zealand, bringing further migration from Europe, the Americas and Australia.

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193 The word ‘sovereignty’ is used only in the English version of the Treaty, while the word kāwanatanga, or ‘governance’, is used in Te Tiriti, the Māori version of the Treaty.
What is not well known is that small numbers of Indian and Chinese migrants were amongst the earliest post-Māori visitors to Aotearoa.

While the Chinese population has been traced back to a single person in Nelson in 1842 (Ng 1993:123), the very earliest Indian presence in Aotearoa has remained obscure, hidden in old ship logs from captains on early sealing and timber voyages. Scholars researching the history of Indian migration and settlement peg the first known record of an Indian in New Zealand to a Bengali who jumped ship in 1809 or 1810 to marry a Māori woman.\textsuperscript{194} The exact date has been unclear as some sources give 1809 as the date (Salmond 1997:373-377; Entwistle 2005:103-106; Leckie 2006:389, 2007:21; Didham 2010:4; Spoonley & Bedford 2012:104), while others give 1810 (Leckie 1995a:136, 1998:163; Friesen 2008a:47; Friesen & Kearnes 2008:212; Swarbrick 2012; Pio 2012:2). Bandyopadhyay (2006:125), citing Cruise (1824), states “The first Indian ever to set foot on New Zealand soil was a Bengali. We do not know his name, but he was a sailor who jumped ship in 1809 and was living with a local Māori.” All of these sources appear to be based on the 3\textsuperscript{rd} May 1820 entry in the journal of Richard Cruise, an English army officer on a ten-month visit to New Zealand. Referring to a man of Indian descent, he writes:

This man had left an East Indiaman\textsuperscript{195} that touched at the Bay of Islands ten years before, and married a woman of the tribe subject to Tekokee, whom he considered his chief. Though quite a New Zealander in his dress and habits, his diminutive person and dark complexion made him appear to great disadvantage among the handsome and athletic people among whom he had settled (Cruise 1824:315).

\textsuperscript{194} Although there is mention of Indian lascar visits to Aotearoa in the late 1790s (Leckie 2007:21, 2010:48).

\textsuperscript{195} ‘East Indiaman’ (or ‘East Indiamen’ plural) referred to any sailing vessel built in the Indian naval shipyards operating under charter or license to any of the India companies of the major European trading powers of the 17\textsuperscript{th}-19\textsuperscript{th} centuries. The finest of these made use of Indian shipbuilding techniques and were largely crewed by Indian seamen. These ships were of excellent quality, built of durable wood, and highly desirable by the European trading powers of the time (Braudel 1984:506).
This would account for later authors’ claims of 1809 or 1810 as the first known recorded account of Indian presence. Complicating matters, Murphy (2007:2) states that “the first known Indian person to come to New Zealand was Bir Singh Gill, an itinerant Sikh herbalist who arrived in 1890.” The murkiness of the details of the first known Indian is discussed below, and presented along with earlier accounts of Indian sojourns to Aotearoa, culled from the first-hand accounts and ship logs from early voyages of exploration, and later sealing and timber ventures.

What is certain, however, is that Indian presence in Aotearoa is recorded along with the very earliest European explorers, an occurrence that is little known and absent from official histories, which have generally neglected early Asian appearance and settlement prior to the arrival of Chinese goldseekers in 1865. Of the general invisibility of the Chinese from official history, Murphy (2003:282) writes: “Chinese New Zealand history has rated barely a mention. Many earlier works compounded the neglect with a dismissive racism that reflects the attitude to Chinese New Zealanders at the time.” The same is true of immigration histories to New Zealand (cf. Taher 1970:38, Borrie 1991, Greif 1995, Phillips 2013) which equally ignore earliest Asian appearance. While both Māori arrival and settlement, followed by European exploration, exploitation (sealing, whaling and the taking of valuable timber), missionisation and colonisation, are well-documented in official histories, little or no mention is made of the earliest Asian contributions, even though Indian presence is

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196 There are, however, alternative theories that earlier Indian contact with Aotearoa may have occurred with Tamil ships accompanying the exploratory fleet voyages of the Chinese in the 1400s, long before the visits of James Cook (Crawfurd 1867, Gosset 1970:16-20, Hilder 1975, Estensen 1998:96-97, Menzies 2002:209-214, Howe 2008:144-145). These stories, difficult to substantiate, are beyond the purview of this thesis.


198 Borrie’s Immigration to New Zealand (1991), for instance, begins with the Chinese in 1870.

199 Phillips’ retelling of the history of immigration, last updated in August 2013 and found in the official Te Ara: the encyclopedia of New Zealand, purports to tell “The Full Story.”
recorded on the first visits of European vessels to the Southern Oceans from 1769. It is only recently that histories of early Chinese and Indian presence have begun to contribute to a wider, more inclusive, retelling of tauiwi settlement in New Zealand that is focused on Asian migration and settlement, yet even these stories are poorly known—excluded from general texts of New Zealand history—and all disregard earliest Asian appearance and settlement.

Referring to ethnic migration, McCarthy states:

The years beyond 1890 are also the focus of W.H. McLeod’s study of Punjabis in New Zealand, though he similarly identifies some early arrivals. These early Punjabis were Malwais or Majhails and were generally hawkers peddling various items such as herbs, chutneys, cloth and semi-precious stones. By contrast, Chinese migrants have received increasing attention, although, as with the historical analysis of other ethnic groups, much scrutiny only embraces the nineteenth-century experience as a precursor to a more sustained focus on the twentieth-century (McCarthy 2009: 175-176).

McCarthy unintentionally conforms to the misguided argument that is reflected in and reinforced by the mainstream belief that Asian contributions to Aotearoan history only began with the 1860s Otago goldrush. She also establishes that this intensifying examination of New Zealand’s ethnic past, by both minority and majority researchers, has typically only been pursued within the context of referencing and interpreting New Zealand’s increasingly ethnic present. While the first merely establishes majority ignorance or inability to discern new truths, the second reinforces an undeclared conviction that mainstream society may not wish to discover earlier alternative histories for fear that they may undermine or potentially ‘erase’ their own.

Such easy dismissal of the very earliest Asian contributions prior to the Chinese goldrush, is further reflected in the state reporting of minorities

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201 It should be noted that while McLeod’s (1986:51) reference to ‘Black Peter,’ who he states was “the first [Indian] to achieve public notice,” is his earliest known individual, as his history of Indian presence only begins circa 1890.
in such official documents as the national census. As early Asian sojourners are markedly absent from such histories, their appearance is insufficiently recognised in official documentation. While not totally absent, pre-1860s Asian presence in New Zealand is certainly difficult to discern. While newer ethnic histories are becoming increasingly accessible, the earliest accounts still remain concealed. Much of this can be unmasked, however, through the seeking of alternative sources—the examination of ships’ logs from early European voyages of exploitation, and in the diaries of, for example, the sojourners, missionaries, and naturalists that were present in, and deliver documentation of, the earliest days of Aotearoan exploration and settlement. It is, however, unfortunate that we have few surviving logs, records or diaries that can be directly attributed to our earliest Asian sojourners. We are, regrettably, forced to shape our understanding of their presence through the only means available to us—the eyes of those Europeans that accompanied them on the initial journeys of exploration and exploitation. While once removed, they nevertheless give us some insight as to how early tauiwi may have lived, and provide record of encounters for which we have no other extant sources. It is through such passages that glimpses of a proto-Indo-Kiwi identity emerge.

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204 Oral sources, too, have been exceptionally important in revealing family histories (see Budhia 1979; Leckie 1981, 2007; McDonald 1982; McLeod 1984; McLeod & Buller 1992; Patel 1995; Thurasundaram 1997; Reid & Heke 1999; Bernau 2005, 2006; Winder 2007; Catlin-Maybury 2008; Pio 2005, 2007b, 2008; Chhiba 2007; Leckie & Patel 2011; Bola 2014), but oral sources for the earliest Indian arrivals are, unfortunately, becoming increasingly inaccessible as the keepers of such lore are either exceptionally aged or have since passed away. As a result, it is unlikely that new oral histories of the earliest Asian presence in Aotearoa will be revealed.

205 Regarding the Chinese, Ng states (2003:7) “the vital documents missing in New Zealand are those written by the Cantonese themselves. Due to their poor literacy, their written recollections in Chinese must be scarce and none have been discovered so far. In English there are only two known Chinese accounts: one was written by Ho A Mee, who assisted the migration of Cantonese goldseekers to Otago in 1866 and 1871, and the other by Wong Young Wha, who co-authored a narrative of the Round Hill goldfield near Riverton.”
Let us first consider the passage mentioned above from Cruise’s 1820 journal. Cruise’s account, of an encounter with an Indian male in 1820, describes him as “quite a New Zealander in his dress and habits, his diminutive person and dark complexion made him appear to great disadvantage among the handsome and athletic people among whom he had settled” (Cruise 1824:315). His brief description serves multiple purposes. It provides us with knowledge of a historically important event by recording the encounter, which appears as an insignificant footnote in an appendix to his journal. Cruise at once describes the subject as being both a ‘New Zealander’ (i.e. of this land, or as being similar to Māori with which he is compared and with whom he has lived for the previous decade) while simultaneously distancing this prototypical Indian male as distinct from Māori (i.e. being smaller in stature and as having darker skin). Cruise also upholds the colonial ideal of the noble savage by describing Māori as “handsome and athletic” while denigrating the Indian as “disadvantaged” by comparison. This may be a reflection of the low regard the British had for Indians in India during the Rāj, and of Indian lascars serving on British ships; in both instances Indians were subordinate to their colonisers. Cruise’s colonial attitude towards the Indian he encountered is clearly evident in his remark, and encapsulates the attitudes Europeans had towards their subjects. More importantly, this position of superiority is reflected in the subsequent ways in which British colonisers approached the earliest official enumeration and record keeping of non-European populations—by treating them as invisible, or by lumping them all into homogenous categories that tended to conceal their identity.206 Cruise, in stating that this Indian male “married a woman of the tribe subject to Tekokee, whom he considered his chief,” demonstrates how easily such a ‘brown-skinned’ individual could disappear amongst Māori. This may be the reason why so many early

206 Discussed in Chapter Six.
Indian sojourners to Aotearoa (and there were many more than the Bengali reported by Cruise) may have gone unenumerated by census officials in the early census years. The few that did end up living in Māori settlements and having children were likewise uncounted, as Māori were excluded from national censuses, and enumerated separately until the 1951 Census, in which both European and Māori populations appear for the first time in a combined national census (Statistics New Zealand 2013).

What is important is the sense of individual and collective identity, of both early Māori and other ethnic minorities present in Aotearoa during initial contact, that was dismissed by European colonisers. Such colonial views lumped all non-Europeans into categories that homogenised internal distinctiveness and ‘othered’ dissimilar ethnicities. Within this context, Māori were seen as either a means through which resource exploitation could be maximised, or as group(s) needing to be either missionised, civilised or both. This ‘othering’ occurred in the case of Asians too, through European references to the pejorative terms Hindoos or Chinamen, ostensibly similar to the European use of the Maoris to refer to those of indigenous origin. By contextualising encounters in this way, it is easy to see how early notice of Asian sojourns to Aotearoa remained largely unrecorded.

Missing is a deeper understanding of how early sojourners, such as Cruise’s prototypical Indian, saw themselves. While they may have suppressed their innate identities to better conform to circumstance, they would, nevertheless, still have a sense of their own Indianness, while

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207 In the early years of European settlement, Māori census taking came under the authority of the Native Secretary, and from 1874 separate European and Māori censuses were undertaken in the same year (Statistics New Zealand 2013).

remaining absorbed in surroundings dominated by Europeans, as upon
the ships on which they served, or under the protection of *whānau* or *hapū*
with whom they lived. This ‘sense of self’ is not so dissimilar from that
experienced by many contemporary minorities, in that both iterations
may seek to retain fundamental elements of self while likely striving to
integrate into the larger majorities within which they are embedded;
recognising that not all minorities may share such endeavour. By
examining such issues today, we may more readily be able to discern the
similarities between qualities that may have existed then and may
continue to exist now, such as the presence of feelings of inadequacy (e.g.
a minority absorbed into a larger majority; having to suppress one’s
indigenous language, culture or religion in favour of the language, culture
or spirituality of the majority), or the experience of particular anxieties
(e.g. the fear of crossing the *kalāpāni*, the angst of not finding suitable
employment, the distress of experiencing discrimination, the
apprehension over the potential loss of cultural transmission to one’s
progeny). Such intrinsic similarities and differences between an
archetypal Indian identity and its more modern interpretation provide
access to a *deeper* appreciation of the identities of the earliest Indian
sojourners to Aotearoa.

Since identity has become such a critical field of inquiry it may be possible
to contextualise it as a historical construct—to theorise its existence and
speculate on its composition—but there’s no certain way to know if any
such assessment is accurate. A lascar serving aboard a European ship may
have formulated a subaltern identity based on attributes of subservience
and compliance, but would have probably ascribed qualities of
ethnocultural identity, and may have aligned additional characteristics of
adventure and exploration, to his own perception of self. A ship-jumper
would, of necessity, be forced to take on certain attributes of those with
whom he settled (e.g. Māori, missionaries), and this would have impacted the nature of his own shifting identity and the need for ‘belonging’ as an outsider. What is crucially important here is the realisation that such an identity even existed, as historians have traditionally little considered subaltern identity as a field of inquiry until recently. As an example, Ghosh’s Ibis trilogy (2009, 2012, 2015) has skillfully animated historic lascar subaltern identity and imbued it with a sense of realism.

In examining the earliest stories of Indian encounters with both European and Māori, any historical misconception that there were only a handful of known Indians prior to the 1860s is rectified, and their presence affirmed with the very earliest Europeans. There were hundreds of nameless and unknown South Asians who accompanied Europeans on the earliest voyages of exploration and exploitation to Aotearoa and the Southern Oceans. Such a reexamination would thus revise existing scholarship on the history of the Indian diaspora here, and alter the majority narrative that characterises tauitiwi arrival and settlement. The following section also aims to connect these early events to the emergence of an Indo-Kiwi identity that is grounded in an awareness of historical events, recognised by majority society, and accentuated by a contemporary understanding of the significance of maintaining one’s ethnocultural identity—an important step in moving towards a deeper discourse of minority recognition.

5.4 Early Indian presence and identity, 1769-1820

Although it is commonly thought that Europeans were the sole post-Māori settlers, few realise that small groups of Indians and Chinese were amongst the first non-Polynesian peoples to arrive in Aotearoa. The first

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209 Critical theorists and postcolonial scholars have only in the last few decades identified such lines of inquiry. See Gramsci’s (1971) work on cultural hegemony, and Said (1979), Guha (1982-1989), Spivak (1988), Bhabha (1994), and Hall (2007).
known record of Māori-European encounter was the visit of Dutchman Abel Tasman in December 1642. Although Tasman never came ashore, four members of his crew were lost in a watery skirmish after an initial misreading of first contact at Taitapu.210 One hundred twenty seven years would pass before the next known European visits to Aotearoa by Surville in 1769-1770 and Cook in 1769-1770, 1773-1774, and 1777.211 These initial visits were followed by numerous subsequent voyages by Europeans in the late 1700s, all well documented (Tapp 1958; Beaglehole 1968, 1969; Dunmore 1981, 2012; Salmond 1991, 1997; Richards 2010).

After Tasman’s 1642 voyage, Māori-European encounter next occurred when Cook and his crew went ashore at Tūrangānui212 between 6-11 October 1769, marking the very first known European landing and presence ashore, followed by subsequent encounters during Cook’s first voyage on the Endeavour, through 31 March 1770 (Beaglehole 1968, Salmond 1991). Twenty-three years later, European sealers who were dropped off at Tamatea213 in 1792 (with the uncertainty of a ship’s return many months later) are considered the first European ‘residents’ (Grant 2012), having spent months ashore and providing for themselves while awaiting passage on a returning ship. Seamen on the earliest European voyages are recorded as having gone ashore, and these excursions mark the very beginning of tauīwi presence. Most of the vessels of European exploration in the South Pacific were of the British East India Company, traveling from India on their way to deliver convicts and supplies to the

210 Taitapu is now known as Golden Bay, in the northeastern corner of the South Island.

211 By extraordinary coincidence, both Surville and Cook passed within thirty miles of each other on 16 December 1769 as a gale blew Surville up the west coast and around North Cape, while Cook, in the Endeavour, was being blown up the east coast around North Cape. The storm had made it impossible for the two ships to sight each other as they nearly crossed paths (see Beaglehole 1968, Dunmore 1981:42, Salmond 1991:317).

212 Now known as Poverty Bay, near Gisborne on the east coast of the North Island.

213 Now known as Dusky Sound in Fiordland, on the southeast coast of the South Island.
recently established convict settlements at Botany Bay in Australia and Norfolk Island. The British East India Company had played a key role in bringing Europeans to Aotearoan shores, with regular sailings between India and Port Jackson, Australia. The French India Company, engaged in a commercial war with the British for power and control of the east, was also pursuing its interests in the South Pacific. Indian sojourners arriving on these trips were the first documented South Asians to set foot on New Zealand soil.

The story of their sojourns to Aotearoa begins in 1769, with the sailing of the French ship *Saint Jean-Baptiste*, under the command of its captain, Jean François Marie de Surville. Surville had been in India looking for trade opportunities between French colonies in India and China. Dunmore (2012:35) records that Surville set sail from the French colony of Pondicherry, India on 2 June 1769 on a voyage of combined exploration and trade to the central Pacific. He arrived off the coast of Hokianga on 12 Dec 1769, and looking for suitable anchorage, set off around North Cape, eventually stopping for two weeks in Doubtless Bay between 18-31 December. As Surville’s crew was suffering severely from the effects of scurvy, he had taken them ashore multiple times to collect water and greens that helped restore the crew’s health (Dunmore 1969, 1981, 2012).

Dunmore’s translation (1981:273-287) of the ship’s Muster Roll of the crew reports a total of 53 Indian lascars from a crew of 232 souls, making up 22.8% of the entire crew. Some of the lascars are named in the original Roll, and some of their deaths recorded. The first lascar of mention is the

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214 Off the northwestern coast of the North Island, south of Ninety Mile Beach.
215 On the eastern side of the northern tip of the North Island.
216 These are recorded as: 3 Indian warrant officers, 47 Indian sailors, and 3 other Indians.
unnamed serang\textsuperscript{217} who is recorded as having died at sea, although the date is unknown. The second is recorded as “Taudel [?]” (Dunmore 1981:283), although I suspect that this refers to the serang’s assistant:

The serang aboard ship was assisted by one or more subordinate petty officers: *tindals* (*tandail* or *tandel* “the head of a *tanda* or body of men,” “a gang boss”). Ship serangs and tindals received higher wages from ship-owners and also customary fees from their lascars (Fisher 2006:24).\textsuperscript{218}

‘Taudel’ is recorded as dying at sea on 29 October 1769. The third Indian warrant officer is recorded as ‘Kasap,’ a deck supervisor and lamp attendant, dying at sea on 10 November 1769. Of the remaining 50 lascars, the Muster Roll records three as dying in October, with all but three dying in November 1769, just prior to reaching Aotearoan waters in December 1769. Of the remaining three lascars, one is recorded as the chaplain’s servant, a Bengali named ‘Nicolas’ who died of scurvy on 29 November 1769. Of the total 53 lascars aboard the *Saint Jean-Baptiste*, it would appear that only two survived to reach Aotearoa. The first is recorded as ‘Mamouth Cassem,’ whose real name was probably Mahmud Qāsim, born in Pondicherry about 1755. The second is listed as a Bengali named ‘Nasrin’\textsuperscript{219} aged about 16-17 years on the Muster Roll (Dunmore 1981:287). Given their names, it can be assumed that both were Muslims. Both are recorded as dying in Peru on 14 April 1770, where the ship sailed after leaving Aotearoa. Given their recorded survival of the Aotearoan excursion, we can be certain that these men would have gone ashore along with the other sick crew members of the *Saint Jean-Baptiste* during their two week stay in Aotearoa between 12-31 December 1769 and their subsequent departure for South America. While numerous log entries attest to the crew’s excursions on land, none of the landing parties are

\textsuperscript{217} *Serang* is the term given to the chief lascar, or boatswain’s mate (Fisher 2006). It was considered his job to provide for the Indian crew, keep them in line, and to be responsible for their actions.

\textsuperscript{218} see also Balachandran (1996:206–236).

\textsuperscript{219} ‘Nasreen’ would be a closer approximation of this Bengali lascar’s name.
named, although it is known that Surville was quite concerned for their health and took sick crewmen ashore for short periods of time during their stay.

Sickness and death which appear indistinguishable among our crew have caused me to reflect seriously, to see if I could not find a solution more certain than that of following the course, planned from the start, which I am now keeping, and go, if I can, to New Zealand, and seek there a place of refuge where we can rest awhile. After considering the position, I believe that anything we could attempt elsewhere would be far less certain than this New Zealand suggestion, and that, anyhow, we have no alternative in the state in which we are (Surville’s log entry of 23rd November, translated by Dunmire 1981:126).

Both Surville’s, and his second Guillaume Labé’s, journals record daily entries between 18-31 December in which sick crew members were taken ashore for fresh air, water and greens to help combat the ill effects of scurvy, from which the crew greatly suffered (Dunmore 1981). Since arriving,

...our crew has been attacked by scurvy. Only 7 or 8 men are fit. I hope that this call will restore them by staying a whole month and putting them ashore. If not, we would be in a nasty situation (Labé’s log, 18 December 1769, translated by Dunmore 1981:245).

Both Surville’s and Labé’s log entries discuss the daily excursions ashore for the sick to recuperate, and collect fresh water and greens. Although it is not recorded which sailors went ashore on which days, it is apparent from both logs that the sick were rotated, giving those ill a chance for rest and recovery ashore for the day, returning to the ship by nightfall.

This morning I landed with two boats, one manned like yesterday, and carry 10 empty barrels with axes and 6 wood cutters, the other carrying only sick cases [crew]...I then had the sick landed who walked about without wandering away (Surville’s log, 19 December 1769, translated by Dunmore 1981:142).

The small amount of land air breathed by the sick is doing them immense good (Surville’s log, 21 December 1769, translated by Dunmore 1981:144).

At 6:30 this morning I landed with the usual preparations, the sick, etc. It is surprising how effective the air of this land and the cress and the wild celery we find here has been. The very next day after they first had some they already felt better (Surville’s log, 24 December 1769, translated by Dunmore 1981:147).
Although the landing parties were unable to spend nights ashore, it is clear that the landings were of immense value to the infirm, and would have enabled the only two remaining lascars to survive to sail for South America where they both died on 14 April 1770 in Peru (Dunmore 1981:287).

Dunmore (1981:44) records an account of the *Saint Jean-Baptiste’s* attempt to land after sighting the South American coast on 4 April 1770. Having endured a horrific trip across the Pacific, and desperate to reach land and Spanish help to aid their recovery, Captain Surville and a small party attempted to cross a treacherous bar to reach landing.

Labé tried to cross the bar on a boat, but turned back. The captain himself then tried, dressed in full uniform with his Cross of St Louis and his sword so as to impress the local Spanish and overcome any reluctance on their part to assist foreign sailors. He wrote a message for help, which he enclosed in a bottle, tying it around the neck of a Pondicherry lascar who was a strong swimmer. The Indian managed to struggle ashore, but the boat capsized by the bar. Surville, weighed down by his clothing, was drowned, together with two sailors who had accompanied him to man the boat (Dunmore 1981:44).

The Pondicherry Indian would have been the same Mahmud Qāsim mentioned in the *Saint Jean-Baptiste’s* Muster Roll. He died 10 days later with the Bengali lascar Nasreen, but the manner of their deaths is unknown. While it is impossible to confirm without doubt that Qāsim and Nasreen came ashore with the other sick crew members in 1769, the mere fact of their survival as the only two lascars attests to the fact that they must have been included in the sick crew’s visits ashore, and recuperated sufficiently to continue their journey to Peru. As both Surville’s and Labé’s logs suggest that all sick crewmen were brought ashore at one time or another, it is most probable that Qāsim and Nasreen are the first South Asians to set foot in Aotearoa.

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220 This excursion was known to have been the first European journey across the Pacific from west to east in these latitudes (Dunmore 1981:44).
Cook’s initial voyage to Aotearoa on the Endeavour, sailing from Plymouth, England in August 1768, was unlikely to have lascars aboard. Those aboard the Endeavour were known to be caucasian. However, Cooks’ naturalist Banks was known to have had two black servants in attendance on this voyage (McNab 1914b:481, Beaglehole 1968:589-600, Salmond 1991:107, Wilson 2003:174, Wilkes 2008:81). Ollivier & Hingley (1987:83) also mention two ‘black’ slaves from Malagasy and Malabar, one a Moorish lascar and the second a Malabar servant, as dying of scurvy in Aotearoan waters during Surville’s 1769 visit.

The next European ship to visit was the voyage of Marion du Fresne to the Bay of Islands between April and July 1772. Although the Muster Rolls of those departing on the two ships of this expedition, the Mascarin and the Marquis de Castries, are known (Kelly 1951:18-19), only the officers aboard are named while the crew is unknown. As the ships departed from the French colony in Mauritius, and called in at Cape Town, South Africa before reaching Aotearoa’s west coat at Taranaki, it is unlikely that lascars were aboard. Although a shore station was established to help the sick recuperate from scurvy and to repair their ships (Kelly 1951:29), there is no mention of an Indian crew. Having built four small straw huts and remaining ashore for several days (Salmond 1991:382), and establishing repair camps at various anchorages during the four month stay, these camps might be regarded as the first known residence of Europeans in Aotearoa. Du Fresne had four black slaves accompany him on this journey and these would be amongst the first known Africans in

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221 Salmond (1991:393) mentions that at one point during their stay in the Bay of Islands, “sixty scurvy-ridden men…who could barely walk” were ashore in a hospital tent set up for the rehabilitation of sick crew members.

222 Salmond (1991:382) records one black male from Mauritius, and an additional three black women purchased during their earlier visit to Fort Dauphin, the first French settlement in Madagascar.
Aotearoa. Kelly (1951:89) records that all four had endeavoured to run away from the French, one of the three women was killed with the others later returning to the ship. This incident with the black slaves, the tales of encounter that ensued, and the accounts of du Fresne’s death, are well known and recorded in both European accounts (Crozet 1891, Kelly 1951, Le Dez in Ollivier 1985) and in local tribal oral history (Salmond 1991:382).

No lascars are known to have been aboard Cook’s second expedition to Aotearoa on the Resolution, which he commanded, and the Adventure, captained by Furneaux, which sailed from England on 13 July 1772. Cook’s third expedition on the Resolution, accompanied by the Discovery, left Plymouth, England on 12 July 1776 and reached Aotearoa in February 1777. As with Cook’s second expedition, it is unlikely that any Indian crew were aboard either ship. Cook’s voyages were considered to be largely exploratory and scientific in nature, and British engagement in the South Pacific only began in earnest as it subsequently solidified its trade interests in India and China in the years following Cook’s visits.

The story of British engagement and lascar involvement in Aotearoa begins in 1783, when one of James Cook’s former companions, James Maria Matra, had first suggested establishing a permanent British settlement in New Zealand in order to supply settlers in New South Wales with valuable flax and timber (Tapp 1958:3). At the time, British East India

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223 Bolster (1990) presents evidence of American black slaves on early American sealing and whaling ships between 1800-1860. As American vessels were known to ply the Southern Oceans, and numerous American visits recorded to Aotearoa, it is possible that these ships employed sailors of African ethnicity.

224 On the day of their sailing, the Plymouth harbour was filled with ships and troops preparing for war with the American colonists (Salmond 1997:118).

225 Cook’s instructions were largely those of exploration, to look for the fabled southern continent, and scientific, notably to record the transit of Venus from the South Pacific so that the earth’s diameter and distance from the sun could be more accurately determined (Salmond 1991:98, Howe 2008:15-16).
Company ships were plying the waters between England, South Africa, India, Port Jackson, Australia and China.

Chartered in 1600, the Company was run by a wealthy oligarchy that controlled its own army and marine forces, fighting Indian rulers as well as European rivals. It held a monopoly over British trade and navigation between the Cape of Good Hope and Cape Horn, using fleets of chartered ships crewed by Indian sailors, marines and black slaves as well as by Europeans. East Indiamen crossed the Atlantic, Indian and western Pacific Oceans in search for profitable cargoes. When British penal colonies were established at Port Jackson and Norfolk Island, East India Company ships were chartered as convict transports and supply ships, carrying cattle, rice, dhal, sugar, salted meats and woven cotton to Port Jackson and Norfolk, and New Zealand became a handy place to pick up homeward cargoes (Salmond 1997:235).

The first named Indian on British ships plying these routes would be the Indian Muslim convict named ‘Zimran Wriam,’ who sailed on the Atlantic in 1791 on his way to the convict settlement in Port Jackson, Australia (Akbarzadeh & Saeed 2001:14).

In November 1792, John Thomson wrote to Henry Dundas, the British Secretary of State at Botany Bay, also suggesting that a British colony be established in New Zealand. Thompson first suggested that a colonising party from British India consisting of “fifty sober men; one hundred sepoys, & 100 convicts” might be sent to New Zealand along with military supplies and stores necessary for one year. According to Thompson, the people in India were, he thought, “just in that state of civilization proper to be made useful” (Salmond 1997:234-235). Many of the ships that plied the route between India and Australia during the years 1794-1801, what Salmond calls “the timber voyages” (1997:234),\textsuperscript{226} were crewed by Indian lascars and sepoys.\textsuperscript{227} These ships most often plied the waters between India and China, and often detoured to colonies in Australia and New

\textsuperscript{226} See Albion (1965) for a discussion of the difficulties Britain faced during these years in its insatiable thirst to acquire timber and spars to repairs damaged ships. Britain was also engaged in war with France during this period, and Salmond (1997:237) notes that the Royal Navy was starved for timber to help its war effort.

\textsuperscript{227} Like the word lascar, sepoy is also derived from the Persian سپاهی (sipāhi), and has come to mean soldier in both Hindi (सिपाही) and Urdu (سپاہی). It entered the English lexicon during the British Raj as sepoy.
Zealand. There are a number of records in ships’ logs and passenger manifests documenting Indian crews and landfall in New Zealand, with a few records stating that some jumped ship while transiting and stayed, and other records recounting landfall and work ashore (Furber 1970, Salmond 1997:235, Leckie 2007:21, Kolig 2010:22).

One of the first of the timber voyages to be recorded making landfall in Aotearoa was the Fancy, commanded by Edgar Thomas Dell, who was charged with the task of delivering provisions from India to Port Jackson, Australia, and procuring the necessary timber and spars to deliver back to India, which were desperately needed to repair British ships. The Fancy, along with an unknown number of Indian lascars and sepoys, departed Mumbai in May 1794, arriving in Port Jackson two months later. After delivering its cargo, the Fancy set sail on 29 September 1794. Dell, having first stopped at Norfolk Island on his way to Aotearoa, arrived in November 1794 at Tokerau. The search for suitable timber led Dell to take the Fancy into the same waters that Cook had taken the Endeavour in 1769, inland along the Waihou River \(^{228}\) (Salmond 1997:238-251). Dell’s diary records:

> At 4:00am on 23 November, the brig’s boats were lowered, and at ten o’clock [we] went off in the longboat accompanied by six Europeans, two Lascars and five Sepoys; and the third officer Alms was in the jolly boat with two Europeans and two Lascars, to take soundings of the river (Dell 1795, as reported by Salmond 1997:245). \(^{229}\)

Dell’s account records Indian crew in nearly equal numbers as Europeans. It is only the second known European visit to the Waihou River after Cook’s initial shore party in 1769. Yet while both accounts are known, the fact that the second visit was accompanied by so many Indian sailors is not.

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\(^{228}\) The Waihou is located near present day Thames in the Hauraki Gulf.

\(^{229}\) Dell’s original journals form part of the Colonial Office correspondence between London and Port Jackson, held in the Mitchell Library, State Library of New South Wales, in Sydney.
Dell recounts his visit ashore, numerous encounters with Māori, and the procurement of the necessary timber to transport back to India. Another log entry from 3 December 1794 records that “Denniston and Alms went with the carpenter, the sawyer, six Lascars and two Sepoys in the longboat to begin felling trees” (Dell 1795 in Salmond 1997:248). A third log entry dated 5 December records that Dell took “a party of nine Europeans, a Sepoy and four Lascars up the river, where they cut down two tall trees, and four more at another place where trees had already been felled” (Dell 1795 in Salmond 1997:249-250). These three references in Dell’s journal are the first confirmed record of Indians ashore in New Zealand, although lascars serving on Surville’s 1769 visit are presumed to have gone ashore. Regarding British visits, Angus reported that a total of “seven vessels had arrived in Port Jackson before 1795 with timber from New Zealand” and it is likely that many of these would have been carrying Indian crew, and perhaps convicts, on their journeys between India and Port Jackson (Tapp 1958:51).

The brief entries in Dell’s journal reflect his objectivity in recording events as they occurred, for they portray Indian lascars as hardworking members of a crew sent ashore to procure timber, no different from other members of the crew with which they served. In this sense, Indian identity at the time could be conceived as one of both industriousness and servitude, perhaps holding a key to the significance of the twin elements of identity and discrimination, central to the formation of a minority perception of self today. A keen desire to work and achieve (industriousness) coupled with a sense of subjugation (servitude) are strongly evident in early accounts of Indian lascars, due to the fact that this history was recorded by European ‘masters.’ More realistically, Ghosh, in his Ibis Trilogy (2009, 2012, 2015), paints a portrait of lascars not as unidimensional servants, but
instead as actors with considerable agency, no doubt oppressed, but alive in spirit and action. Shared notions of colonialism figure strongly in the formation of individual and community identity, especially amongst minority communities (Said 1979, Naipaul 1989, Bhabha 1994, Sen 2006), evident in past accounts of early Indian sojourners. As prototypical events, best exemplified by the lascars on Surville’s 1769 and Dell’s 1794 visits, a modern Indo-Kiwi identity could perhaps reference these initial points of historical presence, and reflect upon the sense of industry (the desire to work) and servitude (subjugation by colonisation) that was experienced by early Indian sojourners. Early notions of servitude have since been replaced by postcolonial experiences of discrimination in which subjects no longer remain demure against authority, but one in which the colonial burden rests on the shoulders of European colonisers, as both the source of, and reason that, discrimination exists. Minorities, in this sense, are no longer seen by the majority as subjects, and the majority’s need to dominate has since been replaced by the perpetuation of discrimination. These archetypical identity patterns are evident in both Indian migrants of the second phase (characterised by the indenture of Indian workers on sugar cane plantations)\(^{230}\) and in modern economic migrations of today (characterised by voluntary migration, economic gain, and the search for a better quality of life), although they are not necessarily continuous or unchanging. Such patterns are periodically revealed in liberal democracies with a colonial past in the form of anti-immigrant diatribes, such as the 2013 Invercargill taxi harangue,\(^{231}\) and other such examples of intolerance and bigotry towards minority communities. The existence of such regularly occurring incidents is a reflection of the inadequacy of shallow diversity management.

\(^{230}\) As earlier mentioned in Section 5.2 ‘Crossing the kanāpāni.’ This specifically refers to Indian indenture in the East Indies, Malaya, South and East Africa, the Seychelles, and Fiji (see Lal 2006a).

\(^{231}\) Originally referred to in Section 2.1.
In addition to the timber voyages, ships were also outfitted for sealing\textsuperscript{232} on which lascars served. Although Cook first visited Tamatea\textsuperscript{233} in 1773 on the \textit{Resolution}, and his sailors are reported to have killed a number of seals for food, the first known sealing expeditions to the South Island were not organised until 1791-1793. Although there were earlier sealing visits to the Macquarie and Antipodes Islands (Richards 1994), the first known sealing ships to reach the two main Aotearoan islands, and the second European visit to Dusky Sound, were the \textit{Discovery}, captained by George Vancouver, and \textit{Chatham}, commanded by William Broughton, in November 1791 (Salmond 1997:518), following charts described during Cooks' visit eighteen years earlier. Since both ships sailed from England in April 1791, and the Muster Rolls for both vessels contain the names of only British sailors,\textsuperscript{234} it is unlikely that either had lascars aboard (Lamb 1984).

Sealing began in earnest in October 1792 with the arrival of the \textit{Britannia}\textsuperscript{235} in Tamatea. The \textit{Britannia} had earlier left England with the task of delivering convicts to the penal colony at Australia’s Botany Bay, subsequently sailing to Aotearoa to procure seal skins for the Chinese market. Under the command of William Raven, the \textit{Britannia} had left behind a gang of 11 sealers. This was not an unusual practice as many sealing gangs were left ashore to exploit the rookeries until their ships returned (Richards 2010:165).\textsuperscript{236} When the \textit{Britannia} did not return as

\begin{footnotesize}
\begin{enumerate}
\item A sealer to the southern oceans, Jules Poret de Blosseville, noted in his diary “Besides providing excellent ports of call, New Zealand offers brilliant possibilities for the sealing trade. Fur seals are very numerous on her coasts and in her bays” (McNab 1907:211-228, Richards 2010:161).
\item Dusky Sound in Fiordland, South Island.
\item These can be viewed online at <memory.loc.gov/cgi-bin/query/r?ammem/mymhiwe:@field(DOCID +@lit(mymhiwe89799m4div13)), last accessed 11 August 2014.
\item The \textit{Britannia (ii)} was a 300 ton whaler built in 1783 in England, and was wrecked off the New South Wales Coast in 1806 (Parsons 1967).
\item It is possible that lascars were also a part of this landing party, although I cannot confirm this at this time.
\end{enumerate}
\end{footnotesize}
scheduled, the sealing gang had abandoned hope and had begun constructing a schooner of about sixty tons, made entirely from New Zealand timber. This half constructed boat was left behind when the *Britannia* and *Francis* finally arrived, 10 months later, to pick up the sealing party in September 1793 (Richards 2010:174). As most of these ships also plied the waters between Port Jackson (Australia) and India, and stopped in Aotearoa to fetch seal skins, it is likely, though improbable, that lascars were aboard these ships.\(^{237}\)

News of the partly-built boat that had been left behind by the *Britannia* party attracted the next visitors to Tamatea in September 1795, when two ships, the East Indiamen sealing supply ship *Endeavour* and the small brig *Fancy*, arrived to collect seal skins, oil and meat, all of which would have fetched profits in European and Chinese markets. This visit records “244 people had arrived in the Sound, including European ex-convicts, escapees, deserters, passengers, officers and sailors,” and “also carried Lascars and Sepoys” and the extensive ship’s log records the movements of these men while on the coast sealing and cutting timber to repair their boats (McNab 1914a Vol. II:518-534, Salmond 1997:290, Richards 2010:174). The *Endeavour* made it into harbour after crossing the Tasman Sea in a raging storm, but it was badly damaged when it made it to Tamatea and had to be run ashore and left behind. This ship is the first Aotearoan shipwreck recorded by Europeans (Hutching 2011). Good timber that could be salvaged from the *Endeavour* was added to finish the construction of a new boat that was built from the half-constructed ship that the previous party had left behind. This newly constructed boat was named *Providence* (Richards 2010:174).\(^{238}\) In January 1796, after four months

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\(^{237}\) Further research may reveal Indian presence in Aotearoa on these earliest sealing ships between 1791-1793.

\(^{238}\) Incidentally, the *Providence* was the first ship to be built entirely of New Zealand timber (Salmond 1997:292).
'settlement' sealing and building boats, the Fancy and the Providence set sail for Norfolk Island. Not all of the original crews from the Endeavour and Fancy were allowed to board, and about thirty-five men, including several Indian seamen, were forced to stay behind, “their dependance for provisions being chiefly on the seals and birds which they might kill” (Collins 1798 Vol. II:460, cited in Richards 2010:174). Upon arrival of the two ships in Norfolk Island, supplies were loaded and “several Lascars and Portuguese seaman, and forty-eight half-starved passengers” were put ashore before carrying on to China to sell their cargo (Collins 1798 Vol. I:460-41, McNab 1914a Vol. II:553; Salmond 1997:292, Richards 2010:174). An American boat, the Mercury, was later dispatched to Fiordland in 1797 to rescue the castaways, picking up “thirty-five half-starved survivors, finally landing them in Norfolk after a stay of more than eighteen months on their own in the Sound (Collins 1798 Vol II:48-49, Salmond 1997:294, Richards 2010:175). Sealing did not last very long in Aotearoa as the rookeries were soon depleted and the value of the procured skins had diminished. Richards (2010:183) records the startling brevity of the sealing heyday which had collapsed by 1809. This helped focus the attention of European merchant ships back to the lucrative timber trade.

These tales tell of the hardships experienced by the very earliest of the sealing gangs left behind in Fiordland between the years 1791-1797. While it is commonly believed that these parties consisted of only Europeans, it is evident from the above, that Indian lascars were also present, and not only served as sailors aboard the vessels that plied these waters, but worked ashore as an integral part of the sealing and boat-building crews. While I have been unable to confirm earlier Indian presence on the

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239 This pathetic company of castaways, which included Indian lascars, was in effect the second sealing gang to be ‘stationed’ in New Zealand (Richards 2010:175).
1791-1793 sealing visits, it is clear that lascars were present in Tamatea between 1795-1797. While these accounts may be found in numerous sources, the presence of Indian lascars with Europeans on the very earliest voyages of exploration in 1769, and on subsequent sealing and timber ships to Aotearoa, is only recorded in historical footnotes. We can be certain, however, that Indian sailors were here at the beginning, aboard vessels of European explorations and exploitation, and that they are equally entitled to claim their place in the history of the exploration and settlement of New Zealand.

What we have instead is a dominant discourse of a sequence of events that begins with Māori arrival and settlement, followed by European arrival and colonisation, which is later followed by Pacific and Asian migration and settlement, with New Zealand moving from a bicultural state to a multicultural state since the immigration reforms of 1987. This discourse is misinformed and largely a result of European control of historical narrative. Aotearoa, from the very earliest appearances of Europeans ashore, was markedly multiethnic in nature. Some of the accounts above suggest that Indian lascars aboard early European sealing and timber vessels were more numerous than I have suggested, and in some instances, may have outnumbered their European crew. Crews on these early merchant vessels may have contained sizable populations of Indian lascars. British retelling of events often reported and named only British officers that served on board or went ashore. There are numerous references to named British officers going ashore for retrieving timber or seals, and any accompanying Indians, if documented, were only mentioned in passing, along with a record of their number. As unnamed participants, they remain invisible, and hence absent from the earliest history of European exploration, exploitation and settlement in Aotearoa.
Overcoming historical colonial attitudes is vital in the recognition of the significance of both minority and national identity for today’s minority communities. Acknowledging Asian presence at the very founding of the modern state, along with recognising earliest Asian participation in nation building, must be an integral part of any redress offered by majorities to minorities. Such an act would be seen as similar to government apologies and settlements offered to Māori under the Waitangi Tribunal for previous injustice. Rectifying Asian history in New Zealand is, therefore, not a big ask, but one that would be a vital first step to establishing a deep diversity framework in New Zealand.

Reaffirming such narratives can also provide genuine sources of minority self-esteem and a catalyst for restoring lost self-respect in the wake of colonial hegemony. That an Indian minority in today’s New Zealand can, and should, claim an integral part in the history of nation building would help fortify and invigorate a shared national identity, allowing Asian populations to claim, along with Māori and European, a share of New Zealand’s history. Kelman (1997a, 1997b) states that failure to adequately recognise ethnocultural contributions to a shared national identity promotes the destruction of human dignity and that a reconceptualisation of national identity needs to take place for social justice and reconciliation between parties. While this process is currently underway with Māori through reconciliation of the Waitangi Tribunal, it is not complete, and acknowledging past injustices towards other non-Māori minorities has barely begun. The Crown, for instance, during Helen Clark’s administration, formally apologised on 12 February 2002 to Chinese New Zealanders whose ancestors had paid the Poll Tax that was imposed on Chinese immigrants during the 19th and early 20th centuries. (Clark 2001,
There have been no subsequent Crown apologies for other injustices that minority communities may have suffered. While Kelman (1997a, 1997b) maintains that reconceptualising national identity to include ethnic minorities, and developing new norms for their accommodation, would aid minority inclusion in a shared national identity, no such attempts by the majority have been achieved. Majority recognition of early Asian presence and participation has the potential to enhance minority participation in society and reinvigorate minority identity through a sense of pride and accomplishment. This could be achieved through formal state recognition of the importance of historic minority contributions to the founding of the nation, a more equitable allocation of resources for social uplift, integration and settlement support, and recognition of current minority political and economic contributions to society. Such recognition could be demonstrated either thru formal apologies for past injustice or other appropriate forms of redress that are mutually acceptable to both parties. This could include enhanced state initiatives designed for majorities to mitigate the perpetuation of racism and discrimination, rather than the marginalisation that is often experienced by minorities today. Formal minority recognition by the crown, however, in and of itself, can not mitigate racism, as best evidenced by Māori through the continued occurrence of discrimination and marginalisation, despite formal recognition and redress. This is why deep diversity emphasises majority contributions towards social cohesion.

Much of the existing historical narrative of Asian sojourn to Aotearoa doesn’t end in 1797, and there are additional anecdotes of early Indian

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240 Under this system, every Chinese person entering New Zealand was required by law to pay a £10 tax, and only one Chinese immigrant for every 10 tons of cargo was allowed entry. This was increased in 1896 to £100 per head, with only one Chinese immigrant allowed for every 200 tons of cargo. The Poll Tax was effectively lifted in the 1930s following the invasion of China by Japan, and was finally repealed in 1944 (Office of Ethnic Affairs 2012).

241 See Zubrzycki (1976), Banducci et al. (2004).
presence to recount that are poorly known or only briefly mentioned by the handful of historians of the Indian diaspora in New Zealand. Existing historical narratives for the Indian population begin about 1809-1810, with the Bengali who jumped ship, and the first known appearance of Chinese presence is in 1842 Nelson. Mention of an earlier Asian presence is a passing observation, e.g. “The first contacts between Indians and Maori occurred when British East India Company ships, crewed by Lascars and carrying sepoys, landed in New Zealand during the late eighteenth century” (Leckie 2006:21), along with Ip’s reference that “The relationship between Chinese and Māori is traced from the earliest encounters in the mid-nineteenth century” (Ip 2009:1). Such documentation has lain dormant as most of the earliest sojourners were unnamed, lacking identity. Unacknowledged historic Asian sojourners remain faceless much in the way that today’s minorities lack appropriate representation. Remaining either unidentified as historical actors or poorly represented as contemporary players can be interpreted or construed as being without identity. In recounting such histories, minorities are better able to reclaim and participate in a shared national identity, while majorities must become familiar with, and take responsibility for, embracing new historical narratives.

As sealing in the Southern Ocean was in decline during the early years of the nineteenth century, the focus of European merchants returned to the timber trade. There were four subsequent visits, not previously mentioned, by European ships to the northeast to collect timber in the years since the 1794 sailing of the Fancy. These occurred between the years

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242 Even Leckie’s statement shows preference for “British,” as opposed to ‘European,’ ships, as we now know that first Indian appearance in Aotearoa occurred during the French India Company’s visit in December 1769. She does, however, in her later work (Leckie 2007), refer to Salmond’s (1991, 1997) mention of lascar presence aboard European ships.

243 Although we now have names and religious identities to attach to the very first Indians in Aotearoa.
1798-1800\textsuperscript{244} and some of these may have had Indian lascars aboard.\textsuperscript{245} Confirmation of lascar presence reemerges in the 1801 crew manifest of the *Royal Admiral*, on its way from London to China via Port Jackson, which sailed into the Hauraki Gulf on 20 April 1801 “heavily armed and manned by a crew of eighty-three European sailors and fifteen lascars” to obtain timber to sell in China. The crew manifest of Captain William Wilson, (cited in Salmond 1997:256), gives lengthy accounts of more crewman going ashore to collect timber. From these and other accounts it is clear that numerous ships entered the Hauraki Gulf and the Waihou River in search of timber for spars and the lucrative markets in China. Although not always recorded in the ships’ logs, most of these ships would have been carrying lascars and, undoubtedly, many of these would have gone ashore with the ships’ officers to help fell timber and transport it back to the ship. After the arrival of the *Royal Admiral* in March 1801, there are over fifty European vessels recorded reaching northeastern Aotearoa\textsuperscript{246} between 1801-1809, when the Bengali lascar who ‘jumped ship’ first appears.

As the presumptive ‘first Indian’ on New Zealand soil (Bandyopadhyay 2006:125) it is important to recount the incident and embed it within its broader historical context. Although hundreds of South Asians may have

\textsuperscript{244} These would be the voyages of 1) the *Cornwall* under Captain William Swain in August 1798, 2) the voyage of the *Hunter i* Captained by James Fearn in August 1798, 3) the visit by the *Hunter ii* under Captain William Hingston, 4) the voyage of the *Betsey i* with Captain Glass (Salmond 1997:525).

\textsuperscript{245} Of these four visits between 1798-1800, not much is known. The *Cornwall* left Port Jackson to go whaling in New Zealand. The *Hunter i*, collected timber in the Hauraki and then continued to China. This ship is recorded as sailing for Campbell and Co. of Calcutta, so it is likely that Indian lascars were aboard on the outward bound journey from Calcutta to Port Jackson. It is not known if any lascars were aboard, although it is likely. The *Hunter ii*, under the command of Captain William Hingston, is known to have sailed from Port Jackson in October 1799 to the River Thames in Hauraki to collect timber, and then on to Calcutta to deliver timber for ship building there. Four crew members are known to have jumped ship and stayed behind with Māori at Waihou. This ship is recorded as arriving in Calcutta in 1800. The *Betsey i* sailed from London to Port Jackson, then spent three days in the Hauraki collecting timber before continuing on to Peru. It is not known if any lascars were aboard (see Salmond 1997:525).

\textsuperscript{246} See Salmond (1997:525-530).
left footprints prior to this event, it nonetheless remains significant as the
first well-documented symbol of Indian presence. Entwistle (2005:103-106)
records an Indian of Bengali descent deserting the ship City of Edinburgh in
1809 in the Bay of Islands to live with his Māori wife. Salmond
(1997:373-377) records in great detail the visit of this ship to the Bay of
Islands March-May 1809, having departed Port Jackson in January.

Captain Alexander Berry, a Scottish-born merchant and explorer, sailed for
the British East India Company (Berry 1912:1, Perry 1966). His memoirs
record his October 1806 trip to India to engage in trade which proved
profitable (Berry 1912:3). In 1809, Berry sailed from Australia to New
Zealand with the intent to repatriate two Ngāti Manu chiefs to the Bay of
Islands, and the hope of procuring much needed timber for spars (Perry
the protection of the two Māori chiefs in the Bay of Islands, Berry (1912)
records an accompanying Bengali servant (Salmond 1997:375). It is certain
that this servant is the same one recorded as deserting ship to marry and
While certainly not the first record of Indian presence, this Bengali is
evidently the first known reference to prolonged Indian settlement rather
than one left ashore with a sealing crew or landing for a few nights to
procure timber. While encounters between sealing gangs and local Māori
on the South Island are recorded, and there are numerous instances of
European and Indian encounters with local Māori on the North Island,

247Berry was one of the more successful merchants and had enjoyed the respect of the colonials and
administrators in Port Jackson based on his reputation for honesty and fair dealing (Macdonald
2005:11).

248Perry (1966) records that the City of Edinburgh then set sail for Fiji for sandalwood, and returned
to New Zealand in October 1809 to procure more timber and to rescue the survivors of the
infamous massacre of the Boyd, a fascinating tale (Berry 1810, 1819, 1912; Swords 1978; Salmond
1997:368-394; Macdonald 2005). The ship later left the Bay of Islands in January 1810 and sailed
across the Pacific to South America. On this voyage the City of Edinburgh lost her rudder, and
limped into Valparaiso, Chile and then on to Lima, Peru, where she was repaired. Berry sold his
timber profitably while in South America, and continued his journey, eventually reaching London
again in late 1812, and eventually settling in Sydney, Australia in 1819 (Perry 1966, Salmond
this record is perhaps the earliest known that describes Indian settlement with local Māori, and hence it becomes significant as a first recorded instance of Māori-Indian intermarriage and potential offspring.\textsuperscript{249}

This event is noteworthy as a foundational symbol of Indian identity in New Zealand. If the first Māori-Indian encounters were documented, no records exist save those sieved through European filters. Only written records of Māori-Pākehā encounter exist, written from a European perspective, and Māori oral history has also passed on such engagements. There are neither oral nor written records of early Māori-Indian encounter except those recorded by Europeans, and what little there is lacks detail. One can only guess what the earliest Indians experienced as they dealt with European and Māori. Perhaps some of the earliest Indian sojourners felt drawn towards the indigenous experience as either a remedy for hardships encountered while serving aboard European vessels, or as an expression of affinity with distinctly Māori ways of being. The very act of jumping ship would be one of flight from subjugation to freedom, filled with the security of Māori guardianship and the protection of Tekokee, whom Cruise (1824:315) identifies as the chief of the tribe within which the Bengali settled. Perhaps this is what may have led him to jump ship and settle amongst Māori.

The visit of the \textit{City of Edinburgh} in 1809 is also noteworthy for it records the presence of an Indian-Portuguese servant, and both a Chinese blacksmith and a Chinese carpenter aboard ship (Salmond 1997:379), which dates Chinese presence in Aotearoa much earlier than the currently believed 1842.\textsuperscript{250} Ships that plied the routes between Europe and its colonies not only carried Indian seamen, but others of Asian and African

\textsuperscript{249} There is now a large and thriving Indo-Māori community, which is the subject of an Office of Ethnic Affairs publication (Pio 2012).

\textsuperscript{250} See Ng (1993).
ancestry as well. Since many of these sailed for the British East India Company and often made China a port of call for trade, small numbers of Chinese would also have served aboard European vessels.

There are further reports of Indians on ships plying these routes in the early 1800s, all of which brought Indians into closer contact with Māori and helped forge early Indo-Māori identity. McNab (1907:184-185) records the 1812 visit to Macquarie Island of the ship *Campbell Macquarie*, which was built and registered at Calcutta. Under the command of Richard Siddons, while searching for new sealing sites south of New Zealand, the *Campbell Macquarie* ran aground on Macquarie Island on 10th June 1812 and was destroyed.

Her crew of 12 Europeans and 30 lascars were all got ashore. She had nearly three suits of sails, and when the weather cleared up the crew succeeded in getting these ashore, where they were stored in a hut, which was afterwards accidentally destroyed by fire. All her stores were lost, independently of which she had on board 2,000 prime skins, 36 tons of salt, and 118 tons of coal taken in lieu of ballast. Captain Siddons, Mr. Kelly, chief mate, and the crew remained ashore from 10th June to 11th October, when they were taken off by the *Perseverance* and given passages to Sydney, where they arrived on 30th October at Broken Bay. While on the island four of the lascars died, also a seaman of the *Mary and Sally* named Thomas McGowen (McNab 1907:185-186).

This incident is noteworthy in that its British crew were considerably outnumbered by Indians. It records four unknown lascars who perished on the island. It is ironic that while the names of the Europeans are well documented and recorded, early mariner historians did not deem the reportage of the names of the Indian sailors necessary, giving some indication of British regard for the lascars. Their historic invisibility is palpable given that this is another recorded incident that tells of the death of Indian crew in the Southern Oceans, not unlike those aboard Surville’s 1769 visit on the *St Jean Baptiste*. This incident chronicles a tale of extreme

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251 Macquarie Island lies in the southwest corner of the Pacific Ocean, about half-way between New Zealand and Antarctica. Politically, it has been a part of Tasmania, Australia since 1900. The Australian-Briton Frederick Hasselborough discovered the uninhabited island accidentally on 11 July 1810 when looking for new sealing grounds. He claimed Macquarie Island for Britain and annexed it to the colony of New South Wales in 1810 (Scott 1993:14).
hardship and perseverance by early Indian sojourners, thus substantiating their resilience and corroborating their endurance for exploration and their will to survive. Such events are worthy of recognition and remembrance and are essential to the evolution of an Indo-Kiwi identity.

Further incidents of Indo-Māori engagement are crucial to this development. Otakou was also visited by occasional ships in the years after Cook’s voyages, most probably searching for seal rookeries. One such visit involving lascars was that of Captain Fowler and the Matilda in August 1813 (McNab 1907:216, Salmond 1997:524). He had entered Otago Bay “in some trepidation since his crew of lascars were emaciated by fatigue, being for a length of time without vegetables or fresh provisions and with only a few gallons of water left” (Richards 2010:193). Fowler reports being favourably treated by local Māori, but also recalls an incident in which he lost 14 of his men on the coast of New Zealand, together with three of his boats. One was stolen by the natives, another was carried off by six of his crew of lascars. The third was sent with his chief officer (Brown), two Europeans and five lascars, all of whom are supposed to have foundered as no tidings were got of either boat or crew (Carrick 1903:172, McNab 1907:115, Richards 2010:192).


Three were reportedly killed by Maori but three survived, probably settling near Whareakeake in Otago until 1823. This means they were some of the earliest long-term non-Maori residers of the Dunedin area. During this time, they assisted Ngai Tahu with strategies for attacking European ships (Leckie 2007:21, as cited in Bishop Selwyn’s notes in an appendix in Basil Howard 1940:379).

These passages are noteworthy for they record the first instance of the theft of British property by Indian sailors. While their European crew

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252 Otakou is the name for an early Māori settlement on the Otago Peninsula, South Island, near present day Dunedin.

253 While the 1916 Census (page 146) records the first official incident in which an Indian male is “under legal detention,” it is obviously not the first.
may have labeled them deserters and sent others for their capture (those sent to retrieve both the boat and the ‘thieves’ also never returned), it is possible that the Indians, desiring a change of scenery, left with whatever means they had at their disposal. Leckie (2007:21) notes that three of the six Indians were reportedly killed by Māori. McNab offers an alternative and contradictory account:

Later on evidence was discovered of the fate of the men. De Blosseville ascertained in Sydney, in 1823, that of the six lascars in the second boat, three were killed by the natives and the others were kept alive and taught the natives how to dive and cut the ship’s cables during the night and how to reduce the efficiency of firearms by attacking in wet weather. Mr. Kelly was told by one of the surviving lascars of the Matilda that Mr. Brown, with six men, had been killed and eaten by the natives (McNab 1907:217).

History may never fully ascertain the veracity of Selwyn’s or De Blosseville’s statements regarding the fate of those the Matilda left behind. It is evident, however, that some survived, and those that did aided local Māori in managing European presence in Otakou. Living under Māori kaitiakitanga\textsuperscript{254} may have been what the Indian ‘thieves’ had intended.

In recounting these events, it is possible to perceive an instance of identity conflict amongst early Indians in Aotearoa. While some may have jumped ship preferring to live amongst Māori rather than European, Carrick (1903:172), McNab (1907:115) and Richards (2010:192) record that “two Europeans and five lascars” were sent, in the charge of the European Officer Brown, after the ‘thieves’ to retrieve them and the boat they had taken. What might these five lascars have thought? Were they to betray their deserting shipmates? And what of the three Europeans? While the eight in the ‘retrieval party’ never returned to their ship, one can only speculate on what identity conflicts may have occurred amongst the five lascars sent to return their compatriots. At best, these anecdotes are useful for revealing other possible explanations; namely, that alternative

\textsuperscript{254} Guardianship.
interpretations of historical events, as recorded by Europeans, are indeed plausible if we are to question existing historical evidence. Other unconventional readings from contrasting points of view should be equally considered, especially when minorities are involved and the only surviving accounts are European. Identity, therefore, becomes critical as a means through which historical evidence is queried.

History records subsequent events regarding the fate of those that did not return to the *Matilda* in late 1813. A subsequent sealing visit a few years later reveals what happened to the third boat and the members of the ‘retrieval party.’ Some of the Indians that did not return exchanged goods or passed on valuable new technologies and skills to local Māori.

They taught the natives the manner of attacking the Europeans during the heavy rains when their guns could not be used, and also how to dive in order to cut the cables of the vessels during the night (Richards 2010:193).

One survivor, said to be from Surat, spoke English and Maori, and was given the name Te Anu. He took the moko and was noted by Bishop Selwyn to be living with his Maori wife and son at Potirepo (Port William) on Rakiura (Stewart Island) in 1844 (Leckie 2007:21, as cited in Bishop Selwyn’s notes in an appendix in Howard 1940:379).

