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A SYMBOLIC PRESENCE?:
NEW ZEALAND'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE COMBATANT TRAINING OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE AND CAMBODIAN TROOPS, 1968-1972.

A thesis
submitted in partial fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree
of
Doctor of Philosophy in History
at the
University of Waikato
by

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University of Waikato
1996

ABSTRACT

Prior to the 1968 Tet Offensive, the New Zealand Government had assisted South Vietnam by providing combat units. Tet led to the Nixon Doctrine and the Vietnamisation programme, and New Zealand policy was then to provide combatant training assistance. This thesis examines the combatant training assistance that the New Zealand Government rendered to the South Vietnamese (and later Khmer) Governments, from late 1969 until December 1972.

The New Zealand Government provided combatant training assistance through four separate efforts, each of which will be examined in turn. Initial training assistance was provided from early November 1969 until mid-April 1970, when Victor (hereafter `V') and Whiskey (hereafter `W') companies were periodically involved, for a very limited time, in training regular army units of the 18th Army of the Republic of Vietnam (hereafter ARVN) Division.

In mid-1970, a small group of army personnel was deployed from New Zealand to the Republic of Vietnam and integrated into Australian Army training teams which were rendering training assistance to both regular and territorial force units. The New Zealanders remained with the Australian training effort until late 1972.

In December 1970, following the withdrawal of one of the New Zealand infantry companies, a training team of twenty-eight personnel was dispatched to a training centre at Chi Lang. This team worked with South Vietnamese training staff to develop a wing which taught leadership skills to Regional Force Officers.

In early 1971, a second training team of eighteen New Zealand military personnel was established at a training centre in Dong Ba Thin, near Cam Ranh Bay. These personnel

were integrated into a United States (hereafter U.S.) Special Forces training team, which was providing infantry training for operational Khmer Republic infantry battalions.

This thesis concentrates primarily on the last three phases of New Zealand's training assistance, while only initially and briefly discussing the first training assistance efforts of the First Battalion of the Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment's V and W companies. The thesis outlines the reasons for the New Zealand Government's decision to turn from the provision of combatant forces to providing training assistance.

This study is based upon oral accounts given by New Zealanders who served in a variety of training roles; and upon Ministry of Defence classified records, Cabinet papers and newspaper articles. It reviews the extent to which the training ventures were a success and a failure, both politically and militarily. To this end, several issues have been examined in detail: the training undertaken by the selected New Zealand personnel in preparation for their tasks in Vietnam; the training programmes that the teams implemented there; the types of instructional methods used and evaluations of their success; the willingness and ability of their students to learn and to absorb the instruction offered; the success of the varying levels of integration that each New Zealand team managed to achieve; and the logistical situation experienced by each team. Also investigated are the problems that faced the wives of team members, with the effects of forced separation upon both partners; and the extent to which the training teams participated in the civic action programme, particularly through the Kiwi Hoanga project.

This thesis finally analyses the factors behind the withdrawal of the training teams, and the political and military conclusions that may be drawn from this gesture of military assistance to a Third World nation by New Zealand military forces.

New Zealand's training assistance to the South Vietnamese and Khmer forces began as, and was ever to remain, a token political and military gesture. Politically the training ventures were to some extent more successful, while militarily – despite the number of Vietnamese and Force Armee Nationale Khmere (hereafter FANK) troops trained – these ventures fell far short of what might be deemed a significant accomplishment.

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I am indebted to a large number of people for their assistance and support in the research and composition of this thesis. I am very grateful to the men who served in the four training efforts, particularly the ones I had the pleasure of interviewing. A complete list of those who gave of their time to assist me is included in the list of sources. Without their help this thesis would be incomplete.

To the librarians and archivists throughout New Zealand who so generously responded to my needs I am truly grateful for their help. I am particularly beholden to Mr D.R. Brown and his staff at the Defence Classified Registry in Headquarters New Zealand Defence Force, Wellington, who unflinchingly provided me with the long lists of files that I requested during my visits to Wellington. I am further grateful to the staff of the Waiouru Military Camp Library and of the Defence Library in Wellington, who tolerated my interminable lists of requests for source material; to the archivists of many New Zealand newspapers, who searched for numerous press articles; to the staff of National Archives; and to Sally Patterson for allowing me to browse through the collections at the Queen Elizabeth II Army Memorial Museum.

I would like to thank Lieutenant Generals Sir John Mace and Sir Leonard Thornton, former Chiefs of the Defence Staff, as well as Mr Denis McLean, former Secretary of Defence, for their efforts to have me granted the necessary clearances to view classified material from the Defence Classified Registry and government documents concerning New Zealand's involvement in the Vietnam conflict.

Others from the New Zealand Army who were helpful in this undertaking include Lieutenant Colonel David Brown (Retired) and Majors Garry Clayton and Michael Nicholas. I

would also like to thank Major Cliff Simons (Retired) for reading my work and offering invaluable criticism. There are also many others who have given me advice and encouragement and I acknowledge publicly their efforts.

Throughout my work on this study my two supervisors at the University of Waikato, Associate-Professor Laurie Barber and Dr Douglas Simes, always proved to be friends and mentors whose toleration, guidance and instructive criticism I have gratefully appreciated. I also wish to record my thanks to the then Pro-Vice Chancellor the late Margaret Avery, for her useful critique. I am particularly grateful to Professor Ken Coates and Peter Gibbons for the invaluable guidance and instructive criticism they provided to me throughout my work.

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GLOSSARY

1ALSG	1st Australian Logistic Support Group.
2ic	Second-in-command.
AAAGV	Australian Army Assistance Group, Vietnam.
AAG	Army Advisory Group.
AATTV	Australian Army Training Team, Vietnam.
Admin	Administration.
AGS	Army General Staff.
AI	Assistant Instructor.
AJHR	Appendix to the Journal of the House of Representatives.
ANZ	Australia and New Zealand
ANZAC	Australia New Zealand Army Corps.
ANZAM	Australia, New Zealand and Malaya.
ANZUK	Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom.
ANZUS	Australia, New Zealand and the United States.
APC	Armoured Personnel Carrier.
ARVN	Army of the Republic of Vietnam.
ATF	Australian Task Force.
ATFLO	Australian Task Force Liaison Officer
AWOL	Absent Without Leave.
BTY	Battery.
CAP	Combined Action Platoons.
Capt	Captain.
CDF	Chief of Defence Forces.
CDS	Chief of Defence Staff.
CGS	Chief of General Staff.
CIA	Central Intelligence Agency.
CIDG	Civilian Irregular Defence Groups.
CINCPAC	Commander-in-Chief, Pacific.

CO	Commanding Officer.
COMAFV	Commander, Australian Force Vietnam.
COMUSMACV	Commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
CORDS	Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support.
CORSO	Council of Organisations for Relief Schemes Overseas.
CP	Cabinet Paper.
CTC	Central Training Command.
CTZ	Corps Tactical Zone.
DAQMG	Deputy Adjutant and Quartermaster General.
DAT	Directorate of Military Training.
DBTTB	Dong Ba Thin Training Battalion.
DCGS	Deputy Chief of General Staff.
DCR	Defence Classified Registry.
FANK	Force Armee Nationale Khmere.
FARK	Forces Armees Royales Khmeres.
FDC	Fire Direction Control.
FO	Forward Observers.
FTC	FANK Training Command.
FTX	Field Training Exercise.
FWMAF	Free World Military Assistance Forces.
FY	Financial Year.
GVN	Government of Vietnam.
G2	Operations Officer.
G3	Intelligence Officer.
HES	Hamlet Evaluation System.
HQ	Headquarters.
JCS	Joint Chiefs of Staff.
JGS	Joint General Staff (South Vietnamese).


JWS	Jungle Warfare School.
JWP	Joint Working Party.
JWTC	Jungle Warfare Training Centre.
KIA	Killed in Action.
LLRP	Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol.
MAAG	Military Assistance Advisory Group.
MACT	Military Assistance Command, Training.
MACV	Military Assistance Command, Vietnam.
MALT	Mobile Advisory Logistic Team.
MAP	Military Assistance Programme.
MAT	Mobile Advisory Team.
MATT	Mobile Advisory and Training Team.
MEDCAP	Medical Civic Action Programme.
MEDTC	Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia.
MFAT	Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade.
MOI	Method/s of Instruction.
MR	Military Region.
MTT	Mobile Training Teams.
NA	National Archives.
NCO	NonCommissioned Officer.
NLF	National Liberation Front.
NATT	Night Advisory Training Team.
NOAT	Night Operations Advisory Team.
NOTT	Night Operations Training Team.
NTC	National Training Centre.
NVA	North Vietnamese Army.
NZ	New Zealand.
NZATGV	New Zealand Army Training Group, Vietnam.
NZDEF	New Zealand Defence.

NZDLO	New Zealand Defence Liaison Officer.
NZLO	New Zealand Liaison Officer.
NZPD	New Zealand Parliamentary Debates.
NZ V Force	New Zealand Vietnam Force.
OC	Officer Commanding.
Ops	Operations.
PAVN	Peoples Army of Vietnam. Also known as the NVA.
POI	Programme Of Instruction.
POL	Petroleum, oil and lubricants.
PF	Popular Forces.
PSA	Province Senior Adviser.
PSDF	Peoples Self Defense Force.
RAR	Royal Australian Regiment.
RF	Regional Forces.
RNZAF	Royal New Zealand Air Force.
RNZA	Royal New Zealand Artillery.
RNZE	Royal New Zealand Engineers.
RNZIR	Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment.
ROSB	Regular Officer Selection Board.
RFTC	Regional Force Training Centre.
RVN	Republic of Vietnam (South).
RVNAF	Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces.
SAS	Special Air Service.
SCP	Sector Command Post.
SEATO	Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation.
SF	Special Forces.
Sgt	Sergeant.
SOP	Standard Operating Procedure.
Ssgt	Staff Sergeant.
STCP	Sector Tactical Command Post.

STZ	Special Tactical Zone.
SVN	South Vietnam.
TOC	Tactical Operations Centre.
TOD	Tour of Duty.
TRG	Training.
UITG	US Army Vietnam Individual Training Group.
UK	United Kingdom.
U.S.	United States.
USARV	United States Army, Vietnam.
USAID	United States Agency for International Development.
V Company	Victor.
VC	Viet Cong (Vietnamese for Vietnamese Communist).
VCI	Viet Cong Infrastructure.
W Company	Whiskey.
WIA	Wounded in Action.
WO	Warrant Officer.
WO1	Warrant Officer, Class I.
WOII	Warrant Officer, Class Two.
XO	Executive Officer.
1ATF	1st Australian Task Force.
1NZATTV	1st New Zealand Army Training Team, Vietnam.
2NZATTV	2nd New Zealand Army Training Team, Vietnam.


MAP 1

New Zealand and Southeast Asia.[1]



MAP 2

The Provinces and Military Regions of The Republic of Vietnam.[2]



INTRODUCTION.

New Zealand's combatant training assistance to South Vietnam and the Khmer Republic from 1969 to 1972, a phase of New Zealand's military involvement in the Second Vietnam War, has hitherto been unexplored in historical analyses.

New Zealand's interest after 1945 in Southeast Asia stemmed primarily from its concern that the upsurge of communist insurgency in the area presented a threat to the stability of the region. The so-called domino theory summed up this concern and formed part of the basis for New Zealand's strategic thinking for the next two decades.[3] After World War Two, the colonial powers that had been ousted by Japan in 1941 sought to reassert their sovereignty in Southeast Asia. Although Britain managed to achieve this relatively successfully in some colonies, France found itself fighting a difficult guerilla campaign, which it was to lose, against a well organised Vietminh under the leadership of Ho Chi Minh.[4]

In 1954, the French sought to achieve a political solution to the continuing conflict. On 20 July 1954, the Geneva Agreement was signed between the French and communist forces in Vietnam. This resulted in the communist north and non-communist south being divided along the 17th parallel. This division of Vietnam was intended to be provisional, and was not intended to be a political boundary. A `Final Declaration' was also included which declared that elections would be held by July 1956 to determine whether the two Vietnams would would be reunited or remain separate. This declaration, although never signed, was generally accepted by most of the participants at the Conference, but not by the United States nor by the regime which came to be known as South Vietnam.

The New Zealand Government supported the Geneva Agreement, as it saw the agreement as an effective wall against the spread of Communism. The New Zealand Government saw a dependence on alliance relationships as important also to the containment of Communism in this region, as illustrated by its signing of three major treaties in the 1950s - Australia, New Zealand and the United States (hereafter ANZUS), the Manila Treaty and the Southeast Asia Treaty Organisation (hereafter SEATO).[5] However, the intended elections in Vietnam were never held, and the question of a unified Vietnam was not resolved. The 17th Parallel became a firmly entrenched boundary. After a lull, the communist guerillas in the south, the Vietnamese Communists (hereafter VC), began mounting attacks against South Vietnam's forces.[6] These attacks gradually intensified during the late 1950s and early 1960s, as the VC sought to bring about the reunification of Vietnam under communist control.

By the early 1960s, the South Vietnamese Government was having increasing problems in consolidating power and maintaining its legitimacy in the face of a lack of popular internal support and increasing communist attacks. The position of the VC was strengthened as they continued to gain popular support and military strength in South Vietnam. The United States increased its assistance to South Vietnam and during 1961 and 1962 military advisers were sent to assist the ARVN. However, the communist forces were also given aid by communist bloc countries, and the situation in South Vietnam became increasingly stalemated.

The New Zealand Government emphasised the gravity of the situation in South Vietnam. Assessments made in 1962 by the Department of External Affairs in Wellington claimed that South Vietnam "has been able only to hold its own during the past year in its struggle against...the Communist Viet Cong..."[7] For this reason, the Prime Minister of New

Zealand, the Right Honourable K.J. Holyoake, wrote that the struggle in South Vietnam would be "long, tense, and bitter."[8] In March 1963, a report from the Department of External Affairs stated that it was almost "incontestable that the increased VC activity would have brought about the overthrow...of the Government had it not been for the greatly expanded United States programme of military and economic aid."[9] Further, the New Zealand Government was "anxious to give...[South Vietnam] the moral and practical assistance in overcoming their present difficulties."[10] The U.S., South Vietnamese and Australian Governments were to place growing pressure upon the Holyoake Government to provide practical assistance in the form of, initially, training units and then combat units.

The New Zealand Government, however, was less enthusiastic than Australia in becoming militarily involved in South Vietnam. During the early 1960s, Holyoake considered proposals from the Americans for the contribution of a small team of New Zealand military trainers and advisers to South Vietnam. Similar proposals were made to the Australian Government. Following discussions between the American government and officials from New Zealand and Australia, and then with South Vietnam, the South Vietnamese made an approach to New Zealand and Australia for combat aid. Canberra announced in June 1962 that a team of thirty instructors, designated the Australian Army Training Team, Vietnam (hereafter AATTV), would be sent to the Republic of South Vietnam for training purposes. The New Zealand Government, however, deployed a civilian surgical team in Qui Nhon.

Due to the deteriorating political and military situation in South Vietnam, the Buddhist strife, the overthrow of the Diem regime and that New Zealand was in the middle of an election campaign, Holyoake staved off making any further promises of support. It was not until June 1964, once the political situation in South Vietnam had

tentatively improved, that the New Zealand Government announced that it would deploy a small non-combat military team - an Engineer detachment.[11] Australia, however, announced that it would double the number of advisors in Vietnam and also send further military aid. As D. McCraw has pointed out, it was not so much the need of South Vietnam for the team that the New Zealand Government had met, as the need of the United States for political support.[12]

The year 1965 was a turning point in the extent of American involvement and also that of its allies in the Vietnam War. Throughout 1964, the South Vietnamese Government's control of the countryside continued to deteriorate as the VC, for the first time, began consolidating into main force regiment and even divisional sized formations. There were reports of North Vietnamese regular units moving into South Vietnam.[13] With the increasingly unstable political situation and the South Vietnamese Government's tenuous control over the countryside eroding even faster, the U.S. Government concluded that without substantial U.S. military support, there was a distinct possibility that South Vietnam would fall to the communists by the end of 1965. A number of military defeats, heavy ARVN combat losses, skyrocketing desertion rates, draft evasions, military inefficiency, and corruption resulted in a deterioration in the ARVN's ability to effectively fight the war. In February 1965, President L.B. Johnson, President of the United States, authorised air strikes against North Vietnam, with the introduction of Marine and Army units the following month.[14] This began what was to be a massive escalation by America, as it assumed more and more responsibility for fighting the war and relegated the South Vietnamese armed forces to a secondary role.

America also looked to its allies for military assistance. New Zealand's meagre military resources were already committed in Southeast Asia. In early 1963,

Indonesia had begun to mount what became known as its policy of confrontation against the newly emerged Malaysia. Fighting began in Sarawak and the British Government had urged the New Zealand Government to increase its efforts there. New Zealand's military commitment in Malaysia was to include one infantry battalion.[15] Further demands were made on New Zealand's military resources. New Zealand was under obligation to be able to react to other SEATO situations aside from the escalating Vietnam War. The re-introduction of the National Military Service scheme in 1962 by the National Government also required considerable effort from the Regular Force soldiers.[16]

However, from 1964 until the end of 1969, the New Zealand Government committed military units to the Vietnam War, albeit with manifest reluctance. In May 1965 it announced the deployment of 161 Battery, an artillery unit, to Vietnam, a decision which Holyoake claimed would "have political value out of proportion to its size."[17] In May 1967, a rifle company, designated `V' Company, was deployed from the 1st Battalion Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment (1RNZIR) to Vietnam, and was joined in December of the same year by one additional infantry company, designated `W' Company.[18] The committal of this second infantry company stretched New Zealand's limited military resources and inevitably created manning problems for the battalion based in Malaysia.[19] In May 1967, 1 New Zealand Services Medical Team was deployed to Bong Son in Binh Dinh Province. The team provided not only direct medical assistance to the South Vietnamese, but also taught medical skills to South Vietnamese personnel. The final element of combatant assistance sent to Vietnam was 4 Troop New Zealand Special Air Service (NZSAS), on 12 December 1969.[20]

The New Zealand Government, while expressing basic (albeit cautious) support for the objectives of the United States and Australia in Vietnam, deemed the provision of any

large-scale military contribution unacceptable, despite continuous pressure from the American and Australian governments.[21] This reluctance to broaden New Zealand's involvement was due to two main reasons. First, the government felt that the Vietnamese conflict could not be resolved by foreign military intervention, and given the resources of its allies the government was justifiably doubtful whether a more active New Zealand contribution would be of much value.[22] The second consideration was the level of New Zealand's financial and military resources. Significant but less important explanations included New Zealand's significant existing military commitment to Malaysia, and concerns regarding domestic political criticism.

Besides its multiplicity of taskings, especially in Malaya, the relatively small size of the New Zealand Army, compared to its ANZUS partners, placed a further constraint on the deployment of anything more than minimal numbers of soldiers to South Vietnam. New Zealand's contribution to South Vietnam throughout the war was very small. Although the New Zealand Army had an approved regular force manpower ceiling of 6,250, in 1965 it numbered only 5,374, only half of which were in combat units.[23] A total of 3,890 New Zealand soldiers served in South Vietnam. The highest peak, in November 1968, saw 543 personnel deployed, representing ten percent of the New Zealand Army's total strength.[24] The Australian Army' strength in 1970 was 17,304 personnel. A total of 41,910 Australian soldiers served in South Vietnam. The peak of its commitment being in 1970, with a total of 6,794 Australians serving in South Vietnam, representing about thirty-five percent of its total strength.[25] Just over three million American soldiers served in Vietnam, peaking at 543,400 soldiers deployed in 1969, representing a total of thirty-five percent of U.S. Army personnel.[26]

Despite all these considerations, the New Zealand Government's resolve in mid-1965 to commit military forces to the Vietnamese conflict was essentially based upon three

strategic and political concerns. These factors heavily influenced governmental foreign policy and defence decision-making. First, it was tenaciously believed by the New Zealand Government that the nation was dependent upon the United States (and the ANZUS alliance highlighted that relationship) for its most vital security and economic interests.[27] This view developed with the implementation of the withdrawal of British military forces from Southeast Asia. The government also held that it must support U.S. regional security policies in order to maintain that relationship. If New Zealand supported America in Vietnam, then this would in turn promote the efforts of the New Zealand Government to obtain a greater understanding from America of the Australian-New Zealand position in Malaysia, and of the need to exert pressure upon Indonesia to mitigate its policy of Confrontation.[28] Thus, once the United States became involved in South Vietnam's struggle to resist domination by the aggressive and militant communist North, "two imperatives to New Zealand involvement reinforced one another."[29]

New Zealand Governments had long perceived a threat to New Zealand's security by the spread of Communism through violent and apparently effective insurgency in Southeast Asia, and recognised that the United States would be the ultimate guarantor of protection for New Zealand and the region against this looming threat. New Zealand had already developed very close co-operation with Australia in security matters, and Australia's resolute commitment of troops to Vietnam placed considerable pressure upon the New Zealand Government to do likewise. Holyoake stated that it was "the need for allied solidarity in supporting the people of South Vietnam in their struggle" that had prompted the government to offer assistance in the form of a small military team.[30] If New Zealand had declined to provide any military assistance, then it would clearly be a repudiation of its beliefs in collective security designed to meet the potential threat to its own national security. In theory, New Zealand's forward defence policy called for a direct

interest in Southeast Asia. However, in a 1965 cable from Washington, the New Zealand Ambassador George Laking observed that for the New Zealand Government, the point at issue was not the question of whether it could send more troops to South Vietnam, but "what effect our decision will have on the United States attitude, in the long-term, towards problems of more immediate concern to our own security."[31]

The New Zealand Government believed that economic development in Southeast Asia would reduce political and military tensions in the region. With the post-World War Two relocation of its troops from the Middle East to Southeast Asia, the government was moving towards a "regional forward defence policy". However, for the next fifteen years, New Zealand's forward defence problem would be two-fold; on the one hand, to adjust the size and shape of her armed forces to meet likely political and military requirements; and on the other hand, to satisfy and to "meet the needs of two not entirely compatible alliances."[32]

The implementation of the Nixon Doctrine following the 1968 Tet Offensive was to alter the form and substance of the allied efforts in Indochina. An ambitious Vietnamisation programme was undertaken, which would allow the progressive withdrawal of U.S. and allied combat troops from Vietnam, while the South Vietnamese armed forces were being retrained, re-equipped and reorganised to shoulder the full burden of defending their own territory. Coupled with a rapid quantitative development of South Vietnam's defence forces, urgent efforts were being made by the United States to improve the quality of these forces through intensive training programmes. It was against this backdrop that South Vietnam approached allies such as New Zealand to seek professional assistance in training - initially for the ARVN and later for the South Vietnamese Regional Forces (RF) and Popular Forces (PF).[33]

Within the context of that metamorphosis in the political and military situation after 1968, and the corresponding shift in New Zealand's foreign policy, this thesis will outline the reasons underlying the government's decision to turn from the provision of combat troops to training assistance. An examination will then be made of the introduction, activities and accomplishments of New Zealand's combatant training assistance to South Vietnam, and later to the Khmer Republic.

New Zealand training assistance to the armed forces of those two nations, more so to the Khmer Republic, during the Vietnam War was in two distinct categories. The first was that of noncombat training assistance, best exemplified by the early labours of the New Zealand Engineer Detachment and 1 New Zealand Services Medical team at Bong Son. These units not only performed their usual active service functions, but also instructed their Vietnamese hosts in basic engineering and medical skills.

The second category of training assistance, namely combatant training, assumed four different forms. Initial assistance was provided from early November 1969 until mid-April 1970, during which months `V' and `W' companies were periodically involved in training regular army units of the 18th ARVN Division. In late 1970, four New Zealanders were seconded to the AATTV, as a prelude to the sending of a larger New Zealand team. In late 1970 and early 1972, two separate New Zealand training teams arrived in South Vietnam, each with a very different training task. the 1st New Zealand Army Training Team, Vietnam (hereafter 1NZATTV), twenty-eight strong, collaborating with Vietnamese personnel to establish a Leadership Wing at Chi Lang (close to the Cambodian border in MR (Military Region) IV), provided leadership training to South Vietnamese territorial force Officers. The 2nd New Zealand Army Training Team, Vietnam (hereafter 2NZATTV), comprising eighteen personnel, was integrated into an existing training establishment.

This team worked with U.S. Special Forces at Dong Ba Thin, some fifteen minutes drive from Cam Ranh Bay, to train Khmer Republic light infantry battalions. This study will concentrate, in particular, on the last three models of training assistance, only briefly describing the initial training assistance provided by Victor and Whiskey companies.

The 1NZATTV, 2NZATTV and the New Zealand servicemen attached to the Australian training teams were all withdrawn from Vietnam in December 1972, soon after the election victory of the New Zealand Labour Party led by N.E. Kirk.

The two other elements which, in addition to their active service roles, engaged in training Vietnamese personnel - the New Zealand Army Medical Team and the New Zealand Army Engineers - have not been included in this survey, given that their training activities were altogether non-combatant in nature.

This study is divided into seven chapters. Chapter One examines the reasons behind the decision to provide training assistance to the troops of the 18th ARVN Division, the training activates of the two infantry companies, and the success or otherwise of the training. The second chapter provides a broad overview of the military situation in South Vietnam following the 1968 TET Offensive and the factors that led to the decision of the New Zealand Government to provide training assistance to South Vietnam. Chapter Three examines the reasons behind the deployment of four New Zealanders to serve with the Australian Training Team in Vietnam and also examines the training activities of these personnel. Chapter Four examines the role of 1NZATTV throughout its duration at Chi Lang. Chapter Five provides a broad overview of the military situation in the Khmer Republic up to the end of 1971, and the reasons that underlay the decision of the New Zealand Government to deploy another training team to South Vietnam, in this

instance to provide training to the FANK. Chapter Six examines the training role of 2NZATTV. The final chapter analyses the factors that led to the decision in late 1972 of the New Zealand Government to withdraw all of its training personnel from South Vietnam.

This study reviews the extent to which the training ventures were a success, both politically and militarily. To this end, several factors have been probed: the training undertaken by the selected New Zealand personnel in preparation for their tasks in Vietnam; the training programmes that the teams implemented there; the types of instructional methods used, and evaluations of their success; the willingness and ability of their students to learn and to absorb the instruction offered; the success of the varying levels of integration that each New Zealand team managed to achieve; the logistical situation experienced by each team; the problems that faced the wives of team members, with the effects of forced separation upon both partners.[34] The extent to which the training teams participated in the civic action programme, particularly through the Kiwi Hoanga project, is an issue that goes beyond the teams' instructional tasks and the scope of this thesis. Such is the political effectiveness of civic action, in "winning hearts and minds" that the civic action programme is discussed in an appendix seven. The thesis finally analyses the factors behind the withdrawal of the training teams, and the conclusions that may be drawn from this episode of military assistance to a Third World nation by New Zealand military forces.

When discussing all these aspects of a multilateral co-operative effort, it must be borne in mind that New Zealand's training assistance to the South Vietnamese and Khmer forces began, and always remained, a token political and military gesture.[35] Politically the training ventures were to some extent more successful, while militarily - notwithstanding the relatively impressive numbers of

Vietnamese and Khmer troops who passed through the training centres - these ventures fell far short of what might be deemed a significant accomplishment.

The New Zealand instructors faced their own particular difficulties which they endeavoured to overcome, with varying degrees of success. The training ventures were clearly too small, and in some cases too short in duration, to be of truly material benefit to the ARVN and the FANK. The personnel chosen for the training ventures were inadequately trained for their respective tasks. The cultural and language barriers proved, in many cases, very difficult to break through. The tactics used by the South Vietnamese and U.S. armies were very different from doctrines employed by the New Zealand Army. The war in Vietnam had already been in progress for many years; not surprisingly, the instructors in 1NZATTV and the AATTV would find the habits and attitudes of their students hard to change.

New Zealand troops, thin on the ground and few in number at the best of times, were assigned to many different types of training ventures, but for political reasons even manifest asymmetries were not corrected. In particular, by the time 1NZATTV had long outlived its usefulness and many of its instructors were undertaking no instruction, 2NZATTV was desperately short of instructors.

A small number of publications deal with the provision of training assistance to South Vietnam and the Khmer Republic during the second Vietnam War. However, most of these examine this subject in relation to the United States involvement in such training. I. McNeill's book The Team: Australian Army Advisors in Vietnam, 1962 - 1972,[36] provides an examination of Australia's training role in Vietnam from the early 1960s until the end of 1972. Although covering, in part, similar material, this thesis examines the reasons why New Zealand contributed a small number of trainers to

the Australian training team and the activities they were engaged in. McNeill mentions the involvement of New Zealand personnel in his book only very briefly.

There are a number of topics related to this study which deserve further research. One important area is the various levels of decision-making and defence policy formulation, through Cabinet, the Ministries of Defence and Foreign Affairs, through the New Zealand Defence Forces, to commanders, in the case of this study, in Southeast Asia.[37] Also, the relationships that exist between the various levels of governmental agencies needs scholarly attention. There is only a small number of publications that examine New Zealand's military and political involvement in the Second Vietnam War. Further research needs to be conducted on the attitudes of the South Vietnamese, both political and military, towards New Zealand's military involvement in South Vietnam, particularly with its involvement in Phuoc Tuy Province. The extent to which the experiences of New Zealand's training assistance were applied to later training ventures involving foreign military personnel is an area which needs to be explored.

The Vietnam War was, particularly by the end of the 1960s, and for some still is, an `unpopular' war. It is hoped that this study will encourage further detailed scholarly research into the other forms of assistance the New Zealand armed forces and civilian agencies provided to the Vietnamese and the Khmer Republics.

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1. Treaties and Alliances of the World: An International Survey covering Treaties in Force and Communities of States (Bristol, 1968), p. 141.

2. Adapted from F. Frost, Australia's War In Vietnam (Sydney, 1987), p. 13.

3. This theory compared the effect of a communist victory in Indochina upon the rest of Southeast Asia to that of falling dominoes. A communist victory in one country automatically placed its neighbours in immediate jeopardy of suffering the same fate. It was feared that this domino effect could spread to even Australia and New Zealand.

4. In 1952, the New Zealand Government dispatched a consignment of arms and ammunition to the French.

5. In 1951, the ANZUS (Australia, New Zealand and the United States) alliance was signed, and in 1954 the Manila Treaty was signed. The Manila Treaty, an attempt to further build up the front against Communism, designated South Vietnam as one of three states to whom assistance could be provided. Ratified on 14 April 1954, SEATO played a crucial role in New Zealand's military policy throughout the 1960s. SEATO sought to conclude a system of collective defence in Southeast Asia and the western Pacific and marked New Zealand's commitment to forward defence on the Asian mainland. For a detailed analysis of SEATO, see M. Pearson, Paper Tiger: New Zealand's Part in SEATO, 1954 - 1977 (Wellington, 1989).

6. Viet Cong was an abbreviation for `Vietnamese Communist'.

7. Report of the Department of External Affairs (Wellington, 1962), p. 25.

8. ibid., p.6.

9. Report of the Department of External Affairs (Wellington, 1963), p. 25.

10. ibid., p. 26.

11. This team participated in reconstruction and development work and taught the Vietnamese basic engineering techniques. For detailed information on this engineer unit, see P. Berry, `Sappers of the South: The Origins of the Royal New Zealand Engineers' (unpublished M. Phil thesis, University of Waikato, 1984). This unit served in South Vietnam till June 1965.

12. D. McCraw, `Reluctant Ally: New Zealand's Entry into the Vietnam War', The New Zealand Journal of History, vol. 15, no. 1 (April 1981), p. 52.

13. G.H. Turley The Easter Offensive: The Last American Advisors Vietnam, 1972 (Novato California, 1985), p. 40.

14. U.S. Sharp Strategy For Defeat: Vietnam in Retrospect (California, 1978), pp. 59 - 60.

15. For an outline of the `Confrontation', see D.M. Horner, Duty First: The Royal Australian Regiment in War and Peace (Sydney 1990), pp. 97 - 99.
The Battalion was deployed to Malaya in December 1957.

16. The National Service scheme, begun in early 1962, was abolished by the Labour Government at the end of 1972.

17. External Affairs Review (Wellington, May 1970), p. 10. For an account of 161 Battery in South Vietnam, see S.D. Newman, Vietnam Gunners: 161 Bty, RNZA, South Vietnam 1965-71 (Tauranga, 1988).

18. For publications on these two companies, see the following works: L.D. Johnson (ed), The History of 6RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Battalion: 1967-1970, two vols (Townsville, 1972): K.E. Newman, The ANZAC Battalion: A Record of the Tour of 2nd Battalion, The RAR, 1st Battalion and the RNZIR (The ANZAC Battalion) in South Vietnam: 1967-1968, two vols (Sydney, 1969): A.R. Roberts (ed), The ANZAC Battalion 1970-1971 (Sydney, 1972): M.D. O'Neill and R.L. Sayce (eds), The Fighting Fourth: A Pictorial History of the Second Tour in South Vietnam by 4RAR-NZ (ANZAC Battalion): 1971-1972 (Sydney, 1973).

19. Both infantry companies operated in Phuoc Tuy Province. On 1 March 1968 the two New Zealand companies were merged with 2RAR to form the 2RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Battalion, until their withdrawal in 1970 and 1971.

20. The troop in Vietnam was attached to the Australian SAS, until the former was withdrawn in February 1971. See D.M. Horner SAS: Phantoms of the Jungle. A History of the Australian Special Air Service (Sydney, 1989).

21. There were also direct requests for military assistance from South Vietnam and then the Khmer Republic, but such requests were largely generated by U.S. initiatives.

22. The numbers of New Zealand troops deployed to South Vietnam was minute, when compared to the troops sent to; the Occupation Force in Japan (approximately 4,000 troops); Korea 1951 - 1953 (1,500 troops); and Malaysia 1964 - 1966 (1,300 troops).

23. NZ Official Yearbook 1966, Wellington 1966, pp. 258 - 260.
The Territorial Force, numbering 11,000 personnel, could serve overseas only in time of war or other emergency.

24. M.R. Wicksteed A Chronology of the New Zealand Army (Wellington, 1988), p. 41. See also J. Paxton (ed) The Statesman Yearbook, 125th edition (London, 1988).

25. I. McNeill To Long Tan: The Australian Army and the Vietnam War: 1950 - 1966 (St Leonards, NSW, 1993), p. 478.

See also J. Paxton (ed) The Statesman Yearbook.

26. In 1968, the U.S. Army numbered 1,570,000 soldiers, with the population numbering just over 200 million. However, only fourteen percent (under 80,000) of the 543,400 troops were assigned to combat. See also J. Paxton (ed) The Statesman Yearbook.

27. New Zealand would eventually commit troops to South Vietnam based upon SEATO obligations. Although SEATO's co-operative military and political basis grew weaker during the 1960s, the political and military co-operation between the ANZUS partners grew stronger.

28. In early 1963 Indonesia began to mount its policy of `Confrontation' with Malaysia.
The maintenance of good relations with the United States was also for trade purposes and for international credit.

29. D. McCraw, `Reluctant Ally', p. 49.

30. Report of the Department of External Affairs (Wellington, 1964), p. 30.

31. New Zealand Ambassador, Washington to External Affairs, 15 April 1965, 43/64/4 Series Visits to South Vietnam, vol I, April 1963 - July 1971, Defence Classified Registry (DCR).

32. I. MacGibbon, `History of New Zealand Defence', in New Zealand: Foreign Policy and Defence edited by E. Olssen and B. Webb (University of Otago, 1977), p. 29.

33. One category of VC troops was also called Regional Forces. However, unless stated, all references to Regional Forces in this thesis refer to the South Vietnamese Regional Forces.

34. My employment in the New Zealand Army as a regular force Royal New Zealand Education Corps Senior instructor has provided me with an invaluable in-depth understanding of both the military environment and the instructional methods employed at all levels in the New Zealand Army, from instructing recruits to advanced instructional courses.

35. New Zealand's training assistance was relatively minute, both in size and diversity, compared to its ANZUS partners. Australia's training assistance to South Vietnam, begun in 1962, was diverse, with servicemen working individually and in groups in all four Military Regions in South Vietnam. They were engaged in combat operations and training with ARVN regular units, territorial forces, U.S. Special Forces and CIA-sponsored programmes. At its height, the AATTV numbered almost 1,000 personnel.

36. I. McNeill, The Team: Australian Army Advisors in Vietnam, 1962 - 1972 (Canberra, 1984).

37. The most recent publication, of which there are very few

that examines Defence policy formulation in New Zealand is by J. Rolfe, Defending New Zealand: A Study of Structures, Processes and Relationships, (Victoria University of Wellington, 1993).

CHAPTER ONE

THE BEGINNINGS: `V' AND `W' COMPANIES' TRAINING OF SOUTH VIETNAMESE FORCES.

It is not good for the Christian's health
to hustle the Asian brown
For the Christian riles and the Asian smiles
and he weareth the Christian down

Rudyard Kipling

New Zealand's combat elements in the Vietnam War entered the conflict as part of a larger Australian force. Australia's own commitment of combat troops in the theatre had begun in May 1965 when a battalion group was attached to the United States (hereafter U.S.) 173rd Airborne Brigade, based at Bien Hoa. In the following year, the Australian Army deployed a two-battalion task force, designated the 1st Australian Task Force (hereafter 1ATF), to Phuoc Tuy province.[1] The first New Zealand combatant contribution to South Vietnam was 161 Battery of artillery, which came under the operational control of 1ATF in June 1966. Subsequently, other New Zealand units were attached to 1ATF, including two infantry companies - Victor (hereafter `V') Company in April 1967, and Whiskey (`W') Company in December 1967 - as well as a Special Air Service (hereafter SAS) troop in January 1969. The Australian-New Zealand link in Vietnam was continuous.

This chapter will discuss the training that the two New Zealand infantry companies, along with other 1ATF units, provided to the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (hereafter ARVN) units in Phuoc Tuy Province. This will involve examining the following related topics: a brief geographical description of Phuoc Tuy Province; 1ATF's role in Phuoc Tuy, in relationship to the U.S. strategy for fighting the war in South Vietnam; a comparison of the counterinsurgency skills of the U.S. and the New Zealand Armies; why 1ATF undertook to train the ARVN and territorial troops in Phuoc Tuy


Province - initially to assist 1ATF in fighting the insurgents and then to prepare the territorial forces to assume responsibility for the province upon the Task Force's withdrawal; and the training that the South Vietnamese received and how effective the training actually was.

The Task Force's area of operations covered most of Phuoc Tuy province, where some 100,000 people lived. The province measured approximately forty miles from east to west and thirty miles north to south. Most of 1ATF's operations were conducted within a twenty-mile radius of Nui Dat (Vietnamese for `small hill'). The Australian Task Force faced the dilemma of having to undertake two divergent tasks simultaneously - to "destroy or at least neutralise the enemy's main and regional forces [North Vietnamese Army (hereafter NVA) and Vietnamese Communists (hereafter VC)] and at the same time remove the claws of the Viet Cong local forces and infrastructure [the National Liberation Front (hereafter NLF)] from the town and villages."[2] Their first mentioned role required conventional military operations, while the added mission required a continuous pacification programme. However, 1ATF did not have the resources to undertake simultaneously both roles effectively, and it was never given the responsibility for the populated area of Phuoc Tuy. Further, 1ATF did not possess the required force with a "complete advisory system...[and] civilian experts in fields in which the Army is neither trained nor equipped."[3]

The American war strategy in South Vietnam until the end of the 1960s embraced two unco-ordinated and, in effect, contradictory concepts - pacification and attrition - which served to limit the effectiveness of 1ATF in Phuoc Tuy province.[4] The U.S. armed forces viewed these two facets as being complementary to each other.[5] It was calculated that the war of attrition would wear down the enemy militarily, while the pacification programme, with its

MAP 3

Phuoc Tuy Province.[6]



three-pronged objective, would deny the enemy support amongst the people.

Attrition was primarily two-fold. First, to find, fight and destroy the NVA and VC forces in South Vietnam, through superior mobility and firepower.[7] This measure was designed to restrain the level of insurgency from North Vietnam, to restore the morale of the Government of South Vietnam, and to enhance the stability and security of South Vietnam. The attritional doctrine adopted reflected the U.S. Army's strengths in firepower and strategic mobility.[8] An operation's success or failure was measured in a ratio of costs inflicted upon the enemy in relation to that expended by the Americans and its allies. The Americans hoped that they could inflict intolerable losses on the communists, while at the same time minimising American casualties. This strategy offered the U.S. Army the prospect of winning the war in South Vietnam quicker than by traditional counterinsurgency operations, such as those used in Malaya, which were usually conducted over long periods of time. Such encounters as the Ia Drang Valley, Khe Sanh, the Tet Offensive, and Long Tan served to reinforce the success of attrition, as NVA/VC combat losses far exceeded those of America and its allies.[9] However, this double-faceted strategy neither secured the population nor enabled the U.S. military to fight its decisive battles with the insurgents, and thus bring about an end to the war.[10] It was only in the late 1960s that the U.S. military began to accept the failings of attrition and the crucial role of population security.

The second facet to this strategy, pacification, was known by many names; civic action, revolutionary development, strategic hamlets and winning hearts and minds. Pacification can be defined as:

> The military, political, economic and social process of establishing or re-establishing local government responsive to and involving the

> participation of the people. It includes the provision of sustained, credible territorial security, the destruction of the enemy's underground government, the assertion or re-assertion of political control and involvement of the people in government, and the initiation of economic and social activity capable of self-sustenance and expansion.[11]

Pacification was designed to serve three basic aims.[12] First, to create and maintain sustained protection of the rural population from the NVA/VC, to deny the NVA/VC a rural popular base which would otherwise provide recruits, supplies and intelligence. Secondly, to generate rural support for the South Vietnamese Government through programmes that would meet rural needs and bring the rural areas politically and administratively under the control of the South Vietnamese Government. Thirdly, to identify and destroy the NLF underground movement, known as the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI).[13]

In contrast to the `big unit' war, the pacification effort, until 1968, was essentially a programme administered by the South Vietnamese with the U.S. maintaining an advisory and supporting role. General W. Westmoreland, one of the Vietnam War's most controversial figures and Commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (hereafter COMUSMACV), believed that the less contact the Americans had with the people also meant there would be "much less provocation of the xenophobia of the Vietnamese, that much less opportunity for unfortunate incidents between American troops and the people."[14] It was reasoned, therefore, that American troops were unsuited to be used primarily in support of pacification, and responsibility for pacification lay with the ARVN and the South Vietnamese civilian authorities. Further, the generally poor performance of the ARVN in combat provided another reason for relegation to this role.[15] It was also assumed that

U.S. advisors would, over time, train and guide the South Vietnamese to become effective enough to assume responsibility for the pacification programme.

Pacification proposed that the ARVN, with assistance from its allies, would clear the enemy from a particular geographical area.[16] The South Vietnamese territorial forces would then maintain the security of the area while teams of specially trained South Vietnamese civilians would carry out civic action and pacification work such as restoring autonomous local administration, the rebuilding of local infrastructures, such as roads, health and medical efforts, rural education programmes, the care and resettlement of refugees, and rural economic revival. To help achieve this, a large American programme under the title of Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (hereafter CORDS) was established in May 1967.[17] A CORDS pamphlet emphasised the importance of controlling the South Vietnamese rural population, because the village/hamlet official personified the government of Vietnam to the rural population.[18] As such, the local government official played a major part in the pacification programme, because it was he to whom the villagers approached for assistance and advice. If the VC could take the place of the official, they could cut off virtually all communication between the South Vietnamese Government and the rural people. The VC could then harness the rural population to their war machine.

However, the South Vietnamese and U.S. military considered that pacification was a civilian rather than a military responsibility, and as a consequence, pacification did not receive much support and funding from the U.S. military until the end of the 1968 Tet Offensive.[19] Until the end of 1968, pacification had been very much a small-scale enterprise. Both the South Vietnamese Government and the Americans, shocked by the results of the Tet Offensive, intensified efforts to increase their control

over the local villages. The United States finally learnt what the British and her allies had learnt in Malaya and Borneo, "that the main element of the war was the war at the village, rather than the war between battalions."[20] Vietnamisation provided a further impetus for intensifying the pacification programme.

Both pacificationa and attrition were based upon the U.S. Army's concept of counterinsurgency warfare. Although well suited to combating enemy forces in conventional warfare, the U.S. Army was neither trained nor organised to effectively fight guerilla forces in an insurgency conflict. The US Army's pre-Vietnam experience in low-intensity conflict - the Revolutionary War, the wars against the American Indians, the Mexican War and the Philippine Insurrection - represented a very small proportion of its history when compared to the three conventional wars - World Wars One and Two, and Korea - that it had fought in. Its experiences in these three wars, plus the `Cold War', shaped the U.S. Army's approach to counterinsurgency warfare.[21] Further, up to the Vietnam War, this conventional approach to counterinsurgency had been successful.

Much of the U.S. Army's doctrinal literature on counterinsurgency operations was based upon the use of conventional means.[22] The tactics, equipment and organisation of the U.S. armed forces had been designed for a conventional war, against conventional enemy forces. American training and operational methods concentrated upon the importance of large numbers of troops, the quick movement and concentration of large forces to attack enemy units, the use of massive artillery and air firepower to minimise U.S. casualties, and large-scale offensive and defensive operations. American soldiers were generally untrained in jungle warfare, relying upon their technological superiority to wage the war in Vietnam.

This `Army Concept', as it was called, was thus applied to South Vietnam. In the late 1950s and early 1960s, the U.S. sought to reduce the ARVN from 250,000 poorly equipped and demoralised troops into a streamlined, state-of-the-art army of 150,000 men and a reliable 40,000 strong militia. The training unit sent to South Vietnam to achieve this was the Military Assistance and Advisory Group (hereafter MAAG) commanded by Lieutenant General S. Williams.[23] Fresh from Korea, where he had witnessed the North Korean and Chinese invasions, Williams was convinced that the assault on South Vietnam would come by way of a large-scale invasion of North Vietnamese, and perhaps Chinese, troops across the seventeenth parallel. Williams, along with seven hundred US military advisers, trained, organised and equipped the South Vietnamese Army in the art of conventional warfare to repel an expected North Vietnamese invasion.[24] These U.S. advisors ignored instruction on counterinsurgency operations. To a certain extent, the ARVN soldier became a mini-American soldier. The South Vietnamese would prove unable to manage this type of fighting on their own, which had proved very expensive and destructive when used by the United States military. Decreasing levels of U.S. support to South Vietnam after the withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Vietnam also aggravated these difficulties.

Although this concept of conventional war was firmly entrenched in the minds of the U.S. military hierarchy, attempts were made, particularly during the Kennedy Administration in 1961, to counter the growing insurgency within South Vietnam.[25] Some of the American military, the Vietnamese General Staff, and foreign counterinsurgency experts such as Sir Robert Thompson, argued that the ARVN should be small, mobile and highly trained in anti-guerilla and counterinsurgency tactics to combat local insurgent forces.[26] This was because opposition to the Saigon government, at least into the early 1960s, was small in numbers, consisting primarily of VC guerillas and political cadre left behind in South Vietnam. Such endeavours,

particularly during the Kennedy administration, to develop a counterinsurgency capability within the U.S. Army received little support among the military hierarchy.[27] The Marines, through their Combined Action Platoons (hereafter CAPs), proved to be successful, although limited in numbers. More emphasis was placed upon the U.S. Special Forces being used as unconventional forces, as opposed to fighting counterinsurgency warfare. The Diem government took steps to instigate procedures to provide for internal aggression, which did have elements of counterinsurgency strategy. However, these programmes were poorly implemented, poorly led and open to corruption. These advocates of a small army, highly trained in the art of fighting guerillas, went unheeded, and largely unheard. Even Kennedy, whose term in office was also known as the counterinsurgency era, failed to produce any revolution in Army doctrine.

Increasing involvement in counterinsurgency in Southeast Asia resulted in growing analysis by U.S. academics and policy-level officials of the three most pertinent counterinsurgency operations - the British in Malaya and the French in Vietnam and Algeria - for lessons and insights that could be applied to the situation in South Vietnam. However, the U.S. military realised few such lessons. Although there were a number of striking similarities in the French and American experiences in Vietnam, the Americans concluded that the French experiences in Indochina resembled "more of a series of cautionary tales than examples to be followed."[28] At the end of the 1950s, Senator J.F. Kennedy reiterated similar views regarding French policies in Algeria. The Americans also believed that the failure of the French to deal realistically with the underlying political appeal of these two insurgencies negated any usefulness these French experiences might have had.

The Americans, and to a lesser degree the South Vietnamese, although paying close attention to and realising the value of the British experience in Malaya, were cautious in applying the counterinsurgency methods the British successfully employed.[29] Although the British applied techniques to counter the underlying realities of Communist insurgency, the Americans appreciated there were numerous differences between Malaya and Vietnam, which made for a very imperfect analogy.[30] Some writers argue that these two campaigns were so dissimilar that no comparisons can be made and B.B. Fall argued that any such comparison is "nothing but a dangerous delusion."[31]

Nevertheless, there were lessons learnt in Malaya that could have been usefully emphasised more heavily in Vietnam - with suitable adaptations. Conscious efforts were sometimes made, often unsuccessfully, to apply Malayan experiences to Vietnam with virtually no adaptation.[32] However, whether a counterinsurgency approach more similar to that used in Malaya would have been as effective in Vietnam remains a hypothetical `if'. Although the Malayan insurgency was far more limited in nature, scale and external support than Vietnam, there were also many similarities.[33] Perhaps the most valid lessons that could be drawn from the Malayan insurgency and applied to the South Vietnam conflict were between 1948 and 1954. R.E. Clutterbuck contends that if the South Vietnamese with U.S. support had managed to do in 1958 to 1964 what Malaya backed by Britain "did so well" in 1948 to 1954, then it is conceivable there could have been a decisive difference in the war's outcome.[34] But the US did not appreciate fully the nature of the conflict and realistically evaluate the situation in Vietnam. By mid-1964, Vietnam had become a much different war from that of Malaya. The conflict was growing increasingly from one of a rural insurgency to one of a quasi-conventional war.[35]

The counterinsurgency skills of the New Zealand and Australian armies were in marked contrast to those of the Americans. By 1965, both Australia and New Zealand had had extensive military experience in Southeast Asia. The Australian and New Zealand military doctrine of counter-revolutionary warfare, successfully developed through training and active service during the Malayan emergency and the Confrontation with Indonesia in Borneo, stressed "the main part of the struggle is political, counterinsurgency operations are simultaneously political and military in their nature. There is no purely military solution."[36] Accordingly, the military effort in its totality and in all its levels must comprise a "joint political-military operation, with close co-operation between the civil power, the police and the armed forces - both indigenous and external."[37] Working with the British during the Malayan Emergency and the Confrontation with Indonesia in Borneo, the counterinsurgency doctrine of the Australian and New Zealand armies closely reflected the British model, demonstrating high levels of skill in small-unit patrolling, ambushing and counter-ambush.[38] This doctrine clearly indicated the types of operations that would be implemented if these two armies became involved in an internal, revolutionary conflict in this geographical region. This doctrine was very well suited to the type of war conducted in Vietnam, particularly with the small unit type of war that existed in Phuoc Tuy.

Not only were there such differences in doctrine, but also differences in the scale and techniques between the training systems and the instructional methods of the American, New Zealand and Australian armies. Lieutenant General J.A. Mace commented: "One [the U.S. system] is a big sausage machine and the other is more of an individual process."[39] He had visited several combatant units in Vietnam, and commented: "you saw the way they pushed the draftees in, I think it was horrifying."[40] The New Zealand soldier was trained at the individual level, much more so

than his American counterpart. This was partly attributable to the relatively small size of the New Zealand Army. Greater emphasis was placed by the New Zealand Army upon the teaching of individual skills in the jungle setting for all ranks and the importance of junior leadership by section and platoon commanders. The New Zealand Army emphasised the importance of all ranks being equally skilled in such areas as marksmanship, navigation, junglecraft, ambushing and counter-ambushing, harbouring, patrolling and tracking.[41]

These differences are perhaps best summed up in the two different attitudes towards patrolling. The U.S soldiers generally made a lot of noise when they were in the bush, letting the enemy know exactly where they were, inviting the enemy to fight them. The New Zealand and Australian troops patrolled very quietly, and in small groups, careful not to give their locations away. An Australian veteran told reporters: "Our patrols do not fire off ammo or shoot up flares like the Yanks - They listen and move quietly, we haven't fired a shot or sent up a flare yet. The Americans think we are mad. It seems to me though, that all they're doing is letting the VC know where they are. I guess we have a bit to teach them."[42]

However, the two-pronged U.S. strategy created difficulties for 1ATF. The essential component of the New Zealand/Australian doctrine of counter-revolutionary warfare, that a single national agency was responsible for the co-ordination of civilian, police and military agencies at all levels, was not present in Phuoc Tuy.[43] The commander of 1ATF was given the responsibility for conventional military operations in the non-populated areas, while the Province Chief, aided by an American adviser, was responsible for population security, counter-guerilla operations and pacification in his province.[44] This meant that 1ATF was responsible for the security of the non-populated areas of Phuoc Tuy province, while operations in the populated areas of the province were entirely under

the control of the South Vietnamese Province Chief and the territorial forces. As a result, 1ATF was excluded from operating in the urban areas where the NLF was at its strongest.

In attempting to overcome these problems, 1ATF viewed them as being essentially military, not political, in nature, and more importance was attached to military operations than pacification measures for several reasons.[45] First, 1ATF planners felt that operations involving population security were beneath the capabilities of what was essentially a Task Force trained exclusively for combatant duties. The task force commander, Brigadier R.L. Hughes, believed that the troops of 1ATF were "of better quality than pure garrison troops", and thus did not consider providing long-term security to the province population in the villages or hamlets.[46] Further, the focus of the Americans upon the strategy of attrition created the rationale that required 1ATF to be employed against mainforce units. As 1ATF's major operational tasks were "to `secure and dominate' its tactical area of responsibility" in Phuoc Tuy province and to "conduct operations anywhere" in Military Region (MR) III, from 1966 until 1971 1ATF spent most of its time "in operations to locate, engage and weaken the armed units of the NLF and PAVN [Peoples Army of Vietnam (hereafter PAVN)]."[47] Secondly, there was a risk that 1ATF could suffer high casualties from mines if units were involved in operations around populated areas, a risk politically unacceptable to both the New Zealand and Australian Governments. Thirdly, the Province Chief in Phuoc Tuy and his U.S. adviser both felt that population security was the responsibility of the territorial forces, and thus did not want 1ATF to operate around the populated regions for any extended period.[48] The level of co-operation between 1ATF, the Province Chief and his U.S. adviser was far from satisfactory. Successive commanders of 1ATF realised that solutions used in the Malayan experience

might not have been appropriate. Unlike Malaya, there was a lack of governmental control in the province and there was a general apathy on the part of the people.

As discussed earlier, the Australian Army's counter revolutionary warfare concept assumed that a competent civil power existed. Although the vital facet of pacification was, as noted earlier, the responsibility of the South Vietnamese Province Chief, he lacked effective military forces to allow him to successfully undertake this role. The poor performance of the territorial forces in Phuoc Tuy province severely curtailed the effectiveness of 1ATF in destroying, or at least neutralising, the local NLF and PAVN. 1ATF's role, as has been shown, was to conduct operations against the NVA/VC, but pacification also critically depended upon effective operations by both the local territorial forces and the programmes implemented to counter the NLF's political composition. However, the territorial forces did not undertake effective operations and the largely incompetent and corrupt South Vietnamese authorities were unable to carry out the administrative, political and military operations that were necessary to ensure that the pacification programme, in Phuoc Tuy province in particular, could succeed. The NLF had extensively infiltrated the South Vietnamese civilian and military agencies. Further, the diverse array of South Vietnam's armed forces hindered the ARVN's operations against the Viet Cong elements in Phuoc Tuy Province.

Although the territorial forces were based in the areas where the influence of the NLF was at its strongest, namely the urban areas, they remained powerless to combat the NLF. The U.S. district senior adviser at Dat Do reported in January 1968, that although ARVN, Regular Force (hereafter RF) or Popular Force (hereafter PF) units were present in almost every hamlet in the district, the "VC still move

about as they please in the hours of darkness" and NLF forces of company strength were able to enter the hamlets of Dat Do at will.[49] Units from 1ATF had to be very wary when driving through the town.

Combined operations between allied and South Vietnamese units were encouraged by the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (hereafter MACV). MACV felt that such operations enabled the ARVN to observe allied methods of operations, mobility, tactics and leadership and obtain practical and valuable experiences that could not otherwise be obtained by attending courses at a training centre.[50] By 1968 there had been attempts by 1ATF to undertake combined operations with the ARVN, such as the protection of some outposts. However, attempts by 1ATF to establish effective liaison and to co-ordinate and combine operations with South Vietnamese forces in Phuoc Tuy continued to be a problem.[51] 1ATF did not have the resources to provide the necessary liaison officers to serve with the South Vietnamese units; this was in contrast with the American policy of working with the South Vietnamese as closely as possible.[52] A CORDS report considered that: "The reluctance of ATF to participate in combined military operations is based upon a fear of accidentally firing on friendly forces or taking casualties because an enemy unit was presumed friendly...As a result, 1ATF usually requests that all friendly military forces be restricted to their compounds at night when Australian forces are operating in their area."[53]

The Task Force was also inhibited in its attempts at combined operations by the attitudes of the U.S. advisory team, particularly the province senior adviser, and the Provincial Chief in Phuoc Tuy.[54] They resented and resisted 1ATF's few attempts to conduct long-term pacification operations in the populated areas of the province.[55] The New Zealand Defence historian, J.T. Henderson, wrote that at

the "command and operation level there...[was] very little working co-operation between 1ATF and the Vietnamese units in the province."[56]

However, the 1ATF operational planners should have been able to overcome these objections, as the dispute between 1ATF and the Province Chief and his U.S. adviser was basically jurisdictional.[57] There were precedents of U.S. units that had been given the authority to operate in populated areas to provide population security: one such example was the U.S. 25th Division, which operated in a province northeast of Saigon in 1966. Further, 1ATF did conduct some short cordon and search operations in villages to search for cadres, NLF sympathisers and ARVN deserters. This suggested that, perhaps, 1ATF might have been able to operate in the populated areas if it had really insisted.

These factors served to complicate significantly 1ATF efforts to assist the South Vietnamese forces in Phuoc Tuy. The situation in Phuoc Tuy province was, according to Henderson, no different from the rest of Vietnam, in which "positions of responsibility are handed out as part of a system of political patronage" by the South Vietnamese regime.[58] Although the South Vietnamese Government needed to appoint people it knew to be trustworthy, the competency of many government officials and military personnel suffered as a result of this patronage system, and the authority of competent civilian officials was "undermined by dissent, cross-currents of loyalties, distrust and competing ambitions."[59] This could have resulted in security breaches if information on Australian operations was shared with them.

There were many reasons for the weakness of the South Vietnamese forces in Phuoc Tuy province. Australian army advisors noted that these included: a complicated command system; poor leadership and poor discipline; absenteeism by many officers; corruption; inadequate firepower of many

units; `live-and-let-live' understandings with the Viet Cong; a reluctance to patrol aggressively or fight at night, with the RF usually preferring to huddle in their flimsy defensive positions at night; and little regard for security and a general state of apathy.[60] The South Vietnamese forces also failed to follow up in clearance operations, which contributed to limited 1ATF contact with the ARVN units in Phuoc Tuy Province. Although the ARVN and RF had many more troops in the province than 1ATF, these South Vietnamese forces were ineffective in their role of providing close-in protection for the population centres.[61]

The Australian Task Force's lack of faith in the ARVN and territorial forces in Phuoc Tuy Province was also a result of the level of penetration by the NLF into the territorial forces, and pro-communist sympathy among some of the ARVN units. Some soldiers, although perhaps not communists, were supportive of the communist cause, "either...directly sympathising with the NLF or by being related to family members who supported the NLF."[62] In July 1971, Major R.V. Musgrove, the Senior Australian Adviser of Phuoc Tuy Province, wrote: "the apparent ease with which the VC move in and out of secure areas must cause concern."[63] There was little doubt that the VC moved around some areas with minimum interference from the territorial forces that were supposedly protecting this region, and there was some evidence that the VC were actually living in bunkers in Hoa Long village. That 3 Royal Australian Regiment (hereafter RAR) was able to find bunkers and had contacts on the boundary one village, Xuyen-Moc, indicated "how thoroughly the territorial forces search and their interest in their job."[64] Brigadier S.P. Weir, a Commander of 1ATF, felt that the South Vietnamese units that performed poorest were usually situated near the major villages of the province.[65]

The soldiering skills, efficiency, competence and motivation of the majority of these South Vietnamese units was generally poor. In his report, Henderson stated that

"columns of RF and ARVN Forces also move more slowly around the outskirts of the villages, their rifles slung almost carelessly across their shoulders."[66] The RF and PF were required to set up ambushes on the outskirts of the villages each night, but 1ATF discovered that these ambushes were seldom set, and if they were, they were invariably located in the same place. As a result, few contacts occurred. This gave 1ATF personnel the impression that the RF and PF were "complying with the tacit understanding with the Viet Cong to leave each other alone."[67] It also appeared to 1ATF, that as long as it was willing to do the hard and dangerous jobs, there was no real incentive for the South Vietnamese to provide for their own protection.[68] There were, however, a few attempts by RF units to stand and fight the enemy, but these were rare. J.W. Nunn, the Acting Secretary of the Australian Army, believed that the Australian Army had, he believed, taught the Vietnamese all it could, but "what we cannot teach them is motivation and in certain sectors there is a significant lack of it."[69]

Henderson wrote a paper about interviews he conducted with several New Zealand Officers who had served in South Vietnam.[70] He noted that few of the New Zealand Officers who had served in 1ATF had any real faith in the fighting ability of the ARVN and territorial forces in Phuoc Tuy. Henderson wrote: "perhaps the most disheartening of all for the hard working New Zealander was the inactivity and inefficiency" of the Vietnamese forces in Phuoc Tuy.[71] Brigadier C.M.I. Pearson, an earlier commander of 1ATF, described the efficiency of the RF and PF in Phuoc Tuy province as being "bloody terrible."[72]

Vietnamisation: A Role for 1ATF

For 1ATF to accomplish its two distinct roles, it needed the participation and co-operation of the territorial forces based in Phuoc Tuy. Since the first phases of 1ATF's

operations in Phuoc Tuy, consecutive commanders of 1ATF had been concerned with improving the standards of the Vietnamese forces in Phuoc Tuy. In 1967, there had been an attempt by 1ATF to train the ARVN battalion that was stationed in Phuoc Tuy.[73] However, 1ATF lacked the resources, both in men and equipment, to undertake its own roles effectively, let alone undertake the training of ARVN units in the province.[74] Training teams would have to be manned by soldiers from the battalions, but they did not have any special instructor training, and the Task Force had not been organised and equipped to train local forces. There were also equipment shortages, and radios, rifles and other equipment necessary for training had to be taken from the battalion's limited supply.

The attempt by 1ATF to upgrade the territorial forces in Phuoc Tuy also coincided with the Vietnamisation programme, which also saw a change in role for 1ATF. On 16 April 1969, Lieutenant General J.J. Ewell, Commanding General II Field Force, issued a new directive to 1ATF, and also to other units under his command, which altered its operational priorities.[75] The first priority was to be pacification, the second priority was to be the upgrading of the South Vietnamese forces and the third priority was to be the continuation of military operations.[76] From May 1969, liaison with and training of the ARVN in Phuoc Tuy by 1ATF was expanded. However, most efforts to provide effective training of the ARVN in Phuoc Tuy were to be still hampered by a shortage of men and materials.[77]

The attitudes of successive commanders of 1ATF were pessimistic towards this decision to train the territorial forces to assume the war against the enemy. A commander of Australian Force Vietnam, Major General R.A. Hay, believed that the Vietnamese and United States governments were over-optimistic about the ability of the South Vietnamese forces to survive if the Allied forces were withdrawn from South Vietnam.[78] Colonel A.B. Stretton, Hay's Chief of

Staff, wrote that "everybody realised the futility of the whole war" and he considered Vietnamisation as merely a "face saving device."[79] Lieutenant Colonel K.C. Fenton, the Commander of NZ V Force (hereafter New Zealand Vietnam Force), was not sure that Phuoc Tuy would be secured if Allied and North Vietnamese forces were both withdrawn.[80] The Deputy Commander of 1ATF believed that even if the RF/PF were well trained and well led, the province would still require a substantial ARVN presence if the Task Force withdrew.[81]

1st Australian Task Force initiated its own programmes for the training of the RF and ARVN, although it was not until October 1968 that manpower for such training became available. The first programme began in November 1968, with 1ATF assisting with the training of RF companies in patrolling.[82] Pearson felt that if 1ATF could improve the patrol capability and general effectiveness of the RF in Phuoc Tuy, then the assistance they could provide to the Task Force would be considerable, although it was felt that it would take about two years to train all the RF in Phuoc Tuy province.[83] The Task Force could then concentrate its manpower and effort more effectively on large NLF/PAVN units in the province.

Pearson established a small training centre for the RF, at the `Heavyweight' training camp, the 18th ARVN Division's training school, near Hoa Long in Phuoc Tuy, only two kilometres south of Nui Dat.[84] Small teams of personnel from 1ATF were attached to the school for periods of up to six months, and they assisted the Australian Army Training Team, Vietnam (hereafter AATTV) advisers who were responsible for co-ordinating this training activity. The centre conducted three types of courses: patrol orientation courses for NonCommissioned Officers (hereafter NCOs) from 1ATF, Mobile Advisory Team (MAT) courses and patrol courses for the RF.[85] The patrol orientation courses lasted five days, and consisted of twenty NCOs and privates from 1ATF.

At the completion of a course, they assisted with the RF patrol course. The MAT courses, made up of three teams from 1ATF, each consisting of five personnel lasted four days. The Vietnamese students were taught the capabilities and organisational abilities of the territorial forces and the provincial administrative system, Vietnamese customs and advisory techniques, territorial force weapons and visited some RF outposts. At the completion of this course, these MATs were to train RF units and also accompany them on actual operations. The RF patrol course comprised a pilot course of forty students from the territorial forces and was divided into four patrols each of ten men, although the subsequent courses comprised fifty students, both Officers and Sergeants. The first four weeks consisted of instruction and practise, and the last two weeks comprised patrolling, under the direction of 1ATF. Each patrol was accompanied by a 1ATF soldier who had completed the patrol orientation course.

The pilot six-week RF patrol course, comprising forty students, began on 9 December 1968. The course was seen to be a success, with the students eager to learn the techniques that the Australians were teaching, and there were some improvements in weapon skills and tactics.[86] However, these successes were not maintained with the next courses. The students experienced difficulties in understanding compass work and map reading. When the instructors initially changed from one day to three day patrols, the Vietnamese students were reluctant to participate, as they were afraid of staying in the field for long periods. There were also problems with students, initially, coming from several different units.[87]

Despite these and other problems, the training was beginning to "make a marked improvement" in the effectiveness of the RF in the province.[88] The RF were beginning to undertake more aggressive patrolling and were winning some engagements with enemy units. However, the

programme came to an end in December 1969 after the 18th ARVN Division elements were relocated from the camp, and the withdrawal of the units protecting the camp. As the students not only had to attend classes during the day, but also had to undertake the security of the centre as well, it was therefore not uncommon for soldiers to fall asleep during classes. Despite attempts to solve the problem of providing security, the Province Chief informed 1ATF that he could not afford to have complete companies removed from the field for four weeks. Consequently, the centre was closed. Because of the school's closure, 1ATF had to devote resources to operations that the RF should have been undertaking. There was to be no further training of territorial force personnel in Phuoc Tuy by 1ATF, until the arrival of extra AATTV personnel in mid-1970.

In mid-1969, Pearson also turned to the training of the ARVN regular force. To the north of Phuoc Tuy province was Long Khanh province, where the 18th ARVN Division was based. The division was responsible for major operations in Phuoc Tuy as well as in Long Khanh, Binh Tuy and Bin Hoa, and its location made it tactically important to 1ATF: unless the division carried out effective surveillance over its area of responsibility, Viet Cong units could use Long Khanh as a base area for forays into Phuoc Tuy.[89] It was therefore a concern to 1ATF that the 18th ARVN Division do its job well. Unfortunately it was one of the less effective ARVN divisions, desperately in need of retraining.

The poor fighting state of the division and the need to have this remedied was recognised in Defence Headquarters in New Zealand and by the Americans. A report in July 1969 had noted that the "...main ARVN formation in the locality of 1ATF, 18th ARVN Division, was among the least effective in the whole of South Vietnam...and the inadequate follow-up of clearance operations...constituted a continuing problem for the Force commander."[90] In an attempt to give this division some combat experience, the senior adviser of IV Corps,

Major General R. Wetherill, had suggested that the Division be taken out of Saigon and sent to the border regions in the Delta. The senior adviser of III Corps, Lieutenant General J.J. Ewell was unimpressed with this suggestion, and considered "the 18th couldn't hit the ground with their [sic] hat in the Delta region against the VC."[91] The suggestion of the transfer of the division was not taken any further.

The 18th ARVN Division's commander gave permission for his units to receive training from 1ATF. 6 RAR/NZ New Zealand Army Corps (hereafter ANZAC) was given the task of providing rifle companies to train and conduct operations with the division, through a series of six-week courses. The aim of the training was to: improve the ARVN units' capability to conduct operations over extended periods, to assist their combat effectiveness; to train them to operate at night; to teach them to use supporting artillery, mortar and air support; and to develop operational techniques.[92] Each course concentrated on such skills as patrolling, night movement, ambush drills, range practices, weapon handling, section deployment and company tactics.[93]

The training of the division's units was undertaken at a camp established about eight kilometres southeast of Nui Dat at the Horseshoe feature.[94] The Horseshoe lay on the northern edge of Dat Do, and rose about 180 feet above the surrounding countryside, dominating the northern approaches to Dat Do. The Horseshoe, a company-sized position, had a well-developed series of bunker defences and minefields sited in all round defence on its slopes. The Horseshoe served not only as a base from which patrols dominated the local area, but was also the key feature in a line of defensive posts that protected the minefield that had been laid by 1ATF.[95]

To train each unit from within the division, each rifle company from 1ATF was responsible for conducting a six-week course of instruction. With one company being made available for each course, there were sufficient officers and NCOs available to permeate the Vietnamese companies.[96] Each ARVN battalion and 1ATF company then conducted a one week "workup operation", which marked the end of the retraining period, after which the 1ATF company was normally released to return to Nui Dat. Each ARVN battalion normally conducted at least one further battalion operation under the operational control of 1ATF before returning to its parent formation. During some of these operations an 1ATF company was integrated within the ARVN battalion. Some training was also provided by 1ATF to the 18th ARVN Division's training centre Blackshoe, such as the "Bushman Scout Programme".[97]

The training began in May 1969. From May to August 1969, rifle companies from 9 RAR and 5 RAR trained 2/48 and 2/52 ARVN Battalions. In mid-August, 6 RAR/NZ (ANZAC) then assumed the responsibility for this task. Over this period the New Zealand rifle companies were given the following South Vietnamese units to train: V4 Company to train 4-52 ARVN Battalion from 3 November until 28 December 1969; and, `W' Company to train B Company, 5 Cavalry Regiment from 15 February until 15 April 1970.[98]

Initially, the attitudes of the New Zealanders assigned to the training programmes were mixed. For the most part, they had some reservations towards the South Vietnamese soldiers. One New Zealander, A.A. Hona, then a signaller, recollects: "You heard and read in the newspapers about these guys; they ran when a shot was fired at them and that sort of thing."[99] However, some were positive towards their role, because it was something different from their normal daily activities. The New Zealanders mixed socially with the Vietnamese, and some of the Vietnamese spoke English. However, some of the Vietnamese "could not work out what we were doing there, they thought of it as an

American/Vietnamese thing. Because we were there in such small numbers, we just did not figure there anywhere. It took us a while to explain our part in the whole war."[100] For most of the New Zealanders, by the completion of the course, their attitudes had mellowed: "after a while, you got to know the guys, and at the end of the day, they were not a bad bunch."[101]

Each course was broken into two phases: first a two-week period where training was conducted in the Horseshoe, and secondly a three to four week operation conducted in the field. Each ARVN unit was sub-divided to allow for easier instruction, so a New Zealand section would then look after a Vietnamese platoon; the ratio of New Zealanders to South Vietnamese was about 1:10.[102] This arrangement was maintained for the duration of the course. For the first phase, the Vietnamese remained at the Horseshoe, where they attended formal lessons, which were taken by the New Zealand section commanders who had attended instructional courses as part of their normal promotional requirements. The South Vietnamese were shown how New Zealand soldiers operated in the field, how they carried their weapons, how to use their weapons effectively, how to set up ambushes, harbours, patrolling, field firing and section, and platoon and company tactics. There was no time limit on these lessons, with one lesson lasting from one hour to several days.[103] When the Vietnamese were not attending lessons, their time was spent out in the field, surrounding the Horseshoe, practising what they had been shown. During this phase of the training, rotating Vietnamese platoons manned the defences of the Horseshoe at night at two-hour intervals, along with the New Zealanders. For the most part, the Vietnamese soldiers performed this task satisfactorily.[104]

Upon completion of the first phase of the training, the Vietnamese and New Zealanders then spent about three to four weeks in the field, undertaking different operations. As

these units were under training, the operations were conducted in relatively quiet areas. With `V' Company, platoon-company groups rotated through three tasks, and they encountered enemy troops.[105] One patrol was ambushed by the VC, and although the patrol performed satisfactory, two New Zealanders were killed and two New Zealanders and two Vietnamese soldiers wounded. From 3 - 15 December, the battalion then participated in Operation Marsden, until the ARVN battalion was extracted by air to Xuan Loc on 15 December.[106] Victor Company was completely integrated into the 4/52 ARVN Battalion, with several men joining each Vietnamese platoon. On 16 February 1970, `W' Company assumed responsibility for the training from A Company. From this time until 28 February, `W' Company undertook a retraining programme and then began training B Company, 5 Cavalry Regiment. This training concluded with Operation Raven. `W' Company remained on the Horseshoe until 15 April 1970, when it handed over responsibility to 7 RAR and moved back to Nui Dat to assume "normal" operations.

Each day began in the same way. In the morning, the New Zealanders gathered the members of their own Vietnamese unit together and talked about the day's activities. Then, each group usually patrolled about 3,000 to 4,000 metres each day, with frequent stops to give the Vietnamese practice in harbour drills.[107] During the day, the New Zealanders remained primarily with the Headquarters element of a Vietnamese company. One section would look after the front platoon and another section looked after another platoon, and so on. The New Zealanders were usually positioned in the centre of any patrol line, so that if the Vietnamese were ambushed they were able to maintain tight control over their ARVN counterparts and also quickly organise counter-ambush techniques. The New Zealanders concentrated upon such basic soldiering skills as ensuring that the Vietnamese soldiers kept their rifles in the correct positions and that spacings between the soldiers were maintained. Hona recalled: "We did not change too many

of their practises...just showed them how we operated. If they adopted these ways, then that was okay. We did not go along to a Vietnamese soldier and say, `Don't do that. That is wrong, do it this way.' You will confuse them, they have already been taught and that was what they were used to."[108]

Towards the latter part of the afternoon, once the group had secured its position for the night and defensive positions had been constructed, the New Zealanders discussed particular aspects of the day with the Vietnamese section and platoon commanders in one group. The New Zealanders found little difficulty communicating with the Vietnamese because most of the Vietnamese Officers spoke English, and for those who did not, there was a Vietnamese interpreter attached to each unit.[109] Most of the Vietnamese officers had sufficient military knowledge to understand what the New Zealanders were telling them. At night, ambushes was set up and towards the end of the exercise, these ambushes were organised in smaller groups, with each of the New Zealand sections taking a Vietnamese platoon out to set up ambushes over the area.

The South Vietnamese used tactics and methods of operating in the field that had been taught to them by the Americans. Unfortunately, the Vietnamese had adopted some practices which the New Zealanders felt were less than satisfactory. For example, the Vietnamese, even when on patrol, walked along with weapons on their shoulders. Such practices certainly changed when the Vietnamese saw the importance of what the New Zealanders were showing them, but, said one New Zealander, "we were lucky that we never had many serious contacts."[110]

The trustworthiness of ARVN units was always questionable. Most of the Vietnamese Officers had either Montagnard or Cambodian bodyguards, partly because "the

commanders could not trust their own men. You never knew whether he was a VC at night and a soldier for you in the daytime."[111] During the field exercises, the Vietnamese proved to be "quite good, they listened, but you could never trust them. They were fairly green."[112] It was not uncommon for a unit to be patrolling and then for no apparent reason the Vietnamese soldiers would suddenly either sit down or take off. During one such patrol, ten soldiers suddenly started chasing something. It was later found that they were chasing an iguana, "because they did not carry very much meat. To us it was annoying because, we would be there, alert, all ready to go and that was the sort of thing they would do. We had to tell them that was not the done thing. They could have run over a mine, but to them that was a way of life."[113] The New Zealanders later found that the reason for such an action was that the only food that the Vietnamese carried was pre-cooked rice and some curry. Any other food had to be borrowed, begged or stolen, even when they were on an operational patrol in enemy territory. To some extent the New Zealanders sympathised with such actions. Soon after, arrangements were made by 1ATF for the South Vietnamese soldiers to be supplied with the same rations as the New Zealanders.

There were many other behavioural patterns that the Vietnamese needed to change. The New Zealanders operated in silence when they were in the field. The South Vietnamese, however, were "a little too noisy, it took them a while to adjust. When they had [adjusted], they were quite good."[114] When the South Vietnamese stopped for the night, they did not do a clearing patrol to ensure there were no enemy troops nearby. They simply put themselves into a defensive position and then fired all their weapons for about thirty seconds. Then, they, recalled D.I. McKintosh, the Company Sergeant Major of Whiskey 3, "just laid down or began cutting firewood, making their bedspaces which were simply hammocks slung in the trees. They would set a few sentries. The rest simply laid down and went to sleep."[115] The New

Zealanders tried to teach the Vietnamese the need to stop, walk out for about 100 metres from where they intended stopping for the night, check the area and then move back into their night location. The instructors also warned of the dangers of living above ground. As Hona remembers: "You would say, `what would happen if a bomb exploded over there and you were hit by shrapnel?' They would say, `What bomb?' That was their attitude. We finally got them digging holes," although the New Zealanders had to usually help them.[116]

During operations, ambushes were laid by the New Zealanders: "Every night, if you camped up near a track, you always set an ambush. If you were not near a track, you just set yourself up normally, in a defensive perimeter."[117] However, on these exercises, the Vietnamese did not appear to have any ambush techniques. The New Zealanders also had to teach the Vietnamese how to set, initiate and clear an ambush. Although the Vietnamese did set up ambushes during these operations, it was very difficult to judge how effective they might have been, as none of them were ever activated: "The only time you could test the effectiveness of an ambush was when the enemy walked into it."[118]

The leadership of the Vietnamese units, generally, was poor and one New Zealander commented that the Vietnamese Officers, particularly the company commanders, were, according to McKintosh, "lazy. They led very little, were very inflexible and did not really have very much initiative. They seemed to just do a lot of yelling and that was about all. The Vietnamese soldiers seemed to react to all this noise okay."[119] The commander of the company that `W' Company trained, recalled McKintosh, "must have been from the city. We had an incident where we had to cross a stream. He wanted one of his batmen to carry him across so that he would not get wet. These three guys would

carry the company commander's gear, plus their own gear and also his food. He never carried anything, except his 9mm pistol."[120] Soldiers were harshly disciplined by their officers. Hona remembered that: "It wasn't uncommon for you to see the platoon or company commander, if a private soldier stuffed up, go along and whack him, very much like the Japanese or Koreans."[121] When two soldiers who left their gun position one night returned to the Horseshoe, the commander held a parade, with the two soldiers in front. The Commander, in front of the other South Vietnamese, beat them up.[122]

When it came time for the Vietnamese to leave at the completion of each course, it was a "long goodbye. It was obvious that they weren't happy about leaving, but they knew that they had to go. Some of the New Zealanders, who had worked with the Vietnamese for some time, were also a little teary-eyed."[123]

The New Zealanders frequently found that ARVN troops departing from the Horseshoe, stole everything they could get their hands on, including ammunition. New Zealanders from `W' Company also found that the unit they had trained had hidden caches of food and ammunition in the surrounding countryside.[124] It was never discovered whether these caches would be used by ARVN units or by the VC, although the New Zealanders believed that this had been hidden for the VC. It was generally agreed that at least twenty-five percent of the ARVN were VC sympathisers.

Five battalions were trained at the Horseshoe but results were mixed, and less than hoped for. Some New Zealand newspapers reported that units trained by the New Zealanders had made a good showing in actions undertaken during and after their training.[125] "Leadership is the answer to their shortcomings", said one officer. "When they have good leaders they will do well."[126] Pearson was

enthusiastic about the first battalion that was trained; it was reported to have acquitted itself well on a subsequent operation into a Viet Cong stronghold in War Zone D.[127] Some of the Vietnamese battalions demonstrated that they could operate effectively during the day, and also at night, and make successful contacts with the enemy. This was illustrated by the fact that some of the units trained by 1ATF had participated in the incursion into Laos in February 1971. Although this reflected positively on the training provided by 1ATF, it also pointed to the disadvantages of the "out of country" operations. Although involvement in these operations proved that the best ARVN units were effective, using them in such operations meant that the responsibility for local defence was left up to the less effective units remaining behind in South Vietnam. These poorer quality units were as reluctant as ever to move out of their base areas and operate in the bush.

The training of the 18th ARVN Division, along with the territorial forces, demonstrated that as long as 1ATF took most of the responsibility for operating, the Vietnamese attitude appeared to be one of "Why should we bother?" Very few of 1ATF personnel were optimistic about the Vietnamisation programme. One officer reflected that the only way to ensure Vietnamisation was a success was for all the Allied Forces to get out, "only then will they [South Vietnamese] realise that they have to operate on their own or take the consequences."[128] At the moment it was a vicious circle; the RF did not patrol because 1ATF did so, and 1ATF patrolled because the RF were reluctant to.

Withdraw: ARVN's Effectiveness in Phuoc Tuy

The announcement by John Gorton, the Australian Prime Minister, in April 1970 that the Australian Government would be gradually withdrawing 1ATF from late February 1970 resulted in a complete change in the role of the territorial

forces in Phuoc Tuy Province. For the Australian Government, the ability of the territorial forces to assume the operational responsibility for the territory previously held by 1ATF now became the objective of Australia's presence in South Vietnam. The RF was now required to assume control over an area which covered most of the southern part of Phuoc Tuy.[129] That the South Vietnamese could control the province was one of the justifications for the withdrawal of 1ATF.

The Australian Ministers for Defence and for the Army, J.M. Fraser and A. Peacock, both distinguished politicians with some intellectual ability, found it politically convenient to be more optimistic about the degree to which the Vietnamese could fill the gap. Fraser commented that by the end of 1970, "the process of Vietnamisation was coming along satisfactorily, and that as far as Phuoc Tuy was concerned, the Viet Cong had not been able to interfere with the process to any effective extent.[130] He argued that although the withdrawal of the Task Force would reduce the military pressure upon the NVA/VC in the province, the RF and PF units, after receiving training from the AATTV, would be able to undertake more operations of the type that the Task Force had been previously performing.[131]

In November 1970, Brigadier W.G. Henderson, the Commander of 1ATF, reported, optimistically, that the local South Vietnamese forces could "quite adequately and very quickly" maintain control of the area vacated by the departing Australian forces.[132] He further commented that the local Vietnamese forces "are very much better now than they were before."[133] However, he still reiterated the need to provide training to the territorial forces.

The territorial forces, however, were in no way ready to replace the departing New Zealand and Australian troops. The process of military Vietnamisation in Phuoc Tuy was not the success that the politicians claimed it to be. David

Barber, the New Zealand Press Association correspondent in South Vietnam, wrote in a newspaper article that many senior Officers from 1ATF retained doubts about the wisdom of cutting back troop strengths in Phuoc Tuy. This was largely because although the RF/PF had improved considerably and although they were playing a larger role, they had not been put to the test.[134] Weir, who then oversaw the training of another four battalions, was unimpressed with the performance of the South Vietnamese.[135] Although the soldiers "appeared to respond in the formal training phase, this was not reflected in the operational phase of the programme when instructors accompanied units into the jungle."[136] It was apparent that the battalions regarded the training as a rest from combat. Only after considerable pressure was extended did these units agree to participate at all the scheduled training activities. In the Wellington Evening Post, it was stated that although the ANZACs had been teaching local Vietnamese troops the techniques of jungle patrolling, and that the AATTV would stay to continue this training programme, "it was no secret that Vietnamese troops do not enjoy or excel in this type of work."[137]

Several New Zealand military personnel shared Weir's pessimism. One, D.V. Cantell, then a Sergeant, recalled that: "you would not want to be in a contact with them any South Vietnamese soldiers. Although some of them were good, the majority, at a pinch were okay."[138] In the field, the Vietnamese tended to employ U.S. methods of operating. For example, when they were patrolling, "they would be very close together, we of course did not do that."[139] The South Vietnamese also relied a lot on their firepower. Many of the New Zealanders, thought McKintosh, felt that "by the end of their training, they were much the same as at the beginning. Their overall bush skills had improved a little and we had shown them other ways of doing things. While they were with us, they did adopt some of our suggestions. But did they continue?...We never saw them again."[140] The

New Zealanders never received any formal feedback as to how well the South Vietnamese units they trained performed in combat.

During August 1970, R.M. Mullins, an official from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, visited Phuoc Tuy province to assess the situation that existed in the province and the effectiveness of the RF/PF. He noted that although there had been marginal improvements in the performance of the RF/PF, they were still largely ineffective and desperately short of able leaders.[141] He concluded that if enemy main force units were able to return to the Province the prospects for the territorial forces in Phuoc Tuy defeating the enemy without 1ATF were not bright.

The training programme concluded abruptly in April 1970, when the division was dispatched to join the U.S./ARVN forces incursion into Cambodia. The training programme, brief as it was, did improve although to a limited extent, the effectiveness of the 18th ARVN Division. Although there were some improvements in the division's battalions, and glowing comments from the divisional commander and even the Vietnamese Army General Staff, Weir was not satisfied with the results of the training programme.[142] Because the division was of poor standard, because it had been allowed to perpetuate its mistakes, and because the officers appeared to be war weary (all factors of which Weir was aware), "its performance during retraining and afterwards was probably no worse than advisers had experienced under similar circumstances elsewhere."[143] There was also some concern expressed by Australian and New Zealand troops over how successful the South Vietnamese troops would be once 1ATF was withdrawn from Phuoc Tuy province. If the RF failed to operate in areas for which they were responsible when the Task Force was available to give them assistance if needed, many argued that they would certainly not do so when the Task Force was finally withdrawn.

However, this training of the 18th Division provided added impetus for the introduction of personnel from the AATTV into the province to assist with the training of the territorial forces. In the latter half of 1969, Lieutenant Colonel R.D.F. Lloyd, a Commander of the AATTV, was asked if he could deploy additional members of the training team to Phuoc Tuy.[144] Lieutenant General Sir T. Daly, the distinguished and paternal Australian Chief of General Staff (hereafter CGS), also known affectionately as `Uncle Tom', had conceded that the advisers were obtaining better experience as individuals through their dispersion throughout the country.[145] However, this situation was to change because of the arrival of 1ATF. Daly therefore tended to the opinion that, "where possible, the Australian training team should be working more closely with 1ATF."[146]

Troops from 1ATF were also involved in three other programmes, which all concentrated upon the training of the territorial forces in Phuoc Tuy province.[147] The first was the provision of teams to assist in the MAT scheme. The Australian Task Force provided up to three MATs, each of which consisted of an officer, a Warrant Officer (WO) and four NCOs. The members of these teams were selected by Headquarters (hereafter HQ) 1ATF from personnel that were made available by their units. The employment was co-ordinated with the U.S. MATs that were in Phuoc Tuy Province. They worked with one RF company or PF platoon for about twelve weeks, then moved to another unit. The role of these MATs was to improve the operational capability of RF companies and PF platoons, particularly in night operations, to assist in correcting training deficiencies, and lastly, to assess the operational capability of the RF companies and PF platoons to which they were attached. This assistance was, however, of a limited nature. The second form of training assistance was provided to the Van Kiep Long Range Reconnaissance Patrol (LLRP) School. This assistance was provided primarily by the AATTV, although the 1ATF SAS Squadron provided some assistance as required. The third

form of training assistance involved the training of RF/PF forces by units in operational areas where RF/PF units were sited in or near the units' areas of operations. Such training was initially arranged through HQ 1ATF and Sector Headquarters. The training normally took the form of courses for mortar crews, patrolling and ambushing techniques, mine warfare and booby trap training, training in the employment of indirect fire weapons, and static and field defences.

By the end of 1970, and throughout 1971, the influence of the enemy and its ability to conduct operations in Phuoc Tuy had been severely curtailed. The effectiveness of the South Vietnamese authorities in this province was growing and there was a growth in the economy of the region. A report in December 1970 noted that the RF forces in Phuoc Tuy had been "doing well and in an entirely Vietnamese operation, opened route 44 past the Long Hai Mountains to both Civilian and military traffic for the first time since 1961."[148] There were instances where the 18th ARVN Division performed effectively. In mid-March 1972, three NVA divisions struck the Xuan Loc area due east of Saigon. Elements of the 18th ARVN Division and RFs, after several days of bloody fighting, repulsed the enemy forces, which withdrew to regroup.[149] A report from HQ NZ V Force stated that the territorial forces were improving, for example RF companies were increasingly operating outside their own provinces under the operational control of another Province Chief or the ARVN, but the report concluded by noting "there is still much to do."[150] However, the possibility of this situation being maintained and even improving was based upon the presence and operations of 1ATF. As 1ATF withdrew from the province there was a growing resurgence of VC activity in Phuoc Tuy.

The effectiveness of 1ATF was limited from its arrival in Phuoc Tuy Province. This was because of the two-faceted American policy towards the war, the inefficiency of the territorial forces in Phuoc Tuy Province and the inability of the Task Force to neutralise the NLF. The essential facet of the New Zealand/Australian doctrine of counter-revolutionary warfare assumed the existence of a single national agency responsible for the co-ordination of all agencies at all levels. However, this was not present in Phuoc Tuy. Despite being responsible for destroying the enemy's mainforce and NLF units in Phuoc Tuy Province, 1ATF lacked the resources to undertake simultaneously both roles effectively, and was never given the responsibility for the populated areas of Phuoc Tuy. Operations in the populated areas of the province were entirely under the control of the South Vietnamese Province Chief and the territorial forces. Combined operations by 1ATF with the South Vietnamese forces were severely limited, because of the inefficiencies of the latter. As a result, 1ATF was excluded from operating in the urban areas where the NLF was at its strongest.

The effectiveness of 1ATF was also severely curtailed through the ineffectiveness of the local territorial forces. 1ATF's expertise in fighting an insurgency war brought a temporary control of the Horseshoe but the South Vietnamese Government's failure to win the `hearts and minds' of the families from where its territorial force was recruited curtailed the probability that operational inter-involvement would produce dedicated practitioners of the art of war.

Because of these factors, 1ATF had to provide training to the 18th ARVN Division, located to the north of Phuoc Tuy Province, and also to the territorial force in Phuoc Tuy Province. The training programmes undertaken reflected the lessons the Australians and New Zealanders learnt in Malaya and in the `Confrontation' with Indonesia. However, that their students frequently showed little commitment to learning and practising the lessons they had learnt, the

unsuitablity of using combat troops as instructors, and a lack of time all served to severely limit the effectiveness of the training. The necessity to train the South Vietnamese became more important since the inevitable reduction in size and withdrawal of 1ATF was likely to entail a greatly increased role for the ARVN in the conflict against the enemy in Phuoc Tuy, a role for which the territorial force was poorly prepared. The training, while improving to a limited extend the effectiveness of the 18th ARVN Division, achieved little in improving to any real extent the abilities of the territorial forces in the Province. These attempts to train the territorial forces had come too late, and the enemy had many years in which to win one of the important facets of guerilla warfare – the support of the people.[151] Having lost this battle, the South Vietnamese were unable to win back the advantage in Phuoc Tuy Province.

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1. Phuoc Tuy province was a sector of the III ARVN Corps, also known as III CTZ. There were eleven such sectors or provinces in the III CTZ, excluding the Saigon Special Zone. Within the III ARVN Corps chain of control, Phuoc Tuy sector was under the operational control of the 18th ARVN Division.

2. I.G. McNeill, `An Outline of the Australian Military Involvement in Vietnam 1962 - 1972', Defence Force Journal, no. 24 (September - October 1980), p. 48.

3. ibid.

4. This strategy changed little during the war. Komer notes that under Generals W. Westmoreland and C.W. Abrams, who were successive commanders of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (MACV), there was "no change in strategy whatsoever." R.W. Komer, Bureaucracy at War: US Performance in the Vietnam War (Boulder, Colorado, 1986), p. 79.

5. ibid.
However, the U.S. military had, up to the end of 1967, dedicated its resources to fighting a conventional war of attrition in South Vietnam.

6. Adapted from F. Frost, Australia's War in Vietnam (Sydney, 1987), p. 33.

7. Contrary to the actual situation, MACV claimed that the big enemy units were supporting the local guerillas.

8. For an analysis of the U.S. Army's strategy towards counterinsurgency, see Chapter Two of this thesis.

9. At the conclusion of the encounter at Ia Drang Valley, over 1,300 Communists were killed for the loss of only 300 American troops. G. Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York, 1978), p. 57.

10. For an explanation of U.S. military operations, see R.W. Komer, Bureaucracy at War.

11. Tran Dinh Tho, Pacification (Washington DC, 1980), p. v.

12. ibid.

13. The VCI or political cadre was designated as the political and administrative organisation through which the VC controlled, or sought to control, the South Vietnamese.

14. W.C. Westmoreland, A Soldier Reports (New York, 1976), p. 146.

15. ibid.

16. G. Lewy, America in Vietnam, p. 86.

17. The broad role of CORDS was to achieve a more efficient management of the pacification programme through the reorganisation and unification of the existing United States and South Vietnamese civilian and military organisations involved in the programme.
For more information on CORDS, see R.W. Komer, Bureaucracy at War.

18. CORDS, The Vietnamese Village: Handbook for Advisors (Translations and Publishing Branch, CORDS, 1971), p. 2. Copy held by writer.

19. G. Lewy, America in Vietnam, p. 89.

20. S. Lipsman and L. Doye, The Vietnam Experience. Fighting for Time (Boston, 1983), p. 76.

21. The Army Concept of war is an army's perception of how a war ought to be fought and this is reflected in the way the Army organises, trains and equips its troops to fight.

22. For an analysis of the U.S. Army's counterinsurgency techniques, see: D.S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era: US Doctrine and Performance (New York, 1977): A.F. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam (Maryland, 1986), pp. 100 - 236: G. Lewy, America in Vietnam: and H.G. Summers, On Strategy: A Critical Analysis of the Vietnam War (California, 1982).

23. MAAG was established in 1955 to administer the U.S. support programme to the French forces in Vietnam. With the withdrawal of these French forces from Vietnam, MAAG assumed the role of providing training to the ARVN.

24. Pacification was the responsibility of the poorly trained, equipped, and led Civil Guard and Self Defence Corps.

25. Some junior officers in South Vietnam supported the use of small units to fight the enemy. A.F. Krepinevich, The Army and Vietnam, pp. 173 - 174.

26. See R. Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency (New York, 1966),

27. The growth and expanded role of the U.S. SFs for counterinsurgency contingencies remained small-scale, and never fully appreciated or understood by the `mainstream' U.S. military. The SFs was the only force employed, or rather ill-employed, on counterinsurgency operations.

28. D.S. Blaufarb, The Counterinsurgency Era, p. 49. Added to this was the strained relationship that existed between France and the United States in the 1960s.
For an examination of the similarities between the French and American experiences, see T.C. Thayer, War Without Fronts: The American Experience in Vietnam (Boulder,

Colorado, 1985), pp. 7 - 21.

29. These methods were known as the `British School of counterinsurgency.' For an explanation of these methods see, R.W. Komer, The Malayan Emergency in Retrospect: Organisation of a Successful Counterinsurgency Effort (California, 1972); R.E. Clutterbuck, The Long, Long War (New York, 1966) and G. Lewy, America in Vietnam, p. 57.
Sir Thompson became a frequent consultant to Nixon. However, Thompson's advice was often ignored by the South Vietnamese, particularly concerning the `Strategic Hamlets' plan.
The communists were never completely defeated in Malaya.

30. See T.C Thayer, War Without Fronts.
In early 1969, a seminar of experienced senior observers, held by the Royal United Services Institution, criticised Washington for neglecting such keys to the British success as the winning of local support and integrated civil/military conflict management at all levels, their simplicity of organisation, their use of native troops, the importance of population security, and intelligence. Lessons from the Vietnam War. Report of a Seminar held at the Royal United Services Institution, London, February 12, 1970.

31. B.B. Fall, The Two Viet-Nams: A Political and Military Analysis (New York, 1967), p. 342.

32. One example was the overambitious 1961 - 1963 `strategic hamlet' programme, which proved a failure. See R. Thompson, Defeating Communist Insurgency, pp. 141 - 142 and R.E. Clutterbuck The Long, Long War.

33. R.E. Clutterbuck The Long, Long War, p. 65 - 76.

34. ibid.

35. There were three phases in the second Vietnam War: Up to mid-1964, it was essentially a guerilla war. From 1965 to 1970, ninety percent of the communists in South Vietnam were in NVA divisions and were opposed by regular divisions of the ARVN and US armies. After 1972, most of the U.S. forces had been withdrawn from South Vietnam and the war was being fought between the North Vietnamese and South Vietnamese regular armies, the former advancing in World War Two style with tanks and artillery in their invasions of 1972 and 1975.

36. `The Division in Battle', in Counter Revolutionary Warfare, Pamphlet No. 11, Counter Revolutionary Warfare, Canberra, 1965., p. 25. Cited in F. Frost, Australia's War in Vietnam, p. 57.
For an analysis of this counter-revolutionary doctrine and the problems that 1ATF faced in attempting to implement it in Phuoc Tuy Province, see F. Frost, Australia's War in

Vietnam, Chapter Three.

37. ibid., p. 58.

38. ibid., p. 57.

39. Interview with Lieutenant General Sir J.A. Mace, dated 13 July 1990. Mace was the Director of Infantry and SAS. He is now a former Chief of Defence Forces (CDF).

40. ibid.

41. A harbour is a temporary tactical defensive posture that a patrol moves into when it stops for any length of time, normally at night.

42. Quoted in article by D. Peterson in the Courier Mail, 24 June 1965. For further differences between the two armies, see B. Breen First to Fight: Australian Diggers, New Zealand Kiwis and US Paratroopers in Vietnam, 1965-66 (Sydney, 1988).

43. F. Frost, Australia's War in Vietnam, pp. 62 - 64.

44. ibid.
The Province Chief, usually a Lieutenant Colonel or Colonel of the regular army, was responsible for both military and civil affairs. He was also the overall commander of South Vietnamese forces in the province, except when ARVN battalions were assigned by the 18th ARVN Division under the control of 1ATF.

45. For an examination of this, see F. Frost, Australia's War in Vietnam, pp. 56 - 70.

46. ibid., p. 115.

47. ibid., p. 59

48. On military matters, the Province Chief reported to the ARVN military command for MR III, while on administrative and political matters, he reported to Saigon. The U.S. advisor reported to CORDS. As such, the "problems of double loyalties and crossed lines...and the suspicions created... are not hard to imagine." ibid., p. 63.

49. F. Frost, Australia's War in Vietnam, p. 123.
For a description of the RF and PF, see Chapter Two of this thesis.
Dat Do, one of the five districts in Phuoc Tuy Province, contained a battalion assigned from 18th ARVN Division and several RF and PF units. The latter two numbering only 16 Officers 626 soldiers to protect a population of 24,000. D.M. Horner, Duty First: The Royal Australian Regiment in War and Peace (Sydney, 1990), p. 265.
The area surrounding Dat Do was a valuable food supply source for the VC and its importance was such that a strong

VCI was maintained in the villages and hamlet of Dat Do and was the base of one of the major NVA units in Phuoc Tuy - the 445th Battalion. For further information regarding 1ATF operations in Dat Do even in 1969, see F. Frost, Australia's War in Vietnam, pp. 121 - 130.
For further information on the RF and PF, see Chapter Two of this thesis.

50. MACV, established in February 1962, was responsible for all military policy, operations, and assistance in South Vietnam and for advising the South Vietnamese Government on all matters about security, organisation, and the use of regular and paramilitary forces.
Other programmes used by the MACV included: CAPs, MATs, Fairfax operations and the Dong Tien programme.

51. F. Frost, Australia's War in Vietnam, pp. 94 - 95.

52. ibid.

53. ibid., p. 94.

54. The U.S. province and district advisory teams had a three-fold primary mission. To advise and assist the Province Chief in all matters relating to the counterinsurgency effort, pacification and development programmes. Secondly, to assist U.S. and ARVN regular units with their missions. Thirdly, to provide liaison between U.S. and ARVN units and the Province/ District Chief and his staff.
The District Chiefs were responsible for the command and control of the provincial forces allocated to their districts.

55. Operation Mundingburra, conducted in the Dat Do area in July and early August 1969, had to be concluded early because of this.
The objective of this operation, conducted in July and early August 1969, was to increase the confidence of the population towards the local government - as required by pacification.

56. J.T. Henderson, `Vietnam: A View from Within. Report on the Visit to Vietnam of Research Officer (History), March - April 1971', Defence Headquarters, June 1971, (unpublished), p. 20. See also S.R. Larson, and J.L. Collins, Vietnam Studies: Allied Participation in Vietnam (Washington DC, 1975), p. 113.
The CDS, now entitled CDF, was in overall command of the New Zealand Armed Services.
There was some very limited joint involvement by territorial force units in some of the operations conducted by 1ATF. For example in October 1970, 578th and 189th RF companies participated in a 1ATF operation as a blocking unit for the Task Force. (A blocking unit was used to stop enemy forces attempting to withdraw from advancing forces. The withdrawing enemy unit was then trapped and forced to fight against normally superior firepower).

57. J.T. Henderson, `Vietnam: A View from Within', p. 20.

58. J.T. Henderson, `Vietnam: A View from Within', p. 31.

59. F. Frost, Australia's War in Vietnam, p. 140.

60. ibid., p. 116. Corruption ranged from officers being paid for `ghost soldiers' and the selling of military equipment on the black market, to buying military and civilian positions of power.

61. In 1970, there were about 30,000 RF, PF and PSDF soldiers based in Phuoc Tuy. This total was comprised of; twenty seven RF companies, totalling about 3,192 men, including one RF battalion comprising four companies; sixty PF platoons, with a total strength of 2,064; and, about 7,647 PSDF combat personnel, of which only 3,700 were armed and 17,102 personnel in support. I. McNeill, The Team: Australian Army Advisors in Vietnam, 1962 - 1972 (Australian War Memorial, 1984), p. 427. However, units were deployed fragmentarily throughout Phuoc Tuy, which did not assist the basic problem of attempting to upgrade the RF/PF to a standard able to work alongside, and eventually replace the Task Force in Phuoc Tuy. I. McNeill, in his book The Team, has followed the original materials very closely. For the purposes of this study, the citations in this thesis have come from the original material and not from the material reproduced from McNeill.

62. F. Frost, Australia's War in Vietnam, p. 141.

63. Report by Major Mulgrave, Senior Australian Adviser, Phuoc Tuy Province, dated July 1971, 15/28/13 NZ Forces in Vietnam: Training Assistance SVN Forces, vol IV, June 1972 - September 1973, Defence Classified Registry (DCR).

64. ibid.

65. Weir commanded 1ATF from 1 September 1969 until the end of May 1970.

66. J.T. Henderson, `Vietnam: A View from Within', p. 31.

67. ibid., p. 36.

68. ibid.

69. F. Frost, Australia's War in Vietnam, p. 461.

70. J.T. Henderson, `New Zealand's Vietnam Involvement. Research Officer, History Interviews With Several New Zealand Army Officers Who Have Served in Vietnam, September - October 1969', (unpublished), p. 37.

71. ibid.

72. I. McNeill, The Team, p. 255. Pearson commanded the

1ATF from 20 October 1968 until the end of August 1969.

73. This was one of the 18th ARVN Division's less capable battalions.

74. One Task Force commander, Brigadier S.C. Graham, blamed this on the inadequate size and composition, saying that it was "a penalty of putting in a small inadequately sized force." F. Frost, Australia's War in Vietnam, p. 94. Graham was the Task Force Commander from 7 January 1967 until mid-October 1967.

