Sustainable community economic development: What lessons can the Tongan Vision Project of Aotearoa/New Zealand learn from the Mondragón Experience?

George Cheney
Professor: Department of Communication Studies
The University of Montana-Missoula, USA[1]
[gcheney@selway.umt.edu]

Abstract

This paper provides readers with information about the Mondragón cooperatives, two corporate groups of worker-owned-and-governed co-ops, located in the middle of the Basque Country, Spain. It draws a number of lessons from the experience of these co-operatives and discusses these lessons in the context of the Tongan Vision Project (TVP) of Aotearoa/New Zealand, a sustainable community economic development project established in January 2000.[2]

Introduction

The Mondragón cooperatives are two corporate groups of worker-owned-and-governed co-ops, located in the middle of the Basque Country, Spain. Founded officially in 1956 as small industrial enterprises, the co-ops were the tangible products of the visionary efforts of a Basque priest, Fr. José María Arizmendiarrieta, and five young engineers. Initially, the co-ops included a small technical school (founded 1943), a manufacturer of small stoves (1956), and a bank that provided low-interest loans for the creation of new cooperative firms (1959). The co-ops, which now include almost 200 firms under the two corporate heads, MCC (headquartered in the town of Mondragón) and ULMA (in nearby Oñati), today are among the very largest private firms in Spain and the Basque Country respectively.

Figure 1: Locating Mondragón



THE BASQUE COUNTRY. The three provinces of Guipúzcoa, Vizcaya, and Alava make up the autonomous Basque government, with its capital at Vitoria. The province of Navarre and the adjoining area of France also have large Basque populations.

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Designed to pursue a 'third way' between state-run socialism and unbridled corporate capitalism, the co-ops combine individual accounts (initial buy-ins plus dividends) with 'social accounts' (collective investments) and involve contributions to community projects (such as Basque language schools, unemployment training programmes, and AIDS initiatives) as well.

The Mondragón cooperatives are concentrated in the industrial sector (such as forging, tool and die making, auto parts manufacturing, and construction), but they have developed major financial institutions, a large consumer arm in the form of a supermarket chain, schools and a technical university, their own health care provisions, and a retirement or superannuation system.

The Mondragón co-ops have a dual structure, characterised by both direct democracy in accord with a one-person, one-vote principle and a cadre of selected managers. Thus, each co-op is governed by its members (as a body of the whole), several organs or committees, and professional managers who serve at the will of the governed (see *Figure 2*).

Figure 2: Model of Mondragón co-operative



Historically, the co-ops have experienced several crises and transformations: including a major strike in 1974, severe economic recessions in the early 1980s and early 1990s, the consolidation of power in the creation of the Mondragón 'Group' in 1985 and later the Mondragón Cooperative Corporation in 1992, the call for equal pay by women members in the 1990s, and the break-off of the ULMA Group of five co-ops in 1992 over issues of local control and a policy departure from the traditional regional clustering (for a new sectoral structure dictated by industrial specialization).

Building on the work of others who have studied the co-ops and adding my own observations, I would explain the success and longevity of the Mondragón project with three factors: a) the Basque cultural context which emphasizes both social solidarity and independence/initiative, b) the development of key support institutions such as a bank, and c) the dynamism of a direct-plus-representative system of internal governance.

As I had the opportunity to observe during several visits to the co-ops in the 1990s (1992, 1994, and 1997—for a total of seven months) and hundreds of interviews and

conversations, the cooperatives face several important challenges currently. Paramount among these challenges, not surprisingly, is how to maintain a strong competitive position in the industries where the co-ops are represented. The second challenge is how to implement new systems of management and employee participation (such as a brand of TQM or total quality management) in a way that serves to revitalise rather than to stifle the traditional forms of employee governance and participation. The third challenge relates to the rise of consumerism in the Basque Country and Spain in general, which is a double-edged trend. On the one hand, consumerism creates an appetite for more consumer goods and services, which in turn fuels the industrial and financial engine of the co-ops. On the other hand, the new consumerist mentality is underwritten by an individualistic ethic ('Give me the best buy') which in some ways is inimical to the social and collectivist traditions of the co-ops. More broadly, the spread of 'marketisation' has meant that 'customer service' becomes the mantra of all organisations. For better and for worse, 'the customer is king', and the employee (every employee) by implication is supposed to be constantly anticipating the desires of the customer.

