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SMALL ISLANDS AND GLOBAL ACTION: COMING OF AGE IN GLOBAL CHANGE

A thesis
submitted in fulfilment
of the requirements for the degree
of

Doctor of Philosophy
at

The University of Waikato

by
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The University of Waikato

2005

DEDICATION

In loving memory of my mother, Zulaikha Ibrahim, who taught me the value of education and in loving memory of my father, Mohamed Ibrahim Didi, who is fondly missed after his sudden death while I was in New York undertaking field research for this thesis in October 2004.

This thesis is also dedicated to all the tsunami victims of Maldives (December 2004) who suffered the greatest tragedy in the known history of the island state of the Maldives.

ABSTRACT

This study aims at advancing theoretical understanding of the role of small island developing states (SIDS) in contemporary international relations (IR). It does this by examining their interaction between, participation in, and contribution to, IR within the framework of the UN. The literature on small states in IR was reviewed, in order to develop a conceptual framework for critiquing the *small states paradigm*, which is based on realist theory. This paradigm views the role of small states in IR as determined by inherent *internal factors* (physical size and capacity to act) and prescribes them as being insignificant and passive actors in IR.

Contrary to the *small states paradigm*, a review of literature showed SIDS to be highly visible and proactive in IR in recent times. Thus, the research question the thesis pursued was: *How can the small states paradigm in IR be strengthened to better explain the rising importance of the role of SIDS in contemporary IR*? The literature review also suggested a proposition for testing empirical research: *that external factors outside states are facilitative of the proactive and contributory behaviour of small states in IR.*

Two case studies of the role of SIDS in UN negotiations were selected to assess the extent to which they may have been influential on outcomes: Law of the Sea and Climate Change. The role SIDS played in the negotiations for each case was explored through analysis of relevant documents and interviews with diplomatic and resource persons from a selection of participating SIDS.

Results strongly suggest that external factors are instrumental in facilitating proactive and influential behaviour of SIDS in these two UN negotiations. The key external factors numbered 18 and were grouped into the following dimensions: developments, events, trends, issues, circumstances and actors.

These results call for revising the *small states paradigm*, so that it includes *external factors* as explanatory variables for the proactive and contributory behaviour of small

states. Thus, external factors were added to the paradigm as ***open-sky dimensions*** which, unlike ***closed-ground dimensions*** (*internal factors*), are dynamic, flexible, optimistic and open elements (like the sky), and thus provide far wider potential or opportunities for small states in IR.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

Alhamdhu lillaahi rahbil aalameen! No words or number of lines can express the profound gratitude I owe to many people and organisations that enabled me to pursue PhD studies and make this thesis complete, a life-time dream come true. I do not know where to begin and where to end. So I wish to offer a BIG THANK YOU to you all. Nonetheless, some important people deserve special mention. Most importantly, I wish to thank my chief supervisor, Associate Professor Richard Warrick for his guidance, support and advice which made my academic journey finally reach its destination. My co-supervisor and the Director of IGCI, Professor Neil Ericksen also deserves special credit for his support and encouragement extended to me throughout my PhD studies. Professor John Hay deserves mention too for his support as the third co-supervisor. I am also thankful to our former postgraduate co-ordinator, Dr. John F. Smith for his support and humour shared every time I came for help. Similarly, I am grateful to the current postgraduate co-ordinator, Dr. Peter Kouwenhoven who has not only been our seminar co-ordinator but also helped with other little requests. Dr. Peter Urich, Dr. Wei Ye, and Mr. Wayne King have also been helpful in making my life productive at IGCI.

Beyond IGCI, I am also grateful to Dr. Michael Goldsmith from the Department of Anthropology who provided helpful references on small states in the Pacific and other insights for my research. Dr. Sayeeda Bano from Waikato Management School also deserves mention for her kind support. The Group Manager of the Student Services, Ms. Bethea Weir has been another very helpful person who extended assistance whenever I came with varied requests. Thank you for your help too.

The greatest source of help for my PhD research undoubtedly came from the Central Library of the University. Especially, the Interloan Department of the library made my research work much easier by facilitating odd requests I made for materials from outside the library. I am most grateful to all the friendly staff of the library for serving me well for about four years.

My life at IGCI would have not been achievable without the kind assistance and support received from important staff whom I would like to call the three angels of IGCI. Ms. Claire Gibson, Mrs. Wanda Ieremia-Allen and Mrs. Louise Armstrong have been very supportive. Especially, I am grateful to Claire for proofreading this thesis while Wanda always assisted me with my computer. My colleagues at IGCI with whom I laughed and shared my days deserve special mention too. Heru, Ampi, Jane, Chandran, Yuhui, Katie, Lisa, Greg, Sennye and Clare. Thank you all for been such good friends.

My PhD studies at IGCI, University of Waikato, would have not been possible without the New Zealand Commonwealth Scholarship. For this I am most grateful to the New Zealand Commonwealth Scholarship Committee. In particular, I am thankful to Scholarship Manager, Ms. Kiri Manuera. I also appreciate the assistance offered to me by the University of Waikato Scholarships Office towards the end of my studies. Similarly, I am grateful to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Maldives for granting me leave to study at the University of Waikato. I am also thankful to the Government of Maldives for nominating me as a candidate for the NZ Commonwealth Scholarship. I also received helpful assistance when I travelled to New York for field research at the UN from two important sources. For this I am grateful to the Maldives Mission to the UN and the Commonwealth Joint Office for Small States in New York.

Finally my greatest source of inspiration and support came from my immediate family. I am most grateful to my loving wife Asima for her continued support and encouragement and to my two children, Shyma and Shamis, who have been great kids making their father proud of the family. I appreciate their understanding in having to live away from their father for more than one and half years in the Maldives. Thank you all for being such a wonderful family.

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Chapter 1
INTRODUCTION

Problem Context and Research Goals

"International politics is full of surprises" (Booth, 534, 1995) and "political scientists will be needed to study the new political pressures and structures which global change might bring about" (Miller, 2, 1990). These statements echo the dynamism of the international system, the emerging global trends, and evolving new realities of international relations (IR) that demand academic attention. One such emerging reality is the rise of a group of small states known as the "Small Island Developing States" (SIDS). These states were traditionally marginalised (Lean, 5, 1994; Ashe et al., 209, 1999) and had little focus in IR, but have emerged highly visible in the international arena since the Second World Climate Conference held in Geneva in 1990 (Davis, 17, 1996). Long before the SIDS shot into the limelight of IR with the emerging concerns of global climate change, they made their pioneering hallmark in the negotiations of another environmental regime known as the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). It was the Mediterranean SIDS of Malta which launched the historic initiative in 1967 at the UN by introducing the well acclaimed concept of 'common heritage of mankind' and calling for an international law to govern the deep seabed and high seas (see Pardo's statement at Twenty Second United Nations General Assembly, 1 November 1967). Most recently, the presence of these states previously forgotten on the world stage has been increasingly felt in climate negotiations for which they formed a political alliance known as the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). The motive of this body was to pursue an international strategy that could be coined as "eco-diplomacy" (see comments of Davis, 1996), the goal of which was to seek environmental security in the face of global warming and to protect its interests in climate negotiations.

It was AOSIS which flagged the appearance of SIDS initially at the UN forums as an identified group and lobbied extensively at the UN Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) held in Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, in 1992, to recognise SIDS as

a group deserving special attention due to their vulnerable nature and inherent constraints (Climate Change Secretariat, 2, 2005). SIDS finally got international recognition when they were mentioned in Chapter 17 (G) of the well acclaimed Agenda 21, known as the sustainable development agenda for the 21st century and adopted by UNCED in June 1992 (see Agenda 21 of UNCED, 1992).

Thus, having broken their silence, the independent SIDS of the world have risen to importance in IR and are enjoying a high visibility today in multilateral negotiations. The role they now play in IR is unprecedented in history and quite contrary to explanations given in IR theories. This calls for revisiting conventional theories that explain the role of small states or their behaviour in IR in order to reflect the emerging causes and effects resulting from the international behavioural changes of SIDS. It is the aim of this thesis to understand and explain the emerging role of SIDS in contemporary IR and explanatory factors with the intention of strengthening theory.

Emerging SIDS

The SIDS have made efforts to break the silence in IR and to draw world attention to their plight as disaster-prone front-line states suffering from the adverse consequences of global warming through climate variation and change, including sea level rise (Slade, 2002). Their efforts bore fruit as evidenced by the first ever United Nations (UN) conference relating to SIDS in 1994 entitled, Global Conference on the Sustainable Development of SIDS. More recently, the First Annual Small States Forum, jointly sponsored by the World Bank and the Commonwealth Secretariat took shape in November 2000.

By the end of the 20th Century, AOSIS which is the political coalition of SIDS, exercised jurisdiction over one sixth of world's surface (UNNGLS, 1, 1994) and held almost one-fifth of the voting power at the United Nations (Davis, 22, 1996; Slade, 1997). In the most democratic and world representative forum of the UN, the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA), the emerging trend is the domination of small states with 'one country one vote' voting rights irrespective of the size of states (Jesen, 224, 1982). They also formed two-thirds of the membership of the Commonwealth of Nations (Commonwealth Currents, 12, 2000). These facts

highlight the increasing importance of SIDS in IR and their disproportionate influence in playing a contributory role in addressing global concerns. Hey (1, 2003) says, "small states today enjoy more international prestige and visibility than any other time in history".

In the past, however, SIDS were observed as being seen but not heard, and thus, were in effect, relegated states in IR (Ashe et al., 209, 1999). Their contribution and importance was said to be insignificant or marginal. Being passive actors in the international system, they failed to get academic attention in IR scholarship. Until very recently there was little literature about the role of SIDS and their participation in IR. Except for occasional articles on specific issues relating to European small states, there has been little research, even in recent times, about the role of small states in IR.

When the Maldive Islands (population less then 100,000 in 1965) was admitted as the first microstate to the UN in 1965, it sparked a wave of debate in the UN circles and generated a few academic studies as to the viability of such states in the international system and their impact on international organisations, particularly the United Nations (UNITAR, 12, 1971; Plischke, 7, 1967). This was because these microstates lacked political power, resources and capacity to make a significant impact on the international stage. Thus, traditionally, IR scholarship had very little focus on these small states and so the general theories developed relating to the international behaviour or role of states in IR escaped incorporation of SIDS in their analyses.

Nevertheless, a few studies have appeared on the subject of small states, which were distinct from SIDS, such as Sweden (Fox, 1959), Israel, (Vital, 1967) and New Zealand (Thakur, 1991). These states were environmentally less endangered, economically more developed, and socially more advanced than SIDS. Also, they all belonged to the developed world having gained membership of the rich club known as the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). They were resource-rich countries with well-established infrastructures and institutional capacity, unlike the underdeveloped SIDS. (See analyses and case studies in Vital, 1967; Benedict, 1967; and Schou et al., 1971.) Raeymaker says "many of these earlier studies were historical and reflected a continuing fascination with the plight of the smaller European states during the inter-war years" (cited in Bartmann, 13, 1997).

The weakest and the smallest states, such as SIDS, were taken for granted and their unique characteristics were overlooked in theoretical understanding of the international role of small states in IR.

Undoubtedly, unlike landlocked small states or resource rich developed European small states, SIDS form a distinctive group within small states due to their unique characteristics, such as: islandness, remoteness, ecological vulnerability and distinctive historical, cultural, and natural heritage. Moreover, their historical circumstances were quite distinct to mainstream European small states, which shared euro-centric heritage and experienced hostile wars. These differences therefore, call for greater scrutiny and analysis in understanding the international behaviour or role of SIDS in IR, which remains quite an under-worked area in IR scholarship.

Inadequate Theories on Small States

The mainstream theories of IR, such as ***Idealism*** or ***Realism*** which are discussed in Chapter 3, have their focus on the characteristics of bigger states and factors that drove them to international interactions. These theories were preoccupied with analysing the factors, circumstances and forces that historically characterised the behaviour of dominant powers in the Western world. For instance, Waltz (71, 1979) posits that "a general theory of international politics is necessarily based on the great powers" by which he implies that such states can only influence state interactions. A critique of such views has concluded that they were a biased "Western, white, male, conservative view" (Booth, 279, 1995). Other critics of mainstream IR theories have argued that they have not taken on board the concerns of the developing countries, let alone SIDS, a sub-group within the developing world (Booth, 1995; Terriff et al., 8, 1999).

