Is TRUTH *primitive?*[1]

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Abstract: Primitivist theories of truth have been defended by some of the luminaries of analytic philosophy, including the early Moore and Russell, Frege, Davidson, and Sosa. In this paper, I take up a contemporary primitivist theory that has been systematically developed throughout a sizeable body of work but has yet to receive sustained critical attention—Jamin Asay's *primitivist deflationism*. Asay's major ambitions are to defend a novel primitivist account of the concept TRUTH and to harmonise that account with a deflationary theory of the property *truth*. I will elaborate a thoroughgoing critique of primitivist deflationism, arguing that we have reason to doubt all of the five theses that constitute the view. Along the way, I will also highlight a number of possible escape routes for the primitivist deflationist, explaining how they can make the view more resilient even as they compel us to rework some of its central commitments.

Keywords: Truth, primitivism, deflationism, concepts, circular definitions, Jamin Asay, Gottlob Frege

1. Introduction

The signature thesis of *primitivism about truth* is that truth cannot be analysed in more fundamental terms. When we hit upon truth, primitivists say, our spade is turned. The history of primitivist theories of truth dates back at least to the origins of the analytic tradition in philosophy, with primitivist views of truth being endorsed by Moore (1899, 1901-2), Russell (1904, 1906/7, 1994), and Frege (1918, 1979).[2] In more recent years, we've also seen a number of contemporary analytic philosophers defend primitivist theories of truth, with the lineup including Donald Davidson (1990, 1996, 2000, 2001, 2004), Ernest Sosa (1993a, 1993b, 2001), Colin McGinn (2000: 104-8), Trenton Merricks (2007: ch. 8), Douglas Patterson (2010), and Jamin Asay (2013a, 2013b, 2013c, 2014, 2016, 2020, 2021a, 2021b).[3]

In this paper, I will focus on a primitivist theory of truth that has been systematically defended but has yet to receive sustained critical attention—Asay's *primitivist deflationism*. I'll start by rehearsing a pivotal distinction within contemporary truth theory, that between the concept TRUTH and the property *truth*.[4] Having this distinction in hand will enable us to distinguish between two forms of primitivism about truth and to identify one, but not the other, in primitivist deflationism.

I'll then turn to Asay's two central arguments for primitivism about TRUTH, the *foundational* and *omnipresence arguments*. These arguments are subtle and engaging, yet I will explain why they ultimately prove to be inconclusive. Additionally, I will develop two independent objections against

[1] Penultimate version. Final version to be published in *The Philosophical Quarterly*.

[2] Sympathy towards primitivism may go back even further. Brons (2015) interprets the early Chinese philosopher Wang Chong (c. 25-100 CE) as being a '*de facto* primitivist' about truth, though his interpretation is challenged by McLeod (2018). For a brief overview of the history of primitivist theories of truth, see Wyatt (2022, §§ 1-2).

[3] See also Boghossian (2010: 562-3), Khatchadourian (2011: i-ii, 2-3), and McLeod (2016: ix-xii, 21, 31, 33, 35, 52, 106, 175). The relationships between primitivist theories and both identity and deflationary theories of truth have also proven to be quite interesting. Hornsby, for instance, defends a well-known identity theory of truth, and she (1997: n. 5) also takes truth to be 'indefinable' (see also Gaskin (2020: § 5.6)). Nulty defends a primitivist theory which he (2007: § 5) regards as being similar to, yet importantly distinct from, identity theories of truth. On the deflationary side, McGrath (1997: 84-5) takes his *weak deflationism* to have affinities with the primitivist theories of Moore and Russell. For more on the relationships between primitivist and deflationary theories of truth, see e.g. Asay (2013c), Edwards (2013: 9, 14), Greimann (2000), Salis (2019), and Wyatt (2016: 380-1).

[4] In what follows, I'll use small caps to denote concepts and italics to denote properties (and for emphasis).

primitivist deflationism itself. My overall conclusion, then, will be that Asay's case for primitivist deflationism comes up short and that the view itself also suffers from serious difficulties. Along the way, I'll point out some potential escape routes for the primitivist deflationist, weighing the advantages and costs of each.

2. Two forms of primitivism

2.1. Concept and property

When evaluating a theory of truth, it is essential at the outset to identify the *target* of the theory. That is, we must determine what the theory is meant to be a theory *of*; otherwise, we risk confusion and talking-past, rather than worthwhile reflection and productive debate. In doing so, we must mind a number of distinctions. One of these is the distinction between the concept TRUTH and the property *truth*. The fine details of this distinction, as it is applied within a particular theory of truth, will hinge upon what that theory entails about the natures of concepts and properties. Its thrust is sufficiently clear, though, when we approach it in more general terms.

The concept TRUTH, whatever else we might want to say about its nature and possession-conditions, is meant to be a mental entity of some sort that thinkers deploy whenever they have thoughts involving truth. The property *truth*, by contrast, is meant to be the property that is possessed by all and only the true truth-bearers. Granting the existence of the concept, we can say, for instance, that if Sarah thinks that the latest theory about the origins of the universe is true, then she deploys the concept TRUTH. Likewise, granting the existence of the property and taking propositions (somehow construed) to be the bearers of truth, we can say that the proposition that the universe is filled with background radiation is true iff it possesses the property *truth*.[5]

2.2. Conceptual primitivism and metaphysical primitivism

The concept-property distinction brings into focus two varieties of primitivism about truth. *Conceptual primitivism* has it that the concept TRUTH is primitive, in that while it does exist, it cannot be analysed in terms of more fundamental concepts. *Metaphysical primitivism*, on the other hand, has it that the property *truth* is primitive, in that while it exists, it cannot be analysed in terms of more fundamental properties or relations.[6]

Conceptual primitivism is defended, for instance, in the work of Donald Davidson and Ernest Sosa, who summarise their views as follows:

> For the most part, the concepts philosophers single out for attention, like truth, knowledge, belief, action, cause, the good and the right, are the most elementary concepts we have…Why then should we expect to be

[5] For useful discussions of the significance and contours of this distinction, see Alston (2002), Asay (2013: ch. 1; 2020: § 6.1; 2021a; 2021b), Bar-On and Simmons (2007), Edwards (2018: chs. 1-2; 2021), Eklund (2021: § 2), Lynch (2005; 2009: ch. 1), Nulty (2008), Scharp (2021a, 2021b), and Wyatt (2018, 2021a).