Most studies of the now-famous Basque co-ops have focused on issues of economic efficiency, productivity, employment, social investment, and market viability. These are important matters, obviously, for any firm, whether structured cooperatively or otherwise. Above all, what interests me about the cooperatives of Mondragón is what I call 'the social question'—that is the complement to the economic question. Rather than asking: 'Can organisations cooperatively and democratically designed survive in today's market?' I offer the query, 'Can such organisations, given longevity and financial success, hold on to their soul?' And, in probing this question for my book (Cheney 1999), I found that rather than seeing the Mondragón cooperatives as unique, we can view their lessons as widely applicable to other socially-inspired ventures in the marketplace. Ultimately, I would say that the co-ops have neither been entirely true to their original vision nor have they completely sold out. Moreover, the struggle over economic and social values there is the subject of a vocal and ongoing debate—which in itself makes the case an important laboratory of investigation.

The case of Mondragón is important for our consideration as we seek to analyse and advance the cause of the Tongan Vision Project of New Zealand. While the two cultures differ in important ways and the goals of the two projects are far from identical, there are important implications for the TVP in the way the Mondragón cooperatives have contended with issues such as a) how to promote values that are both inspiring and usable in practice, b) how to develop a system that has both distinctive features and is open to outside influences and coalitions, c) how to provide the grounds for emergent leadership, d) how to adapt a mission for subsequent generations, e) how to keep the economic and the social in balance, and f) and how to maintain a healthy orientation toward process. I shall address each of these issues briefly, suggesting some lessons from the Mondragón experience that may be relevant to the pursuit of the TVP.

Lesson 1: Maintaining a Consensus and an Identity around Core Values

This is one of the most talked about yet challenging activities for any grassroots organisation. Although we now live in a world where practically every organisation—in every sector—speaks freely about its values, their importance, and their usefulness—questions about authentic and meaningful commitments remain. To

declare values is one thing; to pursue them is quite another; to maintain them over time and even against adversity is still something else. Regardless of the specifics of a particular case, and irrespective of its geographic location or cultural heritage, there is a balance to be sought between vague but inspiring slogans on the one hand and overly specific and insufficiently inclusive banners on the other.

At Mondragón, the core value of 'solidarity' has many different meanings and manifestations (*Table 1*). These meanings and practical effects range from the one-one-one, interpersonal level of camaraderie at work to broad forms of identification with 'cooperativism' and Basque nationalism. It is clear not only that certain meanings are favoured today over others more salient in the past, but also that there have been some shifts in certain meanings over time. Especially interesting is how the value of solidarity has become institutionalised in the cooperatives: for example, through statutes that specify worker-owner contributions to the 'social accounts' of the firms and the sharing of resources among the cooperatives themselves.

Table 1: Meanings of Social Solidarity

Varieties of solidarity in the Mondragón experience	
Interpersonal	Offering one-to-one employee assistance and support
Remunerative	Maintaining a narrow salary range, as required under by-laws
Intra-firm	Referring to the character of employee relations in the co-op as a whole
Inter-firm	Sharing resources and expertise, especially in the light of fluctuations in performance
Local	Emphasizing ties and investments in the community
Ethnic/National	Focused on language, culture and identity
International	With 'cooperativism' and the cooperative movement
Inauthentic or Misguided	As a 'cover' for incompetence or poor performance

