Coping with Vulnerability:
State Resilience to Armed Conflict in Guinea

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Abstract

The aim of this study is to explain why peace has prevailed in Guinea despite the presence of unfavourable conditions. Guinea exhibits many of the major risk factors commonly associated with the onset of civil war and/or armed conflicts, including deep ethnic divisions; a politicised military; an abundance of natural resources alongside extreme poverty; and being located in a conflict ridden neighbourhood. Yet, the country did not descend into civil war and/or armed conflicts. During the 1990s, the outbreak of civil wars in Guinea's neighbouring countries was added to the availability of a large amount of abundant natural resources, and the extreme poverty among its population which was deeply divided along ethno-regional affiliations. From the standpoint of existing models of civil war onset and/or armed conflict, this makes for a dangerous combination against sustaining a country's peace and stability. Likewise, the threat to Guinea's stability was exacerbated in the 2010s by the reintroduction of multiparty politics which produced a system whereby political parties were mainly based on ethnic and/or regional affiliations.

The literature on theories of recent civil wars identifies the presence of one or more of the above variables as significant triggers of civil war onset and or/armed conflicts, particularly in West African nations since the early 1990s. In Guinea, however, the constant presence of these violence risk variables has failed to ignite a broader violent conflict or to destabilize the central power structure of the state, therefore sparing the nation from the types of armed conflicts often associated with similar contexts in many West African nations. This raises the question as to why armed conflict has not been a feature in Guinea since independence despite the presence of unfavourable conditions for peace.

Using qualitative data, the study identifies mitigating factors against the onset of armed conflict in such contexts and explains why Guinea has been spared from armed conflict and/or civil war despite these unfavourable conditions. The thesis reveals that the presence of these conflict risk variables have failed to be associated with the onset of large-scale violence in Guinea largely due to measures taken by the Guinean state and its international partners. This outcome contrasts with much literature on the incidence of armed conflicts in such

contexts. The research results are presented in four papers for publication in refereed international journals. The papers refer to different academic debates, yet there are connecting links between them: they all point to an aspect associated with state resilience to armed conflicts, thereby connecting the Guinean case to a set of African states which managed to maintain peace despite the odds. As such, the study contributes to the research on what make peace resilient in an African state as opposed to the 'failed state' literature.

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Chapter One: Introduction

1.1. Thesis context overview

This study addresses the question of sustaining peace and stability in unfavourable conditions. The literature on theories of contemporary civil wars identifies deep ethnic divisions, a politicised military, an abundance of natural resources alongside extreme poverty, and being located in a regionalized conflict zone, among the significant variables that trigger the onset of civil war and or/armed conflicts.[1] According to these studies, the presence of one or more of these variables has contributed in triggering many recent civil wars and or armed conflicts, particularly in West African nations since the early 1990s.[2] The Republic of Guinea exhibits many of the risk factors commonly associated with armed conflicts, yet, state security has been successfully preserved since independence. For instance, Ahmed Sékou Touré and General Lansana Conté were Guinea's only two presidents over fifty years (from1958-1984 and 1984-2008, respectively) and they remained in office until their deaths of natural causes. Both regimes managed to protect the central structures of the state from destabilising events usually associated with civil wars and/or armed conflicts in the sub-region of West Africa. Following the death of President Conté in 2008 and the brief military take-over by Captain Mussa Dadis Camara (2008-2010),

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[1] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "On economic causes of civil war," *Oxford Economic Papers* 50, 14 (1998): 563-73; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and grievance in civil war," *Oxford Economic Papers* 56, 4 (2004): 563-596; Paul Collier, "Rebellion as a quasi-criminal activity," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 44, 6 (2000): 839–853; James D Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war," *American Political Science Review* 97, 1 (2003): 75-90; Nicholas Sambanis, "Using Case Studies to Expand Economic Models of Civil War," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2, 2 (2004): 259-279; Michael Ross, "Oil, drugs, and diamonds: The varying roles of natural resources in civil war," in *The political economy of armed conflict: Beyond greed and grievance*, ed. Karen Ballentine & Jake Sherman (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003); William Zartman, "Dynamics and Constraints in Negotiations in Internal Conflicts," in *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars*, ed. William Zartman (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institute, 1995).

[2] The civil wars in Liberia, Sierra Leone and Ivory Coast are often cited as examples of these West African armed conflicts. For outstanding studies of these civil wars, see *Stephen Ellis, The Mask of Anarchy: The Destruction of Liberia and the Religious Dimension of an African Civil War* (London: C. Hurst & Co. Ltd, 1999); Mats Utas, *Sweet Battlefield: Youth and the Liberian Civil War* (Uppsala: Uppsala University, 2003); Ibrahim Abdullah, "Bush path to destruction: the origin and character of the Revolutionary United Front/Sierra Leone," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 36, 2 (1998): 203-235; David Keen, *Conflict and Collusion in Sierra Leone* (Oxford: James Currey/Palgrave Macmillan, 2005); Mike McGovern, *Making War in Côte d'Ivoire* (London: Hurst & Co. Ltd, 2011).

veteran opposition leader Alpha Condé was democratically elected to the presidency in 2010.

This relative stability of Guinea existed a alongside continuous presence of one or more of the variables often associated with large-scale armed violence. Firstly, Guinea's main immediate post-independence concern was how to survive as a unified state against the background of the country's ethno-linguistic differences, strong regional affiliations of various ethnic groups, and the external hostilities from France and its West African allies for being the only French colony to opt out of the French Community of the newly independent countries.[3] Secondly, during the last two decades of President Conté's rule (1990-2008) observers had argued that all the pieces were in place for an onset of a large scale-violence in Guinea.[4] During this period, the outbreak of civil wars in Guinea's neighbouring countries was added to the availability of large amounts of abundant natural resources, and the extreme poverty among its population which was deeply divided along ethno-regional affiliations.[5] Thirdly, the threat to Guinea's stability was exacerbated in the 2010s by the reintroduction of multiparty politics which produced a system whereby political parties were mainly based on ethnic and/or regional affiliations.[6] From the standpoint of existing models of civil war onset

[3] Claude E. Welch, "Soldier and state in Africa," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 5, 3 (1967): 309-310; Elizabeth Schmidt, *Cold War and Decolonization in Guinea, 1946-1958* (Baltimore, Maryland: Ohio University Press, 2007).

[4] Lansana Gberie, *Destabilizing Guinea: diamonds, Charles Taylor and the potential for a wider human catastrophe*, Partnership Africa-Canada, the Diamond and Human Security Project, Occasional Paper No. 1(2001); Robert D Kaplan, "The coming anarchy: How scarcity, crime, overpopulation and diseases are rapidly destroying the social fabric of our planet," *The Atlantic Monthly*, Feb., 273, 2 (1994): 44; Amos Sawyer, "Violent conflicts and governance challenges in West Africa: the case of the Mano River basin area," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 42, 3 (2004): 437; Marilyn Silberfein and Al-Hassan Conteh, "Boundaries and Conflict in the Mano River Region of West Africa," *Conflict Management and Peace Science* 23, 4 (2006): 343-361.

[5] Alexis Arieff, "Still standing: neighbourhood wars and political stability in Guinea," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 47, 3 (2009): 331-348; Dane F. Jr., Smith, "US-Guinea relations during the rise and fall of Charles Taylor," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 44, 3 (2006): 415-439; Robert J. Groelsema, *The politics of ethnicity: The cultural basis of political parties in Guinea* (PhD diss., Indiana University, 1998); Cédric Jourde, "The International Relations of Small Neo-authoritarian States: Islamism, Warlordism, and the Framing of Stability," *International Studies Quarterly* 51, 2 (2007): 481-503; Robert J. Groelsema, "The Dialectics of Citizenship and Ethnicity in Guinea," *Africa Today* 45, 3/4 (July- December, 1998): 411-422. International Crisis Group, "Stopping Guinea's slide," *Africa Report* 94 (14 June 2005): 22-23; Sarah Birgitta Kanafani, "Guinea: An Island of Stability?" *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs* 7,1 (2006):153-159; Richard Snyder & Ravi Bhavnani, "Diamonds, Blood, and Taxes: A Revenue-Centered Framework for Explaining Political Order," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 49, 4 (2005): 563-597.

[6] Joschka Philipps, *Ambivalent Rage: Youth Gangs and Urban Protest in Conakry Guinea* (Paris: L'Harmattan, 2013), 136-150; Dane F. Jr., Smith "Guinea Inches Toward Stability," *World Politics Review* (Briefing, 13 May 2013): 1-3; International Crisis Group, "Guinea: Putting the transition back on track," *Africa Report*, N°178 (23 September 2011); Alexis Arieff and Mike

and/or armed conflict, this makes for a dangerous combination against sustaining a country's peace and stability.

Yet, the constant presence of these violence risk variables in Guinea has failed to ignite a broader violent conflict or to destabilize the central power structure of the state, therefore sparing the nation from the types of armed conflicts often associated with similar contexts in many West African nations. For instance, Guinea is surrounded by six countries, namely: Mali, Senegal, Liberia, Sierra Leone, Guinea Bissau and Ivory Coast. Each of these countries has experienced civil war since independence, but Guinea did not. The civil war in Mali between the Tuareg in the North and the rest of the country is the longest running armed conflict in Guinea's neighbourhood. This war started in 1963 when the *Mouvement Populaire de Libération de l'Azawad* (MPLA) (*National Movement for the Liberation of Azawad*) launched a rebellion demanding the secession of the Northern region. The war intensified in the 1990s, between 2006 and 2008, and since 2012.

Senegal is another Guinea's immediate neighbour where in 1983 a civil war broke out demanding the secession of the region of Casamance. In mid-December 1983, hundreds of demonstrators – armed with spears, machetes, and hunting rifles, invaded the streets of Ziguinchor to call for the independence of a region in the southwest corner of Senegal – the Casamance. The government responded with a heavy hand, leaving an official toll of 80 injured and 29 dead.[7] A handful of those retreating, led by veterans from the Senegalese army, under the banner of the *Mouvement des Forces Démocratiques de Casamance* (MFDC), headed to the mangroves and dense forest of lower Casamance to set up rebel bases. They started military training and planning attacks on government positions. In doing so, they began a guerrilla war that has left thousands killed and the south of Senegal strewn with land mines.

Liberia is another neighbour of Guinea where in 1989 a civil war broke out led by Charles Taylor's rebel force, the *National Patriotic Front of Liberia* (NPFL), a

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McGovern, "History is stubborn: Talk about Truth, Justice, and National reconciliation in the republic of Guinea," *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 55, 1 (2013):198-225.

[7] Macartan Humphreys and Habaye ag Mohamed, "Senegal and Mali: A Comparative Study of Rebellions in West Africa," in *Understanding Civil War: Evidence and Analysis*, Vol. 1-Africa, edited by Paul Collier and Nicholas Sambani (Washington: World Bank, 2005), p. 247

former civil servant in President Samuel Doe's government. NPFL fighters crossed into Liberia's Nimba County from Cote d'Ivoire on 24 December 1989 in order to topple Doe's regime, reaching the outskirts of the Liberian capital, Monrovia, in July 1990. President Doe was captured and killed in September 1990, but fighting continued until 1997 when Charles Taylor was elected to the Presidency. The war resumed in 1999 and ended in 2003 by the departure of Charles Taylor to exile in Nigeria in August 2003.

Another of Guinea's neighbours is Sierra Leone where a civil war began in March 1991 when a group of combatants belonging to the Revolutionary United Front (RUF) entered southern Sierra Leone from neighbouring Liberia. Initially the fighting was between the RUF and the Sierra Leone Army (SLA), but in due course a militia group known as the Civil Defence Force (CDF) joined forces with the government of President Kabah in 1996. However, in 1997, a group of soldiers known as the Armed Force Revolutionary Council (AFRC) overthrew President Ahmad Tejan Kabah in a coup; they subsequently joined forces with the RUF. President Kabah was reinstated in 1998 by the Economic Community of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG) after AFARC/RUF was driven from power. On July 7, 1999, the Government of Sierra Leone and the Revolutionary United Front signed a peace agreement in Lomé, Togo, known as the Lomé Peace Accord. The signing of this peace accord marks the formal ending of the war in Sierra Leone.

Guinea Bissau is another country where a civil war broke out in 1998 when army chief of staff General Ansumane Mané led a coup d`etat on the 8th of June 1998 against his former ally, President Vieira, who had dismissed him earlier from his post. An exchange of gunfire in Bissau city between soldiers loyal to the President and troops supporting General Mané in the early morning of 7 June 1998 signalled the start of 11 months of civil war. The rebels, who called themselves the *Junta Militar*, rapidly overran a major military installation and demanded the resignation of Vieira and the formation of a transitional government to be followed by new elections in July 1998. The war ended in May 1999 with the overthrow of President Vieira who took refuge at the Portuguese embassy. He was assassinated in May 2009. During the war, hundreds of people were killed, the city was destroyed and hundreds of thousands fled into the countryside.

Ivory Coast is another of Guinea's neighbours where a civil war began in September 2002 when a group of around 700 soldiers attempted a coup d'état attacking simultaneously the cities of Abidjan, Bouaké and Korhogo. Having failed to take the commercial capital, Abidjan, they retreated to Bouaké. The failed coup soon degenerated into a war between loyalist government forces and breakaway army troops, calling themselves the *Mouvement Patriotique de la Côte d'Ivoire* (MPCI). The war ended in March 2007 with the signing of a peace agreement between the government and the rebels (New Forces) in Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso. The war resumed in November 2010 after disputed presidential elections and ended in April 2011 with the capture of President Laurent Gbagbo.

In many respects, Guinea resembles its West African neighbours that have had civil wars. The country is endowed with large amount of mineral resources alongside the abject poverty of its population which is deeply divided along clear ethno-regional affiliations. Guinea also has been under military dictatorship for nearly three decades. Similarly, during the 1990s, the outbreak of civil wars in Guinea's neighbouring countries was added to recurrent violent domestic unrest involving the armed forces, communal clashes and state repression. Each of these conditions should encourage rebellion and civil war, yet this violence neither lasted long, nor translated into civil wars. More importantly, this unrest has not involved rebel groups fighting for secession or to dislodge the government and therefore did not result in significant casualties on the government side. By all measures then, Guinea has not had a civil war since independence.

Given the above, the fact that Guinea managed to avoid descending into civil war and/or armed conflicts since independence is in itself puzzling and the failure of existing theories to account for Guinea's 'success story' begs explanation. This study will address this apparent gap through the examination of arguments focused on four theoretical approaches to the study of armed conflicts/and or civil war onset: (1) deep ethnic divisions; (2) protracted military involvement in political affairs; (3) natural resource abundance alongside extreme poverty; and (4) the contagion of proximate conflicts, known as 'bad neighbourhood effect'. The thesis explains the persistence of peace in Guinea despite the odds by shifting the focus of analysis from the negative effects of these war risk variables on peace and stability, to identifying mitigating factors inherent in each one of them. As

such, this research is not about studying a particular armed conflict that occurred, but rather, it is a study that is concerned with armed conflicts that demonstrate its potential but did not take off. The core of the study therefore is to determine why armed conflict has not happened in Guinea despite unfavourable conditions for peace.

The decision to investigate resilient peace rather than armed conflicts and/or civil war was influenced by a personal discussion with Johan Galtung in the Autumn of 2003. At the time, studying for a Master of Philosophy in Peace and Conflict Transformation in the Centre for Peace Studies at the University of Tromso, Norway, included a workshop with Johan Galtung. A session on students' master thesis topics revealed that most of these topics had focused on conflicts rather than peace, that is, investigation of various cases of armed conflicts around the world. In another word, there was a clear focus on finding out the causes of armed conflicts (what went wrong) instead of the causes of peace in incidences where things could have gone very wrong (what went 'right'). After the workshop, this researcher had further personal conversation with Jorgen Johansen, who was at that time the coordinator of the peace studies program, urging students to do research on "success stories" of peaceful conflict transformation. By the time of Gantung's workshop and Johansen's conversation, this researcher had chosen a master thesis topic on the Liberian civil war, since there was no civil war or armed conflict from my own country, Guinea. However, since then, the idea of investigating a 'success story' kept reoccurring in the mind.

In his writings, Johansen complains that peace research has been dominated by research in violence, to the extent that "most peaceful cases of conflict handling are not even noticed,"[8] thereby raising the question as to "why should academia in general and peace researchers in particular…focus on the most violent cases?."[9] This researcher repeatedly encountered Johansen and a number of academics of the centre, urging students to concentrate more on researching "the most peaceful cases of conflict transformation in order to learn how to handle similar conflicts in the future."[10] The current research is an effort to contribute to this line of research.

[8] Jorgen Johansen, "Peace Research Needs to Re-Orient," in *Peace Studies in the Chinese Century*, ed. Alan Hunter (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 31.
[9] Ibid., 32.
[10] Ibid., 31.

1.2. Objectives and research questions

The main objective of this study is:

> *To shed light on the ways in which the state in developing nations is able to withstand the effects of unfavourable conditions often associated with the onset of large-scale violence.*

In order to achieve this objective one main research question is formulated. This is followed by four sub-questions to help facilitate the process of addressing issues related to the main question.

The main research question is:

> *Why has Guinea been spared from armed conflict and/or civil war onset despite deep ethnic divisions, a politicised military, the abundance of mineral resources alongside extreme poverty, and being located in a volatile region where its neighbours have been struck by armed conflicts?*

A number of sub-questions arise:

1. *How has Guinea avoided plunging into ethnically based armed conflict?*
2. *Why has the Guinean state remained resilient to armed conflicts following protracted military involvement in politics?*
3. *Why has the presence of abundant natural resources coupled with extreme poverty among most Guineans failed to be associated with the onset of armed conflicts in Guinea?*
4. *How has Guinea been able to sustain domestic peace in a regionalized conflict zone?*

Although the main question is quite general, the sub-questions are rather specific research questions on the relationship between ethno-politics, politicised military, natural resource abundance, and a conflict ridden neighbourhood on the one hand, and domestic peace on the other. These questions are addressed in chapter 2, 3, 4 and 5 and the results are presented in the form of four papers prepared for publication in international peer-reviewed journals. Accordingly, the relevant literature review is provided in each paper. Thus, in order to avoid unnecessary repetition, a separate chapter on literature review is not provided in the thesis.

Paper one (chapter 2) addresses sub-question 1 and provides a review of the literature on the linkage between deep ethnic divisions and large-scale violent

conflicts. A stability of minority rule framework is proposed in order to explain political stability in Guinea. Paper two (chapter 3) addresses sub-question 2 and examines the dominant literature on the linkage between protracted military involvement in politics and armed conflicts in West African nations. It uses a quasi-ethnicity in the military as a model to explain political stability in Guinea. Likewise, paper three (chapter 4) addresses sub-question 3 and reviews the literature on the linkage between the availability of abundant natural resources alongside extreme poverty, and armed conflicts. It proposes a selective redistribution mechanism as an explanatory framework for political stability in Guinea. Paper four (chapter 5) deals with sub-question 4 and examines the literature on the possible linkage between 'bad neighbourhood' and the spread of armed conflicts to neighbouring nations. Using external conflicts internal cohesion as a framework of analysis, the paper explains political stability in Guinea alongside a 'bad neighbourhood'.

Overall, the research seeks to unearth the factors behind the Guinean state's resilience to armed conflicts despite the different contexts through an analysis of a dynamic interaction between internal and external elements that helped avert such open conflicts. These issues are explored using Guinea as a case study, but the aim is to generate some more general statements about the issue of sustaining domestic peace in unfavourable conditions in developing nations.

Although the PhD project was hosted by a political science department, the subject matter is located in the cross-disciplinary field of Peace and Conflict Studies, with its wide range of approaches. According to Galtung, "all disciplines have something to contribute [in peace and conflict and] no academic discipline has any monopoly" on these issues.[11] For this reason, the researcher was not limited by disciplinary restriction and could consider literature from various disciplines, beside political science, such as development studies, social anthropology and sociology. The following section discusses key concepts and defines various terms frequently used throughout the study.

[11] Johan Galtung, "Peace Studies: A Ten Point Primer," in *Peace Studies in the Chinese Century*, ed. Alan Hunter (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2006), 17.

1.3. Concepts and definitions

Investigating issues relating to conflict management in the context of deep ethnic divisions, protracted military involvement in a nation's political affairs, the availability of abundant natural resources with extreme poverty and a 'bad neighbourhood' of a regionalized conflict zone requires asking the right questions and selecting appropriate concepts for analysis. Not only do concepts need to be clearly defined, but also their usage needs to be consistent throughout the study. The central questions of this research have been presented, therefore it is appropriate to introduce the basic concepts and subsequently discuss the relevant methodology used to address the research questions.

1.3.1. Peace, conflict and civil war

The study of peace is so intimately related to the study of conflicts…Most people agree that peace is more than the absence of violence …Conflict is a state of incompatible goals within and between persons, societies, regions, the world.[12]

Although the concept of peace has been under discussion in peace research from the start, a debate on narrow and broad conceptions of peace has accompanied the term.[13] Galtung uses a coin metaphor to conceptualize 'peace' by arguing that "just as a coin has two sides, one side alone being only one aspect of the coin, not the complete coin, peace also has two sides…we shall refer to them as *negative peace* and *positive peace* [emphasis in the origin]."[14] The term 'negative peace' is defined as "the absence of organized collective forms of violence", that is, the absence of war.[15] In contrast, 'positive peace' refers to "the absence of structural violence",[16] that is, the reversal of the structure of the socio-economic and cultural

[12] Ibid., 15-18.
[13] Nils Petter Gleditsch, Jonas Nordkvelle and Håvard Strand, "Peace research − Just the study of war?." *Journal of Peace Research* 51, 2 (2014): 145–158.
[14] Johan Galtung, "Violence, peace and peace research," *Journal of Peace Research* 6, 3 (1969): 183.
[15] Johan Galtung, *Peace Research: Science or Politics in Disguise* (PRIO publication 23 - 6, Oslo 1967, cited in Herman Schmid, "Peace Research and Politics," *Journal of Peace Research* 5, 3 (1968):223. Violence is the connecting link between peace, conflict and war, and it has been defined in both narrow and broad terms. While the narrow definition of violence has been associated with what is known as *personal* or *direct* violence, such as killing, mutilating, hitting or hurting of individuals, the broad definition of violence has been connected with *indirect* or *structural* violence. Whereas direct violence concentrates on physical violence that works on the body and "can be traced back to concrete persons as actors", indirect violence is built into the structure and works on the soul. See, Galtung, "Violence, peace and peace research," 169-171.
[16] Galtung, "Violence, peace and peace research," 183.

systems that produce and justify violence.[17] While the term 'negative peace' has been associated with the narrow understanding of what constitutes peace, 'positive peace' has been associated with the broad definition of peace. In this study, the term peace is used to denote negative peace, that is, the absence of war and other forms of armed conflicts between a government and organized rebel groups. The conception of negative peace emphasises on the "reduction of the overt use of violence"[18] and the maintenance of a "social order from which violence is absent."[19] As such, this focus of negative peace is appropriate for this study's main goal which is centred on how to explain the sustenance of domestic peace in unfavourable conditions. In short, although the current study did not involve moving beyond the mere absence of direct violence associated with negative peace, there is no denial that negative peace is the prerequisite for positive peace, thus the absence of armed conflicts from a country situated in a region that has been plagued with brutal civil wars is an achievement in itself that merits investigation.

Conflict is another important concept frequently used in this study. While 'conflict' is often equated with 'war' in the literature, Johansen made an interesting point by arguing that "war is *not* a conflict" in itself, but "a form of conflict"[20], i.e. war is one of many ways in which conflicts manifest itself. Galtung defines conflict as "a state of incompatible goals"[21] and Wallensteen defines incompatibility as "a severe disagreement between at least two sides, where their demands cannot be met by the same resources at the same time."[22] Accordingly, conflict exists "within and between persons, societies, regions, the world"[23] and does not necessarily lead to violence or war, rather, conflict has the potential of peaceful settlement as well as violence and war.[24]

The aforementioned conception of conflict shows that when intrastate conflict turns violent, the end result can be an armed conflict, which in turn can lead to a

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[17] [Johan Galtung], "An editorial: What is peace research?" *Journal of Peace Research* 1,1 (1964): 1–4. [No author listed.]; Johan Galtung,"Cultural Violence," *Journal of Peace Research* 27, 3 (1990): 291-305.
[18] Galtung, "Violence, peace and peace research," 183.
[19] Ibid., 168.
[20] Johansen, "Peace Research Needs to Re-Orient," 31-37.
[21] Galtung, "Peace Studies: A Ten Point Primer," 18.
[22] Wallensteen, *Understanding Conflict Resolution*, 15.
[23] Galtung, "Peace Studies: A Ten Point Primer," 18.
[24] Michael Nicholson, *Conflicts Analysis* (London: The English Universities Press Limited, 1970), 2-4.

civil war. Varied definitions of civil war and intrastate armed conflict have been associated with a certain number of battle field deaths. The disagreements among these definitions revolve "around the number of deaths and how to count them"[25] in order for a particular armed conflicts to be considered a 'civil war.' In the Correlates of War project (COW), Small and Singer defined a civil war as "any armed conflict that involves (a) military action internal to the metropole, (b) the active participation of the national government, and (c) effective resistance by both sides."[26] The COW definition of civil wars requires that there is organized military action and that at least 1,000 battle deaths resulted in a given year. In order to distinguish civil wars from genocides and massacres, there has to be effective resistance, and at least five percent of the deaths have been inflicted by the weaker party. A further requirement is that the national government at the time was actively involved.

Another major data set most commonly used in the study of civil war and armed conflict is the Uppsala Conflict Data Project (UCDP). An armed conflict is defined by UCDP as a contested incompatibility that concern government or territory or both where the use of armed forces between two parties results in at least 25 battle related deaths. Of the two parties at least one is a government of a state.[27] The UCDP divides armed conflicts into 'minor armed conflicts', 'intermediate armed conflicts', and 'major armed conflicts', also known as 'war'. Minor armed conflicts produce more than 25 battle related deaths per year; intermediate conflicts produce more than 25 battle related deaths per year and a total conflict history of more than 1,000 battle related deaths. Lastly wars are armed conflicts which result in more than 1,000 battle related deaths per year.[28]

Furthermore, Sambani explains that civil wars are those armed conflicts which "were fought by well-organized groups with political agendas, challenging the

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[25] Johansen, "Peace Research Needs to Re-Orient," 31.
[26] Melvin Small and J. David Singer, *Resort to Arms: International and Civil War, 1816–1980* (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1982), 210.
[27] Nils Petter Gleditsch, Peter Wallensteen, Mikael Eriksson, Margareta Sollenberg & Håvard Strand, "Armed conflict 1946–2001: A new dataset," *Journal of Peace Research* 39, no. 5 (2002), 618-619.
[28] Peter Wallensteen and Margareta Sollenberg, "Armed Conflict, 1989–2000," *Journal of Peace Research* 38, no. 5 (2001), 643-644; Peter Wallensteen, *Understanding Conflict Resolution: War, Peace and the Global System* (London: SAGE Publications Ltd, 202), 13-28.

sovereign authority, and [where] violence was reciprocal."[29] He further elaborates that:

> The main insurgent organization(s) must be locally represented and must recruit locally. Insurgent groups may operate from neighbouring countries, but they must also have some territorial control (bases) in the civil war country and/or the rebels must reside in the civil war country.[30]

In a similar line of argument, Fearon and Latin constructed a list of criteria that needs to be met in order for an armed conflict to be considered a civil war:

> (1) They (the conflicts) involved fighting between agents of (or claimants to) a state and organized, non-state groups who sought either to take control of a government, to take power in a region, or to use violence to change government policies. (2) The conflict killed at least 1,000 over its course, with a yearly average of at least 100. (3) At least 100 were killed on both sides (including civilians attacked by rebels). The last condition is intended to rule out massacres where there is no organized or effective opposition.[31]

Interestingly, however, the Causes of War project at the University of Hamburg (known as AKUF, from its name in German), does not have a requirement for a particular number of battle related deaths, arguing that there is no reason to include only those who have died from battle, but not those who have suffered from other consequences of the conflicts, and that information on deaths is often unreliable.[32]

Despite disagreement on the number of battlefield related deaths, what emerges is a general agreement that the types of participants in a conflict, the degree of effectiveness of resistance among conflicting parties, and the method of resistance are important factors that differentiate civil war from other types of violent conflict. Thus, this study adopts the definition of civil war as: (1) an organized armed conflict; (2) that has challenged the sovereignty of an internationally

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[29] Nicholas Sambanis, "What Is Civil War?: Conceptual and Empirical Complexities of an Operational Definition," *Journal of Conflict Resolution* 2004 48, no. 6 (2004): 820.
[30] Ibid., 829.
[31] James Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war," *American Political Science Review* 97, no. 1 (2003): 76.
[32] Klaus Jurgen, Gantze and Torsten Schwinghammer, *Warfare since the Second World War* (New Brunswick, NJ, and London: Transaction Publishers, 2000); University of Hamburg, Hamburg, Germany, "Definition and Typology of War," *Working Group for Research on the Causes of War* (AKUF, Arbeitsgemeinschaft Kriegsursachenforschung), http://www.wiso.uni- hamburg.de/en/fachbereiche/sozialwissenschaften/forschung/akuf/akuf/ (accessed 30 January 2014); Dietrich Jung, Klaus Schlichte and Jens Siegelberg "Ongoing Wars and Their Explanation," in *Between Development and Destruction. An Enquiry into the Causes of Conflict in Post-colonial States*, ed., Luc van de Goor, Kumar Rupesinghe and Paul Sciarone (London: Macmillan, and New York: St Martin's Press, 1996).

recognized state; (3) which occurred within the recognized boundaries of that state; (4) that involved rebel elements consisting wholly or mainly of nationals of the state; (5) with a clearly articulated political agenda.[33] As such, the term armed conflict and civil war in this study applies to a situation where armed forces are used between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state that involves organized armed groups that are able to mount sustained resistance against the state with local recruitment and a clearly articulated political agenda. This limitation excludes other forms of violence, such as coups, communal violence, political repression, massacre, crime and cross-border attacks.[34] The limitation is also particularly important for this study, since in a number of incidences, as discussed later, Guinea has had its fair share amount of violent conflicts with varied numbers of fatalities, nevertheless, none of them can be classified as armed conflict or civil war. These fatalities were mostly related to alleged coup attempts, communal violence, political repression, and cross-border attacks and criminal activities. This differentiation is particularly relevant to this study's assertion that Guinea is the exception to the rest of its West African neighbours in escaping armed conflict and/or civil war.

1.3.2. Resilience

The concept of resilience emerged in the 1970s and 1980s in ecology and social studies reflecting an emphasis in both fields on the inherent dynamism of natural and social systems.[35] Resilience in the ecological literature refers to the buffer capacity or the ability of a system to absorb disturbances, or the magnitude of disturbance that can be absorbed before a system changes its structure.[36] Drawing on this ecological definition, the meaning of resilience has often been used as an analogy of how societies work.[37] This frequent social application of the concept led some analysts to conceptualize the meaning of resilience of a community or a

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[33] Issaka K Souaré, *Civil wars and coups d'etat in West Africa: An attempt to understand the roots and prescribe possible solutions* (Lanham, Maryland: University Press of America, 2006), 28; Ibrahim Elbadawi and Nicholas Sambanis, "Why Are There So Many Civil Wars in Africa? Understanding and Preventing Violent Conflict," *Journal of African Economies* 9, no.3 (2000), 247-248.

[34] Blattman and Miguel, "Civil War,"6.

[35] W. Neil Adger, "Social and ecological resilience: are they related?," *Progress in Human Geography* 24, 3 (2000): 347.

[36] Charles Perrings, Karl-Goran Maler, Carl Folke, C.S. Holling and Bengt-Owe Jansson, "Introduction: framing the problem of biodiversity loss," in *Biodiversity loss: economic and ecological issues*, Charles Perrings, Karl-Goran Maler, Carl Folke, C.S. Holling and Bengt-Owe Jansson, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1995), 4-5.

[37] Adger, "Social and ecological resilience," 347.

society as a whole in terms of its resistance capacity or the ability to absorb perturbations.[38] Carpenter refers to resilience as "referenced on a wide range of issues associated with social and ecological systems," [39] including the management of natural disasters and large-scale violent civil conflicts. In this study the concept of resilience is used in relation to the discourse on a state's vulnerability to violent conflicts and the ways in which nations cope successfully in the face of extreme adversity or risk of large-scale violence. Therefore, a vulnerable state is one which is significantly susceptible to crisis in one or more of the internal or external risks of violent conflict, identified in this study as deep ethnic divisions, protracted military involvement in politics, abundance of natural resources with extreme poverty and a 'bad neighbourhood'. More specifically, the term resilience in this study refers to Guinea's ability to buffer the risk factors of violent conflict without collapsing to civil war and/or armed conflict.

A distinction is often made between a state and a government. While a state is defined as "a political community formed by a territorial population subject to one government", a government is often referred to as "the top political level within institutions responsible for making collective decisions for [a] society."[40] This distinction raises the question as to whether the argument should be directed at the Guinean state's resilience to armed conflicts or the resilience of the particular government at the time. However, although these terms can be differentiated at the theoretical level, in practice, the line between government and state is rather blurred in the context of this thesis. On the one hand, it is true that it was the Guinean state which did not succumb to civil war and/or armed conflicts, but this was due to the fact that each government of the time was able to mobilize supports from its international partners and various segments of the Guinean society in order to avert open conflicts. Therefore, it was a combination of efforts from various Guinean governments and a number of segments of the Guinean

[38]Fikret Berkes, Carl Folke, "Linking social and ecological systems for resilience and sustainability," in Linking social and ecological systems: management practices and social mechanisms for building resilience, Fikret Berkes and Carl Folke, ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998), 6; Adger, "Social and ecological resilience," 349.

[39]Ami C. Carpenter, "Resilience to Violent Conflict: Adaptive Strategies in Fragile States," *Security Management Initiative* (2008), 8 (accessed October 12, 2013), http://www.securitymanagementinitiative.org/index.php?option=com_docman&task=doc_details&gid=511&lang=fr&Itemid=28.Carpenter, "Resilience to Violent Conflict," 8.

[40] Rod Hague and Martin Harrop, Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction, 8th edition (New York: Palgrave MacMillan, 2010), 14, 5. See also, J. P. Nettl, "The State as a Conceptual Variable," *World Politics* 20, 4 (1968): 559-592.

society and the country's international partners' supports that averted armed conflicts in the country. As such, the argument on resilience in this study is directed at the Guinean state rather than to a particular government of the time. In other words, the resilience is indeed about the Guinean state.

1.3.3. Deeply divided society

Societies can be divided in many different ways, but the common sources of such division often revolve around seven elements: class, caste, religion, language, race, ethnicity and clan.[41] Although this variety of sources leads to divergent views of what constitutes 'deeply divided societies', there is general agreement on the importance of ethnicity as a factor in the creation of such societies and its potential for violence.[42] Many examples of the use of the term 'deeply divided societies' date from the last 40 years, nevertheless, "the problems that deeply divided societies give rise to have been a subject [of] debate in political science since the beginning of political analysis, under a variety of rubrics."[43] However, Nordlinger's book, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies*, published in 1971, is considered a pioneer in the use of the term.[44] Despite the absence of 'deeply' in the title, Nordlinger made it clear that he did not mean the management of conflict in divided societies in general, but much more specifically "Conflict regulation in deeply divided societies" and that his aim was the search "for factors that account for the stability of such [societies] under conditions of severe stress" due to polarizations.[45]

Nordlinger considers a society to be 'deeply divided' if a large number of members from conflict groups manifest strongly held antagonistic beliefs and emotions toward the opposing groups or attach overwhelming importance to the issues at stake, or both.[46] Lustick echoed this view but added that such held antagonistic beliefs and emotions must originate from "ascriptive ties" and that

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[41] Adrian Guelke, *Politics in Deeply Divided Societies* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2012), 30.
[42] Erick Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation in Divided Societies* (Cambridge, Mass: Center for International Affairs, Harvard University 1972), 6-7; Ian Lustick, "Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Consociationalism versus Control," *World Politics* 31 3(1979): 325; Ilan Peleg, "Transforming ethnic orders into pluralist regimes: Theoretical, comparative and historical analysis" in *Democracy and ethnic conflict: Advancing peace in deeply divided societies*, Adrian Guelke, ed. (New York: Palgrave Macmillan 2004), 7-25; Guelke, *Politics in Deeply Divided Societies*, 20.
[43] Guelke, *Politics in Deeply Divided Societies*, 8-9.
[44] Ibid., 2.
[45] Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation*, 2.
[46] Nordlinger, *Conflict Regulation*, 9.

such antagonism be "sustained over a substantial period of time."[47] Guelke interprets 'ascriptive ties' as "identities acquired at birth, such as race and or ethnicity" and added that the existence of a deeply divided society often revolves around a "well-entrenched fault line that … contains the potential for violence between the [groups]."[48] Thus, there is a strong linkage between ethnic divisions and the term deeply divided societies. Due to this linkage, one analyst asserts that it has become "common, in the literature, for deeply divided societies to be equated with ethnically divided ones."[49] For instance, O'Flynn argues that the term deeply divided society "typically describes a society marked by ethnic divisions severe enough to threaten the very existence or nature of the state."[50] Reilly echoed O'Flynn by asserting that the term is used to describe "a society which is both ethnically diverse and where ethnicity is a politically salient cleavage around which interests are organized for political purpose."[51] In this study, the term is used to denote this ethnic aspect of societal divisions. Unlike other divisions such as religion, cast, race and class, ethnic divisions have significantly threatened Guinea's stability.