75. Report by the Joint Planning Committee at a Meeting on 26 August 1969. Signed by Lt-col Monaghan, Joint Secretary, Def 23/4/10 Mutual Aid Programme to South Vietnam. Peace negotiations and troop withdrawals, vol I, March - September 1969, DCR.

76.
ibid.77. To assist with this training and liaison, several AATTV MATs were deployed to Phuoc Tuy. See Chapter Three of this thesis.

78. D.M. Horner Australian Higher Command in the Vietnam War (Canberra, 1986), p. 41.

79. A. Stretton Soldier in a Storm (Sydney, 1978), pp. 27 - 28.

80. ibid.

81. Saigon to Wellington, dated 13 February 1970, 15/28 NZ Forces in Vietnam. External Signals, vol III, October 1969 - March 1970, DCR.

82. A 1ATF Training and Liaison Unit was established, consisting of personnel on semi-permanent detachment from other units. The unit's role was to assist in the training and upgrading of the capabilities of the territorial forces.

83. I. McNeill, The Team, p. 255.

84. ACDS Paper 17/7/69. Def 23/4/10, vol I.
Originally named the 10th ARVN Division, it was completely overhauled and renamed the 18th Division.
The camp was given the name ` Heavyweight' because a U.S. heavy artillery unit was previously stationed there.

85. I. McNeill, The Team, p. 255. The following two paragraphs are condensed from The Team, pp. 255 - 258.

86. The course experienced some difficulties from the start. Four of the initial `volunteer' instructors were reluctant to work with the territorial forces because they did not trust them. These men were replaced with volunteers.

87. Having only two or three students from one unit meant

that the instructors did not have as great an influence as they would have liked on changing the methods of operating that a students unit employed.

88. I. McNeill, The Team, p. 258.

89. ACDS Paper 17/7/69. Def 23/4/10, vol I.
After the 1968 Tet Offensive, the North Vietnamese strategy began to place less reliance upon large-scale unit actions and began to fight small-unit military actions.

90. ibid.

91. J.J. Clarke, US Army in Vietnam. Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965 - 1973 (Washington DC, 1988), p. 381.

92. L.D. Johnson (ed), The History of 6RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Battalion: 1967 - 1970, two vols (Townsville, 1972), p. 136.

93. ibid.

94. The Horseshoe feature was so-named because of its crescent shaped hill which was the crater of an extinct volcano.

95. L.D. Johnson (ed), The History of 6RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Battalion.
In 1967, a 12 km minefield, consisting of up to 30,000 mines, was laid by 1ATF east and south of Dat Do. The territorial force units assigned to guard and patrol the minefield failed to do so, and VC troops were able to enter the minefield and remove and relay approximately 5,000 mines. These mines were estimated to have caused 50 percent of 1ATF's casualties from mid-1968 to mid-1970. For further information, see J. Murphy Harvest of Fear: A History of Australia's Vietnam War (New South Wales, 1993), pp. 189 - 192, and F. Frost, Australia's War in Vietnam, pp. 95 - 98.

96. L.D. Johnson (ed), The History of 6RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Battalion, p. 136.

97. Similar to the American `Kit Carson' scouts. At the completion of a training programme conducted by 1ATF, former VC soldiers (Hoi Chanh) worked with forward elements of the task force's infantry, armoured and calvary units during operations. 1ATF exploited the Hoi Chanhs' local knowledge of the terrain and enemy tactics.
Sgt J. Powley, 4 Troop NZSAS, was detached from 13 - 27 February 1970 to Blackshoe as an instructor with a 1ATF Training Team.
There was also one American officer attached to each 1ATF unit involved in the training, to liaise between the training unit and the commander of the unit under training.

98. Other 1ATF companies involved in training ARVN units during this period were; B Company, 3-42 ARVN Battalion, 12 August until 20 September 1969: D Company, 3-52 ARVN Battalion, 15 September until 3 November 1969: and A Company, A

Company, 5 Cavalry Regiment, 28 December 1969 until 15 February 1970. L.D. Johnson (ed), The History of 6RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Battalion: 1967 - 1970, pp. 135 - 136. Since late 1969, because of the steadily increasing commitment of the ARVN to operations, only ARVN companies and platoons were available for training. Training Assistance South Vietnam. Webb (CGS) to CDS, dated 14 April 1970, 15/28/13 NZ Forces in Vietnam: Training Assistance SVN Forces, vol I, March - August 1970, DCR.
The organisation of a "typical" ARVN battalion consisted of a small headquarters, three rifle companies (each company comprising three platoons), a reconnaissance and intelligence squad and a section of 81 mm mortars (the mortars provided the immediate close fire support). The ARVN was accustomed to operating in company groups as the allocation of machine-guns and radios prohibited them breaking down into smaller effective battle groups. `The Outline and Organisation of the ARVN: Land Forces of the ARVN', Visitors Brief, 1NZATTV - Chi Lang. Queen Elizabeth II Army Memorial Museum, Box 18, I 17.

99. Interview with A.A. Hona, dated 8 January 1993. Hona was a signaller in Whiskey Two and Victor Six.

100. ibid.

101. ibid.

102. Interview with D.I McKintosh, dated 7 May 1990. McKintosh was the Company Sergeant Major of `Whiskey 3'.

103. ibid.

104. ibid.

105. L.D. Johnson (ed), The History of 6RAR/NZ (ANZAC) Battalion, p. 136.
Firstly, to protect the land clearing team on Operation Cutlass, which was removing the covered approaches to Route 44 along the western ends of the Long and Light Green. (Light Green referred to light vegetation, while Long Green referred to heavy vegetation). Secondly, to man the Horseshoe's defences, and thirdly, to conduct long patrols into the approaches to Dat Do and Route 44.

106. For a more detailed account of this operation, see ibid., pp. 95 - 110.
Amongst other tasks, `W' Company assisted the RF/PF.

107. ibid.

108. Interview with A.A. Hona.

109. Interview with D.I. McKintosh.

110. ibid. During a contact on 14/15 April, an ambush by 1 Platoon resulted in five enemy soldiers killed.

111. ibid.
Generally, the New Zealand soldiers felt that the Montagnards were "brilliant soldiers in the bush. With one company commander, wherever he went, his bodyguard clung to him like a shadow." ibid.

112. Interview with A.A. Hona.

113. ibid.

114. ibid.

115. Interview with D.I. McKintosh.

116. Interview with A.A. Hona.

117. ibid.

118. ibid.

119. Interview with D.I. McKintosh.
Even when incompetent ARVN officers were identified, the Americans had little success in them remove them from their positions. This was partly due to the failure of MACV to develop a consensus of what constituted an incompetent officer and identifying those who were not performing satisfactorily. J.J. Clarke, US Army in Vietnam, pp. 365 - 366.

120. Interview with D.I. McKintosh.

121. Interview with A.A. Hona.

122. ibid.
This used to be the way Western Officers behaved, for example in the British army in the nineteenth century. The Korean Army units then in South Vietnam also employed harsh punishments.

123. Interview with D.I. McKintosh.

124. Interview with D.V. Cantell, dated 23 February 1992. Cantell was a Sergeant with `W Company'. He arrived in Phuoc Tuy as the training was nearing the end.

125. New Zealand Herald, 25 May 1970.

126. ibid.

127. ibid.

128. J.T. Henderson, `New Zealand's Vietnam Involvement', p. 8.

129. This responsibility increased as more and more of 1ATF was withdrawn, from November 1970 until December 1971.

130. D.M. Horner, Australian Higher Command in the Vietnam

War, p. 51.

131. ibid.

132. The Australian, 9 November 1970. Henderson commanded 1ATF from June 1970 until February 1971.

133. F. Frost, Australia's War in Vietnam, p. 145 - 146.

134. The Dominion, 14 November 1970.

135. I. McNeill, The Team, p. 217. Five battalions from the division had received three months of training each in the period up to November 1969. However, due to the steadily increasing commitment of the ARVN to operations, only ARVN companies and platoons were now available for training.

136. New Zealand Herald, 12 November 1969.

137. Evening Post, 20 September 1971.

138. Interview with D.V. Cantell.

139. Interview with A.A. Hona.
This closeness when patrolling was probably because the Vietnamese, due to their inexperience and poor training, were scared. Men who are scared tend to walk much closer together.

140. Interview with D.I. McKintosh.

141. Visit of Mr R.M. Mullins: Phuoc Tuy Province, 26 August 1970, 95/2/1 Visits overseas - Reports, vol I, October 1968 - December 1973, DCR.

142. I. McNeill, The Team, p. 216

143. ibid., pp. 217 - 218.

144. Lloyd commanded the AATTV from 11 February 1969 until mid-January 1970.

145. I. McNeill, The Team, p. 216.

146. ibid.

147. ACDS Paper 17/7/69. Def 23/4/10, vol I. Also, 1 ATF Standing Operations Procedures (SOP) 1969, Signed by S.P. Weir, Brigadier, Commanding Officer, pp. 4-11 - 4-13, DCR. For further information, see also I. McNeill, The Team, pp. 244 - 259.

148. Brief for Minister of Defence and CDS for their following tour to South-east Asia, dated 8 December 1970, Army 95/3. Visits Overseas - CGS, Minister of Defence and Prime Minister, vol I, August 1968 - October 1974, DCR.

149. For further information on the effectiveness of this ARVN division, see Le Gro W.E. Vietnam From Cease-fire to Capitulation (Washington DC., 1981).

150. Brown to CGS, dated 26 August 1971, Serial 194: Reports - General NZ V Forces, DCR.

151. Other essential facets to a successful guerilla campaign include bases, mobility, supplies and information and the will to win.

CHAPTER TWO

THE DECISION TO ASSIST IN TRAINING THE SOUTH VIETNAMESE ARMY: THE FORMATION OF 1NZATTV.

> ...the first, the supreme, the most far-reaching act of judgement that the statesman and commander have to make is to establish...the kind of war on which they are embarking; neither mistaking it for, nor trying to turn it into, something that is alien to its nature.[1]
>
> Carl von Clausewitz

Chapter two discusses the factors that led to a decision in 1970 by the New Zealand Government to deploy an army training team to South Vietnam. This will involve examining the following related topics: the influence of the 1968 TET offensive upon the assessments made by the United States (hereafter U.S.) and New Zealand Governments of the military situation in South Vietnam after 1968; the discussions that took place between the New Zealand, South Vietnamese, Australian and U.S. governments regarding the role allied troops would play in the Vietnamisation programme; the activities of the New Zealand Joint Working Party (hereafter JWP) that was sent to South Vietnam to discuss and finalise arrangements for a joint Vietnamese/ New Zealand training establishment; the type of South Vietnamese troops that were chosen to be trained by the training team; and the attitudes of the New Zealand press to the announcement to deploy a training team to South Vietnam.

Political and Military Background

By the late 1960s, the failure of the United States to translate a degree of military success into political victory in South Vietnam had placed mounting pressure on the Johnson administration. By January 1968, there was a total of 542,000 U.S. troops in South Vietnam. Even if the United

States had sent larger numbers of troops, it was debatable whether the United States could have succeeded in South Vietnam.

The 1968 Tet Offensive, which began on 31 January, proved the major turning point for United States involvement in Vietnam.[2] This offensive was designed to achieve three objectives: to shatter the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (hereafter ARVN), to trigger an internal uprising in South Vietnam, and to destroy the Americans' political and military positions in the South so that popular support for the war would crumble.[3] In military terms, Tet was a disaster for the Vietnamese Communists (hereafter VC); but politically, the offensive was a victory for the North Vietnamese Army (hereafter NVA) and the VC. That the communists could mount a nationwide offensive when the war was supposedly almost won by South Vietnam and her Allies came as a traumatic experience to the American population. By mid-1968, the United States Government faced acute political differences accruing from the war, which resulted in a change from its policy of escalation to one of de-escalation. Anti-war pressure increased as casualties mounted, television coverage eroded popular support and a new national mood emerged. As a result, President L.B. Johnson, the earthly, extroverted President of the United States, decided not to run for re-election as President.

The Tet offensive had also prompted the South Vietnamese leadership into action and made them more receptive to American advice. Almost immediately after the Tet offensive the South Vietnamese Government made reservists with less than five years active service subject to recall. On 19 June 1968, it announced a general mobilisation in which all males between the ages of sixteen and fifty were called-up, and those between eighteen and thirty-five would serve in the armed forces, including the Regular and territorial forces.

The political climate that had been created by March 1968 when an Australia, New Zealand and the United States (hereafter ANZUS) meeting was held in Wellington (the first time since 1963), meant that a further U.S. build-up in Vietnam had become politically impossible. Johnson announced a partial halt in the bombing of North Vietnam and placed a ceiling on American deployments to Vietnam. Following the U.S.'s lead, New Zealand's force level in Vietnam was also frozen for the rest of 1968, pending the outcome of the American presidential elections in November of that year.[4]

In January 1969, the new U.S. President R. Nixon, a sullen, humourless figure who saw himself as a solitary giant in the mold of such statesmen as Winston Churchill, assumed office, promising `peace with honor'. However, his hopes for a quick settlement to the war were dashed. In 1969, the war soon settled into a stalemate in which the prospects for any dramatic breakthrough, either on the battlefield or at the negotiating table, quickly vanished. Through the first half of 1969, Nixon's administration endeavoured to develop a policy that would result in peace. The 1968 Tet offensive served one purpose for the communists in North and South Vietnam. For doubters left in the Nixon Administration, Tet 1968 demonstrated that the war on the ground in South Vietnam was irrevocably stalemated. The United States had proven that the communists could not win a military victory while American troops remained in South Vietnam, nor could they force the exodus of communist troops from South Vietnam.

Six months later, Nixon announced what was later to be known as the `Nixon Doctrine'.[5] It emphasised the nations of Southeast Asia building up their own security forces, rather than the United States assuming the full burden of defence. The United States would come to the assistance of her allies, but would take an advisory role rather than a combat role. `Vietnamisation' was seen as part of this

doctrine and marked the beginning of a noticeable and substantive change in the U.S. Army's counterinsurgency doctrine. Increasing emphasis was shifting to indigenous troops fighting the insurgents, with the role of the U.S. ground forces reversing to that of advisors.

The origins of the Vietnamisation programme, a term coined by the Secretary of Defense, the tough and brash M. Laird, began in the final months of the Johnson Administration.[6] Johnson, through his Secretary of Defense, C. Clifford, who was a strong proponent of a vigourous military strategy to the war, approved a plan that called for the large-scale expansion and equipment modernisation of the South Vietnamese armed forces. It was also intended to improve the areas of command and control, administration and logistical support operations.

The Nixon administration expanded Clifford's plan, enabling the South Vietnamese armed forces to face the threat of continued insurgency in South Vietnam. The application of the Nixon doctrine to South Vietnam was based upon three premises: a strong, well-equipped ARVN; the willingness of all the parties concerned to work together; and a workable partnership. However, there was a fundamental flaw in these premises: The Nixon administration was well aware that once the United States had withdrawn most of its troops the NVA/VC were capable of launching an attack on South Vietnam, which could overrun the country.[7]

By mid-1969, Nixon's administration had publicly settled on a double approach; to pursue the negotiations already begun in Paris, while Vietnamising the war, so the South Vietnamese could take over the fighting and American troops could begin to be brought home. The U.S. policy of upgrading the South Vietnamese forces had now became a strategy for `winning' the war. With this second approach, Nixon turned to the `Vietnamisation' of the War. The Nixon Administration intended that U.S. forces would be withdrawn,

leaving not more than a `residual force', and the capacity of the South Vietnamese armed forces was to be increased so they could bear the brunt of the fighting.[8] In 1969, the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam's (hereafter MACV) priority shifted away from U.S. combat operations against the NVA/VC to Vietnamisation, but with an unwritten proviso that the survival of South Vietnam depended upon the continuation of American combat and material support, similar to that provided to South Korea. Neither MACV nor the South Vietnamese considered the possibility of American support being either significantly reduced or even stopped.[9]

Near the end of the decade a more favourable assessment of the situation in South Vietnam was made by the New Zealand Department of Foreign Affairs. Up to this point, the department's assessments had been pessimistic towards the abilities of the South Vietnamese Government and military to defeat the communist threat. In March 1968, the department's assessment of the war indicated that many political and military advances were being made by South Vietnam, but the enemy did retain a significant amount of power and could continue to check allied efforts.[10] The report went on to note that it was possible to see "achievements of the South Vietnamese Government... [including] the build...up of the armed forces, the establishment of a substantial measure of military superiority over the North Vietnamese and the Viet Cong."[11] Such assessments were used by the New Zealand Government to justify its involvement in Vietnam, and to also show that further New Zealand troop contributions were unnecessary, given the `political progress' in South Vietnam.

From 1969 until 1972, the New Zealand Government stressed the "increasing progress of the Republic of South Vietnam's self reliance programme."[12] At the end of March 1969, it was estimated that the South Vietnamese Government "controls or is dominant in areas which contain eighty percent of...[the] population."[13] In March 1970, it was

claimed that effective government control had increased to 92.7 percent of the population, and that the pacification programme and the government control was being further extended and consolidated in the rural areas.[14] At a meeting of the ANZUS Council on 26 September 1970, it was agreed that the situation in Vietnam had improved and that the withdrawal of allied forces from South Vietnam, as a result of the growing capacity of the South Vietnamese to defend themselves, was "proceeding satisfactorily."[15] In January 1971, the Right Honourable K.J. Holyoake, the arbitrator and dominant Prime Minister of New Zealand, noted that the progress of Vietnamisation was going well. He also felt that the capacity of the Vietnamese forces to take over responsibility from the allied forces was "increasing at a rapid rate."[16] In March 1971, it was believed that effective control was being consolidated and "political stability was fully maintained."[17]

Lieutenant General L.W. Thornton, an astute and perceptive Chief of Defence Staff (hereafter CDS), was also optimistic in his assessment of the ability of the ARVN to take over the fighting of the war. He considered that: "from the military or security aspect the improvement has been quite dramatic in the past twelve month...The South Vietnamese armed forces...show very great confidence in their ability to handle anything that might come against them."[18] However, he issued a warning regarding the speed of Vietnamisation, which was perhaps an indication that all was not as well as thought: "we must not rush it [Vietnamisation]. This war...could go on for years, and we must be patient."[19]

These over-optimistic assessments tended not to be a true reflection of the situation that existed in South Vietnam.[20] By 1970, the ARVN had managed to restore a considerable measure of security to the countryside, and the ability of the NVA and VC to effectively dominate the war was significantly reduced. However, the VC apparatus was

never destroyed, as its structure remained intact, albeit in a greatly reduced strength and capability. While the NVA/VC had much of their impact upon the local population reduced, the South Vietnamese Government was not able to replace it by gaining the loyalty of the South Vietnamese. The New Zealand Government possibly presented these optimistic assessments to not only legitimise its involvement in the war, but to also show that, given these great strides in progress, New Zealand would not need to send more troops. Indeed, there could even be a justification for the reduction of New Zealand's combatant assistance. The effect that the anti-war movement was having was implicitly acknowledged by the New Zealand Government. Army General Staff (hereafter AGS) in Wellington believed that the purpose of effecting a withdrawal of its forces from South Vietnam was basically two-fold: to relieve the pressure of the anti-war movement upon the New Zealand Government and, secondly, to maintain a sufficiently large presence in Vietnam to retain a position of international influence.[21]

In 1970 and 1971, the New Zealand press tended to support the New Zealand Government's assessments of the current situation that existed in Vietnam.[22] Editorials attempted to show that Vietnamisation was working. In 1970, an editorial in the Marlborough Express noted there was no doubt that the Vietnamisation programme was making better progress than expected.[23] Even the disastrous Vietnamese defeat at the end of Operation Lam Son (Total Victory) 719 in early 1971 was downplayed by several New Zealand reporters, with one reporter, who had travelled several times in Vietnam, noting: "the trends [that the South Vietnamese would gain the `upper hand' in the war] are so encouraging..."[24]

Other significant events occurred in the late 1960s, aside from the establishment of the Nixon Doctrine and the subsequent withdrawal of American troops from Vietnam and Southeast Asia events which saw the beginning of a number of

important changes in the global strategic situation. These changes were to have major repercussions upon the New Zealand Government's political and military policies.

During the period from 1966 to 1970, there were several foreign policy decisions made by the British Government which distracted the New Zealand Government's attention away from Vietnam. In April 1967, a change in British defence policy resulted in the New Zealand Government being informed that the United Kingdom intended to withdraw its forces from Southeast Asia, particularly from its bases in Singapore and Malaysia, by the mid-1970s. However, the precise timings of this withdrawal were conditional upon the progress made to achieve a new basis for stability in Southeast Asia. This decision came as a great shock to the New Zealand Government. In January 1968, as a result of the British devaluation crisis in November 1967 and consequential cuts in public expenditure, the British Government announced the unconditional withdrawal of the British forces from Southeast Asia by the end of 1971. In the External Affairs Report of 1968, Holyoake had written that the British policy change marked for New Zealand "a time for reappraisal, almost as profound as that made necessary by the fall of Singapore in 1942."[25]

These policy changes by Britain created doubt about New Zealand's future role in both Malaysia and Singapore. Would its role increase or would it decrease, and by how much? One important element was the role of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve. If this reserve disappeared, what would happen to New Zealand's obligation? What would the reactions of the Governments of Malaysia and Singapore be if New Zealand used more of its forces from this reserve in Vietnam?

Some of this doubt was eased when on 25 February 1969, the Australian and New Zealand Prime Ministers announced that their countries' troops would be retained in Malaysia

and Singapore after 1971 at roughly their existing levels. Holyoake stressed that this decision had been made in the light of New Zealand's own view of her national interest, rather than in deference to her allies.[26] The election in June 1970 of the Conservative Party to government in Britain, led by E. Heath, resulted in a change in policy towards the withdrawal. The new government decided to maintain a small military presence in Southeast Asia, resulting in the establishment of Australia, New Zealand and the United Kingdom (hereafter ANZUK). Despite the presence of the ANZUK forces, Malaysia and Singapore were to be primarily responsible for their own defence. However, it was obvious to both the Australian and New Zealand Governments that this continued British presence in Southeast Asia would not be long term.

There were also further influences upon the New Zealand Government. New Zealand's traditional export market had been threatened though the withdrawal of General Charles de Gaulle, the French President, from French politics in April 1969. His resignation made British entry into the European Economic Community (hereafter EEC) politically feasible. During this period Japan was growing into an economic power, and New Zealand was endeavouring to develop new markets not only in that country but also in other Asian nations.[27]

As a result of all these developments, the New Zealand Government re-appraised its defence arrangements with its closest allies. It saw that it would have to develop a more independent and probably more costly approach to defence with the reduction of British and American military involvement in Southeast Asia. The New Zealand Government appeared to preclude the continuation of the forward defence policy within a purely American framework. For a time, this consideration drew into question the ANZUS relationship, the cornerstone of New Zealand's security. As a result, there were to be substantial shifts in its defence roles and deployment in Southeast Asia and the Pacific and the

concepts which underlay the role of the forces. The Commonwealth arrangements in Malaysia and Singapore were changed and Australia, New Zealand and Malaya (ANZAM) was replaced with ANZUK. The importance of New Zealand's relationship with Australia was emphasised with the defence production agreement of 1969, the Tasman Declaration of 1970 and developed a closer association with the Technical Co-operation Programme.[28] A major short-term effect of this re-appraisal was the polarisation of foreign policy attitudes by the New Zealand Government, as well as by the opposition party, and a change in the New Zealand Government's attitude towards the type of support that would be provided to South Vietnam.[29]

The Nixon Doctrine and the Vietnamisation of the war raised serious doubts, not only in New Zealand, regarding America's future role in the Southeast Asian region. The faith of a number of countries, including New Zealand and Australia, in the American alliance had been greatly weakened. The implementation of the Nixon Doctrine cast serious doubts upon both the wisdom of U.S. policies and its willingness to intervene, politically or militarily, on behalf of its allies in future conflicts even where such intervention might be more justified than in Vietnam.

The New Zealand Government, in late 1968 and 1969, saw that there was a continuing scope for political initiatives regarding South Vietnam from the Allied nations. These initiatives would be made possible by the "growing confidence" of the South Vietnamese Government, that would create the situation in which "dependence on Allied support...[would] diminish...and...this would lead to the... withdrawal...of Allied troops."[30]

By the beginning of the 1970s, it was already clear that the changes in the international context had important implications for New Zealand. In early 1972, Holyoake noted: "the former guidelines would no longer suffice and

that in the new situation there would be larger scope and need for self-reliance and independent initiative, and the stronger growth of co-operation" among the smaller countries in the region.[31] Although both New Zealand political parties took advantage of changes in the international scene to develop new initiatives in foreign policy, it was the election of the Labour party to government in December 1972 that resulted in the quickening of these initiatives.

The previous year, Holyoake presented this changing attitude by the New Zealand Government towards a more independent attitude regarding its defence ties in a positive manner. He realised that in the `longer term' the communists still posed a potential threat to the security of South Vietnam.[32] He noted, in August 1971, that his government was interested in assisting and maintaining the security and stability of countries and areas important to New Zealand's security. South Vietnam would continue to have New Zealand's support in its war. However, support would cease to be combat assistance, as South Vietnam "is now better able to stand alone."[33] New Zealand's defence capabilities and aid were, he said, "better directed to training and to other forms of assistance..."[34]

The New Zealand Government's official attitude towards the results of the Nixon Doctrine, by early 1971, was mellowing. In early 1971, the Annual Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs noted that New Zealand's relationship with the United States continued to be of central importance in New Zealand's foreign policy. Instead of a mistrust of U.S. policy the New Zealand Government now "viewed with understanding the desire of the U.S. to reorder its commitments abroad in such a way as to reduce its involvement and encourage its friends and allies to play a greater role in shaping the future."[35] The report stated that it was "fundamental to [the] New Zealand foreign policy" that New Zealand "should play its part in promoting

peace and stability in the region [Southeast Asia] in which we live and should lend support in the ways open to us to such endeavours elsewhere."[36] This promotion of `peace and stability' was to be achieved through New Zealand's continued commitment of foreign aid to the region.

Later, in March 1972, Holyoake noted that the growing self reliance of Southeast Asian countries, and the assurances by the United States that it would help these countries handle their own defence, was encouraging to the New Zealand Government. He also saw that New Zealand's continued support to Vietnam was contributing towards the emerging conditions of stability and security in this area.[37] This could then lead to a "vigorous programme of reconstruction" for all the countries of the area.[38]

The New Zealand Government began to adjust its policies to meet the changing situation in Southeast Asia: the government began to move towards developing, through non-military means, the political and economic strength of these countries. As an indication of the National Government's policy, the New Zealand Secretary of Defence, J.F. Robertson, noted in mid-1971 that while New Zealand's military role in Vietnam might seem to dominate all things, it was "only complementary to other activities political, economic, commercial and in the assistance field, to develop New Zealand's relationship with the area."[39] In 1971 N.E. Kirk, New Zealand's charismatic and anti-Vietnam War Labour Party Leader, noted that the war in Vietnam had given Southeast Asia an "exaggerated reputation for violence and instability".[40] In fact, he noted, many countries in the region had achieved greater economic and political stability through "positive material achievement."[41] Although there would probably be violence and instability in Southeast Asia for the next ten years, Kirk expected that such violence would be "on a lower and more manageable level", which could be handled by the effected nations' own internal forces.[42] As a result of a shifting balance of power in this region,

there was being created a climate in which the Asian countries were more responsive to proposals of regional co-operation and mutual assistance. He also noted there was a growing willingness to develop associations which would be of mutual benefit in terms of trade and economics, rather than developing collective security arrangements. Kirk felt that it was not unreasonable for New Zealand to search for new political and economic ties outside both the United Kingdom (hereafter UK) and Europe in this region, especially with the UK seeking admission to the EEC.[43] This development of new political and economic ties was to be accomplished through the development of "enlightened and outward-looking policies."[44] The New Zealand Government had begun to move towards a direct association with the Asian countries.[45] The New Zealand Government, in making policy decisions, was looking more and more at its own interests, rather than those of its treaty partners.

At the end of the 1960s, New Zealand reflected the new situation in Vietnam, regarding the implementation, and implications, of the Vietnamisation programme by its decision to also reduce its combat forces, in concert with its two ANZUS partners, in South Vietnam. For military reasons, nevertheless, in the near future the New Zealand Government would make some changes in their composition, but within an established manpower ceiling. Emphasis was to be placed by the ANZUS partners on programmes to improve the capacity of the South Vietnamese forces. The New Zealand Government was laying the groundwork to justify a decision to begin withdrawing its troops from South Vietnam. The question as to when the forces would be withdrawn involved military factors, including the safety of the forces; international political considerations, such as the need to consult Australia, the advisability of consulting the United States, and the propriety of consulting South Vietnam; and also financial matters. The question of when the military

forces would be withdrawn also raised domestic political issues that had to be resolved at Cabinet level on both sides of the Tasman.

Vietnamisation: The Search for a New Zealand Role

There was considerable consultation by the New Zealand Government with Australia over the sequence and timing of New Zealand's withdrawal from Vietnam. The close relationship that existed with Australia served to reinforce the need for consultation and careful planning over any troop withdrawals, which contrasted sharply with the paucity of consultation by Australia with New Zealand when their forces were first being deployed.[46] Holyoake stressed publicly the importance of New Zealand being seen in South Vietnam to be supporting its ANZUS partners. Air-Commodore F. Gill, National Member of Parliament for East Coast Bays, had said in Parliament: "To withdraw precipitately before we have achieved our aim, before we have made possible the stability of the region, would cause our friends in the region and our allies to look at us in a new light."[47]

The Australian Government, once favouring the withdrawal of its troops by a single operation, now favoured piecemeal withdrawal. Although the general situation in Vietnam had improved, the province of Phuoc Tuy, where the Australian Task Force was located, was far from pacified, and the ARVN would be severely tested soon after 1st Australian Task Force's (hereafter 1ATF) withdrawal. The Australians recommended to the New Zealand Government that the order of withdrawal of New Zealand combat elements be carefully phased with the Australian movement.[48] The Australians wanted the New Zealand component of the Australia New Zealand Army Corps (hereafter ANZAC) Battalion, which was Victor (hereafter `V') Company and

thirty-three other New Zealand personnel employed in support elements, to remain until the withdrawal of the ANZAC battalion from South Vietnam in May 1972.

While Holyoake had hinted several months ago that some New Zealand troops could be withdrawn later in 1970, the New Zealand Government and Army fully supported Australia's withdrawal programme.[49] Major General R.B. Dawson, the New Zealand Chief of General Staff (hereafter CGS), noted that this programme of withdrawal was "a sensible way of handling it".[50] Holyoake noted that New Zealand would not withdraw any troops unless the Australian Government began to pull out: "I have told the Australians that when the last Australian is in Vietnam, there will be a New Zealander alongside him."[51] To have denied such support, at the very least, would have publicly demonstrated a considerable lack of understanding, mutual support and co-ordination in the policies of the two countries.[52]

As the New Zealand Government and military had openly stressed the importance of supporting their ANZUS allies, it was impossible for the New Zealand Government to withdraw its own forces without supporting the efforts of its United States and Australian counterparts. To this end, the New Zealand Government and military was obliged, and agreed, to provide some form of training assistance to the South Vietnamese.

An important factor for the New Zealand Government in the consideration of the provision of training assistance was that the Australians had begun to extend their efforts towards the Vietnamisation programme, particularly with the training of the Regional Force (hereafter RF) and Popular Force (hereafter PF). This point was not lost to J.M. Fraser, the Australian Minister for Defence. In January 1970, he suggested to Dawson that arrangements could be made

to develop a "real training capability" for ARVN forces, which could perhaps concentrate upon the South Vietnamese being taught how to train their own troops.[53] In response, Lieutenant General Thornton, the CDS, wrote to the New Zealand Defence Liaison Officer (hereafter NZDLO) in Canberra, Lieutenant Colonel A.J.A. Cooper, noting that New Zealand would need to examine other ways of providing military assistance to South Vietnam, apart from combatant troops, such as an engineering team or military training teams.[54]

In response to this, Dawson began unofficial, exploratory steps towards the involvement of New Zealand in such a training capacity.[55] He wrote to Lieutenant General Sir T. Daly, his Australian counterpart, noting that if the Australians decided to retain their advisory team in Vietnam with the withdrawal of their combat units, then a possible New Zealand contribution to the the Australian Army Training Team, Vietnam (hereafter AATTV) could be one Officer and four Warrant Officers.[56] Daly was in favour of this offer of New Zealand support and so unofficial preparations began.

Fraser stepped up his suggestions of New Zealand providing training assistance. Fraser suggested to Cooper that, as both Australia and New Zealand were reducing their forces in South Vietnam, a parallel was that both these countries should turn more of their attention to assisting the development of either the ARVN or one of the South Vietnamese security forces.[57] Both countries felt that it was more important to provide training to the RF/PF than the ARVN, as the former had a major part to play in the implementation of the Vietnamisation programme.[58] The New Zealand Ambassador in Saigon had received a cable regarding discussions held between Fraser, the Australian Minister of Defence, and American and South Vietnamese officials on possible contributions that Australia could make.[59] Lieutenant General Thornton, the CDS, felt that it might be appropriate for a study on New Zealand's position to be

prepared in readiness and for consideration to be given to the form of future training assistance that could be provided to the Vietnamese forces.[60] In consultation with G.R. Laking, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, General R.J.H. Webb, now the CGS, was to prepare a report for Defence Council on the optimum form of training assistance that New Zealand could provide to the Vietnamese forces.[61]

At this stage, the New Zealand Army saw a number of viable options for the provision of training assistance to the South Vietnamese.[62] Firstly, the establishment of a training group similar to the AATTV, though on a smaller scale. Secondly, the attachment of a New Zealand advisory group to one ARVN formation. Thirdly, a build-up of New Zealand advisory teams operating with the RF and PF, possibly to take on all or part of a province adjacent to Phuoc Tuy or in districts in Phuoc Tuy not covered by the Australians. Fourthly, the establishment of a small training centre for RF and PF junior leaders, which did not have to be in Phuoc Tuy. Finally, to send five advisors to work at the Van Kiep training centre.[63] However, Webb was aware that an important consideration when deciding the form of such training assistance now and in the future, was that it would be increasingly difficult for the ARVN to release units for training due to the run-down of the Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF).[64]

The New Zealand Government was in favour of a contribution to the AATTV. The New Zealand Minister of Defence, D.S. Thomson, noted that there would be no political objections from the New Zealand Government, but he would be pleased with a prospect of a nationally identifiable effort.[65] On the basis of this, Webb discussed with Lieutenant General Sir Daly, the Australian CGS, a possible New Zealand contribution to the proposed Australian RF/PF training project. While the New Zealand Government

maintained the present ceiling of forces in Vietnam, it would prove "difficult for New Zealand to play much of a part".[66] Nevertheless, Webb believed that New Zealand should assist Australia as much as possible, optimistically hoping that "in the long run we could, in addition to the five outlined above, produce at least two training teams."[67] If the Australian reaction was still positive, Webb would seek formal approval for New Zealand's participation.[68] In the meantime, Thomson had directed AGS to prepare a report on the optimum training assistance that New Zealand could provide to the Vietnamese forces.[69]

However, Australia was already moving ahead in providing further training assistance. On 22 April 1970, J. Gorton, the Australian Prime Minister, publicly announced that 1ATF would be reduced in size in Phuoc Tuy by not replacing 8 Royal Australian Regiment (hereafter RAR) when it completed its tour of duty in November 1970.[70] He also stated that the progress of Vietnamisation in Phuoc Tuy and in South Vietnam in general had made it "desirable and feasible" that Australia change the qualitative shape of its contribution to the Vietnam War.[71] The partial withdrawal of Australian forces would require a "modification of the role at present played by [1ATF] - a modification made feasible by...Vietnamisation and national acceptance of responsibility by the Vietnamese themselves in Phuoc Tuy."[72] The ability of the territorial forces to assume the operational responsibility for the territory previously held by 1ATF now became the "monument to Australia's effort in South Vietnam".[73]

Following Gorton's announcement, Holyoake publicly hinted that there could be some change in New Zealand's contribution, as consideration of a role that New Zealand could continue to play in "developing South Vietnam's capability. We shall...continue to keep the situation under review and to consult our allies."[74] However, similar comments had already been publicly made. Over one month

earlier, Thomson had informed reporters that New Zealand was likely to take a bigger role in the Vietnamisation programme in early 1971 rather than abruptly pull out its men.[75] He noted that: "When it becomes such that we can contemplate any move, we may look at...the best way we can continue to help the Vietnamese."[76] He concluded by noting that any final withdrawal might not be until 1971: If Vietnamisation was to succeed then time was needed to fully train the ARVN.[77]

The New Zealand Government and army had already expected the U.S. to made tentative requests for some form of training assistance to South Vietnam. Rear-Admiral W.E. Lemos, the U.S. Director of Policy Planning in February 1970, informed Brigadier A.H. Sutton, Head of the New Zealand Defence Staff in Washington, that he had been "giving some thought" to a contribution that Australia and New Zealand could make to the continued long term training of Vietnamese personnel, "another example of the Nixon Doctrine."[78] To this Sutton made no comment, save to express New Zealand's interest in the nature of such a proposal.[79]

In early 1970, Thornton was given an appraisal regarding the U.S. view towards an early withdrawal of New Zealand troops from South Vietnam.[80] During Sutton's appointment in Washington, the extent of the U.S. appreciation of the New Zealand presence in South Vietnam had been impressed upon him by all levels in the government and military. Nevertheless, he admitted that: "It has always seemed quite clear to me (although no one has ever directly made this statement) that responsible officers in Defence see no real military significance in the size or shape of our force and that their appreciation relates almost entirely to the political significance of our presence in a combat role."[81] Sutton also had the

impression that the contribution of the Australian Task Force was similarly regarded as not having any military significance for operations in South Vietnam.

Sutton warned Thornton of the possible implications should the Government decide to withdraw all of New Zealand's military forces from South Vietnam. Although the New Zealand and Australian presence did not have any vital military significance to operations in South Vietnam, Sutton advised that, "if full advantage was to be gained from New Zealand's original contribution, then some New Zealand troops needed to be left in Vietnam throughout the run-down period."[82] He stated that these troops would have to remain in South Vietnam for at least eighteen months to two years. He concluded: "I sense that the disenchantment which might accompany such a total New Zealand combat withdrawal would to a great extent erode whatever goodwill had accrued from making a contribution and maintaining it for 4 - 5 years."[83]

Lieutenant Colonel K.C. Fenton, the Commander of New Zealand (hereafter NZ) V Force,n was asked to consider the most effective method by which a small group of New Zealanders could be employed in South Vietnam following the eventual withdrawal of New Zealand combat troops.[84] This group was to be so employed as to be an identifiable New Zealand Army training contribution, to be of undoubted value to the Vietnamese forces and give a valuable return in terms of training and experience.[85] Brigadier R.P.D. Hassett, the Deputy Chief of General Staff (hereafter DCGS), raised the idea of a joint training venture with the South Vietnamese, separate from the Australians, which Thornton also supported.[86] He felt that after the withdrawal of the first rifle company, New Zealand could establish, as the Australians had done, "our own New Zealand/South Vietnamese Jungle Training Centre or some such similar organisation."[87]

Apart from the political value to be gained by New Zealand in providing such training assistance, there were several major military reasons why the South Vietnamese wanted Australian/New Zealand training assistance. General Cao Van Vien, Chief of the South Vietnamese Joint General Staff (hereafter JGS), uninterested in politics and regarded by the Americans to be an extremely competent commander, considered the New Zealand and Australian soldiers' operational methods and skills (patrolling, ambushing and small-unit tactics) to be much in advance and more applicable to the techniques employed by the ARVN and RF/PF, than those of the Americans.[88] Many ARVN officers were impressed with the high quality of training, performance and experience of New Zealand troops. These operating methods of the New Zealanders were certainly within the capacity and financial limitations of the South Vietnamese than those of the Americans. Lieutenant General Phan Trong Chinh, the highly regarded Director of Training, CTC, felt that many American advisers were not very experienced and that their teaching was rather theoretical and he did not believe that the present U.S. orientated RF/PF officer and NonCommissioned Officer (hereafter NCO) refresher and leadership training met the upgrading requirements of the South Vietnamese.[89] Lieutenant Colonel V.B. Brown, the competent and astute commander of NZ V Force, believed that this attitude was probably attributable not only to the tacit acknowledgment that the Commonwealth armed forces were better at teaching guerilla and anti-guerilla warfare than the Americans, but also because some Vietnamese officers had been trained at the Jungle Warfare School (hereafter JWS) in Malaysia.[90] Their experiences vis-a-vis the experiences of others trained in similar schools in the United States were such that JWS-trained officers were the first to be selected by the South Vietnamese Central Training Command (hereafter CTC) as instructors for the RF and PF training.[91] Brown believed that when these graduates were intermingled with Australian and New Zealanders, a very successful training group could be established.[92]

That New Zealand would contribute some form of training assistance to South Vietnam, to train the RF/PF, was almost beyond uncertainty. What had next to be decided was the type. The next section will briefly describe the importance of the RF/PF in the Vietnamisation programme and the state of these two territorial forces.

The Key to Vietnamisation: The RF and PF

The strategy adopted by the U.S. military and allies in operational planning for the Vietnam War had basically consisted of two facets, attrition and pacification, as briefly discussed in Chapter One of this thesis. It was calculated by the U.S. Defense Department that the war of attrition would wear down the enemy militarily, while the pacification programme, with its two-pronged objective, would deny the enemy support amongst the people.[93] The South Vietnamese were expected to continue this strategy.

The difficulty for the U.S. military lay in achieving this strategy: there were over 10,000 hamlets in 250 districts spread over forty-four provinces. One of the major weaknesses of previous pacification efforts was that when a regular force secured a hamlet, it would only remain in the hamlet for a relatively short space of time, and then it would leave. This meant that once the troops had left, the VC simply moved back into the hamlet, quickly rebuilding their influence. The new pacification programme emphasised, as its first stage, `sustained territorial security'. Although the South Vietnamese Government did not have enough forces to sustain troops permanently in all hamlets, it could not politically afford to ignore some parts of the country and concentrate its efforts in a few areas.

It was only in a situation of sustained protection that pacification could work. Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (hereafter CORDS) proposed that the ARVN, with allied assistance, would clear a region, and then the RF would maintain the security of the area while the South Vietnamese Developmental teams carried out the civic action and pacification work.[94] The RF was seen as being ideal, because the large ARVN units could support, but never implement, a pacification programme, as there could never be enough large units available to secure every hamlet.[95]

In many ways the RF and also the PF were the logical forces to build upon. It was these forces that were closest to the local populations, and they already had the mission to protect the local populations from NVA/VC attack. Another consideration was that the South Vietnamese troops generally placed the safety and welfare of their families ahead of their loyalty to either the army or the government. It was felt that these RF/PF forces would, therefore, fight tenaciously to protect their homes and families. From 1968 onwards, the RF/PF became increasingly important to the allies' war effort in Vietnam. The success of the pacification programme was related to the growth of the RF/PF. For example, from mid-1969 until mid-1970 in Military Region (hereafter MR) IV, there was an increase of 801 RF units which paralleled the pacification gain of 801 hamlets in the `secure' category.[96]

By transferring this responsibility to the RF/PF, the regular force units, previously tied down with the pacification programme, could be released for mobile main force operations and border security tasks. From 1965 until 1968, ARVN regular units performed only a secondary role in the war, mainly confined to the support of pacification and the responsibility for maintaining territorial security. The ARVN was thus given little opportunity to develop its combat effectiveness. In transferring the RF/PF to these

roles, about fifty-four ARVN battalions would be freed from the pacification programme and be made available for combat duties.

In 1964, the RF and PF were integrated into the regular army and placed under the command of the JGS. This had been done not only to unify command and increase the availability of military forces to combat the NVA/VC, but to also help combat the high desertion rates among ARVN forces. As most deserting men returned to their native province and village the presence of the RF/PF was thought to continue to provide a military presence in the countryside. Service in the RF/PF was voluntary and the soldiers received about half the salary of a regular soldier. Despite this, many South Vietnamese men preferred to serve in the RF/PF, as RF soldiers tended to operate primarily in their home areas, and PF soldiers served in their own villages. Not surprisingly, the desertion rate of soldiers serving in the RF and PF was much lower than that experienced in the ARVN.

The RF/PF grew rapidly in size. From its integration into the regular army until 1972 the RF/PF forces grew by seventy-two percent, an increase that was fairly uniform between the four MRs. (Table 1)[97] The number of RF companies doubled from 1968 to 1972, with an increase from 895 to 1823 companies. The number of companies in MR III significantly increased and in MR IV they more than doubled. (Table 2)[98]

Operationally, the RF was organised within a province for service within that province.[99] The RF was centrally administered by national and regional headquarters, but normally under operational control of the province chiefs, who assigned them to the various districts within the province.[100]

TABLE 1

TROOP STRENGTHS OF RF/PF IN THOUSANDS

Military Region	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972
MR I	46	58	74	82	80	78
MR II	74	95	110	119	121	116
MR III	65	91	109	122	115	118
MR IV	115	148	182	211	216	208
TOTAL	300	392	475	534	532	520

TABLE 2

STRENGTH OF RF COMPANIES BY CORPS AREA

Military Region	Dec 68	Dec 69	Dec 70	Dec 71	Dec 72
MR I	122	155	212	227	235
MR II	242	293	359	411	412
MR III	272	371	407	413	429
MR IV	399	529	627	616	715
TOTAL	1119	1471	1672	1676	1823

However, despite operating as part of the Republic of Vietnam Armed Forces (hereafter RVNAF), the effectiveness of the RF and PF was constrained by three serious problems: their organisation, command, and employment. The RF and PF were commanded by provincial or district chiefs who were usually too busy with their administrative and political duties to pay enough attention to these small units. Their loose organisation, and large numbers of separate platoons and companies, created difficulties in their control and supervision. This often resulted in the RF/PF not being employed to their fullest capabilities.

The role of the RF was to support the pacification programme and development effort by enforcing the law, maintaining public order, providing adequate territorial security by conducting offensive operations to destroy enemy provincial and local units, supporting PF units as required by hamlet chiefs, assisting in neutralising the Viet Cong Infrastructure (VCI), interdicting enemy lines of

communication and protecting local resources. By the end of 1969, forty-three percent of RF companies were on hamlet or village security missions. However, this trend changed as more and more RF units began shifting to local offensive operations.[101] By mid-1971, only twenty-four percent of RF units were engaged in hamlet/village security, with fifty percent of units moving into active operations, an increase that was uniform in all four military regions.

Although organised into squads, platoons, companies and battalions, operationally the RF was employed into 100-man companies, although they were seldom able to field their full compliment.[102] Some RF companies were deployed at the village level (where village security was poor), for use either on mobile operations within the vicinity of the village or manning platoon sized outposts securing lines of communications. The original concept of the RF was that they were security forces for use within the region from where they were recruited. However, with the withdrawal during the late 1960s and early 1970s, the RF had begun to assume responsibilities formerly undertaken by the ARVN. Companies and battalions were beginning to be used as inter-provincial troops and were assuming a far more offensive and mobile role than previously.[103]

The role of the PF platoon, comprised of local residents, was to help the authorities in the villages and to assume 24-hour security at the local village and hamlet level against VC local guerilla elements.[104] They were also used to protect lines of communication and for the security of static installation security, manning posts, providing limited patrolling and ambushing and acting as a reserve for the Peoples Self Defense Force (hereafter PSDF). Although the PF was organised into squads, platoons or companies, the basic operational unit consisted of either thirty-two or thirty-man squads and platoons. The largest number of PF Platoons was in MR IV. (Table 3)[105]

TABLE 3

STRENGTH OF PF PLATOONS BY CORPS AREA.

	Dec 1969	Dec 1970	Dec 1971	Dec 1972
MR I	920	1,115	1,218	1,209
MR II	1,311	1,586	1,843	1,752
MR III	1.028	1,194	1,266	1,304
MR IV	2,413	3,327	3,752	3,208

The role of the PF, as with the RF, also changed during the implementation of Vietnamisation. Although its role was security missions, the PFs involvement in active missions also increased, albeit slowly. By the end of 1969, seventy-two percent of PF units were engaged in hamlet/village security; by mid-1972 this figure had dropped to sixty percent. In this same period, PF platoons on active operations increased from seven to eighteen percent.[106] With this increase in operations, their role of providing security to the villages was being very slowly taken up by the police and the PSDF.

Despite the growing importance of the RF/PF to the pacification programme, these two territorial forces were far from ready to assume the important role that was placed upon them. This was although they were involved in more of the fighting than any other Territorial or Regular Force units, and also tended to suffer a higher proportion of casualties.

By early 1970, approximately ninety-five percent of all RF and PF units were equipped with M-16s and most units were receiving supplies of M-79 grenade launchers and M-60 machine-guns.[107] Despite this increase in the quality of weaponry, the greatest obstacle to the improvement and training of these forces, along with the ARVN, was the lack at all rank levels of qualified leadership, particularly at

the junior officer and NCO levels, both of which also lacked training, experience and initiative. These findings were supported by a study conducted several years later.[108] The interviewees were questioned on how they viewed ARVN leadership. Thirty-seven percent of those interviewed felt that the best ARVN leadership was "very good, but the majority were poor," and thirty-five percent saw it as being inadequate.[109] This was partly attributable to the fact that this group in particular had suffered heavy casualties from the war. Generally, the leadership demonstrated by the lower military echelons showed little concern for the welfare and morale of their men, two basic considerations in military leadership. One major reason for this poor leadership was the South Vietnamese Government's practise of appointing and promoting officers for their political loyalty, family connections or formal education, rather than for military ability.[110] This also effected desertion rates in the ARVN. In 1969, the Delta region had the highest number of desertions in South Vietnam, although enemy strength and activity in this region were low.[111]

Major General J.H. Cushman, the U.S. Senior Advisor IV Corps, had consistently pointed out grave deficiencies in leadership, training, maintenance of equipment and personnel management of the South Vietnamese. He was particularly concerned about the lack of improvement in leadership and the lack of motivation in the individual South Vietnamese soldiers in the Delta as a whole.[112]

In fact, U.S. reports showed an association between leadership and command effectiveness, both of ARVN and RF/PF units. These reports illustrated that improving the leadership of a unit would yield four times as much improvement in combat effectiveness as an equivalent increase in the quality of the troops, more and better weapons and equipment, and more officers and NCOs.[113] This was because the effectiveness of a South Vietnamese unit was dependent upon its commander, who set the tone of the unit.

His subordinates were often reluctant to take any initiative without his lead. When a Vietnamese commander was killed, his unit more often than not fell apart immediately because junior officers were unwilling to take over.

A further problem that followed, in part, from poor leadership was the lack of time spent in training. MACV considered that six hours per week was the minimum amount of time that a unit should spend to become proficient with its weapons. As of mid-1968, there were only thirteen percent of RF units receiving either these or more hours per week.[114] Many ARVN officers, who saw the war as a five-day week, were disinclined to take the time and effort to train their troops carefully and thoroughly.[115] There was also a lack of sufficient in-place training for RF/PF units.[116] Progress was hampered by a shortage of training teams, the increasing number of new units and the distribution of M-16 rifles which the RF/PF had to be trained to use. From 1968 to 1970, the following trend in combatant units was identified: "Advisors [sic] reported that about 17% of the units trained for less than 20 minutes per week on average during 1970. About 50% trained for less than one day per month...To compound this problem, about half of the training that was conducted was considered ineffective or marginal. In 1970...some units didn't train at all."[117]

The soldiers of the RF/PF were both trained at special training centres in each corps areas, where they undertook the same-style fourteen weeks basic training course as regular ARVN soldiers. Under CORDS, the U.S. advisory service was streamlined. The RF, PF and other province military advisers were merged with the civilian advisers into a single team led by a Province Senior Advisor, who could be either military or civilian. Although all RF/PF units were required to undertake periodic refresher courses, not all units did so, largely because the province chiefs were reluctant to give up their troops to undertake the

training period or else they did not want to pay the transport costs involved in sending their units for such training.

The fact that the RF/PF generally took the brunt of the war was another major incentive to improving their training. They tended to have a higher proportion of combat deaths than the regulars, and until 1972, they were a major target for NVA/VC attacks. From 1968 to 1971, the RF/PF suffered fifty-five to sixty-five percent of all combat deaths, and in 1971 they formed fifty-one percent of the total combat forces. (Table 4)[118] Although the Vietnamisation programme improved this situation by furnishing more up-to-date equipment, this did little to improve the situation of casualties suffered by the RF/PF.

TABLE 4

COMBAT DEATHS PER 1,000

Year	1967	1968	1969	1970	1971
RF/PF	22	29	22	22	25
Regular Forces	18	30	17	16	17

The exception to this trend was in 1968, when the Tet offensive intensified the conventional fighting. As well as this, the gap between RF/PF and ARVN combat deaths widened from 1969 to 1971.[119]

There were several reasons why the RF/PF suffered higher casualties than the ARVN. As the RF/PF operated in the rural areas, they were slow in receiving reinforcements and artillery and air support. Even in 1969, RF/PF units received only thirty percent of the Vietnamese-fired artillery support, with half of this amount being used for firing at suspected NVA/VC locations rather than for support

during fighting.[120] RF/PF units in MR III received ground reinforcements in only three percent of their contacts with VC units.[121] Most fights with NVA/VC occurred at night, often as a result of surprise attacks, and far from combat support. In many instances the RF/PF failed to exploit effectively the fire support that was available, because many RF/PF officers lacked a real appreciation of the benefits of fire support, and the paramilitary forces had to use a cumbersome tactical air/artillery request.[122]

Despite this, the RF/PF appear to have been the most cost-effective South Vietnamese force, in terms of dollars, in killing NVA/VC troops.[123] Even so, the performance of the RF/PF in battle varied from area to area, depending first upon the strength of the enemy attacks and secondly upon the calibre of a unit's officers. The RF/PF accounted for just over thirty percent of all communist deaths inflicted by the RNVNAF, for only a very small percentage of the total programme budget costs. (Table 5)[124]

TABLE 5

PORTION OF COMMUNIST DEATHS INFLICTED BY RF/PF.

	1969	1970	1971
% of total communist combat deaths inflicted by RF/PF	12	20	30
% of total programme budget cost	2	3	4

The RF and PF were one of the contributing factors towards the growing security of the countryside, particularly in MR IV, where the territorial forces were the primary South Vietnamese armed forces.[125] While the RF/PF increased fifty-eight percent during 1968 to 1969, the secure population increased seventy-four percent. In MR IV,

from mid-1969 to mid-1970, the increase of 807 new RF/PF units closely paralleled the pacification gain of 801 hamlets in the category `secure'.[126]

The implementation of the Nixon Doctrine following the 1968 Tet offensive served to alter the allied efforts in Indochina. The introduction of the `Vietnamisation' programme, enabled the progressive withdrawal of U.S. and allied combat troops from Vietnam, while the South Vietnamese armed forces were being retrained, re-equipped and reorganised to shoulder the full burden of defending their own territory. However, the increased importance of the pacification programme stressed, as its first stage, `sustained territorial security'. The South Vietnamese Government, while having insufficient forces to sustain troops permanently in all hamlets, could not afford politically to ignore parts of the country and concentrate its efforts in a few areas.

The New Zealand Government accepted that the key factor of the programme of Vietnamisation was the effectiveness of the RF/PF units since, stated Thomson, the New Zealand Minister of Defence, it "is upon these that provincial security and pacification chiefly depends."[127] Providing training assistance to the RF/PF would also be in line with the type of assistance Australia was now providing, and would satisfy U.S. requests. However, the New Zealand Government and military sought a New Zealand contribution that was separate from Australia's.[128]

A Nationally Identifiable Contribution

New Zealand military officers who had seen the value of New Zealand troops in Korea, Malaya and Malaysia knew that a small identifiable force under New Zealand control would have more political impact than the dispersed members of the

AATTV, however expert they might be. Because of manpower shortages, the Australian Army had indicated to the New Zealand Defence Liaison Officer in Canberra that they would welcome a New Zealand contribution to the training assistance programme. However, the Australians would not require any personnel until October 1970.[129] Although the New Zealand Government was looking for an ANZAC orientation in its contribution, it was obvious that Australia was more concerned with developing a visible nationally identifiable force with little or no consultation with New Zealand. Thus, neither the New Zealand Government nor the Army wanted this situation to arise again with the contribution of a training effort.

One of the major reasons for examining the possibility of providing training assistance was so New Zealand would have a nationally distinct training team. The acronym ANZAC had again been used with the establishment of the ANZAC Battalion, recalling the traditions of the New Zealand and Australian Armies' fighting together. However, throughout the ANZAC experience in the Vietnam War, foreign policy and defence controversies between Australia and New Zealand were apparent to those participating at the military command and field levels of the conflict, and certainly apparent, but not expressed, at the political level. There were examples of New Zealand departing from the Australian line. Australia's approach to the Vietnam War, from 1962 to 1965, was typified by an overt eagerness to become involved and to have the U.S. intervene operationally. However, New Zealand was reluctant to become involved. Australia's eagerness was manifested in open pronouncements of support for U.S. policies; through active diplomatic lobbying by representatives in Washington; by premature commitment of troops at Military Staff talks; by the introduction of conscription in 1964 and through engineering the invitation to send 1 RAR to the theatre.

As already discussed earlier, the New Zealand Government, on the other hand, expressed doubts at the Australian Government's support of the U.S. policy of intervention, preferring a negotiated settlement to the war.[130] The New Zealand Government suggested alternatives to combat operations. The government proposed that the National Liberation Front (NLF) be represented at the early negotiations; the New Zealand Government had dispatched noncombatant units as initial token of support; requested that the bombing of North Vietnam be halted; and finally, after hesitant and lengthy deliberation, committed an incomplete, ill-equipped but voluntarily-manned supporting combat unit to war. This policy was to last right throughout the war until the end of 1972.

The Australian government frequently failed to consult with its New Zealand counterpart. From August 1965 to June 1966, there had been a lack of consultation by Australia with New Zealand over the sending of troops and also over policy.[131] In August 1965, the Australian Government decided to reinforce the Australian contribution to create a national battalion group, 1 RAR, without consulting New Zealand.[132] The formation of 1ATF saw the point where New Zealand lost any political identity that it might have earned in Vietnam and thus any political advantage with the United States. The struggle for identity also involved the tactical subordination of New Zealand units: for example, `W' Company One was added to the ANZAC Battalion. In March 1966, the Australian Government announced that it would deploy a two battalion self-contained Task Force to Vietnam and then that the Task Force would be responsible for Phuoc Tuy Province. This lack of consultation with New Zealand over the decision to take over Phuoc Tuy meant that New Zealand's contribution would no longer be seen as an independent national effort on an equal footing with that of Australia. This tendency to not consult New Zealand, even

in matters pertaining to the disposition of New Zealand's military forces, marked the Australian political attitude for the remainder of the war.

At the field level, professional divisions were apparent between New Zealand's fully volunteer forces and the conscripts of the Australian units.[133] Discord among the ANZAC ranks was partly attributable to professional jealousy and even, in part, to racial prejudice on the part of some Australians towards Maori soldiers. New Zealanders who served in Vietnam generally support the claims that strained relationships existed to a serious degree in the field, and that New Zealand troops "felt hampered by Australian operational limitations imposed for political reasons and because of the high percentage of conscripts" in Australian units.[134] Some of the officers interviewed by J.T. Henderson criticised the Australian troops as being somewhat `brash' in their attitude towards the New Zealanders, who were very much in the minority.[135] One commented there was a reluctance amongst the lower ranks to mix socially, although this was much less in evidence at the officer level.[136] Some said that as they were such a small part of a much larger group, this left the New Zealanders open to ridicule.[137] Some New Zealanders were upset by the comments made by the Australians that they were "cheap" soldiers, meaning that the New Zealand Government was not prepared to spend much money on them.[138]

This desire by New Zealand to have a separate military contribution was not only for military reasons. The New Zealand Government saw political gain to be made. Lieutenant General Webb, the CGS, commented that Thomson, the New Zealand Minister of Defence, "seemed anxious that we should establish our own training assistance project...He feels this to be very important politically."[139] However, this situation placed New Zealand in a difficult position. The establishment of any nationally identifiable contribution would always be limited by the difficulty that

New Zealand had in sustaining any independent activity without heavy expenditure. These two factors were in conflict. On the one hand, New Zealand needed Australian support both for economy in administration and for optimum security of its troops. However, even the submersion of a sizable New Zealand training team within an Australian organisation would possibly not achieve the political effect that the New Zealand Government wanted. Lieutenant General Thornton, the CDS, stated to Thomson: "we clearly would not want to alienate the Australians, nor to work in competition with them."[140] Hence, the form of New Zealand's contribution to South Vietnam within the time frame required was conditioned to a significant degree by the nature of the Australian assistance.

New Zealand Training Assistance: Options

The AGS considered it inappropriate that personnel should be taken from the infantry companies then in Vietnam and used for training South Vietnamese troops. This was because the requirement for the training team was different from that of the combatant units, and not all of the members of the companies would necessarily be good instructors. Also, as the companies were now nearing the end of their tour in South Vietnam, the New Zealand Army did not want to extend their time to undertake a training role. Lieutenant General Sir J.A. Mace, Director of Infantry and Special Air Service (hereafter SAS), commented: "The two didn't relate, there were two entirely different circumstances, the option just didn't meet the requirements."[141]

Ian McNeill, in The Team: Australian Army Advisors in Vietnam, 1962 - 1972, briefly notes the experiences of the Australians and the U.S. advisers which had resulted in their hesitancy to use soldiers from a combat unit for training and advising South Vietnamese units.[142] The New Zealand Army had not been slow in learning from these

experiences. Both the Americans and Australians had already experienced unsuccessful attempts at using combat troops in this role, which were largely due to the orientation of combat soldiers and their lack of experience in the role of advisers.[143] Men in a combat role owed their loyalty, not to the Vietnamese who they were training or advising, but rather to their own parent unit. They were not able to follow up on the training that they did give and they were not familiar with the problems associated with trying to teach new ideas and ensuring that their ideas were retained by the South Vietnamese. It was generally agreed by advisers that it took at least three weeks working with the Vietnamese to achieve results and win the confidence of the Vietnamese that they were working with. Both `V' and `W' companies had undertaken the training of units from the 18th ARVN Division, with little success.

A major consideration for the New Zealand government and military, once a decision had been made to provide training assistance, was the selection of the most suitable location for such a New Zealand training team. On 2 May 1970, Lieutenant Colonel Fenton, the Commander of NZ V Force, held informal exploratory discussions with General Vien, Chief of the JGS, on a possible New Zealand training team contribution. Vien was "very favourably disposed towards, and approved in principle", the concept of a Vietnamese/New Zealand training centre for the RF and PF.[144] He considered, however, that the establishment of another Jungle Warfare Training Centre (hereafter JWTC) in MR III could not be justified. Fenton then proposed that such a centre be established in MR IV. After discussing several possible locations with Fenton, including Tri Ton district near the Seven Mountains area in Chau Doc Province, it was agreed that the site likely to suit New Zealand best would be Dong Tam.[145]

Brigadier Hassett, the DCGS, was anxious to speed up planning so Lieutenant General Webb, the CGS, could discuss with Vien and Lieutenant General Chinh, Director of Training, CTC, any proposed project during his visit to Saigon in June 1970.[146] Hassett directed Fenton to ascertain whether the Vietnamese had a real need for a training centre at Dong Tam and that they were not just making a polite reaction to an offer of assistance.[147] If there was a real need, would a New Zealand contribution of approximately thirty personnel be of significance in helping them. Hassett noted that if the Vietnamese were raising a further RF/PF training centre, then New Zealand was able to provide experienced, well trained soldiers to assist, "and I emphasise the word `assist'..."[148] New Zealand was to be assured also that the school would eventually be Vietnamised. It was also important that such a centre be directly under CTC and not a Province Chief. If the only contribution that New Zealand could make was in terms of manpower, Hassett wanted to know what New Zealand might face in equipment costs, logistic support and interpreters; and what the problems might be regarding logistic and national support for a New Zealand element at Dong Tam. He also sought answers to the following questions: how many students the school could take; where would they come from; and what problems would there be in imparting the doctrine as practiced by U.S. adviser teams?

At this time such negotiations were unofficial and Hassett had no Ministry of Defence or Government approval for any of the proposals that were being discussed. Also, no other Vietnamese, American, or Australian officers were aware of New Zealand's thinking on a proposed contribution. Hassett wrote: "Our approach has been to get our own Army thoughts straight and decide on possible courses of action before we make any formal approach to Defence. I must emphasise, therefore, that all this is very much at the planning level."[149]

Despite this, there was some speculation in the New Zealand press that there was a good chance that New Zealand would contribute some form of training assistance. During the visit of the U.S. Secretary of State, Dean Rusk, to New Zealand in May 1970, he presented a survey of the situation in South Vietnam to Cabinet. The press noted that the outcome of this was an anticipated early announcement by Holyoake that New Zealand would send a small army team to assist in the training of South Vietnamese troops.[150]

However, Webb had two major concerns about Dong Tam. He was initially concerned that there was a lack of jungle terrain around the Dong Tam centre, as the Vietnamese wanted to use New Zealand's jungle warfare expertise.[151] That Dong Tam was in open Delta country could have a very different tactical emphasis to the terrain of Phuoc Tuy in which New Zealand had had experience. However, Chinh did not consider that the lack of jungle areas adjacent to Dong Tam would hinder training as most of the emphasis of the school's mission would be on junior leadership and the majority of RF/PF had little chance to enter multi-canopy forests during their normal operations anyway.[152] Webb's second concern involved the school's mission, `Junior Leader Counter-Guerilla Training', which was indicative of a rather specialised instructional requirement which New Zealand would find difficult to meet.[153] Webb also thought that the New Zealand's Army's expertise would be limited to small team night operations, terrain appreciation, and paralysing Viet Cong lines of approach. In view of this, he wondered if New Zealand would be able to make a sufficiently substantial contribution.

By now, the New Zealand Government saw that it had two options available to it after the withdrawal of combat troops: to contribute to a larger Australian project or to attempt a small-scale New Zealand training operation with

the ARVN. It was noted by D.G. McLean, the Assistant Secretary (Policy), in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs,: "the latter finds a lot of support" from the government.[154] There were several reasons for this change in emphasis. The change in emphasis from a New Zealand team assisting the Australians to a separate New Zealand contribution, stemmed largely from the South Vietnamese requesting New Zealand assistance separate from that provided by the Australians.

Further steps were taken by AGS regarding the intention of the New Zealand Government to establish an independent training project. In June 1970, Webb recommended to Thornton that before the withdrawal of the first rifle company, New Zealand provide assistance to the Australian training team project in South Vietnam in the form of a small group comprising one officer and four Warrant Officers.[155] New Zealand involvement in the Australian training teams, although not necessarily providing the most satisfactory way of helping the South Vietnamese in the longer term, would be of benefit to both New Zealand and South Vietnam.[156] For New Zealand, it was a way of New Zealand personnel getting some experience in the training assistance role, particularly with the RF and PF units. Such experience would be invaluable should discussions be undertaken to establish a "nationally identifiable" training assistance project in the longer term, particularly after the withdrawal of the New Zealand rifle company from South Vietnam. Thomson, the New Zealand Minister of Defence, felt that this type of programme could also become a "focus for other national activity in the field of civil aid."[157]

In the meantime, the New Zealand Cabinet authorised in principle New Zealand participation in a Vietnamese/ Australian training project in Phuoc Tuy province.[158] The training assistance, at this stage, was to be a short-term effort; it was seen by Thomson as being "limited and

exploratory steps" demonstrating New Zealand's interest in offering assistance towards the training of South Vietnamese personnel, as part of the Vietnamisation programme.[159] For the long term, Webb to discussion with the South Vietnamese, without commitment, on the possibility of a specific New Zealand programme of military training assistance being set up in South Vietnam after the withdrawal of the first New Zealand rifle company from Nui Dat.[160] Although nothing was publicly stated as to why Webb travelled to Vietnam, several New Zealand newspaper editorials commented that while he was in Saigon, "It can be assumed [Webb] had discussed the question of training assistance with the South Vietnamese authorities."[161]

Vien advised Webb that military assistance in the training of RF and PF personnel would be welcomed, with this being most urgent in Corps Tactical Zone (CTZ) IV.[162] Vien reiterated that the requirement to upgrade the RF/PF was critical to the success of the whole Vietnamese programme, and that this upgrading should now receive priority over the needs of the ARVN. The RF/PF needed short courses to bring them quickly up to a higher standard, particularly so during the comparative military lull that was expected to continue for the next six months.[163] Vien also supported in principle the concept of a joint Vietnamese/New Zealand effort to train RF/PF Junior leaders. Over the next twelve months there were expected to be heavy demands placed upon the manpower and resources of the ARVN, which would have to assume responsibility for operations, formerly undertaken by 150,000 U.S. troops, against NVA mainforce units.[164]

The expansion of the South Vietnamese armed forces, as a result of the Vietnamisation programme, and the heavy demand for combat replacements, placed great demands on the existing schools and training centres. A consolidation and

reduction of the training centres, particularly the RF and PF centres, had begun in 1970 as a measure to increase training centre capacity at the lowest possible cost.[165] A total of twenty-three RF, PF and Ranger National Training Centres (hereafter NTC) were to be improved, modernised, and consolidated into ten `national' centres by the end of 1972. and particular attention was being paid to improving the range of courses offered at these training centres.[166] The South Vietnamese did not want the New Zealanders to establish any more new schools. They wanted to build up the centres which had been selected as their long-term major RF/PF training centres.[167]

Of the two RF training centres in MR IV, the Cao Lanh Regional Force Training Centre (hereafter (RFTC) and the Chi Lang NTC in the `Seven Mountains' area, only one, Cao Lanh, met all of Webb's requirements.[168] He considered Chi Lang unsuitable, because of its distance from Saigon and its proximity to the Cambodian border and the "VC infested area".[169] His report recommended the establishment of a joint Vietnamese/New Zealand school at Cao Lanh RFTC in MR IV.[170] He suggested that the team should be an identifiable New Zealand effort and make it possible for the New Zealand Army to continue to impart to the South Vietnamese some of its experiences, particularly in jungle warfare. Using Cao Lanh as a base for training could facilitate the development of further New Zealand assistance in related or separate roles if the government wanted to change the nature of its assistance.[171] Webb's view was also accepted by the New Zealand Government, provided a New Zealand team could be supported in IV Corps. He considered that "we should try and meet Vietnamese wishes. In any event we should keep away from Phuoc Tuy if we want to make the maximum national impact."[172]

Webb also suggested a further important means of assisting in the upgrading of the RF/PF, the establishment of New Zealand Mobile Training Teams (hereafter MTTs) to supplement those already in IV Corps.[173] However, the New Zealand Government would have to accept the possibility of New Zealand casualties, a dilemma that the Australian Government had encountered in deciding how their training teams would be employed in May 1962.[174]

The period of New Zealand's military involvement in South Vietnam, from 1963 until 1972, saw increased commitments in manpower and expenditure. Financial cost has often been a major constraint placed upon the New Zealand Government when considering the type of military contribution that it provides to its allies, not just during its involvement in the Vietnam War. This is because New Zealand has always had a comparatively small defence budget in relation to its allies. The argument used for such constrained defence expenditure was based on the premise that defence policy was essentially a matter of co-operation with major allies.[175] The pressure was all the more intense because of financial constraints on the New Zealand Government's expenditure, particularly in the Defence Vote, during this period. Indeed, the logistical equipping and maintenance of a New Zealand force, a very expensive process, was seen to be the responsibility of the major power to which New Zealand was allied.[176] The Vietnam War proved to be a costly war for New Zealand, "yet these costs had to be absorbed within the normal defence vote."[177] The cost of establishing a New Zealand military training team was no different and was a priority for both the New Zealand Government and military. The cost for about thirty men was approximately $220,000 per year, just over half the cost of New Zealand's present contribution.[178]

In early July, Holyoake publicly announced that New Zealand was considering switching some of its combat troops in South Vietnam to a training role, and that a number of alternative were being explored.[179] He stated that whichever option was chosen, the number of New Zealand servicemen serving in South Vietnam would not be increased. It was not politically feasible or acceptable for the New Zealand Government to send instructors to Vietnam until the first withdrawal of combat troops had taken place. The immediate effect of such a move would have been to increase New Zealand's military strength in Vietnam. One newspaper editorial suggested that such a move would be politically acceptable, noting, "whatever course is taken, it will be a welcome move, especially to those who feel strongly opposed to New Zealand involvement in Vietnam."[180]

His announcement signalled that New Zealand's military role in Southeast Asia was visibly changing. The concept of forward defence was not being abandoned; it was merely taking a different form. It was this suggestion that New Zealand military training assistance be provided that newspaper editorials tended, as a whole, to support.

Editorials in New Zealand newspapers tended to agree that New Zealand should concentrate upon training the RF/PF, because they were critical to the success of the pacification and Vietnamisation programmes. An editorial by J. Graham in the New Zealand Herald, warned of the dangers of too much "wishful thinking...and over-optimism" about the ability of the South Vietnamese armed forces to take over the fighting.[181] However, Graham felt that with training and an adequate supply of arms, the Vietnamese, particularly the RF/PF, would be able to cope with the North Vietnamese. The South Vietnamese needed to be encouraged to take over more of the leadership of the war to allow them to "realise their potential", which "needed not to be too far in the distance.""[182] One typical editorial concluded that New

Zealanders would be well equipped to conduct training courses to correct serious weaknesses in basic soldier skills and small unit leadership.[183] The writer voiced the opinions of the New Zealand Army regarding the form of New Zealand's future role in South Vietnam.[184]

At the time Holyoake's statement was published in New Zealand newspapers, several New Zealand journalists commented on various ways a military instructional contribution to Vietnamese could best be utilised. One editorial, typical of a number, suggested that New Zealand should contribute twenty-five to thirty-six experienced personnel, to be attached either to the Australian military training programme or in one of the already established Vietnamese RF/PF training centres.[185] The editorial stated, however, that in the longer term there was much to be said for maintaining a separate New Zealand identity. The editor wrote that this was because it was often highly frustrating for New Zealanders to be merely part of an Australian project, run by the Australians, with the Australians getting all the credit.[186] This was a suggestion generally supported by New Zealand editorials.

The Australian announcement of a troop reduction on 20 August was also accompanied by a similar announcement by Holyoake. On the same day as the Australian announcement, Holyoake stated that the success of the Vietnamisation programme had improved to such an extent that it was now possible to withdraw one New Zealand infantry company of 144 men from South Vietnam in November 1970.[187] In line with the New Zealand Government's policy to withdraw in concert with its allies, Holyoake stated that the withdrawal of this company also worked-in with the Australian intention to withdraw its battalion.[188] It would have been politically difficult for the New Zealand Government not to bring out some troops when the Australian Government began to withdraw its own. He also stated that a decision on the type of

training assistance that the New Zealand Government would take was expected to be announced "shortly following discussions with the South Vietnamese authorities."[189]

This decision was not long in coming. In late August, Thomson, the New Zealand Minister of Defence, recommended to Cabinet that it authorise the establishment of such a project in principle and the immediate dispatch of specialist officers to negotiate in Saigon about the details about the training team project.[190] The Cabinet approved his recommendation. Lieutenant Colonel Brown, the Commander of NZ V Force, received permission from Brigadier Hassett, the DCGS, to approach the JGS and MACV informally with an offer of New Zealand training assistance. A formal approach would be made later, as Cabinet had only approved the provision of training assistance in principle.[191] The training team was to be in the order of twenty-five personnel and the project was to be a joint Vietnamese/New Zealand effort, preferably based on an established Vietnamese school, namely Cao Lanh. A JWP from Vietnam, MACV and New Zealand was to be established at a convenient date.

The New Zealand members of the JWP gathered in Saigon on 15 September 1970.[192] The mission of the JWP, as laid down by Lieutenant General Webb, the CGS, was to determine jointly with the South Vietnamese policies, responsibilities and procedures governing the proposed New Zealand Army involvement at the Cao Lanh RFTC.[193] The centre to be used by the training team had to have good training areas and be in a relatively secure area. New Zealand's aim in a joint Vietnamese/New Zealand undertaking was to establish a close, successful working relationship with the Vietnamese. The JWP was to ensure that Vietnamisation had a real prospect of success, as the Vietnamese were to eventually take over the centre. Lieutenant General Mace, astute, extremely competent and well chosen for the position as the co-ordinating

officer for the project, said "we had to be absolutely sure that when we pulled out, the damn thing wasn't going to collapse."[194] The members of the JWP saw their task as "A meaningful job, it wasn't going to change anything, in terms of scale. But we were making a contribution, I guess commensurate with our size."[195] Lieutenant General Thornton, the CDS, felt that although the training effort was important, he had little doubt that the training team would readily settle down to a "useful job of work at what is, after all, a very lowly level of training activity."[196]

Although the South Vietnamese made it very clear to the JWP that they wanted the involvement of New Zealand in a training project, the members of the party were never really sure where the Vietnamese wanted the training effort to be located. It was noted by Mace: "Whether they were trying really to please us or whether they had a strong view on where they finally wanted us to go, I must say we were never too sure."[197] Although the JWP expected the probable location of the training team to be established at Cao Lanh RFTC, the Vietnamese chairman, Colonel Nahn, the deputy of Lieutenant General Chinh, Director of Training, CTC, proposed a new location, Lam Son. This suggestion came as a shocked surprise to the JWP.[198] He said that students would come from all Military Regions and therefore Cao Lanh's terrain and conditions were not particularly appropriate. Colonel T.R. Benge, the MACV representative, also preferred Lam Son, because the expansion of the Cao Lanh RFTC would not to go ahead, due to the latter's poor training areas and Lam Son had more varied and favourable training areas. General Vien, Chief of the JGS, however, left the choice of location to New Zealand but gave the impression he preferred Chi Lang, as it was being upgraded to a major NTC. Thornton thought that Chi Lang was a possible location and felt that the JWP should therefore visit the camp.[199]

By this stage, the JWP had, recollected Mace, "ducked and dived", and they found there ended up being more options than they were led to believe in their brief in New Zealand.[200] The JWP visited Lam Son, Cao Lanh and Dong Tam and they were "horrified by some of the prospective centres".[201] Despite the South Vietnamese informing the JWP that they wanted a New Zealand training team established in MR IV, the JWP was determined that the urgency expressed by the South Vietnamese, although understood, "should not prejudice a sound and logical establishment of the wing".[202] The JWP "certainly did not like the look of Lam Son", and they were annoyed at the time wasted evaluating this centre, remembers Mace.[203] At Cao Lanh, the JWP found all the firing ranges and training areas flooded. The JWP was positively against Dong Tam because of unacceptable training facilities; the poor security of the centre compared with other NTC training areas; and a lack of CTC control, administration and training support. There were also Australian NOTT and Korean training teams, Judo, operating in the area at that time, and the accommodation was very poor.[204] Likewise, Chinh and Vien both reacted strongly against Dong Tam.

By this stage, the members of the JWP, particularly Major D.A. Ogilvy, had very strong views on where the team should be located: Chi Lang. Mace noted: "The moment we saw Chi Lang, I don't think there was any doubt in our minds that was the place to go. Every time we looked at another place I think Ogilvy was filled with horror that he'd be caught with an alternative."[205] The one certain fact that arose from this maneuvering was that the Vietnamese did not want the wing located at Cao Lanh and this had been personally confirmed by Vien and Chinh. Both of these men strongly supported the JWP's recommendations to change from Cao Lanh to Chi Lang.[206]

The JWP members preferred Chi Lang for several important reasons. They felt that both the training area and the training already being conducted at Chi Lang appeared "good by present Vietnamese standards."[207] There was a wide variety of terrain usable throughout the year which, the JWP felt, was characteristic of most provinces in MR IV. The firing ranges varied between "fair and good" and included areas suitable for live firing; and there appeared to be "an air of general efficiency which created a favourable impression."[208] Finally, in terms of logistics, there was a 2,000 foot pierced steel plate, C-123 and C-7A (Caribou) airstrip within the perimeter of Chi Lang. This would greatly enhance the resupply of the training centre.

The commander of Chi Lang, Colonel Le Ngoc Day and his deputy, Lieutenant Colonel Van, had considerable and recent operational experience.[209] Both were held in high regard by U.S. advisers. The JWP was informed that a good New Zealand relationship with these two officers and with the U.S. Senior Advisor would be assured.

Chi Lang RFTC was situated in the Tri Ton district of Chau Doc province, in MR IV. It was 273 km south-west of Saigon, 145 km from Can Tho and fifteen km from the nearest point on the Vietnam-Cambodian border. The Seven Mountains, adjacent to the training centre, which had a peak elevation of 700 metres, was the most predominant military and geographical feature of the area. That they rose from a seemingly endless plain gave viewers the impression that the mountains were much higher than they actually were. On the lower slopes of the hills, brushwood and isolated trees were growing. The steeper slopes were covered with single canopy forest and medium undergrowth. The Seven Mountains also had deep religious significance to the peoples of the Delta region.

The area surrounding Chi Lang was largely an expanse of flat alluvial plains to the South East, with hills to the West and North. The plains, which did not rise more than two metres above sea level, were crisscrossed by canals and ditches, many of which were tributaries of the Mekong River. These canals and ditches provided the major means of physical communication between many of the villages and hamlets. During dry season, the region was barren - a dust bowl. During the wet season, it was largely covered by flooded rice paddies, although some parts remained as swamp. This region, a rich prize for whichever side controlled it, was known as `the rice bowl of Asia' and was South Vietnam's agricultural heartland, containing more than half the cultivated land. Chi Lang was surrounded by dry crop areas, where corn, sweet potatoes, manioc and peanuts were grown. The Delta contained half of South Vietnam's population, a total of approximately six million inhabitants, and MR IV contained sixteen of the country's forty-four provinces. The Viet Cong also viewed the Delta as a rich prize. They had traditionally drawn much of their manpower, tax revenues and other such resources from the Delta region. The war in that part of Vietnam has been described as "A war of nameless little battles that make no headlines but have cost more lives over the years than all the fighting in the rest of Vietnam."[210]

The NTC was named after an outpost in Lang Soc province, where in 1427 King Le Loi had fought a successful battle which freed the Vietnamese from Chinese domination. On 15 August 1960, a training camp was established on the present site of Chi Lang by the 21st ARVN Infantry Division. In 1963, the political situation resulted in military instability throughout Vietnam. This was reflected in the sudden increase of communist guerilla activity in the 21st ARVN Division's area of responsibility. Due to the need for trained troops, the training centre then became the Fourth Tactical Zone Training Centre on 1 March 1963, responsible

for training IV Corps units. With the purpose of unifying command as well as support, this training centre was redesignated as an NTC in May 1963.

Chi Lang was the major training centre of MR IV. The centre's prime role was to teach all facets of infantry training, both basic and advanced, up to and including platoon leadership for all RF, PF and PSDF units in MR IV. regular force recruits undertook some training here as well. The staff at Chi Lang also assisted with the refresher training of ARVN Regular force infantry battalions. The South Vietnamese intended to upgrade the centre, to make Chi Lang the second largest NTC in South Vietnam (Lam Son was the largest). At the time of JWP's visit, Chi Lang had a rated capacity of 3500 students, but there were 8,500 currently under training, and also a number of Cambodian troops.[211]

At Chi Lang was the headquarters of the Special Tactical Zone (STZ), a divisional sized area, and the camp was also a forward operational staging base for operations into Cambodia and along the Cambodian/South Vietnamese border. All the air support provided to the South Vietnamese by the Americans for ground operations in this zone was co-ordinated at Chi Lang, with the assistance of American advisers. The advisers, MACV Advisory Team 61, under the command of Lieutenant Colonel W.E. Mundy, also advised on ground operations and provided advice, guidance and assistance to the commander and staff of the training centre, in all matters concerning training, logistics, administration, long and short range planning and security.[212] There were also thirteen to fifteen battalions based at Chi Lang, but they spent most of their time on operations.

The village adjacent to the training centre was commonly known as Tu Te, one of the seven hamlets of Tu Te Village.[213] Its proximity to the training centre had caused

the village to expand in relation to the growth rate of the training centre. However, public utilities had not kept pace with this growth rate and the hamlet was very dirty and untidy. The hamlet catered for a transit population only, with an abundance of coffee shops and brothels and very little else. The refugees in the town lived in slums, which could appear very quickly with new arrivals.

Chi Lang was accepted by the New Zealand Government and military as the most acceptable location, but this location was criticised, although by a very few. In a later report, Henderson wrote of his visit to Chi Lang.[214] One of his observations was that due to the physical characteristics of the area, Chi Lang, and even the Delta, may not have been the most ideal area for the New Zealand training team to be established. The New Zealand Army's expertise was in counterinsurgency and jungle warfare, which had been built up through experiences in the campaigns in Borneo, Malaya and Phuoc Tuy. These skills were not altogether appropriate to the type of tactics used in the desert and swamp lands surrounding Chi Lang, and indeed the Delta region as a whole. However, some of the team members who had served previously with the infantry companies in Phuoc Tuy, and even those who had served in Borneo and Malaya, felt that a lot of the area that they had operated in had comprised paddy fields and other open areas. One of the team members of the 1st New Zealand Army Training Team, Vietnam (hereafter 1NZATTV), W.S. Vautier, commented: "And of course, doctrine and infantry tactics don't change a lot - open or close country - applications change but not the doctrine."[215] The New Zealand instructors at Chi Lang would therefore have to adapt their skills to a different concept of warfare.[216]

During the dry season (February to May), the temperature was as hot as ninety-nine degrees Fahrenheit and the surrounding area was barren and dusty. In the cool period, November to March, a record low of fifty-eight

degrees was recorded. The wet season occurred from May to November while the high water level prevailed from June to December, with peak levels occurring in November.

On 20 October 1970, the JWP sent its final report to Lieutenant General Webb, the CGS, on the proposed New Zealand Army Training Team, along with its recommendations.[217] The report stated that the Vietnamese had an urgent requirement, particularly in MR IV, for the type of training to be done by the Vietnamese/New Zealand wing. They also recommended that the team be established at Chi Lang.

The Department of Defence expressed its concern regarding the JWP's recommendation of Chi Lang.[218] Its concern was based upon two points. First, New Zealand lacked the capacity to provide logistical support to the New Zealand team. Secondly, the Royal New Zealand Air Force (hereafter RNZAF) could not extricate the team or assist in a hurry if the security situation deteriorated quickly in the Delta area, due to the distance of Chi Lang from Saigon.

However, although the JWP felt that the camp was located in a potentially dangerous area, the danger was lessened considerably as any training did not have to be conducted anywhere near the dangerous area in the Seven Mountain Region.[219] In his recommendation to Brigadier Hassett, the DCGS, Lieutenant Colonel Brown, the Commander of NZ V Force, noted that there were no military implications locating the team at the centre while the Vietnamese maintained their cross border operations. He believed that there "are psychological advantages in siting our team near an operational area and the resultant edge given to the training is considered of some significance.[220] By this the ARVN were conducting operations against the NVA/VC in the region surrounding Chi Lang.[221]


The JWP had `intensive discussions' with MACV authorities regarding the logistic support of the team, a critical area of importance for the New Zealand Government. MACV guaranteed that the American armed forces would provide whatever logistic support 1NZATTV required, for the foreseeable future.[222] MACV also agreed make the South Vietnamese fully aware that 1NZATTV's presence in Chi Lang was conditional on continuing U.S. provision of this support.[223] To provide the team with its own supplies, an RNZAF Bristol Freighter, based in Singapore, would include Can Tho, which was about sixty miles from Chi Lang, on its weekly Vietnam run when the team was fully established.[224]

A further conference on 8 October resolved other problems. As it was not practical to integrate the team members with the Vietnamese in accommodation, the New Zealand team would construct its own compound with its own barracks, mess and lecture rooms.[225] After this conference, Lieutenant Colonel Mace, the AGS training team co-ordinating officer, and Major Ogilvy, the training team's commander, spent two days in Phuoc Tuy province examining problems experienced by the Australians in the establishment of the JWTC. To facilitate further planning, on 14 October 1970 Webb gave approval, in principle, for Chi Lang to be the location of the team.

The team was to be a very small portion of a very large training centre. The organisation of Chi Lang consisted of a Commandant, his headquarters and three branches - Political, Administrative and Training. (Table 6)[226] The twenty-eight New Zealanders, of whom eighteen were instructors, were to form the Leadership Wing of the training branch at Chi Lang.[227] (Table 7)[228] The name of the organisation was to be the Vietnamese/New Zealand Chi Lang Training Team and the team's course was named the `RF/PF Platoon Leadership Course'.

TABLE 6

ORGANISATION OF CHI LANG NTC.



The team was to have a dual training role. First, in the long term, it was to train selected Vietnamese officers to a level where, eventually, they would be able to take over the Leadership Wing. Secondly, as was the aim of the leadership course, the team was to develop the leadership abilities of the RF Platoon leaders, and to give them "a solid grounding in infantry platoon weapons and tactics" to enable them to more successfully lead their platoons, and probably of equal importance, "can train their platoons adequately for the type of operations likely to be encountered: to range out from their company bases, to cover territory systematically, to make military appreciations and give orders logically and operate effectively at night."[230]

There was to be an initial period of approximately six months during which there were to be four courses, each of five weeks duration, restricted to RF Platoon leaders only.[231] The numbers on these courses would be built up from sixty for the first course, to ninety students in July and to 150 students in

August. Thomson, the New Zealand Minister of Defence, hoped there would be an eventual annual attendance at the wing of 1200 students.[232] It was expected that the initial courses would comprise, as shown by Table 8.[233] At an appropriate time, PF platoon leaders were to be included, with an ultimate annual course attendance of 1200 students. It was planned to investigate subsequently the introduction of RF/PF squad leadership courses which, at this stage, were to be of four weeks duration.[234]

TABLE 7

ORGANISATION OF THE LEADERSHIP WING.




TABLE 8

ANTICIPATED STUDENT NUMBERS FOR INITIAL COURSES.

2nd	course	60	students	of	2	platoons	each	of	30 personnel
3rd	"	90	"	"	3	"	"	"	"
4th	"	120	"	"	4	"	"	"	"
5th	"	150	"	"	5	"	"	"	"

To allow it to fulfill its role, the team was organised into a headquarters, an administrative element and three training committees, the latter of which were assigned particular tasks.[235] The Tactics Committee managed tactical training, taught up to platoon level. The General Subjects Committee taught two main subjects - mines and booby traps, and map reading. The aim of this committee was to develop the students leadership qualities. The Weapons Committee devoted most of its time to teaching students how best to train their soldiers in the use of standard platoon weapons.

For the first six months the New Zealand team would be responsible for the content and conduct of the courses, although all training administration was to be conducted through Vietnamese channels.[236] There was then to be a gradual transfer of responsibility for instruction to the Vietnamese instructors with the New Zealand members assuming the role of assistant instructors. Thus, when 1NZATTV was eventually withdrawn from Vietnam the South Vietnamese would control the entire wing, which was in line with the Vietnamisation programme. Interpreters could be provided without difficulty, but it was unlikely that they would also be instructors. To assist with overcoming the language barrier, a demonstration platoon, which emphasised student participation and observation was to be provided.[237]

As far as the Programme of Instruction (hereafter POI) was concerned, instruction was to be orientated towards the situation in the Delta with every opportunity being taken to emphasise the aspects of leadership. Additional subjects to be included in the POI were organisation, tactics and characteristics of the enemy in the Delta, Psywar (psychological warfare) and Polwar (political warfare) and the Triple Triangle.[238] The New Zealand instructors were to use a variety of instructional methods: by the example set by the New Zealand team in their instructional standards; demonstrations by individuals, squads and platoons; and through the interpreters, who should, ideally, have some

instructional ability. The JWP hoped that Vietnamese staff would be selected who could speak English and would work through the use of a variety of training aids. The emphasis throughout the courses was to be based on competition to create leadership situations.

A report written by Sergeant F.D. Barclay, from 4 Troop SAS, after attachment to a 1ATF Mobile Advisory and Training Team (hereafter MATT), at Van Kiep, in 1969 for six weeks, was of great benefit to the JWP.[239] He pointed out that the instructors needed to be of Warrant Officer rank, because if some commanders of ARVN units being trained was not impressed with the rank of the team commander, they attempted to impede the progress of the training by every possible means, for example using the excuse that training could not proceed because of suspected enemy activity in the area.[240]

It was decided at the meeting that all the instructors in the team, if not already holding Warrant Officer rank, would hold the rank of acting WOII.[241] Warrant officers were acceptable to the South Vietnamese to instruct RF/PF Officers, but the Vietnamese preferred that subjects such as tactics be taught by officers. Nhan gave an assurance that the number of Vietnamese instructors would be at least the same as provided by New Zealand. It was also agreed that as the principle was that the Vietnamese officers should be taught by officers, it was therefore necessary that the training team should include a higher proportion of officers.[242]

As to the question as to how well the New Zealand team would adapt to teaching U.S. tactics, the JWP noted that although the tactics used by the ARVN were basically U.S., "with some adaptation to RVN [Republic of Vietnam, South] conditions...it is intended that the minor-tactics and methods of instructors should closely follow those used in New Zealand."[243] Mace did not think that the New Zealand

instructors would have too much of a problem, but noted that they "wouldn't have got the satisfaction of doing business the way we do it in a small army."[244]

There was some concern regarding the types of training methods that the U.S. used. Earlier, Lieutenant Colonel J.A. Clark, a commander of the AATTV, in correspondence to Canberra, had registered some dissatisfaction with U.S. training methods. He made several suggestions, such as having a much greater ratio of instructors to students.[245] The members of the JWP had agreed with his views and, at the meeting, they emphasised to the Vietnamese that a favourable instructor/student ratio was seen as critical in permitting instruction and also subsequent correction to be directed at the individual student rather than the class as a whole, as was the current Vietnamese practice.[246]

It was highly desirable that the proposed training assistance be provided by New Zealand military personnel with previous experience in training Asian troops. However, the New Zealand Army lacked experience in the type of training that was being proposed. Although very conscious of this, Lieutenant General Webb, the CGS, believed that, on military grounds, it was more important to attempt to meet the Vietnamese need for large numbers of instructors as "best we can now, rather than to try to get ourselves better equipped to handle the task in 12 - 18 months time".[247] Although appreciating that the New Zealand instructors were inexperienced, Lieutenant General Chinh, Director of Training, CTC, informed Webb that the ARVN could not produce the required number of instructors quickly and knew that the New Zealand Army had very experienced personnel who had seen active service in Southeast Asia. Further, as Chinh "dryly observed", even personnel with no Vietnamese training experience "would not find it difficult to better the young inexperienced Americans he got direct from the U.S. or U.S. Army Europe, with no experience of operations and Southeast Asia."[248]

The principles of manning recommended by the JWP were intended to balance out this inexperience. First, personnel were to exhibit personal qualities of tolerance, perseverance, maturity and integrity.[249] Secondly, previous operational experience in Vietnam was seen as pertinent because it did have an impact with the Vietnamese, and it would help give the instructors a feel for the country, the people and the South Vietnamese armed forces, particularly the RF/PF.[250] However, previous service with the Vietnamese was seen to be a much more significant qualification. Lastly, a volunteer who appreciated what he was volunteering for and met the personal qualities listed above was the ideal. The JWP felt that senior NCOs, preferably with some combat experience, would be the best suited for the training team's role.[251] The members would serve with the team for one year, as this was the standard length of a tour of duty for Australian, New Zealand and most U.S. troops.[252]

Assuming New Zealand Governmental approval for the project in early to mid-November 1970, it was estimated by the JWP that the first course could start in about March 1971. From the New Zealand point of view, everything possible would be done to launch the project in the minimum time, subject to taking the necessary care.[253] However, the points and recommendations contained in the JWP's report were agreed to by AGS in principle only. Their confirmation was subject to a decision by the New Zealand Government. The length of time that the team was to remain in Vietnam was never stated by the New Zealand Government. The team was to remain as long as CTC wanted it to remain, but the only proviso was that if vital U.S. support in terms of rations, supplies and air transport was withdrawn due to the U.S. withdrawal programme, the New Zealand team would have to pull out.

The New Zealand Army was fully aware of the need for and importance in giving some form of Vietnamese language training to team members. Reports from the Australian training team had constantly noted the importance of its men being able to speak at least some Vietnamese: "those that spoke Vietnamese and those that tried got a reception out of all proportion to their efforts and were much more quickly accepted by the Vietnamese."[254] During his attachment to the MATT, Barclay had observed the advantages of language training.[255] But some questions remained unanswered. What form of training should be given and of what duration? In as early as June 1970, Headquarters New Zealand Vietnam Force (HQ NZ V Force) was informed that New Zealand Defence (NZDEF) Army was "investigating the best system of Vietnamese language training for New Zealand personnel."[256]

Although the Army intended giving language instruction to the members of any training team, their expectation as to how long this would take was perhaps a little optimistic and not altogether realistic. The brief for the JWP had suggested that the New Zealand instructors could instruct in Vietnamese after a six week language course in New Zealand.[257] Although the team members had not been selected for their linguistic ability, the brief noted that "their motivation to learn would be high and that the selected students would be expected to have a reasonable command of English, the basic requirement for language training.

However, Lieutenant Colonel Mace, the AGS training team co-ordinating officer, was aware of the impossibility of teaching the members of the training team to speak Vietnamese fluently enough in the time available before they travelled to Vietnam. He discussed with the Australians, Americans and South Vietnamese the length of time it would take to allow an instructor to converse, with reasonable ease, with his students.[258] Mace concluded that a period of between six to twelve months was necessary. In his report upon the matter, Mace concluded by stating that language

training was necessary but the team of New Zealand personnel "will certainly not achieve the standard of colloquial language necessary to either impart instruction or to answer questions."[259] He felt that perhaps the team members might be able to undertake, at most, some basic pronunciation training in New Zealand, prior to their departure to Vietnam. This would, hopefully, be sufficient to enable them to continue to improve their vocabulary and to build up specialist vocabulary while they were in Chi Lang. Such a course would not be sufficient to allow the instructors to understand normal conversation or to understand nuances of speech, which could result in them sometimes misinterpreting what they heard.

Several options were examined, but none were ideal. There was the option of sending the men early to South Vietnam for language training. However, the only facility that was available for Vietnamese language training in South Vietnam was a part-time course run by MACV controlled Saigon Education Centre, which was only for two two-hour blocks. The possibility of the centre conducting an eight-week specialist course for the team in January/February 1971 was discounted, because it would have been too expensive.[260] In early 1970, a correspondence course in the Vietnamese language was introduced by the New Zealand Correspondence School. However, this course proved to be too limited.[261] During late 1970, the Australians had investigated means by which they could train two officers who had been posted to AATTV. Part-time courses were seen as limited, because the students would only attain a limited colloquial knowledge of Vietnamese. The Saigon Education Centre option likewise proved too expensive. On-the-job-training could be of value, particularly as locals were generally enthusiastic towards study of their language by FWMAF; but this would not be effective without solid instruction provided by a formal course. The following year several Australian officers took a twelve month course.[262] However, the New Zealand Army

felt that "taking a New Zealand officer out of circulation for over a year...was neither feasible nor practical from the New Zealand Army's point of view."[263]

In short, the team members would certainly not know enough Vietnamese to be able to train their students in the Vietnamese language. Therefore, it was the ARVN who should do the instructing with the team members assisting; that is, coaching the instructor and then assisting during the instruction. As a result, one of the recommendations of the JWP report was that the proposed six-week language course be dispensed with.

Some team members did undertake short periods of language training. Four of the replacements on the first draft had attended a three month Vietnamese language course at the Wellington Polytechnic School of Languages.[264] Although the language course provided sufficient vocabulary for the instructors to engage in the most rudimentary South Vietnamese phrases, they were unable to understand colloquial Vietnamese.

Webb sought Ministerial approval for the proposals for 1NZATTV. He proposed to find the manpower by reducing `W' Company (about to be withdrawn to Singapore), from 144 to 114. This would facilitate the move to Vietnam of the training team, without exceeding the manpower ceiling that had been determined earlier by the New Zealand Government. By this time there were only 426, instead of 540, all ranks still serving in Vietnam. In addition, the twenty-six man SAS troop was to be withdrawn in February 1971. In early November 1970, the New Zealand Cabinet approved the dispatch of the team to South Vietnam.[265]

On 14 November 1970, Thomson, the New Zealand Minister of Defence, publicly announced that a twenty-five man training team would leave New Zealand for Chi Lang early in 1971.[266] There was some uncertainty among the New Zealand

public regarding the government's policy of withdrawing from South Vietnam: Although the government was withdrawing its troops from Vietnam, here it was deploying a small number to Vietnam. The parliamentary reporter for The Press noted that the time had come for the government to decide what the term "disengagement really meant; either a complete withdrawal or a recommitment of teams that were designed to help the Vietnamese to `help themselves'."[267] Despite this uncertainty, both political parties did support the type of assistance that was being provided to the South Vietnamese.

The implementation of the Nixon Doctrine following the 1968 Tet offensive altered the form and substance of the allied efforts in Indochina. A `Vietnamisation' programme was introduced, which allowed the progressive withdrawal of U.S. and allied combat troops from Vietnam, while the South Vietnamese armed forces were being retrained, re-equipped and reorganised to shoulder the full burden of defending their own territory. The Vietnamese were expected to continue to fight the war based upon the `complementary' two faceted strategy adopted by the U.S. military and its allies in their operational planning for the Vietnam War: attrition and pacification.

The increased importance, in the late 1960s, placed upon the pacification programme stressed, as its first stage, `sustained territorial security'. Although the South Vietnamese Government had insufficient forces to sustain troops permanently in all hamlets, it could not afford politically to ignore parts of the country and concentrate its efforts in a few areas. To achieve such a level of competency, the Nixon Administration requested assistance from its allies.

The reasons behind the National Government's decision in late 1970 to provide combatant training assistance to the Republic of Vietnam, in the form of 1NZATTV, were essentially the same reasons which underlay the government's earlier decisions to commit combat troops to the theatre: support for South Vietnam's fight against external subversion; support for New Zealand's two closest allies, the United States and Australia and as an assertive expression of New Zealand's emergence as an active regional role-player in its own right. The Holyoake government's stated position had been that Southeast Asian nations must assume a greater responsibility for their own defence, and New Zealand's training assistance aimed to promote this concept of self-reliance.

Based upon the options available to New Zealand, the establishment of 1NZATTV and its associated role was the best decision. Despite some disadvantages, which New Zealand was aware of, the deployment of 1NZATTV offered New Zealand a number of advantages. It was a nationally identifiable, independent role which saw New Zealand playing the part of an active role-player in its own right. It met a real need of the ARVN and New Zealand was seen to be supporting its two ANZUS partners. It afforded New Zealand a continuing representation in Indochina, and appeased to some extent public opinion as the team was in a relatively quiet part of South Vietnam.

The need to establish a distinct and positive national contribution to the Republic of Vietnam that was not overshadowed by another country, as had happened with its previous contributions, resulted in the decision to deploy the first of what were to be eventually three small groups of New Zealand training personnel to South Vietnam.

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1. C. von Clausewitz, On War, ed and trans by M. Howard and P. Paret (Princeton, 1976), pp. 88 - 89.

2. The Tet offensive lasted from January until February 1968.

3. For further information, see S. Lipsman and L. Doyle, The Vietnam Experience: Fighting For Time (Boston, 1983), pp. 61 - 63.

4. The manpower ceiling was never increased, because of New Zealand's commitments in Malaysia and the mood of domestic opinion. Holyoake had informed Nixon in 1969 that New Zealand's military resources were "stretched about as far as it could go." M. McKinnon, Independence and Foreign Policy: New Zealand in the World Since 1935 (Auckland, 1993), p. 171.

5. For a selection of key extracts from the Nixon Doctrine, see B. Brown (ed), Asia and the Pacific in the 1970's: The Roles of the US, Australia and New Zealand (Wellington, 1971), pp. 241 - 244.

6. The Vietnamisation programme was known to the South Vietnamese as the `U.S. dollar and Vietnamese blood sharing plan'.

7. This was to be evidenced by the NVA's 1972 Easter offensive, where only the intervention of U.S. air power saved South Vietnam from almost certain destruction.

8. The Vietnamisation programme also included measures designed to help solve South Vietnam's political, social, and major economic problems.
Vietnamisation never envisaged the withdrawal of the U.S.

airforce from Indochina.9. The terms of the cease-fire agreement, signed in 1972 between America and North Vietnam, resulting in total American withdrawal from South Vietnam, was to come as a surprise to many.

10. Report of the Department of External Affairs (Wellington, 1968), p. 3.

11. ibid., p. 20.

12. Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Wellington, 1971), p. 18.
The Australian Government also shared this optimism.

13. Report of the Department of External Affairs (Wellington, 1969), p. 16.

14. Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1969 - 1970 (Wellington, 1970), pp. 17 - 18.

15. Annual Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Year ended 31 March 1971 (Wellington, 1971), p. 63.

16. Evening Post, 25 January, 1971.

17. Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1971, p. 19.

18. Christchurch Press, 13 February 1971.
Lieutenant General L.W. Thornton was the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS) from 1965 until 1971. On 11 November 1971, Thornton was accredited as Ambassador to Khmer Republic and Ambassador designate to South Vietnam until 1974.

19. ibid.

20. For an examination of the security situation in South Vietnam, see W.S. Thompson and D.D. Frizzell, The Lessons of Vietnam (London, 1977), pp. 259 - 262.

21. CDS to Cabinet 20 July 1970. Vietnam: Future of NZ Military Deployments, Def 23/4/10 Mutual Aid Programme to South Vietnam. Peace negotiations and troop withdrawals, vol II, October 1969 - April 1970, DCR.
AGS was primarily concerned with the establishment of New Zealand Army policies.

22. For a detailed analysis of the opinions of three New Zealand newspapers during the Vietnam War, see G. Witte, `A War of Words: New Zealand Press Opinion and the Vietnam Conflict', (unpublished Thesis for Post Graduate Diploma in History, University of Otago, Dunedin, 1990).

23. Marlborough Express, 14 July 1970.

24. New Zealand Weekly Times, 26 July 1971. See also Otago Daily Times, 16 June 1971.
Although the operation disrupted enemy operations in the Laotian Panhandle, it did not achieve any other of its objectives and only delayed NVA/VC plans for more than six months.

25. Report of the Department of External Affairs, 1968, p. 25.

26. K.J. Holyoake, `A Defence and Foreign Policy for New Zealand', New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, vol. XIX, no. 3 (March 1969).

27. Other changing circumstances and developing situations in international affairs also of concern to New Zealand policymakers included: the USSR's deployment of new missile systems; clashes between China and Russia; the invasion of Czechoslovakia by Russia; the movement of Russian naval forces into the Indian Ocean, and the growing activity by Indonesia in regional affairs.

28. Such programmes and agreements were intended to make the

co-ordination of effort in defence as a first priority by both countries.

29. By this stage of the war, both the New Zealand National Government and the Opposition Labour Party held similar foreign policy attitudes in relation to the Vietnam War.

30. Report of the Department of External Affairs, 1968, p. 3.

31. Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1971 - 1972, AJHR, A 1, 1972. p. 5.

32. Statement in the House, dated 18 August 1971. 15/28/12 NZ Force in Vietnam - Withdraw, vol II, February - September 1971, Defence Classified Registry (DCR).

33. ibid.

34. ibid.

35. Annual Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the year ended 31 March 1971, p. 34.

36. ibid.

37. Report of the Minister of Foreign Affairs for the Department of External Affairs for the Year Ended 31 March 1971 Presented to the House of Reps by Leave, (Wellington, 1971), p. 60.

38. Statement in the House, dated 18 August 1971. 15/28/12, vol II.

39. Otago Daily Times, 13 August 1971.
This approach sped up with the change in government in 1972.

40. N. Kirk, New Zealand and Her Neighbours (Wellington, 1971), p. 8.

41. ibid.

42. ibid.

43. ibid.

44. ibid., p. 9.

45. Previously, New Zealand's contact with Southeast Asia had been as a result of its relationship with `Mother' England, and also through the result of specific treaty relations, such as ANZUS and SEATO.

46. If the New Zealand Government had not agreed to the Australian request that the 1ATF be established at Phuoc Tuy Province, it was most unlikely that the Australians would ever repeat any similar degree of integration that could

subject them to a repetition of refusal by the New Zealand Government. The New Zealand Government had little doubt that in the long-term that it would be the major losers from such a withdrawal of association.

47. NZPD, vol. 365 (1 April 1970), p. 16

48. CDS to Cabinet 20 July 1970. Vietnam: Future of NZ Military Deployments, 15/28/12, NZ Force in Vietnam - Withdraw, vol III October 1971 - March 1974, DCR.

49. CDS to Cabinet 20 July 1970. Vietnam: Future of NZ Military Deployments, Def 23/4/10, vol II.

50. New Zealand Herald, 12 November 1969.

51. Evening Post, 11 March 1970.

52. For the political and military reasons why the New Zealand Government supported with programme, see CDS to Cabinet 20 July 1970. `Vietnam: Future of NZ Military Deployments', 15/28/12, vol III.

53. P.H. Kitney, ADLO, to Major-General Dawson, CGS, dated 13 January 1970. 15/28/12 NZ Forces in Vietnam - Withdrawal, vol I, July 1969 - January 1971, DCR.

54. Thornton to Cooper Deputy head of NZDCS, Canberra, dated 16 Jan 70. 15/28/12 NZ, vol III.
This was not the first time that the provision of training assistance had been considered by the New Zealand Government and Army. In 1962 and then in 1963, the New Zealand Government considered the possibility of sending a small team of advisers/instructors to South Vietnam as Australia had in 1962. However, the New Zealand Government at that time decided to offer medical assistance in 1962 and then deployed an engineer detachment in 1963.

55. To Brigadier Hassett, from Lt-Col Fenton, dated 5 May 1970, Serial A206: CGS Project - Training Team, DCR.
Fenton had held `observer status' with the Australian Working Group in the planning of the JWTC, and he was well aware of the major problem areas that had to be resolved.

56. From Dawson to Daly, dated 27 January 1970. 15/28/12, vol I.
The role of the AATTV was essentially three-fold: first, to provide advisers to the ARVN and paramilitary units and sub-units in the field; secondly, to provide individuals for integration as advisers or instructors in Special Force Teams; and thirdly, to assist in the training of the ground forces of the Republic of Vietnam.

57. `Reduction of Australian Ground Forces in Vietnam.' To Secretary of Defence from McDowell (NZDLS), dated 10 April 1970. Letter is contained in Annex A, 15/28/12, vol II.

58. ibid.

59. This cable was discussed at a Defence Council meeting on 7 April.

60. The New Zealand Secretary of Defence, Robertson, had discussed this subject with Sir A. Tange, the Head of the Australian Defence Department. Tange had expressed the view that the Australian/New Zealand Chiefs of Staff committee could be a useful forum in which to establish a joint Australian/ New Zealand policy. However, Thornton believed that national identities tended to be lost in joint projects.

61. Laking was the Secretary of Foreign Affairs and the Permanent Head of the Prime Ministers Department from January 1967 until his retirement in December 1972.
Webb was the DCGS from 1968 - 1970: CGS from 1970 - 1971, and then CDS from 1971 - 1976.

62. Training Assistance South Vietnam. Webb (CGS) to CDS, dated 14 April 1970, 15/28/13 NZ Force in Vietnam: Training Assistance SVN Forces, vol I, March - August 1970, DCR.

63. Australian training teams had worked in MR IV from May 1968 until December 1971, when they concentrated in Phuoc Tuy Province.

64. Training Assistance South Vietnam. Webb (CGS) to CDS, dated 14 April 1970, 15/28/13, vol I.

65. To Secretary of Defence, Chiefs of Staff and Secretary of Foreign Affairs, from Minister of Defence, dated April 1970, 15/28/12, vol III.

66. Dawson (CGS) to Lieutenant-General Sir T. Daly CGS(Aust), dated 26 March 1970, 15/28/12, vol III.

67. ibid.

68. To NZ V Force from Army Wellington, dated 23 April 1970, 15/28/13, vol I.

69. Minutes of the Defence Council, held on 7 April 1970, Def 57/3/3 Councils, Boards and Committees Defence Council, Minutes of Meetings, vol III, April 1969 - December 1970, DCR.

70. Commonwealth Parliamentary Debates House of Representatives, vol. 67 (22 April 1970), p. 1458.

71. ibid.

72. ibid., p. 1458.
This modification took the form of two further Australian contributions to the training of ARVN forces in Phuoc Tuy province, both of which were part of a continuing project

which had begun in 1968 when 1ATF had trained small groups of RF units. Several Mobile Advisory and Training Teams (hereafter MATTs), as part of the AATTV, were deployed, and a training centre was established on the site vacated by the 1ATF. For further information on the JWTC, see I. McNeill, The Team: Australian Army Advisors in Vietnam, 1962 - 1972 (Australian War Memorial, 1984), pp. 425 - 464.
For an explanation of a MATT, see Chapter Three of this thesis.

73. ibid., p. 431.

74. New Zealand Herald, 22 April 1970.

75. An earlier cable from Sutton to Thornton had noted: "New Zealand's present thinking does not favour early large scale withdrawal." Sutton to Thornton (CDS), dated 28 Jan 1970, Def 23/4/10, vol II.

76. Evening Post, 2 March 1970.

77. Minutes of the Meeting of the Defence Council, held on 11 March 1970, Def 57/3/3, vol III.

78. Washington to Wellington, dated 5 February 1970, ibid.

79. ibid.

80. From Brigadier A.H. Sutton, Head of the New Zealand Defence Staff in Washington, to Thornton, dated 2 February 1970, ibid.

81. ibid.

82. ibid.

83. ibid.

84. From Hassett to Fenton, dated 16 April 1970, ibid.
Fenton commanded NZ V Force from 1968 until 1970.

85. ibid.
The New Zealand army felt that the South Vietnamese would welcome increased training assistance. At this stage, it was examining several options: to take over as many as possible of the advisory appointments currently filled by the U.S.; increase the number of advisers at Van Kiep; increase the advisers for the territorial forces to a maximum; or, establish a school for junior leaders, if suitable students were available.

86. From Brigadier Hassett to Lieutenant Colonel Fenton, dated 17 April 1970, 15/28/13, vol I.

87.
ibid.88. Report by the Minister of Defence on his Visit to South-east Asia, February/March 1970, 95/2/1 Visits Overseas

- Reports, vol I, October 1968 - December 1973, DCR.
For further information on Vien, see Annex B to Serial 6 to Southeast Asia Brief, dated 22 April 1971. Brief for the Visit of the Minister of Defence and CDS to SE Asia: April - May 1971, 95/3, Separate No. 7, DCR.
The JGS, the command body of the RVNAF, was the focus of co-operation and co-ordination between the South Vietnamese and the U.S. forces in South Vietnam. The Chief of the JGS commanded the three South Vietnamese military services: Army, Navy and Air Force.
See also CGS (Webb) to CDS, dated 15 July 1970, 15/28/13, vol I.

89. See also CGS (Webb) to CDS, dated 15 July 1970, 15/28/13, vol I.

90. Brown commanded NZ V Force, later renamed NZATGV in March 1972, from 1970 until December 1972.
The JWTC was training about forty Vietnamese a year.

91. From Brown to CGS, dated 26 August 1971, Serial A194: Reports - General, NZ V Force, DCR.
CTC was created in 1964 to unify and increase the effectiveness of training activities for the RVNAF. It was responsible for operating and controlling the school and training centre system, the supervision of all RVNAF training, and the preparation and updating of training manuals and army doctrine.
For further information on the RF and PF, see later in this chapter.

92. From Brown to CGS, dated 26 August 1971, Serial A194.

93. G. Lewy G America in Vietnam (New York, 1978), Chapter Three and pp. 182 - 184.

94. Three other territorial forces operated in the countryside: the Dan Ve or Peoples Self Defense Force (PSDF): the National Police: and the Revolutionary Development and Truong Son Cadre. T.C. Thayer, War Without Fronts: The American Experience in Vietnam (Colorado, 1985), pp. 155 - 156.
CORDS role was to achieve a more efficient management of the pacification programme through the reorganisation and unification of both the existing United States and South Vietnamese civilian and military organisations involved in the programme. For further information, see R.W. Komer, Bureaucracy at War: US Performance in the Vietnam War (Boulder, Colorado, 1986).

95. MACV, `Civil-Operations and Rural Development Support', The Vietnamese Village Handbook for Advisers (San Francisco, 1971), pp. 3 - 4.

96. T.C. Thayer, War Without Fronts, p. 166.
For military command and civil administration, South Vietnam was divided into four major geographical regions. Until

July 1970, these regions were known as Corps Tactical Areas. (see Map 2). In July 1970, their names were changed to Military Regions (MRs), that is, MR I, MR II, MR III and MR IV. For military purposes, they were also called Corps Tactical Zones (CTZs). G. Lewy, America in Vietnam (New York, 1978), p. 54.

97. In MR IV, between mid-1969 and mid-1970, there was an increase of 807 new RF/PF units. T.C. Thayer, War Without Fronts, p. 159.

98. ibid., p. 161.

99. Originally named the Bao An (Civil Guard), it was redesignated the RF in 1964.

100. Some RF units operated outside their provinces during the 1972 NVA/VC Easter Offensive, particularly in MR IV. When employed jointly with regular army units, the RF came under the operational control of the military commander.

101. T.C. Thayer, War Without Fronts, p. 160.

102. See Appendix One of this thesis.

103. Some RF battalions were first formed in 1969 to test the mobile operational capabilities of these units. This test was successful, and eventually 360 RF battalions were formed, each comprising three to five companies. They were usually employed in either combined operations with regular ARVN forces or as province reaction forces.

104. The PF, assigned to the District Chief, was under the operational control of the village chiefs. The PF were deployed only within the district from which they were recruited.

105. T.C. Thayer, War Without Fronts, p. 162.

106. The PF was directed primarily against enemy provincial and local force units through extensive patrolling, ambush and reaction operations, especially at night.

107. The weapons carried by most RF companies consisted of: 109 M-16s; nine M-79s: two M-60s: two mortars: and fourteen pistols.

108. H. Pappafloratos, `Military Lessons of the Vietnam War: A New Zealand Officer's Perspective' (unpublished Research Paper in International Politics, Victoria University of Wellington, 1978). The size of the sample used for this study was relatively small.

109. ibid., pp. 34 - 35.

110. This point is discussed in a number of publications, including: F. Fitzgerald, Fire in the Lake. The Vietnamese

and the Americans in Vietnam (Toronto, 1972); S.T. Hosmer, K. Kellen, and B.M. Jenkins, The Fall of South Vietnam: Statements by Vietnamese Military and Civilian Leaders (New York, 1980); and W.S. Thompson and D.D. Frizzell, The Lessons of Vietnam.

111. J.J. Clarke, US Army in Vietnam: Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965 - 1973 (Washington DC, 1988), p. 385.

112. ibid., p. 423.

113. US Department of Defense, The Southeast Asia Analysis Report, Office of the Assistant Secretary of Defense, (Systems Analysis). From 1968 - 1972, Leadership and ARVN Combatant Effectiveness, March 1970, pp. 21 - 27. Other corroborating reports are cited in T.C. Thayer, War Without Fronts, pp. 76 - 77.

114. T.C. Thayer (ed), A Systems Analysis of the Vietnam War: 1965 - 1972, vol. 7: The RVNAF (Washington DC, 1975), p. 158.

115. J.L. Collins, The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army: 1950 - 1972 (Washington DC, 1975), p. 75.

116. Saigon eventually established eight new training centres, two in each corps zone, for territorial forces.

117. R.A. Hunt and R.H. Schultz, Lessons from an Unconventional War: Reassessing US Strategies for Future Conflicts (New York, 1982), p. 102.

118. The `Territorial Forces Effectiveness System' reported more RF/PF casualties than some other data forms, such as the Southeast Asia Statistical Summary data as used by Thayer. T.C. Thayer War Without Fronts, p. 163.

119. T.C. Thayer, War Without Fronts, p. 258.

120. ibid., p. 164.

121. Artillery Support for RVNAF, Analysis Report (May - June 1970), p. 20, ibid.

122. This was reported by a RAND study, T.C. Thayer, A Systems Analysis of the Vietnam War, vol. 7, p. 93.

123. T.C. Thayer, War Without Fronts, p. 259.

124. MACV Measurements of Progress Reports, January 1969 - December 1971 and Where the Money Went, Southeast Asia Analysis Report, August - October 1971. pp. 32 - 34. Noted ibid., p. 168.

125. The NVA was never a significant threat in the IV Corps zone of the Mekong Delta, which remained an insurgency war until South Vietnam fell to the communists in 1975.

126. MACV Measurements of Progress Reports, January 1969 - December 1971 and `Where the Money Went', Southeast Asia Analysis Report, August - October 1971. pp. 32 - 34. Noted in T.C. Thayer, War Without Fronts, p. 166.

127. South Vietnam: New Zealand Military Training Assistance. Memo for Cabinet from Minister of Defence, dated 5 June 1970, 15/28/13, vol I.

128. Later, the South Vietnamese supported the concept of a separate New Zealand contribution.

129. From NZDLS to DCGS, dated 21 May 1970, 15/28/13, vol I.

130. For a further examination of this, see D. McCraw, `Reluctant Ally: New Zealand's Entry into the Vietnam War', The New Zealand Journal of History, vol. 15, no. 1 (April 1981), pp. 49 - 60; and D. McCraw, `The Demanding Alliance: New Zealand and the Escalation of the Vietnam War', The Australian Journal of Politics and History, vol. 34, no. 3 (1988), pp. 308 - 319.

131. For further information, see D. Dickens, `An Evaluation of Australian and New Zealand Army Joint Operations in South Vietnam, 1966 - 1971' (unpublished Research Essay in Public Administration, Victoria University, 1989).

132. The decision of the New Zealand Government to deploy a unit below battalion-sized strength was made against the advice of such senior officers as Lieutenant General Thornton, the CDS. Interview with Sir L.W. Thornton, dated 11 July 1989.

133. The New Zealand soldiers were professionals and were generally better motivated. Some conscripts no doubt wondered why they were fighting in Vietnam. For further information, see J.T. Henderson, `Vietnam: A View from Within.' Report on the Visit to Vietnam of Research Officer (History), March - April 1971', Defence Headquarters, June 1971, (unpublished), pp. 22 - 26 and pp. 57 - 61. See also, J.T. Henderson, `New Zealand's Vietnam Involvement.' Research Officer, History Interviews With Several New Zealand Army Officers Who Have Served in Vietnam, September - October 1969', (unpublished), pp. 52 - 59.

134. New Zealand Herald, `The ANZAC spirit was diluted in Vietnam', 20 December 1971.

135. J.T. Henderson, `New Zealand's Vietnam Involvement.'

136. This was because the officers generally had trained together and knew some of their counterparts.

137. J.T. Henderson, `New Zealand's Vietnam Involvement.'

138. ibid., p. 35.

139. To Major-General S.C. Graham, Army HQ Australia, from Webb, dated 8 June 1970, 15/28/13, vol I.

140. Thornton, Lt Gen, CDF to Minister of Defence, dated 14 April 1970, PM 478/4/28 Countries Series, vol 1. South Vietnam: Political Affairs, Training Assistance to RVNAF, 4.4.70 - 31.8.72, Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade (MFAT).

141. Interview with J.A. Mace, dated 13 July 1990. Mace was the Director of Infantry and SAS. He is now a former CDF.

142. I. McNeill, The Team, p. 217.

143. ibid.

144. ibid.

145. ibid.
Dong Tam, which meant `united hearts and minds', was located near My Tho in Dinh Tuong Province and much more accessible by road from Saigon than Nui Dat.
The intention of the Vietnamese was for allied spheres of influence to be roughly coincident with the Military Regions: MR I-American: MR II-Korean: and MR III-Australian and by implication New Zealand. However, New Zealand would eventually decide to be located in MR IV.

146. Chinh was highly regarded by Brigadier General S.L. McClelland, the MACV training director, and General C.W. Abrams, the commander of the US Military Assistance Command, Vietnam. J.J. Clarke, US Army in Vietnam, p. 378.

147. From Hassett to Fenton, dated 18 May 1970, 15/28/13 NZ Force in Vietnam: Training Assistance SVN Forces, vol II, September 1970 - December 1970, DCR.

148. ibid.

149. To Brigadier Hassett, from Lt-Col Fenton, dated 5 May 1970, 15/28/13, vol II.

150. Waikato Times, 14 May 1970, p. 4.

151. ibid.

152. ibid.

153. Defence Aid to South Vietnam: Community Relations. Saigon to RR Wellington, dated 1 June 1970, Def 23/4/9 Mutual Aid Programme to South Vietnam: Community Relations, vol III, February 1968 - April 1975, DCR.

154. Civic Action Programme: Phuoc Tuy Province. From D.G. McLean, Assistant Secretary (Policy) to: Mr Bolt, Ministry of Foreign Affairs: Mr Mullin, Ministry of Foreign Affairs: ASFR: ACDS: and DCGS, dated 20 May 1970, 15/28/13, vol I.

AS Policy was part of the Defence Division of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. This division was responsible for presenting the Ministry's viewpoint on various committees and working parties that existed to discuss defence policy. (Holyoake viewed defence matters as part of foreign affairs.)

155. Hitchings (Lt-Col D Plans) to DCGS, dated 9 July 1971, 15/28/13 NZ Forces in Vietnam: Training Assistance SVN Forces, vol III, December 1970 - May 1972, DCR. These steps by AGS were as a result of a directive from Thornton earlier that month. Training Assistance to be Offered by NZ to the RVNAF. CDS to AGS, dated 2 June 1970, 15/28/13, vol I.

156. `South Vietnam: New Zealand Military Training Assistance.' To Cabinet from Minister of Defence, dated 5 June 1970, CAB 222/3/2 Defence: South-East Asia, Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos 15-5-62 to 30-9-81, Cabinet Paper (CP).

157. ibid.

158. This was authorised on 8 June 1970. See Chapter Three of this thesis.

159. South Vietnam: New Zealand Military Training Assistance. To Cabinet from Minister of Defence, dated 5 June 1970, CAB 222/3/2.

160. Brooks, Secretary of Cabinet to Minister of Defence, dated 9 June 1970, 15/28/13, vol I. See also 5/3 Separates No 3: Briefs CGS visit to SE Asia June 1970, DCR.

161. New Zealand Herald, 17 June 1970.

162. Webb met with Vien on 17 June 1970. A report of his visit is in: Proposed NZ Army Assistance in Training RF/PF Junior Leaders at Cao Lanh Regional Force Training Center. Dated 24 June 1970, 15/28/13, vol I.
Vien assessed the effectiveness of the RF, in order of priority, as being MR IV, MR I, MR III, and lastly MR II.

163. CGS to CDS, dated 15 July 1970, 15/28/13, vol I.

164. They would have to respond to `fire brigade' tasks in Cambodia, watch over previous communist sanctuary areas on the Cambodian/South Vietnam border region, and would be used to reinforce I Corps, the most likely region where the NVA/VC had the capability to mount major operations. ibid.

165. For further information, see ibid. and; J.L. Collins The Development and Training of the South Vietnamese Army; and J.J. Clarke US Army in Vietnam.
There were a number of significant obstacles to effective training, which any training contribution from New Zealand would have to `combat', including not only poor leadership, particularly at the RF/PF training centres, but also poor quality training staff.

166. CGS to CDS, dated 15 July 1970, 15/28/13, vol I.
At the time that Webb was in Vietnam, there were sixty-six National Training Centres (NTCs) under the command of CTC.

167. ibid.

168. Cao Lanh RFTC, sited on the East bank of the Mekong River, about eight kilometres east of the city of Cao Lanh, had training centre had an official capacity of 4200 students. It was responsible for the training of RF, PF and the PSDF.
The training areas of Cao Lanh, although affected by the monsoon, were less subject to flooding than those downstream (Southeast) and therefore less restrictive. Webb considered that the terrain conditions adjacent to Cao Lanh would typify terrain problems as encountered by small unit teams in MR IV.
The JGS and MACV also supported Webb's recommendation.

169. Webb considered Chi Lang to be unsuitable because of its distance from Saigon.
Because of the sheltering hills which ran from Cambodia, Chi Lang was situated in an area long favoured by NVA and VC units moving south into the Delta area. During the dark, the NVA and VC could use the rice fields almost at will. Further, Chi Lang had been recently subjected to stand-off attacks by fire and ground probes.

170. CGS (Webb) to CDS, dated 15 July 1970, 15/28/13, vol I. See also, From Fenton to CGS. Proposed NZ Army Assistance in Training RF/PF Junior Leaders at Cao Lanh Regional Force Training Center, dated 24 June 1970, Report on Webb's visit, Serial A206.

171. CGS (Webb) to CDS, dated 15 July 1970, 15/28/13, vol I.

172. ibid.

173. ibid.

174. ibid.

175. T.R. Reese, Australia New Zealand and the United States: A Survey of International Relations, 1941 - 1968 (London, 1969), p. 49.

176. ibid.

177. ibid.
This served to have consequent effects on all aspects of defence spending.

178. A Cabinet meeting estimated the annual cost of maintaining a rifle company in Vietnam at approximately $1,100,000. CGS (Webb) to CDS, dated 15 July 1970, 15/28/13, vol I.
Added to this were $45,000 in non-recurring expenses to es-

tablish accommodation and so on. Withdrawing the New Zealand rifle company and also the 1 Service Medical Team from Bong Son by the end of 1971 from Vietnam would save an estimated $419,000 per year. ibid.

179. Dominion, 7 July 1970.

180. Marlborough Express, 14 July 1970.

181. New Zealand Herald, 25 May 1970. Graham was the Diplomatic Correspondent of this newspaper. At the time of writing this article, he was on his fifth tour of South Vietnam.

182. ibid.

183. New Zealand Herald, 17 June 1970.

184. ibid.

185. ibid.
Some newspaper editorials suggested that New Zealand could assist with the construction of essential services or provide financial or technical assistance.

186. ibid.

187. Dominion, 20 August 1970.

188. ibid.

189. New Zealand Herald, 20 August 1970.

190. Memo from Office of Minister of Defence to Cabinet, dated 24 August 1970, 15/28/13, vol I.
The proposition was accepted by the New Zealand Army in July 1970. To assist with planning, photographs and a sketch of the advisory team compound at Cao Lanh showing the requirement for barrack accommodation had been sent to New Zealand in late July 1970.

191. NZDEF to NZ V Force, dated 27 August 1970, 15/28/13, vol I.

192. The JWP was in South Vietnam from 17 September until 21 October 1970.
The members were: Brown, the Commander of NZ V Force and leader of the JWP: Lieutenant Colonel J.R. Mace, the Director of Infantry and SAS, Major D.A. Ogilvy, the commander (designate) of the training team: and Major R.K. Rutherford, the Assistant Director of Works.
Mace, the AGS project co-ordinating officer for the training team project, was responsible for solving any logistical and administrative problems in the establishment of a training team at a suitable location.
Aside the engineer aspects of establishing a training team, Rutherford was to assess the need for civic aid projects in

the area where the training team would be established. Minutes of the Meeting of the Defence Council, held on 15 September 1970, Def 57/3/3, vol III.

193. ibid.

194. Interview with J.A. Mace.

195. ibid.

196. To Laking from Thornton, Def 23/4/1 Mutual Aid Programme to South Vietnam, General vol 5, January 1969 - October 1970, DCR.

197. Interview with J.A. Mace.

198. Lam Son training centre was about 320 Km from Saigon in Khanh Hoa Province, the capital of which was Nha Trang. Lam Son was in a relatively secure area and had a good variety of training terrain. It was also on the RNZAF route to the New Zealand medical teams at Bong Son and Qui Nhon.

199. From NEWZAEM to DCGS, dated 29 September 1970, 15/28/13, vol II.

200. Interview with J.A. Mace.

201. Interview with J.A. Mace.

202. Webb noted in November 1970 that the Vietnamese had stated a "very strong preference" for New Zealand to be represented in Chi Lang," Minutes of the Vietnamese/NZ Training Project. Meeting Held in Colonel Nhans Office 0900, Friday 16 October 1970 Major Brosnan to HQ NZ V Force, 15/28/13, vol II.

203. Interview with J.A. Mace. The JWP later learnt that the suggestion of Lam Son was made as a result of a misunderstanding between CTC and Vien.
Webb discounted Lam Son because it would be difficult to maintain a national identity and a bi-national relationship with the Vietnamese without complications induced by the strong American and Korean presence in the area. However, he would entertain a change of location only if strong pressure came from CTC and the JGS. ibid.

204. Proposed NZ Training Team. New Zealand Working Party Report to CDS. Dated 20 October 1970, 15/28/13, vol II.

205. Interview with J.A. Mace.

206. A signal from HQ NZ V FORCE to Wellington noted: "We are in no doubt that General Chinh and his staff wish us to stay in Chi Lang." HQ NZ V Force to NZDEF (ARMY), dated 14 October 1970, 15/28/13, vol II.

207. Proposed NZ Training Team. New Zealand Working Party

Report to CDS. Dated 20 October 1970, 15/28/13, vol II.

208. ibid.

209. Day was an infantryman, aged forty-six years, who had served with the 21st ARVN Division as a battalion and regimental commander since 1957. Van had spent eight years with ARVN Ranger units and was a Kota Tinggi graduate. The Far East Land Forces Training Centre was located at Kota Tinggi, in Eastern Johore, where such skills as jungle warfare were taught.

210. A.R. Isaacs, Without Honour: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia (London, 1983), p. 88.

211. The intended improvements would give the NTC a student capacity of 10,700, and a total camp population of 13,000.

212. The U.S. advisory team, comprised nineteen senior officers, was located within the NTC. However, the headquarters and its facilities was very sophisticated. There were also fourteen attached personnel, mainly signals personnel and `Bird Dog' (a small reconnaissance and observation aircraft) crews.

213. The correct name of Tu Te was Ap Voi Hai hamlet. A village was a collection of small hamlets or towns.

214. J.T. Henderson, `Vietnam: A View from Within', pp. 101 - 111.

215. Interview with W.S. Vautier, dated 19 August 1990. Vautier was an instructor in the general subjects committee.

216. The team's training areas were one hour's travel from Chi Lang, situated close to the Seven Mountains.

217. Proposed NZ Training Team. New Zealand Working Party Report to CDS. Dated 20 October 1970, 15/28/13, vol II.

218. NZDEF (ARMY) to HQ NZ V FORCE, dated 6 October 1970, 15/28/13, vol II.

219. Webb's attitude towards the security situation at Chi Lang had changed. He noted that although Chi Lang could be rocketed, mortared or even attacked by enemy ground forces, "this of course would apply in any of the training centres in South Vietnam." Webb to CDS, dated 6 November 1970, 15/28/13, vol II.

220. HQ NZ V FORCE to NZDEF (ARMY WGTN), dated 5 October 1970, 15/28/13, vol II.

221. The Seven Mountains was one of the major bases of the 1st NVA Division, whose primary task was to screen and protect communist units moving along the infiltration corridor on the western side of the mountains, and to harass

the South Vietnamese throughout the region.
Fire support bases were being established by the ARVN on the high ground overlooking Chi Lang. Operations were being conducted by the 9th ARVN Division, the 4th ARVN Armoured Brigade and Special Forces units in the mountainous region.

222. HQ NZ V Force was to arrange for surplus equipment from the withdrawing `W' Company to be sent to Chi Lang, to help make up any deficiencies that 1NZATTV might have.

223. There were two main means of access to the training centre; by air using Caribou aircraft, helicopters and, under good conditions, C-123s. Secondly, by road, although the poor road conditions and the security situation limited its viability.

224. The small, metal plated runway at Chi Lang unsuitable for a Bristol Freighter. Thus, supplies for the team had to be moved by either U.S. aircraft or by road. Proposed NZ Training Team. New Zealand Working Party Report to CDS. Dated 20 October 1970, 15/28/13, vol II.
Can Tho, headquarters for IV Corps, was the largest city of the Delta and the fourth largest city in South Vietnam with a population of over 100,000 inhabitants.

225. The primary reason for this was that the sharing of a mess could cause mutual embarrassment because of the differences in Vietnamese and New Zealand salaries. Any suggestion that the students of the New Zealand wing would receive better facilities than other students at the Centre would also cause problems. Proposed NZ Training Team. New Zealand Working Party Report to CDS. Dated 20 October 1970, 15/28/13, vol II. See also Minutes of the Vietnamese/NZ Training Project. Meeting Held in Colonel Nhan's Office 0900, Friday 16 October 1970. Major Brosnan to HQ NZ V Force, ibid.
New Zealand was responsible for providing accommodation, rations, vehicles and items of personal equipment. All other items of supply, maintenance, and building the wing's headquarters, were the responsibility of the Vietnamese. Draft plans for the New Zealand compound are located in: Proposed NZ Training Team. New Zealand Working Party Report to CDS. Dated 20 October 1970, 15/28/13, vol II.

226. Visitors Brief, 1NZATTV - Chi Lang. Queen Elizabeth II Army Memorial Museum, Box 18, I 17.

227. The team was to be located on the eastern side of the Centre's airfield, That Jon. The teams location was on lower ground than the remainder of Chi Lang. The Engineers Report of Chi Lang, dated 20 October 1970, is located in 15/28/13, vol III.

228. There were just over 500 South Vietnamese staff at Chi Lang.
The total number of Vietnamese attached to 1NZATTV was thirty-two, excluding the demonstration platoon. Visitors

Brief, 1NZATTV - Chi Lang. Queen Elizabeth II Army Memorial Museum, Box 18, I 17.

229. `Polwar' or political warfare as employed by the RVNAF, encompassed political indoctrination, motivation, troop information and education, public information, psychological warfare, civic action, social welfare, security and chaplains activities.

230. From Col Brown to CGS, dated 26 August 1971, 15/28/13, vol II.

231. Nhan had stated that the greatest need was for a RF/PF officers course.
Each course was of five weeks duration, with a nine to ten-day interval between courses, a total of eight courses a year. The number of students was to be built up to about 1,000 students during the first year.

232. New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, vol. XX, no. 11 (November 1970).

233. Proposed NZ Training Team. New Zealand Working Party Report to CDS. Dated 20 October 1970, 15/28/13, vol II.

234. A section in the New Zealand Army was equivalent to a seven to ten man U.S. squad.
To encourage attendance on the RF Platoon leadership course, the Vietnamese intended to exempt successful students from having to attend the company commanders course.

235. The New Zealand Army had a very similar system of training, except that it used the term `wing', for example weapons wing, rather than `committee'.

236. The commander of 1NZATTV was to have over-riding powers in relation to the syllabus content and any changes, methods of instruction and allocation of all staff to tasks for the initial period. At his discretion he was to progressively hand over these responsibilities to the Vietnamese. Minutes of the Vietnamese/NZ Training Project. Meeting Held in Colonel Nhan's Office 0900, Friday 16 October 1970 Major Brosnan to HQ NZ V Force, 15/28/13, vol II.

237. ibid.

238. A student was tested in every subject taught, either by written or practical tests. In order for the student to qualify he was to gain sixty percent or better in all subjects.

239. `Training of Regional and Popular Force troops in the Republic of Vietnam.' Capt T.N. Culley to Doctor of Infantry and SAS, dated 3 September 1970, 15/28/13, vol II.

240. ibid.

241. A report written by Sergeant F.D. Barclay, from 4 Troop SAS, after an attachment to a 1ATF MATT at Van Kiep, in 1969 for six weeks, highlight the need for senior NCOs. `Training of Regional and Popular Force troops in the Republic of Vietnam.' Capt T.N. Culley to Doctor of Infantry and SAS, dated 3 September 1970, 15/28/13, vol II.

242. Minutes of the Vietnamese/NZ Training Project. Meeting Held in Colonel Nhan's Office 0900, Friday 16 October 1970 Major Brosnan to HQ NZ V Force, 15/28/13, vol II.

243. ibid.

244. Interview with J.A. Mace.

245. Proposed NZ Training Team. New Zealand Working Party Report to CDS, dated 20 October 1970, 15/28/13, vol II.

246. ibid.

247. To CDS from Webb (CGS), dated 17 September 1970, PM 478/4/28, vol I.

248. ibid.

249. Proposed NZ Training Team. New Zealand Working Party Report to CDS. Dated 20 October 1970, 15/28/13, vol II.

250. Interview with J.A. Mace.

251. Ogilvy had considerable say in the selection of team members.

252. Later, the period for the team members would be reduced.

253. It was apparent throughout the negotiations that the Vietnamese were familiar with many of the points raised by the JWP, perhaps reflecting their experience with the establishment of the JWTC in Phuoc Tuy.

254. HQ NZ V FORCE to NZDEF (ARMY WELLINGTON), dated 5 October 1970, 15/28/13, vol II.
The Australian Army provided language training for its soldiers posted to Vietnam.

255. Training of Regional and Popular Force troops in the Republic of Vietnam. Capt T.N. Culley to Director of Infantry and SAS, dated 3 September 1970, 15/28/13, vol II.

256. NZDEF Army to NZ V Force, dated 17 June 1970, 15/28/13, vol I.

257. Minutes of the Meeting of the Defence Council, held on 15 September 1970, Def 57/3/3, vol III.

258. Proposed NZ Training Team. New Zealand Working Party

Report to CDS, dated 20 October 1970, 15/28/13, vol II. Despite the advice given, the proportion of American advisers who received extensive Vietnamese language training was low. In one study, only nine percent of the officers and four percent of enlisted men received extensive Vietnamese language training, and most attended Vietnamese language courses of only two to twelve weeks in duration. T.C. Thayer, A Systems Analysis View of the Vietnam War, vol. 7, p. 234.

259. Proposed NZ Training Team. New Zealand Working Party Report to CDS, dated 20 October 1970, 15/28/13, vol II.

260. The course provided a limited spoken acquaintance with the language, particularly for United States Agency for International Development (USAID)/CORDS personnel. Those requiring greater knowledge undertook language training in America prior to being posted to Vietnam.

261. A similar course, conducted in mid-1970, was attended by a Medical Service team member. However, he felt that the course was very limited. HQ NZ V Force to NZDEF Army, dated 090748Z July 1970, 15/28/13, vol I.

262. After several months spent in Vietnam brushing up on pronunciation, they became reasonably fluent in the language.

263. J.T. Henderson, `Vietnam: A View from Within', p. 43.

264. The instructors who attended were: WO1 B. Robinson, WOII T.C.R. Scott and Sgt G. Carmichael.
This course was conducted from March to May 1971.

265. NZDEF ARMY (Fenton) to HQ NZ V Force, dated 16 November 1970, 15/28/13, vol II.

266. New Zealand Herald, 14 November 1970.

267. The Press, 25 January 1971.

CHAPTER THREE

THE PROVISION OF NEW ZEALAND MILITARY PERSONNEL TO THE AUSTRALIAN ARMY TRAINING TEAMS.

Chapter three discusses the reasons behind the decision in 1970 of the New Zealand Government to second four New Zealanders, and later a group of similar size, to the Australian Army Training Team, Vietnam hereafter (AATTV) and the activities these personnel were involved in.[1] This discussion, following on from that in chapter two, will require the examination of the following related topics: the training undertaken by the selected New Zealand personnel in preparation for their tasks in Vietnam; the training programmes that the New Zealanders were involved in; the types of students the New Zealanders were involved in training; the extent to which the performance of the South Vietnamese units trained was improved; the consequences of the reduction in the number of AATTV Mobile Advisory and Training Teams (hereafter MATTs) in South Vietnam; the effectiveness of the Night Operations Training Teams (hereafter NOTT) and Night Operations Advisory Teams (hereafter NOAT); and the problems associated with preparing the South Vietnamese to assume responsibility from the AATTV for their own training.

In a memorandum to Cabinet in early June 1970, D.S. Thomson, the Minister of Defence, recommended that Cabinet approve several "limited and exploratory steps" towards New Zealand's involvement in the Australian training teams.[2] These steps were intended to demonstrate New Zealand's interest in offering assistance towards the training of South Vietnamese personnel. The memorandum made four recommendations: Firstly, that in principle one Officer and four Warrant Officers (hereafter WO) be provided for an initial training project, in association with the Australians, in Phuoc Tuy province. Secondly, that the

minister be authorised to send these five men to Australia for preliminary training. Thirdly, that Cabinet authorise him to approve, subject to further discussions with the Australians about the terms and conditions of service, the dispatch of the men to Vietnam after their training. As it was understood by Thomson that Central Training Command (hereafter CTC) had shown "considerable enthusiasm" for a joint Vietnamese/Australian school as detailed above, "it may be supposed that they would also welcome the establishment of a joint Vietnamese/New Zealand school."[3] It was also recommended that approval be given to Lieutenant General R.J.H. Webb, the Chief of General Staff, to have further discussions, without commitment, on the possibilities of the establishment of a specifically New Zealand training programme in South Vietnam. This programme would not be established until the first New Zealand infantry company was withdrawn from South Vietnam.

However, before any such proposals of long term assistance could be placed before the New Zealand Government, a full appreciation of the military requirements, the security problems, costs and the political implications needed to be discussed with the South Vietnamese military authorities, the United States (hereafter U.S.) Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (hereafter MACV), and also with the New Zealand Ambassador to South Vietnam. The National Government also needed to know what the Australian Government's long term intentions were towards its training commitment to South Vietnam.

By mid-1970, the Australians planned to expand their training assistance to the South Vietnamese through three means, all of which were dependent upon South Vietnamese Army administration and logistic support. These were expected to be phased in with the planned withdrawal of the first Australian units in November 1970. Firstly, Australian liaison elements were to be built up at the province and district levels to about twenty-five Officers

and WOs. Secondly, twelve MATTs were to be formed, each comprising two WOs and four junior NonCommissioned Officers (hereafter NCOs), and would be deployed with Regular Force (hereafter RF) companies throughout Phuoc Tuy. Thirdly, a RF/Popular Forces (hereafter PF) Junior Leaders Training Centre was to be formed at Nui Dat, in conjunction with the South Vietnamese Army. This centre, which was to have an Australian training element of twenty to twenty-five personnel, would aim at training 400 to 500 students on each six-week course.[4]

Thomson's memorandum noted that the five New Zealand personnel could be dispatched to South Vietnam without exceeding the existing manpower ceiling.[5] Although it was hoped that the servicemen could have been recruited from those already in Vietnam, that is, the infantry companies, there were no servicemen that could be spared. To obtain such senior people with the necessary experience meant that they would have to come from New Zealand. On 8 June 1970, Cabinet approved, in principle, the above proposals.[6]

Cabinet imposed geographical restrictions upon the placement of team members; the New Zealanders were to be restricted to employment in Phuoc Tuy province only. However, Lieutenant Colonel A.J.A. Cooper, the New Zealand Liaison Officer in Canberra, wrote to Brigadier R.P.D. Hassett, the Deputy Chief of General Staff (hereafter DCGS), expressing his concern over these restrictions. His concern was based upon three main reasons. Firstly, if this restriction was retained, the New Zealand members would, "knowing some Australians propensity for cutting remarks...have to endure disparaging comments about national standards of courage."[7] Secondly, New Zealand's national image would look bad in the eyes of the US and South Vietnamese, in comparison with that of Australia. The type of training assistance being predominantly carried out by the Australians was geographically spread throughout South Vietnam's four Military Regions. Cooper recommended that a

dispersion of effort, rather than a geographical concentration of a small number of personnel, would be much more profitable in enhancing the national image of New Zealand. Thirdly, he noted the need for New Zealand to have an identifiable national contribution, which would hardly be likely if the New Zealanders were to stay in Phuoc Tuy, overshadowed by the Australians.

Hassett, as well as the Australians, concurred with this point of view. In a letter to D.G. McLean, the Assistant Secretary of Policy, he wrote that the Australians had commented that a one year tour spent solely with the RF and PF would be an extremely hazardous and arduous tour.[8] As such: "it would now seem further more that it would be unfortunate to have a disassociated New Zealand element operating under a set of rules which are significantly different from the remainder of AATTV."[9] He noted that Military Regions (hereafter MR) III and IV could also be included, as New Zealand soldiers were already serving with the 1st Australian Task Force (hereafter 1ATF). He also said that it was expected that a further New Zealand training team would probably be stationed at Can Lanh. The Australians had pointed out that the New Zealand geographical limitation to Phuoc Tuy would mean that the Commander of AATTV would have no flexibility in posting the New Zealand element to other areas of employment. The ability to do so would give them a respite from RF/PF duties and also give them training experience in other fields.

In October, Thomson publicly announced that New Zealand was sending a team of one Officer and four NCO's to South Vietnam to work with the AATTV.[10] They would not operate as a single unit, but would be posted to separate training and advisory appointments with RF and PF units. The New Zealand personnel of AATTV were restricted to MRs III and IV and were not allowed to be within five kilometres of the Cambodian border. Thomson stated that the reason for the

New Zealanders joining the Australians was so New Zealand could benefit from the "Australian experience in making its first contribution in this exacting and important role."[11]

As there was a strong feeling in the government that New Zealand should attempt to develop its own identity in this `new phase' of the war, some editorialists considered that this announcement was only the first step towards the establishment of a New Zealand training team, operating independently from the Australians. An editorial in the Auckland Star reported that one possibility that was under `active consideration', was the establishment of a New Zealand training team to work by itself in another province, possibly in one of the Mekong Delta provinces southwest of Saigon.[12] The editor commented that an independent training establishment, a view supported by a number of editorials, "would also strengthen the overall impact of New Zealand's effort."[13]

Lieutenant Colonel V.B. Brown, the Commander of NZ (hereafter NZ) V Force, was informed of the arrangements that had been made for the operational control of the New Zealanders attached to the AATTV.[14] The New Zealand team members were under the operational control of the Commanding Officer (hereafter CO) AATTV for deployment and employment as he directed.

The quality of the New Zealanders posted to the AATTV was very high, with the majority of these men having seen active service in Borneo, Malaya and in one of the infantry companies in South Vietnam.[15] A posting to AATTV, for many New Zealand career soldiers, was seen as, recalls Mountfort, one of the New Zealanders sent to work with the AATTV, "a last chance to serve in Vietnam, a chance to participate in a worthwhile venture."[16] There was no question that the Australian training team was an elite unit, for example, it was the only unit that had won Victoria Crosses in Vietnam.

During a visit to New Zealand, Brigadier G.D. Solomon, Director of Military Training in the Australian Army, had informed Army General Staff (hereafter AGS) that prior to acceptance, each New Zealander nominated to serve with the AATTV was required to attend and pass several courses in Australia. This was in order that the five New Zealanders would be trained at least to the same minimum standard as Australian personnel nominated to serve with AATTV.[17] Solomon informed AGS that vacancies for these five were available on the next series of courses, which were to be conducted in the second half of 1970.

An important concern for the New Zealand government was financial cost. The New Zealand government would have to pay about $(NZ)4,900 for each New Zealanders to attend the courses, which covered travel between each of the three training centres, allowances and tuition fees.[18] As some consolation, Australian Army officials had agreed that the New Zealand Army would not have to pay for the training. The training, and any charges associated, at the United States Army, Vietnam (USARV) Advisors school would be paid for by Australia and recovered on a per capita basis from New Zealand. Thomson, the Minister of Defence, however, hoped that the costs could be reduced "in view of the Australian desire to have New Zealand participation".[19]

Although it had not been intended that New Zealand's participation with AATTV would continue after about one year, the Australians suggested in early October that the New Zealand presence in AATTV could be extended beyond the anticipated period. Cooper noted that if the Cao Lanh project did not allow for operational involvement outside the training establishment, "there could well be value in continuing to send New Zealand personnel to AATTV, perhaps even for periods of less than twelve months."[20] As such, in an attempt to eliminate the added expense that would be incurred as a result of replacement personnel having to attend the same courses in Australia, a New Zealand Army

Officer, Captain N. Turner, also attended with the five New Zealanders. His role was to investigate the feasibility of the New Zealand Army conducting their own courses for personnel who might replace the five New Zealanders. However, Turner's experience was in fact not used, due to problems that are examined later in this chapter. When he returned to New Zealand from Australia, he was posted to the 1st Battalion Depot, although he was used as one of the instructors on the later course for 1st New Zealand Army Training Team, Vietnam (hereafter 1NZATTV) personnel.[21]

The New Zealanders along with sixty Australians attended three courses in Australia.[22] The first was a Tropical Advisor's course at the Jungle Training Centre at Canungra, which concentrated upon the specialist training related to assistance to the RF and PF units. It covered such topics as minor tactics, AATTV training team methods, the environment that team members were likely to find themselves working in, practical skills, and the size and distribution of South Vietnamese forces in Phuoc Tuy Province.[23] The next course was a AATTV Weapons course at the School of Infantry, at Ingleburn, New South Wales, which familiarised personnel with the types of weapons that the RF/PF soldiers might use. The third course was a basic Vietnamese colloquial language course, which was conducted at the Australian Intelligence Centre, outside Adelaide.[24]

Some of the New Zealanders found the military courses to be useful as refreshers, and several achieved very good results, but these courses were generally too limited to be of instructional use. Mountfort recalls that some of the skills taught were of little relevance "there were some good practical lessons, e.g. how to make concrete."[25] The introduction to the AATTV and the methodology instruction was certainly worthwhile. The language course certainly taught the New Zealanders worthwhile skills: "It gave me a smattering of very basic conversation. It was something that I could build upon, although when in Vietnam it was

easy for me to be lazy, because I just used my interpreters. Also, as many of the South Vietnamese wanted to practise their English with us, it was relatively easy to use English rather than Vietnamese as the medium."[26] Most of the New Zealanders demonstrated very good potential as future members of AATTV. Caskey achieved the second highest results out of a class of forty during the colloquial language course.[27]

The speed at which arrangements were made meant that the five New Zealanders knew very little about their intended employment in South Vietnam, and received any such information only gradually. They were given only a "limited amount of information before their departure to Australia", and were told that they would be told more at a later stage.[28] Most of them were "very annoyed" at this constant lack of information. It was only a week before the New Zealanders completed their last course that they were told that they would be returning to New Zealand and then travel to South Vietnam at a later date.[29]

Deployment to the AATTV

The five New Zealanders arrived in Saigon on 19 October 1970.[30] The New Zealanders stayed only about twenty-four hours in Saigon. They were given "mountains of gear. I could not carry the gear that I had been issued."[31] They were then fully briefed by V.B. Brown, who informed them that the duties of the AATTV detachments they were initially posted to included the training of RF, PF and Peoples Self Defence Force (hereafter PSDF) units in the province.[32]

They were then informed of where they were being posted to. Mountfort was posted to the Jungle Warfare Training Centre (hereafter JWTC) at Nui Dat. The JWTC initially concentrated on training RF platoon commanders, but pressure from Phuoc Tuy province forced the JWTC to diversify into

also conducting PF and PSDF courses. The role of the JWTC was to train junior Officers, namely platoon commanders of the RF, and the centre was capable of training 400 to 500 students at a time by a staff of about forty Australians. Mountfort was in charge of basic training and his role was to set up a training programme, conduct a pilot course and to work alongside the Vietnamese staff who would eventually conduct the training.[33] Commenting later on his posting to Nui Dat, he considered, "I wasn't too enthusiastic at being back at Nui Dat. I had wanted to see something different for a change."[34] Problems had developed at the JWTC even before the commencement of the first course.

The attitude of the majority of the Vietnamese staff to their job was less than helpful: "it seemed to me", said Mountfort, "that they were not the slightest bit interested in making the centre work. They were "just interested in their pay packets and getting back to Saigon as often as they could. It was just a constant battle to get them to turn up on time or to commit themselves to anything, for example take a patrol or do anything that was practical"[35] In one instance Mountfort and two other Australian staff set up a jungle training lane, "hacking our way up between Nui Dat 1 and Nui Dat 2 by ourselves, without any escorts keeping guard..."[36]

Despite all preparations for the first course being completed on time, the Australians at the JWTC were to encounter the same frustrating problems that had beset the New Zealanders at Chi Lang.[37] Some of the Vietnamese staff were very lazy, and would not complete tasks unless they were stood over by the Australians. There was a tendency for the Vietnamese instructors to skip through periods in a fraction of the normal time so extra rest could be taken by both the instructors and the students. One typical example was a lesson on patrolling and navigation that was scheduled to take three forty minute lessons. The Vietnamese instructor covered both subjects in thirty-two minutes,

because he felt that the students "looked tired", although the lesson plans had been prepared by the Australians, and had been accepted by the Vietnamese training staff as being necessary and important.[38] The Vietnamese instructors also lacked all-round training, and were inclined to be specialised in only one subject, which was perhaps due to the American- style training they had received themselves.

The Vietnamese staff also lacked discipline and on many occasions they displayed an insolent manner and refused to obey the orders of the Australian and New Zealand staff. They were also arrogant in their dealings with the staff. The extent to which this affected the instruction was commented on by Lieutenant Colonel J.W. Sullivan, the JWTC's Chief Instructor: "if some action is not taken to remove these men from the centre I'm afraid we are not going to achieve much in the coming months."[39]

The lack of interpreters proved to be a continuing problem, despite the ongoing attempts by CTC to post English-speaking Officers to the Centre. The Australians had to take the first course without any interpreters.

Most of the minor problems were eventually eliminated.[40] There were, however, major problems which were never satisfactorily dealt with. Many of the students, particularly the officers, did not regard silence in the jungle as being important, a problem that was widespread in the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (hereafter ARVN) and also in the territorial forces. The students often talked loudly when on exercises, which was a serious training weakness. Secondly, the students demonstrated an apathetic attitude during the courses. This was to some extent due to their war weariness, as some of the students had been fighting for several years.[41] The first course began one week after the intended commencement date, due to a lack of students. Sullivan noted that although the level to which

they were teaching the students might seem too low, among the students there was a "we've done it all before" attitude."[42] However, the student practises usually revealed there was an "abysmal lack of even the rudiments of military knowledge", said Mountfort.[43] This may have also been due to the Vietnamese being contemptuous of these outsiders who had come in to order them around, especially if they had more combat experience themselves. The next course to be conducted was for NCOs. Of these students, Mountfort, said: "I remember vividly thinking, what a fine bunch of men they were. They were really very impressive...I wondered how much we could actually teach them at that stage, but we did."[44]

Despite this, some courses were successful. Two such courses were conducted in June/July 1971. It was stated that the students on the Officers' course were a "noticeable improvement" on previous courses.[45] The average age of the students was lower than in previous courses and they appeared to be more interested in the instruction, as "note-taking is a popular practice."[46] Further, the questions that the students asked "appeared to be based upon the desire to seek clarification of a point rather than being attempts to highlight suspected weaknesses in the instructors."[47] Even the Vietnamese instructors were now producing satisfactory results.

The Vietnamese attitude towards rank was also a problem. For them, rank was all that mattered, rather than expertise. The aspirant instructors never questioned the students who had more rank than them. Consequently, as Sullivan stated, "much of what is said at times is absolute rubbish."[48] The only time that they were questioned was if one of the Committee chiefs, who were Captains, took a lesson. However, it was rare for one of the Captains to observe a lesson as there were only three of them.[49]

The numbers and ability level of students varied over courses. Sometimes the large numbers of students on a course meant that there were sometimes problems obtaining sufficient equipment and training areas, a trend which was to increase while the JWTC was in operation. On some courses, the students displayed a wide range of ability which made for difficulties in not only teaching, but also maintaining the interest of the students. In December 1971, physical training was introduced into the training programme at the JWTC, because the students were found to be generally physically unfit, which resulted in poor performances by some students on the operational phases of the course. The practice of using vehicles to transport the students was reduced and they were required to walk to their different classes.

One of the "grave weaknesses" confronting the success of the AATTV programme at the JWTC was the performance of the Commandant, Lieutenant Colonel Kim, reported to have been an officer of some reputation.[50] However, the Australians found the opposite, one report stated that "he is incompetent in every possible aspect of command."[51] He was not liked by the other Vietnamese Officers at the Centre, because he displayed favoritism among the Vietnamese Officers, and "even the lazy officers...said that he was lazy."[52] This laziness was infectious. He had continuously shown no enthusiasm for his job and had observed only three lessons. Sullivan's report noted many other of Kim's shortcomings. Despite this, it was very difficult to have Kim replaced. Sullivan insisted that, "confidential steps should be taken to remove him. I say confidential because if he gets the slightest hint that I have initiated such action, my value at the centre would end immediately."[53] After a few months, this situation was eased somewhat with the replacement of some of the Vietnamese instructors. However, before this had happened, Mountfort was posted to Dong Tam.[54]

The security of the JWTC was also to remain a problem. The 946th RF Company was responsible for the security and defence of the perimeter, although units from the 1ATF sometimes also patrolled the perimeter. However, the members of the AATTV had little confidence in the alertness of this and later RF companies. Reliance upon the South Vietnamese for security was "a little bit of an act of faith" by the JWTC staff.[55] It was claimed by Mountfort that this company was about "as sophisticated in their protection of us as their cooking facilities were. Fortunately, we were never attacked or threatened."[56] All their cooking was done on a large wok that was supported over the trunks of two trees.

Mountfort had settled into his job, and he "enjoyed the environment and the personal relationships with the Vietnamese and the others at the JWTC." However, in late 1970, he requested to be posted elsewhere, feeling that he was "wasting his time at the JWTC. I wanted to do something worthwhile whilst I remained in South Vietnam."[57]

The other New Zealanders were occupied in very different roles from that of Mountfort. They were posted to Australian MATTs in Phuoc Tuy province as follows: J.J. Cootes was the team 2IC with MATT 7, training 3/15 RF Group Headquarters and 771st RF Company at Ong Trinh, in Long Le District. T. Cameron was a member of MATT 12, based at Tam Phuoc Long Dien District, training the 576th RF Company. B.G. Roe was 2IC of MATT 3, based at Long Hai Ap Suoi Ngha, involved with training the 302nd RF Battalion. J.A. Baird was the team leader of MATT 1, in Binh Ba Duc, Thanh District, training the 655th RF Company.[58]

Following the announcement by John Gorton, the Australian Prime Minister that 1ATF would be gradually withdrawn from Phuoc Tuy, AATTV had begun to raise a total of twelve MATTs. These MATTs were to be deployed throughout Phuoc Tuy province to train RF and PF units.[59] As well as

attending the three preparatory courses in Australia before being posted to AATTV, the Australians posted to the MATTs also attended an eighteen-day US Army Advisers course at Di An. By September 1970, the twelve MATTs had been established. By December 1970, at the request of Lieutenant General Do Cao Tri, the Commanding General of III Corps, two additional MATTs were created.

Each MATT consisted of six personnel: two WOs, four corporals (two infantrymen, one engineer and one medical orderly), and a Vietnamese interpreter.[60] The tasks of the two infantrymen were to provide assistance to the two WO in the major instructional tasks, including such infantry-type subjects as patrolling, general infantry minor tactics, and ambushing. The engineer provided instruction and advice on engineer-type subjects, such as field defences, civic actions, and the laying and lifting of enemy mines and booby traps.[61] The MATTs tried to improve the defences of the RF compounds through teaching such subjects as how to fill and stack sandbags, using the Claymore, and how to erect barbed wire and build bunkers. The medical orderly enabled each MATT to provide medical instruction and assistance, not only to the territorial force units, but also medical and hygiene assistance to the villagers as part of the civic action programme.

The Australians had decided to have six men per MATT for two main reasons. First, if some of the members of a MATT went on leave, then there were enough team members left to provide for their for own protection. Secondly, the larger numbers of personnel in a MATT meant there was less strain upon the members in providing such a range of diverse tasks. Each MATT had to have enough personnel to be able to accompany two patrols or ambushes from one unit.[62] This latter task had become increasingly important where RF companies worked in areas adjacent to or as part of 1ATF operations.[63]

It soon became evident that it was not only dangerous to deploy a MATT without an interpreter, but that it was necessary for each MATT to have at least two interpreters.[64] The Australians learnt that one interpreter limited a team to one training or operational activity at a time, which did not permit the full utilisation of the personnel in each MATT. The necessity for two interpreters was because each one was entitled to a certain number of `stand down' (holidays). Frequently, an interpreter attached to a MATT decided to take his leave during the most critical periods, for example when an operation into the Long-Hai region was begun at short notice. It was discovered there was a requirement for at least three interpreters with the MATT that operated with an RF battalion simply due to the size of the battalion.[65] However, some MATTs experienced difficulties in gaining even one interpreter.

Initially the employment of the MATTs was directed primarily at the RF, and secondly to PF and PSDF units.[66] Each MATT was assigned to train a particular RF/PF unit and this generally took one month to complete. The MATT was then assigned to another unit and the procedure was repeated. On occasions the MATT would return to a unit it had previously trained to assess the performance of the unit and to provide assistance if and where necessary. Sometimes such visits lasted less than one week.[67] The MATTs spent the majority of their time on operations with RF companies and PF platoons, with the basis of their advisory effort spent on `on-the-job' training. The MATTs found that the RF units required assistance with the elementary aspects of battle procedure and other techniques that were essential as part of the success of any operation.[68] During late 1970 and early 1971, the activity of the MATTs became directed primarily at the PF. Major K. Phillips, Senior Australian Adviser, Phuoc Tuy Province, reported in January 1971: "This is not before time as the PF have for some time been the forgotten group in the territorial force structure in Phuoc Tuy."[69]

The involvement by the MATTs in PSDF training was limited.[70] During February and March 1971, the main type of training undertaken by MATT 14 was with the PSDF in Phuoc Tuy.[71] The PSDF personnel were taught such skills as basic inter-team leadership training; weapon handling, political warfare, logistics, village and hamlet defences, first aid, ambushing and patrolling, and how to use a radio.[72] There were also attempts made through some of the districts for a programme of night firing exercises, as well as initial and continuation training. In April 1971, a major programme was launched in Phuoc Tuy province to improve the leadership and general standard of the PSDF, with some training conducted at the JWTC. This was because AATTV had discovered that the standards of training of PSDF units varied greatly and because of the increasingly crucial role that the PSDF was playing in the pacification of the province. There was some limited training given to PF units in working and operating with the PSDF. MATT members accompanied PF platoons from Long Dien on operations with PSDF units and provided training to the PF units on ambushes and village security. By the completion of the training PSDF units were accompanying PF units each night on operations, whereas prior to the arrival of MATT 14, the PSDF remained in the villages and hamlets each night.

Although some of these courses were very successful, the general success of this PSDF training were limited. Despite the enthusiasm of the AATTV members, most PSDF units were apathetic, even though some PSDF personnel lacked even a basic understanding of simple military skills. The MATT members found a tendency for the PSDF personnel to begin firing when they felt like it, without any fire control, or any thoughts of either maintaining silence when on patrol or of conserving ammunition. At several range practises, the PSDF personnel commenced firing without orders at targets that had been left on the mound, and neither the PF Officers nor village chiefs attempted to regain control.[73] The MATT

members had to intervene. Many of the PSDF soldiers' weapons, when inspected by MATT members, were found to be damaged. Many of the PSDF soldiers did not possess a basic scale of ammunition, partly because some of the village chiefs were not sending in requests for ammunition.[74]

This apathy was also demonstrated by the low number of PSDF personnel who attended training and also their receptiveness to the training. In one case, the attendance on one course dropped from fifty-eight on the first day to only five youths by the fourth day. The women who were supposed to attend medical training did not show up. Some PSDF units were reluctant to undertake any physical labour to improve their defences and were not even patrolling their villages with the PF as they were supposed to be doing. Generally, the MATT members found that two weeks with each PSDF unit was insufficient time for training. In one instance, the training programme undertaken by one MATT was only conducted for six days and there was only one range practice. This was because the village chief would not allow any more than seven days continuous training for the PSDF personnel and required them to go back to their fields to work.

The defences of many territorial force units compounds were poor. An inspection by MATT 12 of one compound showed that ammunition for one machine-gun was almost nonexistent and another machine-gun, located on a prominent hill, had only 200 to 300 rounds left.[75] The earth mound and barbed wire surrounding the compound were in very poor condition. However, over the period of one month the compound rose "from a very poor state of defence, both in construction and soldierly aspects to a now quite acceptable stage."[76]

The effectiveness and performances of a number of RF units were also poor. Several reports by MATT 3 noted that the 302nd RF Battalion, as a whole, was reluctant to move into the Long Hai mountains to mount operations against

enemy forces, apart from one outpost that had remained in the same location for some considerable time. This was because the battalion commander had adopted what was termed as "siege complex."[77] The battalion's poor performance had been in reaction to the losses it had sustained. During April and May 1971, it suffered three killed and seventeen wounded by M16 mines, and the battalion did not even sight those who had set the mines. Although the battalion conducted up to ten ambushes each night on known Vietnamese Communists (hereafter VC) infiltration routes, there were very few contacts made with the enemy. When a contact was made, there was a "lack of will" upon the part of the battalion to close with the enemy. The battalion was "in poor shape in relationship to normally acceptable platoon standards."[78]

Major R.V. Musgrove, the Senior Australian Adviser of Phuoc Tuy Province felt that this battalion was being misemployed and was not exploiting the benefits of its organisation and TOE.[79] There was, however, some disagreement over what the battalion should in fact be doing. The MACV advisors of Team 89, which operated in Phuoc Tuy province, did not feel that the battalion should be targeted against major enemy units but should be kept as a `reaction force'.[80] Musgrove felt that this was a negative attitude because in eight months, the battalion had not managed to react adequately to enemy operations. Instead, Musgrove felt that the battalion should be used on limited operations against VC base areas and headquarters to keep the enemy unbalanced and moving.[81]

MATT 3 aimed at changing the tactics used by the RF battalion. To try to overcome these weaknesses in performance, the advisers were used as much as possible at the company level. To this effect, the MATT provided training in the following areas: ambush techniques, weapon discipline, the siting and use of Claymore mines in ambushes

and finally, elementary mine warfare. Despite this, the battalion did not operate as a cohesive entity, but rather continued to function as four independent companies.[82] It was suggested that the battalion use its own weapons, plus artillery, followed by a sweep through the area by the infantry. The first part of this advice had produced improvements in subsequent operations, despite the poor weapon handling abilities of the battalion. The soldiers from the battalion had either little or no fire discipline and the battalion's 60 mm mortars fall of shot was poorly corrected. There was also little night fire discipline, with sentries giving away their positions by constantly firing at `suspected' movement.

Even after six months of consistent effort the MATT had made almost no real improvement to the effectiveness of the battalion. The commanding officer of the battalion was ineffectual and rarely gave any assistance to the MATT. He was always away from his battalion, normally only visiting the battalion for one hour a day.[83] Attempts made by the Deputy Senior Advisor of Phuoc Tuy to have him replaced, were to no avail. The performances of the company commanders were similar to those of the battalion's commander. The battalion's operations Officer proved to be inflexible and was incapable of initiating orders when the commander was away. In December 1971, the 4th Company of the battalion was attacked and upon investigating the incident, MATT members found that the company did not have sentries posted or an adequate defensive perimeter. As a result, the company commander was replaced. The battalion's intelligence Officer was frequently missing for days at a time, with nobody knowing where he was or what he was doing. The battalion's operational effectiveness reflected the deficiencies of Officers who demonstrated little interest in ensuring that units were carrying out their orders when on operations. To combat such inefficiency, an inspection system was introduced at the beginning of 1971 that assisted with the improvement of some of the RF companies by

follow-up action. Company commanders who showed up poorly on such inspections, or on operations, were now replaced, rather then being tolerated as was the case previously.[84]

The attempts of the MATTs to improve the medical standards of the South Vietnamese, as part of the Medcap programme, met with differing levels of success. This was primarily due to a lack of medical supplies. In one instance, medical supplies took three weeks to arrive at a village once they had been ordered.[85] MATT 2 supplemented the limited supplies of medicine of some villages as best it could. The MATT found that because numbers of villagers were being turned away, due to the lack of supplies, the Vietnamese were becoming unresponsive towards the Medcap programme and suspicious of the efforts of Saigon.

The AATTV also began training South Vietnamese personnel to form South Vietnamese MATTs to take over the training of the territorial forces. This corresponded with the continuing allied withdrawal from South Vietnam and the eventual takeover by the South Vietnamese of all the training commitments of the territorial force. This new programme was based upon the concept that it was more desirable for Vietnamese instructors to train Vietnamese soldiers, with the assistance of AATTV MATT personnel, a concept that had been proven with PSDF training conducted by the AATTV in late 1970.[86]

In December 1970, six South Vietnamese MATTs (RF MATTs) were formed to provide training for territorial force units in Phuoc Tuy Province. Each RF MATT consisted of one Officer or Senior NCO and two enlisted men temporarily attached from an RF company. They attended a seven-day orientation course by Team 89, which taught them methods of instruction, construction of field defences, the use of helicopter support, and minor tactics such as patrolling and ambushing. Upon completion of their training, one RF MATT was allocated per district and another was located at Sector

Headquarters, each working with an AATTV MATT. The role of the AATTV MATTs was to supervise the preparation of lesson plans and training aids and to monitor and correct any deficiencies in the instruction that the RF MATTs were imparting to the PF and PSDF.[87] Each AATTV MATT was to provide transport, communications and any other form of training and operational support needed by the RF MATT.

Once the RF MATTs completed their training and arrived at their assigned locations, a normal routine was established. During the mornings, the RF MATT members planned and rehearsed their lessons and were coached by the AATTV MATTs. In the afternoons they, accompanied by the AATTV MATTs, went to the territorial force units and imparted the lessons that they had learnt and rehearsed in the morning.

There were some successes. MATT 1 and an RF MATT from 655 RF Company conducted several training seminars with PSDF units in several towns, and also attended patrols and ambushes in two other provinces. The territorial forces in the district as a whole were found to be well motivated, due largely to the efforts of the Catholic and Montagnard groups, rather than the efforts of the district chief. MATT 7 found that some of the companies showed signs of improvement while the MATT worked with them. The 386th RF Company's efficiency improved, although this progress was hampered by many of the RF Officers' lack of experience.

Some company commanders did listen to the advice they were given and attempted to correct deficiencies within their units, but sometimes their efforts were blocked from the most unexpected quarters. In one example, one of the MATTs accompanied the 578th RF Company on a one-day operation. It was noted that the company lacked basic skills, such as a lack of discipline and the soldiers walked too close together when on operation, which could have resulted in disaster had the soldiers been ambushed.[88]

Although the company commander was constantly advised on how to correct these deficiencies, his platoon commanders refused to carry out his orders. When Matt 7 accompanied one of the platoons from 386th RF Company in an operation, the platoon commander had to be almost forced to go to the planned objectives and ambush sites.[89] The team leader stated: "If the MATTs weren't with him it is almost certain he would have `rested up' in the field for the time [of his patrol]."[90]

Any successes the MATTs made largely depended upon the enthusiasm and co-operation of Vietnamese unit commanders and their views on the advisory system. In many cases, there was tendency by the South Vietnamese to regard the MATTs as a sub-unit of 1ATF rather than as part of an advisory team. Phillips felt there was little doubt that the progress made as a result of the MATTs had to a degree been materially effected by the close proximity of 1ATF.[91] Some RF companies made little attempt to work with the MATTs. MATT 14 experienced problems when working with the 586th RF Company commander. His unwillingness to co-operate with the MATT meant that it had little opportunity to work with the RF company.[92] Also, the presence of a MATT did not automatically imply that advice or assistance given was accepted by the Vietnamese. In some cases an opposite action was taken to the advice given. After so many years of advisory effort having been directed at the Vietnamese, such a reaction came as no surprise to some of the Australians. There was a "tendency by MACV to pressure the advisory effort to hasten improvements that they considered to be required by the advisers [sic]."[93] It was felt by some AATTV members that the presence of an adviser, rather than the constant giving of advice, might have been of a more beneficial solution to this growing trend. In some cases, the Vietnamese had the experience and, in many cases, the ability but they lacked the confidence in their ability to handle the tasks in hand.

Although the RF MATT concept was enthusiastically accepted by most RF company commanders, there were some problems with the RF MATTs training PSDF units. A major problem was the need to continuously monitor PSDF operations, for, in some instances, it had been found that once an RF MATT had completed a training course and moved away, PSDF activities quickly reverted to the standard they were prior to the arrival of the MATT, a problem also shared by AATTV MATTs.[94] Another major difficulty was striking the right combination of military and political training to provide to the PSDF units, in which much more emphasis had to be placed upon the latter. There was also a shortage of transport to and from training locations, some of which were fairly distant. For example, from Baria to Long Hai or Phuoc Thinh was approximately twenty-five kilometres. Although the RF MATTs were enthusiastic in their work, they lacked two necessary supports which greatly limited their potential.[95] First, they lacked the support of the governmental authorities, especially the National Police and Public Health Department, who frequently did not bother to turn up when rostered for lectures for PSDF. Secondly, there was a lack of training facilities and training aids, and there was a time delay in all facets of requisition of training aids. Finally, and very importantly, there was also a lack of quality control, for the AATTV MATTs were frequently unable to observe the training activities of the RF MATTs. This was usually because of either insufficient time to visit all the training activities, or else an absence of transport for the province PSDF co-ordinator.

There were problems for the teams working with PF units. There was an "air of complacency" among some of the PF platoons in Phuoc Tuy province. They felt that they did not need training, because of the continued close proximity of RF units to the populated areas.[96] The PF were prone to feeling over-secure. K. Phillips, the Senior Australian

Adviser, Phuoc Tuy Province, felt that the RF needed to move out on a more permanent basis to "force the District/Village Chiefs to act more constructively with their RF assets."[97] District chiefs tended to request that training be given to the best, rather than the worst, platoons. This was not what the MATTs had been created to do. There was a tendency for some district chiefs to withdraw, with no notice, a platoon undergoing training to undertake other tasks in the district. Such absences could last up to three days, which meant that such units did not complete proper training. The MATTs frequently found it difficult to extract ammunition, firing ranges and transport from the Vietnamese logistic system to undertake training.

However, some problems were slowly overcome. Some RF companies and PF platoons had adopted the practice, when on an operation, of returning each day to the nearest road for re-supply of such items as food. After considerable pressure by the advisers, these units slowly adopted the practice of carrying a three days supply of rations. There were some unorthodox methods used by the advisers to change the practices of RF and PF units. Many RF and PF units had adopted the practice of slinging their weapons, even when conducting operations in enemy territory. One report noted that when one RF company was farewelling an adviser due to return to Australia, the adviser ceremonially burnt all the rifle slings of the soldiers. The adviser then stated: "...now they will carry their bloody rifles correctly."[98]

The effectiveness of the RF/PF in the province, although improving, did have some low points. In the latter part of June and early July 1971, there was a noticeable deterioration of morale in the territorial forces in Phuoc Tuy. The companies around the Long Hai even refused to carry out ambushes and patrolling. This was due to a complete apathy on the part of those commanding the RF/PF, and because of operations "which showed no idea of the basic requirements of military planning."[99] This situation did

change near the end of July 1971 with improvement as RF companies began to move on operations with "some degree of purpose."[100]

Despite such problems, there were no casualties suffered by the New Zealanders attached to the MATTs. As already noted, AATTV personnel did accompany units on active operations and there were sometimes fire-fights with enemy units. Some of these territorial force units were poorly trained and often the adviser did not know how the units would react if they contacted an enemy unit. For example, in mid-December 1970, Corporal T. Cameron accompanied an RF company in the follow-up of blood trails, after an ambush had been sprung the night before. As the company was just out of training, it would not follow the trails immediately after the ambush. On 6 January 1971, Cameron was with an RF company at Binh Ba where it engaged an unknown number of enemy. The next day he was with a PF platoon which engaged a group of enemy troops in Hoa Long Village.

Not only were the territorial force units province criticised by senior AATTV advisors, but also the advisory system itself, particularly as it existed in Phuoc Tuy Province. Phillips was critical of an advisory system that played a part in the lack of effectiveness of the territorial forces. In a report dated March 1971, Phillips considered that the advisory effort "leaves much to be desired."[101] He reported that some of the advisers lacked sincerity and a knowledge of basic military tactics. He also felt that some Australian and US advisors, used their time "only to serve as a stepping stone in a career pattern of which the advising to the Vietnamese was of little consequence", a practice which he found to be "most demoralising."[102] At the end of his term as Senior Advisor, Phillips wrote that at times his job had been frustrating, not always necessarily due to the Vietnamese. "In fact the opposite is generally the case."[103] He felt that it had

become apparent over the first few months of 1971 that the aim of the US advisory reporting system was to justify on paper the withdrawal plan politically required.

Phillips also wrote that with the lull in RF operations came an untimely drop in the activities of the MATTs and that boredom became a problem. He felt that such periods of inactivity could have been used by the MATTs for in-house training for the RF and PF, although this was dependent upon the company commander and the district/village chief. He reported: "there tends to be an unwritten law that if there are no operations then all work ceases apart from nightly ambushes."[104] He noted further that the number of ambushes reported each night, between 100 and 120, was always suspect, and largely appeared to be undertaken for statistical reporting procedures. He found this to be regrettable, but that it had "become an accepted way of life and appears to keep the system (mainly US) happy."[105] He concluded by noting that if one percent of these ambushes were successful the results would speak for themselves.[106]

Phillips also detailed problems at the sector level. Here, advisory effort in the planning and conduct of an operation was virtually nonexistent, although some districts were an exception. There was also a lack of organisation and direction by the sector commands of the territorial forces in Phuoc Tuy. The RF companies were used in operations which were of short duration, lacked any real aim and were of limited value.[107] The majority of these operations were not based on sound intelligence. This was because of an increasing breakdown in the collection, collation, interpretation and dissemination of available intelligence information by the South Vietnamese. These operations were based upon limited and unconfirmed information from a range of sources, usually at low levels. When intelligence was available, operations were generally conducted too late to be effective. Many of these operations became fragmented and futile.[108] The success of

the MATTs was restricted, and even on some occasions rendered ineffective if the RF companies, and indeed the territorial forces in general in Phuoc Tuy, were not used on meaningful operations with specific missions.

Musgrove was also critical, and he highlighted several problems that affected the performance of the MATT system, and consequently attempts to increase the effectiveness of the territorial forces in the province. He concluded there was a preoccupation with reports and with the definitions of problem areas that tied up a lot of Team 89's time. He wrote that these problems were already known, and perhaps more time should be spent on solving the problems. He felt that Team 89 had a greater concern for "efficiency reports and awards than for getting the job done."[109] Musgrove noted further that in some cases advisors learnt what was being planned by the South Vietnamese after the event, not before. Even if an operation was faulty then there was little, if any, attempt to advise tactfully or give alternatives. He noted that it was not that the advisers gave advice incorrectly or in an offensive manner, but rather there was a concern "to be sure they were not adversely reported by the South Vietnamese or Team 89. In other words, Do nothing and you can't do it wrong."[110] As a consequence of this, there was a lack of communication at the Sector level between the advisers and their [South Vietnamese] counterparts. Musgrove wrote that each U.S. adviser "jealously guards his counterpart and prevents access by 1 ATF Liaison Officer (1 ATFLO) and other members of Team 89."[111]

Although his report tended to be both cynical and a little pessimistic towards the RF/PF and the advisory effort in Phuoc Tuy province, Musgrove noted that there were some encouraging signs of improvement in some areas. However, the realistic view served to show there were still many

fields where laziness, incompetence, and apathy hindered constructive attempts by the AATTV in improving the territorial forces.[112] The majority of the MATTs found that many of the RF and PF units lacked any will to try to improve their level of effectiveness. The territorial forces, "at the command and staff level, did not show the drive, basic military knowledge or leadership that was necessary for the security of Phuoc Tuy."[113]

There were also problems with the advisory effort at some sector Tactical Operations Centres (hereafter TOC). During a contact, the Vietnamese in these centres were invariably in the background while the advisers `fought the battles'.[114] Some advisers overlooked that such battles should have been controlled by the Vietnamese with the advisers/liaison groups providing assistance when needed. It was realised that until the Vietnamese were permitted to take what actions they deemed to be correct in their province, there was little chance for any significant improvements or clarification of weaknesses.[115] There was a general tendency for advisers to over-advise and almost reach the point of command without directly assuming the responsibility for such advice.

The MATTs also experienced a number of problems that were not resolved while the AATTV was in Phuoc Tuy. During most of Australia's involvement in Phuoc Tuy, the US maintained an advisory team and 123 MATs in the province.[116] The role of the U.S. advisory team was to advise and assist the South Vietnamese provincial administration and military and to provide reports on the progress of the war to Saigon. The problem was the rapid turnover, during 1970 and 1971, of U.S. personnel assigned to the sector headquarters in Phuoc Tuy.[117] During the first eleven months of 1970, there had been three Province Senior Advisors, four Deputy Province Senior Advisors, six operations Officers and at least two District Senior Advisors in each of the districts.[118] The frequent replacement of the US operations Officer was of

greatest concern to AATTV, particularly as this Officer provided the co-ordination point between the MATTs and the territorial forces.[119] This frequent change of personnel reduced the effectiveness and co-ordination of the activities of the MATTs and the territorial forces operations. Such a turnover of U.S. personnel merely served to frustrate the South Vietnamese and not only inhibited the development of a stable working relationship between the Australians, US and the South Vietnamese territorial forces, but also inhibited the ability of the advisers to become familiar with their job and its requirements.[120]

To solve these problems, Phillips recommended that several of the major appointments in the advisory network in Phuoc Tuy be filled by personnel from the AATTV. The adoption of this recommendation would permit the continuity of the work of the AATTV in Phuoc Tuy and "help the dissemination of Australian philosophies and techniques within Phuoc Tuy."[121] However, these recommendations were not adopted by the Australian Government, mainly because of the extra costs that would be involved.

By April 1971, both Phillips and Musgrove felt that the successes of the MATTs were restricted and they needed to be redeployed from the RF company level of advising to the Group or Battalion level. It was in this area as well as Sector Command Post (hereafter SCP) that constructive advice was required. The RF companies needed to be "put to the test...not on operations that had little or no tactical significance, but rather to look good on some abstract graph in somebody's office."[122] Phillips believed that the average RF soldier had now reached the point of understanding the futility of most of the operations that he was participating in, and that there had developed an air of complacency and an "it will never happen to us attitude."[123] He also felt there was a need for the re-introduction of combined operations between the RF and 1ATF in the clearing zone, for 2 Royal Australian Regiment (RAR) in 1970 had

proven that this was effective in upgrading the RF. However, this could have created problems, given the different methods of resupply and equipment and ammunition holdings of RF units compared to 1ATF. He commented: "patience will be essential", but experience had shown that the South Vietnamese in Phuoc Tuy "have a high respect for 1ATF and will undoubtedly co-operate to the full extent providing the practical approach...is kept in mind."[124]

Musgrove believed that in the areas of PF platoon training, artillery fire control and mine training, the MATTs were still usefully employed, particularly in the two latter cases. He agreed with Phillips that the MATTs role in training the RF in general was no longer relevant, and Musgrove believed that the requirement was now for specialised training from specialist MATTs. Since August, he felt there were only six of the MATTs that could be classified as effective, and these to only varying degrees. He assessed that within the next few months this number would probably be decreased even further. He believed that by 1972, there could only be two MATTs that could be properly employed in the province.[125]

By early 1971, there were several compelling reasons for not only redeploying the MATTs, but to also reduce the number of AATTV MATTs serving in Phuoc Tuy.[126] These were the withdrawal of the Americans from Phuoc Tuy; the lack of suitably qualified personnel who could serve with the AATTV; the inefficiency that existed at the South Vietnamese sector headquarters; the recommendations from AATTV to reduce their effort; the intention of the Australian Government to begin withdrawing more of its forces from South Vietnam; the inability of the MATTs to achieve the results that they had hoped to achieve; and the attitude held by Lieutenant Colonel J.A. Clark, a commander of AATTV, who wrote there were too many advisers in the province and as a consequence "the Vietnamese are starting to get fed up with all the so-called `advice' they are getting."[127] Phillips also

aired these views when he noted in April 1971 that the number of MATTs "is now excessive to the real requirement", and as a consequence "the effectiveness of the current number of [AATTV] MATTs has almost reached the point where the application of the law of diminishing returns is becoming evident."[128]

The large number of AATTV MATTs meant there was competition between each MATT when attempting to get scarce resources or to achieve levels of co-ordination between territorial force units. An example of this was during the beginning of an operation by the 302nd RF Battalion in 1971. Captain L. Opie, who commanded MATT 3, complained that: "There were signs of utter confusion, largely created by advisors and others who felt it essential to interfere with or criticize almost every aspect of the operation. At one point in...the operation there were fourteen people [other than the Vietnamese and the MATT] in the Battalion Headquarters base area..."[129] Once this situation had been remedied and a semblance of order and control had been achieved, the performance of the battalion during the operation indicated that it did have potential to be effective.[130] However, there was still a considerable amount of advisory effort needed before the required standard could be reached.

Clark's opinion that there were too many advisors was also shared by many of the tactical commanders in South Vietnam. General C.W. Abrams, who undertook the difficult task of implementing the Vietnamisation programme as the Commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV) was informed in November 1970 by General J.L. Collins, his Special Assistant, that the presence or absence of advisers meant little to the ARVN.[131] Collins believed that the advisers merely served to provide a channel by which the ARVN could obtain logistical and combat support. He noted that the ARVN did not need any more advice, and

that it was only "laziness and failure on the part of the chain of command to get out and do their job that prevents their forces from becoming more effective."[132] Collins felt that the war would have been won by the ARVN within three months had the South Vietnamese had the desire and will to win.

During May 1971, the MATTs were redeployed as a result of a request by the Province Chief of Phuoc Tuy to the AATTV for assistance in upgrading the PF. He requested courses for platoon and squad leaders, which would be conducted in the various districts where the units were located. However, AATTV considered that it was more efficient and economical to conduct these courses at the JWTC and this recommendation was accepted by the Province Chief. Two MATTs were deployed to the JWTC to assist with this training, five other MATTs were deployed to train the PF platoons in the districts in Phuoc Tuy, and five other MATTs were employed with Group Headquarters and were responsible for the training of all RF Companies in their districts. MATT 3 continued to be deployed with the 302nd RF Battalion. By August 1971, following the Australian Government's announcement that 650 Army personnel would be withdrawn from South Vietnam, the number of MATTs working in Phuoc Tuy had been reduced to eight. However, there were some real successes achieved by the AATTV, particularly in another area of specialty - training the territorial forces in night fighting.

The Night Operations Training Teams

Despite the sometimes limited achievements of the AATTV MATT system, there were considerable improvements shown in the Night Operations Training Teams (hereafter NOTT).[133] The AATTV's involvement in the NOTT began in March 1970 when J.P. Vann, a senior American advisor in MR II, approached Clark with a request that the AATTV provide night operations

training to units in the Delta. As the ARVN and the RF were largely ineffective in conducting night operations, the North Vietnamese Army (hereafter NVA) and VC were able to conduct their night attacks in the Delta relatively unmolested. Although ARVN training programmes did emphasise night operations, the training was not very effective.

In May 1970, under the leadership of Major J. Brown, AATTV members began conducting at Dong Tam eight courses for RF Officers. The Australians saw the key to successful night operations as the skilful use of basic techniques, and the courses taught such basic skills as obstacle crossing, night observation, fire and movement and weapon handling.[134] The courses proved to be very successful, although the Australian instructors doubted that the ex-students attempted to instruct their own troops in the skills they had learnt on the courses.[135]

From November 1970 to February 1971, Vietnamese Officers who had attended courses at Dong Tam formed fifteen separate NOTTs and began training the territorial forces in one district in each of the fifteen provinces.[136] In December the two AATTV NOTTs were deployed to travel to some of these provinces to provide assistance, where necessary, to the Vietnamese NOTTs. From 2 to 25 January 1971, Caskey deployed his team to three provinces.[137] The team's role was to assess the training in the NOAT concept being undertaken by the Vietnamese.[138] The results were disappointing. It was found in the first province that attempts by ex-students to instruct their soldiers in the techniques they had been taught had lasted three days before being given up, because one officer was imprisoned and another transferred.[139] In the second province, the only NOAT training that was undertaken was by an American team, although there was some evidence to show that the Vietnamese were forming a NOAT. However, in the last province the NOAT concept was working very well. A course had been conducted

and the students had deployed to each of the districts in Phuoc Tuy province, where they began to train PF platoons.[140]

The AATTV team discovered a series of problems common to all three provinces. Some of the ex-students had two or even three jobs to cope with and could not concentrate upon the NOTT concept exclusively. Some had even been posted to other units or had been promoted into staff positions and therefore unable to put into practice what they had been taught. Many of the Vietnamese NOATs received very poor support from District and Province Headquarters, and there was a noticeable shortage of the necessary supplies and transport for training. RF companies were heavily committed during the day, albeit on a ten-day offensive, and training was virtually impossible to fit in.[141] There were virtually no American advisers allocated to provide assistance to the ex-students, although in the rare instances where American advisers were providing assistance the training was good.[142]

Despite this general lack of success of the NOAT concept, at a conference at IV Corps Headquarters Can Tho in February 1971, it was decided that the training would continue but would concentrate upon the PF.[143] There would be two NOTTs, each with six men, and they would be based in the Mekong Delta; one of them, named NOTT 2, would remain at Dong Tam and the other, NOTT 1, was to be established at an existing training centre at Bac Lieu.[144] In an attempt to increase the effectiveness of the fledgling NOTTs, Vann also ordered that small US advisory teams were to provide assistance to the Vietnamese NOTTs. To this end, fifteen teams, one to each of the Vietnamese NOTTs, were trained at Dong Tam. The existing course was scaled down and redesigned to suit the role and size of the PF. The course gave special emphasis to night ambushing, with and without the Claymore for mechanical ambushes, and also patrolling

and night firing techniques.[145] Teaching the latter skill was to prove difficult as many PF units were issued with a wide assortment of weapons.

Each course was conducted over a six week period, and concentrated on teaching Officers and noncommissioned Officers, who then returned to their own units and trained their men in the skills involved in night operations. The first two weeks were spent training thirty PF platoon commanders from the various provinces and districts within the training centre's responsibility.[146] The second two weeks were spent training thirty squad leaders from the same platoons. In the third two-week period, each NOTT would then divide into two groups and visit the ex-students in their own home localities. To give the students time to implement what they had learnt back in their own units, the teams normally visited the ex-students after two other courses had been conducted.

The first courses at the two centres began on 22 February 1971. At Bac Lieu, under the command of Caskey, the platoon leaders' course began with a total of thirty-one students from Bac Lieu province.[147] The first course showed the potential of these courses and was relatively successful, although there were some problems. It began on time and the training programme was strictly adhered to. The students showed considerable interest although later, in a verbal critique of the course, the students felt that more time needed to be spent on map reading and contact drills in an ambush. The operational ambush that was conducted by the course was "reasonably well done".[148] However, it was noted that the platoon leaders would have achieved more success with their own platoons as there "is better understanding of a team effort."[149] There were some problems regarding a lack of logistic support from the training centre for the team. This resulted in the course being less successful than had been hoped for.

During the initial courses, the students displayed a lack of interest and displayed poor skills in some activities. This was due, in part, to the training not always being interesting or realistic. This was particularly so when the students were required to set up ambushes. This was because the ambush sites were set up in a relatively secure area where the possibility of any enemy walking into the ambush was unlikely. It was decided that in future, ambushes would be conducted in areas where there was a good likelihood of a contact with an enemy party.[150]

Although some provinces had over 200 PF platoons, the teams had hoped that the standards of these units would improve as a result of the courses. Provinces chose students either from a mixture of districts, or else sent all the personnel from one particular district, then moved on to another district.[151] The latter option proved to be much more advantageous as it made the inspection tours much easier through the reduction in travelling time from one platoon to another.[152]

In March 1971, Mountfort assumed command of NOTT 2, a team which consisted of six Australian WOs.[153] Dong Tam, a large military and riverine patrol boat base, was situated on the north branch of the Mekong river, about six miles west of My Tho. There were a number of units US based at Dong Tam, the largest being the Headquarters and support elements of the 7th ARVN Division training school and the riverine patrol boat headquarters. For the first few months that the team was at Dong Tam there were also two assault helicopter companies; one American and one combined American and Australian.

There was a lot of fraternisation between the NOTT members and the combined helicopter company. Frequently some of the pilots went on patrols and ambushes for the experience of seeing what it was like to be an infantryman. There was also a large amount of fraternisation between the

team members and the South Vietnamese military at Dong Tam, especially once the helicopter units departed and, to a lesser extent, the local villagers, once initial difficulties in "bridging the linguistic and language gap had been overcome", remembers Mountfort.[154] Socialising after work was curtailed, as the team members did not move around Dong Tam at night because shots were occasionally fired. Generally, the team members had their own beer and used to sit around in their own compound and talk, drink and listen to the radio.[155]

The team used a complicated logistic and administrative support system. This support came from three sources, not all of which were based in Dong Tam.[156] Mountfort had been instructed to try to make the Vietnamese logistical system work, but such efforts often proved to be "exercises in ingenuity", and the best incentive to get what they needed from the South Vietnamese was "some of our precious stock of Australian beer."[157] These logistic problems became increasingly acute as a result of the continued withdrawal of U.S. forces from South Vietnam. Such items as spare parts, ammunition and clothing became increasingly difficult to obtain, and these problems were further complicated by frequent incidents of theft. In one instance batteries and radio parts were stolen from two of the NOTT's jeeps, but were replaced with some difficulty. There was a growing level of inefficiency in telephone communications, primarily because of a lack spare parts, which effect the continued security of the two teams.

The onset of the wet season in mid-year created major problems for the team. The team's living and working area, located in a corner of the Dong Tam base, was initially very comfortable, managing "with a bit of begging and borrowing [to build] a house out of a wooden shell of a building."[158] There was a small lecture room and training space that was above the water level close to the team house.[159] However, due to the flat terrain, most of the area was completely

submerged during the rainy season. The team members' beds had to be raised off the ground, as, Mountfort recalled, the "novelty of living knee deep in water and mud wore off...I remember standing in water calf-deep at the bar drinking, standing calf-deep water."[160] After two days of flooding, the team was forced to relocate their accommodation, ammunition connex, water tank, lavatory and shower to higher ground, where a smaller structure was situated. This inconvenience was overshadowed in severity by the effects the wet season had upon training as large portions of the training areas became unavailable due to flooding.[161]

The NOTT at Dong Tam employed a woman who came out to the centre each day from My Tho to cook and clean for the team members. She was given money to purchase the team's food, which consisted of vegetables, crabs, and prawns, from the local market.[162] The NOTT members sometimes visited the US mess but the food served there did not always appeal to them. The way of life that the team members led "resembled flat life", with each team member sharing the work and being rostered for cooking the evening meal, which was often quite varied.[163] One of the team members "managed rabbit and mushroom casserole which, with a bottle of wine, was very well received."[164]

As already noted, the scope of the course was the same at both Bac Lieu and Dong Tam, as were the types of problems encountered by both teams. The inability of the instructors to speak Vietnamese was also a major problem, which was accentuated by the fact that there were only two interpreters attached to each team. This caused a major problem if one of the two was away on leave.[165] Another problem was that the interpreters morale was very low, because they were treated very badly by the South Vietnamese authorities. In at least one instance, the interpreters attached to the team at Dong Tam refused to go out with the team on the assessment phases and went Absent Without Leave (AWOL), because of an on-going problem. The authorities had

refused to provide them with neither food nor pay when they were not working within the team's compound. The province headquarters imprisoned the two interpreters, and although subsequently released, they still refused to work for the team, despite unsuccessful attempts by team members to solve this problem.[166]

The quality of students, their equipment and previous training varied greatly. The students, as `raw material,' were found by the New Zealand instructors to be "good, hardy and close to the earth", and were for the most part peasants, as the Delta region was primarily an agricultural region.[167] However, the students were often lacking in equipment and what they did have was often in poor condition. Some students did not have boots and many had been issued with only one set of uniforms. To train the students effectively in night operations, which involved working in all types of weather conditions, the students needed at least two sets of uniform, because at least one set would get wet through. This was particularly important in the wet season as the students were unable to change into dry clothes, and frequently became ill after being wet. There was a high rate of hospitalisation which reduced the effectiveness of the training.[168] Some had not even been taught how to aim or clean the weapons that they carried. On one course, the condition of all the students M-16 rifles was very poor and three rifles had both the front and rear sights hanging loosely on the weapon, which meant that the students could not even aim to shoot. The weapons had not been maintained for several months, because the students had not been issued with cleaning kits for the weapons and had not received any previous training.[169] One of the first things that team members had to perform when a new group of students arrived was to repair some of the rifles.

The literacy rate, level of education, standards of living, and the levels of training that the students had received prior to attending the course were poor, all of

which served to limit the effectiveness of the training. On one course, eleven of the thirty-one students could neither read nor write, which made "even pretty low-level skills very difficult to get across."[170] The students experienced major difficulties learning to use maps.[171] As a result, the teaching of such skills as map reading and using a Claymore - the concept of an electrical current had to be taught first - took up a lot of valuable training time. Rather than revise map reading it was found that this subject needed to be taught from the beginning.

The were real dangers that the members from both teams had to face. Each course at Dong Tam culminated in an actual ambush in an area adjacent to the Centre. The location of Dong Tam provided the team's students with the most realistic training areas available; the area surrounding the base was enemy territory. During one such ambush, a patrol was hit by a command detonated mines resulting in one Australian and four Vietnamese students being wounded. A further student became a casualty when he moved forward to recover the weapons dropped and stepped on a booby trap which detonated.[172]

At the completion of each course there was a standard graduation ceremony. At the graduation, the students were presented with a certificate and an `owl night-fighter badge', the latter of which was highly prized by the students.[173] All the students who attended the courses passed, as it was marked as an attendance only. The students then returned to their units to implement what they had learnt through the formation of NOATs.

Two to four weeks after the conclusion of a course, members from the NOTT visited as many of the ex-students as possible, although it was physically impossible to visit them all. "You couldn't rush to a PF unit, say `hello', inspect the place, and then leave. You had to observe the

social niceties, inquire after their families...accompany them on an ambush, inspect their defences etc", said Mountfort.[174] The team members usually spent about half a day with each unit, and assessments were made of the ex-students progress in using the skills they had been taught, and follow-up advice and further training was also provided to them. Generally, the PF units were "absolutely delighted that we had taken the trouble to visit them."[175]

Such visits were of considerable stress and danger, as the team members were never sure if members of a particular unit they would visit were VC or VC sympathisers. Each member of a NOAT carried only their own M16 and a pistol, and although each NOAT had a radio, the units that could be contacted for assistance were either very scarce or some distance away. It would not be uncommon to be driving down a paddy berm barely wide enough to turn around or go backwards, "in countryside you had never been to that was reputed to have VC, to visit an outpost that may or may not have known you were coming."[176] Although there were many signs that the VC were operating in many areas, and on several occasions NOATs stumbled upon booby-traps, they never encountered any enemy troops or suffered any casualties on these inspection trips. However, there were occasions when high levels of enemy activity made movement into particular areas very difficult. There was one instance where a NOAT arrived at a village to inspect the local RF unit that was supposed to be guarding the village to find that the village had been visited by a VC unit the previous night collecting taxes.[177] The NOATs always tried to avoid travelling between outposts by night, preferring to stay in either PF or US outposts, or else in the district headquarters. During the dry season travel was relatively easy, with most of the roads being dry and secure, but travel was made very difficult during the wet season due to flooding. Difficulties with travel were further accentuated because even during the dry season some units were so isolated that they had to be visited either on foot, as

vehicle access was impossible, or by boat. The NOATs found that the most dangerous areas to move through were tree-lined areas, particularly those beside canals and on inter-district and inter-provincial boundaries, because in was in these areas that communist forces tended to have mini bases.[178]

Despite such dangers, the team members found it "an eye-opener" to see for themselves the conditions that the PF units lived in and operated under.[179] These units often lived in triangular-shaped mud defensive outposts, in varying conditions of repair, close to either a village or bridge, with little shacks built into the walls. The defensive systems were normally very basic. The walls of these outposts were normally six to eight feet high, sometimes surrounded by barbed wire of varying degrees of quality. Usually an outpost would have a goose, which was used as a warning system, inside the barbed wire fences. The NOATs spent some of their time advising the PF on how to improve these defenses.

Of great concern to both teams was the poor condition of the equipment used by the PF, particularly as such deficiencies seriously hampered their ability to adequately fulfil their role. On one trip to the Kien Hoa Province, Mountfort found that many units lacked certain types of flares, for example illumination flares, which were necessary for night operations.[180] The teams also found that Claymores were either not used or when used, were often not used effectively, despite instruction being given on all the courses. Not only were many Claymores badly sited, but that there was an inordinate number of problems with the Claymores, as "a disturbing portion had faulty electrical leads and detonators or none at all."[181] The NOAT from Bac Lieu visited five outposts in An Xuyen province and found that, generally, the standard of the PF units was poor, and their level of comprehension was not good.[182] On several

occasions at different units, clothing was found hanging on the Claymore wires, and that the shorting caps had been left off the Claymore cables.[183] Even ammunition for operational use, let alone for training purposes, was in short supply. However, some platoons supplemented their equipment with captured VC weapons.

In many instances it was difficult for visiting NOTT teams to get PF units to undertake an ambush. This was primarily because "there was a fair bit of bullshit that went on, and although they said that they did night ambushes and they did this and that, I think sometimes that imagined that they did it or they would do it if they had to."[184] Sometimes, PF units "weren't the least bit interested and there was no way we could cajole them into mounting an ambush or patrol."[185] After several such instances, some of the Australians were reluctant to go out on further visits.[186] However, there were some successes. During one trip, a team went out on two night ambushes with several PF platoons. One of these platoons successfully moved over 7,000 metres through difficult terrain to an ambush site on a canal, which perhaps served to show that some PF platoons were better at moving at night than the NOTTs had been led to believe. The team found that although the district authorities expected a PF platoon to man its outpost and mount an ambush every night, this proved to be impracticable.[187] A common system devised by many PF units was for an ambush to be set for only part of the night, usually in the early evening. Such a pattern was taken advantage of on several occasions by the enemy, and several PF platoons had suffered heavy casualties as a consequence. The NOAT then recommended that whole night ambushes needed to be less frequent if they were supplemented by mechanical ambushes. The teams also found that such investigation trips were very valuable for the PF units. It was found that sometimes PF units sometimes needed correction simply on how they physically occupied their ambush site. When the two teams returned to Dong Tam, they made efforts to ensure

that the PF platoons received adequate equipment, particularly serviceable Claymores. However, there is no evidence about the extent to which the South Vietnamese were able to correct some of these deficiencies.

During some visits, PF platoons were seldom in their bases. Some PF soldiers held permanent jobs elsewhere or units were sent on operations at short notice and were not available to undertake any training, which served to negate the benefits that could be gained from such visits. In April 1971, a NOAT from Bac Lieu visited six outposts and on average there were only between one and three PF soldiers in each outpost.[188] In one instance, even the three-men PF security element that was supposed to travel with the NOAT, organised several days before the intended visit, did not show up due to the commencement of an operation. Caskey recommended that if the NOAT concept was to work, then the platoons being visited should be relieved of all day operations and training programmes for the duration of the visits.[189] If there was training already programmed, he suggested that the District Headquarters supply the NOAT with a copy of the training programme, to give the NOAT the opportunity to observe actual training without having to attend `demonstration' ambushes. As a result, it was decided to travel to the District Headquarters and to have the students who were available brought in to see the team.

The majority of the graduates attempted to pass to their skills, but were hampered by disinterest by their district and provincial authorities in their newly acquired abilities, and by shortages of the weaponry and ammunition needed to demonstrated their new skills. These problems were compounded through a lack of motivation among some PF units because of problems continually experienced by soldiers in receiving their pay entitlements and allowances on time, and some soldiers had inadequate housing for their families. Morale was also slowly eaten away by enemy infiltrators within some units. Finally, many of the

ex-students from Dong Tam had been posted to other tasks or "back to their old jobs and had forgotten all about the NOAT concept and why they were trained."[190]

Despite such problems, the skills that the two NOTTs were teaching were considered to be very useful by both the Americans and the South Vietnamese. Although the Americans were enthusiastic, the Australian Headquarters in Saigon prohibited the AATTV in IV Corps from training Americans.[191] The reason for this may have been because the two NOTTs were already very busy training the Vietnamese, let alone taking on more students. To overcome this ruling, in several instances members of US MATs attended as observers on some of the courses that were conducted at Bac Lieu and Dong Tam. Due to the success of the NOTTs and NOATs, the US MAT at Soc Trang (Team 71), Ba Xuyen province, requested from Headquarters AATTV assistance to advise on the establishment of a US NOTT in late May 1971. Caskey and an Australian WO were attached to this team from 7 to 11 June and again 14 to 28 June to assist in the preparation of a training syllabus, and to assist in instruction during the first course. The Americans in the team were impressed, not only with the content of the course and the instructional abilities of both Caskey and the Australian, but also by the increased abilities of the students at the completion of the course.[192]

One Year Later

In February 1971, Lieutenant General Webb, the Chief of General Staff (hereafter CGS), advised Lieutenant General L.W. Thornton, the Chief of Defence Staff, that the initial contribution of five personnel to AATTV could be replaced in October of that year by another group of the same size.[193] This notification was the first recorded indication that the New Zealand element of AATTV was to have been withdrawn on the establishment of 1NZATTV; Up to this point, it had only

be assumed that this would happen. The basic reason for the decision to continue this assistance was the recognition of the value and wider experience that the New Zealand Army was gaining in training methods with the MATT programme, which was in contrast with the static instructional type activity that 1NZATTV was involved in. Further, the Australians, by early 1971, were enthusiastic about a continued New Zealand presence with AATTV, presumably because of the difficulties they were experiencing in filling the positions in the AATTV. Colonel J. Whitelaw, the Chief of Staff Australian Force Vietnam, had informed Lieutenant Colonel Cooper, the NZLO in Canberra, that a New Zealand element with AATTV would be welcomed by AATTV "for ever and ever".[194] It was planned that the New Zealand personnel serving with AATTV were to be replaced in October 1971.