[6] A third variety is *linguistic primitivism*, according to which the words 'true' and 'truth' cannot be analysed in terms of more fundamental words. For present purposes, we'll need only the bipartite distinction between conceptual and metaphysical primitivism.

It is worth noting that the signature commitment of these three varieties of primitivism is that TRUTH/*truth*/'true' and 'truth' cannot be analysed in terms of *more fundamental* concepts/properties or relations/words. This means that a conceptual primitivist, for instance, is free to hold that TRUTH is analysable as a component of a *network analysis*, where the other concepts in the target network are either less fundamental than or equifundamental with TRUTH. For an especially clear discussion of this point, see Asay (2013c: § 1.2.3), and for a related discussion of theories of truth, see Sher (1999).

able to reduce these concepts definitionally to other concepts that are simpler, clearer, and more basic? We should accept the fact that what makes these concepts so important must also foreclose on the possibility of finding a foundation for them which reaches deeper into bedrock. (Davidson 1996: 264)

Truth is a primitive concept, and has no illuminating definition or Moorean analysis. (Sosa 1993a: 15)

Likewise, G.E. Moore and Trenton Merricks have defended metaphysical primitivism, articulating the view in the following terms:

'Truth' therefore would, on this view, be a simple unanalysable property that is possessed by some propositions and not by others. (Moore 1953: 261)

I conclude that *being true* has no analysis. That is, *being true* is a primitive property. (Merricks 2007: 183).

2.3. Asay's primitivist deflationism

Asay's preferred variety of primitivism is a hybrid of two approaches to truth that are often regarded as being competitors. Like Davidson and Sosa, Asay is a conceptual primitivist. However, unlike Moore and Merricks, Asay rejects metaphysical primitivism in favour of a *deflationary* account of *truth*. To bring out its hybrid character, it is useful to call this theory *primitivist deflationism*. Primitivist deflationism consists of four core theses about TRUTH and one core thesis about *truth*:[7]

Fundamentality: TRUTH is *fundamental*—it cannot be analysed in terms of more fundamental concepts

Explanatory Indispensability: TRUTH is *explanatorily indispensable*—we must use TRUTH to explain certain phenomena

Omnipresence: TRUTH is a structural component of every propositional thought

Ability: TRUTH is the ability to have propositional thoughts

Insubstantiality: The property *truth* is a non-primitive, but nevertheless insubstantial, property.

We can unpack these theses in order to get a sense of how they are meant to hang together.

Asay thinks of our concepts as being ordered in a *hierarchical dependence structure*. Concepts that are higher up in this structure depend upon concepts that are lower down, so that someone who possesses the former does so in virtue of possessing the latter, but not vice versa. For instance, STUDENT is presumably at a higher layer of this structure than PERSON and ENROLLED TO STUDY AT AN EDUCATIONAL INSTITUTION. Someone who possesses STUDENT presumably does so in virtue of possessing the latter concepts, but not vice versa. The latter concepts presumably depend in turn

[7] Regarding the former, see Asay (2013a; 2013c; 2016: 189; 2020: 106-7; 2021a; 2021b). Regarding the latter, see Asay (2013c: ch. 4; 2014; 2016: 189; 2020: 108-11; 2021a).

Asay (2021b, § 4.2) uses the Omnipresence thesis to motivate the Ability thesis by way of inference to the best explanation. I won't address this argument directly, but I will address it indirectly in §§ 3.2 and 4.2. Since Asay motivates Ability using Omnipresence, Omnipresence can be fairly regarded as a more central component of primitivist deflationism than Ability. However, treating both as core theses of the view won't substantially affect the discussion to follow.

upon even more fundamental concepts. This means that the dependence chain continues further down the structure, ultimately terminating at its bottom layer.[8] The Fundamentality thesis is the claim that at the bottom layer of this structure, we will find TRUTH among our most fundamental stock of concepts.

The Explanatory Indispensability thesis rests on an idea that has been hotly contested in debates concerning deflationism about truth. Two notable flashpoints in these debates involve the notions of assertion and meaning.

Frege famously proposed that if one asserts a proposition, then this is because one presents the proposition as being true.[9] For instance, if I assert that the universe came into existence yesterday afternoon, then this is because I present the proposition that the universe came into existence yesterday afternoon as being true. If assertion and truth are indeed linked in this way, then it would seem that to explain the nature of assertion, we must use the concept TRUTH.

Similarly, Davidson systematically developed the idea that a declarative sentence has a certain meaning because it has certain truth-conditions.[10] Thinking about meaning along these lines, we will say that the sentence 'Dogs are amphibians' means that dogs are amphibians because it is true iff dogs are amphibians. If this analysis is on the right track, then it seems that in explaining the nature of linguistic meaning, we cannot do without TRUTH. The Explanatory Indispensability thesis tells us that there are indeed phenomena like this—phenomena that we simply cannot explain without using TRUTH.

The Omnipresence thesis is built upon a contrast between two kinds of components of *propositional thoughts*, where a propositional thought is a state of mind such as believing, hoping, or fearing that has propositional content.[11] Asay suggests that propositional thoughts have some components that are *aboutness-determining*, in that they (partially) determine what a propositional thought is about.[12] By contrast, he regards other components of propositional thoughts as *structural*, in that they (partially) determine the structure of a propositional thought without determining what it is about. To illustrate, if I think that mountains are solid or kiwis are flightless, then my thought is constituted by the concepts MOUNTAIN, SOLID, KIWI, FLIGHTLESS, and DISJUNCTION. MOUNTAIN, SOLID, KIWI, and FLIGHTLESS are aboutness-determining components of this thought, making it a thought about mountains, solidity, kiwis, and flightlessness. By contrast, DISJUNCTION is a structural component of the thought, as the thought has a disjunctive structure while not being about disjunction. The Omnipresence thesis is the claim that TRUTH is like DISJUNCTION, except for the fact that TRUTH is a structural component of *every* propositional thought.

The Ability thesis is meant to tell us what sort of entity TRUTH is. In a telling passage, Asay remarks:[13]

> [I]t's clear that what is distinctive about TRUTH is that it enables us to have a fundamental cognitive ability: the ability to have propositional thoughts. TRUTH makes propositional thought possible. As a result, the simplest answer to the question of the ontology of TRUTH is that it is not a particular representational device, but rather an *ability* to engage in propositional thought.