1.3.4. Quasi-ethnicity in the military

The study of quasi-ethnicity in the military seeks to bring together two areas of academic research which have received considerable attention in their own right, but have yet to be combined in any systematic way: ethnic identity theory and empirical civil military relations study of developing nations. The point of combining these two areas is to cast new light on the often vexed question of relations of military behaviour in politics and conflict management in nations prone to violent civil conflicts. More specifically, the approach explores how the understanding of this relation can be enhanced by considering the military establishment as a quasi-ethnic identity whereby the political behaviour of the military is seen through the lens of an ethnic group's behaviour.

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[47] Lustick, "Stability in Deeply Divided Societies," 325.
[48] Guelke, *Politics in Deeply Divided Societies*, 28-30.
[49] Ibid., 27.
[50] Ian O'Flynn, "Democratic theory and practice in deeply divided societies," *Representation* 46, 3 (2010): 281.
[51] Benjamin Reilly, *Democracy in Divided Societies: Electoral Engineering for Conflict Management* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2001), 4.

Quasi-ethnicity is defined as the "behaviour that mirrors in some important senses a sense of shared common descent and/or history,"[52] and the term quasi-ethnicity in the military is understood as the tendency of "military establishments in multi-ethnic states" to form "a competitive *quasi-ethnic* [emphasis in the origin] identity of their own."[53] On the question as to why examine the political behaviour of military establishments in developing countries through the lens of an ethnic group's behaviour, Zirker explains that "the fundamental behaviour patterns associated with ethnicity … relate directly to the problems – and promise – of military establishments in [developing nations]."[54] Thus, the quasi-ethnicity in the military approach identifies a number of similarities between military establishments and ethnic groupings that warrant the use of ethnic identity theories in explaining military behaviour in politics.[55] In this study, a quasi-ethnic identity approach to military behaviour in politics is used to explain the linkage between military behaviour in politics and political stability in Guinea.

1.3.5. Natural resources

The term 'natural resources' is generally understood as "all non-artificial products situated on or beneath the soil, which can be extracted, harvested or used, and whose extraction, harvest, or usage generates income or serves other functional purposes in benefiting mankind."[56] According to Lecomber, "the definitive feature of natural resources is that they are provided by nature, not by man."[57]

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[52] Daniel Zirker, Constantine P. Danopoulos, and Alan Simpson, "The Military as a Distinct Ethnic or Quasi-ethnic Identity in Developing Countries," *Armed Forces & Society* 34, 2 (2008): 321.

[53] Daniel Zirker and Ibikule Adeakin, "Quasi-Ethnicity in an African army: Nigerian authoritarianism and civilianization in political perspective," (unpublished paper prepared for the New Zealand Political Studies Association, Christchurch, December 2and 3, 2013), 3.

[54] Daniel Zirker, "The military as a distinct ethnic or quasi-ethnic identity in new political systems: musings on primordial attachments and civil-military relations" **(**unpublished paper prepared for the 4th International Symposium on Ethnic Identities, Xanthi, Greece, July 5-10, 2002), 3.

[55] Zirker, Constantine P. Danopoulos and Alan Simpson, "The Military as a Distinct Ethnic or Quasi-Ethnic Identity," 321-324.

[56] Abiodun Alao, *Natural resources and conflict in Africa: The tragedy of endowment* (New York: University of Rochester Press, 2007), 16. For more details on the meaning of natural resources, see Ooi Jin Bee, "Natural Resources in Tropical Countries: An Examination," in *Natural Resources in Tropical Countries*, ed. Ooi Jin Bee (Singapore: Singapore University Press, 1983) 4-7; Erich W. Zimmerman, *World Resources and Industries: A Functional Appraisal of the Availability of Agricultural and Industrial Materials* (New York: Harper & Bros., 1951), 3-20; Judith Rees, Natural resources: Allocation, economics and policy (London & New York: Rutledge, 2th, 1990), 14-17.

[57] Richard Lecomber, *The economics of natural resources* (London & Basingstoke: The Macmillan Press LTD, 1979), 1.

These resources can be classified into two categories: renewable resources and non-renewable resources.

Renewable resources refer to those resources which "may be used without depletion,"[58] meaning that they can be "naturally renewed in short time."[59] This type of resource is also known as 'flow resources' because it "yields a flow which may be tapped without affecting the flow available in future years."[60] Such resources include plants, animals, water, forests, fertile soils, solar energy, fisheries, timber and some "renewable 'services' such as a regional hydrological cycle and benign climate."[61] This kind of resource permits "a constant harvest to be collected without depletion"[62] because it renews itself through natural or biological process.

However, it is worth mentioning that "depletion is possible and will occur whenever output exceeds the rate of natural replacement."[63] In other words, renewable resources can be depleted in quality or quantity by human actions that occur "faster than it is renewed by natural process"[64] thereby leading to what became known as "scarcity of renewable-resources."[65] Accordingly, if such scarcity became severe, it is argued that this could "precipitate violent civil or international conflicts".[66]

Non-renewable resources are those resources with fixed supply because "they have been formed over the course of many years and are believed to have reached the peak of their availability"[67] and therefore necessarily depleted by use.[68] This category of resource includes solid minerals, such as diamonds, gold, bauxite and iron ore. This type of non-renewable resource is the main resource in Guinea, the control of which has the potential to ignite armed conflicts. Thus, the focus of the

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[58] Lecomber, *The economics of natural resources*, 3.
[59] Alao, *Natural resources*, 16.
[60] Lecomber, *The economics of natural resources*, 3.
[61] Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities and Violent Conflict: Evidence from Cases," *International Security* 19, 1 (1994):8.
[62] Lecomber, *The economics of natural resources*, 3.
[63] Ibid., 3.
[64] Homer-Dixon, "Environmental Scarcities," 8.
[65] Ibid., 8.
[66] Ibid., 5; Thomas F. Homer-Dixon, "On the Threshold: Environmental Changes as Causes of Acute Conflict," *International Security*16, 2 (1991): 76-116.
[67] Alao, *Natural resources*, 16.
[68] However, strictly speaking, even this type of resource is "constantly being renewed, but the rate of renewal is so slow that for practical reason, it can be ignored."[68] See, Lecomber, *The economics of natural resources*, 3.

study is on Guinea's solid mineral resources of diamonds, gold, bauxite and iron ore.

As such, in this study, the term *natural resource* refers to this type of non-renewable resource and is used interchangeably with the term mineral resources throughout the study. Although, every stage of the extraction process of natural resources and the mode of production contain ingredients of conflict,[69] this study focuses on the management of the revenues derived from these resources, in relation to the ways in which they may be seen as contributing to political stability in one way or another.

1.3.6. Selective redistribution

Governments in natural resource rich countries may choose to use revenues from abundant natural resources in a proactive manner to buy off demands and political rivals in order to impede armed opposition. This can take the form of large-scale or selective distribution of rents from natural resources. With regards to the linkage between large-scale redistribution and the absence of armed conflicts, governments of natural resource rich states may engage in large-scale distributive policies whereby revenue from natural resources are used to boost public sector employment, initiate mega-projects such as building highways, airports and other mega infrastructures that create jobs which benefits the wider population, allocate subsidies, and provide free education and healthcare. According to Le Billon, as a consequence of boosting public sector employment, allocating subsidies, or providing free education and healthcare, potential rebel leaders might not emerge or will find it difficult to recruit rank and file members among the population who are happy with their economic situation.[70]

Contrary to large-scale redistribution, selective redistribution is a mechanism through which resource revenues are distributed among a relatively small group of elites as a strategy for maintaining stability by accommodating potential political rivals. Under this system, governments in natural resource rich countries would spend revenue from abundant natural resources to buy off opposition in order to

[69] Philippe Le Billon, "The political ecology of war: natural resources and armed conflicts," *Political Geography* 20, 5 (2001): 572; Alao, *Natural resources*, 17.
[70] Philippe Le Billon, "The Political Ecology of War. Natural Resources and Armed Conflict," *Political Geography* 20, 5 (2001): 565; Matthias Basedau and Jann Lay, "Resource Curse or Rentier Peace? The Ambiguous Effects of Oil Wealth and Oil Dependence on Violent Conflict," *Journal of Peace Research* 46, 6 (2009): 761.

dissuade armed rebellion, thereby sustaining political stability. It is often the case that, under selective redistribution, lucrative government business contracts and high profile public positions are awarded to small and identifiable groups of elites (groups from ethnics, military, business community etc). According to Basedau and Lay:

> Elites may distribute rents selectively and create clientelist networks, from which only leaders of politically important groups benefit. Through this mechanism, resource revenues are distributed among a relatively small part of the population and access is granted through personal ties. By accommodating potential political rivals, this strategy is equally devised to maintain stability.[71]

Both large-scale and selective distribution mechanisms, if used effectively, are likely to affect negatively the feasibility of armed rebellion. Yet, in Guinea, resources were redistributed selectively to some key segments of the society where it could trickle down to those who matter for the maintenance of stability. Although these mechanisms are sometimes referred to as corruption, in this study the term selective redistribution is used.[72]

The term 'selective redistribution' is used instead of corruption in order to capture the meaning of redistribution in a natural resource rich country. The term selective redistribution is slightly different from corruption in the sense that corruption can be used in any context, regardless of whether the country is rich or poor, developed or developing because in a corrupt system, it is not always necessary that things physically exchange hands, rather favours also can exchange hands in a corrupt. However, the use of selective redistribution refers to the fact that resources do really exchange hands. In addition, a system can still be corrupt, undemocratic, commit grave violations of human right and remain engaged in a large scale redistribution. Most of the oil rich countries in the Middle East are these types of regimes. In Africa, Gabon is a typical example of this type of regime as a large scale redistributor, but undemocratic and corrupt. In short, the term 'selective redistribution' is appropriate for capturing the situation in Guinea where both poverty and wealth have coexisted for a long time without invoking

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[71] Basedau and Lay, "Resource Curse," 761-762.

[72] Philippe Le Billon, "Buying peace or fuelling war: the role of corruption in armed conflicts," *Journal of International Development* 15, 4 (2003): 416; Hanne Fjelde, "Buying Peace? Oil Wealth, Corruption and Civil War, 1985-99," *Journal of Peace Research* 46/2, (2009); Michael Johnston, "The Political Consequences of Corruption. A Reassessment," *Comparative Politics* 18, 4 (1986).

major armed conflict, therefore the Guinean context is better suited with the term selective redistribution than the term corruption.

1.3.7. 'Bad Neighbourhood Effects'

During the 1980s, the term "spatial diffusion effects"[73] was often used in reference to the possibility that a war between two or more states might spread to other nations. The term was also used to describe the spread of unfavourable ideology such as Communism. Most and Starr's work, *Diffusion, reinforcement, geopolitics, and the spread of war* is an early attempt to produce a theoretical framework of this 'diffusion approach', in the context of the Cold War rivalry among great powers and alliance buildings between states.[74] This meant that Most and Starr's main concern was to determine the conditions under which inter-state armed conflicts will or will not spread to other nations. However, since the early 1990s, the application of the term has gradually narrowed to the post-Cold War era's growing trend that conflicts within countries often spill over across borders.[75] In other words, the post-Cold War era's application of the term shifted to the frequent spread of violent civil conflicts across borders. With this new focus, the term "bad neighbourhood effect"[76] has been more frequently used to describe the various negative effects of violent civil conflicts on neighbouring nations.

As discussed elsewhere in this study, the recent focus on using the term 'bad neighbourhood effect' to highlight the negative outcome of neighbourhood conflicts, is in sharp contrast with the early stage of the theoretical development of the concept whereby the use of 'spatial diffusion effects' emphasised both the 'risks and opportunities' for neighbouring countries. As such, in order to reflect the recent development in the literature, the term 'bad neighbourhood effect', is used in this study but interchangeably with other terms such 'spatial diffusion effects', 'spill over effects' and 'contagion effect' to describe the possible, negative or positive, outcome of armed conflicts to geographically proximate neighbourhoods. Furthermore, despite its importance, the term ideological

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[73] Benjamin A. Most & Harvey Starr, "Diffusion, reinforcement, geopolitics, and the spread of war," *American Political Science Review* 74, 4 (1980): 932.
[74] Most & Starr, "Diffusion, reinforcement," 932.
[75] Myron Weiner, "Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Flows," *International Security* 21, 1 (1996): 29.
[76] Zaryab Iqbal and Harvey Starr, "Bad Neighbours: Failed States and Their Consequences," *Conflict Management and Peace* Science 25, 4 (2008): 315-331; Weiner, "Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods," 5-42.

'contagion effect' is not included in this study because the threat to Guinea's stability emanated mainly from its geographic proximity to countries experiencing armed conflicts and/or political instability rather than a threat from any contagious violent ideology.

1.4. Methodology

1.4.1. The case study method

This study uses a single case study approach with primarily qualitative data collection and analysis techniques. According to Yin "a case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context, especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident."[77] Although various types of case studies have been identified by noted scholars of research methods, there is no agreement among them on how to categorise these cases.[78] For the purpose of this study, two types of cases are discussed as a guide for subsequent analysis of the absence of armed conflicts Guinean.[79]

1.4.1.1. The critical case

The critical case is chosen because it permits the testing of hypotheses. In this case, the researcher develops a clearly specific hypothesis and the case provides the circumstances for a better understanding as to whether the hypothesis will hold or not. For this purpose, the researcher can provide a least favourable or a most favourable design for the hypothesis. The idea here is that if a proposition

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[77] Robert K. Yin, 2003. *Case Study Research: Design and Methods*, 3rd edition (London: SAGE, 2003): 13.

[78] Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (Beverly Hill, California: SAGE,1984), 13-54; Alan Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, 2nd edition (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2004); Stephen Van Evera, *Guide to students of political Science* (ITHACA and London: Cornell University Press, 1997): 49-88; An earlier case for the various scientific uses of the case study method was made earlier by Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *American Political Science Review* 65, 3 (1971): 682-693.

[79] Other important type of cases includes: 1) The unique case also known as extreme case where a case is chosen because the researcher believes that, unlike most others, the case is the only one of its kind which makes it essentially unique; 2) The revelatory case where the researcher has the opportunity to do scientific research on a phenomenon which has never been done until that time; 3) The exemplifying case which provides a context that has the potential to illuminate the ways in which a phenomenon can be viewed. In this way the case can be viewed as an exemplifying case whereby the case is not chosen because it is extreme or unusual in some way but because it will provide an appropriate context for certain research questions to be answered. For detail of these cases see (respectively), Yin, Case Study Research, 1984: 13-54); Bryman, *Social Research Methods*, 51.

can be shown to work when conditions are least favourable for its validity, it is likely to be valid in all other circumstances as well. Alternatively, a proposition which fails to work even in the most favourable conditions can be dismissed. Depending on the findings, a theory can either be supported by showing its value in unfavourable conditions or disproved by showing its failure even in favourable circumstances.

1.4.1.2. The deviant case

The deviant case refers to the analysis of a single case which is known to deviate from established generalizations.[80] The purpose of a deviant case study is to cast light on the exceptional and the untypical (e.g. the countries which have never being governed by the military in West Africa). The researcher's aim for selecting a deviant case is to probe for new explanations for a surprising value poorly explained by a general model of causal relations, therefore, the case is selected in order to reveal why it is deviant.[81] As such, a deviant case is closely linked to the investigation of an inconsistency within the framework of an existing theoretical proposition. Deviant cases are often used to tidy up our understanding of exceptions and anomalies. According to Lijphart, a deviant case study analysis provides a distinct contribution to theory compared to other type of cases.[82] Lijphart argues that when the case under consideration deviates from the general proposition, either completely or partially, an analysis of the case might uncover relevant additional variables that were not considered previously.[83] Likewise, the analysis of a deviant case might lead to a refinement of the operational definitions of some or all of the variables which in turn can stimulate the need for a sharpening of concepts and indicators. In contrast, when the general propositions of a theory and the case under consideration are in agreement, the demonstration that one case fits the theory does not appreciably strengthen it – particularly if the theory is based on a large number of other cases.[84]

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[80] Lijphart, *Comparative Politics*, 692.
[81] Jason Seawright and John Gerring, "Case Selection Techniques in Case Study Research: A Menu of Qualitative and Quantitative Options," *Political Research Quarterly* 61, 2 (2008): 294-308.
[82] Arend Lijphart, "Book review", Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway, by Harry Eckstein, *The Journal of Modern History* 41, 1 (1969): 83-87.
[83] Ibid., 86.
[84] Lijphart, *Comparative Politics*, 692.

1.4.1.3. Advantages and disadvantages of the case study method

The primary strengths of the case study method are the depth and flexibility of analysis of a social situation that it makes possible. By concentrating research efforts on the detailed study of a specified occurrence of a phenomenon, the analysis can pay attention to the context, consider a large range of variables simultaneously, adapt the research design and the understanding of both the questions and answers as they develop, and thereby provide a much richer explanation of the subject interest. Yin argues that a case study approach has a distinct advantage when "a 'how' or 'why' question is being asked about a contemporary set of events, over which the investigator has little or no control".[85] Similarly, this method is also preferred when the focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real life context especially when the boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident.[86] The case of Guinea confronts us with two "how" and "why" questions: How did the country avoid civil war despite the odds and why was it able to do so? These strengths are usually enhanced by the usual dominance of qualitative data in case studies. This emphasis on qualitative data provides a richness of understanding of a phenomenon in context. Despite these advantages, the case study method is commonly criticized on the ground that its external validity[87] is weaker compared to the internal validity. It is often argued that case studies are hard to replicate, provide no comparative data for single case designs or data that may be difficult to compare in multiple case design, and that their representativeness may be unknown.[88] These concerns are enhanced by the possibility of a researcher's bias, which is particularly argued to be relevant for qualitative data.

1.4.1.4. Generalization issues

A common criticism of the case study method is the problem of generalizing the findings. Critics argue that generalizing the results of the case study is hard to achieve because the case may not be representative and that the results are unique

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[85] Yin, *Case Study Research*, 2003, 9.
[86] Ibid.
[87] The term *internal validity* means establishing a causal relationship, whereby certain conditions are shown to lead to other conditions. The term *external validity* means establishing the domain to which a study's finding can be generalized.
[88] Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (London: SAGE; 2rd edition, 1994), 33-38.

to this one instance.[89] However, Yin points out that most experiments could be criticised on similar grounds, yet generalizing from experiments is widely accepted.[90] The main reason for this acceptance is that experiments are based on replication, therefore, the result of an experiment are evaluated against theory and accepted if they are consistent. The more results are replicated the more the theory is accepted as an explanation of the phenomenon. In this way, theoretical generalization is the emphasis of experiment.[91]

In a similar way, Yin argues that theoretical generalization should also be applicable to the single case study. For instance, the researcher using a single case can generalize about relationships exhibited by the findings by demonstrating how the findings and the research design relate to a body of theories. This can be done by showing why the variables may be important for explaining the phenomenon, and how and why they may be related. The generality of case study findings then depends on the use of analytical induction whereby "one starts from observed data and develops a generalization which explains the relationships between the objects observed."92 In other words, findings from these particular instances can be formulated in a way that could lead to general principles. For instance – in the present study – findings from the interaction between political stability and conflict ridden variables such as bad neighbourhoods, military intervention in political affairs, natural resources and deep ethnic divisions might lead to general principles of stability despite unfavourable conditions. This line of inquiry can lead to a theory construction based on the inductive method which then can be tested for robustness by further case studies.[93]

Likewise, the generality of case study findings can also depend on the use of analytical deduction, whereby the findings can be used to test the existing theories of armed conflicts. Depending on the case design, this deductive line of inquiry will either weaken or strengthen these existing theories. In deviant case study

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[89] Yin, *Case Study Research*, 2003, 10-11.
[90] Ibid., 10-11.
[91] Ibid., 10-11.
[92] Earl Babbie, *The practice of social research*, 8th edition., (London: Wadsworth Publishing Company, 1998), 54.
[93] Logicians distinguish between inductive reasoning (from particular instances to general principles, from facts to theories) and deductive reasoning (from general to particular, applying a theory to a particular case). In induction, one starts from observed data and develops a generalization which explains the relationships between the objects observed. On the other hand, in deductive reasoning, one starts from general law and applies it to a particular instance.

analysis, for example, Lijphart argues that the analysis of the case might uncover relevant additional variables that were not considered previously by the existing theory.[94] This new discovery might lead to a refinement of the operational definitions of some or all of the variables which in turn can stimulate the need for a sharpening of concepts and indicators, thereby strengthening the existing theory.[95] In contrast, according to Kuhn, these new findings might lead to a paradigm shift[96] whereby the anomalies are so overwhelming that they became the norm instead of the exception. In this way, the theory is abandoned all together. In contrast, when the general propositions of a theory and the case under consideration are in agreement, the demonstration that one case fits the theory does not appreciably strengthen it – particularly if the theory is based on a large number of other cases.[97]

Another way a single case can be generalized is "to pose competing explanations for the same events and to indicate how such explanations may apply to other situations".[98] Graham Allison's work on the Cuban Missile Crisis has been cited as an example where three competing theories were posited to explain the course of events. By comparing each theory with the actual course of events, Allison shows how one provides the best explanation for this type of crisis, therefore suggesting that this explanation is applicable to other situations, thereby extending the usefulness of this single case study. Thus, Allison cited nuclear confrontation more generally and the termination of wars by nations as other situations for which the theory can offer useful explanation.[99] In short, the strength gained from a single case may not be from having a bigger or more representative sample but from the demonstration that the explanation has theoretical relevance.

1.4.2. Choice of the single case-study

The choice for this study was between a single and multiple case study design, and involved a 'trade off' of greater generality of the findings through the use of comparative analysis against depth of analysis through the use of a single case. At

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[94] Babbie, *The practice of social research*, 86.
[95] Lijphart, *Comparative Politics*, 692.
[96] Thomas Khun, *The Structure of Scientific Revolutions* (Chicago: The University of Chicago Press; 3rd edition, 1996).
[97] Lijphart, *Comparative Politics*, 692.
[98] Yin, *Case Study Research*, 1984,16.
[99] Graham Allison, *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis* (Boston: Little, Brown, 1971), 245-277.

first, it appears that a multiple case study would have been more appropriate for generalizing purposes. However, for the purpose of this study a single case is more appropriate for the following reasons. First, the issue of generalizing has been discussed above and it was argued that a theoretical generalization is possible in a single case. Second, with the scarcity of prior research on conflict management in Guinea, attention should be given to increasing depth of knowledge via a reasonable length of data collection. Third, with limited resources and the need to complete this study within a reasonable time span, it was not possible to include more than one case. However, the sense of comparison was not entirely lost in the course of this study for, in a number of cases, issues pertaining to peace and conflict were analysed in comparison with different periods of Guinea's history. This was particularly the case concerning the role of the military and ethnicity in the stability of the country. For instance a comparison was made of the military's role in politics during the period of 1958-1984 and that of 1984-2008. Similarly, ethno-politics was analysed in a comparative manner between the period of 1984-2008 and that of 2009 to 2013.

1.4.3. Qualitative data techniques

This study uses qualitative data collection and analysis techniques. The qualitative research method has been selected for this study in order to generate data rich in detail and embedded in context. Qualitative research tends to focus on exploring, in as much detail as possible, a smaller number of instances or examples which are seen as being interesting or illuminating, aiming to achieve 'depth' rather than 'breadth'.[100] In this way, qualitative research allows for greater expression and insight into the phenomenon. The aim of using this method is to allow detailed examination of the issue of peace and conflict management within its local dynamism while taking into account its regional context. In this way, depth of analysis is provided which includes not only the issues of peace and conflict, but also the context within which it is located. Contrary to the dominant quantitative research approach to civil war onset, the advantage of this qualitative case study method is that it recognizes that a phenomenon under investigation is often rooted in its context and therefore it cannot be isolated from its surroundings. Noted scholars have pointed out that meaningful insights into leaders' political decision-

[100] Lisa Harrison, *Political Research: An Introduction* (London and New York: Routledge, 2001).

making in West African nations can be greatly enhanced not only by deep knowledge of the region, its history, languages, and literature but also its popular music and event its obsession with sports.[101] The following section concentrates on the fieldwork: the source and type of data obtained; the techniques used and the challenges and opportunities encountered during fieldwork.

1.4.4. Sources of data

1.4.4.1. Secondary sources

This study relies heavily on literature relevant to the subject area of the study, i.e. the sources of intrastate conflicts and the nature of conflict resolution mechanisms and processes. Attention has been given to materials related to the geographical location of the study i.e. West Africa. The reason for relying on secondary sources in these matters is that substantial studies have been done on the conflicts in the West African region where civil wars took place in the beginning of the 1990s and Guinea is often alluded to in this regional context. As such, issues related to causes and processes of conflict resolution in the region are well documented. This documentation provides sufficient data materials to support the primary sources on Guinea. These secondary data were drawn from sources such as books, reports, journals and newspaper articles.

1.4.4.2. Fieldwork [102]

Most of the primary data was collected during a field trip to Guinea in the form of open dialogues and interviews. The fieldwork consisted of six months, from June to November 2011, and was divided into two periods. A preliminary field research of three months (June-August) was conducted in order to obtain basic primary data and to identify potential sources for additional data. During this phase, this researcher undertook a lot of informal discussions and open dialogues about issues related to peace and conflict management in the country. This was followed by another three months (September-November) in the field to follow up, re-

[101] McGovern, *Making War in Côte d'Ivoire*, xix; Graeme Counsel, "Music for a coup 'Armee Guineenne:' An overview of Guinea's recent political turmoil," the *Australasian Review of African Studies* 31, 2 (2010): 94-112; Graeme Counsel, *Mande popular music and cultural policies in West Africa: Griots and government policy since independence* (VDM Verlag Dr. Muller, 2009); Anne Schumann, "Songs of a new era: Popular music and political expression in the Ivorian crisis," *African Affairs* 112, 448 (2013): 440–459.

[102] For a copy of the ethical approval for this study see Appendix B.

check sources and obtain new data which might have been missed during the initial period. Much of the data was collected during the initial period, except that of the military. As mentioned elsewhere, the chapter on the military was added, based on data obtained from the initial period. As such, the second period proved to be a turning point for this study since it allowed the researcher to interview military personnel thereby obtaining their views on the role of the military in maintaining stability in the county. The fieldwork was conducted with different people who had been involved – in one way or another – with issues related to governance, peace, conflict and security in Guinea during the last three decades. This included interviews with military personnel, politicians, academics, religious/community leaders, business personnel and a representative from Non-Governmental Organizations.

The total number of interviewees was sixteen individuals distributed as follows: three military personnel, four politicians, three academics, two religious/community leaders, three business personnel and one non-governmental organization representative. The three military personnel consisted of one captain and two lieutenants. The interviews with them touched on a variety of issues related to the military's role in politics and stability of the country. This included their opinions on the general question of whether they thought that Guinea was in real danger of sliding into civil war in the same way its neighbours had. The interviews with these army officers centred on the living conditions in the army, their feelings about life in the army and how satisfied junior army officers were within the establishment. The aim was to find out their explanations for the relative cohesiveness of the Guinean military in relation to other military establishments in the region.

The academics consisted of three university professors with sociology and history backgrounds who were also actively involved in the national political debates through the national media. The interviews with them touched a wide range of issues, including the role of the military in Guinea's political affairs, ethnicity, governance and natural resources. A particular emphasis was devoted to exploring the importance of natural resources in the political economy of Guinea in general and its role in maintaining a degree of fiscal stability in particular and the extent to which this could be linked with political stability in the country. The discussion

also included ethnic balancing in Guinea and whether there was enough inclusion in various Guinean regimes so that ethnic tensions did not get out of hand and lead to armed conflicts.

The politicians were drawn from four political parties which had existed since the beginning of the democratization process in the 1990s. The interviews revolved around Guinea's resilience to armed conflicts in the context of its violent neighbourhood, the effect of national unity on political stability of the country, particularly during the 1990s and 2000s, and the role of the military in the political and economic life of the country. Particular attention was devoted to the question of the army's involvement in the economic activities of the country and its expansion in the administrative organs of the state after the 1984 military take-over. These interviews also explored the reasons for the failure of the opposition to mobilize mass revolts against the regime of president Conte despite the dire economic conditions during his rule.

The three respondents from the business community were drawn from those who were involved in the Import & Export sector of riz (the staple food of Guinea), the agricultural product sector and the construction sector. The interviews centred around the level of local ownership of businesses, the extent to which the military were involved in the Guinean economy, and the possible impact of these factors in preventing Guinea from experiencing large-scale violence like its neighbours did. Particular efforts were devoted to exploring the reasons behind the fact that, unlike many West African countries, the Lebanese business community does not have a significant influence on the import and export sector of the Guinean economy. The interviews also explored the extent to which the military had been involved in the Guinean economy and the impact that involvement might have on the economic development of the country.

A respondent from a national human right organization was included among the interviewees and centred around the abuses of human right in the country's history since independence and the possible reasons why grievances from such abuses did not lead to armed conflict in Guinea, the same way that such grievances contributed to armed conflicts in the neighbouring countries. The interviews with the two religious/community leaders revolved around the role of

culture and religion in the political stability of the country since independence. A particular attention was devoted to exploring the extent to which religious channels and occasions (such as the mosques and the weekly Friday prayers) were used by the government to spread its narrative of what constituted a threat to national security and political stability in the country.

1.4.4.2.1. Interviews and open dialogues

The interviews were of a qualitative nature and semi-structured, ranging from one and a half hours to two hours per session. The purpose of using semi-structured qualitative interviews was to enable the researcher to ask specific questions that could be difficult to answer on the basis of written documentation alone.[103] The interviews were undertaken using an open interview guide, giving flexibility regarding the persons interviewed in the course of the conversation. The main questions were quite wide, providing the interviewees with space to choose from the angle and approach to the answers. During the interview, leading questions were avoided, and follow-up questions were asked to ensure the reliability of the answers. Of interest were not only the facts, but also the respondent's personal analysis and conclusions.

The use of semi-structured qualitative interviews as the interview guide was important in enabling people to talk freely and to present their perspectives in their own terms. The method allowed the researcher to introduce the themes to be covered and to suggest questions. After that the discussion – in most cases – flowed more freely. At the same time, it permitted a degree of openness to changes of sequence and types of questions in order to follow up the answers given by the interviewees. The semi-structured interviews gave the informants the opportunity to include in the conversation areas of interest to them. This flexibility gave the study the openness needed to understand individual perceptions of issues related to conflict management, peace and security in Guinea during the last three decades. For instance, in a number of cases, interviewees took the liberty to talk about the politico-economic role of the Guinean army. As a result, the researcher decided to probe more on the role of the Guinea military in

[103] Steinar Kvale, *Inter Views: An Introduction to Qualitative Research Interviewing* (Sage Publications, 2004).

the stability of the country and a number of military personnel were added as part of the interviewees. Following the amount of information gathered about the political role of the military, the researcher deemed it necessary to dedicate an independent chapter on the military (Chapter 3).

1.4.4.2.2. Fieldwork challenges

The period of the fieldwork was marked with major political and security events in the country. Two months into the fieldwork, the residence of the newly elected President Alpha Condé was attacked by Gunmen on 19 July 2011.[104] In the days that followed, several dozen soldiers and some civilians were arrested. Between the end of July and the beginning of August, the attorney-general released the names of 37 persons – nine of whom were civilians – who would face prosecution for their part in the attack. The government indicated that the investigation was still open and that more people might be added to the list. In a separate event the police arrested hundreds of opposition activists during September protesting against what they said was the ruling party's attempt to rig a parliamentary election scheduled in December, which was later postponed. Under this climate of political turmoil, on-going investigation and possible pending arrests some key informants did not want be tape-recorded and – in most cases – it was more appropriate not to use the tape recorder in order to facilitate a more open conversation. Instead notes were made and transcriptions made as soon as possible after the session. The downside of this was that the researcher is not able to make direct substantial quotations from the interviews. However, in a number of cases many of the notes written down during the interviews were discussed with the interviewees and their approval sought to use it as a direct quotation if need be.

1.5. Structure of the thesis

Following this introductory chapter presenting the overview context of the study, the research questions, objectives, the main concepts and the methodology, the main product of the academic research presented in this thesis comprises four papers. The papers present, analyse and discuss aspects of the empirical data

[104] For more details, see Vincent Foucher, "Alpha Condé And The Politics Of Military (Mis) Adventure," *African Arguments* (Guinea Briefing, 17 Oct 2011); *Africa Confidential* (French edition), n° 624 (25 July 2011): 8.

produced during the research, each focusing on different aspects of the security threat to the Guinean state and the measures taken to mitigate such threats. The papers have been produced in response to the research objective and questions presented earlier. Each paper was presented in an international conference and has been published in, or submitted to a peer-reviewed international journal in various disciplines: ethnicity studies, military sociology, development economic and regional area studies journals. The papers are stand-alone research products, associated with different academic debates rather than with each other. Their internal interrelatedness is not made explicit in the papers themselves, but a general inter-reference to the papers is often made in order to strengthen a particular argument.

The papers are:

1. Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Escaping Ethnic Based Armed Conflict in Guinea (p.42-68)
2. The Military and Politics in Guinea: An Instrumental Explanation of Political Stability (p.69-104)
3. Mining for Peace: Diamonds, Bauxite, Iron-ore and Political Stability in Guinea (p.105-130)
4. State Resilience in Guinea: Mitigating the 'Bad Neighbourhood Effect' of Civil War Next Door (p.131-153)

Each paper is preceded by a brief summary, describing the paper and indicating its current status (published, in revision following reviewers' comments, in review, to be submitted), after which the paper is presented exactly as published and/or submitted in each journal. The last chapter comprises of the synthesis and conclusions and consists of a discussion on how the papers correspond to each other, followed by a discussion on how the papers shed light on selected theoretical and methodological issues, and the concluding remarks. A list of references is provided after each chapter, and published papers retain their reference sections.

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Chapter Two: Paper One.
Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Escaping Ethnic Based Armed Conflict in Guinea[1]

2.1. Summary of the paper

Paper one, *Stability in Deeply Divided Societies,*[2] explores political stability in Guinea through the lens of primordial, instrumental and constructive modes of discourse of ethnicity and politics. It offers an historical perspective to ethnic tensions in the country and discusses how Guinea's deep ethnic divisions enabled its post-independence elites to construct a strong national identity that cut across ethnic and regional groupings, and to devise cultural policies compatible with domestic stability. The paper argues that elements from Guinea's history, experience of French colonialism, religious and cultural practices provided the raw material for the construction and sustenance of a solid national identity between 1958 and 1984. The paper then investigates how the shift from constructive to a mixture of instrumental and primordial approaches to ethnicity created both threats to and opportunities for political stability since 1984. The paper's main finding is that Guinea's deep ethnic division was an impetus for political stability rather than for unrest.

[1] Under review as Bah, Mamadou Diouma,"Stability in Deeply Divided Societies: Escaping Ethnic Based Armed Conflict in Guinea," in *African Identities*. The paper was presented at New Zealand Political Studies Association's annual Conference, held at the University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, 2-3 December, 2013.

[2] This short title is used to denote the paper henceforth.

2.2. The paper

Abstract

This paper examines the interaction between ethnic politics and conflict management in Guinea. The country belongs to the category of nations characterized in the literature as "deeply divided societies" which, according to much literature, constitute a high risk variable for ethnically induced armed conflicts. Yet Guinea has not succumbed to large-scale violence, giving rise to the question as to why armed conflict has not been a feature in Guinea despite its population being deeply divided along ethnicity and regional affiliation. The paper explores how various constructions of identity have been actively used by political agents to sustain stability through delicate ethnic balancing in a society characterized by its deep ethnic divisions. It is concluded that in contrast to findings in much of the existing literature where deep ethnic division is strongly linked with the onset of large-scale violent civil conflicts, Guinea's deep ethnic divisions has been actually an impetus for stability rather than unrest. However, events in recent times indicate that, the use of various forms of identity construction by political elites to serve their own interests and ward off threats to their power is likely to go wrong as the nation moves to multi-party democracy, thereby posing a real danger to the country's stability.

Keywords: Guinea, Identity Politics, Elections Violence, Armed Conflict, Ethnic Division

Introduction

Guinea almost slid into the kind of civil war that plagued almost all of its neighbors…yet managed several times to pull back from the brink (Macgovern, 2012, p. 235).

Since independence in 1958, Guinea has been confronted with a threat to its stability emanating from the deep divisions of its major ethnic groups along clear cultural and regional affiliations. The country is divided by nature into four major geographical regions whereby each region is dominated by a major ethno-linguistic grouping.[3] Lower Guinea is inhabited mainly by the Soussou ethnic group who represent around 15% of the population. In Middle Guinea the Fulani people are the dominant ethnic group and represent around 40% of Guinea's population. Upper Guinea is predominantly inhabited by the ethnic Manlinké who constitute around 30% of Guineans. In the Forest Region, the Guerzé, Toma and Kissi constitute three very different linguistic groups but are bound together by their regional affiliations and represent around 10% of the population.[4] This type of ethnic composition whereby ethnic groups are few in number but large in size, has put Guinea among those nations categorized as having deep ethnic divisions thereby vulnerable to large-scale violence, as discussed later.