Solidarity is one of the chief values espoused by the Tongan Vision Project, and that value has resonance with Tongan culture. At the same time, as several Interim Working Committee (IWC) members have observed, many Tongans have a skeptical, independent stance with respect to new initiatives, whether they originate within the Tongan community, come from the national (New Zealand) government, or are associated with big business. Thus, solidarity is a value that will need to be articulated and especially demonstrated in particular ways before it will have traction with the larger Tongan community of New Zealand. For the time being, with the TVP being a bit less than two years old (its inception was a meeting in January 2000), the IWC can count on some 'borrowed credibility' and the good will that is accorded a budding effort yet to bear fruit. But, this honeymoon has its limits. If the IWC wishes to promote a new form of social solidarity, which simultaneously relies on Tongan tradition and moves the people's energies in the direction of economic and social justice, it will have to remould the value of solidarity in ways that lean on the familiar symbols of collective allegiance (family, the church, the monarchy/nobility) as a 'fulcrum' for lifting the new project. The old centrepieces of solidarity cannot be rejected but must be incorporated somehow into the new vision. The new vision must be seen as consistent in important ways with tradition while representing an appropriate, well-considered, and community-based response to the social, economic, and political demands of today.

Lesson 2: Creating a Simultaneously Open and Closed System

Here, the central question is: How do we maintain our distinctiveness yet reach out beyond our own boundaries? *Figure 3* depicts a variety of organisational models, ranging from the rigid and largely closed bureaucracy to what some have called 'a loosely-coupled organic network.' Thus, as you move through the models, you are fairly sure to encounter greater fluidity, flexibility, and openness to the larger 'environment'—that is, to the world beyond the organisation's borders. This is not to say that the last of the models is necessarily feasible or superior in all cases; in fact, we may observe that each model 'has its place' depending upon the type of work being done, the kinds of people involved (their abilities, experiences, and preferences), the time constraints, and a range of other factors.

Figure 3: Organisational Models (from Morgan 1989, p. 66)



Model 1: The Rigid Bureaucracy



Model 2: The Bureaucracy with a senior 'management' team



Model 3: The Bureaucracy with project Teams and Task Forces



Model 4: The Matrix Organization



Model 5: The Project Organization



Model 6: The Loosely-coupled Organic Network

These days it is commonplace to pick on bureaucracy as being outdated, excessively hierarchical, dehumanizing, mired in minutiae, and resistant to change. All of these charges have some validity, to be sure, but what is frequently overlooked today is that bureaucratic organisation has important advantages as well, advantages that include 'systematicity,' clarity of roles, focused authority and, when it works according to intent, fair treatment of all persons.

However, in all sectors today—from private high-tech firms to social-movement organisations to public-private partnerships, we witness experimentation with organisational structures that represent modifications of, or significant departures from the traditional bureaucratic order as documented by Max Weber at the turn of the twentieth century. Matrix-style organisations, depicted in the fourth model in *Figure 3*, retain old departmental specialisations while introducing crisscrossing lines of communication and collaboration.

The final model, the loosely-coupled organic network, is so named because it involves relatively fluid lines of authority and influence, is subject to change according to new circumstances, and sees the focal organisation as embedded in a larger 'net' of groups and organisations. In terms of the last feature especially, this model is appealing for many grassroots social movements, joint ventures, and strategic alliances. Advances in information technology, naturally, have made the loosely-coupled organic network more common: for example, a great deal of social-movement organizing today is now conducted principally through the Internet, with groups and individuals from all over the world engaging in coalition building electronically. The great advantage of the last model is that it allows the organisation to have permeable boundaries, giving it openness to outside information and influences. The risk, of course, is that the organisation can lose 'its self' in a sea of organisations, identities, values, and practices.

For the Mondragón cooperatives, which are probably best described in terms of the third model, a bureaucracy with project teams and task forces, the issue of 'openness-versus-closedness' manifests itself in several ways. First, how much should the organisation (actually a set of firms) rely on its own 'local wisdom' in contrast to following or even imitating the example of large non-cooperative corporations around the world? Today, the cooperatives are appearing more and more like the typical multinational corporation in structure, managerial policies, and everyday practices. Second, to what degree should the co-ops maintain a strong Basque identity as opposed to a broader regional, national, or even international one? This question is important not only for marketing and other external communications but also for the employee-owners' sense that their organisation is 'different,' distinct, or perhaps even unique. Third, the co-ops unavoidably 'import' certain larger societal trends such as the transformation of the citizen to the consumer, and this has important implications for the ways members conceive of issues such as the degree of sacrifice they are willing to make for the co-ops' success. With more and more younger worker-owners thinking of themselves as persons with portable careers and as savvy consumers, they may make demands of the organisation that are individually focused ('What can I get out of this?') without necessarily contributing to the common good in a way that goes beyond a strict notion of the employment contract. On the other hand, curiously, the new wave may demand even wider avenues of participation.