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[8] Of course, this suggestion presupposes that the structure does in fact have a bottom layer. In § 3.1.1, we'll consider an argument for the existence of this layer.

[9] See the various formulations of this idea in Frege (1979). Bar-On and Simmons (2007) leverage this idea in developing an important objection against deflationism about TRUTH.

[10] See e.g. the essays in Davidson (1984).

[11] Asay (2021a: 534; 2021b: § 3).

[12] Asay (2021b: 13; see also 2021a: § 3.3) calls these 'subject matter' or 'content-giving' components, though our discussion in what follows won't turn on how we label them.

[13] Asay (2021b: § 4.2).

Plausibly, the concept KIWI is a mental representation that we use to categorise entities as either kiwis or non-kiwis. Asay maintains that unlike KIWI, TRUTH isn't a representational entity. Rather, he holds that TRUTH is an ability—namely, the ability to have propositional thoughts. We'll have more to say about this idea in § 4.2.

Lastly, Asay holds that the property *truth* is a non-primitive but nevertheless *insubstantial* property. In describing *truth* as insubstantial, Asay aligns himself with *deflationists* about truth such as Paul Horwich (1998, 2010), Jc Beall (2021), and Scott Soames (1999). Deflationists have offered a number of conceptions of the insubstantiality of *truth*, and Asay is admirably clear about which conception he has in mind. He takes *truth* to be insubstantial in that it is a merely *abundant* property, articulating this view as follows:[14]

> Abundant properties…are metaphysically superfluous, explanatorily speaking…I incline toward the deflationary view that *truth* is a merely abundant property: it does not reside among the sparse properties that play substantive theoretical roles in metaphysical inquiry, regardless of whether sparse properties are understood in terms of universals, tropes, natural classes, or something else.

The central idea is that although *truth* does exist, it lacks explanatory power—we can't appeal to facts involving *truth* when explaining other facts. For instance, if *truth* is an abundant property, then we'll get no mileage out of facts involving *truth* when we aim to explain genuine resemblances between true propositions, why certain propositions are true while others fail to be true, or why beliefs in true propositions are more likely to lead to practical success than beliefs in false propositions. In this way, *truth* will be on a par with explanatorily inert properties such as *being negatively charged or darker than crimson or famous in more than three English counties*.

3. Arguments for conceptual primitivism

3.1. The foundational argument

3.1.1. The argument

Two arguments form the heart of Asay's case for conceptual primitivism. The aim of the first is to support the Fundamentality thesis, while the aim of the second is to directly support the Omnipresence thesis and to indirectly support the Ability thesis (see n. 6). In this section, I'll detail these arguments and explain why they prove to be inconclusive.[15] In the next section, I'll offer two objections against primitivist deflationism itself. The first will target the Explanatory Indispensability and Insubstantiality theses, and the second will target the Omnipresence and Ability

[14] Asay (2021b: 3; see also 2013c: ch. 4; 2014; 2020: 108-9; 2021a: n. 3).

The seminal treatment of abundant properties is that of Lewis (1983). For discussions of this account of the insubstantiality of *truth*, see Edwards (2013; 2018: ch. 2), Scharp (2021a, 2021b), Strollo (2014), and Wyatt (2016, 2021b).

[15] Asay does develop other notable arguments, including the *elimination argument*, the *logic argument*, and the *Tarskian argument*. He is reluctant to put much weight on the elimination argument, as it depicts conceptual primitivism as a 'view of last resort' (2021a: 529), a depiction that he wants to avoid. The logic argument (Asay 2013c: § 6.3) rests on contentious claims about how we should understand the logical constants, and a proper discussion of those claims would be a paper in itself. In the Tarskian argument, Asay argues that given his other commitments related to truth, Tarski would have been well advised to endorse conceptual primitivism. He (2013b: 7; 2013c: 224) is careful to point out, though, that it would be hasty to maintain that Tarski *proved* that TRUTH is indefinable or even that Tarski took himself to have done so. The Tarskian argument, then, isn't meant to be a direct argument that conceptual primitivism is true, and it is for this reason that, despite its interest, we can set it aside in this discussion.

theses. Considered in its entirety, then, my critical discussion is meant to tick all of the boxes—it is meant to show that we should be suspicious of *every* thesis making up Asay's primitivist deflationism.

Asay's first argument for conceptual primitivism is the *foundational argument* (Asay 2013a: 517; 2013c: § 6.2; 2021a: § 3.2). This argument proceeds in two stages. Asay's ambition at the first stage is to argue that there must be *some* primitive concepts, i.e. that the conceptual dependence structure must have a bottom layer. At the second stage, he goes on to argue that since TRUTH exhibits certain 'marks of fundamentality' (Asay 2013c: 196), it is highly probable that TRUTH occupies a position within this bottom layer. In more detail, the stages of the argument proceed as follows:

Foundational argument, first stage:

P1: Some concepts are not primitive, i.e. they depend upon more fundamental concepts

Support: For example, BACHELOR isn't primitive, since it depends upon more fundamental concepts—namely, UNMARRIED, ADULT, and MALE

P2: Considering one of these more fundamental concepts, there are three possibilities: (i) it is primitive; (ii) it isn't primitive and it depends upon concepts that don't depend upon it; or (iii) it isn't primitive and it depends upon concepts that do depend upon it

Support: (i)-(iii) seem to exhaust all of the possibilities that arise here

P3: Option (iii) can be ruled out, since if concept C_1 depends upon concept C_2, then C_2 can't depend upon C_1

Support: This follows from the plausible assumption that conceptual dependence is both irreflexive and transitive

P4: Option (ii) can't be true of *all* of these more fundamental concepts, since that would entail a vicious infinite regress

Support:

- For instance, if option (ii) were true of UNMARRIED and all of the concepts upon which it depends, then UNMARRIED would depend upon an infinite number of concepts
- It seems impossible for a finite mind to possess a concept of this sort, so it would follow—contrary to fact—that no actual thinker possesses UNMARRIED

C1: Option (i) must be true of some of these more fundamental concepts—that is, some of these concepts must be primitive

Support: P1-P4

Foundational argument, second stage:

P1: Primitive concepts must be highly general and have wide application[16]

Support:

- Primitive concepts are those that we must possess to possess any other concept
- Accordingly: they must be 'all-purpose tools' that a thinker can use while possessing very few concepts

Example:

- It is plausible that ENTITY is a concept that we must possess to possess any other concept
- Since ENTITY has this status, it seems that it must be highly general and have wide application (which it does, given that it applies to entities of any kind whatsoever)

P2: TRUTH is highly general and has wide application

Support: TRUTH can be applied to any kind of truth-bearer, e.g. propositions about morality, aesthetics, religion, chemistry, etc.