The threat to Guinea's stability posed by deep ethnic divisions among its population was exacerbated by the September 1958 vote for immediate independence from France. Being the only French colony to opt out of the French Community of the newly independent countries, Guinea faced a hostile attitude from France and its West African Francophone allies. Given Guinea's ethno-linguistic differences, ethno-regional affiliations and external hostilities from France and its West African allies, Guinea's main immediate post-independence concern was how to survive as a unified state. Likewise, the introduction of multiparty politics in Guinea since 1990 produced a system whereby political parties were mainly based on ethnic and/or regional affiliations. According to some literature, such situations are strongly linked with the onset of ethnically motivated armed conflicts (Horowitz, 1985, p. 291-332).

[3] For a detailed study of various Guinean languages, see Counsel (2009); O'Toole (1978: xvii); Person (1971: 272); Rivière (1977: 27).

[4] In addition to these major ethno-linguistic groups, a number of other minor ethnic groups exist in Guinea but without distinctive geographical domination. See, O'Toole (1978: xix).

Despite these unfavourable conditions, Guinea has avoided descending into large-scale civil conflicts often associated with deeply divided societies. This raises the question as to why armed conflict has not been a feature in Guinea and whether Guinea's deep ethnic divisions were actually an impetus for stability rather than unrest, as much of the existing literature has suggested. Using a framework derived from ethnic and identity literature and data from fieldwork in Guinea,[5] this article examines why the Guinean state has remained resilient to armed conflicts often induced by deep ethnic divisions.

Conflicts in deeply divided societies

In societies that are deeply divided along ethnic lines, the commitment of regimes to establish, perpetuate and even deepen the specific ethnic character of the polity could prove problematical in…the long-term stability of the polity (Peleg, 2004, p. 7).

According to Lustick (1979), a society is deeply divided 'if ascriptive ties generate an antagonistic segmentation of society, based on terminal identities with high political salience, sustained over a substantial period of time' (p. 325). Guelke (2012) interprets "ascriptive" as 'identities acquired at birth, such as race and or ethnicity' thereby concluding that a deeply divided society 'exists along a well-entrenched fault line that … contains the potential for violence between the segments [groups]' (p. 28-30). Additionally, Nordlinger (1972) argues that 'a society is deeply divided when a large number of conflict group members attach overwhelming importance to the issues at stake, or manifest strongly held antagonistic beliefs and emotions toward the opposing segment, or both' (p. 9). Accordingly, although there are divergent views of what constitutes deeply divided societies, a general agreement on the importance of ethnicity as a factor in the creation of such societies and its potential for violence appears to exist (Nordlinger 1972, p. 6-7; Lustick, 1979, p. 325; Peleg, 2004, p. 7-9; Guelke, 2013, p. 20).

The literature is divided on the role of ethnicity in violent conflicts. Recent quantitative studies argue that armed conflicts are far more likely to be caused by economic opportunities than by ethnic and/or political grievances (Collier, 2000, p. 839–853; Collier and Hoeffler, 1998, p. 563-573; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, p.

[5] This article is based upon fieldwork conducted in Guinea from June–November 2011 as part of my larger doctoral research. The fieldwork consisted of interviews with military personnel, politicians, academics, religious leaders, and business personnel.

563-596; Fearon and Laitin, 2003, p. 75-90). These studies conclude that armed conflicts and/or civil wars are often the result of states' weaknesses to supress rebellions which are often motivated by greed rather than grievances. However, much of the literature maintains that violent conflicts and civil wars are often the feature of nations with deep ethnic divisions (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol, 2005, p. 796; Guelke, 2012, p. 33). Ellingsen (2000) found that 'countries with several groups (3-4) have higher risk of civil conflict than countries with many groups (5 or more)' (p. 241). In particular, where two groups are comparable in size, Horowitz found that the frequency of ethnic conflict was greater (Horowitz 1985, p. 437). This view is echoed by others whose findings demonstrate that deep ethnic divisions put a nation at 'a higher risk of suffering a civil war' (Reynal-Querol, 2002, p. 30).

The risk of large-scale violence in deeply divided societies has been explained by the suggestion that deep ethnic divisions often lead to ethnic dominance whereby a single group's social, political and economic power are reflected in the state apparatus (Auvinen, 1997, p. 178; Lustick, 1979, p. 325-344). This concentration of power in the hand of one group and the exclusion of others from the political elite generates discontents and 'may transfer grievances from the elites to the mass level' thereby providing the bases of 'organization and motivation for rebellious actions' against the state (Auvinen, 1997, p. 178). Accordingly, a recent study found that 'competition along ethnic lines (is) strongly associated with internal conflict' (Cederman, Wimmer & Min, 2010, p. 113). In Guinea however, despite the context, organized armed resistance against the state has been absent since independence. Therefore, Guinea's experience presents a rich case study of the linkage between deep ethnic divisions and sustained stability in an African context. The following section explores this linkage by examining some major theories of ethnic identity.

Schools of ethnic identity

Primordial, instrumental and constructivist approaches are among the contending schools of thought concerning what constitutes a nation. Primordialism contends that ethnic identity is rooted in the shared cultural elements of common language, history, mythology, folklore, religious beliefs and practices, arts, and territory (Isaacs, 1975, p. 33; Hameso, 1997, p. 33; Smith, 1983). This emphasis on the

'cultural sources of ethnic identities' (Keyes, 1981, p. 6) which originates from 'what a person is born with or acquires at birth' (Isaacs, 1975, p. 30) is sometimes referred to as the 'idols of the tribe'(Isaacs, 1975, p. 33). Accordingly, the feelings of 'physical and emotional safety' among individuals when they are 'grouped with their kind' (Isaacs, 1975, p. 28) can be explained from these primordial attachments. This sense of belonging, based on the 'cultural interpretation of descent' (Keyes, 1981, p. 5) reinforces an ethnic group's understanding of its distinctiveness from other groups (Barth, 1969) and serves as a powerful tool for the survival and persistence of the group's identity (Isaacs, 1975, p. 30). Thus, 'a tendency to regard the social relations within which [members of the group] live, as sacred' (Zirker, Danopoulos & Simpson, 2008, p. 333) is developed. In this way, primordial analysts see ethnic identity as the framework for interpretation of social and political interactions among groups. As such, primordialism inherently implies that ethnicity can be a destructive force within civil society when there is 'a direct conflict between primordial and civil sentiments' and that such conflicts could lead to the 'problem variously called tribalism, parochialism, communalism, and so on' (Zirker et al., 2008, p. 334). Hence, Young (1993 argues that 'the intensities which surround ethnic conflicts'(p. 22) can best be grasped by focussing on these cultural bases of such powerful emotions.

Contrary to the above, the instrumentalist school asserts that the notion of ethnic identity is rooted in political, rather than primordial elements (Barrington, 2006, p. 14). Instrumentalists insist that 'little is fundamental and "natural" in ethnic attachments and repulsions' and that ethnic identity 'is the creation of elites who use it as a tool to obtain some larger, typically material end' (Zirker et al., 2008, p. 333). This emphasis on the role of elites in the creation and the usage of 'ethnicity in political and social competition…in pursuit of materiel advantage' (Young, 1993, p. 22) is central to the instrumental approach to ethnic identity. Accordingly, one scholar highlights the potential of ethnicity usage for generating 'political entrepreneurs with a conscious and realistic interest in mobilizing ethnicity' (Rothschild, 1981, p. 2) for political, economic and other self-interest centred purposes. From this standpoint, ethnic groups are viewed as 'calculating, self-interested collective actors maximizing material values through the vehicle of communal identity' (Young, 1993, p. 22) mobilization. In this way, the importance of ethnic identity increases when 'cultural entrepreneurs…and

activists' (Young, 1993, p. 22) exploit 'selected ethnic symbols to create political movements in which collective ends are sought' (Zirker et al., 2008, p. 333). Ethnic entrepreneurs often resort to such actions 'in response to threats or opportunities for themselves and/or their groups' (Zirker et al., 2008, p. 333). This material interpretation of ethnic identity, stresses how ethnicity can 'readily be manipulated in the political or economic interests of specific individuals and groups' (Zirker et al., 2008, p. 320) thereby leading to destructive competition among groups within the state (Olzak & Nagel, 1986, p. 1-14).

Constructivist scholars take a middle ground between the primordialist and the instrumentalist approaches. They acknowledge that a shared cultural identity, history and territory constitute the core components of an ethnic identity as claimed by the primordialists but they insist that these elements are not immutable. Yet, an ethnic identity is also constructed from 'language, religion, and historical events' (Barrington, 2006, p. 14) instead of being manufactured from nothing to suit 'material motives' (Groelsema, 1998, p. 32) as the instrumentalist would want us to believe. Hence, constructivist scholars argue that ethnic identity is socially constructed because an ethnic identity exists only when there are 'groups whose belief in a common ancestry…is so strong that it leads to the creation of a community' (Zirker et al., 2008, p. 333). Accordingly, ethnic identity is socially constructed from the 'durable products of human actions and choices' (Zirker et al., 2008, p. 333) rather than being rooted in immutable elements.

In short, primordial scholars assert that there exists a cultural nationalism whereby a nation is rooted in immutable cultural elements. In contrast, instrumentalists insist that identity is situational and dependent on material motives. Yet constructivists assume that identity is manufactured to suit elite nationalists' needs. More importantly, for the purpose of this study, is that all three schools' emphasize that such identity can be fundamentally manipulated by elite members of groups with the potential for violent confrontations or a peaceful coexistence. The extent to which these schools of ethnic identity inform the linkage between deep ethnic divisions and political stability in Guinea is the task of the remainder of this article.

Politics and ethnicity in Guinea: construction of national identity, 1940s-1984

The interaction of politics and ethnicity in Guinea between the 1940s and the mid-1980s exhibits many of the features linked with the constructivist approach to ethnicity. As discussed earlier, the constructivist school considers ethnic identity as socially constructed from culture, language, religion and historical events which provide 'the resources that may be mobilized into a group by appropriate political action' (Zirker et al., 2008, p. 334). The following discussion examines the manner in which elements from Guinea's shared pre-colonial history; shared experience of French colonialism; and largely shared religious and cultural practices were shaped and transformed by the agents of the Guinean state to construct a national identity that cut across ethnic and regional groupings. Political mobilization in Guinea during the 1940s and mid-1950s often began in the form of 'ill-structured regional groups [which subsequently evolve] to become pseudo-political organizations' (Camara, 2005, p. 50-51). In this period, each of Guinea's four regions was dominated by at least one ethno-regional organization. In Lower Guinea, the Soussou dominated *Union de la Base Guinée* (Lower Guinea's Union) was predominant. In Middle Guinea, the *Amicale Gilbert Vieillard* organization was initiated by the Fulani students of the Sébikotane colonial school in Senegal, and subsequently became dominated by the Fulani aristocracy of the Fouta Djallon. The *Union Mandingue* dominated by the Malinkés was predominant in Upper Guinea. In the Forest Region, the predominant organization was the *Union Forestière.*

From 1945 to 1952, these organizations formed 'electoral committees rather than political movements' restricting their political activities to 'defending individuals in trouble with the administration' and providing the means of satisfying the political ambition of individuals whose membership was largely 'determined by ethnic affiliation, tribe, and language'(Riviére, 1977, p. 63). Thus, Guinean politics in this period had a highly ethnic and regional character. However, from early 1953, the *Party Démocratique de Guinea* (PDG) gradually assumed the dominant position on Guinea's political scene which culminated in its assumption of power on September 28, 1958 (Riviére, 1977, p. 51-52). Prior to PDG's ascendency 'when called upon to participate effectively in political life, (Guineans) were divided along ethnic line[s]' (Riviére, 1977, p. 62-63) and ethnic differences led to clashes despite temporary agreements among groups.

The construction of national identity

Suffering in common unifies more than joy does… Where national memories are concerned, griefs are more valued than triumphs, for they impose duties, and require a common effort (Renan, 1882, Quoted in Eley and Suny, 1996, p. 53).

The use of pre-colonial history, common suffering, religious symbols and cultural practices was amongst PDG's most successful mobilization strategies for forging a national identity that cut across ethnicity and regional groupings. The shared pre-colonial history among Guineans was utilized skilfully by the independence movement to forge the Guinean national identity across ethnicity and regional affiliations. Of special interest, was the use of pre-colonial political leaders' resistance to colonial conquest in order to rally people behind the nation building project. To this end, Guinea's pre-colonial figures were promoted by the independence movement as 'common ancestor[s] who belonged to all Guineans' (Schmidt, 2005, p. 993) rather than as Malinké, Fulani, Soussou or other ethnic groups. This promotion of historical figures was carefully selected to represent Guinea's major regions and ethnic groups (Interview, Conakry, September, 2011). Among the most prominent of these leaders is Samori Touré from the Malinké ethnic group, Almamy Bokar Biro Barry and Alpha Yaya Diallo from the Fulani ethnic group and N'Zebela Togba Pivi from the Forest Region. In 1968 the remains of Alpha Yaya Diallo who was exiled by the French were brought home from Mauritania for burial and he was 'commemorated as a hero of the pre-colonial resistance' (Schmidt, 2005, p. 993). This enormous funeral procession was led by President Sékou Touré himself. In addition, the independence movement promoted the resistance of the Fulani religious leader Cerno Aliou - whose movement was crushed by the colonial administration - as a national legacy which belonged to all Guineans.

Shared sufferings

Beside the shared pre-colonial history, the agents of the Guinean state emphasized the experiences of the French colonial rule and the resulting grievances as a common factor around which to construct the Guinean national identity. These

grievances originated mainly from the system of forced labour and the *indigenat*[6] implemented by the French on the population. The forced labour system consisted of both public works and military conscription for the territories known as 'French West Africa' during colonial times (Morganthua, 1964, p. 2). A great deal of hardship was associated with forced labour, resulting in mounting grievances against the French colonialists and their local associates. It is reported that local chiefs in Guinea often used the system to take revenge on their enemies when preparing the list for those who had to serve in the force labour work force (Morganthua, 1964, p. 2). The suffering was exacerbated by the fact that forced labourers from Guinea often had to travel long distances at their own cost to their place of work in the fertile forest zone of the Ivory Coast where European planters and timber merchants had settled (Morganthua, 1964, p. 3). This forced migration from Guinea was due to the fact that the forest region in Ivory Coast had a low density of population and some territories in Guinea were highly populated (Morganthua, 1964, p. 3). As a result, European settlers in the Ivory Coast had to import labourers from neighbouring Guinea to cut trees, plant cocoa, coffee and bananas. In addition to the actual hardship of the forced labour system, the recruitment process in Guinea often caused great psychological pain not only to the labourers but also to their families and neighbours. Reports indicate that 'it was not unusual for a village to be encircled, and men to be taken from the villages under military guard to do the work the administrator thought necessary' (Morganthua, 1964, p. 5).

The *indigenat* was another source of resentment against the French colonial system in Guinea. This law authorized collective fines and restricted the movement of persons by a simple administrative decision, and administrators were allowed to punish persons who moved from one territory to another without authorization. The fact that these colonial administrative disciplinary powers existed in addition to and above the normal provisions of the native penal code, added to the sufferings of the majority of the population under the colonial system in Guinea (Morganthua, 1964, p. 5-6).

[6] The *indigenat* refers to 'the special provisions in the penal code which permitted governors or French administrators to take speedy punitive actions against African subjects', see Morganthua (1964: 5); Mann (2009: 331-353).

Regardless of their origin in terms of language, ethnicity and regional affiliations, all Guineans suffered the same hardship under the colonial system. The only exception was the small number of local chiefs and native elite administrators who helped implement these colonial rules. This common suffering under colonial rule served as a unifying factor for the Guinean people. Intellectuals from the independence movement articulated the idea that 'the misery which kills TOGBA of Macenta is the same as that of Samba of Upper Guinea, Soriba of Lower Guinea, or Diallo of the Fouta Djallon' (Schmidt, 2005, p. 993). This was a reference to selected names and regions associated with particular ethnic groups. The aim was to forge a national identity that cut across ethnic and regional grouping by drawing from the common sufferings under the French colonial rule.

According to Hobsbawn (1992) 'the unity imposed by conquest and administration might . . . produce a people that saw itself as a nation' (p. 138). Renan notes that shared grievances are the critical constituent of national memories therefore a nation is defined as 'a large-scale solidarity, constituted by the feeling of the sacrifices that one has made in the past and of those that one is prepared to make in the future'(Renan, 1882, Quoted in Schmidt, 2005, p. 997). Accordingly, the memory of colonial experience shared by Guineans became increasingly reflected in their collective consciousness of themselves as Guineans during the 1950s (Interview, Conakry, September 2011). Consequently, all Guineans had mutually understood experiences and grievances resulting from French colonialism which permitted them to communicate more effectively with each other (Interview, Conakry, September 2011). Hence Guinean elites were able to negotiate among themselves an inclusive nationalism under which to mobilize the masses (Interview, Conakry, September 2011).

The role of religious and cultural practices

The liberation movement also successfully associated religious symbols and cultural practices with the nationalist cause, stressing the positive attributes of Islam, Christianity and indigenous religions that were compatible with national unity and the struggle for independence (Schmidt, 2005, p. 993-996). Since Islam was the religion of the majority, the leaders of the independence movement tied their programme of emancipation 'with the liberating principles' (Morganthua, 1964, p. 235) of 'justice and brotherly solidarity' (Camara, 2007, p. 162) in Islam. One way of spreading this message to the general population was through the

Friday prayers where worshipers were reminded of the commonalities between adherents of Islam and the movement's struggle for liberation. In addition, the leaders of the movement frequented a different mosque each week, therefore, widely publicizing their relationship with Islam. Similarly, it was a common practice to recite verses from the Quran to mark the beginning of the movement's activities, such as meetings and demonstrations against colonial administrators and their local allies (Morganthua, 1964, p. 236-237). This usage of religious practices by the independence movement helped create common symbols, rituals, and collective practices around which the Guinean people were politically mobilized. This, according to Hobsbawm gave 'a palpable reality to [an] otherwise imaginary community' (Hobsbawm, 1992, p. 71).

Cohesion in fragmentation

Since the early 1960s the government of Guinea adopted a cultural philosophy of *authenticité* whereby authentic Guinean cultural values are restored and used as a foundation for nation building and national integration. In August 1968 the government proclaimed a "cultural revolution" in which 'teaching national languages in the early primary grades' was central, and 'by 1980 all instruction in the first nine grades was being given in these languages with French reserved for the remainder of the secondary and the higher levels' (Gardinier, 1988, 723). Although the "cultural revolution" policy was abandoned in the aftermath of the 1984 military takeover, the results of these policies are still the subject of a heated debate among observers as to the extent to which President Touré succeeded in the integration of Guinea's ethnic groups (Adamolekun 1976; Rivière, 1977; Smith, 2013, p. 2). In particular, critics argue that the insistence on using national languages in primary and secondary education as medium of instruction instead of French was a dividing factor in a country where ethnic polorization has a deep historical root ((Kudamatsu, 2007, p. 8; Schmidt, 2006, p. 134; Everett, 1985, p. 23).

However, drawing a parallel from Gluckman's work (1956) on how order is maintained in tribal societies, this author argues that these policies provided impetus for peace and order rather than divisions and disorder. Gluckman (1956) explains that tribal societies are often 'organized into a series of groups and relationships, that people who are friends on one basis are enemies on the other'

and that the balancing between these multiple relationships produces 'cohesion, rooted in the conflicts between men's different allegiances' (p. 4). Hence, although 'these ties divide men at one point; but this division in a wider group and over a longer period of time leads to establishment of social order'(Gluckman, 1956, p. 23). He suggests that this logic of tribal order can be applied to nation-states by arguing that:

> if we examine the smaller groups which make up our vast and complex societies, it is easy to see that division of interest and loyalties within any one group prevent it from standing in absolute opposition to other groups and to the society at large. For men can only belong to a society through [an] intermediate smaller group (Gluckman, 1956, p. 24).

As such, 'tight loyalties to smaller groups can be effective in strengthening a larger community if there are offsetting loyalties' (Gluckman, 1956, p. 24). As in the feud whereby a perpetual 'state of hostility' exists, 'there is no society which does not contain such state of hostility between its component sections, but provided that they are redressed by other loyalties, they might contribute to the peace of the whole'(Gluckman, 1956, p. 24).

By the same token, it can be argued that while there is no denial that president Touré's cultural policies strengthened Guineans awareness of their cultural and ethno-linguistic differences at the group level, all Guineans were also tied to the socialist ideology which 'was oriented towards capturing the political benefits of…identities' (McGovern, 2013, p. 195) among various ethnic groups. Horowitz (1985) asserts that 'the ubiquity of ethnic loyalties suggests the existence of needs to which they respond' (p. 75). Smith (1981) echoed this view by suggesting that 'there are natural needs for ethnic affiliations' (p. 85-86). Thus, by responding to each group's "natural" needs for bonding together under its respective culture, custom and language, the groups' strengths were increased at the local and regional level. These groups were at the same time tied together by the socialist ideology, thereby providing solid building materials for the larger Guinean community at the national level. As a result, a recent study concludes that 'Guinea is a closely-knit society…the control that a community has over its members whether educated or uneducated, remains strong in [the country]' (Gbaydee Doe, 2003, p. 155) and that this has been reflected at the national level. This finding is in line with Gluckman's suggestion that:

> the greater the division in one area of the society, the greater is likely to be the cohesion in a wider range of relationships, provided that there is a general need for peace and recognition of a moral order in which this peace can flourish (Gluckman, 1956, p. 4).

In Guinea, the need for the survival of the state as a unified entity against external threats posed by France and its West African allies in the aftermath of independence, justified the need for peace and internal cohesion among different ethnic groups. Likewise, the socialist ideology provided the moral order in which this peace could flourish. Thus, from a constructivist stand point, the apparent division of Guineans by strengthening local and regional group identity seems to have led to a greater cohesion at the national level during Touré's rule. As such, the failure of the Portuguese-led military invasion of Guinea in November 1970 to unseat the Touré regime by instigating a military coup and popular revolt against the regime has often been referred to as a testimony of Guineans' deep sense of national identity.[7] According to some account of the events, while the "liberating" forces 'ranged throughout Conakry destroying military vehicles and several… buildings', the population 'watched passively … unwilling to be galvanised into action' against the regime (Cann, 1997, p. 77).

This finding is in line with Wallerstein's suggestion that 'although ethnicity is in some respects dysfunctional for national integration it is also in some respects functional' (Wallerstein, 1960, p. 129). A recent study suggests that the satisfaction of the sense of belonging to one's ethnic group could 'serve as a buffer against perceived rejection from other social groups…resulting in an overall enhanced sense of belonging' (Jaspal and Cinnirella, 2012, p. 510) at the national level. Muller (2008) echoed this view by suggesting that:

> Many Europeans are now prepared, and even eager, to participate in transnational frameworks such as the EU, in part because their perceived need for collective self-determination has largely been satisfied [by] several decades of life in consolidated, ethnically homogeneous states [which] may…have worked to sap ethnonationalism's … emotional power (p. 31).

[7] In November 22, 1970, the Portuguese military command in Bissau sent a group of several hundred Portuguese and Bissau-Guinean soldiers, foreign fighters and exiled Guineans to attack Conakry from the sea. The assault had twofold objectives: One was to neutralize the African Party for the Independence of Guinea [Bissau] and Cape Verde (PAIGC) which had its headquarter offices in Conakry; the other was to unseat President Touré who was a major source of sustenance to this Bissau Liberation movement. For more detail, see Cann (1997: 64-81); Dobert (1971: 16-18); Whiteman (1971: 350-58); Arieff (2009: 331-48). For the significance of Guinea's role in supporting its neighbour Guinea Bissau's liberation movement, see Appendix: K.

A similar case can be made in Guinea – from a constructivist stand point – by arguing that Touré's cultural policies largely satisfied Guineans' needs for a sense of belonging to their respective ethno-linguistic and regional groupings, resulting in a reduced perceived rejection from other social groups at the national level, therefore leading to cohesion rather than disorder. The following discussions examine the shift from the constructivist to that of a mixture of instrumental and primordial approaches to ethnicity and politics in Guinea since 1984 and its consequences for political stability in the country.

Politics and ethnicity in Guinea since 1984: instrumental vs. primordial approaches

The linkage between politics and ethnicity in Guinea since 1984 evinces a mixture of primordial and instrumental features of ethnic identity. As discussed earlier, primordialists emphasize the immutable cultural character of ethnic identity and its destructive tendency when confronted with civil sentiments. In contrast, instrumentalists emphasize the material interpretation of ethnic identity and its potential for constructive competition among groups within the state. The following discussion examines the political circumstances under which both tendencies have flourished in Guinea since 1984.

The political stability of minority rule

Colonel Lansana Conté came to power on the 3rd of April 1984 in a bloodless military take-over after the sudden death of President Sékou Touré a few weeks earlier. In 1993 Lansana Conté won the first multiparty presidential election since independence. He was re-elected in 1998 and 2003, and continued to rule the country until he died in office in December 2008 after a long illness. One of the significant results of the 1984 military coup – in terms of ethnic relations in Guinea – was the change of the president's ethnicity from Malinké to Soussou. Unlike his predecessor, who was from the Malinké ethnic group which constituted Guinea's second largest ethnic group, President Conté was a Soussou whose ethnic group represented a small minority of the population. According to Gellner (1983), the political stability of a country can be threatened 'if rulers of the political unit belong to a nation [ethnic group] other than that of the majority of the ruled' (p.1). This view is echoed by Cederman and Girardin (2007) who assert that 'escalation to violence is more likely where the dominant group [of the state

apparatus] is a demographic minority' (p.176). Likewise, a recent study shows that out of four countries which 'had a minority ethnic in power, three…have suffered civil wars' (Fearon, et al., 2007, p. 187). Considering this situation, President Conté had to maintain a delicate ethnic balance.

The first major challenge to President Conté's rule, which could have degenerated into a major ethnic conflict came in July 1985. Colonel Diarra Traoré, the Prime Minister after the 1984 military coup, was demoted to minister of education in December of the same year. In July of the following year Traoré staged a failed military coup. Both Traoré and former President Touré were of Malinké origin, therefore the coup was seen by some Guineans as an attempt on the part of the Malinkés 'to re-establish their dominance lost with the passing of Sékou Touré' (Schissel, 1986, p. 22). The coup therefore 'unleashed a susu [Soussou] looting spree of Malinké shops, and harassment of Malinkés living in Conakry' (Groelsema, 1998, 11) and other towns (Interview, Conakry, September, 2011). Initially, President Conté 'welcomed the ethnically targeted attacks' on Malinké owned shops and businesses in a speech delivered in his native Soussou language 'in an expression that became famous in Guinea, "Wofatara", which means "well done"' (International Crisis Group, 2007, p. 3 [footnotes 13]) in Soussou. However at a later stage, President Conté's government 'tried to downplay the ethnic nexus behind the coup' by placing the blame on 'Traoré's ruthless quest for power' (Schissel, 1986, p. 22). This behaviour can be interpreted as an appeal to the President's own ethnic identity in response to the apparent threat to his political power. Studies show that rulers in an 'ethnically divided society' (Zirker et al., 2008, p.333) often seek the support of their ethnic group in the struggle to maintain power. Thus, Conté's behaviour reinforces the instrumental arguments that ethnic identity can be 'politicized [and] exploited by elites as an instrument to protect their well-being or existence or to gain political and economic advantage' (Zirker et al., 2008, p.333) in divided societies.

In 1990 Guinea introduced the first example of political pluralism since independence by holding a national referendum to adopt a new constitution. As a result, a multi-party electoral system was established, resulting in the 1993 presidential election and the subsequent local, municipal and legislative elections. However, with the introduction of political pluralism, ethnic politics became a focal point in Guinea. This new process of multiparty politics moved the country

‘toward a politics of identity’ which was led by ‘parties imagined by many of their supporters as representing the ethnic group’ (International Crisis Group, 2007:1) they belonged to. As the democratic process goes on, ‘ethnic identity became a principal source of conflict’ (Groelsema, 1998, p. 14-15) turning elections into ethnic contests.

During the electoral campaign the Malinkés ‘reflected their perception of Malinké claims’ of ‘their right to political domination on the basis of historical events and processes’ (Groelsema, 1998, p. 418). As a results, the Malinké based political party, *Rassemblement du Peuple de Guinee* (RPG), led by Alpha Condé dominated the Upper Guinea region. The Fulanis made a similar cultural and historical claim of their right for political domination in the country. Thus, the Fulani based political parties the *Union pour la Nouvelle République* (UNR) led by Mamadou Ba and the *Party du Renouveau et Progrès* PRP led by Siradiou Diallo largely dominated in Middle Guinea. Because of this primordial attachment, ‘opposition parties failed to form a lasting alliance’ (Groelsema, 1998, p. 17) thereby allowing the ruling *Parti de l’Unité et du Progrès* (PUP) to strengthen its hold on power. One analyst states that the behaviour of the opposition in Guinea:

> had less to do with personal rivalry than ethnic difference. Leaders and parties became captives of their ethnic constituencies. The intellectual and cultural underpinnings of Peulh [Fulani] and Malinké worldviews precluded compromise with each other. Acting upon history and traditions, their cultural leaders and ethnic politicians orchestrated the marriage between culture and politics, excluding outsider identification with party and group goals (Groelsema, 1998, p. 18).

This culturally based impediment of electoral alliances which could have been advantageous to the opposition can be explained from the primordial attachment of the Malinké and the Fulani to their ethnic groups. The political behaviour of the Fulanis and Malinkés drew ‘from a deep cultural reservoir of symbols and myths anchored in history’ (Groelsema, 1998, p. 40) which left the two groups ‘unable to resolve [their] immutable and irreconcilable differences’ (Groelsema, 1998, p. 33). According to a recent study, ‘political coalitions on issues that cut across the main societal divide’ (Guelke, 2012, p. 29) is a rare commodity in deeply divided societies. Thus, from the primordialist standpoint, such a situation often leads to ‘destructive competition among ethnic groups’ (Nnoli, 1995, p. 3) giving rise to violent political struggle. Sources indicate that during municipal elections in May-

June 1991 ‘more than 600 people died in N’zérékoré in Malinké-Forester violence’ (Groelsema, 1998, p. 15).

In contrast, President Conté’s instrumental approach to ethnicity mitigated this danger by drawing support from both the Malinké and the Fulani, and from the ‘less cohesive Foresters’ who ‘lacked the raw materials for political mobilization’ based on cultural affiliation (Groelsema, 1998, p. 41). In an apparent attempt to win Foresters’ support in the 1993 elections, President Conté deliberately evoked their identity against the Malinké community in N’zérékoré (Interview, Conakry, September, 2011), therefore reinforcing his instrumental approach to ethnicity. A long and violent history of ethnic tension exists between the two groups which originate from the end of the 19th century (Bybee, 2013). Back then, the French colonial authorities used the Malinké ethnic group as “allies in their colonial project and granted them access to strategic posts in the area, drawing a fierce reaction from other communities in the region’ (IRIN 2005, p. 18). This historical animosity between the two groups was often utilized by President Conté’s regime in order to consolidate power in a context where primordial attachments among the larger ethnic groups – the Fulani and the Malinké – dominated. This instrumental approach to politics reinforced President Conté’s appeal as a unifying figure.

Ethnic politics and electoral violence since 2009

Since the death of President Conté in December 2008 and the subsequent reintroduction of political pluralism, there has been a re-emergence of primordial attachments to ethnic politics in the country. A recent study found that ‘the fear of ethnic conflicts drastically increased’ (Philipps, 2013, p. 138) in Guinea. This fear was exacerbated by the fact that most candidates in the first round of the presidential elections, held in June 2010, ‘drew their votes from very localized places in their home area and found it difficult to mobilize voters elsewhere’ (International Crisis Group, 2011, p. 5). This situation left the remaining two candidates for the second round, Cello Dalein Diallo and Alpha Condé, representing Guinea’s two main ethnic groups – the Fulani and the Malinké – respectively. During the second round, ethnic tensions increased significantly, resulting to violent confrontations between supporters of the two candidates (European Union Electoral Observation Mission to the Republic of Guinea, 2011,

p. 36, 52, 56, 70-72; International Crisis Group, 2011, p. 5-8). As a result, by the end of the presidential election cycle, which extended to five months, 'several towns in each candidate's home town region had chased out members of the other group with the anti-Fulbe [Fulani] mobilization being particularly coordinated in the north, a Condé strong hold' (Arieff and McGovern, 2013, p. 198-225). The final round of the presidential elections was held in November 2010 and Alpha Condé was declared the winner.

However, the delay of the legislative elections that were originally scheduled for the first half of 2011 and the accompanying violence deepened hostility between Guinea's various ethnic groups.[8] Communal identities and politics have been closely connected in Guinea, and are routinely manipulated – in the primordial sense – to serve political interests (Interview, Conakry, September, 2011). Thus, the disagreements over the organization and date of the elections resulted in communal violence between supporters of divergent political organizations. Since March 2013 it is estimated that election related violence had killed over 50 people (Global Centre for the Responsibility to Protect, 213). In February 2013, at least eight people died and around 240 were wounded and in March 4-8, 2013 at least one person was killed in violent protests (Jeune Afrique, 2013). Likewise, between May 21 and 23, 2013, fifteen people died in the protest (Radio France International, 23 May 2013). In September 22, 2013, one person was killed and 70 others wounded as a result of confrontations between rival communities (Jeune Afrique, 23 Sept. 2013). Additionally, in July 2013 at least 98 people were killed as a result of inter-communal violence between ethnic Guerzés and Koniankés in Guinea's second largest city, N'zérékoré, and nearby areas in the country's southeast (Jeune Afrique, 18 July 2013 ; Samb, 2013). According to some literature, among the features of deeply divided societies is 'a contested political process in which the legitimacy of outcome is commonly challenged by political representatives' of one of the segments (Guelke, 2012, p. 32).

[8] These elections were finally held on the 28 September, 2013. The results were released on the 18 October, giving the ruling party RPG and its allies a narrow majority.

The aforementioned shows that the Guinean national identity was a construction by the elites and that the elements which provided the raw materials for the nation building project were not manufactured by the elites from nothing as the instrumentalist would claim. On the contrary, these elements were drawn from Guinea's pre-colonial history, shared colonial experience and its various religious beliefs and cultural practices. This newly constructed national identity was inclusive in nature and strong enough to hold the country together from inside and to allow mobilization for defending it from outside enemies. However the shift from the combined constructivist approach and socialist ideological orientation to that of a mixture of instrumental and primordial approaches to ethnicity and politics in the country since 1984, presented a new threat to Guinea's stability. Thus, the degree of stability and turmoil in the country since 1984 has often reflected this mixture. While opposition parties were largely associated with exclusiveness and the politics of confrontation, thereby reaffirming a primordial tendency, President Conté's rule was associated with inclusiveness and compromise – in the instrumentalist sense – resulting in strengthened political stability. Yet, although the November 2010 presidential elections paved the way for Guinea's first civilian government in three decades, the dominance of primordial attachment in Guinea's political discourse remains the main source of instability in the country.

Conclusion

This article has examined the interconnection between deep ethnic divisions and stability in Guinea. There is no denying that deep ethnic divisions and ethnically based multiparty politics presented a threat to Guinea's stability, although this threat has largely been mitigated since independence. Based on evidence presented in this study, it is concluded that, contrary to most literature, the presence of deep ethnic divisions does much to explain the absence of ethnically induced armed conflicts in Guinea. The fact that the country is divided into few ethno-linguistic and regional affiliations enabled the leaders of the First Republic (1958-1984) to formulate localized cultural policies that largely satisfied Guineans' needs of belonging at the group level, as discussed above. These policies were tied with the socialist ideology at the same time, leading to an enhanced sense of belonging to the state at the national level, thereby resulting in a strong sense of national identity that cut across ethnicity, religion and regional

affiliations. This enabled the Guinean elites to build a national identity which was sufficient to hold the country together from inside and to allow mobilization for defending it from outside enemies. Similarly, in the Second Republic (1984-2008), President Conté's instrumental approach to ethnicity produced a degree of ethnic balancing. Being from a minority group, President Conté's ethnic group's ability to dominate and exclude the larger groups – the Malinkés and the Fulanis – was minimal, thereby less threatening to their long term group interest. Given the uncertain outcome of armed resistance, none of the opposition groups were eager/and or able to mount a mass mobilization for a violent removal of the Conté regime. However, since the death of President Conté in 2008 and the reintroduction of political pluralism in Guinea, primordial attachment to ethnic politics has increased significantly, resulting in violent confrontations among different ethno-political organizations. Although these confrontations did not amount to the kind of armed conflicts that ravaged most of Guinea's neighbour in recent decades, they are clear signals that the future of Guinea's stability will largely depend on how ethnicity is used and/or misused by the political elites.

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Chapter Three: Paper Two.
The Military and Politics in Guinea: An Instrumental Explanation of Political Stability[1]

3.1. Summary of the paper

Paper two, *The Military and Politics,*[2] explains why the Guinean state remained resilient to armed conflicts following protracted military involvement in the political affairs of the country. For this purpose, the paper uses the quasi-ethnicity in the military approach, a model derived from ethnic and identity literature, whereby the military behaviour in politics is seen through the lens of an ethnic group's behaviour. The paper argues that President Conté's regime was successful in leaning, more or less heavily, on the army to remain in power, through co-option and a degree of ethnicization of the army, similar in that to all 'civilianized' military regimes in this part of the world. Nevertheless, the findings indicate that ethnic favouritism in the Guinean army during Conté's rule did not go as far as to preventing officers from ethnic groups other than that of President Conté's own from making a career in the army. As such, although the Guinean army was far from being a monolithic group, its corporate interests trumped the effect of any lines of fracture, therefore reinforcing an instrumental interpretation of its political behaviour and the resultant stability.