Every one of these points, of course, is relevant to the development of the Tongan Vision Project. The TVP must contend with a broader market and pressures to be beholden to funding agencies as well as to compete with mainstream organisations (in particular, other businesses). The IWC of the TVP is currently debating the second issue, the 'Tonganness' of the project, in that there are risks in either being too Tongan or not Tongan enough. Thus, the IWC must promote a distinctively Tongan identity while not alienating—in fact, inviting the participation of other Pacific

Islanders in New Zealand. This is a daunting but achievable goal; however, the effort to maintain that balance must be ongoing.

Lesson 3: Cultivating leadership; fostering inspiration

Here the central question is: How do we balance an allowance for emergent leadership with an emphasis on training and mentorship? This question speaks both to the relationship between the IWC and the larger Tongan community and to the operation of the small-business incubator and other actualisations of the TVP vision. From the very beginning, the IWC has taken a tentative, humble approach to engaging the larger Tongan community. That is, the young professionals who comprise the IWC have been careful both to respect the traditions of the Tongan community in New Zealand and to demonstrate great openness to the ideas of those whose support they would solicit. The rich and varied forms of expertise held by the members of the IWC give the TVP a strong prospect for success. Even more important are the passionate value commitments of the IWC members, which I have witnessed first hand at several of their meetings.

As with any social-movement-type organisation, however, there is a risk of presumptuousness on the part of the core members of the effort. By their very initiative, the IWC assume a leadership role; yet, what they ultimately seek is the 'disappearance' of their own leadership. That is, a project like the TVP could really be said to be successful when leadership is informally emergent through the larger community and shared to such a degree that the IWC members (present or future) cease to 'stand out in the crowd'. This is an attainable but difficult goal. How does a leadership unit, with a history behind it, foster the conditions for more widely shared leadership? Very easily, the self-appointed leaders enter into the paradoxical situation of trying to structure and promote grassroots democracy. But, the fact of the paradox is no reason to shy away from the task. In fact, such a paradox must inevitably be faced with democratic 'emergence' or resurgence, lest inertia rule the day and no initiative be pursued at all.

In the Mondragón cooperatives, the issue of fostering emergent leadership is relevant especially in this way. As I discovered in my interviews, there are many 'old-timer' employees who are 'waiting for a new charismatic leader [Fr. 'Arizmendi' died in 1976] to lead us in a new phase of democratic organizing.' When I pointed out the paradox to some of my interviewees who expressed this hope, they acknowledged the problem yet still failed to see how they themselves could take responsibility for re-instilling democratic energy into the co-ops—either through participation in the existing organs or by offering creative ideas for new programmes (particularly at the work group and the council levels).

In a sense, this problem is complementary to the one which the IWC of the TVP is facing. They need to enlist not only the support of others, representing various segments of New Zealand's Tongan community, but also encourage them to be leaders themselves—if ultimately the investment scheme, health and educational projects, and small-business endeavours are to be self-sustaining. In other words, the torch must be carried by more people than the current members of the IWC; thus, the TVP must try to avoid any lasting form of dependency. Training and organisational development should be aimed at independence, while at the same time insisting on consistency with the democratic goals of the TVP. Thus, there is necessarily a fine

line to walk between excessive directiveness, on the one hand, and a *laissez-faire* approach on the other. The IWC must try to hold to the middle ground in order successfully to *encourage* new leadership. In fact, this is the ideal of what is called 'transformational leadership'—to help others become leaders, seeing in them the potential to share leadership roles and ultimately to take your place. Such a vision of leadership-in-democracy is entirely fitting for the TVP, given the IWC's conception of the larger effort as broadly decentralised.