The underlying dominant themes in mainstream theories of IR were war, conflicts, security, competing ideologies, trade disputes and arms race. The most dominant IR perspective, known as the Realist paradigm, sketches a very pessimistic picture of IR. Put more explicitly, it advocates a state-centric view of IR professing that states are the only influential actors in world politics and that the international system is one of anarchy or lacking supreme authority to conduct order (Morgenthau and Thompson,

4-17, 1985). Hence the states' main goals were perceived to be maximisation of power or security and the advancement of their state-interests to their fullest advantage. The foreign policies of the states were said to be constrained by the distribution of power (Morgenthau and Thompson, 1985). The explanations given in this paradigm as to the role of states in IR were biased towards power wielding large states and disregarded small states and non-state actors as insignificant or cloutless in IR, let alone the weakest and smallest group of states in the world community, the SIDS.

A subset of theories derived largely from or within the realist perspective, which could be coined as ***small states paradigm***[1], also falls short in accounting for the observed international role of SIDS and the newly emerging circumstances that shape their international behaviour. The small states paradigm is occupied with preconceived ideas of intrinsic factors that are purported to restrict room for a meaningful role in IR by the smallest and weakest states. These inherent factors such as 'smallness' and 'size', are fixed, as is their corresponding incapacity to act (see Vital, 1967; East, 1973).

Small size and its impeding characteristics, were the underpinning premises of the small state theories. Small size is measured as a variable in terms of limited resources and population. Consequently, the concerns that these theories raised were over questions of viability, degree of sovereignty and independence, and the capacity to defend against external threats and meet internal developmental needs. These theories sought to explain the behaviour of small states in IR by focusing on the constraints that they experienced due to lack of capacity and the consequent impact on their actions.

[1] Paradigm is used in the manner defined by Toma and Gorman (453, 1991), that is "A scientific world view or model based on one or more past scientific achievements that helps to organize one's thoughts about a set of phenomena and give direction to research".

Shifting Concerns

The small state paradigm or small state theories have been criticised for failing to accommodate new emerging trends and events in the world political scene. These include the demise of the cold war, change of world order, increasing interdependence of states, shifts in priorities of global issues, consolidation of multilateral co-operation by means of international treaties, and the emergence of global environmental change in the late 1980s. Thus Thakur, one critic of small states theories, argues that they "confuse more than clarify" (Thakur, 245, 1991).

These changing circumstances have shifted attention from traditional concerns that previously dominated international relations onto new issues and actors that have appeared on the world stage. Amongst these sweeping changes, and one that warrants scholars' attention, is the emergence of SIDS and their eco-diplomacy pursued in the face of climate change and sea level rise. Undoubtedly, the arrival of the 'global change era' has placed new issues on the global agenda and activated previously passive SIDS' awareness of their plight in the face of global environmental degradation. The emerging threats, particularly from global warming, were of most concern to the SIDS whose virtual survival was perceived to be at risk (Paeniu, 528, 1991; Ramphal, 6, 1994). These states are, however, least responsible for the precarious state of affairs brought about by global warming (Shihab, Maldives Director of Environmental Affairs, 1989; quoted in Lean, 4, 1994). Such global concerns are transboundary in nature and cannot be resolved by one great nation or group of like-minded countries acting alone, but through collective international co-operation, including that of SIDS.

Although security is still a prominent issue in IR, its face and character have changed. Today, SIDS are not endangered by external military aggressions, but rather by environmental threats and invisible elements like terrorism. These threats cannot be deterred or combated by traditional military strategies, such as increasing defensive capability or entering into security pacts with big powers, but they nevertheless pose serious risks. For instance, the possible consequences of global warming (such as an increase in intensity and frequency of tropical storms, erosion of beaches, and salt water intrusions in low-lying atoll islands) have already endangered life on these

island states as claimed by some SIDS (see, Pernetta and Sestini, 1989; Pernetta and Hughes, 1989). It could, therefore, be argued that environmental insecurity is no less a threat than military invasion, although these threats have no enemies to fight on a battlefield, as Purins asserts (5, 1993). Nevertheless, conventional theories of small states' security, as prescribed in IR, do not reflect the urgency and magnitude of the problem resulting from climate variability and change, nor do they provide practical solutions to such emerging global challenges for the international community.

Advancing the Small States Paradigm

These newly emerging issues and the changing states of SIDS in IR warrant revisiting of conventional theories of small states. They need to be revisited as they fail to account for these far-reaching, contemporary changes. Particularly, the small states paradigm in IR is unable to account for the recent visibility of SIDS in IR and their emerging role in international environmental relations. These theories may not be obsolete, but they are certainly incapable of explaining the current realities unfolding in a new era of global change and the digital age. One such need is to understand the role of SIDS in contemporary IR and the explanatory variables that account for their emerging role. They have broken their silence and have become proactive in IR. They are making their voice heard in international forums, have become contributory to environmental negotiations, and yield substantial voting power to exert influence on the course of international decision-making. Undisputedly, the dramatic rise of SIDS, the shift in global agenda, emergence of new actors on the world scene, interdependence of states, and the arrival of the global change era are changing the face, character, contents and conduct of IR.

Summary

In summary, the inadequacy of a theoretical understanding of SIDS' role in, or contribution to, IR in recent times has motivated the author to undertake this study of the role of SIDS in IR and its determinants. Evidently, the high visibility of SIDS in IR in the era of global change warrants the attention of IR scholarship to explore the role of these states in IR and causes of it. The conventional small states paradigm postulates that small states are passive pawns or objects that are reactive and

marginal, having no significance or importance to IR (Fox, 1959; Vital, 1967; Rothstein, 1968; Vogel, 1983). Their capacity to engage in IR was said to be severely constrained by intrinsic ***internal factors*** such as their smallness and size, leaving them helpless. This paradigm fails to account for ***external factors*** that afford small states or SIDS ample opportunities to overcome inherent constraints and to advance their interests in IR. Such pessimistic views of the international behaviour of SIDS do not reflect the current reality in IR. Thus, it calls into question the propositions and hypotheses presented by the small states paradigm in explaining the international behaviour or the role of small states in IR, in particular SIDS. It is, therefore, the goal of this thesis to better explain the role or international behaviour of SIDS in contemporary IR and to improve the conventional paradigm of small states in IR scholarship.

Research Question and Aim

To address this gap in IR theory, this thesis aims at exploring the following question. *How can the small states paradigm in IR be strengthened to better explain the rising importance of the role of SIDS in contemporary IR?*

To explore and to investigate the above question, the following aim is pursued:
To advance the theoretical understanding of the international behaviour, or the role of SIDS in contemporary IR, through two case studies of their interaction, participation and contribution to IR within the framework of the United Nations.

To achieve this aim, the thesis forms two central parts in its journey towards the destination of theoretical understanding of the role of SIDS and its determinants, namely theoretical investigation via a literature review and empirical investigation based on primary and secondary sources of data. The chapters on the definition of SIDS and theoretical review of IR scholarship constitute literature-based theoretical investigation to explore the conventional theoretical wisdom about the role and explanatory variables of small states, including SIDS, in IR. This investigation helps to arrive at a theoretical framework and a proposition for undertaking the empirical investigation. However, prior to presenting the empirical investigation, an evolutionary background leading to the recent visibility of SIDS in IR is presented to

justify the observation assumed in the research question, that SIDS have become increasingly influential in IR. The empirical investigation constitutes the second part which explores this assumption as a present reality, and is aimed at understanding the importance of this role and the explanatory variables that determine it. In this regard, two case studies of SIDS were undertaken and the detail of their methodology is explained before the case study chapters.

Research Objectives

In order to achieve the above aim, this thesis pursues the following three objectives.

Objective 1: To identify the factors, circumstances and/or forces that could theoretically explain the international behaviour or role of small states or SIDS in IR, in order to develop propositions for this study, by:

Task 1: Reviewing the existing literature relating to the small states paradigm in IR, and analysing its criticisms and alternative perspectives.
Task 2: Formulating the key propositions for undertaking the intended study.

Output: A conceptual framework for analysing the behaviour or role of SIDS in IR.

Objective 2: To document the empirical experiences of SIDS in IR by carrying out two case studies in order to test the propositions identified in Objective 1, by:

Task 1: Analysing the international role or behaviour of SIDS in the Law of the Sea Negotiations and factors that facilitated their role.
Task 2: Analysing the international role or behaviour of SIDS in the Climate Change Negotiations and the factors that facilitated this role.

Output: A set of explanatory variables, which characterise or influence the international behaviour or role of SIDS in IR.

Objective 3: To develop an improved theoretical framework for explaining the rising importance of SIDS in contemporary IR and to identify further research needs on the subject by:

Task 1: Comparing the explanatory factors presented in the small states paradigm and the factors evident from the two empirical case studies.

Task 2: Extracting the factors that give an explanatory basis for understanding the international behaviour or role of SIDS in contemporary IR.

Task 3: Analysing the limitations of this study and arriving at suggestions for future research goals on the subject.

Output: New explanatory variables for revising the small state paradigm towards understanding the international behaviour or role of SIDS in contemporary IR.

Organisation of Thesis

This thesis comprises eight chapters in fulfilling the research question: *how can the small states paradigm in IR be strengthened to better explain the rising importance of the role of SIDS in contemporary IR?* This chapter (**Chapter 1**) has outlined the context and scope in which the study is situated and its research aim and objectives. **Chapter 2** draws on the IR literature to define and characterise small states and SIDS. It reviews the various approaches and criteria adopted by scholars for understanding small states, and then present a definition for SIDS that is characteristically different from those of other small states. The broader discussion on definition of small states provides the basis for the theoretical and empirical investigations of SIDS. The small states theories, or paradigm, in IR scholarship attaches greater prominence to the issue of smallness as a decisive discussion factor in the paradigm and thus this chapter complements and sets the stage for the theoretical discussion that follows in the next chapter.

The theoretical investigation of small states comprises **Chapter 3**. It consists of a literature review of the small states paradigm and an analysis of the explanatory variables presented in the paradigm that are aimed at understanding the factors that

characterise and determine the international behaviour or the role of small states in IR. The chapter also reviews the criticisms raised against the small states paradigm and presents alternative perspectives suggested by scholars. Conceived from these reviews is the proposition that guides the empirical research. In other words, this chapter develops the theoretical framework through which the two empirical case studies are conducted, by exploring the factors, circumstances, and forces that explain the behaviour of small states in IR.

Following this chapter, **Chapter 4** presents a brief background on the historical evolution and significance of SIDS as well as an overview of the recent visibility of SIDS in contemporary IR. In this regard, it briefly looks at the factors that led to SIDS independence; the character of early contribution of SIDS to IR; and emerging environmental activism that gave rise to their high visibility in contemporary IR. In addition to setting the stage for SIDS in IR, the chapter also develops the observation that SIDS have become proactive, contributory and significant actors in IR. This information provides the context to the empirical investigation.

Chapter 5 contains a detailed methodology of the empirical investigation which forms the bedrock of this thesis. It outlines the research approach adopted to conduct the empirical investigation of SIDS in relation to two diplomatic negotiations held at the UN. In this respect, it delineates the rationale for choosing diplomatic negotiations to comprise the qualitative research in the form of two case studies. The chapter also elaborates on the methods of data collection for these cases and the analytical methods used to draw conclusions as to the explanatory variables of SIDS' role in IR.

Chapter 6 presents the first case study of SIDS, which examines the role played by SIDS in the negotiations of the Law of the Sea Convention, and explanatory variables attributable to this role. Thus, it investigates the factors that motivated SIDS to engage in the process and that facilitated their participation in, and contribution to, the process. As described earlier, the objective of this case study is to explore the explanatory variables that characterise and determine the international behaviour or role of SIDS in IR.

Similarly, **Chapter 7** comprises the second case study of SIDS which examines the role of SIDS in the negotiations of the Climate Change Convention and thereby investigates the factors that enabled this role. It also aims at ascertaining whether SIDS' role was significant and contributory to the process, and if so, what commonalities of factors were instrumental to this effect.