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[2] This short title is used to denote the paper henceforth.

3.2. The paper

Abstract

This article explains why the Guinean state remained resilient to armed conflicts following military intervention in politics. The military establishment has been heavily involved in Guinean politics for nearly three decades during which time it has exhibited varied political behaviour. This protracted military involvement in Guinean political affairs presented a threat to Guinea's stability in a region where large-scale armed conflicts are often associated with military intervention in politics. This article explores the linkages between military behaviour in politics and political stability by using a model derived from ethnic and identity literature. It concludes that by adopting an ethnic group-like behaviour, the Guinean military played a vital role in maintaining political stability during the period between 1984 and 2010. This is in contrast to findings in recent studies where military intervention in West African politics is strongly linked with the onset of large-scale civil conflicts.

Keywords: West Africa, Guinea, coups, conflict; military

Introduction

Coups and military factionalism weaken states, weak states provoke rebellion, and civil wars often incite coup attempts. (Patrick McGowan, 2006)[3]

The military, which assumed power in 1984 and formally ceded it in 2010, has been at the heart of Guinean politics for more than a quarter of a century. It helped usher Lansana Conté to the presidency after the sudden death of President Ahmad Sékou Touré in 1984. In the following decades, the military establishment gradually entrenched itself in the politic, economic, and legal system of the country, exhibiting varied political behaviour. Despite this protracted military involvement in Guinean politics, the country did not experience large-scale armed conflicts often associated with military intervention in West African political affairs. This raises the question as to why there have been no armed conflicts in Guinea despite the protracted military intervention in Guinea's political affairs. There is also the question of whether, and to what extent, the army's attitudes to politics were an impetus for political order rather than unrest, as much of the existing literature has suggested, as outlined below. Using a model derived from ethnic and identity literature and data from fieldwork in Guinea,[4] this article explains why the Guinean state remained resilient to armed conflicts often induced by military intervention in political affairs of West African nations.

Coups and Armed Conflicts in West Africa

While being distinct political phenomena, coups and civil wars in West Africa are mutually reinforcing. (Patrick McGowan, 2006).

Recent studies on theories of contemporary civil war identify a strong relationship between military intervention in politics and armed conflicts in West Africa.[5] These studies conclude that coups—whether successful or otherwise—often trigger counter-coups, military factionalism, ethnic polarization, chaotic politics, and communal violence, which often contribute to the outbreak of armed conflicts in the region. According to Collier, a successful coup could trigger "a cycle of

[3] Patrick J. McGowan, "Coups and Conflict in West Africa, 1955-2004: Part II, Empirical Findings," *Armed Forces & Society* 32, 2 (2006): 247.

[4] This article is based upon fieldwork conducted in Guinea from June–November 2011 as part of my larger doctoral research. The fieldwork consisted of interviews with military personnel, politicians, academics, religious leaders, and business personnel.

[5] McGowan, "Coups and Conflict in West Africa, 1955-2004: Part II," 234-53; Paul Collier, *The Bottom Billion, Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What can be Done about* (Oxford, UK: Oxford University Press, 2007); Paul Collier, *Wars, Guns and Votes: Democracy in Dangerous Places* (London, UK: Vintage, 2009).

political instability" whereby societies often "collapse into political black holes of repeated regime change generated from within the army" and "sometimes a coup that fails to oust the government evolves into a rebellion."[6] Collier concludes that the reasons which make countries prone to coups are similar to those that make them susceptible to civil war. In a similar cyclical fashion, countries that have had coups are more likely to have further coups, which often lead to protracted political instability.[7] This view is echoed by Patrick McGowan who concludes that just as "military coups d'etat have been principal [triggers] of several"[8] West African civil wars in recent decades, in several other instances, coups have been triggered by armed conflicts in the region.[9]

This apparent linkage between coups and armed conflicts in West Africa is based on the notion that the unity of military establishments in the region often degenerate over time toward factionalism and/or ethnic polarization.[10] According to Grundy, serious political instability in developing countries is often "precipitated by the inability of officers to control their ranks."[11] Clapham echoed this view by arguing that a divided military establishment often leads to "coups and coup attempts by junior officers and other ranks, and [...] intra-military

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[6] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, *Coup Traps: Why does Africa have so many Coups D'etat?* (Oxford, UK: Centre for the Study of African Economies, Oxford University Press, 2005): 3.

[7] Collier, *The Bottom Billion, Why the Poorest Countries are Failing and What can be Done about it*, 36.

[8] McGowan, "Coups and Conflict in West Africa, 1955-2004: Part II," 247. According to McGovan, coups have been positively linked with the start of civil wars in West Africa. For example, the January 1966 coup and the following countercoup in July 1966 as well as their associated communal violence motivated the Biafran civil war in Nigeria. Similarly, the April 1980 coup and the ethnic polarization that followed led to the Liberian civil war in 1989. The 1991 civil war in Sierra Leone was preceded by four coup attempts. A successful coup in March 1993 and its resulting military factionalism preceded Guinea-Bissau's brief civil war in 1998. Similarly, the successful coup in December 1999 and the failed coup in September 2002 sparked the civil war in Côte d'Ivoire between the north and the south of the country. For a detailed analysis of the linkage between coups and the civil war in Côte d'Ivoire, see Richard Baégas and Ruth Marshal-Fratani, "Côte d'Ivoire: Negotiating identity and citizenship," in *African Guerrillas, Raging against the Machine*, ed. Morten Boas and Kevin C. Dunn (London, UK: Lynne Rienner, 2007), 81-111.

[9] Coups have been triggered by armed conflicts in several instances in West Africa. Mauritania's first coup was triggered by the army's unhappiness over the apparently open-ended war in Western Sahara. See, McGowan, "Coups and Conflict in West Africa, 1955-2004: Part II," 247. Most recently, Mali's coup in March 2012 was a direct result of the ongoing civil war with the Tuareg rebellion in the north of the country.

[10] Magnus Jörgel, Mats Utas, and FOI, *The Mano River Basin Area: Formal and Informal Security Providers in Liberia, Guinea and Sierra Leone* (Uppsala, Sweden: Nordic African Institute, 2007), 80-81.

[11] Kenneth W. Grundy, *Conflicting Images of the Military in Africa* (Nairobi, Kenya: East African Publishing House, 1968), 3.

killings."[12] This division of the military leads to political instability by ruining a country's internal cohesion and in West Africa, this frequency often triggers armed conflicts.[13]

In contrast to the aforementioned, the Republic of Guinea has not experienced political instability and/or armed conflicts induced by such intervention. Therefore, Guinea's experience presents a rich case study of the linkage between military behaviour in politics and sustained stability in the West African region. This article argues that the understanding of this linkage can be enhanced by considering the military establishment as a quasi-ethnic identity[14] whereby the military behaviour in politics is seen through the lens of an ethnic group's behaviour. The following section explores this behaviour by examining some major theories of ethnic identity.

The Military as a Quasi-ethnic Identity

Schools of Ethnic Identity

Among the contending theories of ethnic identity are the Primordialist and the Instrumentalist approaches. Primordial scholars argue that ethnic identity is rooted in shared cultural elements among individuals with common language, history, and territory.[15] This primordialist view of ethnicity asserts that the crucial elements that determine ethnic identity formation and its persistence revolve around "psychological features [that] deal with self-and group-related feeling of identity distinctiveness."[16] The origin and the historical importance of the group are often tied with myth or belief upon which a deep acceptance of some

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[12] Christopher Clapham and George Philip, "The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes," in *The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes*, ed. Christopher Clapham and George Philip (London, UK: Croom Helm, 1985), 6.

[13] Patrick J. McGowan, "African Military Coups D'etat, 1956-2001: Frequency, Trends and Distribution," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 41, 3 (2003): 339-70.

[14] I adopt Zirker's definition of quasi-ethnicity as the "behaviour that mirrors in some important senses a sense of shared common descent and/or history." See, Daniel Zirker, Constantine P. Danopoulos, and Alan Simpson, "The Military as a Distinct Ethnic or Quasi-ethnic Identity in Developing Countries," *Armed Forces & Society* 34 2 (2008): 321.

[15] Anthony Smith, *State and National in the Third World* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1983); Seyoum Hameso, *Ethnicity and Nationalism in Africa* (New York: Nova Science, 1997), 33; For an interesting discussion of the role of language as an identifier of ethnic group, see Okwudiba Nnoli, *Ethnicity and Development in Nigeria* (Brookfield, VT: Ashgate, 1995), chap. 2.

[16] Zirker, Danopoulos, and Simpson, "The Military as a Distinct Ethnic or Quasi-ethnic Identity," 333.

boundaries that distinguishes the group is based.[17] The social relations, within which the individuals live, is regarded as "sacred" and include both the living and the dead. In this way, primordialism sees ethnic identity as "basic to the human psyche"[18] upon which the interpretation of social and political interactions can be based. This belonging to a group offers a sense of personal security and emotional satisfaction for the individual members of the group. Accordingly, primordialism inherently implies that when there is a direct conflict between primordial and civil sentiments, ethnicity can be a destructive force within civil society. Such conflicts could lead to a problem often referred to as political tribalism whereby ethnic identity is used in political competition with other groups.[19]

In contrast, instrumentalism departs from primordialism by emphasizing that ethnic identity "is the creation of elites who use it as a tool to obtain some larger, typically material end,"[20] therefore ethnic identity "is not a primordial force."[21] Instrumentalist scholars argue that the notion of ethnic identity is rooted in political, rather than natural or primordial elements.[22] This school highlights the role of elites in the creation, interpretation, and manipulation of the elements of identity, culture, history, and territory in order to serve their goals.[23] Therefore, from an instrumentalist approach, ethnic identity is often used to "generate political entrepreneurs with a conscious and realistic interest in mobilizing ethnicity"[24] for political, economic, and other self-interest-centered purposes. From this perspective, ethnic identity is often seen as "politicized [and] exploited by elites as an instrument to protect their well-being or existence or to gain political and economic advantage for their group as well as for themselves."[25] The following section identifies similarities between military establishments and ethnic groupings. The aim is to explain the reasons for using ethnic identity theories in explaining military behavior in politics.

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[17] Ibid.
[18] Ibid.
[19] René Lemarchand, "Ethnicity as a Myth: The View from Central Africa," in *Armed conflict in Africa*, ed. Carolyn Pumphrey and Rye Schwartz-Barcott (Lanham, MD: Scarecrow Press), 88.
[20] Zirker, Danopoulos, and Simpson, "The Military as a Distinct Ethnic or Quasi-ethnic Identity," 333.
[21] Okwudiba Nnoli, *Ethnic Politics in Africa* (Ibadan, Nigeria: Vantage, 1989), 17.
[22] Lowell Barrington, *After Independence* (Ann Arbor: University of Michigan Press, 2006), 14.
[23] Okwudiba Nnoli, *Ethnic Politics in Nigeria*, 2nd ed. (Enugu, Nigeria: Fourth Dimension, 2008).
[24] Joseph Rothschild, *Ethnopolitics: A Conceptual Framework* (New York: Colombia University Press, 1981), 2.
[25] Zirker, Danopoulos, and Simpson, "The Military as a Distinct Ethnic or Quasi-ethnic Identity," 333.

Similarities between Military Establishments and Ethnic Groupings

The fundamental behaviour pattern associated with ethnicity relate directly to the problems – and promises – of military establishment in developing countries (Zirker et al., 2008).[26]

A close examination of the behaviour of both military establishments and ethnic groupings in developing countries reveals considerable similarities between the two and warrants the use of ethnic identity theory to explain the behavior of the military in politics. A considerable number of studies explore these similarities and the complex relationship between ethnicity and armed forces.[27] As in ethnic groupings, military establishments have a special bond of danger and heroism that brings them together.[28] In both military establishments and ethnic groups, there exist a sense of a shared worldview, strict controls over entry and departure from group membership, common struggle and myths, common institutional culture and history, common enemy or enemies, and a sanctified group mission.[29] These elements often "reinforce the sense of separate identity"[30] in both entities. The sense of identity is particularly reinforced in the military with the presence of identifiable elements such as uniforms, narrow rules, and standards procedures. According to Zirker, "military establishments can achieve many of the characteristics of ethnic movements"[31] including the creation of an intensified separateness from their larger national political system and society.

This tendency of the military to understand its identity as unique often encourages the "man on horseback" [32] in developing countries to equate his interest as

[26] Ibid., 316.
[27] Zirker, Danopoulos, and Simpson, "The Military as a Distinct Ethnic or Quasi-ethnic Identity," 314-37. See also Cynthia H. Enloe, "The Military Uses of Ethnicity," *Millennium* 4, 3 (1975-1976): 220-34; Cynthia H. Enloe, "Ethnicity and Militarization: Factors Shaping the Roles of Police in Third World Nations," *Studies in Comparative International Development* 11, 3 (Fall 1976): 25-38; Cynthia H. Enloe, "The Issue Saliency of the Military-ethnic Connection: Some Thoughts on Malaysia," *Comparative Politics* 10, 2 (January 1978): 267-85; Cynthia H. Enloe, "Police and Military in the Resolution of Ethnic Conflict," *Annals* 433 (September 1977): 137-49; J. Bayo Adekson, "Army in a Multi-ethnic Society: The Case of Nkrumah's Ghana, 1957-1966," *Armed Forces & Society* 2, 2 (Winter 1976): 251-72.
[28] Zirker, Danopoulos, and Simpson, "The Military as a Distinct Ethnic or Quasi-Ethnic Identity," 323.
[29] Ibid.
[30] Ibid., 322.
[31] Ibid., 323.
[32] Samuel E. Finer, *The Man on Horseback: The Role of the Military in Politics* (London, UK: Pall Mall Press, 1962).

identical to those of the state.[33] Just as in ethnicity, this development could breed in the military "an exclusionist mentality and less tolerant attitudes towards ethnic and social groups.[34] Since a politically entrenched military often develops an ethnic-like behaviour, resultant frameworks from ethnic identity studies should consider issues related to protracted military rule in developing countries. The extent to which the quasi-ethnic identity approach to military behaviour in politics – in the instrumentalist sense – informs the linkage between political stability and military behaviour in politics in Guinea is the task of the remainder of this article.

The Military and Politics in Guinea

The Guinean Army: An Historical Background

In September 1958, the Guinean people voted overwhelmingly for immediate independence from France, therefore rejecting a constitutional referendum sponsored by the French colonial power. This constitution was meant to guarantee the territory a junior partnership in a French-dominated community. Being the only former French colony to opt out of the French Community, Guinea faced a hostile attitude from France and its West African Francophone allies.[35] This unique international situation of Guinea made the task of training and equipping an army capable of defending national sovereignty more difficult than it could have been, had Guinea remained part of the French Community of states.[36]

Due to this rupture with France and the hasty withdrawal of the French Army, "Guinea's entire defence force was reduced to several hundred of Gardes Republicains [republican guards]"[37] in October 1958. Accordingly, on November 1, 1958, the formation of the Guinean military was officially announced, and the primary membership of the armed forces was recruited and trained by the Guinean veterans of World War II, the Algerian and the Indochina Wars, not by colonial officers.[38] The abrupt withdrawal of the French forces led to a change in military orientation toward the Soviet Bloc. Studies indicate that the Soviet Bloc provided

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[33] Zirker, Danopoulos, and Simpson, "The Military as a Distinct Ethnic or Quasi-ethnic Identity," 316-17.
[34] Ibid.
[35] Victor D. DuBois, "The Role of the Army in Guinea," *Africa Report* 8, 1 (1963): 3-5.
[36] Mohamed Saliou Camara, "From Military Politization to Militarization of Power in Guinea-Conakry," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 28, 2 (2000): 316.
[37] Ibid., 315.
[38] Ibid., 313.

Guinea access to modern weaponry and equipment which enabled the country to successfully build a modern armed force.[39] As a result, in a short time after independence, Guinea was able to build a competent new army "to accompany the country's [...] path to nationhood."[40]

Civilian Control of the Army, 1958–1984

The widespread range of military coups against socialist and nonsocialist regimes in West Africa in the late 1960s marked a turning point for the civil–military relation in Guinea. In 1966, the socialist president of Ghana, Kwame Nkrumah, was removed from power by the military and took refuge in Guinea.[41] Likewise, in 1968, the socialist president of Mali, Modibo Keita, who was a close associate of Sékou Touré, was overthrown in a military coup.[42] As noted by Agyeman-Duah, "regime change in one state was seen [by West African leaders] to be directly related to their own security."[43] These events, therefore, prompted a radical change in President Touré's perception of the army and led him to devise strategies for bringing the military under his control. The most important of these strategies in the context of this article were the creation of the National Militia (Milices populaires)[44] and the orientation of the army toward developmental activities.[45] The National Militia consisted of college-educated youth and former educators who were mainly selected from an early age. Alongside the military, the National Militia played a major role in repelling the Portuguese-led military

[39] International Crisis Group, ''Guinea: Reforming the Army,'' Africa Report No. 164, accessed September 23, 2010, http://www.crisisgroup.org/*/media/Files/africa/west-africa/guinea/164%20Guinea%20—%20Reforming%20the%20Army.ashx.

[40] Ibid., 3.

[41] Adekson, "Army in a Multi-ethnic Society," 251-72.

[42] For a complete list of all military coups in West Africa between 1955 and 2004, see McGowan, "Coups and Conflict in West Africa, 1955-2004: Part II," 234-53.

[43] Baffour Ageyman-Duah, "Military Coups, Regime Change, and Interstate Conflicts in West Africa," *Armed Forces & Society* 16, 4 (1990): 550.

[44] The origin of the milices populaires is from the Youth of African Democratic Revolution who volunteered in the early 1960s to "sought out opponents of the ruling party." See Thomas E. O'Toole, *Historical Dictionary of Guinea* (Metuchen, NJ: Scarecrow Press, 2005), 143. However, in the late 1960s, the militia was transformed into a civil service organization. They were given military training and supplied with small arms and a role equivalent to the army. It is possible that the creation of "the multiple armed groups made it possible to keep the army relatively small and affordable." See International Crisis Group, "Guinea: Reforming the Army," 5.

[45] Other strategies consisted of using illiteracy in recruitment, personal loyalty at the top and intensive Pan-African commitment. See Camara, "From Military Politization to Militarization of Power in Guinea-Conakry."

invasion of Guinea in November 22, 1970.[46] After this incident, the National Militia "gained sensational momentum under the direct supervision of the Presidency of the Republic and with rather slim connection to the Ministry of National Defense."[47] President Touré emphasized that the National Militia "will be the training school of our future military cadres" and that this corps "will become the indispensable mainspring of our security system, of which the conventional armed forces constitute [but] a [functional] section."[48] Thus, the Militia was tasked with overseeing each and every segment of the armed force and it became "the real security force around the Presidency and the government as a whole."[49]

Accordingly, despite the scarcity of resources and the Western blockade against Guinea, the National Militia was "materially spoiled by President Touré."[50] This privileging of the National Militia came at the detriment of the conventional armed forces, which was to a large extent marginalized and overshadowed by this Militia unit. In 1974, the militia became a full-time regular force in the capital Conakry while serving a reserve force for national defence at several levels throughout the country. In the following years, the militia was granted "a status superior to the military and police."[51] These efforts to strengthen the Militia unit can be viewed as an attempt to weaken the possibility of a military coup.

The other strategy adopted by Sékou Touré for civilian control of the military was to mobilize the armed forces for "nation-building tasks similar to those assumed by civilians." [52] For this purpose, the armed forces were often mobilized

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[46] In November 22, 1970, the Portuguese military command in Bissau sent a group of several hundred Portuguese and Bissau-Guinean soldiers, foreign fighters, and exiled Guineans to attack Conakry from the sea. The assault mainly aimed at neutralizing the African Party for the Independence of Guinea [Bissau] and Cape Verde (Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné Cabo Verde) which had its headquarter offices in Conakry. President Touré of Guinea had been a major source of sustenance to this Bissau Liberation movement. For more detail, see John P. Cann, "Operation Mar Verde, The Strike on Conakry," *Small Wars & Insurgencies* 8, 3 (1997): 64-81; Margarita Dobert, "Who Invaded Guinea?" *Africa Report* (March 1971): 16-18; Kaye Whiteman, "Guinea in West African Politics," *The World Today* 27, 8 (August 1971): 350-58; Alexis Arieff, "Still Standing: Neighbourhood Wars and Political Stability in Guinea," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 47, 3 (2009): 331-48.

[47] Camara, "From Military Politization to Militarization of Power in Guinea-Conakry,"320.

[48] Ibid., 320-21, cited from Sékou Touré, *The Doctrine and Methods of Democratic Party of Guinea* (Conakry, Guinea: Imprimerie Nationale Patrice Lumumba, 1967), 283.

[49] Camara, "From Military Politization to Militarization of Power in Guinea-Conakry,"320.

[50] Ibid.

[51] O'Toole, *Historical Dictionary of Guinea*, 143.

[52] Elise Forbes Pachter, "Contra-coup: Civilian Control of the Military in Guinea, Tanza¬nia, and Mozambique," *The Journal of Modern African Studies* 20, 4 (1982): 596.

particularly for developmental activities. The Military Production Committee (Commité Militaire de Production [CMP]) was established as the body through which this strategy was implemented. The Committee consisted of military officers whose main responsibility was "the planning and carrying out [of] production goals."[53] Under the CMP, the army built bridges, road networks, administrative buildings, and barracks.[54] Among these industries were the military factories (Usines militaires de Conakry), reported to have produced "about 250 military and civilian uniforms daily and about 180,000 pairs of shoes annually"[55] in the period between 1965 and 1984.

Agricultural development was another field where the armed forces were deployed. For this purpose, an agricultural engineering unit was established. As early as 1970, battalions of agricultural production were operating in the main military regions of Kindia, Labé, Kankan, and Nzérékoré. This agricultural unit was mainly involved in the production of coffee, bananas, tomatoes, and rice. The marketing and distribution of these goods was the responsibility of a military agricultural enterprise created specifically for this purpose.

The aforementioned strategies ensured that during Touré's period, the Guinean armed forces were permanently overshadowed by other parallel security forces.[56] President Touré learned from various military takeover powers in Africa that fostering "battalions of Generals standing as the state's ... fierce watchdogs"[57] was a bad idea. As such, Touré's expansion of the National Militia can be understood as an attempt to create "competing armed groups to guard his regime from internal as well as external threats."[58] Apparently, Toure´ adopted the logic "if each officer is a potential Napoleon, then the fewer officers the safer the president."[59] Accordingly, between 1968 and 1969, the government initiated a "series of bold political moves ... aimed at subduing the army leadership" therefore, "several high-ranking military officers [were] arrested and executed"[60] on the grounds of conspiring against the state. These measures indicate that

[53] O'Toole, Historical Dictionary of Guinea, 45.
[54] DuBois, "The Role of the Army in Guinea," 4.
[55] International Crisis Group, "Guinea: Reforming the Army," 3
[56] O'Toole, *Historical Dictionary of Guinea*.
[57] Camara, "From Military Politization to Militarization of Power in Guinea-Conakry,"316.
[58] International Crisis Group, "Guinea: Reforming the Army,"15.
[59] Collier, *Wars, Guns and Votes*, 151.
[60] O'Toole, *Historical Dictionary of Guinea*, iIii.

Touré's regime remained "paranoid and brutal"[61] toward any real or perceived opposition within the army.

These strategies enabled Touré to minimize the threat posed by the Guinean Army to his rule and to keep them obedient to the civilian government. Therefore, the general agreement among observers is that during Touré's period, the military establishment did not play a significant role in Guinean political affairs.[62] This diminished role of the military in Guinean political affairs and the orientation of the army toward developmental and nation-building activities, explain why defence costs were lower during this period in comparison with President Conté's rule, as discussed later. The total army under Sékou Touré was less than 5,000 soldiers, and the official estimate of defence spending ranged from 4 to 5 percent of the Guinean Growth National Product.[63] Apparently, the fear factor was the single most important element that determined Touré's strategy toward the military. However, instead of ''buying off'' the army with lavish expenditures, President Touré "kept much of the armed forces in poverty."[64] The president ensured that the army in Guinea did not receive "government largess.[65]

In contrast, recent studies confirm that since Touré's death in 1984, the army has grown "to wield an inappropriate degree of influence on the economic and political life of the country,"[66] often acting "as the final arbitrator in national politics."[67] Engeler echoed this view by arguing that in Guinea real power "lies with the armed forces."[68] This indicates a fundamental shift from Touré's strategy which was based on fear, to that of Conté's co-optation which led to massive escalation of Guinea's military expenditures. In the following discussion, we explain the political behaviour of the army in Guinea and its resulting benefits for the military establishment since 1984 by using the instrumentalist approach.

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[61] Africa Watch, "Security Brief," *African Security Review* 12, 3 (2003): 49.
[62] Camara, "From Military Politization to Militarization of Power in Guinea-Conakry," 2000; Pachter, "Contra-coup: Civilian Control of the Military," 1982.
[63] O'Toole, *Historical Dictionary of Guinea*, 9-10.
[64] International Crisis Group, "Guinea: Reforming the Army," 4.
[65] Pachter, "Contra-coup: Civilian Control of the Military," 607.
[66] Human Rights Watch, "We Have Lived in Darkness: A Human Rights Agenda for Guinea's New Government," *Human Rights Watch* (May 2011): 49-50, accessed May 8, 2011, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/guinea0511webwcover_1.pdf.
[67] Graeme Counsel, "Music for a Coup 'Armee Guineenne:' An Overview of Guinea's Recent Political Turmoil," *The Australasian Review of African Studies* 31, 2 (2010):109.
[68] Michelle Engeler, "Guinea in 2008: The Unfinished Revolution," *Politique Africaine* 112 (December 2008): 98.

Guinea's Army in Politics: An Instrumentalist Interpretation

The Guinean military establishment during 1984–2010 exhibits many of the features linked with the instrumentalist approach to ethnicity. As discussed earlier, the instrumentalist school considers ethnicity as an instrument created by elites, through which, they obtain some larger goals for themselves and their groups. The institution of the army has been used in Guinea as an instrument to achieve political, economic, and social goals through the militarization of public administration, the creation of a military–business nexus, and the impunity of the armed forces.

Militarized Public Administration

A militarization of public administration in Guinea was orchestrated by the military establishment. While the military has directly ruled the country since the success of the 1984 coup, in the aftermath of the elections of 1993, the military adopted a 'lead-from-behind strategy' whereby President Conté presented himself for competitive elections, which he eventually won, but also retained his military status and formed a government which comprised both civilian and military members. However, in the last few years of Conté's rule, support for the ruling political party (the People's Unity Party) had declined significantly and its political authority had shrunk at regional and prefectural levels. As an interested group, the military took full advantage of the administrative failure of the Conté regime and inserted itself into every level of government structure. It was often the case that "senior officers were made ministers, governors, and prefects."[69] According to Picarda and Moudoud, prefects and sub-prefects during the Conté period could be active or former military officers and that "close to 40% of sub-prefects were members of the active military during the Conté administration."[70]

This tendency to militarize the public administration increased significantly after the army seized power in December 2008. Following the coup, the new military regime appointed military personnel as prefects, subprefects, and regional governors throughout the country. Reports indicate that thirty of the thirty-three prefects and all eight regional governors were replaced by military officers and of

[69] Human Rights Watch, "We Have Lived in Darkness," 49.
[70] Louis A. Picarda and Ezzeddine Moudoud, "The 2008 Guinea Conakry Coup: Neither Inevitable nor Inexorable," *Journal of Contemporary African Studies* 28, 1 (2010): 61.

the 350 sub-prefects, 50 were also military.[71] By 2010, the territorial administration outside the capital Conakry was "fully militarised [and] through a vast system of road blocks that ring the capital and other towns,"[72] military and ex-military elements controlled transportation and extracted resources from travellers.

This administrative role of the military is significant due to the fact that territorial administrators in Guinea have clientele relationships with central government policy elites and in many cases close ties to the military locally, regionally, and at the national level. Thus, President Conté stacked key military posts with members of the military establishment, including sub-prefects, prefects, and governors, thereby ensuring the loyalty of the armed forces by melding the fate of the army and the regime's stability.[73] In this way, the army had a clear interest in protecting the regime because they feared losing privileges should the country's civilian politicians gain the upper hand. In the same way that the officer corps "proclaimed its interests to be identical with Greece's national interest"[74] following the Greek Civil War (1946–1949), it was often the case that the Guinean military and the government became indistinguishable in maintaining the system which served the interests of the military and the government alike.[75]

Despite a number of mutinies within the ranks of the military, the establishment stood behind President Conté. As a matter of fact, the president was reinstated to power on two occasions after a successful takeover by a portion of the military. In July 1985, some military officers succeeded in deposing President Conté while on a trip abroad. However, a large part of the military aborted the coup and reinstated the president instead of assuming power themselves. Likewise, in February 1996, a mutiny in the army succeeded in detaining the president but later reinstated him to power after he signed an agreement meeting the economic demands of the soldiers. Likewise, soldiers' riots over pay and other discontent often led to the dismissal of the defence minister and/or the armed forces' chief of staff rather

[71] International Crisis Group, "Guinea: Military Rule must End," *Crisis Group Africa Briefing* 66 (October 16, 2009): 5.
[72] Picarda and Moudoud, "The 2008 Guinea Conakry Coup," 67.
[73] Author's discussion during fieldwork in Conakry, 2011.
[74] Zirker, Danopoulos, and Simpson, "The Military as a Distinct Ethnic or Quasi-ethnic Identity," 320.
[75] Author's interview, academics, Conakry, October 22, 2011.

than a major rift among the military establishment.[76]

Different scholars have provided various explanations of the aforementioned behaviour of the military in Guinea, citing ethnic rivalry in the army, personality, regional origin, and generational difference between ranking officers.[77] In particular, the ethnic rivalry approach has gained prominence in these analyses. The fact that both the 1985 coup and the 1996 mutiny were led by officers belonging to ethnic groups different from that of President Conté's led some analysts to interpret the political behaviour of the military from an ethnic rivalry point of view.[78] One analyst argues that since the 1985 coup attempt, "officers of Mandé origin" working toward the restoration of "a Mendé dominated regime"[79] were considered as the main threat to President Conté's rule. Similarly, in the aftermath of the 1996 events, President Conté is alleged to have concluded that the mutiny was "ethnically based."[80] Accordingly, it is argued that the president engaged in a "Sosoization of the army" [81] to the extent that "the Guinean army [was] transformed into an ethnic gang docilely serving General Lansana Conté and [his Soussou] dominated elites."[82] Engeler echoed this view by describing the military establishment "as loyal only to Conté's ethnic group, the Soussou," [83] whom Groelsema described as the ethnic group which had "a disproportionate number of colonels and lieutenant colonels" and "army posts."[84]

While the role of ethnic affiliations in shaping the structure of networks within the armed forces cannot be denied, the political behaviour of the military cannot be entirely reduced to ethnic rivalry within the armed forces. The first battalion to counterattack Diara Traoré's 1985 coup attempt was led by Ousmane Sow who is of Fulani origin, suggesting that "the leadership struggle between Conté and Traoré does not appear to have been a clash between Soussou and Malinké ethnic

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[76] Africa, "Hurdles for African Democracy," *Strategic Survey* 107, 1 (2007): 271.
[77] Africa Watch, "Security Brief," 50; Engeler, "Guinea in 2008: The Unfinished Revolution," 98.
[78] Colonnel Diara Traoré, who led the 1985 coup attempt, was from the Malinké ethnic group, and Commander Ousmane Sow from the Fulani ethnic group, led the 1996 mutiny against the regime of President Conté who belonged to the Soussou ethnic group.
[79] Camara, "From Military Politization to Militarization of Power in Guinea-Conakry," 323.
[80] Ibid., 324.
[81] Ibid., 325.
[82] Ibid., 324.
[83] Engeler, "Guinea in 2008: The Unfinished Revolution," 95.
[84] Robert J. Groelsema, "The Dialectics of Citizenship and Ethnicity in Guinea," *Africa Today* 45, 3/4 (July–December, 1998): 417.

groups."[85] Similarly, it was evident that "officers from Traoré's ethnic group, the Malinkés, did not all support the coup,"[86] therefore contradicting the ethnic rivalry analysis of the events.

As for the 1996 mutiny, it was largely staged by junior soldiers demanding "back pay, a salary increase and better living conditions"[87] rather than a desire to instigate a regime change – on ethnically based grievances. The bad economic situation and political impasse in the country provided the bases for military takeover – in the conventional sense. On the contrary, the soldiers who captured President Conté "released him – without any external pressure whatsoever, or any countercoup, or any threat of one – when he promised to meet their demands,"[88] therefore reinforcing the instrumental interpretation. Thus, this author argues that an instrumentalist approach offers an illustrative alternative explanation of this behaviour on the part of the Guinean military. The army saw its interest as being better served by keeping President Conté in office and using the system as instrument, rather than initiating a regime change with the accompanying political uncertainty. Since the president had a military background, the interest of the military establishment could be better served through him in charge than a civilian president. Similarly, this behavior can be explained by noting that the military meant to keep itself intact as an establishment despite disagreement among its individual members. For example, according to Human Rights Watch, there have always been "illicit benefits enjoyed by the military's upper echelons [which] led to a series of revolts by younger army officers."[89] However, this did not cause major divisions within the armed forces to the extent of threatening its unity as an establishment. The military has always resolved its conflicts internally.

This attitude of the military is similar to the behaviour of an ethnic group whose

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[85] Kudamatsu Masayuki, *Ethnic Favouritism: Micro Evidence from Guinea* (July 28, 2009), 10, accessed March 28, 2013, http://ssrn.com/abstract¼1440303 orhttp://dx.doi.org/10. 2139/ssrn.1440303.

[86] West Africa "Guinea: Diarra Traore's Attempted Comeback," *West Africa* (July 15, 1985): 1412.

[87] Mamadou Diouma Bah, "State Resilience in Guinea: Mitigating the 'Bad Neighbour¬hood Effect' of Civil War Next Door," *The Australasian Review of African Studies* 33, 1 (June 2012): 25; National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, *Reports of the Civilian-Military Relations Assessment Mission: West and Central Africa* (Washington, DC: National Democratic Institute for International Affairs, March 18– April 10, 1997), 7, accessed May 2, 2013, http://www.ndi.org/files/Civil-military-rela-tions-assessment-CEWA-ENG.pdf.

[88] Issaka K. Souaré, *Civil Wars and Coups D'etat in West Africa: An Attempt to Understand the Roots and Prescribe Possible Solutions* (Lanham, MD: University Press of America, 2006), 96.

[89] Human Rights Watch, "We Have Lived in Darkness," 2011.

individuals may fight among themselves, but are easily united against others. According to Khalaf, loyalty in situations of conflicts in tribal society works as follows: "I and my brother against my cousin, and I and my cousin stand together against the outsider."[90] Likewise, Gluckman describes the attitude to conflicts among tribes in the following manner:

> those related ... in brotherhood unite against [their] enemies ... but if one of them is involved in fighting with a more distant section all these districts may join up with one another. Men of the same village fight each other with clubs not spears. Men with different villages fight each other with the spear.[91]

In addition, "there is no raiding within the tribe for cattle,"[92] because cattle is considered the most valuable commodity in tribal society to the extent that "it is recognized that a man ought to pay cattle as compensation for killing a fellow tribe-man."[93] Accordingly, these customary ties forbid members of the same tribe from threatening the one commodity which constitutes the basis for the tribe's economic subsistence. By the same token, the question of why the military in Guinea has never taken power from itself can be explained. The 2008 bloodless military takeover that brought Captain Moussa Dadis Camara to power, just hours after the official announcement of President Conté's death, is a clear testimony of the army's "collective interest in staying in power."[94] President Lansana Conté died on December 22, 2008, after a long illness that had been fueling speculations of his imminent death for at least a decade, prompting some analysts to describe his demise as a closure of "one of the more bizarre death watches in Africa[n]"[95] politics.

Although President Conté had died in the early hours of the evening, his rightful successor according to the constitution, the Speaker of Parliament Aboubakar Somparé announced the President's death the following morning. At the time of the announcement, the Speaker was surrounded by the prime minister, Ahmed Tidiane Souaré, and the chief of staff of the Armed Forces, General Diara Camara. However, five hours later, this constitutional succession was contrasted by the

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[90] Sulayman N. Khalaf, "Settlement of Violence in Bedouin Society," *Ethnology* 29, 3 (July, 1990): 231.
[91] Max Gluckman, *Custom and Conflicts in Africa* (Oxford, UK: Basil Blackwell, 1956), 8-9.
[92] Ibid., 9.
[93] Ibid.
[94] International Crisis Group, "Guinea: Military Rule must End," 1.
[95] Picarda and Moudoud, "The 2008 Guinea Conakry Coup," 51.

announcement of a military takeover by mid-ranking officers led by Captain Moussa Dadis Camara. Had this constitutional transfer of power succeeded, it would have been the first time power was transferred to a civilian administration since the 1984 coup.