Despite this cordiality, relations between the New Zealand and Australian military were strained for a time, because the New Zealand Army was unhappy about having to send the replacements on another course in Australia.[195] This was primarily because of financial costs. AGS felt that they were already paying enough without having to pay for the courses in Australia as well.[196] By the end of 1970, it was costing $NZ216,000 annually, exclusive of pay and allowances, to maintain the New Zealanders who were attached to AATTV. Although hardly a great cost, it was still a relatively large sum of money that AGS had to budget for, particularly with cutbacks in defence spending.

In October 1971, AGS sent the Australians a list of the personnel they had selected as replacements. As the intended replacements had not attended any of the preparatory courses in Australia, the Australians did not consider them as being acceptable for employment with AATTV.[197] The Australians maintained that the New Zealand replacements had to attend the courses to receive the same training as their Australian counterparts, even when Lieutenant Colonel V.B. Brown, Commander of NZ V Force,

offered several of the experienced New Zealand instructors from Chi Lang as replacements. The New Zealand military, particularly Brigadier H Hassett, the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, and Major and General L.A. Pearce, the DCGS, were "less than enchanted with the way Australians have dealt with us on this matter."[198] Despite this displeasure, Pearce did not see how this matter could be officially raised with the Australians, but anticipated raising the matter with Lieutenant General Sir T. Daly, the Australian CGS, during his visit to New Zealand.[199] Holloway wrote that the future of New Zealand's continuing contribution to the AATTV "must be looked at carefully."[200] However, the Australians won the argument and four New Zealand replacements, all of whom had served in previous Southeast Asian campaigns, attended three courses in Australia.[201]

Despite the Australians `officially' welcoming a continued New Zealand presence with AATTV, V.B. Brown indicated the negative attitude of the Commander of the AATTV, Colonel G.J. Leary, to the integration of New Zealanders into the Australian training teams. This attitude may have come as a result of the earlier cutback, in July 1971, in numbers of personnel who were serving with the AATTV. He noted that: "To us here, it was rather disconcerting that New Zealand was insisting on having a share of AATTV when the last thing the CO AATTV wanted was New Zealanders. He's a personal friend...of mine and between us we have few secrets."[202]

Brown did not think that the New Zealanders being sent to work with the AATTV were very good. In late October 1971, he wrote that: "One aspect I have withheld from him is the quality of the men he is getting (so pleased that one in particular is completely unacceptable). We've given him one quite hopeless and one medically unfit WO in the past (40 percent of our contribution) and we noted not without interest that we were about to repeat the process."[203] However, despite Brown's misgivings, some of the men proved

to be very good: WOI T. Samuels received the Certificate of Outstanding Achievement when a group he was commanding on a training exercise contacted a VC unit. His group killed two VC and captured some documents.[204]

An Uncertain Future

At the end of 1971, Australia's involvement in South Vietnam turned full circle with an announcement by the Australian Minister of Defence, D. Fairbairn, that the residual force would be entitled Australian Army Assistance Group Vietnam (hereafter AAAGV).[205] Made up mainly of members of the Training Team, the AAAGV would be involved in training in Phuoc Tuy Province. Now, the main element of Australian involvement once again consisted of the AATTV with only a training commitment.

The two NOTTs had been warned several months before this announcement that they might soon be withdrawn from their present role to join with the remainder of the Australian training team at Phuoc Tuy. The majority of the team members, particularly the New Zealanders, were unhappy about the prospects of leaving their tasks with the NOTTs. They had hoped to have trained all PF leaders throughout the Delta in night operations, by March 1972. However, in November 1971, the two teams were told to cease training and to prepare a group of ARVN Officers, who would take over the role of the two NOTTs.

A cadre course was conducted in October and the graduating ARVN Officers assumed responsibility for training at the two centres.[206] The Australian and New Zealand team members now assumed the role of advisers, observing instruction and taking part in de-briefs of the South Vietnamese instructors. The first instructional course that was conducted at Bac Lieu by the Vietnamese since completing the Cadre course was a platoon leader's course, from 25

October to 6 November. Problems emerged almost as soon as the course began, and it was stated by Captain W.M. McLaughlin, the Team Leader at Bac Lieu, that "It soon became obvious that we had expected too much of these instructors."[207]

The first problem was with the Vietnamese leadership. The original Vietnamese Senior Instructor was replaced by a very junior Officer who did not have any experience in instructing in night operations and had only `sat in' on a course three months ago.[208] He was then replaced by another junior rank who had attended the cadre course, and although "very willing, he was unable to plan ahead any further than one - two periods."[209]

The quality of the Vietnamese instructors was very poor. They undertook very little planning and preparation for their lessons, and in the middle of a lesson, an instructor would often stop the lesson while he went to get training aids that he had forgotten to bring. In some cases, the Vietnamese instructors taught entirely the wrong subject matter, which put some lessons out of sequence. This was due, in part, to the fact that although the lesson plans had been distributed to the instructors, they had not been translated into Vietnamese.

Attempts were made to alleviate these problems. A room was established in the team house, so the South Vietnamese instructors could conduct their course planning, prepare their lessons and check their stores. However, the team members were frequently unable to find the instructor prior to the commencement of a lesson. They were therefore unable to ensure that the Vietnamese instructors knew their subject matter and that lessons were planned carefully. It was subsequently found that these instructors did not always receive support from their immediate supervisors, and were also required to give instruction on other courses at the training centre, sometimes at the same time that they were

required to instruct at the Leadership Wing. The task of translating the lesson plans into Vietnamese was begun in mid-1971. A system was initiated whereby on each course a Vietnamese Officer from each of the students' home provinces also attended. This system proved to be of particular value as the motivational level of the students was increased and discipline problems were alleviated to some extent. However, on one of the last courses prior to the withdrawal of the AAAGV NOTTs, the Liaison Officer from Go-Cong province, where all the students on the course came from, caused problems when he was absent for a great deal of the course and when he was present he showed no interest in the course or the students.[210]

When the AAAGV NOTT team members left their respective training centres, the South Vietnamese staff had assumed responsibility for training the NOTTs.[211] Despite an improvement in the quality of the South Vietnamese staff, the team members did not know what standard the training would be maintained at, or if indeed the students would implement what they had learnt upon returning to their own units.[212] Some of the members of the two AATTV teams felt that the future of the NOTT scheme was very much in doubt.

Following the withdrawal of 1ATF and the reorganisation and reallocation of AATTV, which coincided with the relief of the New Zealand members of AATTV, virtually all the Australians and the New Zealanders in AATTV from MRs I, II and IV were redeployed to the JWTC by mid-December 1971.[213]

At the JWTC, the AATTV formed a twenty-one strong team, along with two five-man MATTs, and two fifteen man teams were with the Long Hai and Phuoc Tuy Training Battalions, training Force Armee Nationale Khmere (hereafter FANK) battalions. MATT 1 was involved in the retraining of PF platoon and squad leaders at the JWTC, although the operational situation dictated new training requirements for territorial forces. A request had been received from the

Province Senior Advisor for the MATTs to train one platoon from each district in reconnaissance duties. By November 1972, MATT 1 had begun to conduct a programme of training PF reconnaissance platoons on four-week courses. MATT 2 had been involved with conducting rifle shooting coaches courses with RF NCOs. In late 1972, MATT 2 was due to complete a cycle of training RF companies. Postings between these different units were possible, although the New Zealanders were restricted to working at the JWTC and with the two MATTs.

The AATTV faced a number of problem areas, some of which had not been corrected since Mountfort's departure. Both the students and the staff still made too much noise while they were on operations. The Australians had attempted to rectify this, and other problems, through constant checking, setting examples and the use of post-operational critiques to eradicate such weaknesses. This was also combined with a lack of motivation upon the part of many of the students, who displayed a `war weary' attitude, which did not change even when on operations.[214] However, Phillips felt that solutions to such problems were unlikely in the short term, and the team members could not see any solutions.

Student standards were low, and class participation was limited. This was due to several factors: squad sizes were too large and the number of students per squad was increasing; there was a lack of trained instructors, both South Vietnamese and Australian; the variation in the quality of the students; overlapping range facilities had to be shared with 1ATF: and the South Vietnamese instructors being constantly diverted to administration tasks. The JWTC was dependent upon 1ATF for training assistance, such as helicopters, ranges and support vehicles.

During Mountfort's absence there was little improvement in the security situation of the JWTC. To maintain better security, the Vietnamese staff were forced to mount an inlying piquet of forty-five students each night. To alleviate some of the problems of the RF company assigned to guard the JWTC, several of the Australian instructors provided training to the unit, and eventually there was a noticeable improvement in performance. The wire fences surrounding the JWTC had become overgrown in some places and security outside the immediate environs of the centre was dependent upon 1ATF. The contraction of 1ATF during August and September 1971 more than doubled the existing perimeter of the JWTC.

Due to the weakness of some of the RF companies that were used for the security of the JWTC, large-scale thefts occurred at the PF training centre.[215] Despite corrective action being taken by the JWTC commander, the security situation within the perimeter of the JWTC continued to be lax.

There were differing views held by the various commanders of AATTV about the usefulness of the JWTC to the South Vietnamese. This was primarily due to the relatively small numbers of South Vietnamese that were trained at the Centre.[216] Although approximately 385 ARVN Officers and 362 Senior NCOs were trained at the JWTC during 1970 and 1971, and a further 1,000 Officers and over 800 Senior NCOs were to attend in 1972, these numbers were minute in comparison to the total numbers of troops trained by the US at any one time. Although the quality of instruction at the JWTC was improving, a survey undertaken of the ex-students of the centre showed that only a very small number of them actually put into operation back at their units what they had learnt. In his final report as the Commander of AATTV, Colonel G.J. Leary noted that the JWTC "had been the biggest single problem during my tour."[217] He felt that the planning for the project should have been thought out more clearly. He

recommended that any future commitments similar to the JWTC should be on a short term basis and for a specified period. He noted that such an "open ended contract as was made for the JWTC left little room for maneuver and can lead to misunderstanding, disappointment and fruitless effort."[218]

The effectiveness of the territorial force units in Phuoc Tuy in combating the enemy varied to a great extent during 1971 and 1972. The security situation in Phuoc Tuy Province deteriorated in March and April 1972 as a result of the enemy's Easter Offensive and a large number of enemy troops entered Phuoc Tuy province and largely dominated the countryside.[219] There was little resistance from the territorial forces, particularly the PSDF and the PF, who were reluctant to patrol outside the urban areas. However, by the end of July the enemy had retired from the majority of the province. However, there were instances where RF units acquitted themselves well in major engagements with enemy units. Due to the aggressive patrolling of RF units around Dat Do, the VCs resupply element was forced to cease attempts to penetrate the town by night.[220] Considerable advances in command and control techniques were achieved by the RF, even by the 302nd RF Battalion, when up to seven RF companies were successfully grouped and deployed in the Binh Ba rubber plantation.[221] In one encounter, in October 1971, 40 PF Platoon was able to successfully repulse a company from the 247th NVA Regiment, a particularly important event, given that the platoon had received four weeks training by an AATTV MATT several months before and the platoon and squad leaders had recently completed a PF Cadre course at the JWTC. The aggressive leadership displayed by the platoon commander was also a contributing factor to the platoon's success.[222]

One of the most important problems that faced the territorial forces in Phuoc Tuy during late 1971 and 1972 was a lack of mobility. It was felt by Musgrove that a

troop of Armoured Personnel Carriers (APCs) would have made a "tremendous difference" to the effectiveness of the territorial forces in Phuoc Tuy.[223] Such mobility would have allowed the territorial forces to mobilise quickly to face enemy threats.

Despite such successes, the SCP in Phuoc Tuy was responsible for many of the poor results achieved by the RF during 1971 and 1972. The Command Post showed a lack of confidence toward the RF, which had communicated itself to the RF units, which were not being used aggressively or effectively.[224] This resulted, particularly during early 1972, in poor showings by the RF against main force VC. However, this lack of confidence was not shared by the advisory elements. Phillips had referred to the existing SCP as "no more a TOC than the Peter Badcoe Club at Vung Tau."[225] There was also a lack of forward planning by the Sector staff to provide a province concept of operations, whereby a number of RF or PF units were co-ordinated in one operation. This was seen as an essential requirement if co-ordination was to be achieved by the South Vietnamese, including 1ATF. The activities of the RF were planned on a piecemeal basis, which resulted in the South Vietnamese reacting to VC activity, rather than taking the initiative from the VC. There were, however, instances when the Sector Headquarters was able to control the operations of more than one RF company.

The new role was to decide the future of the New Zealanders attached to the AATTV. In April 1972, Taylor recommended to AGS that New Zealand advise the Australians that it did not intend to fill the five New Zealand positions in AAAGV after the current members concluded their tour in November 1972.[226] This was because the New Zealanders were no longer accomplishing the second part of their original aim, to gain experience in MATTs, the work that the New Zealanders in the JWTC were doing was really no different to that being done by 1NZATTV and the 2nd New

Zealand Army Training Team, Vietnam (2NZATTV). Further, AGS considered that the courses in Australia that all replacements had to attend were unsuitable and expensive in nature. AGS believed that there was no longer any need to provide assistance to the Australians.[227] Lieutenant Colonel V.B. Brown, Commander of NZ V Force, noted that the "JWTC which was established prior to the Leadership Wing at Chi Lang is more advanced in so-called Vietnamisation than the latter."[228]

Brigadier Holloway, the DCGS, agreed there was less importance in New Zealand contributing to AAAGV now there were two New Zealand training teams deployed.[229] However, Holloway warned that New Zealand had to consider its relations with the Australian Army, noting that the New Zealand Army "should not too readily assume that the apparent willingness of the CO of AATTV to take over the New Zealand appointments was necessarily the view of the Australian Army HQ."[230] Before a decision was made, Lieutenant Colonel Cooper, the NZLO in Canberra, was asked to test the opinion in Canberra on the possibility that New Zealand might not continue to contribute to AAAGV.

The Australians now had no particular concern about whichever course of action the New Zealand Government chose to adopt. In a report, Cooper wrote that Seddon had stated that New Zealand should continue to replace those in AAAGV, but "it was clear that he was only concerned that the `pretense' be maintained."[231] When asked directly by Cooper as to whether New Zealand servicemen were still required with AAAGV, the future of New Zealand's continued service with AAAGV was decided when Seddon replied "they were not."[232] Lieutenant General Sir Daly, the Australian CGS, appeared more readily to accept that a case could have existed for Australia to continue its present roles in South Vietnam. However, Whitelaw had stressed to Cooper that this would be a political decision, which would depend on the

outcome of the current NVA offensive, decisions on funding and the continuation of the training of FANK battalions in South Vietnam.[233]

In mid-May 1972, Major General Pearce, the DCDS, was advised by Lieutenant General Webb, now the Chief of Defence Staff (CDS), to inform the Australian Army informally "that while no decision has been taken on our training teams, it is not intended to replace the New Zealand contribution to the Australian Army team in Phuoc Tuy after their tour is completed in October 1972."[234]

In view of the withdrawal of 1ATF from Phuoc Tuy and the increasingly deteriorating security situation in the province, Major General D.B. Dunstan, the Commander of the Australian Forces in Vietnam (COMAFV), decided to relocate the JWTC to a more secure area.[235] The South Vietnamese suggested Van Kiep National Training Centre (NTC) where they had wanted the training to be conducted originally. Thus, in late September, CTC ordered that the JWTC be moved to Van Kiep. By mid-October 1972, the move from Vung Tau to Van Kiep was completed.[236] Since April 1972, there had been almost no instruction undertaken by either the Australians or New Zealanders who had now been relegated to the role of training advisers.

However, the New Zealanders had little chance to begin their new roles in Phuoc Tuy province. On 25 November 1972, the Labour Party was elected to government. N. Kirk, the new Prime Minister of New Zealand, announced that the New Zealanders serving with AAAGV were to be withdrawn.[237] Mountfort summed up what many of the others had felt about attachment to the AATTV: "We regarded ourselves as something rather special...the comradeship that developed was quite special...It was a pretty close bond."[238]

The secondment of five New Zealanders to the Australian Army Training Team in Vietnam was a preparatory measure to enable the New Zealand Army to accumulate pertinent knowledge that would be of benefit to any training team that might be sent to Vietnam later on. The decision made in October 1971 to replace these New Zealanders, rather than withdraw them upon the establishment of 1NZATTV, clearly manifests the New Zealand Army's recognition that valuable expertise continued to be gained through the wide experiences of its personnel attached to AATTV. This small group of personnel was involved in a diverse range of training roles, including MATTs in contrast to the static training that was being undertaken by 1NZATTV.

There is significance in the contraction of AATTV's geographical deployment in 1970 to Phuoc Tuy province. The fortunes of war were not in South Vietnam's favour. It was a withdrawal of vulnerable training team personnel to one of the few remaining `safe provinces'. AATTV's initial role was one of a strictly advisory capacity until 1964, when it expanded into training. The geographical deployment of AATTV's members was contracted in 1970 when AATTV was concentrated in Phuoc Tuy Province. This contraction and change of role into training also correlated with a decrease in AATTV's success, and the MATTs in particular, in increasing the effectiveness of the South Vietnam's territorial forces. VC/NVA successes in 1972 demonstrated their ability to concentrate and also capture South Vietnamese `controlled' areas. I.G. O'Neill, in his book *The Team* argued that: "For long the U.S., South Vietnamese and Australian Governments had been proclaiming the success of Vietnamisation. Recent events denied these claims."[239] This was perhaps a final epitaph for the efforts of the New Zealanders and Australians who served with AATTV in Phuoc Tuy province.

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1. Chapter two briefly discussed the reasons behind the decision to second a small group of New Zealanders to the AATTV.

2. `South Vietnam: New Zealand Military Training Assistance.' To Cabinet from Minister of Defence, dated 5 June 1970, CAB 222/3/2 Defence: South-East Asia Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos 15-5-62 to 30-9-81, Cabinet Paper (CP).

3. South Vietnam: New Zealand Military Training Assistance. To Cabinet from Minister of Defence, dated 5 June 1970, ibid.
For further information on CTC, see Chapter Two of this thesis.

4. The Australians had indicated that it was at Phuoc Tuy that any New Zealand assistance would be "greatly welcomed." ibid.
`Junior leaders' were officers ranked as Lieutenant's or Captain's. They normally commanded a platoon.
For further information on the RF and PF, see Chapter Two of this thesis.

5. `South Vietnam: New Zealand Military Training Assistance.' To Cabinet from Minister of Defence, dated 5 June 1970, ibid.

6. From Brookes, Secretary of Cabinet, to Minister of Defence, dated 9 June 1970, 15/28/13 NZ Force in Vietnam: Training Assistance SVN Forces, vol I, March - August 1970, Defence Classified Registry (DCR).

7. From Lt-Col A.J.A. Cooper (NZDLS) to Brigadier Hassett (DCGS), dated 29 June 1970, ibid.

8. Hassett (DCGS) to AS(Policy), dated 21 August 1970, 15/28/13, vol I.

9. ibid.

10. The members of this team were: Captain R.M. Mountfort; WOI J.A. Baird; WOI B.G. Roe; WOII J.J. Cootes; WOII J.C. Caskey; and Corporal T. Cameron.
The New Zealand members of AATTV were to complete a one year posting.

11. Hassett (DCGS) to AS(Policy), dated 21 August 1970, 15/28/13, vol I.

12. Auckland Star, 20 October 1970.

13. ibid.

14. Directive issued to the Commander NZ V Force, Amendment No 1. From Colonel R.W.K. Ainge, Commander NZ Army Force Far

East, dated 21 October 1970, Serial A225: Directives Issued by Army HQ and HQ NZ Army Force Far East August 1966 - May 1972., DCR. See also Directive to Commander, NZ Vietnam Force, by the CGS, NZ Army, dated 1 February 1971, 15/28/13 NZ Forces in Vietnam: Training Assistance SVN Forces, vol III, December 1970 - May 1972, DCR.

15. Baird had served in Malaya 5 to 29 August 1958. Cootes had seen active service in Malaya from 17 until 24 October 1961 and had served with V Company in South Vietnam. Mountfort had served in Borneo from 9 May to 21 September 1966, and as a platoon commander in V2 Company from 1967 to 1968. Caskey had served in Borneo, Malaya and South Vietnam. Roe had served in Malaya. From individuals personal files.

16. Interview with R.N. Mountfort, 4 March 1992. Mountfort was initially posted to the JWTC at Nui Dat and was then posted to Dong Tam.

17. Colonel G.J. Leary AATTV, End of Tour Report, dated November 1971. Annex A and B to End of Tour Report, 15/28/13 Separates: AATTV Reports, vol IV, July - December 1971, DCR. In his report, Leary made a series of recommendations to change the training that personnel posted to AATTV received.

18. Secretary of Cabinet to Minister of Defence, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Secretary to Treasury, dated 14 July 1971, 15/28/13 vol III.

19. South Vietnam: New Zealand Military Training Assistance. To Cabinet from Minister of Defence, dated 5 June 1970, CAB 222/3/2. It cost the New Zealand Government about $30,000 per annum to have these men attached to the AATTV.

20. A.J.A. Cooper, NZDLS, to AGS, dated 8 October 1970, 15/28/13 NZ Forces in Vietnam: Training Assistance SVN Forces, vol IV, June 1972 - September 1973, DCR.

21. Fenton to CGS. Proposed New Zealand Assistance in Training RF/PF Junior Leaders at Cao Lanh RF Training Centre. Dated 24 June 1970, 15/28/13, vol I.

22. Copies of the course material issued to the New Zealand students for these three courses is held at the Queen Elizabeth II Army Memorial Museum, Waiouru.
The first course was conducted from 21 July to 4 September 1970, the second from 7 to 11 September 1970, and the third from 15 September until 3 October 1970.

23. The course's syllabus is contained in 15/28/13, vol I.

24. Contained in Serial 296: 1NZATTV Command and Leadership Programme of Instruction, to Col GS/D Ed S, dated 26 July, 1971, DCR, is the Basic Vietnamese Course conducted by the Australian Intelligence Centre, then known as the School of

Military Intelligence, in South Australia.

25. Interview with R.N. Mountfort.

26. ibid.

27. Copy held on Caskey's personal file.
The New Zealanders arrived back in New Zealand on 4 October 1970 upon completion of the three courses. Caskey was to arrive later in New Zealand on 8 November 1970.

28. NZDEF Canberra to NZDEF, dated 30 July 1970, 15/28/13, vol I.

29. From Brown to Smith, 20 October 1971, 15/28/13 vol III.

30. They travelled on the same aircraft with Australians who were also being posted to AATTV. Caskey was still in Australia.

31. Interview with R.N. Mountfort.

32. NZ V Force Quarterly Activity Report 1/71, dated 20 April 1971. V.B. Brown to Defence HQ (Army), 15/28/10, vol III.

33. Mountfort had a staff of one Vietnamese Officer, three Australian WOs and eight Vietnamese NCOs.

34. Interview with R.N. Mountfort.
The JWTC was established as an indirect result of 1ATF's aims of supporting pacification and upgrading the RF and PF and conducting operations against enemy main force units.
These aims had come about as a result of an informal instruction issued in June 1969, by the Commander of U.S. Forces, which reflected the importance that Vietnamisation was now accorded by the U.S. Report by the Joint Planning Committee at a Meeting on 26 August 1969. Signed by Lt-Col Monaghan Joint Secretary, Def 23/4/10 Mutual Aid Programme to South Vietnam, Peace negotiations and troop withdrawals, vol 2, October 1969 - April 1970, DCR.
For further information regarding 1ATF's attempts to upgrade the effectiveness of the territorial forces in Phuoc Tuy and the 18th ARVN Division, see Chapter One of this thesis.

35. Interview with R.N. Mountfort.

36. ibid.

37. The first course to be conducted by the JWTC began on 9 February 1971, and was for RF platoon commanders.

38. Interview with R.N. Mountfort. However, these lessons were the first lessons conducted in the first part of the morning.

39. Report by Lt-Col J.W. Sullivan, Australian Team Leader,

JWTC, dated February 1971, 15/28/13. Separates: AATTV Reports, vol II, November 1970 - November 1971, DCR.

40. 1NZATTV was to also experience many of these problems.

41. This point is discussed in Chapter Four of this thesis.

42. Report by Lt-Col J.W. Sullivan, Australian Team Leader, JWTC, dated February 1971, 15/28/13 Separates AATTV Reports, vol II.

43. Interview with R.N. Mountfort.

44. ibid.

45. Report from the JWTC, for the period ending June 1971, dated July 1971, 15/28/13, vol III.

46. ibid.

47. ibid.

48. ibid.

49. Each Captain was responsible for a different aspect of a course. At the JWTC, there were three committees - basic, advanced and operational - each responsible for different parts of the training.

50. Report from the JWTC, for the period ending June 1971, dated July 1971, 15/28/13, vol III.

51. ibid.

52. ibid.

53. ibid.

54. For more information on the JWTC and the courses conducted, see I. McNeill, The Team: Australian Army Advisors in Vietnam, 1962 - 1972 (Australian War Memorial, 1984).

55. Interview with R.N. Mountfort.

56. ibid. The company supplemented its meagre rations with such delicacies as wasps nests for soups, lizards and "they shot at anything that moved for their meals." ibid.

57. ibid. Mountfort's negative attitude would have certainly clouded his perception of the JWTC.

58. Cootes was with MATT 7 for five months; MATT 3 at the Horseshoe for five months, as the team leader; NOTT 1 at Bac Lieu; and, with NOTT 2 at Dong Tam for two months.
Roe spent two and a half months with MATT 3; nine months with MATT 14, based at Long Bien, An Nghe, at the Horseshoe, as the team leader; and also the team leader of MATT 4,

based at An Ngai, in Phuoc Tuy Province.
Baird served with MATT 1 for eleven months; MATT 2 for one month, based in Binh Ba in Phuoc Tuy as the team leader, training the 578th RF Company. Compiled from 15/28/13 Separates: AATTV Reports, vols II, III, IV and V.

59. The MATTs were consecutively numbered as they were raised. Numbers 10 and 13 were not used because the South Vietnamese considered the number `10' as unlucky and the Australians avoided the use of `13', an unlucky number. As a result, the MATTs, eventually a total of fourteen, one of which was attached to the JWTC, were numbered up to 16.

60. The Australian MATTs, until their concentration in Phuoc Tuy Province in 1970, had more of a training role than the US MATs.

61. The Claymore was a flat rectangular mine which contained over 700 steel balls which, when the mine was activated, were propelled forward in an arc two metres high, sixty degrees wide and fifty metres deep.

62. I. McNeill, The Team, p. 443. The Australians had used two-man MATTs in the Delta, but these were unsuccessful, mainly because they were too small.

63. The introduction of these MATTs resulted in an increased level of training, liaison and co-operation between the Vietnamese and 1ATF.

64. AATTV Report June 1970 from HQ AATTV, dated 12 July 1970, 15/28/13 Separates: AATTV Reports, vol I, April - October 1970, DCR.

65. ibid.

66. By June 1971 the MATTs were employed on two distinct tasks; MATTs 1, 4, 5, 7 and 8 trained RF companies within their districts. MATTs 2, 6, 9, 12 and 14 trained PF platoons. MATT 3 assisted the 302nd RF Battalion.

67. MATT 1 worked with the 480th RF Company from 19 to 24 April 1971, and then worked with the 655th RF Company from 26 April to 1 May 1971.

68. For an explanation of some of these weaknesses, see Chapter Four of this thesis.

69. Report by Major K. Phillips, Senior Australian Adviser, Phuoc Tuy, dated January 1971, 15/28/13 Separates: AATTV Reports, vol II.

70. The PSDF was created in 1968 and was organised into combat and support troops. By the end of 1970, the PSDF totalled nearly four million, of which 1,326,571 were combat members equipped with 463,752 weapons.
The role of the PSDF was to defend their hamlets and to as-

sist with the maintenance of security. However, the major purpose of the creation of the PSDF was to commit as many of the people as possible to the government by soaking up the manpower and denying it to the enemy.

71. This MATT provided initial training in Long Tam and Long Toan hamlets for about one month; provided continuation training to units in An Nhut village and in the hamlets of Long Tan and Long Lam for about three weeks; and provided specialist training for one or two members from each hamlet PSDF inter-team in Long Dien village for sixteen days. During April, the MATT undertook some limited training of the PSDF, in Phuoc Hoa.
The combat PSDF was organised into groups of 134, which consisted of three inter-teams of forty-four members each. Each inter-team was then broken into three fourteen-member teams.

72. It was in these areas that an advisory effort was of particular value.

73. The soldiers of the PSDF were well known for being `trigger-happy', and some urban dwellers felt there was a greater probability that they would be shot at when stopped by the PSDF than by the VC. Tran Dinh Tho, Pacification (Washington DC, 1980), p. 169.

74. Even during early 1971, PSDF units in Phuoc Tuy Province were short of 1,000 rifles, over half of which were still in armouries awaiting magazines.

75. Report by WO II B. Cullen, Team Leader MATT 12, dated January 1971, 15/28/13 Separates: AATTV Reports, vol II.

76. ibid.

77. Report by Major Hearder, Team Leader MATT 3. Report for month ending June 1971, 15/28/13 Separates: AATTV Reports, vol III, March - June 1971, DCR.

78. ibid.

79. Report by Major Musgrove, RF/PF Adviser, Phuoc Tuy Province, dated December 1971, 15/28/13 Separates: AATTV Reports, vol IV.

80. This team consisted of approximately ninety U.S. advisors in three MATs, including some AATTV personnel, based at the province headquarters and in each of Phuoc Tuy's districts.

81. Report by Major Musgrove, RF/PF Adviser, Phuoc Tuy Province, dated December 1971, 15/28/13 Separates: AATTV Reports, vol IV.

82. ibid.

83. ibid.

84. ibid.

85. The village nurse told the MATT members that she was unable to order medical supplies more than once a week and the amount she was able to obtain was small.

86. This also enabled the AATTV MATTs to discontinue their direct support role as instructors for the PSDF.

87. AATTV MATTs 1, 5, 6, 7 and 14 were involved in this programme.

88. Report by WOII R. Neagle, Team Leader MATT 7, dated January 1971, 15/28/13, vol II.

89. ibid.

90. ibid.

91. Report by Major K. Phillips, Senior Adviser Phuoc Tuy, dated January 1971, ibid.

92. ibid.

93. Report by Maj R.V. Musgrove, Senior Australian Advisor, Phuoc Tuy Province, dated July 1971, 15/28/13 Separates: AATTV Reports, vol IV.

94. ibid.

95. ibid.

96. Report by Major K. Phillips, Senior Adviser Phuoc Tuy, dated March 1971, ibid.

97. ibid.

98. Report by Major R.V. Musgrove, Senior Australian Advisor Phuoc Tuy Province, dated July 1971, 15/28/13 Separates: AATTV Reports, vol IV.

99. ibid.

100. ibid.

101. Report by Major K. Phillips, Senior Australian Advisor, Phuoc Tuy Province, dated March 1971, 15/28/13 Separates: AATTV Reports, vol III.

102. Report by Major K. Phillips, Senior Australian Adviser, Phuoc Tuy Province, dated April 1971, ibid.

103. ibid.

104. ibid.

105. ibid.

106. ibid.

107. Report by Major K. Phillips, Senior Australian Adviser, Phuoc Tuy Province. Annex C to AATTV Report, dated October 1970, 15/28/13 Separates: AATTV Reports, vol I.

108. ibid.

109. Report by Maj R.V. Musgrove, Senior Australian Advisor, Phuoc Tuy Province, dated July 1971, 15/28/13 Separates: AATTV Reports, vol IV.

110. ibid.

111. ibid.

112. ibid.

113. ibid.

114. Report by Major Musgrove, RF/PF Adviser, Phuoc Tuy Province, dated October 1971, 15/28/13 Separates: AATTV Reports, vol IV.

115. ibid.

116. There were also other US servicemen in Phuoc Tuy Province; supply and logistics troops from units located at Vung Tau and Baria, US Navy personnel training South Vietnamese naval personnel at Cat Lo Naval Base, and US troops on R and R at Vung Tau. However, in mid-November 1970, the US MATs in Phuoc Tuy province moved to Phuoc Long Province.

117. AATTV Report, Colonel J.A. Clarke, dated November 1970, 15/28/13 Separates: AATTV Reports, vol II.

118. ibid.

119. Report by Major K. Phillips, Senior Australian Adviser, Phuoc Tuy Province, dated February 1971, 15/28/13 Separates: AATTV Reports, vol III.

120. ibid.

121. Report by Major K. Phillips, Senior Australian Adviser, Phuoc Tuy, dated April 1971, 15/28/13 Separates: AATTV Reports, vol II.

122. ibid.

123. ibid.

124. ibid.

125. Report by Musgrove, Senior Australian Adviser, Phuoc

Tuy Province, for period 1 - 30 September, dated September 1971, 15/28/13 Separates: AATTV Reports, vol III.

126. Colonel J.A. Clark, AATTV Report, dated November 1970, p. 4, 15/28/13 Separates: AATTV Reports, vol II.Clark commanded AATTV from 27 January 1970 - 5 January 1971.

127. ibid. See also T.C. Thayer, A Systems Analysis View of the Vietnam War: 1965 - 1972, vol 7: RVNAF (Washington DC, 1975), p. 10.

128. Report by Major K. Phillips, Senior Australian Adviser, Phuoc Tuy, dated April 1971, 15/28/13 Separates: AATTV, vol III.

129. AATTV Report by Major K. Phillips, dated March 1971, 15/28/13 Separates: AATTV Reports, vol III.

130. ibid.

131. J.J. Clarke, US Army in Vietnam: Advice and Support: The Final Years, 1965 - 1973 (Washington DC, 1988), p. 384.

132. ibid.

133. A NOTT trained different units at a centralised training centre.

134. To CGS from HQ NZ V Force, dated June 1970, 15/28/13 NZ Forces in Vietnam: Training Assistance SVN Forces, vol II, September 1970 - December 1970, DCR.

135. For further information, see also I. McNeill, The Team, pp. 290 - 301.

136. This team was responsible for the eight northern provinces in the Delta.

137. The provinces were: Vinh Binh, Chau Thanh: Vinh Binh, Cau Thanh: and Phong Dinh, Phong Phu.
Caskey was attached to MATT 3, based in Long Dien and in April 1971 was transferred to NOTT 2 for nine months as an instructor. In late 1971 he was temporarily the team leader of NATT 1 at Bac Lieu, and then transferred to Vung Tau as an Administration Warrant Officer for his final two months in South Vietnam.

138. A NOAT had two roles - to visit ex-students after they had received their training from a central training centre, and to provide advise to the RF units.

139. Report by WOII I. Caskey, Team Leader NATT 3, 15/28/13, vol II.

140. ibid.

141. Certainly, this not have reflected the `normal' daily

activities of the RF units that were visited.

142. I. McNeill, The Team, p. 300.

143. Present at this conference were: Colonel G.J. Leary, the Commander of AATTV, Browne, Capt B. McGurgon, General Truong (commander of MR IV), General McCown, and the US Army Commander Delta Military Assistance Command.

144. Both teams were commanded by an Australian Major based at the Delta Civilian Advisory Headquarters at Can Tho. NOTT 1 was to train PF personnel from units in the southern part of the Delta. NOTT 2 was responsible for the training of PF units from the twelve Delta provinces north of the Can Tho Mekong Branch.

145. A `mechanical ambush' was one that was initiated with a series of electrically linked Claymore mines.

146. A ceiling of thirty students was decided upon because this number was not only a convenient number to handle, but a platoon was comprised of thirty personnel.

147. Report by WO2 Caskey, Team Leader Bac Lieu NOAT, dated March 1971, 15/28/13 Separates: AATTV Reports, vol III. Caskey became NOTT 2's temporary leader. In April 1971 he became the team's 2IC when he was replaced by Captain A.R. Thomas.

148. ibid.

149. ibid.

150. ibid.

151. On several occasions, both teams experienced a shortage of students, although this never became an on-going problem. NOAT 1 Report by Captain A.R. Thomas, dated May 1971, 15/28/13, vol III.

152. For one squad leaders course, ten students were provided each from Cai Lay and Cai Be districts while the remaining ten students came from Sam Giang, Cho Gao and Gao Duc districts.

153. Mountfort, when he was due to return to New Zealand later that year, was replaced as the team's OC in October 1971 by another New Zealander, Captain J.R. Sheriff.

154. Interview with R.N. Mountfort. The NOTT members were not involved in any civic action projects.

155. ibid.

156. The team was quartered in the 7th ARVN Division training centre, which also provided the team with training assistance. The team's logistic support was provided by an

American province advisory team at My Tho.

157. Interview with R.N. Mountfort.

158. ibid. This became known as `Australia House'.

159. A `team house' was where the team members lived.

160. Interview with R.N. Mountfort.

161. These condition were also the same at Bac Lieu. This problem was accentuated by very poor road conditions.

162. The team members were given an allowance to buy food from the Vietnamese, the same system as used by the Americans.

163. Interview with R.N. Mountfort.

164. ibid.

165. ibid.

166. ibid.

167. Report by Capt R.M. Mountfort, Team Leader, NOTT Dong Tam, dated October 1971, 15/28/13 Separates: AATTV Reports, vol IV.

168. ibid.

169. NOAT 1 Report by Captain A.R. Thomas, Team Leader NOAT 1, dated May 1971, 15/28/13 Separates: AATTV Reports, vol III.

170. Report by WO II I.C. Caskey, Team Leader Bac Lieu NOAT, dated March 1971, 15/28/13, vol II.

171. Interview with R.N. Mountfort.

172. ibid.

173. In the southern Mekong Delta area of South Vietnam, the local people had a superstition about the owl. Custom had it that if the owl looked upon a person, it resulted in an evil omen and eventual death.
The Australian and New Zealand members of the two NOTTs also wore the badge on their uniforms.

174. Interview with R.N. Mountfort.
The number of groups varied between one to three, depending upon how many provinces or districts they were to visit. Each NOAT was supposed to always have a PF escort when moving by foot or water.
Each NOAT typically moved into a particular district to contact the District Chief to ascertain where the ex-students were located. Then, an itinerary for the visit was made to

visit as many of the ex-students' units as possible.

175. Interview with R.N. Mountfort.

176. ibid.

177. ibid.

178. ibid.

179. ibid.

180. Report by Captain R.M. Mountfort AATTV NOTT Dong Tam, 20 August - 17 September 1971, 15/28/13 Separates: AATTV Reports, vol IV.

181. Report by WOII Caskey, Team Leader NOAT Bac Lieu, dated April 1971, ibid.
A new method of packing Claymores meant that firing devices and test equipment was not included and a unit was now expected to use such equipment from previously used Claymores. However, this proved difficult for many PF units had a shortage of serviceable Claymores. They also suffered a serious shortage of batteries for the mechanical firing of Claymores. Report by Capt Mountfort, Senior Advisor, NOAT, Dong Tam, dated April 1971, ibid.

182. Report by Captain A.R. Thomas, Team Leader, NOTT Bac Lieu, 26 June - 26 July 1971, dated July 1971, ibid.

183. Interview with R.N. Mountfort.

184. ibid.

185. ibid.

186. ibid.

187. ibid.

188. Report by Captain R.R. Thomas, Team Leader NOAT 1, dated April 1971, 15/28/13 Separates: AATTV Reports, vol III.
The strengths of some platoons were as low as four personnel, rather than the official strength of twenty-nine.

189. Report by WO II Caskey, Team Leader, MOAT Bac Lieu, dated April 1971, ibid.

190. Report by Capt B. McGurgon, Senior Advisor NAT, ibid.

191. ibid. Also, I. McNeill, The Team, pp. 305 - 306.

192. A letter of appreciation from the Deputy Province Senior Advisor, dated 2 August 1972, is held on Caskey's personal file.

193. CDS to CGS, dated 23 February 1971, 15/28/13, vol III. As already noted, the original intention had been that the five New Zealanders would be withdrawn at the end of a year when 1NZATTV was established and 1NZATTV's establishment was to be increased accordingly.

194. Discussion with DMO and P following his visit to NZ. By A.J.A. Cooper, Army Liaison Officer, dated 19 March 1971, Army 95/1 Visits - to NZ - General, vol 4, July 1968 - April 1971, DCR.
Whitelaw was soon after promoted to Brigadier and became the Director of Military Operations and Plans.

195. There was only one casualty amongst the New Zealanders who were attached to the AATTV. In mid-November 1971, Captain J. Sheriff was wounded in the foot, when an Australian WO in Sheriff's team accidentally fired a .45 pistol that he was preparing to clean.

196. The expenditure involved with the five personnel to complete the courses in Australia was $NZ3,175. Secretary of Cabinet to Minister of Defence, Minister of Foreign Affairs, Secretary to Treasury, dated 14 July 1971, Army 95/1, vol 4.

197. NZDEF Canberra to NZDEF ARMY, dated 080645Z October 1971, 15/28/13, vol III.

198. Handwritten comments written and signed on the signal by Pearce, ibid.

199. ibid.

200. ibid.

201. These replacements, Sheriff, WOII G.J. Morrison, WOI T. Samuels and WOII Hall, attended a Colloquial Language course from 13 July to 2 August 1971; a Tropical Warfare Advisors Course from 3 August to 22 September 1971 and an AATTV Weapons course from 23 to 29 September 1971. They were to have attended a Vietnamese language course at Wellington Polytechnic in late 1971, but the course was cancelled. Like the initial four students, they achieved very well on the courses; Samuel's achieved the highest result on the Vietnamese language course. They served in AATTV from October 1971 to October 1972.

202. From Brown to Smith, 20 October 1971, 15/28/13, vol III. `Smith' was M.W.B. Smithies, the Assistant Secretary, Australian Department of Defence

203. From Brown to Colonel J.L. Smith, dated 20 October 1971, ibid.

204. A copy of the letter awarding him this award is on Samuel's personal file.

205. This change occurred at midnight on 5 March 1972. There had been discussion in Canberra between Defence and Army Staff during the latter months of 1971, regarding the question of whether a residual force from AATTV should remain in Vietnam once the major units of 1ATF had withdrawn. The Australian Army preferred to withdraw completely, but the government considered there was a military and political advantage in retaining a presence in the province. Notes on a discussion between Daly and Webb in November 1971 on this issue are contained in Army 95/1 Visits - to NZ - General, vol 5, May 1971 - April 1972, DCR.

206. This cadre course was conducted from 18 to 24 October 1971. These officers came primarily from the 7th and 21st ARVN Divisions, and a small number from the National Police Field Force. The 7th ARVN division officers assumed responsibility for the NOTT at Dong Tam, and those from the other Division - Bac Lieu.

207. Monthly report by Capt W.M. McLaughlin Team Leader NOTT Bac Lieu. Monthly report: NOTT Dong Tam, 25 October 1971 - 26 November 1971, 15/28/13 Separates: AATTV Reports, vol IV.

208. The Senior Instructor ensured that the POI was organised and that training was conducted effectively and efficiently.

209. Monthly report by Capt W.M. McLaughlin Team Leader NOTT Bac Lieu. Monthly report: NOTT Dong Tam, 25 October 1971 - 26 November 1971, 15/28/13 Separates: AATTV Reports, vol IV.

210. Report on Platoon leaders course 25 October - 6 November 1971, and Squad Leaders course, 10 November - 24 November 1971. Report dated November 1971, ibid.

211. Since February 1971, when the NOTTs had begun to train PF leaders, the NOTT at Dong Tam had trained 341 Officers and 198 NCOs from over 180 PF platoons. The NOTT at Bac Lieu, over the same period, had trained 138 Officers and 123 NCOs, from almost 140 PF platoons. Report for period ended October 1971, dated November 1971, ibid.

212. ibid.

213. The headquarters element of AATTV, however, remained in Saigon until 1 February 1972 when it was withdrawn to Phuoc Tuy.

214. On the second Officers course conducted at the JWTC, fifteen percent of the failures were attributed to such attitudes.

215. Some of the thieves came from the RF companies assigned to protect the centre.

216. I. McNeill, The Team, pp. 478 - 479.

217. End of Tour Report, Colonel G.J. Leary, Commander of AATTV, dated December 1971, 15/28/13 Separates: AATTV Reports, vol IV.

218. ibid.

219. NZATGV. Colonel Fenton (for DCGS) to ACDS, dated 18 July 1972, 15/28/13 Separates: AATTV Reports, vol IV. This brought the total number of enemy troops in Phuoc Tuy province to about 3,000.

220. ibid.

221. ibid.

222. Report by Major Musgrove, RF/PF Adviser, Phuoc Tuy Province, dated October 1971, 15/28/13, vol IV.

223. ibid.

224. During early March 1972, there were five RF companies guarding Route 23 from Dat Do to Xuyen Moc that could have been used more effectively elsewhere.

225. Report by Major K. Phillips, Senior Australian Adviser, Phuoc Tuy Province, dated April 1971, 15/28/13 Separates: AATTV Reports, vol III. The `Peter Badcoe' club was a rest centre.
The TOC was the equivalent of a Command Post.

226. Future of NZATGV. Attachments to AATTV, from Lieutenant-Colonel Taylor to CGS, dated 6 April 1972, ibid.

227. NZATGV. Colonel Fenton (for DCGS) to ACDS, dated 18 July 1972, 15/28/13 Separates: AATTV Reports, vol IV.

228. V.B. Brown to AGS Wellington, dated 17 April 1972, 15/28/13, vol III.

229. To CGS from DCGS, dated 11 April 1972, ibid.

230. ibid.

231. Future of NZATGV. To Col Fenton, NZ Defence Liaison staff NZ High Commission, 2 May 1972, ibid.

232. ibid.

233. NZDLO (Lt-Col A.J.A. Cooper, Army Liaison Officer) to DCGS, dated 12 May 1972, ibid. The Australians were also due to make a decision on the future of their participation in the FANK training programme.
The question of a continued presence of New Zealanders with the AATTV was discussed by the prime ministers of Australia and New Zealand.

234. CGS from Webb(CDS), 19 May 1972, ibid.

235. Dunstan commanded COMAFV from 6 March 1971 until 6 March 1972.

236. For further information on Van Kiep, see I.G. O'Neill, The Team, p. 464.

237. The AATTV had 192 officers, 652 Warrant Officers and Sergeants, 142 Corporals, and four privates: a total of 990 personnel in AATTV. New Zealand's contribution to the AATTV was: two officers, seven Warrant Officers and one Corporal: a total of ten New Zealanders. The Dominion, 25 November 1972.

238. Interview with R.N. Mountfort.

239. I. O'Neill, The Team, p. 475.

CHAPTER FOUR

1NZATTV AT CHI LANG.

> We trained an Army and we trained an air force. Wrong equipment, wrong tactics, maybe wrong doctrine, but we produced an army.[1]


This chapter, divided into two main sections, will discuss the activities of the 1st New Zealand Army Training Team, Vietnam (hereafter 1NZATTV) at Chi Lang. This will involve examining the following related topics: the training undertaken by the members of 1NZATTV prior to their arrival at Chi Lang; the establishment of the New Zealand compound and training wing at Chi Lang; validating the effectiveness of 1NZATTV's training programme; Attention will be given to alternative employment for the team following a deterioration in South Vietnam's war fortunes and judgements that the team had fulfilled its original role, and tension between a political desire for the retention of a symbolic presence and unit safety. The second part of this chapter examines the problems that faced the instructors, including difference in language and culture; the types of instructional methods used, and evaluations of their success; to what extent were the Vietnamese students willing and able to learn and to absorb the instruction that 1NZATTV offered; and the security situation in the Chi Lang area.

While government approval was being sought by for the dispatch of a training team, the New Zealand Army was already raising such a team. On 30 October 1970, New Zealand's Defence Headquarters had issued a warning order for the raising of 1NZATTV.[2] The warning order listed the personnel selected for the Engineer party which was to build

the compound at Chi Lang, the training team's advance party, and those nominated for a preparatory course to select the main body of the training team.[3] Two weeks later, instructions regarding the deployment of the Engineer party were issued.[4] The advance party departed from Whenuapai Air Base on 15 November and the main body departed on 7 December. The organisation of the construction party is shown in Table 9.[5]

TABLE 9

ORGANISATION OF THE RNZE CONSTRUCTION PARTY.



When approval was given for the establishment of the training team, its members were quickly deployed. The members of 1NZATTV's advance party concentrated at Papakura by 5 December 1970 and left Whenuapai on 7 December for South Vietnam.[6]

The training team's advance party had a busy schedule prior to the arrival of the main body at Chi Lang. Together with twenty-seven Americans who were to be posted to Mobile Advisory Teams (hereafter MATs), the party attended the United States (hereafter U.S.) Advisors' course No 82 at Di An from 12 to 29 December.[7] After completing the course, the advance party returned to Chi Lang, where they were required to complete a number of projects. These included preparing a brief for the New Zealand preparatory course, organising lesson plans, selecting training areas,

establishing a demonstration platoon, preparing a briefing for the main body, assessing MAT training programmes with a view to possible attachments by the main body, finalising an in-theatre familiarisation training programme for the main body, and organising courses to select and train Vietnamese staff.[8]

The members of the training team's main body were also busy. To prepare for their operational training role, they undertook two periods of training before concentrating at Chi Lang. The first course, a two-week pre-deployment course, was conducted in New Zealand from 3 to 17 December 1970.[9] The course was intensive, involving five and a half days (including three nights) per week. The candidates were briefed on the organisation and role of 1NZATTV and on Military Region (hereafter MR) IV, and undertook refresher training on the courses and subject material that they would be teaching.[10] Although it had been decided that the instruction would be in Vietnamese, the only training that the students received was a two-hour "general discussion" on instructing through an interpreter.[11]

Most of those nominated to attend the selection course wanted to go to Vietnam. One recalled: "we were breaking our necks to get over there...It was somewhere to be a soldier instead of playing games over here [in New Zealand]."[12] Like most servicemen who serve overseas, the prospect of enforced separation from their families made many of the married men reluctant to go. One team member, who had only been married six months, went only because he felt that not to have done so would have been detrimental to his career.[13]

Those selected for the main body went on leave until 9 January 1971. They flew out from Whenuapai on 11 January, arriving at Tan Son Nhut airfield on 14 January 1971.[14] There, they were welcomed to the Free Forces Headquarters by Major D. Ogilvy, the commander of 1NZATTV, Lieutenant

Colonel V.B. Brown, the Commander of New Zealand (hereafter NZ) V Force, and the New Zealand Liaison Officer, WOI M. Edwards.[15]

Prior to being deployed to Chi Lang, the team members undertook a series of familiarisation visits. They attended a U.S. Advisors' course and spent four weeks attached to U.S. MATs in MR IV (four weeks was decided upon because of a shortage of accommodation at Chi Lang).[16] New Zealand Army General Staff (hereafter AGS) felt that posting the team members to these MATs would enable them to study the type of training given to the local forces by the MATs, and observe how units conducted operations. The experience could be put into practice in Chi Lang.[17]

The the main body then flew to Nui Dat in Phuoc Tuy province for the first of a series of familiarisation visits. They visited the Vietnamese training centre at Van Kiep, an Australian Mobile Advisory and Training Team (hereafter MATT) at Long Hai, and the Jungle Warfare Training Centre (hereafter JWTC). One of the team members, W.S. Vautier, recalled that they learnt some of the "frustrations of the language barrier, the Asiatic mind, what they would listen to. The Vietnamese were very quick to shut off if they didn't want to learn something."[18] However, they saw little relation between what they had observed on their visits and their future role at Chi Lang. The Australians were "playing a different ball game to us. They were living in military compounds training ARVN [Army of the Republic of Vietnam]...we would be training Regional Forces (hereafter RF) which were further down the line."[19] The team flew back to Saigon on 20 January to prepare for their attendance the Advisors Course No 82 at Di An.

Many of the New Zealanders felt the advisors course a waste of time and also frustrating, some feeling that they retained only about ten percent of the subject matter.[20] The New Zealanders were used to instructional methods

involved learning through a `hands-on' approach rather than theoretical. Most of the course was concerned with "talking hypothetics and we found that we could not relate to this hypothetical system."[21] The American style of instruction compounded their frustrations and made learning more difficult. One team member noted that, although the American instructors were highly skilled, their method of delivery was "inflexible to the point of being automated."[22] Another compared the American style of instruction to "plugging in a video. The instructor would just talk, wouldn't look around. While he spoke, there would be an Assistant Instructor (hereafter AI) either side of him, each with a weapon. As he stated a part, the AIs would point to it. He'd say the stripping sequence, for example, and the AIs would do it. They knew everything inside out and backwards, but the actual instructor didn't do anything."[23] However, many of the New Zealanders did learn to some degree, such as conditioning them to the American training and supply system, and background to the Vietnamese social customs and Vietnamese language dialects, the latter of which differed from the one taught to them earlier in New Zealand.

At the completion of the course the twelve instructors were deployed to Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) headquarters at Can Tho on 8 February 1971, where they were briefed on their intended attachments by Colonel J.V. Deputy, and the headquarters G2 and G3.[24] Their deployment was to be in two two-week phases. Phase one, which began on 11 February, included attachment to MATs in village and hamlet security, and phase two, from 5 to 18 March, with RF battalions and RF company groups.[25] Table 10 lists the personnel attached to the U.S. MATs.[26]

The New Zealand instructors saw at first hand the type of war that was being fought and the type of terrain in which their future students lived, fought and died in. One

of the team members, G.G. Tomlin, who travelled to his MAT by helicopter, recollected that from 2,000 feet, "as far as you could see in any direction to the horizon, it just looked like shimmering glass with green on top of it."[27] The type of war fought in MR IV was predominantly one of small unit actions, involving either patrolling and ambushing or infantry attacks without supporting armour or heavy artillery. These tactics were imposed by the region's demographic, geographic and economic characteristics. Because much of the tactical and logistical movement was over water, many of the battles were fought for the control of the canals. Seasonal factors also affected the war: the enemy usually launched their larger attacks during the monsoon season, when the weather allowed easier concealment on the Delta, whereas the South Vietnamese forces generally launched their offensives during the dry season when vehicular movement was much easier.

TABLE 10

ATTACHMENT OF 1NZATTV PERSONNEL TO U.S. MATS.

	Province	Advisory Team No.	Phase 1	Phase 2
WO1 L. Hepi WO11 P. Hunter	Kien Phong	–	162	84
WO11 E.T.M. Grace WO11 R.A. Lowe	Kien Hoa	5	91	88
WO11 R.T. Potatau WO11 W.A. Kearney	Kien Giang	102	87	55
WO11 I.S. Fraser WO11 C.G. Tomlin	An Xuyen	115	103	80
WO11 G.A. Horsfall WO11 G.P. Eyles	Phong Dinh	60	101	56
WO11 W.S. Vautier WO11 C. Howard	Vinh Binh	42	144	72

The New Zealanders found their time with the MATs invaluable, because, recalled Vautier, "it was here that we finally got down to grips with the [type of] person we were to be dealing with at Chi Lang."[28] They would also see some of the results of the U.S. training system, and the over-reliance of the South Vietnamese officers and men on such U.S. tactics as overwhelming fire-power. Some of the New Zealanders were shocked at the lack of basic infantry skills displayed by many of the Vietnamese soldiers they encountered. For example, while the Vietnamese soldiers usually began a patrol with weapons `at the ready', after a while: "they just started to chatter and...they took their boots off. They tied their laces together, put their rifles over their shoulder, muzzle forward, butt to the rear and hung their boots on the muzzle and walked along that way.[29] In one instance, a radio operator "had a pack with a radio strapped to it and a speaker tied to the side. The volume of the radio was so high that incoming traffic could be heard up to 100 metres away."[30]

They found that the Vietnamese had a very lax attitude towards security. One team member noted that in a unit compound he stayed at: "Out from the compound about 100 metres to one side there was a listening post...The Vietnamese would go to sleep out there. You would ring on the field telephone and if they didn't get an answer a soldier would jump up on the berm and fire shots over their head to wake them up. Then you'd ring the phone again and they would stand up."[31]

The Vietnamese could also be very careless with their equipment. In one compound, a New Zealander half filled a box with M16 ammunition he found left lying on the ground: "The little kids were getting dad's magazines and pulling the bullets out because they were so nice and shiny and flicking them out in the sun and watching them sparkle. The soldiers wouldn't pick them up, just walk over the top of

them. If we dropped a round we would have to pick it up, clean it, make sure it wasn't dented and put it back in the magazine."[32]

The New Zealanders were appalled by the numerous examples of poor leadership they saw. They were used to the principle of `leadership by example', which meant very little to Vietnamese officers, who often led `from behind'. When patrolling with the Vietnamese, the New Zealanders' philosophy was to do everything that the Vietnamese did: "we wouldn't expect them to run through a paddy field and get wet and covered in mud without us as well. We would be there with them, making them do it", recalls one of the instructors, G.P. Eyles.[33] The Vietnamese officers tended to "stand on top of a berm, and with their cane direct the operation from there, where there was no water or mud."[34] Some Vietnamese officers considered it below their dignity to carry any equipment on operations beyond a pistol and a cane to point out directions to their men. Their other equipment was carried for them. The Vietnamese officer was usually unwilling to talk to or involve his men in the objectives or planning of a particular operation. While there were clearly valid security reasons for this, it was suggested that the principal reason was their personal pride in being seen as the `source of all knowledge'. Usually, all the soldiers were told was that they were going into battle.

There was an apparent lack of control by the South Vietnamese soldiers when firing their weapons. Several team members frequently observed weapons being fired haphazardly, with no consideration of the possible fall of shot. One U.S. MAT had to take cover from the fire of a South Vietnamese unit. Once the firing stopped, a second MAT (which the first had been en route to visit when the firing started) found its movie screen and one of its vehicles full of bullet holes.[35]

Despite there being a lack of air and artillery support for the RF/Popular Forces (hereafter PF), some team members saw that the available support was not being exploited effectively. A team member noted that one RF company commander tended to clear any ground that was suspected of hiding the enemy by calling in artillery fire. Several team members noted the Vietnamese reluctance to make contact with the enemy, and the `understandings' between the South Vietnamese and Vietnamese Communists (hereafter VC). The former would agree to set their ambushes in the same place every night on the understanding that the VC would avoid them. Their attitude was a quite pragmatic response to both VC assurances that American units were their primary targets, and warnings that if such arrangements were not acceptable the VC would simply wipe the smaller ARVN force out as well. Some Vietnamese units were reluctant to operate at night, accepting without question that `the night belongs to Charlie'.[36]

Although the territorial forces were supposed to be protecting the local villagers, often while on patrol they "just robbed the poor villagers blind."[37] For example, the villagers stored crabs in small cages immersed in water. When moving through a village, "the soldiers would pick up these cages, tie them at the end of their rifles and away they'd go."[38] The hardships resulting from such theft caused serious problems, as after these `friendly' soldiers had completed their pillage, the victims of the theft frequently developed pro-VC sympathies. Most VC units did not steal, although they did impose some taxes on the villages.

The New Zealanders were surprised to find that some American advisers appeared reluctant to carry out their duties. During his time with one MAT, Tomlin noted that: "One area we went to...The Americans literally sat where they had their tent and didn't bloody well move. The closer

it came for the time for them to go back to the States the less they wanted to move away from the place in case they got shot. Some of them were getting really neurotic."[39] Some of the advisors perceived the majority of RF units as untrustworthy. The Americans had warned the New Zealanders of the potential dangers of working with the Vietnamese at night, and were themselves reluctant to accompany the Vietnamese units at night unless escorted by two fellow officers. There had cases of advisers having awoken to find that the RF unit had deserted them to return to the safer confines of their base. Some of the New Zealanders found it hard not to sympathise with the attitudes of the U.S. advisers.

These visits served to affect the attitudes of the team members towards their intended role. While most Vietnamese officers and soldiers displayed obvious shortcomings, some team members observed units that did attempt to stand and fight. Nonetheless, the RF were frequently unsuccessful, due to inadequate training and lack of motivation, both indicative of poor leadership. This was because, recollects Vautier, "you never had enough time to train a person who spent his days in the paddy fields and then came home at night to defend his village."[40] One team member saw how inadequate training and motivation turned one attempt at aggressive action to disaster. At 1.00 one morning, he was advised that a nearby PF unit which, only two days before he had taken them through a short course on how to set an ambush, had nearly been wiped out. They had "gone out and set up an ambush. After two hours they had decided that they had had enough, put their rifles over their shoulders, and walking back to the hamlet, just about got wiped out by the North Vietnamese Army [hereafter NVA]."[41] Such experiences positively altered the attitudes of some of the New Zealanders towards the Vietnamese and their own forthcoming task at Chi Lang: "I had more incentive, particularly with the example of those Vietnamese...who tried to do their job. They wanted the life of

freedom...But, they weren't sufficiently trained to do their job correctly. Because of this...I decided that they should be as well trained as they possibly could be..I think that this attitude was present among at least some of the other team members."[42] Not all the team members were as optimistic. By the end of their tours with the MATs the more pessimistic, Tomlin among them, saw the RF as being only "civilians in uniform", who "did not give a hoot, they didn't really want to fight."[43]

Notwithstanding the shortcomings they had identified in their potential students, the New Zealanders had benefited from this orientation period. By the time they regrouped at Can Tho on 18 and 19 March, they had set a very high standard and were highly commended by both MAT leaders and Province Senior Advisors.[44] On 20 March, the men flew out of Can Tho for Chi Lang.

By the time the main body arrived at Chi Lang, the block syllabus had been organised.[45] Beyond this, however, little in the construction of the compound had been achieved because of several major contributing factors which were not the fault of the engineers. Upon their arrival at Chi Lang, the Engineers established a tented camp, using tentage and other accommodation stores left behind at Nui Dat by Whiskey (`W') Company.[46] When they commenced construction of the permanent camp, they found their equipment, comprising a minor pieces, was far from adequate for their task. There were administration delays in obtaining Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (hereafter MACV) authorisation of the project and procedures in U.S. higher command. Shortages in construction materials as a result of the U.S. withdrawal programme resulted in a large demand for timber to construct packing cases for equipment to be shipped to the United States. The Chi Lang project was low priority and received irregular and variable quality of material. Finally, much time was spent preparing stores requisitions using federal stock numbers of materials available in stores depots in

Vietnam. Attempts to hurry this procedure met with little success, although the project was totally financed by the New Zealand Government.[47]


These constant "delays and promises of action which are not kept", and the shortages of materials, not only severely curtailed construction of the compound, but also had an adverse effect upon the morale of the engineers.[48] Building materials began to arrive in January 1971, allowing the commencement of the building foundations, but not at a rate that could ensure that the compound would be completed on time.[49] It was soon apparent to the New Zealanders that a close association between themselves and the local U.S. units was essential for the compound to be completed. The engineers opened their bar and mess facilities to the Americans. This goodwill gesture paid dividends, for the engineers and the training team found little trouble getting some equipment, materials and vehicles from the nearby American forces.

As such, the training team members, for the first few months, had to live "in old tents. We had bloody pallets on the floor to keep us off the ground because the water ran through the compound when it rained."[50] Unfortunately, adjacent to the compound was a fuel dump, used for the refuelling of US helicopters. When Chinook helicopters landed or took off, the down-draft of their rotors "virtually drowned everything in our compound in sand."[51] Several months later, the fuel dump was moved from the New Zealand compound, but the air constantly smelt of oil, even when the permanent concrete buildings were completed.

The delay in completing these basic amenities made life very difficult for the training team and took them away from preparing for the impending courses. When they should have been concentrating upon preparing lesson plans, and endeavouring to instruct the intake of students, they instead had to work seven days a week, instructing and also

MAP 4

The New Zealand Compound at the
Chi Lang National Training Centre.[52]



providing assistance to the engineers. Tomlin recalls that: "We were helping them by mixing concrete, carrying stuff away, cutting tops out of 44 gallon drums and filling them with sand to build a protective wall all the way around the compound. We had to put barbed wire around the wall because the compound wasn't wired or protected in any way. We also had to make bunkers."[53] The lack of perimeter defences not only caused fears about the vulnerability of the team to enemy attack, but also laid the compound open to theft by the Vietnamese.[54]

While the Joint Working Party (hereafter JWP) and the advance party had anticipated the general problem areas that would have to be overcome during the establishment of the leadership courses at Chi Lang, they had been unable to appreciate the complexities of the potential difficulties in setting up the leadership wing.[55] A study undertaken by the JWP as part of its initial planning had concluded that 1NZATTV would require its own training areas. As a consequence, the training centre's headquarters established firing ranges for the team's use and delineated an area of 600 x 300 metres for all tactical training, the latter area being relatively large by comparison with other areas in the centre. The entire training area allocated to the Leadership Wing could, with careful planning, cater for up to 150 students. The training area was approximately three kilometres from Chi Lang, which posed security problems and made it unsatisfactory for night training.

Problems were also created as a result of differing procedures between the New Zealanders and the Vietnamese, which wasted valuable time. After the South Vietnamese Central Training Command (hereafter CTC) had approved the proposed training programme in principle, the team had to complete a Programme of Instruction (hereafter POI). Although it took a fortnight to prepare, it was only referred to by the Vietnamese as an authority to demand the scale of ammunition, as they did not recognise it as a POI.

There were also problems with the team's initial leadership. Most of the instructors were combat experienced, had held instructional positions in New Zealand, and had gained invaluable insights while attached to the U.S. MATs. However, most of the senior team members had served with the New Zealand Special Air Service (hereafter SAS) and were more familiar with SAS-style tactics. They also relied upon an outdated pamphlet called The Infantry Platoon in Battle, 1953, which recommended methods which were, for the most part, irrelevant to the conditions in Vietnam. This caused frustrations among the other instructors, whose experience was largely ignored. One of the instructors noted that: "having been in Vietnam before, I think it made them [the actual instructors] a bit more pissed off with some of the things they were having to teach that they knew were irrelevant...One particular lesson was written five times and was then thrown out of the window because the leadership decided that they weren't going to vary from the pamphlet...regardless of what our experiences...indicated ...we could see problems but we weren't listened to."[56] These frustrations were alleviated with the arrival of a more flexible Officer Commanding (hereafter OC). In the interim, some instructors unofficially adapted the syllabus to reflect their own experiences. While they adhered to the lesson plans in the classroom, when the instructors took their students into the field, they "threw some of the instructional points out the window on the quiet and...the instructors went on gut instinct."[57]

Following a relatively frustrating preparation period of three months, a pilot course was conducted from 22 March until 17 April 1971. This course assessed the content of the POI, the time and resources allocations, and the suitability of the training areas. It also enabled the selection, from the students, of possible instructors for the Leadership Wing.

The requirements for graduation from the course were refined. To graduate, each student was required to gain at least sixty percent in all tests of every subject taught. Because of the poor results achieved by this group of students, it was accepted that the pass standard was too high. It had been necessary to up-grade marks by five to ten percent in most subjects to allow the students to pass. As a result, the pass standard was lowered to fifty percent. To provide experience in junior leadership, each day a different student was chosen as platoon commander. This allowed every student to act as a platoon commander in the administrative role at least once during the training period.

The instructors also experienced a number of other problems, some of which were unforeseen. During this course, the instructors experienced one of the attributes of the `Asiatic mind': the students would not argue with their instructors for fear of losing face. It was felt the students had been told by their superiors that they should accept whatever was said by the New Zealanders.[58] Other problems were created by the weather. As this course was conducted during the latter part of the dry season, and because of the heat, neither the students nor the instructors could maintain their enthusiasm for practical tactical training throughout the day, particularly during the afternoons. As such, strenuous activities had to be programme for the mornings only. A major problem was that the boundaries of the training areas were not clearly marked, either on the ground or on paper. As a consequence, the New Zealanders frequently found other troops in areas they themselves had booked, a problem that remained throughout the teams deployment at Chi Lang. During night training, students twice stumbled into ambushes that had been set up by the centre's security forces, although this problem was resolved by the completion of the pilot course.

There were also occasional shortages of ammunition, such as M72 rockets, a problem which was to be exacerbated as student numbers grew.

Eleven students, out of a total of fifteen who attended the course were chosen as potential instructors. They had a reasonable amount of combat experience, but had little or no instructional experience. One of the instructors suggested that the students "were chosen for being society-type people, more so than their combat experience. You had to be in the know to get on the course in the first place."[59] After this pilot course, several amendments were made to the POI to overcome the shortcomings that had been identified, a number of new subjects were added.[60] In April, the team commenced its first course proper.

A major problem for the training team was the need to validate their training - was what they were teaching relevant to their students? Were the students applying what they had learnt back at their units? The New Zealand Government certainly felt that the training team represented an effective and worthwhile contribution to the programme. In January 1971, J.F. Robertson, the Secretary of Defence, reported that the establishment of 1NZATTV at Chi Lang was, according to South Vietnamese military officials, "worth the equivalent of two battalions of soldiers", and would have an "immediate effect on South Vietnam's military activities in the delta."[61] In March 1971, the New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs believed that effective control was being consolidated, and "political stability was fully maintained."[62] The New Zealand Minister of Defence, D.S. Thomson, claimed in May 1971 that the training team was "making a very worthwhile contribution" to the Vietnamisation programme.[63] This was noticeable through the "extraordinary vigour [that] the South Vietnamese were putting into their own training programmes."[64] Thomson was, however, much less sure on how long 1NZATTV would remain in

South Vietnam. He noted that any withdrawal depended on "the rapidity with which the Army of the Republic of Vietnam can handle its own leadership training."[65]

However, the student attendance at the courses did not support the `extraordinary vigour' observed by Thomson during his visit to Chi Lang. Although CTC sent a list of nominated RF officers for each course to 1NZATTV, the numbers actually attending frequently fell short of expectations, despite the large increase in RF units in MR IV at the time.[66] This was experienced at the first course proper from April until the end of May 1971. There were shortfalls on four of the seven courses conducted in 1971, including two with large discrepancies. Although some courses were postponed for between three and fourteen days, poor attendance continued throughout 1972. (Table 11)[67] When the first 1972 leadership course commenced three days late on 6 January, there were still only thirty-two out of an expected 150 students. In total, six of the seven courses conducted in 1972 required rescheduling.

TABLE 11

COURSES POSTPONED DURING 1972.

Course	Expected Nos	Original Start date	Nos	Postponed to	Eventual Nos[68]
1/72	100	1 Jan	32	3 Jan	88
2/72	150	28 Feb	103	1 Mar	122
3/72	150	10 Apr	96	24 Apr	114
4/72	100	5 Jun	34	8 Jun	86
5/72	150	17 Jul	81	20 Jul	139
6/72	150	28 Aug	122	31 Aug	129
7/72	150	9 Oct	150	nil	150

The New Zealanders wrote of their frustration in their monthly report: "the poor attendance was a disappointing climax to the considerable amount of pre-course preparation carried out."[69] Some of the instructors were frustrated

because they had been sent to Vietnam to do a job which they felt was important. Further, they not unnaturally assumed the Vietnamese would have sufficient motivation to attend the courses without coercion. Although most of the New Zealand instructors were experienced enough to understand the problems that the South Vietnamese were having, their patience was being rapidly exhausted. However, at least one of the New Zealand OC's, L.H. Pilling, appreciated this difficulty: "I was very well aware of the stress that it causes a unit sending a couple of officers out of the line.[70]

Lieutenant General L.W. Thornton, the Chief of Defence Staff (hereafter CDS) and Lieutenant Colonel Brown, the Commander of NZ V Force, also expressed concern over this problem. In June 1971, Brown first complained to both CTC and the Joint General Staff (hereafter JGS), and later reported that attendance had never been more than "barely satisfactory".[71] Thornton reacted to the problem by arguing: "we cannot sustain a team if this is to be a pattern of future events."[72] In light of poor attendances, Thornton approached the JGS on at least one occasion to seek a commitment to continuing support. As a result, a "strongly worded direction" was sent to province chiefs/ sector commanders by Generals Truong (commander of MR IV), General Cao Van Vien, Chief of the JGS and Lieutenant General Phan Trong Chinh, Director of Training, CTC, in early 1972.[73]

The reasons for the poor attendances were many and varied. There was reluctance upon the part of units to release officers when a particular unit operation or activity had already been planned. There were also difficulties in removing commanders from operational platoons for up to six weeks or more.[74] This was particularly difficult when the NVA/VC launched offensive operations, such as the 1972 Easter Offensive.[75] Some of the non-attendance problem was in reality due to the late

arrival of students. Because of the local terrain, travel in MR IV was difficult, it was not unusual for students to take three or four days longer than expected to reach Chi Lang from his home location.[76] Part of this problem was caused by the Provincial Chiefs. Many were reluctant to pay, from their allotted funds, for the travelling costs of the students attending the courses. This was particularly so when these chiefs believed that the officers were being trained to undertake operations in which they were already experienced and many of them perceived that practical experience was preferable to formal instruction. Although fifty percent of the positions on each course were reserved for students from MR III, few of these were ever filled. This was probably due to the unique nature of the terrain in MR IV (which resulted in different tactics taught and used there), and because Chi Lang was simply in another Military Region. The ingrained territorial organisation of the RVNAF was probably reflected through Province Chiefs from MR III believing that the tactics taught at Chi Lang were generally irrelevant and a waste of time and money.

Despite such problems, Brown believed that the team was filling a real need. The South Vietnamese lacked the instructional ability to teach their RF platoon leaders the peculiar leadership skills and tactics required. Vien shared Truong's conviction that the RFs were only really successful when they adopted the same tactics as the enemy, rather than those used by the American model.[77] Increasingly, by August 1972, RF companies in MR IV normally operated outside their own provinces, under the operational control of another province chief or the ARVN. This made it increasingly important that the RF be well trained.

However, until late 1972 1NZATTV received no feedback from the South Vietnamese about the effectiveness of their courses. In late 1971, Brown aired his concerns about the lack of feedback from the Vietnamese with Vien.[78] For his part, Vien felt that it was still too early to judge the

effectiveness of the instruction. The "consensus of opinion" among the Vietnamese was that the team should continue to conduct RF platoon leadership courses for "some time to come, certainly until the middle of 1972", before handing any responsibility for the leadership course to the Vietnamese.[79] Only in September 1972 did 1NZATTV begin to receive indications that the leadership course was now preferred by province chiefs. This was because the RF was by now initiating more contacts - particularly by night - and inflicting more and incurring fewer casualties than before.[80]

While attempts had already been made to judge the effectiveness of 1NZATTV's courses, for the most part these validations were not based upon hard evidence. During a Parliamentary debate, Holyoake rated the effectiveness of the two training teams highly. When asked if his assessment was based upon a belief that "the men they train are killing other Indo-Chinese people more effectively", Holyoake replied, "Yes. They are more effectively defending their people from the completely unwarranted attack from...North Vietnam."[81] Lieutenant General R.J.H. Webb, the Chief of General Staff (hereafter CGS), felt that the New Zealanders' training approach differed from that of the Americans, particularly in the close instructor/student relationship he had observed at Chi Lang.[82] His assessment was coloured by Brown's over- enthusiastic reports. One of Brown's reports considered that the most apparent result of the instruction so far was: "The considerable interest evidenced at every level, at the intimacy of our instructors, the close student/instructor relationship and our painstaking method of ensuring by question and answer, or by demonstration and imitation that the lessons taught are being absorbed."[83] Brown remained confident that 1NZATTV was turning out a "reasonable product," although he qualified this by stating: "there is still much to do" if the Territorial Forces were to improve.[84]

What attempts the team did make to validate the training met with little success. At the end of each course, the students completed a detailed questionnaire, which, remembers Pilling, "examined whether what we had taught was of any value to the students; what their impressions were of our techniques of teaching - had it been a waste of time for them. There were no names, so we encouraged the students to write freely and openly about it."[85] However, the New Zealanders were never really sure whether what the Vietnamese were writing was true, or if they wrote what they felt their instructors wanted to hear.[86] Perhaps the South Vietnamese thought that it was undiplomatic to criticise the actions of its allies. The team also sought feedback from the commanders of the students' units, "but that really was not successful and I don't blame the South Vietnamese one little bit. They were there trying to fight a war and the last thing they wanted out in the battle front was to fill in forms asking how the training went, that sort of thing."[87]

Although providing at least some feedback, these validation procedures were neither as effective nor in-depth as the team wanted. Many of the New Zealand instructors believed that there was only one reliable method of validating their training and see if any adaptations needed to be made to the course.[88] Unfortunately, as this would have entailed their accompanying the students on active operations when they returned to their units, the prospect of casualties rendered this option politically unfeasible. Further, even if they had been allowed to visit students in their units, there were simply too few New Zealand instructors to enable any to be removed from courses for any length of time.

The arrival of the new OC of the training team, Major L.H. Pilling, proved a major turning point in the discussion of the adoption of an effective validation system. He was an experienced Rifle Company Commander with a very good

intellect and sound leadership skills, and was familiar with Vietnam. Pilling reassessed the team's course content to better reflect the increased responsibilities being forced upon the RF as a result of the American withdrawal. As a result of his assessment, steps were taken to implement a new system. To validate both the content and delivery of the training, while at the same time avoiding New Zealand casualties, a compromise was reached. A small number of New Zealanders were to go out to the units for very short period of time and assess the effectiveness of the training by interviewing unit commanders and some of their ex-students, rather than going out on operations themselves. This was to be achieved by discussing all aspects of the course with ex-students, observing the types of operations and training methods and techniques used by the units, and examining the relevance of the current course syllabus.[89]

There was a total of five trips and the results were invaluable.[90] The groups spoke to both the commanders and the ex-students, asking such questions as: `Do you train your soldiers how to patrol?' and `Do you use any of our tactics?' Frequently, the ex-students said `yes' and depicted to the groups something out of the course that they had understood and had passed back to their troops.[91] Another common question was, `Do you use any hand signals when you are in the bush?' Many of the officers also said `yes', and when they called a passing soldier over to the group, the soldier responded correctly to the ex-student's hand signal. It was considered by the New Zealanders that, recollects Vautier: "Whether they were doing it for our show, it did not matter. It still showed us that they had not forgotten. Whether they had rehearsed it before our arrival or whether they had incorporated hand signals into their training, we never really knew. But we liked to think that this was a positive sign and that they had got something from our training."[92]

Although some ex-students did put what they had learnt into practice, it was obvious to the New Zealanders that further training was required. Generally, the performance of the Vietnamese was of a low standard, and on a par with what the New Zealanders had experienced when they had been attached to the U.S. MATs. The defences of the RF compounds were, remembers Thomason, a member of one of the teams, "typically fairly run-down and were not well maintained... discipline was clearly lacking."[93] One concern was the lack of understanding of the tactical use of support weapons, such as mortars and machine-guns. The teams found that in a number of instances, weapons lacked sights for their weapons, and although some RF soldiers were skilled in firing the weapons without such aids many of their techniques in firing these weapons were a little dangerous and results could be a little haphazard. When one ex-student sent his patrols out, as he had been taught, they were not patrolling far enough out to contact the enemy. Had a mobile team gone out with them even once, at least some of these basic faults could have been corrected. One team member noted: "if we had looked at this and got the support weapons experts to those units...then, maybe we could have taught them something."[94] These trips reinforced the attitudes of some New Zealanders towards the worth of their efforts. One New Zealander claimed that: "I felt a bit helpless...I felt that...God, what we were doing was like a drop in the ocean. Were we actually achieving anything? I had serious doubts."[95]

Although the advantages of this validation system should have been obvious, the New Zealanders experienced considerable difficulties in organising the requisite visits. 1NZATTV had to use both the New Zealand and Vietnamese `chains of command' to even get permission to visit the units. This was primarily because the Vietnamese "had more urgent matters to consider than a request for permission from the team to take out a squad of soldiers and provide them with some retraining."[96] Pilling stated the

effects this had on some of the team members: "I think it was very difficult for some of the team members to grasp fully that concept. They were at Chi Lang to do a job, and they had come from New Zealand where their training was a number one priority. Here, in South Vietnam, it wasn't."[97] The organisational difficulties were exacerbated by communication and transport problems. Remote units could not always be contacted for visits to be arranged. Air transportation was not always available on the day it had been promised, and if it was unavailable, road transport had to be used. This caused further problems, as the New Zealand teams were going into what were termed `black areas'. As such, this necessitated the provision of protection parties, which resulted in the removal of scarce transport from Chi Lang.

These visits also provided an opportunity to publicise the team's leadership courses, as some Vietnamese company commanders expressed considerable interest in the training. The teams provided each commander with a complete breakdown of the leadership courses, and impressed upon them the relevance of the courses. Although most commanders assured the groups that they would send their officers to attend the courses, because it was the only place that they could get any sort of training, their enthusiasm was not matched by actual attendances.

The information gathered enabled changes to be made to the POI so it more closely reflected the change in role of the territorial forces in the Delta and, perhaps as importantly, to stimulate student interest.[98] New subjects were introduced, and more emphasis was placed upon such topics as air and artillery support. To arouse and maintain student interest during lessons, more practical work was initiated, which proved very successful. This was necessary, because if students did not immediately grasp the practicality of a particular lesson, they generally showed no further interest in whatever the instructor had to say.

Changes were made to lesson formats; for example, practical rather than verbal introductions to lessons were used. The Vietnamese instructors also had to be motivated, because they themselves did not seem to care whether the students were really listening. The Vietnamese instructors now took the initial lesson with the New Zealand instructors, and then took the students through the practical parts of the lesson.[99] In late May, the POI was sent to CTC/JGS for approval. The new POI was trialled with course 4/72, and implemented with course 5/72.[100] The new POI was received by the students with "interest and enthusiasm", qualities that were "much more evident than in the past."[101] Although the Vietnamese instructors were also enthusiastic towards the new POI, they still remained a little inflexible, and reluctant to accept fully the changes that were made.[102] However, the team was withdrawn from Vietnam before they were able to validate this new programme.

Search for an Alternative Role

Despite 1NZATTV's primary role, Headquarters New Zealand Vietnam Force (hereafter HQ NZ V Force) was approached on numerous occasions during the second half of 1971 to ascertain whether 1NZATTV could diversify its training.[103] In May 1971, as part of American pressure to provide assistance to Cambodia, MACV suggested that perhaps 1NZATTV could provide assistance with the Force Armee Nationale Khmere (hereafter FANK) training programme at Chi Lang. This was never received with any real enthusiasm by either HQ NZ V Force or 1NZATTV, as such diversification would involve many organisational problems, and 1NZATTV was already fully occupied with its current training programme. In September 1971, General Truong, commander of MR IV), and Lieutenant General Chinh, Director of Training, CTC, asked if 1NZATTV would diversify into training RF heavy weapons and reconnaissance platoon leaders.[104] Both generals considered that the leadership courses were becoming of even

greater importance to MR IV, due to the likelihood of ARVN formations in MR IV being used either for cross-border operations in Cambodia or, as was most likely, to reinforce MRs I and II.

The response from the New Zealand military was, for the most part, negative towards these overtures. Lieutenant Colonel Brown, the Commander of NZ V Force, and Pilling were unenthusiastic towards these proposals, although they were studied by HQ NZ V Force in conjunction with CTC and HQ MR IV. Brown argued that although the training of RF heavy weapon platoon leaders was another role that 1NZATTV could undertake sometime in 1972, the present RF platoon leaders course had priority.[105] Finally, he felt these options, although within 1NZATTV's capabilities, could not be undertaken due to the limited training area allocated to the Leadership Wing.[106] In response to the request to train reconnaissance platoon leaders, Pilling wrote that of late it had become apparent that enthusiasm for such courses "is very much one-sided and "New Zealand intrusion in this area is not particularly welcome."[107] Lieutenant Colonel J.R. Mace, the AGS project co-ordinating officer for the training team project, however, expressed interest in 1NZATTV employing some of its personnel in other areas of training, particularly in a mobile advisory role. However, AGS did not fully agree with Mace, feeling that 1NZATTV should be concentrated at Chi Lang rather than attempting to embark on a wider geographical deployment.

Despite such requests from the Vietnamese, by early 1972 the future of New Zealand's continued training assistance to both South Vietnam and the Khmer Republic was under question at the political level. In February 1972, the Opposition Defence spokesman, A.J. Faulkner, had stated that a Labour Government would end all New Zealand overseas military aid programmes, and would instead introduce social and economic aid programmes. In early 1972, A. McCready, the New Zealand Minister of Defence, with Lieutenant General

Thornton, the CDS, had conducted a tour throughout South-east Asia. McCready felt that the political and military situation in South Vietnam was "very much better than I had anticipated"[108], and with continued U.S. air and logistical support, he was confident that South Vietnam would "survive and hopefully, prosper."[109] He indicated that 1NZATTV could be withdrawn at the beginning of 1973.[110] However, perhaps to show that New Zealand would maintain its support if necessary, he then declared that South Vietnam and its surrounding nations held the key to the security of the entire Southeast Asian region and "we could not afford to loose South Vietnam."[111] He concluded by arguing: "I would rather fight these battles on the paddy-fields of Vietnam than on the Canterbury plains."[112]

However, elements in the New Zealand and Vietnamese military were much more cautious in their appraisals. Webb noted that any such withdrawal depended upon the performances of the RF and PF as the regular army took on greater commitments.[113] General Vien, Chief of the JGS had stressed to McCready and Thornton that it was "premature to attempt to hand this important facet of training to Vietnamese control in the immediate future as they were under pressure in all training, especially with the Cambodian commitment."[114] Vien proposed that McCready review the whole question of New Zealand's assistance towards the end of 1972.

There were, however, indications by early 1972 that 1NZATTV had fulfilled its dual role. Both Brown and Pilling recommended the withdraw of 1NZATTV as soon as practicable. Pilling recommended to Brown that the withdrawal of 1NZATTV could be even earlier than suggested by McCready, perhaps in October/November 1972, although Pilling felt that the wing would function effectively if the team was withdrawn immediately.[115] Pilling claimed that by the end of February 1972, less than twenty-five percent of the team's capacity

was employed in its prime role of instruction, with the remainder of the team involved in making "considerable improvements" to the compound defenses.[116] He considered the Vietnamese staff to be of "good quality, enthusiastic and interested and that they were accepting...more of the responsibility for the training and were conducting most of the training at the wing", and the team had already begun what was an advisory role.[117] Pilling warned that a lengthy advisory period would be "fruitless, lead to frustrations and probably undo much of the good work that the team had achieved."[118] He wrote: "there was a moment in time when advice becomes abrasive and counter-productive", and recommended that the purely advisory role should be a maximum of three months - the equivalent of only two courses.[119]

Brown went even further than Pilling. He not only agreed with Filling, but recommended that the withdrawal of 1NZATTV team begin almost immediately and be completed by 5 November.[120] However, Brown's recommendation was based upon the proviso that the manning by Vietnamese instructors at Chi Lang was stable. By late April, conditions had become unfavourable for an early withdrawal of 1NZATTV. The best Vietnamese instructors at the Leadership Wing were being posted from Chi Lang to other similar training centres, possibly to establish similar wings. Brown was forced to recommend that while this manning problem continued, there was little opportunity to hand over to the Vietnamese responsibility for the conducting of training. As such, he noted that although there was a shortage of `suitable' options for the diversification of New Zealand's training assistance, there were several areas of training, which had "sprung to mind", that 1NZATTV could diversify into.[121] However, none of these options were practical, as the instructors would be geographically spread around at least MR IV, they would be required to work in a wholly Vietnamese environment, they would naturally be required to be able to speak Vietnamese, and the New Zealand Army lacked the

necessary expertise. Further, he felt that any assistance that New Zealand would offer would be relegated to simply fitting into a U.S. presence and would merely replace an equivalent number of Americans, rather than establish the `New Zealand presence' so keenly sought by the New Zealand Government. He surmised that the direct military involvement once sought after by the South Vietnamese "is not the pressing need it once was."[122] Brown wrote that the South Vietnamese "are now impatient to take full control of their own destiny. They are anxious to prove to themselves and the rest of the world, that they can stand on their own feet."[123] He concluded by stating: "as a general observation, the RVN [Republic of Vietnam (South)] Armed Forces have received just about all the advice they can stomach."[124] Brown's report recommended an outline plan for the withdrawal of 1NZATTV and that planning for the withdrawal of the New Zealand Army Training Group, Vietnam (hereafter NZATGV) and the 2nd New Zealand Army Training Team, Vietnam (hereafter 2NZATTV) also proceed.[125] Thornton agreed militarily with Brown's recommendation, concluding: "it seemed clear that unless New Zealand proposed to offer some alternative form of military assistance to South Vietnam, we should make an early decision to terminate our activities in October/ November 1972."[126]

Despite Brown's optimism, some 1NZATTV members were suspicious of how enthusiastic and capable the Vietnamese were to assume control of the Leadership Wing. Although the Vietnamese instructors were satisfactorily undertaking most of the instruction, they were weak in some areas, one which needed "close supervision was their inability to plan and organise logistic support and administration for their lessons."[127] The Vietnamese officer holding the important position of Planning Officer in the Leadership Wing was posted, and no replacement was assigned to replace him. This, according to Major A. Kiwi, the last New Zealand

Commanding Officer (CO) of 1NZATTV, "hardly indicat[ed] that the Vietnamese are desperately trying to take over the Chi Lang tasks at present carried out by 1NZATTV."[128]

Despite the lack of military significance, 1NZATTV's presence, as did both New Zealand training teams, provided overwhelming political value. The Department of Foreign Affairs was much less willing to accept Brown's recommendation regarding the future of the two training teams. G.R. Laking, the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, a little skeptical towards Brown's assessment of the situation in South Vietnam, wondered "whether Brown has necessarily got his facts right..." and believed that the problem required "much more thought than has been given to it so far."[129] Even militarily, the situation in South Vietnam was not favourably disposed towards allowing any New Zealand withdrawal of its troops. Laking noted that the South Vietnamese were under heavy pressure and the war was in a critical phase. Indeed, "if it were to become known that we were about to withdraw the teams, this would inevitably be seen as an indication of doubt about the ability of the South Vietnamese to survive. It would also create difficulties for Australia and the U.S."[130] Despite his assessment, Thornton agreed with Laking, arguing that, politically, "now is hardly an appropriate time" to inform the Vietnamese authorities that New Zealand was going to withdraw its training assistance from South Vietnam and "political considerations may favour delaying its departure until the end of the year."[131]

Any decision by the New Zealand Government regarding the future of its training assistance would be influenced by whatever decision Canberra made regarding the Australian Army Training Team, Vietnam's (AATTV) future and also the FANK training programme. However, Wellington did not really know what Australia's intentions were. Major General L.A. Pearce, the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff (hereafter DCDS), understood that although the Australian Army was in favour

of withdrawing its training assistance, "it is not certain that its views are shared by the [Australian] Departments of Defence and External Affairs."[132] Robertson, the Secretary of Defence, believed that the Australian Government considered that the Vietnam War had reached a critical stage and therefore it was not in Australia's interests to break off "useful contacts with and channels of access to both Vietnamese and Americans."[133] The effect of the Australian Government deciding to continue its training assistance placed upon the New Zealand Government the onus of explaining any decision that it might make to terminate its own training effort at such a time. The New Zealand Government also faced the dilemma that it would be very difficult to withdraw the New Zealand troops training South Vietnamese forces while at the same time continuing to instruct Cambodian units on South Vietnamese soil. As it was politically unacceptable to move 2NZATTV to Cambodian soil, both training teams would have to be withdrawn concurrently.

Although it was too early to make firm recommendations, the New Zealand military had to diversify to substantiate its continued presence in South Vietnam. The New Zealand military was well aware that the future of New Zealand's training team's in South Vietnam was very much short term, and that "one could expect the withdrawal [of New Zealand's training element's from South Vietnam] to be announced two to three months before the elections."[134] As such, Brown was instructed by Lieutenant General Webb, the CGS, to investigate alternative employment or assistance for either of the two New Zealand training team's. Further, 1NZATTV was no receive no further replacements.

In the meanwhile, newspaper reports from David Barber, the New Zealand Press Association correspondent in South Vietnam, also commented upon the frustrations felt amongst the members of 1NZATTV. Barber publicly reiterated many of the points that Major Pilling, OC of 1NZATTV, had stated in

his earlier reports to Brown. Barber concluded that the team members felt that the Vietnamese instructors were fully capable of taking over responsibility for the wing, should the training team be withdrawn immediately. In August, New Zealand newspaper editorials pressured the government to announce a withdrawal date, noting that 1NZATTV had almost completed its tasks and could be withdrawn at the end of 1972.[135] These editorials served to `fuel the fires of protest' against New Zealand's continued presence in Vietnam. With the Australian Labor party also vowing to withdraw Australian troops from Vietnam, Barber wrote that New Zealand Army officials in Saigon felt that a continuing New Zealand training presence after an Australian withdrawal would be politically unacceptable in Wellington.[136]

Brown submitted his recommendations to Webb in late June. He reported that the only feasible option was for 1NZATTV to conduct RF squad leaders courses.[137] Brown felt that this option was feasible, as there were 6,000 to 8,000 potential students in MR IV alone, and the numbers per course should at least be double the numbers on the present platoon leaders course.[138] Dependent on the acceptance of the need for RF Squad Leadership courses by AGS, Brown felt that the strength of the team should not be reduced, but rather increased.[139] Maintaining 1NZATTV at Chi Lang was logistically viable, provided it continued to receive domestic support from 41 Squadron Royal New Zealand Air Force (RNZAF). Provided the New Zealand military wished to maintain a training presence, Brown concluded that 1NZATTV should hand over responsibility for the RF platoon leadership course to the Vietnamese in late 1972 to allow for the planning of the new courses POI, and that squad leadership courses should begin in late 1972.[140]

The end of the communists 1972 Easter Offensive, in mid-April of that year, resulted in not only an increased participation and reassessment of the RF/PF in the war, but also intensified the re-examination of 1NZATTV's future

role. The offensive once and for all quashed any further suggestions of a wider deployment of 1NZATTV. Although defeated, the enemy still maintained pressure in the Delta region. The urgency of training and reorganising the territorial forces, particularly the RF, in MR IV grew as a result of their participation in the war and the heavy ARVN losses incurred during the Easter offensive.[141] As such, an intensive programme of retraining and reinforcement of ARVN units in South Vietnam was initiated. The RF/PF had also made a substantial contribution to the successes gained by the ARVN, with the former accounting for 23,732 (thirty-seven percent) enemy killed during the offensive. (Table 12)[142] Despite suffering their highest percentage of Killed in Action (hereafter KIA), seventy-one percent, the RF/PF performance in MR IV was among the best for all the MRs. To improve their operational effectiveness, the South Vietnamese intensified efforts, begun in early 1969, to concentrate RF companies into battalion sized units.[143]

TABLE 12

KIA BY PROVINCE

MR	Friendly KIA (%) RF/PF	Regulars	Enemy KIA(%) By RF/PF	By Regulars	KIA Ratio (En/RVN) RF/PF	Regular
I	18	82	20	80	4.5	4.0
II	30	70	38	62	3.1	2.2
III	21	79	39	61	3.1	1.3
IV	71	29	76	34	1.2	1.0

These changes further reduced, at least temporarily, U.S. logistical support, security, and intelligence for 1NZATTV.[144] In late June 1972, as a result of the U.S. withdrawal of its forces from South Vietnam, there were only fifteen U.S. personnel in the Chi Lang area, which meant that 1NZATTV was forced to take more of the defence of Chi Lang upon its own shoulders.[145] However, the arrival of about seventy U.S. SFs personnel in July to supervise and

assist with the retraining of operational ARVN battalions assured the continuity of U.S. support to 1NZATTV, at least until January 1972.[146]

To assist with the training requirements for the territorial forces in the Delta, Vien suggested three possible alternative roles that 1NZATTV could diversify into, particularly as the team's role was nearing its end. Firstly, that the team remained at Chi Lang. Secondly, that 1NZATTV form four to five four-man MATs to train RF/PF companies or battalions that were located in the Delta region. The third proposal was for the New Zealanders to be "lumped in" with the U.S. SFs teams at Chi Lang retraining operational RF battalions.[147] He intimated that New Zealand assistance would be most welcome until at least May 1973, and probably thereafter.[148]

Thornton passed Vien's suggestions to Webb, although he accurately surmised what the response would be - "I'm afraid that you will not find any of these alternatives particularly attractive."[149] Neither the New Zealand Government nor Army were prepared to consider any request for continued training assistance that required their soldiers to travel through insecure territory. This meant that Chi Lang was the only location for any future contribution to any training programme. Any proposals which required New Zealanders to work with the Vietnamese "even less attractive" by AGS.[150] Cabinet also agreed, although it considered that an earlier termination due to a peace settlement would be welcome. Based upon this, Vien's first two proposals held little promise.[151]

Vien's third option was seriously considered by AGS, despite Major General R.H.F. Holloway, the Deputy Chief of General Staff (DCGS), having stated the previous month: "the ARVN battalion retraining scheme is scarcely more attractive."[152] He also pessimistically wrote that the South Vietnamese appeared to be "rather lukewarm on the

question of whether or not we provide training assistance and apparently are unconcerned" if New Zealand continued only with FANK training.[153] He concluded by stating, apparently with some sarcasm: "Thornton talks of `valuable symbolism' if New Zealand stood by South Vietnam up to the cease-fire."[154] Thornton concluded, after discussions with American and South Vietnamese authorities, that a New Zealand Army contribution to the programme would be a useful and worthwhile effort, which would also be "very welcomed by the Vietnamese," a view also shared by Pearce.[155] Thornton was directed by AGS to explore further with the South Vietnamese authorities in Saigon the possibility of integrating 1NZATTV into the retraining programme of RF battalions in place of the present RF platoon commanders course.

Despite the obvious `valuable symbolism', General Vien's, Chief of the JGS, third proposal posed few logistical, security and transport problems, as the New Zealanders would be working with the Americans. The Americans confirmed that 1NZATTV would continue to receive the present level of logistic support which, although not lavish, would be adequate for the task. A U.S. training presence at Chi Lang during 1973 was confirmed, although it would be at a low level. This type of training would be further experience for New Zealand instructors. However, because of integration, New Zealand's identity would be submerged, resulting in the loss of any political benefit that could be gained. Wellington could experience difficulties with manning, as personnel would need to be compatible with U.S. SFs and have comprehensive operational experience.[156] Finally, the United States would welcome New Zealand involvement, if no geographical bars, such as the men being restricted to working in only MR IV, were imposed.

The future role of New Zealand's training contribution was clouded by much political and military uncertainty, as Nixon was negotiating with the North Vietnamese for a

cease-fire. The basis of any agreement was that there would be a total withdrawal of all Western forces from South Vietnam. The Holyoake Government publicly endorsed Nixon's peace proposals, with Holyoake noting: "all New Zealanders will welcome the prospect of an early peace that safeguards the right of the peoples of that area to decide their own future."[157] Cabinet discussed the feasibility of continued New Zealand training assistance to South Vietnam while awaiting the outcome of the peace negotiations in progress during October 1972, with McCready, the Minister of Defence, recommending that 1NZATTV be allowed to assist in the RF battalion retraining programme at Chi Lang.[158] Particular care had to be taken to preserve, "to the maximum extent feasible, our national identity," and to "keep New Zealand's efforts in line with those of our Australia, New Zealand and the United States (ANZUS) partners."[159]

In considering that the New Zealand Army had both the capacity and the experience to provide this form and level of assistance, Cabinet decided that New Zealand was to extend its training assistance to the South Vietnamese and the Khmer Republic until May 1973.[160] As U.S. involvement in the RF battalion retraining programme was by this stage minimal, training would be conducted by an integrated team of Vietnamese and New Zealand instructors, something that AGS had sought to avoid.[161]

This decision completed the first half of 1NZATTV's original role - 1NZATTV was no longer involved in the actual instruction. It now assumed a dual role - to provide contributions to the RF battalion retraining programme and to also provide advisers for the Leadership Wing - which was approved until May 1973, or "at an earlier date should the RF battalion refresher training be discontinued."[162]

Problems and Solutions

Prior to the adaptation of this dual role, the team had faced and solved, with varying degrees of success, a number of problem, which affected the team's ability to fulfill its training role.

There was a tremendous divergence in social background, military experience, motivation and ability amongst the students who attended the Leadership courses. They ranged from highly educated officers with University degrees to semi-literate members of various ethnic or religious sects, and from having only completed formal Officer training to veterans who had fought with the French or Viet Minh. The students who attended the leadership courses had been selected and trained under several types of officer selection, most of whom were experienced platoon leaders.[163] The leadership course was later considered by the JGS as a promotional step to the rank of Captain, although there were other avenues available for advancement in rank.

When the New Zealand instructors arrived at Chi Lang in early 1970, they considered that they were ready for their job. However, even what some of them had experienced with the U.S. MATs would not prepare them for their task ahead. The team discovered, through testing students at the beginning of each course, that many, despite previous training or experience, lacked what the New Zealanders considered to be basic soldier skills and knowledge. Some of the Vietnamese students had either very lackadaisical attitudes towards the necessity to keep their weapons clean and in good condition, or were simply unaware of this need. Thus, the students had to be taught how to look after their equipment. Eyles remembers that "we'd be hung for looking after equipment the way they [students] did. They'd drop their equipment on the ground, walk off and leave it. The only reason the course used to clean their weapons was that we used to make them strip and clean them."[164] When

students first arrived on a course, their weapons were always checked: "Some of their weapons I wouldn't have fired the bloody things. Take an M-16 apart and look down the barrel, it looked like it had a charcoal fire going down there for years", recollects Tomlin, one of the instructors.[165] Many lacked even basic weapon skills. One instructor noted that the "mechanism of the M-60 machine-gun, simple in New Zealand minds, is an enormously complicated subject to the type of man selected as a RF platoon commander, and therefore took considerably longer to learn."[166] As such, a considerable amount of time had to be spent on most courses instructing the students on subject matter that they should have known prior to attendance.

Without this extra instruction, the students basic knowledge would not have been of a high enough standard to enable them to learn the more advanced skills that the course was to teach them. However, less time was available to teach them what they had come onto the course to learn. One instructor said: "We were instructing at the level where we were trying to teach platoon commanders how to employ their sections...but a lot of them did not even understand basic soldiering skills.[167] Even when the students did attain such a basic standard, many of the New Zealand instructors felt that sometimes the training syllabus required standards that were a little more than what the students could reach, which tended to be self-defeating.[168]

At the other end of the scale, many of the students had considerable operational experience in the Delta area. South Vietnam had been at war for most of the time since 1941, and many ARVN officers had taken a very long-range and hence non-urgent view of the Vietnamisation phase of the conflict. For many, the most important consideration was survival in a war which was simply a way of life and showed no signs of stopping. Pilling said: "a lot of the officers did not want to fight. That had become very evident to us, particularly after...working with the RF officers."[169] Some

Vietnamese had been commanding men in combat longer than some of the U.S. advisers and instructors had been in the army. Therefore, they felt that with their experience, they no longer needed advice or training on how to fight, an attitude passed down to some of their subordinate commanders - students on the team's courses. As well as this, some of the students had already been trained by either the United States or French troops and were getting tired of being trained and retrained by Western troops.[170] Some New Zealanders also felt that the American "sausage machine training system - the turning out of trainees at a constant rate each month regardless of the level of attainment - had done more harm than good," haven given the Vietnamese the feeling that they were trained and had no need to be retrained, even when they lacked many basic military skills.[171] By 1969 the emphasis was focused upon quality and not quantity. Paradoxically, the allies had publicly commented that the such operations as `Lam Son' had shown that the Vietnamese were able and capable of operating on their own. The New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs, for example, reported that the successful outcome of the operations had "enhanced the self-confidence and morale" of the South Vietnamese.[172] Such comments proved counter productive. If this was the case, some of the students felt, `then why do we need to be retrained?'