Finally, **Chapter 8** synthesises the main outcomes from the theoretical and empirical investigations of the explanatory variables so as to determine their applicability and relevance for explaining the international behaviour of small states within the small states paradigm, and more specifically, the experiences of SIDS in IR. It identifies the theoretical outcomes resulting from the findings of the two case studies of SIDS as to the factors that motivate and facilitate a proactive and contributory role for SIDS in IR. Finally, the Chapter summarises the main findings of this study in formulating answers to the research question: *how can the small states paradigm in IR be strengthened to better explain the rising importance of the role of SIDS in contemporary IR?* It also outlines the limitations of this study in achieving its goals and identifies fruitful lines for future research. As the final concluding chapter, it revisits the small states paradigm and makes some recommendations for advancing theoretical understanding of the international behaviour or the role of SIDS in explaining the rising importance of their involvement in contemporary IR.

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Chapter 2
DEFINING AND CHARACTERISING SIDS

Introduction

The definition of small states and their classification was the precursor inquiry for many of the IR scholars grappling with the development of theory about small states in the 1960s and 1970s. Given the diversity that exists amongst states and the many variables that embody any given state, definition and classification remain problematic. A universally acceptable definition is found to be an elusive task despite multi-faceted approaches (Baehr, 459, 1975; Hey, 2, 2003). This chapter reviews various approaches adopted by researchers when defining small states and the criteria applied for determining them. This will help to situate SIDS in a theoretical context of small states, thereby providing the basis for the theoretical and empirical investigations in Chapters 6 and 7. It is important to examine these approaches and criteria in order to set the research focus of this study and to facilitate discussion of the small states paradigm in the next chapter. It also provides some background characteristics for understanding the concept of small states, but will not dwell on its theories as they are elaborated in Chapter 3. Moreover, this chapter also classifies and characterises the focus group of this study, the SIDS, which it is argued constitute a distinct sub-group of states within the small states category. At the end of the discussion a comprehensive definition for SIDS is provided that is in line with the aim and scope of this study.

Small States

It is a common practice in IR scholarship to categorise independent states of the world into different groups in the interests of analysing their place and role in IR. Of these categorisations, small states lie at the end of an international hierarchical order, but they are neither a homogeneous group nor enjoy a universally recognised definition. Moreover, definition of any group of states is rather a contentious exercise in academia as multi-faceted factors and divergent features that embody any given state

or group of states widen room for criticism and alteration. As Hindmarsh puts it, "there are multiple realities and competing perspectives with regard to being 'small', a 'state' and 'islands'" (Hindmarsh, 2, 1996). Therefore, any attempt to define a group of states keeps enlarging the concepts and enriching the field of knowledge.

The concept of small states began to gain currency in IR scholarship as an analytical tool in the post-colonial period around 1960 (see Vital, 1967; and Wood, 1967). Prior to then, the literature was non-existent in this field (Baldacchino, 1, 2000). Many of the so-called small states were products of European colonialism and the result of decolonisation movements fuelled by the United Nations (UN) (see Duursma, 17, 1996) and the Commonwealth of Nations (Sanders, 3, 1997) in the post-world war period. However, the United Nations Institute of Training and Research (UNITAR) asserts that small states "have emerged, survived, disappeared, re-emerged throughout history in one form or another and their right to existence has never been challenged very often in the past" (UNITAR, 11, 1971).

Most scholars of small states are challenged by the definitional problem in particular when discussing the impact of smallness on international behaviour. Nevertheless, small state theorists have used the relative concept of "smallness" as an analytical tool that could help prescribe the parameters and capacity of small states in pursuing foreign policy goals. Put more explicitly, "smallness" is assumed to determine the extent of the international behaviour or role of a small state. Thus, smallness is regarded as an independent variable that produces a corresponding effect on the dependent variable of international behaviour. Clear definition of the smallness concept is, therefore, a prerequisite to analysing its correlation to international behaviour. Theorists assert that small states have distinctive behavioural patterns in IR that differ from larger states (Vital, 1967; East, 1973). The smallness of these states restricts the menu for choice in determining their role in IR. In other words, the received wisdom is that the smaller the state the lesser its capacity to indulge in IR (Vital, 1967; East, 1973; Baehr, 1975).

The diversity and heterogeneity of small states in various regions of the world make it a difficult task for scholars to cluster them into one group. This is because, when classifying them into a group, the varied features of small states can have some

'falling out of context'. For instance, when one state tallies with the criterion of population, it may be at odds with other criteria, such as having a large territory or abundant natural resources. Thus, a universal definition based on a set criterion for describing a small state or smallness has been a difficult task, despite the adoption of multi-dimensional approaches. Like states vary from one another, and so studies use various names to describe them, such as small powers (Fox, 1959), weak states (Handel, 1981), microstates (Duursma, 1996), mini-nations (Corkran, 1976) or mini-states.

The Institute of Commonwealth Studies in London attempted to define "smallness" in a seminar series that ran for two years to October 1964. Nevertheless, Wood says "it proved impossible for the seminar to decide what 'smallness' means with any precision" (28, 1967) . He contends that it is a comparative and not an absolute idea, which would remain arbitrary due to lack of clarity as to where smallness begins or ends. Baehr says, the definitional problem of "small state" as an analytical tool is an unwinnable exercise, because, 'small' or 'large' are relative concepts open to varied interpretations and criteria. Once the criteria are set, the issue is where to draw the line when placing them in small or large categories (Baehr, 459, 1975). Even if attempted, Baehr says it would remain arbitrary, ambiguous and intellectually undefinable and hard to apply the concept to concrete cases. Bjol (29, 1971), another critic of the small states concept, argues that "by itself the concept means nothing" as a state may be small compared to one, but larger compared to another. Belgium is smaller than France but larger than Luxemburg he explains.

Like many common political terms that describe actors in IR, such as Third World, there is no universally acceptable definition of small state (CCG, 8, 1985). In fact, no two academics or institutions agree as to what constitutes a small state, although there are some converging views as to their attributes. The UNITAR study on small states and territories contends that "there are many ways to define a mini-state or mini-territory, but they are all more or less arbitrary" (30, 1971). Similar comments were made in the Commonwealth study on small states (CCG, 8, 1985).

Notwithstanding these definitional difficulties, scholars have provided four approaches to defining small states: quantitative or tangible; qualitative or intangible;

mixed or hybrid; and social constructionist. The tangible determinants of smallness or small states include population, land area, military strength, natural resources and gross domestic product (GDP) or gross national product (GNP). The qualitative or intangible determinants include tradition, strategic location, degree of domestic stability, organisational capability, personality of leaders, and extent of diplomatic and international influence exercised. The mixed approach forms a hybrid of elements from both quantitative and qualitative approaches. The fourth approach is social constructionist, which is highly subjective but flexible as it depends on the perception of the people who make up such a state or categorise them, such as the UN. The four approaches discussed below are summarized here in Figure 2.1.



Figure 2.1: Four approaches to defining small states

Quantitative Approach

One of the early scholars of small states, David Vital, based his definition on quantitative factors, contending that smallness of a country depicts distinctive characteristics in international behaviour. He took population as the decisive determinant for classifying small states. But his criteria were not specific as he tried to strike a balance between developed and developing countries by suggesting a figure

of 10-15 million for developed states and 10-30 million for undeveloped states (Vital, 8, 1967). Vital's definition does not include what he called "micro-powers such as Western Samoa" because they constitute a distinctive class having "characteristic problems of their own" (Vital, 8, 1967). Thus, microstates, mini-states, and minor states were omitted from his discussion. Mathisen (1972) preferred to consider these states not as a separate category, but as a particular class of small states. Labelling them as the weakest and smallest of all states, Mathisen defined this group of states as having a population under one million (21, 1972).

Barston, too, observed a need for classifying tiny states with a million people or less as a subgroup. He listed European principalities and republics, such as Monaco, Andorra, San Marino and Liechtenstein, as belonging to this group (Barston, 45, 1971). He also mentioned the phosphate-dependent South Pacific island Republic of Nauru, highlighting the question of viability as it contained "little or no arable land". According to Barston, these tiny states are clearly distinctive by virtue of their very small population and geographic size.

Quantitative factors other than population have been applied to determine denominative status of a country such as physical and territorial size, gross domestic product (GDP) or gross national product (GNP), natural resources, and military strength (Bjol, 29, 1971).

Barston summarises four approaches to defining small states:

1) arbitrarily delimiting the category by placing an upper limit on, for example, population size;
2) measuring the "objective" elements of state capability and placing them on a ranking scale;
3) analysing relative influence; and
4) identifying characteristics and formulating hypotheses on what differentiates small states from other classes of state (40, 1971).

Furthermore, he mentions quantifiable elements of state capability, such as population, GNP, defence expenditure, diplomatic representation, membership of

regional and international organisations, and the volume and pattern of foreign trade (Barston, 42, 1971).

Maurice East also preferred quantitative criteria when defining small states. He says one or a combination of factors, such as small land area, small total population, small total GNP and a low level of military capabilities can define a small state (East, 557, 1973).

Another method adopted by IR scholars to classify small or large states is to place them in a hierarchical order within the international system in accordance with their capacity to exert influence in the world system. Johan Galtung followed such an approach by ranking states in the international system according to relative size, wealth, power and degree of development (cited in Pettman, 8, 1976). Obviously, such a ranking places weak and least endowed states at the bottom of the international order as small states.

A quantitative approach has given a precise definition to so called microstates, which were a catchword in the early literature on small states, but lost emphasis after the SIDS concept began to take root in late 1980s. It was observed to be a sub-group within small states, which was characteristic of their minute size. Microstate is defined as a state having a population below one million (UNITAR, 1971; Clarke and Payne, 1987; Hey, 3, 2003).

The measuring criteria applied to define small states vary from study to study. Dolman says, "the definition of a small island is a matter of interpretation rather than fact" (40, 1985). For instance, Israel may be a small state against populous Arab countries, but a bigger power in terms of military strength. Similarly, Fiji is relatively small in comparison to resource-rich and developed New Zealand. In a similar tone Bjol (29, 1971) comments that, "by itself the concept of small state means nothing". He further says "a state is only small in relation to a greater one" (Bjol, 29, 1971).

Qualitative Approach

The second approach to defining small states accounts for qualitative or intangible factors. These include factors such as extent of diplomatic activity, leadership role in global decision-making or the capacity to mobilise international support towards achieving foreign policy goals (see Figure 2.1 earlier). Robert Koehane broke the quantitative tradition of grouping small states by size, material or military basis. He classified states in the world system into four categories, based on intangible or qualitative features that explained the varying nature, potential and capacity of states to exert influence or make an impact on the international system. He provided a definition of smallness based on the "systemic role that states' leaders see their countries playing" (Koehane, 295, 1969). Thus, he classified the lowest category of states as those having minimal influence in the international system, referring to small states. He tagged this group of states as 'system-ineffectual' states, while imperial or great powers were called 'system-determining' states. In-between these two categories were "system-influencing" and "system-affecting" countries, meaning secondary states and middle states respectively (Koehane 296, 1969). He contends that system-ineffectual states could hardly "influence the system-wide forces that affect them" in the international system. However, Koehane did acknowledge, the "conspicuousness of small states" as a "striking feature of the contemporary international system" (296, 1969). Therefore, Koehane broke away from tangible classification of states that centred around the small-large dichotomy and provided a performance-based or role perception-based definition for states within the context of the international system, in which small states were ranked as system-ineffectual, the lowest of four categories of states.

Jaquet provided another qualitative definition of small states, as "a state that is neither on a world scale nor on a regional scale able to impose its political will or to protect its national interests by exerting power politics" (58, 1971). Other, qualitative factors such as extent of diplomatic activity, leadership role in global decision-making, or the capacity to mobilise international support towards achieving foreign policy goals have also been used in arriving at a qualitative definition of small states. Proponents of qualitative criteria for defining states argue that quantitative constraints can be

overcome for small states through "administrative skills, dedication, shrewd diplomacy, national cohesion and morale" (Pettman, 10, 1976).

The qualitative measurements are also highly subjective as one country can be self-misconceived by incorrect judgement of its position and role in relation to neighbours, based on preconceived pretexts such as size and resources. For instance, during the Arab-Israeli wars in the Middle East, Israel was underestimated by larger rival Arab states which in fact were defeated by Israel, a much smaller state in terms of demography and land.