One lascar became a tattooed ‘pakeha Maori’, fully integrated into this adopted tribe, and was still living among them thirty years later when the Rev. Johann Wohlers and Bishop Selwyn visited Stewart Island in 1844 and 1851 (Beattie 1919:221, Selwyn in Howard 1940:379).

The use of the term “Pākehā-Māori” to describe an Indian who lived amongst, and had taken on the customs of, local Māori is curious. Perhaps Europeans at the time could only explain events through reference to their own experience. By contemporary standards, however, those with Asian ancestry do not consider themselves Pākehā, and it is odd that Europeans of the time did. As colonialism dictated an ‘othering’ of their subjects why would a European refer to an Indian using the same term

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255 For more on the subject of Pākehā-Māori, see Bentley (1999).

256 Referring to Asian minorities as ‘European’ is a common occurrence in the early New Zealand censuses, as discussed in Chapter Six, as there were no categories in use at the time to classify them.
that Māori had used to describe them? The most plausible explanation is that Pākehā referred to ‘non-Māori’ at the time. Nonetheless, has been interpreted today by both Māori and Europeans as referring specifically to those of European descent.\(^{257}\) This passage is pivotal as it reintroduces the genesis of a particularly Indo-Māori identity, one seen previously with the Bengali who jumped ship in the Bay of Islands. Such beginnings are noteworthy historical tidbits in the establishment of such an identity. Indians were not the only ones to have ‘jumped ship,’ as Europeans also did so. Both had settled amongst Māori, but it is not known whether they had lived in the same villages. What is known is that Indians had settled and intermarried into hapū at the earliest stage of European presence, events not well recognised today. Why, then, is the early history of Māori-Pākehā intermarriage so well known\(^ {258}\) while the parallel history of Indo-Māori union remains virtually invisible?\(^ {259}\)

A “Pākehā-Māori” Indian versed in European ways would have been exceptionally useful to Māori for facilitating trade, passing on unknown skills and technologies, and explaining foreign attitudes. Richards (2010:195) records several Indian sailors living at Port Daniel\(^ {260}\) with Otakou Māori from 1814, but offers no further insights into their condition or fate. Pybus records that Port Daniel was visited by occasional stray sealing ships and recounts the same tale of the Matilda in 1813, but also offers an alternative interpretation of a possible reason why Māori may have killed some of the Indian sailors.

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\(^{257}\) Moorfield (2011) describes Pākehā as meaning English, foreign, or European, also as a New Zealander of European descent.

\(^{258}\) See Harré (1966), Anderson (1991b), Bentley (1999), Grimshaw (2002), Wanhalla (2008). Thorp (2003:2) states: “Englishmen were reported to be living among the Maori as early as 1801, and by the early 1830s the term ‘Pakeha Maori’ had been coined to describe them.”

\(^{259}\) The only known published work in this field to date has been Edwina Pio’s Caste away? Unfolding the Māori Indian (2012).

\(^{260}\) In Otago Harbour.
Captain Fowler was obliged to take shelter and refit his ship which was much damaged due to violent storms. He was well received by the Maori people and their chief, whom they called Papui, proved himself a very hospitable host. The ship's rigging was repaired with ropes made by the natives, and the ship's stores were replenished with fish, potatoes and fresh water. At the next place of call the Matilda met with disaster. In the south, probably Port Molyneux, some of the crew deserted, and quite a few were murdered by the Maoris, no doubt due to their having broken the law of tapu. One of the crew, a lascar, was found four years later living at Otakou (Pybus 1954:59).

This surviving Indian is fairly well recorded in the ship's log of Captain James Kelly of the Sophia.

Mr. Kelly made the chief of the village a small present of iron, and proceeded to his dwelling to barter for potatoes, leaving one man to look after the boat. On reaching the house of the chief Mr. Kelly was saluted by a Lascar, who told him that he had been left there by the brig Matilda, Captain Fowler. During a long conversation Mr. Kelly inquired after a boat's crew that was said to have been lost near Port Daniel, and learned that Brown, who had charge of the boat, with six men, had been killed and eaten by the natives. The Lascar then offered his services in bartering for potatoes for the vessel, and appeared familiar with the native tongue (McNab 1907:226).

At once the captain made friends with the Maori people and all seemed to be favourable. Next day, with a few sailors he proceeded outside the heads to Whareakeake, now known as Murdering Beach, where he traded with the people for potatoes. He found the people unfriendly, and a lascar, formerly of the Matilda, who was living with the natives, tried to warn the visitors of their danger (Pybus 1954:59).

The day after arrival he rowed with six men to a small native village outside the harbour heads, at a spot still called Murdering Beach. Landing there, he began to bargain with the Maori for a supply of potatoes. A Lascar sailor, who was living with the savages, acted as interpreter. The natives thronged round the seamen. Suddenly there was a yell, and they rushed upon the whites, of whom two were killed at once. Kelly, cutting his way through with a bill-hook he had in his hand, reached the boat and pushed out from the beach. Looking back, he saw one of his men (his brother-in-law, Tucker) struggling with the mob. The unhappy man had but time to cry, “Captain Kelly, for God’s sake don’t leave me!” when he was knocked down in the surf, and hacked to death. Another seaman was reeling in the boat desperately wounded. Kelly himself was speared through one hand (Reeves 1898:96).

These incidents portray the “Pākehā-Māori” Indian first as an interpreter, but also as one who may have been concerned for the Europeans’ welfare by warning of imminent danger. By 1817, this particular Indian had been fully immersed in a Māori environment, yet this incident displays similar qualities as the 1813 desertion of the Matilda: does he side with his Māori guardians or help the Europeans, who were in a desperate situation? It is
not possible to answer, but it is known that the Indian survived and eventually made his way to Rakiura\(^\text{261}\) where he is next found by Bishop Selwyn in 1844 and 1851 (Beattie 1919:221, Selwyn in Howard 1940:379).

There are further isolated incidents of Indians being left behind. McNab (1914a:202) records that four lascars were left under the charge of the missionaries at the Bay of Islands in 1814, while the Europeans amongst them proceeded in the *Active* to Tahiti. After the *Sophia* incident in 1817, there are few detailed accounts of Indian sailors ashore. However, there are literally hundreds of newspaper accounts that record the comings and goings of ships in the various ports and settlements from the early 1800s onwards. Newspapers, like the Sydney Gazette, regularly reported the movements of European vessels along with their ports of call, including destinations, cargo and passenger lists. Accounts of crew movement were likewise considered important news. Many of these describe the numbers of Indian sailors arriving or departing, with names withheld, and little is known of their activities. They remain invisible.

The first Indian to achieve notoriety was an Anglo-Indian from Goa who arrived in 1853, having previously worked the California gold fields. Edward Peters, later known as “Black Peter,” was a farm labourer and gold prospector. Although the Australian Gabriel Read is credited with discovering gold at Tuapeka in Otago, it was Peters who told him where to find it (McLintock 1966a:820, 1966b:55; Leckie 1981:190, 2007:21, 2010:48, 2011:54; McLeod 1986:51; Dwyer 1990; Swarbrick 2012), leading to the first workable gold claim at Glenore, Otago (Ip & Leckie 2011:162). His gold prospecting in central Otago brought about the goldrush upon which much of Otago’s wealth was built, but Peters received very little attention (Leckie 1998:163). Instead, historians focused on honouring the European

\(^{261}\) Stewart Island.

Figure 5.1: Edward Peters, aka ‘Black Peter’ (Otago Daily Times, 6 Nov. 1990.)²⁶³

Of note, however, is the fact that a named Indian, one that history records as the discoverer of gold in Otago, has remained virtually invisible,²⁶⁴ obscured by a European history dedicated to retelling its revisionist colonial tale. Through peopling the historical record with what European versions of history have expunged, a contrasting narrative emerges. Reinserting Asian presence into an overwhelmingly European history has produced a more thorough, and inclusive, account.²⁶⁵

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²⁶² What little is known of Peters comes predominantly from a few main sources (Mayhew 1949, McLeod 1986:51, Dwyer 1990, Williams 2009).


²⁶⁴ As an example, Te Ara, the official online encyclopedia of New Zealand, states that “Otago’s first gold rush was in 1861, after Gabriel Read found gold in what would be called Gabriel’s Gully. Thousands of diggers, later including men from China, went there to make their fortune” (Walrond 2012). Of Peters, Walrond writes “On 23 May 1861 Gabriel Read gained esteem and provincial government bonuses when he found gold. He also saw his name given to the locality of the find, Gabriel’s Gully, near Lawrence. Another character, Edward Peters, had found gold earlier than Read in the same area, but he had not proven that the deposits were extensive enough to be economically worked. Eventually he was awarded a smaller bonus” (Walrond 2012:3). Even though Peters had discovered the gold at Otago, the European, Read, was the one to remain historically visible, while Peters is relegated to a historical footnote.

²⁶⁵ The first step towards rewriting this historical inaccuracy was the publishing of William’s (2009) book, and the recent erecting of an interpretive monument to Edward Peter’s discovery of gold in Otago (Phillips 2009).
As the advent of the goldrush coincides with the first visible Indian in Aotearoa to be named (McLeod 1986:51),\(^{266}\) and details of his doings can be found in the historical record,\(^{267}\) this period marks the end of this early narrative as it transitions from a period of early sojourner to that of the more visible early Indian settler. The history of Indian settlement that follows is exceptionally well documented by Leckie (1998, 2006, 2007, 2011) and others.\(^{268}\) As many historians and researchers\(^{269}\) cite the period that coincides with the Otago goldrush as the beginning of Asian migration to New Zealand, I shall end the retelling here.

Presently, new histories emerge that illuminate Asian presence and participation in nation building. While these histories have only recently been retold,\(^{270}\) they stretch back only so far, and rarely do they reach first instances of Māori-European encounter. Shifting the goalposts demands not only a critical rethink of how collective histories are interrogated, but a thorough lens-cleansing through which such events are viewed and interpreted. A retelling of historical anecdotes may contribute to a renewed sense of identity for all minority communities in a contemporary New Zealand. Bringing earlier accounts to light, within a context of increasing minority assertion, can only facilitate a more fulfilling appreciation of how deeply diverse New Zealand has become.

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\(^{266}\) As earlier described, Selwyn (see Howard 1940 and Leckie 2010:48) mentions the Indian who settled in Otago with a Māori tribe, took moko and was renamed Te Anu. As his Indian name is lost to history, his region of birth in India and his religion will also remain obscure.

\(^{267}\) see McIntock (1966a, 1966b) and Williams (2009).


\(^{270}\) see Ng (1993-1999), Ip (2003b, 2009), and Leckie (2007).
CHAPTER SIX:
INDIAN SETTLEMENT AND
THE NEW ZEALAND CENSUS, 1851-2001

It is important to note the paradoxical nature of the census: it presents a portrait of the whole nation and yet it does so by emphasizing the discrete units and different identities that make up (or do not make up) the whole. There is tension in its objectives, and there is tension in the power of its effects. The power of classifying and counting can be aspirational, harnessed for inclusion and recognition, and it can be disciplinary, applied in ways that exclude and erase (Mezey 2003:1713).

Identity is a fundamental organising principle in the enactment of power, in the mobilisation for and the allocation of resources, and a critical marker of inclusion and exclusion in social organisation (Liu et al. 2005b:15).

It is possible that, by 2050, today’s racial and ethnic categories will no longer be in use (Migration News 2004).

6.1 Introduction and theoretical considerations

The previous chapter revealed that accounts of early Asian presence have been largely ignored by currently accepted histories, reconfiguring the date of earliest known Indian presence in Aotearoa from 1809 (Bandyopadhyay 2006:125, Leckie 2007) back to 1769 and earliest known Chinese presence from 1842 (Ng 1993) to 1809. The implementation of census enumeration is symbolic as it marks the move from Indian presence to Indian settlement, as initial instances of domicile appear. Yet, like historical accounts of early presence, census records obscured early Asian settlement. This chapter looks first at the theoretical drivers behind census classification in New Zealand, relating these to the similar experiences of the US, and second, reveals earlier evidence of Indians in the census then previously known, as notations were often relegated to insignificant footnotes or concealed in ambiguous census categories that obfuscated their tabulation. Examining these categories provides insight into early state reportage of Asian presence in New Zealand, as much of what is presented is as much relevant for early Chinese settlement as it is for Indian.

These would be similar for other settler societies, like Australia, the UK and Canada.
While early censuses record Indian ethnicity, these are not as readily accessible as the historical anecdotes presented earlier. Early censuses constructed a past in which minorities are thoroughly absent, reaffirming a predominantly colonial narrative. A review of early New Zealand censuses also reveals how enumeration has changed, and recent censuses, through steadily increasing numbers, demonstrate minority resurgence and empower emergent communities. Historical census inquiry also reflects European treatment of minority populations. This chapter reviews historical census records of Indian settlement from the first national census in 1851, picking up where the narrative from Chapter Five roughly ends, to 2001, demonstrating repeating patterns of state hegemony in the presentation of minority statistics. This sets the stage for a discussion of the 2006/2013 Census data in Chapter Seven and my survey results in Chapter Eight.

Censuses have had substantial social ramifications and considerable policy implications, which have been, over the course of their history, fueled by discriminatory practices and the problems associated with ethnic classifications, and fanned by increasing waves of immigration. These have lead to theoretical considerations supporting the emergence and increasing importance of identity and the “growing strength of national and ethnic loyalties” (Kertzer & Arel 2002a:1), which have allowed minorities to more assiduously assert themselves politically, over the course of census history. While such assertion may have intensified rising ethnic nationalist movements in some countries, this is not the case in New Zealand, where increasing minority identification on the census

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272 This includes, by extension, Chinese settlement, as the two are inextricably linked as the most prominent non-Māori minorities with whom census enumerators at the time had to contend.

has generally resulted in increased recognition and greater socioeconomic and political representation. It is therefore paradoxical that census history, which began with overtly racist enumeration techniques, is, in New Zealand at least, currently represented in increasing minority participation; though this is not to say that greater assertion is a result of early discrimination, nor that such advances have solved all the problems brought about by European domination of the discourse, even though they may have eased somewhat. Such an understanding of minority advancement, however, theoretically frames and informs this chapter as minority treatment in the history of the New Zealand census is discussed below.

This chapter divides the history of Indian presence in the New Zealand census into essentially three periods: 1) exclusion and minority invisibility in the 1851-1911 censuses; 2) biological determinism, maintaining racial purity, and consolidating minority reportage in the 1916-1981 censuses; and 3) minority inclusion and aspiration, demonstrated in the 1986-2013 censuses in which larger minority groups begin to receive limited recognition, which gradually increases. A discussion of these periods (see Table 6.1) illuminates a primary objective of deep diversity, which highlights the importance of self-identification, and the historic invisibility and continued discrimination of minorities. All three census periods provide practical examples of shallow forms of diversity management and are analogous to similar historical and theoretical treatments of minority reportage in censuses both globally,274 and domestically.275


These three phases also reflect the difficulties of categorising race and ethnicity in censuses over time, and follow minority reportage from first phase exclusion to second phase biological determinism to third phase inclusion through identity affirmation. The first phase is exclusionary, where

Table 6.1: Theoretical and historical periods evident in the New Zealand Census.

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<thead>
<tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Theoretical indicators:</td>
<td>Exclusion</td>
<td>Biological determinism</td>
<td>Inclusion</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Defining characteristics:</td>
<td>Minority invisibility, European domination, Assertion of racial supremacy, Exclusionary policies, Inconsistency and error, Earliest Indian presence first detected</td>
<td>Continued assertion of European domination &amp; racial superiority, State consolidation &amp; standardisation of minority reportage, ‘Race Aliens’ as a census category</td>
<td>Aspirational, Affirmational, Minority political assertion, Self-reported identity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Preoccupations:</td>
<td>Keeping New Zealand white, maintaining racial purity; Intolerance of minorities, Prejudice and bigotry</td>
<td>Keeping New Zealand white, maintaining racial purity; Prejudice; Measuring blood quantum</td>
<td>Minority struggle for recognition, Tolerance, Mitigating racism and discrimination</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Minority treatment:</td>
<td>Māori exclusion, Minority invisibility, Identities imposed by enumerators</td>
<td>Referred to as ‘Race Aliens’ Māori finally included in national census in 1951</td>
<td>Self-identification Focus on ethnicity instead of race Recognition of multiple ethnicities Better minority access to state resources</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

racial and ethnic categories reflected the exclusionary policies and ideologies already at work. The second phase is characterised by the preoccupation with biological determinism and maintaining racial superiority and purity through the precise measurement of blood quantum. The third phase is predominantly aspirational, marked by
increasing minority inclusion, and sees, borrowing Taylor’s (1994) phrase, the emergence of a ‘politics of recognition’ in which minorities are motivated by affirmational goals to receive greater access to state resources, and attain increasing political recognition. All three phases, however, represent shallow forms of diversity management.

Government statisticians and politicians in predominantly white settler societies\textsuperscript{276} during the first census period were largely beholden to and responsible for the polity’s concern with keeping the nation ‘white’ and ethnically cleansed of ‘degrading’ influences. While legislation in settler societies made Asian migration difficult, if not largely impossible,\textsuperscript{277} census enumerators went about the task of either categorising and assigning external ‘identities’ to minorities, or were instructed to explicitly exclude particular ethnic groups, such as Native American populations in the US who were excluded as ‘Indians, not taxed’\textsuperscript{278} (Bennett 2000, Mezey 2003, Hochschild & Powell 2008), or Māori populations in New Zealand who were enumerated separately and excluded from national censuses for a hundred-year period that ended in 1951 (Kukutai 2011a:36, Statistics New Zealand 2013). In so doing, census enumerators, and the government departments or agencies that empowered them, imposed externally designated racial, ethnic, regional or national classifications that did not equate with how both individual members of minority populations or their larger collectives may have viewed themselves. Such categories serve to discipline and coerce individuals into groupings that align with a political or ideological agenda of the majority.\textsuperscript{279} As I will show, this imposition extended to other non-ethnic categories like religious

\textsuperscript{276} e.g. the US, Canada, Australia and New Zealand.

\textsuperscript{277} See Murphy (2007) for historical legislation affecting Indian populations and Murphy (2008) for legislation affecting Chinese populations. Together, they offer an excellent and complete compendium of Asian exclusion via legislation and immigration law in New Zealand.

\textsuperscript{278} This occurred in US decennial censuses beginning in 1790 and ended in the 1870 Census.

\textsuperscript{279} See Foucault (1977).
affiliation and birthplace. Not only did majority political actors utilise and distribute such terms horizontally, they employed these classifications into vertical hierarchical schemes that privileged white Europeans above others, relegating non-Europeans to the bottom of the heap. This first phase of census enumeration also conceals non-European populations by either exclusion (e.g. Māori), or by inclusion, enumerating non-European non-Māori ethnicities as white Europeans, as no official category for such individuals existed. In some instances, discussed below, it is difficult to distinguish Chinese and Indian populations as ethnically distinct, as they were often classified in ‘European’ categories. Likewise, non-Christian religious affiliations are also clearly discriminatory, such as the use of ‘heathens’ to refer to census respondents of non-Christian religions, documented below. Such enumeration strategies establish European hegemony and control over the racial discourse, and are not only indicative but emblematic of this first phase of census classification and categorisation.

The second phase (1916-1981) is predominantly characterised by biological determinism and the preoccupation of maintaining racial purity. This period saw the reorganisation and recategorisation of particular racial or ethnic categories that were externally defined, to one preoccupied with racial superiority and the tracking of blood quantum in mixed-race populations. This belies a similar biological determinism

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280 It is noteworthy, however, that even ‘white European’ was sometimes seen as an arbitrary classification. Thus some European immigrants faced early discrimination; e.g. the Kauri Gum Industry Act 1898, and the Immigration Restriction Amendment Act 1920, were used to exclude non-British migrants (e.g. Dalmatians, Irish, Italians) from entering New Zealand, in addition to the restrictions placed on Asians (see Spoonley 2012, and the New Zealand government’s ‘New Zealand Legislation’ website at <www.legislation.co.nz> for sourcing specific historical immigration legislation).

281 Here, I refer to the discredited notion that most human characteristics are biologically determined at conception by hereditary factors, rather than socially constructed. Biological determinism implies a rigid causation largely unaffected by sociocultural and environmental factors, i.e. scientifically speaking, there is no such thing as ‘race.’ See Lewontin et al. (1984) and Lewontin (1991).
evident in the census histories of other settler societies. This phase is marked by an overzealous concern with miscegenation and maintaining racial purity, critical to maintaining existing social hierarchies based on race, while the third phase saw its demise. This period further solidified the reportage of ‘race’ and fixed ‘racial’ categories based solely on discernible physical qualities until the 1981 census, the last to require respondents to indicate their ‘ethnic origins’ (e.g. race) either in terms of ‘full’ or ‘fractions’ of distinct ‘races’. During this period, categorisation was largely based on perceived race, rather than ethnicity, although the contemporary concept of ethnicity was only beginning to gain credence towards the end of this period. This period corresponded to the US fixation on the exact enumeration of mulattos, quadroons and octoroons, in attempts to measure racial fractions of ‘whiteness’ amongst the black population (Anderson 1990, Mezey 2003, Hochschild & Powell 2008). In New Zealand, this period was likewise characterised by the tracking of both full-blooded ‘race aliens’ and their mixed-race counterparts. These were enumerated in great detail in the census schedules 1867-1966, especially for European, Māori, Indian and Chinese. Although the 1970s saw large increases in Pasifika populations, this period is still very much dominated by majority discourse, until comprehensive changes in immigration legislation ushered in the next phase.

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282 See, for example, Stephen Jay Gould’s *The mismeasure of man* (1996) for an account of early attempts to classify people according to observable physical features.

283 The first appearance of the measurement of blood quantum is found in the 1896 Census (p. 47), which mentions ‘half-caste’ Chinese. This became established practice in the first phase and continued throughout the second phase, making its last appearance in the 1981 Census. Māori ‘half-castes’ are first mentioned in Appendix B of the supplementary 1901 Census estimates.


286 In the US, the word ‘mulatto’ began appearing in the census in 1850, and became a permanent fixture recording mulattos, quadroons and octoroons, during the Censuses of 1890 through 1920 (Mezey 2003).
The third phase, from 1986 to the present, is marked by inclusion, and begins with large minority population gains that resulted from the change in immigration legislation instituted by the 1987 Immigration Act. The impact of new minority settlement that resulted from this legislation was first reported in the results from the 1991 Census and hence marked the beginning of a new phase focusing on minority growth and rapid demographic change. While the first phase focused on ‘race’ reportage and externally-observed physical characteristics, and the second on blood quantum, this period is marked by the self-awareness of one’s sense of belonging to particular groups based on sociocultural, linguistic or religious affiliations. As well as birthplace, the emphasis in this phase focused on self-reported identity as socially constructed and self-discernible, as opposed to ideologically constructed, and imposed, in earlier periods.

The reportage of multiple ethnicities by individual respondents was allowed for the first time during in the 1986 census.\footnote{By contrast, this ability was instituted for the first time in the US in its 2000 Census.} Given the historical bias for single race classification, the movement away from measures of racial fractions to the recognition of multiple ethnicities\footnote{This was accomplished by ticking various boxes for the ethnicity question.} was indeed significant. This enabled more appropriate forms of identity expression, constricted in earlier phases, and recognised emerging ethnic associations that focused on one’s chosen identity(ies) rather than externally imposed racial identification.

The third phase also reflects more sophisticated minority use of statistics as a political tool to further aspirational goals, resulting in a series of political actions aimed at increasing minority access to state resources and
advocacy for greater minority recognition. In many western democracies today, state or federal laws often mandate particular policies pertaining to appropriate political representation, civil rights, the support for disadvantaged or marginalised minority groups, and the monitoring or enforcement of human rights protocols that implement anti-discrimination measures. In this sense, affirmative action programmes targeting equal rights in a variety of sectors has dramatically helped minority populations overcome invisibility and achieve greater political recognition.

This phase, and its more representative ethnic categories, especially those emerging since 1987 immigration reform, has allowed additional ethnic identities to emerge that had previously remained suppressed. Yet the particular ethnic identities that are available to tick on the census form, however aspirational, continue to conceal subgroup populations within larger groups. This is most evident in the Indian population that has numerous ethnic, regional, religious, caste, indigenous and linguistic affinities, as well as birth countries, that set them apart from both the ‘Indian’ population (e.g. Gujarati, Malayali) and other ethnic minority groups in New Zealand (e.g. Chinese, Korean). Each of these subgroups is, in itself, a separate and distinct identity, with most Indians favouring regional or linguistic affiliations in addition to ‘Indian.’ As subordinates amongst dominants, most Indians prefer to identify themselves as ‘Indian’ in New Zealand, as it is easily identifiable by majority populations and distinguishes them as distinct from other ethnicities. Furthermore, the

289 See M. Anderson (1990), B. Anderson (1991), and Lee (1993). See also Morning & Sabbagh (2005) for a discussion of how the census shifted from an exclusionary tool to one of political agency for blacks in the US.

290 This is further discussed in Chapter 8, which presents select survey results of the Indian population.

291 Sheth (1995:169-198) points out that Indian immigrants usually identify themselves with particular regional-linguistic subgroups, not with the Indian national origin group.
claiming of the meta-ethnicity ‘Indian’ on the census reflects both an overarching identity and becomes the basis for cultural solidarity and political representation, i.e. it becomes strategically useful, even if it does gloss over regional, linguistic, cultural and religious differences. When amongst themselves, or in their country of origin, self-identification follows the particular ethnic, regional, linguistic, religious, caste affiliations or country of birth with which one most identifies, rather than as ‘Indian.’

6.2 Exclusion and minority invisibility, 1851-1911

This first census period is generally marked by the steady increase of European populations while Māori populations decline (Pool 1991, Belich 2007). European growth during this period is largely attributed to colonisation and natural births, while Māori decline was due to increasing exposure to introduced diseases (with mortality reducing absolute numbers), while ‘swamping’ by Pākehā reduced their relative share of the total population. Māori exclusion from the national census is noteworthy, although there were early attempts at estimates and later enumerations that were conducted separately.292 Other minority populations, while inconsistently recorded, are largely invisible in 19th century censuses. While they begin to appear in census records during the middle of this period, their identities are often obscured as census enumerators struggled to classify minorities into existing categories due to their inadequate definition.

Although Indian sojourners have been recorded entering and leaving Aotearoa since 1769, it wasn’t until the third national Census of 1861, that

292 The first attempt to count (rather than estimate) the total Māori population was a census of Māori taken over a year between 1857 and 1858 (Fenton 1859).
their official enumeration began. Many of the Indians present in Aotearoa between 1769-1861 had either come for a brief period lasting days or months (i.e. the fleeting visits of Indian lascars on European ships, or the more prolonged stays of European sealing parties ashore), or while transiting on ships that plied the international trade routes between Europe, India, Australia and China. The majority of Indians present during these years would have been considered sojourners, not settlers. Although there were instances of Indians jumping ship, settling under Māori protection, marrying into hapū, and others who came to prospect for gold, only a few of these early sojourners and settlers were recorded in early New Zealand censuses.

While the comings and goings of ships’ crews are well recorded in the arrival and departure records of main ports or in ship captain’s logs, it is unclear how many Indians may have arrived, however briefly, during the period 1769-1861. Old newspaper accounts of arrivals and departures of Indian lascars on transiting ships suggests the possibility that dozens of Indian sailors were domiciled in New Zealand before they begin to appear in the census. Since these are ‘newsworthy’ stories, many refer to extraordinary situations (e.g. lascars arriving in ports in emaciated states, ill treatment at the behest of European superiors, or having been left ashore in sealing parties) or anti-social behaviour, while others refer to

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293 New Zealand’s first national population census took place in 1851, although smaller regional official enumeration goes as far back as 1842 (Statistics New Zealand 2013).

294 A cursory search of old New Zealand newspapers in a database held by the National Library <paperspast.natlib.govt.nz> reveals 31 newspaper references to the search entry ‘lascar’ between the dates 1839 (the first year that the National Library holds records of digitized newspapers) and 1861 (the Census year in which Indians first show up in the New Zealand Census). This does not mean that 31 Indians may have come and gone on ships during this period. It means only that the term “lascar” appears in a New Zealand newspaper during these years. It also does not mean that these references occurred in New Zealand, as quite often these recorded news from other ports (e.g. Sydney, Norfolk Island) in addition to New Zealand. However, many lascars would have transited through New Zealand on their way to and from these ports. A larger search of the entire database (from 1839 through 1945), reveals 3,927 references to ‘lascar.’ An analysis of this material is beyond this thesis’ purview.
specific crimes committed by both Europeans and Indians, or lascars remanded to jail.

This section discusses the earliest references to Indian ethnicities or religions in the 1851-1911 censuses. I have chosen to end this phase with the 1911 Census as censuses from 1916 had standardised ethnicity reporting, and the enumeration of Indian ‘ethnics’ were clearly and continually reported.295 The religious affiliation of census respondents has been recorded from the very first census and continues today. It is in these records that the very first references to those of Indian ethnicity appear. This is probably why other researchers, examining census records for those of Indian ethnicity, overlooked footnotes to religious affiliation tables and pegged Indian enumeration to later dates.

Early censuses recorded predominantly European Christian adherents and great detail was paid to the particular denominations to which respondents belonged. Like practices in other national censuses based on race,296 early religious affiliation in New Zealand was described solely in terms of ‘Christian’ or ‘non-Christian’ dichotomies. The 1851 Census records the only non-Christians as ‘Jews,’297 along with those recorded as ‘Non Sectarian, professing to belong to no Sect, or neglecting or refusing to state their adherence to any.’298 If ethnic Indians were enumerated in 1851, they would have been included in this category. In that year, 97.8% of the population were recorded as ‘Christian,’ tabulated under entries denoting their particular denominations.

295 I have summarised census findings on ethnicity and religious affiliation in Appendices A and B, which are referenced throughout this chapter.

296 As in ‘white’ and ‘non-white.’

297 The 1851 Census records a total of 65 Jews in New Zealand, comprising 0.25% of the total population (excluding Māori).

298 Those recorded as Non-Sectarians in the Census of 1851 numbered 496, or 1.93% of the total population (excluding Māori).
The second national census of 1858 recorded similar categories of Christian denominations, although the category ‘Jews’ was changed to ‘Hebrews,’ and ‘Non-sectarians’ was categorised as ‘No Denomination or Not Described.’ This census also introduced the category ‘Other’ which is not further defined, although it is presumed to include those of other Christian sects or denominations that do not otherwise appear in the religious affiliation tables. If ethnic Indians were recorded in 1858, they would have been listed as ‘Others,’ which accounted for 1.6% of the population. In this year, ‘Christians’ represented 95.5% of the total population, ‘Hebrews’ 0.3%, and ‘No Denomination or Not Described’ comprised the remaining 2.6%. As with the first national census, only European populations appear to have been tabulated, although separate estimates of the Māori population were appended.

In subsequent censuses the categorisation of religious affiliation grew more complex. The third national Census of 1861 is important to historians of religious diversity as it includes the first genuine tabulation of those with ‘Other’ religious persuasions, referring to non-Christian or non-Jewish Europeans. This census is significant as it records a total of fourteen ‘Hindoos,’ four ‘Mahometans,’ and three ‘Buddhists’ in a footnote to the ‘Other’ category that appears in the original tables in the census documents (Figure 6.1). Although it is not clear if the ‘Hindoos’ or ‘Mahometans’ recorded here are from India or whether they represent Europeans who recorded their affiliations as such, given the general anti-

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299 Jews continued to be recorded as Hebrews in the Censuses of 1858 until the Census of 1871. They reappear as Jews from the Census of 1874 through the Census of 1886. From the 1891 Census through the 1926 Census, they are enumerated again as Hebrews.

300 See Appendix B for a full break down of Religious affiliation in the early census years.

301 This notation uncovers an earlier appearance of Indians in the New Zealand Census than previously known.

302 The spelling “Hindoo” is considered a pejorative term by present day standards, and may refer to other Indians of Muslim origin. It is unclear if the 4 ‘Mahometans’ are from India or elsewhere.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCES</th>
<th>Church of England</th>
<th>Church of Scotland, Free Church of Scotland, Other Presbyterian (See Note 1.)</th>
<th>Roman Catholic Church</th>
<th>Wesleyan Methodist Church</th>
<th>Congregationalist Church</th>
<th>Baptists</th>
<th>Primitive Methodist Church</th>
<th>Lutheran Church</th>
<th>Hebrews</th>
<th>Society of Friends</th>
<th>Protestant (See particular Denomination specified)</th>
<th>Otherwise Described or Not Described (See Note 2.)</th>
<th>Total Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
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<td>3,290</td>
<td>1,145</td>
<td>902</td>
<td>650</td>
<td>450</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>574</td>
<td>383</td>
<td>154 118</td>
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<td>Taranaki</td>
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<td>19</td>
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<td>283</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>94</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>99 2,044</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wellington</td>
<td>9,036</td>
<td>5,611</td>
<td>843</td>
<td>710</td>
<td>632</td>
<td>451</td>
<td>743</td>
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<td>89</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>119</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>12,556</td>
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<tr>
<td>Hawke's Bay</td>
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<td>661</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>122</td>
<td>159</td>
<td>73</td>
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<td>11</td>
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<td>601</td>
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<td>5,625</td>
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<td>21</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2,209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canterbury</td>
<td>6,593</td>
<td>5,712</td>
<td>882</td>
<td>749</td>
<td>590</td>
<td>645</td>
<td>771</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>95</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>15,100</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otago</td>
<td>5,874</td>
<td>5,145</td>
<td>6,675</td>
<td>5,517</td>
<td>3,612</td>
<td>2,925</td>
<td>1,220</td>
<td>280</td>
<td>113</td>
<td>116</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>312</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southland</td>
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<td>701</td>
<td>242</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>358</td>
<td>497</td>
<td>129</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>184</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>19</td>
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</tr>
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<td>6</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chatham Islands</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: The numbers under the heading "Otherwise Described or Not Described" are made up as follows, (taking the results of the compilation in their numerical order). Unknown or Not Stated, 3,657, (viz., Male, 3,637) Females, 30. Of these 3,551, viz., 2,922 Males and 636 Females, were in Otago chiefly on the Gold Fields. Christians, 239, viz., Male, 139; Female, 100. Not Denomination, 294, viz., Male, 150; Female, 144. Unchristian, 161, viz., Male, 112; Female, 49. Non-sectarian, 115, viz., Male, 52; Female, 63. Of these 49, viz., Male, 21; Female, 18, are distinguished as "Non-sectarian Presbyterians," viz., Male, 20; Female, 17. Free Thinkers, 34, viz., Male, 23; Female, 11. Christian Israelites, 32, viz., Male, 18; Female, 14. Catholics, 37, viz., Male, 21; Female, 16. New Church, 29, viz., Male, 18; Female, 11. Presbyterian Brethren, 30, viz., Male, 21; Female, 10; Moravians, 10, all Males. The numbers under the heading "Religion of the Bible and Bible Christians," viz., Male, 6; Female, 11; Not Denominated, 20, viz., Male, 12; Female, 8; Hibernians, 14, viz., Male, 11; Female, 8; Disciples, 12, viz., Male, 10; Female, 2; Monitians, 8, viz., Male, 5; Female, 3; Universalists, 8; all Males 5; all Females 3; Mahometans, 4; all Males, 1; all Females, 3; Buddhists, 5, all Males. Others, (in every instance under a Total of 16), viz., Male, 89; Female, 44.
Asian sentiment of Europeans during early colonisation, it is unlikely that Europeans would record a ‘Hindoo’ or ‘Mahometan’ affiliation. It is more likely that these fourteen ‘Hindoos’ are actually Indians recorded in the religious affiliation tables who were not elsewhere classified, as ethnicity was not formally recorded until 1916. This meant that ‘Hindoos’ were enumerated and categorised as Europeans. The four ‘Mahometans’ recorded in this census would be more difficult to place. It is likely, however, that they were brought here on European ships, making it possible that some originated on the Indian subcontinent as lascars, or were Chinese Muslims coming to work the Otago goldfields. It is not possible to state with any certainty based solely on available data presented in the census record.

If ‘Hindoos’ are to be considered ethnic Indians, then presence in the 1861 Census has not been previously uncovered by other academic researchers of the history of religious diversity or of the Indian diaspora in New Zealand, and this notation represents the earliest known or published citation of their presence in a census. Taher (1965:44), McLeod (1984, 1986:52), and McLeod & Bhuller (1992:5) all mention that the first Indians to appear in census returns were six recorded in the 1881 Census, and Taher categorically states that “statistics showing arrivals of Indians before 1897 are not available” (Taher 1970:39). Leckie, possibly following earlier references from Taher and McLeod, also makes reference to the three Indian males noted as living in Canterbury on the Census of 1881.

305 Discussed in Chapter 4.
306 Many of the early censuses record ethnic Indians in the religious affiliation tables, but these, curiously, were subsumed in the European category before the section on Race Aliens was introduced in the 1916, and subsequent, censuses.
307 From London to Africa, India and China, with stops in the colonies of Australia and New Zealand, as previously described in the last section.
308 This citation is most-probably sourced from the ‘Birthplace’ tables from the 1881 Census that records the numbers of both ‘European’ and ‘Asiatic’ populations born in India. There are six ‘Asiatics’ recorded as being born in India in the 1881 Census.
(Leckie 2007:22, 2010:48) as being the first, but prior to this no other earlier citation of Indian presence on the census exists. Consider the following passages:

The earliest record of Muslims in New Zealand is to be found in the 1874 census records, which lists seventeen ‘Mahometans,’ all males, of whom—if all the information given is to be accepted—fifteen were Chinese and fourteen worked in the gold fields (Shepard 1980:150).

The census records report small numbers of Muslims from 1874 on, but those that came before the early twentieth century left no further record (Shepard 2002:234).

The census records of 1874 contain the earliest mention of Muslims in New Zealand (Kolig 2010:21).

Some 17 ‘Mahometans’, as Muslims were then known, all male, and of whom 15 were Chinese working the goldfields in the South Island, were recorded in the government census of April 1874 (Pratt 2010:398).

The first Muslims recorded in New Zealand were mostly Chinese working in the goldfields in the South Island in the latter part of the 19th century (Pratt 2011:744).

As shown above, these statements are incorrect, as Muslims appear as ‘Mahometans’ in the religious affiliation tables in the 1861 Census. Likewise, Drury (2000, 2006), McCormack (1999), and the Federation of Islamic Associations in New Zealand (FIANZ 2014) all incorrectly cite the 1874 Census as having the first known census record of Muslim presence in New Zealand, probably all based on Shepard’s (1980) assumption.

After an absence in the censuses of 1864, 1867 and 1871, Muslims and Hindus next appear in the 1874 Census; and Buddhists, who also first appear in the 1861 Census, do not specifically reappear as ‘Buddhists’ in the religious affiliation section until the 1896 Census, although ethnic

309 See Figure 6.1.

310 The Federation’s website states that “the first Muslims arrived here in 1874. They were of Chinese origin involved in the mining industry but when the industry declined they left” (FIANZ 2014).

311 Chapter Five confirms that Indian Muslims were present and recorded in Aotearoa in 1769.
Chinese first appear in the Census of 1874, and in all successive census records.\textsuperscript{312} It is unclear if the early reference to three ‘Buddhists’ in the 1861 Census actually refers to Buddhism as a religious affiliation, as the category ‘Buddhist,’ used as a proxy for race or nationality similar to ‘Hindoo,’ cannot be easily discounted. It is possible that this 1861 reference represents the earliest appearance of Chinese in the national census.

Indian presence in the fourth Census of 1864 is wholly absent. While Indians were recorded in the previous census, their non-appearance here is likely due to inconsistent application of census categories, census enumerator inexperience, their disappearance into Māori communities, or the possibility that none were present during enumeration.\textsuperscript{313} Numbers of Chinese continued to grow during the Otago goldrush just underway, and some of these would have been Muslims, Buddhists or Confucians. The fifth 1867 Census marks the beginning of measuring racial fractions, as ‘Half-castes’ are included for the first time in the European totals. Presumably, this would include the first children of European-Māori descent. Although Māori exclusion continued, children that were part-Māori and living with Europeans were not. ‘Half-castes’ of Māori-European descent and living with Māori were included in the separate Māori estimates published from 1874. The use of the terms ‘European-Maori’ (used to refer to those children of mixed marriages who were living with Europeans), and the parallel term ‘Maori-European’ (which referred to the children of mixed marriages who lived within Māori settlements), are also noteworthy.\textsuperscript{314}

\textsuperscript{312} However, Chinese do appear in the religious affiliation tables in the 1867 Census.

\textsuperscript{313} The 1916 Census attempts to correct the record with a full accounting going back over 50 years (see Table 6.4), and states that early Indian appearance was underreported in the very earliest censuses.

\textsuperscript{314} For a fuller treatment of Māori ‘half-caste’ populations and their enumeration, see Brown (1994).
Throughout the early census years, birthplace of the European population was recorded, and the category ‘Other Foreign Countries’ was mentioned although not further described. The 1867 Census is also the first to mention ‘Other Foreign Countries’ in more detail, and the new category ‘China’ is included for the first time in the ‘Birthplace’ section. This records 1,219 China-born persons although it is unclear if these are ethnic Chinese. Since the total population of 218,668\(^{315}\) matches the number of Europeans, one might conclude that these are all of European ethnicity, although it is possible that some, many, or most of these were ethnic Chinese, and census enumerators would have recorded them as Europeans.\(^{316}\) If this is the case, it is unclear why official statistics exclude Māori and presumably include those of Chinese ethnicity. In this year, the category ‘Other Foreign Countries’ records 2,448 persons born in either Europe, North America, New Zealand, Australia, ‘Other British Dominions,’ ‘At sea,’ or ‘China,’ so it is possible that these 2,448 individuals, some may have originated in South Asia. In this census, it is impossible to determine if all of those born in ‘Other British Dominions’ are European, as I have previously shown above that some of these numbers referred to ‘Hindoos’ and ‘Mahometans.’

The 1867 Census marks the first appearance of the novel category ‘Pagans, Chinese and Heathens’ conflating ethnicity and religion in the religious affiliation tables. This category recorded 1,111 persons, or 0.5% of the total population. The practice of labeling those of ‘Other’ religious persuasions in this way continued from 1867-1891, although the category was slightly altered to read simply ‘Pagans’ in the 1874, 1878, 1881 and 1891Censuses. The name was again changed to ‘Buddhists, Pagans and Confucians’ in

\(^{315}\) Entitled “Table showing the places of birth of the population, exclusive of aboriginal natives, in New Zealand” 1867 Census, Part 1, Table 11.

\(^{316}\) It is likely that these were ethnic Chinese due to the large numbers known to have come for the Otago goldrush.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>PROVINCES</th>
<th>Church of England</th>
<th>Church of Scotland, Free Church of Scotland, Presbyterian Church of Orkney and Shetland, and Presbyterian not more specifically described (See Note 1)</th>
<th>Roman Catholic Church</th>
<th>Wesleyan Methodists</th>
<th>Congregationalists</th>
<th>Baptists</th>
<th>Primitive Methodists</th>
<th>Lutherans</th>
<th>Hebrews</th>
<th>Society of Friends</th>
<th>Protestant, No particular denomination described</th>
<th>Papists, Converts, and Heathens</th>
<th>Otherwise described</th>
<th>Not described</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Auckland</td>
<td>12,959</td>
<td>2,940</td>
<td>3,015</td>
<td>3,662</td>
<td>3,771</td>
<td>2,027</td>
<td>7,748</td>
<td>847</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>687</td>
<td>654</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>155</td>
<td>96</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Taranaki</td>
<td>1,293</td>
<td>921</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>137</td>
<td>310</td>
<td>150</td>
<td>398</td>
<td>337</td>
<td>314</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wellington</td>
<td>3,709</td>
<td>4,653</td>
<td>2,513</td>
<td>1,578</td>
<td>1,514</td>
<td>1,325</td>
<td>1,337</td>
<td>1,116</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>176</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>130</td>
<td>235</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawke's Bay</td>
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<td>142</td>
<td>570</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>64</td>
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<td>27</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>2,065</td>
<td>792</td>
<td>3,092</td>
<td>1,082</td>
<td>808</td>
<td>106</td>
<td>68</td>
<td>394</td>
<td>312</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>431</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marlborough</td>
<td>1,611</td>
<td>391</td>
<td>379</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>353</td>
<td>290</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>150</td>
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<td>22</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>31</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Canterbury</td>
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<td>3,142</td>
<td>1,767</td>
<td>2,446</td>
<td>2,940</td>
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<td>476</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>475</td>
<td>232</td>
<td>119</td>
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</tr>
<tr>
<td>Otago</td>
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<td>6,592</td>
<td>3,672</td>
<td>1,911</td>
<td>902</td>
<td>799</td>
<td>702</td>
<td>527</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>418</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Southland</td>
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<td>15</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>23</td>
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<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Totals</td>
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<td>25,061</td>
<td>22,255</td>
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<td>2,323</td>
<td>2,530</td>
<td>2,617</td>
<td>722</td>
<td>600</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(1) The denominations in this Table (as far as "Society of Friends") are classified according to the order in the Schedule of "Religious Bodies" appended to "The Marriage Act 1854" (as amended by "The Marriage Act Amendment Act, 1867") but Presbyterian and Free Church have been brought under one comprehensive heading, there being sufficient reason to believe that, in very many instances, the Householders, when filling the Census Form, did not pay regard to the distinction of religious construction and adherence, or to the names by which their religious denominations were known.

(2) The Numbers under the Heading "Otherwise Described" are made up as shown by the Census, taking into account the denominations following that total. The only notable among these denominations is "Christian," 1,134, viz., males, 690; females, 424 (in which, Numbers of Males, 155; Females, 176; "No Denomination," 1,134, viz., Males, 298; Females, 236; "United Methodists," 282, viz., Males, 159; Females, 123; "New Methodists," 196, viz., Males, 113; Females, 83; "Episcopal Methodists," 73, viz., Males, 42; Females, 31; "Plymouth Brethren," 42, viz., Males, 26; Females, 16; "Swedish Lutheran," 63, viz., Males, 20; Females, 43; "Other Denominations," 42, viz., Males, 34; Females, 8; "Swedish Brethren," 42, viz., Males, 26; Females, 16; "New Church," 21, viz., Males, 10; Females, 11; "Moravians," 19, viz., Males, 13; Females, 6; "Others," 235, viz., Males, 126; Females, 109. For these 245 persons, there are no less than forty-nine, more or less varied, descriptions.)
the 1886 and 1891 Censuses. This practice was abandoned in the 1896 Census, which enumerated ‘Buddhists and Confucians’ in a combined category,\(^\text{318}\) with any remaining ‘Pagans’ presumably enumerated in the ‘Other Denominations’ sections of the religious affiliation tables.\(^\text{319}\) Similar to ethnic ‘othering,’ the ‘Pagans’ category further subordinated non-Christian minorities already denigrated by racial superiority, thereby perpetuating majority-minority discourses.

Since 1,101 of the 1,111 categorised in 1867 as ‘Pagans, Chinese and Heathens’ are recorded from Otago, it is assumed that these were Chinese miners working the Otago goldfields. It remains unclear why the Chinese continued to be included in the ‘European’ population totals in 1867. Although they are copiously mentioned in earlier censuses, the Chinese are first listed as a distinct population in the 1874 Census.\(^\text{320}\) Based on this, it can be assumed that many or most of the Chinese recorded domiciled in New Zealand would have been either recorded in the ‘European’ totals in the 1851 through 1871 Censuses or excluded altogether. Europeans were the sole ethnicity recorded in the 1851 through 1871 Censuses, with the exception of Māori, whose numbers continued to be estimated independently.

The 1871 Census is the first year that respondents were allowed to officially object to answering the religion question, as required by the Census Amendment Act of 1870. This Act affirms one’s right to object: “When any person objects to state whether he belongs to any or what religious denomination, he may enter the word object in the census

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\(^{318}\) This practice continued in the 1901, 1906 and 1911 Censuses, after which (from the 1916 Census on), Buddhists and Confucians were enumerated independently.

\(^{319}\) In Figure 6.2, note the third column from the right, entitled ‘Pagans, Chinese and Heathen.’

\(^{320}\) This practice continues today.
form.” The number of such objectors in this year was 8,630, or 3.4% of the total population. This year also includes the category ‘Pagans, Chinese, and Heathen’ that began in the previous 1867 Census, of which 2,612 individuals are recorded, comprising 1.0% of the total population (excluding Māori). This marks the continued blurring of boundaries between religious affiliation and ethnicity, most prevalent during this phase.

‘Half-castes’ (those children of European-Māori mixed marriages) in 1871 were again included in the ‘European’ totals, which referred to those living European lives, as opposed to those living as Māori, who were counted as Māori. Porous boundaries and inconsistent use of terms prevail, and ‘Birthplace’ tables, inconsistently used as a proxy for ethnicity where non-Europeans were included, largely reflected colonial attitudes of the time as these consisted mostly of British citizens born in overseas colonies.

In considering the tables of birthplaces, it should be borne in mind that the numbers given as born in any country are not necessarily natives of that country, the children born of British parents being included (1871 Census, p. 10).

The use of “not necessarily natives” in the 1871 Census demonstrates the ambiguity of the Birthplace tables as being unreliable markers for ethnicity. ‘Other British Possessions’ lists 713 persons as born in India, although many (or most) of these were of European ethnicity.

There are two possible exceptions to the 1871 Birthplace tables. One lists those born in China, which records 2,641 persons, of which 2,576 were recorded in Otago. At least 2,576 of these were ethnic Chinese. However,

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321 Census of 1871, p.3.
322 See Table No. 1, on the opening pages of the 1871 Census.
323 See Table IV, page 80 of the 1871 Census, which shows the “Nationalities.—Subdivisions of groups” and divides the population according to birthplace.
Table V of the 1871 Census,\textsuperscript{324} records 4,828 persons born in China, with 4,431 of these living at the Otago goldfields. It is possible that the earlier table records China-born Europeans and the second ethnic Chinese, though this is impossible to confirm. The second exception is the entry for 231 individuals born in ‘Other Countries.’ Of these, 134 persons were recorded as living in the Auckland region. Since these have been separated out from the European populations born in the British colonies, it may be reasonable to conclude that these are members of other ethnicities, for why else would they be enumerated separately? As with the first exception, an additional table appears showing 893 people born in ‘Other Countries,’ all of whom are presumed to be of the native ethnicity of the listed country, rather than of European ethnicity born in those countries. Of these, a few categories are of note: the category ‘Asia (country not named)’ lists two persons, ‘Fiji’ lists 29 (some of whom may be of Indian ethnicity), along with a variety of other birthplaces.\textsuperscript{325} These two exceptions represent ‘Birthplace’ as an ambiguous census category, providing no way to distinguish European from other ethnicities.

There are a few interesting footnotes scattered throughout the 1871 Census regarding the Chinese. These are significant in that they represent the first time a non-European non-Māori minority is mentioned outside the enumeration tables. These footnotes offer the first textual references in the census about how such minorities should be ‘dealt with’ and suggest that official thinking is one of transience rather than settlement.

\begin{flushright}
In dealing with this subject the exceptional condition of the Chinese population should not be overlooked, as they do not come to the colony with a view to permanent settlement, and do not bring their women with them. Of the two women returned as Chinese, one dwells in Otago, the other in the Chatham
\end{flushright}

\textsuperscript{324} This Table is entitled “Showing the Number of Persons, Males and Females of different Nationalities in the Colony of New Zealand (exclusive of Maoris), in the Towns (of a Population of 500 and upwards), outside Towns, and on Goldfields,” and appears on page 82 of the Census of 1871.

\textsuperscript{325} See page 81 of the 1871 Census.
Islands, and it is doubtful if the latter is of purely Chinese extraction (1871 Census, p. 3).

The 1871 Census is also noteworthy for singling out Chinese in the introduction while Māori remain excluded.

Of the Chinese population 918 dwelt in houses, 2,288 in huts, 12 on shipboard, 1,588 in tents, and 10 were camping out (Census of 1871, p. 3).

The section “Part V: Conjugal Condition of the People” records in a footnote that 28 Chinese men were married, one of whom had a Chinese wife, with the remaining 27 Chinese being married to European women.326 These notations are relevant as they point out specific, although inconsistent, references to other Asian ethnicities that are not provided in earlier accounts.

Although respondent ethnicities were not formally enumerated, the 1874 Census does, however, make continued reference to Chinese presence in various tables and footnotes throughout, which are inconsistently applied with no particular reasons given for exclusion or inclusion in individual tables. Note that while Chinese and ‘Half-Castes’ are recorded in numerous tables, Māori remain excluded, with population estimates appearing separately in an appendix.327 This census marks the first year in which the ‘Half-castes’ category is applied to non-Māori populations. Also noteworthy is Table 1, in the opening summary pages for the 1874 Census, which describes the total population of the colony in terms of Chinese ethnicity (see Table 6.2). It is remarkable that the Census summary of the entire population is defined by one’s Chinese-ness, while Māori remain excluded from the descriptions of the population in the general tables.

326 See page 11 of the 1871 Census.

327 As an example, the following appears on the note to Table 17 of the 1861 Census: “Table XVII.—Showing the Population (exclusive of Māoris); the Number of Chinese and the Number of Half-Castes; the Number of Houses Inhabited, Uninhabited, and in course of Erection, classified according to the Materials of which they are constructed and the Rooms they contain. Also, the Number of Europeans and Chinese living in Houses of different Materials, the Number on Shipboard, and the Number Camping Out.”
This demonstrates the considerable level of inconsistency that marks census reporting during this phase.

Table 6.2: Summary description of the population of the Colony, 1874 Census.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Population</th>
<th>Persons</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Exclusive of Chinese</td>
<td>294,698</td>
<td>166,167</td>
<td>128,532</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>4,816</td>
<td>4,814</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>299,514</td>
<td>170,981</td>
<td>128,533</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In the absence of any formal ethnic categorisation, the religious affiliation tables provide the best evidence of non-European non-Māori populations.

Thirty-eight of the Chinese population of the colony were returned as professing Christianity: they belonged to the under-mentioned denominations:—Church of England, 20 Males, 2 Females; Presbyterians, 7 Males; Wesleyans, 4 Males; Roman Catholics, 5 Males. 15 were returned as Mahometans; the remainder were stated to be Pagans or Confucians; but some doubt existing as to whether the latter word was used advisedly by the Sub-Enumerators, the whole are given in the Tables as Pagans.328

This is the first reference or admission to census enumeration as a tricky task. If the 15 ‘Mahometans’ mentioned above were Chinese, that would leave two Muslims unaccounted for during this year (which shows 17), so it is possible that the two remaining Muslims were Indian. The above reference continues the theme of European domination and the obfuscation of minority reporting that characterises this census period by differentiating non-Christian religions as ‘Pagans’ and the use of ‘Confucians’ as a proxy for Chinese ethnicity, as in earlier uses of ‘Hindoo’ or ‘Hindu’ that referred to the people of India, thus conflating religion with Indian ethnicity.

Interestingly, nine ‘Hindoos’ appear in the religious affiliation tables in the 1874 Census, thirteen years after the first known appearance of Indians in the 1861 Census, and seven years before the previous earliest-known

328 Footnote to “Table IV, Religion.—Subdivision of Groups,” 1874 Census, pg. 57.
reference in the 1881 Census. This would account for two earlier confirmed citations\textsuperscript{329} than those referred to by others\textsuperscript{330} as being the first known census record.

The 1878 religion tables described the Chinese as belonging to either of three categories: ‘Christians,’ ‘Pagans’ or ‘Confucians,’ in which, as in the 1874 Census, ‘Confucians’ could either be a proxy for Chinese, while ‘Pagans’ would presumably refer to all Chinese not returning a Christian affiliation (e.g. Buddhists, Muslims). It is unclear why ‘Confucians’ would not be included in the category ‘Pagans’ while Buddhists and Muslims presumably are, unless ‘Confucians,’ as above, referred to those of Chinese ethnicity who were not Christian.

Fifty-four of the Chinese population of the colony were returned as professing Christianity: they belonged to the under-mentioned denominations: Church of England, 32 males, 4 females; Presbyterians, 3 males; Wesleyans, 7 males; Roman Catholics, 8 males. The rest were Pagans or Confucians (1878 Census, footnote to ‘Table IV,’ p. 255).

Such inconsistencies highlight European (and Christian) superiority during this phase, to the extent that Chinese were often enumerated as ‘Pagans’ in the religious affiliation tables nor counted as an ethnicity/race in the general population tables.

The 1878 Census also distinguishes both ‘Chinese’ and ‘Half-castes,’\textsuperscript{331} as well as Chinese living aboard ships, enumerated in the summaries in the opening pages of the general census.\textsuperscript{332} Regarding birthplace, 905 people are listed as born in India, but presumably these are of European ethnicity rather than ethnic Indians, although impossible to verify. The 4,492 listed

\textsuperscript{329} Namely, the 14 ‘Hindoos’ I’ve recorded in 1861, and the nine recorded in 1874.


\textsuperscript{331} For examples, see Table XVII, page 12, or Table XXI, page 16, of the Census results for 1878.

\textsuperscript{332} See ‘Table XX: Population on Shipboard,’ page 15 of the 1878 Census.
as China-born are explained in a footnote\(^{333}\) stating “9 persons were returned as born in China who were not Chinese.” ‘China’ is the only birthplace listed that identifies individuals by either nationality or ethnicity. As these are noted independently, this provides strong evidence that other listings (e.g. India’s 905 individuals) are of European ethnicity. Those born in ‘Other Countries’ are listed with 1,160 individuals, but these are not further defined. Table IV\(^{334}\) includes ‘Birthplace Unspecified’ which has two distinct sub-categories entitled ‘British Names’ (686 individuals), and ‘Foreign Names,’ which accounts for 26 persons (19 males and seven females) living in New Zealand in 1878 with non-British names.\(^{335}\) These 26 are distributed through the colony as five (four males and one female) in Wellington, 11 (six males and five females) living in Nelson, three males in Canterbury, and seven (six males and one female) in Otago. It is possible that this earlier record of three males with foreign names living in Canterbury are the same Indian males referred to in the 1881 Census\(^ {336}\) (McLeod 1986; Leckie 2007:21, 2010:48; Beattie 2011:142), as the servants of Sir Johan Cracoft Wilson, a retired magistrate from the British Civil Service in India, who settled in New Zealand after his years of service to British India along with his Indian servants. It is likely that their ethnicity became obscured by census enumerators in 1878. If these are indeed the same Indians, it would uncover an earlier reference for birthplace (i.e. those of Indian ancestry or ethnicity) than that of the 1881 citation.

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333 See ‘Table IV: Nationalities—Subdivisions of Groups’ on page 229.
334 See p. 230 of the 1878 Census.
335 This would presumably include non-Māori and non-Chinese names as well.
336 See below.
The Chinese are extensively referred to throughout the 1881 Census, whereas Indians are only briefly mentioned.\textsuperscript{337} Ethnic Indians receive no mention in the religion tables this year, but there is a solitary reference in the ‘Birthplace’ tables\textsuperscript{338} that separates the 1,106 Europeans from the six ‘Asiatics’ born in India. This listing confirms that six Indian males are included in the European ethnicity totals, as they are not elsewhere accounted for. This would appear to be the first confirmed reference to Indian ethnicity in the census, although not the first reference for religious affiliation.

Indian presence in the 1881 Census is corroborated by McLeod (1986:51) and Leckie (2007:22, 2010:48), who make reference to a retinue of seventeen Indian servants eventually brought to Canterbury by Sir Wilson.\textsuperscript{339}

Several of the Wilson retinue deserted their master when they discovered that they could earn better wages elsewhere. Most of them, the loyal and the deserters alike, are said to have married Māori wives. If indeed they can be regarded as a community it was a transient one, obscure while it existed and eventually merging in the society which surrounded it (McLeod 1986:51-52).

Leckie (2007:21-22, 2010:48) records some of the original Indian settlers that arrived with Wilson, and their descendants, as the Sohman and Bussawan families, who have subsequently married into both Māori and Pākehā families, taking on new identities. There is, however, a claim that the six Indians mentioned in this census were independent Punjabi settlers rather than in Wilson’s service:

According to an old Indian resident of Pukekohe, the six Indians recorded in the 1881 census were Punjabis and North Indians who, destined for Fiji, had stayed here instead, for a few years (Taher 1965:44).