Such attitudes were very much in evidence during the courses. When practising their formations in the field, Eyles remembers that the Vietnamese students who were put in command would be "all sitting around talking and laughing, and waving their sticks all around. You wouldn't know what they were talking about."[173] Generally, the students only demonstrated interested in subjects that pertained to their current roles - namely tactics at section and platoon levels - because they were training to be company commanders.[174] Throughout his visits to Chi Lang, Padre L.H. Barber felt

there was "almost a sense of defeatism and a certain fatalism creeping in among the South Vietnamese officers by the early 1970's."[175] A number of New Zealand reporters wrote about the attitudes displayed by many of the students. In late 1972, J.C. Graham observed, after a visit to Chi Lang, that "despite the sound technical knowledge and leadership principles instilled into the...students...an impression remains that their abiding concern is more for survival than for leading their troops to victory."[176]

The students, generally, were seen by some of the New Zealanders as being "stubborn, smart and untrustworthy, in all respects."[177] Although most of the instructors were Warrant Officers (hereafter WO), they had been given acting Captain's rank, as the attitude towards a very hierarchical rank structure had been ingrained into their students. It was a loss of face for a student to admit that he required training, especially from foreigners, from someone who held lower rank. The New Zealanders expected that wearing officer rank would make quite a lot of difference to the receptiveness of their instruction. However, although they suspected that some of the interpreters had informed the students that the instructors were not officers, it was not proven. One instructor reported: "sometimes I felt as if they [the students] were treating us like a joke...were looking down their nose at us."[178] Often, the students would argue with the New Zealand instructors. Some of the Vietnamese students spoke very good English and "if told to do something, would actually debate with us as to why they should do something a particular way. It was really quite challenging."[179] Very few of the Vietnamese trainees could speak any English and many of the New Zealanders felt that those that could "only `understood' what they wanted to hear."[180] However, most of the instructors formerly involved in training New Zealand National Servicemen noted that the attitude of the Vietnamese students was "very much like the National Service training days, when a lot of the

soldiers you got did not want to be there. The only thing they were interested in doing was keeping their nose clean and getting out of there as quickly as possible."[181]

The Vietnamese were smaller in stature than the Europeans and generally were not as strong physically, which affected their performances during the courses. Many of the students experienced difficulties firing some weapons, such as the M-60 machine-gun, which they could not cock lying down. As they had to kneel to cock it, they made easy targets for the enemy. When they tried to fire from the hip, they'd lean backwards to hold the weight and when they fired it the recoil would climb the gun back into the air almost 45 degrees."[182] There were some weapons that the Vietnamese did not like firing, such as the M-79, a 40mm grenade launcher. Vautier recollects that "they'd fire it once and refuse to fire it again, because it kicked like a shotgun."[183] Another such weapon was the M-72 light anti-tank weapon, because of the loud noise. One of the team members Tomlin, noted that: "A student, when he finally realised what happened, the second time he fired it he closed his eyes, because it creeps slowly down. He felt it creep and he jerked it as he fired. It hit the ground before it was fully armed and it started to skip bounce. We were firing at an old M113 hull but none of the students hit it."[184] Also, they were often absent from class, claiming that they were ill. During the dry season, particularly in such regions as the Delta, many of the students contracted meningitis. Doctors attributed this to overwork, exhaustion, a lack of fresh air in their cramped sleeping quarters, lung disease, and the unhealthy diet of some students; food was plentiful in the Delta, but the standard of hygiene of many students was very low.[185] Although the students could keep going for days at a slow plodding pace, they soon became very exhausted if they were required to do bursts of activity.[186] Tomlin said that: "They were willing to play the odd game of volleyball, but anything that

required hard physical work they were reluctant to do. They would simply sit down and that was it...nothing would shift them.[187]

The New Zealand instructors found it exceedingly difficult to gauge the ability of the students to comprehend what was taught in the lessons. The only practicable method, although not always satisfactory, to gauge their comprehension was to observe the students' reactions, partly through their body language. However, the actions and intentions associated were often either obscure or open to misinterpretation, due to language and cultural barriers and differences. The short duration of the course also posed major problems of time constraints for the New Zealanders. These, as with many that they encountered, were problems that the New Zealanders never really overcame. After experiencing the shortcomings of the students and the attitudes that they generally held, the New Zealanders began to feel increasingly frustrated about their task, and some New Zealanders developed cynical attitudes both towards their job and the students.

Although at times impatient, the New Zealand instructors tended, at least initially, to sympathise with their students' indifferent attitudes. Some of the team members noted that for them, in the judgement of Eyles, the attitude of the students to the courses was "never a contentious issue, because we knew right from the word go that the chances of succeeding at whatever we were going to do were going to be quite limited."[188] Others, as Thomason commented: "were fairly pretty well condescending towards some of the Vietnamese and we certainly did not treat them as equals. We were a bit overbearing and we knew best."[189] Some New Zealanders found the experience of working with the Vietnamese students to be "a bit demoralising really. It did not matter a hell of a lot what we said or did, it wasn't going to make any damn difference."[190]

The New Zealanders had no reciprocal agreement with the South Vietnamese regarding the powers of discipline, and had no legal authority over their students, which often made their job even harder. This was overcome by a simple expedient; any disciplinary matters were left to a group of Vietnamese officers, usually at the rank of Captain or Dai Uy, who spent their time walking around the different groups of students. If an instructor was having problems with any student, then the Dai Uy were called. They would ask the New Zealand instructor and Vietnamese interpreter to leave, while the matter was taken care of there and then. After being disciplined, the errant student was often sulking. "Eventually you got a joke in that you had learnt in relationship to the training and then you try and crack it and the interpreter plays his part, because the joke has been rehearsed before. Then the students laugh and the offender forgets his problem. It's bloody crazy, but that's the way it had to be done."[191]

The New Zealanders had to introduce measures to overcome the problems created as a result of these attitudes and the regionalism of Vietnamese students.[192] During lessons, student took turns being in charge of a particular exercise. The New Zealanders learnt very early on that during the practical phase of a lesson, the instructor could not simply point to a student and say `you are in charge of the patrol now'. To get a required task completed necessitated research to find out which unit each of the course's students came from. An officer from one unit did not like to look foolish in front of officers from other units, particularly if he was an officer of higher rank, came from a different region or some of the students came from a minority group. As such, the students had a "pecking order", which often led to much in-fighting and pettiness, particularly when testing leadership skills in the field. If a student was placed in a command position to test his leadership, and the other students would not recognise and

accept his command, "then that was it - they would not do anything that he said", even if he was knowledgeable and fairly good.[193] To try and motivate the students to take more interest in the courses the New Zealanders tried to introduce a parade at the end of each course, in which the best student for each subject would be given a presentation. However, the Area Commander refused to allow this, as he did not want one officer being seen to be better than the others.

The New Zealanders also discovered very quickly that the Vietnamese often took to heart, much more so than Europeans, being shown to be foolish in front of other students. If a student made a mistake during a lesson, "Then you spoke to them collectively, like they had all made a mistake."[194] Normally, the whole class then had to repeat the exercise, for the benefit of either one individual or a small group. This was a serious disadvantage, for it meant that, frequently, the programme fell behind schedule, when the material in some lessons was not completed, because of a lack of time.

However, some instructors did have some successes, albeit not great, with their students. One of the team members, who did not have a "particularly good instructional style", had a greater affinity with the students because he could speak some Vietnamese.[195] Some of the instructors felt that the Maori instructors, more so than the Europeans, were accepted by the students. Haami, one of the Maori instructors said that:

> knowing the values of the people you are going to work with...and I suppose being a Maori, it made me accept another race a lot easier and better than I would have done. Having been in Vietnam before, I knew what the people were like and I understood that they were not wogs, not gooks...they were actually soldiers fighting a war. It was not only because we were the same colour. As a Maori I was

> bigger in stature than they were, which made us more approachable to them, a factor which we recognised.[196]

The Vietnamese instructors, like the interpreters, were generally inflexible, lacked versatility in their instruction and were reluctant to accept change.[197] This inflexibility was demonstrated when the New Zealanders tried to cross-train their counterparts, who refused to specialise in more than one subject, to instruct in subject material taught by other committees. Although assigned to a particular committee, each New Zealand instructor had to assist in instructing a wide range of subject material from different committees, which they found easy because "these were subjects that we were expected to know and teach, which we were all trained for anyway."[198] The New Zealanders considered that if the Vietnamese were to run the Leadership Wing effectively, they should be cross trained in at least one other subject.[199] The poor attendance numbers on some of the courses afforded the New Zealanders time to concentrate upon this problem, but results were disappointing. One report stated that any "further attempts would probably irritate and detract from the overall aim", although it concluded: "1NZATTV was persevering."[200] As a result, until the attitudes of the Vietnamese changed, the brunt of the instruction was borne by the New Zealanders.

Despite the increased emphasis placed upon the training of the territorial forces, the quality of the Vietnamese instructors at the Wing, as at other RF/PF training centres, tended to be lower than their counterparts at ARVN training centres. There were numerous occasions when the Vietnamese demonstrated a lack of instructional experience and a lack of caring about their role. Generally, the Vietnamese instructors did not bother arriving early at a location to set up and practise their lesson, arriving at the same time as the students. As soon as possible after the lesson, the Vietnamese instructors left. The New Zealanders rarely saw the instructors when they were not required for an actual

lesson, which made attempts to develop the Vietnamese instructors' instructional skills extremely difficult. In some cases, the instructors chose to ignore completely what their New Zealand counterpart was saying and passed on what information they thought pertinent. Vautier recollects that on several occasions: "we went out and took a lesson, most of the time we had our counterpart with us and also an interpreter. As it was established later on, my particular interpreter was rattling off, verbatim, what my Vietnamese counterpart had decided from my interpretation of the lesson. On the odd occasion that they would pick up a different interpreter, I found the squads reacting differently. The answer to this was that the counterpart was influencing lessons, to our detriment."[201]

A major problem for 1NZATTV was ongoing shortage of interpreters, both in quantity and quality. This shortage accentuated the problems of the New Zealand instructors, who had little or no experience or skills in conducting instruction through an interpreter.[202] During the first course, there were only two interpreters available and as this meant less than one interpreter for each training cell, they were grossly overworked.[203] If a New Zealand instructor did not have an interpreter with him during a class, a frequent occurrence, then he had to rely on "smiles, the little bit of Vietnamese that you knew and a hell of a lot of swearing to try to indicate what you wanted."[204] It was several months before the wing's authorised strength of seven interpreters was reached, but the standard of almost all of them was very poor.

There were several reasons for the poor quality of the interpreters. Some of the interpreters showed a lack of knowledge of military expressions. The New Zealanders learnt a new lesson - that an interpreter's language is affected by his working environment. They found that the interpreters, as with the instructors, specialised in one subject. To overcome this problem, the interpreters needed

adequate time to become acquainted with the vocabulary, tone, and accent used by each New Zealand instructor. Also, there were problems with the morale of some interpreters. During one of Padre L.H. Barber's visits to Chi Lang, he learnt that one of the Vietnamese interpreters, when transferred to Chi Lang from Saigon, discovered that all his household chattels had disappeared enroute.[205] Barber discovered that the items had been stolen and sold off by a senior ARVN officer. When Barber took the interpreter to an ARVN officer to complain, the interpreter was told that if he complained again, he would be sent to the front. Such incidents served to "whittle away the interpreter's loyalty, which doesn't do much for one's loyalty to the cause."[206]

Prior to the commencement of the first course, the New Zealand instructors were able to gain limited experience working with the small number of interpreters then available. The instructors rehearsed their lessons exactly as if they were taking an actual class. They had to work out with the interpreters how much they could say before they had to stop and it was translated to the students, which "took quite a bit of getting used to."[207] Many words and/or English colloquialisms the New Zealanders used "couldn't quite be turn literally into Vietnamese."[208] The New Zealanders often spoke too quickly, which was quite a problem for the instructors. Despite this preparation, they often found that: "when we stopped and the interpreter took over, there seemed to be a hell of a lot of time we used to have to stand there looking like a dummy, twiddling our thumbs."[209]

The New Zealanders employed a number of techniques to try to minimise the chances and possible consequences of incorrect translation by the interpreters and misinterpretation by the students and instructors. While the interpreters translated, the instructors watched the reactions of the students. If a "look of incredulous

surprise or disbelief appeared on their faces, then we knew that something was wrong and it was best to start again", remembers Vautier.[210] Visual aids were used extensively, and descriptive drops, written in Vietnamese, with English sub-titles, proved very successful in overcoming incorrect translations.[211] The main points of a lesson were written in English on a blackboard and translated by the interpreter which, however, had several drawbacks. Lessons took twice as long to present and much of the enthusiasm of the instructor, and perhaps some of what he said, was lost in interpretation.[212] Particular problems also arose with questioning, which were never really resolved. By the time a question had been translated to the instructor and the instructor's answer translated to the questioner, it was likely that the answer bore little relation to the question. An alternative system to using interpreters was to have the lectures fully translated, and presented by a Vietnamese officer, assisted by the teaching aids written in Vietnamese. Although undoubtedly the best system, which had been trialled by the New Zealanders, it had not always been possible because of the shortage of interpreters and also the latters immense workload.[213] This often meant that the lessons were not translated in time to be learnt by the instructors before the lesson began, or even worse, were hurriedly and inaccurately translated.[214] The New Zealanders had to change their original lesson format, as they was found that the best instructional method was to keep to a minimum the instructor talking, and spend as much of the available time as possible in student practice. Most importantly, any faults in translation could be corrected while the students practised. It was also found that the demonstration platoon, properly rehearsed as to what was required from it, proved to be of great benefit. As such, the platoon was used extensively to illustrate lessons.

Another problem for the instructors was the rigidity of the interpreters. If an instructor deviated, for any reason, from the content and/or sequence of the lesson plan

he had practised, the interpreter would become confused, and often resulted in incorrect translations. Prior to a lesson, the interpreter had studied his Vietnamese translation of a lesson plan, and expected the instructor to follow the prepared lesson plan word for word. This was not always easy, particularly so for newly arrived replacement instructors, when they invariably made changes, however minor, to the format of an already established lesson format. As a result, lesson plans had to be written using the most basic English, using short phrases, and the instructor had to speak slowly and distinctly. This meant that the lessons took considerably longer than normal, and the instructors, because of a lack of time, could not re-emphasise material for students who had difficulties understanding what was being taught.

Some team members experienced a typical `Asian manner', in which the interpreters, although some were very competent and could understand English, were very scared of losing face in front of the students. This problem, experienced by almost all the New Zealanders, was accentuated because the interpreters would take only the lessons that they felt comfortable with. In one instance, Vautier recalls that: "Pearce [Major General Pearce, the DCDS, visited Chi Lang...and I was taking a machine-gun lesson. I passed on some orders through the interpreter who refused to pass the instructions onto the students. I found out later that he was scared of the fact that the students wouldn't be able to carry out what he was telling them, even though the original order had come from me. The whole class just froze. I looked at Pearce and he looked at me, he had a fairly good understanding from way back and he shook his head."[215]

The isolation experienced by the members of 1NZATTV was more than simply being removed from European contact. The security situation around the Chi Lang area had always been precarious, even before the team's arrival. Lieutenant General Thornton, the CDS, had publicly stated there was a

possibility the team might engage with infiltrating enemy troops moving from Cambodia into the Delta, and there was enemy activity in the surrounding area.[216] In March 1972, four suspected VC agents, arrested in Tu Te village, were found to have detailed sketch maps of Chi Lang, including 1NZATTV's compound.[217] That the enemy had this information was a serious threat to the security of the training centre. In April 1971, at a location frequently used by the New Zealanders to conduct lessons, a Cambodian company on an exercise, was decimated and five of its American instructors were killed.[218] There were periods when the security situation around Chi Lang was particularly dangerous.[219]

The security situation throughout 1972 fared no better. The Easter Offensive in 1972 meant that the team was on a constant security alert and were restricted to their compound. This resulted in the necessity to create a local ready-reserve battalion. The situation created disruptions to the training schedule and also affected student numbers at Chi Lang as a result of the shortage of students. On 17 November, a report was received from Saigon of possible assassination attempts on Free World Advisors, and additional security measures had to be taken by 1NZATTV members. In late 1972 there was an increase in enemy activity in South Vietnam as a whole, and in MR IV in particular, through the movement of large groups of enemy troops into the Delta region. Although successful operations against these units reduced the likelihood of direct assaults upon the camp, some attacks were still possible.[220]

How long the New Zealand team could have held off an enemy attack is open to conjecture. Chi Lang never suffered any ground attacks, although there were mortar and rocket attacks made upon the camp, either at night or early in the morning. Such attacks on Chi Lang continued spasmodically throughout the following year.[221] The New Zealanders believed that every time the centre was hit, the VC achieved

far more damage than was ever inflicted upon them. Tomlin, one of the team members, remembered that: "I used to get frightened... apprehensive...during the times that things did come in but I couldn't see anything to hit back at. To have to sit there and take it and not be able to do anything was frustrating."[222]

It was not until December 1971, after the arrival of Major Pilling, the OC of 1NZATTV, that the team concentrated upon the defences of the compound. Prior to his arrival, there were only basically sand-bagged positions, as the majority of effort had gone into erecting the compound. Haami, who arrived at Chi Lang in November 1971 said that: "when I saw the defences of our compound, I said to myself `Christ, I hope we never get attacked. Gee, what have I let myself in for'."[223] Although a defensive system was built, the majority of the New Zealanders were never too concerned about security, as they felt that they were in a reasonably secure area. One of the team members said: "I think I was allocated a bunker, but I did not even know my way there."[224] Under Pilling's leadership, the defensive system was greatly strengthened. The conexes in the compound, used as strategic points, were sandbagged inside and out and rifle slots were cut in the walls. Trenches were dug between the bunkers and to outlying sandbagged positions and the team members practised moving from their sleeping quarters to their allotted positions. Dummy minefields were constructed around the perimeter of the compound, Claymore mines were set up and warning signs were posted. However, visitors were not shown the defensive positions, merely told that they existed.

Many of the New Zealanders had very little confidence in the ability of the Vietnamese troops at Chi Lang to stave off any serious enemy attack. While supposedly patrolling the compound's perimeter at night, patrols from the team's demonstration platoon were frequently discovered to be fast asleep. During rocket and mortar attacks the Vietnamese,

once having manned their positions, invariably fired all of their weapons, many of which did not even have firing sights, as quickly as possible in all directions, with no control. It always took some time for their officers to gain some form of control.

The dangers that the members of 1NZATTV faced were not only from the `unseen enemy' - the NVA and VC. On 9 January 1972, one team member received a minor wound from an unexpected quarter. Tension had existed between two ARVN battalions undergoing retraining at Chi Lang. The tension erupted into violence when the next day, from 1720 hours until 1840 hours, one of the battalion's, camped to the west of the New Zealand compound perimeter, launched a two pronged attack on the other battalion's position to the east of 1NZATTV's compound. The attacking battalion employed mortars and M-79's for support fire, their trajectory taking them over 1NZATTV's compound into the other battalion's positions. ARVN casualties were light, with two killed and twelve wounded, and some of the building in the team's compound were hit by one mortar round, and M16 rounds and shrapnel from M79s. An air conditioner and refrigerator in the mess, damaged beyond repair, had to be replaced. The JGS and General Tam, the chairman of the Free World Military Assistance Forces (FWMAF), apologised to the New Zealanders for the incident. A signal from NZ V Force to AGS, which described the incident, concluded that: "whilst this incident may cause some concern in New Zealand it is not to be unexpected in the heated environment of a country at war. There was no intention of either unit to involve 1NZATTV.[225]

Instances of theft by the students and local villagers remained a constant problem for the New Zealanders of 1NZATTV. These thefts also coloured somewhat the New Zealanders attitudes towards the Vietnamese as a whole. Within the New Zealand compound, there was a common phrase regarding the students' habit of stealing, remembers G.P.

Eyles, who was one of the team members: although the students were regarded as physically, weak, "when they were stealing, they could produce the strength of ten men."[226] Quite ingenious methods were used to steal equipment. It was discovered that the students and locals were using some of the team's wheelbarrows to carry timber off-cuts from the building that was underway in the New Zealand compound, to the local village for firewood. In actual fact, the Vietnamese were more interested in stealing the wheelbarrows than the firewood.[227] Some attempts could also lead to disaster. In one incident, a Vietnamese soldier, while attempting to steal some ammunition from a container, accidentally ignited a tear-gas bomb and the wind carried the tear-gas through the New Zealand compound.

Although known as a good `scrounger', the average New Zealand soldier drew a line between acquiring and stealing. That the Vietnamese did not do so angered many of the New Zealanders. They not only stole items for their own use, such as ammunition, rations and petrol, but they also made ornaments out of virtually any scrap item. However, the punishment that was meted out to those caught stealing by their own officers could be very severe. A visiting Vietnamese Colonel's driver was caught stealing a camera from one team member's tent. The Colonel promptly shot the driver's hand off with a .45 revolver.[228] Despite despite being upset by these thefts, some team members could see why the Vietnamese were stealing: "All soldiers perk things, but they had low equipment levels, they just did not have anything, and they took the first opportunity to steal."[229]

The general attitude of the Australians and New Zealanders employing local civilians on their bases was in direct contrast to the Americans, the latter of which sought to work as closely with the Vietnamese as possible.[230] However, female companionship, in whatever form, was "on tap and was available wherever and whenever you wanted it. It was just like dialling a telephone number."[231] Due to the

long hours that the team had to work, a small number of Vietnamese women were employed as domestic assistants. Although there was little social contact with these women, team members could arrange either to meet with them after hours or else get them to "contact the right people" if the men needed female companionship.[232] Some of the men tried to converse with the women at the base, particularly the bar maids: "You attempted to string a few words together and it didn't take long to learn a few greetings and things like that and test it out on the girls who used to clean the rooms."[233] The Americans employed Vietnamese civilians in a wide range of occupations on their bases, and prostitutes were frequent visitors.[234] Although most of the team members regarded this policy with some suspicion, some were quite happy to make use of this `service.'[235] The completion of their tour with the team, commonly known to the New Zealand team members as `PCOT' - Pussy Cutting Off Time - could be quite traumatic, even for some those who were married, because some team members had developed long term `liaisons' with local Vietnamese women.[236]

While not engaged in actual combat, the team members faced many dangers, frustrations and uncertainties.[237] The New Zealand press reported that the team was doing a difficult job under trying circumstances. One New Zealand newspaper reporter, who had spent time at Chi Lang, painted a bleak picture of the conditions the team faced: They "got on with their jobs in spite of the grinding heat, the sheer loneliness of being cooped up in their own small compound at night because of Viet Cong activities...and the inevitable dissatisfaction of dealing with penny-pinching bosses at home who did not seem to be able to hurry up with overdue back-pay and who have been far from co-operative in the provision of leave facilities for men...doing fine work as professional soldiers under appalling conditions."[238]

Many members of the original team were glad when it came time to return to New Zealand, with disillusion and boredom being the main enemies. Vautier recollects that: "We wanted to come home, we had had enough. We were just bloody frustrated. Seeing what was going on, hearing what was going on, trying to instruct, not knowing whether you were being appreciated or not, you knew that some of what you were instructing was being appreciated, but others didn't want to know."[239] Such attitudes were also noted by visitors to Chi Lang. In one of his reports, J.T. Henderson considered that "the more relaxed comradeship so obvious at Nui Dat was conspicuously absent."[240] Some team members had told him: "morale was about forty percent", while another said: "all I want to do is serve my time and get home and his mates nodded in agreement."[241] Another member noted: "if you want to do some good, get us out of here."[242] During his visits to 1NZATTV, Padre L.H. Barber, although having got the impression the team members were extremely effective, "I also got the impression that some of them had been there too long and that a year's TOD was not a good thing."[243]

Such attitudes by the team members affected the newly arriving replacements. Many replacements, including K.R. Brown, were shocked that some of the instructors; "said that they couldn't wait to get home and that they thought that the South Vietnamese were all bloody useless, and considered their job not to be a worthwhile expenditure of their energies. I found this surprising and I was disappointed... it was a big shock to me."[244]

These attitudes were not only racially based. Towards the end of 1971, concern within 1NZATTV was being expressed towards the poor standard of leadership at Chi Lang, which was affecting the team's morale. Although the men, comprising for the most part experienced and senior

soldiers, were living and working in a confined space, which caused friction between the officers and the men and among the men themselves.[245] Because of the heavy workload, the team members resented any "imagined intrusions" into what spare time they had.[246] Vautier recollects that when the compound was completed: "all that was going on was the beautification of the compound...putting flowers in the gardens...working for the sake of working. We worked our guts out to get the compound finished and not to be peg-arsed around...it was like filling up a sand-bag over there and then emptying over here."[247] Haami recalls that in his farewell speech what a significant proportion of the others felt that his time with 1NZATTV "was the worst time that I have ever spent in my bloody Army career. I told them that if you ever visit my house, you will never see my plague hanging on the wall. But that was only because our bosses were not up to par.[248]

Leadership and the mean's morale did improve significantly with the arrival of Pilling at the team's OC. He kept a close eye on the team members and ensured that they got, within reason, what they needed. He had a policy whereby every member, as far as practicable, went on leave for about three to four days every month to give team members a break from the work environment in Chi Lang.[249] He also set aside, every Sunday morning, a `bitch session' in which anything that the team members were unhappy with was discussed. At the completion of the session, the men had the rest of the day off. Most of the men's complaints were remedied, or at least efforts were made to remedy them.

This situation changed in August 1972, with the replacement of Pilling by Major A. Kiwi, the last of the New Zealand COs before 1NZATTV was withdrawn. Kiwi, however, did not tend to have the same control or command the same respect from the team members as Pilling. He cut the `bitch session' and the team members considered that it was not worth complaining, because they found that little notice was

taken of their complaints and little was done to try to solve them. This could have been partly attributable to differences in leadership - Kiwi was more of a practical person, well suited to command of an infantry company, while Pilling was more of an intellectual. Kiwi did not appear to have the humane sensitivity that Pilling did. The change in leadership style accentuated the morale problems, which were never reduced or remedied while Kiwi was in charge.[250]

Although what was brought out were sometimes minor complaints, they reflect the frustrations of the men in being part of a Vietnamese organisation. Although there were political and morale advantages in being part of an all New Zealand structure, these were overshadowed by the difficulties which arose from being a small group of men in a foreign environment. Major Pilling, the OC of 1NZATTV, considered that: "There were frustrations in terms of isolation. There were no other Europeans...there. We had difficulty in conversing with the Vietnamese, because they didn't speak English and likewise we didn't speak Vietnamese."[251]

Despite such grumbling, there were some morale advantages in being part of an all New Zealand rather than an Australia New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) structure. However, these were more than outweighed by the difficulties arising from being part of a small group in a foreign environment. Although the working and social relationship that 1NZATTV had with the Vietnamese and the U.S. personnel at Chi Lang was cordial, despite inherent difficulties, the team members usually socialised amongst themselves.[252] The New Zealanders did not associate with their Vietnamese students, the latter of whom "were there to be taught and with the Vietnamese social structure, there was a very big social gap between a student and his tutor", recalls Vautier.[253] The extent to which the New Zealanders and their Vietnamese counterparts socialised very much depended upon how well each New Zealander interacted with his

counterpart. Vautier remembers that "it depended very much on the luck of the draw. The Vietnamese instructor that I worked with was a very difficult person. We didn't particularly strike it off."[254] One New Zealander commented: "Basically, we got on well. The biggest barrier...was the language, but those we could get to know...were genuine. The others, all they wanted was to get what they could out of you."[255]

Despite obvious ethnic differences, attempts were made to try and keep these differences in the background, which generally worked. There was some apprehension when the team first arrived at Chi Lang and it took considerable time for this apprehension to dissipate somewhat, but Tomlin remembers that they: "had to be careful as to what we said and how we said it, because what we would say to you or I would say to each on the booze, we were never sure if it was accepted by them or not and take offense at it quickly.[256] Eyles noted: "you had to be very careful of the sensitivity of the Vietnamese. It was very distasteful to say the least - eating frogs and birds that they had shot to pieces with M-16s. However, you just had to do it."[257]

Although there was an American advisory team working at Chi Lang, the New Zealanders initially had little contact with its members, save occasionally as circumstances permitted. Although there were some visits by the two groups to each other's messes, the American withdrawal resulted in a decrease in such social interaction. As the team settled into its role, more time was available for recreation. The New Zealanders of 1NZATTV were, for the most part, very impressed with the U.S. personnel at Chi Lang and had an excellent relationship with them. K.R. Brown, one of the team members, noted that "they were experienced, very professional on an individual level, very dedicated and highly motivated ...Most of them had been in

the army all their lives and had seen a lot of action. Their marksmanship was exceptional, far better that ours."[258] By mid-1971, the team's mess had built up a very good reputation among the Americans for its high level of hospitality. The airfield at Chi Lang was frequently used by U.S. pilots when flying missions into Cambodia. When not in action, the pilots often came into the New Zealand mess for meals "at any time of the night and day", and went for a swim in the team's pool.[259] Eyles recalls that: "you scrounged what you could get, but at the same time you gave things back."[260] Team members were frequently able to get lifts on American aircraft into Can Tho and other towns. Several of the New Zealanders were taught how to fly the Cobra attack helicopter, even if it was only in a straight line. Some, when on leave in Can Tho, flew into the Khmer Republic with American and South Vietnamese aircraft on bombing missions, if there was "a spare seat".[261]

1NZATTV was to have been as self sufficient as possible, using the New Zealand supply system to obtain any necessary equipment. However, the rapport the team had built up with American units and servicemen enabled the team to obtain items much more quickly, and in larger quantities, than was possible using the New Zealand supply system. The New Zealanders were amazed about the attitude of the Americans to their equipment, because: "some things we wanted, it either took us so long to get it or we could not get it and we had to make do with what we had and, yet the way the Americans got equipment and discarded it at times used to make us almost cry."[262] To obtain the required tools for repairing the Land-rovers that they had received from Nui Dat: "a couple of the boys got on the booze with the Americans. We took a truck to a large American camp and they opened a big row of containers and told us to help ourselves."[263] The New Zealanders returned to Chi Lang with all the mechanical equipment that they needed. The Americans gave the team, recalled Tomlin, one of the team members: "shotguns, M-1 Garrands a 7.62 mini-gattling gun, a

multi-barrelled gatling gun, and a 76mm recoilless rifle. You try to do that in our army, they'd string you up. We kept them in our Q store because we weren't supposed to have them. They even offered us a Sioux helicopter."[264]

The New Zealanders could almost get anything they needed from the Vietnamese, but at a price. In the first few months of its existence at Chi Lang, 1NZATTV was able to acquire some items through the Vietnamese, "there were few items including ammunition and so on that a can of petrol for the Honda scooters could not fix."[265] Despite this, such resourcefulness upon the part of the New Zealanders and their subsequent standard of living did create "an alienative [sic] feeling amongst those that we were there to train."[266]

However, maintaining the serviceability of the team's vehicles proved to be a problem for the team's mechanic. There were considerable difficulties in obtaining replacement parts through the New Zealand supply system for the landrovers. By early October 1972, because of the on-going American withdrawal from Vietnam, there was very little left in the way of replacement parts, however basic, for the four 3/4 ton U.S. trucks, and anyway, the team's landrovers were not compatible with the vehicles used by the Americans. The team's vehicles were kept going through "improvisation and ingenuity", although vehicles would often be unserviceable for weeks at a time.[267] Major Kiwi warned NZATGV: "this situation cannot last too long before vehicles will be completely useless."[268]

Despite these problems, the New Zealanders at Chi Lang fared much better than their Australian counterparts, and of all the training teams, 1NZATTV had perhaps the best facilities and compound. In early March 1972, Kiwi and WO1 B.L. Crafts had spent one week at the JWTC at Nui Dat, to compare the two training establishments.[269] This visit disclosed that logistical support was the most glaring

difference. Although 1NZATTV had little difficulty up to this point in obtaining such supplies as ammunition for training, weapons, training aids, and rations from National Training Centre (hereafter NTC) headquarters, the Australians had virtually no Vietnamese logistic backing and depended upon whatever they could get from 1st Australian Task Force (hereafter 1ATF). The intended withdrawal of 1ATF created such almost insurmountable security and logistical problems for the JWTC that the continuation in Nui Dat of the JWTC became questionable.

The team received two main groups of replacements during its time at Chi Lang. A course was held at Papakura Camp in late October 1971 to select and prepare replacements for 1NZATTV.[270] Out of a total of eighteen personnel who attended, fifteen were finally selected.[271] However, the problem of providing instructors posted to Chi Lang with some form of Vietnamese language training remained unresolved. A three-week Vietnamese colloquial language course, similar to the one conducted at the language school in Saigon, was to have been held at the Wellington Polytechnic. However, it was cancelled because HQ NZ V Force had advised New Zealand Defence headquarters (NZDEF) that a Vietnamese language course for the replacements was "not justified."[272] No other training was available to the replacements, as the U.S. school at Di An had closed in September 1971 and they could not be attached to any U.S. advisory teams. The replacements went straight to Chi Lang from New Zealand.[273]

Upon their arrival at Chi Lang, the replacements were interviewed by the Officer Commanding (OC) and then the Training Officer to ascertain which committee they would be posted to. These replacements, as with most newly arrived instructors, were enthusiastic about their intended involvement in the training programme. They knew that if

the Labour Party won the impending general election in New Zealand, then their time in South Vietnam would be short, "a point that was always in the back of our minds."[274] They knew there was a high probability that Labour would be elected.[275] However, due to training requirements and pressure, they were given little time to become familiar with the camp, instructing with interpreters or the type of training undertaken by the team. Almost immediately they began instructing.

A New Role

With the change to an advisory role by 1NZATTV, the sudden withdrawal of New Zealand instructors from the Leadership Wing was not comprehended by the Vietnamese instructors. Whereas before all support had been provided by 1NZATTV, the Vietnamese instructors suddenly found themselves without such support from the moment the team adopted their new role. This caused much bitterness, criticism and resentment about, and towards, the members of 1NZATTV.[276] Eventually, the Vietnamese became resigned to conducting the Junior Leadership courses themselves with the limited resources that were available to them.

The adoption of an advisory role proved to be a new experience for the New Zealanders. They found it difficult to advise, assist and guide the Vietnamese without materially contributing the necessary logistic and administrative support that the team had previously provided. The team's preparations for its new role began smoothly, but a number of problems needed to be solved, including continuing shortages in transport, instructors and equipment.[277] A report summed up the feelings of the New Zealanders: "It is extremely frustrating and depressing to see the previously high standards very quickly disintegrate.

The Vietnamese instructors...without...administration and logistic back-up...will not be able to accomplish the mission."[278] Most of these problems remained unresolved.

A total of 150 students, the largest number of students to attend a course at the wing, attended the first course to be trained and administered entirely by the Vietnamese since the inception of the Leadership Wing.[279] However, a number of problems served to adversely affect the morale of both the Vietnamese instructors and students. The number of students proved to be too high for the Vietnamese staff of the Wing, and the administration and logistical resources of the NTC. The centre's already burdened logistic and administrative back-up meant that the Wing lacked much of its necessary training resources, and had a chronic shortage of transport.[280] There was a decline in both the instructional standards and the effectiveness of the training, most apparent in the practical subjects. Insufficient time had been devoted to enable the students to practise what they had been taught, and the instructors failed to prepare and plan their lessons.[281] The arrival of a number of ARVN battalions for retraining reduced the number of the wing's allocated training areas, and placed a severe drain upon training materials and ammunition stocks at Chi Lang.[282] However, although the Wing tried hard to raise the students' standards, the New Zealanders reported that the standard of the course was only "fair", and the course achieved the highest failure rate thus far.[283]

There was a further reorganisation of the Leadership Wing in late November, before the commencement of course 8/72. The reorganisation disbanded the headquarters element of the wing and assimilated all the instructors into the three committees of the Training Branch which, in effect, meant that the Leadership Wing no longer existed.[284] Although the reasons for this were never made clear to 1NZATTV, this reorganisation could have been to try to

overcome the support problems the wing experienced. In actual fact, the exact opposite occurred and most problems went unresolved.[285] As a net result of this change, student interest was very low, and the Vietnamese instructors showed a growing lack of interest, meaning that the standard of instruction fell even lower.[286] The New Zealanders now found their channel of communication to the Vietnamese military hierarchy to be unclear and ineffective.[287]

The future of both the battalion retraining programme and 1NZATTV became more uncertain with the indefinite postponement of the start of the programme.[288] Although the question of the programmes commencement would not be examined before 15 November, in early November the date was again postponed. Both postponements were as a result of an upsurge in enemy activity and the redeployment of RF battalions to meet this threat.[289] In late November 1972, an assessment of the ARVN forces in the Delta stated that it "appeared likely that all the provinces in MR IV would be attacked immediately before the cease-fire."[290] The report noted that neither the ARVN or territorial forces were making little effort to halt the build-up of enemy forces in the Delta, "because they were looking with one eye on the cease-fire."[291] Contingency plans for the withdrawal of NZATGV were completed, based upon the likelihood that either the security situation at Chi Lang would deteriorate, or that a cease-fire would be signed.[292] Lieutenant Colonel Brown, the Commander of NZ V Force, felt "drastic action [was] required if 1NZATTV is to survive any prolonged inactivity."[293]

The future of the team was sealed when NZATGV was advised by General Vien's, Chief of the JGS, soon after that there was no intention to recommence training of RF battalions prior to any cease-fire and with General C.W. Abrams, commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (COMUSMACV), notification that the allied presence in South Vietnam would be terminated within sixty days of

the signing of a cease-fire agreement. Major General Pearce, the DCDS, recommended that approval be given to withdraw 1NZATTV from Vietnam, as "it is now evident...that there is no longer a task for 1NZATTV."[294] The New Zealand Minister of Defence concurred with Pearce, noting that 1NZATTV could be withdrawn "at very short notice."[295] On 11 December 1972, Cabinet approved the withdrawal of all elements of NZATGV from Vietnam as soon as practicable.

In hindsight and from other appraisals of the 1970s, 1NZATTV accomplished a useful training function with the ARVN RF officers in the Delta region. Although many of the officer students were battle hardened, their minor tactical skills, small arms skills and command confidence were shown to have improved by the validation procedures operated by the team. Despite inadequate preparation of the team's members, cultural differences, instructional difficulties resulting from the use of interpreters, little understanding of Vietnamese language and culture, and their students suspicions of alien instructors, until three-quarters of the way through Major Pilling's posting as commander, 1NZATTV can be judged to have been a minor but useful training team.

With a worsening war scene and the change from officer instruction to a scheme that envisaged the retraining of RF battalions came the moment when militarily the team's usefulness declined. Having established the leadership courses and trained the Vietnamese instructors to the best of their ability, the New Zealanders faced the onerous and unrewarding task of ensuring that at least minimum instructional standards were met by their Vietnamese counterparts. The promised battalion retraining scheme was constantly delayed, and instructors were left with time on their hands, and morale declined. While the political need to synchronise 1NZATTV's withdrawal with American and Australian withdrawals elsewhere, and the need to keep a

symbolic New Zealand military presence as long as it was safe, dominated the timing of withdrawal, in reality the team's role ended seven months before it returned to New Zealand.

During 1NZATTV's second year of employment, the New Zealand Government determined to deploy a second training team to South Vietnam. While its role would be in marked contrast to that of the team at Chi Lang, the lessons learnt through the deployment of 1NZATTV considerably aided the second team in its work with larger FANK units and in a very different working environment.

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1. W.S. Thompson and D.D. Frizzell, The Lessons of Vietnam (London, 1977), p. 243.

2. Warning Order - Raising of the New Zealand Army Training Team Vietnam (NZATTV), dated 30 October 1970. From Brig Hassett to DCGS, AD-A11 2564 42/17/8 Training AATTV: Replacements for 1NZATTV. NZ Army Training Team (Vietnam) Preparatory Training Course Directive, dated 9 November 1970, National Archives (NA).
Unfortunately, the warning order was not circulated as quickly as it should have been. Many team members did not receive it for more than two weeks after it was released.

3. A list of potential members for 1NZATTV had been compiled since April 1970.
1NZATTV was to include an advance body of ten personnel and a main body of fifteen personnel, with a further six available as replacements if required.

4. NZATTV Deployment of RNZE Party for Construction of NZ Compound at Chi Lang, dated 13 November 1970, AD-A11 2564 42/17/8. The engineer team was titled `6 Specialist Team RNZE', its short title being `6 Spec Team'.
A `mounting instruction' lists all the administrative requirements a unit requires prior to deploying overseas, including information on important dates, and equipment.

5. NZATTV Deployment of RNZE Party for Construction of NZ Compound at Chi Lang, dated 13 November 1970, AD-A11 2564 42/17/8.

6. See Appendix Nine for a list of members of this party.

7. Initially, U.S. personnel serving in the MATs were selected from U.S. units in Vietnam. From early 1969, however, personnel were assigned directly from the United States to a specific MAT for a one year tour. While this was intended to enhance the expertise of the American MATs, the advisors' levels of corporate knowledge were seriously reduced. Few received any form of useful language training, and they received only an introduction to the problems of working in a foreign culture. Training was `on-the-job.'

8. Proposed NZ Training Team. New Zealand Working Party Report to CDS. Dated 20 October 1970. 15/28/13 NZ Forces in Vietnam: Training Assistance SVN Forces, vol II, September 1970 - December 1970, Defence classified Registry (DCR). An RF platoon was trained as a demonstration platoon.

9. NZ Army Training Team (Vietnam). Preparatory Training Course. Directive Lt-Col Hamilton for CGS, dated 9 November 1970, AD-A11 2564 42/17/8. The data that had been provided in AATTV's monthly reports proved useful in preparing a syllabus for training the team's personnel.

10. For military command and civil administration, South Vietnam was divided into four major geographical regions or Military Regions (MRs), that is, MR I, MR II, MR III and MR IV.

11. Course Programme for NZATTV Preparatory Course, undated, 15/28/13, vol II.

12. Interview with W.S. Vautier, dated 19 August 1990. Vautier was an instructor in the general subjects committee.

13. ibid. A large proportion of those interviewed also shared this view.
The possibility of active service was but one lure. Some servicemen wanted to go because of the generous monetary allowances granted for overseas service, as the exchange rate was very much in New Zealand's favour. Also, after completing an overseas tour servicemen were eligible for a 2.5 percent housing loan. A subsequent reduction in allowances, brought about by changes in the exchange rate, caused much bitterness amongst the financially-motivated.
Nevertheless, the calibre of men chosen for the team was high. Of the twenty-eight members of the team, eighteen came from instructional positions either at National Service Training units or the Army Schools in Waiouru. The majority of the instructors had combat experience: thirteen had previous service in Korea, Malaya, Borneo or Vietnam.

14. Once in South Vietnam, 1NZATTV came under the command of Commander NZ V Force.

15. Edwards, one of the team members, remained at HQ CORDS as New Zealand Liaison Officer (NZLO), to support the twelve New Zealander during their attachment to the MATs. However, due to movement and resupply problems experienced by them during their attachment to the MATs, the NZLO's position was made permanent.

16. US MATs provided most of the RF/PF training in MRs I, II and IV. At the end of January 1971, there were approximately 3,000 US advisors in MR IV.
Having foreseen that the team would experience difficulty working with non-English speaking instructors, the JWP had earlier recommended that the New Zealanders should be given appropriate initial experience prior to joining the wing at Chi Lang.

17. AATTV policy stipulated that advisors from Australia were posted to an operational unit for six months and then posted to a training centre, where they could assist in remedying weaknesses that they had observed on operations.
The New Zealand instructors wore Vietnamese Lieutenant's rank while attached to the MATs, and Captain's rank upon arriving at Chi Lang.
During their attachment in Chi Lang the New Zealander wore shoulder tags which had `Tun Tay Lun', Vietnamese for `New Zealander'. They also wore, as did all the members of the

training centre, the Chi Lang shoulder/chest patch consisting of four colours and four symbols:
a. Blue: the colour of infantry and the colour of hope - "Hope is for everlasting peace."
b. Red: which symbolised courage, blood, enthusiasm and high morale - "Fight for the Nations cause."
c. Black: the colour of unity and sacrifice - "Sacrifice for the Vietnam Nation," and;
d. White: the colour of purity and heroism - "Troops of the crusade."
e. The White Star, the symbol of a base point - "To destroy the communists to save our country. For peace in our homeland."
f. The Flame, a symbol of blood. Boiling blood which symbolised the struggling spirit.
g. The Arrow, which symbolised the valiant advance under good leadership. The flame out on the arrow meant - "We have come through fire and danger sacrificing our blood and bones as we advance courageously to accomplish our mission of the fatherland."
h. The Seven Mountains, which depicted the great range of mountains, adjacent to the training centre which is a sacred area of South Vietnam in the Delta Region.
Recommendation of Briefing for Lt-Col, Chief of Staff/ DOD NZ Delegation on 25 January 1971, 15/28/13, NZ Forces in Vietnam: Training Assistance SVN Forces, vol III, December 1970 - May 1972, DCR.

18. Interview with W.S. Vautier.

19. ibid.

20. Interview with W.S. Vautier.

21. Interview with G.G. Tomlin, 12 May 1989. He was an instructor in the general subjects committee and as he was a Physical Training Instructor, he also took the students for most of their physical training.

22. ibid.

23. ibid.

24. G2 was designation for an Operations officer, and G3 was Intelligence.

25. Each MAT included two officers, three enlisted men and a Vietnamese Army interpreter. A MAT's primary role was to advise and train RF companies, PF platoons and both RF and PF Group Headquarters on basic operational skills, such as small unit operations. Each MAT operated under the supervision of the local province and district Advisory Team.

26. Collated from K.C. Fenton to CGS, Operational Summary NZ Forces Vietnam March 1971, dated 16 April 1971, 15/28/13, vol III.

27. Interview with G.G. Tomlin.

28. Interview with W.S. Vautier.

29. Interview with G.G. Tomlin. The soldiers hung their boots on their rifles, probably because they had only one set of boots and had to purchase any extra gear that they needed.

30. ibid.

31. ibid.

32. ibid.

33. Interview with G.P. Eyles, 16 June 1991.

34. ibid.

35. ibid.

36. This belief may have been brought about by the extent to which the NLF had infiltrated and influenced the territorial forces.

37. Interview with W.S. Vautier.

38. ibid. The New Zealanders were not the only allied troops to observe such incidents. One Australian account noted that one RF company, in a normal day, stole six to eight pigs and 100 chickens and ducks. I. McNeill, The Team: Australian Army Advisors in Vietnam, 1962 - 1972 (Australian War Memorial, 1984), p. 276.

39. Interview with G.G. Tomlin.

40. Interview with W.S. Vautier.

41. ibid.

42. ibid.

43. Interview with G.G. Tomlin.

44. K.C. Fenton to CGS, Operational Summary NZ Forces Vietnam March 1971. Dated 16 April 1971, 15/28/10, Monthly Activity Reports - NZ Forces in Vietnam (Operational Summaries, Reports etc), vol III, February 1971 - February 1972, DCR.

45. A copy of the syllabus is contained in Appendix Three of this thesis.

46. The Engineers advance party concentrated at Papakura Camp the day after their instruction was released.

47. Lt J. McDonald to Lt-Col R.M.L. Dickie, Chief Engineer,

12 December 1970. This letter is held in the Vietnam file at Engineers Museum, Linton Military Camp.

48. Lt J. McDonald to Lt-Col R.M.L. Dickie, Chief Engineer, 8 March 1971. This letter is held in the Vietnam file at Engineers Museum, Linton Military Camp.
From Chief Engineer to Col GS, dated 14 April 1971, 15/28/13, vol III.

49. It had been expected that the compound would be completed by 31 March 1971, but construction was not completed until late that year, and at a higher cost than had been initially forecast. As such, a replacement engineer team of seven personnel arrived at Chi Lang in mid-June 1971. Two engineers, WOII W. Kearney and Lt R.A. Barrett, were appointed to the training team to undertake engineer training for the Vietnamese. See Appendix Nine of this thesis for a list of team members.

50. Interview with G.G. Tomlin.

51. Interview with W.S. Vautier.
This problem was partly overcome by the Americans laying oil on the sand to keep the dust down.

52. Layout of New Zealand Compound, Annex A to Visitors Brief, 1NZATTV - Chi Lang. Queen Elizabeth II Army Memorial Museum, Box 18, I 17.

53. Interview with G.G. Tomlin.

54. There was a considerable amount of equipment stolen from the team's living quarters by local Vietnamese civilians and soldiers. Until a defended perimeter was established, the team had little means of combating the thefts.

55. For information regarding the JWP, see Chapter Two of this thesis.

56. Interview with W.S. Vautier.

57. ibid.

58. ibid.

59. ibid.

60. General Course Report for the RF Platoon Leadership Course No 1. Ogilvy (NZ Team Commander) to NZDEF ARMY, dated 3 May 1971, 15/28/13, vol III. For a detailed list of the changes made see Appendix Four of this thesis.
The basic medical knowledge of the students was discovered to be very limited. Most of the students believed that the best way to revive someone suffering from heatstroke, was to scratch the victim's neck with his dogtags.

61. Evening Post, 27 January 1971.

62. Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Wellington, 1971), p. 19.

63. New Zealand Herald, 5 May 1971.

64. ibid.

65. ibid.

66. See Appendix Six of this thesis for courses conducted in 1971.
Prior to June 1971, only 634 of a possible 950 vacancies on the New Zealanders' courses had been filled. However, there were about 1900 officers available for training in MR IV.

67. Collated from reports in 15/28/10, vols II to IV, and 15/28/13, vols III to IV.

68. It was commonplace for students to arrive up to one week after a course had commenced.

69. Extracts from 1NZATTV Monthly Report January 1972, letter dated 29 February 1972, 15/28/13, vol III.

70. Interview with L.H. Pilling, dated 13 May 1989. Pilling was the OC of 1NZATTV from November 1971 - August 1972.

71. The Future of NZATGV. From Brown to AGS, dated 17 April 1972, 15/28/13, vol III.

72. Monthly Report 1NZATTV, Pilling to HQ NZ V Force, dated 3 February 1972, ibid.

73. From NZATGV to NZDEF Army, dated 180200Z April 1971. Serial A194: Reports - General NZ V Force, DCR. This had the desired effect, albeit only in the short term, when course 2/72 was able to fill 122 of its 150 vacancies.

74. To NZDEF WGTN from HQ NZ V FORCE, dated July 1971, 15/28/13, vol III. These problems were also experienced by U.S. training units.

75. The offensive lasted from 30 March until mid-April 1972.

76. V.B. Brown to AGS Wellington, dated 17 April 1972, 15/28/13, vol III.

77. Brown to CGS, dated 26 August 1971, Serial A194.

78. From Colonel Brown to CGS, dated 26 August 1971, ibid. The AATTV team at the JWTC experienced the same problem.

79. ibid.

80. From NZATGV to NZDEF Army, dated 3 October 1972, 15/28/13 New Zealand Forces in Vietnam: Training Assistance, South Vietnamese Forces, vol IV, June - September 1973, DCR.

81. New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (NZPD), vol. 380 (10 August - 14 September 1972).

82. Visit to Far East by CGS, dated 8 September 1971, Army 95/3/1, Visits Overseas - CGS, Minister of Defence and Prime Minister, vol I, October 1968 -, DCR.

83. From Colonel Brown to CGS, dated 26 August 1971, Serial A194.

84. Brown to CGS, dated 26 August 1971, ibid.

85. Interview with L.H. Pilling.

86. Interview with K.W. Thomason, 14 July 1990. Thomason was in the tactics committee.

87. ibid.

88. Interview with W.S. Vautier

89. Extracts from 1NZATTV Monthly Reports for January 1972, 15/28/13, vol III.

90. The first trip, from 12 to 18 January 1972, saw four New Zealanders, one Vietnamese instructor and one interpreter visit five RF units. This visit proved successful, so three further visits were conducted - from 18 to 25 March, 3 to 8 April and 12 to 18 June 1972.

91. Team members had to have unit commanders' permission to interview any ex-student. The groups suspected, although it was never proven, that some ex-students were warned to agree with everything that they said, possibly so the commander would not look bad in front of the New Zealanders and his superiors.

92. Interview with W.S. Vautier

93. Interview with K.W. Thomason.

94. ibid.

95. ibid.

96. Interview with L.H. Pilling.

97. ibid.

98. Monthly Report 1NZATTV, April 1972, Pilling to HQ NZATGV, dated 1 May 1972, 15/28/10 Monthly Activity Reports - NZ Forces in Vietnam (Operational Summaries, Reports etc), vol IV, February - December 1972, DCR.
The team experienced a number of problems rewriting the POI. Typing, translating and reproducing all the new lesson plans took a lot of time, due to the poor quality of the team's interpreters.

99. ibid.

100. A copy of this new POI is held by the Waiouru Army Museum. Command and Leadership POI, dated 20 July 1972, signed by L.H. Pilling. See Appendix Five for the course programme.

101. Monthly Report 1NZATTV, May 1972, Pilling to HQ NZATGV, dated 1 June 1972, 15/28/10, vol IV.

102. Monthly Report 1NZATTV, August 1972. Major B.J. Marshall for Commander, dated 8 September 1972, ibid. [Marshall was the Deputy Commander of NZATGV].

103. HQ NZ V Force was renamed HQ NZATGV on 6 March 1972, but remained in the Free World headquarters building in Saigon, with a strength of six, with liaison officers at Can Tho for 1NZATTV and Bien Hoa for 2NZATTV. This renaming enabled New Zealand's contribution to South Vietnam to be identified with training rather than the broader description of Army or military assistance. 15/28 NZ Forces in Vietnam (Excluding Medical), vol IV, August 1971 - October 1973).

104. At this stage, there was one such platoon per RF company, and one reconnaissance platoon per province, Visit to Far East by CGS, dated 8 September 1971, Army 95/3/1, vol I. Truong and Chinh both sought to improve not only the capabilities of both groups, but also enable the latter to employ the same tactics as the VC. From Colonel Brown to CGS, dated 26 August 1971, Serial 206: CGS Project - Training team, DCR.

105. The Future of NZATGV. V.B. Brown to AGS, dated 17 April 1972, 15/28/13, vol III.

106. ibid. However, Brown may have been stonewalling, as Pilling had been informed by the Vietnamese Commander of Chi Lang, that more training areas would become available to the team towards the end of 1971.

107. ibid.
The commanders of such RF platoons were already being trained at specialist courses with ARVN officers.

108. New Zealand Herald, 10 March 1972.

109. ibid., 16 May 1972.

110. Marlborough Express, 9 March 1972.

111. New Zealand Herald, 16 May 1972.

112. ibid.

113. ibid.

114. Report by Minister of Defence on his visit to SE Asia,

27 February - 16 March 1972, Army 95/2 Visits Overseas - NZ Personnel - General, vol I, October 1968 - May 1979, DCR.

115. Extracts from 1NZATTV Monthly Report January 1972. Letter dated 29 February 1972, 15/28/13, vol III.

116. Extracts from 1NZATTV Monthly Report January 1972. Letter dated 29 February 1972, ibid.
However, they were busy undertaking maintenance tasks and providing assistance to U.S. advisory personnel at Chi Lang. Monthly Report 1NZATTV May 1972. Pilling to HQ NZATGV, dated 1 June 1972, 15/28/10, vol IV.

117. To Secretary of Foreign Affairs from Thornton, dated 14 April 1972, ibid.

118. ibid.
Such potential problems were also noted by the Australian training team at the JWTC. Lieutenant Colonel K.H. Kirkland, commander of the JWTC, made recommendations identical to Brown and Pilling: that reductions be made in July in all three areas of Australia's training effort in Vietnam and a withdrawal of AATTV be completed in November 1972. He wrote: "if they [Vietnamese] haven't absorbed what we had to teach them in that time there was no point in going on any further." I. McNeill, The Team, p. 473. Brigadier I.A. Geddes, the commander of Australian Army Assistance Group, Vietnam (AAAGV), agreed with Kirkland's assessment.

119. To Secretary of Foreign Affairs from Thornton, dated 14 April 1972, 15/28/13, vol III.

120. The Future of NZATGV. V.B. Brown to AGS, dated 17 April 1972, ibid.

121. ibid. One option was to provide New Zealand instructors at Vietnamese military schools and colleges.

122. ibid.

123. ibid.

124. ibid.

125. The dates for the withdrawal were 29 October - 5 November 1972.
Brown also argued that if 1NZATTV was reduced in strength, he felt there was no doubt that the Vietnamese could expect to move into the vacant accommodation in the New Zealand compound. "Unfortunately there are certain irreconcilable differences in social, eating and toilet habits which would make co-existence next to impossible." Brown to Fenton, Col GS, dated 7 June 1972, Serial 206.

126. Withdrawal of Forces from SVN. From Thornton to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, dated 14 April 1972, 15/28/13, vol III.

127. Major Kiwi to JGS/CTC, Saigon Course 6/72, dated 5 October 1972, 15/28/13, vol IV.

128. RF Platoon leadership Course 5/72. Final Course Report, Kiwi to JGS/CTC, dated 23 August 1972. Handwritten note, 15/28/10, vol IV.

129. From Laking to Weir, dated 11 May 1972, 47/4/28, vol 1.

130. To the Minister of Foreign Affairs from Secretary of Foreign Affairs, ibid.

131. Withdrawal of Forces from SVN. From Thornton to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, dated 14 April 1972, 15/28/13, vol III.

132. Pearce to AGS, dated 4 May 1972, ibid.

133. To Minister of Defence. Continuation of Military Training Assistance to Cambodia and Vietnam. From J.F. Robertson, Secretary of Defence, dated 7 July 1972, Defence 23/4/1, Mutual Aid Programme to South Vietnam, General, Vol 8, July 1972 - December 1975. DCR.

134. Withdrawal of Forces from South Vietnam. From Major Grant DAQMG(P) to CGS, dated 17 May, 15/28/13, vol III.

135. Evening Post, 25 August 1972.

136. Christchurch Press, 28 August 1972.

137. This recommendation came as a result of a request to Brown from the South Vietnamese for such a course. The JWTC was already conducting, with some success, similar courses. Brown to Fenton, Col GS, dated 7 June 1972, Serial 206.

138. AATTV was busy developing the JWTC at Phuoc Tuy and was phasing out the MATTs. With the reduction in the numbers of NTCs, the U.S. advisory role in training was diminishing. The Vietnamese did not want NZATGV to set up platoon Leadership Wings in other NTCs. ibid.

139. To provide an opportunity for younger instructors to gain practical experience, Brown recommended that the rank of NCO team members be reduced. It was planned to increase the team to thirty personnel

140. The handover was on the proviso that the course content did not change and that the existing Vietnamese staff level remained relatively unchanged.
Robertson initially suggested to the Minister of Defence that the Vietnamese be told that the New Zealand Government was interested only in providing training assistance for which there was an established need. To Minister of Defence. Continuation of Military Training Assistance to Cambodia and Vietnam. From J.F. Robertson, Secretary of Defence, dated 7 July 1972, Defence 23/4/1.141. During the

offensive, both the ARVN and the territorial forces had suffered approximately 70,000 casualties. The latters casualties comprised almost thirty-eight percent of the total.

142. T.C. Thayer, A Systems Analysis View of the Vietnam War (Washington DC, 1975), p. 226.
A total of 63,496 enemy soldiers were killed during the offensive. The offensive had shown that the ARVN was a capable military machine, despite its weaknesses, if strongly motivated and well-led.

143. The RF was seen as capable of taking part in large unit operations with ARVN regular forces. Results from the Easter Offensive had demonstrated that the best results were achieved when there was some mix of regular and RF/PF troops. However, in MR IV the RF/PF had operated largely independently of ARVN units.
The RF/PF's high losses in MR IV and the low number of enemy troops they had killed was probably due to the way the RF/PF was employed. Since March 1972, they had been moving away from security to offensive operations.
As the Delta was now the most likely source of ARVN reinforcements for the northern part of South Vietnam in the event of any NVA incursions or invasions, any reduction in ARVN strength would place more demands on the operational requirements of the RF. This had occurred during the Easter Offensive.
By this stage, there were twenty RF battalions in MR IV.

144. The shortage of U.S. air transportation progressively inhibited Brown visiting the two New Zealand training teams. Brown complained forcefully to MACV, noting: "although of course a relatively junior officer," he was the military representative of "one of the only two troop contributing countries which are prepared to pay their way in the Republic." Brown to USMACV (SJS protocol), dated 20 October 1972, Serial 216: Visits, DCR.

145. It was only from 17 November 1972 that radio communications direct from Chi Lang to Saigon, through an ANPRC 47 radio set, were established by 1NZATTV. Monthly Report 1NZATTV to the end of June 1972. From Pilling to HQ NZATGV, dated July 1972, 15/28/10, vol IV.

146. This was a timely increase. In August 1972, approximately 300 personnel of K8 Battalion infiltrated into the Seven Mountains Region, for the supposed purpose of harassing Chi Lang. Several days, some prisoners indicated that a reconnaissance around the Chi Lang area had been conducted. Monthly Report 1NZATTV. August 1972. Major B.J. Marshall for Commander. Dated 8 Sep 1972, 15/28/10, vol IV.

147. Extracts from a letter from New Zealand Ambassador, Saigon to CDS, dated 1 August 1972, Defence 23/6/1 Military Aid Programme to Cambodia, General, vol 3, July 1972 - February 1975, DCR.

The Americans planned to have five MATs, with each team comprising fifteen U.S. and twenty ARVN instructors, with four or five New Zealand personnel. There would be four RF battalions at Chi Lang at any one time, with each course lasting two weeks.
At this stage, the programme was to train twenty-six battalions until mid-January 1973.

148. Saigon to Wellington, dated 25 September 1972, 15/28/13, vol IV.

149. Extracts from a letter from New Zealand Ambassador, Saigon to CDS, dated 1 August 1972, ibid.

150. NZDEF Army to NZATGV, dated 21 September 1972, ibid.

151. Most importantly, the New Zealand Government would have to accept the possibility of New Zealand casualties, which they were not.

152. Holloway to CGS, dated 29 August 1972, 15/28/13, vol IV.

153. ibid.

154. ibid.

155. Extracts from a letter from New Zealand Ambassador, Saigon to CDS, dated 1 August 1972, Defence 23/6/1, vol 3. Pearce recommended that the team be brought up to a strength of thirty personnel, if the New Zealanders serving with the AATTV were withdrawn. L.A. Pearce to CDS and Secretary of Defence, dated 29 September 1972, 15/28/13, vol IV.

156. ibid.

157. Evening Post, 1 November 1972.

158. Memorandum for Cabinet, dated 18 September 1972. He also recommended the continuation of 2NZATTV's role, subject to review in January 1973, CAB 222/3/2, Defence: South-East Asia Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos 15-5-62 to 30-9-81, Cabinet Paper (CP).

159. ibid.
The additional cost of redeployment to the programme in the 1972/1973 financial year would amount to $140,000, of which only $52,000 would be costs above those incurred with 1NZATTV's existing role. The cost of the two training teams from December 1971 until the end of 1972 was: 1NZATTV, $465,181: and 2NZATTV, $139,000, Evening Post, 25 August 1972.

160. From NZDEF Army to NZATGV, dated 18 October 1972, 15/28/13, vol IV.
Despite Cabinet's decision, Brown recommended that the two New Zealand training teams be located in just one camp -

either at Chi Lang to assist in the retraining programme, or else at Dong Ba Thin to assist with the FANK training programme. Pearce instructed Brown to simply implement what had been decided - "There could...be no question of simply redeploying this team...as you propose. You should therefore direct your efforts to this end." NZDEF Army to NZATGV. For COMD from DCGS, dated 17 October 1972, 15/28/12 NZ Forces in Vietnam - Withdrawal, vol III, October 1971 - March 1974, DCR.
However, AGS began to prepare a contingency plan for the withdrawal of NZATGV. NZDEF Army to NZATGV, dated 1 October 1972, 15/28/13, vol IV.

161. Each course was of two weeks duration: six days of individual training: three days of platoon training; four days of company training; and a one day battalion exercise. Two battalions would arrive each week, and an initial quota of forty-five battalions were to be trained by April 1973. During October, some of the New Zealand instructors had been attached to the U.S. Special Forces team to observe the RF battalion retraining. SITREP 39/72, Period 11 - 18 October 1972. NZATGV to NZDEF Army, Serial A192: HQ NZATGV Weekly Sitreps, DCR.

162. From NZDEF Army to NZATGV, dated 18 October 1972, 15/28/13, vol IV.
The South Vietnamese intended to raise, with allied assistance, five training teams for the RF battalion retraining programme.
Lieutenant Colonel A.J.A. Cooper, the New Zealand Defence Liaison Officer (NZDLO) in Canberra, was chosen to replace Brown in early 1973.

163. The first group were those trained under the `Reserve Officer Candidate' course, and had been trained to the level of a squad commander. Secondly, those trained under a `Special Reserve Officer Candidate' course, the primary source from which the RF obtained its officers. They were trained to the level of a squad commander, but the emphasis was upon individual training, as most had been NCOs. The third category was `Direct Commission', given to members of an ethnic minority or religious sect who had raised a force of platoon level or more. Their type of training and its duration was unknown.

164. Interview with G.P. Eyles.

165. Interview with G.G. Tomlin.

166. From Col Brown to CGS, dated 26 August 1971, 15/28/13, vol III.

167. ibid.

168. Interview with W.S. Vautier.

169. Interview with L.H. Pilling.

170. This has been discussed in Chapter Two of this thesis.

171. Interview with J.A. Mace, 13 July 1990. Mace was the Director of Infantry and SAS. He is now a former CDF.

172. Annual Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Year ended 31 March 1971 (Wellington, 1971), p. 18.

173. Interview with G.P. Eyles.

174. The students often asked the team for further instruction in company tactics, rather than section or platoon-sized operations.

175. Interview with L.H. Barber, 23 February 1992. Barber, a New Zealand Army Padre attached to 1RNZIR in Singapore, was responsible for the spiritual needs of the New Zealand training members and he visited Chi Lang on several occasions. From Commanders Diary, 1 and 2 Army Training team, Vietnam, April - July 1972, DCR.

176. Dominion, 28 September 1972.
A number of New Zealand reporters visited the two training teams. Such visits were usually arranged by Defence Public Relations.

177. Interview with K. Haami, 15 July 1990. Haami was in the tactics committee.

178. Interview with K. Haami.

179. Interview with G.P. Eyles.

180. ibid.

181. ibid.
However, the New Zealanders hoped that in the future the students would recall at least some of the lessons propounded by the New Zealanders. Although only a small fraction of Vietnamese officers passed through the leadership course, it was hoped that they would in time influence a wider group of officers and perhaps have some real influence on leadership attitudes. To assist towards this, by early 1972 each student left the centre with a full set of basic lesson plans, written in Vietnamese.

182. Interview with G.G. Tomlin.

183. Interview with W.S. Vautier.

184. Interview with G.G. Tomlin.

185. ibid.

186. This perhaps also demonstrated the extent that the South Vietnamese had come to depend upon mechanical transportation

187. Interview with G.G. Tomlin.

188. Interview with G.P. Eyles.

189. Interview with K.W. Thomason.

190. ibid.
Ogilvy was very conscious that indifference by the Vietnamese towards the courses might reinforce the derogatory attitudes that some of the team members may have already held towards Asians. For this reason he preferred New Zealand instructors with Malaysian rather than Vietnamese campaign experience.
Later in this chapter there are criticisms made by team members. Some criticisms of U.S. and ARVN personnel, are based on cultural differences. It is not a crime for people from to be different, to see things differently, or to do things differently from people from other cultures. Such narrow criticisms are perhaps partly based upon racial intolerances and frustration borne out by the attitudes of many of the students to the team's training programme.

191. ibid.

192. This was because of the tension that existed between ethnic Vietnamese and the minority groups, such as the ethnic Cambodians and Cao Dai, that lived in South Vietnam, and also as a result of regional competition and the rank structure.

193. Interview with W.S. Vautier.

194. ibid.

195. Taken from his personal file.

196. Interview with K. Haami.

197. This was due primarily to the influence of the U.S. military training system.

198. Interview with W.S. Vautier.

199.
ibid.200. Extracts from 1NZATTV Monthly Reports for January, dated 29 Feb 1972, 15/28/13, vol III.

201. Interview with W.S. Vautier.

202. Although one of the instructors was experienced in instructing through an interpreter, no attempt was made to pass his skills onto the other instructors. ibid.

203. As a short-term solution, which was far from satisfactory, five English-speaking Vietnamese instructors were used as interpreters.

204. Interview with G.G. Tomlin.

205. Interview with L.H. Barber.

206. ibid.

207. Interview with G.G. Tomlin.

208. ibid.

209. ibid.

210. Interview with W.S. Vautier.

211. The absence of a sign writer meant that a lot of time was spent making large charts. One instructor noted that he "even traced around instructors and drew the skeleton inside that, and drew the different organ groups in the skeleton." Interview with G.G. Tomlin.

212. The only time an instructor was sure was during weapon training, when the instructions were directly related to the students' actions.

213. The interpreters had not only to translate lesson plans and act as interpreters during lessons, but also accompany the instructors into the field.

214. In one case a platoon commander received a particular lesson plan only one hour before the lesson was due to begin. As a consequence, neither he nor his platoon knew what the lesson was about.

215. Interview with W.S. Vautier.

216. Christchurch Press, 13 February 1971.

217. Extracts from 1 NZATTV Monthly Report February 1972. Letter dated 14 March 1972, 15/28/13, vol IV.

218. Dominion, 17 June 1971.

219. Often the only road out of Chi Lang was considered unsafe for use by 1NZATTV due to VC activity. During the nights of 18 and 20 May, a village six kilometres north of Chi Lang was attacked by about forty enemy troops and a road block was established at a pass that the team members used when travelling to Can Tho for supplies. Monthly Report 1NZATTV May 1972. Pilling to HQ NZATGV, dated 1 June 1972, 15/28/10, vol IV. See also Monthly Report 1NZATTV June 1972. Pilling to HQ NZATGV, dated 4 July 1972, ibid.

220. The security situation deteriorated even further in late 1972, when the NVA moved more troops into the Seven Mountains region. By this time, there were two VC battalions, K8 and K9, and elements of 1 NVA Division in the Delta. NZATGV to NZDEF Army, dated 130845Z September 1972,

Serial A192.

221. One of the most serious attacks came in early December 1972, when three 122mm rockets fired into Chi Lang, killed six ARVN soldiers and wounded forty-nine others. NZATGV to NZDEF Army, 011045Z November 1972, Serial A192.

222. Interview with G.G. Tomlin.

223. Interview with K. Haami.

224. Interview with K.W. Thomason.

225. From NZ V Force to NZDEF Army, dated 11 January 1972, 15/28/10, vol IV.
There was considerable friction between Cambodian battalions undergoing training at Chi Lang and the local South Vietnamese army and civilian population. DAT to Col GS, Training Assistance to Cambodia, dated October 1971, Army 34/15 Aid to Cambodia (FANK Training), vol I, March - December 1971, DCR.

226. Interview with G.P. Eyles.

227. Interview with W.S. Vautier.

228. Interview with G.P. Eyles.

229. Interview with W.S. Vautier.

230. In Nui Dat, 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF) usually did not allow Vietnamese within the base area because of potential security risks.

231. Interview with G.P. Eyles.

232. Interview with K.R. Brown, 17 May 1989. Brown was an instructor in the weapons committee.

233. ibid.

234. The women who worked at Chi Lang worked in two main `occupations' bar girls, and housemaids. There were two different types of `bar girls' in Vietnam - those who worked as bar maids, and the prostitutes who worked in the bars.
The team employed six housemaids, aged from about eighteen to thirty to wash and iron clothes, and clean the barracks.

235. Interview with K.R. Brown.

236. Interview with L.H. Pilling.
The granting of leave for team members who needed to have leave to meet with women, endorsed by Pilling, ended with the arrival of Kiwi. Possibly because of his Christian life base, Kiwi was much less understanding of his men's sexual urges.

237. The team members worked long hours during their tour at Chi Lang. They worked six days a week on each five-week course.

238. Christchurch Star, 5 June 1972.
In late April 1972, Cabinet authorised a reduction in allocation allowance, from $2.56 to $1.42 per day, for New Zealanders serving in South Vietnam. The reason given was that there had been a devaluation of South Vietnam's currency in October 1970. However, neither Australia nor America cut any of the allowances that their troops received. Due to pressure from Defence, as a result of the complaints from the troops still in Vietnam, this decision was reversed early the following month.

239. Interview with W.S. Vautier.

240. J.T. Henderson, `Vietnam: A View from Within. Report on the Visit to Vietnam of Research Officer (History), March - April 1971', Defence Headquarters, June 1971, (unpublished), p. 104.

241. ibid.

242. ibid.

243. Interview with L.H. Barber.

244. Interview with K.R. Brown.

245. This was particular so between some of the team's NCOs, largely because they were of similar rank, and also because of personality conflicts, and argued over who was the most senior in rank and therefore should be in charge. These problems were further magnified by the isolated environment at Chi Lang. There was also some tension amongst several of the team's officers, but were kept hidden from the men.

246. Interview with K. Haami.

247. Interview with W.S. Vautier.

248. Interview with K. Haami.

249. The team members usually went to Can Tho, where they stayed in the officers mess. (In the U.S. Army a Warrant Officer is classified as an officer.) Interview with D.J. Brassey, 10 July 1990. He was the team's mechanic.

250. Interview with L.H. Barber.

251. Interview with L.H. Pilling.

252. When team members were not working, there was a wide range of facilities at Chi Lang which accommodated most sporting interests, and movies were shown in the evenings.

253. Interview with W.S. Vautier.

254. ibid.

255. ibid.

256. Interview with G.G. Tomlin.

257. Interview with G.P. Eyles.

258. Interview with K.R. Brown.

259. Interview with L.H. Pilling.

260. Interview with G.P. Eyles.

261. ibid.

262. ibid.

263. ibid.

264. Interview with G.G. Tomlin.

265. Letter to S.H. Capon from B.L. Crafts, dated 13 May 1990.

266. ibid.

267. Monthly Report October 1972. From Major Kiwi to NZATGV, dated 2 November 1972, 15/28/10, vol IV.

268. ibid.

269. From Colonel Brown to CGS, dated 26 August 1971, Serial A194: Reports - General NZ V Force.

270. Course Directive, NZATTV Replacements, dated 20 September 1971, AD-A11 2564 42/17/8. The course was held from 20 October to 17 November 1971.
Although his course was longer than that conducted for the original team members, there were still shortcomings, for example only one hour was spent upon Vietnamese customs.

271. These replacements were, for the most part, experienced instructors, ten of whom came from instructional positions. Twelve had served overseas, eight of which had served in Vietnam (in one of the two infantry companies.

272. NZ V Force to NZDEF Army, dated 10 May 1971, 15/28/13, vol III.

273. A second group of replacements were sent to Chi Lang in November 1972, despite the likelihood that New Zealand's training contribution would be withdrawn from South Vietnam at the end of the year. However, they did not attend any courses and were simply posted to the team. Interview with

D.J. Brassey.

274. Interview with K.R. Brown.

275. In fact, these replacements arrived only a matter of weeks before the newly-elected Labour Government withdrew the two training teams from Vietnam.

276. Monthly Report October 1972. From Major Kiwi to NZATGV, dated 2 November 1972, 15/28/10, vol IV.

277. They attended a one-week familiarisation course conducted by the advisory U.S. SFs Team at Chi Lang. It provided training on weapons and equipment not used by the New Zealand Army but which would be required to instruct on.

278. Monthly Report October 1972. From Major Kiwi to NZATGV, dated 2 November 1972, 15/28/10, vol IV.

279. The course, 7/72, was conducted from 9 October until 11 November 1972.

280. The wing had only two, 2 1/2 ton vehicles, and there were no replacement vehicles available.

281. Monthly Report October 1972. From Major Kiwi to NZATGV, dated 2 November 1972, 15/28/10, vol IV.

282. The training centre was directed to provide additional training areas for the retraining of three ARVN battalions until Christmas. Monthly Report: 1NZATTV August 1972. Major B.J. Marshall for Commander, dated 8 September 1972, 15/28/13 Separates: AATTV Reports, No 1, vol V, March 1972 - June 1972 and NZATTV.
ARVN operational ammunition requirements meant large-scale reductions in the availability of munitions at Chi Lang, with the Wing sometimes receiving only fifteen percent of its authorised training scale of some types of ammunition. Monthly Report 1NZATTV June 1972. Pilling to HQ NZATGV, dated 4 July 1972, 15/28/10, vol IV.
It was only prior to 1NZATTV's withdrawn that there were enough radio sets to allow students on exercises to have radio communications with the Tactical Operations Centre.

283. Monthly Report November 1972. From Major Kiwi to NZATGV, dated 2 December 1972, 15/28/10, vol IV.
Of the 150 students, 115 qualified on the course, thirty-two failed, and three were returned to their units for medical or disciplinarian reasons.

284. 1NZATTV Monthly Report and Commanders Diary 1972. Major B.J. Marshall for Commander to AGS, dated 7 December 1972, 15/28/13 No 1, vol V.

285. ibid.

286. From NZATGV to NZDEF Army, dated 290855Z Nov 1972,

15/28/10, vol IV.

287. There was no senior Vietnamese officer whose primary responsibility was the Leadership Wing.

288. The original start date was to have been 9 October.

289. NZATGV to NZDEF Army, dated 08100Z Nov 1972, 15/28/13, vol IV. In early October two RF battalions had been withdrawn from Chi Lang after only five days retraining. However, while waiting for the scheme to begin, those not directly involved in the RF platoon Leadership wing were preparing for the battalion retraining programme. From NZATGV to NZDEF Army, dated 3 October 1972, ibid.

290. Saigon to Wellington, dated 27 November 1972, 15/28 External NZ Forces in Vietnam. External Signals only, vol VIII, October 1972 - April 1975, DCR.

291. ibid.

292. Contingency Planning - Withdrawal from South Vietnam. G.A. Hitchings to AGS, 16 November 1972, 15/28/12, vol III. Brown to AGS, dated 15 November 1972, ibid. In either event, the plan detailed both teams and HQ NZATGV would move to Saigon, and then travel direct to Singapore.

293. NZATGV to NZDEF Army, dated 270959Z November 1972, ibid.

294. Pearce to CDS, Secretary of Defence, dated 28 Nov 1972, 15/28/13, vol IV.

295. Memo for Cabinet. Termination of Military Training Assistance to the Khmer Republic and the Republic of Vietnam. Dated 8 December 1972, CAB 222/3/2.

CHAPTER FIVE

THE DECISION TO ASSIST IN THE TRAINING OF FANK: THE FORMATION OF 2NZATTV.

This chapter will discuss the reasons that underlay the New Zealand Government's decision to deploy a second training team to South Vietnam to assist with the training of the Force Armee Nationale Khmere (hereafter FANK). This will involve the examination of the following related topics: the military situation in the Khmer Republic up to the end of 1971 and the factors that underlay the U.S.'s incursion into the Khmer Republic; the decision of the U.S. to provide training to the FANK; the discussions held prior to the decision to deploy a second New Zealand training team; and the attitudes of the New Zealand press to this announcement.


Political and Military Background

North Vietnam's interest in Cambodia had stemmed from the establishment of a Central Committee for the Liberation of the Khmer People, by the Vietminh in April 1950. In 1951, a programme of the newly formed Vietnam Workers' Party expressed the hopes of an IndoChina Confederation of Vietnam, Cambodia and Laos. This was, however, secondary to the primary goal of the North Vietnamese in the overthrow of the South Vietnamese Government.

Prince Norodom Sihanouk, the Cambodian Head of State after 1960, had attempted to walk a tightrope in his external relations with the United States on the one hand and with Vietnam and China on the other.[1] He had allowed North Vietnamese Army (hereafter NVA) and Viet Cong (hereafter VC) forces to occupy north-east Cambodia since 1965, while at the same time encouraging the United States to bomb North Vietnamese bases in Cambodia. These bases

MAP 5

Military Regions of the Khmer Republic, 1971.[2]



enabled the North Vietnamese to undertake hit and run attacks against American and the Army of the Republic of Vietnam (hereafter ARVN) forces in South Vietnam.[3] These communist bases contained major base camps, training sites, logistic facilities, weapons and ammunition factories, airstrips, Rest and Recreation (R and R) facilities and Prisoner of War (POW) compounds. The NVA use of the seaport of Kompong Som offered secure facilities for the arrival of arms from China.[4] The NVA in Cambodia was supplied with arms from China and Russia. These arms, as well as supplies going from North to South Vietnam, arrived mainly by sea through the U.S.-built port of Sihanoukville and then cross-country to the border bases.[5] This route was known as the `Sihanouk Trail'. The NVA was supplied with food from the native Cambodians in the areas where the NVA/VC and Khmer Rouge (communist insurgents in Cambodia) bases were located. This NVA force was eventually built up to four NVA divisions, the 1st, 5th, 7th and 9th. As the NVA's demands and control of territory increased, so did the Cambodians' historical hostility to the invader.[6]

During the 1960s, Sihanouk reluctantly accepted the intrusion of these NVA/VC forces onto Cambodian soil.[7] This acceptance was basically because Cambodia was not strong enough to either prevent their presence in the border regions in Cambodia or defeat a North Vietnamese invasion even if he did try to expel them. Secondly, he did not want a civil war to break out in Cambodia had he requested protection from Washington. Despite this, the relationship between Cambodia and the North Vietnamese was an uneasy one. Sihanouk was placed in an unenviable position, for the increasing military operations conducted by the NVA/VC from Cambodia into South Vietnam invited retaliation from the Americans and South Vietnamese.

By the late 1960s, Sihanouk saw evidence that the North Vietnamese were not merely seeking sanctuary in Cambodia. A number of communist insurrections had been encouraged by the

North Vietnamese in several eastern provinces of Cambodia during 1967 and 1968. By early 1969, there were an estimated 30,000 to 50,000 NVA troops, about five divisions, in eastern Cambodia. By 1970, this number had grown to approximately 65,000.

This high-handed treatment of the Cambodians in the border area by the communists, a faltering economy and notorious corruption in the royal family, finally led to Sihanouk's fall from power. On 11 March 1970, 10,000 Cambodians demonstrated in Phnom Penh against the presence of NVA/VC troops in their country.[8] During the demonstration they sacked and burned the North Vietnamese embassy and Vietnamese houses and businesses. Despite Sihanouk's public and repeated denounciations of the Vietnamese communists in Cambodia, the National Assembly and the Council of the Kingdom withdrew their confidence in Sihanouk, and took steps to remove him from power. Sihanouk was in Paris when his Premier, Lon Nol, a devout Buddhist and unlikely war leader took control of Cambodia on 18 March 1970.

Lon Nol immediately took steps to try to expel the communists from Cambodia. Cambodian forces struck quickly against the NVA/VC in Cambodia, launching several operations against NVA/VC base areas and closing the port of Sihanoukville to the communists.[9] There were also a series of unsuccessful meetings between representatives of the Cambodian Government and North Vietnam to remove communist troops from Cambodia.[10] On 12 March the National Assembly of Cambodia passed a resolution which demanded the withdrawal of all Vietnamese troops from Cambodia by 15 March.

Lon Nol's actions jeopardised the security of the elaborate network of NVA bases that extended along the entire Cambodian-Vietnamese border. The North Vietnamese Government reacted swiftly and forcefully to this new situation. If the Cambodians insisted that the NVA leave,

then the NVA would be denied the important `Sihanouk Trail' for their supplies. Instead the NVA/VC in South Vietnam would have to rely solely upon the Ho Chi Minh trail.

As a result of Lon Nol's strategy, the NVA and Khmer Rouge launched a wave of attacks. The purpose of these attacks was twofold; first to seize a safe strip of Cambodian soil ten to fifteen kilometres wide along almost the entire South Vietnamese frontier and secondly to secure their lines of communications leading to these internal bases.[11]

Military Weaknesses of the FANK

The small, inexperienced, and poorly equipped 30,000 strong Cambodian army was virtually helpless against the well organised, trained and supplied communist forces of only 10,000 men. On 19 April 1970, communist forces captured Sang, a town only twenty miles from Phnom Penh. The Cambodian Government controlled, tenuously at best, a number of enclaves around Phnom Penh and the provincial capitals and a strip of land between Battambang and Phnom Penh. Aside from Battambang, none of these areas were self-sufficient and their dependence upon Phnom Penh for food and other essentials grew. The Cambodian troops became increasingly involved in keeping the roads to these isolated enclaves open.[12] By mid-April 1971, the military situation had deteriorated to such an extent that the communists had isolated Phnom Penh, overrun more than half the country, and controlled over twenty percent of the population.

The war quickly assumed a pattern that would change little over the next few years. Each year, communist offensives tended to begin in January to coincide with the beginning of the dry season and ended as the monsoon began in May and June. Within a few months a series of small unit

contacts had decimated about eighteen FANK, battalions, killed about 800 FANK soldiers and resulted in 3,100 FANK desertions.[13] This had been achieved by 10,000 NVA troops.[14]

After the overthrow of Sihanouk, the Cambodian Government emphasised that it intended, once it was strong enough, to assume total responsibility for the defense and security of Cambodia. The government saw one of its important objectives as turning its army into an efficient, disciplined and well-equipped force which would be capable of winning back the population and the territory that was under the control of communist forces.

However, in mid-1970, the FANK was not in any state to achieve this. At the time of the deposition of Sihanouk, the Cambodian Army, then entitled the FARK (Forces Armees Royales Khmeres) consisted of approximately 35,000 men, of which about 10,000 were combat troops.[15] The FARK was lightly armed and for the most part lacked combat experience aside from conducting operations after early-1967 against dissident groups in different parts of Cambodia. The primary mission of the FARK remained defensive and units spent a large part of their time developing the economy of Cambodia, though the building of roads, villages and schools.[16] This meant there was little time for military training. The FARK had been dependent on three main sources of equipment.[17] The lack of a standard type of weapon in the FANK, and the obsolescence of most of what was in use, affected the training, maintenance, and supply of spare parts and ammunition. This further accentuated the problems that the FANK was experiencing in fighting the Communist forces in Cambodia.

On 25 June 1970, Lon Nol's Government ordered a general mobilisation, to build up the size of Cambodia's armed forces. Cambodian citizens, of both sexes, between the ages of eighteen and sixty, were to join the Cambodian armed

forces. By early 1972, the FANK had increased in numbers from 35,000 to 200,000. Despite this increase in quantity there was no corresponding increase in quality, due largely to inadequate training facilities. As a result, the FANK was unable to mount major offensive operations against the combat experienced NVA/VC.

In attempting to fulfill its new role, the FANK had to overcome two main problem areas; it required enlarged training facilities and new equipment, neither of which could be supplied through Cambodian resources either on the scale or in the time required because of the NVA attacks. Despite its limited training facilities the Cambodian Government planned to train 23,000 men during 1971.

The military training facilities in Cambodia had been originally designed and equipped for the FARK and were woefully inadequate for combat training, particularly of larger units with modern equipment. Before Sihanouk's overthrow, military training had been conducted largely for civic action and guard duties, with little or no actual basic training. The military schools and training establishments that did exist provided only a very small number of trained officers and men. In December 1969, twenty-six officers graduated from the Royal Military School at Phnom Penh.[18]

By the beginning of 1971, the FANK training facilities were limited to one training camp at Kambul, a former golf course, although other training camps were being constructed. The training camp at Kambul was about twelve miles from Phnom Penh. The camp ran a six-week course for 3,000 officers, NonCommissioned Officers (hereafter NCOs) and troops. However, the training course was very limited, the training was cursory and erratic and training equipment was virtually non-existent, a common problem within the other training camps. The normal period of training had been cut by fifty percent to accelerate the formation of

badly needed units. Some soldiers were sent into battle with, at best, only a few hours of training. Although the "high morale of the troops was impressive", a shortage of ammunition impaired the effectiveness of the courses run at the camp.[19] What stocks of weapons were available were haphazardly issued, and one unit might have different types of weapons, each type requiring different sizes of ammunition. This meant that many FANK units stood little chance when they fought the seasoned NVA troops.

It quickly became apparent that Lon Nol could not survive without outside assistance, and on 14 April 1970 the Cambodian Government appealed to overseas countries such as America, New Zealand and Australia for military and economic assistance. The collapse of Cambodia would have been a disastrous blow to Vietnamisation and South Vietnam's prospects of survival. On 20 April, Lon Nol appealed directly to Washington for aid, requesting large amounts of military equipment. He also urged that Cambodian mercenaries assisting U.S. Special Forces in South Vietnam be sent back to Cambodia to help fight the communists.[20] The United States had been actively recruiting ethnic Cambodians from South Vietnam, particularly in the Delta region where there was a large minority of ethnic Cambodians, to fight in Cambodia. Later, in July, there were four battalions of Cambodians who had been trained in Special Forces camps in Military Regions (hereafter MR) III and IV operating with the 9th and 21st ARVN Divisions.

As a result of the Cambodians' appeal, Richard Nixon, President of the United States, directed military aid to Cambodia, which commenced on 22 April 1970.[21] This military aid grew from a some small-arms to large amounts of military aid, including small-arms, ammunition, communications equipment, training funds and training assistance.[22] In addition, the U.S. aid programme included the construction

of three training facilities in South Vietnam. The military assistance provided to the Khmer Republic was a result of the principles of the Nixon Doctrine.

The scope of this aid was widened when, on 28 April 1970, Nixon agreed that American forces, in conjunction with South Vietnamese forces, would attack two areas in the communist held territory in Cambodia on 1 May 1970. Although this decision to use American troops was an apparent violation of the Nixon Doctrine, it was reached after alternative courses of action had been eliminated. The Cambodian Army could not be relied upon to assist in invading the areas as it was too small and untrained. The ARVN was unable to attack alone as it was not nearly strong enough.

The U.S. Government stated that the main intention of this attack was to relieve pressure on Lon Nol's Government and give him time to build up the FANK. However, M. Laird, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, openly stated: "our objective is not the survival of the Government in Cambodia."[23] Intelligence reports showed that from November 1967 to September 1969, NVA/VC military activity had increased three-fold in "the area of Cambodia closest to South Vietnam".[24] This build-up posed a growing threat to the security of South Vietnam. The attack into communist held territory would show the North Vietnamese that the U.S. was, despite the withdrawal of its forces, still willing to come to the assistance of South Vietnam. Such a belief would, the United States hoped, break the stalemate that had occurred in its negotiations with North Vietnam. The attack would also show that the Vietnamisation programme was working as long as the South Vietnamese forces involved gave a good account of themselves. Most of all, the incursion would gain time for the implementation of the Vietnamisation programme and also for the withdrawal of

American troops from South Vietnam, by lessening the dangers that would face a greatly weakened U.S. presence in South Vietnam.[25] If Cambodia did fall to the communists, then Cambodia would become a major base for operations against South Vietnam, with which it shared a 600 mile border, and a major supply route for the North Vietnamese forces.

Although the Cambodians were disappointed over the limitations set by Nixon regarding the time that U.S. forces could remain in Cambodia, militarily the incursion was a success. Sir R. Thompson, the British counterinsurgency expert, estimated that the incursion had set the NVA/VC back approximately eighteen months to two years.[26] The VC/NVA delayed mounting any operations in MRs III and IV for almost two years. The diversion of North Vietnamese troops into Cambodia was followed by a decline in monthly U.S. casualties in MR III from 134 in April to forty-seven in October 1970.[27] Most of all, the attack gave Lon Nol's Government a respite; time for the Khmer Republic to build and train its Army.

However, the incursion into Cambodia resulted in public outcry in the United States and in other countries including New Zealand against what was increasingly viewed as an escalation of the Vietnam War into Cambodia.[28] This outcry even forced Nixon to make a public statement that he would not send any more troops into Cambodia, and that the operation had occurred only to disrupt enemy forces and not to turn Cambodia into another Vietnam. However, the removal of U.S. forces from Cambodia in July 1970 placed the United States in the position of having to defend another country that could not protect itself. The results of the incursion meant that increased American aid was inevitable, as Nixon had given the South Vietnamese a new responsibility which they could not fulfill; a responsibility, moreover, that the Cambodians were not enthusiastic about.

This incursion had also served to emphasise that the alliance between Cambodia and South Vietnam was an uneasy one. Traditionally, ethnic animosity existed between the two countries. This was heightened by the fact that the Vietnamese were both Cambodia's enemy and ally. During 1970, Cambodian troops committed atrocities on many of the Vietnamese civilians who lived in Cambodia. Thousands of Vietnamese in Cambodia were uprooted from their homes, forced into detention centres, and there were reports of Vietnamese bodies floating down the Mekong River. Likewise, there were reports of South Vietnamese troops who had fought in Cambodia behaving like invading troops rather than troops providing assistance to an ally. There were reports of ARVN troops stealing from, and using excessive firepower against, Cambodian villages, and of Cambodian and South Vietnamese troops firing upon one another. The large-scale military operations undertaken by the ARVN into Cambodia rekindled ethnic animosities. Due to these factors, relations between the Cambodians and South Vietnamese forces were for the most part even more strained, which helped to inhibit effective military co-operation. Lieutenant Colonel V.B. Brown, the Commander of New Zealand (hereafter NZ) V Force, wrote in a report that this barrier did not exist at the higher echelons but was very pronounced at the lower soldier level.[29]

The incursion also marked the beginning of a series of congressional resolutions and legislative initiatives that were to limit severely the executive power of Nixon. These steps resulted in the U.S. Congress forbidding the use of American advisers in Cambodia and also limiting the amount of U.S. military aid destined for Cambodia.[30]

In New Zealand, the Prime Minister, Keith Holyoake, realised the potential disaster that could befall the Indochina area should Cambodia be overrun by the communists. He felt that the situation that existed in Cambodia was one that could not be allowed to "drift".[31] If it was allowed

to do so, then it was highly possible that these hostilities would eventually involve the whole of the Indochina area. In early April 1970, he proposed that the "sensible approach" was to call for an international conference in which all the parties concerned could work out their differences.[32]

Holyoake, including the opposition Labour Party, supported the analysis that the war in Cambodia was a different scenario from that occurring in other countries in Indochina. In a letter to Washington in early May 1970, he reported that: "A point has been reached at which the whole situation in Indo-china has been drastically undermined and the integrity and independence of Cambodia are directly threatened by the pursuit of Communist imperialist aims."[33] Norman Kirk, the leader of the New Zealand Labour Party, also supported this stance. He considered that the war in Cambodia was a much clearer case of aggression than the other wars in Indochina. Kirk also stressed that Lon Nol did not seek and seize power by a coup, but was given it constitutionally by an elected assembly.[34]

On 16 and 17 May 1970, a Foreign Ministers' conference was held in Djakarta and attended by representatives from ten noncommunist countries, including New Zealand, South Vietnam, and Australia, with Cambodia invited as an observer. The aim of the conference was to: "find a constructive formula on how to stop the situation in Cambodia from further deteriorating...in order to enable the Cambodian people to solve their own problems while preserving their policy of...nonalignment."[35] It was at this forum that Asian countries met on a security problem for the first time, without foreign prompting or interference. Holyoake saw the conference as being a positive step, as Asian countries attempted to settle their own regional problems with minimal foreign intervention.

Conference resolutions called for the immediate withdrawal of all foreign forces from Cambodia, the reaffirmation of Cambodia's neutrality and non-interference in Cambodia's internal affairs. The U.S. Government almost immediately announced its endorsement of those demands. The conference showed that the war in Cambodia, unlike the Vietnam War, was seen by many non-Asian countries to be a clear case of external aggression.[36] Despite this, the meeting resulted in a tempering of Cambodian hopes for substantial support from other countries. There was, however, little agreement reached at the conference on an appropriate course of action to be taken.

Several days later, on 30 June 1970, Nixon announced a guideline which consisted of seven points for future U.S. policy towards Cambodia, the guideline being based upon the Nixon Doctrine. The guideline noted, in particular, that no U.S. ground personnel would serve in Cambodia and that America would "encourage and support the efforts of third countries wishing to furnish Cambodia with troops or material."[37] The U.S. Government saw a justification for its incursion into Cambodia: the Cambodians, in trying to attain full sovereignty and neutrality, had already attempted to push the NVA/VC out of their country. The second aspect of the Nixon Doctrine was concerned with cases involving other types of aggression. The United States would furnish military and economic assistance when requested and as appropriate, but the United States looked to the nation directly threatened to assume the responsibility of providing the manpower for its defence. However, Lon Nol would soon request more than the materials of war, despite Nixon's guidelines.

Nixon's decision to expand aid to Lon Nol was made on the basis of three factors: the idea of providing a new protective shield for American troops in Vietnam; the personal emotional investment that Nixon had already made in Cambodia; and his desire to experiment with the Nixon

Doctrine. The Nixon Doctrine had proposed that the United States would provide materiel and counsel for a country in Southeast Asia in order for it to withstand either internal or external attack, while remaining politically detached. Despite this reasoning, the war in Cambodia was to show the fallacy of the Nixon Doctrine. From 1970 onwards, the Nixon Administration was not only to provide material assistance, but to also debate what sort of war Cambodia should fight, and what sort of Army Cambodia should have. The aid that was furnished by Washington to the Cambodians was for the expressed purpose of making it an active belligerent on the side of the United States and South Vietnam. This was at variance with the Nixon Doctrine's principle that Cambodia's neutrality would be respected.

In October 1970, the National Security Decision Memorandum 89, the `Cambodian Strategy', detailed the U.S. policy towards the Cambodian war. The United States was to build up a Cambodian army that, with South Vietnamese and Thai ground and air support and American air power, must try to hold about half of the Khmer Republic against the Communists. The first phase of this policy stated that special attention was to be paid to developing capable FANK light-infantry forces, with supporting weapons as appropriate, and towards the establishment of effective government control in the countryside.[38] By 1971, the Khmer forces were to have imposed upon them by the Nixon Administration the logic of a fully equipped main-force army, and to pursue a strategy that even its U.S. advisers agreed was totally unequipped to undertake.[39]

The planners of such a strategy had given little thought to the impact it would have upon either South Vietnam or the Khmer Republic itself. The results of American studies of the FANK had consistently shown that it would take at least two years to build up the FANK to the

required size of 220,000 men, and that a crash expansion programme would not work as the FANK lacked the leaders and training necessary.[40] This was also a failing of the Vietnamisation programme. Later, in June 1971, H.A. Kissinger considered that the United States had three objectives in the Khmer Republic. First, to retain an anti-North Vietnamese government; second, to provide the Cambodians with enough material so they would deny to the NVA most of the rural Khmer population; and third, to encourage the FANK to move onto the offensive against the communists in the Khmer Republic. The concept of Cambodian neutrality was totally abandoned by Washington.

The U.S. Secretary of State, W. Rogers, appearing before the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations in December 1970, testified that the Administration was providing aid to the new Cambodian Government. This, he stated, was only because the Khmer Government's political and military viability contributed directly to American objectives in Vietnam, without entailing the involvement of any U.S. ground forces. He claimed further that the build-up of the FANK with United States, Thai, and South Vietnamese aid benefited the South Vietnamese by forcing the communists to disperse their forces and therefore reduce their military presence in MRs III and IV. The Financial Year 1972 Congressional Presentation of the military assistance programme stated that U.S. military assistance had enabled the Khmer Republic's forces to "engage the attacking communist force in sustained contact."[41] This had thus "diverted and tied down large numbers of NVA/VC forces which would have otherwise be deployed against American and South Vietnamese forces in South Vietnam."[42]

To circumvent Congressional restrictions on American training in the Khmer Republic itself, the U.S. Army began to arrange for Khmer units to be sent to South Vietnam and Thailand.[43] Cambodian personnel were also trained under a variety of arrangements in such other locations as America

and Okinawa. In the Financial Year 1971, 38,679 Cambodians were trained in South Vietnam alone. At this stage, the United States played only an indirect part in the training of FANK troops in South Vietnam. Some U.S. personnel were involved in the training activities in a co-ordinating capacity, while later, some Special Forces were involved with the training. Washington indirectly financed South Vietnamese military personnel involved and material costs of the training programme through its support of the South Vietnamese defense budget. Much American military aid sent to the Khmer Republic was channeled through Thailand and South Vietnam. This was because the United States replaced equipment and materials that these two countries sent to the Khmer Republic which also assisted in circumventing the Congressional aid restrictions placed on Cambodia.

The South Vietnamese assisted the Cambodians through two major means. First, through conducting active combat operations and, secondly, from 1970, through training FANK battalions. The United States participated in the training of the FANK battalions through the use of training teams, which were composed primarily of U.S. Special Forces instructors. The mission of these teams was training the battalions from initial basic training until they returned to the Khmer Republic as formed units.[44] This mission comprised several aspects: to conduct battalion combat training for selected FANK units; to conduct small-unit leadership training of selected FANK individuals, as directed by the Joint General Staff (hereafter JGS) through Military Assistance Command, Training (hereafter MACT); and to perform other such missions as might be directed by the director MACT.

In 1971, as the 1972 Financial Year Military Assistance Programme was being developed, there were extensive discussions within the U.S. Government and between Washington and Phnom Penh regarding the size of the armed forces to be supported by the United States. The Cambodians

wanted Washington to agree to support not only the 230,000 existing men under arms, but also support an intended increase in men in the Financial Year 1972. Some Cambodian officials felt that the FANK should be a larger force, which could be supported by the Khmer Government without outside assistance. The U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh, however, estimated that the FANK numbered about 175,000 men. Embassy staff believed that, of this number, there were about 75,000 territorial forces under arms who stayed in one military region and 65,000 who were part of a general reserve that could be employed all over the country. After discussion, the United States agreed to train, from 1 October 1971 to November 1972, forty FANK infantry battalions. This number of FANK battalions would bring the FANK up to a total of 220,000 trained and equipped men, an army of the size the U.S. Government thought the Cambodian economy could sustain.[45]

However, there was considerable disagreement between the U.S. State Department and the U.S. Embassy in Phnom Penh on the one hand and the Military Equipment Delivery Team Cambodia (hereafter MEDTC), Admiral J.S. McCain, the U.S. Commander-in-Chief Pacific (CINCPAC) and the JGS on the other, regarding the nature of the undertaking.[46] The latter group regarded the figure of 220,000 men as being a figure to reach in 1972, while the Embassy and the State Department considered the figure as a goal to be reached over time, subject to the availability of funds, training schedules, and the FANK's ability to use American support effectively.

The headquarters of the U.S. Army Vietnam Individual Training Group (hereafter UITG), located at Bien Hoa, was under the command of United States Army, Vietnam (USARV) and under the operational control of the training directorate of the Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (hereafter MACV).[47] The control headquarters at Bien Hoa, commanded by a Lieutenant Colonel, was controlled by MACT. At each camp,

there was a staff of 100 American soldiers commanded by a Major. For training purposes, instructors, transportation to and from training areas, and medical personnel for dispensaries were supplied.

From May 1970, the first FANK recruits, known as the `first wave', began arriving for training under 5th Special Forces Group at Long Hai, in coastal Phuoc Tuy Province, and at Dong Ba Thin.[48] A further camp was also established at Chi Lang.[49] Until October 1970, 4,096 Cambodians in eight battalions were trained.

In October 1970, the Special Forces, namely team B-36, were asked to train an additional thirty FANK battalions and 3,000 unit leaders by July 1971.[50] To produce these thirty battalions, the Special Forces completely overhauled and compressed the current training programme to include a three-week leadership course given to the battalion commanders prior to their arrival of their units. This new schedule put recruits on a six-day field operation only eight weeks after arriving in South Vietnam. These FANK troops began arriving at the three training sites in November 1970. The first of the "second wave" FANK battalions arrived at Long Hai on 7 November. Dong Ba Thin and Chi Lang received their first battalions under this programme on 22 November and 4 December 1970 respectively.

Lon Nol approached Washington to train forty-eight FANK battalions from 1 October 1971 until November 1972. These battalions were to be trained ten at a time and the first of the forty-eight `third-wave' battalions arrived at Long Hai and Dong Ba Thin in August 1971. A month later the first battalions arrived at the third centre, the Phuoc Tuy Training Centre, two and a half miles from Long Hai. These training centres also trained a host of other Cambodian groups ranging from nurses to medium-range reconnaissance patrol cadre.

By November 1971 sixty FANK battalions totalling over 50,000 troops had been trained in South Vietnam and equipped by the United States. Five other battalions had undergone training in Thailand and three others were given instruction by Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) units in Southern Laos. This training continued in early 1972 at an average rate of 5,000 soldiers a month. The UITG was scheduled to complete FANK training in November 1972, by which time it was expected that seventy-eight battalions would have been trained. Although the Cambodians still needed further training it was hoped by the United States that by the completion of this training in South Vietnam, the Cambodians would have organised their own training facilities.