Mixed or Hybrid Approach

Sensibly, other scholars see merit in both quantitative and qualitative approaches to defining smallness. They argue for the use of a mixed approach (see Figure 2.1). As Rothstein says, "A Small Power is a state which recognizes that it cannot obtain security primarily by use of its own capabilities, and that it must rely fundamentally on the aid of other states, institutions, processes or developments to do so" (29, 1968). He further says, "a small state is not defined by specific qualities it possesses (or lacks) but rather by a position it occupies in its own and other eyes" (Rothstein, 29, 1968).

Michael Handel (1981) identified the weakest and smallest of all states, as mini-states placed at the bottom of the continuum of an international hierarchy of power. Their striking features were said to be very small population and very little territory. Many of these mini-states were observed as isolated islands most of which have developmental challenges resulting from scarcity of resources. He argues that self-defence for these states is out of question since they are totally incapable of withstanding any external aggression (Handel, 47, 1981). Thus, his definition for weak states combines both tangible criteria (lack of resources) and intangible criteria (lack of self-defence).

To bridge the differences that exist in analysing concepts such as 'small states', 'island states' and 'small island states', Shaw (967, 1982) suggested six criteria as follows:

1) level of income / development
2) size / smallness
3) remoteness / islandness / landlockness
4) internal fragmentation / dispersion
5) length of experience as an independent country
6) level of resource (human and physical)

The definitional problem of small states is quite a riddle to be solved for many small states' theorists. Similarly, critiques of the small states concept note that the diversity is so great among so-called small states that it tends to describe an "imaginary small state" based on observed common characteristics (Van Campen; quoted in Handel 54, 1981).

Many criticisms have been levelled against these approaches and criteria in defining small states. Small states were said to be defined with preconceived values of colonial Western countries or in the context of war-experienced European developed states. In other words, conventional definitions were conceived within Western economic, military and cultural criteria as the norm (Wetters, 1987; Hauofa, 1993; cited in Hindmarsh, 2-3, 1996). Hindmarsh further argues that, "such approaches fail to examine the cultural, social, political and economic logic for being, or aspiring to be, a state, regardless of size or insularity" (4, 1996). Hindmarsh also observes that cut-off points for defining small states based on population have reduced over the years which reflect either rapid proliferation of small states with smaller populations or those older small states grown out in population invalidating previous claims of small state (Hindmarsh, 1996).

Social Constructionist Approach

Having criticised these mainstream approaches in defining and classifying states, Hindmarsh offers an alternative approach, which can be called a Social Constructionist Approach (see Figure 2.1). It is based on a subjective criterion where peoples of respective states or related to states, construct their status by declaring

themselves, whether they are small, sovereign or autonomous states. This approach is construed often in opposition to former approaches, which were assumed to be Western-centric, bent on capitalist-led development values and taken-for-granted that large size was preferable to small (Hauofa, 1993; Baldacchino, 1993, cited in Hindmarsh, 2-3, 1996).

Robert Rothestein (1968) and Robert Koehane (1969) were the first to shed light on this approach according to Hey (3, 2003). However, they referred to this approach as a psychological dimension of defining small states in line with the prevalent mood of international power politics of the time. This dimension tallied with the social constructionist approach, which came as an opposing view to positivist thinking of objectively based definitions or approaches. According to Hindmarsh (2-3, 1996), the social constructionist approach is viewed to be more people-centred and self-perception based as it reflects the aspirations and will of the people of a given entity fitting into the definer's perception than imposed versions by neo-colonial, Western-centric, capitalist-led and male-dominant view.

Finally, given the diversity and disparity that exist among so-called small states as heterogeneous entities, it makes it an elusive task to define small states without reservations or arbitration. There are, therefore, no uniform measurements available to objectively classify small states. As preceding discussion demonstrates, opinion differs among scholars as to the criteria to be employed in defining a small state. Even if a criterion is decided, the quantifiable delimitation of the range to qualify states as small or large is disputable. The concept of small states therefore has failed to receive a more universal definition, and is confined to case specific working definitions that vary from study to study according to the aim, nature and scope of inquiries.

Common Ground for Small States Concept

Notwithstanding these definitional problems of the concept of smallness, analysts have asserted that small states are distinguishable from larger states and exhibit distinctive international behaviour. IR theorists have, therefore, developed "small state" as a valid concept defined by either measurable quantitative criteria or

intangible qualitative criteria, or both. The common parameter that many scholars opted for when identifying a small state is the demographic criterion. As UNITAR said long ago, "In the determination of smallness, an essential element is population" (31, 1971). Thus, population size has been the most popular determinant and the cut off point, or the upper limit, considered was 1 to 1.5 million. For example, the studies conducted by the Commonwealth on vulnerability of small states in 1985 and in 1997 adopted 1 million and 1.5 million respectively as delimiting the upper point of reference (CCG, 9, 1985; CAG, 7, 1997).

The demographic factor became the most popular determinant in defining small states because statistics on population are readily available and future growth is easily predictable. It is also unlikely to fluctuate like economic indicators. This criterion is favourable for many other reasons as well. There are noticeable similarities and common characteristics in countries with small populations, which incapacitate and make them more vulnerable in contrast to other states. The constraints faced by them in this regard include limited human resources, small domestic market, and external dependence for defence, trade and development assistance.

Small Island Developing States (SIDS)

The SIDS are the focus group for the empirical investigation of this study. They definitely exhibit the characteristics that were discussed in the preceding sections that define a small state. Moreover, their situation is so unique that they can be classified as a sub-grouping within small states, because many of the distinct features that embody SIDS are recognisable. These are: acute smallness, environmental vulnerability, insularity and underdevelopment. It is therefore, imperative to examine the factors and characteristics that add a different dimension to SIDS within the small state framework.

Acute Smallness

The SIDS are truly "small" in many aspects. The land area of these islands is very small, most of them comprising either one single island or a group of atoll islands scattered across a large area of sea. Some analysts have characterized them as being

different in natural resources, having low levels of income and education, being physically remote from the super powers and/or any neighbours and having small populations (King, 1993 and Hauofa, 1993; cited in Hindmarsh, 2, 1996).

French President de Gaulle once classified Caribbean small island states as "specks of dust" in the Caribbean Sea, while the US preferred to identify them as a mass of water (cited in Julie, 2, 1992). These comments reflect the weak characteristics of SIDS that result from their smallness. Not only are SIDS small in terms of land area and demography, but there also exists a strong tendency for outward migration in search of jobs and education, which shrinks their populations. Similarly, there is an acute shortage of physical land on these islands and expansion of land is not a feasible task given the cost involved in reclaiming land from coastal areas. Available lands are too often infertile for growth of cash crops and resource exploitation. These factors lead to disadvantage, such as lack of human and material resources and market and infrastructure required for viable commercial enterprises. Smallness leads to tiny markets and dependence on one or two industries, such as fishing and/or tourism. Overall, infrastructure and institutional development is severely challenged due to the structural constraints brought about by minute size.

Environmental Vulnerability

The second central feature of SIDS, "environmental vulnerability", makes them really fragile and endangered states. Their physical geography leads to insularity resulting from remoteness and isolation. According to Royle, the two factors that make islands special are isolation and boundedness (38 and 134, 2001), for their land is surrounded by seas making them very prone to both man-made (oil spills) and natural disasters (cyclones and storms). For instance, it was reported in 1995, that Hurricane Luis caused US $500 million in damage to the economy of one Caribbean country, virtually closing every tourist hotel in the country and forcing skilled labour to migrate in search of jobs (Sanders, 7, 1997).

The island states are also endangered by the disastrous consequences of global warming that could displace whole populations due to climate change and sea level rise. It is particularly distressing to the lowest lying island states above sea level, such

the Maldives and Tuvalu. Tuvalu authorities are already looking into contingency plans for relocating its 9,300 residents. *The Guardian* (UK) newspaper reported on 20 July 2003 that the President of Tuvalu Congregational Church was in Australia lobbying for land for its people when they finally quit nine atolls due to sea level rise.

The developmental efforts of SIDS are impeded due to the allocation of a large portion of the budget for environmental protection, such as sea walls and water purification for domestic consumption as in the Maldives. Elsewhere the continuation of drought and sea level rise already affect the water table by increasing its salinity. Such island-nations may be heaven on earth for their natural beauty, but they are also helpless victims of the twin dangers from global warming - climate change and sea level rise. Thus, environmental factors haunting island states are seen to be holding them hostage and robbing them of their development.

Preamble paragraph 4 of the Programme of Actions for Sustainable Development of SIDS adopted at Barbados Conference describes the precarious nature and vulnerability of SIDS as follows:

> There are many disadvantages that derive from small size, which are magnified by the fact that many islands are not only small but are themselves made up of a number of small islands. Those disadvantages include a narrow range of resources, which forces undue specialization; excessive dependence on international trade and hence vulnerability to global developments; high population density, which increases the pressure on already limited resources; overuse of resources and premature depletion; relatively small watersheds and threatened supplies of fresh water; costly public administration and infrastructure, including transportation and communication; and limited institutional capacities and domestic markets, which are too small to provide significant scale of economies, while their limited export volumes, sometimes from remote locations, lead to high freight costs and reduced competitiveness (UN, 7, 1994).

Insularity

A third distinct feature of SIDS is their "insularity" or remoteness from mainlands and major markets of the world. The archipelagic states are economically most vulnerable, because their islands are scattered widely across the seas causing enormous challenges for developing and maintaining buildings and infrastructure. Being so far away from major markets and access to raw materials, transport costs are particularly high. These factors disable them from achieving economies of scale for competing in global markets. The openness resulting from islandness and its consequent effect of remoteness also makes SIDS susceptible to external criminal elements, such as drug trafficking and armed adventures. SIDS may have large territorial waters under an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) as subscribed for them by UN Law of the Sea Convention, but they lack the technology and facilities to tap their fishery and other seabed resources. SIDS have neither the technical nor institutional capacity to overcome these developmental challenges, making them more precarious than other small states.

Underdevelopment

The SIDS came into being as a result of the decolonisation movement spearheaded by the UN in the post-colonial period. As Arnold says, the majority of new members that joined the United Nations after 1985 were newly independent nations of the former empires, which were small, often island groups and regarded as members of the Third World (18, 1994). These countries were also referred to as the South, characterised by poor economic performance, dependence on foreign aid, mounting debts, and political instability (Arnold, viii, 1994). Their state of underdevelopment groups them into the political coalition of the developing world at the UN, collectively known as the Group of 77. For SIDS exhibit features such as resource constraints, ecological fragility, geographic nature and lack of developmental capacity. As Royle points out, the vulnerability of island ecosystems to natural disasters, their inability to achieve economies of scale, and insularity restrain political and human development of SIDS (Royle, 134, 2001).

Although SIDS are by-and-large small states, these factors qualify them to be reclassified as a sub-group within the category of small states. However, in academic scholarship, emphasis was laid on generalising all small states, irrespective of their physical characteristics, be they land-locked, developed, or islands, highlighting universality rather than uniqueness (see comments by Shaw, 95, 1992).

SIDS Defined

In line with the prevalent trend in defining small states based on population as the key determinant, and in conformity with the aim of this study, SIDS are defined as *those small sovereign states largely surrounded by water, inhabited by a population of 3 million or less and developmentally challenged due to limited resources, insularity and environmental fragility.*

The 41 states that fall within this definition and which are designated by the UN as SIDS is given in Table 2.1. Most of these SIDS are members of the political coalition called Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), which is set out in Table 2.2). However, some members of AOSIS do not fit into the working definition of SIDS given above. For example, AOSIS membership includes Cuba, which has a population of 10 million, and Singapore, which has a per capita income of US $27,800, which is more than that of Canada, France and UK (World Almanac, 247, 2002). Moreover, AOSIS also includes non-self governing territories, like Netherlands Antilles and the US Virgin Islands. With these few exceptions, AOSIS can be taken as a strong advocate for promoting and protecting the interests of SIDS in international environmental negotiations and for spearheading environmental diplomacy aimed at raising the profile of SIDS in IR.