P3: Primitive concepts must be related to a large number of *derivative* (non-primitive) concepts

Support: Primitive concepts must function as the conceptual basis upon which one acquires all of one's derivative concepts

P4: TRUTH is related to a large number of derivative concepts

Support: TRUTH is related, for instance, to BELIEF, KNOWLEDGE, LINGUISTIC MEANING, ASSERTION, CONJECTURE, PRETENCE, SCIENTIFIC SUCCESS, etc.

C2: TRUTH is a primitive concept

Support: P1-P4

3.1.2. Problems with the argument

The foundational argument contains thought-provoking ideas about the structure of our repertoire of concepts and the distinctive features of primitive concepts. Despite these virtues, however, it suffers from at least two significant problems.[17]

[16] I've added the second line of support for this premise, as it seems to capture what Asay has in mind here.

[17] The argument may also be affected by additional problems. For instance, its first stage might be interestingly challenged by an advocate of a holistic approach to conceptual analysis that is modelled off of the *foundational holism* that is defended by Sher (2016: ch. 2). In the present discussion, however, I will develop only the two problems that I detail below.

The first problem is that the analogy that Asay draws at the second stage looks to be rather weak. He suggests that like other plausibly primitive concepts, TRUTH is highly general and has wide application. When we compare TRUTH to these concepts, however, we see that TRUTH actually has a considerably narrower range of application than they do, and is thus considerably less general than they are.

Let the *range of application* of a concept *C* be the set *G* containing all and only the kinds of entity $K_1,\ldots, K_n$ to which *C* applies. The concept BODY OF WATER, for instance, has a range of application that includes lakes, rivers, ponds, lagoons, oceans, canals, all of the other kinds of body of water, and no other kind of entity. While the issue as to which of our concepts are primitive is controversial, natural candidates include NUMERICAL IDENTITY, EXISTENCE, and ENTITY.[18] NUMERICAL IDENTITY applies exclusively to pairs which consist of an entity of any kind and itself, so NUMERICAL IDENTITY's range of application includes every kind of entity. Similarly, EXISTENCE applies to existent entities of any kind, and ENTITY applies to existent or non-existent entities of any kind. By contrast, TRUTH applies only to *true truth-bearers* (e.g. true propositions), which means that TRUTH's range of application includes comparatively few kinds of entity. It is fair to say, then, that compared to the former concepts, which are highly general—the Swiss Army knives of our conceptual repertoire—TRUTH is a rather *localised* concept.[19]

A second problem with the foundational argument is that there is a well-known alternative explanation for why TRUTH is as general and widely applicable as it is. The explanation comes to us from deflationists such as Paul Horwich, and it is that TRUTH's primary function is to serve as a device of blind endorsement and generalisation, a function that it couldn't perform unless it was applicable to truth-bearers of any kind.[20]

Formulated in the terms of Horwich's minimalist conception of truth, the initial thought behind this explanation is that to possess TRUTH, one must be disposed to accept, in the absence of supporting argumentation, every instance of the *Equivalence Schema*:[21]

(ES) ‹p› is true iff p.

According to Horwich, the central function of TRUTH is to enable us to have thoughts such as those that are expressed by the following claims:

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[18] Indeed, Asay (2021a: n. 4) mentions NUMERICAL IDENTITY and EXISTENCE as strong contenders for being primitive concepts. See also McGinn (2000: chs. 1, 2) and Strawson (1992: 8, 24), as well as the overview of empirical work on children's representations of objects in Samet and Zaitchik (2017: § 2.2).

[19] This isn't to deny, of course, that its applicability to true truth-bearers of any kind is a notable fact about TRUTH. This fact plays a significant role, for instance, in the *scope problem* for monist theories of truth that is developed by Lynch (2009: ch. 2) and Sher (1999). It may also, via an argument much like the foundational argument, motivate the view that TRUTH is one of our most fundamental *semantic* concepts. That view, though, is far more modest than conceptual primitivism.

Additionally, it is worth noting that Asay (2013c: § 1.1.3; 2020: § 1.2) is officially neutral as to which of the usual candidate truth-bearers (e.g. propositions, sentence-types, sentence-tokens, statements, beliefs, or judgments) are in fact bearers of truth. Yet even if TRUTH's range of application includes true entities of each of these kinds, it will still be far narrower than those of NUMERICAL IDENTITY, EXISTENCE, and ENTITY. Thanks to an anonymous referee for prompting this clarification.

[20] See Horwich (1998), as well as similar claims by many other deflationists, e.g. Quine (1970).

[21] Angle brackets serve to name propositions.

Horwich eventually revises this account in three respects. The revised proposal (Horwich 2010: 42, 47–8, ch. 3, n. 10) is that *S* possesses TRUTH iff *S* is disposed—when supposing either that some entities are true or that some schema of the form 'the proposition that p is F iff p' is valid—to accept in the absence of supporting argumentation (i) every instance of (ES) that *S* understands and (ii) that only propositions are true. However, we can safely set these further complexities aside.

(1) What my guru said last night is true (where one can't remember what one's guru said last night but has an unshakeable trust in their pronouncements)

(2) Every proposition of the form ‹If p, then p› is true.

For TRUTH to enable us to think thoughts such as these, it's clear that TRUTH must be applicable to propositions of any kind. After all, one's guru might have issued a pronouncement about any subject matter, and propositions of the form ‹If p, then p› can be about any subject matter whatsoever. Call this the *minimalist explanation* of TRUTH's generality and wide application.