\textsuperscript{337} This, however, would be expected, with 5,004 ethnic Chinese and only 6 ethnic Indians listed in 1881.

\textsuperscript{338} See Table IV, p. 192, of the 1881 Census.

\textsuperscript{339} This small enclave that served under Wilson is perhaps the first known settled Indian community in New Zealand.
McLeod (1986:52) states that this is unlikely to be true. Gillion (1977:131) records that the first free Punjabi immigrants reached Fiji in 1904, which would render Taher’s citation incorrect, leaving McLeod’s and Leckie’s accounts more likely to be accurate.

Five additional Asians are recorded in the 1881 Census in the birthplace tables, although they are listed as ‘Asia (country not named)’ leaving it impossible to determine birthplace. There are also 24 individuals (11 males and 13 females), not otherwise accounted for, listed as ‘Birthplace Unspecified’ and as having ‘Foreign Names,’ similar to those recorded in the 1878 Census. Of these, 12 (five males and seven females) were recorded as living in Auckland, five (two males and three females) living in Taranaki, a single female in Wellington, one male and one female living in Hawke’s Bay, two females living in Marlborough, and two males living in Otago. Although it is unknown where these persons were born, the possibility that some of these may have been ethnic Indians, or some of the unaccounted-for servants of Sir Wilson, cannot be discounted.

The religious affiliation and birthplace tables of the 1886 Census make no separate reference to ethnic Indians or the religious affiliations of Hindus or Muslims, although it can be stated that if these did exist, they would either be listed as ‘Other denominations-Pagans,’ which recorded a total of 4,472 individuals (4,466 males and six females), or as ‘Other denominations-others (variously returned),’ which recorded a total of 179 individuals (111 males and 68 females). As the Chinese population is not elsewhere included in the religious affiliation tables this year, it is likely that the majority of those returned as ‘Pagans’ are ethnic Chinese, although some of the remainder, and those returned as ‘others (variously returned),’ are likely to be ethnic Indians. The ‘Birthplace’ category makes

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340 See p. 194 of the 1881 Census.
the explicit mention that those included in the tables are those with ‘British names’ only, so ethnic Indians can be discounted as having been included in the birthplace tables this year.

The same convention for birthplace and religious affiliation continued in the 1886 Census, so no ethnic Indians or revealing religious affiliations can be ascertained from the tables and no further footnotes mention either.

The 1896 Census records 46 Indian males, 43 of whom are listed as ‘Mahometans’ while three are listed as ‘Hindoos.’ Leckie corroborates:

Religious returns indicated that most of these were Muslims. Only three people in New Zealand that year declared themselves as ‘Hindoos’ (Leckie 2007:22).

The 1896 census also represents the first appearance of Zoroastrians in the religious affiliation tables. As the 46 Indian males are already accounted for, it would appear that the two Zoroastrian individuals listed are from a country other than India, most presumably Persia, being the birthplace of Zoroastrianism. The birthplace tables state that four Persian ‘Asiatics’ were resident in New Zealand this year (three males and one female), so it is likely that the first two Zoroastrians in New Zealand were from Persia, although the possibility that they migrated from India cannot be discounted.

The religious affiliation tables of the 1901 Census list two male ‘Brahmins,’ 41 male ‘Mahometans’, and three ‘Zoroastrians.’ The two male ‘Brahmins’

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341 These appear in Table VI of the Census of 1896 (p. 124), which lists 1,192 Europeans (664 males and 528 females), and 46 ‘Asiatics’ (all male), as being born in India. It is assumed that all 46 males would be of Indian ethnicity.

342 Modern-day Iran.

343 See ‘Table VI: Birthplaces,’ p. 124, 1896 Census.

344 Zoroastrian communities have been living in India since the 8th century, where they first fled to avoid persecution by Muslim invaders (Hodivala 1920:88, Paymaster 1954, Palsetia 2001, Hinnells 2005).
would certainly be Indian Hindus, although it is unclear which countries the 41 Muslims are from. This reference is the first to conflate Indian caste affiliation with ethnicity. As the majority of Chinese returned to China at the end of the Otago goldrush, the likelihood that they consist of Muslims from countries other than China would be greater than in previous Censuses.\textsuperscript{345} The three ‘Zoroastrians’ listed in the religious affiliation tables are enumerated as two ‘Zoroastrians’ and one ‘Parsee,’ which would indicate that the Zoroastrians were probably of Persian descent, and, as Zoroastrian Indians are generally known as ‘Parsis’ (or ‘Parsees’), the sole ‘Parsee’ listed in the 1901 Census would most certainly represent the first confirmed Indian Zoroastrian. In addition to the entries in the religious affiliation tables, the birthplace tables list a total of 24 Indian ‘Asiatics.’ Of these 24, two would be male ‘Brahmins,’ one ‘Parsee,’ and the remainder presumably Indian Muslims.

Birthplace and Religious Affiliation tables in the 1906 Census continue to serve as proxies for ethnicity. This year records six India-born male ‘Asiatics’ along with 1,224 India-born Europeans (695 males and 529 females).\textsuperscript{346} In the religious affiliation tables, ten Hindus are described, consisting of nine ‘Brahmins’ and one ‘Hindoo,’ all of whom are certain to be ethnic Indians. There are also 17 Muslims described, 16 as ‘Mahometans’ and one returning as ‘Islam.’ A single ‘Zoroastrian’ is also enumerated. These tables record two ‘Vedantists,’ but it cannot be said

\textsuperscript{345} The Chinese population, drawn by the Otago goldrush in the 1860s and 1870s, began to be officially enumerated as ethnic Chinese in the Census of 1874, and in all successive census years. They had previously appeared in the religious affiliation tables prior to 1874, although it is difficult to ascertain their exact numbers from these. They reached their zenith of 5,004 individuals in the 1881 Census and began to drop steadily as the gold reserves became depleted, reaching a nadir of 2,147 individuals in the 1916 Census. This steady decline indicates that the many ethnic Chinese that migrated to New Zealand to mine gold, returned home once these stockpiles were depleted. Their numbers began to increase again from the Census of 1921, when those Chinese that chose to remain in New Zealand began to send for their families, which signaled the arrival of new Chinese populations that came to New Zealand to settle permanently. The increase in the Chinese population continues to this day.

\textsuperscript{346} See the 1906 census, page 165.
with any certainty that these are ethnic Indians. It is unclear why only six ethnic Indians are enumerated in the birthplace tables as ‘Asiatics’ while ten Hindus are mentioned in the religion tables, so it is likely that the actual number of ethnic Indians recorded in the 1906 Census is slightly greater than six. These examples underscore the great number of inconsistencies throughout this census phase. It also demonstrates the difficulty early census enumerators experienced in recording ethnicity in the field, as the concept was poorly described by census bureaucrats to insufficiently trained enumerators. Instead, religious affiliation, birthplace, race, or skin colour often substituted for ethnicity.

The 1911 Birthplace tables record 15 India-born male ‘Asiatics’ along with 1,191 India-born Europeans (677 males, 514 females), so at least 15 ethnic Indians were recorded this year. The religious affiliation tables record two male ‘Hindoos,’ 12 male ‘Mahometans,’ and two male ‘Zoroastrians.’ The first ‘Sikh’ in New Zealand is also recorded, unsurprisingly categorised under ‘No Religion,’ which explains why it was previously overlooked by other researchers. McLeod (1980:115, 1986:53) correctly states that the very first known Punjabi immigrants, two brothers, Phuman and Bir Singh, most likely came to New Zealand in the early 1890s, with the first census record of an Indian domiciled here in 1881 (1986:52), which is incorrect. While the Bir brothers, of whom much is already known (McLeod 1980, 1986; McLeod & Bhullar 1992; Leckie 2007), may have arrived circa 1890, it does not necessarily mean that they were the first Punjabis to reach New Zealand nor the first Punjabi settlers, as others could have arrived earlier.

347 Ethnic Indians were unlikely to report a Hindu religious affiliation as ‘Vedantist,’ although Vedanta philosophy had become fashionable in European circles due to the writings of Thoreau and Emerson.

348 See the 1911 Census, page 103.

349 As mentioned earlier, the first census record of Indian presence would be the 1861 reference I have previously mentioned, with this 1911 census citation being the first of a Punjabi Sikh in the New Zealand census.
and were unreported. However, this 1911 Census citation is the first to record a Punjabi Sikh in New Zealand, and, following McLeod, it is entirely possible that they may have arrived, and appeared on a census, long before this, although such references would not be distinguishable from other ethnic Indians enumerated in earlier census years. Of note, the 1911 census contains the first appearance of a detailed section outlining the various ‘Places of Worship’ throughout New Zealand, listing 1,971 churches and five ‘Hebrew’ temples.\textsuperscript{350} This Census is the first to include a detailed accounting of non-M\textsuperscript{ā}ori minority employment habits, with the inclusion of a special table of the ‘Occupations of the Chinese.’\textsuperscript{351}

In sum, this census period is marked by inconsistencies in race and religion reporting, and the relative invisibility of non-European populations. While exclusionary legislation prevented Asian populations from immigrating, and ideologues campaigned to keep New Zealand racially white, the low numbers of Indians and Chinese reported appear out of proportion to the exaggerated emotions stirred by fervent anti-immigration campaigners.\textsuperscript{352} As a result, this period was mostly characterised by ideological concerns at play by both political actors in the legislative realm and those charged with the collection and presentation of census statistics designed to reflect such principles.

\textit{6.3 Biological determinism & the consolidation of minority reportage, 1916-1981}

Ethnicity, as a distinct table, did not appear in a national census until 1916, which saw the introduction of a novel section entitled ‘Race Aliens.’\textsuperscript{353} The

\textsuperscript{350} See the 1911 Census, page 136.

\textsuperscript{351} See the 1911 Census, page 98.

\textsuperscript{352} e.g. the White New Zealand League. See Chapter 4, and Leckie (1985) for a discussion of this period.

\textsuperscript{353} See the 1916 Census, page 138.
use of this term to refer to racialised ethnic ‘others’ categorises non-European non-Māori populations as ‘alien,’ i.e. without ‘race.’ This confirms their ambiguous status as neither belonging nor welcomed, and elevates those with ‘race’ (Europeans), as racially superior to others alien to ‘race.’ The 1916 Census, therefore, marks the beginning of a distinct phase of minority statistical reporting that, over a period of 65 years, saw the ideologically driven elements of the first phase give way to a more embedded racialisation in the second. A defining characteristic of this phase was the notion of biological determinism and racial superiority that defined it. This was marked by the dogged persistence to record and report the details of “all conceivable kinds of ‘racial mixtures’” (McKinnon 1997:76) in the greatest detail possible. The preoccupation with keeping New Zealand white is most easily demonstrated in the ‘Race Alien’ tables of this period, and in the continued tracking of blood quantum, which began in the 1896 Census with ‘half-caste’ Chinese\(^{354}\) and continued through the 1981 Census, which marked its last appearance.\(^{355}\) The 1986 Census began to chart a different course that no longer required such detail. This period ends with the 1981 Census as the collection and distribution of statistics in subsequent censuses had clearly defined categories and collection methodologies, and minority populations, due to transformational adjustments in immigration legislation, increased in numbers and found voice (Park 2010, Spoonley & Bedford 2012b).

Regarding the first appearance of ethnic Indians, Vasil & Yoon (1996:2) state “It was only with the 1916 Census that Indians began to be listed separately as a distinct ethnic segment.” While technically correct, earlier references to religious affiliation, the 14 ‘Hindoos’ in the 1861 Census, cannot be so easily dismissed. Prior to 1916, Indians were not officially

\(^{354}\) See 1896 Census, p.47, which reports on “Half-caste Chinese”

\(^{355}\) See Volume 7 of the 1981 Census, Table 19.
enumerated as a distinct *ethnic* category, although earlier censuses list the numbers of Chinese, Māori, Chatham Islands Moriori, and Pacific populations over which New Zealand had dominion. Although Indians do indeed appear in earlier censuses, they regularly appear in the ‘Race Alien’ tables begun in 1916. The ‘Race Aliens’ section also included minority breakdowns of religious affiliation for the very first time:

The principal religions of the Hindus\(^{356}\) were: Hindu, 53; Mohammedan, 25; Vishna,\(^{357}\) 22; Sikh, 15; Brahmin, 12; while 20 returned themselves as belonging to the Church of England (1916 Census, pp. 143-144).

While the first instance of ‘Hindu’ used above refers to those of Indian ethnicity, and the second to religion, it is unclear why ‘Vishna’ \[^{sic}\] and ‘Brahmin,’ both of which should clearly fall under the religious use of the term ‘Hindu,’\(^{358}\) are listed separately. This is most likely due to census enumerator error or ignorance, or perhaps they were instructed to record exactly what respondents returned when questioned. The above quote also indicates that by 1916, over half (25 individuals) of the 47 Muslims enumerated in the religious affiliations tables were Indian Muslims. This provides insight into earlier enumerations, which record the total number of Muslims, but provide no ethnicities or birthplaces. Extrapolating backwards, this reference provides further evidence that the known Indian Muslim population in earlier census years may have been underreported,\(^{359}\) with the balance being ethnic Chinese.

The 1916 Census introduced a new approach to enumerating religious affiliation. This census references the categories of ‘Christians,’ ‘Non-

\(^{356}\) The Census of 1921 was also the last to refer to ethnic Indians as ‘Hindoos’ or ‘Hindus,’ and from 1926 on, those returning a Hindu religious affiliation were identified as such and appropriately distinguished from Indians of other religious affiliations.

\(^{357}\) ‘Vishna,’ instead of the correct ‘Vishnu’ or ‘Vaishnavite’ is how it appears in the Census.

\(^{358}\) Vaishnavites comprise the largest of the Hindu sects, while ‘Brahmin’ is a caste term, referring exclusively to Hindus who belong to the highest caste.

\(^{359}\) Earlier censuses record the total Muslim population as follows: 1861 (4 Muslims), 1874 (17 Muslims), 1878 (39 Muslims), 1881 (7 Muslims), 1896 (43 Muslims), 1901 (41 Muslims), 1906 (16 Muslims), and 1911 Censuses (12 Muslims).
Christians,’ ‘Indefinite,’ and ‘No Religion,’ which when totaled equal the sum of those that specified a religious affiliation. The ‘Christian’ category, which earlier censuses may have used to denote a second layer of symbolic ‘whiteness’ behind ‘European,’ lists the subdivisions of 15 distinct denominations. The ‘Non-Christian’ category lists the subdivisions of ‘Hebrews,’ ‘Mohammedans,’ ‘Buddhists / Confucians,’ and ‘Other,’ thereby ‘othering’ European ‘Hebrews’ by placing them in the new ‘Non-Christian’ category, where previously they had been included with the Christian denominations. The ‘Indefinite’ category includes six subdivisions; and the ‘No-religion’ category lists the subdivisions of ‘Atheist,’ ‘No Religion,’ and ‘Other.’ The categories ‘Object to State’ and ‘Unspecified’ are also provided. Similar conventions for enumerating religious affiliation are followed in successive censuses. It is clear that the 1916 Census set a precedence for enumeration of those returning non-Christian affiliations that continues to the present day.

The Birthplace tables in the 1916 Census, however, revert to earlier practices of not separating India-born Europeans from India-born ‘Asiatics,’ so it is impossible to determine the number of ethnic Indians in 1916, although 32 individuals are described as born in ‘Foreign Countries’ in the sub-category ‘Asia’ that are not further described. It is possible that many or some of these are ethnic Indians. The 1916 Census also marks the first appearance of a distinct sub-category of the ‘Occupations’ section that records the various trades in which 167 male and 14 female ‘Hindus’ were engaged in at the time. Table 6.3 is remarkable for what it reveals. Of the 167 Indian males “38 were engaged in dealing in food, &c,” while 26 in

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360 This had not been clear in earlier censuses due to the muddled nature of non-European reporting.

361 In this census year, as in previous years, ‘Hindus’ refers to those of Indian ethnicity.

362 The symbol ‘&c.’ is an older English form of abbreviating the latin ‘et cetera’ and appears throughout early censuses.
pastoral and 24 in agricultural pursuits.” This table demonstrates that 58.0% of all Indians at the time were employees, while 30.4% were either employers or self-employed, establishing the emergence of an Indian entrepreneurial class as early as 1916.

Table 6.3: Occupations of 181 ethnic Indians recorded in the 1916 Census.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupations</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>3.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Self-employed</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative assisting</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage earner</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>58.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage earner unemployed</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not stated</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td>167</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Another table details the occupations of selected ‘Race Aliens’ (i.e. “Chinese, Hindus, Syrians and Others”) for comparison. This table provides insights into the working lives of the Indian population in 1916. The largest number worked in agricultural or pastoral pursuits (27.6%), followed by those selling food and drinks (21.0%), followed by those dependent on natural guardians (7.7%), and those engaged in domestic service (7.2%). This table provides earlier and more detailed employment records than has been previously published in academic accounts of the earliest Indian settlers (Taher 1970, Palakshapa 1973, Tiwari 1980, McLeod 1986). McGee (1962:215) and Zodgekar (1980:195-196) provide similar tables, but only beginning with the 1921 Census, and Leckie (1998:169-170; 2007:36-65) discusses the diversification of the employment of early

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363 See the 1916 Census, page 146.

364 This table is based on two tables presented on page 146 of the Census of 1916. I have added the percentages column.

365 The detailed information on ethnic Indians is extracted and presented in full in Appendix C, along with an additional percentages column.
Gujarati and Punjabi settlers during this period and beyond in great detail, based on her ethnographic research.

Another table specifically details the number of years that 181 Indians have lived in New Zealand. Of these, 165 are recorded as ‘Full-blooded’ and 16 as ‘Half-castes.’ The number of ‘half-castes’ recorded provides early evidence of Indian intermarriage with European and Māori populations, as the second parent’s ethnicity is unclear. This Table provides evidence of settlement 40-50 years prior to 1916, that three males were settled as far back as 1876-1886.

Table 6.4: Length of residence of the Indian population in 1916.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Length of residence (years):</th>
<th>Years</th>
<th>Full-blooded</th>
<th></th>
<th>Half-caste</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>Male</td>
<td>Female</td>
<td>Total</td>
<td>Male</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Under 1</td>
<td>1915-1916</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 and under 2</td>
<td>1914-1915</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 and under 3</td>
<td>1913-1914</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 and under 4</td>
<td>1912-1913</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 and under 5</td>
<td>1911-1912</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5 and under 6</td>
<td>1910-1911</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>6 and under 7</td>
<td>1909-1910</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>7 and under 8</td>
<td>1908-1909</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>8 and under 9</td>
<td>1907-1908</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>9 and under 10</td>
<td>1906-1907</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10 and under 15</td>
<td>1901-1906</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15 and under 20</td>
<td>1896-1901</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20 and under 30</td>
<td>1886-1896</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30 and under 40</td>
<td>1876-1886</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40 and under 50</td>
<td>1866-1876</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50 and over</td>
<td>Prior to 1866</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not stated</td>
<td></td>
<td>11</td>
<td>–</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Born in New Zealand</td>
<td></td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Totals</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>160</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>7</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

366 Entitled “Table showing the number of Hindus in New Zealand classified according to Length of Residence in the Dominion, Census.” (1916 Census, p. 149).

367 1916 Census, pp. 148-149.
It will be noted that of 145 full-blooded male Hindus born abroad whose length of residence is known, 113 had been under five years in the country; and of 6 half-caste males 3 had been under three years in the country, 4 under six, 5 under eight, and all under ten. These figures clearly show the increase in the number of persons of this race in the Dominion. It will also be noted that 6 full-blood and 4 half-caste Hindus have been born in the country. The table affords good evidence that until recent years at least a large proportion of the Hindu arrivals in the country merely stayed here a few weeks in transit to, or from, the Pacific Islands. A comparison of the arrivals of Hindus during each of the ten years ended 1916 with the approximate year of arrival of those included in the above table gives the following results (1916 Census, pp.148-149):

Table 6.5: Indian arrivals in the Colony, 1907-1916.\textsuperscript{368}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Arrivals during Year</th>
<th>Number in Dominion in 1916 who arrived in same year</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1907</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1908</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1909</td>
<td>157</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1910</td>
<td>80</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>190</td>
<td>8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1912</td>
<td>325</td>
<td>22</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1913</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1914</td>
<td>257</td>
<td>20</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1915</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>32</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.5 provides evidence that the majority of the early Indian arrivals recorded in the 10 years before the 1916 Census were transient, for instance, of the 325 ethnic Indians that arrived in New Zealand in 1912, only 22 were still recorded as domiciled in New Zealand. If cross-referencing the list of Punjabi immigrants provided by McLeod (1984) with the years of arrival above, it might be possible to put names to many of the numbers mentioned.

Note the discrepancy between the numbers of Hindus recorded in the religious affiliation tables in 1916 (88 individuals), versus the number of ‘Hindu’ (i.e. Indian) ‘Race Aliens’ (181 individuals). This means that only 48.6\% of the ethnic Indians recorded in 1916 were Hindu, with the remainder most likely being Muslims or Christians. Of the 181 ethnic Indians recorded, 165 were full ethnic Indians and 16 were children of

\textsuperscript{368} Source: extracted from the 1916 Census, p. 139.
mixed marriages, 4 of whom were New Zealand-born, 10 born overseas (possibly the progeny of European-Indian marriages born in India), and 2 unknown.\textsuperscript{369}

Zodgekar (1980:183) records that “Indians have largely arrived since the suspension of the indentured system in 1917 and its abolition in 1920” and notes that many of the early arrivals came from Fiji as a result of the end of the indenture system.\textsuperscript{370} This is corroborated by Kondapi (1951), and was the major source of the dramatic increase in ethnic Indians in the 1921 Census. This year saw an increase from the 181 individuals noted in the 1916 census to 671 individuals in the 1921 Census. Although Zodgekar notes the presence of ethnic Indians based on census figures from 1916 onwards, he does not record any earlier Indian presence in census records before 1916.

The 1921 Census continues the ‘Race Alien’ section begun in 1916:

Third in numerical importance\textsuperscript{371} among the race-alien communities are the Indians. The Indians arriving in New Zealand are British subjects, and in that respect differ from the bulk of other race-alien immigrants.\textsuperscript{372} Until very recent years there was scarcely a handful of Indians resident in the Dominion. Figures quoted in the table subjoined for years prior to 1916 are probably subject to the same remarks as in the case of Syrians in the paragraph immediately preceding\textsuperscript{373} (1921 Census, p. 118)

\textsuperscript{369} See page 139 of the 1916 Census.

\textsuperscript{370} Historical evidence, however, suggests that the increase in arrivals of Indians in New Zealand may be more due to the increasing awareness of impending immigration restrictions in New Zealand rather than the end of the indenture system in Fiji. Leckie (1998, 2007) also considers that increased chain migration from Gujarat and Punjab to New Zealand were important factors.

\textsuperscript{371} The Chinese and Syrians, respectively, are the other two ethnicities.

\textsuperscript{372} New Zealand had difficulty classifying Indian arrivals during this period as Britain governed colonial India until 1947 and Indians under the British Rāj in India were considered British citizens. This created conflict for anti-Asian immigrationists in enacting suitable legislation upholding a white New Zealand policy that prevented further Indian and Chinese immigration. See Murphy (2007 and 2008) for the legislative differences between the Indian and Chinese populations respectively.

\textsuperscript{373} The previous paragraph in the census reads: “In earlier years for which figures are given hereunder the procedure apparently was that an examination was made of cases where the place of birth was recorded as China, Syria India, &c. and by scrutiny of names and other particulars decisions as to whether individuals were Asiatics or Europeans were arrived at. It follows then, that the earlier figures quoted below comprise simply persons, apparently Asiatics, who were born in Syria (China or India), and are therefore likely to be slightly understated” (1921 Census, p. 118).
This exemplified the rather ambiguous positioning of Indian immigrants at the time, as their status as British subjects did not translate into a more favourable immigration status (see Murphy 2007).

Table 6.6. Summary of Indians noted in previous Census years (1921 Census, p. 118).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census year</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th>Females</th>
<th>Total:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>46</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>46</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>15</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>167</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>181</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>622</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>671</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The intercensal increase between 1916 and 1921 was 409, or 270 percent. It is however, believed that the number in 1916 was slightly understated owing to the method of inquiry presenting a possible defect, remedied in 1921 (1921 Census, Race Aliens, p. 118).

This census table clearly shows that Indians who do not appear in earlier censuses, were indeed present and recorded, most probably as ‘Others.’ This table confirms the first recorded instance of ethnic Indians present, although not separately enumerated, in earlier censuses, even though it remained unrecorded until 1921.

The religious professions of ‘Race Aliens’ in the 1921 Census are also described, as follows:

Speaking generally, non-Europeans are comparatively illiterate, and this fact combined with language difficulties and customs foreign to New Zealand practice tends towards a reduction in the degree of accuracy in census statistics. It seems probable that statistics of religions are among those more affected. A large number—2113—of the race aliens was recorded as Christian, comprising 24 percent of the males of full blood and 76 percent of the females. Half-castes were almost all (males, 92 percent; females, 97 percent) described as Christians. The various churches with their adherents are briefly tabulated (1921 Census, p. 121).
Table 6.7: Religious affiliation for ‘Race Aliens,’ 1921 Census.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious affiliation</th>
<th>Number</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Church of England</td>
<td>703</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian</td>
<td>198</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>756</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodist</td>
<td>112</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptist</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Christian churches</td>
<td>227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confucianism</td>
<td>2,081</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinduism</td>
<td>371</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhism</td>
<td>36</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>837</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Total*: 5,438

Only about one-sixth of the Chinese are Christians, belonging principally to the Church of England, Presbyterian, and Baptist Churches. The great majority were returned simply as followers of Confucius. Syrians, who were almost all Christians, are chiefly adherents of the Roman Catholic Church. Such few of the Indians as claimed Christianity were mainly attached to the Church of England. The great bulk were Hindus or Mohammedans (1921 Census, p. 121).

This table confirms that the majority of ethnic Chinese that came to work the Otago goldfields in the late 1860s were largely recorded as Confucian (63.7%, or 2,081 Confucians recorded from 3,266 ethnic Chinese). The 371 Hindus recorded in this table account for 55.3% of the 671 ethnic Indians recorded in the ‘Race Alien’ table, which would mean that of the remaining 300 ethnic Indians, the majority would have been Muslims, with a smaller number of Christians.

There are 386 ‘Hindus’ listed in the religious affiliation tables for all respondents (371 of whom are Hindus accounted for in the religious affiliations of the ‘Race Aliens’ table above). However, a closer inspection

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374 It is unclear if these are Confucians or a proxy for Chinese ethnicity, as in the use of ‘Hindoo.’

375 Muslims are not specifically included in Table 6.7 above, unless included as ‘Others.’

376 See the 1921 Census, page 125.
under the section ‘Non-Christian Religions’ in the general tables for all respondents (not just for ‘Race Aliens’) reveals further breakdowns into Muslims, Buddhists and Hindus: “Mohammedans, Buddhists, and followers of one or other of the group of religions associated under the generic name of ‘Hindu’\textsuperscript{377} compose the greater part of the remainder.”\textsuperscript{378} Those labeled ‘Hindu’ in the religion section are those of Indian ethnicity answering the religion question, and include Muslims and Buddhists. As Muslims are not specifically mentioned there is no way to confirm the numbers present in 1921, although the figure of 837 ‘Others’ provides some insight.

The ‘Industrial Distributions’ of ‘Race Aliens’ are given in great detail in the 1921 Census. Table 6.9 represents the 671 ethnic Indians recorded this year.\textsuperscript{379}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Type of employment</th>
<th>Number</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Sale of vegetables and fruit</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>15.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Staff of licensed hotels</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent on hosts or natural guardians</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brick and tile making</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairy-farming</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawking</td>
<td>32</td>
<td>4.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land-drainage</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>4.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing in scrap metal, used bottles, &amp;c.</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shipping</td>
<td>28</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General farming</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>260</td>
<td>38.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>671</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Chinamen are comprised very largely of market-gardeners, laundrymen, and fruiterers. Industries followed by Indians are very much more varied and of considerably different character (1921 Census, p. 121).

\textsuperscript{377} The conflation of ‘Hindu’ with ethnic ‘Indian’ continues in the 1921 census.

\textsuperscript{378} See the 1921 Census, p. 126.

\textsuperscript{379} I have removed the Chinese data to simplify the table and have added percentages of the total population.
Table 6.9: Grade of Occupation of ‘Race Aliens’ described in the 1921 Census.\textsuperscript{380}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Grade of Occupation</th>
<th>Chinese</th>
<th>Syrians</th>
<th>Indians</th>
<th>Others</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>487</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working on own account</td>
<td>698</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>187</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>1,025</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative assisting</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>64</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage-earner</td>
<td>1,417</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>363</td>
<td>343</td>
<td>2,235</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Wage earner, but unemployed</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>187</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not applicable</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>526</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total: 3,266 707 671 794 5,438

The 1926 ‘Race-Aliens’ section is quite extensive. It records 987 ethnic Indians, and the first children of Indian-Māori marriages (‘half-castes’).\textsuperscript{381} Table 6.10 lists the religious affiliations of all 987 ethnic Indians, and continues to highlight the preoccupation with reporting mixed races.\textsuperscript{382} This table shows that 35.7\% of ethnic Indians in 1926 recorded a Hindu religious affiliation,\textsuperscript{383} 32.4\% Christian, 9.9\% Sikh, 5.5\% Muslims, with 9.7\% objecting to answer the question. However, while 338 ‘Hindus’ returned as ethnic Indians under ‘Race Aliens,’ an additional 21 ethnic Indians (15 ‘Brahmins,’ one ‘Rajput,’ one returning as ‘Temple of India,’ and four stating their religious affiliation as ‘Vedic’) would bring the total to 359. Also of note is the large increase in the Sikh population (97 individuals) up from a population of 18 recorded in 1916, and the first Indian ‘Jain’ appears in 1926. It is evident from the overall number of Muslims in the 1926 Census (76 ‘Mahometans’ and four ‘Sufis’ recorded in the general religious affiliation tables), that 54 were of Indian ethnicity with 22 originating in other countries, possibly China.

\textsuperscript{380} 1921 Census, p. 122.

\textsuperscript{381} The 1926 Census lists a total of nine ‘Indian-Māori,’ enumerated in the Race Alien tables.

\textsuperscript{382} This is sourced solely from the section on ‘Race Aliens,’ although I have added a percentages column.

\textsuperscript{383} This consists of the 34.3\% who returned ‘Hindu’ plus the 1.1\% that returned ‘Brahman.’
Table 6.10: Religious professions of the Indian population, 1926 Census.\textsuperscript{384}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religion:</th>
<th>Males</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Females</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Full blood</td>
<td>mixed</td>
<td>Full-blood</td>
<td>Mixed</td>
<td>Number</td>
<td>Percent</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Church of England</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roman Catholic</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Presbyterian</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Methodist</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Baptist</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salvation Army</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Missions</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Latter Day Saints</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Protestant, nfd</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bretheren</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian, nfd</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian, other</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>333</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>338</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhist</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>9.9</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mohammedan</td>
<td>49</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>5.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brahman</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Theosophist</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other non-Christian</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No religion</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other beliefs</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Object to state</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>96</td>
<td>9.7</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not specified</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td>661</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>147</td>
<td>987</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The 1926 Census also reports in detail the number of male and female Indians engaged in different industries. These tables reveal a far wider set of occupational skills than has previously been recorded for the Indian population. For example, Leckie states: “Most Indian pioneers worked long hours, in hard work, and travelled widely as hawkers, rural labourers or as domestic workers. These men were part of New Zealand’s...”

working class” (Leckie 2010:51). Others scholars described this early period of Indian settlement, approximately 1910-1930, in this way:

The majority of Indians intended to take up farming and a few of the artisans hoped to continue with their trades such as shoemaking. But as land was too expensive to buy, they were forced into rural labouring jobs such as road-building, or rural industries such as brick and tile making. The artisans found their intentions frustrated by the trade unions. The Indians in the urban areas were forced into the hawking of fruits and vegetables, bottles and rags. Here, at least, hard work and long hours could yield some return. Others became servants or washerman. Everywhere the Indians met with occupational prejudice and were forced to take jobs which limited the form of their contact with the host society (McGee 1962:214).

The history of Indians in New Zealand has been closely bound up with the dairy and market-gardening industries but at the early stages of their immigration they sought employment as flax workers, bottle-collectors, drain diggers and scrub cutters (Tiwari 1980:7).

These statements are not necessarily true, and were probably based on anecdotal or interview evidence, rather than statistical data. Table 6.11 demonstrates a broader degree of expertise noted by the higher percentage of skilled jobs (e.g. administrators, shop owners, teachers, lawyers) that Indians were employed in 1926, and many of these might

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDUSTRY</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>Percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural and pastoral:</td>
<td>158 – 158</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry:</td>
<td>22 – 22</td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and quarrying:</td>
<td>3 – 3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufactures and industrial:</td>
<td>66 5 71 7.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building and construction:</td>
<td>30 – 30</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and communication:</td>
<td>49 – 49</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commerce and Finance:</td>
<td>223 2 225 22.8</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public administration and professional:</td>
<td>10 9 19 1.9</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Recreation:</td>
<td>3 – 3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal and domestic service:</td>
<td>78 28 106 10.7</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other industry, or not specified:</td>
<td>168 133 301 30.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL:</td>
<td>810 177 987 100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 6.11: Industries of the ethnic Indian population, Census of 1926.385

385 1926 Census, Vol. VI ‘Race Aliens,’ p. 28-29. I have added the percentages and totals for each sector for easier comparison. Appendix D provides the complete table along with the subcategories that have been omitted above for brevity.
have been civil servants in the British Rāj (i.e. telegraph operators, government service) prior to emigration. Based on an analysis of the above table, only 16% of the total Indian population in 1926 was involved in agricultural and pastoral industries, 2.2% involved in clearing bush (forestry), 0.3% in the mining and quarrying industry, 4.2% in milling flax, 2.2% in land drainage, 1.9% in scrap metal and bottle collecting, 2.5% in hawking and street selling, for a total of 29.4% of the population involved in menial labour. A considerable percentage (21.9%) were dependent on their ‘natural guardians,’ demonstrating the increasing numbers of children of Indian migrants, or recently arrived Indian wives not otherwise employed, while 1.3% of the total population were either in hospitals, wards, mental institutions or jail. A further 0.3% of the population was retired. This accounts for a total of 52.9% of the total population. An additional 7.0% of the population is not specified. The remainder (40.1%), forming the majority, were involved in other manufacturing and industrial pursuits; the building and construction, and the transport and communication sector; commerce and finance; public administration and professional employment; recreation; and personal and domestic services. In sum, approximately 30% held low-waged menial jobs, approximately 30% employed in other services, while approximately 40% were involved in more settled, higher-waged positions.

Many of the early Indian and Chinese settlers are often portrayed as market gardeners in the 1920s, and the difficulties they faced in making ends meet were emphasised (Tiwari 1980:7-9; Leckie 1985, 2007). However, Table 6.11 reveals that only six ethnic Indians were recorded as market gardeners in 1926, while 1,144 ethnic Chinese held the same

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386 See the full table in Appendix D.
Many more Indians at the time were engaged in mixed farming practices, or in bush- and scrub-cutting, trades or commercial occupations. Table 6.12 records the occupations of ethnic Indians in the 1926 census. These are only presented once, in the detail in which they appear in the census, in order to reveal and substantiate the wide range of economic activities in which the Indian population was engaged at the time. A thorough accounting of the breath of occupations has not previously been presented outside of the original census.

Table 6.12: Reported occupations of the ethnic Indian population, 1926 Census.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATIONS</th>
<th>Indians</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Females</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural and pastoral occupations:</td>
<td>132</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest occupations:</td>
<td>58</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miners and quarrymen:</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-precious metal workers, electrical fittings, &amp;c.:</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers in fibrous materials other than clothing</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers in clothing and dress</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers in food, drink, and tobacco</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers in wood</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers in building and construction, n.e.i.:</td>
<td>35</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers in transport and communication:</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial occupations:</td>
<td>211</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Public administration:</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerical and professional occupations</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupations connected with sport &amp; recreation:</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>–</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Personal and domestic occupations:</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>29</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ill-defined occupations:</td>
<td>92</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Persons not actively emplyd in gainful occupation:</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>131</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL:</td>
<td>810</td>
<td>177</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Notes: *n.e.i. = not elsewhere identifiable, n.o.d. = not otherwise described.)

387 See the 1921 Census, page 28.

388 1926 Census, Vol. VI ‘Race Aliens,’ p. 30-32. I have added a percentages column, with sector totals, for easy comparison. Appendix E provides the complete table along with the subcategories that have been omitted above.
The wide array of skills and occupations, including a doctor, and shopkeepers\textsuperscript{389} is evident. This information shows that the early Indian settlers of this period were a mix of highly skilled and unskilled labourers, and not just flax and scrub cutters, hawkers, market gardeners or bottle collectors as is often portrayed in histories of the Indian diaspora in New Zealand. Many held reputable positions, owned shops, had employees, taught school, drove trains, and were cooks. This data further supports my earlier assertion that saw the emergence of an Indian entrepreneurial class as early as 1916. Additionally, as three (2 males, 1 female) are listed as students, this may be the first reference to Indians attending public school, demonstrating settlement.

From 1926, enumeration of ethnic Indians continued in this fashion, so further descriptions are unnecessary, as subsequent history is well described (Leckie 2007). Minority presence in the census continued to increase throughout this period, and a greater transparency is evident in improved, more consistent, ethnic reporting. The eventual inclusion of Māori in the 1951 Census marks an important turning point roughly halfway through this phase, and provides an example of the increasing participation of minority populations in the national arena, although the inclination to maintain racial purity remained a primary concern of the majority. This second phase is bounded by the historical significance of allowing individuals to report multiple ethnicities for the first time in the 1986 Census, largely brought about by significant sociopolitical changes occurring in New Zealand society leading up to the transition. Such macro-political factors\textsuperscript{390} neutralised the need for the continuation of ‘Race

\textsuperscript{389} See Appendix E.

\textsuperscript{390} e.g. significant changes in immigration policy, rapid demographic change, increased bicultural discourse, Māori cultural resurgence and the beginnings of Treaty of Waitangi claims.
Alien’ reporting and categories that identified and highlighted miscegenation.

6.4 Minority inclusion and aspiration, 1986-present.

The third census phase is marked by the emergence of ethnicity as the central concept for minority reporting in the national census. The 1986 Census is a critical starting point for this transition as it marks the move away from the previous preoccupation with blood quantum and ‘race alien’ reporting to that of self-identification with the particular ethnicities of one’s choice. The first appearance of the ability to tick affiliation with more than one ethnicity is one of this phase’s chief characteristics. This adaptation parallels the corresponding transformations that were occurring in immigration reform at the time, which ceased to rely on the traditional source countries of Western Europe, and opened up migration from non-traditional sources, including Asia. The focus on ethnicity, rather than physical characteristics, replaced the nomenclature of race, but the classifications and categories continued to conflate birthplace, ancestry, nationality and culture. Ethnic self identification coincided with general improvements of minority performance in a variety of socioeconomic indicators (Callister 2007, Poata-Smith 2013), the emergence of political representation (Banducci et al. 2004, Park 2010, Sullivan 2010), and the commencement of inclusion in a common national identity (Greif 1995, Ip 2003, Ip & Pang 2005, Bandyopadhyay 2006, Dobson 2011). Such recognition allowed advancement of both government and minority interest in improving inequality and in better addressing minority aspirations (Park 2010, Kukutai 2012:28).

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391 and more recently, the Pacific Islands.
These changes brought about, or are a result of, identity politics based on increasing minority recognition, as this period witnesses the substantial growth of minority communities. Demographic change can best be observed in the increases in intercensal growth in minority populations during this phase. The growth in the Indian population is highlighted in Table 6.13, which grew 877% between 1981 and 2013. While intercensal growth reached its zenith of 93.6% in the 1986-1991 period, in the wake of the passing of the 1987 Immigration Act, the Indian population continued to increase. The 2006 Census identified an Indian population growing at a faster rate than the Chinese for the first time, and this trend was recently confirmed by the 2013 statistics.


<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Census year</th>
<th>Indian ethnicity (n)</th>
<th>Total population (%)</th>
<th>Intercensal growth (%)</th>
<th>Change since 1981 (%)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1981</td>
<td>11,244</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1986</td>
<td>15,810</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>40.6</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1991</td>
<td>30,606</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>93.6</td>
<td>172.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1996</td>
<td>42,408</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>38.6</td>
<td>277.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2001</td>
<td>62,196</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>46.7</td>
<td>453.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2006</td>
<td>104,625</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>68.2</td>
<td>830.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2013</td>
<td>154,449</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>47.6</td>
<td>876.9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Along with rapid and consistent population growth came an increased need for sociocultural groups, as a larger population brought about a communal shift away from primary economic pursuits and the business of survival, evident in the first two phases, towards a greater enjoyment and celebration of one’s heritage and cultural roots, which became important

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392 See Morning & Sabbagh (2005) regarding the similar shift occurring in the US at the time and its impact on the US Census.

393 The 2013 Census ethnicity statistics were released in May 2014.

394 Base figures sourced from Statistics New Zealand, 1981-2013 Censuses. Indian ethnicity includes those returning “Fijian-Indian.”
in the third phase. Greater political organisation and representation also emerged during this period. Rapid population growth mirrored significant changes in the number and extent of organisations and associations that cater to the thriving Indian population today. Prior to 1986, there were only a handful of organisations and associations that represented the needs of the Indian community. The first to form was the New Zealand Indian Central Association.

Ironically, it was the vehement opposition to their settlement in New Zealand that induced Indians to form a national association in 1926 that would long outlive the White New Zealand League (Leckie 2007:140).

The early formation and expansion of such cultural, religious and political networks, along with the growth of an increasingly expressive Indian identity, is well chronicled by Leckie (2007:140-168). Today, there are hundreds of organisations and associations that represent the needs and aspirations of the various regional, cultural, religious, linguistic, sporting, women’s, professional groups and trade organisations that now operate in New Zealand.\(^{395}\) This list, however, does not represent the continued growth and influence of Indian enterprise in the economic sector and the steady drive towards a New Zealand-India free trade agreement, currently underway. Furthermore, whereas there was scant political representation of the Indian community in New Zealand, there have been a number of key representatives and elected officials at local, regional and national levels, including a mayor and several MPs, since the beginning of this census phase. These changes all represent minority aspiration and affirmation for greater political voice in the national arena that is a defining characteristic. Figure 6.3 demonstrates that the proportion of the Indian community to the total New Zealand population stating an ethnicity (solid line), is in close approximation to the proportional representation of Indian MPs elected to the New Zealand Parliament.

\(^{395}\) See the list of current Indian organisations and associations in Appendix K.
The first South Asian elected to Parliament was Dr Ashraf Choudhary in 2002, at which point the total Indian population represented 1.7% of the total New Zealand population. As the only elected South Asian member, his representation in Parliament amounted to 1 of 120 seats, or a proportion of 0.8%, less than half of what proportional representation should account for, and well below parity. This scenario was repeated in Parliament’s 48th session, which had 121 members. Near parity was reached in the 49th and 50th Parliaments, both of which saw a total of three South Asians MPs.

As the next Chapter demonstrates, the Indian population reached 3.9% of the total New Zealand population stating an ethnicity. Due to the dramatic rise in the Indian population as per the 2013 Census data, and the fact that only three Indian MPs made it into Parliament in the September 2013 elections, the 51st Session has again fallen below parity. It should be noted, however, that each of the South Asians that made their way into

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The figures for 47th and 48th Parliaments are based on statistics from the 2001 Census, the figures for the 49th and 50th Parliaments are based on statistics from the 2006 Census, and the figures from the 51st Parliament are based on statistics from the 2013 Census.
Table 6.14. Details of South Asians in recent New Zealand Parliaments.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Name:</th>
<th>Party</th>
<th>Dates served</th>
<th>Religion</th>
<th>Electorate or List MP</th>
<th>Born</th>
<th>Country of birth</th>
<th>Year of migration</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Dr Ashraf Choudhary</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>2002-2011</td>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>List MP</td>
<td>1949</td>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>1976</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Rajen Prasad</td>
<td>Labour</td>
<td>2008-2014</td>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>List MP</td>
<td>1946?</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>1964</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kanwaljit Singh Bakshi</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>2008-</td>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>List MP</td>
<td>1964</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>2001</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mahesh Bindra</td>
<td>NZ First</td>
<td>2014-</td>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>List MP</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>2002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dr Parmjeet Parmar</td>
<td>National</td>
<td>2014-</td>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>List MP</td>
<td>?</td>
<td>India</td>
<td>1995</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Parliament were List MPs and not Electorate MPs, i.e. they were not elected by the constituency of their electorate. This has allowed, for example, New Zealand First MP Mahesh Bindra (ranked 11 on the New Zealand First party list) to be awarded a seat in Parliament on the coattails of New Zealand First’s party vote, even though he received a total of only 717 votes of the 34,097 received in his Mount Roskill electorate (2.1% of the total number of votes cast in his electorate), losing to Phil Goff, who received 18,637 votes (or 54.7% of the total votes cast in the electorate).397

The differential between the two lines in Figure 6.3 reached its largest gap in the current 51st Parliament (a difference of 1.4%, compared with the lowest, achieved in the 49th Session, of 0.1%), since South Asians first appeared in the New Zealand Parliament during its 47th Session. This would be due to the increase in the Indian population without a concomitant rise in the number of Indian MPs entering Parliament in October 2014. It will be interesting to continue tracking proportional representation in Parliament in this way as minority populations continue to increase. What remains then, would be for Indian political representation to achieve or exceed parity in proportion with the

397 The data presented here is available on the New Zealand Electoral Commission’s website (Electoral Commission 2014).
percentage of Indians in the total New Zealand population. One normative condition of shallow diversity\textsuperscript{398} would therefore exist when the proportion of minority MPs in Parliament falls below the proportion of the Indian population in relation to the total New Zealand population. A condition of deep diversity could similarly be reached when the proportion of minority MPs exceeds the minority proportion of the total New Zealand population. The model presented here may be one way, among others, in which deep diversity may be quantified in terms of political representation, however, there is neither sufficient data nor a long enough track record in New Zealand at present to consider any such analysis robust. It does, however, suggest that there may be merit in the possibilities of quantifying shallow and deep approaches towards diversity in New Zealand. This should change as the minority proportions continue to increase in relation to majority decreases, and suggests that such models may be employable in other western democracies with highly pluralised societies.

6.5 Summary analysis

Three particular themes emerge, distinct from the three identified phases in New Zealand’s census history. First would be the interpretation of race as physically determined by observable skin color. This is evident in the first census period where the term ‘white,’ and the preoccupation for keeping Asians out, were major occupations of majority society. At the time, a dichotomy based on skin-colour was quite evident, i.e. ‘white’ and ‘non-white’\textsuperscript{399} populations, similar to what occurred in the US.\textsuperscript{400} While colour-based census distinctions are still evident in the US today, New

\textsuperscript{398} See Table 2.2 on the key values and assumptions of the diversity discourse.

\textsuperscript{399} With ‘non-white’ referring to everything else, e.g. Māori, Chinese and Indian populations.

\textsuperscript{400} See M. Anderson (1990), Lee (1993), Bennett (2000), Mezey (2003), and Hochschild & Powell (2008).
Zealand moved away from the use of such categories, to those specifying ethnicity as the primary form of categorisation. However, during the first two census phases, there was much confusion over where to place particular races that were neither white nor Māori. For instance, Indians first appear in the 1861 Census in the religious affiliation tables, yet because no ethnicity categories existed they were tabulated as Europeans. Likewise, the first appearance of Chinese in the census saw them classified and counted as ‘white,’ i.e. enumerated in the ‘European’ category. This is similar to the US, in which particular ethnicities, e.g. Mexican and others of Spanish descent (what would now be termed ‘Hispanic’), and ‘Asian Indians,’ were placed in the ‘white’ category, as they neither fit in nor could be classified as ‘black’ or ‘native American’ (M. Anderson 1990, Lee 1993, Bennett 2000, Mezey 2003, Hochschild & Powell 2008).

Second, the early interpretation of religious affiliation also follows similar lines as ethnicity with populations in early census years defined by either/or dichotomies of ‘Christian’/‘non-Christian.’ ‘Non-Christian’ minorities were often reported as tiny footnotes, or subsumed under ‘Other’ categories that were not further defined. Similarly, categories like ‘Hindoo,’ often used in early census reportage in New Zealand and other settler societies, referred to all those of Indian descent, regardless of ethnic or religious affiliation. This type of enumeration obscured early minority reportage.

Third, and more importantly, would be the conflation of the terms race and ethnicity which were inadequately defined, and which today have separate definitions and implications. The confusion between such terms as race, ethnicity, birthplace, region, ancestry, nationality, and citizenship, 401 The ambiguity over 1867 records that listed ‘China’ as a birthplace has led me to conclude that these are ethnic Chinese. This is detailed in the earlier discussion of the 1867 birthplace records.

402 Scientifically, there is no such entity as race, although it exists as a social construct. See Peterson (1987), M. Anderson (1990), Lee (1993:81), Gould (1996) and Hochschild & Powell (2008).
and between cultural, linguistic and religious affiliations and designations, is evident throughout the first two census periods, which makes it difficult to differentiate categories. Such blurring often resorted in the erasure or invisibility of minority presence. In early censuses, religious affiliation and birthplace were often considered proxies for ethnicity, as the concept was either unknown or poorly defined in the first two phases. Questions of more easily discernible race or colour were central, while distinctions based along sociocultural, linguistic, regional or religious lines, were more difficult to discern and enumerate. Such dilemmas highlighted porous group boundaries and gave way to clearer definitions and demarcations between the meanings of these terms in the third phase.

As the 1916 Census marked a specific change in how non-Māori minorities were categorised and enumerated, and ushered in the second phase of ethnic reporting, it is useful to note how the New Zealand census has, over time, variously interpreted minorities in relation to their European enumerators. While the first phase was characterised by inconsistency, error and invisibility, this second phase, beginning in 1916, brought about specific structural changes to reportage with the introduction of new categories better designed for consistency in both ethnic and religious reporting. This signified an evolving classification scheme in which minorities moved from relative invisibility towards one that sought to standardise their categorisation, mirroring population increases. While the vocabulary of ethnic classification was poorly defined during this 1916 transition, the perception that the state needed to improve its minority reporting was nonetheless discernible. This is perhaps best exemplified by the 1916 Census’s specific reference to the Indian population: “The other class of race alien besides Chinese who
were deemed worthy of a separate discussion is the Hindu race,”⁴⁰³ which, while demonstrating an awareness of a growing population (and hence the need for inclusion in state reporting), nonetheless continued to conflate religion with ethnicity. Such a statement, however, did not explain why Māori were not likewise “deemed worthy of a separate discussion” (remaining excluded from the national census), nor did it attempt to disclose an actor responsible for doing the ‘deeming.’ As responsibility rests with the state, there was no discussion or explanation of Māori exclusion at this time other than to state that they were enumerated separately.⁴⁰⁴

Phase One censuses were therefore marked by significant irregularities in categorising Asian settlers. In the absence of any formal ethnic classification, enumerators and operatives, supported by ideologically driven government bureaucracies, resorted to jumbling such nonclassifiables in religious affiliation and birthplace tables, accomplishing erasure through tabulation as ‘Europeans.’ Such cursory dismissal belies the treatment early Indian settlers experienced on arrival and is reflected in the harsh treatment many experienced aboard the European vessels that brought them here.⁴⁰⁵ Such blatant physical demonstration of European superiority at sea was mirrored ashore in European assertions of control in arenas where the power discourse could be easily maintained (census enumeration and reporting), where white

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⁴⁰³ See the 1916 Census, page 148.

⁴⁰⁴ Brown (1984) and others (Kukutai 2003, 2011a, 2012) however, have later explained Māori exclusion.

⁴⁰⁵ Many of the newspaper clippings available on the PapersPast website, when searching the term ‘lascar,’ return horrific tales of their mistreatment, even murder, at the hands of their European superiors. For example, the reporting of the incident aboard the *Kestrel*, on its way to Port Philip, Melbourne, which details the whipping and murder of a lascar (*Wellington Independent* 1846), or the incident aboard the *Shah Jehan*, which reports the charge of murder of five lascars by Commander Adams. In his defense, Adams states: “I have no objection to the court enquiry into my conduct towards my lascar crew, and confidently assert that I have always behaved to them in a spirit of humanity and kindness, and was not guilty of any act of cruelty towards them” (*Daily Southern Cross* 1861).
collar offenses were less frequently noted by a majority sharing similar values.

Second phase tabulation focused on exacting reports of race and blood quantum, perpetuating majority notions of racial superiority while suppressing an assertion of minority identity, and severely restricting non-European immigration. Minorities during this phase were barely tolerated as second class citizens. Third Phase incidents of racism and discrimination appear to be rooted in pervasive racial ideologies, readily evident through miscegenation reporting during the second period. Third phase enumeration, however, marks a significant departure from earlier ideological and racial priorities, and relied predominantly on self-reported ethnicity and ticking inclusion in multiple ethnicities. Overall, New Zealand appears to have overcome ambiguity in ethnicity reporting in the third phase, which remains problematic in the US, still grappling over questions of ethnicity, offering overlapping questions where one would suffice (Bennett 2000, Morning 2008).

Figure 6.4: US Census questions on ethnicity, 2010 Census.
US questions continue to conflate race, colour, ancestry, nationality and citizenship with ethnicity. Confusion over these terms prevails since this practice continues in its decennial census. US ethnicity discourse remains based on colour (i.e. white/black) and nationality.

The third phase of the New Zealand census, however, still represents shallow forms of diversity management even though multiple, self-identified ethnicities are allowed. This is due to public census reporting that remains generally limited to Level 2 categories and a single Level 3 designator (‘Fijian-Indian’), which inconsistently appears in Level 2 reporting alongside ‘Indian’.\textsuperscript{406} This is in contrast to current indigenous reporting, which allows for \textit{iwi} self-identification and reports it publicly.\textsuperscript{407} A deep diversity approach would see similar prompts for non-Māori minorities, which are generally limited to Level 1 (i.e. ‘Asian’) and Level 2 (i.e. ‘Indian,’ ‘Chinese’) distinctions for ethnicity reporting. While a write-in space is available on the form,\textsuperscript{408} these only clue respondents to specify other Level 1 or Level 2 ethnicities and not subgroup affiliations (like Gujarati or Maharastrian). Currently, insignificant numbers of Indians write in subgroup affiliations, the practice and extent of which are detailed in Chapter Seven. Furthermore, census reporting favours some groups over others. While European populations are afforded 70 distinct Level 2 subgroups in the publicly available statistical releases from the 2013 Census, the separate \textit{iwi} table for Māori (Table 15) lists 139 distinct

\textsuperscript{406} In ethnicity reporting for the Indian situation, Level 1 refers to ‘Asian,’ Level 2 to ‘Indian,’ and Level 3 to further descriptors like ‘Fijian-Indian,’ ‘Bengali,’ and ‘Punjabi,’ which are inconsistently reported in the publication of available census statistics during Phase Three, i.e. while the Level 3 ‘Fijian-Indian’ category appears regularly, other Level 3 Indian subgroups do not.

\textsuperscript{407} For more information on Māori treatment in the New Zealand census see Kukutai (2012).


See my survey results in Chapter Eight.
does not equate with the number ticking both ‘Indian’ for ethnicity and ‘Fiji’ as one’s birthplace, nor does self-identification with ‘Indian Tamil,’ for example, represent all Tamilian Indians in New Zealand. The only probable explanation for the inclusion of these additional six ‘ethnicities’ would be that they represent the largest numerical instances of Indian subgroup identification on the census. Their inclusion demonstrates that group boundaries are indeed difficult to define, and portrays state ethnic enumeration procedures that continue to conflate ethnicity, and religious, linguistic and ancestral affiliations.

Census reporting of ethnicity is indeed problematic. What criteria ought to be implemented in order to achieve greater equity in ethnic recognition? Which groups should be represented and how? In presenting some subgroup statistics is the state alienating others? Is recognising all subgroups possible or even meaningful? If actual and accurate representation is a goal, then, in order to counter the ‘example effect,’ perhaps the addition of a simple prompt, along the lines of “Please state any subgroup identification” could be added to Question 11. Question 11 already has a prompt for Level 2 affiliation (“other such as Dutch, Japanese, Tokelauan. Please state:”). Would adding a similar prompt for Level 3 subgroup identification resolve these issues? This may represent the simplest was to address equity issues in reporting and might allow for the greater representation of subgroup identities, however changing the ethnicity question on the census would involve extensive consultation and is no easy task. While it wouldn’t answer all of the relevant questions, it would address equity and accuracy. The larger issue to address, however,

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412 The ‘example effect’ occurs when fixed lists of potential responses, provided as examples, influence a respondent’s write-in response or the boxes they may tick (see Waters 2000:1736).

413 See Figure 7.1 in Chapter 7.
is whether or not minorities desire further subgroup identification, a topic beyond the scope of this thesis.

As a central focus of this chapter, an examination of themes and phases is relevant as there is a growing body of literature that considers the significance and impact of particular government pursuits, like census enumeration, on notions of identity, identity formation and minority group belonging. Finally, this chapter concludes with a discussion on the meaning and implications that deep diversity holds for the census and the possibilities of a future not defined by ethnic classifications.

6.6 Conclusion

Much of the above discussion is necessarily descriptive and provides the raw data and source citations necessary to help alter the previous historic narrative. Failure to do so would leave the record incomplete and perpetuate an Asian migration discourse that assumes their arrival and settlement is a relatively recent phenomenon. This discourse is shared by both majority and minority communities, and unpacking evidence of earlier tauīwi settlement helps reshape anecdotal narratives into factual evidence. The reasons for providing such detail are three-fold. First, it helps shift the migration discourse by embedding Asian ‘others’ in Aotearoa at the time of earliest European colonisation. Second, awareness of earlier settlement should help non-Māori minorities better identify with an emerging shared national identity. As previously shown, the recognition of common histories strengthens minority identities and provides a basis for improved cohesion. Shared national identities might allow majority and minority alike to construct new alliances that could

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undermine the dominant-subordinate paradigm. Majorities might therefore be more open to Asian inclusion in a common national identity when equipped with knowledge of a shared past. Such an appreciation might help reduce minority discrimination by majorities controlling the discourse, although no such evidence currently exists. Third, the detail provided is necessary to render the obscure evident and reverse the historic invisibility of early tauwiwi settlement. Providing one instance might merely correct historic error; providing multiple examples helps establish a trend of European complicity in the erasure and invisibility of early tauwiwi history.

The data reported here also helps connect the central thesis themes of invisibility and identity. Establishing erasure and invisibility of early minority settlement in Phase One, and providing detailed examples of the preoccupation with maintaining racial superiority in Phase Two, has heralded, on the heels of lessening immigration restrictions in 1987, and the introduction of multiethnic self-reporting in Phase Three, the emergence of minority identities that had long been suppressed. This has enabled socioeconomic and political minority aspirations to manifest and become established in the parliamentary arena, and has made progress possible in other sectors (e.g. economic, educational, health), although parity on all fronts, and for all populations, remains elusive. Heightened recognition empowers political actors in multiple ways. The further strengthening of minority identity, along with concomitant increases in European awareness, may help curtail incidences of discrimination, which, along with inequality, remain entrenched at all societal levels—characteristic of shallow approaches.

Such discrepancies reveal that a possible fourth census phase, distinguished by deepening diversity governance, may be on the horizon.
This might allow for equal and more inclusive diversity governance strategies in which the desire for more refined and subtler ways of self-identification become increasingly less important, for reasons that, in the third census period, are exceedingly essential; that the desire for minority aspiration and affirmation is no longer necessary to define census categories by ever-smaller divisions. That, or census enumeration as currently practised will give way to major reform, as New Zealand ponders the future of its national census and the increasingly burdensome economic costs it entails, considering other options. While current ethnicity categories form the basis for the distribution of shrinking state resources, political representation, and the accommodation of group rights, is it possible to conceive of a future in which fourth phase enumeration no longer necessitates such descriptive and lengthy categorisation? Achieving such a condition may be unlikely in the short-term, and largely unnecessary by present standards. In moving toward greater minority recognition, as aspirations begin to be realised, Treaty obligations settled, proportional political representation achieved, and the allocation of resources for affirmative action no longer required (as only some, of many, examples of achieving appropriate minority recognition), can we envision a future in which cumbersome ethnicity questions are no longer required?