Emergence of SIDS

The international community grew much larger in the last quarter of the 20th century and the creation of many small states contributed to this enlargement. Particularly, the growth of membership of the UN led by small states brought diversity and multiplicity within an already established category of states known as small states. Such shifts call for close scrutiny of these developments in order to better reflect the

reality of contemporary IR. Because IR is such a dynamic and fluid phenomenon that brings unending changes and impacts, it is imperative that the factors which distinguish SIDS from the over-grown small states category be examined in order to test the argument that these states form a unique group and warrant special attention.

The UN has recognised SIDS since the 1992 Earth Summit as a unique group that requires the special attention of the world community (see Chapter 17.G of Agenda 21, UNCED, 1992). In 1994, it designated 41 of its small members as SIDS out of a total 191 member states. However, the UN has not arrived at a definition of this group other than designating them on the basis of vulnerability and developmental capacity (see Barbados Programme of Action (BPOA), UN, 1994). Comparatively, it can be argued that SIDS possess features or characteristics that warrant them to be recognised as a distinguishable group of states within the small state category.

While SIDS gained currency at the UN in the early 1990s, sporadic references about them were made in a few earlier studies. However, none of these studies provided a clear definition, and gave only vague references as to what is a small island state (see UNITAR study, 31, 1971 and Dommen, 931, 1980). Recognition of SIDS as a special category did not happen until the 1990s. In fact, some analysts like Selwyn had contested against making islands a special social and economic category (like land-locked countries), arguing that the problems faced by island countries were parallel to those found in small remote mainland countries (950, 1980). Similarly, Shaw posited that many concepts deduced from the study of island states are equally useful in analysing mainland states (95, 1982). He further argued that many of the characteristics found in island states are a result of their smallness rather than islandness. Therefore, consensus for recognising SIDS as a unique group of states was hard to achieve in the early days of their independence.

It was with the emergence of global environmental concerns that led to classification of SIDS as a specific group of countries. According to the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the concept of SIDS was initially put forward by the representatives of small island states in the preparatory process of the United Nations Conference on Environment and Development (UNCED) in the early 1990s (UNDP, 1, 2002). Thus, the Rio Declaration and Agenda 21 adopted at the UNCED in

1992 are seen as the first official documents making reference to SIDS as a special group of countries, requiring the attention of the international community in promoting sustainable development (Agenda 21, Chapter 17, section G, 1992). Recognising the vulnerability and challenges faced by SIDS, UNCED called for a global conference on their sustainable development and this led to the conference in Barbados in May 1994, which produced as its outcome what was called the "Programme of Action for SIDS".

Conclusion

Definition and classification of small states has been a problematic exercise for many IR scholars. The inherent diversity and accompanying disparity make the task of definition formidable and elusive. Nevertheless, small states and SIDS have survived in the literature offering conceptual and analytical frameworks for researchers who seek an understanding of their political, social and economic development and the role played in IR.

Four approaches have been used in defining small states: quantitative; qualitative; mixed approach; and social constructionist. The classification of small states is based on four characteristics that were common to all, including special features that characterise their condition and behaviour. These characteristics are smallness, weakness, openness, resilience and dependence. They are characteristics resulting from intrinsic factors over which small states have little, if any, control.

It is argued that SIDS form a unique group within small states due to the peculiar distinguishing features of 'acute smallness', 'environmental vulnerability', 'insularity' and 'underdevelopment'. These specific features merit SIDS to be considered as a special sub-grouping within small states. They also possess distinctive features that exhibit varying causes and effects on their international behaviour, and which do not conform fully into models of generalised behaviour of small states in IR. SIDS have been largely neglected in the study of small states in IR. Nevertheless, they have been an indispensable part of the international community for more than 30 years.

The definition and characteristics of small states and SIDS were reviewed in this chapter in order to provide the basis for developing a theoretical framework in Chapter 3 for empirically studying SIDS in IR in Chapters 6 and 7. However, in the absence of suitable IR theories to analyse the international role of SIDS in IR (which is a conceptually different group than that of small states), small states theories are examined in order to develop a theoretical framework for analysing the factors that determine their international behaviour in IR.

Table 2.1: UN List of SIDS

UN LIST OF SIDS	
AFRICA	
1) Cape Verde,	Population: 436,000 (1995)
2) Comoros,	Population: 550,000 (1995)
3) Mauritius,	Population: 1,127,000 (1995)
4) Sao Tome and Principe,	Population: 140,400 (1995)
5) Seychelles,	Population: 77,400 (1997)
ASIA AND THE PACIFIC	
6) Bahrain,	Population: 580,400 (1996)
7) Cook Islands,	Population: 19,400 (1995) **
8) Fiji,	Population: 773,000 (1996)
9) Kiribati,	Population: 79,000 (1995)
10) Maldives,	Population: 245,000 (1995)
11) Marshall Islands,	Population: 56,000 (1995)
12) Micronesia,	Population: 123,000 (1995)
13) Nauru,	Population: 10,200 (1995)
14) Niue,	Population: 2,300 (1994) **
15) Palau,	Population: 16,700 (1995)
16) Papua New Guinea,	Population: 4,295,000 (1995)
17) Samoa,	Population: 165,200 (1995)
18) Singapore,	Population: 2,987,000 (1995)
19) Solomon Islands,	Population: 399,000 (1995)
20) Tokelau,	Population: 1,690 (1986) *
21) Tonga,	Population: 105,600 (1995)
22) Tuvalu,	Population: 10,000 (1995)
23) Vanuatu,	Population: 177,400 (1997)
EUROPE	
24) Cyprus,	Population: 737,000 (1995)
25) Malta,	Population: 375,000 (1995)
LATIN AMERICA AND THE CARIBBEAN	
26) Antigua and Barbuda,	Population: 67,500 (1995)
27) Aruba,	Population: 79,800 (1996) *
28) Bahamas,	Population: 284,000 (1996)
29) Barbados,	Population: 257,000 (1995)
30) Cuba,	Population: 10,998,500 (1995)
31) Dominica,	Population: 83,000 (1995)
32) Dominican Republic,	Population: 7,823,000
33) Grenada,	Population: 94,500 (1995)
34) Haiti,	Population: 7,325,000 (1996)
35) Jamaica,	Population: 2,528,000 (1996)
36) Netherlands Antilles,	Population: 204,000 (1995) *
37) St. Kitts and Nevis,	Population: 41,000 (1995)
38) St. Lucia,	Population: 156,000 (1995)
39) St. Vincent & Grenadines,	Population: 118,000 (1995)
40) Trinidad and Tobago,	Population: 1,272,000 (1995)
41) U.S. Virgin Islands,	Population: 97,300 (1995) *

* Non-self governing territory ** Not a member of the UN

Source: UN Division for Sustainable Development, 2000
Website: **http://www.un.org/esa/sustdev/sidslist.htm** (24 January 2002)

Table 2.2: Members of Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS)

MEMBERS OF ALLIANCE OF SMALL ISLAND STATES (AOSIS)	
MEMBERS	**OBSERVERS**
1) Antigua and Barbuda	40) American Samoa
2) Bahamas	41) Guam
3) Barbados	42) Netherlands Antilles
4) Belize	43) U.S. Virgin Islands
5) Cape Verde	
6) Comoros	
7) Cook Islands	
8) Cuba	
9) Cyprus	
10) Dominica	
11) Fiji	
12) Federated States of Micronesia	
13) Grenada	
14) Guinea-Bissau	
15) Guyana	
16) Haiti	
17) Jamaica	
18) Kiribati	
19) Maldives	
20) Malta	
21) Marshall Islands	
22) Mauritius	
23) Nauru	
24) Niue	
25) Palau	
26) Papua New Guinea	
27) Samoa	
28) Singapore	
29) Seychelles	
30) Sao Tome and Principe	
31) Solomon Islands	
32) St. Kitts and Nevis	
33) St. Lucia	
34) St. Vincent and the Grenadines	
35) Suriname	
36) Tonga	
37) Trinidad and Tobago	
38) Tuvalu	
39) Vanuatu	

Source: AOSIS website: http://www/sidsnet.org/aosis/members.html (22 April 2005)

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Chapter 3
THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK

Introduction

The overarching research question this thesis asks is, *how can the small states paradigm in IR be strengthened to better explain the rising importance of the role of SIDS in contemporary IR?* In searching for answers to this question it is imperative to begin with a literature review in the field of IR, in order to become familiar with the existing theories that describe not only the international behaviour or the role of small states in IR but also the explanatory variables that account for that behaviour or role. Therefore, this chapter aims at understanding the theoretical assumptions and explanations made for small states, like SIDS, as to their role in IR and the underlying factors that determine their role. It also reviews the criticisms levelled against these assumptions and scrutinises their limitations in order to find a theoretically informed proposition(s) for understanding the international behaviour or the role of SIDS in contemporary IR. It is this proposition that is explored as to its validity in the empirical investigation of SIDS relating to two diplomatic negotiations in chapters 6 and 7.

Notwithstanding the vacuum existing in IR scholarship for locating suitably fitting theories that account for the rising importance of SIDS in contemporary IR, this study avails itself of the closest available theoretical framework, which I call the *Small States Paradigm*. This paradigm was derived by combing through some of the broader studies undertaken on small states within the perspective of IR or foreign policy behaviour. Although researchers and scholars who have undertaken studies on small states do not call the body of knowledge a paradigm, they have been referred to as Small States Theories (Holl, 14, 1983; Papadakis, and Harvey, 431, 1987). Nevertheless, Moller vaguely made a reference to what he calls "Vital's paradigm of small states", which could be taken as a sporadic reference (45, 1983). The small states theories began to appear in IR scholarship in the 1960s (Fox, 1959; Vital, 1967; Benedict, 1967) and focused mainly on comparative foreign policy studies of large

states versus small states. Those small European states were in no way comparable to the SIDS described in Chapter 2. The explanations for the international behaviour of small European states were heavily influenced by the prevailing dominant IR theories known as Idealism and Realism where large states were considered more worthy of scholarly research than small states (Hey, 5, 2003; Waltz, 1979).

The small states paradigm does not provide readily available analytical frameworks for understanding the role of SIDS in IR because it embodies very loosely described and open-ended propositions and concepts that reflected the realities of the immediate post World War Two period ahead of the sweeping changes that gave rise to the contemporary international system. Nevertheless, this paradigm does provide useful and applicable ideas, propositions, and concepts for extracting explanatory variables for determining the international behaviour and the role of SIDS in IR.

Theoretical Background

Having been influenced by the major IR schools of thought that were prevalent in the post World War Two period and sandwiched between the deepening East-West divide that rooted the international structure of the time, the small states paradigm appeared in the 1960s and 70s in an effort to understand the causes and effects of the international behaviour of the world's neglected or relegated small states (Handel, 3, 1981). Two important factors motivated IR scholars to begin analysing the position and the role of small states in IR. Many European small states survived the onslaught of the Second World War without losing their integrity and statehood, while a number of formal colonies of disintegrating European empires began to assert independence under the decolonisation movement spearheaded by the newly established UN (see comments of Reid, 5, 1974). The behavioural approach to political science inquiries that gained currency in the 60s and 70s were also catalytic in building interest in small states (Holl, 15, 1983).

The pioneering study by Annette Baker Fox in 1959, entitled the *Power of Small States: Diplomacy in World War Two*, set the stage for development of what could be called the small states paradigm. It presented an account of the interrelations between

great and small powers in Europe at the time of the Second World War and how lesser states had manoeuvred to master their destiny without falling either prey to, or becoming pawns of, great powers. The study was heavily influenced by the predominant paradigm of IR at the time known as *realism* and its surgical precepts of power politics. David Vital (1967), another leading small states theorist of IR, presented a similar account in his comparative analysis of large and small states, while identifying the causes and effects of international behaviour. He outlined the characteristic behaviour of small states arising from their smallness of size and the lack of capacity to act in defence of their interests.

Both scholars based their analyses on traditional power politics equating the national goals of small states to those of larger states and concentrating on structural constraints that small size imposes on lesser states. Thus, the realist paradigm could be regarded as the launching pad of the small states paradigm (see comments by Moller, 37, 1983). As in realism, the small states paradigm assumes that power is the key element that determines the course of international destiny for independent states. The international environment, or the world system, within which states have to exist is said to be an anarchical system where there is no order. For the international system lacks an authoritative body to regulate affairs of states and so the weight of power of individual states shapes the international order, or the structure of the international system. In such circumstances, each state is forced to employ self-centred national attributes to survive in the system and to seek power maximisation to that effect. The capacity of power is determined by the size of the state. In other words, the more resources a state has, the better its capacity to act in defence and promotion of its national interests in IR. The two major analytical concepts that determine international behaviour of small states are 'size' and the 'capacity to act'. They are derived from power politics as presented in the dominant IR theory of realism.