For present purposes, the key detail is that the minimalist can explain TRUTH's generality and wide application without taking TRUTH to be primitive. They can happily propose, for instance, that NUMERICAL IDENTITY, EXISTENCE, and ENTITY are among our most fundamental concepts, while TRUTH sits at a higher layer within our conceptual dependence structure. Moreover, given that Asay's analogy between TRUTH and paradigm primitive concepts is rather strained, this minimalist explanation of TRUTH's generality and wide application may prove to be the more promising of the two.[22,23]

3.2. The omnipresence argument

3.2.1. The argument

Asay's second central argument for conceptual primitivism, and the one that he finds most compelling, is the *omnipresence argument*. This argument is a successor to Frege's much-discussed treadmill argument (1918, 1979). Asay, following a number of commentators on Frege, takes that argument to be unsuccessful, but he contends that by reworking it, we can salvage its spirit. The omnipresence argument runs as follows:[24]

P1: Our propositional thoughts are constituted by their component concepts

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[22] Interestingly, Horwich (2010: 80) does suggest that 'true' is a primitive term. Whether he would, or should, say the same of TRUTH is a tricky issue. On the one hand, Horwich's views about TRUTH tend to mirror his views about 'true,' e.g. his views about the conditions under which one possesses TRUTH and the conditions under which one understands the meaning of 'true.' On the other hand, Horwich holds (1998: 16-17, 103, § 32; 2010: 50-3) that the concept PROPOSITION is prior to the concept TRUTH, in that one must possess the former to possess the latter, but not vice versa. This entails that PROPOSITION is at a lower layer of our conceptual dependence structure than TRUTH.

My inclination is to read Horwich's claim that 'true' is primitive as the claim that 'true' cannot be *explicitly* defined, e.g. in a Tarskian fashion, even though it can be *implicitly* defined in the manner that Horwich describes. This claim is entirely compatible with Horwich's view that PROPOSITION is more fundamental than TRUTH. In the present context, though, the important point is just that in accounting for TRUTH's generality and wide application, a minimalist isn't compelled to regard TRUTH as primitive.

[23] While the minimalist can straightforwardly explain TRUTH's generality and wide application, they must confront a range of well-known concerns. One of these, which we touched on in § 2.3, pertains to the conceptual connections between TRUTH and ASSERTION and is developed by both Asay (2013c: § 8.2) and Bar-On and Simmons (2007). This concern raises many nuanced issues pertaining to assertion, and discussion of these issues is beyond the scope of this paper. Again, the present point is not that minimalism is true—it's that minimalists can tidily explain TRUTH's generality and wide application, which means that Asay's foundational argument looks to come up short.

[24] Asay (2013a: § 3; 2013c: § 5.2; 2020: 107; 2021a: § 3.3).

Support: For instance, if I think that mountains are solid, then my thought is constituted by the concepts MOUNTAIN and SOLIDITY (as well as, perhaps, EXEMPLIFICATION or SET MEMBERSHIP)

P2: The concepts that constitute propositional thoughts are either aboutness-determining or structural

Support: This is a plausible assumption, in light of examples such as the thought that mountains are solid or kiwis are flightless (see § 2.3)

P3: In general, the propositional thought that p just is the propositional thought that it is true that p

Support: For any proposition *p*, it seems that there is no difference between the belief (hypothesis, desire, hope, or etc.) that p and the belief (hypothesis, desire, hope, or etc.) that it is true that p

P4: TRUTH (partially) constitutes every propositional thought—that is, TRUTH is *omnipresent*

Support: P3

P5: TRUTH isn't an aboutness-determining component of every propositional thought

Support: Some propositional thoughts, e.g. the thought that mountains are solid, aren't about truth

P6: TRUTH is a structural component of every propositional thought—it is *structurally omnipresent*[25]

Support: P2, P4, P5

P7: If TRUTH is structurally omnipresent, then it is not possible to define TRUTH in terms of more fundamental concepts

Support:

- If TRUTH is structurally omnipresent, then the definiens of any attempted definition of TRUTH will contain TRUTH as a structural component
- Accordingly, any such attempted definition won't define TRUTH in terms of more fundamental concepts, but will rather be viciously circular and thus unsuccessful

C: TRUTH is a primitive concept

Support: P6, P7

[25] Note that this premise is compatible with TRUTH being an aboutness-determining component of some propositional thoughts, e.g. the thought that truth is a complex topic. P6 entails that in this sort of thought, TRUTH appears twice—once as a structural component and once as an aboutness-determining component.

3.2.2. Problems with the argument

The omnipresence argument is ingenious, and Asay is correct to find it more compelling than Frege's treadmill argument. However, like the foundational argument, it comes up short in several respects. I'll outline three serious problems that beset the argument.[26]

The first is the *problem of symmetry*. P3 tells us that the thought that p just is the thought that it is true that p. Asay indicates that the 'just is' relation is meant to be an equivalence relation,[27] which means that it is reflexive, symmetric, and transitive. Since the 'just is' relation is symmetric, P3 entails both of the following:

($P3_{LR}$) The propositional thought that p just is the propositional thought that it is true that p
($P3_{RL}$) The propositional thought that it is true that p just is the propositional thought that p.

The problem is that in inferring P4 from P3, Asay tacitly and unwarrantedly privileges ($P3_{LR}$) over ($P3_{RL}$).

Asay's contention here is that given P3, it follows that our propositional thoughts have more structure than we might ordinarily think. He argues that since the propositional thought that p just is the propositional thought that it is true that p, we should hold that any propositional thought that we ordinarily describe simply as 'the thought that p' in fact contains TRUTH as a structural component. In this way, Asay highlights ($P3_{LR}$) and having done so, draws an *additive* lesson about our propositional thoughts from P3.

But are there any good reasons to highlight ($P3_{LR}$), to the exclusion of ($P3_{RL}$)? It would seem not: P3 entails both ($P3_{LR}$) and ($P3_{RL}$), so privileging one over the other seems unwarranted. Moreover, if we concentrate on ($P3_{RL}$), we see that it is just as reasonable to draw a *reductive*, rather than an additive, lesson from P3. The reductive lesson is that some of our propositional thoughts—those that we describe as being 'thoughts that it is true that p'—actually have less structure than we ordinarily think, insofar as contrary to appearances, they don't contain TRUTH as a (structural or aboutness-determining) component.[28] That is, when we concentrate on ($P3_{RL}$), we see that it is just as reasonable to infer from P3 not that TRUTH is omnipresent, but—to the contrary—that TRUTH is present less often than it seems to be.