The swift abrogation of the constitutional succession by junior officers and the lack of meaningful resistance from high-ranking military officers indicate that the corporate interests of the military trumped the effect of potential lines of fracture within the military such as ethnic rivalry, personality, and generational differences. Similarly, this type of behaviour is in line with the findings of previous studies that social prestige and economic well-being are highly valued within military establishments, and therefore, can motivate intervention in political affairs.[96] According to Gutteridge, the political attitude of the military "may be compounded of a number of elements of which the economic status of the soldier [and] his reputation"[97] are key factors. This view is echoed by First who argues that "whatever the political background to a coup d'état, when the army act it generally acts for army reasons, in addition to any other it may espouse."[98] As such, the anxiety to defend the interests of the military as an institution and to protect its corporate status and privileges provides "the most widespread and powerful of the motives for intervention"[99] in politics.

Accordingly, the 2008 coup that prevented the return to civilian rule in Guinea can be interpreted from this instrumental approach. This is in contrast with the traditional interpretation of military intervention in politics that stresses fragility of state institutions;[100] social and political environments in which the military functions;[101] internal structure of the military;[102] and low levels of political culture.[103]

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[96] Jerzy J. Wiatr, "Social Prestige of the Military: A Comparative Approach," in *Military Profession and Military Regimes, Commitments and Conflicts*, ed. Jacques van Doorn (The Hague, Paris: Mouton, 1969), 73-81.
[97] William F. Gutteridge, "The Political Role of African Armed Forces: The Impact of Foreign Military Assistance," *African Affairs* 66, 263 (1967): 93.
[98] Ruth First, *The Barrel of a Gun: Political Power in Africa and the Coup D'etat* (London, UK: Allen Lane, The Penguin Press 1970), 20.
[99] Finer, The Man on Horseback, 41.
[100] Samuel Decalo, *Coups and Army Rule in Africa, Studies in Military Styles* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1976), 7.
[101] Finer, The Man on Horseback, 1975.
[102] Morris Janowitz, *The Military in the Political Development of New Nations: An Essay in Comparative Analysis* (Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press, 1964), 31-74.
[103] Samuel Huntington, *Political Order in Changing Societies* (New Haven, CT: Yale University Press, 1968), 194.

The following section explains the economic consequences of militarizing Guinea's public administration.

The Military–Business Nexus

Since the military coup of 1984, the Guinean Army gradually expanded to the extent that it was considered oversized in relation to the population of Guinea.[104] Up to the end of the 1990s, the Guinean Army was estimated at around 9,700 soldiers.[105] However, since 2001, the army saw a dramatic increase in its numbers, estimated at around 45,000 soldiers by 2010.[106] This rapid growth of the army has been explained largely in terms of the security threats posed by Guinea's neighbouring civil wars in the 1990s and 2000s. There was a "series of cross-border attacks on Guinea by Sierra Leonean rebels and Liberian government forces [between 2000 and 2001]."[107] However, while the security threats of neighbouring civil wars cannot be discounted, analysts argue that Guinea did not need a military of this size.[108] As such, the security threat was largely used to justify the increases of military expenditure, and therefore, the military was sized to support the large-scale military patronage of the regime.[109]

Official figures from the annual national budgets from 2007 to 2010 show that the military was allocated 12.12 percent of the national budget in 2007; 12.65 percent in 2008; 24 percent in 2009; and 33.5 percent in 2010.[110] Although significantly high, these numbers should be taken cautiously because "official reports of military expenditures do not tell the whole story."[111] As discussed below, the military is able to obtain resources outside of the formal budgetary channel. These figures become more significant when compared with what was allocated to other ministries. In 2010, for instance, "health care received just 1.7 percent and pre-

[104] Interview, Politicians, Conakry, November 20, 2011.
[105] O'Toole, *Historical Dictionary of Guinea*, 9-10.
[106] Human Rights Watch, "We Have Lived in Darkness," 50; International Crisis Group, "Guinea: Reforming the Army," 15, footnotes no. 97.
[107] Human Rights Watch, "We Have Lived in Darkness," 50-51.
[108] Interview, Military Personnel, Conakry, November, 2011.
[109] Interview, military personnel, Conakry, November, 2011; See also, Human Rights Watch, "We Have Lived in Darkness," 2011, 51; International Crisis Group, "Guinea: Reforming the Army," 15; Arieff, "Still Standing," 340-42.
[110] Human Rights Watch, "We Have Lived in Darkness," 51.
[111] Justin Clardie, "The Impact of Military Spending on the Likelihood of Democratic Transition Failure: Testing Two Competing Theories," *Armed Forces & Society* 37, 1 (2011): 168.

university education 7 percent of the national budget."[112]

In addition to its formal budgetary allocation, the army continued to have access to money, subsidized goods, and services. For example, subsidized goods for the military included Guinea's staple food whereby soldiers paid less than 10 percent of the market price for a bag of rice.[113] In particular, maintaining the rice ration served mainly two goals: (1) it was used by President Conté "as a way of buying support and indirectly channelling extra money to the armed forces" and (2) "it served as a source of personal enrichment for [...] officers involved in its management and distribution to the troops."[114] Similarly, there was a conscious effort on the part of the military establishment to ensure that "throughout the Conté period the military was overpaid and coddled."[115] For instance, reports indicate that "for years, the lucky holder of a post in Guinea's presidential guard could expect a plush villa and a share in rackets worth up to $50,000 a month.[116]

Similarly, studies have shown that during this period "it was not uncommon to see ordinary soldiers driving luxury cars such as Mercedes Benz, Jaguar, or Range Rover, vehicles [which are] out of reach of their official wages."[117] Likewise, by "hiring their uniforms and guns to those who would then terrorise at will,"[118] Guinean soldiers would make extra cash. Other privileges enjoyed by military officers include "clubs for the military officers complete with restaurants, sports facilities and even with hotels. No other profession in Guinea enjoy the same range of facilities as the military officers."[119] Upon joining the military, "unlike most of the population we are guaranteed that we will not be unemployed and struggle with basics."[120] So, this became a very stable career in many ways due to the fact that members of the military would get housing almost immediately on joining as an officer and that things were sold to them at a rock bottom price. By virtue of being

[112] Human Rights Watch, "We Have Lived in Darkness," 51.
[113] International Crisis Group, "Guinea: Ensuring Democratic Reforms," *Africa Briefing* No. 52 (June 24, 2008): 10.
[114] International Crisis Group, "Guinea: Reforming the Army," 15.
[115] Picarda and Moudoud, "The 2008 Guinea Conakry Coup," 51-69.
[116] Saliou Samb, "End of the Good Life Stirs Discontent in Guinea's Army," *Reuters*, July 22, 2011, accessed May 8, 2013, http://www.trust.org/item/?map¼analysis-end-of-the-good-life-stirs-discontent-in-guineas-army/.
[117] Counsel, "Music for a Coup," 104.
[118] Ibid.
[119] Interviews, Military Personnel, Conakry, September 2011.
[120] Ibid.

part of the military "you will be able to get a car in one way or another."[121] In addition, high-ranking officials "were rewarded with contracts or business opportunities,"[122] and through the military clientele system these benefits trickle down to both officers and ordinary soldiers in a way that ensures their loyalty to their superiors and to the political elites.

Available sources indicate that unregulated recruitments and promotions based on loyalty and, to some degree, ethnic affiliations were widespread in the Guinean armed forces.[123] For example, recruitments and promotions of loyal and "relatives of well-placed senior officers and politicians"[124] were common practices in the Guinean armed forces. In particular, promotion has been used by President Conté as an effective conflict resolution mechanism, whereby "whenever there were problems or tensions within the armed forces, Conté immediately ordered promotions of all serving personnel"[125] resulting in disproportionate number of officers compared with the number of common soldiers. While actual figures are unavailable, a recent study estimates that there were "two officers to each common soldier"[126] by the end of Conté's era in 2008. This obvious reversed pyramidal structure of the army, whereby it was common to find "young lieutenants [serving] as military drivers"[127] resulted in lack of respect for hierarchy and poorly disciplined army – often acting independently of central oversight. Following the September 2009 killings, President Dadis Camara admitted that the army was beyond his control and that they were ill-disciplined.[128]

Thus, under Conté, the military was transformed into a business empire. Senior military officers continually benefited personally from income from national resources that would otherwise be directed to national development.[129] Some of

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[121] Ibid.
[122] Human Rights Watch, "We Have Lived in Darkness," 49.
[123] Information about ethnic distribution in the Guinean armed forces was beyond the reach of this author. Nevertheless, it appears that ethnic favouritism in the Guinean army during Conté's rule "did not go as far as in some other West African countries" and that officers from ethnic groups other than that of President Conté's own "could still make a career" in the army. See, International Crisis Group, "Guinea: Reforming the Army," 6.
[124] Ibid., 7.
[125] Ibid., 8.
[126] Ibid.
[127] Ibid.
[128] Saliou Samb, "Uncertainty Prevails under Increasingly Isolated Junta," IPS News, October 8, 2009, accessed May 2, 2013, http://www.ipsnews.net/2009/10/politics-gui-nea-uncertainty-prevails-under-increasingly-isolated-junta/.; "Guinea Massacre toll put at 157," BBC News Africa, September 29, 2009, accessed May 2, 2013, http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/8280603.stm.
[129] Fieldwork Discussion, Conakry, September–November, 2011.

these military personnel were often involved in reinvesting these illegal incomes into legitimate businesses and using their military connections to protect these businesses.[130] On one hand, they themselves were involved in a lot of business activities such as transport and construction.[131]On the other hand, they maintained strong links with the business elites "who have to acquire military approval for many major investments."[132] In this way, the military became entrenched in many places vital to the Guinean economy. Some believe that "there is no single institution in the country that is not manned by several former generals and brigadiers."[133] Despite the fact that these personnel may no longer be linked officially to the military, "they in a way are still loyal and have links to the Guinean army,"[134] and could use their military status to defend these businesses should anybody think of rattling it.[135] It is very often the case that transport vehicles belonging to military personnel might not need to abide with traffic rules owing to the military status of the owner.[136]

This military–business nexus strengthened both entities – the military establishment and the politico-business elites – vis-a`-vis the ordinary citizens. Through the passage of time, maintaining this relationship became of mutual concern to both the military and the politico-business elites. On one hand, to ensure the backing of the military, the political and business elites favored powerful factions within the army. On the other hand, the army protected the interest of these elites.[137] Of particular interest in the context of this study is the government's usage of the military as an important instrument for the survival of the regime. This behavior of the government toward the military establishment is in conformity with the arguments of those who advise governments that seek preventing repeated military coups to keep the military happy,[138] and those who argue for the strengthening a country's armed forces for maintaining political stability.[139] Although such advice has been provided to emerging democracies, it

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[130] Interview, Business Personnel, Conakry, September, 2011.
[131] Fieldwork Discussion, Conakry, September–November, 2011
[132] Interviews, Business Personnel, Conakry, September 2011.
[133] Ibid.
[134] Ibid.
[135] Fieldwork Discussion, Conakry, September–November, 2011.
[136] Author's observation during field work in Guinea, September–November, 2011.
[137] Counsel, "Music for a Coup," 104.
[138] Samuel P. Huntington, *The Third Wave: Democratization in the Late Twentieth Century* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1991).
[139] Clardie, "The Impact of Military Spending on the Likelihood," 163-79.

also worked well in the autocratic semi-military regime of Guinea during Conté's rule.

This strengthening of the military served two main purposes: (1) since the success of the 1984 coup, there has not been what Collier calls the disturbing feature of coups whereby "one leads to another"[140] and (2) it ensured domestic stability. With a strong military and its vested interest in keeping the system intact, the regime was able to subdue its real and potential domestic opponents. Likewise, strengthening the military helped mitigate the external threats to Guinea's stability during the peak of the West African regional wars of the 1990s and 2000s. Throughout these decades, Guinea was surrounded by a number of countries experiencing political unrests and/or civil wars. The outbreak of these violent civil conflicts in Guinea's regional neighbours presented a threat to its stability through what is known as "the 'bad neighbourhood effect,' whereby civil war in one country spreads to neighbouring countries due to their geographic proximity."[141] However, the concerted efforts of the Guinean state and its international partners successfully mitigated the "bad neighbourhood effect" on Guinea.[142] The most important of these efforts in the context of this study is the strengthening of the armed forces through foreign military assistance [143] and increased military spending. Studies have shown that the Guinean government justified the increase of military spending on the grounds that neighbouring wars might spread to Guinea.[144] As a result, the capacity of the Guinean military to defend the country against regional rebel networks and domestic destabilizing forces was increased.

Brutality and Impunity of the Armed Forces

The brutality and impunity of the security forces has been the feature of Conté's rule.[145] Various studies about the Guinean armed forces conclude that brutality and impunity run "deep into the armed forces' culture." [146] According to International Crisis Group, the armed forces of Guinea "have a well deserved

[140] Collier, *Wars, Guns and Votes*, 146-47.
[141] Bah, "State Resilience in Guinea," 14.
[142] For details of these efforts see, Ibid., 13-33.
[143] Dane F. Smith Jr., "US-Guinea Relations during the Rise and Fall of Charles Taylor," *Journal of Modern African Studies* 44, 3 (2006): 433-35.
[144] Arieff, "Still Standing," 331-48.
[145] Author's Interviews, Conakry, November 2011.
[146] International Crisis Group, "Guinea: Reforming the Army," 16; See also, Counsel, "Music for a Coup," 2010.

reputation for human rights abuses, including suppressing opposition, torture and extra-judicial killings."[147] This view is echoed by the United Nations (UN) Office of the Special Adviser on Genocide, which concluded that "Guinea has a history of human rights violations, perpetrated mostly by the security forces, including unlawful killings, rape, arbitrary detention, torture and excessive use of force."[148] According to Human Rights Watch, during Conté's era the army was "well protected: and not worried about any possibility of accountability measures"[149] for their abuses.

A brief account of some examples of abuses committed by the armed forces against civilians during the past few years bear testimony to these views. Between September and December 1993, thirty-seven people died at the hands of the security forces during a nationwide spontaneous protest against rigged voting.[150] Furthermore, nine people died in March 1998 at the hands of the security forces when residents of the Kaporo district at the outskirt of Conakry refused orders to evacuate their homes.[151] In another development, the Guinean Ministry of Health admitted that the violent response of the security forces to the 2006–2007 nationwide strikes over the high cost of living "had resulted in the deaths of 129 individuals, and 1764 wounded"[152] as of March 19, 2007. However, the actual number of the deaths may never be known because "many victims never went to a hospital or a morgue, but were quickly buried by their families in accordance with Islamic tradition."[153] For instance, in January 2007, the suppression of the strikes resulted in the death of fifty-nine people.[154] Likewise, subsequent suppression of protests in February 2007 led to the death of seventy-five protesters at the hands of the security forces.[155] In addition, thirteen people died in Conakry and Labé as a result of the suppression of the general strike during the week of June 12,

[147] International Crisis Group, "Guinea: Reforming the Army," 17.
[148] United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Genocide, *Report of the Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide on his Mission to Guinea from 7 to 22 March 2010* (United Nations, 2010): 9, accessed May 8, 2013, http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/osapg_mission_report_guinea_mar_2010.pdf.
[149] Human Rights Watch, "We Have Lived in Darkness," 14.
[150] Cullen S. Hendrix and Idean Salehyan, Social Conflict in Africa Database (SCAD), accessed December 16, 2011, www.scaddata.org.
[151] Ibid.
[152] Human Right Watch, "Dying for Change: Brutality and Repression by Guinean Security Forces in Response to a Nationwide Strike," *Human Right Watch Report* No. 19, 5(A) (April 2007): 54, accessed December 16, 2011, http://www.hrw.org/sites/default/files/reports/guinea0407webwcover.pdf.
[153] Ibid.
[154] Ibid.
[155] Ibid.

2006.[156] According to Engeler, "most demonstrations were put down by the military"[157] and, as a result of this indiscriminate use of violence by the security forces, many people lost their lives. During the aforementioned violent suppression of the demonstrations, many in Guinea wished a faction of the military would take over power.[158] Instead, the military and the police went their way to shoot at the protesters and to implement a state of emergency declared by the president in order to regain full control of the streets.

This brutality of the armed forces against the civilian population was exacerbated by the military's formal return to power in the 2008 coup. Initially, President Camara promised to organize elections in which members of the military would not participate. However, subsequent events demonstrated that the military was gradually preparing the ground for the legitimation of its power through elections, as had other civilianized military regimes in West Africa. By early 2009, the intention of President Dadis Camara to stand for the presidency became increasingly evident. President Camara's appearances on television surrounded by cheering supporters became increasingly frequent.

In a speech in April 2009, the president revealed his intention of running for the presidency at the end of the transitional period in January 2010. In response, opposition parties announced a mass demonstration, against perpetuation of military rule in the country, to be held at Guinea's biggest football stadium on September 28, 2009. The political rally was violently repressed by the military resulting in 157 deaths of unarmed civilians and over 1,700 injured.[159] Eyewitnesses described that "armed men in uniform entered the stadium, closed all gates and started shooting,"[160] just as party leaders were about to address the crowed. The use of automatic firearms by soldiers and "their knives when they ran out of bullets"[161] and widespread sexual violence against women, including gang

[156] Human Right Watch, "Guinea: Security Forces Respond to Protests with Killings," Human Rights Watch News Release (July 6, 2006), accessed December 28, 2011, http://www.hrw.org/node/71018.
[157] Engeler, "Guinea in 2008: The Unfinished Revolution," 87.
[158] Author's discussions with a number of group of traditional leaders: Conakry, September 2011.
[159] International Crisis Group, "Guinea: Military Rule must End," 2; Counsel, "Music for a Coup," 109; Sadiki Koko, "Challenges for a Return to Civilian Rule in Guinea," *African Security Review* 19, 1 (March 2010): 103-104.
[160] International Crisis Group, "Guinea: Military Rule must End," 2.
[161] Counsel, "Music for a Coup," 109.

rape were reported in numerous eyewitness accounts.[162] According to Amnesty International, "several women were publicly raped by soldiers."[163] A Human Rights Watch report on the events concluded that the killings and sexual assaults were committed by members of various units of the Guinean armed forces, including the elite Presidential Guards, the elite Gendarmes, the Police, as well as men in civilian clothes armed with knives and machetes.[164] In short, both the military and the police acted independently of the popular protest movements, therefore reinforcing their ethnic-like loyalty to the establishment.

Impunity is another feature of the Guinean armed forces. Analysts are in agreement that the impunity of the armed forces is entrenched in Guinea. After a mission to Guinea in March 2010, the UN Special Adviser to the Secretary-General on the Prevention of Genocide concluded that:

> Impunity [in Guinea] is the norm; perpetrators of past violence and human rights violations have gone unpunished ... the impunity traditionally enjoyed by the security forces contributed to the repressive culture of successive regimes.[165]

Although there exists the Bureaux de Garnisons setup in the army as avenues "to deal with complaints against members of the armed forces,"[166] according to recent studies, these avenues "have proved ineffective."[167] Likewise, the Guinean judiciary has long been politicized and is far from being independent. In a meeting with representatives of the National Guinean of Employers on January 7, 2007, President Conté declared that "The state is me. The government is me. The justice is me,"[168] "I am the boss, the others are my subordinates.[169] This was in

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[162] Human Rights Watch, "Bloody Monday: The September 28 Massacre and Rapes by Security Forces in Guinea," *Human Rights Watch* (December 2009), accessed April 5, 2013, http://www.hrw.org/node/87190.

[163] Amnesty International, *Guinea: International Inquiry Needed into Conakry Killings and Rapes* (September 30, 2009), accessed April 5, 2013, http://www.amnesty.org.uk/news_details.asp?NewsID¼18437.

[164] Human Rights Watch, *Guinea: Stadium Massacre, Rape Likely Crimes Against Humanity* (December 17, 2009), accessed April 5, 2013, http://www.hrw.org/news/2009/12/17/ guinea-stadium-massacre-rape-likely-crimes-against-humanity.

[165] United Nations Office of the Special Adviser on Genocide, "Report of the Special Adviser," 2010, http://www.un.org/en/preventgenocide/adviser/pdf/osapg_mission_report_guinea_mar_2010.pdf.

[166] International Crisis Group, "Guinea: Reforming the Army," 17, footnote no. 124.

[167] International Crisis Group, "Guinea: reforming the Army," 17.

[168] Cheikh Yerim Seck, "Fin de récréation?" *www.jeuneafrique.com* (January 7, 2007), accessed December 27, 2011, http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/LIN07017findeno itar0/.

[169] Engeler, "Guinea in 2008: The Unfinished Revolution," 91, quoted from *Agence France-Presse (AFP)*, "Je suis le chef, les autres sont mes subordonnés" (June 15, 2007), http://www.maliweb.net/news/international/2007/06/15/article,7655.html.

justification of his personal interference in the judiciary in order to release two of his closest associates from prison who were accused of embezzlement.[170] Reports indicate that "when informed of his friends' arrest on 16 December 2006, Conté went to the central prison in person and ordered the guards to release both men."[171] The president concluded that the men have "no problem with either the state or the government or with the law."[172] In this regard, Counsel concludes that during Conté's rule "all members of the armed forces were virtually above the law."[173]

This impunity of the Guinean armed forces continued following the 2008 coup. After the September 2009 killings, the government tried to diminish the brutality of the armed forces and to deflect responsibility for the massacre. The official figures indicated that the death toll was fifty-seven civilians, among whom only four people died by gunshot, the others by being trampled.[174] Likewise, the government claimed that "the soldiers were provoked"[175] by the protesters, and blamed opposition parties for failing to control their supporters.[176] This deflection of responsibility continued and no arrest was made. However, under mounting domestic and international pressures, the government allowed a UN inquiry to investigate the September 2009 killings, resulting in charges of crimes against humanity laid by the UN Commission against the Guinean government.[177]

Realizing that he was going to be named by the government as the sole perpetrator responsible for the killings and that he was being made a scapegoat, the commander of the Presidential Guards, Lieutenant Toumba Diakité made an assassination attempt on the president's life in December 2009 by shooting him in the head.[178] The president survived and was transferred to Morocco for further

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[170] This incident refers to the well-known case of Elhadj Mamadou Sylla and Fode Souma, close associates of President Conte. In 2006, Sylla was jailed, accused of embezzlement of public funds worth US$2.7 million from the Central Bank of the Republic of Guinea. See Jörgel, Utas, and FOI, *The Mano River Basin Area*, 64.

[171] Mike McGovern, "Guinea" in *Africa Yearbook 2006*, ed. Andreas Miller, Henning Melber, and Klass van Walraven (Leiden, Netherlands: Brill, 2007), 104.

[172] Seck, "Fin de récréation?," http://www.jeuneafrique.com/Article/LIN07017findenoitar0/.

[173] Counsel, "Music for a Coup," 104.

[174] Human Rights Watch, "Bloody Monday," 68.

[175] Counsel, "Music for a Coup," 107.

[176] International Crisis Group, "Guinea: Military Rule must End," 3.

[177] UN Security Council, *Report of the International Commission of Inquiry Mandated to Establish the Facts and Circumstances of the Events of 28 September 2009 in Guinea*, December 18, 2009, S/2009/693, accessed May 1, 2013, http://www.refworld.org/docid/ 4b4f49ea2.html.

[178] "L'ex-aide de camp du président Dadis Camara, Toumba Diakité, s'explique sur son geste," *Radio France International* (December 16, 2009), accessed May 1, 2013,

medication. After this incident, the military disagreed on whether to cling to power, and then officers who argued that the corporate interest of the military would be better served by a return to civilian rule settled the argument. Subsequently, the military establishment rallied behind vice president and Minister of Defence, General Sékouba Konaté who decided to relinquish power to civilians. A semi-military transitional government was put in place, whose task was to organize free and fair presidential elections. Veteran opposition leader, Alpha Condé, was declared the winner of the presidential elections held in November 2010. However, there has not been a "meaningful effort to hold those responsible for abuses to account."[179] This impunity of the armed forces has been reinforced by the persistent refusal to investigate human rights abuses "committed by members of the armed forces."[180] According to Lawyers Without Borders, "throughout Guinea's recent history, the security services have appeared to benefit from total protection."[181] Despite national and international pressure, successive Guinean governments have "failed to bring to justice even one member of the security forces credibly implicated in killings and other serious abuses"[182] of human rights. This brief account of the major events of the last two decades demonstrates that the Guinean armed forces have indeed been the principal sources of human rights violations in the country. More importantly, it shows that there was no political will to deliver justice to the victims of these violations because, according to Guinea's legal bar association, the government in place was often both, "murderer and investigator."[183]

The aforementioned show that, in contrast to the period 1958–1984 where President Touré "kept much of the armed forces in poverty"[184] and out of politics, the economic situation, social status, and political role of the Guinean military were enhanced significantly between 1984 and 2010. During this period, the military establishment became a self-serving corporate entity and played a major social, economic, and political role in the country. As a result, the social prestige of the

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http://www.rfi.fr/contenu/20091216-exclusivite-rfi-lex-aide-camp-president-dadis¬camara-toumba-diakite-explique-son-ge.; "Guinea aide admits shooting junta leader Camara," *BBC News* (December 16, 2009), accessed May 1, 2013, http://news.bbc. co.uk/2/hi/8415659.stm.

[179] Human Rights Watch, "We Have Lived in Darkness," 14.

[180] International Crisis Group, "Guinea: Reforming the Army," 17.

[181] Human Rights Watch, "We Have Lived in Darkness," 14.

[182] Ibid., 14.

[183] Ibid., 57, quoted from Letter from the president of the Guinean bar association, Boubakar Sow, to the Minister of Justice, Alsény Réné Gomez, January 31, 2007.

[184] International Crisis Group, "Guinea: Reforming the Army," 4.

military establishment and its economic well-being increased considerably since 1984.

Conclusion

This article has examined the interconnection between political behaviour of the military and stability in Guinea since 1984. Although the protracted military involvement in Guinean political affairs presented a threat to Guinea's stability, based on the evidence presented, I conclude that by adopting an ethnic group-like behaviour – in its instrumentalist sense – the Guinean military played a vital role in maintaining political stability during the period between 1984 and 2010. The Guinean military establishment behaved as an ethnic-like group in relation to other segments of the Guinean state. Due to this ethnic-like behaviour, the military was able to achieve the unity required to maintain a degree of cohesiveness and strength. This behaviour prevented the military from falling into what is categorized as a 'low unity' type of military establishment, whereby intra-military killings and "coup-traps" are prevalent.[185] In turn, this perceived common identity is likely to have strengthened unity among members of the military establishment and prevented the country from descending into coup d'état induced armed conflicts.

This finding is in line with the instrumentalist school of ethnicity which considers ethnic identity as an instrument created and used by elites in order to obtain some larger goals for themselves and their groups. Just as members of an ethnic group tend to unite when faced with external threats to its well-being, the military in Guinea had equally maintained the threshold of unity required to preserve its corporate interest. This ethnic-like behaviour permitted the military to achieve higher social status and more economic goals for itself through militarization of public administration; creation of a military–business nexus; and impunity of the armed forces, therefore re-enforcing the instrumental interpretation of the military's behaviour in politics. This interpretation points to the daunting task facing the fledgling democracy of Guinea's post-military rule. According to Clardie, a democratic transition is a result from bargaining between the elites, and "the result of this bargaining creates winners and losers . . . , it is important for the new democratic government that the military does not perceive itself as a loser in

[185] Clapham and Philip, "The Political Dilemmas of Military Regimes," 6.

the democratic transition."[186]

Herein lies the importance of the quasi-ethnic identity approach to military behaviour for Guinea and other emerging democracies in West Africa. Therefore, further case studies of military establishments using ethnic identity literature – in the instrumental and/or primordial sense – can advance interdisciplinary research of political behavior of military establishments in West African nations that goes beyond the conventional civil–military relations discussion, and so contribute to our understanding as to why democracies in West Africa often relapse to military rule.

[186] Clardie, "The Impact of Military Spending on the Likelihood,"165.

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Chapter Four: Paper Three.
Mining for Peace: Diamonds, Bauxite, Iron-ore and Political Stability in Guinea[1]

4.1. Summary of the paper

The third paper, *Mining for Peace*,[2] focuses on the relationship between mineral resources and conflict management in Guinea. The role of the strategies of Guinea's international partners in providing the impetus for political stability is examined, followed by an analysis of the internal dynamics of Guinea's political economy. Nuances in internal conflicts and tensions within Guinean society in the context of structural adjustment and other external factors are examined for the kinds of impetus they deliver to the relative political 'stability' observed. As such, an expanded discussion on the 'selective distribution' mechanism was undertaken to explain how this contributed towards political stability and/or averted open conflicts. Also, the various and competing social groups and political factions in the country are examined in relation to mineral resource extraction to demonstrate existing tensions and how conflicts were avoided. The analysis in the paper discredits the myth that resource-rich countries with extreme poverty will descend into armed conflicts thereby providing a fair understanding of how open conflicts within under-developed resource-rich states might be averted.

[1] Published as Mamadou Diouma Bah, "Mining for Peace: Diamonds, Bauxite, Iron-ore and Political Stability in Guinea," *Review of African Political Economy* 41, No. 142 (2014): 500 – 515, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/03056244.2014.917370. The paper was presented at the 33rd Annual Conference, African Studies Association of Australasia and the Pacific (AFSAAP), *Engaging Africa / Engaging Africans: Knowledge, Representation, Politics*, Victoria University, Melbourne, Australia, December 2 - 4, 2010.

[2] This short title is used to denote the paper henceforth.

4.2. The paper

Abstract

The article explores the relationship between mineral resources and conflict management in Guinea. Literature on theories of recent civil wars and/or armed conflicts in West Africa identifies the combination of abundant natural resources and extreme poverty as a significant trigger of violent civil conflicts. In Guinea however, despite this combination, the state has managed to avoid large-scale civil violence. This gives rise to the question of why this combination has failed to be associated with the onset of large-scale violence in the country. The article identifies mitigating factors that have contributed to political stability in Guinea. It concludes that measures taken by Guinea and its international partners mitigated the security threats posed by these resources, while keeping most Guineans in abject poverty. This is in contrast to findings in recent quantitative studies whereby natural resource abundance alongside extreme poverty is strongly associated with armed conflicts in West African nations.

Keywords: Guinea; mineral resources; political stability; military – business nexus; poverty; conflicts

[L'exploitation minière pour le maintien de la paix: Les diamants, bauxites, minerais de fer et de la stabilité politique en Guinée]. L'article explore la relation entre les ressources minérales et la gestion des conflits en Guinée. Les études menées sur les récentes guerres civiles et de conflits armés en Afrique de l'Ouest identifient la combinaison des ressources naturelles abondantes et l'extrême pauvreté comme des causes de conflits civils violents dans ces pays. En Guinée néanmoins, l'Etat a réussi à éviter la violence civile à grande échelle. Cela donne lieu à la question de savoir pourquoi cette combinaison n'a pas été associée à la violence à grande échelle dans le pays. C’est dans cette optique que L'article identifie les facteurs atténuants qui ont contribué à la stabilité politique de la Guinée. Il conclut que les mesures prises par cette dernière et ses partenaires internationaux ont atténué les menaces posées par ses ressources à l’encontre de son stabilité politique, tout en gardant la plupart des Guinéens dans une pauvreté abjecte. On peut donc constater que ceci est en contradiction avec les résultats des études récentes, selon lesquelles l'abondance des ressources naturelles à côté de

l'extrême pauvreté est fortement associée à des conflits armés dans les pays de l'Afrique de l'Ouest.

Mots-clés: Guinée, ressources minérales, stabilité politique, lien armée-entreprise, pauvreté, conflits.

Introduction

Resource dependence … makes countries more susceptible to civil war … The greater a country's poverty, the more likely it is to face a civil war. (Ross 2003b, 5, 6).

Guinea possesses deposits of bauxite, gold, diamond and iron ore that make it among the resource-rich countries in Africa. There is also potential for other minerals, such as uranium, zinc, cobalt, platinum, nickel, silver and high-quality granite (World Bank 1990a, 10). In addition, it is estimated that Guinea's long-term production capacity of gold could vary between 10 and 15 tonnes per year (Campbell and Clapp 1995, 426). Furthermore, the Simandou Mountain range, which stretches for 70 miles in Guinea's southeast highlands, possesses one of the largest deposits of high-grade iron ore in the world that remain un-mined (Keefe 2013; Tinti 2013). Ironically, many reports of Guinea's economic potential are contrasted with the poverty and misery of most Guineans. According to the Human Development Index, from 1992 to 1994 the country occupied the last place in the report's list (UNDP 1992, 1993, 1994). In 1996, Guinea ranked 160th out of 174 countries and by 2009 the country ranked 170th out of 177 countries included in the report (UNDP 1996, 2009). In 2013, Guinea remained at the bottom 10 least developed nations, ranking 178 out of 186 countries (UNDP 2013). A recent study concludes that even in Guinea's capital, Conakry, 'running water is an exception and electricity is available for only a few, unpredictable hours per day' (Tinti 2013). Thus, there is a general agreement that in the last few decades 'Guinea has remained at the bottom twenty of the least developed countries in the World' (Soumah 2007, 183).

Notwithstanding the abundance of these resources in Guinea and the extreme poverty of its population, the country has not experienced large-scale armed conflicts often associated with this combination in West African states. Successive Guinean regimes have managed to protect the central structures of the state from destabilising events usually associated with civil wars and/or armed conflict in West African nations. This raises the question as to why armed conflict has not

been a feature in Guinea given the presence of this violence risk variable. There is also the question of whether, and to what extent, Guinea's and its international partners' strategies towards these resources were an impetus for political order rather than unrest as much of the existing literature has suggested, as outlined below. Using qualitative data from fieldwork in Guinea,[3] this article examines why the Guinean state has remained resilient to armed conflicts often induced by the combination of extreme poverty and abundant natural resources in West African nations.

Natural resources and armed conflicts in West Africa

State-centric versus rebel-centric approaches

A body of recent quantitative research on the causes of civil war identifies the availability of abundant natural resources, combined with extreme poverty, as significant triggers of civil war and/or armed conflicts (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004; Collier 2000; Fearon and Laitin 2003; Ross 2003a, 2003b, Zartman1995; Sambanis 2004). In particular, these studies conclude that, since the early 1990s, a number of countries in West Africa succumbed to civil war and/or armed conflicts owing to the combination of poverty and abundance of natural resources.[4] However, the literature is in strong disagreement as to why this combination often leads to the outbreak of violent civil conflicts. The debate has been focused on arguments based on two theoretical approaches: one state centric and the other rebel centric.

The state-centric approach to the linkage between abundant natural resources and armed conflicts highlights the ways in which these resources lead to state weakness to govern, resulting in violent contest for territorial or state control (Le Billon 2001, 56). A number of scholars suggest that the availability of these resources tends to weaken the state where it relies on revenue derived from primary commodity exports of these resources and neglects investment in other sectors of the economy (Fearon and Laitin 2003; Humphreys 2005; Ross 1999,

[3] This article is based upon fieldwork conducted in Guinea from June–November 2011 as part of my larger doctoral research. The fieldwork consisted of interviews with military personnel, politicians, academics, religious leaders and business personnel.

[4] For instance, the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone are often mentioned as examples where this combination led to brutal armed conflicts (see Reno 1995; Abdullah 1998, 206; Boås 2001, 721).

2003b, 5, 6). The state-centric literature proposes that rulers of states whose revenues are mostly derived from the export of primary commodities 'have less need for a socially intrusive and elaborate bureaucratic system to raise revenues' (Fearon and Laitin 2003, 81), resulting in 'a state ... that is divorced from the domestic economy' (Humphreys 2005, 513). This weakened incentive to create effective bureaucratic institutions that generate tax revenue from citizens often leads to low level of state-society linkages and a weakened cohesion among social groups. These weaknesses leave the state vulnerable to armed rebellion and 'less capable of mustering support against a threat' (ibid. 522) to its security.

In contrast, the rebel-centric approach focuses the debate on the opportunities these resources provide rebel groups to start large-scale armed conflicts and sustain them. Recent research concludes that an abundance of natural resources provides both motivation and opportunity for armed rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler 1998, 2004; Collier 2000). These studies suggest that the availability of these resources correlates with the onset of civil war and/or armed conflict through the rent-seeking incentives they provide for armed rebellion and the financing opportunities they create for rebel groups. Studies have found that the prospect of private gain derived from the control over these resources has been a strong motivating factor for the onset of many recent armed rebellions in the African continent (Grossman 1999; Gates 2002). Similarly, studies of recent civil wars have found strong links between access to these resources and rebel groups' capacity 'to equip and finance an army and . . . to survive against a government army' (Collier and Hoeffler 2007, 720, see also Collier 2000) particularly in West Africa (Gberie 2005, 180–196).

The aforementioned shows that the two approaches start from the same premises – that the combination of natural resources and extreme poverty played a key role in triggering recent civil wars in West Africa – but they reach different conclusions as to the reasons behind such findings. Both approaches found that a number of natural resource-rich countries that had experienced civil war in the region since the 1990s had also declining income in their pre-war years (Hiskett 1987; Isichei 1987; Sambanis 2004). This finding led scholars to suggest that there was a correlation between lower GDP and the onset of large-scale violent civil conflicts (Sambanis 2004). Rebel-centric scholars take this correlation to mean that poverty in mineral-rich nations creates opportunities for financing

and recruitment among disgruntled unemployed youth, therefore exacerbating the risk of armed rebellion (Collier and Hoeffler, 2004, 569).