A Modest Contribution

New Zealand's eventual participation in the training of FANK units began in October 1970 when a parliamentary delegation from the Khmer Republic, led by the President of the Senate Ong Som, had visited New Zealand the previous month. The purpose of the visit was to thank the New Zealand Government for its assistance to the Khmer Republic.[51] The New Zealand Government had already provided some assistance to the Khmer Republic. In July 1970, $50,000 worth of medical supplies had been sent by New Zealand to the Khmer Republic, and Holyoake wrote: "the government is now considering whether further assistance should be provided."[52] Holyoake stated that the delegation did not come to New Zealand to ask directly for assistance and that the delegation: "did not represent the Cambodian government...and it had not come to New Zealand to make any requests for aid...He [Ong Som] did...indicate that help of various kinds is urgently needed...He naturally said, when asked by the press, that anything New Zealand could do would be welcome."[53]

In January 1971, J.F. Robertson, the New Zealand Secretary of Defence, and Lieutenant General L.W. Thornton, the Chief of Defence Staff (hereafter CDS), conducted a two week tour of New Zealand military establishments in Southeast Asia. During the tour they discussed New Zealand's programme of withdrawal from South Vietnam with South Vietnamese, American and Australian officials. They also made a one-day stop to Phnom Penh to talk with the Cambodian Government and military officials, particularly with Lon Nol. After this visit, Thornton felt that the biggest difficulty that faced the Khmer Republic was training and equipment for its rapidly built-up army. However, he stated that no specific request from Phnom Penh for arms from New Zealand had been made.[54]

In February 1971, the Cambodian Foreign Minister, Kown Wick, visited New Zealand and held discussions with Holyoake and New Zealand officials, outlining the problems that had been created as a result of the rapid expansion of the Cambodian armed forces. Wick considered that besides military aid, expert assistance was also urgently needed in the establishment of military training areas around Phnom Penh.[55] As a result of these talks, several specific proposals were brought up for further examination by the New Zealand Government including the provision of such defence equipment as arms, ammunition, uniforms, radios, and pilot training and technical training in New Zealand.

On 3 March 1971, the New Zealand Chiefs of Staff Committee invited J.H. Weir, the Assistant Secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to discuss his Ministry's views on the provision of training assistance to the Khmer Republic.[56] Washington was soon to follow-up on the proposals made by Kown Wick.

While Holyoake was visiting Washington in April 1971, the U.S. Secretary of Defense, M. Laird, asked him if New Zealand would be prepared, with Australia, to provide in-country training in Cambodia.[57] Holyoake expressed to Laird an interest in the possibility of providing training assistance to the FANK, although the form of such assistance was not stated. The Counsellor of the U.S. Embassy in Wellington, C.B. Wood, portrayed Holyoake's comment regarding the merits of providing in-country training assistance as a New Zealand initiative. The U.S. used this apparent initiative to not only encourage other countries to offer training assistance but to put pressure upon the New Zealand Government to provide such assistance. These intentions of the U.S. Government were later confirmed when a communique from the NZDLO in Washington to Wellington in June 1971, noted that the United States was "hoping against hope that New Zealand would be the first to agree to provide some token in-country training contribution."[58] The New Zealand staff in Washington and Wellington were left with the clear impression that New Zealand's involvement with training in the Khmer Republic would have been used to `break the ice' to set a pattern and encourage others, particularly the Australians, to participate in an in-country training programme.[59] The communique further stated that every opportunity had been taken to impress upon the New Zealand Government the value that would accrue should they think fit to provide such assistance. The communique concluded: "we sense that there will be considerable disappointment when the administration becomes aware of the limited New Zealand intention."[60] The Australian Army and Government were already fully aware of this tactic being used by the United States to gain foreign support.[61]

From the end of Holyoake's visit to Washington in April, the Nixon administration stepped up its efforts to persuade New Zealand to provide training assistance to the FANK. At the same time, New Zealand began to conform more

closely to the Australian Government's attitude towards similar requests made to them by America. The New Zealand Government requested its liaison officer in Canberra to "ascertain and advise as soon as possible, whether a similar proposal has been put to the Australians, and if so what their [Australians] reactions are."[62]

There was some scepticism in New Zealand that Washington was using underhand methods in attempting to persuade the New Zealand Government to provide assistance to the Cambodians. Some New Zealand politicians were suspicious that the New Zealand Government was being tempted by "economic inducements" from Washington.[63] Such suspicions, uttered publicly on several occasions by members of parliament, were refuted by Holyoake. A report by Robertson suggested that the United States was exerting some pressure upon both New Zealand and Australia to step up contributions towards providing training assistance to the Cambodians.[64] Robertson concluded by writing that he had noted with interest: "the growing trend by US officials to try and covertly influence their allies to do things in Indo-china which, because of political pressures back home, they cannot do themselves, but nevertheless should. I will be interested to see how hard...this point [is pushed]."[65]

During his visit to Southeast Asia in April and May 1971, D.S. Thomson, the New Zealand Minister of Defence, had held discussions with General Cao Van Vien, Chief of the JGS, regarding the provision of training assistance to Cambodia. In his report, Thomson wrote that Vien had said that he was hopeful that the Cambodian forces would develop a good operational capability. From personal experience, Vien knew that: "the Cambodians were robust and determined and if their leaders could be trained in time, the FANK would give a good account of itself."[66]

However, since 1970, there had been a severe reduction in the effectiveness of the FANK. Soon after Nixon's election, the Nixon administration began to impose upon Lon Nol the logic and strategy of a fully-equipped mainforce army. Most of the U.S. advisers in the Khmer Republic agreed that they were creating an army that the Cambodians could not cope with. The increasing quantities of heavy and sophisticated U.S. equipment that the FANK was being given meant that the FANK units were forced to move along the roads, making the Cambodian soldiers easy targets for frequent enemy ambushes, and many were annihilated as a result. General J. Cleland, the chief of the MEDTC, felt that the FANK was being supplied with too much sophisticated equipment, noting that the base of the Army came from "a non-technical society that is seriously deficient in technical expertise."[67] To further accentuate this problem, U.S. Congressional restrictions meant that the FANK was denied the necessary training and management skills vital to maintaining the army the United States was creating. Even at the basic level, many of the FANK personnel were unable to maintain the vast amounts of sophisticated equipment given to them by the United States. Despite his feelings, Cleland had told the Australians that he believed that the Khmer Republic would succeed with their aim.[68]

Due to the quantity of supplies and the inadequate training it received, the FANK came to "depend on firepower to win. Seldom has FANK outmanoeuvered the enemy - he has outgunned them."[69] By mid-1974, at least eighty-seven percent of all American military aid was spent on ammunition.[70] When America began cutting back its supply of ammunition to the Khmer Republic, the FANK became increasingly unable to fight the way it had been taught.

There was also a lack of effective leadership and experience among most levels of leadership within the FANK. One report, from the Pentagon's Systems Analysis Office in May 1970, stated that the FANK suffered from, amongst other

things, a lack of combat experience, equipment deficiencies, an incompetent and corrupt officer corps, and understrength units.[71] The report further claimed that the armed forces could be quickly raised by 90,000 men. However, the experience of South Vietnam suggested that they could not be trained properly and controlled for about four to five years. The Pentagon suggested a two-year crash training programme, but it would prove to be counterproductive, because the rapid expansion of the FANK had wildly outgrown the availability of the leaders and the necessary training.[72]

Even by mid-1973, this situation had improved very little. A U.S. assessment of the FANK compiled in May 1973, considered, "FANK combat performance was characterised by poor leadership, low morale, and the instances of some units refusing to advance against enemy resistance."[73] Battlefield tactics also reflected both the incompetence of the officers and the poor training of their men and the FANK's infrequent offensives were no better. The normal attack pattern of the Khmer Republic's army was "characterised by a dull plodding, belated advance, devoid of surprise, co-ordination or innovation. When the enemy chose to resist, friendly casualties were high and objectives rarely attained."[74] Some FANK officers were also corrupt and the FANK experienced major problems with `phantom soldiers', as did the South Vietnamese.[75] Enemy targets were often not well observed and machine-guns were rarely positioned properly. Some artillery officers worked particular hours only, often for only five days a week. There was rarely any proper co-ordination of artillery with infantry attacks.

Behind all these problems was Lon Nol, who maintained much the same role in the military as did Hitler in Germany by the end of the Second World War. The U.S. assessment noted that:

> it isn't enough to produce trained units complete with qualified officers and non-commissioned officer personnel; these leaders must operate within a system that gives them directions and insists on results. If malaise, nepotism or weakness is allowed to exist at the top it will pervade the entire organisation.[76]

The limitations of this large western styled army that the Nixon Doctrine was creating were demonstrated in the Battle of Chenla II at the end of 1971. The operation was mounted in an attempt to relieve the besieged town of Kompong Thom. The Cambodian troops kept to the roads, creating a front "forty miles long and two miles wide".[77] When the Cambodians were forced into a rout, the FANK lost enormous amounts of troops and military equipment.

During a meeting of the Chiefs of Staff on 23 April 1971, R.M. Mullins, from the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, advised that his ministry would be seeking the views of Thornton on the subject of providing training assistance to the Khmer Republic.[78] Thornton later reported back that the Cambodians had stressed to him the need for skilled foreign instructors.

Because of the political situation and military setbacks in Vietnam, by the early 1970s there was a growing disillusionment in the west towards the idea of military intervention in Southeast Asia. Direct military involvement in the region was seen in terms of costly and unsatisfactory results. The Khmer Government found that most nations were meticulously washing their hands of the type of direct support so massively undertaken in South Vietnam. Many western countries regarded the Cambodian conflict as being just another facet of the Indochina problem.

What made the situation in Cambodia different from that in South Vietnam was there was a stronger case to be made for the Khmer Republic being the more deserving of assistance. The conflict in Cambodia had markedly fewer

aspects of a civil war and more signs of outright aggression from a neighbouring country. Both the New Zealand Government and the Opposition Labour Party had acknowledged quite clearly that Cambodia was the subject of blatant communist aggression.[79] Cambodian sovereignty was being arrogantly and illegally violated by an outside country. In reply to a statement that the New Zealand Government was supporting a government that was likely to be overthrown by its own people, Holyoake stated: "There had very recently been a general election in Cambodia which resulted in an overwhelming victory for the former Prime Minister, General Lon Nol and his government. I could not by any stretch of the imagination call that a dictatorship."[80] However, there was a small number of politicians in New Zealand who did not support such proposals. Their focus was upon the Khmer Rouge rather than the North Vietnamese. One politician later said: "training Cambodians in Vietnam is teaching Cambodians to kill other Cambodians."[81]

Many New Zealand newspaper editorials agreed that the Cambodian war was much more than a civil war. These editorials, particularly those written by reporters who had been in Cambodia, believed that the Cambodians were "battling an enemy they detest for the survival of their religion, their lands, their culture and their way of life."[82] An editorial in the Auckland Star commented that the Khmer Rouge in Cambodia "could hardly provide a convincing basis for civil war."[83] Another editorial considered that the Cambodian people were striving to reject an invader, which was much more identifiable than the enemy that the South Vietnamese were fighting, which "arrogantly and illegally ignored Cambodian sovereignty."[84] Some newspaper editorials compared the FANK with "some other Asians" noting such comments as "the Cambodians show a fine potential as soldiers...and take their knocks, hold the line, rather than flee down the road as some other Asians did at the first taste of war."[85] One newspaper editorial

noted that comparing Cambodia with South Vietnam was "like comparing a sharply focused colour photograph with a blurred and smudgy negative."[86]

Many editorials in New Zealand newspapers supported the view that the Khmer Republic should be supported in its fight against the communists, and some felt that the New Zealand Government should also provide assistance. Part of the reason for this support was that the Cambodians sought, not foreign assistance, such as combat troops, but rather such items as instructors, ammunition and weapons. A widely accepted idea was that Cambodia was a real test of the validity of the Nixon Doctrine, and there could not be "a more optimistic testing place."[87]

In late April 1971, Lieutenant Colonel Brown, the Commander of NZ V Force, was informed that the New Zealand Government was looking into the possibility of providing some form of instructor assistance to Cambodia.[88] The New Zealand Government had not been approached by the Khmer Government, but the question had "been aired in broad terms at high levels by the U.S. Government", primarily through Laird's urging of Holyoake to consider in-country training.[89] The New Zealand Army now "felt obliged to investigate possibilities" and report them to Holyoake soon as possible after his return to New Zealand.[90] The New Zealand Army felt that perhaps the "most promising line of approach" to this problem would be to examine the possibility of the 1st New Zealand Army Training Team, Vietnam (hereafter 1NZATTV) being increased in size, allowing the Vietnamese to release resources to enable part of 1NZATTV to assist with the existing FANK training programme, or else provide leadership training to Cambodians at Chi Lang.[91] However any of these options would have been in addition to the existing tasks that 1NZATTV was undertaking. Brown was ordered to investigate the most appropriate military training assistance that New Zealand could provide to the Khmer Republic. Further, in early May

1971, the NZDLO in Canberra had discussions with Colonel Jonathan `Fred' Ladd, an affable man well known for his acerbity when describing General W. Westmoreland's handling of the war.[92]

Ladd's attitude regarding how the war should be fought in both South Vietnam and the Khmer Republic was at variance with `official' U.S. policy. As a Special Forces soldier he had been openly critical of the U.S. Army's massive build-up during the Vietnam War: these attitudes had cost him any chance of becoming a general. He believed that U.S. policy towards Cambodia was being carried out by officials in Saigon who understood little of the conditions that existed in Cambodia. Ladd favoured the formation of a FANK army which would be equipped and trained to fight the war in their own way, with a minimum of reliance on both very sophisticated equipment and on the use of massive firepower.[93] Ladd wanted the FANK to use tactics similar to those of the enemy and did not want the U.S. to make the same mistakes that they had made in training the ARVN.[94] Ladd believed that such intentions were quite irrelevant to the war in Cambodia.[95] Ladd felt that the greatest need was for groups of four to five experienced instructors from countries such as New Zealand and Australia to be attached to training establishments in the Khmer Republic.[96] He continually reiterated to Brown the contribution that even a small group of western instructors could make, as he felt there was little point in attempting to provide basic instruction directly to the FANK soldiers. Therefore, Ladd felt that these instructors should have administrative skills, rather than combat skills, as the Cambodians required guidance with the administration of training programmes and facilities.[97] The Cambodians were enthusiastic about developing their own training centres in an endeavour to save overseas funds, to reduce delays that were inherent in sending their troops from Cambodia for training in South Vietnam, and to eliminate their reliance on the South Vietnamese armed forces. The relationship the

Cambodians had with the South Vietnamese was at best tenuous. However, the Australians were opposed to this suggestion, feeling that from an administrative point of view, it would be too difficult to provide assistance to servicemen who would be scattered throughout Cambodia.

At the end of May, Brown reported back to Wellington. In his report, Brown wrote that all FANK training, other than low level basic infantry training, was conducted in South Vietnam.[98] As the Americans wanted to form small Cambodian advisory teams similar to MATs, he suggested that if this policy was pursued there could be openings for New Zealand to concentrate upon the subjects of training FANK officers and senior NCOs in the "niceties" of command and control, tactics to battalion level, and the employment of artillery, armour and air support. Brown also had held "lengthy discussions" with General T. Maxtaxis, commander of the MEDTC, Colonel Gordon, Services Attache at the Australian Embassy in Phnom Penh and the FANK Director of Training, B.G. Thappana Nhinh, regarding the possible involvement of New Zealand in the FANK training system in South Vietnam, particularly in assisting the Cambodians to improve their own training capabilities.[99] As a result of his discussions with Maxtaxis, Brown felt that the present system of training the FANK in South Vietnam was more acceptable than training in New Zealand, although neither met the prime requirement of training in Cambodia.

Maxtaxis, a self-professed military intellectual who enjoyed crushing beer cans in his hands, complicated New Zealand's attempts to ascertain what training assistance the Cambodians needed. The difference between Ladd and Maxtaxis perhaps exemplified Washington's policy in Cambodia. Maxtaxis saw the Cambodian war as being merely: "A holding action. You know, one of those things like a rear guard you drop off. The troika's going down the road and the wolves are closing in, and so you throw them something off and let them chew it."[100] He was quite different to Ladd in not

only personality, but also as to his attitude towards the type of assistance that should be provided to Cambodia. Conflict quickly developed between Maxtaxis and Ladd.[101] In one example, Ladd ordered inexpensive commercial trucks from Australia for FANK use. Maxtaxis overrode Ladd's decision and ordered complicated American military trucks. The Cambodians had no idea how to maintain them and a depot opened to repair military trucks, was used instead as a storage area for broken down vehicles.[102]

In his report, Brown reiterated that MACV considered that the present system of bringing units to South Vietnam for training to be wasteful in both time and money.[103] As a result, the prime requirement was to re-establish FANK training centres in Cambodia. The major training centres were to be established around Phnom Penh with one at Battambang. The United States sent all the appropriate training manuals to Cambodia with the full realisation that the training in that country would never be effective until a suitable organisation was established to centralise the control of training, to group the scattered training centres, and to provide the impetus for the Cambodians to train themselves. Brown felt that involvement in such an enterprise was an immense task and and was outside the scope of what New Zealand could provide.[104] However, he believed that Nhinh might be receptive to a small contribution to his staff in Phnom Penh as advisers on the organisation of training, although this depended upon the political decision to send New Zealand troops to Cambodia.

The Cambodians sought to establish their own training facilities within Cambodia, because of animosity with the South Vietnamese and the high costs involved. When FANK training in South Vietnam ended in December 1972, the FANK had planned that it would train eighty battalions and 114 Regional Force (RF) companies in 1973.[105] To begin training their own troops, the FANK planned to establish in Cambodia

five battalion training centres, with each centre conducting twelve-week courses, and be capable of handling approximately twenty battalions per year. By the end of 1970, there were several training camps under construction, each with the capacity to turn out one battalion per week.[106] Although it had been planned to train and fully equip eighty Cambodian companies in South Vietnamese training camps, the Cambodians had suggested that the training should take place in areas just on their side of the border or at least not too far into South Vietnam. This was not practicable as it would be expensive in time and money to build new training camps, however basic they would be.

Brown wrote of the problems confronting the existing training programme. Everyone acknowledged that the average FANK soldier was fine but that leadership was weak.[107] However, if New Zealand was to concentrate its efforts on training such groups as platoon and company commanders in FANK battalions, then New Zealand would be in danger of encroaching on the already established system. This system meant that officers and NCOs attended the appropriate ARVN schools, while the men received basic training at a National Training Centre. At the completion of this training, the battalion was brought together, starting at the platoon level until the whole battalion was complete. One of the outstanding problems that blighted co-operation between the ARVN and the United States was language, a problem that the New Zealanders were currently presently encountering at Chi Lang. There was little likelihood of the United States acquiring interpreters or English-speaking Cambodians, as they were in short supply and in great demand in Cambodia as a result of the rapidly expanding FANK forces. FANK provided French speaking liaison officers who interpreted all the instruction either directly from French speaking ARVN instructors or through French speaking ARVN interpreters.[108]

The possibility of providing training courses in New Zealand and Australia for FANK personnel suffered the same problem of language differences. Ladd had informed Brown that it would be at least another year before there would be a significant number of FANK officers with sufficient English to attend courses in New Zealand or Australia. Brown did not feel that the Cambodians would accept the length of time that was required to learn English. Based upon the lack of English-speaking Cambodians, Brown's report again raised the earlier possibility that 1NZATTV be strengthened.[109] Brown also reported that a delegation, drawn from all three services in the Khmer Republic was soon to tour Australia to assess the opportunities available for the training of FANK officers.

Brown stated that Cambodia was the key to the survival of South Vietnam, an idea propounded by the Nixon administration.[110] Therefore, both FANK and ARVN operations would have a marked influence on South Vietnam's economic and political future. Despite this acknowledgment, Brown concluded that his belief that New Zealand should not encroach on the present system of FANK training in South Vietnam had been reinforced.[111] Brown had reached this conclusion after lengthy discussions with Maxtaxis, Gordon and Thappana Nhinh. Ladd had also told Brown that the training of Cambodians in South Vietnam was a Vietnamese problem and that it was difficult and inappropriate for first world countries to become involved.

Shortly after Brown's report was received in Wellington, Lieutenant General R.J.H. Webb, now the CDS, was asked by Thomson to forward details of training assistance that New Zealand might be able to provide to Cambodia. These details were to form a brief for Holyoake regarding the training assistance programme that was underway in South Vietnam. The comments made by Ladd and Maxtaxis on the possible avenues for New Zealand training assistance were received with interest by the New Zealand Government.

Although the provision of aid was to be discussed, Thomson doubted that much more than token assistance could be offered.[112] Webb felt that any provision of training assistance by New Zealand would be limited. In a minute to Major General L.A. Pearce, the Deputy Chief of Defence Staff, (hereafter DCDS) Webb stated that he felt that New Zealand was unable to do anything sophisticated for several reasons. New Zealand was limited as to what it could do due to its "crumpled" resources, it had not received any specific proposals, and lastly, "we should stick our necks out only if Ministry of Foreign Affairs or the Government apply pressure."[113] Webb doubted whether, in the event, New Zealand could provide much more than token assistance.[114]

The option of using 1NZATTV to train FANK personnel was discounted for several reasons. Robertson, the New Zealand Secretary of Defence, stated that the Chi Lang training centre was a "South Vietnamese installation of the Republic of Vietnam" and therefore did not feel "it is for us to suggest that the Vietnamese should offer more training to the Cambodians at Chi Lang, and that our team should be diverted to this task."[115] In a memo to Thomson, Robertson noted that if the Chi Lang project was "anything to go by, then the cost of a contribution to any training venture for the FANK would be high."[116]

Pearce was not opposed to the possibility of stationing New Zealand troops in Cambodia in a training capacity, provided certain stringent conditions were met. In a paper to Webb, which examined the feasibility of stationing New Zealand troops in Cambodia, he suggested that first, the United States underwrite the New Zealand presence to the extent of logistical support and, in an emergency, operational assistance.[117] Second, that the Khmer guarantee the security of the New Zealand establishment. Thirdly, that the FANK provide petroleum, oil and lubricants (POL) and Defense stores and that U.S. and/or Australian Embassy assistance be provided in an emergency for communications

facilities and medical aid. Pearce considered that for the New Zealand Government to establish a training organisation within Cambodia, where New Zealand neither had any resident diplomatic representation nor the backing of an established Allied military presence, entailed particular difficulties. However, he believed that these difficulties did not necessarily rule out the proposal.

Webb felt that such military assistance could be given to Cambodia provided the United States was able to provide a substantial measure of support. In a report to Thomson, he went on to list the conditions that he felt needed to be met before "he could recommend with confidence" the stationing of troops in Cambodia.[118] Webb was thinking in terms of providing a "suitable" team of approximately sixty New Zealand artillery instructors to train six to seven of the new Cambodian field batteries up to an operational standard and to assist in the formation of an artillery school near Phnom Penh. He favoured this form of aid because the Cambodians were due to receive eleven batteries of 75mm pack howitzers, in addition to their existing guns, in about six months time. Webb felt that the team would remain in Cambodia for about two years, the length of time it would take to train a staff for the school.

Thomson supported Webb's proposal. Thomson felt "sure...that we could set up a very effective artillery training establishment with about eighty personnel and an annual cost of approximately $NZ500,000..."[119] Thomson also argued this case from a political angle. He considered that if there was a serious American Government commitment towards a project of this nature, a willingness on New Zealand's part to participate actively "might well attract even greater recognition than we have gained from our presence alongside the American forces in South Vietnam."[120]

In late June, G.R. Laking, Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Permanent Head of the Prime Minister's Department, wrote to Holyoake stating his opinion on the possibility of New Zealand providing in-country training assistance to Cambodia.[121] He argued the opposite to Thomson, the New Zealand Minister of Defence, and Webb, arguing that it would be unthinkable for New Zealand to become militarily involved in providing low-level in-country training assistance. This was particularly so when the United States was unable, by virtue of congressional action, to introduce military forces or advisers into Cambodia, and also when the Australians had also decided against in-country training. While Washington would welcome an in-country contribution by New Zealand, such an initiative by New Zealand could well become the centre of controversy in the United States, particularly so if, as was later shown to be the case, the U.S. Administration was to use it as the basis on which to press for the introduction of U.S. advisers. He stated further that with the New Zealand Government's policy of withdrawal from South Vietnam, an undertaking to provide in-country training could be seen to be a reversal of this trend. He favoured the suggestion that 1NZATTV could be used to train Cambodians. Laking concluded by arguing that:

> Again, such an initiative on New Zealand's part would appear incongruous to our five power Defence partners, notably Australia, when we have been pressing hard for economies in that context and have notified our parties that, on financial grounds, we shall be obliged to trim our contribution; the Australian Government too, could be concerned by the precedent which a New Zealand initiative in Cambodia would be thought to establish.[122]

The possibility of New Zealand providing in-country training was explored by the New Zealand Army and Government in some detail. The provision of a New Zealand team to the Artillery School in Cambodia was ruled, the reasons for which were to form the basis for the eventual decision by the New Zealand Government not to become involved with in-country training of any form in Cambodia.[123] The first

major reason was political. To have become involved in in-country training, despite both Washington and Canberra having decided to reject such a venture, would have isolated New Zealand from its Australia, New Zealand and the United States (ANZUS) partners and at the same time the New Zealand Government and military would have to face the possibility of being involved in an escalating commitment. The second reason was financial. Direct personnel costs of maintaining such a team would be approximately $NZ490,000 annually, a large commitment for a government attempting to reduce defence spending. Thirdly, there were the obvious language difficulties involved in such an enterprise and the experiences of 1NZATTV members had highlighted this problem. Fourthly, there was the logistical isolation to be considered in view of the non-participation in any in-country training enterprise by both the United States and Australia.[124] Lastly, there were very real security problems due to the fluid situation that existed in Cambodia. There was a danger that team members could not be extracted if the security situation was to deteriorate to any real extent. Holyoake agreed with Laking's assessment, and the matter was discussed no further.[125]

Because of New Zealand's decision not to take part in in-country training, the U.S. Department of Defense made it clear to the New Zealand Defence staff in Washington that any New Zealand assistance to Cambodia would be highly appreciated. The Defence Department also began mentioning the possibility of a New Zealand/Australian presence, perhaps with U.S. participation, to train Cambodians in South Vietnam and a base area that was presently being deactivated, could be made available for the purpose. A report from the NZDLO in Washington stated: "they [United States] have been at pains to impress on us that training of this nature would be much more valuable than training in New Zealand, or than the provision of surplus arms and equipment

...probably...foreign to the equipment now being provided to the Cambodian Army under the American Military Assistance Programme."[126] The report further considered that the level of morale, combined with the operational successes of the Cambodian forces had been a "matter of surprise and considerable satisfaction to the U.S. authorities."[127]

In June, Lon Nol made a further appeal for aid. Although he welcomed foreign aid, Lon Nol reiterated that the Khmer Republic was to be as self-reliant and independent as possible, but in reality, however, this was improbable.[128] Sirik Matak, the Khmer Republic's Minister of Defence and Information, stated: "we ask them to give us equipment or weapons, we don't want their men to die in our place."[129] In response to his pleas for assistance, further assistance was provided to the Khmer Republic. Prior to June 1971, U.S. appropriations to Cambodia amounted to about $US260 million being spent on arms, ammunition, artillery, trucks and other miscellaneous military supplies. The Australian Government provided $Aust1.6 million in military aid and $600,000 in Colombo Plan aid during 1971/72.[130] In addition, they were planning to appropriate $200,000 for the military training of Cambodians in Australia during 1971/72.[131] With U.S. support, South Vietnam had provided training for, thus far, 30,000 FANK troops.[132]

New Zealand's aid to Cambodia, up to this point, had been sent under the Colombo plan. Economic assistance was provided through capital aid in the form of grants and loans for national projects, through technical aid in the form of experts, facilities for technical training, and the supply of special equipment.[133] This aid had consisted of $50,000 worth of relief supplies sent in 1970, and in early 1971 $12,000 worth of plasma was delivered to Cambodia. In mid-1971, the New Zealand Government offered to Cambodia, subject to preliminary discussions with Washington and

Canberra, access to army and air force training courses in New Zealand for small numbers of personnel and some surplus military equipment.[134] In an earlier report to Holyoake, Laking had suggested that the question of providing courses should be discussed in detail with the Cambodians and recommended that the New Zealand Embassy in Saigon pursue the matter further.[135] The Embassy would also need to explain to the Cambodians the problems involved in offering such courses and to indicate New Zealand's limited capacity.

However, there were problems associated with training FANK personnel in New Zealand. One major problem was the language barrier. However, Laking did note that if the Australians went ahead with their plans to establish an English language training course as a preliminary to military courses, then it could be possible for some trainees to undertake this language course before coming to New Zealand.[136] In June, Matak informed the New Zealand Ambassador that his government would bear this offer in mind when considering its future training requirements. Matak also informed the Ambassador that infantry training was the first priority for the FANK but felt that this type of training was best done in the present locations. Wick had approached the New Zealand Government about the possibility of training approximately twenty to twenty-five Khmer pilots. However, Air Staff in Wellington replied that the Royal New Zealand Air Force (hereafter RNZAF) did not have the capacity to train such numbers.[137] The most that could be offered was to take approximately four to five Cambodians who had already completed their basic training, to undertake helicopter conversion training and instructor training for both helicopter and fixed wing aircraft. The Cambodians did not react to this offer.[138]

There were constraints placed upon the type of military equipment New Zealand could send to Cambodia. In May 1971, MEDTC advised Lieutenant Colonel Brown, the Commander of NZ V Force, that any surplus equipment, unless compatible with

that already in use by the FANK, should be accompanied by suitably qualified technicians to ensure that the proper advice was given on its use and maintenance.[139] Attempts to standardise FANK equipment were underway as the FANK had been using equipment of Soviet, Czech, French, Chinese and American origins. The surplus military equipment that New Zealand offered consisted primarily of three million rounds of .303 ammunition, 5,000 back packs and 4,000 mosquito nets.[140] Jet barges worth $50,000 were on order and $40,000 had been earmarked for radio equipment. The government also offered 1,000 .303 rifles, 100 .38 Smith and Wesson revolvers and 14,000 rounds of .38 ammunition. The New Zealand Government realised that these arms were obsolete but thought that the Khmer Republic could supply these weapons to any village defence forces. However, the FANK replied that such equipment was of little use to them.[141]

One of Cambodia's most pressing military requirements, as already stated, was the construction of basic facilities at their training establishments. Laking considered that New Zealand was able to assist by providing prefabricated buildings which needed to be only of a rudimentary design. However, such aid involved substantial expenditure of about $100,000 to $200,000. There was, however, no item on the vote of any Ministry to which such expenditure could be charged and the New Zealand Government preferred other less costly forms of aid.[142] In July 1971, the New Zealand Government gave its approval to the New Zealand Army to begin sending military equipment to Cambodia.

On 13 August C.B. Wood, the Counsellor of the U.S. Embassy in Wellington, wrote to Lieutenant General Thornton, the CDS, noting that the discussions that were held on 6 August about the possibility of New Zealand joining with Australia and the United States in training FANK military personnel in South Vietnam "appears to follow logically the

interest in ground forces training for Khmer troops which your Prime Minister expressed to Secretary Laird on 16 April."[143] Three days later the Deputy Head of Mission at the American Embassy wrote to Thomson seeking a New Zealand participation in a joint training programme for Cambodian military personnel in South Vietnam. This request was considered by the Chiefs of Staff committee on 16 August 1971, which decided that unless Washington made specific proposals for consideration by Australia and New Zealand, then the matter should be allowed to rest.[144]

American officials also discussed New Zealand's participation in a FANK training programme with several other New Zealand political and military figures. Soon after the Chiefs of Staff committee meeting, Lieutenant Commander Procopio from MACT suggested to Brown that perhaps New Zealand would then be interested in contributing towards a combined United States/Australian/ARVN/New Zealand training facility in South Vietnam. Procopio informed Brown that the matter had been discussed with Thomson, Laking and Thornton. In early September 1971, Thomson informed the U.S. Embassy in Wellington that he could find no support for New Zealand participation in a joint training establishment. In this communique he made it clear that unless Washington took the lead and showed a willingness to involve itself there was unlikely to be any interest shown by the New Zealand Government.[145] Likewise, the New Zealand Government was then experiencing the practical problems associated with attempting to support 1NZATTV and was uninterested in an independent New Zealand programme.

This lead was taken, when on 29 September, K. Franzheim II, the American Ambassador to New Zealand, wrote to Holyoake in more specific terms, stating that America appreciated the relief aid that New Zealand was providing, but that a "modest training programme would have more lasting value."[146] Franzheim sought approval from Holyoake to integrate twelve to fifteen New Zealand military

personnel into the current FANK training programme. He wrote that the matter had already been discussed by the U.S. Embassy and New Zealand officials with the thought that New Zealand's involvement could be on a small scale and in conjunction with American and Australian programmes. He also wrote: "we are making a similar approach to Canberra who have expressed interest." In conclusion, he stated: "I sincerely hope your Government will lend its approval to the above programme."[147] As a result of Franzheim's letter, the New Zealand Government took immediate steps to ascertain what position Australia was likely to adopt in respect to this American proposal. Brown was requested to ascertain the likely reactions of the Australians.[148]

A memorandum from Wood to Robertson, the New Zealand Secretary of Defence, further propounded Franzheim's request.[149] He wrote that the United States approved of the concept of integrating twelve to fifteen New Zealand military personnel into the FANK training programme and that a "limited number of New Zealand personnel would be considered *initially*."[150] From this it could have been anticipated that at a later date the United States might expect more New Zealand troops to become involved in such a training proposal. Washington sought New Zealand's contribution in such areas as technical specialities (engineering, intelligence, ordinance), the medical sphere, tactics (jungle warfare), and field communications. At this stage the New Zealand Government had no information about the extent and nature of the U.S. involvement in training FANK at the three training camps in South Vietnam. On the same same day as Wood's memorandum was received a signal was sent to Brown requesting information on the extent and nature of U.S. involvement in the FANK training programme. The signal stated: "it should be made clear that these inquiries are being made entirely without commitment."[151]

The adoption of such a proposal raised several questions of policy for the New Zealand Government. The New Zealand Secretary of Defence was not convinced that New Zealand should get involved in FANK training, despite the obvious military advantages.[152] At this stage of the Vietnam War the New Zealand Government, although having soldiers in 1NZATTV and the Australian Army Training Team, Vietnam (hereafter AATTV), was withdrawing its remaining combat forces and the medical team from Vietnam. An undertaking as proposed by the Americans ran counter to the overall reduction of New Zealand's military involvement in Southeast Asia. As a consequence, the New Zealand Government would need to decide whether it considered an increase in military aid was acceptable under these circumstances. As already stated, Laking believed that all further aid to Vietnam should be non-military.[153] Secondly, it was highly likely that any New Zealand Government was eager to support the Nixon Doctrine policy, which saw Asian countries helping themselves to the maximum extent possible. The New Zealand Government felt that perhaps Vietnam and Thailand were in a better position to provide such assistance, as both received considerable U.S. help, were able to provide assistance, were geographically close to Cambodia, and had less of a problem with the language barrier that which Western soldiers would experience.[154] Politically, with the growth of some stability in South Vietnam due to allied forces and the continuing withdrawal of these troops, the New Zealand Government was more enthusiastic about devoting development resources or civilian technical training assistance to Indochina rather than providing further military training. Thirdly, there were two interrelated factors involved with the question of providing training assistance to Cambodia.[155] Such training assistance would require a dispersal and enlargement of New Zealand's meagre resources particularly its training effort, when, in the context of the establishment of the new five power arrangements in Malaysia and Singapore, New Zealand would probably have to increase its training assistance to

these latter two countries. The New Zealand Government had indicated to Indonesia that it was interested in providing similar assistance. With limited resources available for defence aid, the political priorities between Indonesia and Singapore/Malaysia would have to be determined. Politically, the provision of training assistance to Malaysia and Singapore was much more attractive to the New Zealand Government than provision of such assistance to Cambodia. Robertson commented that it was unlikely that New Zealand would get much U.S. support, at least initially, should New Zealand get involved in assisting Cambodia.[156]

During his visit to South Vietnam in late September and early October 1971, Lieutenant General Webb, the CDS, had observed some of the FANK training in progress. Webb felt that the FANK training programme appeared to be similar in nature to the National Services scheme that was at that time being run in New Zealand, and that: "ordinary infantry instructors could handle the job quite satisfactorily."[157] This was because instruction "clearly follows the normal US pattern of mass production" and he had observed training where there was only one U.S. instructor to groups of over 100 Cambodians.[158] He reported that an identifiable New Zealand contribution could be made and was well within the New Zealand Army's capabilities. The most manageable and useful activity that New Zealand could provide would be to assist with the basic training of Cambodian units, as suggested by the United States. He concluded by noting that if such training was undertaken by New Zealand, it could make the greatest impact and have the most identifiable presence if the instructors were kept in one location. The New Zealand Defence Council decided to invite the Secretary of Defence to seek government approval, in principle, for the provision of military training assistance.

Measures had already been taken by the New Zealand Army to prepare for such a likelihood. The New Zealand Directorate of Military Training (DAT), examined the FANK

training programme in South Vietnam. Its report, completed in October 1971, also drew upon the experiences of 1NZATTV in Chi Lang to indicate the pitfalls and advantages of any New Zealand training effort.[159] It considered that the New Zealand Army's instructional techniques proved to be superior to those of the U.S. training methods for the FANK training programme. Ideally, therefore, any New Zealand instructional team should be an independent part of any joint U.S./New Zealand effort. Secondly, a training team could not operate effectively unless logistically supported by either a U.S. or Australian logistic organisation. Thirdly, any such training effort would require a reasonably secure area to operate from. Fourthly, a New Zealand training effort would be ineffective unless adequate interpreter assistance was provided. By New Zealand standards, both the quality and quantity of the planned instruction had to be, out of necessity, of a relatively low calibre. Added to this were the problems of instructing the students through interpreters and the assimilation of a large number of men from rural areas into a military environment. The rank structure of any such training effort needed to have a high rank structure at the Major or Lieutenant Colonel level, to avoid the Cambodians loosing face, a problem that 1NZATTV had to deal with. The report concluded: "the Cambodian is a determined individual, when sufficiently aroused and will, no doubt, benefit from the programme."[160] Although a New Zealand contribution would be small, the report felt that such assistance would incur a series of benefits for New Zealand, providing the following were observed.[161] First, that it remain intact as a nationally identifiably group. Secondly, that the training effort could be sustained for an indefinite period and could maintain a constantly high standard of instruction. Finally, that it was selective in the tasks in which it undertook, in that every objective had to be not only achieved but be seen to be achieved.

By mid-1971, the New Zealand press began to demonstrate a greater interest in the debate about whether the New Zealand Government would provide training assistance to Cambodia. Throughout New Zealand's involvement in the Vietnam War, the New Zealand Army had conducted a very efficient propaganda campaign for New Zealand journalists. From 13 April to 29 May 1971, seven New Zealand journalists had toured Southeast Asia on a trip sponsored by New Zealand Defence Public Relations.[162] In its report to the Defence Council, Defence Public Relations reported that these journalists were impressed by the Cambodians' attitude and their determination, militarily, to cope with their problems.[163] They also appreciated the Cambodians' need for economic assistance. Overall, the trip was seen by Defence Public Relations as being very successful.[164]

As already discussed earlier in this chapter, the New Zealand Government showed great interest in any decision that Canberra would make about the U.S. requests for training assistance to the FANK. By the beginning of November 1971, the New Zealand Government was still unsure of the Australian Government's attitude. At the official level the Australians' attitude was seen by the New Zealand Government as being favourable towards the U.S. requests. It was presumed by the New Zealand Government that if the Australians did decide to participate, it would probably be in another facet of training and not necessarily at any of the training camps presently being used by the United States. At the same time, however, the New Zealand Government was very keen to ensure that any offer that it might make was not dependent upon Australian participation or support but in fact should be seen as a separate national project.[165]

The New Zealand Government's uncertainties regarding Australia's likely decision on providing assistance to the FANK were soon dispelled. On 3 November 1971, the Australian Government agreed to provide instructors and

facilities in South Vietnam for the training of several battalions of Cambodian troops. In an attempt to play down the political damage that could result from this announcement, Thomson, the New Zealand Minister of Defence, publicly commented that from his study it was clear that any assistance that New Zealand might give should be of the instructional-type course that was already being provided by 1NZATTV.[166] He concluded by noting that any assistance would be limited by Cabinet to training courses either in New Zealand or in South Vietnam.[167] The NZDLO in Washington had already made it plain to D. Packard, the U.S. Deputy Secretary of Defense: "it would be unhelpful (and unprofitable for them), to revive publicly in New Zealand any possibility of New Zealand assistance with in-country training for Cambodians."[168]

In early November 1971, at a press conference, William McMahon, the Australian Prime Minister, announced that his government had decided, in principle, to train Cambodian troops in South Vietnam in co-operation with New Zealand and American troops. This statement, widely published in New Zealand newspapers, placed the New Zealand Government in a particularly embarrassing position. Thomson told the press that no agreement, even in principle, had been made by the New Zealand Government to train Cambodian troops in South Vietnam. He also said that preliminary discussions on the matter had already taken place, and the United States Embassy in Phnom Penh was awaiting a formal request from the Cambodians.[169] When asked why McMahon had said what he did, Thomson was reported as having said: "You'll have to ask that in Canberra."[170] Packard was reported as having side-stepped questions when he was in New Zealand about how New Zealand came to be asked to train Cambodian troops.[171]

New Zealand newspaper editorials had speculated that a decision on New Zealand military assistance to the Cambodian armed forces was imminent. At the beginning of November, several newspaper articles had reported discussions were

being held between Washington, Wellington and Phnom Penh on the possible forms of New Zealand assistance to Cambodia. John Marshall, the Deputy Prime Minister of New Zealand, announced that the feasibility of sending New Zealand advisers to provide out-of-country training for Cambodian personnel was being examined by the New Zealand Government.[172]

Intense debate raged within Parliament regarding the origin of the Khmer Republic's appeals for assistance. The New Zealand Government maintained that the requests for assistance to Cambodia had come from the Cambodians, not Washington.[173] The Opposition Labour Party did not support this view and attacked the government for considering the request for aid, wherever it originated. Kirk asked Thomson whether the government had given any consideration to the possibility of a dangerous interpretation being placed on the government's present apparent willingness to train Cambodians when, at the time there had been a democratically elected Assembly in Cambodia, such assistance had been refused.[174] He further commented that the Assembly had been discharged by the government and there were no plans for its re-election. One newspaper editorial reported: "the Government seems to have overlooked the extent to which the change from democratic to military rule would strengthen Labour's case against our getting involved in military training of Cambodians."[175]

Newspaper reports also cast doubt on the origins of these requests for assistance. In early 1972, some New Zealand newspaper editorials stated that the Nixon administration had sent a list of monetary contributions which the Khmer Republic should seek from such countries as the United States, New Zealand, and Australia.[176] These editorials charged that the U.S. State Department had indicated in its messages to Phnom Penh that once the letters soliciting the money had been sent, it was prepared to urge U.S. embassies in the key countries to make

high-level approaches in support of the request. The release of the Pentagon Papers in 1971 had exposed the duplicity of the New Zealand Government regarding its dealings with Washington, particularly about the provision of military assistance to South Vietnam and this made New Zealanders more suspicious of decisions made by their own government.[177]

On 19 November 1971, Thomson recommended to Cabinet that it approve several proposals for providing assistance to the Khmer Republic.[178] First, that New Zealand training assistance be given in association with the United States and Australia to FANK units in South Vietnam, subject to satisfactory arrangements being made. Secondly, that Cabinet agree that New Zealand will participate in discussions with South Vietnamese, Australian, Cambodian, and U.S. representatives to develop specific recommendations to the governments of the above countries on detailed arrangements for the joint training scheme. Finally, that he prepare a specific proposal for further Cabinet consideration when the above recommendations have been received. Thomson felt that the approval, in principle, given by the Australian Government for the provision of a small number of Australians to train Cambodians was also an important factor for the Cabinet to take into consideration when making its decision regarding his recommendations.[179] He sought to establish the New Zealand Government's policy on this matter before any necessary detailed investigation of a possible New Zealand role in any new training venture was carried out. This would then "allow a firm proposal for New Zealand participation in such a project to be submitted at a later date."[180] Thomson recommended that about twenty-five New Zealanders would be required.

Thomson's recommendation stated that New Zealand's participation in assisting Cambodia was of political importance to U.S. efforts in providing the aid necessary to ensure continued Cambodian resistance and to demonstrate the application of the Nixon Doctrine.[181] He also considered that from the government's examination of FANK requirements, the most valuable form of assistance New Zealand could provide would be training assistance to upgrade the quality of the newly formed FANK infantry battalions, one of the most urgent and vital requirements of the Cambodian Army. He recommended that this be achieved through the provision of a training team to take FANK units through a twelve-week training cycle. He believed that although it was difficult to gauge the duration of this project, it was unlikely that it would extend beyond two years. Therefore, the American proposal provided the best context in which New Zealand could provide assistance to Cambodia, which would be consistent with the government's policy in respect of Indochina and therefore this programme would be supported by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. Further, there were many advantages for New Zealand in assisting with FANK battalion training: a strong national profile; a greater national incentive to maintain high standards of training; the provision of a greater scope for the New Zealand Army to develop its operational techniques, which would allow the New Zealand Army to demonstrate its `small army' operational effectiveness and improvisation vis-a-vis the `massive resources' approach.[182]

There were several possible locations for such a training team; Long Hai, Phuoc Tuy or Dong Ba Thin.[183] Chi Lang had already ceased operation as a training centre for FANK units. Due to its proximity near the border, any training venture away from Chi Lang could become subject to a "frightening battlefield test between half-baked Cambodian trainees and hardened VC regulars.[184] This, and the

antagonism between the U.S. SF personnel and Vietnamese at Chi Lang, a number of the FANK trainees had deserted back to Cambodia.[185] The Khmer Government urgently requested that Chi Lang be moved. As it was a troubled camp anyway, it ceased operations upon the graduation of the 30th Infantry Battalion on 23 September 1971, the last battalion of the 1971 programme. New Zealand interest for training Cambodians was centered upon the Long Hai Peninsular training camps. The Americans were enthusiastic towards a New Zealand participation in FANK training at Phuoc Tuy. The Australians appear to have been less than enthusiastic to New Zealand involvement, perhaps because of a lack of communication between the three parties - Australia, New Zealand and the United States. A signal to Canberra from 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF) stated that: "MACT training directorate have invited us to participate, with commander NZ Force, in a visit to Cambodian training centre on 8 October. We are declining. As neither Australia or ourselves are aware of any proposal...[as stated above], we would appreciate any background you may have."[186]

On 22 November 1971, the New Zealand Cabinet approved, in principle, Thomson's proposals. On the recommendation of UITG Headquarters, Cabinet approved the team undertaking selected aspects of specialist training. First, weapons instruction covering all small arms weapons. Secondly, assistance with combat first aid instruction, and thirdly, technical laboratory and x-ray assistance in a fifty bed hospital and on the job training of FANK equivalents.[187]

On 16 December 1971, Thomson publicly announced: "after long and serious consideration by the government" a small training team was to be sent to South Vietnam to assist with the training of Cambodian troops.[188] He stated that this was at the request of the South Vietnamese and Cambodian Governments and that the New Zealand Government was well aware of the immense problems that were facing the Cambodian Government in attempting to train its armed forces.

Public concern in New Zealand regarding the announcement did not appear great, although there had been demonstrations over the American incursion into Cambodia. In late December, the Defence Department received a small number of letters from individual citizens who opposed the sending of the training team to train Cambodian personnel.[189] Some editorials, while noting there were good reasons for sending the team, questioned the sincerity of the New Zealand Government in assisting Cambodia and attacked the degree of assistance that was to be provided. One newspaper editorial wrote: "He [Mr Thomson] speaks of Cambodia's `immense' problems of training its forces and then offers to alleviate the immense problem with a team of twenty-five men or fewer."[190] The New Zealand Government was also attacked for its decision to send another training team to South Vietnam.

There were increased attacks on the New Zealand Government, alleging that the government had not told the truth behind the reasons it gave for its decision to send a training team to assist the FANK. Several newspaper editors wrote that the government, despite frequently denying so, had in fact given in to pressure from the U.S. Government.[191] One newspaper editorial stated that the background to the government's decision was "reminiscent of the staunch and repeated denials by the New Zealand Government of U.S. pressure to commit troops to South Vietnam..."[192] The Opposition Labour Party in New Zealand also attacked the government's decision. Kirk charged the New Zealand Government with being "less than frank" on the question of the initiation of aid to Cambodia.[193] Holyoake replied that: "Aid requests from the Government of the Khmer Republic are fully documented."[194] This debate also served to cast further doubts on the origins of appeals by the South Vietnamese Government to New Zealand for military assistance from 1964 onwards. In mid-February, in response to Labour Party attacks upon the decision to send the second

training team to South Vietnam, A. McCready, the New Zealand Minister of Defence, stated that sending the New Zealand team was the least that the New Zealand Government could do without getting involved in the Cambodian conflict.[195]

The New Zealand Government was to be politically embarrassed again. It was not until the morning of 18 December, after Thomson's announcement had appeared in the local press the previous afternoon, that the text of Thomson's speech was officially conveyed by the New Zealand embassy staff in Saigon to Deputy Foreign Minister Phuong and the Cambodian Ambassador to New Zealand.[196] Phuong was "not pleased at the Government's failure to give the Cambodians prior notice", and the apology by the embassy's staff for this error did not appease Phuong's anger.[197] Although the Cambodian Ambassador "expressed his thanks and appreciation as well as some surprise at reading the press report first", A signal from the New Zealand embassy in Saigon wrote: "he was not pleased and I could <u>not</u> blame him as this is just the sort of treatment we dislike ourselves. Why did we do it?"[198]

Staff in the New Zealand Embassy in Saigon was further embarrassed when Phuong requested that arrangements for the training assistance should be formalised if possible although he had waived such requirements for Australia due to the shortage of time. They had to tell Phuong that he did not "know enough about what the New Zealand Government had in mind for us to advise even on procedural matters at this stage."[199] The New Zealand Government apologised to Headquarters New Zealand Vietnam Force (hereafter HQ NZ V Force) for neither the Vietnamese nor Cambodians being given prior notice of the Minister's statement.[200] The excuse given was that it was felt that once the decision had been made it was bound to become public and an early announcement was thus desirable. Also, the Minister wanted to make the announcement in Parliament and with only the formal closure

on the Friday, he was restricted to the afternoon of 16 December. The decision to go ahead with the public announcement was made late in the morning.

Although governmental approval for training assistance was granted, it was still necessary for the New Zealand Army to investigate a number of military matters so that in late January it could bring forward detailed proposals to the government regarding the type of training assistance that would be provided to Cambodia. Time was crucial, as the New Zealand House of Representatives rose on 9 December and was not due to resume until March 1972. Earlier, in December, Lieutenant Colonel Brown, the Commander of NZ V Force, in attempts to work out some areas of concern, had said: "to meet the Government's Parliamentary timetable, it will be necessary for reps in Saigon to agree on recommendations regarding detailed training arrangements by the end of this week."[201]

Both the New Zealand Government and Army General Staff (hereafter AGS) felt that the training assistance that they could provide should operate as a separate national entity. However, they realised that this might not be practicable. The New Zealand Army preferred that the personnel for the team be located in the same camp as their western counterparts. Of the two training camps in Phuoc Tuy Province, the Long Hai training centre appeared preferable, and AGS hoped that the training team could be located there. However, AGS also appreciated that this would depend upon training arrangements.[202]

Although there had been recommendations that a minimum of twenty-one New Zealand instructors be sent to assist with the FANK training programme, AGS considered that this figure was too high. This opinion was based upon the possibility that if the United States still operated on a battalion training basis, there was no prospect of approval being granted to send such a large number of instructors.

Lieutenant Colonel V.B. Brown, the Commander of NZ V Force, had been required to ascertain from the United States how best the New Zealand team could fit into American training system, and also find out in detail how the Australians were planning to conduct their training assistance. From his findings, Brown was to make outline proposals to Defence headquarters in Wellington. After considering Brown's report, Defence was to then formulate proposals of how the New Zealand Army planned to handle the training task. These proposals, which would then need to be cleared by the Minister of Defence, would form the basis of discussions in Saigon with the United States, Australia, South Vietnam, and the Khmer Republic.

The Australians in South Vietnam had already examined the proposed FANK training programme and a copy of their report had been sent to HQ NZ V Force in early November 1971.[203] It was intended that four battalions would be trained at Phuoc Tuy and another four battalions at Long Hai. The report also provided a breakdown of the type of training and the training programme, the latter of which was good and instruction was given through interpreters.[204]

Before the introduction of the Bull-ring method of instruction, the instructional methods used in the FANK training were based upon instructor training groups, totalling ninety men.[205] Each group was involved in simultaneously training three FANK battalions, about thirty instructors per battalion, with the instruction conducted through locally recruited interpreters. The New Zealand Army felt that if the United States had maintained its operation on the battalion training basis, "we would have no prospect of getting approval for the twenty-five - thirty instructors that we understand they use for each battalion."[206]

On 22 December 1970, Brown personally visited Dong Ba Thin to inspect the camp and report his recommendations to Wellington. The centre, situated approximately fifteen minutes drive from Cam Ranh Bay airfield on Route 1 on the east coast of South Vietnam, was 270 miles north of Saigon. A paper earlier presented to Cabinet by Robertson, the New Zealand Secretary of Defence, noted that the centre was a favourable location for a New Zealand training team, "if it affords the opportunity to establish an independent role without capital cost."[207] The centre could be easily maintained and administered from Saigon through routine flights by 41 Squadron RNZAF flying B-170 aircraft, supporting the surgical team at Qui Nhon.[208] Brown considered, however, that the flights were desirable, not essential, as communications were better at Dong Ba Thin than at Chi Lang.[209] The camp had a rated capacity to handle three battalions at once, under successive stages of training, with an emergency capacity of four battalions. The training programme was staggered so the battalions arrived four weeks apart. Despite New Zealand being in the position of "Johnny come lately", he felt that a New Zealand presence at the two other training camps in Phuoc Tuy would be "less than welcome..."[210] Of the three alternatives, Brown strongly advised that the New Zealand team be based at Dong Ba Thin, to give New Zealand an independent role in the training scheme.[211] There were few problems with security, as located adjacent to the camp were the 3rd and 5th Battalions of the Republic of Korea's 2nd Marine Corps Brigade, and 118 Special Forces personnel involved in the FANK training programme.[212]

Brown also made two recommendations. As the U.S. training system was based upon the Bullring system, he felt that the New Zealand team should accept full responsibility for one facet of training, with participation in one or more other subject areas, such as medical and communications.[213]

He recommended that the team total approximately twenty personnel, the "irreducible minimum", for a weapon training committee.[214] He advised that only first class instructors, preferably with combat experience, were acceptable as all the U.S. instructors at Dong Ba Thin had considerable combat experience and who did not "suffer fools gladly."[215]

Brown also advised that the team arrive piecemeal. This was to avoid a repetition of the same upheaval caused when the Australians arrived en masse at the two FANK training centres. This resulted in the already overworked U.S. instructors, having to conduct a training programme to bring their Australian counterparts up to a suitable standard to participate in the FANK training programme.[216] As well as this, a "typical grandiose parade" was held for the Australians, resulting in lost training time.[217]

Army General Staff considered that Brown's proposal was "practical and suitable but some further detail is needed before approval can be sought", as AGS still assumed that any training assistance would have been located in Phuoc Tuy Province.[218] AGS told Brown to seek official concurrence of U.S. and ARVN authorities that it was acceptable and preferable to them that the New Zealand training team be integrated with the UITG team at Dong Ba Thin.[219] If this was confirmed and no logistic or financial penalty was involved in placing the team at Dong Ba Thin, AGS would agree that further negotiations should proceed for the team to be concentrated in one training centre. Despite these arrangements, the New Zealand Government and Army were unable to enter into any formal agreement with the Cambodians, South Vietnamese, or Americans until Cabinet approval of detailed proposals had been gained. The next Cabinet meeting was not scheduled until 25/26 January 1972.

Both the South Vietnamese and Khmer Republic Governments, particularly the former, were eager for the scheme to begin. Brown attempted, unsuccessfully, to

encourage the army to move quickly towards signing an agreement, writing that the delays "...could invoke invidious comparisons with our Australian compatriots."[220] Brown had advised FANK representatives that the New Zealand Army was unable to parallel the Australian alacrity, because Thornton was not due to arrive in South Vietnam until 22 January.[221] Also, the embassy in Saigon was also having increasing difficulty in explaining such delays.[222] However, while wanting to press ahead with the training scheme as quickly as possible, the New Zealand Government and Army did not want to move too quickly. Their main consideration was that the project should succeed, particularly when it "is a controversial issue in New Zealand, taking into account the strong political overtones."[223] New Zealand Defence headquarters (NZDEF) informed Brown that it was of no "real consequence that the Australians are getting a little ahead of us" and for months New Zealand was ahead in expressing an interest in FANK training in Vietnam and "but for our interest, it is unlikely that the Australians would have become involved."[224]

This point was raised during a meeting with Sir A. Tange, Secretary of the Australian Department of Defence, Admiral Sir V. Smith, Chairman of the Australian Chiefs of Staff Committee, and G.R. Laking.[225] Laking stated that the publicity about the proposed New Zealand training assistance to Cambodia had raised political difficulties for the New Zealand Government, whose plans for sending fifteen to twenty advisers to South Vietnam had been well advanced.[226] He stated that as a result of the adverse public reaction to the proposed training assistance, and because of the New Zealand Government's other `preoccupations', he thought that the question had still not been settled. He was still hopeful that New Zealand might eventually do something. Laking considered that the military situation in Cambodia

was not improving and that this tended to "paralyse thinking", but the situation itself "really points up the need to provide some assistance quickly."[227]

In his instructions to the new Ambassador to South Vietnam, Holyoake wrote that New Zealand's direct interests in Cambodia were even more limited than those in South Vietnam.[228] Despite this, New Zealand's concern for the stability of Southeast Asia did give the New Zealand Government a "strong interest" in ensuring that North Vietnamese aggression against Cambodia did not succeed. Holyoake was also concerned to prevent Cambodia being "freely used as a base for North Vietnamese efforts to take over South Vietnam."[229] In December 1971, Lieutenant General Thornton, the CDS, and Robertson conducted a tour of New Zealand defence establishments in Southeast Asia. Both considered that they had an "outstanding impression of confidence and determination" on the part of the Khmer Government and people, despite a lack of equipment and training.[230] However, about the likelihood of New Zealand assistance, Thornton considered that: "there certainly will be no point in our establishing what might look like a garrison force, even if a tiny one. We can read the signs as well as the Americans."[231]

Thornton later confessed that he had some misgivings regarding the question of New Zealand providing training assistance to the Khmer Republic. He commented that: "It was a very strange enterprise...because the people we were training, they were really peasants, they had no military background of any kind. There was very little cohesion in Cambodia."[232] He saw the value of such training as a "pin prick kind of operation", which was "never going to change the course of the war. I saw it as a political gesture rather than a significant political event."[233] He also spoke frankly to the Americans about how he saw their training effort in Cambodia, telling them: "although they

[Americans] were trying to help the Cambodians, in a heavy handed way, it was not effective at all, and the US policy was misplaced."[234] Thornton had expressed in several reports, as a result of several trips to Phnom Penh, that the collapse of the Khmer Republic was not inevitable. He considered: "If only they could get their economy right, maybe they could improve the lot of the people. That would strengthen the feeling in the army and then the army might be able to pull up its boot straps and hang on."[235]

On 25 January 1972, the New Zealand Cabinet approved the establishment of the 2nd New Zealand Army Training Team, Vietnam (hereafter 2NZATTV) at Dong Ba Thin. An advance party was to be dispatched, with the remainder of the team to follow as soon as possible. Cabinet delegated to the Ministers of Defence and Foreign Affairs the authority to approve the terms to be embodied in the necessary exchanges between the New Zealand Ambassador, and the South Vietnamese and U.S. authorities.[236] Although approval for a second training team was made primarily upon the recommendations in Brown's report, there were several other considerations. Both the U.S. and South Vietnamese authorities favoured the camp as a location for a New Zealand team, which would enable the establishment of an identifiable and independent New Zealand role, without the capital cost of developing a new centre.[237] If the team was to have been co-located with an Australian team, New Zealand's participation would be automatically merged into, at best, an Australia New Zealand Army Corps (ANZAC) presence. This was a situation that had occurred at Nui Dat and one that the New Zealand Government had avoided in the location of 1NZATTV. This, therefore, made only one location possible, as the Australians were situated at two of the three FANK training centres.

Cabinet's decision to send a second training team to South Vietnam caused concern amongst some New Zealand military officers, who were surprised there were sufficient military personnel available to man a second training team.

Lieutenant Colonel J.A. Mace, Director of Infantry and SAS, wrote that: "I would have thought the Army is huffing and puffing to man a second team."[238] There was some disagreement by the New Zealand Air Force over the title of the team. The Deputy Chief of Air Staff, E.C. Cartrell, suggested that as servicemen of other services were involved, `Army' should not be in the title. Brigadier R.H.F Holloway, the Deputy Chief of General Staff (DCGS), responded, arguing that the attachment of one medical NCO from each of the Royal New Zealand Navy (RNZN) and RNZAF "does not seem to change the character of the team which is to be engaged in the training of infantry battalions..."[239]

Despite Lieutenant Colonel Brown's, the Commander of NZ V Force, urging that 2NZATTV be deployed as early as possible and Cabinet's approved, the training team's advance party was not to leave New Zealand for South Vietnam until mid-February and the main party until March.[240] The New Zealand Government had decided not to send the advance party until a Memorandum of Understanding was signed, and would then be reviewed as appropriate.[241] The memorandum was signed finally on 12 February 1972 by Thornton and the Vietnamese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Tran Van Lam.[242]

The decision to dispatch a second team to South Vietnam was prompted by much the same considerations as those which had previously led to assigning New Zealanders to work with the AATTV, and then to the formation of 1NZATTV. This decision was in response to a changed political and military state of affairs throughout IndoChina early in 1970. The United States, too, sought New Zealand's active participation in a strategy which saw as vital the continued viability and co-operation of the Khmer Republic, necessitating a build-up of its armed forces. The consolidation and strengthening of the FANK would result in a greatly increased efficiency in combating enemy units.

Threatened with a consolidated and strengthened FANK to their rear, communist troops would have to be withdrawn from South Vietnam, and thus facilitate U.S. disengagement from the war.

The possibility of training Cambodians posed many problems, aside from public opposition within New Zealand, for the government. The most logical location for any training venture was within the Khmer Republic, but this was politically unacceptable. When the U.S. appropriated funds for military aid to Cambodia, the introduction of U.S. military forces or advisors into that country was expressly forbidden by Congress, lest this become the beginning of a creeping commitment. The Australian government had also decided that it would not undertake in-country training in Cambodia. As such, it was unthinkable for New Zealand to become involved in this form of training, despite the fact that Cambodia's greatest need was for expert advise rather than equipment.

Although unable to detach sufficient manpower to establish a New Zealand training centre, as had been developed at Chi Lang, the logistical support available from U.S forces meant that a greater national `identification' was possible within an American cultural milieu. Thus, 2NZATTV, comprising a strength of eighteen, was deployed to Dong Ba Thin as part of the U.S. FANK training command.

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1. Sihanouk was the King of Cambodia from 1941 to 1955, a political leader from 1955 to 1960, and the Cambodian Head of State from 1960 until 1970. In April 1975, the Khmer Rouge controlled Royal Government of National Union of Cambodia, ostensibly headed by Sihanouk as Prime Minister, assumed control of the country. In reality, Sihanouk, was only a figurehead and never welded any political power again. W. Shawcross, Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia (London, 1979), p. 61.

2. Adapted from W. Shawcross, Sideshow, p. 254.

3. The next five paragraphs are condensed from W. Shawcross, Sideshow, and M. Caldwell, L.H. Tan Cambodia in the Southeast Asian War (New York, 1973).

4. ibid., p. 64.

5. Sihanoukville was later named Kompong Som.

6. W. Shawcross, Sideshow, p. 64.

7. ibid., pp. 66 - 68.

8. ibid., pp. 117 - 118.

9. For further information, see A.R. Isaacs Without Honour: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia (Baltimore Md, 1983), pp. 204 - 211.

10. Cambodia was officially renamed the Khmer Republic on 9 October 1970.

11. ibid.

12. The only reliable means of communication between Phnom Penh and these enclaves was by air.

13. `FANK' was officially adopted as the name for the Army of the new Khmer Republic. No acronym, based upon an English translation, was devised to refer to the armed forces of the Khmer Republic, as had been done for the RVNAF.

14. A.R. Isaacs, Without Honour, pp. 205 - 206.

15. W. Shawcross, Sideshow, p. 131.

16. Despite independence from France in 1953, the FANK retained the characteristics that it had inherited from the period of French influence - French concepts of doctrine, tactics, and military organisation - until the end of 1972. The basic organisational unit of the FANK was the battalion, numbering approximately 500 men, although some battalions had as few as 250 men.

17. From France, the United States, and the USSR and China.

18. D.P. Whitaker, et. al., Area Handbook for the Khmer Republic (Cambodia), (Washington, 1973), p. 313.

19. Saigon to Wellington, dated 30 January 1971, 15/28 External NZ Forces in Vietnam External Signals only, vol V, October 1970 - February 1971, Defence Classified Registry (DCR).

20. Known as `Khmer Serei', the mercenaries were right-wing guerillas led by Son Ngoc Thanh. They were also recruited into the U.S. Special Forces, undertaking clandestine reconnaissance and sabotage missions into Cambodia and Laos.

21. As early as 25 March 1970 senior Khmer military commanders had approached American embassy officers in Cambodia requesting military assistance.

22. This initial military aid consisted of 6,000 AK-47s which had been captured in South Vietnam and a slightly larger number of American small-arms, along with ammunition. US military assistance to Cambodia was as follows: 1970/71, $US190.1 million; 1971/72, $US200 million: and 1972/73, $US209 million. D.P. Whitaker, et. al., Area Handbook for the Khmer Republic (Cambodia) p. 326.

23. New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, January 1971, p. 46.

24. H. Kosut, Cambodia and the Vietnam War, (New York, 1971), p. 53.

25. R. Nixon, The Real War, (New York, 1980).

26. R. Thompson, Peace is Not at Hand, (New York, 1974).

27. S.W. Simon, War and Politics in Cambodia: A Communications Analysis, (North Carolina, 1974), p. 110.

28. This incursion into Cambodia triggered violent protests in America, the most tragic resulting in the death of four students at Kent State University.

29. For Col GS from Commander HQ NZ V Force, dated 17 May 1971, 15/28 External NZ Forces in Vietnam, External Signals only, vol IV, March - August 1971.

30. Certain legislative provisions affected U.S. administration of the U.S. Military Assistance Programme (MAP), such as the Cooper-Church amendment of January 1971, which prohibited the assignment of U.S. advisors to the FANK.

31. New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, vol. XX, no. 4, April 1970, p. 25.

32. ibid.

33. Wellington to Washington, dated 8 May 1970, 15/28, vol IV.

34. Saigon to Wellington, dated 27 June 1970, ibid.

35. Government of Indonesia, Department of Foreign Affairs, Indonesia, 1, no 5, May 1970, p. 4.

36. A view also shared by some New Zealand newspaper editorials.

37. D.P. Whitaker, et. al., Area Handbook for the Khmer Republic (Cambodia) p. 219.

38. W. Shawcross, Sideshow, p. 181.

39. This was the same policy that America had encouraged South Vietnam to undertake in the mid-1960s.

40. W. Shawcross, Sideshow, pp. 180 - 182.

41. Thailand, Laos and Cambodia: January 1972. A Staff Report Prepared for the use of the Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments Abroad of the Committee on Foreign Relations United States Senate. U.S. Government Printing Office; Washington. 1972. p. 7.

42. ibid.

43. During 1971 and 1972, twenty-four FANK infantry companies were trained in Thailand. The United States paid for the equipment, weapons, training and ammunition, the Thai Government provided instructors, facilities, and in-country transportation, and the Cambodian government paid base pay and subsistence.

44. There was an agreement between the Governments of South Vietnam and the Khmer Republic by which Phnom Penh reimbursed Saigon for the use of the training sites and for the rations consumed by the FANK troops while in training. However, there were differences in opinion regarding what the correct exchange rate should be.

45. The United States aimed to provide the FANK with the most basic equipment. The cost of equipping a FANK company was estimated at $US15,000, whilst the cost for a South Vietnamese Army Company was $US55,000. To Ambassador and Lt-Col Brown from CJMR, dated 18 July 1972. Serial 226: Aid to Cambodia, DCR.

46. MEDTC was formed on 31 January 1971 to administer the delivery of military equipment to Cambodia's armed forces. Although prohibited from acting as advisors, these personnel assisted with planning, budgeting, logistics, and training.

47. The UITG was formed on 1 November 1970. It was responsible for providing basic training to FANK battalions and

was responsible for specialist training, such as training FANK cadres for static and mobile training establishments. On 15 May 1972 it was disbanded and in its placed was formed the FANK Training Command (FTC), which was subordinate to the Army Advisory Group (AAG), a subordinate command of HQ MACV.

48. The facilities of Long Hai, an ex-Special Forces camp and former PF training centre, were very basic. The centre at Phuoc Tuy, the Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion, operated from 1 September 1971 until 30 November 1972.

49. This centre, the Chi Lang Training Battalion, operated from 24 February until 1 September 1971.

50. The 5th SFs Group was given responsibility for the training of the FANK, because of its previous experience with Cambodian ethnic minorities in the Civilian Irregular Defence Group (CIDG) programme.

51. New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, vol. XX, no. 10, October 1970, p. 69.

52. ibid.

53. New Zealand Parliamentary Debates (NZPD), vol. 369, 21 October 1971, p. 421.

54. Evening Post, 27 January 1971.

55. Details of this are located in, Separate - Brief for CGS - Discussions with CGS Australia visit to New Zealand, October - December 1971, DCR.

56. This committee was responsible for advising the government on all important defence problems and in the preparation of all strategic appreciations and military plans. Minutes of the Chiefs of Staff Committee held 3 June 1971, Def 57/4/3 Councils, Boards and Committees, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Minutes of Meetings, vol VII, July 1970 - July 1971, DCR.

57. `In-country' training meant training FANK in Cambodia. Wellington to saigon, dated 22 April 1971, Aid to Cambodia (FANK Training), vol I, March - December 1971, DCR.

58. From Washington to Wellington, dated 1 June 1971, Def 23/6/1, Military Aid Programme to Cambodia: General, vol I, September 1970 - October 1971, DCR.

59. New Zealand Defence Staff Washington: Periodic Report, dated 10 July 1971, Army 11/11/3 Defence Office Papers, vol 9, January - December 1971, DCR.

60. From Washington to Wellington, dated 1 June 1971, Def 23/6/1, vol I.

61. Australian Force Vietnam Army to Canberra, info HQ NZ V Force, dated 070300Z November 1971, Serial 226.

62. Wellington to Canberra, dated 19 April 1971, Def 23/6/1, vol I.

63. NZPD, vol. 368, 25 August - 25 September 1970, p. 2652.

64. Memorandum to CDS from Secretary of Defence, dated 28 July 1971, Def 23/6/1, vol I.

65. ibid.

66. Report by the Minister of Defence on visit to South-east Asia April/May 1971, Army 95/2/1, Visits Overseas - Reports, vol I, October 1968 - December 1973, DCR.

67. W. Shawcross, Sideshow, p. 270. Cleland was the Chief of MEDT for Cambodia from 1972 to 1974.

68. To Ambassador and Lieutenant-Colonel Brown, from CJMR, dated 18 July 1972, Serial 226.

69. W. Shawcross, Sideshow, p. 313.

70. ibid.

71. ibid., p. 165.

72. From Saigon to Wellington, dated 16 June 1971, 15/28 External NZ Forces in Vietnam (excluding medical), vol III, February 1971 - February 1972, DCR.

73. W. Shawcross, Sideshow, p. 218.

74. ibid., p. 316.

75. ibid., p. 227. Officers collected pay for soldiers in their units who either did not exist or else had been killed. Such soldiers were known as `phantom soldiers'.

76. ibid., p. 231.

77. ibid., p. 202.

78. Thornton was to be shortly accredited as the Ambassador to the Khmer Republic.

79. NZPD, vol. 376, 3 November 71, p. 4294.

80. NZPD, vol. 379, 4 August 71, p. 1563.

81. New Zealand Herald, 9 June 1972.

82. Otago Daily Times, 17 June 1971.

83. The Auckland Star, 8 June 1971.

Estimates of the strength of the Khmer Rouge who operated with the North Vietnamese varied, from 15,000 to 20,000.

84. Otago Daily Times, 17 June 1971.

85. ibid.

86. The Auckland Star, 8 June 1971.

87. ibid.

88. From Wellington to Saigon, dated 22 April 1971, Army 34/15 Aid to Cambodia (FANK Training), vol I, March - December 1971.

89. ibid.

90. ibid.

91. ibid.

92. From 1970 until 1972 Ladd administered the discreet CIA-run Military Assistance Programme in Cambodia, emphasising Special Forces and guerilla-type operations, and to also order appropriate equipment for this task.
He was removed one year after assuming his post in Cambodia. Although remaining in Phnom Penh, he had lost virtually all his original influence with the Cambodians.
General W. Westmoreland was one of the Vietnam War's most controversial figures and Commander of the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (hereafter COMUSMACV),

93. From Saigon to Wellington, dated 16 June 1971, 15/28 NZ Forces in Vietnam. External Signals, vol VI, March - August 1971.

94. ibid.

95. From Saigon to Washington, dated 31 March 1971, ibid.

96. From HQ NZ V Force to NZDEF Army, dated 251030Z May 1971, Serial 226.
This concept was also favoured by MACT.

97. From Canberra to Wellington, dated 9 May 1971, Def 23/6/1, vol I.
These instructors, based at either Phnom Penh or the Kambul training centre, could plan courses, reorganise training procedures, redesign camps and establish an effective administration system for the programme as a whole.

98. From Brown to Col GS, dated 28 May 1971, Serial 226.
FANK specialists attended ARVN training schools in a diverse range of subject areas.

99. From HQ NZ V Force to NZDEF Army, dated 251030Z May 1971, ibid.

Laird foresaw that if the equipment ordered by Ladd was being mislaid, Congressional support for Cambodia might be placed in jeopardy. On 28 December 1970, Laird ordered that a MEDT be organised in Cambodia. Maxtaxis commanded the MEDT from 1971 until 1972.

100. W. Shawcross, Sideshow, p. 191.

101. For further information on this, see A.R. Isaacs, Without Honour, pp. 189 - 192.

102. ibid.

103. From Brown to Col GS, dated 28 May 1971, Serial 226.

104. ibid.

105. Saigon to Wellington, dated 10 November 1970, 15/28, vol V.

106. ibid.
Kambul, located near Phnom Penh, was already training FANK battalions. At Kompong Speu, two FANK battalions had begun training on 1 July 1970. Thirdly, Sisophon was to begin recruit training at the end of July 1970, and by November 1970 was training about 20,000 students per year. At Sisophon each intake, consisting of approximately 3,400 students, was eight weeks long. Preparations for several other camps, Lobek, Riem, and Romeas were already underway. For further details of these camps, see: To Ambassador and Lt-Col Brown from CJMR, dated 18 July 1972, Serial 226.

107. From Brown to Col GS, dated 28 May 1971, Serial 226.

108. For Col GS from Commander HQ NZ V Force, dated 17 May 1971, 15/28, vol IV.

109. ibid.

110. From HQ NZ V Force to NZDEF Army, dated 251030Z May 1971, Serial 226.

111. ibid.

112. Minutes of Meeting of Chiefs Of Staff (COS) Committee, dated 3 June 1971, Def 23/6/1, vol I.

113. CDS to CGS, dated 14 May 1971, Army 34/15, vol I.

114. Minutes of the Chiefs of Staff Committee, held 3 June 1971, Def 57/4/3, vol VII.

115. To Minister of Defence from J.F. Robertson, Secretary of Defence, dated 26 July 1971, Army 34/15 Aid to Cambodia (FANK Training), vol II February 1972 - March 1980, DCR.

116. ibid.

117. CGS to CDS, dated 4 June 1971. `Military Assistance to the Khmer Republic'. Detailed Annex A, Army 34/15, vol I.

118. Thornton, CDS, to Minister of Defence, dated 7 June 1971, Def 23/6/1, vol I.

119. Secretary of Defence to Prime Minister, dated 10 June 1971, Army 34/15, vol I.

120. ibid.

121. To Prime Minister from Laking, Secretary of Foreign Affairs, dated 22 June 1971, Def 23/6/1, vol I.

122. ibid.

123. Minutes of the meeting of the Chiefs of Staff, dated 9 July 1971, Army 34/15, vol II.

124. In practical terms, the task of advising the Cambodian armed forces would be so immense as to be far beyond New Zealand's capacity.

125. Minutes of the meeting of the Chiefs of Staff, dated 9 July 1971, Army 34/15, vol II.

126. New Zealand Defence Staff Washington: Periodic Report, dated 10 July 1971, Army 11/11/3, vol 9.

127. ibid.

128. Otago Daily Times, 17 June 1971.

129. ibid.

130. Secretary of Foreign Affairs to Prime Minister, dated 26 May 1971, Serial 226.

131. These courses, ranging in duration from five months to two years, included basic English language training, basic officer training, jungle warfare and pilot training. ibid. Other countries also provided support. The British, though inhibited from giving direct military aid to Cambodia, supplied Bailey bridging equipment and assisted with English language training. Indonesia provided some specialised military training and provided several thousand rifles. Japan provided aid which was labelled `humanitarian', but included trucks which could be used for military purposes.

132. Secretary of Foreign Affairs to Prime Minister, dated 26 May 1971, Serial 226.

133. Treaties and Alliances of the World: A Survey of International Treaties in Force and Communities of States (Bristol, 1968).

134. The Government intended that most of the costs in

training FANK personnel could be absorbed within the existing budget.

135. From Secretary of Foreign Affairs to Prime Minister, dated 26 May 1971, Serial 226.

136. ibid.

137. Details of this are located in, Separate - Brief for CGS - Discussions with CGS Australia visit to New Zealand, October - December 1971.

138. ibid.

139. From Commander HQ NZ V Force to Col GS, dated 23 May 1971, Serial 226.

140. From Secretary of Foreign Affairs to Prime Minister, dated 26 May 1971, ibid.

141. It was not until after this offer had been made to the Khmer Republic that Wellington realised that the weapons had already been sold. WGTN to Saigon, dated 29 Nov 1971, Army 34/15, vol I.

142. From Secretary of Foreign Affairs to Prime Minister, dated 26 May 1971, ibid.

143. To Thornton from C.B. Wood, Counsellor of Embassy, dated 13 August 1971, Def 23/6/1, vol I.

144. Minutes of the Chiefs of Staff Committee Meeting held 16 August 1971, ibid.

145. From Wellington to Washington, dated 2 September 1971, ibid. Brown was also informed of this, NZDEF Wgtn to HQ NZ V Force, dated 0104307 September 1971, ibid.

146. To Holyoake from K. Franzheim II, dated 29 September 1971, Army 34/15, vol II.

147. ibid.

148. Wellington to Saigon, dated 30 September 1971, Serial 226.

149. To Mr J. Robertson, Secretary of Defence, from C.B. Wood, Counselor of Embassy, dated 30 September 1970, Def 23/6/1, vol I. A similar letter was also sent to the Australian Government.

150. ibid. Emphasis in original.

151. Wellington to Saigon, dated 30 September 1971, ibid.

152. Memorandum to CDS from Secretary of Defence, dated 28 July 1971, ibid.

153. ibid.

154. A significant amount of information was received by the New Zealand Army regarding the decisions of Thailand and South Vietnam to train FANK units.

155. Memorandum to CDS from Secretary of Defence, dated 28 July 1971, Def 23/6/1, vol I.

156. ibid.

157. Visit to Southeast Asia by CDS, September/October 1971. Dated 8 October 1971, Army 34/15, vol I.

158. ibid.

159. Major Swain, G2A1 to DAT. FANK Training Programme. Dated 28 October 1971, ibid.

160. ibid.

161. ibid.

162. For a detailed programme of the trip, see 57/3/6 Councils, Boards and Committee's. Defence Council, Defence Office Memoranda, vol 8, 27 October 1970 - September 1971. New Zealand Seven Journalists Tour of Asia 1971, Lt-Col R.I. Launder, Director of Public Relations, to Defence Council, dated 2 June 1971, DCR.

163. ibid.

164. ibid.

165. From J.F. Robertson, Secretary of Defence to Minister of Defence. Draft copy of paper to present to Cabinet. Military Training Assistance to Khmer Republic Forces. Dated 1 November 1971, 23/6/1 Military Aid Programme to Cambodia, General, vol II, November 1971 - July 1972, DCR.

166. Dominion, 4 November 1971.

167. Canberra also stated that no Australian troops would be stationed in Cambodia.

168. Washington to Wellington, dated 3 November 1971, Army 95/1 Visits to New Zealand - General, vol 5, May 1971 - April 1972, DCR.

169. New Zealand Herald, 13 November 1971.

170. Auckland Star, 13 November 1971.

171. New Zealand Herald, 18 November 1971.

172. Read by Sir J.R. Marshall to Press Conference in Parliament Buildings at 6.00 pm on Monday, 1 November 1970.

173. NZPD, vol. 376, 29 October - 19 November 1971, pp. 4293 - 4294.

174. ibid.

175. Auckland Star, 6 November 1972.

176. ibid., 12 January 1972.

177. N. Sheehan, et. al. The Pentagon Papers, as Published by the New York Times (New York, 1971).

178. Military Training Assistance to Khmer Republic (Cambodia) Forces. Memorandum to Cabinet from the Minister of Defence, dated 19 November 1971, CAB 222/3/2 Defence: South-East Asia Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos 15-5-62 to 30-9-81. Cabinet Paper (CP).

179. ibid.

180. ibid.

181. ibid.

182. ibid.

183. Members of the New Zealand Ministry of Defence were initially unable to find the latter camp on any of their maps.

184. S.L. Stanson, Green Berets at War: US Army Special Forces in South-East Asia, 1956 - 1975 (Novado, 1985), p. 287.
On one field operation during September 1971, a half-trained Khmer battalion was overrun by seasoned NVA troops.Four SF's personnel and sixteen Khmer trainees were killed, four supporting helicopters were shot down, and twenty one Cambodians were captured.

185. This antagonism finally led to a tragic field incident when on 15 January 1971, three U.S. SF soldiers escorting a FANK battalion's platoon were ambushed by some VC. The U.S. soldiers appealed to the Vietnamese at Chi Lang for help, but were informed that all units were `busy' and no response was possible. The personnel received assistance from another ARVN unit, but only after the fight was over. ibid., p. 286.

186. Australian Force Vietnam to Army Canberra, info HQ NZ V Force, dated 07 0650Z October 1971, Serial 226.

187. To Minister of Defence from P.J. Brooks, Secretary of the Cabinet, 34/15, vol I.
On 9 December 1971, Australia formally announced that it would provide thirty instructors from its training team to train FANK units. On 3 January 1972, one officer was posted to the U.S. headquarters at Bien Hoa, three officers and

twelve Warrant Officers (hereafter WO) to the Long Hai Training Battalion, and two officers and twelve WOs to the Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion.

188. NZPD, vol. 377, 23 November - 17 December 1971, p. 5366.

189. These letters are held in Defence 23/6/1, vols II and III.

190. New Zealand Herald, 17 December 1971.

191. Holyoake had denied such accusations in May 1970. Christchurch Star, 4 May 1970.

192. Auckland Star, 18 December 1971.

193. Christchurch Star, 14 January 1972.

194. ibid., 15 January 1972.

195. New Zealand Herald, 18 February 1972.

196. The article in the above footnote stated that FANK troops would be trained in South Vietnam in Phuoc Tuy Province.

197. From Mahoe NZ V Force to Wellington, dated 18 December 1972, Serial 226.
All signals from the New Zealand Embassy in Saigon to Wellington were sent through the defence communications network at HQ NZ V Force. `Mahoe' was the name given to signals originating from and intended for, embassy staff in Saigon.

198. ibid., underlining in original.

199. ibid.

200. Wellington to Saigon, dated 20 December 1971, ibid.

201. Brown to WGTN, dated 1 Dec 1971, Army 34/15, vol I.

202. Wellington to Saigon, dated 20 December 1971, ibid.

203. Australian Force Vietnam to Canberra, info HQ NZ V Force, dated 070300Z November 1971, Serial 226.

204. Australian Force Vietnam to Canberra, info HQ NZ V Force, dated 070300Z November 1971, Serial 226.

205. This method is based upon groups of instructors, with each group specialising in one subject. During training, the students are broken up into groups. One group receives a lesson on weapons, and then rotates with other groups to another lesson with another group of instructors. This is in contrast with a group of students being taught all different skills by a single group of instructors.

206. Wgtn to Saigon, dated 20 December 1971, Army 34/15, vol I.

207. From J.F. Robertson, Secretary of Defence to Minister of Defence. Draft Copy of paper to present to Cabinet. Military Training Assistance to Khmer Republic Forces, dated 1 November 1971, Def 23/6/1, vol II.

208. From V Force Commander to AGS, dated 18 December 1971, Serial 226. 41 Squadron flew fortnightly from Saigon to Cam Ranh Bay return.

209. The New Zealand Government had earlier stated that the fights to Cam Ranh Bay by 41 Squadron was a condition for locating the team at Dong Ba Thin.

210. From V Force Commander to AGS, dated 18 December 1971, Serial 226.

211. ibid.
Besides having the best staff accommodation, working conditions and medical facilities, Dong Ba Thin had an extensive range of training facilities, and the training area covered approximately 11,000,000 sq metres. A detailed list of the training facilities is located in Dong Ba Thin - Training Site Fact Book (As at March 1972). Copy held by writer.

212. This brigade, the `Blue Dragons', had assumed responsibility for the Cam Linh Peninsula - Dong Ba Thin area.
Th American unit, initially named B-43, went through several paper changes in unit designation: 51st USARV Individual Training Company (24 February 1971); USARV Individual Training Group, Dong Ba Thin Training Battalion (DBTTB) (October 1971); FANK Training Command, Army Advisory Group, DBTTB (May 1972); FANK Training Command (15 May 1972); and, Field Training Command (FTC) (1 December 1972).

213. The Americans were very short of medical instructors and staff.

214. From V Force Commander to AGS, dated 18 December 1971, Serial 226.

215. ibid.

216. ibid.

217. ibid.

218. From Wgtn to Saigon, dated 7 January 1972, 15/28/10 Monthly Activity Reports - NZ Forces in Vietnam (Operational Summaries, Reports etc), vol IV, February - December 1972, DCR.

219. ibid.

220. From V Force Commander to AGS, dated 18 December 1971,

Serial 226.

221. From Wellington to Saigon, dated 13 January 1972, Army 34/15, vol II.

222. Mahoe to NZDEF ARMY Wellington, dated 10 January 1972, Serial 226.

223. From Wellington to Saigon, dated 13 January 1972, Army 34/15, vol II.

224. From Wellington to Saigon, dated 13 January 1972, Army 34/15, vol II.

225. Discussion between Sir A. Tange, Admiral Sir V. Smith and Laking, dated 10 December 1971, Army 95/2/1, vol I.

226. ibid.

227. ibid.

228. Letter of Instructions for Ambassador in Saigon, dated 6 March 1972, Def 23/4/1 Mutual Aid Programme to South Vietnam, General, vol 7, October 1971 - June 1972, DCR.

229. ibid.

230. Auckland Star, 18 December 1971.

231. ibid.

232. Interview with Sir L.W. Thornton, 11 July 1989.

233. ibid.

234. ibid.

235. ibid.

236. Unlike the logistical arrangements that existed for 1NZATTV, the team, except for personal arms, some minor items, was to have all its logistical support provided by the U.S. Army.
The annual cost of maintaining the team was set at $57,000.

237. Earlier, the U.S. and South Vietnamese authorities agreed to the New Zealand training effort being integrated with the U.S. training unit at Dong Ba Thin. NZ V Force to NZDEF Army, dated 10 January 1971, Serial 226.

238. From Lt-Col Mace to Lt-Col R.T.V. Taylor, Director of Infantry and SAS, 1RNZIR Do Correspondence Lt-Col J.A. Mace CO 1RNZIR November 1971 - Nov 1973.
The Australian army was also experiencing manpower shortages and difficulties in filling the positions in AATTV.

239. From Holloway to DCAS, dated 31 January 1972, Army

34/15, vol II.

240. Training of FANK personnel in the Republic of Vietnam by New Zealand Service Personnel. To CDS/Secretary of Defence from CGS, dated 14 January 1972, 15/28/13 NZ Forces in Vietnam: Training Assistance SVN Forces, vol III, December 1970 - May 1972, DCR.

241. Minutes of the Meeting of the Chiefs of Staff Meeting, held 3 February 1972, Def 57/4/3 Councils, Boards and Committees, Chiefs of Staff Committee, Minutes of Meetings, vol VIII, August 1971 - July 1982.
A Memorandum of Understanding established the administrative procedures and channels of command that were to be exercised in the assignment, administration, and control of the members of 2NZATTV assigned to the UITG.

242. A copy of this Memorandum is located in Def 23/6/1, vol II.

CHAPTER SIX

2NZATTV AT DONG BA THIN.

> But New Zealand's contribution was so tiny that in the end our contribution was totally swallowed. A small nation, doing what it could in the circumstances, making an impression, in a tiny way...so all the opportunity was there and I think that we made a meaningful crack at it...[1]

The 2nd New Zealand Army Training Team, Vietnam (hereafter 2NZATTV) fulfilled a more difficult role than did the 1st New Zealand Army Training Team, Vietnam (hereafter 2NZATTV). Situated at Dong Ba Thin, near the American base at Cam Ranh Bay, the team trained Cambodian battalions. Its role was both difficult and delicate, given the determination of the United States (hereafter U.S.) not to expand the war zone anymore than needful. The team's difficulties are investigated by an examination of the following: the organisation of 2NZATTV; the training undertaken by the team members prior to their deployment to South Vietnam; the security situation in the area; the Force Armee Nationale Khmere's (hereafter FANK) training programme; the extent to which the members of 2NZATTV were able to integrate into the training programme, and also socially with the U.S. personnel, at Dong Ba Thin; the types of students that attended the courses at Dong Ba Thin, and their ability to learn and to absorb the instruction offered; the discussion behind a request from the Khmer Government to have the FANK training programme extended; the living quarters of the team members; and the impact that the training of `boy soldiers' had upon the training activities at Dong Ba Thin.

The organisation and training role of 2NZATTV was very different from both the 1st New Zealand Army Training Team, Vietnam (hereafter 1NZATTV) and the element of the Australian Army Training Team, Vietnam (hereafter AATTV) employed in the FANK training programme.[2] The organisation of 2NZATTV is shown in table 13. 2NZATTV's members were fully integrated into the existing American training structure at Dong Ba Thin. Not only did they provide instruction in weapons, tactics, and general subjects, but they also filled certain U.S. command and staff appointments.[3] Unlike the AATTV, the New Zealanders kept very little information from their U.S. counterparts. It was common for documents sent from Headquarters New Zealand Vietnam Force (heerafter HQ NZ V Force) to 2NZATTV to be stamped `For NZ Eyes Only', but there was only one safe in the orderly room, to which both the Americans and New Zealanders had access. Major J.G. Daniell, a mature and experienced commander of 2NZATTV, with a very good command and control ability, gave such documents to the Americans for them to read, because "it had to be as open a relationship as that, otherwise I don't think that it would have worked...we had a good working relationship with the Americans."[4] This was in contrast to the Australians, who were "fiercely independent and drove their own ship, side by side with the Americans...The Americans were much in favour of the way we preferred to do things."[5]

There were geographical and operational restrictions, placed upon the personnel of both New Zealand training teams. No members of the two New Zealand training teams were allowed to be within 5 km of either the Cambodian or Laotian borders, except if moving by road between Chau Doc and Can Tho.[6] 2NZATTV was not to be deployed from Dong Ba Thin without specific authority from the commander of New Zealand Army Training Group, Vietnam (hereafter NZATGV). However, there were two exceptions which allowed team members to operate away from Dong Ba Thin or Chi Lang. First, team personnel could accompany personnel under

training on operational exercises that were part of an approved training syllabus in which the two training teams were involved, but no New Zealanders were allowed to accompany Cambodian or South Vietnamese forces on actual operations. Secondly, the New Zealanders could accompany South Vietnamese officials during the normal course of the latters' supervisory visits to RF (hereafter Regional Force) and Popular Force (hereafter PF) units in the field. The only combat tasks that might be undertaken by members of 2NZATTV without the specific authority of the commander of NZATGV were those necessary to safeguard "themselves and any personnel, property, and bases within their responsibility against a military threat."[7]

TABLE 13

ORGANISATION OF 2NZATTV.

OC(Major)

Admin Officer(Capt)

Clerk(Sgt)

Weapon Training Wing Wing	Medical Training
3 Training Officers(Capt/Lt)	2 Instructors RNZAMC[8] (Ssgt/Sgt)
1 Training WO (WOII)	2 Medical Technicians/ Instructors (Ssgt/Sgt)
7 Instructors (Ssgt/Sgt)	

By late January 1972, the personnel for 2NZATTV had been selected. Unlike Major L.H. Pilling, the Officer Commanding (hereafter OC) 1NZATTV, Daniell had no input into the selection of his team's members, although he recalls that "on the whole I was pretty happy with those selected, aside from one or two small exceptions."[9] Unlike 1NZATTV, most of 2NZATTV's members had not served in an operational environment, but were experienced instructors, either

training National Servicemen or regular servicemen, which stood them in good stead, for the most part, in training raw civilians to be soldiers. "From that point of view", said S.D. Hopkins, a member of 2NZATTV, "my intended role was not that strange. I do recall being a little horrified that I would not have liked to have been thrown into the front line after only twelve weeks training."[10]

Many of those selected to attend the selection course for 2NZATTV wanted to go to Vietnam for similar reasons to those who were in 1NZATTV. However, some were unimpressed with the limited amount of time between their notification and their departure date. One of the men, B.J. Pepper, recalls that he was only told three weeks before he was due to leave for South Vietnam. Upon being informed, he "shot up to the Military Secretary and...he said to me `Oh, we should have told you a bit earlier.' I presume that someone had neglected to let me know."[11] Some of the wives were also unenthusiastic about their husbands going overseas. Pepper commented: "my wife tried to dissuade me from going, and was quite adamant that I should not go and that I should withdraw."[12]

In January 1972, the New Zealand Directorate of Army Training (DAT) undertook a study to formulate a course suitable for the personnel from 2NZATTV prior to their departure for South Vietnam.[13] The directorate concluded that the essential aim of any course should be to introduce the team into the U.S. Army Vietnam Individual Training Group (hereafter UITG), Dong Ba Thin, rather than to prepare them for their instructional role.[14] This was due to the limited time frame before the team members were deployed to South Vietnam, which restricted the duration of any predeployment course. If the team was to be trickled into Dong Ba Thin, as was likely to be the case, then on the job training with the U.S. personnel would be possible.[15] The report recommended that the content of the course should consist of a background briefing of the FANK training

programme, techniques for instructing Asians through an interpreter, an introduction to unfamiliar weapons and refresher live shoots with as many weapons as possible.

Despite this report, the preparatory training that the team members received prior to being deployed to South Vietnam was far from satisfactory in preparing them for their intended role, a scenario similar to 1NZATTV. To prepare them for their operational training role, 2NZATTV's main body underwent two periods of training. First, five days of initial training in New Zealand, and then in-theatre familiarisation at Dong Ba Thin. The initial course for the main body was held at Papakura camp, from 14 to 18 February 1972.[16] The course was, said B.J. Pepper, a team member, "quite interesting, quite intense and was very rigorous. We got hammered into the deck a bit. They jammed as much into the week as they could."[17] However, there was only one hour set aside to show the team members different methods of instructing through an interpreter. Many of the men, who were to initially experience difficulties in relating to their students when they started working at Dong Ba Thin, later felt that they should have received instruction on Khmer culture and traditions, and also the American way of life.[18] At the completion of their training, the members of 2NZATTV were given seven days leave and they were to concentrate back at Papakura by 25 February.

This training was very different from that received by the Australians selected for the FANK training programme. They were chosen from the pool of existing AATTV instructors who were to have been withdrawn from South Vietnam as a result of the contraction of AATTV's training assistance to Phuoc Tuy Province. They were experienced in both advisory and training roles and had also worked in a similar organisational setting as at Phuoc Tuy.[19] A lot of American experience and knowledge was passed onto the Australians and they received a thirteen-day refresher course, orientated towards practical instructional techniques at Vung Tau.[20]

As the course was in South Vietnam, resources such as actual Khmer interpreters, Methods of Instruction (hereafter MOI) and actual lesson plans that were used in the FANK training programme were available, and instructors from UITG were readily at hand: luxuries that the New Zealand team did not have. The Australian course sought to orientate the instructors to the more formal instructional environment that they would be working in.[21]

Integration and the POI

While the main body of 2NZATTV was undergoing its training, its advance party arrived in South Vietnam. Its duties were very similar to those undertaken by 1NZATTV's advance party. In consultation with HQ NZ V Force and UITG, it was to arrange in-theatre familiarisation training for the main body when it arrived at Dong Ba Thin.[22] Valuable preparation time was lost, however, due to delays in the authorisation of the press release about 2NZATTV, and the advance party did not leave New Zealand until 12 February 1972. Daniell remained in Saigon where he was given a very through briefing on his responsibilities by Lieutenant Colonel V.B. Brown, the Commander of NZ V Force, and he was then taken on an orientation tour.[23]

In the late afternoon of 1 March 1972, the main body of 2NZATTV under the command of Captain B.J. Pepper, an experienced and extremely competent officer, arrived at Cam Ranh Bay. They were surprised by the terrain as they were transported to Dong Ba Thin.[24] The terrain to the east of the camp, from the far edge of Route 1, was, recalls R.L. Scott, "very hot, glistening sand. It was blinding. You had to wear sun- glasses all the time."[25] On the other landward side of the camp, the terrain "rose to very steeply broken bush hills. There were little villages nestled on the numerous streams that came down the hills. It was

beautiful. The training areas consisted of thin, scrubby bush which was very hot, not nice and cool or thick, like New Zealand or even parts of Malaysia."[26] The centre was located in a very exposed location, not only because the flat area surrounding the camp, but because the close proximity of the huge American base at Cam Ranh Bay, a tempting target for the enemy.

In the afternoon of the first day of their arrival the New Zealanders were welcomed to the camp by Colonel D. Johnson, nick-named `Big Daddy', a "happy-go-lucky guy", who was the American commander of Dong Ba Thin.[27] They were then given a comprehensive briefing on the FANK training programme. The briefing included such subjects as the organisation at Dong Ba Thin and the positions that the New Zealanders would be filling. The New Zealanders were integrated into the American training team in Dong Ba Thin (table 14).[28]

TABLE 14

POSITIONS HELD BY 2NZATTV PERSONNEL.

Name	Duty Position	Section
Batty	Instructor Medical MTT	Training
Beaumont	Instructor .30 Cal weapons committee	Ops & Trg[29]
Blakeway	Instructor Medical Medic Section	Training
Brandon	XO (2IC) Training team A511	Trg Detmt[30]
Cameron	X-ray technician/Wardmaster Dispensary	Medical
Cunningham	Instructor General Subjects Committee (Mines, booby traps, etc)	Ops & Trg
Daniell	Deputy Commanding Officer	Command
Hokianga	Instructor Tactics Committee	Ops & Trg
Kiwikiwi	Instructor Tactics Committee	Ops & Trg
Luce	Laboratory Technician Dispensary	Medical
McConnell	Weapons Committee	Ops & Trg
Morrison	Clerk (Orderly room)	Admin[31]
Pepper	S3 Officer (Training)	Ops & Trg
Scott	Instructor Weapons MTT	MTT
Shuker	IC Training Committee	Ops & Trg
Smith	Instructor General Subjects Committee	Ops & Trg
Watson	Instructor Mortar Weapons Committee	Ops & Trg
Wherawera	Instructor .30 Cal Weapons Committee	Ops & Trg
Pomley	Weapons Instructor	Ops & Trg
Wainoa	Weapons Instructor	Ops & Trg

The New Zealanders were given one week to familiarise themselves with their intended roles.[32] There were several battalions at the camp in various stages of training and they were taken by their American equivalents and introduced to the type of instructional system that they were expected to use, including instructing through interpreters. The most important concern for the New Zealanders was to understand the need to teach the maximum amount of subject matter to the FANK, bearing in mind the constraints that were placed upon the Programme of Instruction (hereafter POI). However, the majority of the New Zealanders had little difficulty with their intended roles. The integration of the New Zealanders into the American training programme was successful and by the end of March 1971, Daniell stated that no problems had arisen, and all team members were "now fully conversant in the U.S. systems and methods of operations and training."[33] He felt that the technical ability of all the team leaders was "of a good quality and well up to the standard of their U.S. counterparts."[34]

The POI for a FANK battalion was essentially the same for all three FANK training centres in South Vietnam (table 15).[35] Three weeks before the arrival of a battalion, a three-week Battalion Leaders' Orientation course was conducted by Mobile Training Teams (MTTs) for the battalion's officers and senior NonCommissioned Officers (hereafter NCOs).[36] This course was broken into two training phases. First, a two-week orientation phase, and then a one-week on-the-job training and observation phase. The course sought to familiarise the battalion leaders with the type of training that their parent battalion would receive upon its arrival at the training centre, and to teach them leadership skills, through practical exercises. They were primarily taught the capabilities and tactical

deployment of their battalion's weapons - "Why we site them in certain locations, and what would happen if you did this."[37] The Cambodians were also taught how to write orders. One of the team members, J.A. Brandon, remembers that: "We used to write orders - very much a French way of doing things. Everything was written, as the Cambodians weren't very good in giving orders orally because they were too formal. I guess it was a measure of their lack of experience."[38] The NCOs were also taught military instruction, to they could assist with the twelve-week training period of their battalion and any subsequent training back in Cambodia.

TABLE 15

SUBJECT AREAS

Subject	Hours	Week	
	1	2	3
1. General	38		
a. Command and leadership	6	6	
b. Drill and ceremonies	5	2	3
c. Land navigation	16	16	
d. Signal communications	4		4
e. Techniques of military instruction	7	7	
2. Weapons	22		
a. M-16 Rifle Familiarisation	12	12	
b. Familiarisation with weapons	10	10	
3. Tactics	45		
a. Fire team training	5		5
b. Squad training	10		10
c. Platoon training	15		15
d. Company training	10		10
e. Battalion training	5		5
4. Miscellaneous	3		
a. Supply economy	1		1
b. Inspections	2	1	1
c. On the job training	54	54	54
162	54	54	54

This initial group of students was a contrast to the rest of the battalion. Generally, these officers were, recollects Scott: "highly motivated, and there were some very intelligent people amongst them. They obviously had university backgrounds... very likeable at the end of the period...a lot of them could speak French and halting English."[39] However, some, "from what they said, looked upon the training as a recreational thing, a chance to get out of the battlefield or delay going there, and live a little bit longer."[40] Scott remembers: "I got the impression that really some of them were there under duress However, most of them, I think, soon came to realise that they were actually in a war and were part of it..."[41]

The course was very physical, and the Cambodians went through, remembers Brandon, "for want of a better term, a bastardisation course to weed out those who could not take the pace...because you had only twelve weeks to train a battalion from peasants to infantrymen. The training was pretty demanding, so you could not afford to have slackers. As such, they had to run from one lecture to another."[42] In one instance, recalls Brandon, "one old battalion commander, could not keep up and he had to go. He went, but tears were streaming down his face. Later, we found out that he had been a brigade commander in the Viet Cong and was a very experienced soldier."[43]

Several days after the completion of this course, the remainder of the battalion flew into Cam Ranh Bay in one, sometimes two, C-130 direct from Phnom Penh.[44] The Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) played a major part in the conduct of this operation. One of the team members, J.H. Wharewera, "Everything was shrouded in semi-secrecy. Some of the aircraft were painted black and the pilots weren't military. They were dressed like civilians."[45] The battalion was met by its own leaders and were taken by truck to the camp to begin their training.[46]

With the large numbers of soldiers coming to the camp for training, it was very difficult to sort out those who were unsatisfactory for soldiering. When the Cambodians arrived they were subjected to a "thirty second medical check, to ensure they had five fingers, they could see, hear, walk, and use their arms. Some of them had grotesque looking sores, lumps, and Venereal Disease. Their sores were checked and treated."[47] In one instance, it was several weeks before it was realised that one FANK soldier was retarded: "he could not read or write nor could he even look after himself. There were several such cases."[48] Even those obviously unsuitable, either medically or physically, "were not sent away - it was uneconomical to do so. They were just cannon fodder."[49]

After their medical examinations, the soldiers issued with all of their equipment, from weapons to clothing, which they retained when they returned to Cambodia. Some battalions, if they had been in combat before their arrival at Dong Ba Thin, arrived already equipped with uniforms and their own weapons. "On one occasion we had a battalion arrive equipped in light-brown Chinese-type gear...including Chinese-type rucksacks."[50] The FANK soldiers were always searched as soon as they arrived, as some had in their possession such weapons as hand grenades and pistols.