In short, given that the 'just is' relation is symmetric, it is no more reasonable to draw Asay's additive, rather than an opposing reductive, lesson from P3. This means that contra Asay, the purported equivalence between the thought that p and the thought that it is true that p provides no evidence that TRUTH is omnipresent.[29]

A second problem is the *problem of viciousness*. Suppose that we grant, for the sake of argument, that TRUTH is structurally omnipresent (P6). Suppose also that I attempt to define TRUTH. Call the thought that I have when I entertain the definiendum of this definition the *definiendum-thought*, and call the thought that I have when I entertain the definition's definiens the *definiens-thought*. If TRUTH is structurally omnipresent, then it is a structural component of the definiens-thought. Clearly, TRUTH must also be a component (specifically, an aboutness-determining component) of the definiendum-thought. It seems, then, that there is an important sense in which

[26] The omnipresence argument may be affected by additional problems as well. For instance, Richard (1997) and Künne (2003: §§ 2.1.4, 7.3.5) raise considerations that put pressure on P3. However, I'll focus here on developing the three problems that I detail below.
[27] See Asay (2013a: 507, esp. n. 9; 2021b: 534), and cp. Asay (2020: 107; 2021b: 8-11, 14).
[28] This plausibility of this lesson was noted long ago by Frege (1918: 328) and Ramsey (1927: 157-8).
[29] Though his ambitions were rather different, it is instructive to compare the problem of symmetry to the problem that Alston (1958) raises for Quine's views about ontological commitment.

my definition is circular: the concept that I am trying to define is a component of both of the definiendum-thought and the definiens-thought. But is this circularity *vicious*, or is it benign?

To address this question, we should ask: what is the aim of my definition of TRUTH? Here is a worthwhile aim that I might pursue: to describe, in an informative way, the conditions that are both necessary and sufficient for TRUTH to apply to a given entity *x*.[30] In thinking about whether my definition fulfils this aim, it will be useful to have a working example of a definition of TRUTH that I might offer. The following definition will suffice, where a *Fregean proposition* is a structured truth-bearer whose constituents are modes of presentation and a *Russellian fact* is a structured truthmaker whose constituents are particulars, properties, and relations:[31]

> (3) TRUTH applies to an entity $x =_{df} x$ is a Fregean proposition and there is a Russellian fact *y* such that *x* corresponds to *y*.

If TRUTH is structurally omnipresent, it follows that when I offer (3), the structure of my definiens-thought is: That[[it is true that][*x* is a Fregean proposition and there is a Russellian fact *y* such that *x* corresponds to *y*]]. For the sake of argument, suppose that we can characterise Fregean propositions, Russellian facts, and correspondence in TRUTH-free terms. The critical question is this: does TRUTH's presence as a structural component of the definiens-thought demonstrate that (3) fails to describe TRUTH's application conditions in an informative way?

To see why it doesn't, we should bear in mind John Burgess' incisive observation that 'a definition is informative if it *sometimes* gives us helpful information; it should not be required to do so on all occasions' (Burgess 2008: 221). Burgess (*ibid.*) illustrates this point using the following definition:

> (4) $p =_{df}$ (*p* and *q*) or *r*.

Even though (4) is circular, this circularity doesn't render (4) uninformative on all occasions. This is because (i) it is possible to verify (4)'s definiens using a procedure that doesn't involve its definiendum—namely, by determining that r—and (ii) it is also possible to falsify (4)'s definiens using such a procedure—namely, by determining that not-q and that not-r. For this reason, it is sensible to regard the circularity in (4) as benign.

A similar point holds with respect to definition (3). Suppose with Asay that P3 of the omnipresence argument, which we discussed just above, is true. Call the purported equivalence that is detailed in this premise the *Fregean equivalence*.[32]

Given the Fregean equivalence, even if TRUTH is a structural component of the thought that p, we can still *identify* this thought in either of two ways—as 'the thought that it is true that p' or simply as 'the thought that p.' Putting things in Fregean terms, we can say that even if we grant that definite descriptions of these respective forms refer to the same thought, we should nevertheless hold that they express distinct modes of presentation of this thought.[33]

Applying this observation to (3), it follows that there are two importantly different ways of identifying what we called the definiens-thought. We can identify it as 'the thought that it is true that *x* is a Fregean proposition and there is a Russellian fact *y* such that *x* corresponds to *y*.' If we

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[30] In speaking of a definition of TRUTH as 'informative,' I mean that it has the potential to inform those who have thought carefully about truth, as well as those who haven't. Cp. Burgess (2008: 217)'s distinction between a definition's being 'pedagogically illuminating' and its being 'philosophically illuminating.'

[31] For related discussion of these notions, see Dodd (2008: ch. 5, § 1), Hornsby (1999), and Horwich (2010: 315).

[32] Again, cp. Frege (1918: 328).

[33] This, of course, would be Frege's explanation of why the Fregean equivalence is informative.

do so, then the resulting definition of TRUTH won't be informative in the slightest. However, we can also identify this thought simply as 'the thought that *x* is a Fregean proposition and there is a Russellian fact *y* such that *x* corresponds to *y*.' If we do so, then the resulting definition will be informative (provided, again, that we can characterise Fregean propositions, Russellian facts, and correspondence in TRUTH-free terms). As a result, the circularity in (3) doesn't render (3) uninformative on all occasions, so it is sensible to regard this circularity as benign.

In short, the Fregean equivalence enables us to grant that TRUTH is structurally omnipresent while rejecting Asay's contention that any definition of TRUTH will be viciously circular. This casts doubt on P7 of the omnipresence argument.

A third problem with the omnipresence argument is the *problem of contradiction*. As we've noted, Asay uses the Fregean equivalence to argue that our propositional thoughts have more structure than we ordinarily think. Specifically, he argues that since the thought that p just is the thought that it is true that p, we should endorse the following principle:

The Hidden Truth Principle: The structure of the thought that p is That[[it is true that][p]].

The Hidden Truth Principle, together with the Fregean equivalence and a further plausible assumption, generates a contradiction. The other plausible assumption is this:

The Structure Principle: If the thought that p just is the thought that q, then the thought that p and the thought that q have the same structure.

We can illustrate the route to contradiction using an arbitrary propositional thought, e.g. the thought that mountains are solid, which we can call *M*:

(5) The structure of *M* is That[[it is true that][mountains are solid]] (Hidden Truth Principle)

(6) *M* just is the thought *T* that it is true that mountains are solid (Fregean equivalence)

(7) The structure of *T* is That[[it is true that][it is true that][mountains are solid]] (Hidden Truth Principle)

(8) *M* and *T* have the same structure (6, Structure Principle)

(9) The structure of *M* is That[[it is true that][it is true that][mountains are solid]] (7, 8)

(10) The structure of *M* is That[[it is true that][mountains are solid]] and the structure of *M* is That[[it is true that][it is true that][mountains are solid]] (5, 9, Adjunction)

(11) The structures That[[it is true that][p]] and That[[it is true that][it is true that][p]] are distinct (Self-evident)[34]

[34] (11) is compatible with the fact that thoughts with the two given structures have logically equivalent propositional contents. Compare the sentential case: a sentence of the form 'it is true that p' is syntactically distinct from a sentence of the form 'it is true that it is true that p,' even though the sentences have logically equivalent propositional contents.