In contrast, state-centric analysts interpret lower GDP as indicative of a state's weakness to defend itself against armed rebellion, therefore supporting the state-centric approach. Furthermore, the two approaches agree that civil war is more likely in populous countries with vast natural resources. While some analysts claim this is because large populations are more likely to include aggrieved groups, therefore reflecting the rebel-centric approach, others attribute it to states having difficulties controlling large populations, therefore supporting the state-centric approach.

Taken together, both approaches are the result of quantitative analysis which gained prominence in the 1990s and is still a dominant analytical framework for recent West African civil wars and armed conflicts. There is no denial that this type of analysis contributed greatly to our understanding of the linkage between abundant natural resources and recent armed conflicts in West African nations. However, the models failed to explain why some countries in the region did not descend into civil war and/or armed conflicts despite the combination of abundant natural resources and extreme poverty. Using qualitative data, the study will address this apparent gap by identifying factors that could mitigate the outbreak of large-scale violent civil conflicts induced by such a combination. Therefore, Guinea's experience presents a rich case study for examination of mitigating factors against armed conflicts in such contexts. The country managed to avoid descending into civil war and or/armed conflicts despite the combined abundant natural resources and extreme poverty and despite being surrounded with a number of West African nations suffering from interconnected civil wars in the 1990s and 2000s. The following section discusses the dichotomy of poverty and wealth in Guinea and its security threats to the country.

The duality of poverty and wealth in Guinea

The depth of poverty [and] the dilapidation of the infrastructure … makes the country look like it has just emerged from a civil war. (International Crisis Group 2007, 5)

With little industry, scarce electricity and few navigable roads, Guinea often ranks among the poorest countries in the world, as outlined above. Following independence in 1958, the Guinean state 'survived economically by permitting

large foreign mining firms to set up enclaves for the export of bauxite [and other minerals] with a large government ownership stake' (Smith Jr. 2006, 417). Immediately after independence, a joint venture at the Sangaredi mining enclaves with Harvey Aluminum (US) was established. This investment later became the Compagnie de Bauxites de Guinée, which subsequently evolved into one of the largest single bauxite mining operations in the world, jointly managed by ALCOA and ALCAN in recent years (Ibid. 417). The other important bauxite companies that are actively engaged in mining bauxite in Guinea include the Office des Bauxites de Kindia and the Société d'É conomie Mixite Friguia.[5] Similarly, commercial mining of diamonds began in Guinea in the mid-1930s and flourished during the colonial period. However, after independence the new country adopted socialist economic policies and 'all industries, including diamond mining, were nationalised' (Gberie 2001, 6). This shift towards the Eastern Bloc increasingly isolated Guinea's economy, which was heavily dependent on French and other Western nations' investments. Although Guinea tried to remedy this economic isolation by seeking friends from the Eastern Bloc, political differences between Guinea and the Soviet Union in the late 1960s and early 1970s further worsened the economic situation in the country. As a result, there was a significant slump in the production of diamonds and in 1973 'formal diamond mining operations were closed down' (Ibid. 7). Although informal mining of diamonds continued between the mid-1970s and early 1980s, 'a large proportion of Guinean diamonds were smuggled to Sierra Leone or to Liberia, as both these places paid for [them] in dollars, much valued in an increasingly economically isolated Guinea' (Gberie 2001, 6; see also Koskoff 1981, 88–89).

However, the death of President Sékou Touré in 1984 prompted a military coup led by Colonel Lansana Conté, who took power in April the same year. Under Conté, state control of the economy was relaxed and private investments were encouraged. The new government aimed, in particular, at encouraging investments in the mining sector. For this purpose, the government introduced a code of investment which emphasised investment in 'mining and [its] related industries' (Yansané 1990, 1236), giving preferential treatment to 'businesses that

[5] For comprehensive studies of Guinea's mineral profile, see Morgan, Izon, and Sow (1992) and Soumah (2007).

develop natural resources and local raw materials' (Gberie 2001, 7). In addition, the government banned 'private diamond mining', which was strongly linked with members of the Touré regime, and ordered the 'removal of diamond traders, their families, and workers from the mining area' (Yansané 1990, 1237).

The mining sector benefited significantly from these economic reforms. By 1999, there were over '14 companies holding exploratory licenses in the diamond mining' (Gberie 2001, 7 – 8) sector. Among these companies were the Canadian company Trivalence Mining Corporation. This company invested in new technologies that allowed 'hands-free' sorting of diamonds. In 1999, the company upgraded its three plants by introducing a machine which automatically shines the diamonds as they pass through the machine and 'shoots them into a locked steel box using a jet of compressed air' (Snyder and Bhavnani 2005, 584). The introduction of these technologies in the diamond mining sector increased the number of carats recovered and the country's exporting capacity (Ibid. 584, footnote 42). Reports indicate that in 2000, production of diamonds at Trivalence's AREDOR mine increased by 63% over 1999 (Ibid. 585, footnote 45), and national diamond production in 2004 rose to 739,891 carats from 666,000 carats in 2003 (Bermúdez-Lugo 2004, 21.3).

As for the bauxite sector, the new code of investment in the mining sector introduced by the Guinean government in the mid-1980s led to a renewed joint venture between a consortium of foreign mining companies and the government of Guinea, whereby the country's ownership of 49% partnership in the mining sector was strengthened. Furthermore, in 2007 uranium was discovered in the forest region as well as possible offshore oil reserves. These discoveries led to a renewed interest on the part of international corporations in Guinea, resulting in the organisation of 'several mining conventions' (Engeler 2008, 94) in 2008.

These mining enclaves often give the government around 49% shares of the investment, therefore providing the state with 'steady foreign exchange reserves, but few jobs and no spin-off for wider creation of wealth' (Smith Jr. 2006, 417). For instance, Guinea's 'average per capita income fell from US$560 in 1997 to US$410 in 2001' (Melly2003, 5) and in 1997 it is estimated that the mining sector was employing only around 10,000 people (Soumah 2007, 179). In short, the aforementioned shows that Guinea possesses large amount of diamonds,

bauxite, iron ore and other minerals, but Guineans also remain among the poorest people on earth. Yet, this dichotomy of wealth and poverty did not lead to large-scale violent civil conflicts in the country, contrasting with existing literature. The remainder of this paper identifies possible mitigating factors that could explain this puzzle.

Mineral resources and political stability in Guinea

According to some studies, diamonds have proven to be an extremely portable, high-value medium of exchange, therefore offering a prominent target for armed groups in West African nations (Gberie 2001, 13; 2005, 180 – 196). Contrary to diamonds, bauxite and iron ore have not been directly linked with the outbreak of armed conflict in West Africa. Unlike diamonds, bauxite and iron ore are not easily smuggled across borders and require heavy investment – often in partnership with the state. Nevertheless, revenue from these minerals provides significant wealth to the state. This wealth, according to existing literature, constitutes strong incentives for armed struggle for the control of state apparatus in conflict-prone nations (Cederman and Girardin 2007, 175; Cederman 1997, 72 – 108; Wimmer 2002, 85 – 113). Accordingly, the abundance of these minerals in Guinea constituted a threat to the country's stability in a region where armed conflicts have often been linked with the struggle for access to resources through the control of state apparatus.[6] Instead, this paper proposes that the availability of these resources enabled various Guinean regimes to maintain a foreign economic policy compatible with internal stability, resist austerity measures imposed by international financial institutions and adopt selective redistribution mechanisms favourable to domestic stability. These measures were largely accepted by Guineans and the country's international partners, therefore mitigating the security threats posed by Guinea's mineral resources.

[6] According to some scholars, elite rivalry to gain access to the vast revenue from the cocoa sector and Côte d'Ivoire's offshore oil fields through the control of the state 'contributed to the contemporary Ivoirian crisis' (McGovern 2011, 173). Of particular interest is chapter five in McGovern (2011) 'Following the Money: The Cocoa-Coffee Filiere' (137 – 169). Souaré (2006, 52 – 53) echoed this view by arguing that instead of 'the religious and/or ethnic arguments,' the 'causes of the Ivoirian crisis are to be found in the discriminatory policies ... against some groups of the population' since 1993 aiming at preventing them from access to political power.

Foreign economic policy compatible with internal stability

Since the 1950s Guinea's large reserve of bauxite and its enormous potential as a supplier of this commodity continued shaping its foreign relations in a manner that strengthened internal stability. As discussed below, successive Guinean regimes have been able to draw external support for regime stability owing to Guinea's vast reserve in mineral resources (interview, academics, Conakry, September 2011). President Nixon's support of Touré's regime in the aftermath of the Portuguese-led military invasion of Guinea in November 1970[7] has been attributed to Washington's interest in Guinea's mining sector. According to Cann (1997, 78), 'the United States had a growing commercial investment in Guinea's bauxite mines, and thus President Richard M. Nixon in a confiden- tial letter to Sékou Touré deplored the incident' and 'authorized $4.7 million as a contribution to the rebuilding of Conakry' (Ibid. 79). The Soviet Union reacted to this Guino-American rapprochement by establishing a naval and air presence in Conakry, including the deployment of sophisticated Soviet arms, including the 'Soviet Bear-D long-range reconnaissance aircraft' (Ibid. 78). This Soviet military presence in Guinea became known as the 'West African Patrol' and it made regular visits to the ports in the region. Thus, unlike conflicts elsewhere during the Cold War, where 'the United States and the Soviet Union were major sources of [supports] for insurgencies and states fighting insurgencies' (Straus 2012, 196), in Guinea both superpowers supported President Touré's regime stability.

This unlikely behaviour from these rival superpowers has been linked to the strategic importance of bauxite for the manufacture of military and civilian aircraft during the Cold War era (MacDonald 2009, 56). Despites the officially proclaimed socialist orientation of Guinea, 'the Sékou Touré regime left much of the production and distribution of its chief exports (bauxite and alumina) in foreign capitalist hands' and 'continued to do most of its trading with Western nations' in the mining sector (Gardinier 1988, 724). As such, President Touré 'appealed both to the Soviet Union and the United States for military aid, playing the

[7] In 22 November 1970, the Portuguese military command in Bissau sent a group of several hundred Portuguese and Bissau-Guinean soldiers, foreign fighters and exiled Guineans to attack Conakry from the sea. The assault mainly aimed at neutralising the African Party for the Independence of Guinea (Bissau) and Cape Verde (PAIGC), which had its headquarter offices in Conakry. President Touré was a major source of sustenance to this Bissau Liberation movement. For more details see Dobert (1971), Whiteman (1971), Cann (1997) and Arieff (2009).

superpowers against each other' (Cann 1997, 78), thereby using the superpower rivalry to strengthen Guinea's security forces.

This endorsement from great powers might have deterred domestic and regional destabilising forces, therefore strengthening regime stability in Guinea (interview, military personnel, Conakry, October 2011). Similarly, studies indicate that Touré was able to finance many of his security forces from revenue from the mining industry (International Crisis Group 2010, 3). For example, there were 'arms for bauxite deals' between Touré and the Soviet Bloc, which 'allowed him to amass modern weapons and equipment' (Ibid.) for his newly formed post-independent armed forces. Reports indicate that despite bad economic conditions, President Touré used revenue from natural resources to spend lavishly on his security apparatus such as the national militia (Bah 2013).

Upon assuming power in 1984, President Conté was able to channel repayment of the Soviet Union's estimated $400 million debt from past purchases of arms and industrial equipment by using 'bauxite exports from the Kindia mine operated by the Soviet technicians' (Schissel 1986, 24). Similarly, following the military takeover in 2008, led by Captain Mussa Dadis Camara, most members of the international community condemned the coup d'état and imposed diplomatic, military and economic sanctions on Camara's government until he ceded power to an elected civilian body. Amid this mounting pressure on the military junta to return the country to civilian rule, Camara's government was able to secure a lucrative deal with China International Fund (CIF) in 2009 'worth an estimated $7 billion', which 'would grant the company near-exclusive control over Guinea's mineral, oil and gas resources' (Gelfand 2009). In the following year, CIF 'confirmed plans to fund a $2.7bn infrastructure project to develop a mining facility' (Burgis 2010) held by 'the small British mining company Bellzone to dig for iron' (Holslag 2011, 373). These deals strengthened the financial capacity of the regime and were used to demonstrate the capacity of the military regime to attract foreign finance in the face of fading domestic support alongside rising African and international isolation (Alden 2009).

Resistance to austerity measures imposed by international institutions

Another measure taken by various Guinean governments to strengthen domestic stability was the resistance to implementing structural adjustment programmes

imposed by international institutions. By the late 1970s, Guinea's state-managed economy was in serious crisis, prompting Touré's socialist regime to enter into negotiations with the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank for the possibility of a loan as part of a structural adjustment programme, but significant progress was not made before Touré's death in 1984. This lack of progress was attributed to Touré's refusal to abandon 'his goal of a planned domestic economy' (Campbell and Clapp 1995, 431).

In contrast, upon assuming power following the 1984 bloodless military coup, Conté accepted the terms of the IMF/World Bank structural adjustment programme. According to Graybeal and Picard (1991, 286), the regime 'committed itself ... verbally and in writing, to the centrepiece' of the programme, 'namely, to cut dramatically the size of the Guinean public sector.' In particular, the programme required the government to cut the number of state employees to about 50,000 from the estimated 140,000 (Ibid. 287). These reforms were met with stiff resistance from within the military and the bureaucracy, who 'questioned the need for massive layoffs' (Yansane´ 1990, 1237) because they would be the main losers (interview, academics, Conakry, September 2011). Nevertheless, the government announced a 34,000 reduction in the number of civil servants by the end of 1987 as part of a gradual implementation of the programme. The reaction to this announcement 'created fears of a political back-lash' and it became clear that implementing these reforms 'will provoke civil unrest and political instability' (Graybeal and Picard 1991, 289) 'with hazardous political repercussions for the Conté regime' (Ibid. 290).

The likelihood of an outbreak of armed conflicts induced by a deep cut in the number of state employees and the removal of government subsidies could not be underestimated in Guinea at a time when the country had just emerged from 26 years under a socialist regime. Reports indicate that the Conté administration inherited a system whereby 'most of the beneficiaries of the old system' (Yansané 1990, 1239) were living in the urban areas. This included civil servants, employees of state enterprises and many other Guineans who had been living in towns and cities.[8] This segment of the Guinean society was 'dependent on

[8] The author's fieldwork discussions confirm that many of those who made large profits from the black market economy and those 'who used to purchase imported goods with overvalued currency' (Yansané 1990, 1239) during Touré's rule were concentrated in the urban areas.

the public sector' to the extent that the threat of IMF-backed austerity measures to the interest of 'this urban class and its potential allies [was] obvious' (Graybeal and Picard 1991, 291).

There was a real risk that 'disgruntled civil servants could create a political backlash which could be exploited by anti-Conté forces' (Schissel 1986, 25). The tendency of disgruntled civil servants turning to armed rebellion in West Africa warranted President Conté's reluctance to antagonise them in Guinea.[9] The Liberian civil war in 1989 and that of Sierra Leone in 1991 were both led by disgruntled civil servants.[10] Thus, the main preoccupation of the government was making sure that economic reforms did not 'engender excessive discontent in the urban areas …which could be used to destabilise the government' (ibid. 23).

Faced with this situation, the regime adopted the dual strategy of delaying and/or diluting reforms. The strategy was meant to appease both the civil servants and Guinea's international partners. Thus, despite the regime's repeated renewal of 'its commitment to cut back the size of the civil service,' a World Bank official concluded that 'the Government talks a good game … but continues to avoid the implementation of reforms' (Graybeal and Picard 1991, 289). This delaying tactic reassured state employees that the government was not seriously committed to carrying out the reforms (fieldwork discussion, Conakry, September – November 2011). The component of the programme known as the Programme Libre de Commerce, which required the liberalisation of the import of foodstuffs, 'was dissolved in mid-February 1986 on government order' (Yansané 1990, 1239). Instead, the state maintained 'control over vital imports' (Schissel 1986, 23) by establishing a joint venture with a number of French trading houses 'for the import of vital foodstuffs' (Ibid. 24). Likewise, in January 1986 the government cancelled the unpopular 'price increases for sugar, condensed milk and cooking oil products' (Yansané 1990, 1239) introduced earlier to reflect the impact of the devaluation on the cost of imported goods. Similarly, implementation of the

[9] In July 1985, President Conté's regime survived a coup attempt led by former Prime Minister Diarra Traoré 'baked by disgruntled [disbanded] militia and police units', which left '18 dead, 229 wounded [and] 100 arrests' (Yansané 1990, 1237; for further details see Guinea 1985, 1412).

[10] The civil war in Liberia was led by Charles Taylor, a former President Doe ally, who served in Doe's regime until he 'ran into trouble with Doe' and fled Liberia in 1983 and in 1989 launched the Liberian civil war (Reno 1995; Boås 2001, 721). Likewise, the Sierra Leonean civil war was led by Foday Sankoh, a former military officer, who spent seven years in prison for taking part in an alleged coup attempt to unseat President Siaka Stevens' government (Abdullah 1998, 206).

programme was diluted towards partial reforms of the banking system and the replacement of the Sily[11] by the Guinean Franc, thereby sending a signal to Guinea's international partners that at some point in the future the country would be fully integrated into the CFA franc zone backed by France (Africa report 1986, 42; Graybeal and Picard 1991, 286).

Seemingly, this dual strategy worked at the initial stage of the programme. As early as 1985, Guinea became 'the second largest recipient of soft loans from France's Fonds d'Aide et de Coopération (FAC) with $88.6 million' (Schissel 1986, 24). Likewise, the United States' aid to Guinea increased 'up to $8 million annually, not including food imports and technical assistance worth another $11 million' (Everett 1985, 22). In early 1986, the IMF granted President Conté's government a loan of $36 million as a first instalment of a $150 million package deal (Africa report 1986, 41). Likewise, the government secured a $42.6 million loan from the World Bank to support the programme, and the Paris Club agreed to reschedule $200 million of Guinea's foreign debt (Schissel 1986, 24). However, in the long term, there is general agreement among observers that the outcome of the programme did not meet expectations, to say the least (Campbell and Clapp 1995, 425; Graybeal and Picard 1991). The reasons for this shortcoming have been attributed to 'domestic policy inadequacies' (Campbell and Clapp 1995, 425), which means that 'Guinean officials were stalling [the implementations of the reforms] for political reasons' (Graybeal and Picard 1991, 289). This raises the question as to why the Guinean regime was able to resist the attempts by international financial institutions to impose deep cuts in the size of the public sector and the removal of subsidies. Some analysts explain Guinea's allergy to outside interference as 'a mixture of defiant nationalism, left over from the Sékou Touré years' (International Crisis Group 2005, 13) and the incompetence of the Conté regime. While the role of this mixture in shaping Guinea's attitude toward the donors cannot be denied, this behaviour cannot be entirely divorced from the country's vast natural resources. The following section explains how revenue from the mining industry and the redistribution mechanism adopted by various Guinean regimes explain this resistance and its resulting political stability.

[11] President Sékou Touré introduced the Sily as Guinea's currency in 1972 and since then it has symbolised the country's economic independence from France.

Mineral revenue and selective redistribution

Guinea's trump card is its resource base. (Everett 1985, 24)

The availability and the use of mineral resources as 'economic sanctuary' against genuine economic and political reforms has been a feature in Guinea since independence. According to some analysts, Guinean regimes survived years of aid suspension without caving into demands for political and economic reforms 'because Guinea is a resource-rich, wealthy nation enjoying heavy investment from foreign mining firms' (BBC 2009). This view is echoed by Snyder and Bhavnani (2005, 584), who found that revenue from various mineral resources generates 'a large and steady source of revenue' for those who control state apparatus in Guinea. From independence in 1958 until 1984, mining contributed 'an estimated 25% of [Guinea's] GDP, 95% of exports, and 79% of tax revenue' (Campbell and Clapp 1995, 427, quoted from World Bank 1990b, 32). The importance of the mining sector to the country's economic health continued during President Conté's rule between 1984 and 2008. Of all revenues in 1986, mineral activities yielded 81.6% (Yansané 1990, 1240) and in 1989 Guinea's mining sector accounted for '90% of all exports' (Topouzis 1989, 40).

Although the annual output of diamonds in Guinea varies from year to year, it is estimated that production is usually around 250,000 carats per year. Between 1995 and 1999, the stated value of Guinean exports of diamonds to Belgium alone was $113.5 million (Gberie 2001, 8). However, one writer has suggested that the real value of Belgian imports of diamonds from Guinea during this period was over $400 million (Ibid.). Likewise, diamond sales rose to more than $15 million in 2000, which was an 89% increase over sales in 1999 (Snyder and Bhavnani 2005, 585, footnote 44). Besides, it is reported that by 2001, there were 'eight formal buying offices in Guinea, each paying a fee of $50,000 per annum to the government' (Gberie 2001, 8). Similarly, the National Bureau of Expertise, the agency which evaluates Guinea's diamonds and issues certificates of origin, collected a 3% tax increase on diamond exports in 2004 (Bermúdez-Lugo 2004, 21.3).

As for the bauxite sector, it is estimated that one third of the world's highest grade bauxite deposits are located within Guinea's borders. Some studies estimate that between 45 – 62% of Guinea's bauxite is of high alumina content

(Campbell and Clapp 1995, 426). Between 1986 and 1992, 'Tax revenues from the main bauxite mining company – Compagnie des Bauxites de Guineé (CBG) – accounted for an average 62% of total tax revenues' (Snyder and Bhavnani 2005, 584, footnote 43). In 1989, the country's revenue from bauxite and aluminium accounted for 87% of total tax revenues (Topouzis 1989, 40). Overall, the bauxite sector has been the major source of tax revenue and foreign exchange for Guinea, 'accounting for a steady 60 – 70% of export earnings' (Snyder and Bhavnani 2005, 584). In short, bauxite and other minerals constitute the most important sector of the Guinean economy, providing a stable flow of income to successive Guinean governments, while keeping most Guineans in dire economic circumstances.

This dichotomy of wealth, poverty and political stability in Guinea owes much to the existence of a centralised rent-seeking and selective redistribution system. Through this system, resources have often been channelled to a small circle of elites who prospered from revenues of bauxite, diamonds and other minerals (interview, academics, Conakry, September 2011). During President Conté's rule, the system consisted of two main groups. The first was the primary patronage group, the second was the secondary patronage group. Studies show that 'the primary patronage group in the country [were] not more than 120 people' and that the 'secondary patronage networks may incorporate as many as 3500 middle-level administrators, military officers and private-sector businessmen' (Picarda and Moudoud 2010, 59). This clientele redistribution of mineral and state rents targeted mainly mid- and high-ranking military officers, the presidential entourage, mid-level state administrators and some privileged sections of the population. In the military, cohesion was often maintained by rewarding high-ranking officers with business opportunities and/or lucrative contracts and 'through the military clientele system these benefits trickle[d] down to both [lower-ranking] officers and ordinary soldiers in a way that ensures their loyalty to their superiors and to the political elites' (Bah 2013, 12). Studies show that the system allowed the higher echelons of the military 'to get rich' and that 'the military and the security forces in general [were] better protected than the civilian population' from the falling standard of living (International Crisis Group 2007, 2). Available sources indicate that President Conté's most 'effective conflict resolution mechanisms' (Bah 2013, 12) in the army were quick promotion. The President often settled

‘problems or tensions within the armed forces’ by ordering the immediate ‘promotions of all serving personnel’ (International Crisis Group 2010, 8). Although this unregulated promotion resulted in disproportionate number of officers compared with the numbers of common soldiers, its accompanying benefits ensured the officers’ loyalty to the regime.

The presidential entourage was another component of the selective distribution system – a small group of individuals often described as ‘those close to the President [Conté]’ (International Crisis Group 2005, 12) ‘who monopolised much of the import and export business’ (Ibid. 13). This group constituted of powerful ministers, businessmen, military officers and their clientele networks. A recent study describes the privileges and favours guaranteed to this group as ‘monumental’ (Ibid. 12) in their scale. For instance, it is estimated that ‘for years, the lucky holder of a post in Guinea’s presidential guard could expect a plush villa and a share in rackets worth up to $50,000 a month’ (Samb 2011). Similarly, businessmen closely associated with the presidency are often capable of accessing ‘personalised favours and deals that gave’ them ‘a stranglehold on the economy’ (International Crisis Group 2005, 13). These favours include access to non-competitive state contracts and tax exemptions (interview, businessman, Conakry, September 2011).

The attempt to dissolve the Société guinéenne d’exportation des produits agricoles et miniers (SOGEPAM) as part of an economic reform project introduced by former Prime Minister François Lonsény Fall highlights the extent to which this group benefited from being ‘close to the President.’ When Lonsény Fall was appointed as Prime Minister in 2004, Guinea was in a dire economic situation. By 2003, most Guinea’s international donors, including the IMF, the World Bank and the African Development Bank, had suspended their programme owing to the country’s payment default (International Crisis Group 2005, 13). Fall was appointed as Prime Minister in March 2004 ‘to restore sufficient order to get the [donors’] money flowing again’ (Ibid. 12). Reports indicate that at the heart of Prime Minister Fall’s economic reform project was a plan to dissolve SOGEPAM for non-performance reasons. However, the company was mostly benefiting those businessmen close to the president and their associates (interview, businessman, Conakry, September 2011). As such, the group persuaded President Conté to issue a direct order ‘not to touch SOGEPAM’

(International Crisis Group 2005, 12). In an interview in 2006, President Conté admitted that the mining sector was the most corrupt area of the Guinean economy, where the politico-military-business elites enrich themselves at the expense of the larger population (Michel 2006). Lack of transparency appears to have contributed immensely to the large-scale corruption in the mining sector. Contracts between the government and investors were often secret, therefore it was difficult to know the details of contracts and to hold officials accountable (interview, academics, Conakry, September 2011).

This politico-business nexus strengthened both Conté's semi-military regime and the business-elites vis-à-vis domestic and external destabilising forces. Thus, through the passage of time, the maintenance of this politico-business elites relationship became of mutual concern to both entities. As such, when Guinea became a victim of a series of coordinated armed attacks from rebels backed by Liberia and Sierra Leone between 2000 and 2001, 'the Guinean business class created a war fund' (Gbaydee Doe 2003, 154) to support the government against the rebel attack. This was in sharp contrast with what happened in Liberia and Sierra Leone, where businessmen and politicians saw 'their respective wars' as opportunities to negotiate 'profitable deals with rebels' (Ibid.), thereby exacerbating the conflicts.

The behaviour of the Guinean business class towards the threat to political stability in the country can be attributed to the high level of Guinean ownership of private investment in the vital national industry and the import and export sectors compared with her Mano River Union[12] neighbours of Sierra Leone and Liberia. Studies show that before the outbreak of the civil wars in Liberia and Sierra Leone in the 1990s, foreign nationals owned around 90% of 'private investment in the extractive industry and trading of imported goods' while Guineans

[12] The Mano River Union was established in October 1973 by Liberia and Sierra Leone, aiming at customs and economic union between the two countries. In October 1980 Guinea joined the Union (for more details see Robson 1982; Jörgel, Utas, and FOI 2007).

owned 70% of investment in these sectors during the same period (Gbaydee Doe 2003, 159–160). The concentration of these businesses in the hands of Guineans has largely been attributed to the capacity of the Guinean business class to utilise the economic liberalisation in place since 1984 when Guinea emerged from its socialist economy during Sékou Touré's era. Studies show that the economic liberalisation in the mid-1980s produced a business class which consisted of 'outside' Guinean businessmen who had fled Touré's socialist regime and 'inside' Guinean traders who had never left the country (Bah, Keita, and Lootvoet 1989; Lambert 1991). These two groups created 'shared out zones of influence among themselves' (Lambert 1991, 487) and eliminated foreign businessmen from distribution within the country. The 'outside' Guinean businessmen were involved only insofar as they were 'partners with "inside" traders, who control not only distribution but also re-exportation toward neighbouring' (Ibid.) countries. This high level of domestic control of economic activities in Guinea has been 'a major sources of stability given that the decision… to endorse violent confrontation can be largely contingent on how much one has to lose or gain in doing so' (Gbaydee Doe 2003, 160). Accordingly, the business class in Guinea has consistently been 'reluctant to push conflict to the brink, recognising they have the most to lose' (Smith Jr. 2013, 3). In short, despite remaining one of the least developed countries on the planet, mineral revenues have spared the Guinean economy from total collapse and allowed for a degree of public services to be maintained through a selective redistribution mechanism that enabled successive Guinean regimes to keep most Guineans in extreme poverty, yet avoid large-scale violent resistance.

Conclusion

The combination of abundant mineral resources and extreme poverty presented a threat to Guinea's stability in a region where large-scale armed conflict has often been associated with such contexts. Yet, measures taken by various Guinean regimes and the positive response to it from Guineans and the country's international partners have mitigated such security threats. In particular, the selective redistribution mechanism adopted by the various Guinean regimes has played a major role in maintaining political stability in the country since independence. However, the death of President Conté in 2008 and the subsequent democratic election of President Alpha Condé to the presidency in

2010, after a brief military takeover by Captain Mussa Dadis Camara, have brought major social and political changes in Guinea. Yet, as demonstrated in this paper, the economic conditions of most Guineans remain unchanged. More importantly, since the reintroduction of political pluralism in 2010, ethnic conflict has begun to play out in Guinea's mining sector. In August 2012, a protest against the Brazilian mining giant Vale quickly turned violent. The residents of the town of Zogota near N'zérékoré 'vandalized the company's facilities to protest its recruitment of outside workers at the expense of the local Guerzes and Tomas ethnic groups' (Bybee 2013), leading to 'at least five dead, killed by soldiers who fired real bullets' (CONFLICTBASE 2012). Given this situation, it is unlikely that the economic policies of previous Guinean regimes towards the country's mineral resources can be sustained by President Condé's government. Events since 2008 suggest that political stability is less likely to be sustained unless Guineans get more shares from the country's natural resources than they used to from previous regimes.

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Chapter Five: Paper Four.
State Resilience in Guinea: Mitigating the 'Bad Neighbourhood Effect' of Civil War Next Door.[1]

5.1. Summary of the paper

The fourth paper, *Mitigating the 'Bad Neighbourhood Effect',*[2] explains how the Guinean state did manage to maintain domestic peace in a regionalized conflict zone. The analysis includes the role of regional political dynamics in explaining why Guinea did not end up being sucked more deeply – for sure enough it was involved to some extent – into the conflicts that ravaged its neighbours. The paper identifies opportunities for consolidating domestic peace in the difficult environment and argues that the influx of refugees into Guinea's population centres caused a change in government policy which resulted in positive economic changes, thereby easing the risk of Guinea itself being dragged into economic malaise and potentially its own civil war. The paper's main finding is that the refugees were integrated into Guinea's economy, rather than a parallel economy being constructed to accommodate them. This finding provides an important counter to the dominant argument that the flood of refugees often threatens the commercial life of a country, lowering profits, threatening an established regime of accumulation. In contrast, the paper shows how the Guinean government and its international allies turned refugees to additional labour forces, lowering wages and boosting profits thereby strengthening the regime of accumulation. This refugee's integration policy allowed the Guinean government to portray itself on the global stage as a benevolent government, thus ensuring continued aid in the face of election rigging, corruption and domestic opposition, thereby mitigating the possible consequences of disturbances nearby.

[1] Published as Bah, Mamadou Diouma, "State Resilience in Guinea: Mitigating the 'Bad Neighbourhood Effect' of Civil War Next Door," *The Australasian Review of African Studies* 33, 1 (2012):13-33. The paper was presented at International Peace Research Association (IPRA) Conference, *Peace Theories Commission*, University of Sydney, 6-10 July, 2010.

[2] This short title is used to denote the paper henceforth.

5.2. The paper

Abstract

This article addresses the question of how to sustain domestic peace in a regionalized conflict zone, with special reference to the Republic of Guinea. From 1990-2008, Guinea was surrounded by six countries experiencing political unrest and/or civil war. The outbreak of these wars and the influx of refugees presented a threat to Guinea's stability. This article explains how the Guinean state, despite these unfavourable conditions, known as the 'bad neighbourhood effect,' remained resilient during these decades. It concludes that the measures taken by Guinea and its international partners successfully mitigated the contagion effects of Guinea's neighbouring conflicts. This is in contrast to findings in recent quantitative studies where the 'bad neighbourhood effect' is strongly linked with the onset of large-scale civil conflicts.

Introduction

"Whenever a conflict breaks out within a region, there is good reason to fear that it may spread to neighbouring states… The arms that flow into a country with a civil conflict can also move outward to its neighbours." - Myron Weiner, 1996[3]

Recent quantitative studies on theories of contemporary civil war identify several key variables as significant triggers of civil war onset.[4] One of these variables is known as the 'bad neighbourhood effect', whereby, civil war in one country spreads to neighbouring countries due to their geographic proximity. According to these studies, many recent civil wars in different parts of the world have been triggered by the spread of neighbouring civil conflicts. Specifically, these studies argue that the civil wars in West African nations since the early 1990s contributed

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[3] Myron Weiner, "Bad Neighbors, Bad Neighborhoods: An Inquiry into the Causes of Refugee Flows," *International Security* 21: 1 (1996), 29.

[4] Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "On economic causes of civil war," *Oxford Economic Papers,* 50: 14 (1998): 563-573; Paul Collier and Anke Hoeffler, "Greed and grievance in civil war," *Oxford Economic Papers,* 56: 4 (2004): 563-596; Paul Collier, "Rebellion as a quasi-criminal activity," *Journal of Conflict Resolution,* 44: 6 (2000): 839–853; James D. Fearon and David D. Laitin, "Ethnicity, insurgency, and civil war," *American Political Science Review,* 97 (2003): 75-90; Nicholas Sambanis, "Using Case Studies to Expand Economic Models of Civil War," *Perspectives on Politics,* 2: 2 (2004): 259-279; Michael Ross, "Oil, drugs, and diamonds: The varying roles of natural resources in civil war," in Karen Ballentine and Jake Sherman, eds. *The political economy of armed conflict: Beyond greed and grievance*, (Boulder, CO: Lynne Rienner, 2003); William Zartman, "Dynamics and Constraints in Negotiations in Internal Conflicts," in William Zartman, ed. *Elusive Peace: Negotiating an End to Civil Wars*, (Washington, D.C: Brookings Institute, 1995).

to the outbreak of civil wars in neighbouring countries in the sub-region.[5] In Guinea, however, the state managed to avoid descending into civil war, particularly in the last two decades even as a number of Guinea's neighbouring countries experienced violent civil conflicts. Why did the 'bad neighbourhood effect' over the last two decades fail to instigate civil war onset in Guinea? In fact, were Guinea's neighbouring civil wars actually an impetus for political order rather than unrest, as much of the existing literature has suggested? Using qualitative data, this study argues that measures taken by the Guinean state and the international community have successfully mitigated the 'bad neighbourhood effect.' It will show that the Guinean government constructed a hospitality and stability discourse, for both internal and external use, in order to mobilize support for domestic stability in the face of regional instability. This study will also reveal that there was a positive response to the discourse, which resulted in tangible political, economic and military aid, which contributed to internal stability.

Bad neighbourhood and the spread of conflicts

In the early 1980s, Most and Starr questioned the validity of the "neighbourhood effects" concept.[6] Their major concern was to highlight the theoretical importance of the 'diffusion approach'[7] in a Cold War context. They argued the "notion that an event may alter the probability of subsequent events through diffusion or contagion processes is not new,"[8] but the application to war contagion across borders is perhaps a new phenomenon. Examining the diffusion approach during the Cold War era, Most and Starr noted that:

> each nation's structure of risks and opportunities is likely to be changed once a war is under way and these changes may be most dramatic for those nations which are proximate to the warring nations.[9]

[5] It is argued that the war in Liberia spilled over to both Sierra Leone and Côte d'Ivoire. See for example, International Crisis Group, "Tackling Liberia: The Eye of the Regional Storm," *Africa Report*, 62 (April, 30, 2003); Morten Bøås, "Liberia and Sierra Leone-dead ringers? The logic of neo-patrimonial rule," *Third World Quarterly* 22 (2001): 697-723; International Crisis Group, "Liberia: The Key to Ending Regional Instability," *Africa report*, no.43, (April, 24, 2002).

[6] Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr, "Diffusion, Reinforcement, Geopolitics, and the Spread of War," *American Political Science Review*, 74: 4 (1980), 932.

[7] Most and Starr, 1980, 932.

[8] Most and Starr, 1980, 932.

[9] Most and Starr, 1980, 932.

In a later work, Starr emphasised the value of diffusion studies in which, "events external to some social unit have consequences for or effects on those units" meaning that there is "the probability that similar events will or will not occur"[10] nearby. These studies were able to show that significant events, such as large-scale conflict, cannot be isolated social phenomena. This contends that geographic proximity to violent conflicts increases the probability of subsequent events in nearby societies.[11] The terms employed by Most such as 'risks and opportunities,' 'will or will not occur,' are particularly significant for the present study. It shows that in its early stage of theoretical development, the 'diffusion approach' was understood in terms of both risks and opportunities as an outcome for neighbouring countries.

However, since these early works, there has been a growing attempt to highlight the various negative effects of civil wars on neighbouring countries. By the early 1990s the debate had narrowed the focus on the negative effects of neighbouring wars. Weiner argued that the close proximity of countries with internal wars raises the question of whether there is a 'bad neighbourhood effect.'[12] He examined whether there is a high probability that internal conflicts in one country can trigger conflicts in neighbouring countries. Weiner also focused on the growing trend of the post-Cold War era in which conflicts within countries tended to spill across borders. Subsequent studies identify ways in which a civil war can lead to similar conditions in neighbouring states.[13] For example, refugee movements and economic losses are among the major consequences, as these can potentially lead to internal strife.[14] They argue that refugee migration could enable the expansion of rebel networks, as well as demographic alterations within the host nation.[15] Refugee migration can heighten local sentiments among the host country's population. As a result, this can trigger radicalized movements on the basis of

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[10] Zaryab Iqbal and Harvey Starr, "Bad Neighbours: Failed States and Their Consequences," *Conflict Management and Peace Science,* 25: 4 (2008), 318.