After being issued their equipment, each battalion was then separated into company groups for training. Although these groups were "a bit big, that was as small as we could get them for the number of instructors we had available."[51] The training was designed to produce a light infantry battalion capable of assuming and performing operational missions.[52] The POI for each FANK battalion, within a twelve week period, was divided into six phases. The first phase, comprising three weeks, consisted of Basic Combat Training, in which half the time was devoted to M-16

marksmanship and the remainder to basic infantry subjects. The training was divided into four main groups of instruction:[53]

General Subjects	39 Hours
Weapons	91 Hours
Tactics	25 Hours
Miscellaneous	7 Hours

The second phase, comprising two weeks, was the Infantry Advanced Individual Training. This cycle included familiarising the soldiers with the .30 calibre machine-gun, 60 and 81 mm mortars, and tactical training at the squad level. In addition, individual training was conducted for the specialist groups.[54] This phase was divided into four main groups of instruction:

General Subjects	4 Hours
Weapons	11 Hours
Tactics	76 Hours
Miscellaneous	6 Hours

The third phase consisted of Basic Unit Training and was a two week training cycle. This period, devoted to reconnaissance platoon specialist training, and rifle platoon and company training, was was divided into four main groups of instruction:

Platoon Training	52 Hours
Company Training	36 Hours
General Subjects	10 Hours
Miscellaneous	9 Hours

The fourth phase comprised the first field training exercise. The objective of this one-week exercise was to train, test, and evaluate the squads, platoons and companies of the battalion.

The fifth phase was the Advanced Unit Training. This phase, an eleven day cycle, was divided into four main parts:

General Subjects	1 Hour
Company/Battalion Tactics	76 Hours

Weapons	9 Hours
Miscellaneous	8 Hours

The final phase consisted of the second field training exercise, which involved the whole battalion. This was a twelve day exercise, and its objective was to train, test, and evaluate company and battalion sized operations.

The FANK training programme was rigidly controlled by Central Training Command (CTC) in Saigon "literally down to the last period. If you wanted to change something you had to get Saigon's okay, so there was no flexibility within the unit to change what it was you were doing. Even the U.S. OC of the camp was unable to make changes on his own initiative."[55] However, few of the staff officers in Saigon who designed the POI and wrote the reports on the American COs, ever travelled to Dong Ba Thin, or indeed any of the other training camps, to view for themselves the training and the associated problems. The hesitancy upon the part of any of the American commanders of the FANK training centres was also due in part to the nature of the U.S. promotional system. If he altered a programme without permission, he received a less than glowing personal report. There was, however, consultation and co-ordination at the lower levels of the FANK training effort and between American, Australian and New Zealand representatives. Every two months a meeting was held in Saigon with the U.S. Military Assistance Command, Vietnam (hereafter MACV), where training programmes were analyzed and modified as required, and then distributed to the FANK training centres in South Vietnam.[56]

Ensuring that the modified POIs were disseminated to all three committees at Dong Ba Thin was a major undertaking for both Pepper and his administrative staff. "We had to make the programmes two to three weeks in advance all the time."[57] Each POI was checked by Pepper's staff to ensure there was no double booking of facilities, that battalions had sufficient ammunition and supplies when they were in the

field. However, "once you started changing the POI of battalions, it was a very, very difficult operation to keep policed and we had some great difficulties in trying to arrange alternatives, due to time constraints."[58] Within the three Committees at Dong Ba Thin themselves, there were regular meetings, once a week, to co-ordinate training.

Success and Failure

The organisation of the instruction of the classes was, in some respects, very similar to what the New Zealanders had experienced in training National Servicemen. Training was conducted from Monday to Saturday.[59] Initially, the New Zealanders and Americans undertook the bulk of the instruction, with the Cambodians who had undertaken the leadership indoctrination course, watching. By half way through the course, these Cambodians were undertaking ninety percent of the instruction themselves, with the Americans and New Zealanders advising. As a result, near the end of a battalion's training, some of the instructors taught only once or twice a day and "if you weren't instructing, you were literally doing nothing. You might go for a drive somewhere or watch other groups training."[60] The New Zealand medical staff at the two camp hospitals and dispensary likewise, found themselves very busy when a battalion's medics were being trained. However, between courses "you were virtually surplus to requirement. All we had to do was prepare our lessons for the next course."[61]

During April and May 1972, operations in Cambodia required the withdrawal of five FANK battalions from the training programme in South Vietnam, due to heavy enemy attacks south of Phnom Penh. This decreased the workload of the instructors and enabled the team to devote more time to the preparation of lessons, training aids, and programmes, which led to an overall improvement in the standard of instruction.

Some of the New Zealand instructors had to adjust to differences between American and New Zealand Army MOIs and U.S. tactical principles and doctrine. The major difference between the two MOI was that the Americans trained to squad level, while the New Zealanders trained the individual soldier, and "I think there was a gap, which mentally we did not adjust to nor accept it very well."[62] While a class in New Zealand might be as large as fifteen soldiers, at Dong Ba Thin each class consisted of 200 to 250 students during the early stages of the POI, and forty to forty-five students during the specialised classes. Wharewera described a `typical' weapons lesson as being "me standing on the back of a truck or a platform teaching up to 500 soldiers how to strip an M-16."[63]

For some, they had little difficulty adapting. The New Zealand medics found little difficulty in teaching, as "it was only a case of orientating to the U.S. way of thinking and their training pamphlets and getting on with the job."[64] Some instructors, recollects M.A. Cunningham, one of the team members, "talked with the U.S. instructors about, for example, ambushes - there was no great difference. There were some instructors who, due to their job or lack of operational experience, may have found U.S. tactics hard to grasp. As we worked and lived with U.S. personnel in our own committees, we quickly became familiar with U.S. methods."[65] Although some of the New Zealanders disagreed with both the U.S. MOI and some of their military tactics, nevertheless, remembers Pepper, "we went along with them as we were told to do and worked with the large class sizes as best we could."[66]

Due to such large class sizes, there was sometimes a problem ensuring there were enough training aids available for some subjects. Scott found that with a large class "you would be trying to teach them how to use a compass, but you would only have three compasses. It was very hard to teach

a group who could not read or write how to read a map and a compass, let alone having an extra problem of shortages of equipment ...you had to instruct through an interpreter made our job twice as hard."[67] However, instructing was made a little easier, because the Americans had a wide range of aids available. E. Beaumont, one of the instructors, recalled that "they had damn good training aids, weapons exploded, weapons stripped down and all that."[68]

The large class sizes also compounded other problems, particularly the high illiteracy rate amongst some FANK battalions. Most of the New Zealanders did not initially realise that some of their students could neither read nor write. M.T. Dance, a team member remembers that: "I asked one guy to read some words on a blackboard out, and he literally broke down and cried because he couldn't read. Coming from New Zealand, you are used to all soldiers being able to read. I had taken it for granted that all Cambodians could read."[69] The illiteracy rate hampered some training, particularly such technical subjects as map reading and mortars. This problem was accentuated because sometimes over ninety percent of a battalion were recent enlistees and lacked a basic understanding of military procedures and discipline. The particularly low levels of education of many of the soldiers from the 51st and 45th Battalions resulted in changes having to be made to several subject areas and was partly solved by re-assigning illiterate personnel to non-technical positions.[70] Further, many of the lessons were kept as practically-based as possible.[71] However, problems still existed with a lack of basic understanding of even some rudimentary subjects even when the two battalions graduated. For some Cambodian medics, a lot of the material that they were taught was, according to R.N. Cameron, "perhaps too high powered for them. Some of the terminology made it for them more of an exercise in English than in medicine."[72] Even by the

completion of their training, many of the battalions still had serious problems which their training had not altogether solved.[73]

Some were critical of subject matter that was included in the POI. Some New Zealanders doubted the benefits of teaching illiterate soldiers such technical skills as map reading. Scott recalled, "You are teaching a people who lived in the bush to walk paces through bush and navigate. But if you took them back to their own areas they could lose you. Perhaps we should have trained only the leaders of the squads and platoons in such skills."[74] M.R. Wicksteed, the training officer at Dong Ba Thin, "often wondered, given that we were training conscripts, why we were trying to teach them the theory of the group, map reading and so on. It was a pointless exercise. It was difficult enough to teach at the best of time, even to the average National Serviceman. I remember one day watching an American spend two hours on explaining the theory of the group."[75] The New Zealanders generally felt: "if we had taught them how to live in the field, fire a rifle and look after themselves, and if we had tried to put their training into a natural progression, we would have served them better. I think many of them ended up being confused as to what was meant to happen next and why something was happening..."[76]

The New Zealanders did not agree with the defensive system that the U.S. instructors were teaching FANK battalions to use when they moved into a position at night. The system meant that the FANK units were split into little groups, which meant that the groups could not support each other because at night they could not communicate with another. Because the Cambodians experienced great difficulties trying to learn this complicated system, "they used to have little gunfire battles with themselves. One group would open fire on another group, because they saw movement, rather than confirm first. Then the other group

would fire back, then another group would fire on either of the two groups because they thought they were the enemy. Thus by morning, nobody would have any ammunition left."[77] The New Zealanders preferred to use the triangle defence, whereby each group was able to support each other.[78]

Many of them felt that the time frame given to `train' peasants into soldiers was too short, although there was little that could be done to change this. It was "pretty damn silly...there was too much being shoved down their throats in too short a time."[79] One of the New Zealanders noted: "there was no logical progression to the training. In other words, you did not start with personal training, move into section training, platoon training company training and so on. It was all over the place to me."[80] Although attempts were made to improve the POI, the "Americans were very polite...and to a degree agreed with it, but were hamstrung by the inflexibility of Saigon."[81] Where possible, many of the New Zealanders continued to use their own MOI, "until we were spotted and we eventually amalgamated the two instructional systems [U.S. and New Zealand]."[82] Some New Zealanders were never `found out': "I could have aborted the whole thing because I was my own boss. The officer in charge of the medical section, as far as medical instruction was concerned, was more interested in his surgery. He only came around twice to observe the training."[83]

The New Zealanders adapted the MOI that they felt would make the training easier for the instructor and increase the amount of information learnt by the students. Before the arrival of 2NZATTV, the American instructors had simply taught the Cambodians en masse. When instructing large groups, the New Zealanders reorganised the seating arrangements so each platoon was divided into groups of three to four soldiers, each small group sitting in a row. Between each group there was a small gap, so that as the main instructor presented his lesson at least one other

instructor and interpreter were able to move between the groups to correct any faults that students might be making.[84] This technique was used because "there was no way that the instructor could confirm that what he was saying was being taken in, and so we had a number of training NCOs to assist."[85] The majority of the New Zealand instructors found this system "a piece of cake. It was the same as taking a lesson in New Zealand, except that the time frame is stretched out."[86] One adaptation was that the New Zealanders attempted to ensure that the students undertook as much practise as possible during a lesson.[87]

Due to time constraints and the resulting pace of instruction, and the sizes of the classes the training schedule allowed little time for remedial teaching. As such, the New Zealanders devised several methods to attempt to reteach material where necessary and also validate the level of student learning. One solution was to put the Cambodians into teams and use competitions to instill some skills, for example stripping weapons. They then timed groups of teams, which "used to promote a hell of a lot of interest among not only the students but also the Americans, who had never come across this sort of method before."[88]

The New Zealanders also attempted to add realism to the training. They constructed a jungle lane from scrap material to develop the reaction time of the FANK soldiers. The Cambodians also had exercises which involved the taking of an objective such as a particular hill, which were "always well received by the Cambodians because they enjoyed these types of `wargames'."[89] When the Cambodians attacked a position, several of the Americans acted as the enemy. These Americans just stood up during the attack and fired blanks into the air to simulate enemy fire. Several New Zealanders suggested that the `enemy' should "put on camouflage as an enemy soldier would and fire his rifle,

looking through the sights as the Cambodians appeared, and ducking down if there was any sort of supporting fire coming onto the position."[90] This training method was adopted by the Americans.

The New Zealanders also set up some demonstrations to show the American instructors some of the MOI used by the New Zealand Army. One example was the different shooting methods used. "We proved time and time again that our method of quick firing, the `double tap' method, was far, far better in terms of scoring hits than the Americans `finger' method."[91] Some American MOI were found, even by experienced New Zealand soldiers, let along inexperienced FANK soldiers, to be "bloody dangerous".[92] The instructional method used to teach the U.S. system of quick firing meant "they would have ten guys on the mound, all faced one behind the other. When the target popped up, they would spin around and shoot. I only did it once. I wouldn't do it again."[93]

Some of the improvements recommended by the New Zealanders to improve the training of the FANK recruits were readily adopted by the open-minded Americans. Wharewera and Beaumont discovered why many of the Cambodians could not hit a target with their .30 machine-guns. It was due to the short stature of the Cambodians and the long stock of the weapon, "it was obvious they could not reach the trigger properly. If they were, they used to skew over to one side so by the time they reached the trigger they could not use the sights."[94] They both recommended that the shoulder stock be shortened. The Americans were "quite overwhelmed that we would be able to find things that they themselves could not pick up."[95] The modification led to significant improvements in the abilities of the machine-gunners and was adopted by all the other FANK training battalions. Although the Americans adopted many of these innovations, the New Zealanders found that the American instructors "didn't like doing the work to develop the necessary training aids.

Their biggest problem was coming from a background where somebody else did those things for them. In New Zealand you had to make your own training aids."[96]

Despite the problems, the Cambodians tended to be a very practical people and did not appear to have many difficulties with the workings of most of the weapons. Classes on weapon training spent most of the time on the firing range, from 7.00 a.m. to 7.00 p.m. Before firing, the Cambodians `zeroed' their weapons.[97] "They would then fire at targets on the range but at no stage did anyone go forward to check their accuracy, it was too dangerous. So neither you nor the soldiers had any idea how accurate their shooting was."[98] However, the majority of the Cambodians were: "terrible shots. They were frightened by the noise. You see pictures of people holding weapons above their heads and firing - but some of the Cambodians did this. They did not get down behind cover when fired at, weigh up the situation, fire a few shots and then roll away and so on. They tended to freeze and to try to fire off as many rounds as possible. They did not care who was around them, as long as they did not get hit."[99] The New Zealanders devised a method by which they could impress visiting dignitaries with the ability of the FANK soldiers - a FANK soldier was kept hidden at Dong Ba Thin for about six months. "Every time a General came to Dong Ba Thin, we got this fellow out. He would be blindfolded and he could strip and assemble a weapon really well. His shooting was very good."[100]

The New Zealanders found the nature of the Cambodian peasant soldiers to be very different from that of the South Vietnamese. Although motivated towards fighting the communists, "attentive and keen to learn, they would go off in peals of laughter at the slightest thing. We had to keep impressing upon them the necessity for keeping at a task...it was often hard to get them to take things seriously."[101] Most of the instructors liked the Cambodians, as it was "very hard not to like the Cambodians.

They are a superb, gentle people. As soldiers, I had reservations about them, because most of them weren't by nature aggressive killers. You could not imagine many of them shoving a bayonet into someone's guts. The Vietnamese were the reverse, they were tough, almost cruel."[102] Some instructors felt as if they "were leading lambs to the slaughter - [the Cambodians] did not see harm in anybody...it was sad."[103]

The high temperatures during the day also affected the training and the enthusiasm of the students, particularly during physically demanding exercises. During the middle of the day the temperature was normally around 100 degrees Fahrenheit "and you weren't able to pick your weapon up. Most of the parts of the weapons were metal. The students and ourselves cut our shirt sleeves off or else cut holes in the sleeves so we could pick up our weapons."[104]

There was a wide variation in the training and combat experience of the battalions sent for training. It was common for up to sixty percent of a battalion to have been recently civilians, with no previous military experience. Some battalions were totally comprised of civilians, many still wearing civilian clothing and/or no footwear, conscripted only days before departing from Phnom Penh. A small number of the battalions had some combat experience, such as the 48th Battalion.[105] Many platoons, companies, and even battalions consisted of large numbers of family members. A company might have complete family groups within it ranging from grandfathers aged sixty, to sons and cousins from fourteen years of age. This composition was partly the result of the Khmer government conscripting whole Cambodian hamlets and villages, many of which had begun as clusters of interrelated households.[106] One of the instructors recalled that the "fathers were happy that their sons learned to shoot a gun because when the whole family, including mothers

and sisters, went on operations in the Cambodian countryside the son could protect the family while the father went on patrol."[107]

The composition of many FANK battalions created serious problems, for which the New Zealanders had to find solutions, which were far from perfect. They found that quite often specialist groups, such a machine-gun or mortar crew, were made up of a family unit - a young boy, his father, and grandfather. Sometimes, "the old guy had limited sight, and was very low in comprehension. I tended to change the team around. The grandfather was too old to carry the ammunition, and as he was slightly taller and had the reach, he became the firer. We taught him elevation, etc. We taught the other chap how to strip and clean the weapon, and the son carried the ammunition. We achieved amazing results, but when they got into a contact and one of them was shot, they would be in trouble. But that was the only way that we could get them to work as an acceptable unit."[108]

Language was less of a problem for many of the members of the team, than for 1NZATTV. Some of the members of 2NZATTV communicated relatively effectively without knowing any Khmer. A number of the Cambodians could speak French and as some of the New Zealanders had learnt French at school, they were able to undertake limited conversation with the Cambodians. Added to this, some of the Cambodians had been taught "`British' English, and some of the Cambodians could understand us better than they could the Americans."[109] Some of the New Zealanders could speak some words and phrases of Khmer. "Nobody taught us. You would pick up the odd phrase - I used to be able to count up to twenty in Cambodian. You use the American expression `lock and load', which was `schlock crop' in Cambodian. And fire was `bang'. You could run a range shoot without an interpreter."[110]

For those who could not speak any French or Khmer, there was a pool, albeit small, of interpreters allocated as needed. Most of these interpreters had taken the same lessons many times and were competent enough to even assist with the instruction. However, as was experienced by 1NZATTV, Scott noted that "although we may sometimes have got the feeling that a Cambodian instructor might not have been doing a good job, some of the interpreters would always say `yes, he told them this and he told them that'. But you were never actually convinced that he had actually said that."[111] Some interpreters who were very good and one was, recalls Cunningham, "very reliable ...he spoke Cantonese, Japanese, English, Cambodian and Vietnamese."[112] On the other hand, there was one who was "pretty lazy and was often not there when you wanted him."[113] When there was a shortage of interpreters, Scott recollected that, "you'd be taking one from a medical lesson and taking him straight down to a weapons lesson. It was very difficult because they had to cope with the mental gymnastics, converting English into Khmer, putting phrases into military language..."[114] There were other problems created as a result of the language difference. There was one problem with weapon training. The names of the parts of some weapons did not have an equivalent name in the Khmer language. Some of the names of those parts had to be altered.

Generally, the Maori instructors had more success as instructors, although Major Daniell, the commander of 2NZATTV, commented: "I would not say that they were the mainstay of the team."[115] They had, in the judgement of Wicksteed, a "much better empathy with the Cambodians, primarily because the Maoris had a language ability, as most were bilingual and had a well established sense of nonverbal communication, which their European colleagues often did not."[116] They established a very easy relationship with the Cambodians, having a better rapport than Americans with the Cambodians. The majority of the Maoris tried to learn Khmer

and some, particularly Wharewera who was very adept, were good enough to lecture in the language, to which the Cambodians, remembers Daniell, "responded enormously. Of course the spin-off of that was that they had the respect of the people they were training, far more so than those who didn't learn the language."[117]

Each FANK battalion conducted two field exercises during its twelve weeks of training, as already noted. The first six-day field, held in the eighth week of training, actively rehearsed the FANK units in battle drills. It was unofficial policy at Dong Ba Thin to send the trainees into areas where enemy elements were known to be operating and anything that moved in the area was treated as enemy.[118] American intelligence "told us there were certain elements of this regiment, brigade etc operating in the area, although we didn't know how many enemy there were."[119] The Special Forces (hereafter SFs), who treated the field exercises more as operations than exercises, hoped that any combat experience gained by a battalion would outweigh the casualties that might be taken, as "we had to get them into the jungle and to know what to do when they returned to Cambodia."[120] A contact with an enemy unit was "good for the Cambodians because it was a combination of their training and it gave them first hand experience."[121] After returning from this exercise, the battalion was given advanced training and was then sent further into hostile territory on the final twelve-day "graduation" exercise.

When on these exercises, air and artillery support was available to support any FANK unit that contacted a strong enemy force that was prepared to stand and fight.[122] The command post at Dong Ba Thin knew exactly the grid squares of the training areas, and as soon as a call for fire support was received, the post dispatched an aircraft to spot enemy troops. However, the defenses of the U.S. artillery battery were non-existent, which meant that they were vulnerable to ground attack and the guns were

controlled by computer. To operate that system, recollects Wharewera, "the fire controller at the battery had to have a co-ordinating picture with the unit requesting fire support, otherwise the battery was virtually useless. This is exactly what usually happened to us - we did not have anybody who could work in with the U.S. battery."[123]

The Korean unit operating around Dong Ba Thin had a fearsome reputation among the local inhabitants, and proved to be very effective in its role. As part of his role, Pepper visited the Korean headquarters every week to inform them of such matters as the areas that the FANK battalions would be operating in and the duration that they would be there, the routes that the FANK units would be taking, and the radio frequencies that would be used should the Cambodians need artillery support. This was because the Koreans frequently operated in the field and they also had an artillery unit. However, Pepper remembers that the Koreans were "difficult to deal with operationally. They were strong willed and did their own thing."[124] At the completion of a visit, Pepper thought that he had arranged everything, but "bugger me, we would be out there and who do we run into, but Koreans. They were operating in the same areas that we were. This happened a lot. It's a wonder there wasn't some real shooting going on out there. Of course, I used to storm over to the Korean commander and lay down the law. He would say, `oh, we are very sorry' and that sort of thing, but such incidents were common."[125]

The FANK soldiers, who tended to be physically small, found it very difficult to carry their combat loads when on an exercise. When a battalion was readying itself for a field operation, Wharewera remembers that "the administration people would check them all out, and see that they had the right gear, and load them onto the trucks. We used to take a spare truck which would pick up everything that the Cambodians had thrown away - such as ammunition belts and mortar bombs en route to the exercise area -

anything that was too heavy for them. By the time you got to the drop-off point the spare truck was full of gear. When they arrived at the location where the operation would begin, you lined them back up again, and handed the equipment back out."[126] The same problem occurred when a battalion was due to return to Cambodia and its soldiers were provided with a full issue of equipment and ammunition. However, as the Cambodians were still not used to carrying heavy loads, they tipped as much of their equipment and ammunition as they could into the 44-gallon drum rubbish bins. Pepper commented that "you would find belts of ammunition and hand grenades in a garbage can. Before the Cambodians left, they had to cleanup. Some joker would light a garbage can, and the can would go `boom'.It was quite spectacular."[127] These problems were never resolved.

The FANK battalions generally performed satisfactorily when they contacted enemy troops during these field exercises, although luckily there was usually only limited fighting.[128] During most of these engagements, Pepper remembers, "the Cambodians were running into Vietnamese Communists [hereafter VC] who would shoot for about five minutes and then go for their lives. They did not stand and fight. The Cambodians did the right things - they put down their fire, got organised and gave quick orders. However, if they had hit enemy units that were prepared to stand and fight, it might not have been such a good story."[129] A lack of previous military experience played a major part in the overall "unsatisfactory" performances of some of the battalions - "they performed very much, as I recall, like National servicemen going out on their first exercise...I was not all that impressed. The major weaknesses of one battalion, the 42nd Battalion, which had been formed only two months before arriving at Dong Ba Thin, were inadequate preparation of defensive positions, poor fire planning and faulty navigation."[130] Often, there was not enough time to correct all these deficiencies.

The Cambodians also lacked discipline in the field. The instructors spent a lot of time instructing companies in tactical formations which, according to Scott, "tried, often unsuccessfully, to get these people to keep assault formations, practise battle drills, and to get some sort of sense of urgency."[131] On many of the field exercises, while patrolling through hostile territory, the Cambodians would suddenly began, Scott recalls, "racing across the open plain in excellent formation. I thought `finally I've cracked it.'"[132] Unfortunately, in one instance, the instructor found out soon after that the entire company was chasing a rabbit to supplement their rations.[133] They were generally, according to Daniell, "a little lackadaisical and were very noisy in the field, rattling their mess tins, talking to each other, and so on. They found it hard to realise that their lives depended upon their abilities to keep quiet."[134] There were, however, few cases of indiscipline by individual soldiers. The worst that might happen was "they might slope off and go to sleep in the bush."[135] Any discipline was administered by the Cambodian NCOs who "had a number of punishments; humiliate them, make them put their finger in the ground and walk around in a circle, run up and down with a rifle above their head, pushups, or beat them up - mainly bastardisation."[136]

This inexperience and indiscipline of the Cambodians also caused problems, particularly when live firing was involved as part of the training, and especially during the field exercises. The use of live ammunition practise was to get the Cambodians used to moving under actual battlefield conditions. One instructor, Wicksteed, who watched a live firing exercise, recalled: "The instructors were firing machine-guns, using live ammunition, on fixed mounts, above the heads of the Cambodians. This was a training situation, in a safe environment, with safety precautions. The officers could not get their men up off the deck to advance. The men refused to get off the ground. To me that was appalling.[137]

The Cambodians were a very religious people, but some of their beliefs directly overrode accepted military considerations.[138] Scott noted: "It was quite easy to look at these people and say `if they're unfortunate to be disturbed during one of their ceremonies, they're going to be annihilated.' I'm afraid that...this often happened."[139] One such example was their belief in the power of amulets, frequently worn around the neck in brightly coloured pouches by FANK soldiers.[140] When entering battle, a soldier put the amulet into his mouth, "believing that it made him invincible to enemy bullets, but it had exactly the opposite effect. It made him easier to see."[141] On one occasion, recollects Cunningham, a battalion crossed a river as it was just starting to get dark. One company commander was informed that this was to be the last crossing point until the following morning, and as such the men were to fill their water canteens. The troops filled them and moved onto a hill and prepared their defensive positions for the night. Then, "lo and behold, some ran out of water during the evening, so they left their rifles in their trenches and went down to the river. They could not understand the problem or danger. You can't do that sort of thing on operations, it would be fatal."[142]

The Cambodians, for the most part, had casual attitudes towards the potential dangers of being on an actual operation. One of the instructors commented: "you looked at how these battalions were at night in their personal security. They light fires, sit around the fire at night having a smoke, talking and laughing, they strip off and wash while on operations, they wouldn't put sentries out and this sort of stuff...you realised all this sort of thing was ludicrous."[143] An incident which occurred twice on one field exercise alone illustrated these problems. A FANK battalion was to cross a river tactically: "We sent the recce platoon up to secure the river and they did a reasonably good job. Then, each company was to cross at that point, and then disperse and take over a defensive

position and then the recce platoon would move on, and so on, until all the battalion had crossed. The first company got to the river and they then took all their gear off and went for a swim. They just did not see the danger."[144] This casual attitude also showed through in the attitudes of some battalion officers. Wharewera remmembers that during field exercises some FANK officers: "did not, or couldn't, see the mistakes they were making in the field exercises. Throughout the battalion's exercises, they found the biggest tree on a halt with the most shade, and they all congregated around it. It was like a big picnic. They would lay out bottles of wine and French bread."[145]

The quality of leadership at all levels in a battalion has a major impact upon the morale and effectiveness of the unit during its training and combat performance. The enthusiasm, interest, leadership and combat experience of the Cambodian officers varied. Generally, they did not "have to do anything as such - they didn't have to perform on physical aspects, such as the confidence course or assault course, that the soldiers had to do."[146] When asked why they behaved this way, many of the officers would "shrug their shoulders and say `no need to do it'."[147] The general impression of many of the instructors, in the judgement of Cunningham, towards these officers was that "they stood aloof from people, They tended to stand back and not get dirty. They never seemed to show any leadership in the field. If you took out a group and there was an officer, generally, you were forever guiding him. He never made a decision for himself."[148] One battalion commander, recalls Brandon, one of the team members, was: "so much of a disaster that his men mutinied and refused to move and refused to obey orders. It was subsequently disbanded and sent back to Cambodia. Perhaps a bit of an overreaction on the part of the Cambodian authorities."[149] Some battalions performed badly during their training and the attitude by some soldiers towards training, particularly the soldiers in the 42nd Battalion, was one of `teach me if you can', which

was attributed to poor leadership among its senior officers. Some battalion's were still rated as `unsatisfactory' at the end of their training.[150] Some of the Cambodian soldiers responded to officers who they considered had committed some particular `crime' with their own justice. There were instances of FANK soldiers `fragging' their own officers.[151] In one instance, a Commanding Officer (CO) of a FANK battalion was killed when someone rolled a grenade into his tent. None of his troops would say why he was killed, but some of the instructors suspected that he was a Khmer Rouge.[152]

There were instances of corruption amongst the officers of some battalions and also among some of the South Vietnamese officers at Dong Ba Thin. There were instances of Cambodian officers who stole rations and then sold them back to their soldiers and where Vietnamese officers stole supplies before they arrived at Dong Ba Thin, which were then sold to the Cambodian officers. On several occasions, while FANK battalions were undergoing their field exercises, "rations from helicopter resupplies "would go missing for some reason. How, I don't know."[153]

However, some FANK battalion commanders showed a genuine interest in the training of their own battalion, despite their own inexperience. Captain K. Suon, the commanding officer of the 52nd Battalion, attended all training and in a progress report on the battalion's training, he was described as "obviously a leading factor in the good standard of their leaders, and he has considerable respect from his junior leaders."[154] The report also considered that the "enthusiasm and standard of dress [of the battalion] is very good and they continue to impress their advisors."[155] Some of the officers and NCOs of this group had been trained by the French or had fought in the Khmer Rouge or the Viet Minh Armies.

However, the quality of leadership displayed by a FANK battalion commander tended to be reflected at the lower end of the battalion – at the company and squad level. The good general performance and leadership level of the 48th Battalion throughout its training was attributed to the ability and experience of the squad leaders.[156] One of the major difficulties that the instructors did have with the FANK leadership, however, was, according to Wharewera, "getting the right amount of firepower at the right place at the right time and when to stop firing. They had what I would term a typical American attitude. If something makes a noise over there, fire everything you've got at it...They were probably scared."[157] However, in most cases leadership problems were eventually overcome through the provision of extra training where needed.

Some FANK battalions worked hard and were enthusiastic during their training. Generally, the performance of the 45th Battalion was "good and morale and health reasonably high", but "during FTX [Field Training Exercise] [the] battalion showed signs of strain, but [the] exercise [was] completed with satisfactory results."[158] One report on the 42nd Battalion stated that the men were "inexperienced, but keen."[159] Some of the mistakes made by the Cambodians were corrected by extra instruction and constant practise. Although the 25th Battalion's "morale and esprit de Corps was high and that support weapons completed training satisfactory, the battalion's individual soldiers [are] not yet proficient in battle drills and squad tactics."[160]

At the completion of their training cycle, the FANK battalions were flown out of Dong Ba Thin to Phnom Penh. "The Cambodians were packed into aircraft. They used to land at night in Phnom Penh. While the aircraft were turning around, the Cambodian troops had to jump out. One of the aircraft came back with another group and it still

had some baggage of the soldiers who had attended the previous course aboard."[161] The training cycle was then begun one to seven days later.

It was very difficult for both the New Zealanders and the Americans to measure how successful their efforts were with the FANK training programme. There was some official validation made of the battalions during their training. Each week, an assessment was made of a battalion by each instructor which critiqued such things as the unit's shooting results, its progress during the different lessons, and what further training any squads needed. The team at Dong Ba Thin, in common with their counterparts at Chi Lang, never received any official statements as to how the battalions fared once they had returned to Cambodia. The only information they did receive was, Pepper recalled, that "so and so battalion had landed and they had taken up positions in such and such a province and that from last report all was okay. However, these were only rumours."[162] In one case, the New Zealanders heard that one battalion was decimated minutes after arriving in Phnom Penh as they attempted to get from their aircraft to cover and that two battalions were wiped out within weeks of returning to Cambodia. Such rumours, although never confirmed, proved detrimental to the morale of some of the instructors. Daniell, the commander of 2NZATTV stated, however, "we knew that they were going back to a difficult situation in which they were surely to be outfought, but it was a matter of simply trying to do the best we could."[163] One New Zealander commented, "you looked at how the battalions operated on the exercises during their training...You could force them to do it while you were there in charge, but you knew that then they were on their own, that is the way they would revert to..."[164]

Privately, some of the team members were uncertain as to how successful their training role was. They often wondered, in the judgement of Cunningham, "when you tried to train them, did you do them any harm or did you do them any good."[165] However, for the majority of the New Zealanders there was little time for contemplation, because the turnover of battalions was "so quick, very much like a sausage machine and there was little rest between the departure of one battalion and the arrival of another."[166] Wharewera commented: "You would get a battalion, start on them and then half way through another battalion would arrive. You got to a stage where they either had the skill or didn't, and it was no use going on and on."[167] The performance of many of the battalions during their training reinforced the fact there was only a certain amount of information and skills that could be taught to a battalion comprised, for the most part, of conscripts, within a twelve week course. Scott recollected that "you realised that you're not going to get anywhere near the sort of standard you wanted...Really you just did the best you could. I think some of them were quite satisfying results. But others, it was just hopeless."[168] Some of the instructors consoled themselves in the hope that, recalled Wicksteed "if we did nothing, but taught a Cambodian who knew nothing to look after himself better than when he marched into the camp, then we did something constructive."[169]

The conclusions of the small number of New Zealand reporters who visited Dong Ba Thin were mixed, although some were positive towards the training and its results. McCready, the Minister of Defence gave high praise to the teams. He stated how much the Cambodians appreciated New Zealand's involvement in the POI.[170] He concluded that the instructors were unanimous in their praise of the Cambodian trainees, who were "highly motivated in their desire to learn to fight to defend their country, determined to master the instruction and stuck well to the very long hours of extremely strenuous training."[171] Some believed that the

training was of a very practical nature which was helping the Cambodians defend their homeland. A reporter for the New Zealand Herald, J.C. Graham, visited the two New Zealand training teams. He reported that "there is no doubt about the keenness of the Cambodians to gain military knowledge and to get back and start expelling the Vietnamese from their territory...They learn remarkably rapidly and with great enthusiasm, in spite of the language barrier..."[172]

However, newspaper most editorials doubted that the FANK trainees put into practice much of what they had learnt when they had returned to the Khmer Republic. Graham felt that despite the enthusiasm of the Cambodians towards their training, "it is not certain how much they retain. There have been reports that once they get into the field in Cambodia, they tend to abandon the good lessons they have learned, with unhappy results."[173] Some reporters even felt: "from some points of view the exercise seems a little pointless".[174] F. Haden, a reporter for the New Zealand Herald, agreed with this point for two main reasons. Firstly, "the Cambodian administration doesn't seem to be prosecuting its war against the North Vietnamese and local guerillas with any great enthusiasm" and secondly, "there's not a great deal recruits can be taught in the twelve weeks the team have them - through a painful language barrier, at that."[175]

Despite having to work long hours, the members of 2NZATTV assimilated with the Americans much more successfully than had the members of 1NZATTV with the South Vietnamese at Chi Lang. The American instructors at Dong Ba Thin were from the 5th U.S. SFs Battalion, the largest U.S. unit at Dong Ba Thin. Many of them were, remembered Daniell, "very professional, very committed to the Vietnamese and Cambodians...although they were a pretty hardened bunch. Several of them were into their third tour in Vietnam."[176] There were also non-SF personnel involved in the FANK training programme who, thought Scott, "had

opted to stay on longer, or who had not completed their time and weren't due to return to the USA. I got the impression that there were some who were not really highly motivated."[177] Some of the New Zealanders considered that "the letter group tended to wait for orders. They did not like moving out or undertaking something without orders...They had Article 15, if they did something and it stuffs up they are in trouble. At the same time, the SFs did not tend to go by the book, and they acted independently."[178]

Assimilation was also assisted by the fact that there was a lack of single rooms available at Dong Ba Thin. As such, rooms were shared, with the two occupants being of similar rank and undertaking a similar job. Pepper recalls that the accommodation buildings for the team were "fairly grotty, but their layout was reasonable. I had a bed on one side and the other chap had a bed on the other, and it was not terribly private."[179] Due to the high water table "the conditions that we were living in weren't the best nor very sanitary, especially as soon as it rained and the tide came in, everything floated around."[180]

Some of the New Zealanders ate in the American mess, but although there was plenty of food it was not the balanced diet that the New Zealanders were used to. Most of the New Zealanders, remembers Cameron, "weren't too keen on the meals, as the Americans ate what I would call soft food. At breakfast they cooked eggs, pancakes, spam, and cornflakes, a hell of a lot of processed and fried food. You did not get chops or anything like that, nor was there much fruit or fresh vegetables."[181] Consequently, many of them ate in the NCOs club. In it, Cameron recollects, there was a little kitchen, in which a Vietnamese woman cooked, and they were able to "get a decent steak quite easy. The six o'clock mentality was still rife. You knocked off work

and you adjourned to the club and had a few cans of beer. By the time you got hungry dinner was over - so you went to the club and had a steak and chips, or chicken etc".[182]

The busy work schedule and the success of the assimilation of the New Zealanders with the Americans meant that the members of 2NZATTV did not suffer, to as great an extent, the same morale problems and internal bickering that plagued 1NZATTV for part of its time at Chi Lang. Many of the New Zealanders at Dong Ba Thin felt, in the judegemtn of Wharewera: "if you became too serious, you would go around the bend. We tended to work hard, set up our lessons for the next day and then have a few beers and laugh. We adopted the same type of attitude we held in New Zealand, but adapted it to suit the conditions."[183] The leadership style of the New Zealand officers at Dong Ba Thin played a significant role in the high morale of 2NZATTV. At its first Hangi, several of the New Zealanders of 2NZATTV met Captain A. Kiwi, the commander of 1NZATTV, for the first time, when he visited Dong Ba Thin. Wharewera recollects:

> We were sitting under this trailer load of booze. Kiwi disapproved straight away. He was a straight-up guy. There were morale problems with 1NZATTV, because, primarily they were too hard on themselves. We went the other way. Daniell and Pepper were extremely capable officers and understood how the situation was between us and the American unit. The team at Chi Lang had bitch sessions among themselves, but we didn't. We flowed straight into whatever was going down. We would have a shot at it and we would change it in our own way. What our officers were looking for were the same results that we were looking for, rather than being disciplinarians.[184]

Due to the amalgamation of the New Zealanders into the various committees, they were rarely able to meet as a group, and tended to socialise with their American colleagues.[185] However, the New Zealanders generally felt that, according to Scott, "by allowing us to be assimilated, it certainly fostered what I feel to be a good working relationship."[186] However, there were limited opportunities

for the New Zealanders to relax, which contrasted with the situation at Chi Lang. Normally once a week groups of entertainers, such as strip-tease shows, performed, although Pepper remembers that "some of the acts they used to bring around were questionable, they were fairly rough. But they used to go to great lengths to try to get these shows to Dong Ba Thin."[187] Despite such shows quickly becoming repetitive, they were well patronised because there was nothing much else to do. Nga Trang offered such attractions as shopping and restaurants, but opportunities to visit were very infrequent and normally the New Zealanders only had a days' leave at a time and it was often impossible to obtain transport back to Dong Ba Thin. There were some vehicles available, and most Sundays provided a rare opportunity for the New Zealanders to congregate together at the local beach, along with many of the Americans, for drinks and a hangi. Daniell recollected that "I really felt pretty sorry for the guys [Americans] because they were stuck there and very limited variety of things for them to do. They couldn't play rugby."[188]

This integration was successful although many of the New Zealanders felt there appeared to be a lack of cohesion among the Americans at the camp. The SFs had an attitude of "going it alone. They did not really associate with the ordinary battalion people and so on."[189] The Americans at the camp also seemed to lack a sense of camaraderie. Cameron recalled that "You could walk into the bar, and see fifteen Kiwis all together, sitting around joking and carrying on. You would find twelve Yanks and you'd have three lined across the bar, there would be a space between each of them (all could even be from the same unit), and none would be speaking to the other. You would find two Negros huddled together, and maybe another one on his own.[190] Many of the New Zealanders initially found it "a little difficult to assimilate into their system. But we made the effort and it didn't take all that long and we got into it."[191]

There was a certain amount of racial tension at Dong Ba Thin, particularly between the white and black Americans, of whom the latter group made up the majority of the Americans at the camp. Cameron recalled: "They seemed to be still fighting the civil war, very much divided: the North hated the South, especially the blacks; East hated West; and country hated the town."[192] There were virtually no incidents of racism between the Americans and the Maori soldiers from 2NZATTV. One group of black Americans kept together and slept in what was known as, remembers Dance, `The Ghetto': "It was a dark, dingy hole of an area. There was no lighting outside at all...If there was a stand-to, they just stayed in their rooms and pulled their bed over themselves."[193] However, some of the quarters were "bloody marvellous. The Negroes had taken some walls out and made big communal spaces. These areas were complete with dim lights, gaudy colours, the strong smell of pot, and a lot of Jimmy Hendrix music thumping away."[194]

There was some limited contact with the other two ethnic groups - the Montagnards and the South Vietnamese. The New Zealanders mixed very well with the Montagnard soldiers, and "as you got to know them, they got very well attached."[195] They also mixed, although to only a limited extent, with the South Vietnamese soldiers who were usually working. The only contact that some of the New Zealanders had with the local South Vietnamese civilians was when the medics travelled during some weekends to the local villages to provide medical aid. These trips were very popular with the locals, and "we had long queues of mothers with their children waiting."[196] They did not socialise with the Cambodian trainees for several reasons: the Cambodians had a busy training schedule; few Cambodians had any money; their religion forbade them to drink; but primarily because of potential health risks. The Cambodians lived in very spartan conditions. They lived in long huts, their beds consisting of a raised platform, with wooden or wire slats

and a mattress. Their toilet facilities, Dance recollected "were just cans underneath a row of seats, which weren't even cleared regularly. The day we drove through when we first arrived at Dong Ba Thin, you could see these tins literally overflowing. The Cambodians also cooked and ate around their toilet areas as well."[197]

Of concern to the team was the security situation surrounding Dong Ba Thin. The team members found the defensive system surrounding the camp to be barely satisfactory, although it was better than that surrounding 1NZATTV's compound at Chi Lang. Dong Ba Thin's defenses were localised into three sectors, based upon the compounds of the four nationalities based at Dong Ba Thin.[198] The defences, which extended for about 200 metres beyond the camp perimeter, consisted of mines and flares. There was a ten-foot high perimeter fence around the U.S./New Zealand compound.[199] At each corner of the compound was a sandbagged tower, each with a searchlight, a .30 Browning machine-gun and radio and telephone contact with the camp command post. As the water table was only about one foot below the surface, the defensive positions had to be built above the ground. These positions were, recalled Wharewera, a team member, "terrifying to say the least, as most of the defensive systems constructed by the New Zealand Army were built under ground...the bunkers at Dong Ba Thin were in the open and were dangerous...The first rocket would blow the screen away and the second would blow the tower down on our heads. I tended not to go in the bunkers."[200]

The security of Dong Ba Thin during the day, and of the surrounding countryside day and night, was the responsibility of a Montagnard unit, the South Vietnamese and the FANK trainees. The Montagnards were responsible for the internal security of the camp, while the maintenance of the security of the area surrounding the camp and its environs was the responsibility of the RF.[201] During the night, the FANK trainees were used to provide security for

the camp. Each company was given a sector of the camp to defend and sections from each company were rotated every few hours to guard the camp perimeter. However, there were problems, as it was not uncommon to find some of the Cambodian soldiers asleep at their posts. Beaumont, one of the team members, recalled that "They were only little fellows...When they had been out all day, you could see that by the end of the day they were worn out."[202] As to whether the Cambodians could have been trusted if the camp was attacked, Daniell commented that: "I don't know. They were an unknown quantity, because we were never attacked."[203] The security situation was such that the Americans "controlled the area from dawn to dusk, and the enemy from dusk to dawn."[204]

Most of the training areas were adjacent to Dong Ba Thin, although some were a distance from the camp.[205] As such, all troops were transported to and from these areas. The Montagnards always moved ahead of these convoys to ensure that the route, and the intended training areas, were free of enemy troops. A security system had been arranged with assistance from the prostitutes of the two villages which the troops had to travel through. Wharewera recalled that "most of them stayed in the second floor of this house - they would leave their windows open if there were no enemy troops in the vicinity or they would shut their windows if there were. If they were shut, we wouldn't go any further. Sometimes their windows were shut."[206]

The security situation at Dong Ba Thin was jeopardised to a certain extent by unusual practises that were tolerated by some of the American camp commanders. When the New Zealanders arrived at Dong Ba Thin, Cunningham recollected that "the biggest thing that struck me...when we came into the compound it was only 2.00 pm and a lot of Americans were walking around with cans of beer in their hands."[207] The New Zealanders found the Americans' attitude towards prostitution unusual. Wicksteed noted that he, " came away

with the impression that the Americans were completely and utterly obsessed by sex. On the roadside, at each end of the camp, there were signs that read `Don't stop. If you do, you will be shot at.' However, on Wednesday, Friday and Saturday nights, prostitutes and girlfriends of the Americans, and some of the New Zealanders, were allowed into the camp."[208] These nights were called `Hog night' and the "men literally made pigs of themselves."[209]

Examples of unprofessional conduct amongst some of the Americans led some of the New Zealanders to view with skepticism the support that could actually provide if the Cambodians contacted any enemy troops when on their field exercises. Some of them found that: "in the firepits around the perimeter, there were M40 grenades just lying loose on the floor, rusting away, and belts of ammunition just lying in the dirt. The Americans would test the Claymores every now and then and invariably they weren't working."[210] During a practise to test the response of the Americans in firing para-illuminating flares in response to an enemy attack, M.T. Dance, a team member, recalled: "The Koreans got their light - one and a half hours after they had asked for it and where they never wanted it - right over the top of their compound. And that was done by the SFs themselves."[211] When he went to find out what happened, he found a fight in progress with a negro and a white soldier, while the officers just stood there and watched what was going on. There was no intervention. That incident was typical of what happened."[212]

The security situation around Dong Ba Thin deteriorated with the on-going withdrawal of the Americans and Koreans from Cam Ranh Bay. In mid-1972, a report by Frank Haden, a New Zealand reporter, graphically illustrated his impressions of the security situation: "The constant if unseen presence of the VC is underscored by the pockmarked

walls of the New Zealanders living quarters where 13 rounds of medium calibre mortar fire plastered the compound a few nights before we arrived."[213] By late 1972, the VC were launching attacks on Cam Ranh Bay and Dong Ba Thin was rocked as an ammunition dump was blown up.[214] In late November, a local PF platoon ambushed a thirty-man North Vietnamese Army (hereafter NVA) and VC unit only 7,000 metres from the camp.[215] The NVA/VC continued to step up their attacks and on several occasions, the camp was hit by enemy small arms fire, mortars and rockets. In one attack, one of four 12 mm rockets hitting camp, landed in the U.S./New Zealand compound. "You've never seen so many blokes trying to get under one pool table at once", E. Beaumont commented.[216] The extra security measures that were introduced as a result of the continuing American withdrawal from the Cam Ranh Bay area and the increasing enemy activity in the area imposed some limitations on the conduct of all night and field training exercises.[217]

The camp was also attacked on several occasions by communist sympathisers within some FANK units undergoing training at Dong Ba Thin. In the early hours of one morning, a Khmer Rouge element in one of the FANK battalions indiscriminately fired their rifles and several M79s at buildings in the U.S./New Zealand compound. There were no casualties as a result of the attack, although some of the bunkers were peppered with shrapnel.[218] The members of this group eventually surrendered and were dealt with by the FANK battalion commander.[219]

Boy Soldiers

Despite cordial working conditions, one otherwise minor incident caused a great deal of public concern in New Zealand. The incident grew to such enormous proportions in the New Zealand press, that the future of 2NZATTV was in the balance. At the end of August 1972, reports were published

from D. Barber, the New Zealand Press Association correspondent in South Vietnam, revealing that the New Zealanders were involved in training soldiers who were much younger than the legal minimum age of sixteen years, for military service in the FANK.

At the time he wrote his first report on the matter, Barber was on his first visit to Dong Ba Thin. On the second day of his visit he was walking past a classroom when the recruits who were in the building came out. As they left, picking up their equipment stacked outside, he recalled: "I was struck by the size and obvious youth of them."[220] Published later in the New Zealand press were his graphic impressions of the sight as the recruits lined up and began to move to their next class. To him, they seemed like: "Diminutive figures, clad in ill-fitting American Army fatigue uniforms, their trousers were rolled up, their jackets hanging down around their knees. They marched weighed down with their equipment and carrying rifles bigger than themselves."[221] Reported numbers of these under-age recruits also varied. Barber reported that American instructors had told him that in one FANK battalion of 500 personnel, about 100 recruits were supposedly under the age of fifteen years. However, some of them were as young as nine years old.[222]

Although claiming to be eighteen years of age, the camp medical orderlies stated that many of the boys had not even reached puberty.[223] In one of his early newspaper articles, Barber included a photograph of two boys who were part of a machine-gun crew and two other boys from the same unit who were part of a reconnaissance team. Most of these boys undertook the same training as conducted by the older soldiers. Pepper recalled: "there was no differentiation. They did the lot - threw grenades, live firing, fired mortars, fired machine-guns and so on, although we had to shorten the butts for those little fellows."[224]

While many of the New Zealand instructors had not written in their letters home that they were engaged in such a practise, the American and New Zealand instructors generally shared similar attitudes towards training such young boys. Many generally felt they were giving the boys a fighting chance: "These kids are going to fight anyway - at least we can give them a chance to stay alive. We're giving them training in every aspect of war. They leave here with a better chance of survival than they would have if we didn't train them."[225] Wharewera noted: "I didn't see a need to differentiate between young or old at the time. From our point of view, our government did make a big thing out of nothing. As soldiers, we have no input into what happens. In hindsight, New Zealand is a politically naive country anyway."[226] Pepper considered "it was an Asian, not European situation. You had to grow up fast over there...and this is what they were doing. Survival was their main concern."[227]

Thappana Nginn, the Khmer Republic's Minister of Defence, informed L.W. Thornton, the Ambassador to Khmer Republic and Ambassador designate to South Vietnam, when approached regarding this matter, that some of these young boys, while serving as FANK soldiers, were in such non-combat roles as batmen or provided assistance to the women who travelled with the battalions.[228] Not all the boys were necessarily sent to South Vietnam to train to be soldiers, despite what was portrayed in Barber's reports. Some of the instructors at Dong Ba Thin had seen some of the youngsters more than once. Boys were sometimes sent several times to the camps to collect badly needed supplies of military equipment, although by August 1972 all Cambodian troops were outfitted and equipped before they came to South Vietnam.[229] Frequently, the American CO of the camp assigned some of the youngest boys to the instructors as body guards. However, there were some who had served in active combat and even killed enemy soldiers. One of the New Zealanders recalled: "I remember a particular one that

had really been captured by the Vietnamese in Cambodia. He escaped, killing one of his captors. He had been on several combat operations and had killed three enemy soldiers."[230]

These under-age `soldiers' came from several sources. Many of the boys were drafted into the army from orphanages in Phnom Penh, and the percentage of boys that were arriving in South Vietnam was growing, presumably because of the heavy losses the Cambodian Army was experiencing.[231] However, Scott stated, "no doubt they were boys and physically they were very tiny, but they were tough, a bit like street kids. I dare say that's not a bad comparison."[232] For most of these boys the battalion was the only home they knew. A Cambodian company commander, when asked why two ten year old boys were in his unit, replied: "when we go through their villages they run up and ask to join us. If we refuse to take them, they cry."[233]

Barber's graphic portrayals and photographs, widely published by the New Zealand press, resulted in adverse newspaper editorials and moral outrage by the public within New Zealand. Public opinion turned against the presence of the team at Dong Ba Thin, which had been generally supported by the New Zealand public since its conception.[234] This incident erupted at a critical juncture. It assumed such national political significance that it had a major impact upon Cabinet's consideration of the proposals concerning New Zealand's continued participation in any FANK and Army of the Republic of Vietnam (hereafter ARVN) training ventures.[235] That the incident occurred and the way it was subsequently handled officially proved to be very embarrassing for the New Zealand Government. Initially, official comment on the matter by the New Zealand Government varied greatly. When asked to comment upon the reports, McCready, the Minister of Defence, appeared to be unaware that the team members were in fact training young boys. He said that the report was quite contrary to what he had seen for himself during a visit to Dong Ba Thin. However, he

stated that the incident would be investigated. Any decision that Cabinet would make regarding the two training teams was to be deferred until Lieutenant Colonel Brown's, the Commander of NZATGV, report on training was received.[236]

While not confirming Barber's allegations, a spokesman for the New Zealand Defence Department said that they were aware that units training at Dong Ba Thin included personnel who were well below the "ages of the recruits inducted for military training in the Western World."[237] However, he argued that it was "clearly the Cambodian authorities business as to whom they should enlist to fight off the invaders of their country."[238] He further noted: "we are well aware that in Indochina it is not unusual for whole families to actively take part in units on operations."[239] But, as an acknowledgment that Washington was aware of the situation, an army spokesman from Saigon stated, "the Americans do what they can to weed out the youngest at Phnom Penh airport."[240] Such personnel records that did exist were "very rudimentary to say the least" and the Americans and New Zealanders did not receive the sort of details which would be "customary in a more highly developed administration."[241]

The opposition Labour party in New Zealand, led by N. Kirk, quickly took advantage of the incident to attack the New Zealand Government's policy of continued involvement in Vietnam. The Labour Party called for the immediate withdrawal of all New Zealand units still in South Vietnam. Kirk considered that, "It is amazing that the Government has entered into this child-killer training. I am amazed that, far from disowning responsibility for training children to kill and be killed, government authorities have tried to justify it."[242] He argued that the involvement of New Zealanders in training these boys was "immoral and evil" and added: "is there nothing this fearful war in Vietnam cannot degrade and corrupt?"[243]

On 5 September A. McCready publicly admitted there was evidence to support the allegations of the team training young soldiers. As a result, the team was ordered by the New Zealand Government to halt temporarily the training of the FANK battalions while the problem of the training of under-age trainees was resolved.[244] During this period the instruction by the New Zealand team members was limited to selected groups, such as battalion leaders and medics, whose ages were not in dispute, and in the revision of lesson plans and the manufacture of training aids. Initially, the decision to stop the New Zealanders from instructing was, recollected Cunningham, "laughed off. But as time went on, and the training was starting to be hampered, the humorous side disappeared and the situation started to become tense."[245] The Americans, were already short staffed without having a further eighteen men withdrawn, and some U.S. personnel were called back from leave. However, the majority of the Americans were sympathetic to the team's members. Most of the American anger was directed more towards Barber, and the American CO did not initially want any New Zealand press visiting the camp.

Thornton discussed the matter in Phnom Penh with Thappana Nginn, with MACV and the allied training team representatives. As a result of these discussions, the Chief U.S. Army Assistance Group directed that no redistribution of under-age FANK trainees was to take place, although the FANK authorities had advised the U.S. authorities that they did not intend returning under-age trainees to the Khmer Republic.[246] There were some instances where under-age soldiers still arrived at Dong Ba Thin for training. On the start of a course at the end of September 1972, forty-one under-age and four overage personnel were returned to Cambodia, as there was an available flight to do so.[247] The majority of under-aged soldiers who arrived in South Vietnam underwent training as it was uneconomical to send them back to Cambodia.

As an apparent result of Thornton's findings, McCready publicly stated there was no evidence to support the claims that large numbers of Cambodian boys were being trained in South Vietnam. McCready reported that the numbers of Cambodian soldiers being trained who were under the age of sixteen years was less than five percent. The number that they had trained so far was estimated by the New Zealanders as being about ten who were clearly below the age of sixteen years.[248] McCready further claimed that in a survey of the ten FANK battalions then under training in South Vietnam, about fifty soldiers were found to be under the age of sixteen years. This figure represented only one percent of the total training strength. McCready's explanations were received with some scepticism by the New Zealand press.[249] Reports from Major Daniell, the commander of 2NZATTV, also suggested that the numbers of young soldiers were, in fact, very small. In September, Daniell and the FANK Liaison Officer inspected the battalions that were currently under training at Dong Ba Thin.[250]

These ramifications of Barber's stories also seriously affected the FANK battalions which were then undergoing training, particularly at Dong Ba Thin. Pepper remembers that "we watched heart-rending situations at the airport when the boys were being returned to Cambodia. Here we had fathers watching sons returning to an uncertain future with, in many cases, no-one to look after them when they arrived back home. The morale in some of these battalions went to zero following this episode. There were fathers who didn't want to soldier anymore because their sons were now at the mercy of someone in Cambodia."[251]

Search for an Alternative Role

Even at the start of New Zealand's involvement in the FANK training programme, there were already discussions regarding the future of New Zealand's two training teams.

Daniell considered there was a definite need for New Zealand to provide not only training to the Cambodians but to increase the assistance provided to the Americans at Dong Ba Thin. As a result of the intended withdrawal of twenty-nine training personnel from Dong Ba Thin by the end of April, Daniell He recommended that consideration be given to increasing the strength of 2NZATTV to a strength of thirty personnel.[252] He believed that in addition to contributing to the training, New Zealand personnel would derive much benefit from the experience gained in operating as part of the U.S. unit. However, he considered that the unit environment at Dong Ba Thin demanded that only mature and very competent personnel should be considered for posting.[253] However, the current restraints on establishment increases to the teams in Vietnam and the political implications of such an increase to the New Zealand personnel in South Vietnam made Daniell's proposal a "non-starter."[254]

Despite the obvious necessity of a New Zealand contribution to the FANK training programme and Daniell's recommendation that the size of 2NZATTV could be expanded, Brown recommended to Army General Staff (AGS) that planning proceed for the withdrawal of the two training teams from South Vietnam, on the basis that 2NZATTV would be withdrawn on the scheduled completion in November 1972 of the existing training programme.[255] He stated that the continuance of New Zealand's involvement in FANK training was more a political than a military decision. Although recognising a need for initial training and retraining of FANK infantry battalions for the foreseeable future, Brown concluded that such training was best accomplished "in Cambodia itself by the Cambodians and continuing efforts to provide them with this were being made."[256] Therefore, he hoped that the Cambodians would have organised, by that time, their own training system in-country.[257] During his visit, McCready had told the Americans that the New Zealand Government would be prepared to consider, at some appropriate stage, any

other type of training assistance that the Cambodians might might consider appropriate to replace the current FANK training programme and with which the Americans and Australians might also wish to identify.[258] However, it was decided that the two training teams would remain in South Vietnam, at least in the meantime.

The future of both New Zealand training teams was to be decided in mid 1972. In early June 1972, the Khmer Republic formally approached the United States, New Zealand and Australia requesting that the present FANK training programme be continued until the end of November 1973.[259] This extension was because the Khmer Republic was unable to meet its own training requirements, due to a lack of large-scale training facilities in Cambodia, a lack of sufficient instructors, and a preoccupation with political matters. This extension would enable a further twelve FANK battalions to be trained, which represented the gap between the numbers of battalions that FANK could train locally and the amount of equipment which the Military Equipment Delivery Team, Cambodia (MEDTC) could supply.[260]

The United States agreed to the Cambodian request and made a formal request to the New Zealand and Australian governments that they participate in a tripartite effort.[261] Once the Khmer and South Vietnamese governments had agreed to the proposal, the United States planned to continue training FANK battalions at Dong Ba Thin under Australian command, U.S. logistics and management support, with New Zealand and Khmer participation.[262] The United States suggested a combined training battalion, comprising eighty Australians, twenty to twenty-five Americans, and fifteen to eighteen New Zealand instructors.[263]

By mid-1972, however, the logistical situation regarding the two New Zealand training teams was not quite as simple as previously. Despite the logistical support of this new training venture as a U.S. responsibility, UITG's

assurance that measures were to be taken to ensure continual logistical support, and that New Zealand still received favoured nation treatment, the capacity of the U.S. to help the New Zealand forces in South Vietnam was rapidly diminishing. With the handover of the U.S. Air Force complex at Cam Ranh Bay to the South Vietnamese, logistic support to 2NZATTV became progressively more difficult throughout 1972.[264] Increasingly, 2NZATTV had to "make do" with improvised training aids, facilities and so on, but there were some items that were in plentiful supply - "there were thousands of enemy weapons that nobody wanted."[265]

On 14 June 1972, American, Australian, and New Zealand representatives met to discuss this request. This meeting was inconclusive, primarily because Australia and New Zealand had drawn different interpretations of the Cambodians' request.[266] New Zealand's Foreign Affairs department considered that this FANK training request was simply a continuation of the current project rather than the beginning of a new one.[267] Subsequently, a `clarifying' meeting was held on 16 June under the chairmanship of Thornton, the Ambassador to Khmer Republic and Ambassador designate to South Vietnam, at the New Zealand Embassy.[268]

At this latter meeting, there were differences about the preferred site for the continued FANK training programme. Thornton and Brown preferred to remain at Dong Ba Thin, while Brigadier I.A. Geddes (Commander Australian Army Assistance Group, Vietnam), expressed reservations about this option and suggested Bien Hoa, possibly because of a lack of security if the Koreans departed from the area, and the tenuous logistical situation that was resulting from the stand down of U.S. forces at Cam Ranh Bay.[269] The meeting concluded that "Bien Hoa was superior in every way" and McClelland undertook to investigate the availability of a suitable location at Bien Hoa.[270]

That the Australians regarded Dong Ba Thin unsuitable, posed an unfortunate dilemma for the New Zealand Government. Wellington suspected that if the Australians refused to change their minds over Dong Ba Thin, then they would be forced to compromise in one of two ways.[271] Either 2NZATTV and the Americans continued to operate at Dong Ba Thin, leaving Australia with full responsibility for one of the Long Hai camps or else they joined the Australians at Bien Hoa, leaving the Americans at Dong Ba Thin. Whatever decision the New Zealand Government made, it faced the responsibility of denying support to one of these two countries.

Thornton was critical of the hesitancy of the Australians' to give New Zealand any hint of a possible decision about whether to provide any assistance to the proposed FANK training programme.[272] This was because any decision made by Wellington to such a proposal would be influenced by Australia's course of action. In a report to the Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Thornton wrote, "we understand that Canberra is not likely to look on that with much favour", an assessment which Brown agreed with.[273] However, the New Zealand Government likewise, had also not made its position clear on the matter. Thornton felt that before very long he would be pressed to give an outline of New Zealand's likely response.[274] Washington made it very clear to both the New Zealand and Australia Governments that whatever decision they made regarding their continued participation in the FANK training programme, the Americans intended to accept the Cambodians' proposals, "even if they have to go it alone."[275] Despite the uncertainty regarding the future of its training assistance, the New Zealand Government was determined that 2NZATTV would remain at Dong Ba Thin in its present role.

Brown attempted to clarify the New Zealand Government's position regarding its involvement in the FANK training programme. He requested that the establishment of 2NZATTV be increased to between twenty and thirty personnel by ending its involvement in Chi Lang.[276] However, the New Zealand Government still felt that it would be difficult to continue with FANK training in South Vietnam unless New Zealand was making at least a token contribution towards the training of South Vietnam forces. This view was also shared by the Australian Government. However, AGS responded that any such increase of 2NZATTV was impossible.

Despite this disagreement over the location, there were many advantages for the New Zealand Government in supporting the new FANK training programme. From a military point of view, there was no doubt that the FANK battalions badly needed training of the sort envisaged. There was also no doubt that the Khmer Republic could not provide adequate training from their own resources without foreign assistance. From a strategic viewpoint, the allies saw it as being in their interests to improve the military capability of the Khmer Republic to resist North Vietnamese aggression. To have declined the request of the Khmer Government would have placed on the New Zealand Government the onus of explaining why it had decided to discontinue its contribution to a programme which earlier that year it regarded as necessary. This could have posed difficulties if both the Australians and Americans decided to continue on the grounds that the programme was still needed. The political benefits that would accrue vis-a-vis the Americans and Australians as well as the Khmer Republic from the continuation of New Zealand's training assistance had also to be carefully weighed before a final decision was made.[277]

The New Zealand Government was prepared to approve the establishment of a tripartite training establishment at Dong Ba Thin, based upon several assumptions: the constraints on foreign advisors operating in Cambodia would remain; U.S.

force levels were low enough to allow the increase in number of personnel proposed; FANK could be equipped prior to travel in South Vietnam; funds could be made available; an official request would be made by Cambodia, and the South Vietnamese Government would agree to the new programme; the Khmer Government would make a request to the Australian and New Zealand Governments, who would both accept; the U.S. logistic support would continue; the Khmer Government would provide sufficient troops to meet the twelve battalion training objective; a site could be found and be acceptable and supportable; and finally, air lifts for the movement of trainees between Cambodia and South Vietnam would be available.

At a Working Level Meeting held in late July, both the Australian and New Zealand representatives indicated that their countries would prefer to work with the Americans in a joint effort, rather than establish separate nationally identifiable programmes in support of FANK training.[278] Despite the present problems, the current system of FANK training was seen by both the New Zealand and Australian representatives to be working well. They indicated that the size of any effort would be contingent upon the political situation in their respective countries as well as the capacity of the U.S. logistical system to provide the required support. At the end of September, ten members of the Phuoc Tuy Training Battalion conducted a reconnaissance of Dong Ba Thin. As such, the Phuoc Tuy and Long Hai training centres were to be closed down in November 1972.[279]

As all its required conditions were met, on 16 October 1972 the New Zealand Cabinet approved in principle to continue its military training assistance to Cambodia through the activities of 2NZATTV until 30 November 1973, or earlier if American support for the programme ceased.[280] However, there was to be no increase in personnel for the team.

Also during this time, the Cambodians had begun preparations for training their own troops. On the direct orders of Lon Nol, four Cambodian Brigadiers and sixteen field grade officers visited FANK training centres in May 1972 to collect ideas for the establishment of their own training centres in the republic by the end of 1972. To assist with these preparations, and to make FANK more self reliant in training matters, a series of courses were conducted at the FANK training centres in South Vietnam. Courses teaching MOI were held for FANK instructors at Bien Hoa, and a twelve week course was conducted at Dong Ba Thin for Cambodian static training establishments and Mobile Training Teams. The best students from these courses were retained as instructors for duty in the UITG training battalions for a further twelve weeks before returning to Cambodia as mobile battalion training cadres. FANK specialist instructors were also attached to the ARVN specialist service schools for short periods.[281]

However, the new FANK training programme was never implemented. Abruptly, in late October, Lieutenant Colonel Brown, the Commander of NZATGV, was informed that the New Zealand Government had authorised the withdrawal of the two training teams from South Vietnam. These instructors were not informed of their future until 29 November 1972, when Australian Army Assistance Group, Vietnam (AAAGV) was told to arrange for the return of those who had been instructing in the FANK programme to Australia. In early November 1972, NZATGV informed New Zealand Defence (NZDEF) that unconfirmed reports indicated that the U.S. intended ceasing all FANK training when the cease-fire came into effect in January 1973, all trainees would then be returned to Cambodia, and all American instructors and advisors would then withdraw over the next thirty days.[282] The FANK training scheme was to continue at Dong Ba Thin until it ceased in early December 1972.[283] This was due to the intended signing of a cease-fire, and the unofficially voiced intentions of the U.S. to withdraw all of its forces from South Vietnam.

Despite this decision, small groups of New Zealand replacements arrived at Dong Ba Thin in early November 1972.[284] The New Zealand Army sought to have as many of its instructors as possible receive experience in the skills offered in the FANK training programme, and some of the members of 2NZATTV had almost completed their time in South Vietnam anyway. The training undertaken by these replacements was ad-hoc. After receiving less than one month's notice, one group attended a short familiarisation course: "We knew we were going to South Vietnam to train Cambodians, but I don't think we really knew the scope of the project, and how exactly we would be employed. The course was of very little use."[285] One replacement, S.D. Hopkins, went to the School of Military Engineering for two days where one of his friends taught him about mines and booby traps, although "this was not formally arranged."[286] Most of the replacements met the personnel that they were replacing at Saigon, where they "talked for about two hours while waiting for our flights. Originally there was supposed to be a two to three day change-over."[287] However, the replacements had little time to use the skills that they had been taught before they were withdrawn from South Vietnam.

When it came time to be withdrawn from South Vietnam, two of the team members, Sergeants Cunningham and Wharewera, signed on to remain in Dong Ba Thin. The reason for their decision was, recalls Wharewera, "it was better than soldiering in New Zealand. We were doing a job we were trained to do. To come back to New Zealand and just do the old, insignificant training, was boring. We were having a good time. We had never been shot at."[288] They were the only single soldiers in 2NZATTV. Presumably the other team members, who were all married, wanted to return home to their families.

In late November 1972, the FANK Training Command (hereafter FTC) presided over the graduation of the last scheduled Khmer light infantry battalions and the closure of the Long Hai and Phuoc Tuy training camps. This left only the Dong Ba Thin site actively training FANK battalions. On the morning of 28 January 1973, the FTC was ordered to cease all operations. On 23 February 973, the unit at Dong Ba Thin was also disbanded.

In all, the UITG-FANK-FTC had partially retrained four ARVN airborne divisions, trained four ARVN Divisions, fourteen ARVN ranger battalions, a tank regiment, eight reconnaissance companies, eighty-five Khmer infantry battalions and one Marine Fusilier battalion. During its placement at Dong Ba Thin, 2NZATTV had participated in the training of ten of these FANK battalions.[289]

2NZATTV's contribution to MACV's training initiatives was limited in the comparatively small size of the team and by the twelve week parameter for each course. While of undisputed value in assisting with the FANK training programme, the twenty-eight instructors faced serious problems that reduced their effectiveness. The New Zealanders' lack of adequate preparation, differences in language and culture, time constraints, a low ratio of instructors to students, and the peasant FANK recruits were barriers to effectiveness. However, the New Zealanders considered that the training methods and content were as good as could have been devised in the time allowed, given the decision to produce `trained' FANK battalions quickly. The team members successfully integrated into the American training system, and achieved some success in improving the effectiveness of the FANK training programme. Despite the decision to extend the training programme until late 1973, the decision of the ANZUS partners to withdraw their troops from South Vietnam put paid to any further impression the team might have made to the chances of the Khmer Republic's army in holding at bay the communist forces in that country.

Although eighty-four FANK light infantry battalions were trained, and 2NZATTV participated in the instruction of ten, the net result was probably limited to slightly improving the participants' likelihood of survival. The withdrawal of 2NZATTV came at a time when the team members felt they were most needed.

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1. Interview with J.A. Mace, 13 July 1990. Mace was the Director of Infantry and Special Air Service (SAS). He is now a former CDF.

2. A second Memorandum of Understanding regarding FANK training was also signed by Brown and Colonel J.V. Hemler, CO FANK Training Command on 18 August 1972. Serial 226: Aid to Cambodia. This memo remained unchanged throughout the duration of 2NZATTV's attachment to the DBTTB.

3. A complete course programme is contained in 15/28/13 No 1, vol V, AATTV Reports and NZATTV Reports, March - June 1972. Defence Classified Registry (DCR).

4. Interview with J.G. Daniell, 18 August 1990. He proved to be a particularly capable commander of 2NZATTV, and received excellent personal reports whilst he held this position.

5. ibid.

6. Military Working Arrangement between Commander MACV and Commander NZATGV, dated 21 August 1972, 15/28/13 NZ Force in Vietnam: Training Assistance SVN Forces, vol I, March - August 1970, DCR.

7. ibid.

8. RNZAMC is the acronym for Royal New Zealand Army Medical Corps.

9. Interview with J.G. Daniell.

10. Interview with S.D. Hopkins, 13 July 1990. Although appointed leader of the general subjects committee, he spent little time with 2NZATTV. He was sent to Saigon to assist with arranging the withdrawal of the two New Zealand training teams.

11. Interview with B.J. Pepper, 16 May 1989. He was the S3 Officer (Training).

12. ibid.

13. The information for this report was gathered from three main sources. First, three ex-members of 1NZATTV and the AATTV were interviewed: Majors B.P. Martin, D.L. Ogilvy, and Captain R.M. Mountfort. Secondly, reports from the training programme used by the Australian Army in preparing their personnel to work in AATTV, and also from 1NZATTV.

14. To DAT from G2AT. Training of FANK Training Team 2NZATTV. Dated 12 January 1972, 15/28/13, NZ Forces in Vietnam: Training Assistance SVN Forces, vol IV, June 1972 - September 1973, DCR.

15. The trickle system referred to the constant sending or replacement of small numbers personnel of a unit.

16. The students received briefings on all facets of the FANK training programme. They also received refresher training in instruction and weapons they would be instructing on.

17. Interview with B.J. Pepper.

18. Interview with J.H. Wharewera, 18 June 1991. He was an instructor in the weapons committee, specialising in the .30 calibre machine-gun.

19. One such example was AATTV's involvement with the Dong Da National Training Centre, which was involved in FANK training.

20. A copy of the Australians training programme is contained in Report by Lt-Col P.T.F. Gowans, Chief Instructor, AATTV Cambodian Training Cadre Course, 15/28/13 NZ Forces in Vietnam: Training Assistance SVN Forces, vol III, December 1970 - May 1972, DCR.
The course was conducted from 20 December 1971 to 1 January 1972

21. Almost six of the thirteen days were spent taking lessons, as against one hour during the New Zealanders course.

22. 2NZATTV Mounting Instructions, dated 1 February 1972, 15/28/13, NZ Forces in Vietnam, vol III.

23. He met some of the Australian and American training teams involved in the FANK training programme.

24. Dong Ba Thin was located approximately 15 minutes drive, or one kilometre in a straight line, from Cam Ranh Bay.

25. Interview with R.L. Scott, 10 July 1990. Scott was a weapons instructor in one of the MTTs.

26. ibid.

27. From V Force Commander to AGS, dated 18 December 1971, Serial A226.
Johnson had already worked with New Zealanders, having attended a jungle warfare course at the training centre in Malaysia.

28. Monthly Report 2NZATTV for March 1972. Major Daniell, OC to NZATGV, dated 3 April 1972, 15/28/13 No 1, vol V.
Not all of the New Zealanders were directly involved with instruction, and a small number of officers filled some command positions, such as the Second in Command; two S3s, one being responsible for operations and the other for training policy; and one S2 (an Intelligence/Security position). Pepper was responsible for training policy. He was to

prepare and arrange the Programme of Instruction (POI), prepare the operational plans for the field training exercises, and liaise with the Koreans as to when and where the FANK trainees would be out on exercise. He was also involved with assessing the Cambodians when they went out on their exercises.

29. Ops stood for Operations and Trg was Training.

30. XO was Executive Officer and Trg Detmt was Training Detachment.

31. Admin stood for Administration.

32. On 5 March 1972, a welcoming ceremony was conducted at Dong Ba Thin for 2NZATTV, despite Brown's earlier recommendation.

33. Monthly Report 2NZATTV March 1972. Major Daniell, OC, to NZATGV, dated 3 April 1972, 15/28/13 No 1, vol V.

34. ibid.

35. A complete programme of the training undertaken at Dong Ba Thin is contained ibid.

36. There were about forty-six officers in each battalion. One New Zealander, Lt J.A. Brandon, was in charge of the courses' administration. The majority of New Zealanders did not participate in this course, which was conducted by MTTs. The only other New Zealander attached to the MTTs was Scott.

37. Interview with J.H. Wharewera.

38. Interview with J.A. Brandon, 15 May 1989. He was the XO (2IC) of Training Team A511.

39. Interview with R.L. Scott.

40. Interview with M.T. Dance, 3 March 1992. Dance was a weapons instructor.

41. Interview with R.L. Scott.

42. Interview with J.A. Brandon.

43. ibid.

44. A FANK battalion consisted of approximately 512 personnel, organised as a headquarters element comprising eleven personnel, and three rifle companies each of 167 men. Each company comprised a headquarters element of five personnel, a mortar squad of nine personnel, a reconnaissance platoon of thirty personnel, and three rifle platoons each of forty-one men.

45. Interview with J.H. Wharewera.

46. Each newly arrived FANK battalion received, for the duration of its training, a MTT. The MTT consisted of one Captain, who advised the battalion's CO, and seven to nine Warrant Officers or Sergeants. The cadre did the battalion's administration and was responsible for its welfare.

47. Interview with M.T. Dance.

48. Interview with R.L. Scott.

49. Interview with M.T. Dance.

50. Interview with J.A. Brandon.

51. Interview with J.G. Daniell.

52. For a detailed training programme, see `FANK Training Programme of Instruction', Army 34/15 Aid to Cambodia (FANK Training), vol I, March - December 1971.

53. Weapons - 81mm mortar, 60mm mortar, and .30 browning. Tactics - infantry major tactics. Miscellaneous - reconnaissance platoons, air drops, and artillery fire support missions.

54. Specialised instruction was given to: the machine-gun squads, mortar specialists, radio telephone operator training, medical specialists and battalion staff training. After their training, they were incorporated into the battalion exercises.

55. Interview with M.R. Wicksteed, 11 July 1990. Wicksteed was a general subjects instructor.

56. Pepper was the New Zealand representative at these meetings.

57. Interview with B.J. Pepper.

58. ibid.

59. During each day there were eight forty-minute periods as well as some night classes.

60. Interview with M.T. Dance.

61. Interview with R.N. Cameron, 16 June 1991. He was the X-ray technician/Wardmaster at the camp dispensary.
Part of the New Zealanders' duties entailed the provision of medical treatment to the FANK soldiers and also the local Vietnamese civilians.

62. Interview with S.D. Hopkins.

63. Interview with J.H. Wharewera.

64. ibid.

65. Interview with M.A. Cunningham, 5 March 1992. He instructed in the general subjects committee.

66. Interview with B.J. Pepper.

67. Interview with R.L. Scott.

68. Interview with E. Beaumont, 11 July 1990. Beaumont was in the weapons committee and instructed on the .30 Calibre machine-gun..

69. Interview with M.T. Dance.

70. NZATGV to NZDEF Wellington, dated 271020Z Sep 1972, Serial A192: HQ NZ ATGV Weekly Sitreps. See also From NZATGV to NZDEF Army, dated 271020Z Sep 1972, 15/28/10, Monthly Activity Reports - NZ Forces in Vietnam (Operational Summaries, Reports etc), vol IV February - December 1972, DCR.

71. Ten percent of lessons were lecture-based, twenty-five percent were based upon demonstrations, while sixty-five percent of lessons were based upon practical exercises.

72. Interview with R.N. Cameron.

73. Monthly Report 2NZATTV November 1972. Marshall (HQ NZATGV to AGS), dated 6 December 1972. 15/28/10, vol IV.

74. Interview with R.L. Scott.

75. Interview with M.R. Wicksteed.

76. ibid.

77. Interview with J.H. Wharewera.

78. There were also problems encountered because the Cambodians had a casual attitude towards ammunition and the need for safety.

79. Interview with J.G. Daniell.

80. Interview with M.R. Wicksteed.

81. ibid.

82. Interview with J.H. Wharewera.

83. Interview with R.N. Cameron.

84. This was termed, by the New Zealanders and Americans, the `walk-around'.

85. Interview with R.N. Cameron.

86. Interview with J.H. Wharewera.

87. During the medical lessons, the Cambodians were taught a mixture of theory and practise. Firstly, they attended lectures in the classroom and then they were taken into the field where they were given a number of scenarios to work through, such as treating and bandaging wounds.

88. Interview with J.H. Wharewera.

89. Interview with B.J. Pepper.

90. ibid.

91. Interview with J.H. Wharewera.

92. ibid.

93. ibid.

94. ibid.

95. ibid.
Both New Zealanders received a letter of commendation from United States Army, Vietnam (USARV) for their efforts. Letter of Commendation, from J.V. Hemler, Commander USARVN, dated 12 May 1972. A copy of this letter is contained in each of the recipients personal files.

96. ibid.
In some of the camps, groups of personnel specialised in making the required training aids, although some lesson plans and aids were manufactured in the U.S.

97. `Zeroing' ensures that the sights of a weapon are correctly set for its particular firer.

98. Interview with M.T. Dance.

99. Interview with M.A. Cunningham.

100. Interview with J.H. Wharewera.

101. Interview with B.J. Pepper.

102. Interview with J.G. Daniell.

103. Interview with M.A. Cunningham.

104. Interview with J.H. Wharewera.

105. ibid.
Due to the high casualty rates, some FANK battalions sent to Dong Ba Thin were comprised of `composites' - the remnants of several battalions joined to form one new battalion.

106. It was customary for the second generation to live

near the parents of either the husband or the wife. Within a short time a neighbourhood emerged which consisted of closely connected kin.

107. Christchurch Star, 29 Aug 1972.

108. Interview with J.H. Wharewera.

109. Interview with M.R. Wicksteed.

110. Interview with E. Beaumont.

111. Interview with R.L. Scott.

112. Interview with M.A. Cunningham.

113. Interview with S.D. Hopkins.

114. Interview with R.L. Scott.

115. Interview with J.G. Daniell.

116. Interview with M.R. Wicksteed.

117. Interview with J.G. Daniell.

118. Interview with B.J. Pepper.

119. ibid.

120. ibid.

121. ibid.

122. The Koreans, their battery located to the north of the camp, provided the bulk of the artillery support. There was also a U.S. 105mm artillery battery near Dong Ba Thin.

123. Interview with J.H. Wharewera.

124. Interview with B.J. Pepper.

125. ibid.

126. Interview with J.H. Wharewera.

127. Interview with B.J. Pepper.

128. Since the withdrawal of 1st Australian Task Force (1ATF) and the lack of U.S. support, the security situation in Phuoc Tuy province quickly deteriorated. By October 1972 the security situation in Phuoc Tuy was becoming critical. FANK battalions undergoing field exercises around the Long Hai hills were being involved in an increasing number of contacts with enemy units. Some battalions suffered heavy casualties and although there were some casualties among the U.S. advisors, no Australians were ever injured.

129. Interview with B.J. Pepper.

130. Interview with S.D. Hopkins.

131. Interview with R.L. Scott.

132. ibid.

133. ibid.

134. Interview with J.G. Daniell.

135. Interview with J.H. Wharewera.

136. ibid.

137. Interview with M.R. Wicksteed.

138. Most of the Cambodian soldiers were Thervada Buddhists, Cambodia's state religion. About eighty-eight percent of the FANK soldiers actively practised this religion.

139. Interview with R.L. Scott.

140. ibid.

141. Interview with E. Beaumont.

142. Interview with M.A. Cunningham.

143. ibid.

144. ibid.

145. Interview with J.H. Wharewera.

146. Interview with M.A. Cunningham.

147. ibid.

148. ibid.

149. Interview with J.A. Brandon.

150. Monthly Report 2NZATTV November 1972. Marshall (HQ NZATGV to AGS), dated 6 December 1972, 15/28/10, vol IV.

151. The term `fragging' derived from the use of a fragmentation weapon, normally a grenade, to kill an unpopular officer.

152. Interview with J.A. Brandon.

153. ibid.

154. NZATGV to NZDEF WGTN, dated 060915Z December 1972, 15/28/10, vol IV.

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107. Christchurch Star, 29 Aug 1972.

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116. Interview with M.R. Wicksteed.

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155. ibid.

156. NZATGV to NZDEF Wgtn, dated 271020Z Sep 1972, Serial A192.

157. Interview with J.H. Wharewera.

158. Monthly Report 2NZATTV November 1972. Marshall (HQ NZATGV to AGS), dated 6 December 1972, 15/28/10, vol IV.

159. ibid.

160. ibid.

161. Interview with J.H. Wharewera.

162. Interview with B.J. Pepper.

163. Interview with J.G. Daniell.

164. Interview with R.L. Scott.

165. Interview with M.A. Cunningham.

166. ibid.

167. Interview with J.H. Wharewera.

168. Interview with R.L. Scott.

169. Interview with M.R. Wicksteed.

170. Report by Minister of Defence on his visit to South-east Asia, 27 February - 16 March 1972, Army 95/3/1 Report on visits overseas by CGS, Minister of Defence and Prime Minister, vol 1, October 1968 -.

171. ibid.

172. New Zealand Herald, 6 June 1972.

173. ibid.

174. New Zealand Herald, `The Year of the Rat', 11 June 1972.

175. ibid.

176. Interview with J.G. Daniell.

177. Interview with R.L. Scott.

178. Interview with M.A. Cunningham.

179. Interview with B.J. Pepper.

180. Interview with J.H. Wharewera.

181. Interview with R.N. Cameron.

182. ibid.

183. Interview with J.H. Wharewera.

184. ibid.

185. ibid.

186. Interview with S.D. Hopkins.

187. Interview with B.J. Pepper.

188. Interview with J.G. Daniell.

189. Interview with B.J. Pepper.

190. Interview with R.N. Cameron.

191. Interview with B.J. Pepper.

192. Interview with R.N. Cameron.

193. Interview with M.T. Dance.

194. Interview with R.N. Cameron.

195. Interview with M.A. Cunningham.

196. Interview with J.H. Wharewera.
The personnel of 2NZATTV did not participate in civic action programmes to the same extent as 1NZATTV. Consequently, this effort could not be related to military assistance to South Vietnam except by inference, although Holyoake had argued that if New Zealand could assist Cambodia in its fight against Communism, then Vietnam had a better chance of survival. Letter of Instructions for Ambassador in Saigon, dated 6 March 1972, Def 23/4/1 Mutual Aid Programme to South Vietnam, General, vol 7, October 1971 - June 1972, DCR.

197. Interview with M.T. Dance.
The Cambodians were virtually autonomous within their own living lines, and cooked their own meals.

198. The Cambodians and South Vietnamese each had a separate compound, and the Americans and New Zealanders shared one compound.

199. Each side of the perimeter was about one kilometre long.

200. Interview with J.H. Wharewera.

201. Some of the Montagnards were used to demonstrate such skills as ambushing and contact drills, and were also assigned as bodyguards to all the camp's senior officers.

There was a small number of female Montagnard soldiers, whose job was to search the women workers as they entered and left the camp.
The RF assumed the responsibility for security from the withdrawing Koreans. They were kept busy, as it was estimated that the major enemy unit that was operating in the area was a VC Sapper battalion, which had a strength of about 550 troops.

202. Interview with E. Beaumont.

203. Interview with J.G. Daniell.

204. Interview with R.M. Cameron.

205. The firing ranges were located fifteen kilometres south of the camp.

206. Interview with J.H. Wharewera.

207. Interview with M.A. Cunningham.

208. Interview with M.R. Wicksteed.
In most of the training centres that he visited, Daniell observed that similar such practises were tolerated. Interview with J.G. Daniell.

209. Interview with M.T. Dance.

210. ibid.

211. ibid.

212. ibid.

213. New Zealand Herald, 11 June 1972.

214. During September and October, there was a major North Vietnamese offensive and 2NZATTV was on a thirty-minute notice to vacate to the Cam Ranh Bay area, where they would be evacuated by either aircraft or helicopter.
Soldiers from one American unit due to return to the U.S. were attacked, while in their barracks. Having handed in their weapons in the afternoon, the Americans could not defend themselves, and twenty-seven were killed by satchel charges.

215. NZATGV to NZDEF ARMY, dated 5 October 1972, 15/28/13, NZ Forces in Vietnam, vol IV.

216. Interview with E. Beaumont.
The only damage suffered was to the air conditioners, which were all blown out of the walls.

217. Monthly Report - 1NZATTV September 1972. Dated 6 October 1972, Marshall for Commander, 15/28/10, vol IV.

218. 2NZATTV only ever had one casualty. Wharewera received two minor fragmentary wounds from a grenade explosion on a range at the centre on 11 October 1972.

219. The New Zealanders never found out what happened to these men, only that they had been "suitable dealt with. We had a fair idea of what happened to them, because "some of the Cambodians ideas of punishments were "fairly harsh." Interview with B.J. Pepper.

220. Interview with D. Barber, dated 16 May 1991.

221. Auckland Star, 29 August 1972.

222. ibid.

223. The Khmers counted their age from conception and were already a year old when born. The use of the Buddhist calendar meant that in theory, a child two days old in western terms could already be two years old in the Cambodian. Christchurch Press, 1 September 1972.

224. Interview with B.J. Pepper.

225. ibid.

226. Interview with J.H. Wharewera.

227. Interview with B.J. Pepper.

228. Christchurch Press, 29 Aug 1972.

229. Interview with R.L. Scott.

230. ibid.

231. Christchurch Star, 29 Aug 1972.

232. Interview with R.L. Scott.

233. Christchurch Star, 29 Aug 1972.

234. Letters were sent to the editors of many New Zealand newspapers, criticising the training of these youths.

235. From Wellington to Saigon, dated 2 September 1972, Army 34/15 Aid to Cambodia (FANK Training), vol II, February 1972 - March 1980...
There had been some `low-level' inquiries from the Americans regarding the willingness of New Zealand to conduct unit instruction in night operations or even to supplement or replace U.S. training teams in some ARVN training depots, ibid.

236. From Wellington to Saigon, dated 5 September 1972, ibid.

237. Auckland Star, 29 August 1972.

238. ibid.

239. ibid.

240. Christchurch Press, 1 September 1972.
There was also an agreement with the Khmer Government that any personnel selected for FANK training in South Vietnam would be pre-screened.

241. From Saigon to Wellington, dated 31 August 1971, PM 478/4/28 Countries Series, vol 1, South Vietnam: Political Affairs. Training Assistance to RVNAF, 4.4.70 - 31.8.72.

242. Christchurch Star, 30 August 1972.

243. ibid.

244. From 4 to 24 September 1972, the team was not allowed to participate in the training programme.

245. Interview with M.A. Cunningham.

246. HQ NZATGV to NZDEF ARMY, dated 21 September 1972, 15/28/13, NZ Forces in Vietnam, vol IV.

247. NZATGV to NZDEF ARMY WGTN, dated 3 October 1972, ibid.

248. New Zealand Herald, 14 September 1972.

249. Christchurch Star, 14 September 1972.

250. NZATGV to NZDEF Army from Brown, dated 25 September 1972, Army 34/15, vol I.
As a result of this investigation, the numbers of under-age trainees returned to Cambodia were as follows: 45th Battalion, eleven; 48th Battalion, thirty-one; and 51st Battalion, twenty-one. The unit that Barber first saw which had under-age recruits was the 42nd Battalion which, according to Daniell, was "quite abnormal", with an estimated twenty percent below the legal age of 18 years. ibid.

251. Interview with B.J. Pepper.

252. Letter from Daniell, Major OC to HQ NZATTV, dated March 1972, Serial 196: Establishment - 2NZATTV.

253. ibid.

254. Handwritten note by Fenton on bottom of Daniell's letter, ibid. See also Chapter Four of this thesis.

255. By this date, it was expected that seventy-eight FANK battalions would have been trained.

256. V.B. Brown to AGS Wellington, dated 11 April 1972,

15/28/13, NZ Forces in Vietnam, vol III.

257. V.B. Brown to AGS Wellington, dated 17 April 1972, ibid.

258. Report by Minister of Defence on his visit to South-east Asia, 27 February - 16 March 1972, Army 95/3/1, vol 1.

259. From Brigadier Whitelaw to AJAC, dated 29 June 1972, Defence Def 23/4/1 Mutual Aid Programme to South Vietnam, General, vol 8, July 1972 - December 1975, DCR.
MACV had already planned a tripartite training programme prior to the formal request by the Khmer Republic.

260. About forty-five battalions had attended twelve-week basic training courses in South Vietnam up to this point.

261. In mid April, Brown had warned AGS that the U.S. would be making such an approach, fully briefing them on the background to the request, and the composition of New Zealand's expected contribution. V.B. Brown to AGS Wellington, dated 11 April 1972, 15/28/13, NZ Forces in Vietnam Assistance, vol III. He also correctly surmised that the probable location would be Dong Ba Thin, as the Province chief in Phuoc Tuy was demanding the return of both the Phuoc Tuy and Long Hai camps for tourist purposes and that the Lam Son National Training Centre (NTC) could no longer support FANK unit training after completion of the 1972 financial year.

262. ibid.

263. ibid.
Each contributing countries would administer and sustain their own contingents. The FANK battalions would be equipped prior to leaving the Khmer Republic. The Americans and South Vietnamese would provide transportation between Cambodia and South Vietnam for the FANK battalions.

264. A Memorandum of Understanding with the FANK Training Command, signed by Brown noted that New Zealand would pay for all support obtained from U.S. military sources for NZATGV. 15/28 Separate, no 8, vol I, Military Working Agreement between COMD USMACV (Maj-Gen G.H. Woodward, Chief of Staff, (MACV) and COMD NZATGV, dated 21 August 1972.

265. Interview with R.L. Scott.

266. `Residual Forces, Vietnam.' From AJAC, dated 30 June 1972, 15/28 Separate, no 8, vol I.

267. ibid.

268. Those attending were the New Zealand and Australian Ambassadors, Brigadier I.A. Geddes (Commander Australian Army Assistance Group, Vietnam), Colonel A.W.F. Rofe (Australian Attache), Lieutenant Colonel Brown, Commander of NZATGV, McClelland, and the U.S. Senior Training Advisor.

269. V.B. Brown to AGS Wellington, dated 17 April 1972, 15/28 Separate, no 8, vol I.

270. ibid.

271. NZATGV to Wgtn, dated 200845Z June 1972, Serial A226.

272. From Thornton to Secretary of Foreign Affairs, dated 14 April 1972, ibid.

273. ibid. See also V.B. Brown to AGS Wellington, dated 17 April 1972, ibid.

274. Residual Forces, Vietnam. From AJAC, dated 30 June 1972, Defence 23/4/1, vol 8.

275. NZATGV to Wgtn, dated 200845Z June 1972, Serial A226.

276. NZATGV to NZDEF Army, dated 10 June 1972, Serial A226.

277. To Minister of Defence. Continuation of Military Training Assistance to Cambodia and Vietnam. From J.F. Robertson, Secretary of Defence, dated 7 July 1972, Defence 23/4/1, vol 8.

278. A Working Level Meeting Covering Australian New Zealand Contributions to FANK Training - Formal Proposal, dated 28 July 1972, Serial A226.

279. The FANK training programme at both Phuoc Tuy and Long Hai concluded on 22 November 1972.

280. From NZDEF ARMY to NZATGV, dated 18 October 1972, 15/28/13, NZ Forces in Vietnam, vol IV.

281. In October 1972, ten FANK officers arrived from the Khmer Republic on attachment to Dong Ba Thin, to assist with instruction.

282. NZATGV to NZDEF ARMY, dated 9 November 1972, 15/28/12 NZ Forces in Vietnam - Withdrawal, vol III, October 1971 - March 1974, DCR.

283. NZATGV to NZDEF ARMY, dated 27 October 1972, ibid.

284. See Appendix Nine of this thesis for a list of these personnel.

285. Interview with M.R. Wicksteed.

286. Interview with S.D. Hopkins.

287. Interview with R.N. Cameron.

288. Interview with J.H. Wharewera.

289. These battalions were the: 22nd, 25th, 27th, 35th,

41st, 42nd, 45th, 48th, 51st and 52nd.

CHAPTER SEVEN

THE DECISION TO WITHDRAW.

In August 1971, the Prime Minister of New Zealand, Keith Holyoake, considered that the establishing of the training team at Chi Lang had concluded a chapter in the history of New Zealand's relations with South Vietnam.[1] The lowering of the New Zealand ensign on 21 December 1972, at Free World Headquarters, Saigon, was the conclusion of eight years of New Zealand military involvement in the Vietnam War. Several days later, the last of New Zealand's servicepersons to have served in South Vietnam stepped off a Royal New Zealand Air Force (hereafter RNZAF) transport at Whenuapai Airbase.

Chapter Seven will analyse the factors behind the withdrawal of the training teams. This will involve examining the following related topics: the attitudes of the training team members towards their intended withdrawal from South Vietnam; and the problems faced by the wives and partners of the team members. Problems of withdrawing are assessed: The synchronising of the 1st New Zealand Army Training Team, Vietnam's (hereafter 1NZATTV) withdrawal with allied withdrawals. The deteriorating military situation in both South Vietnam and the Khmer Republic post-1972 will be briefly outlined.

It was only from 1969 onwards that the New Zealand Government had been moving slowly towards the withdrawal of troops from South Vietnam. However, the government was conscious of its obligations within the framework of the Australia, New Zealand and the United States (hereafter ANZUS) alliance. It believed that New Zealand's interests were best served by supporting its two closest allies, when and where they required such support. This had been a major

reason for its decision to become militarily involved in the Vietnam War in 1964 and later for the introduction of the training teams. A date for the completion of this withdrawal was never revealed, as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs expected that the result of the continuing withdrawal of the US and Britain from Southeast Asia "may well bring a period of acute political instability."[2] Lieutenant Colonel V.B. Brown, commander of New Zealand Army Training Group, Vietnam (hereafter NZATGV), had made several recommendations, in early 1972, that the training teams be withdrawn from South Vietnam. For political reasons, the New Zealand Government had decided that the teams would remain.

By the early 1970s, there were signs that the importance that the New Zealand Government attached to the alliance system was weakening. In 1970, there was a growing attitude in the New Zealand Government which claimed: "we are an independent country and will need to formulate our own assessments."[3] In 1972, as US involvement in Vietnam drew to a close, the assessment of New Zealand's security obligations changed. The 1972 Defence Review observed "that formal security alliances can be and are interpreted today in more flexible, sophisticated and non-restrictive terms than was feasible 20 or even 10 years ago."[4] The Defence Review indicated that New Zealand's more `sophisticated' interpretation was that the New Zealand Government's obligation was primarily to secure its own area:

> ...if our major allies are to continue actively to be concerned about the security and well-being of New Zealand and its area of primary strategic concern, they must have reasons for believing that we are willing to make an appropriate defence effort on our own behalf and for the sake of regional security. Defence co-operation entails reciprocity.[5]

The Defence Review argued there was a need for closer relations between New Zealand and Australia, because both faced "similar uncertainties, dangers and challenges. For both, closer collaboration in many fields, including defence, must surely be the way ahead."[6]

The election of a Labour Government in New Zealand at the end of 1972 resulted in a fundamental shift in assumptions that up to this point had underlain New Zealand's foreign policy. The New Zealand Government began to move away from dependence upon either Britain or the United States (hereafter U.S.). As early as 1966, it had been a policy of the New Zealand Labour Party to withdraw New Zealand's training effort from South Vietnam when it became government. The Labour Party saw the war in South Vietnam as basically a socio-economic problem, and that it was essentially a civil war.[7]

From 1968, the Labour Party had begun to emphasise the necessity for New Zealand to rethink both its defence and foreign policies. This process of rethinking rapidly gained momentum with the election win by the Labour party in 1972.[8] The Labour Government sought to create stability in Southeast Asia through non-military means. It placed great emphasis upon morality and upon humanitarian aid and encouraged greater regional co-operation in Southeast Asia through larger volumes of commerce, trade and development, and the broadening of New Zealand's relationships with these countries.[9] The New Zealand Opposition Defence spokesman, A.J. Faulkner had stated, in 18 February 1972, that a Labour Government would end all New Zealand overseas military aid programmes and that the party's aid programmes for the area would be social and economic only.[10] N. E. Kirk, the Labour Party leader, claimed that the provision of monetary aid to Southeast Asia, and the withdrawal of the New Zealand training teams were part of the same policy.[11] Kirk stated in early December 1972 that as a cease-fire was likely, the

people in South-east Asia "should soon be able to turn their energies to rebuilding...They are going to need all the help they can get."[12] He then went on to say that now "we can turn to more positive ways of expressing New Zealand ideals and of using New Zealand skills and resources."[13] The day following his speech, Kirk announced that the New Zealand Government would be giving a gift of $10 million, over five years, to the countries of Indochina, including South Vietnam, for post-war reconstruction. He argued: "the killing, the maiming and destruction have gone on too long."[14] Faulkner acknowledged that the two New Zealand training teams had carried out their tasks with "the high degree of professional skill New Zealand had come to expect of their defence services and in a manner which brought credit to them. He thanked the personnel who had served in the training teams for their efforts."[15] On 28 January 1973, President Nguyen V. Thieu, President of South Vietnam, sent a letter to Kirk thanking the New Zealand Government for the provision of combat and training assistance. In reply, Kirk considered that "although all New Zealand soldiers have now left South Vietnam, there is no question of our losing interest in your country."[16]

The Labour Government sought greater independence from its allies, stressing the need for New Zealand to develop independent foreign policies rather than pursue policies that related to alliances.[17] Such independent initiatives were in response to the changed international environment in the Southeast Asian region, the ramifications of the Nixon Doctrine due to the phased withdrawal of the US military from Southeast Asia, the withdrawal of Britain from the region, and Labour Party policy.[18] Kirk wrote that countries like New Zealand had to "stand on their own two feet...This means that small countries can no longer rely on them [the great powers] as heavily as in the past but must be able and ready to look after their own interests...Our policy will be a policy of independence."[19] However, this did not mean withdrawing from ANZUS. The New Zealand

Government saw the treaty as still valid, but would place less emphasis upon its importance in New Zealand's defence arrangements. In 1970, Kirk had claimed: "an independent foreign policy does not mean that we become an international ostrich and bury our heads in the Pacific sands."[20] In 1973, the Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs stated that the ANZUS treaty still had continued validity for New Zealand.[21] In 1973, also, the New Zealand Government recognised the Government of North Vietnam to "open a line to Hanoi through which New Zealand can add its voice to others urging peaceful reconstruction."[22]

One of the first announcements to be made by the New Zealand Labour Government, as expected by the New Zealand public, was to announce the withdrawal of the remaining New Zealand troops from South Vietnam. However, a definite date was yet to be decided upon.[23] At a Cabinet meeting in early December 1972, a report from Major L.H. Pilling, the Officer Commanding (OC) of 1NZATTV, was presented which concluded that 1NZATTV could be withdrawn immediately. This was because the South Vietnamese instructors had assumed sixty percent of its work in running the leadership courses and they could take over the entire management of the courses at any time.[24] It was also noted that the 2nd New Zealand Army Training Team, Vietnam (hereafter 2NZATTV) could be withdrawn within three weeks of the American team's withdrawal from Dong Ba thin. The Cabinet decided that the Americans had been given sufficient notice regarding the anticipated withdrawal of the New Zealand team from Dong Ba Thin to have enabled the American team to make alternative arrangements. However, this was certainly not so. When 2NZATTV was finally withdrawn, one team member, M.R. Wicksteed, recollected: "I think that there was a sense of frustration upon the part of the Americans at the news and also to our withdrawal."[25]

In his final report regarding New Zealand military units in South Vietnam, L.W. Thornton, the New Zealand Ambassador to the Khmer Republic and Ambassador designate to South Vietnam presented his assessment of the effect that the withdrawal would have. He believed that he did not think that New Zealand's

> credibility/acceptability to the Vietnamese Government had been affected by the withdrawal of our troops. The fact that we had a small training team there was evidence of our sympathy and we had a tremendous aid programme, which for us was a very large aid programme...I don't think that we have lost ground with the Vietnamese because we have pulled out our troops. We have not been seen as having `deserted the cause'.[26]

On 11 December 1972, Cabinet approved the withdrawal of all elements of NZATGV from Vietnam as soon as practicable. This was publicly announced on the same day.[27] Lieutenant Colonel Brown, commander of NZATGV, was ordered to notify all the appropriate Vietnamese, US, and Australian military authorities. Thornton, who had already been advised of the government's decision, was to advise the South Vietnamese Government. However, it was left to Brown to determine, in consultation with Thornton, the actual date when the two teams were to be withdrawn.[28]

Before this announcement, there was a sense of frustration among the New Zealand troops regarding the uncertainty surrounding their future. Despite the Labor Party vowing to withdraw the troops from Vietnam when it assumed power, Army General Staff (hereafter AGS) still planned to replace team members who were nearing the end of their tour. Many New Zealand troops knew that a Labour victory was highly probable. The Australian Labour Party had also vowed that it would do likewise with the Australian training teams. Many men in the two New Zealand training teams knew that any decision regarding their future would not be based upon military considerations but rather domestic and international politics which would be decided

upon in the general elections in New Zealand and Australia. Another deciding factor was whether the Australian and American training teams would remain in South Vietnam. One member of 2NZATTV, R.N. Cameron, commented: "we knew we would be withdrawn. It was just a matter of time."[29] Many New Zealand servicemen, particularly those who had not had an opportunity to serve in South Vietnam, "hoped that Labour would not get in. They felt that Labour would stop their opportunities to further their experience and knowledge in military matters", recalled M.T. Dance, then a Sergeant in 2NZATTV.[30]

At least one New Zealander from each of the two training teams went to Saigon to liaise with NZATGV headquarters in the close-down of New Zealand's training effort. One of these New Zealanders stated that: "I was never really impressed...I thought that they were pretty well laid back and that was Vietnam Force Headquarters. I thought that the people in the HQ had it cushy. I got the impression that they didn't really give a stuff about the people further out."[31]

After the training activities had concluded, the bulk of 1NZATTV flew to Saigon while some of the New Zealanders prepared the training wing for handover to the South Vietnamese. There was disappointment amongst the New Zealanders regarding the stores accounting procedures, for there were no arrangements made to hand over any 1NZATTV equipment to the South Vietnamese. Only stores that were in new or as new condition were to be returned to New Zealand. However, much of the team's equipment, particularly webbing and personal support equipment such as packs that the South Vietnamese urgently needed, was destroyed.[32] An RF battalion that had arrived at Chi Lang as 1NZATTV was being withdrawn was very poorly equipped, and some of the New Zealand instructors felt that this battalion could have used the equipment that the team had to destroy. The vehicles that belonged to the team were handed over to the South

Vietnamese, partly because the roads to Chi Lang and Can Tho were cut by enemy troops and moving vehicles to either area by road was too dangerous.[33] The airstrip at Chi Lang was too small to allow an aircraft with the capacity to carry the vehicles to land. Primarily, it was almost uneconomical to repair the vehicles as it was estimated that they would have cost about $NZ1,000 to $NZ2,000 to repair.[34] The South Vietnamese stood little chance of obtaining spare parts to keep them going as the New Zealanders themselves had found it virtually impossible to do so. One of the team members who had remained back in Chi Lang after the bulk of the team had flown to Saigon recalled that he did not feel as if the Vietnamese really did want the team's equipment. The official handover of the Leadership Wing at Chi Lang to the South Vietnamese took place on 12 December 1972.