Lesson 4: Adapting yet preserving a common mission

How much adaptation is necessary, desirable, healthy, ethical? I have already indicated to some extent the need to see statements of vision, mission, and values as modifiable over time and circumstances. But this idea bears a bit more attention here. The dynamics of language (any language) are such that we can unify large numbers of people with ambiguous but powerful references to values—like solidarity, or service, or freedom. The breadth of meaning of such terms allows many different groups to inhabit the same symbolic space. But that same ambiguity can be used, for good or for ill, to effect change. That is, in any organisation, we may find departure from traditional values represented by an explicit assertion of 'new values' (as in, 'That was then, this is now'; or, 'We used to focus on this, now we focus on that'). But, it is also true that abstract value terms in any language offer a great deal of opportunity for 'movement' within their symbolic arenas. In the US for example, the symbol of 'revolution' used to be associated with parties of the left; since the Reagan era, however, parties of the right have successfully appropriated revolutionary symbols while still maintaining their 'conservative' identities. Other examples abound in politics, culture, and everyday life.

Central values of the Mondragón cooperatives, like the larger Basque and Spanish societies in which they are embedded, include participation, solidarity, and equality. And, these values are formally represented in the 'constitution' of the co-ops, in the form of a statement of principles. Over time, however, the value of equality has been pushed into the background, as the wage index between the lowest and highest paid employee-owners has widened and ultimately been pegged to the market for top-level managers. The value of solidarity has lost some of its natural, spontaneous character as it has become more institutionalised in the form of specifications for minimum levels of 'social investment' and the sharing of resources among firms (what is know as 'inter-cooperative solidarity'—see *Table 1*). Finally, the value of participation has been reshaped, recast in a form that conforms more to the exigencies of contemporary management programmes than it does to the traditional, political conception of participation as influence over corporate policy. The change is encapsulated by the quotation below, from one of the founders of the Mondragón co-ops:

> Today we need a form of neo-cooperativism. Participation means something different and more than voting on policies: it must be real participation in daily work, and not something legal or political in nature. . . . We have to participate for reasons of competitiveness and the expansion of the market. And, the kind of participation we most need is not something up in the clouds, dealing with abstract issues, but something continuous and concentrated in one's job.
>
> Author's interview (1994) with Jesús Larrañaga, a co-founder of the Mondragón co-operatives

These words are telling because they represent a shift in meaning that is justified by appeals to external market pressures ('realities') and focused on the level of the job and the work team as the arena of participation. In this case, we can genuinely ask whether the change is so great as to represent a denial of traditional forms of 'participation.' That is, while the co-founder employs the same familiar term, he uses it in an entirely new context. For this reason, some groups of employee-owners in the co-ops have challenged the shift as an unwelcome departure from tradition, claiming that they, the protesting employees (calling themselves simply 'cooperative groups'), carry the torch of the 'real values' of the cooperatives. My point here is not so much to resolve this question with respect to Mondragón but rather to highlight the fact that these kinds of tensions will inevitably be faced by the TVP should it prosper and endure as its designers and I hope that it will. Values, meanings, and associated practices must be renegotiated from time to time, yet the risk of undermining the original purposes of the project need to be kept in view. Over time, 'authenticity' will be at issue and the subject of heated debate.

Lesson 5: Recognizing the interdependence of the social and the economic

Here I might summarise my point with these words: How do we 'keep our eyes on the prize'—in both senses of the word? Earlier, I explained how the economic and the social are intertwined in a project such as the Mondragón cooperatives and other similar ventures. They are interdependent realms with mutually influencing goals. With Mondragón, for example, the social goals cannot be pursued at all if the cooperatives fail financially. Conversely, to pursue economic success to the exclusion of the social goals may not only mean that the co-ops 'lose their soul' but also that they ultimately lose their economic edge—which has been demonstrated to be a function in large part of the social vision.