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CHAPTER SEVEN:
SUMMARY AND ANALYSIS OF
THE 2006 AND 2013 CENSUS DATA

7.1 Introduction

Through the use of historical census data on the New Zealand Indian population, the previous chapter discussed three distinct periods in the state treatment of minorities: 1) *minority invisibility*, characterised by exclusionary policies, European domination and racial supremacy, 2), *biological determinism*, controlled largely by the discourse of blood quantum and the maintenance of European domination, and 3) *inclusion*, in which minority assertion and aspiration receive majority recognition. These phases have woven through them the twin threads of identity and discrimination—central themes throughout. This chapter sets the stage for presenting select survey results in Chapter Eight. It summarises select statistical results from the 2006 and 2013 New Zealand Censuses,\(^{416}\) and examines the theme of identity that emerges from census results on ethnicity, birthplace, linguistic and religious affiliation, educational attainment and income. The investigation undertaken in Chapters Seven-Eight exposes the disparity between the current use of ethnicity as a classificatory tool in the census and the myriad ways in which minorities choose to identify.

\(^{416}\) Due to the February 2011 Christchurch earthquake, the 2011 Census, originally planned for March 2011, was postponed until March 2013. I had originally planned to use statistics from the 2011 Census, but in the wake of its cancellation, I had to resort to using the 2006 data, the most recent year for which figures were currently available during the writing of this thesis. The 2006 data was made available through a customised data request and subsequent grant from the Council of New Zealand University Librarians (CONZUL) and Statistics New Zealand (JOB-3357 and JOB-4081). This data formed the basis for the first draft of this chapter. Ethnicity data from the 2013 Census was only publicly released on 15 April 2014, with additional data on 19 August 2014, and due to time constraints for completion, a second customised data request based on the 2013 data was not possible. As a result, I have updated some of the statistics to reflect the publicly released 2013 Census data, where possible.
A deep diversity framework intrinsically questions the underlying assumption that ethnic categories, as portrayed by census classifications, are each homogenous entities, e.g. that all ‘Indians’ (or ‘Filipinos’ or ‘Māori’) share similar characteristics with other members of their group; that there is little differentiation between them. In fact, the diversity that exists within Level 1 and 2 ethnic categories can be described at various levels. The state generally supports such differentiation in its public releases of census ethnicity statistics of both European and Māori populations, but such heterogeneity is not divulged for other Level 1 ethnic categories. This perhaps best represents an existing bicultural framework, but shows considerable bias against growing tauiwi populations, who may wish to obtain greater access to census detail than currently provided.\textsuperscript{417} This reaffirms a shallow interpretation of diversity management. In describing the Indian population in New Zealand, it is therefore important to discuss demographic performance in a wide variety of sectors\textsuperscript{418} in order to demonstrate that considerable differentiation exists within other Level 1-2 ethnic populations.

Using more detailed results that disaggregate higher-level ethnic categories into stated Indian subethnicities that are not publicly available, this chapter begins with a summary of the Indian population based on the 2013 Census, and proceeds with an in-depth analysis based on the 2006 data and, where available, more recent figures from the 2013 Census. It examines a number of key variables by cross-tabulating these by stated ethnicities and subethnicities, country of birth, and other regional, linguistic, or religious affiliations. These difference are key to understanding the demographic makeup of the population and in

\textsuperscript{417} At present, there is no published research suggesting that those with ‘Indian’ ethnicity in New Zealand desire to make claims for specific subgroup identification. However, Murphy (2007) has specifically reported that are are potential legislative and political claims that can be made on behalf of all Indians in New Zealand.

\textsuperscript{418} e.g. language, religious affiliation, educational attainment and income.
exposing whatever previously invisible heterogeneity exists. Differences of
birth country help distinguish, for example, India-born Indians from Indo-
Fijians, Indo-South Africans and New Zealand-born Indians as having
distinct sociocultural histories and identities that differentiate them from
others in the ‘Indian nfd’ classification. Such submergence only reaffirms
shallow ideological approaches which homogenise diversity, allowing
particular regional, religious, and linguistic identities to remain invisible,
perpetuating status quo. Deeper diversity strategies addressing
ideological and operative societal values may allow particular
sociocultural needs to be accommodated. Such an analysis details the
methods in which the Census continues to misrepresent identity amongst
minority populations.

7.2 Summary and analysis of 2006 and 2013 Census data

This section analyses data on the New Zealand-resident Indian population
from the 2006 and 2013 Censuses. The release of ethnicity statistics for
tauīwi are limited, as only Level 1 (e.g. Asian) and Level 2 (e.g. Indian)
are publicly available, while specialised Level 3 or 4 requests are only
obtainable at cost to the researcher, institution or organisation requesting
the data. Statistics on both European and Māori populations are
exceptionally well detailed and publicly released, while statistics on other
ethnic minorities are much less detailed.

419 For instance, India-born Indians may have higher rates of diabetes than the New Zealand-born
population, or Indian Muslims or Hindus may be politically under-represented when compared
with the general New Zealand population.

420 Generally, only Level 1 categories are available in Statistics New Zealand’s data tool ‘NZ Stat,’
available on their website, while some Level 2 categorisations are available as downloadable
spreadsheets.

421 All 2006 Census figures presented here represent the Usually Resident Population Count on
census night and do not include those visiting New Zealand temporarily. Note that Statistics New
Zealand uses a Base 3 system to protect confidentiality where actual numbers are small, so as not to
be able to identify individuals. In such cases, low numbers are rounded to the nearest multiple of 3.
This may result in numbers that do not always total or equal 100%. In all instances, those returning
as nei (not elsewhere included) have been removed from the calculations, except where otherwise
noted.
Population summary

In the 2013 Census, 156,567 individuals identified within the Indian ethnic group, accounting for 3.7 percent of the total population, or 3.9 percent of those stating an ethnicity. The ‘Indian’ category has more than doubled from 1.7 percent of the total population in 2001, to 3.7 percent in 2013.

Table 7.1: Indian ethnicity, 2001-2013 Censuses.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
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<th></th>
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<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>62,193</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>104,583</td>
<td>2.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other stated ethnicities</td>
<td>3,524,382</td>
<td>94.3</td>
<td>3,755,580</td>
<td>93.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not elsewhere included</td>
<td>150,705</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>167,784</td>
<td>4.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Population:</td>
<td>3,737,280</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>4,027,947</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The existing census question on ethnicity asks respondents to select which ethnic group they belong two, allowing for multiple responses, and provides blank spaces in which to write an ethnic affiliation not already provided. This allows Level 1 and 2 responses to be tabulated. Level 1 responses consist of aggregating ethnicities into larger categories of ‘European,’ ‘Māori,’ ‘Pasifika,’ ‘Asian,’ and ‘MELAA.’

Although subgroups are not required, any respondent can write one in, but for ethnic Indians there is only a single option, as no further prompts exist, as they do for Māori on Question 15 regrading ancestry and iwi affiliation. Only a small percentage of Indian census respondents opt to write in such further identifiers as ‘Gujarati,’ ‘Sikh,’ or ‘Fijian-Indian.’

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422 ‘MELAA,’ as a Level 1 aggregated ethnicity classification in the New Zealand Census, stands for Middle Eastern, Latin American, and African.

423 Question 15, however, only applies to indigenous New Zealanders.

424 Although most Fijian Indians prefer the term ‘Indo-Fijian,’ I follow the practice established by Statistics New Zealand, employing the term ‘Fijian Indian’ for consistency with the original data.
During the 2001-2013 intercensal period, minority communities underwent rapid increases in their respective populations. Of the four main minority categories, Māori increased the least (13.7%), while Pasifika populations grew 27.7%, and Asian and MELAA populations grew 98.1% and 95.0% respectively. In contrast, the total New Zealand population increased 13.5% during this 12 year period. Much of the growth in the New Zealand population is being fueled by increases in non-Māori minority populations (e.g. Asian migration), and other factors, such as natural increase in European, and Māori populations, and natural increase and migration in Pasifika.

In comparing the 2001-2013 intercensal growth rates of the ‘Indian nfd’ and ‘Fijian Indian’ groups with Level One ethnicities, those stating ‘Indian’ ethnicity grew at a faster rate (138%) than the larger Asian population (98%), while those stating ‘Fijian Indian’ ethnicity more than quadrupled (451%) during this period. This can partially be due to the sharp rise in the Fijian Indian population in the post-coup years. The overseas-born populations for both the ‘Indian nfd’ and ‘Fijian Indian’

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425 Determining which groups are recognised on Question 11, would largely be determined by numerical representation, as mentioned earlier, and by historical presence.
426 See Table 7.2.
427 See Table 7.3.
groups grew at faster rates than their New Zealand-born counterparts, not unexpected in migrant communities.

Table 7.2: Percentage change in ethnic populations in New Zealand, 2001-2013.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total New Zealand Population</strong></td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>13.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 1 Ethnicities</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>European</em></td>
<td>-9.1*</td>
<td>13.8*</td>
<td>3.4*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Māori</em></td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>5.9</td>
<td>13.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Pasifika</em></td>
<td>14.7</td>
<td>11.3</td>
<td>27.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Asian</em></td>
<td>48.9</td>
<td>33.0</td>
<td>98.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>MELAA</em></td>
<td>44.3</td>
<td>35.1</td>
<td>95.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Other ethnicities</em></td>
<td>53,492*</td>
<td>-84.3*</td>
<td>8,327*</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total stated</strong></td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.3: Percentage change in Indian ethnic communities, 2001-2013.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Indian nfd total</strong></td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>47.3</td>
<td>138.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Indian nfd - NZ-born</em></td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>48.8</td>
<td>94.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Indian nfd - OS-born</em></td>
<td>74.6</td>
<td>46.8</td>
<td>156.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Fijian Indian total</strong></td>
<td>183.2</td>
<td>94.6</td>
<td>451.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Fijian Indian - NZ-born</em></td>
<td>107.8</td>
<td>155.7</td>
<td>431.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Fijian Indian - OS-born</em></td>
<td>199.1</td>
<td>85.7</td>
<td>455.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.4 introduces Level 3 subgroups and percentages reported in the 2006 Census. As no further prompts exist, ethnic Indians overwhelmingly

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428 *The huge percentage increase in those with ‘Other ethnicities’ and fluctuations in European populations are due to the official recognition of those stating a ‘New Zealander’ ethnicity in 2006, consisting predominantly of ‘European’ populations (Kukutai & Didham 2012). This is offset by the resultant drop in ‘European’ populations in the same period. The significant drop in ‘Other ethnicities’ in the 2006-2013 intercensal period is likewise due to the significant decrease in those stating a ‘New Zealander’ ethnicity in the 2013 Census.
(93.2%) identified as ‘Indian’ by simply ticking the box. Those that specified subgroup affinity, a write-in response under ‘other,’ represented only 6.9% of all Indians, doing so along regional (e.g. ‘Gujarati,’ ‘Punjabi’), ethnic (e.g. ‘Anglo Indian’) or religious (e.g. ‘Sikh’) lines, with the majority stating ‘Fijian Indian’ (5.4%) in contrast to those born in India or in other diasporic countries (94.6%). This demonstrates the overwhelming dominance of the ‘Indian nfd’ category, hence the importance of the

Table 7.4: Indian ethnicities (Level 3), by birthplace, 2006 Census.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Stated Ethnicity</th>
<th>NZ Born</th>
<th>Overseas Born</th>
<th>Not Stated</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>percent</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian nfd*</td>
<td>22,857</td>
<td>95.9</td>
<td>73,737</td>
<td>92.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengali</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fijian Indian</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>4,878</td>
<td>6.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarati</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Tamil</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjabi</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>114</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo Indian</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>192</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian nec*</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td>23,832</td>
<td>100.1</td>
<td>79,869</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Percent across:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

429 In comparison, 2013 Census figures show that 91.7% identified with the ‘Indian nfd’ category, although further breakdowns by birth country or stated subethnicity were not available before submission of this thesis.

430 By contrast, Māori are specifically asked for their iwi (Level 3) affiliation in Question 15.

431 *nfd = not further defined, *nec = not elsewhere classifiable.
India. As such, membership in such groups as ‘New Zealand-born Indian,’ ‘Fiji-born Indian,’ ‘South Africa-born Indian,’ or Indian Muslim and Indian Christian become important in identity formation.

Of those stating an ‘Indian’ ethnicity (all Indian ethnicities combined), 22.8% were born in New Zealand, while 76.4% were born overseas. Of the Indian subgroups recorded, ‘Fijian Indian’ was the most popular (5,616). This indicates a strong national affiliation and identification with Fiji, distinguishing them from India-born or other birth countries of the diaspora. The percentage identifying as ‘Indian’ was remarkably similar for both overseas- and domestic-born Indians, possibly due to the absence of subgroup prompts on the census form. The birthplace comparison within the ‘Fijian Indian’ group is significant, as it shows that Fijian Indians are more strongly represented among overseas-born (vs. New Zealand-born) ‘Indians.’ The two historic Indian settler populations (Gujaratis, Punjabis), both self-identified in numbers too small to warrant attention when compared with the ‘Fijian Indian’ population, which prefers to distinguish itself from Indians of other diasporic countries. This is possibly due to the length of their generational tenure in New Zealand, demonstrating that subgroup identification may be less important for established migrants than more recently arrived populations that may wish to distinguish themselves from those of other regions. More recent migrants (e.g. ‘Indian Tamil,’ ‘Bengali’) also chose self-identification in smaller numbers. Of all reported subgroups, ‘Fijian-Indians’ are most likely to distinguish themselves from the general Indian population.

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432 Here I follow the census usage of the category ‘Indian Tamil,’ as opposed to the more commonly used ‘Tamilian.’ ‘Indian Tamil’ is also used in the census to differentiate it from ‘Sri Lankan Tamil,’ referring to South Asian Tamil speakers of Sri Lankan origin, a separate ethnic category tracked by Statistics NZ.

433 It is important to note, however, that should subgroup prompts be offered on future censuses, more may choose to report regional, national, linguistic or religious affinity than currently represented statistics reveal.
Table 7.5: Stated Indian ethnicities by country of birth, 2006 Census.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indian identity:</th>
<th>Country of Birth</th>
<th>Total Stated</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>India</td>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>All others</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian nfd</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>40,959</td>
<td>99.2</td>
<td>24,885</td>
<td>83.7</td>
<td>22,860</td>
<td>95.9</td>
<td>7,882</td>
<td>89.6</td>
<td>96,594</td>
<td>93.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengali</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>102</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fijian Indian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>4,824</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>5,589</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarati</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian Tamil</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>153</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>195</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjabi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>138</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>72</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>264</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo Indian</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>117</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian nec</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>15</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>471</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total stated</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td>41,304</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>29,736</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>23,832</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>8,792</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>103,695</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It should be noted however that subgroup identification with ‘Fijian Indian’ only signifies that respondents identified their Level 2 affiliation and does not necessarily signify Fijian birth, and should not be considered a proxy for those born in Fiji or their descendants. As such, only a small percentage (16.2%) of Fiji-born Indians identified as ‘Fijian Indian,’ with the majority (83.7%) ticking ‘Indian.’ Of all those born in India, 99.2% stated an ‘Indian’ ethnicity, demonstrating that strong national affiliations are important for migrant communities, or that the absence of a subgroup prompt was a strong factor in identification as ‘Indian nfd.’ The ‘example effect’ referred to earlier\textsuperscript{434} appears to explain, at least partially, why participation in subgroup identification is poorly demonstrated amongst the Indian population.\textsuperscript{435} Regardless, stating a ‘Fijian Indian’ identity is the highest of any of the main birth countries. In comparison, those stating

\textsuperscript{434} See Waters (2000:1736).

\textsuperscript{435} There may be additional factors, and research into why so many India-born Indians identify as ‘Indian nfd,’ or why so few Fiji-born Indians fail to identify as such, is indeed warranted, but presently beyond the scope of this inquiry.
other Level 2 Indian subgroups barely registered above 0.5 percent of the total Indian population.

Table 7.6 shows that of those identifying as ‘Fijian Indian,’ 86.3% were born in Fiji, 12.8% in New Zealand, with 0.9% born elsewhere, demonstrating that Fijian Indian self-identification is important, even when born outside of Fiji.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Birth Country:</th>
<th>Indian nfd</th>
<th>Fijian Indian</th>
<th>All other sub-ethnicities</th>
<th>Total Indian Ethnicity Stated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>40,959</td>
<td>24.4%</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>24,885</td>
<td>25.8%</td>
<td>4,824</td>
<td>86.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>22,860</td>
<td>23.7%</td>
<td>714</td>
<td>12.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other countries</td>
<td>7,882</td>
<td>8.2%</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>0.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Indian stated:</td>
<td>96,594</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
<td>5,589</td>
<td>100.0%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Due to the small numbers reporting subgroup affinities, the ‘Indian nfd’ and ‘Fijian Indian’ categories, along with birthplace differentiation, form the basis for further analysis of the census data. Comparisons are drawn between those born in New Zealand and those born overseas, creating four distinct identity groups. These are used throughout to determine if any significant differences exist between the Indian and Fijian Indian ethnicities, or between the New Zealand-born and overseas-born Indian populations.

All Indians combined identified 111 distinct countries of birth. The top four birth countries together represent 93.2% of the Indian population. The top ten countries, are tabulated in Table 7.7. The top three birth countries of India, Fiji and South Africa together account for 92.3% of all Indian migrants. Southeast Asia, other South Asian countries, Europe, North
America, the Gulf, and East and South Africa are also represented. The top twenty birth countries together account for 98.2% of the entire Indian population in New Zealand, while the remaining 91 birth countries only account for a total of 1.8% of the population.

Table 7.7: Top ten birth countries, total Indian population, 2006 Census.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Country of birth:</th>
<th>Total Indian population</th>
<th>Percentage of Indian migrants</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>number</td>
<td>percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>India</td>
<td>41,304</td>
<td>39.49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji</td>
<td>29,736</td>
<td>28.43</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand</td>
<td>23,832</td>
<td>22.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Africa</td>
<td>2,640</td>
<td>2.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malaysia</td>
<td>1,356</td>
<td>1.30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>England</td>
<td>660</td>
<td>0.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Australia</td>
<td>369</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Singapore</td>
<td>366</td>
<td>0.35</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pakistan</td>
<td>351</td>
<td>0.34</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lanka</td>
<td>288</td>
<td>0.28</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other countries</td>
<td>3,678</td>
<td>3.52</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>TOTAL:</strong></td>
<td><strong>104,583</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

As expected, the largest groups of migrant Indians come from South Asia and Oceania (predominantly from Fiji), with smaller populations arriving from Africa and Southeast Asia. Those stating an ‘Indian’ ethnicity are more widely distributed, with the majority (44.6%) born in Asia (including India), 25.3% in the Pacific (including Fiji), and 23.6% in New Zealand. Those stating a ‘Fijian Indian’ ethnicity are overwhelmingly (86.0%) from Fiji, while only 12.8% were born in New Zealand, demonstrating that a Fijian ancestry is sufficiently important as an identifier, even when born in countries outside Fiji. This is not demonstrated to the same extent in any of the other identified subgroups. Of all Indians born in the Pacific (excluding New Zealand and Australia), which includes predominantly
Fijian Indians, 83.8% identified as ‘Indian’ while 6.2% identified as ‘Fijian Indian.’ While the majority of Fijian Indians identified as ‘Indian,’ only a small proportion self-identified as ‘Fijian Indian.’ This might be statistically significant if ‘Indian’ respondents were instructed to further identify with a subgroup.

There is variation and differentiation with age distribution in both New Zealand-born and overseas-born Indians, as well as between those stating either an ‘Indian’ or ‘Fijian Indian’ ethnicity. The key point is that migrant groups demonstrate a selective age structure, concentrated in the working ages. When compared to all Indians in each age range, the percentages of those aged under 15 years of both groups are significantly higher for the domestic-born than those born overseas. Young age structures are characteristic of recent migrant populations. Although Indians have been in New Zealand for multiple generations, they have only appeared in larger numbers relatively recently. In the 15-24 year age range, the emphasis shifts to ethnicity, where those stating ‘Fijian Indian’ are more represented than those stating ‘Indian,’ regardless of birthplace; i.e. percentages of ‘Fijian Indians’ are higher for this age range than those stating an ‘Indian’ ethnicity. Both New Zealand-born ‘Indians’ and ‘Fijian Indians’ are less likely to be of working age than are overseas-born.

Table 7.8: Age distribution by Indian ethnicity and birthplace, 2006 Census.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age range:</th>
<th>New Zealand-born Indian</th>
<th>Overseas-born Indian</th>
<th>New Zealand-born Fijian Indian</th>
<th>Overseas-born Fijian Indian</th>
<th>TOTAL INDIAN:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>percent</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>percent</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>0-14 yrs.</td>
<td>14,625</td>
<td>63.3</td>
<td>9,672</td>
<td>12.9</td>
<td>525</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-24 yrs.</td>
<td>3,624</td>
<td>15.7</td>
<td>11,865</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>25-34 yrs.</td>
<td>1,806</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>17,418</td>
<td>23.2</td>
<td>39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>35-44 yrs.</td>
<td>1,449</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>16,047</td>
<td>21.4</td>
<td>12</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>45-54 yrs.</td>
<td>1,098</td>
<td>4.7</td>
<td>10,782</td>
<td>14.4</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>55-64 yrs.</td>
<td>345</td>
<td>1.5</td>
<td>5,550</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>65+ yrs.</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>3,690</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TOTAL:</td>
<td>23,121</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>75,024</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>720</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
- ‘Indians’ and - ‘Fijian Indians,’ i.e. those born overseas are significantly more likely to be of working age than their New Zealand-born counterparts, which is expected for migrant populations.

Table 7.9: Years since arrival, overseas-born populations, 2013 Census.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Years since arrival:</th>
<th>Indian nfd</th>
<th>Fijian Indian</th>
<th>Total Indian</th>
<th>Percent difference b/w Indian nfd &amp; Fijian Indian populations</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>&lt; 1 Year</td>
<td>6,606</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>189</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1 Year</td>
<td>6,480</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2 Years</td>
<td>6,480</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>216</td>
<td>2.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>3 Years</td>
<td>6,810</td>
<td>6.6</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>5.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>4 Years</td>
<td>8,040</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>777</td>
<td>9.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>5-9 Years</td>
<td>26,550</td>
<td>25.7</td>
<td>2,751</td>
<td>31.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>10-19 Years</td>
<td>29,442</td>
<td>28.5</td>
<td>2,637</td>
<td>30.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20+ Years</td>
<td>13,017</td>
<td>12.6</td>
<td>1,362</td>
<td>15.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Stated</td>
<td>103,476</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>8,670</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Migrants stating ‘Indian’ or ‘Fijian Indian’ ethnicity are compared in Table 7.9. For the total Indian migrant population, a third (32.5%) had arrived in New Zealand within the four years prior to the 2013 Census, with the remainder (67.5%) arriving five years or more prior to the 2013 Census.

While those identified as ‘Fijian Indian’ arrived in slightly larger percentages (46.1% have been in New Zealand at least 10 years) than those stating ‘Indian’ during the post-Fiji coup years (41.1%), those stating an ‘Indian’ ethnicity have been arriving in larger percentages (25.6%)

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436 The ‘Indian nfd’ category in the publicly released 2013 results, excludes Level 3 Indian categories (e.g. Bengali, Punjabi) which were instead included in the ‘Other Asian’ category. This demonstrates considerable inconsistency with earlier censuses. Positive values for percentage differences in the final column indicate that those stating an ‘Indian nfd’ ethnicity are growing at faster percentages than those stating a ‘Fijian Indian’ ethnicity, while negative values indicate that those stating a ‘Fijian Indian’ ethnicity are growing at faster percentages.

437 The Fiji coups occurred in 1987 and 2000 and led to widespread Indian emigration, many of whom settled in New Zealand.
compared to ‘Fijian Indians’ (13.2%) in the last three years prior to the 2013 Census.

*Cultural variables: language acquisition and transmission*

The 2006 Census also provides significant details of the various languages and religions of the Indian population, all exceptionally important in identity formation. Both language and religious affiliation will be explored in detail, with comparisons made between both the New Zealand-born and overseas-born populations, as well as between both ‘Indian nfd’ and ‘Fijian Indian’ populations. Table 7.11 shows the total number and percent of all four identity groups able to speak at least one South Asian language.

Table 7.10: Indians speaking at least one South Asian language, 2006 Census.\(^{438}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity:</th>
<th>New Zealand-born</th>
<th>Overseas-born</th>
<th>Birthplace Total Stated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>percent</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>23,115</td>
<td>22.3</td>
<td>74,988</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fijian Indian</td>
<td>717</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>4,878</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><em>Ethnicity Total:</em></td>
<td>23,832</td>
<td>23.0</td>
<td>79,866</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

This table demonstrates that respondents born overseas are significantly more likely (77.0%) to speak at least one South Asian language when compared with those born in New Zealand (23.0%). When those born in New Zealand are viewed by ethnicity, those identifying as ‘Indian’ are significantly more likely (22.3%) than ‘Fijian Indians’ (0.7%) to speak at least one South Asian language. When those born overseas are viewed by ethnicity, those identifying as ‘Indian’ are again significantly more likely (72.3%) than ‘Fijian Indians’ (4.7%) to speak at least one South Asian language. Row percentages show that, regardless of birthplace, ‘Indians’ are nearly twice as likely (23.6%) as ‘Fijian Indians’ (12.8) to speak at least one South Asian language. This demonstrates considerable variation between the different identity groups.

\(^{438}\) ‘Indian’ includes all Indian ethnicities except ‘Fijian Indian.’
Table 7.11: Top spoken languages & birthplace, all Indian ethnicities, 2006 Census.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>South Asian language spoken</th>
<th>New Zealand-born</th>
<th>Overseas-born</th>
<th>Total Indian Stated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>percent</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>3,615</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>38,688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2,124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengali</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1,002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjabi</td>
<td>1,629</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>8,445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarati</td>
<td>3,798</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>11,643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marathi</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Indo-Aryan*</td>
<td>636</td>
<td>6.2</td>
<td>4,467</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malayalam</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3,273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telugu</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Dravidian*</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>10,218</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>77,739</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*Includes both *nfd* and *nei* responses.)

Table 7.11 displays only the stated South Asian languages (which includes members of both the Indo-Aryan and Dravidian language families) that are spoken by those stating any Indian ethnicity. This excludes English and any other non-native Indo-Aryan or Dravidian languages spoken in South Asia. First, the New Zealand-born population will be compared with the overseas-born population to determine the extent of differentiation. As expected, percentages of native language speakers are generally higher for overseas-born populations, however, there is a curious anomaly which shows that Punjabi and Gujarati speakers, which comprise the two native languages of the earliest Indian settlers in New Zealand, are markedly higher in the New Zealand-born population when compared to the overseas-born population; the more established Indian

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439 A complete table appears in Appendix F.

440 Census respondents can state more than a single language spoken.
communities (i.e. those in both the Gujarati- and Punjabi-speaking communities) appear to be passing their native language on to their children more than the more recently arrived migrant populations from other regions of India. Hindi, the most widely spoken of the Indian languages, is still spoken by more overseas-than domestic-born Indians in New Zealand. However, Hindi is not being passed on in the same percentages to New Zealand-born generations as are both Gujarati and Punjabi. Whereas Hindi shows a downward trend amongst New Zealand-born, both Gujarati and Punjabi languages are showing significant increases. This lends credence that the Indian population still strongly identifies with its smaller subgroups, languages and regional affiliations (e.g. Gujarati, Punjabi) over a pan-Indian identification, thereby supporting a deep diversity framework for analysis. However, it is significant that India’s most important Indo-European language, Hindi, is not being passed on in the same percentages as are the Gujarati and Punjabi languages. This has important ramifications for Indian New Zealanders and shows that much work still needs to be done in language transference to younger, domestically-born, generations. It also shows that Gujaratis and Punjabis are much more likely to pass on their regional languages than they are to teach successive generations Hindi. This may provide evidence that regional or linguistic affiliations are more significant identity markers than are the Indian or Fijian Indian identity groups, demonstrating the shallowness of the Level 2 classification of ‘Indian’ provided in the census, and supporting a deep diversity framework.

Table 7.12 breaks down the most widely spoken of the Indian languages by birthplace, as breaking down the figures into the four identity groups.

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441 Figures from the 2013 Census show that Hindi is now the fourth most spoken language in New Zealand, after English, Māori and Sāmoan, accounting for 67,983 speakers, or 1.7% of the total population stating a spoken language.
does not reveal any useful information. This is because the majority of Fiji-born Indians did not specifically state a Fijian Indian identity, as mentioned earlier, and many of the ‘overseas-born Indians’ were born in Fiji. A comparison between the New Zealand-born and overseas-born groups reveals more useful results. Of the total Indian population stating Hindi as a spoken language, 91.0% were overseas-born while only 8.5% were born in New Zealand. This shows that less than one-in-ten New Zealand-born Indians speak Hindi compared with more than nine-in-ten overseas-born. Those stating Gujarati as a spoken language have a far better rate of language continuance than do other South Asian language speakers, with 74.8% overseas-born and 24.4% of those speaking Gujarati being New Zealand-born. Of Punjabi speakers, 83.1% were born overseas, while 16.0% were born in New Zealand. Those speaking Dravidian languages (e.g. Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam) have the lowest rate of language continuance when compared with speakers of other South Asian languages, i.e. 96.6% of all Dravidian language speakers where born overseas while only 3.0% were born in New Zealand. This shows that Gujarati and Punjabi speakers are passing on their language skills to their domestically-born generations in significantly greater numbers than are

Table 7.12: South Asian languages by birthplace, Indian ethnicity, 2006 Census.442

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Languages spoken:</th>
<th>New Zealand-born</th>
<th>Overseas-born</th>
<th>Total Indian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>percent</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindi*</td>
<td>3,648</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>39,087</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarati</td>
<td>3,798</td>
<td>24.4</td>
<td>11,643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjabi</td>
<td>1,629</td>
<td>16.0</td>
<td>8,445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Indo-Aryan</td>
<td>870</td>
<td>8.2</td>
<td>9,687</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dravidian languages</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>3.0</td>
<td>8,886</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All other languages</td>
<td>22,479</td>
<td>23.6</td>
<td>72,318</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*includes Fijian Hindi.)

442 Percentages listed are row totals rather than column totals. Languages spoken includes all of the people who stated each language spoken, whether as their only language, or as one of several languages. Where a person reported more than one language spoken, they have been counted in each applicable group. Therefore the total number of responses in the table will be greater than the total number of people.
their other Indo-Aryan and Dravidian speaking counterparts. These results would show that much more could be done for preserving non-Gujarati and non-Punjabi speaking Indians than is currently underway in Indian communities in New Zealand.

Indigenous South Asian languages are also spoken by small numbers of other ethnicities and not just those stating an Indian ethnicity. Table 7.13 looks at selected Indian languages by Level 1 ethnicities and demonstrates the uptake of South Asian languages amongst non-Asian ethnicities. This could be the result of intermarriage and/or those that stated more than a single ethnicity. It is evident that South Asian language speaking is not restricted to Asian ethnic groups. This may indicate intermarriage where spouses, or children of mixed marriages, learn to speak the languages of their parents/spouses, and respondents stating more than a single ethnicity. Of note are the high numbers of non-Asian speakers of South Asian languages. This is even more evident when those stating a ‘New Zealander’ ethnicity are removed from the ‘Other ethnicity’ category, as it is comprised of predominantly ‘New Zealanders’ who are mostly Europeans (Kukutai & Didham 2009, 2012). The final column on the right represents the percentage of the total South Asian language speakers that speak each language. This right-most column shows that Hindi is spoken by 43.7% of all respondents stating a spoken South Asian language, while Gujarati and Punjabi are spoken by 15.6% and 10.5% of the total population of South Asian language speakers respectively. Tamil is spoken by 5.5% of the South Asian language speaking population, followed by Urdu at 4.1%.

There are some interesting points to consider in Table 7.13. When those stating a ‘New Zealander’ ethnicity are considered and added to the

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443 i.e. the percentages in this column are column percentages and not row percentages.
European total, nearly 2% of all Hindi speakers stated a European ethnicity. Furthermore, 2.1% of all Hindi speakers stated a Pasifika ethnicity; these are most likely Fijian Indians with both Fijian and Indian ancestry. Also of note, most likely due to intermarriage and/or respondents stating more than a single ethnicity, are the 2.1% of Gujarati speakers that are members of an ‘Other’ ethnic affiliation, most likely those stating a ‘New Zealander’ ethnicity.

Table 7.13: South Asian language spoken by ethnicity, 2006 Census.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>South Asian languages spoken</th>
<th>European</th>
<th>Maori</th>
<th>Pacific</th>
<th>Asian</th>
<th>MELAA</th>
<th>Other ethnicity**</th>
<th>Total Speakers Stated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indo-Aryan:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindi*</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>924</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>43,227</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarati</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>15,591</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjabi</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>10,566</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu</td>
<td>174</td>
<td>4.1</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>108</td>
<td>2.6</td>
<td>3,879</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marathi</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2,544</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengali</td>
<td>69</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2,160</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinhala</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>3,864</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I-A rdf</td>
<td>123</td>
<td>3.2</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>267</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>5,639</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other I-A</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>6.8</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>90</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>2,148</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dravidian:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>5,535</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telugu</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2,799</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malayalam</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>2,124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Othr Drav.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>903</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>1,320</td>
<td>1.3</td>
<td>273</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>1,470</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>49,979</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*includes Fijian Hindi. **includes both ‘New Zealander’ and ‘Other ethnicity’ categories.)

The Urdu language, spoken by predominantly Muslim Indian and Muslim Fijian Indian speakers, represents the most widely spoken South Asian language that is spoken by ethnicities other than Asian. Of all Urdu speakers nationally, 4.1% are European, 2.4% stating an ‘Other’ ethnicity (including ethnic ‘New Zealanders’), 2.6% stated a Pasifika ethnicity (most probably Muslim Fijians with both Fijian and Indian ancestry), and 1.6%

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444 Cell percentages represent row percentages rather than column percentages and represent the total number from each ethnic category that speak each individual South Asian language. Row percentages can total more than 100% as language speakers for each particular language can identity as belonging to more than one ethnicity. Column totals represent the number of respondents in each ethnic category that speak a South Asian language, while the percentages in the bottom ‘Total’ row are row percentages.
stating a MELAA ethnicity. Marathi speakers show the narrowest
distribution of all the Indo-Aryan languages, with 99.5% of Marathi
speakers stating an Asian ethnicity. Amongst Bengali speakers, 3.1% stated
a European ethnicity and 1.7% stated an ‘Other’ ethnicity, which also
includes those stating a ‘New Zealander’ ethnicity. As a whole, speakers of
Dravidian, or South Indian, languages are slightly less distributed than
their Indo-Aryan counterparts, with a more limited distribution amongst
other ethnicities. A small exception to this is the percentage of those
stating an ‘Other’ ethnicity (which includes ethnic ‘New Zealanders’) which constitute about 2% of the entire Tamil-speaking population. Of all the spoken Indo-Aryan and Dravidian languages, Malayalam speakers represent the least widely distributed language, in which 97.7% of all Malayalam speakers stated an Asian ethnicity.

Depicting language diversification amongst the ‘Indian’ population using
a deep diversity framework helps demonstrate sub-populations within
this Level 2 category. While regional variations in homeland affiliation,
usually measured by which Indian state one’s ancestors come from, are
less prominent culturally, linguistic variations between populations are
much more pronounced. The North Indian Indo-Aryan language family is much more closely related to English and its kin European languages
than it is to the Dravidian, or South Indian, language family, which comprises a distinct language family, separating it from the Indo-
European language group. So Hindi, an Indo-Aryan language, is more
closely related to English and German then it is to Tamil and Malayalam,
both Dravidian languages. Such linguistic differentiation distinguishes the

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445 e.g. Maharashtra, Uttar Pradesh, Kerala or Tamil Nadu.

446 The Indo-Aryan language family consists of, for example, Hindi, Urdu, Marathi, Gujarati, Punjabi, and Bengali, and is considered a member of the larger Indo-European language family.

447 The Dravidian language family consists of, for example, Tamil, Telugu, Malayalam and Kannada, and is considered to be one of the main language families globally, and is unrelated to the Indo-Aryan language family (Caldwell 1856, Krishnamurti 2003).
‘Indian’ population into speakers of unrelated language families, unlike other ethnic communities in New Zealand (e.g. Chinese, Korean, Filipino), in which the languages spoken by its members show variation only within their particular language families. As such, the ethnic term ‘Indian,’ itself a construct, lumps together particular groups sharing regional, religious and cultural, but not linguistic, affinities. These distinctions become readily apparent when applying a deep diversity framework to ethnic analysis. Such interpretations demonstrate uptake and continuance of particular South Asian languages in New Zealand, and also highlight those at risk of decline or disappearance. As language is often a carrier of cultural significance, declining use over successive generations highlights particular policy needs. Such requirements are currently being addressed amongst Māori language populations (Fleras 1989, Reedy 2000) and have generally aided Māori cultural resurgence (King 2003:324, Spolsky 2003). This has aided the significant increases in Māori subgroup (iwi) affiliation revealed in the 2013 Census (Smallman 2014).

Cultural variables: bi- and multilingualism

In terms of the numbers of languages spoken, Table 7.14 shows the numbers and percentages of those born domestically and those born overseas. As expected, this table shows that New Zealand-born Indians are more likely to speak only a single language (presumably English) rather than multiple languages, while those born overseas are more likely to speak multiple languages rather than only a single language. Multilingualism accounts for 67.9% of the entire overseas-born Indian

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448 For example, ethnic Chinese in New Zealand speak predominantly Northern Chinese (which includes Mandarin), Yue (which includes Cantonese), or Min (spoken predominantly in the southeastern Fujian province). All Chinese languages spoken in New Zealand are members of the Sinitic branch of the Sino-Tibetan language family (Thurgood & LaPolla 2003).

449 Number of languages spoken refers to all languages, and not just Indian languages.
population, whereas only 46.8% of domestically-born Indians are multilingual.

Table 7.14: Number of languages spoken by birthplace, Indian ethnicity, 2006 Census.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of languages spoken:</th>
<th>New Zealand-born</th>
<th>Overseas-born</th>
<th>Total Indian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>percent</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>10,869</td>
<td>53.2</td>
<td>25,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>8,541</td>
<td>41.8</td>
<td>35,040</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three or more</td>
<td>1,017</td>
<td>5.0</td>
<td>18,264</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>20,427</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>78,504</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

By comparison, Table 7.15-7.16 show the number of languages spoken by each of the main ethnic groups. As expected, European populations account for the majority of monolingual speakers in New Zealand (68.6%), and for the majority of bilingual speakers as well (28.8%). Asian populations, however, are in the majority for multilingual speakers, accounting for 40.8% of the multilingual population stating an ethnicity. By comparison, 36.5% of all Indians are monolingual, while 44.0% are bilingual and 19.5% are multilingual. The majority of Europeans are monolingual (91.5%), with only 6.9% bilingual and 1.6 multilingual, and Māori have higher bilingual percentages (22.7%) when compared with Europeans. Both European and Māori populations show similarities in multilingualism with rates of 1.6% and 1.7% respectively. Asians by comparison have lower rates of monolingualism (37.3%) and much higher rates of bilingualism (48.5%) and multilingualism (14.2%) when compared with either European or Māori language groups. Higher bi- or multilingual percentages are expected in migrant populations. The New Zealander ethnicity shows striking similarities to Europeans, which adds further support to Kukutai & Didham’s (2012) assertion that the New Zealander ethnicity is composed largely of Europeans. This table
demonstrates however that the majority of language diversity in New Zealand is due primarily to minority diversification.

Table 7.15: Percentages of spoken languages by ethnicity, 2006 Census.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Number of spoken languages</th>
<th>European</th>
<th>Māori</th>
<th>Pacific</th>
<th>Asian</th>
<th>MELAA</th>
<th>NZer</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>c %</td>
<td>r %</td>
<td>c %</td>
<td>r %</td>
<td>c %</td>
<td>r %</td>
<td>c %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>One</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>68.6</td>
<td>75.5</td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>37.3</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>35.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Two</td>
<td>6.9</td>
<td>28.8</td>
<td>22.7</td>
<td>18.0</td>
<td>48.5</td>
<td>26.8</td>
<td>50.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Three +</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>34.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>14.2</td>
<td>40.8</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.16: Ethnicity by number of spoken languages stated, 2006 Census.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity:</th>
<th>None</th>
<th>Monolingual</th>
<th>Bilingual</th>
<th>Multilingual</th>
<th>Total Stated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total NZ population:</td>
<td>74,820</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>3,064,305</td>
<td>80.5</td>
<td>558,720</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Main Ethnic Groups:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>48,384</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>2,317,85</td>
<td>89.8</td>
<td>175,908</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māori</td>
<td>15,465</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>407,094</td>
<td>73.4</td>
<td>122,469</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>9,306</td>
<td>3.6</td>
<td>127,554</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>110,379</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>9,333</td>
<td>2.7</td>
<td>125,979</td>
<td>36.3</td>
<td>163,956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MELAA</td>
<td>1,341</td>
<td>4.0</td>
<td>11,445</td>
<td>33.9</td>
<td>16,455</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealander</td>
<td>8,121</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>389,949</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>22,617</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ethnicity</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>912</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>345</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Four Identity Groups:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian, total pop.</td>
<td>3,240</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>36,420</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>43,830</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian, NZ born</td>
<td>2,814</td>
<td>12.4</td>
<td>10,533</td>
<td>46.5</td>
<td>8,319</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian, OS born</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>24,216</td>
<td>32.7</td>
<td>31,956</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji Indian, NZ born</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>47.7</td>
<td>222</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji Indian, OS born</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>984</td>
<td>20.3</td>
<td>3,084</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.16 shows that 80.5% of the total New Zealand population is monolingual, while 14.7% are bilingual and 2.9% are multilingual. For

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450 This table includes all of the people who stated each ethnic group, whether as their only ethnic group or as one of several ethnic groups. Where a person reported more than one ethnic group, they have been counted in each applicable group, hence column totals will not equal 100%.

451 All percentages are row percentages.
monolingual populations, both Europeans (89.8%) and those stating a ‘New Zealander’ ethnicity (91.5%) hold the majority while Asian (36.3%) and MELAA (33.9%) populations are in the minority. For bilingual speakers, the situation is reversed. Asian (47.2%) and MELAA (48.7%) populations hold the majority of bilingual speakers, while European (6.8%) and ‘New Zealander’ (5.3%) populations are in the minority. A similar situation exists for multilingual populations, where Asian (13.8%) and MELAA (13.5%) populations are again in the majority, with European (1.6%) and ‘New Zealander’ populations (1.3%) in the minority.

Similar comparisons can be made for the four identity groups. Both New Zealand-born Indians (46.5%) and those stating a Fijian Indian identity (47.7%) have higher rates of monolingualism than their overseas-born compatriots. The opposite is true for bilingual Indian and Fijian Indian populations, where both overseas-born Indians and overseas-born Fijian Indians have much higher bilingualism rates than their domestically-born counterparts. Also, overseas-born Fijian Indians have much higher rates (63.7%) of bilingualism than the overseas-born Indian population (43.2%), and when compared to the total for the entire Indian population (42.6%). As expected, multilingual rates are highest for the overseas-born populations when compared with their domestically-born counterparts. For multilingual speakers however, there are some difference between the identity groups. While both Indian and Fijian Indian populations born domestically have low multilingual rates (4.3% and 7.2% respectively), overseas-born Indians are more likely to be multilingual than are overseas-born Fijian Indians. When comparing the total Indian population to the total population of New Zealand, there are considerable differences between the two. While the total New Zealand population is 80.5%

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452 That both ‘European’ and ‘New Zealander’ categories have very similar monolingual rates is a further indicator that those stating a ‘New Zealander’ ethnicity on the census are primarily ‘Europeans.’
monolingual, only 35.4% of the Indian population is, and while only 17.5% of the total New Zealand population is either bi- or multilingual, 61.5% of the Indian population is bi- and multilingual.

Cultural variables: Religious affiliation

Religion is an integral and significant aspect of Indian identity (Kaviraj 1997, Sen 2006),\(^{453}\) with Indian populations distinguishing themselves predominantly along regional, linguistic and religious lines.

Table 7.17: Religions of those stating an Indian ethnicity, 2006 Census.\(^{454}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious affiliation</th>
<th>Indian n</th>
<th>Indian %</th>
<th>Fijian Indian n</th>
<th>Fijian Indian %</th>
<th>Total Indian Stated n</th>
<th>Total Indian Stated %</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>No Religion</td>
<td>4,776</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>4.5</td>
<td>5,022</td>
<td>4.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhism</td>
<td>348</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>357</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christianity</td>
<td>16,476</td>
<td>17.0</td>
<td>795</td>
<td>14.3</td>
<td>17,268</td>
<td>16.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinduism</td>
<td>54,402</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>2,805</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>57,192</td>
<td>56.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>9,735</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>1,572</td>
<td>28.3</td>
<td>11,310</td>
<td>11.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jain</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judaism</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>0.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māori Christian</td>
<td>249</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>255</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>9,324</td>
<td>9.6</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>9,330</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zoroastrian</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>0.9</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>885</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other nfd</td>
<td>294</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>1.4</td>
<td>330</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total stated:</strong></td>
<td>96,675</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>5,547</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>102,135</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 7.17 portrays the religious affiliations of the Indian population. Hindus comprise the majority (56.0%) of the total Indian population, followed by Christians (16.9%), Muslims (11.1%) and Sikhs (9.1%). Secular Indians made up 4.9% of the total Indian population. For the most part,

\(^{453}\) Sen (2005) also points out that atheism has an ancient lineage in Indian philosophy.

\(^{454}\) Those stating both an Indian ethnicity and a religion. ‘Not elsewhere included’ were removed.
the religious affiliations of those identifying as ‘Indian’ and ‘Fijian Indian’ were similar for most religious groups, however, a much larger percentage of the ‘Fijian Indian’ population (28.3%) identified as Muslim when compared with ‘Indians’ (10.1%). Also, those identifying as ‘Sikh’ were represented in much higher proportions (9.6%) amongst ‘Indians’ when compared with ‘Fijian Indians’ (0.5%). Indians identifying ‘Māori Christian’ affiliations are of note here, signifying an important element of Indo-Māori integration. Although these represent only a tiny fraction of Indian religiosity, it does indicate Indian marriage into Māori whānau, in which Indians have taken on the religious identities of the larger family. This interethnic blending may go back several generations and represent descendants of early Indian settler intermarriage.

Table 7.18 portrays religious affiliation for select Level 1 ethnicities to determine if any additional significant differentiation exists. As evident, European populations are predominantly Christian (56.3%) and secular (37.7%), while Asian populations have a more religiously diverse spread. Māori populations, while majority Christian, show similar rates of secularisation, and, as expected, significantly higher rates for adherence to Māori religious traditions when compared with the other Level 1 ethnicities. While 31.2% of the Asian population are secular, 28.7% are Christian, 17.6% are Hindu, and 11.4% Buddhist. Of interest in Table 7.20 are the rather low percentages of non-religious Indians (4.9%) when compared with the total stating Asian ethnicity (31.2%) and with the total stated population (34.7%). This affirms that stating an affiliation, or not stating one, is important in considering the various factors that may comprise a formulation of Indian identity. As an ethnic group, the Indian population shows a significantly lower rate of secularism when compared with other ethnicities, as well as a high degree of religious diversification, which portrays those of Indian ethnicity as being the most religiously
diverse when compared with other Level 2 ethnicities. Compared with other Level 1 ethnicities, the total Indian population shows extensive religious diversification. Christian Indians account for only 16.5% of the total Indian population. At the lowest end of the scale, Christians account for 56.3% of the European population, and, at the higher end, 80.2% of Pasifika populations report a Christian affiliation. Further group differentiation into ‘Indian nfd’ and ‘Fijian Indian’ ethnicity also reveals significant differences within the Indian population. Using a deep diversity framework for analysis (e.g. stressing the importance of religious differentiation in identity formation) allows us to ascertain additional underlying differences between both ‘Indian nfd’ and ‘Fijian Indian’ groups.

Table 7.18. Religious affiliation and ethnicity, total stated population, 2006 Census.\footnote{The ‘All others’ category includes MELAA, ‘New Zealander,’ and those stating an ethnicity that is not elsewhere classifiable in the other main ethnic groupings. This category, like those of European ethnicity, is comprised mostly of Christian and secular populations.}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious affiliation:</th>
<th>European</th>
<th>Maori</th>
<th>Asian</th>
<th>All Other</th>
<th>Total Stated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Religion</td>
<td>955,257</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>193,683</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>106,569</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhism</td>
<td>10,755</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>1,836</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>38,994</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christianity</td>
<td>1,426,305</td>
<td>56.3</td>
<td>245,052</td>
<td>46.2</td>
<td>97,809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinduism</td>
<td>3,300</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>816</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>59,922</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>3,861</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1,074</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>19,863</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judaism</td>
<td>5,088</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>375</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>210</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maori Christian</td>
<td>13,950</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>58,779</td>
<td>11.1</td>
<td>696</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Spiritual/ New Age</td>
<td>14,373</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>2,946</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>300</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other nfd</td>
<td>6,801</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>4,431</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>4,693</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Object to answer</td>
<td>152,925</td>
<td>6.0</td>
<td>45,519</td>
<td>8.6</td>
<td>11,631</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total stated: 2,534,42 | 102.3 | 530,622 | 104.5 | 341,211 | 101.9 | 697,218 | 102.7 | 3,720,50 | 102.5 |
Table 7.19: Comparisons of ethnicity by religiosity, 2006 Census.\textsuperscript{456}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity:</th>
<th>Secular</th>
<th>Religious</th>
<th>Object</th>
<th>Total Stated:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total NZ pop.:</td>
<td>1,290,786</td>
<td>34.7</td>
<td>2,282,001</td>
<td>61.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Level 1 Ethnicities:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>955,257</td>
<td>37.7</td>
<td>1,484,433</td>
<td>58.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māori</td>
<td>193,683</td>
<td>36.5</td>
<td>315,309</td>
<td>59.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific</td>
<td>34,833</td>
<td>14.0</td>
<td>207,822</td>
<td>83.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Asian</td>
<td>106,569</td>
<td>31.2</td>
<td>229,656</td>
<td>67.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>MELAA</td>
<td>3,651</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>29,112</td>
<td>87.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealander</td>
<td>155,265</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>222,156</td>
<td>53.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other ethnicity</td>
<td>309</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>1035</td>
<td>72.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Asian ethnicities:</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian</td>
<td>4,989</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>96,366</td>
<td>95.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chinese</td>
<td>83,352</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>52,182</td>
<td>37.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Korean</td>
<td>6,003</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>23,244</td>
<td>79.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Filipino</td>
<td>564</td>
<td>3.4</td>
<td>15,882</td>
<td>95.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Japanese</td>
<td>6,963</td>
<td>63.7</td>
<td>3,720</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sri Lankan</td>
<td>318</td>
<td>3.9</td>
<td>7,908</td>
<td>96.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cambodian</td>
<td>852</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>5,556</td>
<td>85.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Thai</td>
<td>501</td>
<td>8.7</td>
<td>5,202</td>
<td>90.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asian</td>
<td>3,183</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>20,682</td>
<td>85.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total Asian:</strong></td>
<td>105,921</td>
<td>31.3</td>
<td>228,009</td>
<td>67.3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In terms of religiosity, further comparisons between the Indian population and other Level 1 ethnicities are made in Table 7.19. Compared with the other Asian ethnicities, Indians rank as the third least secular Asian country (4.9%), compared with the least secular country, the Philippines (3.4%). The Japanese (63.7%) and Chinese (59.6%) are the two most secular Asian ethnicities. As a whole, the New Zealand population is 61.3% religious, while amongst the main ethnic groups, MELAA ethnicities

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\textsuperscript{456} Percentages represent row totals. These may not equal 100\% as respondents are allowed to tick more than one affiliation (e.g. secular and Buddhist).
combined are the most religious (87.6%), followed by Pasifika (83.3%).
Compared with the other Asian ethnicities, Indians, along with Sri
Lankans and Filipinos, are the most religiously affiliated ethnicities with
Sri Lankan’s 97.0% religious, followed by Filipinos (95.9%) and Indians
(95.2%). As expected, the least religiously affiliated ethnicities are the
Japanese (34.0%) and Chinese (37.5%). Of those ethnicities that ‘object’ to
answer, the ‘New Zealander’ ethnicity shows a marked difference from
the European population (11.6%), as compared with only 6.0% of
Europeans. This is perhaps the only indicator of comparison in which a
‘New Zealander’ ethnicity shows a marked deviation of nearly double

Table 7.20 shows how the four identity groups differ from the total Indian
population with regard to religiosity, and comparisons can be made with
the other main ethnic groups as well as with other Asian ethnicities.
Compared to all Indians, there are significant differences between ‘Indian’
and ‘Fijian Indian’ identity groups born domestically and born overseas.
Those identifying as New Zealand-born ‘Indians’ are *more than three times
as likely* to be secular (15.0%) when compared with the total Indian
population (4.9%), and New Zealand-born ‘Fijian Indians’ are *more than
four times as likely* to be secular (20.2%) when compared with the ‘Indian’
total. Conversely, overseas-born ‘Indians’ (1.9%) are two and a half times
less likely to be secular, and overseas-born ‘Fijian Indians’ just over twice
as likely (2.3%) to be secular, when compared with the total ‘Indian’
population. When compared with each other, those specifically stating a
New Zealand-born ‘Fijian Indian’ identity are slightly more likely to be
secular (20.2%) than those identifying as New Zealand-born
‘Indians’ (15.0%). As expected, there are significant differences between
the New Zealand-born and overseas-born populations of both ‘Indian’
and ‘Fijian Indian’ identity groups, with the New Zealand-born ‘Indian’
group significantly more likely to be secular (15.0%) than the overseas-born ‘Indian’ group (1.9%), while the domestically-born ‘Fijian Indian’ group is significantly more likely to be secular (20.2%) than the overseas-born ‘Fijian Indian’ group (2.3%). The key point here is that the overseas-born groups are far more likely to report religious affiliations. This has significant repercussions on Indian identity demonstrating that both New Zealand-born groups incorporate secular characteristics of the total New Zealand population. This demonstrates that the New Zealand-born groups exhibit a higher degree of integration into majority society than do their migrant counterparts.

Table 7.20: Four Indian identity groups by stated religiosity, 2006 Census.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Ethnicity:</th>
<th>Secular</th>
<th>Religious</th>
<th>Total Stated:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>percent</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total Indian population</td>
<td>4,989</td>
<td>4.9</td>
<td>96,366</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian identity:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian, NZ-born</td>
<td>3,336</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>18,852</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Indian, overseas-born</td>
<td>1,401</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>72,282</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fijian Indian identity:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji Indian, NZ-born</td>
<td>138</td>
<td>20.2</td>
<td>546</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji Indian, overseas-born</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>2.3</td>
<td>4,683</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Both overseas-born groups are more likely to be religious than their domestic counterparts. For instance, overseas-born ‘Indians’ are 13.5% more likely to be religious than those born domestically, and those specifically stating an overseas-born ‘Fijian Indian’ identity are 18.3% more likely to be religious than their domestic-born counterparts. Between the ‘Indian’ and ‘Fijian Indian’ groups, nearly identical patterns exist for both secular and religious, and the two are nearly identical with ‘Indians’ 4.9% secular and 95.1% religious, while ‘Fijian Indians’ 4.6% secular and 95.4% religious. For the four identity groups, birthplace is the significantly
more important factor determining religiosity, with overseas-born populations of both groups significantly more likely to be religious when compared with their domestic-born counterparts, who are significantly more likely to be secular. This would confirm the trend that both ‘Indian’ and ‘Fijian Indian’ tend to follow the pattern of secularisation amongst majority New Zealanders, which might be interpreted as evidence of integration, suggesting a growing national identity, or a stronger affinity of belonging to New Zealand. Since birthplace is a determining factor in the differences between religiosity and secularism, a result of this finding would point to the possibility that other ethnic minorities might experience similar shifts, or that length of stay in New Zealand for migrants may also be a factor contributing to rising patterns of secularisation amongst minority groups.

In terms of religious affiliation, Table 1 (Appendix G) shows that there are no major differences between overseas-born and domestically-born populations, although Hinduism, Islam, Jainism, Sikhism and Zoroastrianism are all slightly better represented amongst the overseas-born population than within domestically-born communities, with Hinduism being represented at nearly 15% higher levels amongst the overseas-born populations when compared with the New Zealand-born populations. This Table also shows that Zoroastrian Parsis are coming from predominantly overseas and have begun to establish themselves as a viable population in New Zealand. When row percentages are considered, Table 2 (Appendix G), all religions show significantly higher percentages amongst overseas-born populations, except those specifying Māori Christian and Māori Religion affiliations, and those specifying adherence to Spiritual and New Age movements, which are significantly higher amongst the New Zealand-born populations. This confirms the movement towards secularity amongst the New Zealand-born Indian population and
displays a characteristic shift towards secularity demonstrated in the total New Zealand population.

Table 7.21 compares the four main identity groups according to their stated religious affiliation, and exhibits some interesting differences between groups. Hinduism is the most stated religion for domestic-born (45.6%) and overseas-born (59.6%) ‘Indians,’ as well as for overseas-born ‘Fijian Indians’ (54.6%), with these populations showing sizable Hindu majorities. However, religious affiliation is much more broadly distributed amongst the New Zealand-born ‘Fijian Indian’ population. The religious distribution amongst New Zealand-born ‘Fijian Indians’ shows roughly one-quarter of this population affiliating with each of the Christian (24.1%), Hindu (25.4%), Muslim (27.2%) and secular (20.2%) populations, with the remainder, 3.1%, affiliating with other religious traditions. This might suggest higher rates of religious conversion to another religious or secular belief amongst New Zealand-born ‘Fijian Indians.’

In comparing the four identity groups, domestically-born ‘Fijian Indians’ have the highest percentage of Muslims. In comparison, Hinduism, in the other three identity groups, is the majority religion, comprising nearly half of all domestically-born ‘Indians,’ or more than half of both

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious affiliation:</th>
<th>NZ-born Indian</th>
<th>Overseas-born Indian</th>
<th>NZ-born Fijian Indian</th>
<th>Overseas-born Fijian Indian</th>
<th>Total Stated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>percent</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>percent</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Religion</td>
<td>3,336</td>
<td>15.0</td>
<td>1,401</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>138</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christianity</td>
<td>3,927</td>
<td>17.7</td>
<td>12,402</td>
<td>16.8</td>
<td>165</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinduism</td>
<td>10,122</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>43,899</td>
<td>59.6</td>
<td>174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>2,238</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>7,422</td>
<td>10.1</td>
<td>186</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other religions</td>
<td>2,565</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>8,559</td>
<td>11.6</td>
<td>21</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td>22,188</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>73,683</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>684</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
overseas-born ‘Indians’ and overseas-born ‘Fijian Indians.’ As earlier, secularism runs highest in both domestically-born ‘Indian’ (15.0%) and domestically-born ‘Fijian Indian’ populations (20.2%). Adherence to Christianity is fairly even throughout, although New Zealand-born ‘Fijian Indian’ populations have the highest percentage (24.1%) of Christian adherents when compared with the other three identity groups. Both domestically-born and overseas-born ‘Fijian Indians’ have the highest percentages of Muslim adherents, 27.2% and 28.9% respectively, when compared with their New Zealand-born and overseas-born ‘Indian’ counterparts, at 10.1% each. Islam has a higher representation rate amongst ‘Fijian Indian’ populations (27.2% for those born in New Zealand and 28.9% for those born overseas) that is nearly three times that of their ‘Indian’ counterparts (10.1% for those born in New Zealand and 10.1% for those born overseas). As expected, other religious traditions, e.g. Sikhism, Jainism and Zoroastrianism, are more represented in both New Zealand-born and overseas-born ‘Indian’ populations, when compared with their ‘Fijian Indian’ counterparts.