The behavioural role of small states in IR as described in the small states paradigm reflects propositions present in the second dominant theory of IR, known as *idealism*. In describing the behavioural outcomes of small states, it was posited that they opted for cooperation rather than conflict, and promoted international organisations and international norms and laws as a mainstay of world peace and development. *Idealism* and *realism* therefore, had a profound effect on the small states paradigm. As

precursors to the small states paradigm, it is thus imperative to examine in more detail these two dominant theories of IR. These are the long-standing, pioneering and competing theoretical paradigms in IR, which gave birth to IR scholarship as an independent discipline. The key premises underpinning each theory are summarised in Table 3.1

Idealism

As the pioneering IR theory, *idealism* provided the analytical skeleton for IR scholarship after the First World War. It rested on moral principles and prescribed an idealist view of the world by setting optimistic characteristics for the behaviour of world states. Interchangeably referred to as utopianism or liberal internationalism (McCraw, 18, 1994), idealism stems from moral values and legal norms. In relating to world politics, this theoretical perspective bases its account on normative judgements and wishful thinking, for it characterises state relations as harmonious and cooperative, which can avoid wars and conflicts. It also advocates for international disarmament and promotes international trade as an avenue for building friendship and understanding. One of the leading proponents of this perspective, Woodrow Wilson, former President of United States of America, asserted that the First World War resulted from human greed for power (Carr, 1939 [1946]. He asserted that constructing a democratic world and facilitating cooperation among states towards common interests could avoid such tragedies. The envisioned cooperation was to be based on international law and sovereign equality of states and provision of collective security.

According to McCraw, idealists believe that "laws of nature dictate harmony and cooperation between peoples" (18, 1998). Similarly, if democracy is propagated and human rights upheld in the world's states, idealism asserts that peace can be promoted and wars avoided (McCraw, 1998). Idealists advocate that international organisations are the best vehicles to facilitate collective security to all nations and regulate world order. The League of Nations came into being in 1920 as a result of this idealist trend. However, credibility and practicability of such idealist thinking came into question when the League of Nations failed to stop Hitler's expansionist ambitions and subsequent break out of the Second World War.

Realism

Realism has been the foremost dominating school of thought in IR since the Second World War. It was conceived in opposition to the forerunning theory of idealism, which made its initial appearances in the 1930s. The realist perspective gained prominence among IR theorists as a direct response to failure of idealist theories to answer many questions left behind by the Second World War. The realist perspective hatched from a scientific or behaviouralist approach to the study of international politics and the external behaviours of states. Realists looked at the world in a more critical manner and based their assumptions on facts and the nature of state systems. Their views stood in opposition to the idealistic thought of harmonious interests of states and their adherence to international norms.

Thus, realists drew a pessimistic world outlook. The international system was described as an anarchical system where states would compete for power. Power and security were adjudged as overarching national interests for which military capability was sought and advanced. Inquiries made through the realist perspective often examined the causes of war and conflicts (Jackson and Sorensen, 1999) with explanations made in terms of power politics. A leading proponent of the realist school of thought, Morgenthau says, "statesmen think and act in terms of interest defined as powers" (5, 1985).

The realist perspective also contends that sovereign states are the principal actors in the international system. However, no one entity can command authority in the system to regulate the interactions of states. Thus, relations among states become competitive as each is tempted to maximize its national interests to the fullest advantage on a self-help based approach. States' capability to acquire power for advancing their interests in IR is determined by the size of the country, military strength and wealth. Realists assume that states are selfish and security will be their prime concern. Conflicts would be a natural phenomenon as states attempt to maximise power for survival. Realism does not believe in the ability of international organisations to regulate the international behaviour of states (McCraw, 19, 1994).

Table 3.1: Key premises in idealism and realism theories

Key premises in idealism and realism theories	
Idealism	**Realism**
- Idealistic and optimistic worldview - Basis on moral, ethical & legal principles - Normative or traditional outlook - Promotes international cooperation & interdependence - Supports international organisations - Advocates for liberal democracy - Safeguards human rights - Promotes disarmament and trade - Advocates for collective security & equality of states	- Pessimistic worldview & self-help approach - Basis on power capacity & promotion of national interests - Behavioural or scientific outlook - Believes in conflicts as natural phenomenon - Promotes defensive & military capacity - Believes in states as principal actors - Portrays international system as anarchic

Small States Paradigm

Until the 1960s, IR scholarship failed to pay attention to small states even though these states had existed long before the discipline took root after the First World War (Holl, 14, 1983). Even in recent times, according to Wagner, the published works on small states are country-specific, issue-specific and descriptive in nature (Wagner, 2, 1989). Little has changed since then. Thus, the author of this thesis had to comb through a wide body of literature on small states in order to cluster the underlining concepts, theories, and models under one heading: the *small states paradigm.* Information on small states has appeared under various names, such as small states theories (Holl, 14, 1983), small states studies (Goetschel, 9, 1998), and small states literature (Hey, 2, 2003; Hindmarsh, 4, 1996).

Similarly, except for sporadic references to the UN and its indispensability to small states, nothing much has been analysed about the role of small states in multilateral politics or international diplomacy, which is the focus of this study. Also, most studies

were concentrated on regional settings, providing less universal applicability of derived hypotheses. For example,e see Fox (1959), Rothstein (1968), Mathisen (1971); Goetschel (1998) and Holl (1983) on European small states, Pettman (1976) on South East Asian small states, and Fauriol (1984) on Caribbean states.

Most accounts of small states focused on security, economic concerns and manoeuvrability against great powers. The European small states occupied the focus of early small states theorists and their analyses were measured by weighing the national goals of larger states and their characteristics in IR without categorically treating small states with independent and compatible traits. The position of a state in the international system was determined by its capacity to influence international politics and to impose its will on other states. The main bedrock for obtaining this power is assumed to depend on the resources a state possesses (Papadakis and Harvey, 420, 1987). Consequently, the predominant concerns in the small states paradigm were their security and viability in the international system (Goetschel, 9, 1998; Holl, 15, 1983). Security became the main concern because small states were said to be vulnerable to foreign aggression as they lacked capacity to defend themselves. This was a predominant concern because the realist paradigm over-emphasised the dimension of power politics (Hey, 5, 2003). Similarly, the question of viability emerges as a severe resource constraint that bars small states from fulfilling their obligations in the international system as independent states.

Protection and security were, therefore, seen as the greatest concerns of small states, as they were perceived to be militarily weak and defenceless. A number of studies on small states thus addressed the question of security and viability in various volatile situations and at times of war. (For examples, see the works by Annette Baker Fox (1959); David Vital (1967); Robert Rothstein (1968) and Michael Handel (1981). Rothstein contends, "small powers are preoccupied with their autonomy and security", which ill-afford their energy and meagre resources to allocate for other needs (4, 1968).

Two clear trends were exhibited in the literature. One was comparative assessment of the foreign policy behaviours of small states with that of larger states (Fox, 1959; Vital, 1967; East, 1973); and the other was strategy for small states to seek security

and manoeuvrability against predatory powers (Rothstein, 1968; Mathisen, 1971). In other words, the focus ranged from inter-state relations between great and small states, to similarities and differences in foreign policy behaviours between great and small states.

Notwithstanding these shortcomings, the small states paradigm presents explanatory accounts for analysing factors that determine the international behaviour of small states and the subsequent role they play in IR. These are, however, largely based on *inherent* or *internal* national factors and overlook the potential afforded by *extra-national external* factors (Walker, 270, 1987).

Explanatory Variables

What then, are the explanatory variables or factors given in the small states paradigm for explaining the international behaviour or role in IR of small states? They are conceptualised as the physical concept of *size* and the structural concept of *capacity*. These concepts are considered in the small states paradigm as main inputs that determine the international behaviour of small states. They are theorized as independent variables that explain the causes of the international behaviour or role of small states in IR.

Physical Concept of Size

The foundation of the small states paradigm is based on the analytical concept of size, which is regarded as a key explanatory variable (Reid, 9, 1974). Physical size of any given country is assumed to determine the width and the breadth of the international role it can afford to play (Barston, 1973; East, 1995). It is therefore, the major explanatory variable given in the small states paradigm as the determinant of international behaviour. Size is described as the aggregate sum of natural, human and material resources with which a country is endowed (East, 1995). In other words, the amount of territory, population, and natural resources determines a country's size (Vogel, 56, 1983). Pettman mentions two other criteria as characterising the size of a state: size of resources and level of dependence on the international system (Pettman, 8, 1976). For Fauriol, it was resources and power base (population, territory, military

resources) along with other national development issues (GNP, per capita income, industrialisation, energy use) (cited in Hampton, 12, 1998).

Size-based analyses of states in theorising about the distinctive patterns of foreign policy behaviour or characteristic roles in IR are the most commonly found in literature on small states. Maurice East says, "the concept of size has received an increasing amount of attention as a factor affecting foreign policy" (556, 1973). He cites Rosenau and Rummel to further emphasise the important correlation between size and international behaviour of nation-states. Size determines the constraints and opportunities available for foreign policy behaviour. It is hypothesised that small size resembles lack of capability, resource-poorness, and military-weakness. Therefore, size is perceived as manifesting multiple problems or challenges for small states, which cannot be overcome on their own. It can practically hold a state hostage depriving development and placing its viability in question. It incapacitates small states to attain economies of scale, robs them of a domestic market, and makes them dependent on outside sources of aid and investments or trade incurring high risks beyond control of the state. These attributes largely reduce the choices small states have towards crafting prudent policies in domestic and international affairs. East contends that small states "have a small proportion of already small resource base to devote to the international sector" (East, 550, 1973). Vital (1967), stressed the physical size as the overriding determinant of international behaviour of small states. The greater the size, the better the advantage it offers in IR and vice-versa (see comments by Baehr, 1975, 456-7; Papadakis, et al., 420, 1987). Therefore, size is assumed in small state theories as the underlying bedrock for understanding the role or behaviour of small states in IR.

Differences of size have political consequences for both large and small nations. All things being equal, the state with greater economic resources and a larger population has more influence on events outside its frontiers, greater security from pressure and attack, more prestige, and a larger element of choice in respect of the national policy it pursues (Vital, 3, 1967). Thus, Vital asserts that size "sets the limit to what can be attained and fixes the international role and status of the nation more securely than any other [factor]" (4, 1967). If states are resource-rich they are attributed to have the capacity "to reward and punish other states" (Jensen, 223, 1982). This is because the

physical size of resources enables them to possess power which is supposed to be the main diplomatic instrument to protect and advance national interests.

The impact of size on a small state goes beyond the foreign policy mechanism. It discourages leaders of small states from being proactive and ambitious in the pursuit of their national interests. According to Vital, leaders are haunted by intrinsic weaknesses, making them indignant, apologetic and lacking in perseverance (33-38, 1967). Pettman says leaders see their predicament as "basically unalterable", bringing a ray of hopelessness in the belief of their inherent weaknesses (157, 1976). The pessimism elicited by intrinsic vulnerability is well demonstrated when Rothstein quoted the diplomat of a small state saying "nothing we do matters very much" (28, 1968). Vital contends that a small under-developed state is developmentally challenged due to absolute limitations of size, a high degree of vulnerability, and a high degree of incompatibility between economic, political and military requirements (56, 1967).

Like the relative concept of smallness, the size of a state is assessed by comparison with other states. Similarly, their place and rank in the international system is ascertained by their political influence weighted by power. Therefore, it is a popular practice among IR theorists to arrange states in an international hierarchy determined by power capacity. The states with the smallest size lie at the lowest end of the international hierarchical order. The size is a concept derived from *internal* or *inherent* factors of states, which is unalterable. In other words, fixed natural assets help determine the course of international affairs for any given state. Size is therefore assumed to be the principal determinant of a state's freedom to manoeuvre independent foreign policies and to advance interests in IR. The smaller the size of a state, the greater the limitations it brings to international behaviour and vice versa.