For the TVP, the chiefly economic goal of having Tongans own '10 percent of the wealth in New Zealand' is a rousing call for individual and family investment, new business creation at the neighborhood level, and the mobilization of an entire community. Taken out of context, though, the goal can be tainted with individualism and a narrow notion of well-being that equates sheer economic success with living 'the Good Life.' Being a highly privileged professional in the richest and most wasteful nation on earth, I broach this point with great hesitation and sensitivity: the demonstrable fact of New Zealand's Tongans being largely in a state of poverty is a material condition we cannot ignore. Thus, the economic goal of the TVP *is worthy in itself*. However, as already discussed in some meetings of the IWC, there is the risk of unintentionally promoting a narrowly conceived consumerism, given that New Zealand's Tongan community—like nearly every community in the world today—is bombarded with questionable but nevertheless compelling images of 'success' and 'happiness' through the institutions of marketing and advertising. Thus, it is important that the IWC, like a number of organisations around the world today, adopt a multi-faceted model of economic, social, and spiritual well-being.

In fact, members of the IWC are already trying to do just that, by carefully planting certain social values in the small-business incubator plan. However, they need to be aware of the role of socially inspired values at every stage and in every part of their programme, lest the TVP take on a purely economic life of its own that looks rather different from what was originally envisioned.

The interrelationships of economic and social factors in any organization invite certain ironies. For example, when a business is doing well, its managers or leaders may think that there is no need to attend to social well-being because 'we are doing very well, thank you.' Likewise, in hard economic times, the very social values that would give the members of the organisation some hope and support may be overlooked as 'things we cannot afford right now.' As I observe a variety of types of organisations, across all sectors, I am reminded of the need to measure 'success' in more than one way. But that imperative is often ignored as we all focus on the bottom line—whether that measure be the individual's or family's accumulation of consumer goods or a firm's expansion into new products and services or a university's serving more students and bringing in more grant dollars than last year.

Part of the beauty of the Mondragón cooperative structure (as depicted earlier in *Figure 2*) is that it deliberately accounts for both the economic and the social side of enterprise. The Governing Council is designed to be concerned primarily with the needs of production, efficiency, and growth, whereas the Social Council's main concerns are for the well-being of employees, individually and collectively. When it works well—and especially when the Social Council is vibrant—the dual structure promotes a healthy tension between economic and social goals, recognizing that each must be understood with reference to the other.

Lesson 6: Enacting Democracy as a Process and Not Only as a Structure

The final lesson of Mondragón for Tongan Vision Project can be crystallised with the word 'process'. Truly democratic institutions are hard to maintain and sustain. This is partly because the very structures established for their preservation can also lead to their stagnation or even to their own undoing. This we see at international, national, and community levels. This lesson applies, therefore, equally well to organisations and to social movements. The trick is to set up structures that encourage participation while also seeing those structures, however inspired, as contingent and subject to modification—both over time and in relation to different groups.

The IWC is already pursuing multiple avenues of communication: relying on face-to-face meetings with groups from the larger Tongan community, presentations to church congregations, interviews on radio talk shows, announcements and articles in newspapers and newsletters, and electronic communication with a growing network of supporters (both in New Zealand and beyond). Also, joint meetings with other organisations within the Tongan and the broader Pacific Island communities are in the planning—all in the interest of coalition building. The use of varied media and settings gives the IWC important opportunities for feedback and dialogue as well as the dissemination of its ideas and initiatives. The growing use of e-mail and web-based communications within and beyond the IWC will be especially interesting to observe with respect to the exchange of ideas and information, the sense of interconnectedness of project participants (especially Tongans not presently part of the main TVP support network of some 100 persons), and the mobilisation of the larger Tongan community. The employment of diverse channels of communication in a project such as the TVP affords the core group (or leadership unit) flexibility in adapting its strategies and specific programmes according to community responses. At the same time, such a mix of informal and formal communications allows the IWC and the TVP to avoid premature closure on any phase of the project—a crucial point for a democratically organised effort.