The data presented here demonstrates that the ‘Indian’ ethnic group is New Zealand’s most religiously diverse community, adding significant populations of minority religions (e.g. Hindus, Sikhs, Zoroastrian Parsis) that are not as well-represented as in other Level 1 ethnicities. Disaggregation has also shown extensive differentiation within the Level 2 ‘Indian’ category, and as a result, there is now an extensive network of Indian religious organisations and associations that have distinguished themselves from the earlier ethnic and cultural groups that formed during the earlier years of Indian settlement in New Zealand.\(^\text{457}\) Such diversification and affiliation has been an important element of Indian community life in New Zealand, and has helped attract new migrants.

\(^{457}\) See Appendix K; cf. McGee (1962) and Tiwari (1980).
and keep them here, contributing to New Zealand’s growing economy and its rising trade interest in Asia.

*Education and Income:*

A deep diversity framework that questions underlying assumptions of ethnic classification needs to view all aspects of diversification both within the Indian community itself, and in comparison with other ethnic groups. Such an analysis helps to determine how Level 1-2 ethnicities might differ when more closely examined. Scrutinising categories of educational attainment and income is another way of achieving this aim.

Table 7.22: Highest qualification by identity groups, ages 15 and above, 2006 Census.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Highest qualification:</th>
<th>NZ-born Indian</th>
<th>OS-born Indian</th>
<th>NZ-born Fijian Indian</th>
<th>OS-born Fijian Indian</th>
<th>Total Indian Stated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>No Qualification</td>
<td>1,289</td>
<td>16.2</td>
<td>6,594</td>
<td>13.9</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 1-4 Certificates</td>
<td>4,524</td>
<td>56.7</td>
<td>14,316</td>
<td>30.1</td>
<td>114</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Level 5-6 Diplomas</td>
<td>534</td>
<td>6.7</td>
<td>5,223</td>
<td>11.0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bachelor Degree or higher</td>
<td>1,629</td>
<td>20.4</td>
<td>21,375</td>
<td>45.0</td>
<td>9</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

*Total Stated:* 7,976 100.0 47,508 100.0 177 100.0 3357 100.0 59,370 100.0

Of those with no qualification, New Zealand-born ‘Fijian Indians’ are significantly more represented (27.1%) than the other identity groups, which may put them at a disadvantage. For those with primary qualifications (Level 1-4 certificates), the domestic-born ‘Fijian Indian’ population has the highest rates (64.4%). For those with secondary qualifications (Level 5-6 diplomas), the highest rates of completion are shown amongst the overseas-born ‘Fijian Indian’ population (14.6%). The lowest rates for completion of secondary qualifications fall to New Zealand-born ‘Fijian Indians’ with only 3.4% completion of secondary qualifications. As numbers are especially low, it is difficult to assess the degree of differentiation of this population with any accuracy, however, it
is evident that New Zealand-born ‘Fijian Indians’ have higher rates of those with no qualification and of those having a primary qualification when compared with the other identity groups.

For those attaining a Bachelors degree or higher, New Zealand-born ‘Fijian Indians’ have the lowest achievement level with only 5.1% of those aged 15 and above attaining a Bachelors or higher degree. In comparison, overseas-born ‘Fijian Indians’ are significantly more likely (23.4%) to have earned a Bachelors or higher degree. In comparison, New Zealand-born Indians are significantly more likely to have earned a Bachelors or higher degree (20.4%) than their ‘Fijian Indian’ counterparts (5.1%). The only identity group to show an achievement rate for completion of a Bachelors or higher degree that is higher than the rate for the entire Indian population, is the overseas-born ‘Indian’ group, which shows that 45.0% have a Bachelors or higher degree. This is nearly double the percentage of overseas-born ‘Fijian Indians’ (23.4%). Overall, ‘Fijian Indians’ tend to have higher rates for lower qualifications, while ‘Indians’ tend to have higher rates of higher qualifications, which is more clearly evident when combining the overseas- and New Zealand-born populations of each group. This may be due to a more competitive educational system in India resulting from a much larger population, or more probably due to the fact that many ‘Fijian Indians’ migrated under different circumstances (i.e. in the post-coup years) than those ‘Indians’ who came as voluntary migrants, which would need to qualify under a more stringent points-based immigration system. These differences, however, may also be affected by age structure and not just by migrant selectivity. In any case, the above analysis demonstrates that applying a deep diversity framework can be instructive in highlighting specific differences between subgroup

458 Numbers of domestic-born Fijian Indians with higher degrees are presently, however, generally too small for solid conclusions to be made.
populations that might normally remain hidden. It can also help identify if any particular communities may be at risk.

Educational attainment is directly related to income, as those with higher degrees will generally earn higher salaries (Maani 2000, US Census Bureau 2002, Baum et al. 2010). Figure 7.2 views income data and compares the total Indian population to those specifying an Asian ethnicity and to the total New Zealand population that stated an ethnicity.

Generally, the Indian population compares favourably with both those stating Asian ethnicity and with the total population of New Zealand. Percentages of Indians earning smaller annual amounts (<$10,000), however, are higher than both Asians and the total New Zealand population. This may be indicative of a relatively young migrant population or higher rates of younger populations that typically earn less. At higher income brackets, Indians earn slightly less than both the Asian
and total New Zealand populations. At low income levels ($1-$30,000), the Indian population is slightly less represented (49.0%) when compared with all those stating an Asian ethnicity (54.9%) and with the total New Zealand population stating an ethnicity (52.6%). At middle income levels ($30,001-$70,000) the Indian population is nearly identical (34.5%) to that of the total population of New Zealand (33.5%), with all those stating an Asian ethnicity at 24.4%. In the upper most income-brackets ($70,001+), the Indian population is slightly less represented (5.4%) compared with the total New Zealand population that stated an ethnicity (8.2%), while those stating an Asian ethnicity are represented at 4.2%. This might show that top income earning jobs are usually reserved for those with New Zealand experience, adding to the Indian population’s perceived experience of discrimination, discussed in Chapter 8.

Table 7.23: Income range and median income by identity groups, age 15+, 2006 Census.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income bracket:</th>
<th>NZ-born Indian</th>
<th>OS-born Indian</th>
<th>NZ-born Fijian Indian</th>
<th>OS-born Fijian Indian</th>
<th>Total Indian stated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (loss/none - $30,000)</td>
<td>4,761</td>
<td>61.1</td>
<td>35,889</td>
<td>59.9</td>
<td>117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle ($30,001 - $70,000)</td>
<td>2,367</td>
<td>30.4</td>
<td>20,919</td>
<td>34.9</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High ($70,001 and above)</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>8.5</td>
<td>3,075</td>
<td>5.1</td>
<td>0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>7,794</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>59,883</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>150</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Viewing the data according to the four identity groups confirms the finding that those stating a New Zealand-born ‘Fijian Indian’ identity earn less than the other three groups at both low and middle income levels. At high income levels, more New Zealand-born ‘Indians’ are represented than the other identity groups, and those stating a New Zealand-born

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459 This is often a euphemism for employers who do not wish to employ migrants, or only wish to hire Pākehā or Māori employees.
‘Fijian Indian’ identity are not represented in the higher income ranges of those earning more than $70,000 annually.\textsuperscript{460}

Median Income for the four identity groups is compared below. While Median Income for the total Indian population is $27,126, both overseas-born ‘Indian’ and overseas-born ‘Fijian Indian’ identity groups compared favourably well, earning only slightly higher than that of the total Indian population ($27,324 and $26,776 respectively). Of the four identity groups, New Zealand-born ‘Indians’ earned less than the median income of the total stated Indian population aged 15 and above ($25,784), while those stating a ‘Fijian Indian’ identity earned less than half ($10,833) when compared to the total Indian population. Compared with the total New Zealand population, both overseas-born identity groups, and the New Zealand-born ‘Indian’ identity group, had median incomes that compared well with the total stated population, while the New Zealand-born ‘Fijian Indian’ identity group had significantly lower income.

Figure 7.3: Median income by identity groups, ages 15+, 2006 Census.\textsuperscript{461}

\textsuperscript{460} The data may be affected by age structures as these are not age-standardised.

\textsuperscript{461} In computing Median Income, the Loss and Zero income categories were removed.
Such an analysis of identity groups suggests that the low median income for New Zealand-born ‘Fijian Indians’ group may largely be attributed to the lower levels of educational attainment demonstrated earlier.

In order to determine whether birthplace or ethnicity is more of a factor, the above data is further disaggregated in Table 7.24. By birthplace, no significant differences are apparent when compared with the total Indian population, although those ‘Indians’ and ‘Fijian Indians’ born in New Zealand appear to make slightly higher salaries. When breaking down the data according to stated ethnicity, no significant differences are apparent when compared with the total Indian population, although ‘Fijian Indians’ are slightly under-represented in the higher income levels compared with the total Indian population.

Table 7.24: Income bracket by birthplace and identity group, age 15+, 2006 Census.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Income bracket:</th>
<th>Birthplace</th>
<th>Total Indian</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>NZ-born</td>
<td>OS-born</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Low (loss/none - $30,000)</td>
<td>4,878</td>
<td>61.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Middle ($30,001 - $70,000)</td>
<td>2,400</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>High ($70,001 and above)</td>
<td>666</td>
<td>8.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td>7,944</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

The application of a deep diversity framework for an analysis of the education and income data has proved useful in highlighting significant differences between subgroups, with the New Zealand-born ‘Fijian Indian’ population exhibiting both lower educational attainment levels and lower income earning potential than the other subgroups, the Asian population in general, and the total New Zealand population.
7.3 Conclusion

This chapter summarises 2006 and 2013 Census data on the Indian population, examining differences between four specific identity groups defined by birthplace (domestic- or overseas-born), and by stated ethnicity (‘Indian’ or ‘Fijian Indian’). Other stated identities (see Table 7.4) were not included due to low reported numbers. Such an examination reveals the complex nature of Indian identity that emerges from the census data, and portrays the population, not so much as one homogenous group, but one showing marked differences within the four select identity groups, as seen through such variables as birth country, spoken language, religious affiliation, education and income. Significant differences emerge between the four select identity groups, especially in terms of language acquisition and transmission, which demonstrates that both the Punjabi and Gujarati languages are being passed on at significantly greater rates than Hindi, the most widely spoken South Asian language and currently the fourth most spoken language in New Zealand. Religious affiliation trends also show a marked increase in secularity for the domestically-born, portraying them as nearly eight times more likely to be secular when compared with their overseas-born counterparts. This trend could have significant implications for religious identity, while indicating growing acculturation amongst settled Indians and increased integration in a national identity. In terms of educational attainment, ‘Fijian Indians’ demonstrate a higher rate of lower educational qualifications while those stating an ‘Indian’ identity portray elevated rates of higher educational qualifications. As a result, New Zealand-born ‘Fijian Indians’ appear to be somewhat disadvantaged when compared with the other identity groups. Presented income data confirms this statistic. These findings have emerged based on the application of a deep diversity framework for the analysis of census data.
While subgroup differentiation is apparent within the census data even when only Level 2 ethnicities (i.e. Indian) are requested on the census form, the absence of such prompts for ethnic subgroup affiliation (e.g. ‘Gujarati,’ ‘Punjabi’) creates low numbers that make comparisons difficult. As such, the only ethnically identified subgroup appearing in sufficient numbers for analysis was the ‘Fijian Indian’ category, and comparisons between it and ‘Indian nfd,’ as well as division between overseas and New Zealand-born Indians were carried out. If Level 3 subgroup prompts appeared in the census, larger numbers would be stating regional (e.g. Maharashtrian, Tamilian), linguistic (e.g. Malayalam, Konkani), ethnic (e.g. Anglo Indian) and religious (e.g. Sikh) identities than are currently represented in the available ethnicity data, and further differentiation in the Indian population would be readily apparent.

Overall, given the differences between the four identity groups presented in this chapter, it should be evident that census homogenisation of Indian ethnicity masks the heterogeneity evident within the ‘Indian nfd’ population. As with Level 1 and 2 ethnic categories, further distinctions within the population can not only help identify particularly disadvantaged segments, but can also help other subgroups achieve better political representation and greater access to resources. Such identification may also aid minority inclusion in a national identity and improve incidences of perceived discrimination, highlighted in Chapter Eight.

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462 While such distinctions are not all necessarily ‘ethnic,’ the fact that small portions of the population are identifying themselves as such on the census ethnicity question is noteworthy.
Identity is always plural and in process. (Brah 1996:197).

The ethnic and cultural origin questions [on censuses] result in complexities and ambiguities, although results fit in with the argument that ethnicity involves choices and complexities rarely captured by simple or ‘objective’ questions (Goldscheider 2002:82).

The landscapes of group identity around the world are no longer familiar anthropological objects, insofar as groups are no longer tightly territorialized, spatially bounded, historically unsconscious, or culturally homogenous (Appadurai 1991, pp. 191–192).

8.1 Introduction

While the recent census results presented in Chapter 7 allowed for an analysis based on stated ethnicity (‘Indian’ or ‘Fijian Indian’), these do not adequately portray the substantial diversities within the population and controvert underlying identities that are equally, if not more, significant. Census categories are limited and a more extensive examination and analysis of ethnicity and identity is possible by utilising a deep diversity approach. Census statistics present a misleading notion of a singular Indian ethnic identity (i.e. ‘Indian nfd’) when there are deeper, more nuanced, differences. This chapter presents select results from a web-based survey of people of Indian ethnicity resident in New Zealand between 2008-2013. The survey reveals the complexity of Indian identity otherwise obscured by the census, and demonstrates that ethnicity is too broad a concept to be reduced to a single term. Since census formulations of questions on race or ethnicity often force respondents to select a single group when their own identities are more complex (Goldscheider 2002:79), and fixed lists of potential responses, provided as examples, can often influence write-in responses, the survey data presented here

463 The “example effect” referred to earlier (c.f. Waters 2000:1736).
allows for a richer and deeper analysis. While 79 distinct questions were asked of survey respondents, this chapter presents findings and analysis that are relevant only to the themes of self-reported identity and discrimination.\footnote{Unreported results from the survey will make their way into future articles.}

Section 8.2 presents data that supports a wider interpretation of identity than that provided by existing state categories, which generally assume that members of any particular ethnic group all share a single ethnic identity with similar, if not the same, characteristics and values (cf. Wimmer 2009, 2013; Sen 2006). It presents key identity variables crucial to an understanding of Indian identity (e.g. ancestral region, language, religion) to demonstrate their wide variety. The presentation of such data is contextualised within a wider theoretical frame that posits the inclusion of such various attributes as religion, language, culture, a sense of a shared history, and a connection with the powerful symbols associated with an ethnic group, as being essential building blocks of ethnic identity formation (Cohen 2004). These elements serve to reinforce and perpetuate a subjective feeling of belonging, thus providing an important theoretical frame which supports deep diversity. A sense of ethnic belonging imparts sentiments of dignity, self-respect and pride in its unique character, continuity with the past, connections to homeland, and survival beyond the self, allowing minority members to better adjust to, and integrate with, majority society (de Vos 1995, Cohen 2004, Guibernau 2013).

One result of migration and integration is that most minorities now profess multiple group affiliations and more complex ethnic identities (Castles & Miller 2009). The data presented here establishes the heterogeneity of Indian identity in New Zealand as not being limited to the use of the term ‘Indian’—that regional, linguistic and religious
affiliations, among others, are equally as important as ethnicity in self-identification. While normative, ideological and operative values of shallow approaches to multicultural policies have produced statistics based on census formulations of ethnicity, a deep diversity framework allows for a fuller explication of ethnicity and identity than is achievable through a state instrument such as a census. Such an approach posits that survey respondents, when asked about their identity in the absence of any ‘example effect,’ will use innumerable terms to describe themselves. As ‘Indian’ and ‘Fijian-Indian’ responses, the two most popular Indian ethnicity categories on the Census, were utilised in Chapter 7 to further analysis, crosstabulation with the select variables of migrant status and identity and will be used here.

Section 8.3 examines an emergent issue from the survey—the perceived incidence and experience of discrimination—which has profound impacts on both individual and group identity, and has sociopolitical implications for advancing minority aspirations and recognition. That discrimination continues is an ongoing issue demonstrating the inability of shallow policy approaches to mitigate and alleviate its pernicious effects. Presenting direct evidence of the extent and pervasiveness of its existence through the presentation of survey respondent experience should obviate the need for deeper policy initiatives. Normative values of shallow policy approaches assume that minorities need better integration, and stress the need for improved majority toleration of minorities—in other words, the state tends to focus more on becoming better at existing policies

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465 Census formulations in New Zealand long predate shallow multiculturalism.

466 i.e. born domestically or overseas.

467 Described below.

468 In some instances, age was useful as a variable to support migrant status during the discussion of language usage and cultural transmission, and gender crosstabulations were instructive during the discussion of discrimination.

469 See Mossakowski (2003), Sellers & Shelton (2003), Sellers et al. (2006), Yip et al. (2008).
designed to mitigate racism, rather than implementing new strategies with different target groups and deeper approaches. Ideological values that champion minority integration into existing national identities usually exclude minority individual and group conceptions of personality and selfhood, and the failure to recognise the significance of appropriate minority accommodation may therefore negate stated policy objectives. Operative values that advance minority dependance on majorities only serve to strengthen paternalistic reactive attitudes towards racism rather than addressing more proactive active engagement responses that deeper policy approaches require. A deep diversity framework focuses on the mitigation of discrimination at its source through including and working with dominant majorities rather than merely requiring minorities to better integrate.

Background

Existing literature on the Indian diaspora in New Zealand does not fully address nor quantify the demographic changes to the population since more recent migrant arrivals. While the understanding of recent change has been largely anecdotal, the findings presented in this chapter differentiate Indian identity from that presented in recent censuses. As an example, much previous work published prior to 2005 focused largely on Punjabi and Gujarati migrants as the main Indian migrant communities (Grimes 1957; McGee 1960, 1962, 1993; Taher 1965, 1970; Tiwari 1980; McLeod 1980, 1984, 1986; Zodgekar 1980; Leckie 1981, 1995b, 1998; McLeod & Bhullar 1992), with most migrating directly from India. A second body of literature followed the more recent influx of Fijian-Indians

in the aftermath of the 1987 and 2000 coups in Fiji. Some recent work still examines Gujarati and Punjabi populations (Chhiba 2007, Harrington-Watt 2011, Leckie & Patel 2011, Bola 2014). Other recent research, while acknowledging the diversification of the Indian population, does not adequately quantify the rise of additional Indian communities from other geographic, linguistic and cultural regions, as well as new religious groups, that comprise a quickly-diversifying population (Leckie 2006, 2010, 2011; Friesen & Kearns 2008; Friesen 2008a; Singh & Singh 2011; Swarbrick 2012). Leckie’s *Indian Settlers* (2007), however, does an exceptional job of bringing together the history of Indian migration and settlement in New Zealand into a single volume and discusses the changing demographic brought about by recent immigration, but where its focus is primarily qualitative, this chapter is quantitative.

Until the 1980s over 90% of Indians in New Zealand traced their roots back to Gujarat (Zodgekar 2010:70) with the remainder hailing mostly from the Punjab. This profile changed dramatically since 1987 immigration reform. Zodgekar (2010) discusses this recent Indian demographic and describes the religious and linguistic affiliation of those identifying as members of the ‘Indian nfd’ ethnic group based on 2006 census data, yet no research has attempted to quantify the diversity of Indian identities in New Zealand based on data collected directly. This research, built on previous recent work discussing growing diversity in the population (Bandyopadhyay 2006, 2010; Leckie, 2007, 2010, 2011; Zodgekar 2010) attempts to trace the possible contours of contemporary Indian identity in New Zealand; that Punjabi and Gujarati communities, while exceptionally well-established, are no longer the sole

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472 Individual Indian identity can often be construed as an *ad hoc* mixture of birthplace, spoken language(s), caste, and regional, religious and ancestral affiliation.
representatives of the Indian community, and that more recently arrived migrant populations from other Indian cultural, geographic and linguistic regions, as well as from other countries of the diaspora, are growing rapidly and have quickly established themselves as distinct communities within the Indian ethnic population.

This increase in Indian diversity has helped fuel the recent growth of Indian sociocultural, linguistic, sporting and religious organisations and has helped make the Indian population more varied and visible than it was a decade ago.\(^{473}\) New religious communities are overseeing the construction of new houses of worship to cater to this rapidly diversifying population,\(^{474}\) with new alliances being formed between the expanding number of Indian cultural, educational and linguistic organisations that cater to the growing demands of new migrants and their desire for recognition. Compared to a decade ago, Indian migrant communities now come from a greater variety of birth countries, speak a wider variety of languages, and have an exceptionally wide array of religious proclivities, cultural and linguistic needs.

When properly queried, respondents should give more varied and complex responses regarding identity and ethnicity than those currently recorded through existing census questions of birthplace, ethnicity, language and religion. Other identifiers and subgroups exist. Through demonstrating variability between populations (e.g. that migrant status or gender can impact self-identification or one’s experience of discrimination) I hope to show that a deep diversity approach is not only useful to help fine-tune the delivery of policy, but also essential is

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\(^{473}\) See Appendix K for a list of current Indian organisations and associations in New Zealand.

\(^{474}\) For instance, the Sri Balaji Temple Trust in Hamilton has recently purchased property and is currently proceeding with additional fund-raising for temple renovation.
determining the importance of subgroup variability as opposed to single identifiers like ‘Indian.’

8.2 Complex identities

This section focuses on the quantitative results from the survey that help define the makeup of a more complex Indian identity than those reported in the Census. Earlier chapters have already discussed the importance of state recognition of minority identities, and the wide gap that exists between state interpretations of minority identity and how minorities self-identify. This is crucial to a deep diversity framework, as, established in earlier chapters, incorporating minority identity into a shared national identity can be instrumental in aiding social cohesion between minority and majority populations (Miller 1995, Kearns & Forrest 2000:1001, Putnam 2007, Novy et al. 2012:1879, Reeskens & Wright 2012), aid the settlement, adaptation and integration of new migrants, lead minorities to more certain forms of belonging (e.g. permanent residency, citizenship), and enhance the overall wellbeing of minority communities in host societies (Jasinskaja-Lahti et al. 2006, Grant 2007, Ager & Strang 2008, Dhingra 2008, Fischer & Boer 2011, Doerschler & Jackson 2012, Ward & Stuart 2012). A greater sense of minority belonging can also foster increased participation in all levels of society (de Wit & Koopmans 2005, Parekh 2006). Data presented here supports the diversity of expressed identities within the survey population. Exposing the disparities between the two interpretations of identity may be a first step in moving from shallow forms of diversity management to more inclusive, deeper, forms of diversity governance.

These results better represent the diversity within the Indian population than those afforded by census statistics. Key demographic variables of the survey population are presented below.
Table 8.1: Socio-demographic profile of survey respondents (n=1124).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable: Age ranges:</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Variable: Migrant status:</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>15-19 years</td>
<td>43</td>
<td>New Zealand-born</td>
<td>122</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>3.8</td>
<td>Overseas-born</td>
<td>934</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>20-29 years</td>
<td>244</td>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>1056</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>21.8</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-39 years</td>
<td>263</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23.5</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>40-49 years</td>
<td>261</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>23.3</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50-59 years</td>
<td>204</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>18.2</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>60-69 years</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>Gender:</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>male</td>
<td>674</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>70 and above</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>female</td>
<td>443</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>2.2</td>
<td></td>
<td>39.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>1118</td>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>1117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Ancestral homeland in South Asia⁴⁷⁵

Respondents were asked to select their parent’s homeland (state or region) within South Asia.⁴⁷⁶ This is an important identity marker for Indian ethnicity, as each region or state contains its own particular languages and customs, distinct from other regions within South Asia. It removes any association with birth country (as reported in census figures) and asks respondents to state their parent’s original regional affiliation (often a proxy for ethnicity), where known. Much in the way that Māori first choose to identify by waka or iwi affiliation (in lieu of ‘Māori’), those of Indian ethnicity often first identify with particular geographic regions (e.g. West Bengal), languages (e.g. Malayalam), or country of birth (e.g. Fijian-Indian) rather than identifying themselves as ‘Indian.’ Many born outside of India, whose families have lived for generations overseas, may be uncertain of their ancestral homeland, as these ties were often lost over successive generations, hence the don’t know/not sure category is an

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⁴⁷⁵ *South Asia* is used here rather than *India* as many in the Indian diaspora emigrated before partition in 1947 split the subcontinent into India, Pakistan and Bangladesh.

⁴⁷⁶ Respondents were allowed to give more than one answer if their parents came from different regions.
important identity marker to include as it provides insight into one’s connectedness to India. Many who have lost touch with their ancestral regions in South Asia might be able to identify a particular geopolitical or linguistic region (e.g. somewhere in Bihar), but may be unaware of the specific village, town or city from which their ancestors migrated. The majority of those in the global Indian diaspora that are descendants of indentured servitude or *girmitiya*,\(^477\) were born in, for example, Fiji, South Africa, Trinidad and Tobago, Guiana and the West Indies, and have mostly lost touch with relatives who may still dwell in South Asia (Lal 2006a).

Survey results presented in Figure 8.1 demonstrate that the current composition of the Indian population is no longer made up of predominantly Gujarati, Punjabi and Fijian Indian communities, and differs significantly from the ‘Indian nfd’ results in the 2006 and 2013 Censuses. Census data on Indian ethnicity renders invisible distinguishing features of the Indian demographic that contribute to the highly heterogeneous population revealed using a deep diversity approach. While the statistics presented are not based on a representative survey of the entire Indian population in New Zealand, they are, nonetheless, indicative of the hidden diversity within the ‘Indian’ census population, with distinct groups possessing their own regional language, culture, customs and cuisines, not unlike Europe. In this sense, to say one is ‘Indian’ is the South Asian equivalent of using Level 1 census ethnicity categories like ‘European’ or ‘Polynesian,’ when regional variations are more important identifiers. To further this analogy of nested hierarchies of identity, stating that one is ‘Bengali’ or ‘Maharashtrian’ rather than ‘Indian’ is akin to stating that, for example, one is ‘German’ or ‘French’

\(^{477}\) See Lal (1983).
Figure 8.1: Ancestral region in South Asia (n=1044).\textsuperscript{478}

\begin{itemize}
  \item Andra Pradesh: 7.3%
  \item Arunachal Pradesh: 0.1%
  \item Assam: 0.8%
  \item Bangladesh: 0.9%
  \item Bengal: 6.5%
  \item Bihar: 2.7%
  \item Delhi (NTC): 3.5%
  \item Goa: 2.1%
  \item Gujarat: 19.1%
  \item Haryana: 1.9%
  \item Himachal Pradesh: 0.3%
  \item Jammu & Kashmir: 1.3%
  \item Jharkhand: 0.3%
  \item Karnataka: 6.2%
  \item Kerala: 9.5%
  \item Madhya Pradesh: 1.1%
  \item Maharashtra: 10.7%
  \item Manipur: 0.1%
  \item Meghalaya: 0.1%
  \item Nagaland: 0.1%
  \item Nepal: 0.6%
  \item Orissa: 0.7%
  \item Persian Parsi: 0.3%
  \item Punjab: 12.4%
  \item Punjab (Pakistan): 2.5%
  \item Rajasthan: 2.5%
  \item Sikkhim: 0.1%
  \item Sindh: 0.2%
  \item Sri Lankan Tamil: 1.8%
  \item Tamil Nadu: 11.8%
  \item Uttarkhand: 0.7%
  \item Uttar Pradesh: 10.6%
  \item Don’t know: 3.3%
\end{itemize}

\textsuperscript{478} Survey respondents could tick more than a single ancestral region.
rather than ‘European,’ or stating one’s specific *iwi* affiliation rather than ‘Māori.’\textsuperscript{479} Larger common denominators may be useful for state purposes or to further majority understanding, but does little to support ethnic self-identification.

There is now extensive diversification within the Indian population,\textsuperscript{480} and other (non-Gujarati non-Punjabi) Indian regional groups are quickly increasing in population,\textsuperscript{481} forming new sociocultural, religious, regional and linguistic groups and associations, as well as new alliances. The addition of new ethnic and religious organisations has helped increase overall Indian visibility and recognition. This can be seen with the rapid growth of distinct cultural associations (e.g. Kerala, Probasee Bengali), linguistic groups (e.g. Marathi, Tamil), or religious organisations (e.g. Kerala Christian, Fijian-Indian Hindu) groupings.\textsuperscript{482} The 3.3% of those survey respondents that do not know their ancestry are mostly made up of those Indians born in Fiji and South Africa who have largely lost touch with their ancestral homeland. Surprisingly, such a loss appears to have both strengthened one’s religious identity, where the loss of homeland is replaced by one’s increased faith and devotion,\textsuperscript{483} which in turn fuels the Sanskritisation\textsuperscript{484} of the predominantly low-caste indentured servants that

\textsuperscript{479} It is useful to note here that the Māori word *iwi*, usually interpreted as ‘tribe,’ has additional meanings connoting ‘strength’ and ‘bones,’ in that the important individual parts (bones) comprise and support a larger whole (Moorfield 2011).

\textsuperscript{480} See Figure 8.1, where only 31.5% of survey respondents reported either Gujarat or Punjab as an ancestral homeland.


\textsuperscript{482} See Appendix K for a list of currently known Indian cultural, linguistic and religious organisations currently in New Zealand.

\textsuperscript{483} This phenomenon is observed in Fijian-Indian Hindu populations in New Zealand, which are anecdotally seen as more religious than their India-born counterparts. While evidence supporting this exists in my survey results, a discussion of this topic is beyond the scope of this thesis.

\textsuperscript{484} Sanskritisation is an anthropological term used to describe the process of raising one’s caste affiliation to one of higher status, usually through increasing one’s use of religious ritual and ascription (see Srinivas 1952, Charsley 1998).
migrated from India in the second wave of the Indian diaspora. This process has been especially well represented amongst girmitiyas and their descendants, and is currently evident in Fijian-Indian and South African-Indian populations in New Zealand. Sanskritisation also constitutes a possible reason why original girmitiyas may have changed their surnames or conveniently forgotten or failed to pass on their original names and caste affiliations to subsequent generations. Such intra-group discrimination is not unknown amongst Indian populations in New Zealand. It also provides additional evidence of internal diversification within the population. If group and subgroup boundaries are both defined by processes of group inclusion and exclusion, than surely intra-group discrimination is ample evidence of diversification within the ‘Indian nfd’ population in New Zealand.

Migrant status

While Chapter Seven focused on the ethnic categories of ‘Indian’ and ‘Fijian Indian’ in the census (being the only two categories with sufficient numbers for analysis, this chapter utilises migrant status (i.e. born overseas or born in New Zealand) in order to analyse additional identity differentiation. In some places, both age range and gender proved useful for crosstabulations. As much of the subsequent analysis uses

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485 See Section 5.2.

486 Indian surnames are often markers for one’s caste and religious affiliations.

487 See the earlier discussion of the Jacinta Lal story regarding discrimination between groups of Indians in New Zealand.

488 In the earlier data analysis stage of this thesis, an analysis based on the strength of respondent agreement or disagreement with identifying more as either Indian or Kiwi (Questions 10 & 11 on the survey) was discussed and trialled. Four possible identification models presented themselves based on the data: 1) New Zealand-born that strongly identified as Kiwi, 2) New Zealand-born that strongly identified as Indian, 3) Overseas-born that strongly identified as Kiwi, and 4) Overseas-born that strongly identified as Indian. While an analysis based on these four identity groups would have proved illuminating, there was insufficient data (in terms of actual numbers in cells) in two of the four categories, needed for a robust analysis. Crosstabulations for chi-square analysis generally require minimum cell counts of five or greater.
migrant status, Table 8.1 provides the percentages of overseas-born and New Zealand-born from the survey used throughout this chapter.

**Identity terms**

Respondents were instructed to “Enter some words or terms that you might use to describe yourself.” This was the only wholly open-ended question in the survey, as opposed to providing a preset list of terms for respondents to tick, in order to counter the ‘example effect.’ While 468 respondents (42.2%) skipped this question, 642 respondents (57.8%) wrote in one or more descriptive terms to self-identify. A total of 144 distinct terms were recorded, presented in Table 8.2.

The overwhelming majority of responses (60.8%) chose to self-identify using a term denoting nationality or ethnicity with either a single or hyphenated term of identification, while many used terms representing qualities or attributes that they perceived they had, or identified as coming from a particular regional or geopolitical location, or with a particular religion. This demonstrates the importance of regional affiliation and belonging to one’s identity, which has significant implications for the notion of a shared national identity. This contrasts with the shallow forms

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489 While the literature suggests that open-ended questions have higher responses rates in email or web-based surveys when compared to traditional paper questionnaires (Bachmann et al. 1996, Shin et al. 2012), no comparable literature discussing response rates for open- versus closed-ended questions on web-based surveys was found. However, the ‘burden’ of open-ended responses, that respondents would need to be ‘highly motivated’ to be expected to respond to more challenging open-ended questions, and the rate of survey ‘abandonment’ being the highest during the asking of open-ended questions on web-based surveys, was discussed in the literature (Crawford et al. 2001). As a possible explanation for the response rate received for a single open-ended question in an otherwise completely close-ended questionnaire format, I suggest that most respondents on web-based surveys are more interested in ticking boxes quickly, and have a tendency to skip over questions that require more thought and time to consider, rather than pausing to answer an open-ended question. Even so, a 58% response rate for this open-ended question would not be considered ‘low’ and shows high respondent motivation and interest in answering the question.

490 Rather than present a list of terms, I have grouped them into similar themes by the type of term used. For instance, many respondents listed geographic terms denoting ancestral region (e.g. Punjabi, Bengali), while many used religious terms (e.g. Sikh, Christian) to self-identify, and others used particular adjectives to describe specific qualities about themselves (e.g. easy-going, broad-minded).
of identification requested on the census. Although the Census and survey questions are framed differently, the survey results at least demonstrate the types of responses that may be received in the absence of any ‘example effect.’

Table 8.2: Identity terms used, grouped by category.\textsuperscript{491}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity terms used:</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>% of responses (n=1194)</th>
<th>% of cases (n=645)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Nationality or ethnicity (e.g. Kiwi, Indian, Indo-Fijian)</td>
<td>726</td>
<td>60.8</td>
<td>112.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Quality/attribute (e.g. broad-minded, cosmopolitan)</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>9.8</td>
<td>18.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Geographic or political region in India (e.g. Punjabi, Malayalee)</td>
<td>64</td>
<td>5.4</td>
<td>9.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Religious term (e.g. Hindu, Christian, Sikh)</td>
<td>57</td>
<td>4.8</td>
<td>8.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cultural term (e.g. bi- or multicultural, has strong cultural ties)</td>
<td>50</td>
<td>4.2</td>
<td>7.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Occupational term (e.g. accountant, employee, nurse, teacher)</td>
<td>37</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender/familial term (e.g. female, male, mother, son, husband)</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>4.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Citizenship/residency status term (e.g. dual citizen, 3rd gen.)</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>2.1</td>
<td>3.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Educational term (e.g. educated, student, well-read, PhD)</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>0.8</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Caste designation (e.g. Brahmin, Iyar, Kshatriya)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>2.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Language term (Telugu speaker, Haryanvi, multi-lingual)</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Income or economic class (e.g. middle class, money saver)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Age-related term (e.g. young, old, 25 years old, retired)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other term</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>4.6</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Total responses: 1,194 100.0 185.1

To highlight the differences between the example effect in the census and the self-identified terms used in the survey, I have expanded the ‘Nationality or ethnicity’ terms used above into their nationality or geographic regions, presented below. These survey statistics demonstrate how those that chose to identify using a nationality or regional identity

\textsuperscript{491} The total percentage of cases (i.e. survey respondents) exceeds 100% as respondents could denote multiple terms. Of those that responded (n=645) 45.7% gave a single term, 33.3% gave two distinct terms, 13.9% gave 3 distinct terms, and 7.1% gave 4 or more terms. The most number of terms given by a single respondent (Respondent #62) was 12.
would define themselves. It is interesting to note that nearly 40% of those identifying a nationality or ethnicity chose to use the term 'Indian' (or similar term) in the absence of an ‘example effect,’ compared with the 93.2% that did so on the Census, where ethnic examples are provided. Also, while 5.4% of Census respondents wrote in ‘Fijian Indian,’ 9.8% of survey responses did so. More importantly, 26.7% of all survey responses chose to self-identify as ‘Kiwi’ or ‘New Zealander’ while an additional 17.1% self-identified with both countries using a hyphenated term like ‘Kiwi-Indian’ or ‘Indo-Kiwi.’ Together, those responses demonstrating ‘Kiwi/New Zealander’ (and similar) and hyphenated ‘Kiwi-Indian’ (or similar) affiliations accounted for a combined 43.8% of all responses, demonstrating strong affiliation between Indian identity and a sense of...

Table 8.3: Identity terms for nationality or ethnicity.\textsuperscript{492}

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity terms using nationality or ethnicity, singly or hyphenated:</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>% of responses (n=726)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Indian (or similar term) (e.g. Desi, Hindustani, South Asian)</td>
<td>289</td>
<td>39.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealander, Kiwi, New Zealand-born (or similar term)</td>
<td>194</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kiwi-Indian, Indo-Kiwi, New Zealand-Indian (or similar)</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji-Indian, Indo-Fijian (or similar term)</td>
<td>71</td>
<td>9.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Asia (e.g. Singaporean, Malaysian, Southeast Asian)</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>1.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>African, South African (or similar term)</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>1.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North American (e.g. American, Canadian)</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>1.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>European</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māori</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pacific Islander (or similar term)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>1.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>726</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{492} Where respondents wrote separate terms for ‘Indian’ or ‘Kiwi,’ (e.g. where these terms were separated by a comma), the terms were categorised as separate terms. Where identity terms were hyphenated (e.g. ‘Indo-Kiwi,’ ‘Kiwi-Indian’) these were placed in the hyphenated category above.

\textsuperscript{493} See Table 7.4, 2006 Census.
‘belonging’ in New Zealand. This provides empirical evidence that a greater number (44%) of survey responses identify with being both ‘Kiwi’ and ‘Indian’ than those identifying solely as ‘Indian’ (40%), demonstrating strong support for the notion of a shared national identity discussed in previous chapters. Much of the shallow policy discourse work that focuses on minority integration (i.e. that minorities must be better integrated or assimilated into majorities as the hosting population) appears to have already been accomplished. What remains then is for majorities to do their fair share of the accommodating.

As for regional affiliations, 10% of respondents identified with terms signaling a strong regional identification within India, using geopolitical boundaries in addition to the Gujaratis and Punjabis identified by the Census. In fact, those with Dravidian\textsuperscript{494} identities (40.7%) self-identified in greater numbers than those Gujaratis and Punjabis (26.6%) from North India, perhaps reflecting a southern predilection for distinguishing themselves, both regionally and linguistically, from North Indians.

Table 8.4: Identity terms used for regional geopolitical affiliations within India.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity terms for regional affiliations:</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>% of responses</th>
<th>% of cases</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Tamilian</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>21.9</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>South Indian</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>18.8</td>
<td>1.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjabi</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>17.2</td>
<td>1.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarati</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Maharashtrian</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>7.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malayali</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>9.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengali</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>6.3</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>North Indian</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Anglo-Indian</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Goan</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>3.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>64</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>10.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\textsuperscript{494} Represented in this table by ‘Tamilian’ and ‘South Indian’ responses.
This confirms a strong Dravidian regional identification that South Indian communities are having on the Indian diaspora in New Zealand, and demonstrates strong identity assertion and differentiation from North Indian populations formerly dominated by Gujaratis and Punjabis. These types of responses signify an exceptionally determined identification with ancestral homeland, regardless of country of birth, which is not evident in Census statistics.

In terms of religious affiliation, 8.9% of all self-identifying respondents used a religious term, 45.6% of whom identified as ‘Hindu,’ 15.8% as ‘religious,’ and smaller numbers as members of other religions or as ‘secular.’ Regarding other types of self-identification, 2.0% of respondents used a caste identifier to proclaim their caste (e.g. Brahmin) or jāti affiliation, while 5.7% identified themselves by their profession.

Table 8.5: Identity terms used for religious affiliations.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity terms for religious affiliations:</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>% of responses (n=57)</th>
<th>% of cases (n=642)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Hindu</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>45.6</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>religious or spiritual</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>15.8</td>
<td>1.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Parsi/Zoroastrian</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>0.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christian</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>8.8</td>
<td>0.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>7.0</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Muslim</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>secular</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>5.3</td>
<td>0.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jewish</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1.8</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>57</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>8.9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

495 See Table 8.2.

496 While caste is identified with varna (वर्ण), one’s jāti (जाति) is often a more relevant identifier. Jātis usually refer to or associate with a traditional job function or tribe and is used to denote any one of thousands of caste (varna) subgroups, such as clans, communities and sub-communities within India (see Mandelbaum 1970, Chapter 2, or Tyler 1973, Chapter 8, for classic discussions of varna and jāti).
The largest category of responses however, after those using Indian or New Zealander/Kiwi designations, were those that used particular qualities, adjectives or nouns to identify themselves. 18.1% of respondents used words like ‘broad-minded,’ ‘confident,’ ‘humble,’ ‘migrant,’ ‘resilient,’ ‘respectful’ or ‘vegetarian.’ Respondents also left telling comments in addition to stating identity terms. Many of these reinforce the depth to which respondents still feel very much connected to their ancestral homeland, regardless of where they were born or when they migrated. Those selected are poignant examples of how strongly respondents felt about expressing particular identities.

These comments testify to the increasing complexities of one’s Indian identity, a feature of deep diversity. There are some interesting cases. Respondent 361 used the single identity term, Kiwi even though he is a 35-39 year old Indian male born in Kenya who migrated directly to New Zealand in 2003, and disagreed with Question 10 identifying himself as an Indian. Respondent 654 commented on the general disgust felt amongst ethnic minorities after the Paul Henry incidents mentioned in Chapter 1. These comments generally show that respondents, although strongly identifying with being Indian, also strongly identify with their adopted homeland, many of whom consider themselves full Kiwis and are proud to be living in New Zealand. Such comments are consistent with theoretical considerations on the importance that ethnic boundary making, identity and belonging have on both individual and group formations and constructions of self-worth (Barth 1969, Guibernau 2013, Wimmer 2013). Creating a strong vision of oneself as being both Indian and Kiwi, therefore, represents an important integration marker— that one’s

497 See Table 8.2. Some of these responses include ‘accountant,’ ‘Ayurvedic practitioner,’ ‘musician,’ ‘nurse,’ ‘political activist,’ ‘scientist,’ ‘software engineer,’ ‘teacher,’ or ‘volunteer.’

498 See Table 8.6.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Comment:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>204</td>
<td>“NZ citizen of Indian origin. You can take me out of India but can’t take India out of me.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>244</td>
<td>“I love &amp; am privileged to live in NZ &amp; love my Indian identity. Proud to be Indian.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>278</td>
<td>“Indian by birth. Kiwi by choice.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>308</td>
<td>“All Blacks Indian.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>369</td>
<td>“Indian in my attitude and values around family, work ethic and value of education, but Kiwi in most aspects of my lifestyle.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>370</td>
<td>“Jewish-New Zealander-Indian” (Respondent NZ-born, 15 yrs., father Indo-Fijian Hindu, mum pākehā Jew; considers himself Jewish.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>396</td>
<td>“I identify with all my cultures. I use mainly Kiwi, Asian, Indian and Malaysian to identify myself where race is concerned.” (Respondent a 20-24 year old female, mother of Sri Lankan, Indian, &amp; Portuguese heritage, born &amp; raised in Malaysia. Father of Native American, Irish and Scottish heritage.)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>413</td>
<td>“Indo-Fijian turning Indo-Kiwi.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>416</td>
<td>“I’ve adapted to my new culture. NZ is my country. I’m a NZ citizen of Indian origin.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>440</td>
<td>“Indian born New Zealander with strong feelings towards both NZ and India.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>472</td>
<td>“Of Indian origin. Have resettled, remarried to a lady from NZ. Subsequently, feel that I’ve moved on and now identify myself as a New Zealander. This is home.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>482</td>
<td>“Born in India but lived in NZ for over 49 years and class myself as a Kiwi.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>586</td>
<td>“Ko Ganges te awa, Ko Taxi te waka, Ko Kolkata te iwi, Ko Slumdog Millionaire te Kiriata, Ko butter chicken te Kai, Ko dairy te mahi, Ko rohit ahau, No reira, tena koutou, tena koutou, tena koutou katoa.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>595</td>
<td>“Physically Indian, mentally kiwi.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>611</td>
<td>“Now that NZ’s home, I’ve strong bonding here. At the same time my bonds with India are quite strong too which helps me bring to the fore the best of both worlds.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>701</td>
<td>“By race, I am an Indian first. By ethnicity, I am a Tamil; born in Malaysia; came to NZ as a tertiary student and settled. By nationality, I am a New Zealander.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>799</td>
<td>“Gujarati &amp; Ngati Tuwharetoa.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>847</td>
<td>“A good blend of Indian and Kiwi—picking up the good parts of both cultures.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>912</td>
<td>“I’ve adopted the Kiwi lifestyle and am living life in the New Zealand way, but I personally don’t think I’m a kiwi. I’m an Indian living overseas with a different lifestyle compared to the lifestyle I was living in India.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>915</td>
<td>“When it’s rugby, I’m kiwi, when it’s cricket I’m Indian!”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>985</td>
<td>“Have lived in NZ since age 3 weeks. I think like Kiwi &amp; talk like a Kiwi. Parents have Indian roots which have been passed on to me. I speak and understand the language. I love NZ, it’s the best place in the world.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1010</td>
<td>“NRI (non-resident Indian) who loves New Zealand and loves to be in New Zealand.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1013</td>
<td>“Fijistani.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1014</td>
<td>“Mixed heritage, born in India, now living in New Zealand and loving it.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1035</td>
<td>“FBI Kiwi” (Foreign-born Indian Kiwi).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1058</td>
<td>“The in-between space between two cultures.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

499 Numbers in the Table refer to the corresponding respondent number in the survey.
struggles for acceptance within the wider society for instance, have been mitigated, echoing Bourdieu:

The social world is both the product and the stake of inseparably cognitive and political struggles over knowledge and recognition, in which each pushes not only the imposition of an advantageous representation of himself or herself,... but also the power to impose as legitimate the principles of construction of social reality most favorable to his or her social being—individual and collective, with...struggles over the boundaries of groups (Bourdieu 2000:187).

This has strong implications for nationality, citizenship, belonging, and participation in a shared national identity, essential for an operative framework of deep diversity to become established and take effect. Respondent 779 confidently declares a distinctively Indo-Kiwi identity with the simple proclamation of her/his “Gujarati and Ngāti Tuwharetoa” identity. Such assertions are thus essential not just for the self-recognition and expression of one’s individual identity, they are crucial for altering majority perceptions of collective minority ethnic identity.

Also of note is the popular use of the Hindi term desi500 for self-identification. This is a relatively recent term, popularised in the west mostly amongst younger Indians in the diaspora who prefer not to identify themselves with any particular South Asian region, instead wishing to emphasise their South Asia-ness through shared values and common bonds (like food, culture and music) rather than through regional, national or ancestral affiliations with which they may not relate. Desi, literally ‘of the country,’ does away with regional, linguistic and religious identification and is a broad spectrum, rather hip, term referring to anyone with South Asian ethnicity or ancestral affiliation to the subcontinent. Accordingly, it defies political boundaries and inclusively refers to anyone from India, Nepal, Pakistan or Bangladesh. It is especially in use by children of Indian migrants, or their descendants, who live and

500 Desi (pronounced ‘deshi’) is derived from the Sanskrit/Hindi word desh (देश), meaning ‘country.'
were raised in western countries like the UK, US or Australia, who lack strong regional or national South Asian affiliations, or who wish to defy class and caste boundaries. The use of the term has been recently popularised in India and countries of the diaspora by South Asian youth through web sites, social media and television shows. A US-based company was recently granted a top level internet domain name (.desi)\textsuperscript{501} in August 2014 to further popularise its use. The growth and adoption of the term desi, however, appears to signify a shift away from the complex identities of recent migrant populations and a movement towards more uniform categorisation—a re-homogenising of identity in younger generations or the descendants of migrant populations. It may also be seen as indicative of a greater desire, especially amongst the domestically-born, towards finding commonalities and a shared sense of identity and belonging with other South Asian youth that goes beyond the regional, linguistic and religious identifiers of previous migrant generations. This example should serve to highlight the rather complex and changing nature of identity in minority populations.\textsuperscript{502}

\textit{Language use and frequency}

Identity is indeed complicated, and it is often difficult, if not impossible, to reduce one’s understanding to a single variable like ethnicity, birthplace, nationality, ancestry, or religion. Language, however, is often one of the most potent conveyors of identity, and most global nationalist movements view language as a key component in establishing ethnic boundaries (Arel 2002:92). In the Indian context, spoken language, like regional affiliation or ancestral home in India, can be considered a proxy for ethnicity, as mother tongue is often one of the dominant identity markers.

\textsuperscript{501} See <www.nic.desi>, last accessed 7 January 2015.

\textsuperscript{502} An examination of emergent desi identities may best be left, however, for future research.
Survey respondents were asked a variety of questions relating to language usage. These are summarised below and cross tabulated by migrant status.

Table 8.7. Language indicators by migrant status.\(^{503}\)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language indicator</th>
<th>NZ-born</th>
<th>OS-born</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaks a South Asian language (n=954)****</td>
<td>86</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaks 1 or more South Asian Languages (n=954)****</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>9.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaks a South Asian language at home (n=955)****</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Speaks a South Asian language at home always or often (n=866)****</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agrees that speaking a South Asian language at home is somewhat, very, or extremely important (n=914)</td>
<td>91</td>
<td>11.2</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: ***p < 0.001, **p < 0.01, *p < 0.05. \(\chi^2(1) = 99.446, p = 0.000, p < .001\)

Survey respondents were asked to select any and all South Asian languages spoken from a list of 28 languages presented, ranging from Assamese to Urdu. If a particular spoken South Asian language was not listed, respondents could choose ‘Other’ and write it in. In total, 94.4\% of all survey respondents (n=954) spoke a South Asian language indigenous to their ancestral homeland. Since 88.4\% of respondents are migrants\(^{504}\) this statistic is to be expected. Analysis of the Census results in Chapter 7 however, have shown that language transmission to children of migrants, and language ability of those born in New Zealand is strikingly lacking. Survey results confirm this, with those born overseas (90.5\%) significantly more likely than those born in New Zealand (9.5\%) to speak a South Asian language.

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\(^{503}\) n in the first column represents the question’s total number of respondents, including both ‘yes’ and ‘no’ responses, while n in the other columns represents those responding ‘yes’ only. P-values represent levels of significance, with p < 0.001 indicating very high significance.

\(^{504}\) See Table 8.1.
An analysis by age range also reveals that this is indeed the case, with those aged 30 years or above significantly more likely (76.5%) to speak a South Asian language than those aged under 30 (23.5%).

Table 8.8: Age range by ability to speak a South Asian language.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Age range:</th>
<th>Do you speak a South Asian language?</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>no</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>15-29 years</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>30.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>30-49 years</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>58.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>50+ years</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>11.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>53</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2 (2) = 7.734, p = 0.021, p < 0.05 \].

The table in Appendix I presents the frequency and percentages for those that speak South Asian languages, excluding English. The most spoken South Asian language in New Zealand is Hindi, spoken by 79.9% of survey respondents, followed by Gujarati, spoken by 27.1%. Punjabi (20.1%) and Tamil (20.1%) are spoken by equal numbers of survey respondents, followed by Marathi (16.5%) and Urdu (11.8%). Most Indians in New Zealand will speak some Hindi, although many South Indians do not, as it is considered a language of the north. However, it is understood by most although not always spoken at home. At home, most Indians will speak either their regional language or English. Until recently, it has been commonly held that Gujarati, Punjabi and Hindi speakers have made up the majority of Indians residing in New Zealand (McGee 1962; Patel 1987; Shameem 1994, 1998; Corne 1996; Roberts 1997, Leckie 2005). This research shows that while still prevalent, Gujarati, Punjabi and Hindi are being challenged for their supremacy by the increasing numbers of other speakers from different regions in India. Where Gujarat and Punjab used to dominate as the regions that Indians came from (Tiwari 1980, McLeod 1986, Leckie 2007), this is no longer the case. Indians from other regions...
such as Tamil Nadu and Maharashtra are now arriving in greater numbers, and as a result, their regional languages are being spoken with greater frequency and by increasing numbers. Current demographic trends should see this linguistic diversity continue to increase.

Indian language speakers are generally multilingual and survey respondents detailed the number of South Asian languages spoken.

Figure 8.2: Number of South Asian languages spoken per respondent (n=955).\textsuperscript{505}

While 5.5\% of survey respondents do not speak a South Asian language, 29.8\% speak one South Asian language, 31.7\% speak two South Asian languages, 18.6\% speak three South Asian languages, and 14.3\% speak four or more South Asian languages in addition to English.

In terms of other spoken languages, 28.8\% of all survey respondents spoke an additional non-English non-South Asian language, while 71.2\% did not (n=954). Of those able to speak another foreign language (n=275) these were French (24.7\%), Fijian (20.7\%), Malay (12.0\%), Arabic (11.3\%), German (10.5\%), Spanish (6.9\%), Māori (6.2\%), Afrikaans (6.2\%), Japanese (5.8\%), Indonesian/Javanese (5.1\%), with the remainder speaking a variety

\textsuperscript{505} Includes both migrants and non-migrants, excludes English.
of foreign tongues ranging from Chinese to Zulu. This is generally indicative of the wide variety of birth countries from which Indian migrants emigrate. It is interesting to note that while no survey respondents were born in France, 20.7% of those speaking a foreign language choose to learn French. The high incidence of Arabic would be amongst those survey respondents that indicated Muslim religious affiliation, or those that were either born, grew up, or resided in one of the Gulf states prior to migrating to New Zealand. The incidence of survey respondents that can speak Māori is noteworthy, and this perhaps denotes intermarriage, a strong desire to learn the language of the country in which one resides, a strong sense of belonging, or the emergence of a shared Indo-Māori identity.506

Some respondents did qualify the level at which they could speak the foreign language indicated, as evidenced by Respondent 949, who commented that they had “learnt Japanese in school, but could not hold a conversation.” Another, Respondent 992, commented “I took Māori at college for one year, but father made me end it to take economics!!” There were a few over-achievers in the population. For instance, Respondent 484 stated that he spoke German, Mandarin and Farsi, as well as Bengali, Gujarati, Hindi, Konkani, Marathi, Punjabi, Sanskrit, Tulu and Urdu. Respondent 568 commented that in addition to the seven languages she can speak and the five that she can read and write, she claims to speak six other foreign languages. While almost hard to fathom, South Asians are known for their abilities at multilingualism. There were respondents at the other end of this ability spectrum as well. For instance, Respondent 1006 commented that she spoke “Fiji-Hindi, but I am not sure if that is Fijian or not.”

506 See Pio 2012.
In terms of the frequency of language usage in everyday life, an indication of the intensity of one’s connection to homeland, a few questions were asked of survey respondents about the frequency of use and level of importance ascribed to speaking one’s mother tongue, two of which are presented below.

Figure 8.3: How often do you use a South Asian language at home? (n=867).

The majority of survey respondents (82.3%) regularly (either often or always) speak their particular native language at home, while only 17.5% of respondents use their native language only rarely or never. This shows that a large majority of respondents choose to speak their native language at home. The frequency of South Asian language use at home is crosstabulated by migrant status in Table 8.7 with very highly significant correlations ($\chi^2(1) = 59.105, p = 0.000, p < .001$) that show the frequency of language usage steadily increasing amongst migrants, while no such trend is seen amongst the New Zealand-born.

Respondents indicating they could speak a South Asian language, were asked “How important do you think it is for your immediate family members to speak an Indian language at home?” The majority of survey respondents (67.1%) felt that it was either very important or extremely important to speak one’s native language at home while only 32.9% felt that it was either not important or somewhat important. Crosstabulating
these results according to migrant status shows that amongst migrants, a significant majority (69.7%) felt that it was either very important or extremely important to speak a South Asian language at home, while only 30.3% said that it was either not important or only somewhat important.\footnote{507} This trend is reversed amongst the New Zealand-born population, showing a highly significant correlation between migrant status and the perceived importance of speaking a South Asian language in the home.

Table 8.9: Migrant status by importance of S. Asian language use (n=921).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Importance of South Asian language usage at home</th>
<th>not important</th>
<th>somewhat important</th>
<th>very important</th>
<th>extremely important</th>
<th>total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Migrant Status: OS-born*</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>row%</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>row%</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>85</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>162</td>
<td>19.9</td>
<td>332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Migrant Status: NZ-born**</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>row%</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>row%</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>14</td>
<td>13.1</td>
<td>42</td>
<td>39.3</td>
<td>31</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: $\chi^2(1) = 59.105, p = 0.000, p < .001$. **$\chi^2(3) = 23.488, p = 0.000, p < .001$.\footnote{507}

Religious affiliation and practice

Survey respondents were asked the following question: “I currently consider myself to be...” and were given a list of choices in which to tick a suitable response. Respondents could also tick ‘Other’ and fill in the comment box to denote affiliation with another religion, denomination or sect, or write in comments. Respondents could tick as many religions as appropriate. One’s religious identity is extremely important to one’s...
conception of self. As such, the data gives a sense of the religious diversity of the respondents as well as an indication of the religious diversity of the overall Indian population.

Hindus comprised 62.7% of all survey respondents, Christians 12.6%, Sikhs 6.7% and Muslims 3.7%. Three Jewish Indian migrants currently living in Christchurch also participated in the survey. Some select comments pertaining to identity and religious practice are included in Table 8.10. From the statistics and comments it is interesting to note that some Hindus believe that their religion encompasses other religions. Also evident, are trends towards general spirituality or secularity, rather than towards any one particular faith.

Figure 8.5: Respondent religion (n=972).

For survey results, the responses ‘No religion or belief,’ ‘Atheist’ and ‘Agnostic’ were combined to create the category ‘None,’ and ‘Multireligious,’ ‘Spiritual’ and ‘Other’ were combined into the category ‘Other.’ ‘Refused’ is the category ‘Prefer not to answer.’ Many respondents used the comments section to write in a particular denomination or sect, but these were recoded to the main religious category (e.g. ‘Arya Samaj,’ ‘Hare Krishna’ or ‘Lingayat’ were recoded as ‘Hindu’ and ‘Methodist’ as ‘Christian’).
Table 8.10: Respondent comments on religion affiliation.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Comment:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>369</td>
<td>“I am spiritual and believe in the fundamental principles of Hinduism, but I don’t follow any organised religion.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>395</td>
<td>Hindu: “Not a staunch follower. Don’t care too much about religion.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>448</td>
<td>Other: “My spiritual beliefs are ever evolving but not fixed to a particular religion.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>454</td>
<td>Other: “Into spiritualism—believe all religions have one higher spiritual being.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>668</td>
<td>“Buddhism, Jainism and Sikhism are offshoots of Hinduism. Hinduism consists of all these beliefs. Why you should separate them?”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>801</td>
<td>Sikh: “I don’t follow all the practices strictly as for my appearance etc., but I believe in the teachings.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>814</td>
<td>“Spiritual, but do not follow any religion.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>817</td>
<td>Other: “I believe all religion is equal.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>825</td>
<td>“I’m a Hindu by origin, but strongly believe in all religions as spiritualistic.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>897</td>
<td>Muslim: “Shia, follower of 12 Imams, the progeny of prophet Mohammad (peace be upon him), and awaiting Imam Mehdi the Savior.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>949</td>
<td>“Grew up with celebrating some Hindu festivals, now enjoy the culture, and believe something bigger, but don’t know what.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>992</td>
<td>“Internal and neutral spiritual beliefs, don’t practice anything.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>993</td>
<td>Hindu: “studying the bible.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1000</td>
<td>Humanist/Rationalist: “I want to be a spiritual person.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1051</td>
<td>Sikh: “We also go to Hindu mandirs to visit. We are not baptised Sikhs.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1054</td>
<td>Hindu: “Buddhist, Jain and Sikh faiths are branches of Hinduism. God is one—different paths to reach God, no different religions. I respect all religions/faiths.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1089</td>
<td>“Like my mother, I will participate in Hindu events but I don’t actively follow the Hindu religion, I don’t pray regularly.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Survey respondents were also asked about their own religious practice, of which more than four-fifths, 82.7%, practice their religion, while 17.3% do not. These are cross tabulated by migrant status below.