An anonymous referee has suggested that Asay might deny (11). One response, which strikes me as sufficiently convincing, is to reiterate that (11) is a self-evident claim about the relevant structures. An additional response would be to point out that if Asay denied (11), then he would also have to deny e.g. that the structures That[[it is true that][p]] and That[[it is true that]…[p]] are distinct, where the ellipsis is replaced with infinitely many iterations of '[it is true that].'

(12) It is not possible for a thought *A* to have two distinct structures (Self-evident)

(13) It is not possible for a thought *A* to have the structures That[[it is true that][p]] and That[[it is true that][it is true that][p]] (11, 12)

(14) It is not the case that (the structure of *M* is That[[it is true that][mountains are solid]] and the structure of *M* is That[[it is true that][it is true that][mountains are solid]]) (13)

(15) ('The structure of *M* is That[[it is true that][mountains are solid]] and the structure of *M* is That[[it is true that][it is true that][mountains are solid]]) and (it is not the case that (the structure of *M* is That[[it is true that][mountains are solid]] and the structure of *M* is That[[it is true that][it is true that][mountains are solid]])) (!) (10, 14, Adjunction)

That this contradiction results from combining the Fregean equivalence with the Hidden Truth Principle and the Structure Principle demonstrates that we shouldn't endorse all of these principles. The Structure Principle is very plausible, so absent reasons to reject this principle, it shouldn't be the one to go.[35] If we reject the Fregean equivalence, then we must reject P3 of the omnipresence argument. If we accept the Fregean equivalence but reject the Hidden Truth Principle, then we must reject the inference from the former to the latter. However, if we do that, then we must also reject the inference from P3 to P4 in the omnipresence argument. Accordingly, no matter how we slice it, the problem of contradiction looks to undermine the omnipresence argument.

4. Objections to primitivist deflationism

So far, my main contention regarding Asay's primitivist deflationism is that his arguments for the conceptual component of the view fail to convince. Those arguments, without a doubt, bring a number of interesting issues to light, but they shouldn't inspire any conversions to conceptual primitivism. To wrap up this critical discussion of primitivist deflationism, I want to offer two objections against primitivist deflationism itself which operate independently of the above concerns for the foundational and omnipresence arguments. The first is that Asay's package deal of conceptual primitivism and metaphysical deflationism is internally unstable. The second is that Asay's endorsement of both the Omnipresence and Ability theses renders him unable to account for the fact that certain propositional thoughts are truth-apt.

4.1. Instability

Yet the latter structures are clearly distinct, given that (i) the complexity of the former is finite; (ii) the complexity of the latter is infinite; and (iii) no structure can have both finite and infinite complexity. It follows that we should accept (11).

This referee also helpfully points out that the reasoning in (5)-(11) is infinitely iterable (for a similar point, see Kim (2020: 132-3)). This compounds the force of the problem of contradiction, as it shows that Asay is in fact committed to taking *M* to have *infinitely many* distinct structures, among which are the two structures mentioned here.

[35] Note that thoughts whose propositional contents are logically equivalent do not seem to call the Structure Principle into question. A pertinent example is the thought *A* that if it rained this morning, then the streets are wet and the thought *B* that if the streets are not wet, then it did not rain this morning. It seems clear that *A* and *B* have different structures, insofar as *B*'s structure involves negation, whereas *A*'s structure does not. Additionally, it seems inaccurate to say that *A* just is *B* (or that *B* just is *A*).

As we've seen, a signature feature of Asay's primitivist deflationism is that it combines a primitivist account of TRUTH with a deflationary account of *truth*. In particular, as we noted in § 2.3, Asay maintains that the property *truth* lacks explanatory power while the concept TRUTH is explanatorily indispensable. These differential attitudes towards TRUTH and *truth* should give us pause. Upon inspection, it becomes clear that their admixture is volatile, which means that Asay should give up either the view that *truth* is explanatorily inert or the view that TRUTH is explanatorily indispensable (or both).

Asay takes TRUTH's explanatory indispensability to be revealed in connection with phenomena such as assertion. The trouble is that Asay's rationale for this view actually speaks in favour of the explanatory power of *truth*, contrary to metaphysical deflationism.[36] The explanatory claim about assertion that Asay puts forward, following Frege, is this:

(16) If a speaker asserts a proposition, then they do so in virtue of presenting the proposition as being true.

(16) entails that if our explanandum is, say, that Paul asserted ‹wombats fly› at time *t*, then the explanans is that at *t*, Paul presented ‹wombats fly› as being true.

Moreover, the following principle seems trivially correct:[37]

(17) If a speaker presents a proposition as being F, then in doing so, they present the proposition as having the property *being F*.

From (17), we can infer that the explanans in this case is that at *t*, Paul presented ‹wombats fly› as having the property *being true*, i.e. the property *truth*.

The general result is that (16) and (17), together with the assumption that speakers assert propositions (which is of course congenial to Asay), entail that there are facts involving the property *truth* which explain other facts. For instance, they entail that the fact that Paul asserted ‹wombats fly› at *t* is explained by the fact that at *t*, Paul presented ‹wombats fly› as having *truth*. This, however, is a commitment that is anathema to a metaphysical deflationist. In this way, then, Asay's combination of conceptual primitivism and metaphysical deflationism proves to be internally unstable.

There are a number of ways that Asay might resolve this instability. Two interesting options are: (i) to reject metaphysical deflationism in favour of a version of *metaphysical substantivism* according to which *truth* has explanatory power, and (ii) to revise conceptual primitivism so that it doesn't involve a commitment to the Explanatory Indispensability thesis. Option (i) may be viable, but it will be difficult for Asay to endorse, given that he develops a range of forceful arguments against metaphysical substantivism.[38] Option (ii) would move Asay closer to a deflationary theory of TRUTH, but it would allow him to retain the Fundamentality, Omnipresence, and Ability theses, all of which constitute distinctively primitivist ideas about TRUTH.[39] So while going with option (ii) would

[36] Asay's views about e.g. linguistic meaning may do the same, though I leave this question for future work. Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this issue.