Structural Concept of Capacity

While the concept of *size* provides a skeleton for the small state paradigm, *capacities to act,* adds muscles and blood into its life. It is the second most important concept presented in the paradigm as providing inputs that determine the international behaviour of states. *Capacity to act* is defined as the power to deter threats and to

advance national interests overseas. Incapacity to act is known to be a function of the inherent characteristic of small size. Rothstein hypothesises three factors that highlight small states' incapacity to act: the need for outside help; the narrow margin of safety; and leaders that see the country's weakness as unalterable (Rothstein, cited in Koehane, 293, 1969). The concept, therefore, denotes the limitations and weaknesses that small size imposes upon small states (Papadakis and Harvey., 421, 1987). Overall, the small states' incapacity to act is meant to be lack of self-defence and self-sufficiency. Vogel says that the capacity concept is defined in terms of economic and military capacities (56, 1983). Leaders of small states see such predicaments as "basically unalterable" (Pettman, 12, 1976). This phenomenon makes them apologetic, psychologically inhibited (Vital, 157, 1967), and dependent on the mercy of security alliances.

The power-capacity of a state is measured in terms of the impact that it can have on the external environment (Thakur, 245, 1991). This power comes from levels of economic, political and social development of the state. If a state lacks natural and human resources and its economic and bureaucratic institutions remain undeveloped, its capacity to act is severely constrained. In such conditions, the state becomes highly vulnerable to external threats and increases dependence on foreign sources, which leads to erosion of sovereignty and freedom. Small states are prime victims of this situation according to the small states paradigm. The viability of small states in the international system is often raised in the small states literature due to this incapacity to withstand pressures from the external environment. For Mathisen, the international hierarchy of states is determined by states' "capability to avenge war" (13, 1971).

Vital hypothesised that the survival of small states depended on their capacity to act in response to external stimuli. Accordingly, "it is the capacity of the state to withstand stress on the one hand, and its ability to pursue a policy of its own devising on the other" which give them life (Vital, 4, 1967). The viability and stability of a state is commonly viewed in IR in terms of power or military strength. The power is the decisive factor that provides the diplomatic and political instruments to win bargains or to wield political influence in international decision-making. Power-wielding states can afford to exercise diplomatic instruments such as rewarding (giving development aid) or punishing (imposing coercion, and sanctions) on states that do not co-operate

with them or become hostile to their interests. Power is the phenomenon that ranks states in the international hierarchical order, which privileges them with status and prestige. Burton says, "state interests are like the basic needs of individuals. They expand with the ability to acquire" (114, 1968). He asserts that the distinctiveness of the behaviour of small states was seen as a result of impediments their size imposed upon their capacity to possess power.

On the economic front, small states' incapacity to act stems from economic weaknesses resulting from their limited resources. Basically, the lack of human and natural resources inhibit national developmental efforts on every front. This leads to incapacity to generate national wealth and to acquire military strength, let alone resourceful diplomacy overseas. Industrial capacity is shrunk as well as making small states too dependent on foreign markets and external manipulations, raising the question of not only economic viability but also political viability. Thus, small states are quite open to foreign penetrations. Larger states may attempt to exploit their natural resources under unfair terms of trade, exert pressure to join military alliances or win political favours by disguised means of aid. Burton illustrates the influence great powers have on small states in this way: "The greater states can always export unemployment, control terms of trade, export ideologies, and use aid and capital loans as bargaining weapons and, if necessary intervene directly in the affairs of other states" (30, 1968).

The concept of capacity to act is not only confined to economic and military spheres, but also diplomatic as well. Lack of economic wealth inhibits states' interactions overseas and incapacitates the exercise of important functions, such as intelligence gathering and negotiations. Such states can ill-afford many diplomatic missions overseas and the few they have are under-staffed. This reduces their ability to perform an active role in international diplomacy, thereby restricting their participation and involvement in IR. Overall, such incapacity disallows states from making informed foreign policy decisions. Small size-led budgetary constraints also restrict them from exploiting prospective avenues and opportunities to protect and advance their national interests. As East says, the "reduced organisational capacity" in this regard makes small states "slower in perceiving events and developments in the international system" (559, 1973).

Table 3.2: Summary of Small States Paradigm

Summary of Small States Paradigm	
Inputs of Behaviour (Explanatory Variables)	**Behavioural Role** (International Behaviour)
- Small physical size - Incapacity to act	- Pawns and objects for great powers - Passive, reactive and marginal profile - Security and viability is national priority - Economic assistance and development aid are the next priorities of foreign policy - Powerless and insignificant in terms of world politics - Lacks diplomatic manoeuvrability and limited choice for action - Opts for non-monetary but verbal commitments - Promotes collective security through the UN - Promotes international organisations and international norms and laws - Politically immature and has little experience - Prefers ad hoc approach to issues and selectivity in interests pursued - Foreign relations are merely administrative in nature - Prefers regional approach to address issues within regional groupings

Summary

It is assumed that the structural concept of capacity together with the physical concept of size, profoundly impacts upon the behaviour of states and limits the courses of action that they can pursue in IR. Table 3.2 summarises the two explanatory variables given in the small states paradigm and corresponding behavioural outcomes or the role. Finally, the gloomy perspective provided in the small states paradigm as to the international behaviour or role of small states makes the target group of this study, the SIDS redundant in IR. Nevertheless, the pressing question is, do these descriptions

and theories fit into the realities of contemporary IR, or do they call for revisit of the small states paradigm? That question is addressed in the next section.

Discussion

The broad-based and open-ended discussions within the IR perspective found in the literature on small states was reviewed in the preceding sections in order to identify the explanatory factors that determine the international behaviour of small states and the corresponding role they play in IR. The theories or concepts conceived in this regard have been clustered and presented under the title of the small states paradigm. Its description of causes and effects of international behaviour paints a bleak future for small states. A close scrutiny of this paradigm reveals, however, that the explanatory factors are all based on inherent structural features of small states that are restrictive in nature. In other words, the analytical frameworks of the small states paradigm seem unalterable and lead small states into a dead end. This is because it appears to shut all doors of opportunity for small states to play a meaningful role in IR. Their projected outlook is pessimistic, severely restricting their scope for worthy action in IR. They are regarded as security consumers and incapable of fulfilling international obligations and responsibilities. The behavioural outcomes of these states were described as passive, reactive, inactive, marginal and low profile. Also, they were observed as pawns and objects at the mercy of great powers to be utilised for their advantage. Explicitly put, small states were characterised as a liability for the international system and as having no concern in world politics. The capacity to participate in and to contribute to IR is largely a function of a states' size measured in terms of resources and power. Therefore, size is regarded as the main yardstick or denominator of the international role or behaviour of small states: the smaller the size, the lesser the choice for international action.

Notwithstanding these claims, the primary concerns of security and viability raised in the small states paradigm have proven to be unsubstantiated. No small state that gained independence and statehood since the UN came into existence in 1945 has disappeared or withered away. On the contrary, proliferation of small states has continued and their prominence in IR has hastened. The emergence of SIDS is a

classic example of small states worthy of mention in this regard. The international community has recognised SIDS as a special group that requires world attention. To this effect, the UN held a global conference on SIDS in 1994 and established an office at its main headquarter known as the SIDS Unit. Moreover, SIDS themselves have formed a political alliance (AOSIS) to defend and promote their interests in international environmental negotiations. They control today one-fifth of the voting power at the UN and have been highly visible and active in Law of the Sea Negotiations and Climate Change Negotiations. Undoubtedly, small states have risen to importance and gained higher visibility in contemporary IR than ever before in world history (Keohane, 1969; Hey, 2003).

The small states paradigm as it stands is incapable of explaining these changes. What factors or variables, therefore, better explain this significant SIDS' development in IR? It can be argued that the small states paradigm is inherently flawed and its vision narrowly focused, because when its concepts are applied to understanding the behaviour of SIDS, it raises more questions than answers. The small states paradigm may not, however, be totally obsolete, but it appears that revisiting it with respect to the behavioural inputs and outputs of SIDS is warranted.

The dynamism of the international system and changing face of IR help explain the shifts in the international behaviour of SIDS. The changes include: increasing importance of international organisations; onset of pragmatic trends, such as decolonisation; arrival of a global change era and interdependence; arrival of new non-state actors, such as NGOs and epistemic communities; international restructuring, such as the demise of the cold war; shifts in the world agenda, such as increasing prominence of environmental issues and international terrorism; and rapid development of telecommunications for diffusing knowledge.

It was external threats arising from hostile elements that dominated security concerns of small states in yesteryear, but the source of this insecurity today is global environmental change. The issue of the viability of small states is also displaced today as international organisations and international norms provide collective security for all states. The following remarks of Jensen reflect the emerging influence of small states in the international system.

> Small States have dominated in the context of United Nations General Assembly and with coalescence and co-operation they can dominate the voting outcome particularly since each state, regardless of size, has an equal vote (224, 1982).

These changes on the world stage call for a broadened perspective of the small states paradigm. These changes constitute *external* factors that afford new opportunities for previously marginalised and relegated small states to raise their profile in IR. Are these external factors accountable for the proactive and visible role SIDS now play in contemporary IR? If so, how can we contribute to enlarging and strengthening the theoretical explanations of the small state paradigm as to the behavioural determinants and outcomes of SIDS? To answer these questions, it is necessary to analyse the limitations and weaknesses of the small states paradigm.

The small states paradigm can be argued as inherently flawed, narrowly focused and outdated for various reasons. The paradigm's foundation was first laid on the inter-war experiences of small states in Europe, which had contrasting historical and developmental conditions than newly independent small states in the developing world. Small states in the developing world have been newly freed colonies whose priority was not balancing of power but economic development. The inquiries into small state behaviour were also made in comparison to great powers and seeing things through their eyes (Papadakis, and Harvey, 423, 1987; Thakur, 241, 1991). There also existed great diversity and wide disparity among so called small states (Mathisen, 17, 1972). Some states may be quantitatively small in size, but well-endowed in terms of qualitative factors. For instance, Israel is very small in size compared with its hostile neighbours, but far advanced and stronger in terms of military strength. As a matter of fact some analysts regard Israel as "active and aggressive actor in terms of foreign policy" (Hey, 2, 2003). These factors make small states paradigm less universally applicable as European small states are a minority in the international system.

Some analysts also dispute the key independent variable of physical size identified in the paradigm as an unreliable yardstick to assess international behaviour. Pettman argues that many of the characteristics resulting from size are shared by small and large states (157, 1976). Michael Handel also contends that many problems faced by

the weak states are also to a lesser extent shared by the more powerful states (7, 1981). He says that new developments emerging under "a host of conditioning factors" restrict the freedom of big powers while enhancing the manoeuvrability of the small states (Handel, 7, 1981). With the advent of integration and globalisation, Thakur argues that "attributes such as small or large are irrelevant" (cited in Goetschel, 10, 1998). According to Vayrynen, "there is no one-to-one relationship between the size of a nation and its external behaviour" (93, 1983). Another critic of size-based theories, Thakur says, the concept of size "confuses more than clarifies" (Thakur, 241, 1991). These scholars argue that states do not exist in a vacuum, but rather each interacts with other states by capitalising on opportunities that arise from other sources. Singapore has developed into a flourishing transhipment port and regional hub for business development, while militarily weak Kuwait has generated enormous wealth from its oil resources. Therefore, it could be argued that the economic health of a country cannot be assessed only by the quantity of resources available, but also by the quality of resources and strategic advantages with which a country is bestowed. Thus, it cannot be taken as a straightforward yardstick for assessments of foreign policy behaviour that small states are economically vulnerable due to small territorial size (Handel, 48, 1981).

The small states paradigm could also be regarded as inherently faulty since one of its premises, "smallness", is a taken-for-granted problem. Small size is believed to restrict the menu of choice in developing and executing foreign polices (Wagner, 7, 1989; Thakur, 242, 1991). This factor also contributed to the mythical question of viability of small states in the international system. Thus Papadakis, and Harvey (430, 1987) and Thakur (280, 1991) argue that security of a state not challenged and theories originating in the security dilemma of that country cannot explain the state's behaviour. Inter-state relations are today more governed by international norms and rules than ever before and the UN Charter prohibits war (articles 2, 4, and 5, UN Charter). Hey (8, 2003) says, the "problem in the current small states literature is its outdated focus on state security". Thakur (1991) further points out that security dimensions have changed as well in recent times bringing new issues into focus, such as ecological degradation. To address such security issues, it is not the strengthening of military capability which is required, but co-operation of all states, big and small, to make firm commitments to the security of the planet as a whole. Given the

increasing interdependence and emerging new threats to stability of states, Thakur says, "security and survival of nations anywhere have become hostage to policies and practises everywhere" (280-1, 1991). These sentiments were reiterated by Hey who argues that United States' security is more under scrutiny than small states after the September 11 (2001) attack on America (9, 2003). The overarching concern for viability of small states in the small states paradigm is therefore ill-founded.