Table 8.11: Migrant status by religious practice (n=849).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migrant Status</th>
<th>Do you practice your religion?</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>OS-born*</td>
<td>68</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ-born</td>
<td>33</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *χ²(1) = 54.329, p = 0.000, p < .001.

509 Those with ‘not applicable,’ ‘prefer not to answer,’ or ‘don’t know’ responses (n=120) were removed.
Overseas-born populations are significantly more likely (91.0%) to practice their religion when compared with the domestically born (64.9%), while the New Zealand-born are more than three times as likely (35.1%) to not practice their religion when compared to migrants (9.0%). Migrants are also ten times as likely to practice their religion (91.0%) than not (9.0%), while non-migrants are nearly twice as likely to practice (64.9%) than not practice (35.1%). This demonstrates a very highly significant relationship between religious practice and migrant status where migrants are much more likely to be religious than their domestic counterparts. This quantifies a trend demonstrating the increasing secularity of migrant minorities as they become more acculturated and integrated in successive generations. This trend towards secularity has been largely anecdotal and hasn’t previously been demonstrated amongst ethnic migrant populations in New Zealand.

Some select comments about one’s religious practice are presented in Table 8.12. Respondent 779 identifies herself as a 45-49 year old female born in New Zealand, and living in the Waikato with a Christian Māori mother and an Indian Hindu father, who was brought up Christian. Her mother has Scottish and English heritage while the father recently migrated from Gujarat. For a number of respondents, the move towards secularisation is clearly evident; as are the pressures to conform to the influences of mainstream society. Other respondents have experienced the increasing numbers of migrants in their midst that swell numbers in their particular congregations. This may lead some groups to splinter and form newer, more specialised groups, as is evident in the establishment of a second Sikh gurdwara and Muslim mosque in Hamilton, or the rise of Indo-Fijian Hindu groups that form from larger, pan-Indian religious associations, where previously only a single religious group existed.
Table 8.12: Respondent comments on religious practice.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Comments:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>755</td>
<td>“Although not religious, I follow traditional customs as a mark of respect &amp; belonging.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>779</td>
<td>“Only Christian &amp; Maori. Don’t know any Indian practices. Would love to learn them.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>801</td>
<td>“There are a lot of rules and regulation in Sikh religion, don’t cut your hair, wear a turban, don’t cut your beard or mustache. I respect it but I can’t follow these rules. I do believe in God and I love my culture. I love Punjabi music and the traditional dances, weddings and everything. But the main thing which a Sikh should be doing on daily basis, all the rules which I don’t really follow so I ticked atheist but I do believe in god.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>802</td>
<td>Sikh: “I don’t follow all practices strictly as in appearance, but I believe in the teachings.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>840</td>
<td>“I believe in God but don’t believe in religious institutions.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>879</td>
<td>It depends for me, just thanking God once in a while when I felt that I got some good news, I do. I don’t believe in different religions though, I do think that there is some super power that is directing activities on earth. I thank that super power for offering our life as human beings and ask him to grant me some when I need to move ahead in life.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>939</td>
<td>“I participate when required.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>947</td>
<td>“I read and keep up with scientific research.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>956</td>
<td>“I sing in a church choir”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>965</td>
<td>“Not to the extent I should, but I do.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1010</td>
<td>“Without being dogmatic, I feel respectful towards all religions.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1051</td>
<td>“I guess I’m mainstream moderate Sikh. I go to temple when I can. It gets hard to balance w/ other obligations like work, home life. I like meeting people who have arrived in NZ in different migration waves. I miss meeting people who are not just Punjabi or Sikh.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1070</td>
<td>“Although not overtly religious, we do small <em>pujas</em> for major Hindu festivals with the intention of sharing cultural values with our kids, so they can appreciate their roots.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1076</td>
<td>“My religion is embedded in my nature through my good deeds and I don’t practise all the traditional customs in Hinduism. Just have some select things we as a family follow.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1091</td>
<td>“I am not a very religious person. I have developed my own philosophy having an interest in all religions and philosophies.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1106</td>
<td>“Now I don’t believe in any kind of religious rituals, though I consider myself as Hindu.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Likewise, with Malayalam-speaking communities, where a single Kerala association had previously formed to cater to the group’s cultural and linguistic needs, splinter groups have emerged along religious lines to
create separate Christian and Hindu Malayali associations. Also evident is the tendency, especially amongst Hindus, to worship at one’s household shrine. Many see this as more important than attendance at the local mandir, or as a substitute place of worship in the absence of a local temple and pujāri.\textsuperscript{510}

Religious change and acculturation

As respondent religion was discussed above as an integral part of identity, this section focuses on religious change and acculturation. The religious affiliation of both parents and survey respondents was queried. In combining the results from these two questions, it is possible to quantify interfaith marriage in the parent’s generation, and to view the extent of religious conversion and change, and possible movements towards secularity (i.e. has a respondent’s religion remained the same as the parent’s or has it changed? In what ways has it changed?). These have not before been viewed for Indian populations in New Zealand within the context of integration. Results show that 6.6% of all respondents are the offspring of an interfaith marriage, while 93.4% grew up in single faith homes (i.e. the religion of both parents are the same, n=973). In order to view the extent of religious conversion and change, responses were coded into the following categories: a) respondent religion remained the same as that of the parents (where both parent’s religions were identical); b) where parent’s religions were different (parents’ interfaith marriage) and the survey respondent chose to follow one of the parent’s religions over the other; c) where the respondent became multireligious, incorporating both the parent’s religions, as well as other religions, into their own spirituality; d) where the survey respondent questions the religion(s) of the parents; e) where the respondent lost one (i.e. took on only one of the parent’s religions) or both of the parent’s religions (i.e. became secular); f) where

\textsuperscript{510} A mandir (मंदिर) is a Hindu temple; a pujāri (पूजारी) is a Hindu priest.
the survey respondent converted to another religion altogether from that of the parents; or g) where the respondent became religious where the parents were not religious at all.

Table 8.13: Respondent religious outcome, based on parent’s religion (n=949).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Respondent religious outcome</th>
<th>number</th>
<th>percent of responses</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Stayed the same as parents</td>
<td>729</td>
<td>75.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chose one of the parent’s religions</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>2.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Became multireligious or spiritual</td>
<td>52</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Questions parent’s religion</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>5.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Lost one or both of parent’s religion(s)</td>
<td>88</td>
<td>9.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Converted to another religion different from parents</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>1.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Became religious, where parents were not religious</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>962</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

From this table it is possible to state that over three-quarters of survey respondents (75.8%) kept and followed the same religion of their parents while one-quarter of respondents (24.2%) did not. Of those that did not, 14.8% became secular (i.e. either lost their parent’s religion or in some way questioned the relevancy or appropriateness of their parents’ faiths) in a way that they no longer practiced or kept up their religious beliefs. This is an important finding for delegates that attended the first Hindu Conference in New Zealand\(^{511}\) who were concerned about the incidence of religious conversion amongst their sons and daughters who appeared to be converting in large numbers from Hinduism to Christianity prior to their weddings. The survey however demonstrates that it is not the incidence of conversion to Christianity that should be of concern, but rather the movement towards secularity that is occurring in much greater numbers primarily amongst the young or amongst those that appear to be more integrated or acculturated to New Zealand society.

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\(^{511}\) This was held in May 2007 in Auckland, and was sponsored by the NZ Hindu Council.
**Kiwi & Indian identification**

Two questions ask respondents to rate the strength of their agreement with statements about their identity. The first asked “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘In many ways I think of myself as being a Kiwi,’” while the second asked “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the statement: ‘In many ways I think of myself as being an Indian.’”

Table 8.14: Extent of respondent agreement with Kiwi and Indian identity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of agreement</th>
<th>Kiwi identity</th>
<th>Indian identity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strongly disagree</td>
<td>85</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>disagree</td>
<td>172</td>
<td>17.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>neither agree nor disagree</td>
<td>253</td>
<td>25.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>agree</td>
<td>327</td>
<td>32.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>strongly agree</td>
<td>166</td>
<td>16.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>1,003</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Nearly half of all survey respondents (49.2%) either ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ that they think of themselves as being Kiwi. One quarter of survey respondents (25.2%) were neutral, neither ‘agreeing’ nor ‘disagreeing.’ The remaining quarter (25.6%) either ‘disagreed’ or ‘strongly disagreed.’ This shows that nearly half of all survey respondents answering the question agree that they think of themselves as being Kiwi, demonstrating the extent to which the surveyed population perceives themselves as being fairly well integrated into majority society. For agreement with the statement on Indian identity, the overwhelming majority of survey respondents (81.4%) either ‘agreed’ or ‘strongly agreed’ with the statement. Nearly 10% were neutral, while only 8.7% either ‘disagreed’ or ‘strongly disagreed.’ This demonstrates that the large majority of
respondents agreed with Indian self-identification. This also indicates strong retention of Indian cultural and religious values.

Survey respondents, while feeling comfortable with Kiwi identification, felt much more comfortable identifying themselves with their Indian heritage. At the opposite end of the scale, there were comparable numbers of those that ‘strongly disagreed’ with either statement, less than 10% each, with a 3.7% spread between the two responses, while there was much larger disparity between those that ‘disagreed,’ with a 13.2% spread between the two responses. 17.1% of survey respondents that answered the question ‘disagreed’ to identifying with being Kiwi, while only 3.9% ‘disagreed’ with being an Indian, e.g. respondents are much more likely to agree to having an Indian identity, than to having a Kiwi identity. Also of note is the neutral group, those that ‘neither agree nor disagree’ with either statement. In this group, 25.2% of respondents were neutral on the Kiwi identity question, while only 9.9% were neutral on the Indian identity question. There appears to be a wide disparity (15.3%) between neutral Kiwis and neutral Indians, showing that there are still greater numbers of those unsure about their Kiwi identity than there are those that are certain of their Indian identity. These results are cross tabulated by migrant status in Table 8.15.

The crosstabulation between migrant status and agreement with Kiwi identity shows a very highly significant relationship, while the crosstabulation between migrant status and agreement with Indian identity shows no correlation between the two. This is reflected in the fact that migrant respondents disagree with identifying as ‘Kiwi’ in much higher proportions (28.1%) than those born in New Zealand (4.3%), while the percentage difference between migrants (8.5%) and those born in New Zealand (10.3%) who disagree with possessing an Indian identity is much
Table 8.15: Migrant status by agreement with Kiwi and Indian identity.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migrant Status:</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OS-born</td>
<td>246</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>390</td>
<td>876</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>28.1%</td>
<td>27.4%</td>
<td>44.5%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ-born</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>98</td>
<td>115</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>4.3%</td>
<td>10.4%</td>
<td>85.2%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migrant Status:</th>
<th>Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>OS-born</td>
<td>75</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>728</td>
<td>885</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>8.5%</td>
<td>9.3%</td>
<td>82.3%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ-born</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>116</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>10.3%</td>
<td>14.7%</td>
<td>75.0%</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Notes: *p < 0.001 (very highly significant) \[\chi^2(2) = 68.302, p = 0.000, p < 0.001\]. **p > 0.05 (not significant), \[\chi^2(2) = 4.089, p = 0.129, p > .05\].

smaller, as the majority of Indian respondents agree with identifying as an Indian, regardless of migrant status. What is important here is the high level of respondent agreement with ‘Kiwi’ identification (49.2%), which demonstrates the importance of a deep diversity approach. The significance of the migrant status-Kiwi identity relationship is such that while those respondents born in New Zealand are nearly twice as likely to agree with identifying as ‘Kiwi’ (85.2%) the majority of overseas-born respondents (44.5%) still strongly identify with being ‘Kiwi,’ even though born overseas. As earlier mentioned, this has significant implications for minority belonging to a shared national (‘Kiwi’) identity. A deep diversity approach therefore indicates that additional policy initiatives could focus on the possibilities of strengthening a minority sense of belonging as a means to improve minority integration.

512 See Table 8.14.

513 This points to the possibility that additional research could be undertaken examining whether or not the level of agreement with a ‘Kiwi’ identity increases as the length of migrant settlement increases.
8.3 Discrimination, personal safety and barriers in labour market

As discussed in the Chapter introduction, this section examines the perceived incidence and experience of discrimination, which has profound impacts on both individual and group identity.\textsuperscript{514} It examines the rate of perceived discrimination amongst the surveyed population. The results are crosstabulated by migrant status and gender to determine if any significant relationships exist. For some of the discrimination variables below,\textsuperscript{515} analysis is furthered by crosstabulation of respondent’s strong or weak identification with being a ‘Kiwi’ or an ‘Indian’ (Questions 9 and 10 on the survey)

\textit{Difficulty finding employment}

The question “Have you ever had difficulty finding a job in New Zealand?” was asked.\textsuperscript{516} The majority of survey respondents, 54.2\% did not have difficulty finding employment in New Zealand, while 45.8\% had difficulty finding suitable employment. Crosstabulated results by gender reveal that males (61.8\%) are more likely than females (38.2\%) to have difficulty finding employment in New Zealand. This quantifies anecdotal evidence that suggests that males are generally overqualified for New Zealand positions (e.g. bank managers that end up as taxi drivers). It also suggests that females are having less difficulty finding employment than males and that this is perhaps due to the choices of professions that many Indian females make (e.g. social workers, educators, nurses, doctors), all positions on New Zealand skills shortages list. This suggests that females


\textsuperscript{515} These consist of Questions 75, 76, 78 and 79 of the survey.

\textsuperscript{516} (n=942). ‘Don’t know,’ ‘not applicable,’ ‘prefer not to answer’ responses (n=90), were removed, leaving (n=852).
may be more employable due to the professional choices they make, and that male professions may not be as well represented on the skills shortages list, although this is by no means conclusive. The chi-square statistic shows that the correlation between gender and difficulty finding employment is not significant.

Table 8.16: Gender and Migrant Status by difficulty in finding employment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>No</th>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>col %</td>
<td>row %</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>col %</td>
<td>row %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>199</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>57.2</td>
<td>149</td>
<td>38.2</td>
<td>42.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>263</td>
<td>56.9</td>
<td>43.1</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>61.8</td>
<td>38.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>462</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td>390</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: $[\chi^2(1) = 2.075, p = 0.150, p > 0.05]$.  

When cross tabulating by migrant status, it is evident that those respondents born in New Zealand are more than twice as likely (70.2%) to not have difficulty finding employment than those that do have difficulty (29.8%). Of migrant respondents, a slight majority (52.1%) reported having no difficulty finding employment while a slight minority (47.9%) reported having some difficulty. However, of those reporting difficulty in finding employment in New Zealand, respondents were more than ten times as likely to be migrants (92%) when compared with those born in New Zealand (8.0%). This shows a highly significant relationship between migrant status and the perceived difficulty of Indian minorities in finding suitable employment.
A total of 76 respondents left comments, many of which are pertinent, as they are indicative of the difficulties and frustrations many have had while trying to obtain suitable employment.

Table 8.17: Respondent comments on finding suitable employment.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>8</td>
<td>“Searched for over 6 months, then found a job. I’ve been in it since and am very happy!”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>49</td>
<td>“I haven’t really had difficulty, but I know I am an exception, especially for people who moved here around 2000.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>68</td>
<td>“It was quite difficult to get the first job, but relatively easy after that.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>92</td>
<td>“It was difficult for my wife.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>107</td>
<td>“Finding a job was difficult as I had no New Zealand experience.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>111</td>
<td>“In 1996 it was tough to find employment, as not many Indians were here and most of us were over-qualified for the jobs that we applied for.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>133</td>
<td>“When I first moved here, I found it difficult to get a job in the area of my expertise.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>139</td>
<td>“When I migrated it was hard finding a job to match my qualifications and experience.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>162</td>
<td>“Experienced discrimination as to being overqualified or over-experienced.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>230</td>
<td>“Not getting a relevant job, employers have a parochial mind in asking for NZ experience. How can we gain experience if no one hires us? Our knowledge &amp; skills aren’t properly utilised.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>237</td>
<td>“Not able to find job in 1990 in my field, so I left to go back to Bahrain.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>272</td>
<td>“It’s very hard to get job here being migrant.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>275</td>
<td>“I had no difficulty. I was recruited while still working in India.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>344</td>
<td>“Applying for last 8 mo. but all applications rejected despite 24 yrs management experience.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>383</td>
<td>“YES! To the point of total frustration, feelings of unworthiness, leading on to a state of depression - something I have never experienced before.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>393</td>
<td>“Could not find a job in my field.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>396</td>
<td>“I find it very difficult...and I’m not sure whether it is because no one wants you to answer the phones when you have an Indian name - perhaps the customer might think you’re actually answering from a Call Center in India!”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>405</td>
<td>“In the beginning, yes. Everyone was looking for someone with NZ experience.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>443</td>
<td>“For the first time only, after that I jumped between jobs without any problems.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>479</td>
<td>“Took time, about six months, to get into my own field of expertise.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>498</td>
<td>“Although I was highly qualified, I worked in a related field in an assistant’s position for sometime to come to grips with the system before deciding on my next step.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>561</td>
<td>“Was always considered inferior despite having extensive experience, training &amp; skills”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>607</td>
<td>“I’m too qualified I guess for NZ companies!!”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>644</td>
<td>“It took 90 odd applications before I landed a position.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
“Even though I am NZ qualified and have accumulated work experiences and now I am made redundant due to National Government’s cost-cutting policy and restructure. I am now unemployed for almost 1 year and have applied for 370 jobs and have attended a total of 20 interviews. Everyone acknowledges I have proven skills and experience and an MBA from a NZ university, I was not successful in securing a job yet. The feedback I get is that I don’t “fit in with their team and personality.” I feel that I can fit in and work hard as I am focused in my job and this can be perceived as too serious-looking. I am not an extrovert and pub going person or rugby fan. I feel that Kiwis need to be exposed to working with other cultures and races and be more accommodating. It is them not feeling comfortable working with other races and cultures. It’s like Paul Henry’s comment - why employ a person who doesn’t look like or sound like a New Zealander. I do look different - colourwise, sound and think different. I am comfortable working in a mainstream culture and my wife is a pakeha and I understand Kiwi culture and mindset. Likewise my pakeha wife understands Indian culture and loves cooking Indian meals and Bollywood movies. Pakehas need broadening their cultural exposure and training in multiculturalism. The main reason I am considering going to Australia is because I feel I am discriminated in securing employment in NZ due to my race and my accent and now my age (55 years). Many of my friends are in the same boat and most of them shifted to Australia to seek jobs there. We need help and affirmative action from the government, like for the Pacific people and Maoris. The current government is killing our ethnic voice.”

“I always felt I was offered positions below what my resume deserves.”

“I wanted to find a job in computing but because of just level 5 qualification I did not really qualify, but it’s difficult to find jobs, even like casual one with KFC, Burger King or something.”

“Very difficult, took me 7 years for office job relevant to my study.”

“Rejected since I did not have New Zealand job experience.”

“I am here from last five months and do not have a job.”

“There is racial attitude for people competing for top jobs.”

“It’s a herculean task to land a job in New Zealand, especially for aspiring students.”

From these comments, a number of interesting themes emerge. Many respondents felt that it was extremely difficult to find suitable employment, while some felt that they were clearly over-qualified (e.g. Respondent 712). Some had difficulty at first when searching for their first job, or reported that the settling in process was difficult, but once they felt settled in, things improved. Many also took jobs below their qualifications or found jobs in similar or related fields. Some also felt the need for further education or reskilling. Others felt that they could not find a job due to the recession. Some also relied on family connections to help them find employment. A number of people experienced ethnic, age or gender discrimination while looking for suitable work, and some mentioned that once they had changed their name to one that New Zealanders could pronounce, their employment chances improved considerably. Some
reported experiencing depression or that the search for employment negatively affected their mental state. There were still others that mentioned that they had had no problems and that the search for suitable employment was as expected. Respondents 701’s comments are instructive as an example of particular policy needs to be addressed; i.e. that a shift away from government agencies working with potential employers, toward working with host communities, is an area that requires attention.

Personal safety

The next questions relate to one’s perceived experience of safety, racism and discrimination in New Zealand. This question asks “With regards to your own personal safety and security in New Zealand, in general, how safe do you actually feel living here?” In sum, 46% of survey respondents answering the question felt ‘somewhat safe,’ while 41% of the population felt ‘totally safe.’ Only 14% of the population felt either ‘unsafe’ or ‘totally unsafe.’

Table 8.18: Personal safety in New Zealand.517

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Level of personal safety:</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>I feel totally unsafe living here &amp; am often concerned about my personal security</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel somewhat unsafe living here &amp; am sometimes concerned about my personal security</td>
<td>115</td>
<td>12.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel somewhat safe living here &amp; am not usually concerned about my personal security</td>
<td>413</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>I feel totally safe living here &amp; am rarely concerned about my personal security</td>
<td>365</td>
<td>40.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>899</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Crosstabulating by gender reveals that males are more likely (61.3%) than females (38.7%) to feel either ‘safe’ or ‘totally safe’ in New Zealand. Other comparisons are inconclusive, although there does appear to be a significant relationship between gender and perceived personal safety.

517 ‘Don’t know,’ ‘NA,’ and ‘prefer not to answer’ responses (n=13) were removed from the sample.
Table 8.19: Gender and Migrant Status by Perceived personal safety.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Unsafe or totally unsafe</th>
<th>Safe or totally safe</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>col %</td>
<td>row %</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>60</td>
<td>49.6</td>
<td>16.7</td>
<td>299</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>61</td>
<td>50.4</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>473</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>121</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td><strong>772</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: $\chi^2(1) = 5.128, p = 0.024, p < 0.05$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migrant status:</th>
<th>Unsafe or totally unsafe</th>
<th>Safe or totally safe</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>col %</td>
<td>row %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas-born</td>
<td>112</td>
<td>92.6</td>
<td>14.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand-born</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>7.4</td>
<td>8.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td><strong>121</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: $\chi^2(1) = 2.628, p = 0.105, p > 0.05$.

When crosstabulating by migrant status, migrants were 12.5 times more likely (92.6%) to feel either unsafe or totally unsafe than non-migrants (7.4%), demonstrating the unease the majority of migrants feel as minorities in their adopted homeland. Other crosstabulations are inconclusive and contradictory, as the chi-square statistic reveals that the variables are independent. A couple of respondent comments however, do highlight some of the difficulties Indian minorities experience, regardless of gender or migrant status.

Respondent 912 in Table 8.20 underscores the emotions experienced by ethnic minorities, while Respondent 1031 highlights the ignorance some New Zealanders have about religious minorities:
Table 8.20: Respondent comments on personal safety.

No. Comments:

912  "I used to feel safe, but I don’t feel safe anymore and I’m usually concerned about my safety and security. I have been assaulted by drunken youths on a weekend evening for no apparent reason. They laughed after assaulting me and ran away. By the time the police arrived, they were gone. It has left a deep impact on my mind and I avoid going to areas where there are drunk people. This was the worst thing that has ever happened to me in my life and the only reason I thought of leaving NZ for good. It’s not that I can’t hit someone, the only reason I think most Indians are peaceful and non-violent is because we know that if we get involved in an incident and get charges laid against us, it will affect our visa/residency and job prospects etc.

1031  "With turban on my head while walking some times teens traveling in car pass unpleasant remarks. Probably mistaken identity, they may think I am Muslim, which of course is again undesirable."

Target of perceived discrimination

This question asks “Have you ever felt that you were the target of or involved in an incident of cultural, ethnic or racial discrimination in New Zealand?” While 51.6% of all survey respondents answering the question stated that they had not been a target of cultural, ethnic or racial discrimination in New Zealand, 48.4% had stated that they had been a target. Results are crosstabulated by gender, migrant status, and identification with being either a ‘Kiwi’ or ‘Indian’ below.

Table 8.21: Gender by ‘Ever been a target of discrimination?’ (n=834).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>col %</td>
<td>row %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>170</td>
<td>39.4</td>
<td>50.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>261</td>
<td>60.6</td>
<td>52.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: $X^2(1) = 0.536, p = 0.464, p > 0.05$.

For gender, there does not appear to be any significant relationship and results are inconclusive. However, of those perceiving that they have been a target of discrimination 41.9% were women while a greater number

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518 (n=835). ‘Don’t know’ and ‘Prefer not to answer’ responses (n=81) were removed from the sample.
(58.1%) were men. Nearly equal percentages of both genders had similar percentages of perceived discrimination. For migrant status however, of those that have experienced being the target of a discrimination event, 86.9% were migrants compared with the 13.1% born in New Zealand. This suggests that other factors may contribute to the high incidence of migrant discrimination amongst respondents. For instance, difference in accents between migrant and non-migrant respondents may be a factor that potential employers consider when undertaking hiring decisions. Nearly equal percentages of migrants (47.6%) and non-migrants (54.1%) have experienced being the target of a discrimination event, suggesting an inconclusive result in which the two variables appear to be independent; there is no significant relationship between migrant status and the perceived incidence of being the target of discrimination. This suggests that other factors may be in play.

Table 8.22: Migrant Status by ‘Ever been a target of discrimination?’ (n=835).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migrant status:</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>col %</td>
<td>row%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas-born</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>89.6</td>
<td>52.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand-born</td>
<td>45</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>45.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total:</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>404</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: $\chi^2(1) = 1.444, p = 0.230, p > 0.05$.

Crosstabulations based on strong or weak identification with being ‘Kiwi’ reveal that no significant relationship exists between ‘Kiwi’ identification and having ever been the target of discrimination. Indians who strongly identify with being ‘Kiwi’ are therefore just as likely as those with a weak affiliation to report that they have experienced some form of discrimination. This is consistent with the argument that simply feeling a part of the ‘host’ society does not offer a buffer against workaday discrimination for racialised minorities. Crosstabulations based on strong or weak identification with being ‘Indian’ also reveal that no significant
relationship exists between ‘Indian’ identification and having ever been the target of discrimination.

Table 8.23: Strength of identification by ‘Ever been a target of discrimination?’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Strength of Kiwi Identification (n=781)</th>
<th>Strength of Indian Identification (n=787)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>No</td>
<td>Yes</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>col %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Kiwi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>192</td>
<td>46.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Kiwi</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>218</td>
<td>53.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td></td>
<td>410</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

$[\chi^2(1) = 2.101, \ p = 0.147, \ p > 0.05].$

Frequency of experiencing discrimination

This question asks “How often have these incidents occurred, if at all?” Of the 848 responses, 40.4% had ‘never’ experienced an incidence of cultural, ethnic or racial discrimination in New Zealand, while 32.7% had experienced these ‘rarely,’ 22.8% ‘sometimes,’ and 4.1% ‘regularly.’ Of those who either ‘never’ or ‘rarely’ experience discrimination, males are in the majority (62.4%) compared to females (37.6%), although both males (50.4%) and females (49.6%) nearly equally experience incidents of discrimination either ‘sometimes’ or ‘regularly.’ Although both males and females are more likely to either ‘never’ or ‘rarely’ experience an incidence of racism or discrimination, of those that do, females (32.7%) are more

519 ‘Don’t know’ and ‘I prefer not to answer’ responses (n=69) were removed from the sample.
likely than males (23%) to experience discrimination either ‘sometimes’ or ‘regularly.’ Hence the results show that a significant relationship exists (\( p < 0.01 \)) between gender and one’s experience of discrimination.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Never or rarely</th>
<th>Sometimes or regularly</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>col %</td>
<td>row %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>233</td>
<td>37.6</td>
<td>67.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>386</td>
<td>62.4</td>
<td>77.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>619</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2(1) = 9.798, p = 0.002, p < 0.01. \]

For migrant status, of those that either ‘sometimes’ or ‘regularly’ experience a discrimination event, migrants are much more likely (92.1%) than those born in New Zealand (7.9%) to experience discrimination. Although both migrants and those born in New Zealand both have a higher incidence of ‘never’ or ‘rarely’ experiencing a discrimination event when compared with ‘sometimes’ or ‘regularly’ experiencing one, the New Zealand-born have a higher incidence of experiencing it ‘never’ or ‘rarely’ (82.2%) than do migrants (71.2%), and migrants have a higher incidence of experiencing discrimination ‘sometimes’ or ‘regularly’ (28.1%) when compared with those born in New Zealand (17.8%). This shows a significant relationship (\( p < 0.05 \)) between migrant status and the frequency of one’s experience of discrimination with migrants more prone to experiencing a higher frequency of discrimination.
events than non-migrants. These statistics quantify that much policy work needs to be undertaken in host communities in order to lessen minority experience of incidences of discrimination.

Crosstabulations based on strong or weak identification with being ‘Kiwi’ reveals that no significant relationship exists between ‘Kiwi’ identification and the frequency of experiencing discrimination. Crosstabulations based on strong or weak identification with being ‘Indian’ also reveals that no significant relationship exists between ‘Indian’ identification and the frequency of experiencing discrimination.

Table 8.25: Strength of identification by ‘Frequency of experiencing discrimination’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strength of Kiwi Identification (n=793)</th>
<th>Never or rarely</th>
<th>Sometimes or regularly</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>col %</td>
<td>row %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Kiwi</td>
<td>279</td>
<td>47.8</td>
<td>71.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Kiwi</td>
<td>305</td>
<td>52.2</td>
<td>76.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>584</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2(1) = 2.438, \ p = 0.118, \ p > 0.05. \]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Strength of Indian Identification (n=799)</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Identity</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>col %</td>
<td>row %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Indian</td>
<td>109</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>77.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Indian</td>
<td>480</td>
<td>81.5</td>
<td>72.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>589</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\[ \chi^2(1) = 1.138, \ p = 0.286, \ p > 0.05. \]
**Where discrimination occurs**

This question asks “If these incidents have happened to you, where have they occurred?” Those selecting ‘I have not experienced any such event,’ accounted for 29% of all responses (n=1254), with the remaining 71% of respondents locating at least one discrimination event.

Table 8.26: Locations where discrimination occurs.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Location where discrimination occurred:</th>
<th>n</th>
<th>% of responses (n=890)</th>
<th>% of cases (n=463)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>At home</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>1.6%</td>
<td>3.0%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In my neighbourhood</td>
<td>104</td>
<td>11.7%</td>
<td>22.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>At school</td>
<td>124</td>
<td>13.9%</td>
<td>26.8%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While looking for work</td>
<td>154</td>
<td>17.3%</td>
<td>33.3%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the workplace</td>
<td>220</td>
<td>24.7%</td>
<td>47.5%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>While out and about in the community</td>
<td>241</td>
<td>27.1%</td>
<td>52.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other location</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>3.7%</td>
<td>7.1%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td>890</td>
<td><strong>100.0%</strong></td>
<td><strong>192.2%</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

It is interesting to note that many believe anecdotally that discrimination occurs most frequently in the workplace, yet this does not appear to be the case amongst survey respondents, who stated that most discrimination events (27.1%) occurred while they were out and about in the community minding their own business or while running errands. A similar number of respondents (24.7%) had reported workplace discrimination, while 17.3% had reported discrimination while seeking employment. Smaller numbers (13.9%) had reported discrimination at school, while 11.7% had reported discrimination while out and about in their own neighbourhoods. When combining the sums for the responses ‘in my neighbourhood’ with ‘out and about in the community,’ we get a substantial percentage (38.8%) of all respondents stating that they

---

520 Respondents were invited to tick all the locations that may apply.

521 ‘Not applicable’ responses (n=362) were removed from the sample. ‘Out and about in the community’ refers to running errands or going from place to place tending to one’s business.
experienced a discrimination event while out and about, while 42% had experienced discrimination in either their workplace or while looking for employment. This strongly suggests that government funding and public policy directed at improving workplace relations and encouraging multicultural diversity amongst employers may need to be redirected towards the general host community of New Zealand, for it appears that a sizable amount of discrimination events occur outside of the workplace. As most discrimination occurs within a community context, this strongly suggests that employers are not the only ones that need to be the focus of new policy initiatives, which need to be directed towards educating majority populations. This is a significant finding that has emerged from this research and demonstrates that working with host communities may be more important than working with minority communities in terms of better integration outcomes.

A number of indicative comments were also received, some of which specifically locate these events.\textsuperscript{522} Numerous respondents identified multiple discrimination events. Most of these occurred while out and about in the community, with fewer events occurring in the workplace or while looking for employment. A number of events occurred within the Indian community itself, suggesting that discrimination also exists within the Indian community, e.g. between Indians of differing birth countries (e.g. India-Indians and Fijian-Indians), between Indians from different geographical regions within India (e.g. Gujaratis and Punjabis), or between different caste or economic groupings.\textsuperscript{523} This further supports ‘Indian’ diversification as an insufficient means for ethnic identification, as intragroup discrimination continues and the discriminator and discriminatee are differentiated.

\textsuperscript{522} See Table 8.27.

\textsuperscript{523} This was initially mentioned in referring to the Jacinta Lal story in Chapter 1.
<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>No.</th>
<th>Comments</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>45</td>
<td>“Real Estate agents.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>69</td>
<td>“Once at a restaurant in Taupo, and once in one of the parks in Auckland.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>116</td>
<td>“While walking on footpath some teenagers in a car mouthed abuses and spat at me.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>167</td>
<td>“While in business meetings.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>244</td>
<td>“Within the Indian community.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>262</td>
<td>“Dealing with police once. It was awful to see that they chose to visit a break-in in a European household and not come to mine just few days after that when I took the trouble to go to the police station as well.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>341</td>
<td>“At Court.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>659</td>
<td>“By ethnic Indian groups (a committee), by my own community people because I am an Indian women and it is culturally inappropriate to be seen to influence change.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>670</td>
<td>“At my local pub.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>717</td>
<td>“While walking through the streets of Christchurch.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>737</td>
<td>“Once while in a coffee shop, and another time from an Air NZ flight attendant.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>859</td>
<td>“Mostly at pubs and targeted by drunk people.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>874</td>
<td>“One unforgettable time, when about 10 Maori kids shouted ‘go back to your country’ and forced us to come out from a children’s park. Those kids were about 6-13 year old.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>879</td>
<td>“Once by a Pacific Islander sitting in his car on the side of road in Remuera. I was looking at what was written on his car, painted with a garden mower, or something like that. I was listening to music and the guy fingered me and said f... word.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>921</td>
<td>“While riding bike to office at pedestrian crossing I was abused by drivers many times.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>944</td>
<td>“I worked for a telephone survey company and got a lot of rude comments because of my name, but when I changed it, the rude comments stopped.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>953</td>
<td>“Judgements stopped when I used my married name. I wanted to keep my (Indian) maiden name but knew I was better off with a European name when applying for jobs. My mother (NZ born pakeha) suffered terribly at times when people knew her Indian surname. My brothers and I attended private Anglican prep and secondary schools in 1970s and 80s. Having an Indian surname was treated with suspicion. Once other mothers had met our pakeha mum, we would be welcome in other’s homes.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>992</td>
<td>“Once while doing a public talk on refugees. The Chairperson asked if I was a former refugee but didn’t ask my pakeha colleague. Another time I took a wallet I found to the police. The cop said ‘Where did you say you found it, outside your dairy?’ I said ‘I beg your pardon. I don’t own a dairy.’ He was stereotyping and was serious.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>996</td>
<td>“Once in a supermarket, and another time while on a train.”</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1004</td>
<td>“At the beach or parks while walking my dog.”</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Two respondents (Respondents 944 & 953) specifically mentioned name discrimination and the pressure to alter one’s first or last names to have more ‘western-sounding’ or ‘easier-to-pronounce’ names that are
perceived to be more ‘customer friendly.’ This is a recurring issue experienced by many and common to ethnic minorities.

Is there discrimination in New Zealand?

Of the respondents answering ‘yes’ or ‘no,’ 90.7% believe that racism and discrimination currently exist within New Zealand society, while only 9.3% believe that it does not exist. The high number of ethnic minorities that believe that discrimination exists, also indicates that much integration and awareness work still remains amongst majority communities to educate them about ethnic and religious minorities. These statistics are crosstabulated below to determine if any significant relationships exist.

Table 8.28: Gender and Migrant Status by ‘Does discrimination exist in NZ?’ (n=775).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>%</th>
<th>Total</th>
<th>%</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>21</td>
<td>6.4</td>
<td>307</td>
<td>93.6</td>
<td>328</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>11.4</td>
<td>396</td>
<td>88.6</td>
<td>447</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: \( \chi^2(1) = 5.628, p = 0.018, p < .05 \).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migrant status:</th>
<th>No</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
<th>Total</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>col</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>col</td>
<td>r</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>col</td>
<td>r</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Overseas-born</td>
<td>70</td>
<td>97.2</td>
<td>10.4</td>
<td>604</td>
<td>85.9</td>
<td>89.6</td>
<td>674</td>
<td>87.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>New Zealand-born</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2.8</td>
<td>2.0</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>14.1</td>
<td>98.0</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>13.0</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td>72</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>703</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>775</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: \( \chi^2(1) = 7.364, p = 0.007, p < .01 \).

Women are slightly more likely to agree (93.6%) that discrimination exists than men (88.6%), although the difference appears negligible. Even so, the statistic demonstrates that there is a significant relationship between gender and agreement that discrimination exists. For migrant status, of those agreeing that discrimination exists in New Zealand, 85.9% were

524 ‘Don’t know’ and ‘Prefer not to answer’ responses (n=139) were removed from the sample. The original number of respondents was (n=914).
migrants compared with only 14.1% of those born in New Zealand. Amongst the overseas-born only 10.4% thought that discrimination did not exist while 89.6% believed that it does. Interestingly, amongst Indians born in New Zealand, 98% believe that discrimination exists while only 2% believe that it does not, so non-migrant Indians have a slightly higher percentage (98%) of those who believe discrimination exists when compared with migrants (89.6%). Either way, there is a significant relationship between migrant status and the belief that discrimination exists in New Zealand society.

Table 8.29: Strength of identification by ‘Belief that discrimination exists in NZ.’

### Strength of Kiwi Identification (n=733)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>col %</td>
<td>row %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Kiwi</td>
<td>29</td>
<td>42.0</td>
<td>7.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Kiwi</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>58.0</td>
<td>10.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>69</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>10.9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(\chi^2(1) = 1.838, p = 0.175, p > 0.05\).

### Strength of Indian Identification (n=738)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>No</th>
<th>Yes</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>col %</td>
<td>row %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Indian</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>22.9</td>
<td>12.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Indian</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>77.1</td>
<td>8.9</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>70</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>8.9</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

\(\chi^2(1) = 1.381, p = 0.240, p > 0.05\).

Crosstabulations based on strong or weak identification with being ‘Kiwi’ reveals that no significant relationship exists between ‘Kiwi’ identification and if a respondent believes that discrimination exists in New Zealand. Crosstabulations based on strong or weak identification with being ‘Indian’ also reveals that no significant relationship exists between ‘Indian’
identification and if a respondent believes that discrimination exists in New Zealand.

*Discrimination against Indians in New Zealand*

For the last question of the survey, respondents were asked “To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement: ‘There is discrimination in New Zealand against members of the Indian community.’ Responses were ticked along an ordinal scale ranging from ‘strongly disagree’ to ‘strongly agree.’ The majority of survey respondents (53.3%) either ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ with the statement that there is discrimination against Indians. This is followed by 29.1% of respondents, who were neutral towards the statement, neither agreeing nor disagreeing, while only 17.6% of respondents either ‘disagreed’ or ‘strongly disagreed’ with the statement.

Table 8.30: Extent of agreement that discrimination against Indians exists in NZ.525

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>There is discrimination against Indians in NZ</th>
<th>number</th>
<th>percent</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Strongly disagree</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Disagree</td>
<td>101</td>
<td>12.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Neither disagree nor agree</td>
<td>240</td>
<td>29.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agree</td>
<td>336</td>
<td>40.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strongly agree</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>12.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td>824</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Crosstabulation by gender reveals that for both males and females, there is an increasing trend of the extent of agreement with the statement, that the lowest percentages are to be found amongst those that ‘strongly disagree’ or ‘disagree’ with the statement, and the highest percentages are found amongst those that either ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ with the statement, although females show a higher percentage of agreement (58.6%) than do

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525 ‘Don’t know’ or ‘I prefer to not answer’ responses (n=94) were removed from the sample.
males (49.6%). Amongst those that ‘disagree,’ males are in the majority (69.2%), compared with only 30.8% for females, demonstrating the higher extent to which females voice their displeasure with discrimination. The statistic shows that there is indeed a relationship between gender and the extent of agreement with the statement.

Table 8.31: Gender & Migrant Status by ‘Agreement Indian discrimination exists.’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree &amp; Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree &amp; Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>c%</td>
<td>r%</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Female</td>
<td>44</td>
<td>30.8</td>
<td>13.2</td>
<td>94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Male</td>
<td>99</td>
<td>69.2</td>
<td>20.5</td>
<td>145</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>143</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: \(\chi^2(2) = 9.094, p = 0.011, p < .05\]

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Migrant status</th>
<th>Strongly Disagree &amp; Disagree</th>
<th>Neutral</th>
<th>Agree &amp; Strongly Agree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>c%</td>
<td>r%</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>migrant</td>
<td>133</td>
<td>92.4</td>
<td>18.5</td>
<td>209</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>NZ-born</td>
<td>11</td>
<td>7.6</td>
<td>11.2</td>
<td>30</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Total</td>
<td>144</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>239</td>
<td>100.0</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

For migrant status, as with gender, for both migrants and non-migrants, there is an increasing trend of the extent of agreement with the statement, that the lowest percentages are to be found amongst those that ‘strongly disagree’ or ‘disagree’ with the statement, and the highest percentages are found amongst those that either ‘agree’ or ‘strongly agree’ with the statement, although the New Zealand-born show a slightly higher percentage of agreement (58.2%) than do migrants (52.5%). As expected, of those that ‘strongly disagree’ or ‘disagree’ with the statement that discrimination exists against Indians in New Zealand, the overwhelming majority (92.4%) are migrants, compared with only 7.6% of non-migrants. Migrants are also much more likely (87.4%) to remain ‘neutral’ than are those born in New Zealand (12.6%).
Crosstabulations based on strong or weak identification with being ‘Kiwi’ reveals that no significant relationship exists between ‘Kiwi’ identification and if a respondent agrees with the statement that discrimination against Indians exists in New Zealand. Crosstabulations based on strong or weak identification with being ‘Indian’ also reveals that no significant relationship exists between ‘Indian’ identification and if a respondent agrees with the statement that discrimination against Indians exists in New Zealand.

Table 8.32: Strength of identification by ‘Belief that discrimination exists in NZ.’

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Strongly disagree and disagree</th>
<th>Agree and strongly agree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>col %</td>
<td>row %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Kiwi</td>
<td>56</td>
<td>40.9</td>
<td>21.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Kiwi</td>
<td>81</td>
<td>59.1</td>
<td>28.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td>137</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: $\chi^2(1) = 3.704, p = 0.054, p > 0.05$.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Identity</th>
<th>Strongly disagree and disagree</th>
<th>Agree and strongly agree</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>col %</td>
<td>row %</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Weak Indian</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>19.6</td>
<td>26.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Strong Indian</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>80.4</td>
<td>24.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td>138</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Note: $\chi^2(1) = 0.188, p = 0.665, p > 0.05$.

526 Neutral responses (n=229) were removed from the equation.
8.4 Summary

Identity and discrimination have emerged as the two most important issues from the survey results. Identity results demonstrate the extent to which the survey results differ from the census results in terms of self-identification, while discrimination results quantify that much work still remains to be done amongst majorities in order to mitigate the incidence of discrimination in society and for increased integration of minorities into majority society. Together, these results portray a need for policy to be better directed towards both mitigating discrimination of minorities by majorities and in raising minority awareness amongst majority populations. This may aid the emergence of a shared national identity, a cornerstone of a deep diversity framework. Presented identity results have already shown that minorities have already begun such integration work while majorities have not. Discrimination results have also demonstrated the extent and frequency of the perceived incidence of discrimination amongst the survey population, showing that much work remains to be done amongst majorities in order to diminish the incidence of discrimination and racism within New Zealand society. A critical reading of deep diversity however, would suggest that, for minorities, a sense of belonging in a shared national identity with majorities is insufficient, as majorities do not necessarily share the same sensibilities, hence the continued presence of racism. As the mechanisms of discrimination operate independently of migrant actors, policy will need to take a more proactive stance at mitigating it effects.
CHAPTER NINE: CONCLUSION

A DEEP DIVERSITY FRAMEWORK FOR NEW ZEALAND

The main hope of harmony in our troubled world lies in the plurality of our identities...Our shared humanity gets savagely challenged when our differences are narrowed into one devised system of uniquely powerful categorization (Sen 2006:16).

9.1 Introduction

Since the founding of the modern state, minorities have had a tremendous impact on the social fabric of New Zealand. Historically, British colonisation of Aotearoa led to the minoritisation of indigenous Māori, and furthered their dominance in the sociocultural, political and economic spheres. Strong Māori resurgence since the 1970s led the call for biculturalism and an assertion of interest in participating in affairs which affected them directly. A bicultural response was needed, and performed its role as an appropriate and timely reaction to experienced inequality. As a policy directive, biculturalism generally served New Zealand well and led to many significant changes in social policy that have had, and continue to have, a positive effect, although much progress remains. Recent immigration, most notably from Asia, has had a broad demographic impact, and migrants and minorities have played a substantial role in realising positive economic outcomes, improving international relations, and increasing New Zealand’s multicultural footprint. Multiculturalism, as unofficial policy objective, consequently emerged to complement biculturalism as a policy directive. Such an initiative allowed policymakers to shift focus from a restrictive immigration policy favouring migrants from traditional European source countries to a points-based system prioritising skill shortages not limited to specific sending countries. Multicultural policy objectives, designed to
enhance bicultural initiatives, targeted migrants and non-Māori minorities in settlement support, and improved economic and social integration.

This thesis expresses the premise that existing state forms of multicultural management are not working as well as they could; there is room for improvement and much racism and discrimination remains.\(^{527}\) It examines the possibility of approaching increasing forms of plurality with a novel framework for advancing diversity governance in multicultural societies. When it comes to appropriate policy, multicultural models of the past generation appear poorly placed to progress minority treatment and aid social cohesion. Based on shallow approaches that may have previously functioned well, such policies no longer seem appropriate responses to contemporary forms of diversity, minority participation, continued discrimination, and calls for greater minority accommodation. Clearer policy guidelines are essential for states preparing for the ‘superdiversity’\(^{528}\) forecast to come.

Multiculturalism, when used to refer to a general state of affairs—as in “New Zealand is a multicultural nation”—is an acceptable and rarely contested statement affirming present plurality, and should be amenable to all along the political spectrum. It draws attention to the number and variance of ethnicities, cultures, languages, and religions that interact in society today. Multiculturalism, however, becomes problematic and contentious when it involves state direction in, and negotiation of, policy

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\(^{527}\) As I write this, another racist incident has appeared in the press. A New Zealand policewoman has been found guilty of racially abusing an ethnic Indian taxi driver from Malaysia during a late-night fare dispute in Queenstown, telling him to “f... off to India, you come here and get all the Kiwi jobs. Eat your f...... curry and f... off to India. This is a Kiwi job.” (Edens 2014). Given the New Zealand police’s proactive stance on race relations and religious diversity (New Zealand Police 2004, 2012), this would appear to be a sizable setback and public relations problem for this government institution.

\(^{528}\) Vertovec first introduced the concept of ‘superdiversity’ as a summary term in 2007, defining it as “a term denoting a transformation of population patterns, especially arising from shifts in global mobility.” For more on ‘superdiversity,’ see Vertovec (2007, 2010, 2015), Spoonley & Butcher (2009) and Spoonley (2014).
circumscribing minority affairs. Whereas biculturalism formed a two-party partnership designed to address Māori grievances under the Treaty of Waitangi and saw resources directed at Māori social uplift and better bicultural relations, multiculturalism appears to have had limited success at garnering support or participation. Existing forms of multicultural policy represent shallow forms of diversity management. New forms of governance are required in order to accommodate rapidly changing demographics, increased immigration, and expanding minority participation in society. Shallow management policies invoke the particular normative, ideological and operative values\(^{529}\) that appear increasingly peripheral given burgeoning superdiversity and contemporary forms of pluralism, not to mention the accompanying rise of minority participation in the sociocultural, economic and political affairs of state. Deeper governance strategies need to be contemporary, appropriate, and equally responsive to all societal groups.

Deep diversity, a novel conceptual framework for diversity policy in liberal western democracies, is only one such response to increasing pluralism. It outlines the need for newer forms of diversity governance that establish more appropriate and better suited values which can be applied to policy frameworks designed to improve social cohesion. It does not purport to solve policy problems nor presume to harbour definitive solutions. It does however hope to direct policymakers to ask more appropriate questions about the nature, depth and direction of increasing diversity, and to think about alternative responses to the new challenges of cohesion in superdiverse societies. Achieving majority participation in policy directives is a hallmark of deep diversity, as shallow policies mostly

\(^{529}\) As discussed in Chapter Two, normative assumptions generally affirm or establish what might be commonly held beliefs about existing shallow and proposed deeper interpretations of diversity. Ideological values represent aspirational beliefs, principles and ideals that are currently accepted. Operative values result from actualising normative assumptions and by putting policies into play.
direct ‘targeted’ initiatives at minorities in the perceived need for better integration. Such policies can only hope to achieve limited results as only a portion of society (e.g. minorities, migrants, refugees) are ‘doing the work’ of integration, through settlement support services, language initiatives, educational training and economic integration programmes that currently make up the bulk of diversity policy initiatives. Campaigns focusing on better preparing majorities for minority integration and migrant accommodation could actually help in reducing the regular incidences of racism and discrimination and help undermine the perpetuation of insidious forms of structural and institutional discrimination, which are more deeply embedded and therefore more problematic to extricate and expunge.

In taking a critical look at historical accounts and census treatments, I have shown that self-reported identity constructs from the case study are far more complex than those utilised by the state for the management of its diversity. In exploring earliest Indian presence in Aotearoa between 1769-1850, I uncovered and introduced new information that places Indians in Aotearoa at the very founding of the modern nation. This differs distinctly from mainstream Pākehā views of the immigration discourse that specifically peg the earliest Asian arrivals to the discovery of gold in Otago, with settlement generally occurring during the 1850s and 1860s in exceptionally small numbers. European political dominance established a series of anti-Asian immigration legislation which remained fairly intact until progressive immigration reform was enacted in 1987. This was followed by the huge increase in Asian immigration seen today. Such a discourse has historically played largely upon European fears of an Asian tidal wave outpacing European growth, characterised by the traditional preoccupation with maintaining and perpetuating a white New Zealand. European discourse today focuses on a bicultural policy that
incorporates multiculturalism, and Asian immigration is largely still perceived as a recent phenomenon, something to be limited or controlled. If the ‘Asian’ discourse is to be believed, then little has changed in the state’s view, or majority perception of, Asians/Indians since the founding of the modern nation-state.

Asian understanding of the diversity discourse generally demonstrates similar historical attitudes, with the majority of migrants also believing that Asian settlement and immigration is a relatively recent phenomenon. Except for a small domestic minority with multigenerational citizenship, very few migrants are aware of an earlier Asian and African\textsuperscript{530} history in Aotearoa. Scholars of Asian minority history show Indian presence here as early as 1809, and Chinese arrivals from the 1840s, both in exceptionally small numbers,\textsuperscript{531} but here nonetheless. As I have demonstrated, first Asian presence in Aotearoa dates back to 1769, along with the very first arrivals of European vessels to Aotearoa, and places Indian sailors as crew aboard European expeditions of exploration and exploitation. From these accounts, it is possible that hundreds of Indian lascars came to Aotearoa aboard ships during the early years of European settlement. A detailed view of the Muster Rolls of each of the European vessels that visited up to about 1850, along with thorough archival readings and database searches of past newspapers and court cases, tasks beyond the purview of this thesis, would be in order to demonstrate the extent of early Asian participation and to help complete an inclusive history of New Zealand’s founding discourse. The realisation of Asian presence in Aotearoa along with the very first Europeans has the potential to alter Asian understanding of their place in New Zealand, and creates an opportunity

\textsuperscript{530} I have earlier mentioned that African and Pasifika peoples were also known to be aboard the earliest European ships, although their treatment here is beyond the scope of this research.

for new histories to be written and for new shared national identities to be forged.

I have also explored the idea that a refashioned Indo-Kiwi identity could be established through the knowledge and understanding that Indians were present long prior to dates originally assumed; that Indians are not just recent arrivals stealing Kiwi jobs (as the September 2014 outburst of the Pākehā policewoman in Queenstown illustrates), but that they played a vital role in the very foundations of New Zealand history alongside indigenous Māori and their European colonisers. That Indians have a claim, however small, to Aotearoan history and early Māori-European encounter has significant implications for both how majorities perceive minorities and how minorities perceive themselves in relation to majority society. Tauiwi need no longer consider themselves recent arrivals or outsiders needing to be integrated, but rather as having just as much a right as Europeans to live and fully engage in a plural, deeply diverse, New Zealand society. Although the promise of biculturalism remains largely unfulfilled, Māori, as tangata whenua imbued with kaitiakitanga of a multicultural Aotearoa New Zealand, have a unique role and responsibility in actively engaging both Pākehā and non-Pākehā tauiwi in multicultural discourse, and in pursuing improved relations of all kinds, under terms established by the Treaty of Waitangi.

At present, there is a surprising lack of scholarship on Māori-tauiwi relations that should become increasingly important for a steadily pluralising Aotearoa. Today’s diversity discourse therefore appears solidly

532 In an earlier anecdote, I related the tale of an Indian who settled amongst Māori and aided them in dealing with European incursion.

533 Kaitiakitanga refers to Māori guardianship and stewardship (Moorfield 2011).

grounded in either bicultural (a singularly Māori-European affair), or multicultural modes of reference generally focused on the rather ambiguous term ‘race relations,’ itself referring to associations amongst and between all of New Zealand’s various ethnicities, the majority-minority discourse, and sorely underreported indigene-immigrant relations. Walker (1990), Ip (2003a), Kukutai (2008), and Chang (2009) write of growing Māori suspicion regarding ever-increasing Asian immigration, strongly suggesting that Māori-tauīoi relations are equally in need of attention. Ip (2003a:227) rightly states that formal bicultural policies have failed to define the place of non-Maori minorities in a modern multicultural New Zealand, demonstrating that new forms of diversity governance are necessary in a rapidly pluralising New Zealand that already consists of a population in which more than a quarter were born overseas. It is clear that the race relations dialogue needs to increasingly embrace notions of an inclusive shared national identity if it is to make significant progress in its ‘race relations.’

Joris de Bres (2005:291), New Zealand’s former Race Relations Commissioner, recently introduced the need for such an inclusive national identity as an increasingly important race relations issue. Such an identity, he posits, is not easily defined, and “would be a perilous undertaking—opening one up to all sorts of charges of social engineering and political correctness.” I would counter that such an inclusive national identity does not require a guiding hand or potentially intrusive government agency directing its formation, but rather that it already exists in nascent stages and can be unearthed through identification with various forms of belonging and inclusion already experienced by majority and minority alike. At issue is getting all parties actively engaged. Such forms of

Ghosh & Leckie’s (2015) just-released edited volume, and Spoonley’s (2015) included article, begin to address this need.
belonging can easily be found in a shared view of participation in the founding of the modern state. Māori trepidation of rising Asian immigration notwithstanding, de Bres (2005:291) also identified the “changing interpretation of our history” as an element having the potential of contributing to an inclusive sense of belonging, but such an ideal hadn’t been previously articulated. I have discussed in Chapter Two such activities as communal service in war, and such experiences as a shared sense of colonial history (which could help in better articulating improved Māori-tauiwi relations), or enthusiasm for national sporting events, singing the national anthem, civic engagement, participation in national elections, realising citizenship, or in local, regional and national communal activities that tie participants to shared common goals; all are psychologically vital for experiences of inclusion and belonging. A shared national identity can thus be the instrument through which migrants and minorities can better participate and integrate into majority society. And majorities, being aware of such shared experiences, can hopefully be more welcoming of minorities into majority society. What remains is for majorities to be better at or work harder on the sharing part, and for Māori, as tangata whenua, to take a leading race relations role in a now deeply diverse Aotearoa. Māori are well placed to take on such a challenge and lead such an initiative.

In focusing on early Indian settlement in New Zealand, I also examined the history of their appearance in the New Zealand Census, beginning in 1851, as it marked the movement from presence to settlement, as sojourners stayed and initial instances of Indian appearance in the census record began. In so doing, this thesis uncovered earlier appearance in the census than was previously known and exposed majority ambivalence and discrimination in historical state treatment of minorities. Such an examination of census history revealed the extent of the obfuscation of
early Indian settlement and provided insight into the state reportage of early non-Māori minorities. A review of census records presented evidence that directly addressed the research objective of establishing that past state treatment of minorities tended to render non-Māori minorities invisible. An examination of early minority treatment in the census focused on their early invisibility from the census record, and demonstrated majority inconsistencies in the early reportage of minority populations, which continues today with the publicly released and freely downloadable census figures for ethnicity from 2013,\textsuperscript{536} in which ‘Indian’ and ‘Fijian Indian’ groups are clearly reported in the data spreadsheets while other Level 3 Indian groups\textsuperscript{537} are subsumed under the Level 2 category of ‘other Asian,’ making it difficult to determine actual numbers.

The summaries of select statistical results from both the 2006 and 2013 Censuses critiqued state reportage of ethnic identity that emerged from existing categories of ethnicity, birthplace, linguistic and religious affiliation, educational attainment and income. Recent censuses have only publicly reported on those who identify their ethnicities as either Indian, usually referred to in the census as ‘Indian nfd’; and ‘Fijian Indian,’ which includes only 5.4\% of those reporting Indian ethnicity, and is therefore not a proxy for Indians born in Fiji (which represented 28.7\% of the entire ‘Indian’ population\textsuperscript{538}). Other reported Indian subethnicities are grossly underreported due to the lack of sufficient prompts on the census forms. Such an examination exposed the disparity between the census’ current use of ethnicity as a classificatory tool and the myriad ways in which minorities choose to identify. The two disparate measures of identity, one objectively imposed by the state, the other constructed on emic self-

\textsuperscript{536} Released in August 2014.

\textsuperscript{537} e.g. ‘Bengali,’ ‘Indian Tamil,’ ‘Punjabi,’ ‘Sikh’ and ‘Anglo Indian.’

\textsuperscript{538} See Table 7.6, based on 2006 Census results.
identification, demonstrated that, while progress has been achieved, majority recognition of minority identities is still largely unfulfilled. This can potentially hinder minority integration and exclude groups from participation in a shared national identity.

Select findings and analysis of a survey of the Indian diaspora in New Zealand demonstrated the depth of self-reported identity not evident in either the 2006 or 2013 Censuses. It also portrayed the continued experience and location of discrimination, as evidenced through responses on employment, self-reported racism and perceptions of personal safety. The stated ethnicities in the official census statistics do not adequately portray the substantial diversities within the Indian population and controvert underlying emergent identities that are equally, if not more, significant. The census statistics therefore present a false notion of a single minority ethnic identity when a more extensive examination and analysis of ethnicity and identity is possible by utilising a deep diversity approach.

9.2 The policy implications of deep diversity

In *The future of multi-ethnic Britain*, Parekh (2000b) makes several recommendations to government policymakers to improve social cohesion in the UK. He cites three especially important guiding principles which must be consistently applied and remain central in all government policy, decision making, and legislation. These three central concepts are cohesion, equality and difference. Other fundamental guidelines included in the Report of the Commission include: addressing racisms, tackling disadvantage, empowering and enfranchising, and a pluralistic culture of human rights (Parekh 2000b). To these I would add some fundamental
guidelines to be considered when formulating or implementing public policies within a deep diversity framework, as below.

All groups within human society have an intrinsic and equal value, and an equal right to exist, no matter the extent of difference that may divide. The fundamental and inherent value of equality for diverse groups exemplifies a basic right to the freedom of existence. This includes a fundamental concern and respect for individuals, groups, subgroups, tribes, associations, populations and all manner of human individual and collective society. No one group should therefore privilege its own beliefs above those of any other. Deep diversity effectively negates the notion of ethnocentrism, the belief in the inherent superiority of one’s own group or culture over others, or as a tendency to view other groups or cultures from the perspective of one’s own. Instead, deep diversity presumes that the beliefs, traditions, customs and languages of all human cultures are inherently of equal value. No particular group or political entity therefore has a right to lessen diversity except in circumstances that are critical to the common good and the functioning of society. This point may be necessarily vague, but it allows for the various interpretations necessary for changing circumstances in a widely diverse array of cultures and social structures that need be taken into account in the formulation and implementation of diversity policy.