[11] Harvey Starr, "The power of place and the future of spatial analysis in the study of conflict," *Conflict Management and Peace Science,* 20: 1 (2003): 1-20; Harvey Starr and Benjamin A. Most, "Theoretical and logical issues in the study of international diffusion," *Journal of Theoretical Politics,* 2: 4 (1990): 391-412

[12] Weiner, 1996.

[13] Idean Salehyan and K. S. Gleditsch, "Refugees and the spread of civil war," *International Organization,* 60: 2 (2006): 335–366.

[14] Salehyan and Gleditsch, 2006; Iqbal and Starr, 2008; Starr, 2003.

[15] Idean and Gleditsch, 2006.

defending the interest of what one author describes as the 'sons of the soil.'[16] Thus, as Brown writes, "the sudden influx of refugees can aggravate ethnic problems and further complicate the picture by changing the domestic balance of power."[17] In addition, recent studies have concluded that the negative impacts of civil war on the economy of neighbouring countries are significant enough to constitute a major threat to their security and stability.[18] According to these studies, civil war can cause financial drain to border nations due to factors like medical or food expenses for refugees, disruption of trade, damage to supply lines and the increased perception of risk by would-be investors.

It is apparent that the 'bad neighbourhood effect' model is centred on the idea that geographic proximity to violent civil conflicts increases vulnerability to an outbreak of civil wars through the 'spill over effects.' This model is the result of research based on quantitative studies which gained prominence in the early 1990s. It is still one of the dominant analytical tools for the recent civil wars in many parts of Africa.[19] However, while the model may contribute to our understanding of civil war onset in some cases, it does little to help us understand why proximal conflicts do not mirror the same effect in other cases. That is, existing methods of analysis tell more about the cases where the spill-over effects took place than about instances where it did not. We still do not understand why some countries do not descend into large-scale civil conflicts despite the presence of this high risk variable. This study will address this apparent gap by explaining ways in which domestic political order could coexist with neighbouring conflicts. More specifically, in an attempt to understand political stability in this context, the present study will shift the focus of analysis from the negative effects of

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[16] Myron Weiner, *Sons of the Soil: Migration and Ethnic Conflict in India,* (Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1978)

[17] Michael Brown, "The Causes and Regional Dimensions of Internal Conflict," in Michael Brown, ed., *The International Dimensions of Internal Conflict* (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1966).

[18] James C. Murdoch and Todd Sandler, "Economic growth, civil wars, and spatial spillovers," *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 46: 1 (2002): 91–110; Bryman Daniel L. *Things Fall Apart: Containing The Spillover from an Iraqi Civil War* (Washington, DC: Brookings Institution Press, 2007); Collier and Hoeffler, 1998.

[19] For instance, the World Bank recently reported that "The effects of violence in one area can spread to neighboring states and to other parts of the world, hurting development prospects of others and impeding economic prospects for entire regions," *World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security and Development*, http://web.worldbank.org/WBSITE/EXTERNAL/NEWS/0,,contentMDK:22883746~pagePK:34370~piPK:34424~theSitePK:4607,00.html (accessed 12 April 2011).

neighbouring wars to identifying how they might provide opportunities for consolidating domestic peace.

Mitigating the bad neighbourhood effect: The case of Guinea

Counter arguments and propositions

Contrary to the 'bad neighbourhood effect' theory, an External Conflict Internal Cohesion approach (ECIC) suggests that states can leverage neighbouring conflicts for internal stability.[20] This model sees external conflict as an opportunity for the state to mobilize the energy of various groups, in order to bring about increased internal cohesion, in the face of external threat. From the perspective of ECIC, countries facing potential spill over effects can adopt conflict management mechanisms that mitigate such negative effects. As such, it is reasonable to argue that a combination of measures taken by concerned states and the international community can significantly minimize the negative effects of a 'bad neighbourhood.' Through the Guinean experience, this study proposes that regional civil wars provide opportunities for: enhancing domestic cohesion and improving external relations; solidifying government control over remote provinces; and strengthening the capacity of national armed forces. These propositions are converted into hypotheses and examined in the remaining discussion.

Guinea's neighbouring wars: A hospitality and stability discourse

The outbreak of civil war in countries bordering Guinea, in particular Liberia and Sierra Leone, provided the Guinean government the framework to formulate foreign and domestic policies in a manner that served internal stability. The international community perceived them as interrelated regional wars with the potential to destabilize the entire sub-region. For instance, the Secretary-General of the then Organization of African Union (OAU), Salim Ahmed Salim, described the civil war in Liberia as "a threat to regional peace and security."[21] This view was echoed by the Nigerian President Ibrahim Babangida in his speech to the

[20] Arthur A. Stein, "Conflict and Cohesion: A Review of the Literature," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, 20: 1 (1976): 143-172; P. Terry Hopmann, "International Conflict and Cohesion in the Communist System," *International Studies Quarterly* 11: 3 (1967): 212-236.

[21] Ademola Adeleke, "The Politics and Diplomacy of Peacekeeping in West Africa: The ECOWAS Operation in Liberia," *The Journal of Modern African Studies*, 33: 4 (1995), 577.

Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) summit in Abuja in November 1992, when he said "today it is Liberia, tomorrow it could be any one of the countries represented here."[22] Likewise, according to Jawara, the former President of the Gambia, ECOWAS leaders, "could well imagine the implications for sub-regional stability if [the rebel group in Liberia] fought its way to power."[23] Finally, Admiral Augustus Aikhomu of the Nigerian navy described the Liberian civil war as being "a potential for massive ... destabilization of the sub-region." [24]

These civil wars provided the Guinean government the discursive materials with which to present Guinea as an 'island of stability' threatened by the conflicts possibly spreading into Guinea itself.[25] The idea that Guinea was facing a real danger of sliding into civil war was strengthened by the fact that Guinea was hosting thousands of refugees fleeing from these wars. Furthermore, some of Guinea's border areas were affected by military clashes between government and rebel forces.[26] For instance, attacks on Guinean military and civilians in the region near the borders with Liberia and Sierra Leone intensified in 2000. According to official figures, "fighting between armed groups and Guinean soldiers was reported to have led to some 360 deaths between early September and mid-October."[27] Among these figures are 35 deaths in an attack on the town of Macenta near the Liberian border in mid-September 2000, and 40 deaths in various parts of the southeast of Guinea in early September of the same year.[28] Similarly, an attack on the town of Gueckédou in early December 2000 led to the deaths of 86 people and to massive destruction in the city. Subsequently, an attack on the nearby town of Gueckédou was repelled by the Guinean armed forces who admitted to having killed 150 rebels in the process. Rebel attacks continued throughout the following year as well. A series of attacks around Macenta resulted in more than 130 deaths between late January and early

[22] Adeleke, 588.
[23] Adeleke, 588.
[24] Adeleke, 577.
[25] Sarah Birgitta Kanafani, "Guinea: An Island of Stability?," *Georgetown Journal of International Affairs*, 7: 1 (2006): 153-159
[26] Lansana Gberie, *Destabilizing Guinea: diamonds, Charles Taylor and the potential for a wider human catastrophe* (Partnership Africa-Canada. The Diamond and Human Security Project, Occasional Paper No. 1, 2001).
[27] Pierre Englebert, "Africa south of the Sahara," in Katherin Murison, ed. *Regional Surveys of the World*, 32nd Edition, (Europa Publication, 2003), 477.
[28]Englebert, 477.

February 2001.[29] According to the Guinean government, this upsurge in violence was attributed to:

> forces supported by the governments of Liberia and Burkina Faso and to the members of the Sierra Leonean rebel group the Revolutionary United Front (RUF), who [are] acting in alliance with Guinean dissidents.[30]

Faced with this situation, the government adopted a dual strategy in order to address the issue. On the one hand, the Guinean elites presented Guinea as a 'good neighbour' in a 'bad neighbourhood' region while, on the other hand, they emphasized the value of the country's stability against external and internal threats. This dual strategy can be theoretically expressed as framing a hospitality and stability discourse.

Hospitality discourse

In order to project the image of a hospitable neighbour, the government of Guinea took a series of concrete measures, including participation in regional peacekeeping operations, hosting regional peace negotiations, and adopting an open refugee policy.

Regional peacekeeping operations

The outbreak of civil war in Liberia in December 1989 constituted a major challenge to ECOWAS, which Guinea is a founding member. ECOWAS was established in May 1975 to promote fiscal development within the sub-region. Member-states have largely restricted their interactions to purely economic matters and refrained from interfering in domestic political issues confronting the region.[31] However, in 1990 this tradition of non-interference changed dramatically when ECOWAS intervened in the civil war in Liberia. Initially, ECOWAS responded to the situation by appointing a standing mediation committee.[32] Later, this committee created an intervention force known as the Economic Community

[29]Englebert, 477.
[30] Englebert, 477.
[31] ECOWAS member states are Benin, Burkina Faso, Cape Verde, Côte d'Ivoire, The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Liberia, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo
[32] The committee members constituted The Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Nigeria, and Togo as members, and Guinea and Sierra Leone as observers.

of West African States Monitoring Group (ECOMOG), with troops mainly from Nigeria and smaller units from Gambia, Ghana, Guinea and Sierra Leone.[33]

In order to project the image of a good neighbour, the regime in Guinea decided to participate in these regional peacekeeping operations. This was significant due to the fact that it was the only Francophone state to contribute troops to the first ECOWAS peacekeeping operation in Liberia.[34] Francophone participation was necessary in order to put aside the idea that the intervention was an attempt to shift the regional balance of power in favour of the West African Anglophone states. Historically, both France and Nigeria compete for influence in West Africa.[35] In 1970, France sponsored the formation of the Communaute Economique de l'Afrique de l'Ouest (CEAO) which binds together Burkina Faso, Côte d'Ivoire, Mali, Mauritania, Niger, and Senegal, all of which are French-speaking countries. From Nigeria's perspective, CEAO was a neo-colonial organisation aimed at intensifying the dependence of the Francophone countries of West Africa on France. As such, Nigeria viewed any French economic and military presence in West Africa as a major threat to the realisation of its own strategic and geo-political goals. Thus, Nigeria promoted ECOWAS as a response to the French sponsored CEAO. From the stand point of Nigeria, ECOWAS was expected to bridge the colonial division of the sub-region in order to enhance the potential for meaningful development. However, the fact that Côte d'Ivoire and Burkina Faso, both strong allies of France, supported the Liberian leader Charles Taylor, explains why Nigeria suspected Parisian influence. Thus, Nigeria's view was that France could not be allowed to use the rebel movement in Liberia as a vehicle to further its interests in Nigeria's geo-political sphere of influence.[36]

However, the Liberian situation presented the Anglophone countries, particularly Nigeria, with a dilemma – how to bring the Francophone countries into this peace operation. Their participation would provide a consensual basis for ECOMOG and ensure that a Nigeria-led initiative did not reinforce the fear of Nigerian

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[33] Adeleke, 571-572.

[34] Although Senegal joined later, it quickly stepped out again. For an analysis of the Francophone perspective on conflict resolution in the sub-region of West Africa see, Robert A. Mortimer, "Senegal's Role in ECOMOG: The Francophone Dimension in the Liberian Crisis," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 34: 2 (1996): 293-306.

[35] Adeleke, 577.

[36] Adeleke, 577.

domination that is inherent amidst smaller West African countries.[37] As such, the Guinean elites saw their participation as an opportunity to project the country's image as a good neighbour in a bad neighbourhood. Accordingly, this participation was highly regarded by Nigeria, the United States and Great Britain. As discussed later, Guinea's participation turned out to be hugely rewarding for the Guinean elites.

Peace negotiation host

In addition to providing troops to support the peacekeeping operations in the regional wars, Guinea hosted several peace negotiations aimed at finding solutions to the conflicts in Liberia and Sierra Leone. In 1997 alone, Guinea hosted two ECOWAS Foreign Ministers' meetings aimed at resolving the conflicts in Sierra Leone. Nigeria convened a meeting of ECOWAS Foreign Ministers on 26 June 1997 in Conakry to discuss how the exiled President of Sierra Leone, Ahmad Tidian Kabbah, could be restored to power.[38] Although the meeting did not produce a peace agreement, it sent a clear message to the military junta in Sierra Leone that ECOWAS was firmly behind the exiled President Kabbah, a democratically elected leader. The meeting called on the military leader to step down and re-instate Kabbah as President. Following intense shuttle diplomacy between West African capitals, a second ECOWAS Foreign Ministers' meeting was held in Conakry on 22-23 October 1997. On the last day, the ECOWAS Six-Months Peace Plan was signed by Sierra Leone's military junta and ECOWAS foreign ministers. The peace plan became known as the Conakry Peace Accord. The terms of the accord stipulated that the military leadership should step down and reinstate Kabbah by April 1998.[39] Similarly, in June 2003, the World Conference of Religions and Peace (WCRP) sponsored a meeting for the Inter-Religious Councils of Liberia, Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Côte d'Ivoire.[40] Representatives of the Councils met in Guinea and discussed issues of conflict transformation and peace building in the sub-region.

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[37]Adeleke, 580-581.

[38] Abass Bundu, *Democracy by force?: a study of international military intervention in the civil war in Sierra Leone from 1991-2000* (Universal Publisher, 2001), 92.

[39]Julius Mutwol, *Peace agreements and civil wars in Africa: insurgent motivations, state response, and third party peacemaking in Liberia, Rwanda and Sierra Leone* (Cambria Press, 2009), 252.

[40]World Conference of Religion for Peace, 2003. "West Africa sub-region inter-religious coordinating committee", Conakry communiqué, 24 June 2003. http://ocha-http://ocha-gwapps1.unog.ch/rw/rwb.nsf/db900SID/ACOS-64CQN4?OpenDocument, (accessed on 12 June 2010)

By hosting these regional peace activities, the Guinean government aimed to present itself as "an active player in the process of regional conflict-resolution."[41] For example, when the Conakry Peace Plan was "hailed as a significant breakthrough"[42] by the international community, the Guinean elite used this diplomatic achievement to polish its regional image and promote Guinea as the "last bastion against instability, defending […] against rising trans-national warlords."[43]

Open refugee policy

Faced with refugees from neighbouring conflicts, the Guinean government adopted an open policy towards international humanitarian NGOs and the influx of refugees from Liberia and Sierra Leone, using it to cultivate the image of a 'hospitable neighbour.' For example, the government of Guinea did not merely create refugee camps. Rather, refugees were allowed to settle spontaneously within Guinean communities. Furthermore, the Guinean government welcomed a number of international humanitarian NGOs and interstate organizations, such as UNHCR, WFP, and WHO. Guinean officials used this hospitality to cement the country's image of 'good neighbour' in a 'bad neighbourhood' region. They used state-owned radio to explain to its international audience that:

> Guinea, indeed, more than any other regional country, has been harbouring the greatest number of people displaced as a result of the Liberian crisis and it is doing so with remarkable hospitality.[44]

The strategy was used by the highest Guinean officials. In 2001, President Conté encouraged visiting French and British officials to support "Guinea's efforts to restore and consolidate peace and security in the sub-region"[45] and he reassured them about Guinea's determination to assist the refugees.

Stability discourse

The aforementioned West African civil wars also provided Guinean elites the opportunity to emphasize the value of the country's stability against a region

[41] Bundu, 100.
[42] Bundu, 100.
[43] Cedric Jourde, "The International Relations of Small Neo-authoritarian States: Islamism, Warlordism, and the Framing of Stability," *International Studies Quarterly* 51: (2007), 493.
[44] Radio diffusion nationale de Guinee, March 15, 1993, cited in Jourde, 493.
[45] Radio diffusion nationale de Guinee, April 19, 2001, cited in Jourde, 493.

marked by violent conflicts. Unlike the hospitality discourse, which was mainly directed at external audiences, the stability discourse was aimed at both international and domestic audiences. For the international community, the government juxtaposed the country's stability against the image of a region marked by instability, rogue regimes, and violent warlords. Guinean officials highlighted the "threat posed by transnational networks of domestic opponents, regional warlords, and foreign refugees,"[46] in order to stress the importance of stability in Guinea. In doing so, Guinean officials hoped to capitalize on Western concerns over the region's stability, in order to mobilize their support for political stability. This was done by constructing a saviour identity where stability in Guinea was promoted as a necessary factor for resolving the sub-region's conflicts. For this purpose, the government was able to project the image of a stable 'good neighbour' in a war-torn region, willing to offer its own national stability for the purpose of regional peace. Emphasizing Guinea's stability as a rare and valuable asset was set against the threats of instability stemming from a loose network of domestic opponents, foreign refugees, and regional warlords. In summary, the hospitality and stability discourse used by the Guinean government was aimed at mobilizing political, military, and economic resources from Western countries, as well as harnessing national cohesion.

Enhancing domestic cohesion and improving external relations

Hypothesis 1: The risk of internal instability due to the spill-over effects of neighbouring wars provides governments the opportunity to reinforce the sense of national unity and to mobilize support for political stability.

Externally, the hospitality and stability discourse appears to have found a positive response among Western policy makers. This was evident from the repeated praise of Guinea for its decision to host regional refugees and to act as a good regional neighbour. For instance, after being nominated as the American ambassador to Guinea, Ambassador Barrie Walkley told the Senate Foreign Relations Committee that:

> despite its security concerns, Guinea has been the primary haven for up to 700,000 refugees fleeing West Africa's brutal wars. Guinea has stood up to Liberia's Charles Taylor and [the

[46] Jourde, 493.

> Revolutionary United Front] of Sierra Leone, and has forcefully defended its own borders.[47]

This endorsement was echoed by a spokesperson from the U.S. State Department who stated, "Guinea is one of Africa's most hospitable nations because it has hosted more than 500,000 refugees over the past decade."[48] During a visit to Guinea in 2001, General Wilford, the head of an American delegation of military officers, stressed that "Guinea has been playing [sic] in strengthening peace and stability in the sub-region," reaffirming his, "firm willingness to support Guinea's efforts in favour of security in West Africa."[49] Similarly, upon her visit to Guinea, the British Minister of Foreign Affairs, Clare Short, commended:

> General Lansana Conte and his government's actions towards the restoration and preservation of peace in the sub-region. Mrs Short paid tribute to the outstanding hospitality displayed by the Guinean people and government, which welcomed and sheltered several hundreds of refugees from Sierra Leone and Liberia.[50]

Domestically, the horror stories of civil war in neighbouring countries, narrated by refugees and images of devastation beamed to the population on state controlled mass media, nourished the stability discourse among the Guinean population. This discourse portrayed domestic political opponents as extremists aiming to destabilize the country in collaboration with regional rebel networks. This strategy was called upon frequently in two contexts—the election campaign and domestic unrest.

Election campaign

During the election campaigns of 1993 and 2003, the strategy of linking domestic political opposition with regional rebel networks was employed heavily by the ruling elites. In December 1993, after winning a highly disputed election, President Lansana Conté accused the opposition of working to destabilize the nation and warned Guineans to be vigilant:

> Today it is deplorable to note that despite the relentless efforts of well-meaning people who have mobilized for this last stage of the democratic process, the spirit of violence prevails over our country's most sacred values, tolerance and mutual

[47] Jourde, 498.
[48] Jourde, 498.
[49] Radio diffusion nationale de Guinee, August 29, 2001, cited in Jourde, 498.
[50] Radio diffusion nationale de Guinee, April 19, 2001, cited in Jourde, 498.

> assistance. This unfortunate situation has undermined the entire West African region, where the unbridled race for power with its ethnic hatred and division, succeeded in destabilizing the basis and foundation of […] societies. This scourge was avoided in the Republic of Guinea, and this is why I call on you for immediate awareness and to assume your responsibilities so that our country continues to be a model in the sub-region.[51]

Similarly, the government used the 2003 campaign, which was boycotted by the opposition, as an opportunity to depict political opponents as destabilizing forces. The President explained to the people that the opposition refused to participate in the electoral process because "they want to take over [power] by other means" and that their aim is "to see disorder in Guinea just like in the neighbouring countries." [52] In November 2000, the legislative election was postponed indefinitely by Presidential decree citing "the ongoing state of insecurity affecting the country"[53] due to the neighbouring civil wars. In addition, in mid-June 2001 a national referendum on a proposed constitutional amendment that would permit the President longer and limitless term in office was "justified […] by reference to the ongoing state of instability in the border region of Guinea."[54] The referendum proceeded despite strong criticism from opposition and human rights groups.

Domestic unrest

The Guinean elites have also used the stability discourse to mobilize support by linking domestic unrest to regional rebels and warlords. This was especially the case when a group of poorly paid junior soldiers staged a mutiny in the mid-1990s. In February, 1996 the ruling elite faced their first real challenge when angry soldiers mutinied and demanded back pay, a salary increase and better living conditions. Reports at the time indicated that the soldiers were earning less than a dollar a day.[55] As a result, the soldiers captured President Conté and forcibly escorted him to the Alpha Yaya Diallo military camp. Some 60 people were killed and another 300 injured.[56] The rebel soldiers disagreed on whether to instigate a regime change and then officers supportive of Conté settled the argument. In turn, Conté was released and returned to power after agreeing to

[51] Radio diffusion nationale de Guinee, December 29, 1993, cited in Jourde, 494.
[52] Jourde, 495.
[53] Englebert, 477.
[54] Englebert, 478.
[55] *Africa Confidential* (AC), "The war moves north," 42: 2 (26 January 2001), 3.
[56] Thomas E. O'Toole, *Historical Dictionary of Guinea* (Lanham: The Rowman & Littlefield Publishing Group, Inc., 2005), xIvii.

increase military pay. Following this incident, the government accused the opposition of:

> trying to mobilize mercenaries, money, and weapons from regional trans-national warlord networks, to establish training camps in Liberia and Sierra Leone, and to organize a 'fifth column' of Guineans and foreigners within Guinea.[57]

On another occasion, several armed men shot at President Conté's motorcade on 19 January 2005 in Conakry wounding a bodyguard. The attackers escaped and the security forces arrested around 100 people from the surrounding neighbourhood. Although the real authors of the attack were never identified and their motives never revealed, the official statement referred to them as "those who receive orders from abroad."[58] The Guinean government utilized instances of domestic unrest, such as this, to mobilize support for internal stability by directly accusing the opposition of trying to import instability with the help of regional rebels and warlords. How this strategy translated into increased material benefits in the form of military and economic assistance, as well as its implication for the country's stability, is the subject of the following sections.

Solidifying government's control over remote provinces

Hypothesis 2: Refugees in border regions creates economic activity and the infrastructure necessary to access such activities. This provides an opportunity for the host government to solidify its presence and control over remote provinces, which are usually starting points for rebellions.

In 1994, Guinea was accommodating some 500,000 refugees from civil wars in neighbouring Liberia and Sierra Leone. These refugees settled themselves spontaneously in Guinean communities between 1990 and 1993, an arrangement accepted by both the Guinean authorities and the UNHCR. As such, the government of Guinea did not create refugee camps. Rather, villages that welcomed refugees received support from aid intended for refugees. Most of these spontaneous settlements took place in Guinean villages and towns in regions bordering Liberia and Sierra Leone. Refugees outnumbered the local population

[57] Jourde, 494.
[58] International Crisis Group, "Stopping Guinea's slide," *Africa Report*, 94 (14 June 2005): 22-23.

considerably in some areas.[59] This demographic alteration presented the Guinean authorities and the international community with challenges often associated with refugees, such as pressure on the existing healthcare system and scarcity of economic opportunities in host communities. Faced with these obstacles, the Guinean government and UNHCR took measures to mitigate the negative impact of refugees on the healthcare system and local economy.

One measure was realised through an understanding between Guinea's Ministry of Health and the UNHCR, whereby refugees were permitted to use the countries health facilities, while the UNHCR would pay for the treatment of refugees as "a fee-for-service equivalent to that which Guinean patients pay."[60] As a result of this policy, the workload in the healthcare facilities increased considerably. As such, more funding from foreign donors was "directed to reinforce existing facilities, with the involvement of non-governmental organizations."[61] In addition, "supplementary health posts were created offering free health care to all habitants"[62] in areas with a high concentration of refugees and distant from existing health facilities.

The Guinean approach to handling refugees was in sharp contrast to more common refugee situations (with parallel health services). This led to two outcomes: an increase in the number of health centres where refugees could settle; and accelerated implementation of health coverage plans from refugee assistance programmes. In the Gueckédou region, for instance, many positive changes were made to the health system. These included repairing the district hospital of Gueckédou, improvements in supplies and equipment, and the training of staff. In the rural areas of Gueckédou, health centres and health posts increased from three in 1990 to 28 in 1995.[63] Similarly, in the heart of the region where a high number of refugees settled, "a 30-bed rural hospital with a full-time doctor was opened in early 1992."[64] In addition, permanent ambulance services at hospitals in rural

[59] Nicolette Lawrie, and Wim Van Damme, "The importance of refugee-host relations: Guinea 1990–2003," *Lancet* 362: 9383 (2003), 575.
[60] Wim Van Damme, Vincent De Brouwere, Marleen Boelaert, and Wim Van Lerberghe, "Effects of a refugee assistance programme on host population in Guinea as measured by obstetric interventions," *Lancet*, 351: 1609-1613 (1998), 1610.
[61] Wim Van Damme, "Do refugees belong in Camps? Experience from Goma and Guinea," *Lancet* 346: 8971(1995), 61.
[62] Van Damme, 1995, 361.
[63] Van Damme, 1998, 1610.
[64] Van Damme, 1998, 1610.

areas with a high concentration of refugees resulted in increased referrals to the district hospital in Gueckédou. This had a positive effect by increasing the availability of health services in the region. Moreover, the accessibility to these services was enhanced as "the ambulance was free of charge for refugees and Guineans alike."[65]

With respect to the economic dimension, studies have indicated that positive long-term change in the Guinean border regions outweighed the temporary negative effects often associated with large numbers of refugees.[66] It is apparent that the refugee influx in Guinea, and the relief it attracted, created financial opportunities and assistance that transformed the economies of remote rural areas. This is demonstrated in several examples. Freely settled refugees meant the availability of cheap labour and increased exploitation of agricultural resources. Reports indicate that rice production increased as a result of higher cultivation in the lower swamp areas – a common practice in Liberia, but hardly known in Guinea.[67] Many refugees participated in the local subsistence economy by exchanging labour for a share in the agricultural harvest. Agencies assisting the refugees employed hundreds of local staff.[68] Some refugees were given land by local authorities on a temporary basis in exchange for taxes and other services.[69] Reports indicate that relief food was sometimes resold to the population and that some Guineans registered as refugees and obtained free food.[70] The transportation infrastructure leading to areas in and around the settlements was substantially improved, especially where a high number of refugees settled. Roads and bridges were repaired, mainly to allow food aid to be transported to the refugee settlements.[71] However minor, the improved infrastructure increased trade in the area and strengthened the local economy and access to cash. In short, it is evident that the liberal refugee approach in Guinea had positive effects on the host population. Refugees were perceived by local people as an economic asset for villages and the population was generally positive towards them. This attitude played an important role in mitigating the negative impacts often associated with refugee influx.

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[65] Van Damme, 1998, 1611-1612.
[66] Van Damme, 1998, 1611.
[67] Van Damme, 1998, 1612.
[68] Van Damme, 1995, 61.
[69] Van Damme, 1995, 62.
[70] Van Damme, 1998, 1611.
[71] Van Damme, 1998, 1612.

Strengthening the national armed forces' capacity

Hypothesis 3: The risk of internal instability, due to the presence of neighbouring wars, provides an opportunity for governments to attract foreign military assistance and justifies increased spending on training, equipment and armed forces budgets.

In order to defend the Guinean state from internal rebellion and to secure its border against the spread of neighbouring wars, the Guinean armed forces were well trained, equipped and compensated. The international community was concerned that the regional conflict might spread to Guinea, therefore creating another humanitarian crisis in the region. This presented the Guinean government with opportunities to attract military aid from donor countries. The U.S. provided both economic and military aid to the Guinean regime in order to prevent it collapsing from rebellions. The military aid sought by the Guinean government varied from training and equipment to cash flow for covering salary increases often demanded by the security forces. The United States increased economic aid to Guinea from $22.5 million in 1998 to $35.6 million in 2002.[72] This was considered by some observers as broadening U.S. aid to Guinea, beyond the usual aid often restricted to primary education and healthcare. Although the assistance package at this stage did not include direct budgetary or foreign exchange support, it nevertheless sent a message of moral support for Guinea in the face of a destabilizing threat from neighbouring wars. In 1998 the U.S. State Department and its Embassy in Guinea requested the U.S. Special Operations Command send "a Joint Combined Exchange Training Program (JCET) team to work with Guinean forces on military activities designed to protect the Guinean border."[73] As a result, a resident military attaché was assigned to the U.S. Embassy in Conakry for the first time and the JCET was initiated. The U.S. military sent a second training team in 2000, which provided basic training to Guinean forces in border security, small weapons, and martial arts. The total military training aid increased from $100,000 in 1998 to $300,000 in 2001. The U.S. also increased its military support to Guinea in the aftermath of the September 2000 attacks on Guinean frontier villages, launching a programme in 2001 to "train an 800-man

[72] Dane F. Smith Jr., "US-Guinea relations during the rise and fall of Charles Taylor," *Journal of Modern African Studies,* 44:3(2006), 434.
[73] Smith, 434.

ranger battalion over a 6-month period as a rapid reaction force."[74] As a result of this programme, the Guinean army received vehicles, communications equipment and uniforms. According to Smith, the composition of the battalion was carefully chosen to include representatives from Guinea's different ethnic groups, and the Guinean government committed itself to maintain the battalion as an integrated unit.[75] During the same time period, the Chinese government, for its part, trained several hundred Guinean army commandos.[76]

In addition to economic and military aid, the U.S. provided moral support to Guinea. The support was necessary for political stability in the country, which faced economic stagnation and growing opposition to its autocratic ruler. In this regard, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright visited Conakry during a trip to Sierra Leone in October 1999 and held a meeting with President Conté. This was the first contact of a senior U.S. official since Conté's visit to Washington, D.C. in 1988. Although the subject of the meeting was the Sierra Leone conflict, it was also a signal that the government of Guinea enjoyed U.S. backing against the threat of rebel groups in the sub-region.[77] Despite U.S. concerns about human rights practices and political freedom in Guinea, it did not preclude the provision of military assistance. According to some observers, including a former U.S. Ambassador to Guinea, if it weren't for U.S. concerns over regional stability this type of military cooperation would not have been possible with Guinea.[78]

Concluding remarks

Based on the evidence presented in this study, it is apparent that the argument in *Hypothesis 1* has been largely confirmed. It was found that the Guinean government constructed a hospitality and stability discourse, through which it was able to mobilize the population behind the government's narrative of what constitutes a threat to internal stability. This narrative included linking domestic political opposition to regional rebel groups, as well as the prospect of the 'spill over effects' of regional instability through domestic political opposition. Based on the available data, it appears that the Guinean population's fear of instability

[74] Smith, 434.
[75] Smith, 434.
[76] Alexis Arieff, "Still standing: neighbourhood wars and political stability in Guinea," *Journal of Modern African Studies*, 47:3 (2009): 331-348.
[77] Smith, 434.
[78] Smith; Arieff.

could explain why opposition groups failed to mount a mass mobilization against the regime. Similarly, *Hypothesis 2* has been confirmed. It is evident that there was a positive response among international donors to the government's narrative on the refugee issue. This resulted in the improvement of infrastructure like roads and healthcare facilities, as well as, the economies of Guinea's border regions where refugees settled. These improvements "increased the […] administrative presence" of the government in these remote regions therefore, "leading to increased local identification with and allegiance to the Guinean state."[79] Hence, based on evidence presented in this study, it is apparent that Guinea's troubled remote provinces remained largely stable despite repeated cross-border clashes between rebel groups and government forces. The government was able to maintain stability in these provinces and to prevent the escalation of violence. This finding is significant due to the fact that identification with one's government is widely believed to enhance the perceived legitimacy of the said government among the population. Due to such legitimacy, it can be asserted that the domestic challenges facing governments are less likely to take the form of violence and affect political and social stability. More significantly, previous studies conclude that most civil wars often start from troubled remote regions due to the absence of functioning government institutions.[80] With regards to *Hypothesis 3*, it was found that military assistance from major powers to Guinea and the increased spending on training, equipment and military funding was justified on the grounds that neighbouring wars might spread to Guinea. Undoubtedly, this assistance increased the capacity of the Guinean military to defend the country against regional rebel networks and domestic destabilizing forces. Although the outbreak of civil wars in Guinea's regional neighbours and the influx of refugees fleeing from these wars presented a threat to its stability, I conclude that measures taken by the Guinean state and its international partners successfully mitigated the 'bad neighbourhood effect' on Guinea.

[79] Arieff, 339.
[80] Collier and Hoeffler 1998; Collier and Hoeffler, 2004.

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Chapter Six: Synthesis and Conclusion

This chapter discusses how the papers – *Stability in Deeply Divided Societies* (Chapter 2), the *Military and Politics* (Chapter 3), *Mining for Peace* (Chapter 4), and *Mitigating the 'Bad Neighbourhood Effect'* (Chapter 5) – correspond to each other, how they can be seen as responding to, how they illuminate different parts of the discussion on theory and methodology in the introductory chapter, and provides the concluding remarks. First, the correspondence between the papers is examined in terms of their thematic and logical connectivity. Second, the theoretical contributions of the papers are explained through the demonstration of how stability of a 'Minority Rule', Quasi-Ethnicity in the Military, Selective Redistribution mechanisms and External Conflict Internal Cohesion, provide the explanation of why Guinea has been spared from armed conflict and civil war (see figure 1 and table 1).

6.1. Correspondence between the papers

Although the papers in this thesis are stand-alone, each one of them furthers the debate on state resilience to armed conflicts. As discussed in Chapter 1, the papers are associated with academic debates centred on four distinct theoretical approaches to the study of armed conflicts and/or civil war onset, and should be seen as stand-alone research outcomes. Nevertheless, they mutually support each other towards an understanding of the endurance of peace in an African state despite the existence of unfavourable conditions. As such, even though the four papers can be viewed as stand-alone, there are thematic and logical connections between them.

6.1.1. Thematic connectivity

Thematically, the four papers support each other on the interplay between internal and external factors that mitigated large-scale violence in Guinea. On the domestic front, the papers share the perspective on the military as a key agency in Guinea's stability. As such, in each of the four papers, an aspect of the military establishment, in relations to political stability, is examined. Likewise, Guinea's international partners' role in maintaining domestic stability is a recurrent theme in all papers.

6.1.1.1. On the domestic factors: the role of the military

The issue of the ethnicization of the Guinean military and its potential destabilizing effects has been addressed by both *Stability in Deeply Divided Societies* (Chapter 2) and *Military and Politics* (Chapter 3). The two papers communicate through the use of instrumentalism as an analytical framework to shed light on the relationship between the military establishment and ethnic identity attachments on one side and political stability on the other. *Stability in Deeply Divided Societies* shows that a large part of the Guinean population promptly linked the 1985 coup attempts with ethnic affiliations, therefore risking the outbreak of large-scale communal violence. However, the government's instrumental interpretation of the coup acted as a major factor in maintaining political stability in the country during the crisis. Similarly, the discussion in *Military and Politics* shows that the absence of excessive ethnic favouritism in the military led to a degree of cohesion being maintained within the military establishment, thereby preventing the Guinean military from the tendency in many West African military establishments to degenerate over time toward ethnic polarization and/or factionalism. Both papers, therefore share the idea that although the Guinean army was far from being a monolithic group, its corporate interests trumped the effect of any lines of fracture such as ethnic, factional or generational differences and, therefore, reinforced an instrumental interpretation of its political behaviour and the resultant stability.

The other two papers *Mining for Peace* (Chapter 4) and *Mitigating the 'Bad Neighbourhood Effect'* (Chapter 5) communicate with each other in their view on the ways in which the Guinean military was strengthened and political stability resulted. Whereas *Mining for Peace* emphasizes the role of mineral resources in securing military expenditures and the resultant strengthening of the military, *Mitigating the 'Bad Neighbourhood Effect'* discusses how regional conflict dynamics enabled the Guinean government to justify military spending and attract foreign military aid. In short, the four papers arrived at the conclusion that Guinea's stability owes much to the existence of a strong military which was sufficiently coherent to withstand the effect of the many lines of fracture such as ethnic, personal and generational differences thereby able to defend the state from destabilizing events.

6.1.1.2. On the external factors: Guinea's international partners

Apart from the military, the two papers, *Mining for peace* and *Mitigating the 'Bad Neighbourhood Effect'*, also communicate with each other in their view on the role of Guinea's international partners in maintaining domestic stability. *Mining for Peace* discusses how successive Guinean regimes have been able to draw external support for internal stability due to the mounting interest in the country's vast reserves in mineral resources. The paper asserts that the strategic importance of bauxite for the manufacture of military and civilian aircraft during the Cold War and the growing demands for mineral resources in recent decades shaped Guinea's international partners' responses to its foreign economic policy in a manner that strengthened internal stability in the country. Similarly, *Mitigating the 'Bad Neighbourhood Effect'* shows that armed conflicts in Guinea's near neighbourhood provided the regime in Conakry with the opportunities to formulate a narrative of what constituted a threat to regional stability. This narrative was then 'sold' to Guinea's international partners whose positive response to the narrative worked in favour of domestic stability in the country. In this way, the two papers can be seen as complementing each other in highlighting the external factors that have played an important role in averting open conflicts in Guinea.