Any democratic organisation worth its salt must productively confront certain paradoxes, such as the leadership paradox discussed earlier with respect to both Mondragón and the TVP (see list of paradoxes in *Appendix*). Another common paradox, also already suggested, is the tendency to impose 'grassroots' democracy from the top—as so many corporates and governmental agencies have done in recent years in the name of 'employee participation'. In another realm, social-movement organizers and agents of social change are often caught by surprise when the second wave of membership or leadership wishes to take the organisation in a new direction. No matter how noble, no matter how well intended, no matter how cleverly designed, a democratic organisation must be open to its own transformation. And, in closing, I am happy to say that the Interim Working Council of the Tongan Vision Project began and continues its work with just that sort of enlightened awareness. I look forward to seeing what shapes the TVP will take—and some of those will be beyond our present imaginings.

Endnotes

1. This paper was written while I was Adjunct Professor in the Department of Management Communication at The University of Waikato and was prepared in follow up to a series of talks about Pacific Island peoples in contemporary Aotearoa/New Zealand. The series was organised and facilitated by Teena J. Brown-Pulu and held on campus of the University of Waikato in Hamilton in August of 2001. I wish to expresses my gratitude to Teena for this invitation, to the members of the Interim Working Council of the Tongan Vision Project (especially Manase Lua) for bringing me into their community, to the Department of Management Communication at the University of Waikato for enriching my intellectual life, and to FRST of NEW ZEALAND for financial support for part of his work with the TVP.

2. I am honoured to have taken part in discussions relating to the Tongan Vision Project and to have contributed to that project in some small way. Malo aupito. Thank you very much.

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Appendix

Participatory Processes/Paradoxical Practices

Cynthia Stohl, Purdue University, and George Cheney, The University of Montana

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1. **Paradoxes of Structure:** Concerning the "architecture " of participation — e.g., "Be spontaneous, creative, vocal and assertive in the way we have planned!"
   - **Paradox of Design:** Imposing or mandating *grassroots* participation from the top, e.g., with Total Quality/Participative Management
   - **Paradox of Adaptation:** While trying to preserve the organization's essential qualities, adapting so much to outside forces or expectations that the organization's "soul" is lost
   - **Paradox of Punctuation:** Short-cutting the democratic process in practice because the process costs time, in such a way that, over time the vitality of the system is lost
   - **Paradox of Formalization:** Institutionalizing democracy such that spontaneity is gone: routinization of that which ought to be inspired

2. **Paradoxes of Agency:** Concerning the individual's (sense of) efficacy within the system — e.g., "Do things our way but in a way that's still distinctively your own!"
   - **Paradox of Responsibility:** Relinquishing directly to a group one's rights to make decisions, particularly while insisting that the *right* to participate be maintained
   - **Paradox of Cooperation:** Following formal or informal procedures in such a way that hinders rather than promotes cooperation, including the pattern of *non-participation* in the interest of furthering cooperation
   - **Paradox of Sociality:** Intense involvement at work as an ironic limit on other forms of participation (e.g., in family and community) such that all types of participation become undermined; prevalent in highly mission-based organizations
   - **Paradox of Autonomy:** Giving up more individual rights than one intended to do through a "contract" with a highly democratic organization; surrendering individual agency for that of the collective; the gains to the individual through adhesion to the community become outweighed by the sacrifices

3. **Paradoxes of Identity:** Concerning issues of membership, inclusion, and boundaries — e.g., "Be *self*-managing to meet organizational goals!"
   - **Paradox of Commitment:** Making commitment to and enactment of the group's espoused values and beliefs about voice and participation a test that ironically leads to exclusion rather than inclusion
   - **Paradox of Representation:** Becoming co-opted by dominant interests; losing one's "voice" unexpectedly — e.g., when labor thinks like management and forgets about workers yet still insists its role is distinct
   - **Paradox of Compatibility:** The potential problems with exporting a particular model of democracy or participation to another society or culture

4. **Paradoxes of Power:** Concerning the locus, nature and precise exercise of power in the organization —e.g., "Be independent, just as I have commanded you!"
   - **Paradox of Control:** Encountering less and not more freedom within team-based structures — at the group level or at the system-wide (organizational) level
   - **Paradox of Leadership:** Waiting for a charismatic leader to inspire, create and maintain democracy
   - **Paradox of Homogeneity:** Failing to see the value of resistance or oppositional voices; excessive valuing of agreement, cooperation and consensus — especially in social movement organizations — while preaching diversity of opinion