In the instance of non-Māori minorities, this can best be achieved through the avoidance of enacting any policy or legislation that gives preferential treatment to any one particular group above any of the others. However, Kymlicka’s (1995) notion of group differentiated rights would need to be the operative value for what he terms ‘national minorities,’ which in a New Zealand context refers to certain differentiated rights for Māori, as tangata whenua. In such instances, ethnically oriented policies may be
permissible as long as they uphold principles that justify differential treatment on the basis of fairness, special needs, or beliefs, and in so far as they do not interfere with the normal functioning of society. Following Parekh (2000b), where an urgent resolution is required for any particular policy initiative that is deemed by the majority to be morally or ethically unacceptable, the operative public values of the wider society should prevail. This provides us with specific guidelines for policy application given the particularities of the New Zealand context, while simultaneously upholding the foundational principles of biculturalism, their importance to Māori, and their incorporation in deeper forms of diversity governance. As earlier mentioned, biculturalism and multiculturalism are not mutually exclusive entities.

Policies targeting migrant and minority populations also need to include specific companion policies especially designed for the host community. Shallow policies are usually designed and implemented for a sole purpose, such as immigration and legislation that determines the porousness of state borders, a separate set of policies designed for the smooth settlement and acculturation of migrant communities, or health and education policies designed specifically for minority uplift. Companion policies that specifically target the majority are wholly absent. These need to be designed in such a way as to educate majorities on the social and economic value of hosting minorities, and should likewise include preparing majorities for minority arrival, as in the way that minorities are expected to learn and adapt to majority values, adhering to the particular sociocultural, legal, economic, religious and linguistic norms of majority society. Majorities are also sorely in need of basic education about minority values and beliefs, and educational programmes designed to further understanding of minorities is either nonexistent or in exceptionally short supply. Such education should allow majorities to
differentiate, for example, Sikh from Muslim, and to achieve a level of understanding of and respect for difference that has the potential to mitigate discrimination and racism.

Particular non-governmental organisations such as the various Interfaith Councils scattered throughout New Zealand’s larger cities are currently engaged in raising awareness of cultural and religious diversity primarily amongst majority populations in need of awareness enhancement. They actively engage both minorities and majorities in common endeavours. Such voluntary associations differ markedly from the numerous Multicultural Councils that already exist in the main centres, but which occupy a different sphere of influence and need; these are largely designed as outlets to further ethnic minority accommodation or representation and do not engage as well with majority society—they speak largely to minorities and have little majority appeal. It is therefore of interest that Multicultural Councils are well-supported throughout New Zealand and have a national governing infrastructure, while Interfaith Councils remain largely unfunded and maintain no national infrastructure. Similarly, agencies that work specifically with minorities, such as settlement support services and refugee or migrant resources, are funded, though poorly, and tend to focus predominantly on social uplift and improved integration. While necessary, their purpose appears to equally assuage majority guilt (Hage 1998) as it does to provide minority aid, albeit while perpetuating paternalistic majority roles as ‘aid givers’ and ‘information bestowers.’ They do however, motivate majorities to engage with minorities and are of great value, but that value largely sustains shallow multiculturalism rather than engage in deeper diversity strategies. Policies that reflect a deeper approach could better equalise resources in this regard, to include those agencies, associations and organisations that are having a larger impact on majority society in addition to those that work with minorities. Social
cohesion is thus a two-way street, requiring the inclusion and active engagement of both minorities and majorities; it is not an arena reserved exclusively for minority actors and majority aid givers. Creating public spaces for engagement and promoting a shared national identity necessitates equal majority participation and effort at social cohesion and should be a major objective of diversity policy initiatives.

New Zealand, however, cannot be accused of inaction on majority engagement. A recent example of government resourcing targeting majorities deserves mention. Quite often, immigration, settlement and integration policies are, in most places, working well for migrant communities, but once settled, individual members of such communities are often unable to find suitable employment. In this instance, companion policies might target host community employers about the economic and social benefits of hiring migrant and minority populations, or improving policies of professional accreditation. As an example, the Office of Ethnic Affairs implemented its EPIC NZ initiative in May 2012, which engages potential employers and educates them about the benefits of hiring minorities, migrants and refugees. Such strategies represent new modes of thinking about minority integration and social cohesion, point toward more equitable policies to come and new models of diversity governance. Yet much remains unknown of their efficacy. New Zealand has yet to fully address issues of professional accreditation in particular fields where labour shortages are pressing and well qualified members of migrant minority communities remain unemployed because they do not possess the domestic qualifications or experience necessary for employment. Much work in this sector remains.

539 The Office of Ethnic Affairs changed its name to the Office of Ethnic Communities in early 2015.
Further, diverse societies are stable and robust when its constituent minority and majority communities are justly recognised and receive equitable shares of economic and political power. This means that policy and legislation must allow for appropriate representation of minority and majority communities at all levels. In some circumstances, this might entail greater representation of minority communities and lesser representation of majority communities. The operative policy here would be that representation should be equal or nearly equal to the percentages within society at large, as best determined by official census or other established means to enumerate its populations and establish the various types of diversity it contains. This exemplifies the continued importance of regular national enumeration and why appropriate categorisation is a fundamental necessity of deep diversity. This would include such distinct demographic entities as ethnicity, gender, religion, and other important measures of particularity determined by the specific composition and circumstance of the state.

Also, most governments and institutions generally have profound structural or organisational limitations that are inherited and deeply entrenched. The removal of institutional and structural discrimination must therefore remain a priority at all levels of government and from within institutions, organisations and associations. Institutional and structural discrimination within society is often a primary reason for minority disadvantage, lower levels of health or educational attainment, and higher crime and incarceration rates. Public and private institutions and organisations need to address these inequities and implement policies designed to mitigate such entrenched hinderances.\textsuperscript{540}

\textsuperscript{540} See Human Rights Commission (2012b) for its discussion paper on addressing structural and institutional discrimination in New Zealand society.
Public policy must also be viewed within the wider context of other relevant state policies; that no single policy should be designed or implemented without reference to related diversity policy initiatives. Policy domains are generally holistic and must be viewed in relation to others purposed to address diversity or accommodate difference. As an example, immigration policies and laws should not be implemented in isolation, but instead need to be viewed within the context of the entire migration complex, and *in conjunction with*, rather than as an afterthought for the migrant receipt of professional accreditation earlier mentioned. Such policies must reference and be synchronised with other outcomes designed for social uplift. Viewing such policy settings as a holistic system, rather than as independent entities, is what drives and motivates integration. When we situate multiculturalism within its larger context, “we see that it is not a rejection of integration, but a renegotiation of the terms of integration” (Kymlicka 1998:24).

In formulating, implementing and monitoring policy, deep diversity must be exceptionally proactive in its responsibilities towards minorities, ensuring that they are not marginalised in any additional ways. Such obligation requires that state policy supersede merely the immigration legislation that determines entry and residence, but also provides for succor during settlement, assistance in obtaining employment, promoting minority identity, and engagement of both minority and majority communities towards full minority participation in civil society, including clear pathways to citizenship. Policy is more than just immigration legislation and settlement support; it must focus equally on the civil institutions and organisations that support minorities, as on the minorities and majorities themselves. Tackling the historically rooted and deeply entrenched forms of structural and institutional discrimination are paramount. Additional policy initiatives are needed to ensure that state
organisations and institutions engage with the communities that comprise the majority, not ones directed just at minority populations. This is where current forms of multiculturalism most often fail and deep diversity begins.

9.3 Significance of the research

This thesis has presented new evidence of state minority treatment through an examination of the Indian diaspora in New Zealand as a case study. It has highlighted the historical treatment of non-Māori minorities through a reexamination of both Aotearoan history and early census records related to the case study. Such an examination underscores the historic invisibility and erasure of non-Māori minorities based on a perceived bicultural past that excludes tauīwi minorities. Establishing non-Māori minority presence at the founding of the modern state is therefore crucial in advancing the notion of a shared multicultural past that has the potential to influence majority and minority understanding of a national identity inclusive of Māori, European and other tauīwi populations.

Revealing new evidence of minority presence and participation in early Aotearoan encounter history also has significant implications for the treatment and inclusion of minorities in the contemporary execution of public policy designed to increase social cohesion and reduce ethnic tension and discrimination.

The research has also demonstrated that state-imposed identity and ethnic categorisation measures, as currently employed on the census for example, may be incompatible with larger policy objectives designed for minority social inclusion—there is an acute disconnect between what the state hopes to achieve and the implementation of its diversity management policies that fails to acknowledge the importance of how minorities may
choose to self-identify. Minority groups that remain poorly identified may have less incentive in social participation than do groups that are more appropriately identified. Māori subgroup identification on the census allows for individual and group participation in the public arena and recognition for the purposes of political accommodation and resource allocation. Failure to apply such standards to other minority groups may magnify inequality, increase marginalisation, and lessen social participation, resulting in an inability to achieve stated policy objectives. More equitable application of policy implementation in the diversity arena may help realise state ambition in improving social cohesion. As such, the research identifies new avenues and highlights areas in which policy is currently deficient. It demonstrates that many policy advances are still required in order to equalise majority and minority participation and to achieve a more appropriate balance between the extent of minority increase and the depth of current diversity policy.

The application of the case study has also made a significant contribution to the understanding of minority treatment in the New Zealand context, and has highlighted some of the obstacles faced by minorities in overcoming discrimination and achieving recognition and accommodation within plural or pluralising societies. It is hoped that the treatment of the Indian situation in both historic and contemporary contexts may have ramifications for other ethnic minorities in New Zealand. This may also have implications for diversity governance within other state contexts, and may help New Zealand advance its own diversity policies and aspirations for providing ‘a fair go for all.’

The Indian population today is arguably New Zealand’s most diverse ethnic community, and hence serves well as a case study, a lens through which a deep diversity framework can be applied. It arguably contains the
greatest ethnic, religious and linguistic heterogeneity of all New Zealand’s ethnic groups, and comprises the largest number of birth countries of all New Zealand’s minorities. An examination of Indian presence and settlement has revealed a previously invisible element of Aotearoan history that not only adds a significant chapter to minority contributions to the founding of the modern state, but also exposes the extent of state complicity and responsibility in the erasure of non-Māori minority participation from history. Such an addition enhances existing historical discourse from being purely bicultural to establishing multicultural presence and participation in the very founding of the modern state. This may allow more inclusive histories to be written. An in-depth examination of historical Indian appearance in the census has exposed state control of a racial discourse that firmly established European hegemony and minority invisibility, especially in the earliest censuses between 1851-1916. A history of state obfuscation of minority participation, through an examination of the most current Indian census data, has exposed continued majority dominance and control of the race relations discourse and its prevailing focus on predominantly bicultural relations at the expense of more multicultural modes of collaboration. This demonstrates that New Zealand, while striving to be a proactive force and a global leader in state management of pluralism, still has much to realise.

Demonstrating both the Indian demographic as presented in the census and through the analysis of a survey of the Indian population today exposed the lacunae between what the state reports about Indian ethnicity and what individual members of the Indian population reveal about themselves. Self-identification thus emerges as a possible element in the construction of identity and enhances a sense of belonging to the nation-state. Revealing the extent of the difference between the two presentations of identity has potentially shown a way forward by providing the same
means of self-identification for members of all ethnicities as are afforded today to Māori. Certainly, the current obfuscation of Level 3 Indian subgroups in the 2013 Census spreadsheets must be addressed. Demonstrating such equality helps advance diversity management to diversity governance.

9.4 Reflections on the study

The identities we end up constructing through the choices we might make of association or group membership all provide what de Bres (2005:292) refers to as “a means of defending and contesting existing power relationships,” i.e. such interactions allow us to continually reassess and reinterpret our participation and integration in society. These choices also both perpetuate and challenge exclusion. When the state prompts Māori to identify iwi, as it does on Census Question 15, it promotes societal inclusion of Māori subgroups and advances bicultural discourse, thereby allowing for greater participation and interest amongst Māori, leading to a greater sense of inclusion, among other reasons. This suggests the still decidedly bicultural lean of existing state diversity policy, perpetuating limited or shallow forms of diversity management which further exclude non-Māori minorities and do little to advance diversity governance and the notion of a shared national identity.

Barth (1969), Wimmer (2013) and Guibernau (2013) also share the belief that identity is constructed through both belonging and exclusion. Belonging, through the choices of association and membership, allows us to experience both a shared sense of national identity and group-subgroup affiliation. This can increase minority participation in society, enhancing social cohesion. The choices imposed by the state through exclusion, tend to alienate or marginalise through separation and division, which
increases inequality. When the state fails to prompt other ethnic minorities for subgroup affiliations, it unintentionally highlights exclusion rather than promoting inclusion. While recognising the unique status of Māori as tangata whenua within New Zealand society, such unequal application of what should be standardised ethnicity prompts for all populations may tend to marginalise non-Māori minorities through the evident differences in how subgroup affiliation is treated and enacted by government institutions. When the state could be sending a message of inclusion, it inadvertently applies asymmetrical standards that perpetuate shallow management forms. This is why self-identification can be such an indispensable tool in improving social cohesion and why its greater importance must be cultivated rather than disregarded. An application of deeper diversity measures would therefore call upon states to equally apply prompts for all subgroups, sending a message of inclusion rather than division. Subgroup affiliation for non-Māori minorities would therefore appear to challenge the state imposition of the single ethnicity ‘Indian’ for example, when further subgroup self-identification is a crucial consideration for promoting inclusion. While census treatment may merely be a single example of this principle, it can, nonetheless, perpetuate inequality and inhibit the advancement of shallow management to deeper forms of diversity governance.

This thesis discussed the importance of self-identification and what Amartya Sen (2006:60) argues is the “mistake of attempting to see human beings in terms of only one affiliation.” However, Sen reminds us that a singularly exclusive identity, one based on prioritising a strong affiliation with a single religious or ‘civilizational identity’ at the expense of one’s other ‘lesser’ identities, can often lead to extreme violence or terrorism. We should therefore come to embrace the very diversity of our own myriad individual heterogeneous identities, all of which can exist simultaneously
(e.g. identities of gender, race, ethnicity, religion, nationality, employment, caste, class) and are negotiated and change based on one’s particular context and circumstance. The stuff that drives religious extremism and violence is the very identification with a supreme overarching principle, the notion that nothing else matters except the annihilation of all those that do not share the same belief or singular identity. It would therefore stand to reason that the very opposite of ethnic ‘lumping’ (borrowing the term from biological taxonomy), the embracing of all of our various collective identities, might help bring about the very civic solidarity, active engagement, and social cohesion of which this thesis speaks.

Homogenising identities, Huntington (1996) warns, runs the risk of heightening ethnic tension by reducing identity to its largest common denominator. While his notion of an impending ‘clash of civilisations’ has been discredited, there are dangers and difficulties associated with reductionist classifications of people according to the largest groups to which they may allegedly ‘belong.’ Similarly, early Marxist analysis tended to categorise individuals as either workers or nonworkers, thereby alienating any other identities they might have possessed—as if one’s occupation was the sole realm of individual identification and all other measures were rendered inert. Through such reductionism “we implicitly give credibility to the allegedly unique importance of that one categorization over all the other ways in which people of the world can be classified” (Sen 2006:41). The potential of such limited categorisation to undermine social cohesion is just one such outcome of shallow and limited forms of diversity management.

The tendency for ethnic lumping should hold as equally true for classifications like ‘Asian’ or ‘European.’ Individuals do not have unidimensional identities unless they are taught or learn to prioritise a
singular identity as being most important, to the exclusion of any other identities they may possess. Such classifications often ignore or deny the existence of the many subgroup affiliations minorities may choose. If states wish to prevent the formation or fomentation of fundamentalism, they need to promote identity diversification over homogenising classification. Such homogenisation creates majorities that harbour limited understandings of diversification (e.g. the inability to distinguish Sikh from Muslim) and only serves to reinforce majority anxiety about ethnic diversity rather than promoting heightened awareness. It also prevents minorities from full participation in society due to poor recognition.

Complicating matters, Putnam (2001) describes American desocialisation based upon a persistent and long-term drop in community activities—that as social beings we are less involved in community memberships, associations and organisations than we were a generation ago, and most of our assorted ‘lesser’ identities have been dismissed for participation in the few that we have prioritised. Such change in our ability to be engaged makes society inherently less cohesive and more vulnerable to unraveling. To counter such effects, I have highlighted the importance of ‘active engagement’ as fundamental to deep diversity, creating a form of civic solidarity that would see individuals embrace their multitudinous identities, whatever they may be, and actively pursue interest in involvement in activities of a civic nature. The importance of subgroup affiliation must be acknowledged for increasing social cohesion. Singular affiliation at the expense of indulging multiple identities may have the opposite effect.

Limited state categorisations in the census reduce identity to uniformity, defining individuals as European, Māori, Asian, for example, as if ethnicity alone defines identity. Human beings cannot be understood or
preeminently classified in terms of the ethnic groups to which they belong—they have underlying layers of identities in addition to the singular ethnic categories with which they may choose to affiliate. To be categorised as ‘Indian’ for example, assumes, to perhaps all other non-Indians, that one is equally similar in other ways to all other ‘Indians,’ when there are underlying regional, linguistic, cultural, behavioural, ancestral and religious differences that perhaps better define ethnicity.

9.5 Future research

Amongst its many objectives, this research set out to identify weaknesses in existing forms of diversity management; it did not purport to solve its associated problems. As such, it set out a framework through which diversity governance can be advanced in an era of superdiversity. Deep diversity should therefore help policymakers design and prioritise new policy objectives, guide implementation and strengthen evaluation procedures. Follow-up research could thus focus on operationalising and prioritising some of the concepts introduced here.

In its treatment of the Indian diaspora in New Zealand, the presentation of the demographic results from the survey I conducted, focused only on those aspects that directly addressed the research objectives, that is, they were focused on the small portion of survey results that spoke to the twin themes of self-reported identity and discrimination, as examples. Analysing the wide variety of themes from the collected data that were beyond the purview of the present research would allow for an exploration of the relationship between other variables and deep diversity. Additional data was collected on such themes as migration pathways, reasons for migration, intent to stay, settlement, sponsorship, remittances, citizenship, employment and income, relevance of educational attainment
to employment, the receipt of government benefits, religion, religious practice and participation, religious conversion, language use and application, the extent of cultural transmission to children, integration into majority society, Māori relations, and political participation. The implications and relationships, if any, of each of the variables within the above listed themes could be further explored.

The analysis of the Indian demographic presented here focused mainly on the ethnicity question in the census, and the extent to which census respondents chose to affiliate as either ‘Indian nfd’ or as ‘Fijian Indian.’ A similar analysis of Indian identity could occur along the lines of country of birth, ancestral home and regional affiliation, religion, language, or the strength of one’s association with either a Kiwi or an Indian identity, instead of just the ethnic classifications or migrant status reported here. In terms of Indian participation in Aotearoan history, this research has only identified presence and activity as occurring along with the very first European arrivals. Further research documenting the nature and extent of its earliest participation would be in order. Archival research of additional Muster Rolls and ship logs and diaries of each of the early European vessels that visited Aotearoa would indeed be in order, and a thorough reading of newspapers past might reveal relevant anecdotes to construct a more realistic history of other early minority presence during European settlement.

Applying a deep diversity framework has also helped augment the importance that a shared national identity has to minority integration. Exploring the extent of this relationship, as well as its implications, should be of primary importance for future research. How important is this relationship for social cohesion? In addition to minority participation in a common history, what additional factors can be identified that could
potentially contribute to a shared national identity? How might majority perception influence the adoption of a shared national identity and influence social cohesion? Indeed, what role might a shared national identity play in mitigating discrimination and racism, if any? What other ways can be identified for majority participation in active engagement?

Themes of appropriate minority political representation were introduced and a potential model for quantifying that engagement discussed. Although limited in scope in terms of its presentation in this thesis, it may be possible to apply it to other minorities in New Zealand to determine if the percentage of existing political representation is commensurate with the minority’s percentage of the total population of New Zealand. These comparisons could be applied to minority representation in other countries and compared. As a starting point, this model also suggests that quantifying a deep diversity framework may indeed be possible in areas other than appropriate political representation. This would warrant further analysis.

Many questions, however, remain. Are the results of an analysis of the Indian demographic, and the implications they may have on public policy, relevant to other ethnic groups in New Zealand? How extensive is existing diversity? What measures represent best practice at quantifying diversity? Should policies that have aided Māori cultural resurgence be put in place for tauiwi? Should non-Māori minorities have similar rights to declare subgroup affiliation on the national census as do Māori? These questions, and others, suggest multiple avenues for further research.
9.6 Summary conclusion: a deep diversity framework for New Zealand?

Overall, this thesis has presented an alternative historical account, that both remedies the invisibility of non-Māori minority contributions and destabilises the sequence and issues of priority that have been evident in the bicultural discourse, demonstrating that such minorities have been a fundamental part of nation building since the inception of Māori-European encounter. While this unsettles the existing settlement narrative and the primary considerations of biculturalism, deep diversity, as an alternative approach to diversity management, offers a multicultural governance framework that builds upon the accomplishments and successes of the bicultural discourse, however limited, and acknowledges the multicultural nature of contemporary Aotearoa New Zealand.

Yet much progress remains. Spoonley (2015:51) states that “the more problematic issues relate to the recognition of minority ethnic rights alongside the rights of tangata whenua.” Yet deep diversity does not presume a multicultural appropriation of the bicultural endeavour, or that the bicultural discourse diminish in any perceptible way. Rather, it builds upon the foundational outcomes of biculturalism while enabling both to evolve and mature in combination or close association. The recognition of both contemporaneous discourses positions Māori as indigenous kaitiaki, well-placed to affirm and lead Aotearoa New Zealand’s existing diversity to a more deeply heterogenous future. Biculturalism and multiculturalism are therefore not seen as “problematic” contending isms jostling for prominence in the diversity discourse, but rather as positive

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541 e.g. recognition of indigenous rights, heightened collaboration in national institutions, greater Māori social and political participation, Treaty redress and settlement.

542 guardians, stewards (Moorfield 2011).
complementary and interdependent ideologies that ground a modern Aotearoan New Zealand ethic. It’s a part of our shared national identity.

The alternative history, census scrutiny, and survey data presented in the substantive chapters of this thesis are linked through an analysis informed by a deep diversity framework, which serves as the thread that weaves the disparate historic, demographic and statistical approaches evident in Part II together. In such an analysis, the elemental motifs of identity and invisibility have served as the unifying stream cohering an historic past to continued contemporary practices that perpetuate state hegemony and assertion of majority values over minority aspirations. The invisibility of non-Māori minority groups from the historic settlement narrative, the homogenising of ethnicity in the contemporary diversity discourse, and continued state disregard of the significance of self-identification (especially evident in the domain of census enumeration), perpetuate both majority dominance of social and political discourse and the subaltern status of minorities and their subgroups. Historic and contemporary state handling of identity and invisibility concerns only serves to reinforce and perpetuate discrimination at individual, group, institutional, and structural levels, highlighting the need for change in diversity policy from existing top-down patriarchal management to more inclusive and equitable governance strategies.

The perpetuation and experience of racism and discrimination in society raises interesting issues about the nature of tolerance and minority rights. How far should majority tolerance extend? More importantly, is tolerance alone enough? A lesson of deep diversity is that majorities must work harder at social cohesion; that mere tolerance of difference will never be enough to achieve it. Toleration implies an insignificant acknowledgement of the existence and difference of ‘others,’ and ignores any practical
engagement. It should be abundantly clear that moving beyond tolerance is crucial for social cohesion and for establishing a deep diversity framework. Spoonley (2015:51) rightly laments that “a new multiculturalism [is] now apparent,” but has “yet to be reflected in policy.” Are such achievements even possible for New Zealand to realise? Further, how far should minorities press for recognition and accommodation? What are majority’s limits in the face of what may be deemed to be unnecessary minority demands? What responses are therefore appropriate in a society moving beyond tolerance?

A further challenge for deep diversity is how states might contend with and react to threats to its domestic and global security. If society believes that minorities threaten national security, then, according to Kymlicka (2010b:86) “the space for multiculturalism disappears.” If however, states emphasise the importance of social cohesion and a shared national identity, implement their diversity policies equally with majority and minority alike, and are responsive to minority calls for appropriate accommodation and political representation where reasonable, will that be enough to reduce racism and mitigate structural and institutional discrimination? A shared national identity, at least, may be just the beginning for a deepening diversity to take hold in Aotearoa New Zealand, and can be an instrument through which social cohesion may best be achieved.

The challenge is how to keep building in our small nation the tolerance and mutual respect for each other which allows diverse peoples to live alongside each other in peace. Trying to enforce a monoculture which doesn’t allow for diversity of culture, heritage, and belief would be a disaster for New Zealand. Trying to force everyone into a mythical mainstream would blow up in our face. In our nation building, the unifying concept must be love for our country— whoever we are and whatever our backgrounds. Proud Kiwis can be of any religion, faith, or belief; of any ethnic or cultural background; of any gender or orientation. The New Zealand way must be to build unity in diversity, to avoid marginalisation, to practise inclusion in the national interest, and to encourage all those who want to be part of the building of New Zealand (Clark 2005).
Given its bicultural history and the current extensive ethnic diversity, New Zealand can become an exemplar of social cohesion if it boldly embraces policies and practices informed by deep diversity.
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Outten, H. Robert, Michael Schmitt, Daniel Miller, and Amber Garcia

Owens, John M.R.

Pakulski, Jan and Stefan Markowski

Palakshapa, T.C.


Palat, Ravi

Palmquist, J., and A. Stueve

Palsetia, Jesse S.

Panda, Abinash and Rajen K. Gupta

Papa, Rahui and Paul Meredith.

Papademetriou, Demetrios

Paradies, Yin C.
Parasher, Paritosh

Parekh, Bhikhu

Park, Geoff

Park, Shee-Jeong

Parsons, Vivienne

Patel, Kamla

Patel, Shanti

Patsiurko, Natalka, John L. Campbell and John A. Hall

Paymaster, R.
Peace, Robin, Paul Spoonley, Andrew Butcher, Damian O’Neill

Peach, Ceri

Pearson, David

Pearson, Michael

Penninx, Rinus

Perry, T. M.

Peskin, Lawrence A. and Edmund F. Wehrle

Peters, Winston and Joshua Van Veen

Peytchev, Andy, Mick Couper, Sean Estaban McCabe and Scott Crawford

Phillips, Anne

Phillips, Jock


Piekarski, Linda, Gwen Kaplan and Jessica Prestegaard

Pike, Kenneth Lee

Pincus, Fred


Pio, Edwina


Poata-Smith, Evan Te Ahu


Pool, Ian
Poot, Jacques

Porter, Stephen and Michael Whitcomb

Portes, Alejandro

Portes, Alejandro and Min Zhou

Portes, Alejandro, Patricia Fernández-Kelly and William Haller

Pouwhare, Robert

Powley, Katherine

Praat, Angelique

Prasad, Shiu

Pratt, Douglas

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Prewitt, Kenneth

Principe, Michael

Prins, Baukje and Sawitri Saharso

Prosser, Richard

Putnam, Robert

Pybus, T.A.

Qaisar, Jan A.

Quddus, Jawaid

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Rabel, Roberto

Raj, Dhooleka Sarhadi

Raj, Yashwant
Rajagopal, Arvind

Ram, Monder, Trevor Jones, Paul Edwards, Alexander Kiselinchev, and Lovemore Muchenje

Ramirez, Deborah A., Jennifer Hoopes and Tara Lai Quinlan

Rata, Elizabeth

Rata, Elizabeth and Roger Openshaw

Rawls, John

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Redhead, Mark

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Sandel, Michael

Sandercock, Leone

Sastri, Nilakanta

Sauermann, Henry and Michael Roach

Sax, Linda, Shannon Gilmartin and Alyssa Bryant

Scheffer, Paul

Schillewaert, Niels and Pascale Meulemeester

Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr.
Schönwälder, Karen

Schoorl, J., L. Heering, I. Esveldt, G. Groenewold and R. van der Erf

Schwandt, Thomas

Scott, Keith

Scott, Robert and Arnold Shore

Sedgwick, Charles P.

Sellers, Robert, and J. Nicole Shelton

Sellers, Robert, Nikeea Copeland-Linder, Pamela Martin and R. L’Heureux Lewis

Sen, Amartya

Sen, Amartya and Bernard Williams

Shameem, N.
Sharma, Swati

Sharp, Andrew

Shepard, William

Sheth, Manju

Shi, Tongyun

Shih, Tse-Hua and Xitao Fan

Shin, Eunjung, Timothy Johnson and Kumar Rao

Shukla, Sandhya

Shulha, Lyn and Robert Wilson

Sibley, Chris and James Liu
Silberman, Roxane, Richard Alba and Irène Fournier  

Simi, Pete and Robert Futrell  

Simon, Patrick  

Simon, Patrick and Valérie Sala Pala  

Simon, Patrick and Victor Piché  

Simon, Thomas W.  

Simpson, Tony  

Sinclair, Keith  

Singh, Gurharpal  

Singh, Gurtej and Verpal Singh  

Singh, S.  

Singh, Teena  

Skeldon, Ronald  
Skerry, Peter  

Skutnabb-Kangas, Tove  

Smallman, Elton  

Smith, James P. and Barry Edmonston (eds.)  

Smith, Mark K.  

Smith, M. A., and B. Leigh  

Smith, Philippa Mein  

Smith, Thomas  

Smits, Katherine  

Snipp, C. Matthew  

Solomos, J.  

Somerville, Will  

Song, Sarah  

Sowell, Thomas  
Spivak, Gayatri

Spolsky, Bernard

Spoonley, Paul

Spoonley, Paul and Richard Bedford

Spoonley, Paul and Andrew Butcher

Spoonley, Paul, and W. Hirsh

Spoonley, Paul, and Erin Tolley (eds.)

Spoonley, Paul, and Andrew Trlin
Spoonley, Paul, Philip Gendall and Andrew Trlin (eds.)  

Spoonley, Paul, Cluny MacPherson, David Pearson, and C. Sedgwick (eds.)  

Spoonley, Paul, David Pearson and Cluny Macpherson (eds.)  

Spoonley, Paul, Cluny MacPherson, David Pearson, and C. Sedgwick (eds.)  

Srinivas, M.N.  

Stacey, Judith  

Stanley, Dick  

Stasiulis, Daiva K.  

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Stavenhagen, Rodolfo

Steeh, Charlotte, Nicole Kirgis, Brian Cannon and Jeff DeWitt

Stein, Peter

Stéphanie, Anne-gaëlle Vieille

Stiebel, Lindy

Stoker, Valerie

Stone, John

Strauss, Leo and Joseph Cropsey

Stromer, Mark

Stüssi, Marcel

Sullivan, Ann
Sutton, Douglas G.  

Swarbrick, Nancy  

Swords, Meg  

Sydney Morning Herald  

Taher, Mohommod  


Takaki, Ronald  


Tan, Lincoln  

Tapp, E.J.  

Tarumoto, Hideki  

Tashakkori, Abbas and Charles Teddlie (eds.)  

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Taylor, Charles  

Taylor, Phil

Teaiwa, Teresia and Sean Mallon

Teik, Khoo Boo

Temm, Paul

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Thorp, Daniel

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Tinker, Hugh

Tishkov, Valery
Tiwari, Kapil N.

Toepoel, Vera, Marcel Das and Arthur Van Soest


Trlin, Andrew

Trlin, Andrew, A. Henderson and N. North

Trouteaud, Alex R.

Tsatsanis, Emmanouil

Tuckel, Peter and Harry O’Neill

Tuffin, Keith, Angelique Praat and Karen Frewin

Tyler, Stephen A.

United Nations

United Nations Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination


US Census Bureau

US Department of State

van Leeuwen, Roel

van Meijl, Toon


van Selm, Martine and Nicholas W. Jankowski

Vasil, Raj

Vasil, Raj and Hong-key Yoon

Vass, Beck

Vasta, Ellie
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Vertovec, Steven

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Walsh, Rebecca

Walzer, Michael

Wanhalla, Angela

Ward, Colleen and En-Yi Lin

Ward, Colleen and James Liu

Ward, Colleen and Anne-Marie Masgoret

Ward, Colleen and Jamie Stuart

Warder, Michael

Waters, Mary C.
Watson, Geoff


Wearing, Brian

Weber, Max

Weller, Paul

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Williams, Alan

Williams, Fiona

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Williamson, Timothy

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Wilson, Alan and Nial Laskey

Wilson, John

Wilson, Kathleen

Wilson, Kerry Jane

Wimmer, Andreas
Winder, Virginia  

Winkelmann, Rainer  

Wolf, Eric  

Wolfe, Patrick  

Wolff, Robert Paul  

Wood, Emma and Bernard Guerin  

Wrench, John  

Wright, Kevin B.  

Xenakis, Sappho  

Yang, Jeff  

Yin, Robert K.  


Yip, Tiffany, Gilbert Gee, David Takeuchi  
Young, Crawford  

Young, Iris Marion  

Young, Rachel, Andrea Vance and Kate Chapman  

Young, Steven  

Zakaria, Fareed  

Zapata-Barrero, Richard  

Zodgekar, Arvind  

Zolberg, Aristide R.  

Zubrzycki, Jerzy  
PART IV: APPENDICES

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### APPENDIX A:
Summary of census statistics reporting ethnicity, 1851-1926
(Summarised from both the official census reports and separate Māori estimates)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>European</th>
<th>Pacific</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
<td>n</td>
<td>%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1851</td>
<td>26,707</td>
<td>92.5</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td>59,398</td>
<td>50.6</td>
<td>56,049</td>
<td>47.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>99,021</td>
<td>59.8</td>
<td>56,336</td>
<td>34.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1864</td>
<td>172,158</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>218,668</td>
<td>85.0</td>
<td>38,540</td>
<td>15.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>256,393</td>
<td>86.8</td>
<td>37,502</td>
<td>12.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>294,698</td>
<td>85.4</td>
<td>45,470</td>
<td>13.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>409,979</td>
<td>89.5</td>
<td>43,395</td>
<td>9.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>484,923</td>
<td>90.8</td>
<td>44,097</td>
<td>8.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1886</td>
<td>573,940</td>
<td>92.5</td>
<td>41,969</td>
<td>6.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1891</td>
<td>622,214</td>
<td>93.1</td>
<td>41,953</td>
<td>6.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>699,603</td>
<td>94.1</td>
<td>39,834</td>
<td>5.4</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>769,838</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>43,112</td>
<td>5.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>886,002</td>
<td>93.4</td>
<td>47,701</td>
<td>5.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>1,005,823</td>
<td>93.9</td>
<td>49,829</td>
<td>4.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>1,096,244</td>
<td>94.3</td>
<td>49,771</td>
<td>4.3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>1,213,475</td>
<td>91.8</td>
<td>52,751</td>
<td>4.0</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>1,338,167</td>
<td>91.5</td>
<td>63,670</td>
<td>4.4</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

### NOTES:

a. 'European,' in the following census years, referred to:

- 1851: 'European' (1,209,239) and 'European-Māori' living with European (4,236)
- 1858: 'Europeans' (1,332,095), 'European-Māori quarter-castes' (6,053), and 'European, not specified, but apparently European (19)

b. While Māori were excluded from the national census until 1951, I am including the totals (which were usually represented by estimates taken at the time). In the following years, these referred to:

- 1926: 'Māori' (45,429), 'Māori-European' (11,609), and 'Māori-European three-quarter castes' (6,632)

c. Other Asian referred to the following in the listed census years, below:

- 1851: 'Afghans' (2), 'Asiatic Jews' (5), 'Asiatic Turks' (1), 'Japanese' (59), 'Javanese' (1), 'Sinhalese' (12), 'Thai' (1)
- 1858: 'Armenians' (2), 'Asiatic Turks' (1), 'Asiatic Jews' (68), 'Japanese' (38), 'Sinhalese' (18), 'Javanese' (4), 'Malays' (14), 'Siamese' Thai (1)
- 1861: 'Armenians' (2), 'Asiatic Jews' (5), 'Japanese' (50), 'Japanese-Māori' (9), Indian-Māori (9), 'Sinhalese' (5), 'Filipino' (16), 'Javanese' (1), 'Malays' (3)

d. 'Pacific' referred to the following in the listed census years, below:
1906: ‘Cook and other annexed islands’
1911: ‘Cook and other annexed islands’
1916: ‘Cook and other annexed islands (12,797),’ ‘Polynesian, other and undefined’ (151), ‘Fijians’ (29), and ‘Melanesians’ (18)
1921: ‘Population of Cook and other annexed Pacific Islands’ (13,209), ‘Population of the Mandated Territory of Western Samoa’ (36,343), ‘Polynesian, other and undefined’ (360), ‘Melanesians’ (21)
1926: ‘Population of Cook and other annexed Pacific Islands’ (13,863), ‘Population of the Mandated Territory of Western Samoa’ (40,229), ‘Population of Tokelau Islands Dependency’ (1,033), ‘Polynesian-Māori (39),’ ‘Polynesian, not further-defined’ (549), ‘Fijian’ (109), ‘Melanisians (3)

e. ‘Other’ included populations not otherwise included in the previous columns of the above table, and consisted of the following in the listed census years, below:
1851: ‘Military and their families’
1858: ‘Military and their families’
1861: ‘Military and their families’ (7,294) and ‘Gold miners at Otago’ (3,000)
1871: ‘Military and their families’
1891: ‘Moriori at Chatham Islands’
1896: ‘Moriori at Chatham Islands’
1906: ‘Moriori at Chatham Islands’
1911: ‘Moriori at Chatham Islands’
1921: ‘Australian Aboriginals (4),’ ‘American Indians’ (4), ‘West Indians’ from the West Indies (41), ‘Arabs’ (3), ‘Egyptians’ (3), ‘Syrians’ (707), ‘Abyssinians’ (8), ‘Negroes’ (96), ‘Other half-castes, unspecified (59),’ ‘non-Europeans, not further defined’ (49)
APPENDIX B:
Summary of census statistics reporting religious affiliation, 1851-1926

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Christian</th>
<th>Jewish</th>
<th>Hindu</th>
<th>Islam</th>
<th>Buddhist</th>
<th>Other Religions</th>
<th>Other</th>
<th>Total Stated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1851</td>
<td>25,110</td>
<td>97.8</td>
<td>65</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>496</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1858</td>
<td>57,130</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>188</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>968</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>1,560</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1861</td>
<td>89,701</td>
<td>90.6</td>
<td>326</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>8,993</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1864</td>
<td>166,411</td>
<td>98.2</td>
<td>955</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2,174</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1867</td>
<td>211,363</td>
<td>95.4</td>
<td>1,262</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3,195</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1871</td>
<td>239,542</td>
<td>93.7</td>
<td>1,262</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>2.4</td>
<td>8,630</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1874</td>
<td>284,235</td>
<td>95.2</td>
<td>1,215</td>
<td>0.4</td>
<td>39</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>135</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1878</td>
<td>393,747</td>
<td>95.4</td>
<td>1,424</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>103</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>17,356</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1881</td>
<td>463,281</td>
<td>94.8</td>
<td>1,536</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>237</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>23,543</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1884</td>
<td>542,243</td>
<td>94.2</td>
<td>1,559</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>431</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>31,380</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1889</td>
<td>594,334</td>
<td>95.0</td>
<td>1,463</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>493</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>29,080</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1896</td>
<td>670,358</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>1,549</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3,391</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>563</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1901</td>
<td>739,401</td>
<td>95.8</td>
<td>1,611</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2,432</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>706</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1906</td>
<td>846,566</td>
<td>95.5</td>
<td>1,867</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1,452</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>1,410</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1911</td>
<td>949,954</td>
<td>94.4</td>
<td>2,128</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1,501</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>1,858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1916</td>
<td>1,063,296</td>
<td>95.8</td>
<td>2,341</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>97</td>
<td>1,433</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>12,489</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1921</td>
<td>1,162,851</td>
<td>97.6</td>
<td>2,380</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>402</td>
<td>22,212</td>
<td>1.9</td>
<td>3,919</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1926</td>
<td>1,261,594</td>
<td>93.7</td>
<td>2,591</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>359</td>
<td>15,553</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>65,647</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

NOTES:

a. ‘Other Religions’ included, in the following years:
- 1886: ‘Spiritualist’ (252), and ‘Other Religions’ (179)
- 1891: ‘Spiritualist’ (339), and ‘Other Religions’ (154)
- 1896: ‘Zoroastrian’ (2), ‘Spiritualist’ (376), and ‘Other Religions’ (187)
- 1901: ‘Zoroastrian’ (3), ‘Spiritualist’ (499), and ‘Other Religions’ (204)
- 1906: ‘Zoroastrian’ (1), ‘Spiritualist’ (1,054), and ‘Other Religions’ (355)
- 1911: ‘Sikh’ (1), ‘Zoroastrian’ (2), ‘Spiritualist’ (1,197), Sikh (1) and ‘Other Religions’ (657)
- 1916: ‘Sikh’ (18), ‘Other Religions’ (12,471)
- 1921: ‘Sikh’ (38), ‘Bahá’í’ (2), ‘Chinese Religions’ (2,100), ‘Other Religions’ (20,072)

b. ‘Other’ included, in the following years:
- 1851: ‘Non-Sectarians’
- 1858: ‘No Denomination’
- 1861: ‘No Denomination’
- 1867: ‘Pagans, Chinese, and Heathens’ (1,111)
- 1871: ‘Object to answering’
1874: ‘Pagans’ (4,764), ‘No Denomination’ (1,281), ‘No Religion’ (152), ‘Object’ (6,760)
1878: ‘Pagans’ (4,379), ‘No Denomination’ (2,211), ‘No Religion’ (202), ‘Object’ (10,564)
1886: ‘Pagans’ (4,472), ‘No Denomination’ (6,046), ‘No Religion’ (973), ‘Object’ (19,889)
1891: ‘Pagans’ (3,928), ‘No Denomination’ (8,252), ‘No Religion’ (1,558), ‘Object’ (15,342)
1896: ‘No Denomination’ (8,535), ‘No Religion’ (1,875), ‘Object’ (15,967)
1901: ‘No Denomination’ (4,799), ‘No Religion’ (4,550), ‘Object’ (18,295)
1906: ‘No Denomination’ (9,339), ‘No Religion’ (1,709), ‘Object’ (24,325)
1911: ‘No Denomination’ (9,177), ‘No Religion’ (5,529), ‘Object’ (35,905)
1916: ‘No Religion’ (4,311), ‘Object’ (25,577)
1921: ‘No Religion’ (3,919)
1926: ‘No Religion’ (2,838), ‘Don’t Know’ (224), ‘Object’ (62,585)
**APPENDIX C:**
Detailed occupations of Indians recorded in 1916 (Census of 1916, p. 147).

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupation:</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Totals</th>
<th></th>
<th></th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Females</td>
<td>No.</td>
<td>Percent</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ministering to religion, charity, health, education, &amp;c.</td>
<td>1 -</td>
<td>1 -</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engaged in supplying board and lodging</td>
<td>12 -</td>
<td>12 -</td>
<td>12</td>
<td>6.63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engaged in domestic service and attendance*</td>
<td>8 5</td>
<td>13</td>
<td>7.18</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing in property and finance</td>
<td>1 -</td>
<td>1 -</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.55</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing in art and mechanic production</td>
<td>4 -</td>
<td>4 -</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing in textile fabrics, dress &amp; fibrous materials</td>
<td>1 -</td>
<td>1 -</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing in food, drinks, narcotics, and stimulants</td>
<td>38 -</td>
<td>38</td>
<td>20.99</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing in animals, animal and vegetable substances</td>
<td>3 -</td>
<td>3 -</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dealing in metals and other minerals</td>
<td>1 -</td>
<td>1 -</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General and undefined merchants and dealers</td>
<td>5 -</td>
<td>5 -</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engaged in traffic on seas and rivers**</td>
<td>2 -</td>
<td>2 -</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working in art and mechanic production</td>
<td>2 1</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working in textile fabrics, dress and fibrous materials</td>
<td>5 -</td>
<td>5 -</td>
<td>2.76</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working in food, drinks, narcotics, and stimulants</td>
<td>6 -</td>
<td>6 -</td>
<td>3.31</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Working in metals and other minerals</td>
<td>9 -</td>
<td>9 -</td>
<td>4.97</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engaged in construction of buildings, roads, railways &amp;c</td>
<td>1 -</td>
<td>1 -</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engaged in disposal of the dead or of refuse</td>
<td>4 -</td>
<td>4 -</td>
<td>2.21</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engaged in undefined industrial pursuits</td>
<td>3 -</td>
<td>3 -</td>
<td>1.66</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engaged in agricultural pursuits**</td>
<td>24 -</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>13.26</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engaged in pastoral pursuits***</td>
<td>26 -</td>
<td>26</td>
<td>14.36</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engaged in mining and quarrying</td>
<td>2 -</td>
<td>2 -</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dependent on natural guardians****</td>
<td>6 8</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>7.73</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Supported by voluntary or State contributions</td>
<td>2 -</td>
<td>2 -</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Criminal class (under legal detention)</td>
<td>1 -</td>
<td>1 -</td>
<td>0.55</td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td>167</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>181</td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**NOTE:** *=includes 1 female half-caste; **= includes 1 male half-caste; ***=includes 2 male half-castes; ****=includes 2 male half castes and 5 female half-castes.
APPENDIX D:
Industries of the ethnic Indian population, Census of 1926.
(Source: 1926 Census, Vol. VI ‘Race Aliens,’ p. 28-29.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>INDUSTRY:</th>
<th>Gender</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Males</td>
<td>Females</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agricultural and pastoral:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sheep farming</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairy farming</td>
<td>40</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed farming and farming undefined</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market gardening</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bush-felling and scrub cutting</td>
<td>20</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forestry:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bush sawmilling</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mining and quarrying:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gold mining</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Road metal, gravel, and sand pits</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manufactures and industrial:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brickworks, &amp;c.</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Foundries and general engineering</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flax milling</td>
<td>41</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailoring</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dressmaking</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Boot repairs</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Confectionary (sugar)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Job and general printing</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photography</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Building and construction:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Roads, construction and maintenance</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railways and tramways</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Land drainage</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Transport and communication:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Railway service</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrying and cartage services</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shipping service</td>
<td>36</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Loading and discharging vessels</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Table continued on next page)
### Industries of the ethnic Indian population, Census of 1926.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Industry Type</th>
<th>Count</th>
<th>Percentage</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td><strong>Commerce and Finance</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Groceries and provisions</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2.25</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Vegetables and fruit</td>
<td>136</td>
<td>73.07</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tobacco, &amp;c., including hairdressers &amp; tobacconists</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cycles, motor-vehicles, and accessories</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>0.54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Textiles, clothing, drapery, &amp;c.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1.57</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scrap metal, waste materials, old bottles</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>10.02</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fancy goods and toys</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1.05</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawking and street selling</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>12.79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>General stores and mixed businesses</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>8.18</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>4.86</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td>100</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| **Public administration and professional**             |       |            |
| General government, administrative, n.e.i.*            | 1     | 0.41       |
| Local government administrative, n.e.i.*               | 3     | 1.57       |
| Legal profession                                      | 1     | 0.54       |
| Religion, persons connected w/ places of worship      | -1    | -0.54      |
| Hospital staff, incl. mental staff & attendants       | -2    | -1.05      |
| Kindergarten, primary, and secondary schools          | 2     | 1.05       |
| Other                                                  | 3     | 1.57       |
| **Total**                                              |       | 1.93       |

| **Recreation**                                         |       |            |
| Theatrical and other entertainers                      | 1     | 0.54       |
| Other                                                  | 2     | 1.05       |
| **Total**                                              |       | 0.30       |

| **Personal and domestic service**                      |       |            |
| Private domestic service                               | 4     | 2.17       |
| Licensed hotels and accommodation houses               | 38    | 19.61      |
| Private hotels and boarding houses                     | 32    | 16.52      |
| Restaurants, soda-fountains, &c.                       | 1     | 0.54       |
| Laundries, job-dyeing, and dry cleaning                | 1     | 0.54       |
| Other                                                  | 2     | 1.05       |
| **Total**                                              |       | 10.74      |

| **Other industry, or not specified**                   |       |            |
| Industry not specified                                 | 68    | 34.37      |
| Retired                                                | 3     | 1.57       |
| Dependent on natural guardians                         | 87    | 43.67      |
| Hospital inmates, orphanages, institutions             | 7     | 3.52       |
| Inmates of gaols, industrial schools, &c.              | 3     | 1.57       |
| **Total**                                              |       | 30.50      |

**TOTAL: 810 177 987 100**
APPENDIX E:
Reported occupations of the ethnic Indian population, 1926 Census.
(Source: 1926 Census, Vol. VI 'Race Aliens,' p. 30-32. Includes subcategories omitted from Table 6.12.)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>OCCUPATIONS:</th>
<th>Indians</th>
<th>Total</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Agriculture and pastoral occupations:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mixed farming and farming undefined</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dairy-farmer</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Market gardening</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Relative assisting on farm, n.o.d.*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Farm labourer</td>
<td>93</td>
<td>93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Ploughman</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Teamster</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Milkman (undefined)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sharemilker</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Forest occupations:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bushman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Log-hauler</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Scrub-cutter, bushfeller (not mill)</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firewood-cutter</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Post-splitter</td>
<td>10</td>
<td>10</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kauri-gum digger, bleeder</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flax cutter</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>16</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Miners and quarrymen:</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Collier, coal-miner, n.o.d.*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Non-precious metal workers, electrical fittings, &amp;c.</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coppersmith</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Electric lineman, telegraph lineman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fitter (not range-fitter)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Plumber</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers in fibrous materials other than clothing</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Flaxmill hand, n.e.i.*</td>
<td>17</td>
<td>17</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Workers in clothing and dress</td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tailor</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Dressmaker</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinist (clothing)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bootmaker (not factory)</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(Notes: *n.e.i. = not elsewhere identifiable, n.o.d. = not otherwise described.)

(Table continued on next page)
APPENDIX E: (continued)
Reported occupations of the ethnic Indian population, 1926 Census.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Workers in food, drink, and tobacco</th>
<th>3</th>
<th>0.31</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Brewer (ale, stout)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Workers in wood</th>
<th>11</th>
<th>1.13</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Carpenter</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Machinist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sawmill hand, n.e.i.*</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Printing machinist</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Photographers</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Workers in building and construction, n.e.i.:</th>
<th>35</th>
<th>3.59</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Contractor</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Navvy</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Drainer, ditcher</td>
<td>25</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Workers in transport and communication:</th>
<th>44</th>
<th>4.51</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Steward (marine)</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Donkeyman (marine)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fireman, stoker (marine)</td>
<td>14</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal trimmer</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Seaman, boatswain</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waterside worker</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Engine-driver (locomotive)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Driver, motor-lorry, motor-bus, &amp;c.</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Carrier, carter</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Messenger (other than telegraph)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telegraph messenger</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Commercial occupations:</th>
<th>213</th>
<th>21.85</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Employer, n.e.i.*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Manager</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Soft goods merchant</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Coal and firewood dealer</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Storekeeper, shopkeeper, retailer</td>
<td>15</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hairdresser, barber</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hairdresser and tobacconist (combined)</td>
<td>7</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hawker, pedlar</td>
<td>82</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Grocer, provision-merchant</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Greengrocer, fruitier</td>
<td>55</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Agent, n.o.d.*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buyer (not livestock)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Salesman, canvasser (not insurance)</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Shop assistant, shopman</td>
<td>34</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Commercial traveller</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX E: (continued)
Reported occupations of the ethnic Indian population, 1926 Census.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Public administration:</th>
<th>5</th>
<th>0.51</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>School-teacher (State school)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nurse (hospital)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Probationer (hospital)</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Firebrigadesman</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Clerical and professional occupations:</th>
<th>12</th>
<th>1.23</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Medical practitioner, doctor, surgeon</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Law clerk, conveyancing clerk</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sister of Mercy, compassion, &amp;c., nun</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Civil servant, n.o.d.*</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Insurance clerk</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Clerk, n.e.i.</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Typist, stenographer</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Student, n.o.d.*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Occupations connected with sport &amp; recreation:</th>
<th>2</th>
<th>0.21</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ticket-taker, gate or door keeper</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Personal and domestic occupations:</th>
<th>113</th>
<th>11.59</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Manager (not hotel)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Cook, chef</td>
<td>27</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kitchenman, sculleryman</td>
<td>22</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Pantryman</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Houseman, housemaid</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic servant</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Laundry employee, n.o.d.*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hotel porter</td>
<td>19</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Waiter</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Others</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Other ill-defined occupations:</th>
<th>94</th>
<th>9.64</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Labourer, n.o.d.*</td>
<td>67</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Factory hand, n.o.d.*</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bottle gatherer</td>
<td>9</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not specified (age 16 years or over)</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Persons not actively employd in gainful occupation:</th>
<th>230</th>
<th>23.59</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Retired farmer or farm manager</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Convict, gaol prisoner</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Mental hospital patient</td>
<td>4</td>
<td>2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Invalid, hospital patient (not mental)</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Inmate of benevolent institution</td>
<td>1</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Not specified (children under 16 years)</td>
<td>87</td>
<td>79</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Domestic duties</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>49</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Retired, n.o.d.*</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>-</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

TOTAL: 810 177 975 100

(Notes: *n.e.i. = not elsewhere identifiable, n.o.d. = not otherwise described.)
APPENDIX F:
Spoken languages and birthplace, all Indian ethnicities, 2006 Census.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>South Asian language spoken:</th>
<th>New Zealand-born</th>
<th>Overseas-born</th>
<th>Total Indian Stated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>percent</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hindi</td>
<td>3,615</td>
<td>35.4</td>
<td>38,688</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Urdu</td>
<td>165</td>
<td>1.6</td>
<td>2,124</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Fiji Hindi</td>
<td>33</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>399</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengali</td>
<td>48</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>1,002</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Oriya</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Nepalese</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Punjabi</td>
<td>1,629</td>
<td>15.9</td>
<td>8,445</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sindhi</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kashmiri</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>54</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sinhala</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>51</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarati</td>
<td>3,798</td>
<td>37.2</td>
<td>11,643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Konkani</td>
<td>3</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>576</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Marathi</td>
<td>54</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2,484</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Indo-Aryan*</td>
<td>588</td>
<td>5.8</td>
<td>3,132</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kannada</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>858</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Malayalam</td>
<td>51</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>2,052</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Tamil</td>
<td>111</td>
<td>1.1</td>
<td>3,273</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Telugu</td>
<td>105</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>2,676</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Dravidian*</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>27</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td><strong>10,218</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>77,739</strong></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

(*Includes both nfd and nei responses.*)
APPENDIX G:
Religious affiliation and birthplace, all Indian ethnicities, 2006 Census.

Table 1: Religious affiliation and birthplace, column percentages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious affiliation:</th>
<th>New Zealand-born</th>
<th>Overseas-born</th>
<th>Total Indian Stated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>percent</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhism</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>0.6</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christianity</td>
<td>4,092</td>
<td>21.1</td>
<td>13,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinduism</td>
<td>10,296</td>
<td>53.1</td>
<td>46,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>2,424</td>
<td>12.5</td>
<td>8,808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jainism</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>0.0</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judaism</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māori Christian</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>1.0</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māori Religion</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>2,028</td>
<td>10.5</td>
<td>7,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zoroastrianism</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Religions nfd</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>0.7</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>Total:</strong></td>
<td>19,398</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>76,962</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Table 2: Religious affiliation and birthplace, row percentages.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Religious affiliation:</th>
<th>New Zealand-born</th>
<th>Overseas-born</th>
<th>Total Indian Stated</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td></td>
<td>n</td>
<td>percent</td>
<td>n</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Buddhism</td>
<td>117</td>
<td>33.6</td>
<td>228</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Christianity</td>
<td>4,092</td>
<td>23.9</td>
<td>13,029</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Hinduism</td>
<td>10,296</td>
<td>18.1</td>
<td>46,515</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Islam</td>
<td>2,424</td>
<td>21.6</td>
<td>8,808</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jainism</td>
<td>6</td>
<td>5.7</td>
<td>99</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Judaism</td>
<td>30</td>
<td>38.5</td>
<td>48</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māori Christian</td>
<td>186</td>
<td>72.9</td>
<td>60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Māori Religion</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>100.0</td>
<td>3</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Sikh</td>
<td>2,028</td>
<td>22.0</td>
<td>7,200</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Zoroastrianism</td>
<td>66</td>
<td>7.5</td>
<td>819</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Other Religions nfd</td>
<td>135</td>
<td>44.1</td>
<td>153</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
APPENDIX H: Survey Questionnaire.

CONFIDENTIAL QUESTIONNAIRE

Title of the study: “The Indian Diaspora in New Zealand”
Researcher: Todd Nachowitz, Dept. of Political Science and Public Policy, University of Waikato

NOTE: This survey is also available on the web. If you would prefer to use your computer to fill out this questionnaire please visit my web site at: <http://indiadiaspora.wikispaces.com> and follow the “take survey” link on the left.

Introduction to the research: Results from the 2006 New Zealand Census show that the Indian ethnic community is now the fastest growing Asian ethnic group in New Zealand. Yet given its rapidly increasing numbers and high profile, it remains one of the least studied of the many ethnic communities comprising a multicultural New Zealand. The current research attempts to increase the existing body of literature on Indian migration and settlement in New Zealand, document how Indian migrant communities accultur ate while maintaining their distinct cultural and religious identities, and view processes of building new cultural and religious institutions.

This survey forms part of a larger study encompassing diversity policy and the Indian diaspora in New Zealand. It will allow the researcher to describe the nature of the study community by providing statistics on its demographics, use of language, and degree of acculturation. Results from this questionnaire will provide a necessary foundation for discussing issues of acculturation, discrimination, ethnicity and identity, and immigration policy that will be further explored in later formal interviews with key informants.

Research outcomes will be presented at academic conferences both nationally and internationally, may be published as articles in academic journals, and will form the basis for the submitted PhD thesis at the University of Waikato. Submission of the final thesis is expected by April 2011. Anyone of Indian ethnicity or ancestry (regardless of one’s country of birth) currently living in New Zealand may take this survey if you meet all of the following requirements:

[ ] one or both of your parents are of Indian ancestry or ethnicity,
[ ] you are either a permanent resident or citizen of New Zealand, or have a temporary work or study permit,
[ ] you currently reside in New Zealand,
[ ] you are 15 years of age or older. If you are 14 yrs old or younger do not fill out this form.

Please answer each question to the best of your ability by ticking an appropriate response or writing in an appropriate answer in the space provided. This questionnaire will take approximately 15-20 minutes to complete. The information you provide in this questionnaire is strictly confidential and you are not required to give your name, contact information, or any other details that may identify you. You do not have to fill out this form if you do not wish to. In submitting this form, however, you are giving your consent to allow the anonymous tabulated results of this study to become a part of the presented or published research. When you have completed this questionnaire, please mail it back in the stamped, self-addressed envelope provided, or place it inside the slot in the box for return to the researcher.

This research has gone through ethical review and has been approved by the University of Waikato’s Human Research Ethics Committee in the Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences. If you have any objections or complaints about the nature of this research or the questionnaire, you may contact the University of Waikato’s Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences Human Research Ethics Committee (University of Waikato, Private Bag 3105, Hamilton 3240) or you can email its secretary at <fass-ethics@waikato.ac.nz>. For more information on the research and its results, or if you would like to be a participant in the formal interview stage of the research, please contact Todd Nachowitz, Department of Political Science and Public Policy, University of Waikato, Private Bag 3105, Hamilton 3240, or email him at <tn37@waikato.ac.nz>. Many thanks for your cooperation!

About the researcher: Todd is a doctoral candidate in the Department of Political Science and Public Policy at the University of Waikato. His interest in South Asia began over 30 years ago as an undergraduate student in the USA. He completed his BA in South Asian Studies at the University of Wisconsin-Madison. He also attended Banaras Hindu University (B.H.U.) in Varanasi, and later conducted fieldwork for his Masters degree in Development Anthropology from Syracuse University (New York) on indigenous resistance to large-scale development projects, focusing on the Tehri and Narmada dam projects. Todd is also a student of Indian classical music, and speaks Hindi and Urdu. Todd has spent over 10 years living and studying in South Asia, working in the fields of cross-cultural education, language training, and conservation. He has lived in Varanasi, UP (1980-1981, 1985-1988), Lahore, Pakistan (1983-1984, 1991-1992), and Kathmandu, Nepal (1992-1995) and continues to make regular visits to India. Since December 1995, Todd has lived and worked in New Zealand as the Academic Director for an undergraduate programme in biodiversity and conservation, based at the University of Waikato. He returned to university to complete a PhD in 2007.
APPENDIX H: Survey Questionnaire (continued)

Please answer each question to the best of your ability by ticking an appropriate box [✓] or by filling in a response on the line provided.