[37] Note that (17) is compatible with the plausible principle, which is top of mind for Asay, that if a speaker presents a proposition as being F, then in doing so, they use the concept BEING F. This principle pertains primarily to the speaker's mind—specifically, to which concepts they use—whereas (17) pertains primarily to how they present the proposition as being—namely, as having the property *being F*. Thanks to an anonymous referee for raising this issue.

[38] See especially Asay (2013c: ch. 4; 2014).

[39] Or, in light of the additional problem that will emerge shortly, he could retain the Fundamentality and Ability theses while replacing Omnipresence with Omnipresence*.

compel a shift of allegiance by Asay in one of the main debates between deflationists and substantivists, this shift would preserve the primitivist core of his theory of TRUTH.

4.2. Truth-aptness

I'll close by detailing a second problem with primitivist deflationism. Asay endorses the standard idea that certain propositional thoughts (e.g. beliefs, hypotheses, and predictions) are *truth-apt*, i.e. capable of being true or false.[40] However, this standard idea generates a problem for conceptual primitivism that emerges in connection with the Omnipresence and Ability theses. The Omnipresence thesis tell us that TRUTH is a structural component of every propositional thought. The Ability thesis tells us that TRUTH is a thinker's ability to have propositional thoughts. The problem is that if we take propositional thoughts to be even partially composed of abilities, it becomes unclear how such thoughts could in fact be truth-apt.

For instance, consider my belief that London is north of Paris. Asay takes beliefs to be truth-apt, so he must hold that this thought is truth-apt (and indeed, that it is true). According to Asay, the structure of this thought can be represented as: That[[it is true that][London is north of Paris]]. Moreover, he takes the components of this thought to include: TRUTH, LONDON, BEING NORTH OF, and PARIS. Now suppose that TRUTH = the ability to have propositional thoughts, and think of the other concepts as having whatever nature you like (e.g. as being mental representations). Is the entity that these concepts compose truth-apt? No: it seems that taking TRUTH to be an ability *spoils* the eligibility of any 'propositional thought' that it composes to be evaluated as true or false.

To see this, start with the belief that London is a city and think of it as being composed of LONDON and CITY, where these concepts are mental representations of some sort. Evaluating this thought for truth is unproblematic: it is true, given that London is in fact a city. Now add an additional component to this thought—my ability to hammer nails—so that the components of the resulting entity are LONDON, CITY, and my ability to hammer nails. Think of these components as being configured however you like, and call the entity that they compose *Novus*. Can Novus be evaluated as true or false? It seems not—rather, it seems that given the kinds of components that it has, it would simply be a category mistake to describe Novus as true or as false.

The situation is no different if we start with LONDON, BEING NORTH OF, and PARIS and add my ability to have propositional thoughts. Think of these components as being configured however you like, and call the entity that they compose *Neos*. Can Neos be evaluated as true or false? Again, it seems not—evaluating Neos as true or as false looks to amount to a straightforward category mistake.

Accordingly, if any 'propositional thought' is partially composed of TRUTH and TRUTH is an ability, then no such 'propositional thought' is truth-apt. This means that since Asay endorses both the Omnipresence and Ability theses, he is saddled with the result that *no* propositional thoughts are truth-apt, which is clearly intolerable. As a result, he must give up either (or both) of these theses.

We saw in § 3.2.2 that Asay's argument for the Omnipresence thesis is problematic, so unless a better argument is forthcoming, perhaps that thesis should go. It's worth noting in this connection that the Omnipresence thesis contributes to the problem of truth-aptness because it states that TRUTH is literally a *part* of every propositional thought. A thesis in the vicinity that doesn't generate the problem of truth-aptness is:

*Omnipresence**: In having any propositional thought, one exercises one's mastery of TRUTH.

[40] Asay (2021a: 531; 2021b: § 3).

Rather than entailing that TRUTH is a part of every propositional thought, Omnipresence* tells us that exercising one's mastery of TRUTH is a part of what it is to have a propositional thought. Were he to replace Omnipresence with Omnipresence*, Asay would be able to make some of his most striking claims about TRUTH without falling prey to the problem of truth-aptness. For instance, he would be free to maintain that:[41]

> the concept of truth is what enables us to engage in propositional thought. Without a concept of truth, we can't think in terms of propositions…[T]o advocate omnipresence is to advocate the claim that we must have a concept of truth if we are to engage in propositional thought. That is to say, anyone who asserts, believes, denies, hypothesizes, lies, or pretends must possess TRUTH.

These considerations suggest that opting for Omnipresence* over Omnipresence may be the right move to make in light of the problem of truth-aptness. On the other hand, Omnipresence* would have to be directly motivated, and it seems that Asay's omnipresence argument won't be especially helpful in this regard.

As for the Ability thesis, we've seen that if TRUTH is an ability, then including it as a component of any 'propositional thought' spoils the truth-aptness of that 'propositional thought.' Accordingly, if Asay holds on to the Ability thesis, then he will be compelled to endorse what we might call the *Alethic Absence* thesis:

Alethic Absence: TRUTH is not a component of any truth-apt propositional thought.

Alethic Absence is rather difficult to stomach in light of e.g. the belief that:

(18) Every sentence of the form 'if p, then p' is true.

It's highly plausible that TRUTH is a component of this belief, so motivating the view that it isn't would certainly be a challenge. If this challenge proves to be too steep, then that will be a sufficient reason to reject the Alethic Absence thesis and in turn, the Ability thesis.

5. Conclusions

In this paper, my aim has been to cast doubt on all of the theses that make up Asay's primitivist deflationism. I should emphasise that I've taken pains to thoroughly criticise this theory because it is one of the most ambitious and carefully crafted theories of truth that is currently on the market. My hope is that upon appreciating the shortcomings of Asay's central arguments for conceptual primitivism as well as the shortcomings of primitivist deflationism itself, theorists of truth will be encouraged to improve the view and to devise better arguments in favour of it. Primitivist deflationism, or rather a successor theory, is likely to be one of the main contenders for years to come, so it is in our interests to determine how resilient and fruitful such a theory can be.[42]

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[41] Asay 2021a: 533-4. Asay could also use Omnipresence* to motivate the Ability thesis by way of inference to the best explanation, much as he does with Omnipresence (see n. 6).

[42] For empirical arguments in favour of a stripped-down version of conceptual primitivism, see Ulatowski and Wyatt (forthcoming).

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