6.1.2. Logical connectivity

Beside the thematic correspondence between the papers, there is also a logical connection between them. Although each paper deals with an aspect of conflict management in Guinea in relation to deep ethnic divisions, the politicised military, natural resources abundance and 'bad neighbourhood', the paper *Stability in Deeply Divided Societies*, lays the ground for the discussion on these issues by tackling the nation-building process. Starting with the emphasis on the importance of a strong national identity in mitigating the negative effects of deep ethnic divisions on political stability, the paper offers an historical perspective of ethnic politics as a potential source of violent conflict. It traces the relationship between ethnicity and political mobilization prior to independence (1946-1958); during the First Republic (1958-1984); and in the Second Republic (from 1984 to present). As such, the paper provides an overall, bird's-eye-view look at crisis and conflicts resulting from interactions among Guineans throughout various periods of their history and the mechanisms they developed to avert these conflicts from

transforming into large-scale violence. After all, it is people who compete for the control of state apparatus and resources. It is therefore logical to start by looking at people's interactions from an identity perspective. The resultant cooperation and/or confrontation among Guineans from various ethnic and regional belongings are then further examined in subsequent papers for the kind of political stability which resulted.

The analysis of the nation-building process is then followed, in *Military and Politics*, by the examination of the Guinean armed forces as the most important segment of the state, for the kind of role it plays in the security of both the state and the people. After that, the most important commodity of the Guinean economy is discussed in *Mining for Peace*, highlighting the security aspects of Guinea's mineral resources, in relation to fiscal stability and military expenditure. Finally, in *Mitigating the 'Bad Neighbourhood Effect'*, Guinea's surrounding security environment is analysed in relations to the elements of ethnicity, the military and natural resources discussed in previous papers. In short, the papers are arranged in a way that the Guinean people and their history are discussed first. Then, the most important institution for state and the people's security – the armed forces – is discussed. This is followed by the discussion of the security aspect of the most important component of the Guinean economy – the mineral sector. Finally, the interaction between the Guinean state and its surrounding security environment is explained.

6.2. Theoretical and methodological issues emerging from the papers

Drawing on recurrent themes in the literature on recent civil wars and armed conflicts in West African nations, the basic point of departure for this thesis was the observation that theoretically, the persistence of peace in Guinea represents a challenge to dominant models of civil war onset and/or armed conflict in West Africa and the related assumptions that deep ethnic divisions, a politicised military, an abundance of natural resources alongside extreme poverty, and being located in a regionalized conflict zone, constitute a dangerous combination against sustaining a country's peace and stability. In the course of this investigation, it has been shown how the Guinean state, as a developing nation, has been able to withstand the effects of such unfavourable conditions for peace. In the following discussion, we examine the theoretical and methodological contributions that

emerge from the study, in explaining: 1) why Guinea did not go to war; 2) how to refine the existing models that failed to explain the Guinean case through the use of the deviant case study method explained in the introductory chapter.

Figure 1 below illustrates the way in which aspects of the theoretical outcome were used to construct a 'Stability in Vulnerability' framework. This model provided the lens through which the researcher sought to explains the dynamism of peace and conflict transformation that led to the absence of armed conflicts in Guinea despite the odds, i.e. negative peace (as defined in Chapter 1 [section 1.3.1]).

Figure 1: Stability in Vulnerability model



Table 1 below provides a summary of the composition of each part that contributed towards the construction of a 'Stability in Vulnerability' model, namely: stability of minority rule; quasi-ethnicity in the military; selective redistribution; and external conflict internal cohesion. Specifically, the table provides details of the internal working relationships within each part that have guided the data analysis in chapter 2, 3, 4 and 5.

Table 1: Main components of 'Stability in Vulnerability' model

<table>
<tr>
<td>Stability of minority rule
(Chapter 2)
1. Characteristics of Major ethnic groups:
• strong primordial attachment to identity
• historical power rivalry
• closely matched (numbers and resources)
2. A president from a small minority ethnic group
⇩
Inclusive politics</td>
<td>Quasi-ethnicity in the military
(Chapter 3)
1. Militarization of:
• public administration
• the economy
• the judiciary
2. Co-option of the military (lavish spending)
⇩
Ethnic-like behaviour
⇩
Cohesive military</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Selective Redistribution
(Chapter 4)
1. Primary group composition:
• powerful ministers
• business persons (closely associated with the presidency)
• high echelon in the military
• presidential guards
2. Secondary group composition:
• mid-ranking officers
• mid + lower level administrators
• private sector business persons (close to the presidency)
• privileged persons (notable tribal families and religious authorities)
⇩
Elite cohesion</td>
<td>External conflict internal cohesion
(Chapter 5)
1. Stability and hospitability discourse to justify:
• additional security measures
• increased security spending
• increased foreign aid
• 'discount' in human right and democracy from international partners
⇩
Domestic cohesion</td>
</tr>
</table>

6.2.1. The political stability of a 'minority rule'

Although noted scholars have argued that the rule of a demographic minority group in deeply divided societies tends to lead to large-scale violence,[1] the findings in this study suggests that such an outcome can be avoided and that political stability can follow the rule of a president from a demographic minority. As in *Stability in Deeply Divided Societies*, it is demonstrated that the ethnic minority factor of President Conté dissuaded opposition groups from initiating a violent overthrow of his regime. This behaviour of the opposition can be attributed to the lack of serious threats to their interests from such a minority rule and the uncertain outcome of political violence in a deep ethnically divided society.

The resultant stability from this minority rule within the context of deep ethnic divisions in Guinea suggests that the presumed nexus, in the literature, between minority rule in deeply divided societies and violent conflicts can be refined by the introduction of new variables, i.e. whether or not the minority president adopts an instrumental or primordial approach to ethnicity, and the extent to which the larger ethnic groups manifest primordial attachments to politics (Figure 1 and table 1). President Conté was from the minority Soussou ethnic group which represents only 15% of the population and therefore seemed unlikely to be able to rely on his own ethnic Sossou to dominate the main opposition groups, the Fulanis 40% and the Malinkés 35%. On the one hand, this situation led President Conté to an 'inclusive' approach to ethnicity and politics, in the instrumentalist sense. On the other hand, being nearly matched in numbers and probably in resources, the Fulanis and the Malinkés were also locked in a primordial competition for power since independence, therefore, President Conté's 'inclusiveness' alleviated the fear among the Fulanis and Malinkés of being perpetually dominated.

In short, it is apparent that in Guinea, the two largest ethnic groups, the Fulanis and the Malinkés, had a strong primordial attachment to their ethnicity which prevented them from political compromises among themselves (Chapter 2). At the same time, the two groups where nearly matched in number and probably

[1] Ernest Gellner, *Nations and nationalism* (Ithaca, New York: Cornell University Press, 1983), 1; Lars-Erik Cederman and Luc Girardin, "Beyond Fractionalization: Mapping Ethnicity onto Nationalist Insurgencies," *The American Political Science Review* 101, 1(2007): 176; James D. Fearon, Kimuli Kasara and David D Laitin "Ethnic Minority Rule and Civil War Onset," *The American Political Science Review* 101, 1(2007): 187.

resources so that the outcome of an attempt for violent removal of President Conté, was uncertain. As such, both groups settled with the demographically minority president whose ethnic group was less likely to be able to dominate the state and threaten any of the two groups' vital interest.

6.2.2. A political stability of quasi-ethnicity in the military

As in *Military and Politics*, the quasi-ethnicity in the military approach, has proven to be a valuable tool for the interpretation of military cohesion and its resultant stability in Guinea. The introduction of this approach, in its instrumental sense, as an analytical tool enabled the author to go beyond the traditional civil-military relation approach, thereby revealing important lapses in the politicised military-conflicts-nexus arguments in the existing literature. The use of instrumentalism to explain military behaviour in politics has helped clarify the puzzle of why military cohesion could be maintained in Guinea despite a protracted military involvement in politics (1984-2010). As such, the widely accepted assumption in the literature that military disintegration and violence often follow protracted military rule in West African nations has been called into question. Although the Guinean military dominated the political life of the country for more than a quarter of a century, the study reveals that the military maintained cohesion by behaving as a quasi-ethnic group. As such, the quasi-ethnicity in the military approach suggests that when a military establishment behaves as a quasi-ethnic group, in the instrumentalist sense, this behaviour is likely to prevent it from degeneration into factionalism that results in violent conflicts as suggested by the dominant literature.

The behaviour of armed forces as an ethnic group varies from case to case. In Guinea, the vested interests of the military establishment and the ruling elites in preserving the system led to the Guinean military's behaviour as a quasi-ethnic group. The study demonstrates that, alongside the civilian administration, the military had inserted itself in most of the vital organs of the Guinean state through the militarisation of public administration, the economy and the judiciary. This non-written agreement between the ruling elites and the military establishment to preserve the system for the mutual benefits it provided the two entities, led to a sustained stability despite the vulnerability of the system to armed conflict, in

particular, during President Conté's rule, thereby reinforcing the instrumental approach.

The 2008 coup provided further opportunity to test the 'instrumental' explanation of military behaviour in politics under a different leadership. The suppression of an opposition rally led to large-scale killings of civilians carried out by the Presidential Guard in September 28, 2009 and an assassination attempt made on the President, Captain Moussa Dadis Camara, followed. After these events the military became subject to mounting domestic and international pressures to relinquish power to civilians. This led to a major rift within the military on whether to cling to power. However, the argument was settled by officers who persuaded their opponents that the corporate interest of the military would be better served by a return to civilian rule. Such behaviour lends supports to the instrumental approach under different circumstances and leadership.

The use of quasi-ethnicity in the military in Guinea, in the instrumental sense, sheds light on an important aspect of civil-military relations in Guinea during the period between 1958 and 2008. It was uncovered that the relatively low cost of the Guinean military under Sékou Touré compared with the subsequent massive escalation of Guinea's military expenditures was a fundamental shift in strategy, from President Touré to President Conté. Both leaders feared the threats the military establishment posed to their rule, but the two leaders developed two very different strategies for dealing with such threats. While President Touré opted to reduce spending on the armed forces, thereby weakening the military establishment, President Conté opted for the strategy of co-option by lavish expenditure, thereby strengthening the military. Both strategies worked for the stability of the country over divergent time periods. During President Touré's era in the 1960s, 1970s and mid-1980s a small military was an impetus for political stability in the West African region where military coups were largely the primary source of instability and political unrest. However, during President Conté's rule in the late 1980s, 1990s and early 2000s, a weak, underpaid and disorganized national army in the face of increased armed rebellions in the region proved fatal in many West African nations. Thus, President Conté's strategy of strengthening the military served to provide stability in the country. In short, the outcome of the case study of Guinea strengthens the quasi-ethnicity in the military approach as a viable tool for the analysis of political behaviour of the military in developing

nations. According to Lijphart, if a theory is not based on a large number of cases, its general propositions can be strengthened appreciably by the demonstration that one more case fits the theory.[2] This finding, therefore contributes towards the building of a sound quasi-ethnicity in the military approach to the study of civil-military relations in developing nations that goes beyond the traditional civil-military relations.

6.2.3. The political stability of selective redistribution

As in *Mining for Peace*, the use of selective redistribution as an analytical framework has contributed positively in explaining why poverty, wealth and peace existed side by side in Guinea. Under a selective redistribution system, resources are often channelled to a small circle and/or group of elites. As in chapter 4, Guinea's selective redistribution system consisted mainly of a primary and a secondary group (Figure 1 and Table 1). The primary group was composed of a small group of individuals close to the Presidency, also known as 'presidential entourage'. Membership of this group was comprised of powerful ministers, higher echelons of the military hierarchy, the presidential guards and those businessmen close to the Presidency. The secondary group consists of mid-and lower ranking officers, mid-and lower level state administrators, private sector businessmen and a privileged section of the population (religious leaders and tribal dynastic families). The two groups monopolised much of the import and export businesses, non-competitive state contracts, tax exemptions and other favours, thereby giving them 'a stranglehold on the economy'. However, individuals in both groups had their own clientele networks through which the resources were channelled to them from above to trickle down in order to ensure loyalty from below and maintain the system's cohesion. As such, this study provides the ground for more research that may further discredit the myth that resource-rich countries with extreme poverty will descend into armed conflicts, thereby providing a fair understanding of how open conflicts within under-developed resource-rich states might be averted, albeit, in the negative peace tradition, as explained in the introductory chapter (1.3.1).

[2] Arend Lijphart, "Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method," *American Political Science Review* 65, no. 3 (1971):692.

6.2.4. External conflict internal cohesion

The above mentioned internal dynamic of conflict management can also be linked with external factors, particularly during the 1990s and 2000s. As in Chapter 5, *Mitigating the 'Bad Neighbourhood Effect'*, Guinea's surrounding regional instability provided opportunities for the consolidation of domestic peace. The widespread incidences of regional wars and the influx of refugees fleeing these conflicts invoked the interest of major powers in the political stability of Guinea. As the paper shows, the international community invested a lot of diplomatic effort and economic aid in an effort to maintain stability in the country. More importantly, the Guinean government and its international partners paid particular attention to the strengthening of the Guinean armed forces through military aid and training in border control. In addition, the external conflicts ensured that most officers who might have been involved in challenging the state and President Conté's regime were sent to fight in the neighbours' wars as part of the regional interventions to end these wars. This served as a diversion from internal threat to outside challenges and guaranteed financial gains in terms of salaries and benefits from participation to the ECOMOG forces in both Sierra Leone and Liberia.

Internally, the external wars enabled the state to mobilize forces against domestic disturbances and served as a justification for extreme measures such as the introduction of roadblocks across the country. These roadblocks served both economic and security purposes. Economically, the extortion from roadblocks enriched the rank and file of security forces, informally supplementing their salaries.[3] It also served as a security guarantor for the regime against potential rebellion from inside the country.[4] As such, the Guinean case demonstrates that the effects of such unfavourable conditions – bad neighbourhoods – on political stability not only can be successfully mitigated, but also can be turned to opportunities for the state to mobilize national and international resources in order to increase internal cohesion, solidify control over borders, strengthen its national armed forces' capacities and enhance its external relations.

[3] A study on the economic aspect of roadblocks during the civil war in Ivory Coast found that "the number of checkpoints along a route [was] directly linked to the route's economic profitability" than being "where combatants and arms were suspected of entering the country", see Mike McGovern, *Making War in Côte d'Ivoire* (London: Hurst & Co. Ltd., 2011), 186.

[4] Crisis Group 2005, 15-16.

This finding is in conformity with the findings of earlier studies that roadblocks in West Africa are often linked "to the proliferation of repressive state structures for putting down social movements, or undertaking shakedowns by police, gendarmes, militias and presidential guards". [5] The paper therefore, contributes to the strengthening of the 'under studied' literature on the External Conflict Internal Cohesion approach (ECIC) which stipulates that, contrary to the 'bad neighbourhood effect' theory, nations are not necessarily 'helpless' in the face of potential spill over effects. According to Lijphart, the demonstration that one case fits a theory which is based on a few cases can appreciably strengthen the theory.[6] Thus, considering Guinea's resilient peace as a deviation from the general propositions of the mainstream literature on the spill-over effects, has led to the uncovering of additional variables that were not previously considered in the analysis of refugees-host relations: the advantage of integrating refugees into host countries' economy and healthcare system, rather than the construction of a parallel system to accommodate them. As mentioned earlier, Lijphart argued that the uncovering of previously overlooked variables is one of the major theoretical contributions of the deviant case study approach.[7]

6.3. Concluding remarks

For discontent to develop into rebellion requires a whole series of contingent, mediating factors that are beyond my – and I daresay most other observers – capacity to formulate simply (James Scott, 2005). [8]

The central objective of this study has been to investigate the ways in which the state as a developing nation is able to sustain domestic peace in unfavourable conditions. This task was undertaken through the examination of Guinea's resilient peace. Working towards this aim, the study examined four research questions linked to the theme of the relationship between identity politics, politicised military, natural resource abundance alongside extreme poverty, and a conflict ridden neighbourhood on the one hand, and domestic peace on the other. This investigation yielded several important methodological and theoretical

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[5] A. Mbember, "Pouvoir, violence et accumulation," *Politique Africaine* no. 39 (L'Afrique autrement, 1990), quoted in McGovern, *Making War in Côte d'Ivoire*, 185.

[6] Lijphart, *Comparative Politics*, 692.

[7] Arend Lijphart, "Book review", Division and Cohesion in Democracy: A Study of Norway, by Harry Eckstein, *The Journal of Modern History* 41, 1 (1969): 86.

[8] James Scott, "Afterword to 'Moral Economies, State Spaces, and Categorical Violence'," American Anthropologist 107, 3 (2005): 395-402 [Quoted in Mike McGovern, *Making War in Côte d'Ivoire* (London: Hurst & Co. Ltd, 2011), 179].

insights outlined in the preceding sections of this chapter. The remainder of the chapter will recapitulate the main findings of this inquiry in relation to the four research questions and point to some questions and avenues for further theoretical and empirical research.

Question 1

The first question was derived from the observation of the existing discrepancy between deep ethnic division and the endurance of peace in Guinea. As discussed in chapter 2, Guinea falls within the category of countries described by the existing literature as deeply divided nations ethnically, thereby vulnerable to ethnically induced armed conflicts. To find out the mechanisms through which Guinea was able to withstand this threat to its security, the first question was phrased as follows:

How has Guinea avoided plunging into ethnically based armed conflict?

To begin to address this question, it was necessary to examines how various schools of thought conceive the relationship between ethnic identity awareness and armed conflict. As demonstrated in chapter 2, despite the divergent views among primordial, instrumental and constructivist approaches concerning what constitutes an ethnic identity, these schools agree that such identity is prone to manipulation by elite members of groups. The task was, therefore, to demonstrate how the use and/or misuse of ethnic identity shed light on political stability in Guinea. For this purpose, a historical perspective to ethnic tensions in Guinea was undertaken and the mechanisms developed to avert these tensions from transforming into large-scale violent conflicts were identified.

It was found that between 1958 and 1984, a strong national identity that cut across ethnicity and regional groupings was constructed based on elements from Guinea's pre-colonial history, common suffering, religious symbols and cultural practices. Specifically localized cultural policies that largely responded to various groups' needs of belonging at the group level were formulated and tied with the socialist ideology of the state at the national level. The result was a strong sense of belonging to the state that enabled President Touré's government to mobilize resources for defending the state against destabilizing forces during the 1960s,

1970s and the early 1980s. This outcome is in conformity with the constructivist approach to ethnic identity discussed in chapter 2.

However, the period between 1984 and 2008 witnessed a change of the president's ethnicity from a larger ethnic group to a smaller one, thereby presenting an additional risk of armed conflicts. Nevertheless, this risk was largely mitigated. Firstly, hailing from a small minority, President Conté could not afford to alienate the larger ethnic groups and therefore adopted a rather inclusive rule during his time in office. This degree of inclusiveness mitigated ethnically based grievances against the regime. Secondly, none of the larger ethnic groups, who were the main opposition, perceived a serious threat to its interests from a president who hailed from a minority group, therefore, due to their primordial rivalry and the uncertain outcome of an armed rebellion in deep ethnically divided societies, the opposition groups were unable and/or unwilling to mount an armed rebellion for the removal of President Conté, leading to sustained stability of the regime. This outcome is in conformity with the instrumentalist approach to ethnicity discussed in chapter 2. Yet, since 2008, political pluralism has been reintroduced in Guinea and primordial attachments to ethnic politics have dramatically increased, resulting in significant election related violence. Thus, the question of whether deep ethnic divisions will lead Guinea to the kind of armed conflicts that ravaged most of Guinea's neighbour in recent decades or towards sustained stability remains open-ended, but the answer will depend on how ethnicity is used and/or misused by the political elites.

Question 2

To provide a much-needed explanation of the interconnection between the political behaviour of the military and sustained stability in a region where protracted military involvement in politics has often led to armed conflict and vice-versa, the thesis has relied on a model that perceives military behaviour in politics through the lens of an ethnic group's behaviour. This is important because the model carries the analysis beyond the conventional civil-military relations discussion. Drawing on Zirker, Danopoulos and Simpson's quasi-ethnicity in the military model of analysing the political behaviour of the military in developing countries, a second research question was devised based on the instrumental sense of the model:

Why has the Guinean state remained resilient to armed conflicts following protracted military involvement in politics?

The idea behind this question was to facilitate the exploration of the linkages between military behaviour in politics and political stability, by looking specifically at how an ethnic group-like behaviour of the military affects its internal cohesion and the unity among its members. As discussed at length in Chapter 3, the ethnic-like behaviour of the Guinean military enabled this institution to sustain a degree of cohesiveness and the unity required to preserve its corporate interest that superseded any other differences that might have existed within the establishment. Being fairly strong and coherent, the military establishment created a system of rule whereby its interest was well articulated, thereby preventing the country from descending into 'coup-traps' – prevalent in most West African nations – and the accompanying armed conflicts. The need to preserve the system marked the intersection point between the interest of the military and that of the political elites. Both entities were well served by the system. Thus, protracted military involvement in Guinea's political affairs did not lead to armed conflict. Instead, based on the evidence presented, the vested interest of the military in preserving the system contributed to the political stability of the country during the period between 1984 and 2010. Accordingly, the question of whether the democratic election of Alpha Condé to the presidency in 2010 does mean that Guinea has turned toward democracy, with a subordinated military, although beyond the scope of this study, merits further research.

Question 3

The recent findings that there exists a strong correlation between the availability of abundant natural resources and the onset of recent civil wars and armed conflicts in West African nations, prompted the need to explain Guinea's resilient peace alongside the duality of wealth and poverty in the country. To find out the mitigating factors that might have permitted the existence of peace side by side with extreme poverty alongside abundant natural resources in a region where such combination has led to large scale violence, the third question was phrased as:

Why has the presence of abundant natural resources coupled with extreme poverty among most Guineans failed to be associated with the onset of armed conflicts in Guinea?

To address this question, the internal dynamics of Guinea's political economy was analysed in the context of structural adjustment programmes and the global strategic importance of mineral resources. As in chapter 4, the investigation led to the discovery that the availability of these resources permitted successive Guinean regimes to resist conflict-prone austerity measures imposed by the structural adjustment programmes, adopt selective redistribution mechanisms favourable to domestic stability, and maintain a foreign economic policy compatible with internal stability. These measures contributed towards a degree of political stability thereby mitigating against the onset of armed conflicts in Guinea. Nevertheless they also perpetuated a politico-economic system where enormous inequality prevailed thereby keeping most Guineans under abject poverty. Thus, with the reintroduction of political pluralism in early 2010s, and ethnic tensions beginning to play out in Guinea's mining sector, it remains uncertain whether long term political stability can be sustained based on previous regimes' policies towards the country's mineral resources.

Question 4

Drawing on the insights provided by the investigation of the 'spill over effects' of armed conflicts to geographically proximate neighbourhoods, the fourth question to be addressed was:

> *How has Guinea been able to sustain domestic peace in a regionalized conflict zone?*

Drawing on the existing literature on the contagion effect of proximal armed conflicts, it was pointed out that from the perspective of peace and conflicts studies, a central concern is that the outbreak of civil war in geographically proximate neighbourhoods and the influx of refugees present a real threat to a country's stability. However, developing the theoretical framework for explaining the resilience of peace in Guinea, it was argued that proximal armed conflicts could also provide the state with opportunities to consolidate domestic peace through: enhancing domestic cohesion and improving external relations; solidifying government control over remote provinces; and strengthening the capacity of national armed forces. These propositions were converted into three hypotheses and tested in chapter 5. It was found that the Guinean government was able to use the outbreak of civil wars in Guinea's neighbourhoods and the influx

of refugees fleeing from these wars, to construct a hospitality and stability discourse as a narrative of what constituted a threat to regional security and the importance of Guinea's stability in mitigating such threats. This Guinean narrative of peace and conflict in the West African region was successfully 'sold' to the domestic audience and to Guinea's international partners, resulting in enhanced internal cohesion, improved external relations, solidified government control over remote provinces, and strengthened national armed forces' capacity. These findings led to the conclusion that the combined efforts of the Guinean state and its international partners worked in favour of resilient peace in the country despite the unfavourable neighbourhood conditions.

6.4. Avenues for Future Research

The findings from the Guinean case study suggest that when a military establishment is well entrenched in the political, economic and legal system of a country, it tends to behave as a quasi-ethnic group and that both cohesion of the military and longevity of the regime will follow. This finding can be further tested as to whether it can also be applicable to other cases in West Africa and other parts of the world where armed conflicts did not follow military intervention in political affairs. Using quasi-ethnicity in the military as a model for further case studies will shed more light on additional circumstances under which military establishments are likely to behave in a quasi-ethnic manner, in the instrumental sense, thereby leading to cohesion and regime longevity. The findings of such studies will address an important security gap in the face the growing phenomenon of radical ideological armed groups in West Africa and the Sahel region. The recent events in Mali and Nigeria connected to these groups suggest that states whose regimes choose to weaken its military would do so at their own peril. These events present a security dilemma for new democracies in the region, namely: How to balance between the need to break with the legacy of protracted military entrenchment in politics and the maintenance of a strong military that is able to defend the state against destabilizing events. By studying military behaviour through the lens of ethnic group behaviour, this model is able to utilize the vast amount of literature surrounding ethnicity to address "the problems and

promises of military establishments in developing countries,"[9] thereby advancing interdisciplinary research of political behaviour of military establishments in developing nations that goes beyond the conventional civil-military relations discussion.

Another avenue for further study is election related violence – that is, violence directly associated with an electoral contest, either before, during, or after a poll has taken place. As this study shows, the reintroduction of political pluralism in Guinea in early 2010s has led to significant election related violence. Both presidential and parliamentary elections in Guinea have been accompanied with widespread violence ranging from clashes between the security forces and party supporters, riots, communal violence and coercive intimidation of voters. As discussed in chapter 2, such events are representative of deeper ethnic tensions in the country that surfaced with the new democratic process. Beside the threats of undermining the legitimacy of the electoral process associated with such violence, it also risks the outbreak of armed conflict. Further research that focuses on how to prevent election related violence in Guinea not only will spare Guineans from the immediate human and material costs of such violence, but also reduce the chances of an outbreak of armed conflicts.

Lastly, there are a number of countries in sub-Saharan Africa that have been spared from violent conflicts since independence despite being vulnerable to such situations. Studies aiming to explain why peace has prevailed in these countries, despite the unfavourable conditions, will yield important contributions to peace studies. Contrary to the mainstream in current peace and conflicts studies focusing on the causes and consequences of armed conflicts and the efforts made to rebuild post-war societies, a study that focuses on why peace has endured in these countries, will enhance our understanding of what makes peace resilient in the African continent.

[9] Daniel Zirker, Constantine P. Danopoulos and Alan Simpson, "The Military as a Distinct Ethnic or Quasi-Ethnic Identity in Developing Countries," *Armed Forces & Society* 34, 2 (2008): 314.

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Appendices

Appendix A: Map of Guinea

Source: International Crisis Group

Appendix B: Ethics Approval and Information Sheet

- **Ethics Approval**

Mamadou Diouma Bah
Dr Alan Simpson
Prof Daniel Zirker

18 February 2010

Dear Mamadou

Application for Ethical Approval FS2010-02: PhD "The dynamics of conflict resolution in West Africa: Guinea under General Lansana Conte (1984-2008)"

Thank you for your email of 18 February providing the statement requested in my letter of 18 February, and the revised forms that you attached to it. These fully satisfy the requirements of the Committee.

I am now able to provide formal ethical approval for your PhD project.

The Committee has been advised that all staff and students undertaking "risky" research overseas should contact the Risk Assurance Manager, Ken Housely, because of insurance issues. Mr Housley's phone extension number is 4118, email rgfnkch@waikato.ac.nz, office Room B.2.02. You should advise him that you have ethical approval from this Committee and alert him to the nature of your research.

With best wishes,

John Paterson
Chair
FASS Human Research Ethics Committee

[Mamadou - I have given a signed hard copy of this letter to Dr Simpson to pass on to you. John]

- **Information Sheet**

Name of Researcher: Mamadou Diouma Bah

Department of Political Science and Public Policy

Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences

University of Waikato

Private Bag 3105

Hamilton, New Zealand

E-mail: mdb21@students.waiakato.ac.nz, mamadjuma@gmail.com
Tel: +64 (0) 212603036

Background:

I am a PhD student in Political Science and Public Policy at the University of Waikato, New Zealand. I am currently undertaking research to complete my doctoral thesis which focuses on issues of peace and conflict management with reference to Guinea. Various groups and individuals have been involved in the debate on how to deal with these issues particularly when there are high risk civil war variables such as the availability of natural resources, wars next door and ethnic diversity. Using the Guinean experience, this research seeks to examine issues related to peace and conflict management in the context of a regionalized conflict zone with abundant natural resources and ethnic diversity. It is hoped that this studies will make a significant contribution towards understanding these issues.

Interview Process:

I would like to speak to you about peace and conflict management in Guinea. I am interested in hearing your views on these issues in relation to the availability of natural resources and the neighbouring civil wars at the time.
The interview will take about 60-90 minutes, depending on the time you have available. I would like to tape-record the interview so that I can obtain an accurate record of your views.

As participant, you have the choice of being anonymous or not, this will be discussed at the start of the interview and again at the end of it. I will not use your name or identity in any form in the thesis, unless you give permission.

However, I wish to notify you that even when all these will have been done, confidentiality may be inadvertently breached with people who may be familiar with your opinions and arguments on the issue at hand. I will, on my part, do whatever humanly possible to protect your identity.

As participant, the interview transcript will be made available to you upon request. You have the right to clarify any aspect of the information or issue discussed in the interview within a period of two months after the interview.

Any and all information derived from the interview (e.g. audio recordings, written transcripts) will be held securely in my university office. No one except me or my supervisors will have access to them. They will be stored there until the research is complete and the PhD thesis has been approved and accepted by the University of Waikato. After this period, these research materials will be stored securely for an indefinite period.

If you agree to take part in this interview, you have the following rights:

- **a.** to refuse to answer any particular question, or to withdraw from the interview at any time

- **b.** to ask any further questions about the interview, how it will be used, or the research project at any time either during the interview or up to a period of two months after the interview
- **c.** to examine any information you have provided and amend any part you wish and/ or request that certain information not be used, up to a period of 2 months after the interview

- **d.** to withdraw your consent (written or verbal) up to a period of two months, by contacting me at the address above

- **e.** to make any complains you may have about the interview or the research project to the University's Faculty of Arts and Social Sciences' Human Research Ethics Committee, University of Waikato, Private Bag 3105, Hamilton 3240, or you can email its secretary at fass-ethics@waikato.ac.nz

- **f.** You may also contact my supervisor at the following address

Dr. Alan Simpson

Senior Lecturer

Department of Political Science and Public Policy

Waikato University, New Zealand

Phone: +64 7 838 4724

E-mail:poli0219@waikato.ac.nz

Appendix C: General guide questions for the interviews

1. How do you describe the threat of civil war onset in Guinea, particularly during the last two decades?
    - Real threat? Why?
    - Over estimated threat? Why?
2. Why the presence of deep ethnic divisions, politicised military, abundant natural resources and armed conflicts in Guinea's neighbouring nations has not been associated with civil war and/or armed conflicts?
4. Can culture and history explain the reasons why Guinea avoided civil war? Why/ why not?

Appendix D: Guide questions on deep ethnic divisions

1. Guinea is considered a deeply divided society in terms of ethnic composition, what role (if any) did ethnicity play from the stand point of peace and conflict management?
    - Was there ethnic fractionalization in Guinea?
    - To what extent were there peaceful and cooperative relations between ethnic groups in Guinea? How often did cooperation break down? Provide examples.
    - What are the formal institutions that usually work to contain disputes between members of different ethnic groups?
    - What are the informal institutions that usually work to contain disputes between members of different ethnic groups?

Appendix E : Guide questions on abundant natural resources

1. Why did Guinea's reliance on primary commodity exports not lead to civil war onset?
2. It is argued that Guineans have not benefited from its vast natural resources, do you agree?

   If no, why? If yes, why frustration arising from the failure to gain expected economic benefits from these abundant natural resources did not lead to large scale violence in Guinea?

3. What are the government's distribution mechanisms of revenue from natural resources?
   - Large scale distribution?
   - Selective scale distribution?
4. Can the government's distribution mechanisms of revenue from natural resources be linked to peace in Guinea? Why?
5. Why has the high rate of unemployed youth in Guinea not been used as rebel supply for a civil war onset?

Appendix F: Guide Questions on Neighbourhood wars effects

1. Why did the availability of civil wars next door not inspire potential rebels to trigger large scale civil violence in Guinea?
2. What has the government done in order to mitigate the spill over effects of the neighbouring civil wars?
3. It is often said that refugees help spread conflicts over borders, why do you think this was not the case in Guinea?

Appendix G: Guide questions on the military and politics

1. It is said that the Guinean military's protracted involvement in politics presented a threat to the country's stability? Do you agree? Why?
2. Why did the Guinean military avoid falling into the 'coup-traps'? (meaning one coup leading to another).
3. What role (if any) did ethnicity play in the Guinean military?

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Dear Mamadou, yes you can have permission from ARAS to use your article for the purposes of your dissertation.
Good luck to you.
regards

Dr. Tanya Lyons

Editor - *Australasian Review of African Studies*

Appendix K: Invasion of Guinea in November 1970 (L'Agression Portugaise)

In 1958, Guinea became the first French colony in sub-Saharan Africa to become independent, after Guineans voted for immediate sovereignty rather than continued association with France. Sékou Touré, the head of the pro-independence Parti Democratique de la Guinée (PDG), became the country's first president. Touré defended a sweeping anti-imperialist 'revolution' in both nationalist and pan-African terms, portraying the PDG as embodying both the Guinean nation and universal aspirations for African independence and self-sufficiency. However, by the late 1960s, nationalist movements against European colonial rule in West Africa had dwindled to Portugal's remaining African 'provinces', Cape Verde and Guinea-Bissau.

At this time, the *Partido Africano da Independência da Guiné e Cabo Verde* (the African Party for the Independence of Guinea Bissau and Cape Verde, or PAIGC) was leading an anti-colonial guerrilla assault on Portuguese rule in Guinea-Bissau. Although outnumbered and out-funded by the Portuguese counter-insurgency campaign, PAIGC proved to be extremely effective. The PAIGC insurgency, and the fierce Portuguese military response, provided Touré's anti-colonialist rhetoric with context and urgency long after most colonial regimes in Africa had faded. Touré made himself the PAIGC's main regional patron, offering Conakry as a base of operations to the PAIGC's founder and leader, Amílcar Cabral, as early as 1960 (Dhada 1998: 574).

Touré supplied significant military and logistical support, as well as diplomatic cover, to the PAIGC throughout the war. By 1970, in addition to Cabral's house in Guinea's seaside capital, the PAIGC maintained bases in Conakry and Guinea's interior; received military training on Guinean bases; interned Portuguese prisoners of war on Guinean territory, including within Guinean military bases; used Conakry's *Voix de la Révolution* radio facilities to broadcast nationalist programmes in local languages into neighbouring Guinea Bissau on medium- and short-wave; and published PAIGC literature through the PDG's printing press (Arieff 2009: 333-335; Whiteman 1971: 350–358).

Guinea's support for the PAIGC did not go unnoticed. In the early hours of 22 November 1970, the Portuguese military command in Bissau sent a group of several hundred Portuguese and Bissau-Guinean soldiers, foreign fighters and exiled Guineans to attack Conakry from the sea, targeting PAIGC installations as well as Guinean government infrastructure. The mission was dubbed Mar Verde (Operation Green Sea) by its Portuguese commander, Guilherme Alpoim Calvão. The mission aimed to rescue Portuguese prisoners-of-war, destroy the PAIGC leadership in Conakry, and cripple the Guinean government's ability to continue supporting the rebel movement (Arief 2009: 335-338; Cann 2007: 217–29; Dhada 1998: 586; MacQueen 1999: 216–217).

The commandos who carried out the operation, divided into units and captured the Almamy Samory Touré military base downtown, which served as the military headquarters; occupied the Republican Guard base in Conakry, known as Camp Boiro, freeing hundreds of Guinean detainees accused of subversion who had

been interned there; liberated two dozen Portuguese prisoners held at a separate detention facility known as ‘La Montaigne’; attacked the PAIGC headquarters; shut down the city’s central power supply; and burned down Touré’s Bellevue presidential villa and Cabral’s house, but the attempts to destroy the Guinean air force and capture the national broadcaster failed (Dobert 1971: 16–18).

The fighting was brief. By 9 a.m. on the morning of 22 November, Touré was able to broadcast a call to the nation on national radio, announcing that Conakry had come under attack by ‘imperialist forces’ led by the Portuguese colonial regime, and proclaiming that the Guinean people would ‘defend itself down to the last survivor’. Deciding that the mission could not proceed in the absence of broadcast control, Calvão ordered a withdrawal early the following morning (Cann, 1997: 64–81).

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