1. In which New Zealand city or town do you live in or near?  

2. In which New Zealand region is your city or town located? Please tick only one box.
   [ ] Auckland  [ ] Marlborough  [ ] Timaru & Oamaru
   [ ] Bay of Plenty  [ ] Nelson & Bays  [ ] Waikato
   [ ] Canterbury  [ ] Northland  [ ] Wairarapa
   [ ] Gisborne  [ ] Otago  [ ] Wanganui
   [ ] Hawkes Bay  [ ] Southland  [ ] Wellington
   [ ] Manuwatu  [ ] Taranaki  [ ] West Coast

3. I am:  [ ] female  [ ] male

4. Age (please select only one of the following age ranges):
   [ ] 15-19 yrs  [ ] 35-39 yrs  [ ] 55-59 yrs  [ ] 75-79 yrs
   [ ] 20-24 yrs  [ ] 40-44 yrs  [ ] 60-64 yrs  [ ] 80-84 yrs
   [ ] 25-29 yrs  [ ] 45-49 yrs  [ ] 65-69 yrs  [ ] 85+ yrs
   [ ] 30-34 yrs  [ ] 50-54 yrs  [ ] 70-74 yrs

5. What is your current marital status? (please tick only one box):
   [ ] not married  [ ] separated
   [ ] married (not separated)  [ ] divorced
   [ ] legally joined in a civil union  [ ] widowed or bereaved partner
   [ ] partnered in a de facto relationship

6. How would you best describe your parent’s ethnicity (e.g. Indian, European, Māori)?
   [ ] mother’s ethnicity:  ____________________________
   [ ] father’s ethnicity:  ____________________________
   [ ] don’t know/not sure  [ ] I prefer not to answer

7. If you are (or were) married, what is (or was) your partner/spouse’s ethnicity (e.g. Indian, European, Māori)?
   (Note: if you have been married more than once, choose a response for your most recent partner).
   [ ] partner/spouse’s ethnicity:  ____________________________
   [ ] don’t know/not sure

8. Please list the region or regions in South Asia that one or both of your parents or ancestors are from (e.g. Gujarat, Haryana, Kerala, Maharashtra, Orissa, Punjab, Tamil Nadu, Uttar Pradesh, etc.).
   [ ] list region(s):  ____________________________
   [ ] don’t know/not sure

9. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
   “In many ways I think of myself as being a Kiwi.”
   [ ] strongly disagree  [ ] disagree  [ ] neither agree nor disagree  [ ] agree  [ ] strongly agree

10. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
    “In many ways I think of myself as being an Indian.”
    [ ] strongly disagree  [ ] disagree  [ ] neither agree nor disagree  [ ] agree  [ ] strongly agree

11. Please enter some words or terms that you might use to describe yourself.

12. Were you born in New Zealand?
    [ ] Yes, I was born in New Zealand. ➔ Please continue with Question 13, below. ➔
    [ ] No, I was born somewhere else. ➔ If born somewhere else, please skip to Question 16, below. ➔

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APPENDIX H: Survey Questionnaire (continued)

➔ Born in New Zealand: (Please answer Questions 13-15 below, and then skip to Question 24.)

13. In which New Zealand city or town were you born? ___________________________________________

14. Which of the following statements is true for you? (Please select only one response):

[ ] My parents migrated to New Zealand and I was born here.
[ ] My grandparents migrated to New Zealand and I was born here.
[ ] My great-grandparents migrated to New Zealand and I was born here.

15. How often do you return (or have you returned) to your ancestral country? (tick only one box):

[ ] I have never been back to my ancestral country  [ ] every year
[ ] I have only returned once or twice in my life  [ ] more than once a year
[ ] rarely (once every five to ten years)  [ ] don’t know/not sure
[ ] occasionally (one every three to five years)  [ ] I prefer not to answer
[ ] often (every two to three years)

If you were born in New Zealand, and answered Questions 13-15, please skip to Question 24, below. ➔

➔ Born Overseas: (Skip questions 13-15 above, and continue with Question 16, below.)

16. In which country were you born? _______________________________________________________

17. After leaving the country of your birth, did you move directly to New Zealand?

[ ] yes, I moved directly from my birth country to New Zealand
[ ] no, I moved somewhere else after leaving my birth country and before settling in New Zealand

18. Migration Path: Please list the countries in which you may have lived, worked, studied or settled in for a period of six months or longer, i.e. list your responses in the order of migration starting with your country of birth and ending with New Zealand. Some examples might be: [India → Dubai → New Zealand], or [Singapore → U.S. → Canada → New Zealand].

________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

19. In what year did you first arrive in New Zealand to settle? _______________________________

20. What were your most important reasons for migrating to New Zealand? ___________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

________________________________________________________________________________________

21. If you are not yet a citizen of New Zealand do you plan to apply for citizenship in the future?

[ ] yes  [ ] no  [ ] don’t know/not sure  [ ] I prefer not to answer
[ ] not applicable

22. Approximately how often do you return to the country of your birth for a visit (or the country in which you spent the most amount of time before moving to New Zealand)? Please tick only one box.

[ ] never  [ ] every year
[ ] I used to go often, but these days I hardly ever get the chance  [ ] more than once a year
[ ] rarely (once every five to ten years)  [ ] don’t know/not sure
[ ] occasionally (one every three to five years)  [ ] I prefer not to answer
[ ] often (every two to three years)

23. Since your arrival in New Zealand, who have you sponsored (or helped to sponsor) to migrate to and settle permanently in New Zealand (e.g. mother, father, sister, brother, mother-in-law)?

[ ] Please list: ________________________________________________________________

[ ] I have not sponsored anyone  [ ] don’t know/not sure  [ ] I prefer not to answer
APPENDIX H: Survey Questionnaire (continued)

→ Everyone should answer the following questions:

24. What is your current residency status in New Zealand? Please tick only one box.
   [ ] I am currently a New Zealand Citizen
   [ ] I currently have Permanent Residency status in New Zealand
   [ ] I currently have a Visitor’s Permit to stay in New Zealand
   [ ] I currently have a Work Permit which allows me to stay in New Zealand
   [ ] I prefer not to answer
   [ ] Other: __________________________

25. Do you feel that your settlement in New Zealand is permanent or temporary?
   [ ] permanent
   [ ] temporary
   [ ] don’t know/not sure
   [ ] I prefer not to answer

26. How possible is it that you might move to or settle in another country (other than New Zealand) in the future?
   [ ] not possible (i.e. I do not plan on moving to another country from New Zealand)
   [ ] possible (i.e. I do not plan on moving to another country at this time, but it may be possible in the future)
   [ ] very possible (i.e. it is likely that I may be moving on to another country in the future)
   [ ] don’t know/not sure
   [ ] I prefer not to answer

27. If you were to move somewhere else after leaving New Zealand, what country or countries would you choose to settle in? Please list any that may apply.
   [ ] Please list:
   [ ] I do not wish to settle anywhere else
   [ ] I am undecided or not sure
   [ ] I prefer not to answer

28. What country’s passports do you currently hold? Please list the names of any countries that have issued you a passport. You may list more than one country.
   [ ] Please list:
   [ ] I do not currently have a passport
   [ ] I prefer not to answer

29. How would you best describe your parent’s religion or belief (e.g. atheist, agnostic, Bahá’í, Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, Jain, Muslim, Parsi, Sikh)?
   [ ] mother’s religion:
   [ ] father’s religion:
   [ ] don’t know/not sure
   [ ] I prefer not to answer

30. I consider myself to be:
   [ ] Atheist
   [ ] Agnostic
   [ ] Bahá’í
   [ ] Buddhist
   [ ] Christian
   [ ] Hindu
   [ ] Humanist/Rationalist
   [ ] Jain
   [ ] Jewish
   [ ] Muslim
   [ ] Parsi/Zoroastrian
   [ ] Sikh
   [ ] I have no religion or belief
   [ ] I prefer not to answer
   [ ] other: __________________________

31. Do you currently practice your faith or belief?
   [ ] yes
   [ ] no
   [ ] don’t know/not sure
   [ ] not applicable
   [ ] I prefer not to answer

   → If yes, please continue with Question 32, below. →
   → If any other response, please skip to Question 36, below. →

32. At home, I practice (e.g. prayer, puja, ritual) my faith or belief (please tick one box only):
   [ ] daily
   [ ] more than once a week
   [ ] more than once a month
   [ ] monthly
   [ ] several times a year
   [ ] never
   [ ] weekly
   [ ] yearly
   [ ] difficult to say
   [ ] don’t know/not sure
   [ ] not applicable
   [ ] I prefer not to answer

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APPENDIX H: Survey Questionnaire (continued)

33. If there is a designated place of worship, or location where you practice your faith or belief (that is outside your home), how long does it take you to get there? (please tick only one box):

[ ] 15 mins. or less  [ ] 1+ hours  [ ] don’t know/not sure
[ ] 15-30 mins.  [ ] 2+ hours  [ ] not applicable
[ ] 30+ mins.  [ ] 3 or more hours  [ ] there is no place of worship for my faith in NZ

34. How often do you go to your dedicated place of worship or location (outside your home) where you practice your faith or belief? (please tick only one box):

[ ] daily  [ ] monthly  [ ] don’t know/not sure
[ ] more than once a week  [ ] several times a year  [ ] not applicable
[ ] weekly  [ ] yearly  [ ] I prefer not to answer
[ ] more than once a month  [ ] never  

35. If you visit or attend a place or location where you practice your faith or belief, how closely is it aligned with your preferred denomination or sect?

[ ] it is exactly the same  [ ] don’t know/not sure
[ ] it is slightly different  [ ] not applicable
[ ] it is very different  [ ] I prefer not to answer

⇒ Everyone should answer the following questions.

36. In which Indian languages can you have a conversation about everyday things (e.g. Hindi, Gujarati, Punjabi)?

[ ] list language(s): ____________________________

[ ] I do not speak an Indian language

37. In which Indian languages can you read and write?

[ ] list language(s): ____________________________

[ ] I can not read and write in an Indian language

38. Excluding English, please list any other non-Indian languages (e.g. Arabic, Fijian, French) that you may speak.

[ ] list language(s): ____________________________

[ ] other than English, I do not speak any other non-Indian language(s).

39. How often do you use an Indian language (excluding English) to speak with an immediate family member at home?

[ ] never  [ ] rarely  [ ] often  [ ] always

[ ] I speak an Indian language, but there is no one at home that I can speak it with

[ ] I do not speak an Indian language

40. How important do you think it is for your immediate family members to speak an Indian language at home?

[ ] not important  [ ] somewhat important  [ ] very important  [ ] extremely important

[ ] not applicable  [ ] don’t know/not sure

41. How important do you think it is for your immediate family members to read/write an Indian language?

[ ] not important  [ ] somewhat important  [ ] very important  [ ] extremely important

[ ] not applicable  [ ] don’t know/not sure

42. Are you currently attending, studying or enrolled at school or anywhere else?

[ ] no, I am not currently a student  [ ] don’t know/not sure

[ ] yes, full time (20 or more hours per week)  [ ] I prefer not to answer

[ ] yes, part time (less than 20 hours per week)
43. Your highest educational qualification (certificate of graduation or degree) is currently: (tick only one box.)

[ ] I never attended school
[ ] primary, i.e. I attended primary school and have no further education or qualification
[ ] secondary, i.e. I hold a high school degree
[ ] trade certificate or similar
[ ] tertiary, i.e. I graduated from a university or polytechnic and hold a Bachelor’s or equivalent degree
[ ] postgraduate diploma
[ ] Masters Degree, i.e. I hold a Masters Degree from an accredited university
[ ] Professional Degree, e.g. doctor, lawyer
[ ] Doctorate Degree, i.e. I hold a PhD from an accredited academic institution
[ ] other (please specify): ________________________________

44. Your highest education degree or equivalent was earned in which country?

[ ] name of country: _____________________________________
[ ] don’t know/not sure

45. Have you ever had difficulty finding a job in New Zealand? (please tick only one box):

[ ] yes [ ] no [ ] don’t know/not sure [ ] not applicable [ ] I prefer not to answer

46. Have you ever needed to be retrained in New Zealand in order to find a suitable employment? (tick one box):

[ ] yes [ ] no [ ] don’t know/not sure [ ] not applicable [ ] I prefer not to answer
[ ] other (please specify): ________________________________

47. Are you currently receiving any government benefit (e.g. unemployment, housing supplement, student allowance)?

[ ] yes [ ] no [ ] don’t know/not sure [ ] I prefer not to answer

48. If yes, what government benefits are you receiving?

[ ] please list: _________________________________________

49. Do you ever send (or have you ever sent) money you have earned here in New Zealand back to family members that live outside of New Zealand in order to help support them back home? (please tick only one box):

[ ] yes [ ] no [ ] don’t know/not sure [ ] not applicable [ ] I prefer not to answer

50. Are you currently employed and earning wages?

[ ] yes, I am currently employed and earning wages. If yes, continue with Question 51, below.
[ ] no, I am not currently employed. If no, please skip to Question 57, on the next page.
[ ] no, I am retired. If no, please skip to Question 57, on the next page.

51. Is your current job relevant to your highest qualification?

[ ] yes [ ] no [ ] don’t know/not sure [ ] not applicable [ ] I prefer not to answer
[ ] other (please specify): ________________________________

52. In the job that you work the most hours, which of these best describes your situation? (please tick one box):

[ ] a paid employee
[ ] self-employed and NOT employing others
[ ] an employer of other person(s) in my own business
[ ] working in a family business or family farm without pay

53. Do you feel that you are under-qualified, qualified, or over-qualified for your current job? (tick one box):

[ ] I feel that I am under-qualified for my current job [ ] don’t know/not sure
[ ] I feel that I am qualified for my current job [ ] I prefer not to answer
[ ] I feel that I am over-qualified for my current job

54. How happy or content are you with your current job? (please tick only one box):

[ ] unhappy [ ] somewhat happy [ ] happy [ ] very happy
[ ] don’t know/not sure [ ] I prefer not to answer
APPENDIX H: Survey Questionnaire (continued)

55. Do you think that your current salary is commensurate with your qualifications and skills? (tick one box):

- [ ] yes
- [ ] no
- [ ] don’t know/not sure
- [ ] I prefer not to answer

56. My current annual income range (in New Zealand dollars) is: (please tick one box only):

(Nota: These are the same range categories used for the 2006 Census by Statistics New Zealand.)

- [ ] zero income
- [ ] don’t know/not sure
- [ ] I prefer not to answer

- [ ] $1 to $5,000 annually
- [ ] $5,001 to $10,000 annually
- [ ] $10,001 to $15,000 annually
- [ ] $15,001 to $20,000 annually
- [ ] $20,001 to $25,000 annually
- [ ] $25,001 to $30,000 annually
- [ ] $30,001 to $35,000 annually
- [ ] $35,001 to $40,000 annually
- [ ] $40,001 to $50,000 annually
- [ ] $50,001 to $70,000 annually
- [ ] $70,001 to $100,000 annually
- [ ] $100,001 or more annually

Everyone should answer the following question:

57. How many of your own children currently live with you in your home?

- [ ] I have no children
- [ ] I have children but they no longer live with me
- [ ] I prefer not to answer

If you have children currently living with you at home, please continue with Question 58, below.

If you have no children currently living with you at home, please skip to Question 61, below.

Children currently living with you at home: (Please answer Questions 58-60 below)

58. Have any of your children ever taken any Indian language classes?

- [ ] yes
- [ ] no
- [ ] don’t know/not sure
- [ ] I prefer not to answer

59. Have any of your children ever taken any Indian music, dance or other classes?

- [ ] yes
- [ ] no
- [ ] don’t know/not sure
- [ ] I prefer not to answer

60. Have any of your children ever taken any religious instruction outside the home?

- [ ] yes
- [ ] no
- [ ] don’t know/not sure
- [ ] I prefer not to answer

Everyone should answer the following questions:

61. Regarding your place of residence in New Zealand, do you yourself own, or partly own, the dwelling that you usually live in? (Note: If you hold the dwelling in a family trust, tick “yes”)

- [ ] yes
- [ ] no
- [ ] don’t know/not sure
- [ ] I prefer not to answer

62. Do you (or does your family) own any farmland or farm in New Zealand?

- [ ] yes
- [ ] no
- [ ] don’t know/not sure
- [ ] I prefer not to answer

63. What type of internet connection do you have in your home?

- [ ] dial-up
- [ ] broadband
- [ ] don’t know/not sure
- [ ] we have no internet connection

64. Have you ever been on a Māori marae?

- [ ] yes
- [ ] no
- [ ] don’t know/not sure
- [ ] I prefer not to answer

65. Would you support education on the Treaty of Waitangi to become a part of the settlement process for new migrants arriving in New Zealand?

- [ ] yes
- [ ] no
- [ ] don’t know/not sure
- [ ] I prefer not to answer

66. Should education on the Treaty of Waitangi for new settlers be considered optional or compulsory?

- [ ] optional
- [ ] compulsory/mandatory
- [ ] don’t know/not sure
- [ ] I prefer not to answer
APPENDIX H: Survey Questionnaire (continued)

67. How difficult is it for you to get involved with (or be engaged in) non-Indian New Zealand society?
   [ ] very difficult  [ ] don’t know/not sure
   [ ] somewhat difficult [ ] I prefer not to answer
   [ ] not difficult at all

68. Please list any sports or physical activities that you (personally) regularly or sometimes play or participate in (e.g. badminton, cricket, golf, hockey, jogging, netball, swimming, walking, yoga, working out at a gym, etc.).
   [ ] Please list: ____________________________________________________________
   [ ] not applicable  [ ] don’t know/not sure  [ ] I prefer not to answer

69. Are you (personally) a member of an organised sporting team or organisation?
   [ ] yes  [ ] no  [ ] don’t know/not sure  [ ] I prefer not to answer

70. Which of the following types of Indian groups, clubs, associations or organisations do you (personally) attend? (Please tick one response per row.)
   currently attended currently attended previously attended but no longer attended: 
   do not attend or never attended: don’t know or not sure: I prefer not to answer:
   not applicable:
   social/cultural:
   sporting:
   religious:

71. Are you currently registered to vote in New Zealand? Please tick only one box.
   [ ] yes  [ ] no  [ ] don’t know/not sure  [ ] not applicable  [ ] I prefer not to answer

72. Have you previously voted in a New Zealand election? Please tick only one box.
   [ ] yes  [ ] don’t know/not sure
   [ ] no  [ ] I am not registered to vote
   [ ] I am too young to vote
   [ ] I prefer not to answer

73. With which political party or ideology do you most identify?
   [ ] Please list a political party: ____________________________________________
   [ ] don’t know/not sure  [ ] I prefer not to answer
   [ ] I do not have a political affiliation or ideology
   [ ] I do not identify with any political party or ideology

74. With regards to your own personal safety and security in New Zealand, in general, how safe do you actually feel living here? Please tick only one box.
   [ ] I feel totally safe living here and am rarely concerned about my personal security
   [ ] I feel somewhat safe living here and am not usually concerned about my personal security
   [ ] I feel somewhat unsafe living here and am sometimes concerned about my personal security
   [ ] I feel totally unsafe living here and am often concerned about my personal security
   [ ] don’t know/not sure
   [ ] I prefer not to answer

75. Have you ever felt that you were the target of or involved in an incident of cultural or racial discrimination?
   [ ] yes  [ ] no  [ ] don’t know/not sure  [ ] I prefer not to answer

76. How often have these incidences occurred, if at all? Please tick only one box.
   [ ] never  [ ] rarely  [ ] sometimes  [ ] regularly
   [ ] don’t know/not sure  [ ] I prefer not to answer
APPENDIX H: Survey Questionnaire (continued)

77. If these incidents have happened to you, where have they occurred? Please tick any or all that may apply.
   [ ] not applicable / I have not experienced any such incidents
   [ ] at home
   [ ] at school
   [ ] in the workplace
   [ ] in my neighborhood
   [ ] other location (please specify): __________________________
   [ ] while looking for work or seeking employment
   [ ] while out in the community going about my business
   [ ] don’t know/not sure
   [ ] I prefer not to answer

78. Do you believe that racism or discrimination exists in New Zealand?
   [ ] yes
   [ ] no
   [ ] don’t know/not sure
   [ ] I prefer not to answer

79. To what extent do you agree or disagree with the following statement:
   “There is discrimination in New Zealand against members of the Indian community.” Please tick only one box.
   [ ] strongly agree
   [ ] agree
   [ ] neutral (neither agree nor disagree)
   [ ] disagree
   [ ] strongly disagree

Thank you for your time in filling out this questionnaire.
Your help is greatly appreciated!

Please place this questionnaire in the box provided.

If you have been given this form, or have taken it home to complete, please post it back to:

Todd Nachowitz
Department of Political Science and Public Policy
University of Waikato
Private Bag 3105
Hamilton 3240

______________________________________________________________________________________________________________

Tear here and take this part back home with you.

Many thanks for your cooperation! For more information on the research and its results, or if you would like to be a
participant in the formal interview stage of the research, please email me at <tn37@waikato.ac.nz>.

If you enjoyed taking this survey, and know of other eligible family members or friends throughout New Zealand
that might also like to participate, please tear this portion of the page off and take it home with you. If other family
and friends would like to take this survey on-line, the survey is accessible at:

<http://indianidiaspora.wikispaces.com>

Click on the “take survey” link on the left side of the web page to take the survey. While you’re there, you’ll also
find lots of interesting information on the site, including a list of known published materials on the Indian diaspora
in New Zealand, as well as a comprehensive list of Indian organizations and associations throughout New Zealand.
APPENDIX I:
Spoken South Asian languages of survey respondents (Q36).*

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Language</th>
<th>Frequency</th>
<th>Percent of responses (n=2082)</th>
<th>Percent of cases (n=902)</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
<td>Assamese</td>
<td>5</td>
<td>0.2</td>
<td>0.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bengali</td>
<td>78</td>
<td>3.7</td>
<td>8.6</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Bhojpuri</td>
<td>24</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>2.7</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Garhwali</td>
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<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.2</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gujarati</td>
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<td>11.7</td>
<td>27.1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<tr>
<td>Hindi</td>
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<td>79.9</td>
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<td>7.5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.4</td>
<td>0.9</td>
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<td>0.3</td>
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<td>0.6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Oriya</td>
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<td>1.0</td>
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<tr>
<td>Punjabi</td>
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<td>Rajasthani</td>
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<td>2.2</td>
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<td>Sanskrit</td>
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<td>1.2</td>
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<td>0.3</td>
<td>0.7</td>
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<tr>
<td>Tamil</td>
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<td>8.7</td>
<td>20.1</td>
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<td>4.1</td>
<td>9.5</td>
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<td>1.1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Urdu</td>
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<td>5.1</td>
<td>11.8</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>other</td>
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<td>1.0</td>
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<td><strong>2,082</strong></td>
<td><strong>100.0</strong></td>
<td><strong>230.8</strong></td>
</tr>
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</table>

* 'Fiji-Hindi' and 'Hindi' are combined above, since Fiji-Hindi is a dialect and not a distinct language. Since respondents speak more than one South Asian language the percentage shown is based on the total number of cases (respondents) that answered the question rather than the total number of languages spoken for all respondents.
APPENDIX J:

List of publications on the Indian diaspora in New Zealand
(Note: A current list of sources on the Indian diaspora in New Zealand is maintained on my
web site at <indiandiaspora.wikispaces.com>.)

Adam, Leila

Ali, Nargis
2013. Being Muslim and doing Islam: narratives that shape the physical activity of Muslim women in New
Zealand, a thesis submitted to AUT for the degree of Doctor of Health Science. Auckland: Faculty of
Health and Environmental Sciences, Auckland University of Technology. Available at <aut.researchgateway.ac.nz>.

Anderson, Anneka

Anonymous

Asia New Zealand Foundation

Atkinson, J.

Ballantyne, Tony
Studies, 4(1), pp. 5-29.
2010. “India in New Zealand: the fault lines of colonial culture” in Sekhar Bandyopadhyay (ed.) India in
New Zealand: local identities, global relations. Dunedin: Otago University Press.

Bandyopadhyay, Sekhar
2006. “Reinventing Indian identity in multicultural New Zealand” in Henry Johnson & Brian
Moloughney (eds.) Asia in the Making of New Zealand. Auckland: Auckland University Press.
Community.” New Zealand Journal of Asian Studies, 10(2), pp. 159-161.
2010b. “In the shadow of the empire: India-New Zealand relations since 1947” in Sekhar
Bandyopadhyay (ed.) India in New Zealand: local identities, global relations. Dunedin: Otago
University Press.

Beal, Tim
2006. “Coming to terms with trade: exploring the implications of New Zealand’s economic relationship
with Asia” in Henry Johnson & Brian Moloughney (eds.) Asia in the making of New Zealand.
Auckland: Auckland University Press.
2010. “New Zealand and globalising India: the challenge of developing economic engagement” in
Sekhar Bandyopadhyay (ed.) India in New Zealand: local identities, global relations. Dunedin: Otago
University Press.

Beattie, James John
the History of Gardens and Designed Landscapes: An International Quarterly, 31(2), pp. 139-159.

Bedford, Richard

Bedford, Richard & W. Levick

Bell, Daphne
2001. New to New Zealand: a guide to ethnic groups in New Zealand. Chapters on “India” (pp. 35-38) and
APPENDIX J: List of publications on the Indian diaspora in New Zealand (continued)

Bernau, Sharmila

Blacklock, E.

Bola, M.K.

Booth, Alison

Boyd, James W. & F.M. Kotwal

Brawley, S.

Budhia, Santi

Buehler, Arthur Frank

Butcher, Andrew, Terry McGrath & Paul Stock

Chakravarty, Sayantan

Chhana, Bhikhi

Chhiba, Uka

Chhiba, Uka and Amrut Morar.

Chhichhia, Purvi Pravin

Clarke, Ian

Corne, C.

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APPENDIX J: List of publications on the Indian diaspora in New Zealand (continued)

Crawfurd, John

Davey, Judith, Sally Keeling & Arvind Zodgekar

Daldy, Bridget, Jacques Poot and Matthew Roskruge

DeSouza, Ruth
2006. Walking upright here: countering prevailing discourses through reflexivity and methodological pluralism. Waitakere City: Muddy Creek Press. Features the dual transition of migration and motherhood for women from Goa, India now living in New Zealand.

de Vries, Huibert Peter

Didham, Robert

Dixon, Greg

Dobson, Stephanie

Drury, Abdullah

Federation of Islamic Associations of New Zealand

Friesen, Wardlow

Friesen, Wardlow & Robin A. Kearns
APPENDIX J: List of publications on the Indian diaspora in New Zealand (continued)

Friesen, Wardlow, Laurence Murphy & Robin A. Kearns

Fuchs, Martin, Antje Linkenbach & Aditya Malik
2010. “What does it mean to be Indian? A view from Christchurch” in Sekhar Bandyopadhyay (ed.)
India in New Zealand: local identities, global relations. Dunedin: Otago University Press.

Gani, Azmat & Bert Ward
1995. “Migration of professionals from Fiji to New Zealand: a reduced form supply-demand model.”
World Development, 23(9), pp. 1633-1637.

Ghosh, Gautam and Jacqueline Leckie

Gilbertson, Amanda
MA in Anthropology, Victoria University of Wellington. Available at <researcharchive.vuw.ac.nz/ handle/10063/161>.


2010. “Choosing Indian and Kiwi identities: the ethnic options of New Zealand-born Gujaratis” in
Sekhar Bandyopadhyay (ed.) India in New Zealand: local identities, global relations. Dunedin: Otago University Press.

Gillion, K.L.
1956. “Sources of Indian emigration to Fiji.” Populations Studies, 10(2), pp. 139-157.

Gordon, R. & J. Reynolds

Grant, S.
1997. Fiji-Indian women in New Zealand: the effects of migration and change on their communication patterns.

Graves, T.D.
1984. “Would you want your daughter to marry one.” In D.R. Thomas (ed.) Patterns of social behaviour:
New Zealand and the South Pacific. Psychology Research Series No. 17, University of Waikato.

Graves, T.D. & N.B. Graves
1984. “As others see us: New Zealanders’ image of themselves and of immigrant groups.” In D.R.
Thomas (ed.) Patterns of social behaviour: New Zealand and the South Pacific. Psychology Research Series No. 17, University of Waikato, Hamilton.

Grimes, E.
1957. Indians in New Zealand—the socio-cultural situation of migrants from India in the Auckland Province.

Harrington-Watt, Kathleen
2011. Vernacular photographs as privileged objects: the social relationships of photographs in the homes of

Hilder, Brett.

Hill, C. & P. Brosnan
1984. "The occupational distribution of the major ethnic groups in New Zealand." New Zealand

Imtiaz, R.
research paper. Wellington: Victoria University of Wellington.

Ip, Manying & Jacqueline Leckie
(eds.) Localizing Asia in Aotearoa. Dunmore Press.
APPENDIX J: List of publications on the Indian diaspora in New Zealand (continued)

Indian, The

Jaisim, A.

Jansen, Adrienne & Ans Westra

Johnson, Henry

Johnson, Henry & Guil Figgins

Johnson, Henry & Brian Moloughney (eds.)

Johnston, Ron, Andrew Trlin, Anne Henderson, & Nicola North

Johnston, Ron, Andrew Trlin, Anne Henderson, Nicola North & M.J. Skinner

Kasanji, Lalita Vanmali

Kashyap, C.L.

Keen, D.

Kember, James

Khan, Abdur Razzaq

Kirwan, E.

Kolig, Erich
APPENDIX J: List of publications on the Indian diaspora in New Zealand (continued)

Kolig, Erich & William Shepard

Kondapi, C.

Krogt, C.J.

Kunin, Rebecca

Leckie, Jacqueline

Leckie, Jacqueline & S. Patel

Leckie, Jacqueline & Paola Voci (eds.)

Lewin, Joanna, Carina Meares, Trudie Cain, Paul Spoonley, Robin Peace & Elsie Ho

Listener, The

Longhurst, Robyn, Lynda Johnston & Elsie Ho
APPENDIX J: List of publications on the Indian diaspora in New Zealand (continued)

Lovell-Smith, B.

Maharaja, A.

Maurice, Donald

McDonald, J.

McGee, T.G.

McGill, David

McKinnon, Malcolm

McLeod, W. H.

McLeod, W. H. & S. Bhullar

McLoughlin, D.

McMenamin, Dorothy

Meanger, S.

Morrison, Philip
APPENDIX J: List of publications on the Indian diaspora in New Zealand (continued)

Nagar, Swati  

Nair, W.F.  

Nandon, R.  

Narayan, Paresh Kumar & Russell Smyth  

Nayar, Shoba C.  


Nayar, Shoba & C. Hocking  

Nayar, Shoba, C. Hocking & J. Wilson  

North, Nicola  

O’Connor, M.E.  

O’Connor, Peter  

Palakshapa, T.C.  

Palat, Ravi Arvind  

Panda, Rajaram & Pankaj Jha  

Patel, Kamla  

Patel, Shanti  
APPENDIX J: List of publications on the Indian diaspora in New Zealand (continued)

Pearson, David

Pernice, R., A. Trulin, A. Henderson & N. North

Pio, Edwina


Poulsen, M., R. Johnston & J. Forrest

Prasad, Shiu

Pratt, Douglas


Rahman, Qamer

Rasanathan, Kumanan, David Craig & Rod Perkins

Rasanathan, Kumanan, Shanthi Ameratunga & Samson Tse
APPENDIX J: List of publications on the Indian diaspora in New Zealand (continued)

Raza, Fezeela

Reid, R. & A. Heke

Richardson, Lynne (ed.)

Roberts, Mary


Roberts, Mary, C. Corne & H.P. Stoffel

Roche, G.H.

Roy, W.T.

Rush, Elaine, Lindsay Plank & Chittaranjan Yajnik

Rush, Elaine, Lindsay Plank, Vishnu Chandu, Manaia Laulu, et al.

Sawicka, T.

Selvarajah, Christopher

Shameem, N.


Shameem, S.
APPENDIX J: List of publications on the Indian diaspora in New Zealand (continued)

Shepard, William

Singh, Gurtej & Verpal Singh

Singh, Harpreet

Singh, Jesvier

Singh, Pritam

Singh, S.

Solanki, N.

Swarbrick, Nancy

Taher, Mohommod

Thuraisundaram, P.

Tiwari, Kapil

Trlin, A., A. Henderson & N. North
APPENDIX J: List of publications on the Indian diaspora in New Zealand (continued)

Turner, Sukhi

Vasil, Raj & Hong-Key Yoon

Veitch, James

Voci, Paola & Jacqueline Leckie (eds.)

Voigt-Graf, Carmen


Wall, Christine

Watson, Geoff


2005c. “Sport and the New Zealand Indian community: towards a history of the New Zealand Indian sports association.” Conference presentation at The New Zealand Historical Association Biennial Conference, November 24-27, University of Auckland, Auckland, NZ.


Wellington Indian Association

Wellington Indian Sports Club

Williams, Gwyn


Williams, Jacqueline


Wilson, J.
APPENDIX J: List of publications on the Indian diaspora in New Zealand (continued)

Wilson, S.

Winder, Virginia

Winitana, C.

Wood, Emma & Bernard Guerin

Zodgekar, Arvind
APPENDIX K:

List of current organisations related to the Indian diaspora
(Note: A current list of organisations related to the Indian diaspora in New Zealand is maintained on my web site at <indiandiaspora.wikispaces.com>.)

INDIAN ORGANISATIONS & ASSOCIATIONS:

Indian Cultural Organisations and Associations:

Auckland Indian Association: PO Box 8110, Symonds St, Auckland; <www.auckindianassoc.org.nz>

Auckland Malayalee Samajham, PO Box 1093, New Market, Auckland; <aucklandmalayalisamajam.org>

Auckland Marathi Association, PO Box 64 369, Botany Town Centre, East Tamaki, Auckland

Bay of Plenty (Rotorua) Indian Association, PO Box 294, Rotorua

Bengali New Zealand Council, Christchurch

Bharat Samaj – Society for Indian Cultural Activities, 51 Catherine Crescent, Paparangi, Wellington

Bharatiya Samaj Charitable Trust, 17 Valley View Rd., Glenfield, North Shore City, Auckland 0629: <www.bsct.org.nz>, <bhartiya@xtra.co.nz>

Bihar Jharkhand Sabha of Australia and New Zealand: <info@bjsm.org>, <www.bjsm.org>

Canterbury Tamil Society, PO Box 80097, Christchurch: <www.canterburytamilorganisation.org>, <canterbury.tamil@gmail.com>

Central Districts Indian Association, PO Box 4037, Palmerston North

Christchurch Fiji (Indian) Association

Christchurch Indian Association, PO Box 22-423, Christchurch

Christchurch Indians: <nzindians.moonfruit.com>

Christchurch Kerala Association, 32 Strowan Rd, Christchurch

Country Section (NZ) Indian Association, PO Box 10391, Te Rapa, Hamilton: <cocop@ihug.co.nz>

Fiji Association in Auckland, PO Box 19333, Avondale, Auckland: <www.fijiassociation.co.nz>

Fiji Indian Association, 32 Kauri St., Miramar, Wellington; Hall on Halford Place (north end of Jackson St., Petone): <www.fia.org.nz>

Goan Overseas Association of New Zealand: <www.goanz.co.nz>


Indian Cultural Society, PO Box 1358, Hamilton: <icswaikato@hotmail.com>

Indian Social and Cultural Club, Level 1 / 829 Colombo St., Christchurch 8053: <iscenzt@gmail.com>; Facebook: <www.facebook.com/IndianSocialAndCulturalClubChristchurchnz>

International Movement for Tamil Culture, PO Box 40306, Glenfield, Auckland

Kerala Association of Palmerston North

Koshih Waikato Charitable Trust, Hamilton: email: <kwctrust@gmail.com>, web: <ketehamilton.peoplesnetworknz.info/koshish>.

Manawatu Bengali Society

Manukau Indian Association, 57 Hillside Road, Papatoetoe, Auckland 2025; web: <manukaauindians.org.nz>, on Facebook at <Manukau Indian Association>

Massey University Indian Association: <www.facebook.com>, email: <masseyindia@gmail.com>

Massey University Tamil Society

Migrant Heritage Charitable Trust, PO Box 251579, Manukau, Auckland 2140: <www.might-i.org>

Muth Tamil Sangam, PO Box 96105, Balmoral, Auckland; <www.muthamilsangam.co.nz>

New Plymouth Indian Community, New Plymouth
APPENDIX K: List of current organisations related to the Indian diaspora (continued)

New Zealand Charotar Patidar Samaj (NZCPS), Auckland: <www.charotar.co.nz>
New Zealand Indian Central Association: PO Box 1941, Wellington 6140; web: <www.nzindians.org.nz>; email: <secretary@nzindians.org.nz>
New Zealand India Society, 31 Mulberry Street, Wellington
New Zealand Kannada Koota, Auckland: <www.kannadakoota.co.nz>, email: <secretary@kannadakoota.co.nz>
New Zealand Punjabi Cultural Association, 158 Kolmar Rd, Papatoetoe, Auckland
New Zealand Punjabi Foundation, Auckland: <nzpf2012@gmail.com>
New Zealand Punjabi Youth, 79A Park Avenue, Papatoetoe, Auckland
New Zealand Sikh Society, Hamilton: <info@nzsikhsociety.org.nz>
New Zealand Sikh Women’s Association, 214 Great South Rd, Otahuhu, Auckland: <nzswha@yahoo.com>
New Zealand Tamil Senior Citizens Association, Auckland
New Zealand Tamil Society, PO Box 6428, Wellesley St, Auckland: <www.nzta.org.nz>
New Zealand Telugu Association, 2/181 Mt Albert Rd, Mt Albert, Auckland: <www.nztta.org>
North Shore Indian Association: <northshoreindian@yahoo.co.nz>
Probasee Bengali Association of New Zealand, PO Box 27388, Mt Roskill, Auckland: <www.probasee.co.nz>
Pupekohe Indian Association, PO Box 149, Pupekohe, Auckland
Rotorua Malayalee Association
Shanti Niwas Charitable Trust, PO Box 24 386, Royal Oak, Auckland: <www.shantiniwas.org.nz>
Shanti Niwas Community Centre for Indian Senior Citizens, 63 Allendale Rd, Mt Albert, Auckland
Sikh Centre, PO Box 76730, Manukau City, Auckland
Society of Indians, PO Box 7137, Christchurch
Tamil Society Waikato, PO Box 4189, Hamilton
Taranaki Indian Association, 170 Heta Road, New Plymouth
Then India Sanmarga Ikya (NZ) Sangam, 723 Great South Rd, Papatoetoe, Auckland: <www.nzsangam.com>
UniIndian Student Association: <http://uniindian.tripod.com/aboutus.html>
United Indianz, an umbrella organisation of Indian cultural & religious groups in the Auckland area: <anilchanna@yahoo.com.au>
University of Canterbury Indian Students Association, Christchurch.
Waikato Fiji Association, 63 Nevada Road, Hamilton: <www.waikatofijiassociation.com>
Waikato Indian Association, PO Box 920, Hamilton
Waikato Indian Community Centre, Phoenix House, 22 Richmond St., Whitiorea, Hamilton
Waikato Punjabi Cultural Club, Hamilton: <www.wpcc.co.nz>
Waikato Senior Indian Citizens Association, PO Box 7175, Hamilton
Waikato Telugu Association, 12 Chesham St, Hamilton: <waikatotelugu@gmail.com>
Waitakere Indian Association, Waitakere: <www.wia.net.nz>
Wellington Indian Association: PO Box 14-480, Kilbirnie, Wellington; <www.wia.org.nz>
Wellington Kerala Community: <www.welKcom.org.nz>
Wellington Malayalee Association: <www.wellingtonmalayalees.org>, <contact@wellingtonmalayalees.org.nz>
Wellington Mutamizh Sangam: <admin@mutamizhsangam.org.nz> <www.mutamizhsangam.org.nz> <wmsangam@gmail.com>
Wellington Tamil Society, Moera Community Centre, Lower Hutt, Wellington; PO Box 471, Wellington: <www.wts.org.nz>

Indian Religious Organisations and Associations:
Ahmadiyya Muslim Community, 20 Dalgety Drive, Wiri, Manukau City, Auckland: <www.ahmadiyya.org.nz>
Al-Hijra Islamic Education Trust, PO Box 10662, Wellington: <www.al-hijra.org.nz>
Art of Living Foundation, Sri Sri Ravi Shankar; <www.artofliving.org>
Arya Pratinidhi Sabha of New Zealand (Arya Samaj); PO Box 76-876, Manukau City, Auckland 2241
Auckland Satsang Ramayan Mandal
Auckland Sikh Society, 158 Kolmar Rd, Papatoetoe, Auckland 1701
Avondale Islamic Centre, PO Box 19339, 122 Blockhouse Bay Rd., Avondale, Auckland
Bay of Plenty Sikh Society, PO Box 357, Te Puke
Brahma Kumari Centre New Zealand, Wellington: <www.bkwso.org>
APPENDIX K: List of current organisations related to the Indian diaspora (continued)

Federation of Islamic Associations in New Zealand: <www.fianz.co.nz>
Fiji Indian Satsang Mandal, 21 Balgay St, Christchurch
Hamilton Ramayan Sanstha, PO Box 164, Hamilton
Hindu Council of New Zealand-Auckland, PO Box 26040, Epsom, Auckland: <www.hinducouncil.org.nz>
Hindu Council of New Zealand-Hamilton, PO Box 23045, Hamilton: <hcnz.hamilton@gmail.com>
Hindu Elders Foundation, Bukem Place (Off Gadsby Rd), Mangere East, Manukau, Auckland
Hindu Heritage Centre, Bukem Place (Off Gadsby Rd), Mangere East, Manukau, Auckland
Hindu Organisations and Temple Association (HOTA); email <forum@hota.org.nz>, web <www.hota.org.nz>
Hindu Swayamsewak Sangh
Hindu Youth New Zealand, Auckland
Indian Christian Life Centre, 92-98 St. George St, Papatoetoe, Auckland: <netministries.org/see/churches.exe/ch11830>
Institute of Sathya Sai Education New Zealand, PO Box 201081, Airport Oaks, Mangere, Manukau
International Muslim Association of New Zealand: <www.iman.co.nz>
ISKON New Zealand: <www.harekrishna.org.nz>
Islamic Resource Centre, PO Box 27732, Mt Roskill, Auckland
Islamic Women’s Council of New Zealand, Hamilton, <iwcnz@yahoogroups.com>
Invercargill Sikh Society, Invercargill
Kelston Islamic Centre, 145 Cartwright Rd off Sabulite Rd, Kelston, Auckland
Manawatu Muslim Association, PO Box 148281, Awapuni, Palmerston North: <manawatumuslims@yahoo.com>
Mt Roskill Islamic Trust, Mt Roskill, Auckland
Muslim Association of Christchurch, Christchurch
Muslin Association of Taranaki, 126A Seaview Rd, Westown, New Plymouth: <www.nakimuslim.org>
New Zealand Guru Ravidas Sabha, PO Box 461, Pupekohe, Auckland 1730
New Zealand Hindu Temple Society, 41 Stanhope Rd, Ellerslie, Auckland
New Zealand Islamic Awareness Week (usually August of each year): <www.islamawareness.co.nz>
New Zealand Muslim Association, PO Box 2822, Ponsonby, Auckland: <www.nzma.net.nz>
New Zealand Muslim League, Hamilton
New Zealand Muslim League, Wellington
New Zealand Sikhs: <www.sikhs.co.nz>
New Zealand Sikh Society-Auckland, PO Box 22579, Otahuhu, Auckland
New Zealand Sikh Society-Christschurch, 55 Westgrove Avenue, Avonhead, Christchurch
New Zealand Sikh Society-Hamilton, PO Box 9464, Hamilton
New Zealand Sikh Society-Hastings, PO Box 162, Hastings 4201
New Zealand Sikh Society-Palmerston North, PO Box 982, Palmerston North
New Zealand Sikh Society-Wellington, PO Box 13598, Johnsonville, Wellington: <www.sikhs.wellington.net.nz>
North Shore Islamic Centre, 9B Kaimahi Drive off Target Rd, Glenfield, Auckland
Otago Muslim Association, Dunedin
Papakura Islamic Centre, 12 Tironui Station Rd, Takanini, Auckland
Parsi Community (Parsiana Lodge), 82 Pakuranga Road, Pakuranga, Auckland
Sat Sanatan Vedic Trust, Christchurch
Satsang Ramayan Mandal, Palmerston North, Manawatu
Satsangh Ramayan Mandal Waikato, Hamilton
Sathya Sai Service Organisation, Wellington
Shalom Celebration Centre (Indian Church), PO Box 8991, Symonds St, Auckland
Shirdi Sai Baba Sansthan of New Zealand, PO Box 16142, Sandringham, Auckland: <www.shirdisaibaba.org.nz>
Shiv Shakti Ramayan Mandal, Waitakere, Auckland
Shree Sanatan Dharma Hanuman Mandal, 195 Onewa Rd, Birkenhead, Auckland 0626
Shree Sita Rama Kalyana Mahotsava Committee, Mt Roskill, Auckland
Shri Krishna Cultural Centre, No 6, Marshall Ave, Wanganui
Shri Sanatan Dharma Ramayan Mandal, Wellington
Sikh International Gurmat Trust, 40 Water Street, Otahuhu, Auckland
Sikh Naujawan Sabha New Zealand, PO Box 27727, Mt Roskill, Auckland
Sikh Religious Trust of New Zealand, 48 Station Road, Papatoetoe, Auckland
South Auckland Muslim Association, PO Box 22 863, Otahuhu, Auckland
APPENDIX K: List of current organisations related to the Indian diaspora (continued)

Sri Om Adishakti, 7-15 Tomo Street, New Lynn, Auckland: <sriominc@gmail.com>, <www.sriomadisakthi.org>.
Tauranga Sikh Society, PO Box 3097 Greerton, Tauranga
Vaishnav Parivar New Zealand, Auckland: <www.pushimargnz.org.nz>
Vishva Shanti Aashram New Zealand, PO Box 76 612, Manukau, Auckland
Waikato Muslim Assoc., PO Box 665, 921 Heaphy Trc, Hamilton <wma@xtra.co.nz> <wma.co.nz>
Waitakere Indian Association: <www.wia.net.nz>
Waitakere Ramayan Mandali
Wellington Indian Association: <www.wia.org.nz>
Young Muslim Women’s Association: web: <www.ymwa.org.nz> or email: <ymwa.nz@gmail.com>
Zarathustrian Association of New Zealand, PO Box 25128, Pakuranga, Auckland: <www.zanz.org.nz>

Indian Language Classes:
Auckland Muth Tamil Sangam, Tamil classes <www.muthamilsangam.co.nz/tschool.html>
Bharatiya Samaj Hall, Mt Roskil, Auckland; Hindi classes, Sundays 10:30-1:00pm: <www.bsct.org.nz>
Canterbury Tamil Society, Tamil School, Christchurch: <www.canterburytamilassociation.org>
Hindi Language and Culture Trust of New Zealand, 18 Donegal Park Drive, Manukau, Auckland: <info@teachhindi.org.nz>, <www.teachhindi.org.nz>
Hyderabad Urdu Cultural Association New Zealand, Mount Roskill, Auckland: <hucanz@gmail.com>
ISSO Swaminarayan Hindu Temple, 10-12 Wentworth Avenue, Papatoetoe, Auckland 2025: <issouakxtra.co.nz>
New Zealand Punjabi Cultural Association, 158 Kolmar Rd, Papatoetoe, Auckland; Punjabi lessons
Thamizh Aruri Foundation Charitable Trust, 9A Fancourt St., Meadowbrook, Auckland. Promotes Tamil language & culture
Waitakere Hindi Cultural Association, Auckland, 54A Robertson Rd, Avondale, Auckland
Wellington Hindi School, 38 Priscilla Cres, Kingston, Wellington: <www.hindischool.wellington.net.nz> email: <info@hindischool.wellington.net.nz>
Wellington Indian Association, Gujarati classes: <www.wia.org.nz/education.html>
Wellington Tamil Society, Moera Community Centre, Lower Hutt, Wellington; PO Box 471, Wellington: <www.wts.org.nz>

Indian Music and Dance Groups:
Anujay School of Dance, Auckland
Anuradha Ambalavanar & Bharatanatyam Group of Christchurch
Indiance Dance Group, Auckland
Indian Classical Music and Dance in New Zealand: <icmnz.wikispaces.com>
Indian Classical Music Interest Group, Auckland: <www.icmig.istar.net.nz>
Kadam Dance Academy, Hamilton
Kalaniketan Dance Academy, Hamilton
Mohammed Rafi Academy of Music, Mt Roskill, Auckland
Monisha School of Dance, Auckland
Natrja School of Dance, 1025 High St, Avalon, Wellington
Natyaloka School of Indian Classical Dance, Dunedin: <natyalokanz@gmail.com>
New Zealand Carnatic Music Society, Auckland: <www.nzcms.org>
New Zealand Indian Fine Arts Society, Wellington: <www.nzifs.blogspot.com>
Nrittyabhinaya School of Indian Classical Dance, Auckland
Padma School of Classical Dance, Auckland
Raaga Music Group, Hamilton
Rhythm School of Indian Music, Auckland: <www.rhythmschool.co.nz>
Sargam School of Indian Classical Music, Auckland
Sonar Chand Dance Academy, Te Atatu South, Auckland
Suparna Basu Dance Group, 102 Onepu Road, Lyall Bay, Wellington
Wellington Indian Classical Music Academy Trust (WICMAT): <www.musicindia.org.nz>
APPENDIX K: List of current organisations related to the Indian diaspora (continued)

Indian Professional Organizations:
Auckland Indian Medical Society

Indian Schools:
Global Indian International School, 10 Bukem Place, 69 Gadsby Rd, Mangere, Auckland
Guru Nanak Sikh School, Nanaksar Gurdwara, Manurewa, Auckland: <www.nanaksar.org>
Institute of Sathya Sai Education New Zealand: <www.issenz.org.nz>

Indian Social Service Organisations:
Bharatiya Samaj Charitable Trust, Mt Roskil, Auckland: <www.bsct.org.nz>
Ekal Vidyalya Foundation of New Zealand: email <ekalnz@yahoo.co.nz> or <modaksnz@xtra.co.nz>,<www.ekal.org>
Hindu Niwas Charitable Trust; <hinduniwas@gmail.com>
Jaagriti Women Support Group: contact Roopa for more information.

Indian Sports Groups & Associations:
Auckland Indian Badminton Club
Auckland Indian Sports Club: <www.aisc.org.nz>
Bay of Plenty Indian Sports Club, PO Box 887, Rotorua
Central Districts Indian Sports Club (CDISC), PO Box 4037, Palmerston North
Christchurch Indian Sports Club, PO Box 22 239, Christchurch
Hamilton Malayalee Badminton Association
New Zealand Indian Sports Association: <nzisa@ingear.co.nz>.
North Harbour Indian Sports Club: <www.nhisc.org.nz>
Pukekohe Indian Sports Club: <www.pisc.co.nz>
Sikh Sports Club Bay of Plenty
SPROUT, Sports Recreation and Outdoor Trust, for people of Indian origin in NZ: <www.sprout.net.nz>
Waikato Indian Sports Club, Hamilton: <waikato.isc@gmail.com>
Waikato Gujarati Soccer Club
Waikato Punjabi Badminton Club
Wellington Tamil Sports Club, PO Box 471, Wellington

HOUSES OF WORSHIP:

Mandirs:
BAPS Swaminarayan Mandir, Rotorua
Bharatiya Mandir, 252-254, Balmoral Rd, Balmoral, Auckland 1003; Ph 09-846-2677: <www.bharatiyamandir.org.nz>
ISSO Swaminarayan Hindu Temple, 10-12 Wentworth Avenue, Papatoetoe, Auckland 2025: <issoauk@xtra.co.nz>
Kurinji Kumaran Temple/New Zealand Hindu Association, No. 1 Batchelor St, Newlands, Wellington: <www.hindutemple.wellington.net.nz/index.html>
New Zealand Thirumurugan Temple, Ellerslie, Auckland: <www.nzmurugan.org.nz>
Pillayar Temple, Sri Ganesh Temple Trust, Papakura, Auckland
Radha Krishna Temple, Hamilton: <abhay001.wordpress.com>
Radha Krishna Temple, 145, New North Rd, Eden Terrace, Auckland 1003; Ph 09-379-4463
Ram Krishna Mandir, 25-27 Onslow Rd, Papatoetoe, Auckland 1701; Ph 09-278-6341
Shiva Mandir, Sanatan Shivarchan Trust, 43 Holmes Ave, Manurewa, Auckland
Sri Balaji Temple Trust, 2 Kent St., Frankton, Hamilton: <www.sribalaji.co.nz>
Shree Sanatan Dharma Hanuman Mandir, 195 Onewa Rd, Birkenhead, Auckland 0626
Shri Radha Giridhari Mandir (ISKCON), 1229 Coatsville-Riverhead Hwy 28, Riverhead, Auckland 0892: <info@harekrishna.org.nz>
Shri Ram Mandir, 11 Brick St., Henderson, Auckland: <shrirammandir.org.nz>

APPENDIX K: List of current organisations related to the Indian diaspora (continued)

Shirdi Sai Baba Temple of New Zealand, 12-18 Princes St, Onehunga, Auckland:
<www.shirdisaibaba.org.nz>
Swami Narayan Group, temple building in Christchurch: <chch_hindutemple@xtra.co.nz>
Sri Ganesh Temple, 4 Dent Place, Papakura, Auckland
Subramaniyam Temple, 41, Stanhope Rd, Ellerslie, Auckland 1005; Ph 09-263-8854
Thiru Subramaniam Temple, New Zealand Hindu Temple Society, Auckland: <www.aalayam.org.nz>

Masjids & Islamic Centres:

Ahmadiyya Mosque, 20 Dalgety Drive, Wiri, Manukau City, Auckland: <www.ahmadiyya.org.nz>
Al-Madina School, Mangere, Auckland
Al-Noor Charitable Trust, Christchurch
An-Nur Kiwi Academy, Dunedin
Avondale Islamic Centre, Avondale, Auckland
East Auckland Islamic Trust, PO Box 251 019, Pakuranga, Auckland
Frankton Mosque, Hamilton
Glen Innes Islamic Centre, Auckland
Hawera Islamic Centre, Hawera, Taranaki
Jamii Masjid, 921 Heaphy Terrace, Hamilton
Kelston Islamic Centre, Kelston, Auckland
Lower Hutt Islamic Centre, Lower Hutt, Wellington
Masjid Al-Huda, P O Box 6288, Dunedin
Masjid Al-Noor, NZ Muslim Association, 122-126 Blockhouse Bay Road, Avondale, Auckland:
<www.nzma.net.nz>
Masjid Al-Noor, Muslim Association of Canterbury, P O Box 8272, Riccarton, Christchurch:
<www.mac.net.nz>
Masjid Al-Taqwa, 58 Grayson Ave., Manukau, Auckland: <www.masjidattaqwa.co.nz>
Masjid-e-Umar, 185-187 Stoddard Rd, Mt Roskill, Auckland: <www.masjidemar.co.nz>
Mt Albert Islamic Centre, Auckland: <www.mtalbertislamiccentre.org>
North Shore Islamic Centre, Glenfield, Auckland
Palmerston North Islamic Centre, PO Box 1482, Palmerston North
Papakura Islamic Centre
Ponsonby Masjid, 17 Vermont Street, Auckland: <www.nzma.net.nz>
Porirua Islamic Centre, PO Box 50 038, Porirua, Wellington
Ranui Masjid, 31-33 Armada Drive, Ranui, Auckland: <www.nzma.net.nz>
South Auckland Mosque, PO Box 22 807, Otahuhu, Auckland
Waikato Muslim Association, PO Box 665, 921 Heaphy Terrace, Hamilton <wma@xtra.co.nz>
Wellington Masjid / New Islamic Centre, PO Box 14503, Kilburnie: <www.iman.co.nz>
West Auckland Mosque, 31-33 Armada Drive, Ranui, Waitakere City
Zayad College for Girls, Mangere, Auckland

Gurdwaras:

Hamilton Gurdwara, 399 Greenhill Rd, Puketaha, Hamilton
Nanaskar That Isher Darbar; 102-104 Great South Rd, Manurewa, Auckland: <www.nanaskar.org>
Nelson Gurdwara, Nelson
Shri Dashmesh Darbar, 158 Kolmar Rd, Papatoetoe, Auckland
Shri Guru Singh Sabha, 127 Shirely Rd, Papatoetoe, Auckland
Shri Guru Ravidas Gurdwara, Bombay Hills, South Auckland
Sri Guru Nanak Dev Singh Gurdwara Sahib Ji, Otahuhu, Auckland
Sri Kalgirdhar Sahib Gurdwara, 70 Takanini School Road, Takanini, Auckland
Sri Guru Ravidas Sabha Hastings, PO Box 808, Hastings
Sikh Temple, Palmerston North, Manawatu
Tauranga Gurdwara, 41 Oropi Road, Orahi, Tauranga
Te Puke Gurdwara, Te Puke, Bay of Plenty
Te Rapa Hamilton Gurdwara
Wellington Gurdwara, PO Box 13598, Johnsonville, Wellington

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APPENDIX K: List of current organisations related to the Indian diaspora (continued)

Churches:
Cavalry Tamil Church, New Lynn, Auckland: <www.calvarytamilchurch.org>
Mercy Gates Indian Christian Fellowship, Pukekohe, Auckland
New Zealand Tamil Christian Fellowship, 30 Kaikoura St, Sunnyvale, Mt Wellington, Auckland
Shalom Malayalee Church, Wellington: <www.shalomwgtf.org.nz>
St. Dionysius Indian Orthodox Church, Hamilton: <stдиonysius@shamilton.org.nz>
Telugu Church of New Zealand, 283 Mt Eden Rd, Mt Eden, Auckland: <www.teluguchurchnz.org>

Media:
Apna FM: <www.apna990.co.nz>
Asia Magazine: <www.amag.co.nz>
The Asian Radio Show, Dr Sapna Samant: <www.holycowmedia.com/theasianradioshow>
Bharat Darshan (Hindi Magazine in NZ): <www.bharatdarshan.co.nz>
FreeFM, Hamilton: <www.freemf.org.nz>
Darpan, The Mirror: <www.teamworkproductions.co.nz>
Humm FM, Auckland’s 1st global Indian & Asian FM station. 106.2FM.
Indian Events: <indianevents.co.nz>
Indian Newslink (newspaper): <www.indiannewsslink.co.nz>
Indianz Outlook (newspaper), Auckland: <www.indianzoutlook.co.nz>, <prem@indianzoutlook.co.nz>
Indupages.com, Indian events & classifieds for Auckland, Hamilton, Wellington & Christchurch: <www.indupages.com>
Kiwi-Muslim directory: <www.muslimdirectory.co.nz>
Kuk Punjabi Samachar, PO Box 200034, Papatoetoe, Auckland: <kukpunjabi@xtra.co.nz>;
<www.kuksamachar.com>
Mirchi Radio / Saaz Aur Awaaz, PO Box 22297, Christchurch: <plainsfm.org.nz>
New Zealand Tasveer News (Punjabi newspaper): <http://nztasveernews.co.nz>
The Global Indian Magazine: <www.theglobalindian.co.nz>
The Indian, A New Zealand Indian e-zine: <www.theindian.co.nz>
The Indian Weekender, weekly newsmagazine <www.indianweekender.co.nz>
Radio Spice: <www.radiospice.co.nz>
Radio Tarana: <www.tarana.co.nz>
Radio Masti, Hamilton: <www.radiomasti.co.nz>
Sikh Centre’s Weblog: <http://sikhcentre.wordpress.com>
Voice of Islam TV, PO Box 97920, Wiri, Manukau: <www.voiceofislamtv.com>