The announcement of the intended withdrawal of the training effort from South Vietnam drew mixed reactions form those who were still serving in NZATGV. The decision was welcomed by some of the New Zealanders still serving in NZATGV. One, R.N. Mountfort, then serving with the AATTV, of them recollected: "I was pleased to go home; I thought that I had done my bit. The way of life that we led is all right for a limited period, but it is not the sort of thing you would want to sustain for a long time."[35] For some, knowing when they would return to New Zealand coloured their attitude, mindful that they would be in South Vietnam for only a limited period. This made the stress and privations they suffered more bearable and made it easier for them to focus their energies and concentrate upon their job.

Some instructors from both teams were disappointed about being withdrawn from South Vietnam. Although the men of 2NZATTV knew they would be withdrawn, Cameron remembered: "We did not expect to be pulled out so quickly. We thought, okay, probably after Christmas or something like that. We were annoyed at being withdrawn from South Vietnam but we

were soldiers. You did as you were told. But I was disappointed. I preferred to be in the field, rather than playing politics back in the camps in New Zealand."[36] Some of the others had mixed feelings. J.G. Daniell, then commander of 2NZATTV, recollected that: "Although I was happy to go home, despite all the reservations I had about the value and the degree of training the Cambodians were receiving, I still felt that we had achieved at least something, it was better than doing nothing."[37] Some of the instructors from 1NZATTV shared similar feelings, for much the same reasons. This was because they were withdrawn in the middle of training a RF battalion highly motivated towards its training: a rare quality among the South Vietnamese individuals and units. As a result, some of the instructors were enthusiastic about the training. Because of the speed of the withdrawal, there had been little time to prepare plans for the training to be undertaken by the Vietnamese themselves. Some of the New Zealanders believed that they should not have been withdrawn until after that battalion had completed its training. Some of the men from 1NZATTV had been given acting Warrant Officer rank while they were in Chi Lang. They would loose this rank upon their return to New Zealand, which many of them felt to be very distasteful.

Regrets about the withdrawal of the two teams were felt most among those who had been at Chi Lang and Dong Ba Thin for only a relatively short period. Many of them wanted to stay for the whole of their tour. One soldier recalled: "there was a certain amount of feeling of being a transient through Chi Lang...You wear one instead of two ribbons and this sort of thing. You are asked: `Oh, how long were you over there for?' From a professional point of view, it was disappointing not to have completed the job I was trained for. I did the course, had been through the interpreters, looked at the lessons I had to take, but never actually got to get out there and give any of it."[38]

The bulk of the New Zealand team at Chi Lang was withdrawn from Chi Lang by US aircraft. The use of U.S. rather than New Zealand aircraft was based partly upon the experiences of Victor (`V') Company when it was withdrawn from Vietnam in 1971. Just before the date of the withdrawal, several US and Australian aircraft had been hit by ground fire when travelling over parts of central and northern Bien Hoa province. When the RNZAF was approached to provide an aircraft to withdraw one of the New Zealand infantry company's, the reply that AGS received was because of the deteriorating security situation at Vung Tau, "we are unwilling to commit a C-130, one-fifth of New Zealand's long range transport fleet, to an overnight stop in a forward area unnecessarily."[39]

The personnel from 2NZATTV had similar experiences with the RNZAF. When they were withdrawn from Dong Ba Thin, the weapons had to be crated as per RNZAF regulations. However, the men were in a hostile environment and, if attacked prior to boarding the plane, they had little means of defence. The New Zealand officers at Dong Ba Thin, recalled Wicksteed, had "quite an argument with the Air Force."[40] The RNZAF was not prepared to fly into Cam Ranh Bay as the RNZAF felt that the airbase was not secure, but were prepared to fly to Na Trang. Wicksteed continued, "We said...driving from Cam Ranh Bay to Na Trang...we regarded as far more dangerous that the b... landing at Cam Ranh Bay which was literally as the crow flies half a mile away."[41] In the end, the RNZAF agreed to fly into Cam Ranh Bay. Wicksteed remembers:

> we would secure the airfield. You could not. There were just so few of us that it was a nonsensical thing to say. The aircraft parking area alone was large enough for an aircraft to land on. Securing the airfield meant putting two jeeps, with M-60s, out at either end of the airfield. The aircraft arrived, we popped a couple of smoke flares, the aircraft circled and then landed.[42]

The men from 1NZATTV were flown from Chi Lang to Saigon where fifteen personnel from 1NZATTV were billeted in the Mondiel hotel. They remained there until approval to move was granted and the hand-over at Chi Lang completed. This was done to ensure their safety and security. The last members to leave would include the training team at Dong Ba Thin and headquarter's personnel from NZATGV. The personnel from 2NZATTV were flown from Nha Trang to Saigon where they were also billeted until they were due to leave Vietnam.

The day before they were due to fly out for Singapore, Tan Son Nhut was attacked. The New Zealand Air Force Bristol Freighter from 41 Squadron had been at the airfield overnight and after the attack the pilots were all excited about it. "They [the crew] searched all over the aircraft to see if they could find scratches on it."[43] Aside from rocket shrapnel chipping some of the paint, the aircraft was undamaged. From 12 to 20, December the personnel from NZATGV and the rest of the freight flew from Saigon to Singapore by special RNZAF flights.[44]

The men arrived in Singapore where they remained for five days for `de-kitting' and debriefing. Before leaving Singapore, the men were advised of the positions and camps that they would be posted to after Christmas.[45] On 21 December the men flew out of Saigon for New Zealand. The aircraft landed first in Auckland where some of the men disembarked. The Hercules then flew the remainder of the men to Christchurch, stopping at various airports along the way.

At Auckland, unlike the situation at the other airports, the men arrived home to a virtually empty airport. D.J. Brassey, an ex-team member of 1NZATTV described the scene: "There was a little bit of political stuff at Whenuapai, there were people from the New Zealand/Vietnam Association, and a few kids were waving paper flags of South

Vietnam and Cambodia. A lot of us were disappointed there was no official welcome back. But when I saw my wife and children, that more than made up for it."[46]

One New Zealander, Wicksteed, who did not want to withdraw from South Vietnam recalled that at the welcome ceremony, "Faulkner asked me `Are you pleased to be home for Christmas?' I remember saying `No, I'm not. I believe we had a job to do and we did not finish what we were sent there to do.' And he wasn't interested in that and he turned on his heels and walked off and spoke to somebody else."[47]

Once the welcome ceremony had been completed, the men had to clear customs. Several team members agreed that: "Customs were obviously annoyed that they were there at Whenuapai for such a small group of people, and they were equally annoyed that we had been delayed for three hours, and it was late at night...They went though our luggage with a `fine tooth comb'. They did us for everything. It was just an unpleasant end to it all, I thought."[48] Ironically, Faulkner commented in the New Zealand press: "the change of Government brought some changes of policy, and part of it was to bring you back from Vietnam. No one could be less than very proud of the type of country that we are, to produce men like you."[49]

For many wives, the greatest problem they had to now face was readjusting to having a man about the house. Some of them had become used to having their husbands away. Mrs Daniell recalled "When he came back, I did not want him to take over. I was already doing things myself very well. It was very hard to hand back the running of a household and the decision making."[50]

Some of the wives found that their husbands had changed, albeit temporarily, both physically and mentally. One wife did not recognise her husband when he arrived at the airport:

> I remember you walked across there with that moustache, you were as black as the ace of spades, you were smoking and had gained a lot of weight. A man walked up to me and said `Oh, David has not come home.' I was feeling so let down and so sad. I then realised that this man I was looking at was my husband.[51]

Although most of the New Zealanders had not been involved in actual combat, Dance recollects that "there was false sense of normality. Vietnam was a combat area, but you never knew when, where or if, you were going to be hit. You never knew if you would run over a mine or if the villagers would do anything to you. The people you saw on the road with weapons, you assumed that they were friendly. You never knew what was going to happen. Even when I got back to safe New Zealand, I was still quite tight inside, wound up like a clock and it took a while to come back to reality."[52] Many of the men had broken sleep patterns which took about twelve months to return to normal.

The wives also found it difficult to converse with their husbands, although this was only a short-term problem. During their time in South Vietnam the men had developed their own Army jargon, virtually a pidgin language, with many of the words they used being Vietnamese, American English or Khmer. After using this language for an extended time, it took some of the men time to break the habit of talking like this to their wives and families.

There were some other problems, many temporary, which wives and families had to get used to. Mrs Brassey recalls:

"I didn't like the way he drove a car in the middle of the road, and he drove very fast. I was quite frightened for a while. And all the adjustments. He couldn't sleep at night for the whole night. He kept waking up every few hours. And the children had to adjust to having a father again."[53]

The wives of the replacements had expected their husbands to be in Vietnam for at least nine months, and the swift pull-out of the team personnel was also hard for the families who had adjusted themselves to being without their husbands. One wife felt that the news of the expected return of her husband had been: "Oh, I was excited. It was great. I was really pleased he was coming home. It was like Christmas etc all rolled into one."[54]

The reasons and facts behind the fall of South Vietnam and the Khmer Republic to communist forces have already studied in great depth in other writings. The book written by W.E. Le Gro, Vietnam: From Cease-fire to Capitulation provides an account of the decline of the South Vietnamese Territorial Forces in Military Region (hereafter MR) IV, the region in which 1NZATTV operated.[55] From mid-1973, until the fall of South Vietnam in 1975, the South Vietnamese forces in MR IV faced a deteriorating situation.

By the end of 1972, the South Vietnamese had the `upper hand' with regard to the military situation in MR IV. The South Vietnamese forces in MR IV had kept the route from the lower Delta to Saigon open, the rice harvests were largely protected from theft by enemy forces, the ARVN units in MR IV were in relatively fair condition and controlled the major population centres. The enemy forces in MR IV had sustained heavy casualties, particularly in the 1972 Easter Offensive. In October alone, the North Vietnamese Army (hereafter NVA) and Viet Cong (hereafter VC) suffered over 5,000 casualties. Further, they received few replacements, and their ammunition stocks were low. There were three ARVN

divisions located in the north of MR IV and the Territorial Forces were conducting an increasing number of operations in concert with these ARVN units.[56] This integration served to reduce any impact that 1NZATTV's training might have made. The Territorial Forces tended to be subservient to ARVN leadership and these territorial units had to ensure that their tactics were similar to those used by the US-trained ARVN units.

Before the signing of the cease-fire in late January 1973, the NVA attempted to capture territory in South Vietnam, an operation known as Landgrab 73. On 23 January 1973, the enemy began its widespread attacks in MR IV, among the heaviest in South Vietnam. These attacks were primarily directed against Territorial Force outposts and district towns. In the Delta, the enemy attempted to capture areas which had the greatest potential for subsequent exploitation and expansion. The heaviest action in MR IV centered around the Seven Mountains area where ARVN rangers undertook a slow and costly campaign to destroy the remnants of 1 NVA Division. RF and PF outposts throughout MR IV experienced relatively persistent enemy harassment and there were over 800 minor contacts alone in the three weeks following the cease-fire.[57] The high casualty rates and the pressure of combat suffered by the RF/PF, meant that it became increasingly difficult for commanders to release their RF and PF units to attend training, such as the RF battalion retraining programme introduced into Chi Lang at the end of 1972. This resulted in the combat efficiency of units, particularly those in areas with the highest levels of combat, declining even further.

By 28 January, Landgrab `73 had ceased, with the communists failing to make any significant or lasting gains. The war in the Delta became a struggle to control the rice harvest.[58] The South Vietnamese still maintained control over much of the Delta despite high casualty rates suffered during Landgrab 73 and until the surrender of South Vietnam

to communist forces on 30 April 1975, no district town in MR IV was captured or even temporarily controlled by communist forces. As a result of increasing cutbacks in US military aid to South Vietnam, combat units found their issues of equipment and ammunition increasingly curtailed.[59] The situation was the worst among RF/PF units in the Mekong Delta. By 1974, few PF soldiers were able to participate in an operation with adequate supplies of ammunition.

There were also economic factors that resulted in a decline in the standards of the ARVN and the Territorial Forces. A rapid rise in economic inflation in South Vietnam resulted in soldiers' salaries losing purchasing power and increases in the price of rice, the staple diet of the South Vietnamese.[60] The petroleum crisis in 1973 pushed up the prices of oil, forcing the government to introduce severe rationing of fuel to the armed forces. The withdrawal of the US from South Vietnam also led to large-scale unemployment for many South Vietnamese. These factors resulted in servicemen being unable to support their families solely on their army pay. This resulted in increasing desertions from not only regular but also Territorial Force units as soldiers spent more time working in more profitable jobs or else growing food for their families. By mid-1973, there were signs of a significant decrease in the morale and manpower of many units, which affected their combat effectiveness. This situation became so severe that the commander of MR IV, Lieutenant General Nguyen Vinh Nghi, was replaced in November 1974.[61]

In late 1974, in line with its policy of consolidating independent units into large formations that were better suited to sustained conventional warfare, two NVA divisions were established in MR IV. Throughout most of December 1974, the communist forces in MR IV launched the most widespread and intense attacks to date. Despite a generally effective defence by the RVNAF, the security in the hamlets

and countryside of the southern Delta deteriorated as a result of the widespread attacks against isolated and lightly defended regions. Although by the end of January 1975, the RVNAF in MR IV had managed to hold their own despite high casualties, the security situation in MR IV slowly deteriorated.[62] The Territorial Forces in this region in particular, were not competent enough to defeat the communists. Further, there were insufficient regular force units to assist the Territorial Forces. As a result of this ineffectiveness, the NVA/VC gained control over several villages and hamlets in the north of MR IV.[63]

In MR IV the South Vietnamese had an eventual total of 144 RF battalions, and 125 separate RF companies, employed by eighteen STCs. Despite the comparatively large number of units, these units were all seriously understrength, through a combination of factors: ineffective recruiting, combat losses, desertion and the `flower soldier' practice.[64] In MR IV RF strength was only eighty percent of its authorised level and the strength of the Noncommissioned Officers (NCO) was even lower. Although RF battalions had about 400 men, some were as low as 300. Some battalions, such as in Chuong Thien Province, could field only 150 soldiers, just over a company's strength, for operations. As unit numbers declined, so did morale and combat efficiency which resulted in further desertions. In MR IV the numbers deserting were generally higher than those being recruited. There were, however, some RF units who, fighting near their homes, were very effective.

The FANK also experienced major military setbacks, similar to those experienced by the RVNAF, which greatly reduced the success of the FANK training programme and 2NZATTV's role within it.[65] From 1970 until 1975, the FANK was slowly driven from the rural areas to the larger urban centres. By August 1972, the communist forces in the Khmer Republic controlled about eighty percent of the countryside and about half the population. The eastern and northern

portions of the Khmer Republic were now secure springboards for the NVA and VC to operate into South Vietnam. By the spring of 1973, all roads leading from Phnom Penh were blocked.[66] Some supplies could reach Phnom Penh only by air or by barge up the Mekong from South Vietnam. Phnom Penh itself was subject to periodic raids and bombardment. With considerable US aid, the FANK was only able to achieve a temporary stalemate. The FANK was unable to launch any viable offensives due mainly to the lack of enthusiasm of the Cambodians for the war and the poorly trained and equipped government units who were better suited to defensive rather than offensive operations. In April 1975, Phnom Penh fell to the communists.

New Zealand's withdrawal of its training teams from South Vietnam in December 1972 did not mark the end of its military presence in Southeast Asia, but in retrospect it may be seen as the beginning of the end. The failure of the United States, with its vast reservoir of the material of war, to contain Communism in South Vietnam, suggested that Southeast Asian nations were best left to decide their own destiny. Further, New Zealand's military presence should be only by request and limited to the nation's reducing military capability. Economic decline, Britain's withdrawal east of Suez, and a growing popular distaste for United States nuclear policy, together made overseas defence commitments unpopular with the taxpayer.

New Zealand's concept of `forward defence', a policy set forth in 1955, when New Zealand's contributions to Commonwealth defence moved from the Middle East to Malaya, was gradually eroding. Its requiem was sung in the New Zealand Government's 1978 Defence Review, although the last New Zealander of 1Royal New Zealand Infantry Regiment

(RNZIR) did not leave Singapore for home until the early 1990s: "there is no longer a strategic requirement for us to base forces in Southeast Asia."[67]

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1. New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, vol. XXI, no. 8, August 1971. p. 63.

2. G.R. Laking, `International Problems Confronting New Zealand in the 1970s', in Foreign Policy in the 1970's, NZIIA (1970), p. 26.

3. ibid.

4. The Defence Review, AJHR, A 5 (1972), p. 14.

5. ibid., p. 15.

6. AJHR, A 5 (1972), p. 30.

7. D. McCraw, `From Kirk to Muldoon: Change and Continuity in New Zealand's Foreign-Policy Priorities', Pacific Affairs, vol. 55, no. 4 (Winter 1982-1983), p. 642.

8. This foreign policy would last only until mid-1975, mainly because of external financial forces which made it unworkable.

9. D. McCraw, `From Kirk to Muldoon', p. 646.

10. For an explanation of why the New Zealand Government chose, however, to retain troops in Malaysia and Singapore, see K.J. Jackson, `New Zealand and Southeast Asia' Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies, vol. 9, no. 1 (March 1971), pp. 9 - 13.

11. The New Zealand Labour government decided to withdraw all of its troops from South-east Asia, and by 1975 also included those in Singapore.

12. New Zealand Herald, 12 December 1972.

13. ibid.

14. ibid.

15. New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 22, no. 12 (December 1972), pp. 35 - 36.

16. Kirk to Thieu, 19 February 1973, 15/28 NZ Forces in Vietnam (Excluding Medical), vol IV, August 1971 - October 1973.

17. Annual Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs for the Year ended 31 March 1973, (Wellington, 1973).

18. This regional-based policy was remodelled from Labour policies of the early 1930s.

19. N. Kirk, `New Zealand in the World of the 1970's', New

Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 22, no. 12, December 1972, p. 3.

20. The Press, 6 May 1970.

21. Report of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 1973. p. 11.

22. New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review, vol. 23, no. 9 (September 1973), p. 41.

23. In early December 1972, the South Vietnamese, US and Khmer Governments were informally notified by L.W. Thornton, the New Zealand Ambassador to the Khmer Republic and Ambassador designate to South Vietnam, that a decision to withdraw all New Zealand troops immediately could be expected within two to three weeks of the new government assuming office in Wellington.

24. Note for Ministers, `Withdrawal of Military Training Teams from Vietnam, dated 7 December 1972, CAB 222/3/2 Defence: South-East Asia Vietnam, Cambodia, Laos 15-5-62 to 30-9-81, Cabinet Paper (CP).

25. Interview with M.R. Wicksteed, 11 July 1990. Wicksteed was a general subjects instructor with 2NZATTV.

26. Interview with Sir L.W. Thornton, dated 11 July 1989. Copy of this report is held by Thornton.

27. NZDEF Army to NZATGV 1 December 1972, 15/28/12 NZ Forces in Vietnam - Withdrawal, vol III, October 1971 - March 1974.

28. ibid.

29. Interview with R.N. Cameron, 16 June 1991. He was the X-ray technician/Wardmaster at the camp dispensary.

30. Interview with M.T. Dance, 3 March 1992. He was a weapons instructor.

31. Interview with M.R. Wicksteed.

32. The bulk general stores held by NZATGV were returned to Singapore by RNZAF B-170 on 6 December 1972. Any surplus items were returned to the US salvage authority.

33. Contingency Planning Withdrawal from South Vietnam. To AGS from G.A. Hitchings, dated 16 November 1972, 15/28/12, vol III.

34. ibid.

35. Interview with R.N. Mountfort, 4 March 1992. He served with the AATTV at the JWTC at Nui Dat and then at Dong Tam.

36. Interview with R.N. Cameron.

37. Interview with J.G. Daniell, 18 August 1990.

38. ibid.

39. Withdrawal of NZ V Force from SVN. To Col GS from B.T. O'Connor, dated 6 December 1972, 15/28/12, vol III.

40. Interview with M.R. Wicksteed.

41. ibid.

42. ibid.

43. Interview with M.R. Wicksteed.

44. Instructions for the Withdrawal and Disbandment of NZATGV, NZATTV. Fenton, dated December 1972, 15/28/12, vol III.

45. For a copy of the posting orders, see NZDEF WGTN to FF COMD et. al., dated 6 December 1972, ibid.

46. Interview with D.J. Brassey, 10 July 1990. He was the team's mechanic.

47. Interview with M.R. Wicksteed.

48. ibid.

49. New Zealand Herald, 23 December 1972.

50. Interview with Mrs J. Daniell, 18 August 1990.

51. ibid.

52. Interview with M.T. Dance.

53. Interview with Mrs M.J. Brassey, dated 10 July 1990.

54. ibid.

55. W.E. Le Gro, Vietnam From Cease-fire to Capitulation (Washington DC., 1981). The following paragraphs are condensed from this book.

56. The 7th Infantry Division was responsible for Kien Phong, Kien Tuong, Dinh Tuong and Go Cong Provinces. The 9th Infantry Division was responsible for Sa Dec, Vinh Long, Vinh Binh and Kien Hoa Provinces. The 21st Infantry Division was responsible for Phong Dinh, Ba Xuyen, Bac Lieu, An Xuyen, Chuong Thien and Kien Giang provinces. The 44th CTZ was responsible for the northwestern portion of the delta.

57. A minor contact was a fight in which there were no more than five ARVN casualties.

58. Almost ninety percent of the communists rice require-

ments were filled from South Vietnamese sources, primarily from the Delta. Over 600 tons of rice were smuggled out of the Delta each month by communist forces.

59. G. Lewy America in Vietnam (New York, 1978), pp. 207 - 208.

60. ibid., p. 209.

61. Nghi was replaced by Major General Nguyen Khoa Nam.

62. The resultant shortage of combat troops in MR IV could have been partly attributable to `ghost' soldiers. Units were suddenly understrength when called into action as a result of this practice. This problem was particularly serious in MR IV. For further information, see Khuyen Dong Van, The RVNAF (Washington DC., 1980), p. 366 - 369.

63. The NVA/VC gained control of villages and hamlets in the provinces of Kien Giang, An Xuyen and Chuong Thien.

64. A `flower soldier' was a soldier who paid his unit commander a fee to be freed from duty.

65. For an examination of the fall of the Khmer Republic, see: A.R. Isaacs Without Honour: Defeat in Vietnam and Cambodia (Baltimore Md, 1983), pp. 241 - 289; W. Shawcross Sideshow: Kissinger, Nixon and the Destruction of Cambodia (London, 1979); S. Sutsakhan The Khmer Republic at War and the Final Collapse (Washington DC., 1980).

66. The objective of the Khmer communists, supported by the VC/NVA, remained always to isolate Phnom Penh from the other zones held by the FANK.

67. The Defence Review, AJHR, A 5 (1972), p. 30.

CONCLUSION

> In August 1971, Holyoake considered that the establishing of the team at Chi Lang had "concluded a chapter in the history of New Zealand's relations with South Vietnam", and that all New Zealand combat troops, except the training team, would be back home by the end of 1971.[1]

The decision to send Army Training Teams to Vietnam issued from New Zealand's cautious approach to the Vietnam War, an attitude evident throughout the Holyoake, Marshall and Kirk governments' involvement. All three governments were politically sensitive to public uneasiness about the war, and to the vociferous objections of minority but outspoken segments of the population. The Holyoake government, in particular, had to balance the domestic policy requisite for appeasing a concerned electorate against the foreign policy consideration of being responsive to the collective security expectations of the nation's major ally and valuable trading partner, the United States. Whatever help was given - non-combatant, combatant, medical or training teams - the tightrope had to be walked with care, and New Zealand's national identity in the theatre kept somehow distinguishable, where possible, from those of other allies. In the event, New Zealand's presence would actually lose most of its separate national identity, and so forfeit some of the political advantages that might have been gained, particularly with the establishing of the Australia New Zealand Army Corps (hereafter ANZAC) Battalion.[2]

The combatant training assistance that two New Zealand infantry companies provided to the 18th Army of the Republic of Vietnam (hereafter ARVN) Division and the territorial forces, as brief an episode as it was, did not reflect a deliberate change in policy by the New Zealand Government about the type of military assistance that was considered

appropriate. It was, rather, done specifically to meet 1st Australian Task Force (hereafter 1ATF) concerns about the longer-term territorial security of Phuoc Tuy province, once 1ATF was withdrawn in accordance with the Vietnamisation programme. However, the training provided by 1ATF was largely unsuccessful. This was due primarily to time constraints, language difficulties, the two-faceted war in Phuoc Tuy and 1ATF's inability to undertake both anti-guerilla and pacification operations. Other reasons included the New Zealanders' lack of experience in instruction to non-English speaking troops, as well as the unhelpful attitude displayed by the Vietnamese participants toward the training programmes. This attempt to train the territorial forces in Phuoc Tuy, like the Vietnamisation programme as a whole, came too late to be truly effective.

The reasons behind the New Zealand Government's decision, in late 1970, to provide combatant training assistance to the Republic of Vietnam, in the form of the 1st New Zealand Army Training Team, Vietnam (hereafter 1NZATTV), were essentially the same reasons which underlay the government's decisions in earlier years to commit combat troops to the theatre: support for South Vietnam's fight against external subversion; support for New Zealand's two closest allies, the United States and Australia, by ensuring that its efforts closely mirrored those of its Australia, New Zealand and the United States (hereafter ANZUS) allies; and as an assertive expression of New Zealand's emergence as an active regional role-player in its own right. The Holyoake government's stated position had been that Southeast Asian nations must assume a greater responsibility for their own defence, and New Zealand's training assistance aimed to promote this concept of self-reliance.

Washington's adoption of a Vietnamisation policy was received with a sigh of relief in Wellington - as it was in Canberra. Subtle changes in long-term planning with respect

to Southeast Asia were now possible. Policy adjustments could be made with a view to further betterment of relations in a region likely to become important to New Zealand trade. This change in attitude was inevitable, given the convergence of four momentous circumstances whose impact was felt worldwide: the failure of American policies in Vietnam; the promulgation of the Nixon Doctrine and the resultant changes in United States (hereafter U.S.) policy towards its allies; the development of new links with China by Western nations following a visit to Peking in 1971 by the U.S. Secretary of State, H. Kissinger; and Britain's withdrawal from East of Suez to refocus its interests on European affairs.

Partly because of these far-reaching global developments, and because of home-grown social developments of the time, an impetus for change was created in New Zealand politics, with the Labour Party espousing a more independent foreign policy. That government sought to follow a foreign policy independent of any broadly shared national interests with other countries, and outside of a particular alliance. Although the American link remained a cornerstone of New Zealand's defence policy, the form of that relationship was changing as a result of the Nixon Doctrine and its broader ramifications.[3] In the refined language of diplomacy, the government "viewed with understanding the desire of the US to...reduce its involvement [overseas] and encourage its friends and allies to play a greater role in shaping the future."[4] As America favoured withdrawal and a reduction of its commitments in Southeast Asia, naturally so would the two ANZAC partners seek to lighten their own burdens. New Zealand's military role in Southeast Asia was changing. The tenet of forward defence was not being abandoned, but rather was assuming a different shape. The government saw its primary role as

being the "establishment a direct relationship and sustaining a habit of consultation and co-operation", with the countries of Southeast Asia.[5] New Zealand still wanted to continue its support to South Vietnam, but at a significantly reduced cost.

The New Zealand Government's foreign policy in the 1970s was very different from its alliance diplomacy of the previous decade.[6] This was not simply a matter of changing policies: it marked a fundamental shift of underlying assumptions as New Zealanders began to emphasise their own distinct nationhood and cast off the images of being dependent upon Britain, the United States or even Australia. Yet, judging Vietnam's requirements on merit, the New Zealand Army and the Government clearly recognised that assistance to the Vietnamese defence forces was well warranted. New Zealand could not refuse to lend training assistance to Saigon - to do so would have been a repudiation of its belief in collective security, given the country's unavoidable reliance on a common effort to meet potential threats to its own national security. Although hardly an impartial observer, in 1973, Kirk vehemently denounced his predecessor's adherence to the concept of alliance diplomacy:

> It had not been a moral crusade that had taken New Zealand into Vietnam...[Holyoake] had described the reason for New Zealand being in Vietnam as being a payment on an insurance policy. New Zealand fighting men were there conducting a war, partly on the civilian population, not for a moral cause, not to stem communism, but as a payment on an insurance policy.[7]

The secondment of five New Zealanders to the Australian Army Training Team, Vietnam (hereafter AATTV) was a preparatory measure intended to let the New Zealand Army accumulate pertinent knowledge that would be of benefit to any training team that might be sent to Vietnam later on. The decision made in October 1971 to replace these New

Zealanders, rather than withdraw them upon the establishment of 1NZATTV, clearly manifested the New Zealand Army's recognition, quite rightly so, that valuable expertise continued to be gained through the wide experiences of its personnel attached to AATTV, who were involved in a diverse range of training roles, including Mobile Advisory and Training Team (MATTs), in contrast to the static training that was being undertaken by 1NZATTV.

The dispatch of a second team - to help train Force Armee Nationale Khmere (hereafter FANK) troops - was prompted by much the same considerations as those which had previously led to assigning New Zealanders to work with the AATTV, and then to forming 1NZATTV, in response to a changed political and military state of affairs throughout Indochina early in 1970. The United States, too, sought New Zealand's active participation in a strategy which saw as essential the continued viability and co-operation of the Khmer Republic, necessitating a build-up of its armed forces. The consolidation and strengthening of FANK would result in a greatly increased efficiency in combating enemy units. Threatened with a consolidated and strengthened FANK to its rear, communist forces would have to be withdrawn from South Vietnam, and this would facilitate U.S. disengagement from the war. From the standpoint of efficiency, there were problems when the training area on Vietnamese soil was so far removed from where the Cambodian troops would be fighting. Little could be done in that regard, as sending New Zealand instructors into Cambodia was politically unacceptable. Government moves to provide training assistance to FANK were further complicated by premature press leaks from other countries, which caught Wellington off-balance.

Despite close associations between the New Zealand and Australian armies, the New Zealand Government, and indeed the New Zealand military, sought to retain a distinct

national identity within each training venture. Given the options available, and experience in combat and training ventures with the British and Australians in Malaya and with the latter in Vietnam, the New Zealand Army and Government did choose appropriate options for the provision of training assistance. Requests by the U.S. to assist FANK had been made simultaneously to Australia and to New Zealand, naturally foreshadowing the possibility of a co-operative venture. New Zealand on its part could commit to this effort either specialists dedicated to instruction on a single subject, or a multidisciplinary team that would conduct training in a wide range of skills. Although unable to detach sufficient manpower to establish a New Zealand training centre, as had been developed at Chi Lang, New Zealand was able to plan its contribution without reliance on the decisions of Australia.[8] With the logistical support available from U.S forces and the seemingly greater national `identification' possible within an American cultural milieu, the 2nd New Zealand Army Training Team, Vietnam (hereafter 2NZATTV) would eventually make its quarters at Dong Ba Thin as part of the U.S. FANK training command. The Australian Government, however, had preferred New Zealand's training effort to be identifiable with that of Australia's. The government's choice to participate in the American-led programme caused some friction between the governments of New Zealand and Australia.

The contribution of training teams provided several advantages, both militarily and politically, for New Zealand. The training teams were small, and were hardly a major drain on the limited military budget. For a small investment of funds and manpower, although perhaps for a comparatively high cost in administrative support, they afforded the nation a continuing military representation in Indochina. Holyoake reported to Parliament that the total

cost of New Zealand's military involvement in Vietnam, from 1964 to the final withdrawal of operational units, was $NZ18.6 million.[9] He further stated that expenditure on military training teams, mainly pay and allowances, including the provision for 1972, was for Chi Lang $NZ465,181 and for Dong Ba Thin $NZ139,000.[10] The training assistance was a constructive contribution to helping the Vietnamese develop their own defence capabilities to resist communist aggression; the instructors had no direct involvement in combat, as both Chi Lang and Dong Ba Thin were in relatively quiet sectors of South Vietnam, which would somewhat appease the anti-war movement while minimising the risk of sustaining New Zealand casualties; and perhaps most importantly, it was a continued demonstration of New Zealand's commitment to support its ANZUS partners. In addition, the government's access to Vietnamese and Cambodian military leaders and officials was thus enhanced, and the personnel by their presence gave New Zealand diplomats and servicemen a `feel' for the situation on the ground that might not otherwise have been experienced in the theatre.

The roles and situations of the two New Zealand training teams were as contrasting as were their respective strengths and weaknesses.[11] The five New Zealanders integrated into AATTV were involved in a diverse range of training roles, including MATTs, as distinct from the two New Zealand teams, which were in primarily static locations. 1NZATTV had a dual training role, providing not only leadership training to South Vietnamese Regional Force (RF) field officers, but also training selected Vietnamese officers to assume responsibility for the wing. 1NZATTV was established as a distinct New Zealand contribution to Vietnam, as part of `Vietnamisation', judged to be of `undoubted value' to the Vietnamese forces and to provide the New Zealand Army with a valuable return in training and experience. 2NZATTV was integrated into the U.S. Army

Advisory Group at Dong Ba Thin, located four hundred miles from Chi Lang, and trained Khmer Republic infantry battalions. The commitment of this team was based on the practical needs of the Cambodians and the assistance that they were already receiving from the United States. Much of what the instructors from 2NZATTV taught was dictated primarily by the Americans and the students that the Cambodians provided. In the judgement of J.G. Daniell, the commander of 2NZATTV, "Within the limitations of time and personnel available to train the Cambodians, it was probably as good a system as you could have had, under those conditions."[12]

The South Vietnamese territorial forces in Phuoc Tuy, along with the 18th ARVN Division, proved ineffective in preventing enemy access to the province after the withdrawal of 1ATF. Some effort had to be diverted from 1ATF to upgrading the ARVN performance. Attempts at upgrading ARVN units through retraining schemes and the leavening of Vietnamese units with Australian troops, however, produced little improvement or were only effective while Australians remained in the units.[13]

Following the withdrawal of 1ATF in late 1971, the security situation in Phuoc Tuy Province quickly deteriorated, despite the short-lived training programme that had been instigated by 1ATF and the on-going efforts of the AATTV. The territorial forces were now faced with the almost impossible task of exerting their control over territory, that it had been almost entirely excluded from, which 1ATF had formerly assumed sole charge. This situation was further compounded by 1ATF's failure to eliminate the influence of the National Liberation Front (NLF) from the province.[14] The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Vietnamese Communists (VC) operated extensively throughout much of Phuoc Tuy province, and the Vietnamese territorial forces were unable to counter this increased threat. Any real

possibility that the territorial force could destroy the enemy in the province was remote. Many territorial force units faced problems ranging from officers who displayed little interest in their responsibilities, to unmotivated troops and inadequate systems of administration and supply.

The military contribution, in all its guises, that New Zealand provided to the Vietnam War was relatively small: too small to be militarily significant. This was acknowledged by the New Zealand Army especially, even before the selection of personnel for 1NZATTV. The effectiveness of New Zealand's combatant training assistance can be summed up with L.H. Pilling's, an ex-OC of 1NZATTV, assessment:

> The Vietnamese Army was so huge, and we were so small. We really didn't have any great impact at all. Even if we had doubled or even trebled our numbers, I do not think our impact would have been much greater.[15]

Despite the political and military advantages, the value of the two training teams experiences to the New Zealand Army was minimal. Upon returning to New Zealand, the personnel from the two teams were simply posted to various units throughout New Zealand.[16] The Australian and United States Armies methodology on following-up personnel who have been overseas and recording their experiences, is something the New Zealand Army could do well to imitate. The reports sent from New Zealand Army Training Group, Vietnam (hereafter NZATGV) to New Zealand were filed in the classified registry in Defence Headquarters. As individuals, the experiences of the New Zealanders in the training teams were not recorded and used to adapt training methodologies, unless they were involved in training foreign troops or posted into a position allowing them to use or pass on to others their experiences. Pilling became the commander of Waiouru Military Camp, which provided training for the army, which allowed him to provide some input into the training system.

Both New Zealand training teams faced similar problems in fulfilling their respective training roles. As part of a joint Vietnamese/New Zealand training effort, 1NZATTV faced considerable problems in the areas of logistical support and construction material. There were inadequacies in both student numbers and student motivation, in the validation of training, and in support from Vietnamese command at the lower strata; problems that the New Zealanders were poorly prepared to face. The New Zealand instructors were inadequately trained for their task - having little experience in instructing foreign students, and very little understanding of either the Vietnamese language or culture. Having established the leadership courses and trained the Vietnamese instructors to the best of their ability, the New Zealanders faced the onerous and unrewarding task of ensuring that at least minimum instructional standards were met by their Vietnamese counterparts. Although it was recommended by Lieutenant Colonel V.B. Brown, commander of NZATGV, and Pilling, by mid-1972, that the team at Chi Lang be withdrawn, the New Zealand Government felt that, politically, it could not do so. This was for two reasons. First, 1NZATTV could not be withdrawn, leaving 2NZATTV in South Vietnam. This was politically unacceptable. Second, a political decision was made that New Zealand's training assistance could not be withdrawn before that of its two ANZUS allies.

Other factors limited the effectiveness of 2NZATTV's training. Team personnel were as inadequately prepared for their task as their counterparts in 1NZATTV. The terrain at Dong Ba Thin was in marked contrast to that in which the Cambodian troops would be fighting. The pace of the training schedule meant there was little allowance for flexibility and for remedial instruction. This paucity of time was also compounded by the requirement of the battalions under training to mount local security operations

in the last stage of their course. The low ratio of instructors to students also created limitations upon the effectiveness of the training, and also the extent to which the teaching syllabus and teaching material could be amended. Nevertheless, the New Zealanders considered that the training methods and content were as good as could have been devised in the time allowed, given the decision to produce trained battalions quickly.

One consistent failing throughout all of New Zealand's combatant training programmes was a lack of feedback received from the Americans, Vietnamese and the Cambodians regarding the effectiveness of the training. 1NZATTV did attempt to instigate validation systems, although most were relatively ineffectual, but 2NZATTV was unable to put such systems into operation, because the New Zealanders were never allowed into Cambodia.

During late 1971, and throughout most of 1972, Army General Staff (hereafter AGS) examined alternative training and advisory roles for the two training teams to determine their continued existence in Vietnam. However, AGS accepted that the future of the training venture depended on whether the New Zealand Government would, for political reasons, maintain the New Zealand presence in South Vietnam. This brought pressure on the New Zealand Government to maintain increasingly essential Trans-Tasman co-operation, which was to later bloom to fullness in Closer Economic Relations and also closer military relations. Yet, notwithstanding this external pressure, New Zealand's politicians were not unaware that the dissension created by the Vietnam War that had torn American society apart and publicly discredited its military, was also present, albeit in less vigourous and expansive style, in New Zealand. It had become an unpopular war.

The failings of New Zealand's training contribution should not be seen in isolation, but rather in the framework of the overall U.S. policy that existed towards the war in South Vietnam and Cambodia. The Vietnamisation programme was instigated too late and given too little time to succeed. This was also true of attempts to train the FANK to fight the Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge. Vietnamisation fell far short of developing leadership or instilling a sense of self-reliance in the South Vietnamese regular force and Territorial Force ranks. Prior to 1968, the Territorial Forces of South Vietnam received virtually no supervision and very few training programmes had any real long-term effect in improving their effectiveness. The goals of the Vietnamisation programme were beyond the capability of a U.S. advisory and assistance programme such as Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) and depended upon the generation of indigenous, purely Vietnamese initiatives and leadership, which never really emerged.

The Vietnamese authorities felt that the most valuable long-term form of assistance that New Zealand could provide was in jungle warfare and basic infantry skills. Vien considered the New Zealand and Australian soldiers' skills in jungle warfare tactics to be much in advance of the jungle skills of the Americans'. Both the Australians and New Zealand units had developed their skills, through training in Counter-Revolutionary Warfare techniques and with active service in the Malayan Emergency and the Confrontation with Indonesia in Borneo. They possessed highly skilled patrolling and ambush capabilities which were very well suited to the type of war conducted in Vietnam.

In the long term, the efforts of New Zealand's training contribution to enable the Vietnamese and Cambodians to defeat communist forces came to nought - in 1975 the Khmer Republic and South Vietnam, within two weeks of each other,

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12. Interview with J.G. Daniell, 18 August 1990. He commanded 2NZATTV.

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Although depleted in strength and influence, the NLF cadres were never defeated in Phuoc Tuy. See F. Frost, Australia's War in Vietnam (Sydney, 1987), pp. 158 - 163.

15. Interview with L.H. Pilling, dated 13 May 1989. Pilling was the OC of 1NZATTV from November 1971 - August 1972.

16. A number of personnel also resigned from the army upon their return to New Zealand.

CONCLUSION

> In August 1971, Holyoake considered that the establishing of the team at Chi Lang had "concluded a chapter in the history of New Zealand's relations with South Vietnam", and that all New Zealand combat troops, except the training team, would be back home by the end of 1971.[1]

The decision to send Army Training Teams to Vietnam issued from New Zealand's cautious approach to the Vietnam War, an attitude evident throughout the Holyoake, Marshall and Kirk governments' involvement. All three governments were politically sensitive to public uneasiness about the war, and to the vociferous objections of minority but outspoken segments of the population. The Holyoake government, in particular, had to balance the domestic policy requisite for appeasing a concerned electorate against the foreign policy consideration of being responsive to the collective security expectations of the nation's major ally and valuable trading partner, the United States. Whatever help was given - non-combatant, combatant, medical or training teams - the tightrope had to be walked with care, and New Zealand's national identity in the theatre kept somehow distinguishable, where possible, from those of other allies. In the event, New Zealand's presence would actually lose most of its separate national identity, and so forfeit some of the political advantages that might have been gained, particularly with the establishing of the Australia New Zealand Army Corps (hereafter ANZAC) Battalion.[2]

The combatant training assistance that two New Zealand infantry companies provided to the 18th Army of the Republic of Vietnam (hereafter ARVN) Division and the territorial forces, as brief an episode as it was, did not reflect a deliberate change in policy by the New Zealand Government about the type of military assistance that was considered

appropriate. It was, rather, done specifically to meet 1st Australian Task Force (hereafter 1ATF) concerns about the longer-term territorial security of Phuoc Tuy province, once 1ATF was withdrawn in accordance with the Vietnamisation programme. However, the training provided by 1ATF was largely unsuccessful. This was due primarily to time constraints, language difficulties, the two-faceted war in Phuoc Tuy and 1ATF's inability to undertake both anti-guerilla and pacification operations. Other reasons included the New Zealanders' lack of experience in instruction to non-English speaking troops, as well as the unhelpful attitude displayed by the Vietnamese participants toward the training programmes. This attempt to train the territorial forces in Phuoc Tuy, like the Vietnamisation programme as a whole, came too late to be truly effective.

The reasons behind the New Zealand Government's decision, in late 1970, to provide combatant training assistance to the Republic of Vietnam, in the form of the 1st New Zealand Army Training Team, Vietnam (hereafter 1NZATTV), were essentially the same reasons which underlay the government's decisions in earlier years to commit combat troops to the theatre: support for South Vietnam's fight against external subversion; support for New Zealand's two closest allies, the United States and Australia, by ensuring that its efforts closely mirrored those of its Australia, New Zealand and the United States (hereafter ANZUS) allies; and as an assertive expression of New Zealand's emergence as an active regional role-player in its own right. The Holyoake government's stated position had been that Southeast Asian nations must assume a greater responsibility for their own defence, and New Zealand's training assistance aimed to promote this concept of self-reliance.

Washington's adoption of a Vietnamisation policy was received with a sigh of relief in Wellington - as it was in Canberra. Subtle changes in long-term planning with respect

to Southeast Asia were now possible. Policy adjustments could be made with a view to further betterment of relations in a region likely to become important to New Zealand trade. This change in attitude was inevitable, given the convergence of four momentous circumstances whose impact was felt worldwide: the failure of American policies in Vietnam; the promulgation of the Nixon Doctrine and the resultant changes in United States (hereafter U.S.) policy towards its allies; the development of new links with China by Western nations following a visit to Peking in 1971 by the U.S. Secretary of State, H. Kissinger; and Britain's withdrawal from East of Suez to refocus its interests on European affairs.

Partly because of these far-reaching global developments, and because of home-grown social developments of the time, an impetus for change was created in New Zealand politics, with the Labour Party espousing a more independent foreign policy. That government sought to follow a foreign policy independent of any broadly shared national interests with other countries, and outside of a particular alliance. Although the American link remained a cornerstone of New Zealand's defence policy, the form of that relationship was changing as a result of the Nixon Doctrine and its broader ramifications.[3] In the refined language of diplomacy, the government "viewed with understanding the desire of the US to...reduce its involvement [overseas] and encourage its friends and allies to play a greater role in shaping the future."[4] As America favoured withdrawal and a reduction of its commitments in Southeast Asia, naturally so would the two ANZAC partners seek to lighten their own burdens. New Zealand's military role in Southeast Asia was changing. The tenet of forward defence was not being abandoned, but rather was assuming a different shape. The government saw its primary role as

being the "establishment a direct relationship and sustaining a habit of consultation and co-operation", with the countries of Southeast Asia.[5] New Zealand still wanted to continue its support to South Vietnam, but at a significantly reduced cost.

The New Zealand Government's foreign policy in the 1970s was very different from its alliance diplomacy of the previous decade.[6] This was not simply a matter of changing policies: it marked a fundamental shift of underlying assumptions as New Zealanders began to emphasise their own distinct nationhood and cast off the images of being dependent upon Britain, the United States or even Australia. Yet, judging Vietnam's requirements on merit, the New Zealand Army and the Government clearly recognised that assistance to the Vietnamese defence forces was well warranted. New Zealand could not refuse to lend training assistance to Saigon - to do so would have been a repudiation of its belief in collective security, given the country's unavoidable reliance on a common effort to meet potential threats to its own national security. Although hardly an impartial observer, in 1973, Kirk vehemently denounced his predecessor's adherence to the concept of alliance diplomacy:

> It had not been a moral crusade that had taken New Zealand into Vietnam...[Holyoake] had described the reason for New Zealand being in Vietnam as being a payment on an insurance policy. New Zealand fighting men were there conducting a war, partly on the civilian population, not for a moral cause, not to stem communism, but as a payment on an insurance policy.[7]

The secondment of five New Zealanders to the Australian Army Training Team, Vietnam (hereafter AATTV) was a preparatory measure intended to let the New Zealand Army accumulate pertinent knowledge that would be of benefit to any training team that might be sent to Vietnam later on. The decision made in October 1971 to replace these New

Zealanders, rather than withdraw them upon the establishment of 1NZATTV, clearly manifested the New Zealand Army's recognition, quite rightly so, that valuable expertise continued to be gained through the wide experiences of its personnel attached to AATTV, who were involved in a diverse range of training roles, including Mobile Advisory and Training Team (MATTs), in contrast to the static training that was being undertaken by 1NZATTV.

The dispatch of a second team - to help train Force Armee Nationale Khmere (hereafter FANK) troops - was prompted by much the same considerations as those which had previously led to assigning New Zealanders to work with the AATTV, and then to forming 1NZATTV, in response to a changed political and military state of affairs throughout Indochina early in 1970. The United States, too, sought New Zealand's active participation in a strategy which saw as essential the continued viability and co-operation of the Khmer Republic, necessitating a build-up of its armed forces. The consolidation and strengthening of FANK would result in a greatly increased efficiency in combating enemy units. Threatened with a consolidated and strengthened FANK to its rear, communist forces would have to be withdrawn from South Vietnam, and this would facilitate U.S. disengagement from the war. From the standpoint of efficiency, there were problems when the training area on Vietnamese soil was so far removed from where the Cambodian troops would be fighting. Little could be done in that regard, as sending New Zealand instructors into Cambodia was politically unacceptable. Government moves to provide training assistance to FANK were further complicated by premature press leaks from other countries, which caught Wellington off-balance.

Despite close associations between the New Zealand and Australian armies, the New Zealand Government, and indeed the New Zealand military, sought to retain a distinct

national identity within each training venture. Given the options available, and experience in combat and training ventures with the British and Australians in Malaya and with the latter in Vietnam, the New Zealand Army and Government did choose appropriate options for the provision of training assistance. Requests by the U.S. to assist FANK had been made simultaneously to Australia and to New Zealand, naturally foreshadowing the possibility of a co-operative venture. New Zealand on its part could commit to this effort either specialists dedicated to instruction on a single subject, or a multidisciplinary team that would conduct training in a wide range of skills. Although unable to detach sufficient manpower to establish a New Zealand training centre, as had been developed at Chi Lang, New Zealand was able to plan its contribution without reliance on the decisions of Australia.[8] With the logistical support available from U.S forces and the seemingly greater national `identification' possible within an American cultural milieu, the 2nd New Zealand Army Training Team, Vietnam (hereafter 2NZATTV) would eventually make its quarters at Dong Ba Thin as part of the U.S. FANK training command. The Australian Government, however, had preferred New Zealand's training effort to be identifiable with that of Australia's. The government's choice to participate in the American-led programme caused some friction between the governments of New Zealand and Australia.

The contribution of training teams provided several advantages, both militarily and politically, for New Zealand. The training teams were small, and were hardly a major drain on the limited military budget. For a small investment of funds and manpower, although perhaps for a comparatively high cost in administrative support, they afforded the nation a continuing military representation in Indochina. Holyoake reported to Parliament that the total

cost of New Zealand's military involvement in Vietnam, from 1964 to the final withdrawal of operational units, was $NZ18.6 million.[9] He further stated that expenditure on military training teams, mainly pay and allowances, including the provision for 1972, was for Chi Lang $NZ465,181 and for Dong Ba Thin $NZ139,000.[10] The training assistance was a constructive contribution to helping the Vietnamese develop their own defence capabilities to resist communist aggression; the instructors had no direct involvement in combat, as both Chi Lang and Dong Ba Thin were in relatively quiet sectors of South Vietnam, which would somewhat appease the anti-war movement while minimising the risk of sustaining New Zealand casualties; and perhaps most importantly, it was a continued demonstration of New Zealand's commitment to support its ANZUS partners. In addition, the government's access to Vietnamese and Cambodian military leaders and officials was thus enhanced, and the personnel by their presence gave New Zealand diplomats and servicemen a `feel' for the situation on the ground that might not otherwise have been experienced in the theatre.

The roles and situations of the two New Zealand training teams were as contrasting as were their respective strengths and weaknesses.[11] The five New Zealanders integrated into AATTV were involved in a diverse range of training roles, including MATTs, as distinct from the two New Zealand teams, which were in primarily static locations. 1NZATTV had a dual training role, providing not only leadership training to South Vietnamese Regional Force (RF) field officers, but also training selected Vietnamese officers to assume responsibility for the wing. 1NZATTV was established as a distinct New Zealand contribution to Vietnam, as part of `Vietnamisation', judged to be of `undoubted value' to the Vietnamese forces and to provide the New Zealand Army with a valuable return in training and experience. 2NZATTV was integrated into the U.S. Army

Advisory Group at Dong Ba Thin, located four hundred miles from Chi Lang, and trained Khmer Republic infantry battalions. The commitment of this team was based on the practical needs of the Cambodians and the assistance that they were already receiving from the United States. Much of what the instructors from 2NZATTV taught was dictated primarily by the Americans and the students that the Cambodians provided. In the judgement of J.G. Daniell, the commander of 2NZATTV, "Within the limitations of time and personnel available to train the Cambodians, it was probably as good a system as you could have had, under those conditions."[12]

The South Vietnamese territorial forces in Phuoc Tuy, along with the 18th ARVN Division, proved ineffective in preventing enemy access to the province after the withdrawal of 1ATF. Some effort had to be diverted from 1ATF to upgrading the ARVN performance. Attempts at upgrading ARVN units through retraining schemes and the leavening of Vietnamese units with Australian troops, however, produced little improvement or were only effective while Australians remained in the units.[13]

Following the withdrawal of 1ATF in late 1971, the security situation in Phuoc Tuy Province quickly deteriorated, despite the short-lived training programme that had been instigated by 1ATF and the on-going efforts of the AATTV. The territorial forces were now faced with the almost impossible task of exerting their control over territory, that it had been almost entirely excluded from, which 1ATF had formerly assumed sole charge. This situation was further compounded by 1ATF's failure to eliminate the influence of the National Liberation Front (NLF) from the province.[14] The North Vietnamese Army (NVA) and Vietnamese Communists (VC) operated extensively throughout much of Phuoc Tuy province, and the Vietnamese territorial forces were unable to counter this increased threat. Any real

possibility that the territorial force could destroy the enemy in the province was remote. Many territorial force units faced problems ranging from officers who displayed little interest in their responsibilities, to unmotivated troops and inadequate systems of administration and supply.

The military contribution, in all its guises, that New Zealand provided to the Vietnam War was relatively small: too small to be militarily significant. This was acknowledged by the New Zealand Army especially, even before the selection of personnel for 1NZATTV. The effectiveness of New Zealand's combatant training assistance can be summed up with L.H. Pilling's, an ex-OC of 1NZATTV, assessment:

> The Vietnamese Army was so huge, and we were so small. We really didn't have any great impact at all. Even if we had doubled or even trebled our numbers, I do not think our impact would have been much greater.[15]

Despite the political and military advantages, the value of the two training teams experiences to the New Zealand Army was minimal. Upon returning to New Zealand, the personnel from the two teams were simply posted to various units throughout New Zealand.[16] The Australian and United States Armies methodology on following-up personnel who have been overseas and recording their experiences, is something the New Zealand Army could do well to imitate. The reports sent from New Zealand Army Training Group, Vietnam (hereafter NZATGV) to New Zealand were filed in the classified registry in Defence Headquarters. As individuals, the experiences of the New Zealanders in the training teams were not recorded and used to adapt training methodologies, unless they were involved in training foreign troops or posted into a position allowing them to use or pass on to others their experiences. Pilling became the commander of Waiouru Military Camp, which provided training for the army, which allowed him to provide some input into the training system.

Both New Zealand training teams faced similar problems in fulfilling their respective training roles. As part of a joint Vietnamese/New Zealand training effort, 1NZATTV faced considerable problems in the areas of logistical support and construction material. There were inadequacies in both student numbers and student motivation, in the validation of training, and in support from Vietnamese command at the lower strata; problems that the New Zealanders were poorly prepared to face. The New Zealand instructors were inadequately trained for their task - having little experience in instructing foreign students, and very little understanding of either the Vietnamese language or culture. Having established the leadership courses and trained the Vietnamese instructors to the best of their ability, the New Zealanders faced the onerous and unrewarding task of ensuring that at least minimum instructional standards were met by their Vietnamese counterparts. Although it was recommended by Lieutenant Colonel V.B. Brown, commander of NZATGV, and Pilling, by mid-1972, that the team at Chi Lang be withdrawn, the New Zealand Government felt that, politically, it could not do so. This was for two reasons. First, 1NZATTV could not be withdrawn, leaving 2NZATTV in South Vietnam. This was politically unacceptable. Second, a political decision was made that New Zealand's training assistance could not be withdrawn before that of its two ANZUS allies.

Other factors limited the effectiveness of 2NZATTV's training. Team personnel were as inadequately prepared for their task as their counterparts in 1NZATTV. The terrain at Dong Ba Thin was in marked contrast to that in which the Cambodian troops would be fighting. The pace of the training schedule meant there was little allowance for flexibility and for remedial instruction. This paucity of time was also compounded by the requirement of the battalions under training to mount local security operations

in the last stage of their course. The low ratio of instructors to students also created limitations upon the effectiveness of the training, and also the extent to which the teaching syllabus and teaching material could be amended. Nevertheless, the New Zealanders considered that the training methods and content were as good as could have been devised in the time allowed, given the decision to produce trained battalions quickly.

One consistent failing throughout all of New Zealand's combatant training programmes was a lack of feedback received from the Americans, Vietnamese and the Cambodians regarding the effectiveness of the training. 1NZATTV did attempt to instigate validation systems, although most were relatively ineffectual, but 2NZATTV was unable to put such systems into operation, because the New Zealanders were never allowed into Cambodia.

During late 1971, and throughout most of 1972, Army General Staff (hereafter AGS) examined alternative training and advisory roles for the two training teams to determine their continued existence in Vietnam. However, AGS accepted that the future of the training venture depended on whether the New Zealand Government would, for political reasons, maintain the New Zealand presence in South Vietnam. This brought pressure on the New Zealand Government to maintain increasingly essential Trans-Tasman co-operation, which was to later bloom to fullness in Closer Economic Relations and also closer military relations. Yet, notwithstanding this external pressure, New Zealand's politicians were not unaware that the dissension created by the Vietnam War that had torn American society apart and publicly discredited its military, was also present, albeit in less vigourous and expansive style, in New Zealand. It had become an unpopular war.

The failings of New Zealand's training contribution should not be seen in isolation, but rather in the framework of the overall U.S. policy that existed towards the war in South Vietnam and Cambodia. The Vietnamisation programme was instigated too late and given too little time to succeed. This was also true of attempts to train the FANK to fight the Vietnamese and Khmer Rouge. Vietnamisation fell far short of developing leadership or instilling a sense of self-reliance in the South Vietnamese regular force and Territorial Force ranks. Prior to 1968, the Territorial Forces of South Vietnam received virtually no supervision and very few training programmes had any real long-term effect in improving their effectiveness. The goals of the Vietnamisation programme were beyond the capability of a U.S. advisory and assistance programme such as Civil Operations and Revolutionary Development Support (CORDS) and depended upon the generation of indigenous, purely Vietnamese initiatives and leadership, which never really emerged.

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
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
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PHOTOGRAPH 1

AATTV Owl Night Fighting Badge.[1]




PHOTOGRAPH 2

The Proximity of the Seven Mountains to the Chi Lang National Training Centre.[2]



PHOTOGRAPH 3

1NZATTV Personnel Building Defensive Positions.[3]



PHOTOGRAPH 4

The New Zealand Compound at Chi Lang.[4]




PHOTOGRAPH 5

South Vietnamese Students Undergoing Instruction.[5]



PHOTOGRAPH 6

WOII Lichwark Instructing With an Interpreter - Sergeant Ngoc Su.[6]



PHOTOGRAPH 8

Sgt Nathan Instructing FANK Trainees on the M-16.[8]



PHOTOGRAPH 9

Sgt Keno Instructing FANK Instructor Trainees on Navigation.[9]



PHOTOGRAPH 10

Lt Hopkins Instructing FANK Trainees.[10]



PHOTOGRAPH 11

2NZATTV Personnel Just Prior to Flying Out of Cam Ranh Bay in December 1972.[1]

Back Row, Left to Right: Capt Johnson, Capt Wicksteed, Lt Col Downen, Maj Skogstad, Nuy, Sgt Keno, Sgt Cunningham, SM Mertzig, Sgt Taylor, Sgt Nathan, Lt Bransby, Capt Huggins, Lt Fitzgerald, WO II Merito.

Front Row: `Charlie', Ssgt Cameron, Sgt Hughes, 2Lt Hopkins, Sgt Naera, Ssgt Elvy, Sgt Dance, LMA Clark.

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1. Army, 24 February 1972.

2. Original held at the Queen Elizabeth II Army Memorial Museum.

Photograph Album 9201147/2, Box 18, I 17.

3. ibid. Photograph Album 9201147/1.

4. ibid.

5. ibid. Photograph Album A/N 9201146.

6. ibid.

7. ibid. Pictorial History 2NZATTV Dong Ba Thin SVN, Photograph Album A/N 9201145/2.

8. ibid.


9. ibid.

10. ibid. Pictorial History 2NZATTV Dong Ba Thin SVN, Photograph Album A/N 9201145/2.


11. ibid.

Appendix One: Organisation of An RF Company and Organisation of a PF Platoon

ORGANISATION OF AN RF COMPANY[1]



ORGANISATION OF A PF PLATOON.[2]



Appendix Two: Organisation of 1NZATTV.

The following[3] is a detailed organisational plan of 1NZATTV.

Headquarters Element.	Rank	Vietnamese	NZ
Team Leader	Major	1	1
Admin Officer	Captain	–	1
Team QMS	Lieutenant	–	1
Storeman/Dvr/	Sergeant	–	1
Cook	Sergeant	–	1
Clerk/Typist	Sergeant	–	1
Interpreter		1	–
Mechanic	Sergeant	–	1
TOTAL:		2	7

Training Wing

Training Officer	Captain	1	1
Assistant Training Offr	Captain/Lt	1	1
TSM/Training Warrant Officer	(WO)	–	1
TOTAL:		2	3

	Tactics Committee		Weapon Training Committee		General Subjects Committee		Demo Platoon	
	VN	NZ	VN	NZ	VN	NZ	VN	NZ
Senior Inst	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
Assist Int	8	6	6	3			4	4
–	–							
Interpreters	3	–	2	–	2	–	–	–
Students	–	–	–	–	–	–	28	–
TOTAL:	12	7	9	4	7	5	28	1

Appendix Three: Initial Programme of Instruction for 1NZATTV.

By the time that the main body arrived in Chi Lang, the advance party had devised a Programme of Instruction (POI). On each of the five-week courses, the instructors taught the following subjects:

GENERAL SUBJECTS

Summary	Number of Periods Day	Night
1. Organisation of the RF, PF and PSDF	3	
2. Organisation and equipment of the enemy	5	
3. Triple Triangle Tactics	4	
4. Psywar and Polwar	5	
5. Leadership	10	
6. First Aid	3	
7. Mines and Booby Traps	14	
8. Map Reading	13	2
Total	57	2

WEAPON TRAINING

1. M16	28	2
2. M60	12	
3. M79	2	
4. M72	3	
5. M26	3	
6. Claymore Mine	3	
7. Tripflare	1	1
Total	52	3

TACTICS

1. Squad and Platoon Battlecraft	43	
2. Patrolling	19	2
3. Patrol bases	24	2
4. Ambushing	27	2
Total	113	6

MISCELLANEOUS

1. Sport and Physical Training	4
2. Commanders	5
Total	9

Appendix Four: Amended POI After Pilot Course.

As a result of the initial course, there were recommended amendments to the programme of Instruction. They were as follows:

General Subject

	Present Allocation	Proposed Allocation	
Organisation of RF Coy and Platoon	2	2	
Enemy Organisation	4	2	−2
Enemy Tactics	2	2	
Triple Triangle Tactics	3	3	
Psywar and Polwar	4	4	
Leadership training	12	9	−3
First Aid training	–	2	+2
Graduation tests - General Subjects	3	6	+3
Physical Training and Sports	20	20	
Opening and Graduation Ceremonies	2	2	
Commanders Time	5	5	
TOTAL GENERAL SUBJECTS	57	57	

Weapon Training and Shooting

M16 Rifle Refresher Training	5	3	−2
M60 MG Refresher Training	5	3	−2
M16 Rifle shooting (including night shooting)	30	34	+4
M60 MG shooting	8	8	
M79 Refresher Training and shooting	2	2	
M72 LAW Refresher Training and Firing	3	2	−1
M26 Hand Grenade Training	3	3	
M18A1 Claymore Mine Training	2	2	
Trip Flare Training	3	3	
Demolition Training	–	6	+6
Mines and Booby Traps	8	8	
Graduation Tests - Weapon Tests	4	4	
TOTAL WEAPON TRAINING AND SHOOTING	73	78	

Squad and Platoon Battlecraft

Squad Battledrills for the Attack	12	20	+8
Platoon " " " "	28	19	−9
Night Operations	10	10	
Graduation Tests - Squad and Platoon Battlecraft	4	4	
TOTAL SQUAD AND PLATOON BATTLECRAFT	54	53	

Patrolling and Harbouring

Preparation for Patrols	8	7	−1
Reconnaissance "	4	4	

Fighting "	18	18
Platoon Harbouring Drills	20	20
Graduation Tests - Patrolling and Harbouring	4	4
TOTAL PATROLLING AND HARBOURING	54	53

Ambushing

Preparation and conduct of the Ambush	14	15 +1
Daylight Ambush Exercises	4	5 +1
Night Ambush Exercises	6	6
Graduation tests - Ambushing	4	4
TOTAL AMBUSHING	28	30

Map Reading and Navigation

Map Reading Instruction	14	8 -6
Daylight Navigation Exercise	6	3 -3
Night " "	6	6
Graduation Tests - Map Reading and Navigation	2	2
TOTAL MAP READING AND NAVIGATION	28	19
TOTAL PERIODS ALL SUBJECTS	290	290

Appendix Five: New POI dated 20 July 1972.

The following sets out the new POI which was introduced to Chi Lang, and taught on course 4/72, from 8 June - 12 July 1972.[4]

Item No	Training Syllabus	Training Length Day	Night
	A. GENERAL TRAINING		
1	RF,PF and PSDF Org and Eqpt	6	1
2	Enemy Org and Eqpt	6	
3	Triple Triangle Tactics	4	
4	Psywar and Polwar	5	
5	Command and Leadership	8	
6	First Aid and Sanitation	4	
7	Mines and Booby Traps	17	
8	Map Reading	16	1
9	Communications Security	1	
10	Motivation Lecture	1	
11	Service Writing		1
12	New Zealand Lecture		1
13	Chemical Warfare	2	
14	Opening and Graduation Ceremonies	4	
15	Commanders Time	4	
	TOTAL	78	4
	B. WEAPONS AND FIRING		
1	M16 Rifle Refresher and Firepower Demo	4	
2	M16 Firing (Day)	10	
3	M16 Firing (Night)		2
4	M60 MG Refresher and Firepower Demo	3	
5	M60 Firing	4	
6	M79[5] Refresher and firing	3	
7	M26[6] Refresher	3	
8	M18A1 Claymore Refresher	4	
9	Trip Flare Refresher	1	
10	Lecture Ammunition Care and Supply	1	
11	M79, M72, 57mm Recalls Rifle Refresher	1	
12	Written Test	1	
	TOTAL	34	3
	C. COMBAT TECHNIQUES SQUAD AND PLATOON		
1	Combat Techniques	26	1
2	Patrolling	32	2
3	Defence	8	
4	Ambushing	25	2
5	Flotation	4	
	TOTAL	95	5

D. ADMINISTRATION

1	March In Administration	3	
2	Visits to NTC Admin Installations	4	
3	March Out Administration	2	
	TOTAL	9	0

E. EXERCISES

1	Final Exercise	20	1
	TOTAL	20	1
	GRAND TOTAL	236	13

The details of the marking system, changed also as a result of the validation, that was used by the Committees is as follows:

1. General Subjects.

a. General Subjects Written and Practical Tests.

Psywar/Polwar		50
Triple Triangle Tactics		50
Organisation RF, PF and PSDF		50
Leadership		60
Enemy Organisations and Tactics		50
Mines and Booby Traps Written		50
Mines and Booby Traps Practical		55
Service Writing Paper		75
	SUB TOTAL	440

b. Map Reading.

Daylight Navigation		40
Night Navigation		40
Map Reading Practical Test		40
Map Reading Written Test		40
	SUB TOTAL	160

c. Assessment.

Company Commanders Assessment based upon students discipline, performance, dress and bearing and co-operation throughout the course.

	SUB TOTAL	100
TOTAL MARKS GENERAL SUBJECTS		700

2. Weapon Training.

a. Practical Handling.

1. Claymore

Position Mine	5
Aiming Mine	5
Layout Cable	5
Test Circuit	10
Arm Mine	5
Positioning of Firer	5
Confidence in Handling/Safety	10
SUB TOTAL	45

2. Tripflare

Setting Up	10
Dismantling	10
Confidence in Handling/Safety	5
SUB TOTAL	25

3. Hand Grenade

Two throws per student 10 pts each	20
Confidence in Handling/Safety	5
SUB TOTAL	25

4. M79 Grenade Launcher

Two rounds fired per student 10pts each	20
Handling/Safety	5
SUB TOTAL	25
SUB TOTAL PRACTICAL HANDLING	120

b. M16 Shooting.

100 rounds to be fired from ranges between 30 and 300 metres in the lying and standing positions with time limits on some practices. A further 20 rounds to be fired at night. One point per hit on target.

SUB TOTAL 120

C. Written Test.

Questions to be on that part of the instruction that cannot be tested by practical handling or shooting.

SUB TOTAL 160

TOTAL MARKS FOR WEAPON TRAINING 400

3. Tactics.

Students are to be assessed on three aspects of their tactical training.

a. Written test

Combat Techniques	50
Ambushing	50
Patrolling	100
SUB TOTAL	200

b. Practical Assessment of Officers in Command Appointments.

During the course each student will be given a command appointment six times. On each of these occasions he will be assessed under the following headings:

1.	Enthusiasm	10
2.	Control	10
3.	Verbal Orders	10
4.	Execution of Battle Techniques	10
	SUB TOTAL	40

An average of the six marks is to be taken and that mark scaled up proportionally to give a mark out of 600.

SUB TOTAL	600

c. Student Participation.

To ensure that students not in command appointments maintain a helpful and enthusiastic approach, each student is to be given a mark out of 100 at the end of his tactical training.

SUB TOTAL	100
TOTAL MARKS FOR TACTICS	900

The graduation tests consisted of a combination of the following; written and practical tests, individual assessments which were based upon practical applications and diligence. The marking schedule was as follows:

Serial Subject	Total possible Marks	% of total
1. Tactics	900	45
a. Written test	200	10
b. Practical tests	700	35
2. Weapons	400	20
a. Practical tests	120	6
b. Written tests	160	8
c. Shooting	120	6
3. General Subjects	700	35
a. Written tests	440	22
b. Map Reading	160	8
c. Students Assessments	100	5

To graduate, a student had to gain 1,200 marks (60 percent) out of a possible 2,000. In each phase the student had to also reach the following minimum standard if he was to pass the Leadership course:

Serial	Subject	Minimum Total Marks	Percentage
1.	Weapons	140	25
	a. Shooting	42	35
	b. Practices/Written tests	98	35
2.	General Subjects	350	50
	a. Written/Assessments	270	50
	b. Map Reading	80	50
3.	Tactics	450	50

Marks could also be taken off the total marks the student gained for disciplinary reasons. The scale was; Arrested for one day without confinement, subtract 100 marks (or 5 percent of the total), and close confinement for one day, subtract 200 marks (or 10 percent of the total).

As an incentive to pass, it was written that:

> Students who fail to gain 1,200 marks (60 percent) for the total marks on the course will be punished for laziness. Students who fail to get 1200 marks because of violations of military discipline are to be severely punished.
>
> Students who fail to qualify in above will be punished by their parent units. National Training Centre Chi Lang will be responsible for forwarding to the parent unit a report recommending punishment.[7]

Appendix Six: Courses Conducted at Chi Lang up to the end of 1972.

The following table sets out the numbers of students who attended the training programme conducted by 1NZATTV.

Course	Course dates	Expected Numbers	Att	Q	NQ
Up to the end of 1971.					
Course No 1	22 Mar – 17 Apr 71	15	15	12	3
Course No 2	26 Apr – 29 May 71	60	32	32	–
Course No 3	7 Jun – 10 Jul 71	90	59	57	2
Course No 4	19 Jul – 21 Aug 71	120	94	89	5
Course No 5	30 Aug – 2 Oct 71	150	104	101	3
Course No 6	11 Oct – 13 Nov 71	100	73	72	1
Course No 7	22 Nov – 24 Dec 71	100	88	87	1
Up to the end of 1972.					
Course No 1	6 Jan[8] – 9 Feb 72	100	32	32	0
Course No 2	1 Mar[9] – 4 Apr 72	150	122	117	5
Course No 3	24 Apr[10] – 27 May 72	140	114	101	13
Course No 4	8 Jun[11] – 12 Jul 72	100	86	67	19
Course No 5	20 Jul[12] – 23 Aug 72	150	139	114	25
Course No 6	31 Aug[13] – 4 Oct 72	150	129	122	7
Course No 7	9 Oct – 11 Nov 72	150	150	135	15
Course No 8	20 Nov –	150	151	117	33

Appendix Seven: Civic Assistance.

This appendix examines the extent to which the training teams participated in the civic action programme, particularly through the `Kiwi Hoanga' project. This will involve examining the following related topics: the civic assistance that the New Zealand Army had provided to South Vietnam prior to the beginning of 1971; and the civic aid activities the members of the two New Zealand training teams were involved in.

During the Malaya and Borneo conflicts, the New Zealand Army had experienced the value of civic action in fighting a guerilla war. In Malaya, there had been continuous efforts to improve the living and educational conditions of the Malayan peasants and poor Chinese squatters. These programmes were administered by the local police and government officials administered these programmes, while the soldiers provided protection and hunted the Communist terrorists.

The New Zealand Government's initial assistance to South Vietnam was orientated towards providing civic action. In June 1964, an Engineer detachment was deployed to South Vietnam. The detachment's task, defined in general terms, was to assist in reconstruction and development work, both in a working and training capacity.[14] The detachment carried out a number of tasks, including the construction of several bridges and six kilometres of road and, whenever possible, worked with Vietnamese personnel to teach them basic engineering skills. As a result, both the roles of the team were fulfilled and for. Despite this contribution being more of a compromise, of all New Zealand's units, the engineers perhaps accomplished the most in enhancing New Zealand's reputation in Vietnam through civic action.

The second non-combatant unit that worked in South Vietnam, was the 1st New Zealand Services Medical Team, which arrived in South Vietnam in May 1967. The team had two main tasks - to provide surgical and medical care for the South Vietnamese civilians and to expand the capability of the South Vietnamese to care for their own people.

The medical team's training role was much less successful than its role in providing medical care. Although consisting of a small staff, the team cared for a large number of patients. Sometimes the team was unable to cope even with its task of providing medical care. In November 1969, the team did 271 operations, administered ninety-nine general anesthetics and treated twenty-two war related injuries.[15] There were also many other reasons for the inability of the medical team to accomplish more through civic assistance. Language differences were a problem, as it was for the engineer detachment. It was possible to tell the Vietnamese to do a particular task, but trying to teach them why you perform such a task was very difficult, even with the use of interpreters. The Vietnamese cultural rules towards class and sex also proved to be an inhibiting factor.[16]

Despite these difficulties, slow progress was made by the medical team. By 1971, a Vietnamese doctor was running the clinic and was in administrative control of the hospital. There was a Vietnamese anesthetist and all theatre and x-rays were done by Vietnamese. Colonel J.J. Ardagh, who was twice a team leader, considered in December 1971, that he was satisfied that the Vietnamese were staffing and running the hospital efficiently.[17]

By the end of the team's period of operation, several lessons had been learnt which proved valuable to later training effort by the New Zealand units. It was particularly important that the personnel for any training team be selected with care.

These personnel should not only have the necessary skills, but also the general character traits that would fit them for such service.

The introduction of New Zealand combatant units into Vietnam resulted in civic action assuming secondary importance, as the New Zealand Government supported the attrition policy. However, some minor, unofficial civic assistance by New Zealand combatant units was still provided to the South Vietnamese civilians. Personnel from 161 Battery found time to provide some civil assistance in Nui Dat.[18]

Despite the experiences of Malaya and Borneo, little was done by the two New Zealand infantry companies in the way of civic action.[19] These units spent long periods on operations against the PAVN and NLF units and when they returned to base, time had to be spent resting and patrolling the perimeters of Nui Dat. As Brigadier C.M.I. Pearson, a Task Force commander, stated, the most prominent use of the Task Force was to "get out after the regular VC [Vietnamese Communists] and knock them out, eliminate them and separate them from the population."[20] The attitude held by the New Zealand soldiers towards civic assistance also inhibited the efforts of the Task Force in succeeding in its mission.[21] They resented and were cynical towards organised civic action programmes, feeling that, generally, the locals were unappreciative of their efforts. Many soldiers felt that they could use their time more profitably by resting between operations. However, individually, soldiers would help a villager in need, provide medical assistance to injured or sick Vietnamese or visit children at the orphanage at Baria.[22] In one of his reports, Henderson wrote that the major reason was "basically the New Zealand soldier, like all professional soldiers, is primarily interested in fighting. This is what he volunteered for. He considers himself a fighter and not a philosopher."[23] Perhaps the real problem with the soldiers' attitudes lay in the lack of preparation that the New Zealand soldiers had received for participation in civic action. The soldiers no doubt found it

difficult to build any empathy with the Vietnamese, as they received very little training in either the Vietnamese language or customs. Despite this lack of education, 1ATF Standard Operating Procedures stated that it was imperative for those soldiers who were working with the Vietnamese, to "maintain the highest standard of conduct. An understanding of the Vietnamese way of life and its social orders will help to preserve the good image of the Australian soldiers. Acts of vandalism and careless thinking will destroy this image..."[24] This ignorance upon the part of the individual New Zealand soldier was to remain unsolved throughout New Zealand's involvement in the Vietnam War.

The withdrawal of its combatant troops and introduction of the two training teams and the importance that the United States was attaching to civic action resulted in a growth in New Zealand's support for the pacification policy. Although 1NZATTV's role was largely one of training, a small portion of its time was also set aside to providing civil aid assistance to the local villages, once they had completed their priority task of constructing the compound. This civic action programme was called *Kiwi Hoanga* (New Zealand Vietnam Force Civil Aid Programme).[25] Through *Kiwi Hoanga*, the personnel of 1NZATTV were to undertake two projects; the original team was to construct a dispensary at the local village, and then to assist in the construction of school classrooms at Tu Te. The team was subsequently to be deployed to undertake aid reconnaissance work on such small projects as assisting with sewerage and drainage schemes.

The *Kiwi Hoanga* scheme was established in November 1967, by Holyoake as a vehicle to finance civic action projects in areas where New Zealand troops were stationed in South Vietnam. Authority was delegated to the Minister of Defence to approve expenditure of up to only $NZ30,000 a year in the years 68/69, 69/70 and 70/71. The role of the scheme was to strengthen goodwill with the local people and although based upon humanitarian grounds, it was basically a community relations

project. That 1NZATTV was an entirely New Zealand effort provided an ideal circumstance for "developing a worthwhile New Zealand image in broader fields than just military training."[26] The New Zealand military felt "that specific projects could be ensured to make substantial impressions within narrower limits, for example purely in the area where and/or people with whom the whole training team works."[27] However, for "public relations purposes, it was the whole package that mattered the most."[28] The amount set aside for 1972, $NZ3,000, was considered by some to be far too small. The initial reaction of Lieutenant Colonel V.B. Brown, the Commander of NZ V Force, and of the members of 1NZATTV to this amount of money was that the money was minute compared with South Vietnam's needs. Brown noted: "...to propose it publicly [the amount to be spent] would surely call for considerable nerve."[29] Brown further considered that to make such an amount "go far enough would indeed require an "ingenuity" not repeat not witnessed since events described in Luke 9, verses 12 to 17."[30]

The training team at Chi Lang had hoped to expand its civil aid work as its advisory role increased, but no-one was sure how long 1NZATTV would remain in South Vietnam. The team considered several possibilities where civic action might be provided. Initially, the building of a marketplace in Chi Lang was considered but rejected on the grounds that it was not deemed necessary. The New Zealand Government finally settled on two projects: the construction of a medical dispensary and a school.

The first civic aid project undertaken by the team was the upgrade of a three room dispensary at Voi Hai hamlet adjacent to the Chi Lang NTC. An existing building was refurbished and developed and several alterations were made. A treatment room and a roofed waiting area were constructed. In the rear of the new room, a medical store and quarters for two dispensary staff, public toilets and showers were built. Costing $NZ3,500, it was opened on 30 June 1971.[31]

However, by the end of 1971, five months after the dispensary had been opened, the clinic was still unused. The reasons for this was, according to village officials, the absence of an available doctor or nurse, that they were unable to obtain medical supplies, and they thought that New Zealand planned to staff and supply the dispensary after it was completed.[32] Finally, in late January 1972, a health worker was appointed to the dispensary, but he had neither equipment nor drugs.

The team at Chi Lang then examined their most ambitious project, to build a $NZ10,000, four-room secondary school to serve sixty children who lived in three of the hamlets. The team was initially concerned that if such a school was built then the same incident might occur in staffing, as had happened with the dispensary. HQ NZ V Force wanted to ensure that "because we had somewhat burnt our fingers over the dispensary...we wished to make quite sure our next project would be something the people really wanted."[33] However, the team received assurances from the South Vietnamese authorities in Saigon that approved teachers would be assigned to the school when it was eventually completed.

The school took three months to build, using local South Vietnamese contractors and assistance from team members. It had a reinforced concrete roof, which would allow for a second story later on.[34] However, things did not go smoothly with the construction. Each stage of construction was inspected by Lt R.A. Barrett, commander of the Engineer detachment building the New Zealand compound at Chi Lang, and he continually found that the standard of the construction methods was below the required specifications. The doors and window frames were poorly constructed, were made from inferior quality wood, and were badly fitted.[35] He ordered those in charge of the contractors to reconstruct several stages of the construction work. He experienced great reluctance upon the part of the South Vietnamese to undertake this extra work, which was further complicated because of L.H. Pilling's, OC of 1NZATTV, apparent

ambivalence towards the project. Barrett wrote: "I remember this being a trying experience, as I really never had the official support of Major Pilling."[36]

The school was to suffer the same fate as the dispensary. At a special ceremony L.W. Thornton, the New Zealand Ambassador to the Khmer Republic and Ambassador designate to South Vietnam, handed the school, and also a selection of New Zealand books, over to the South Vietnamese Minister of Education, Mr Ngo Khac Tinh. Tinh said that the New Zealand team had "not only played a part in defending South Vietnam but had also contributed to the peaceful future of the people."[37] Despite promises from the South Vietnamese authorities that the necessary teachers had been found and that the first school term would begin on 15 September, the remained empty. Major A. Kiwi, the last New Zealand Commanding Officer (CO) of 1NZATTV, was to note that the failure to get teachers for the school was a "bitter disappointment for 1NZATTV and a sad blow to New Zealand's prestige."[38] It was not until August 1973, that the school finally had six teachers and a roll of 250 pupils. Despite the apparent lack of enthusiasm upon the part of the South Vietnamese authorities, other work was undertaken on improving the school. In mid-November 1972, some assistance was provided by team members to the school's Parent Teacher Association in the building of a wall around the school and work was commenced on a toilet block and a school office.[39]

Unlike 1NZATTV, the members of 2NZATTV undertook no civic action at all, apart from very limited action undertaken upon the initiative of individuals, such as handing out sweets to some of the local children.

Appendix Eight: Wives and Families.

This appendix examines the problems that faced the partners and families, all of whom remained in New Zealand, of the members of the two New Zealand training teams.

For many of the members of both teams, a major concern for them was their partners and family that they had left back in New Zealand. One of the replacements for 1NZATTV, D.J. Brassey, discussed with his wife his intended deployment to Vietnam. He told her that he wanted to go, and reluctantly she agreed, although she was worried. In a situation that was typical to many of the partners, his wife stated that:

> I was very worried about being left on my own, with three young boys. I was assured by the Army that they would look after me and that I would not have any problems. When a problem did arise, I was to approach his unit, which would look after me.
>
> He went away because he believed that what he was doing was the right thing to do at the time. It wasn't the first time that I had to manage on my own. Being in the Army, he had been away many, many times, for example, he had been to Korea. I was used to being on my own and I knew what to expect when he went. We had discussed the fact that David's career was the Army and when I married him, he was in the Army and I had to accept him as a soldier.[40]

The mens partners initially found it very hard to settle down to life with their husbands gone. One, Mrs Brassey, recalls:

> It was very difficult for the first month or two, because you had to readjust to doing things without him being there. There was no help and we had three young boys. It was hard to manage until you got into your own routine, and then everything's fine, you'd settled down, you'd sorted yourself out.[41]

Some of the mens partners who lived in Waiouru, in particular, experienced some social problems. Women whose husbands did not go with the training teams, looked upon those whose husbands did, as being "women without husbands."[42] Some of the former group of wives were afraid that these women, while their husbands were away, would prey upon the men, particularly the married ones, in Waiouru.[43]

Despite this, being located within these defense housing enclaves, there was a well-developed Army welfare system which looked after the partners and families of all servicemen either posted overseas, attending a course or on exercise in other parts of New Zealand. Generally a team member's unit looked after his family, such as cutting lawns and firewood, although for families who lived outside the army camp environment such a welfare system did not operate. Most of the mens partners felt that the units were genuinely willing to assist them wherever possible. One wife recalled that: "Any problems with the car, you didn't go to the local garage, you went to the Army workshops, and things like that. But I made sure that I didn't run to them over every little problem. Only if something major happened."[44]

Some of the mens partners found it easy to keep busy during the enforced absences. They went to stay with either family or friends, took up employment, or else found that managing a house kept them very busy. Those who did not have a job, close family or children, found the separation quite hard. Even those who did manage to keep busy, found there were periods during the day when they felt lonely, usually between 4 to 6 pm. The separation was also hard on their children, particularly those who were reaching adolescence. Many of the members of the two teams in this situation felt that their children needed a father figure during this important part of their growing up.

The partners and families had received little information on the role the men would be taking in both teams, aside from being told that it would be unlikely that they would be involved in any fighting.[45] Unlike other Army units, the wives and girlfriends of many of the members of both training teams' were in an unfortunate position. This was because their husbands, for the most part, were taken from units scattered all over New Zealand. This meant that not all the mens partners were able to gather and talk over common problems.

Some of the wives and partners of the men in the training teams, primarily those in the same locations, mixed socially, sometimes regularly, to swap any news that they received through either correspondence or from the men's units. Generally there was little news given to the mens partners by the New Zealand Army. In one instance several partners of members of 2NZATTV were concerned that they had heard that Dong Ba Thin had been bombed. Mrs Daniell recalled: "we didn't know anything about it at all. We tried finding out from some of the officers we knew, but we never really did find out what happened until we read the papers."[46] They found it difficult to follow their husbands' exploits as the training teams, like their Australian counterparts, received very little publicity. Aside from a small number of short, television news items in which film of some of the members was shown, newspaper articles normally referred to the question of when the training teams would be withdrawn.

For the mens partners, contact through letters proved to be of great importance, as it was the only way that they could keep in touch with their husbands. The women usually wrote about everything that happened at home although they tried not to write about domestic problems that their husbands could not do anything about: "We'd write about what I was doing, what the children were doing and write just as I felt. He needed to be as near to home as possible. So, I would tell him the simple things, even what we did, letters we received. I tried to keep him as part of the family."[47]

Once the partners and family began receiving letters from their husbands, the worry and anxiety decreased. Mrs Brassey remembers:

> I started getting letters from him on a regular basis and he'd write to the children. I never got frightened by the letters. He told me about one or two incidents that would happen, but on the whole I didn't feel very worried about him. He used to write more about the building of the school and the children and the village and things like that. And hearing that in his letters and reading letters like that counteracted what you listened to on television. It made us feel much more settled down.[48]

The letters that the team members wrote were sent straight back to New Zealand, and were uncensored. The team members were grateful that they were also able to write as many letters as they liked, particularly as they did not have to pay for the postage. Everyone in the team looked forward to receiving mail, which generally arrived from Can Tho on a regular basis, thanks to the efforts of the New Zealand Liaison Officer based there.

Despite the assistance that the units provided to the men partners, many of the men sometimes worried about what their partners wrote about. This worry was largely due to a sense of helplessness as they could not do anything, while they were in South Vietnam, about their family's problems. One major problem for the men was, recalled D.J. Brassey. a member of 1NZATTV:

> In a place like Chi Lang, we couldn't send birthday cards etc. One of the things we actually did do with the children at home was we used to receive these comfort packs - razor blades, American lollies etc. We used to get a pack once a week. We used to send these through the mailing system and that made it feel as if we had more contact with the children. Most of the team members tended to do this, even if they did not have any children. We also learned that the children loved getting these parcels.[49]

The husbands generally did not write about the problems that they were having at Chi Lang. Brassey noted that:

> I don't think that any of us tended to write home anything alarmist. Certainly, if things were a little worrying we wouldn't write home about anything like that. You tended to try not to make your wife feel miserable. At most, we might note there had been a rocket attack, but we would say it wasn't in our compound.[50]

The men's partners tended not to write about the anti-war movement in their correspondence, even if some of them were harassed because their husbands were in South Vietnam. Overall, these partners lived within the confines of the military housing that was located beside each Army camp.[51] As a result, they were generally geographically removed from the anti-Vietnam War movement in New Zealand. Although the majority of the men in South Vietnam believed that they were there as professionals, some were disappointed about the support shown to them by the New Zealand public in general. Some of the men were, thought L.H. Pilling, "disappointed about New Zealanders, that they really did not understand why we were there".[52] One of the team members considered that,

> It was not really very pleasant when you are fighting an enemy when CORSO [Council of Organisations for Relief Schemes Overseas] in New Zealand is collecting money and sending it to North Vietnam. That money, they say, goes into medical supplies, but in reality everybody knows it goes into what is really needed at the time - weapons and ammunition. It come down the trail and those guns and ammunition is being fired at you. And it is not very pleasant when you are sitting there and to know that at New Zealanders are providing the bullets that might kill you.[53]

Appendix Nine: Team members of 1NZATTV and 2NZATTV.

A. Members of 1NZATTV

Officers Commanding 1NZATTV:

Maj D.L. Ogilvy, Dec 1970 - July 1971,
Maj B.P. Martin, July 1971 - Nov 1971,
Maj L.H. Pilling, Nov 1971 - Aug 1972,
Maj A.R. Kiwi, Aug 1972 - Nov 1972.

1NZATTV's Warrant Officers:

WO1 N. Jamieson MM, Dec 1970 - Aug 1971,
Wo1 G. Nash, Aug 1971 - May 1972,
WO1 B.L. Crafts, May 1972 - Sep 1972,
WO1 T.J. Fell, Oct 1972 - December 1972.

Lt R. Barrett
Ssgt D.J. Brassey
Sgt I. Bird
WO2 W. Bold
WO2 G. Carmichael
WO2 R. Christie
WO2 H. Clarke
WO2 L.J. Cooper
WO2 G. Curley
WO2 P. Dillion
WO2 E.M. Dix
WO2 K.J. Donaldson
WO1 M. Edwards[54]
WO2 G. Eyles
WO2 I. Fraser
WO2 P. Fuller
Sgt P. Gillies
WO2 I.H. Gillies
WO2 T. Grace
Lt P. Grant
WO2 G. Haami
WO2 J.R. Hardie
WO2 P.W. Hawke
2Lt J. Heard
WO1 L. Hepi
Sgt A.J. Hewitt
WO2 G. Horsfall
WO2 C. Howard
WO2 W. Hughes
WO2 P. Hunter
Sgt J.R. Hurliman
Sgt B. Ibister
WO2 W. Kearney
WO2 E. Langley
WO2 B. Lichwark
WO2 R. Lowe
WO2 R. Maaka
WO2 R.F. McKenzie
WO2 F.R. Mintey
Capt H. Oakley-Browne
Lt R. Ottaway
Lt G. Pearce
WO2 R. Potatau
Ssgt L.R. Robinson
WO1 B.A. Robinson
WO2 L. Scott
WO2 K.N. Thom
Lt K. Thomason
WO2 G. Tomlin
WO2 S. Vautier
2Lt J. Wasson
WO2 P. Wereta

B. Team Members of 2NZATTV.

Sgt J.W. Batty
SSgt E. Beaumont
Sgt I.V. Blakeway
Lt J.A. Brandon
Lt G.H. Bransby
CPO C. Cameron
SSgt R.M. Cameron
LMA W.S. Clarke
Sgt R.W. Kiwikiwi
LMA J.P. Luce
2Lt T.T. McConnel
WO2 K.W. Merito
Sgt M.G. Morrison
Sgt H.T.P Naera
Sgt F.C. Nathan
Capt B.J. Pepper

Sgt M.A. Cunningham
Sgt M.T. Dance
Major J.G Daniell
FSgt R. Elvy
2Lt P.N. Fitzgerald
Sgt H.P. Hokianga
2Lt S.D. Hopkins
Sgt R.G. Hughes
Sgt R. Keno
Capt R.L. Scott
WO2 L.G. Shuker
Major P.J.Skogstad
Sgt V.T.C Smith
Sgt R. Taylor
SSgt R.K. Watson
Sgt J.W. Wharewera
Capt M.R. Wicksteed

C. Engineers at Chi Lang.

Advance Party:

Lt and QM J. McDonald
Sgt R.B. Inwood
Ssgt L.W. Nathan
Cpl N.T. Smith

Main Body:

Sgt C.J. Hill
Sgt E.W. Bruce
Spr K.J. Hanson
Spr R.V. Haynes
Sgt R.L. McAllister
Lcpl T.E. Gilbert
Spr I.J. Prichard
Spr W.D. Murphy.

Replacements.

Lt R.A. Barrett
WOII W. Kearney
Cpl A.P. Hawkins
Gnr R.J. Rameka.
WOII C.B. Chamberlain
Sgt J.W. Lock
Gnr D.R. Bevan

Appendix Ten: Awards Awarded to 1NZATTV and 2NZATTV Personnel.

The Governments of South Vietnam and the Khmer Republic issued medals to many members of both New Zealand training teams. The following is a list of those who had such medals presented to them.

The Legion of Merit, 2nd Class
C.G. Wotton L.H. Pilling J.G. Daniell.

Cambodian National Defence Medal:
J.W. Batty E. Beaumont I.V. Blakeway R.M. Cameron.

Medal of the Brigade with Bronze Star

M.A.Cunningham	H.P. Hokianga	R.W.Kiwikiwi	J.P. Luce
M.G. Morrison	B.A. Robinson	L.R. Smith	R.K. Watson
J.W. Wharewera	J.W. Batty	E. Beaumont	I.V. Blakeway
C. Cameron.			

ARVN Armed Forces Medal 1st class
J.G. Daniel

Certificate of Commendation
T.T. McConnell M.G.Morrison

Training Service Medal
1st class L. Scott
2nd class L.G. Shuker J.H. Wharewera

Certificate of Outstanding Achievement of Brigade Level
T. Samuels

Letter of Commendation
V.T.C. Smith

National Defence Medal with Silver Star

T.A. McConnell	J.G. Daniell	B.J. Pepper	R.L. Scott
J.A. Brandon			

National Defence Medal with Bronze Star

C. Cameron	J. Luce	L.G. Shuker	L.R. Robinson
E. Beaumont	R.K. Watson	P.W. Batty	I.V. Blakeway
M.A. Cunningham	H.P. Hokianga	R.W. Kiwikiwi	M.G. Morrison
V.T.G. Smith	J.H. Wharewera		

Commemoration Medal
V.B. Brown

Order of Merit, 2nd Class
L.H. Pilling J.G. Daniell

Training Service Medal 1st Class
D.L. Ogilvy

Cultural and Educational; Service Medal 2nd Class
L.H. Pilling

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1. `The Outline and Organisation of the ARVN: Land Forces of the ARVN', Visitors Brief, 1NZATTV - Chi Lang. Queen Elizabeth II Army Memorial Museum, Box 18, I 17.

2. ibid.

3. ibid.

4. Waiouru Military Museum. Command and Leadership POI, dated 20 July 1972. Signed by L.H. Pilling.

5. An M79 is a grenade launcher

6. An M26 is a grenade.

7. Waiouru Military Museum. Command and Leadership POI, dated 20 July 1972. Signed by L.H. Pilling..

8. Postponed from 3 January, due a lack of student numbers.

9. Postponed from 28 February, due a lack of student numbers. Two days after the course had begun, 19 more students arrived.

10. Postponed from 10 April, due a lack of student numbers. During the first few days of the course, 18 more students arrived.

11. Postponed from 5 June, due to initially only 34 students arriving at the start date of the course. During the first few days of the course, 52 more students arrived.

12. Postponed from 17 July, due to initially only 81 students arriving at the start date of the course. During the first few days of the course, 58 more students arrived.

13. Postponed from 28 August, due to initially only 122 students arriving at the start date of the course. Only seven more students arrived, on 1 September.

14. For more detail, see P. Berry, `Sappers of the South: The Origins of the Royal New Zealand Engineers' (unpublished M. Phil thesis, University of Waikato, 1984).

15. The New Zealand Army in Vietnam: 1964 - 1972. A Report on the Chief of the General Staff's Exercise, 1972 (Wellington, 1973), p. 75.

16. For further details, see ibid.

17. ibid, p. 77.

18. Such assistance was the rebuilding of a damaged hospital ward, the construction of a house for a blind man, and the large-scale distribution of toys, chewing gum, food and

cigarettes.

19. For further information of the civic assistance that was provided by 1ATF, see F. Frost, Australia's War in Vietnam (Sydney, 1987), pp. 38 - 44.
The Task Force was not given civilian experts in fields of civic action in which the army, at this stage, was neither trained nor equipped to administer.

20. F. Frost, Australia's War in Vietnam, p. 131.

21. For an analysis, see J.T. Henderson, `New Zealand's Vietnam Involvement.' Research Officer, History Interviews With Several New Zealand Army Officers Who Have Served in Vietnam, September - October 1969', (unpublished), pp. 27 - 31.

22. At Vung Tau, some of the New Zealanders stationed there had taught the South Vietnamese basic English and basic mechanical skills during the evenings, and assisted with the construction of drains and footpaths.

23. J.T. Henderson, `New Zealand's Vietnam Involvement', p. 31, 33.

24. 1 ATF Standing Operations Procedures (SOP) 1969, Signed by S.P. Weir, Brigadier, Commanding Officer, pp. 6-3 - 6-6, Defence Classified Registry (DCR). Copy held by writer.
In an attempt to overcome these problems, 1ATF established a fifty-three-man Public Affairs unit, whose task was to undertake solely civic aid projects, but the unit's enthusiasm lasted only during the period that Weir commanded the Task Force. The team was comprised of Australian soldiers, because the New Zealanders, when asked if they would like to assist gave no response.
Although civic action never received more than ten percent of the 1ATF budget, the unit undertook a range of activities: construction; medical and dental projects, education, agriculture and commodity distribution. In 1970 the unit granted to the Vung Tau Signals school $VN500,000 worth of construction materials to build a dispensary, install electrical wiring for the province's high school and grant $VN250,000 worth of books and magazines. Other projects included the construction of a water well, a water pump and a water pipe system around the hamlet of Ong Trinh hamlet in Phuoc Hoa village, and the construction of four new classrooms for the City High School, costing almost $VN2,000,000. Fund raising was also undertaken by the Public Affairs unit for various projects. For further information on civic action, see F. Frost, Australia's War in Vietnam, Chapter 8.

25. Kiwi Hoanga is derived from a type of sandstone used in the process of cutting and grinding stone implements.

26. A. Sec(Pol) to AS(F), dated 3 May 1971, Def 23/4/9, Mutual Aid Programme to South Vietnam: Community Relations, vol III, February 1968 - April 1975, DCR.

27. From Saigon to Wellington, dated 13 October 1970, Def 23/4/1 Mutual Aid to South Vietnam, General, Vol 4, January 1969 - October 1970, DCR.

28. ibid.

29. Saigon to pp Wgtn, to Secretary of Foreign Affairs and Secretary of Defence, dated 29 September 1970, 478/4/28 vol 1, Countries Series: South Vietnam, Political Affairs. Training Assistance to the RVNAF, 4.4.70 - 31.8.72, DCR.

30. ibid.
In much of his correspondence to Wellington, particularly to the Secretary of Defence, Brown frequently used biblical references to sum up his feelings on different matters.

31. Plans for the dispensary are held in Def 23/4/9, vol III.
This refurbishment, proposed by the New Zealand Embassy in Saigon and HQ NZ V Force, had been urged by the previous camp commandant, Colonel Dat, the village council, and CORDS. The local population was approximately 16,000 people and there was no hospital or clinic in the area.

32. Christchurch Press, 1 December 1971.

33. From Saigon to Wellington, Mahoe, dated 13 December 1971, Defence 23/4/1, vol 7.
1NZATTV personnel supervised the building of the classroom which was financed through $NZ3,000 set aside for *Kiwi Hoanga*, and $NZ10,000 from the SEATO Aid Fund.

34. In May 1973 construction began on a toilet block and headmaster's office for the school.

35. Lt R.A. Barrett RNZE. Construction and Equipment for classrooms. Construction for additional story at Tu Te Village, Tri Ton district Chau Doc Province, dated 21 June 1972 to Col Brown. Letter held in the Engineers Museum, Linton Military Camp.

36. From Lt R.A. Barrett RNZE to Maj Grant, Director of Plans, dated 18 September 1971, 15/28/12 NZ Forces in Vietnam - Withdrawal, vol III, October 1971 - March 1974, DCR.

37. Reveille, September 1972.

38. RF Platoon Leadership Course 5/72, Final Course Report. Kiwi to JGS/CTC, dated 23 August 1972, 15/28/10 Monthly Activity Reports - NZ Forces in Vietnam (Operational Summaries, Reports etc), vol IV, February - December 1972, DCR.
One teacher had been directed to go to Tu Te from Saigon, but refused, saying that the area was too isolated.
Many other schools had been closed throughout South Vietnam since martial law had been declared following the big North Vietnamese offensive in early 1972.

39. This work was not completed until early February 1973. The village chief of Tu Te requested a New Zealand Ensign that could be flown permanently over the school; A flag was eventually sent from New Zealand.

40. Interview with Mrs M.J. Brassey, dated 10 July 1990.

41. ibid.

42. Interview with G.P. Eyles. Several of the wives had expressed this point of view, either in their letters or else told their husbands when they returned from South Vietnam.

43. ibid.

44. Interview with Mrs M.J. Brassey.

45. Interview with Mrs C.P. Vautier, dated 19 August 1990.

46. Interview with Mrs Daniell, 18 August 1990.

47. Interview with Mrs M.J. Brassey.

48. ibid.

49. Interview with D.J. Brassey.

50. ibid.

51. Linton, Papakura and Trentham camps were located in large urban areas.

52. Interview with L.H. Pilling.

53. ibid.

54. At the end of his tour, he was posted to NZ V Force, NZLO, Can Tho. He held this position until Dec 1971.

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1. External Affairs became Foreign Affairs in 1969.

ERRATA

Delete 'Hereafter' before abbreviations
Page xxv, line 30, *For* 17,304 personnel, *read* 17,304 personnel, as well as some 16,000 national servicemen
Page 7, line 7; *For* pacificationa, *read* pacification
Page 52, line24; *For* earthly, *read* earthy
Page 54, line 5; *For* reversing, *read* reverting
Page 69, line 11; *For* made, *read* make
Page 70, line19; *For* Force,a was, *read* Force, was
Page 91, line 4; *For* discussion, *read* discuss
Page 91, line 5; *For* on the, *read* the
Page 138, line 3; *For* Regular, *read* Regional
Page 141, line 14; *For* Zealanders, *read* Zealander
Page 236, line 12; *For* loose, *read* lose
Page 304, line 31; *For* from a some, *read* from some
Page 337, line 25; *For* ordinance, *read* ordnance
Page 346, line 8; *For* Peninsular, *read* Peninsula
Page 348, line 21; *For* was, *read* were
Page 409, line 9; *For* judegemtn, read judgement
Page 422, line 6; *For* Daniell He recommended, *read* Daniell recommended