Besides smallness or size, the small states paradigm has been criticised for its overriding yardstick of 'power potential', as an inadequate tool of analysis for the role of small states in IR. This is because it is only one of a host of factors that determines the behaviour of small states. Thus, military capability is not that critical compared to other factors (Hoffmann cited in Rothstein, 400, 1966). Displacing the notion of power, Rothstein asserts, "small powers have been as powerful as their capacity to achieve intended effects" (3, 1968). Therefore, he argues that power-based explanations of the role of small states in IR are inadequate. It ignores the potential contribution they make in the area of non-military affairs of world politics. The traditional definitions that stemmed out of the material dimensions of small states are "simply unable to explain the influence small powers have come to exert in world politics" (Rothstein, 21, 1968). Thus, Rothstein argues that the small state concept is seen as a device to explain lack of influence, weakness and powerlessness and so is inadequate to describe the comprehensive behaviour of small states. In a similar tone of argument, George Liska, says, what constitutes a "small state might rest on primary power differentials or derivatives" (cited in Rothstein, 22, 1968). Definitions of power-relative dimensions in comparison to other larger states, therefore, fail to incorporate broader parameters that could sufficiently explain the potential behaviour of small states in IR.

Similarly, Handel points out the incompatibility of great and small states in military terms by saying that "one should not compare apples and pears" given that military capacities in weak and great powers were undisputedly obvious (36, 1981). He further comments that the tendency to focus on measurable criteria arises from the desires of theorists to arrive at precise and unquestionable definitions. Handel argues that the power of a state is not best measured in relation to all other states, but its neighbours' and individual states' goals. He recalled the power exerted by the Organization of

Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), a coalition of small states according to him, which successfully sanctioned an oil embargo in 1973 against the mighty industrial countries. In a similar tone, Papadakis, and Harvey (420, 1987) argue, "that power can emerge from factors other than material resources and that 'non-power' activity is possible". Therefore, there are avenues open for small states to overcome internally derived size-based impediments to play a meaningful role in IR.

Having been conceived within the framework of power politics and influenced by past interwar experiences of Europe and the cold war, the small states paradigm was a rigid product of the prevalent circumstances and Western-centric view of the world. The small states paradigm does not, therefore, represent a universal model readily applicable to SIDS. Nevertheless, in the absence of suitable alternatives, small states theories provide some analytical utility for examining the role of SIDS in IR with the ulterior objective of enlarging and further developing the theories in the small states paradigm.

Conclusion

All the analytical concepts of the small states paradigm were developed on the basis of inherent, *internal* factors, which overlooked many *external* factors that provided prospective opportunities for small states for international action. James Rosenau, who is widely recognised as the father of foreign policy theory building, posited that systemic or *external* environment factors are more fundamental in shaping the international behaviour of small states than the *internal* factors (Rosenau, 1972). In a similar tone, Michael Handel (1981) and J.W. Burton (1968) have asserted that the interplay of internal and external factors necessarily mould the foreign policy behaviour of any state whether small or large. While internal factors remain constant, the dynamic external factors keep changing as time and events unfold, shifting the structure of the system, its actors, and issues addressed. According to Handel, the power of small states is derived from the external environment rather than domestically (257, 1981). The institutional setting in the external environment offers "plenty of opportunity to apply their qualitative virtues" (Goetschel, 22, 1998). Moreover, the importance of the external factors on the international behaviour of any state is well illustrated by the following comments by Jensen: "In a sense, if there

were no external determinants, there would be no foreign policy, a state is largely reacting to some condition or happening in its external environment" (231, 1982).

However, small state theorists fail to venture into the external factors outside states in analysing the impact that they bring upon the international behaviour or the role of small states. As Burton puts it, "the contemporary flow of ideas, universal changes in values, the influence of technological advances and the widespread activities of commercial enterprises" have brought notable changes to IR (28, 1968). These new changes cannot be analysed within the traditional small states paradigm of IR, but call for new analytical models and conceptual frameworks.

Small states are neither at a dead end nor victims of natural features. They are not helplessly crippled by structural limitations, like small physical size and incapacity to act. On the contrary, avenues that lie outside their states, that is *external* factors arising from the international environment, provide them with better opportunities and room to manoeuvre in IR. Undoubtedly, IR is a dynamic phenomenon that experiences rapid changes often benefiting the smallest and weakest states in the international system. They are not completely powerless in participating in and to contributing to IR as recent history of the UN has demonstrated. Indeed, small states are becoming highly visible in multilateral relations and gaining prominence in contemporary IR, in a manner never previously seen. Therefore, the inability of the inherent *internal* factors presented in the small states paradigm to explain the causes and effects of international behaviour of SIDS suggests that it be revised to better suit the current realities of rapidly changing IR. This may be achieved by paying attention to *external* factors.

As recent history shows, SIDS play a disproportionate role in contemporary IR (see chapter 4) in spite of their structurally constrained *internal* factors. Now the question is what factors explain this rising visibility and importance of SIDS in IR? Interestingly, the *size* and *capacity to act* for SIDS remain the same. Then what explains this shift in their behaviour and what factors are responsible? *Are not the external factors that lie outside SIDS' territories facilitative of this change?* To explore the answers to this question, this thesis adopts a proposition, which argues that *external factors outside states are facilitative of the proactive and contributory*

behaviour of small states in IR? To validate this proposition this study investigates two case studies of SIDS relating to two multilateral negotiations at the UN in the chapters 6 and 7. These case studies constitute the empirical investigation of this thesis.

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Chapter 4

BACKGROUND AND RISING VISIBILITY OF SIDS IN IR

Introduction

This chapter presents a background of SIDS in IR and their rising visibility in recent times. It is meant to provide a pretext for the theoretical chapter (Chapter 3) and context for the empirical investigation (Chapters 6 and 7) which tests the proposition derived from the theoretical chapter. This Chapter therefore, begins with a brief background to the historical evolution of SIDS and their significance to the international community. Later it examines the reasons for their independence and factors that facilitated statehood for their participation in IR. In this regard, it traces the events, issues, trends, actors and circumstances that impinged upon the international environment making it pregnant to give birth to SIDS. Finally, it gives an account of the early role of SIDS in multilateral diplomacy at the UN and their rising visibility in contemporary IR.

Inhabited small islands have existed on the earth since time immemorial and the old admiral charts drawn by the pioneering explorers and travellers had them marked (see comments of Davis, 1996). Organised life had prevailed in these islands as autonomous entities before the arrival of European colonialists. The Republic of Maldives in the Indian Ocean and the Kingdom of Tonga in the South Pacific, are good examples of autonomous entities of small islands that have existed for centuries. Their insularity resulting from remoteness, smallness, isolation and peripherality, were contributing factors to their marginalisation in the world. In one sense, these features of island states come as a blessing in disguise. Their geographical isolation gave them immunity from plunders or exploiters and preserved their cultural and natural virginity, thus contributing to global heritage. Of course, their intrinsic incapacity resulting from smallness of resources disabled them from competing with the forces of economic and political globalisation which tend to champion the survival of the fittest. Nevertheless,

the relevance and importance of small island states to modern civilisation and their relative contribution to world peace and development cannot be ignored.

Significance of SIDS to International Community

SIDS, the smallest and weakest group of all nations in the world, were virtually non-existent as independent political entities until the wave of decolonisation broke out after the Second World War. However, Crocombe says that island nations "existed long before they evolved into modern nation-states, just like states in Europe and Asia" (442, 2001). Nevertheless, historically they were under three European colonial powers: United Kingdom (UK), France and Portugal. They were taken as pawns or tools disposable at the discretion of the colonial powers to advance their strategic and economic interests. A few island states were privileged not to fall prey to colonial domination by virtue of lacking economic interests. They were the Kingdom of Tonga in the South Pacific (Crocombe, 2001) and the Republic of Maldives in the Indian Ocean. These states have had self-governance in most of their known history, but surrendered foreign and defence affairs to the UK. Undoubtedly, SIDS were either colonised or made protectorates because of their importance to world powers. Therefore, it may be helpful to review the significance of these states to the world community before embarking on the discussion of their political liberation.

As Russell King commented, "the islands hold a particular attraction, functioning as small-scale spatial laboratories where theories can be tested and processes observed in the setting of a semi-closed system" (quoted in Royle, 20, 2001). Similarly, Royle (2001) says that the relevance of islands as laboratories can be seen most significantly in the work of Charles Darwin. Observations on the Galapagos Islands helped Darwin to develop ideas on biological adaptation and were significant also in his research on evolution. Many Pacific islands, until the late 1990s, had been used for nuclear testing and dumping of chemical wastes. Although these actions amount to abuse by powerful countries, it adds to the dimension of their usefulness for isolated experiments. Finally, their historical and circumstantial uniqueness to IR came to light with the sweeping changes resulting from the Second World War, and the wave of decolonisation that was institutionalised by the United Nations.

SIDS offered multiple uses for world states. Geopolitical interests of islands and their strategic location for military outposts were the most eye-catching interest. European military expansions sought islands in strategic locations for the establishment of military bases. For example, British forces used Gan Island of the Maldives during the Second World War to fight against Japanese forces in the Indian Ocean. Similarly, as Royle comments, "The Marshall and other Pacific Islands proved their strategic value in this war [Second World War] as some of the bloodiest battles in the whole conflict were fought over possession of tiny scraps of land, whose sole utility was their ability to provide storage bases, shelter for shipping and landing strips for aircraft" (52, 2001).

Another interest in SIDS for the world community was demonstrated by their utility for ocean travellers and inter-continental traders. They served as calling ports of major sea-routes for refuelling, restocking foods, or as safe harbour from stormy weather. When land transport was obstructed and risky, the sea has been used as a highway where islands were viewed as the equivalent of service stations (Royle, 2001).

Besides the geopolitical interests of islands, they also offer economic benefits for cash crop cultivation, such as sugar, tea and banana. Island waters have been the breeding grounds of rich fisheries too. Their importance for tourism in recent times is another economic attraction of islands. Tropical islands untouched by pollution and undisturbed by explosives are seen to be heavens on earth for holiday seekers of the world and proved to be assets for world tourism. Therefore, small islands, despite their lack of resources and minute size, hold significant scientific research, geopolitical and economic interests to the world community.

Gaining Independence and Statehood

Shifts of World Order

The sweeping changes that followed the end of the Second World War shook the international order and power structure of the world. The devastation brought by the war to European imperial powers was unspeakable. This had weakened their

economies and shifted focus from colonial expansion to reconstructing of their battered countries. Another development was the emergence of new countries to replace the power vacuum created by war-torn declining European powers. The balance of world power shifted and two new super-powers emerged in the post World War Two period. The two new powers that emerged from the victorious side of the war were armed with opposing ideologies known as capitalism led by the United States (US) and communism led by Union of Socialist Soviet Republics (USSR). Their ideologies were based on political and economic management of state affairs, namely public management verses private management. They became immediate arch rivals and began to compete with one another in every aspect of IR towards gaining more areas of influence and securing more satellite states. These two political heavyweights did not confront each other directly but backed a number of confrontations in the post World War Two period, some of which came to the brink of nuclear war (e.g., the Cuba missile crisis in 1962). The ideological rivalries that were often fought over the media and international forums and between alliances, were dubbed the 'Cold War'. This ideological rivalry between two superpowers later gave rise to a bipolar world order where IR came to be polarised between these two camps in world politics. No region or country was unaffected by the Cold War, the heat of which was mostly felt by the forums at the UN.

As a new international order began to take shape at the end of Second World War, the two superpowers out won what was then called the European great powers. These new superpowers were non-imperial (Arnold, 1, 1994) and sympathetic towards nationalistic struggles seeking self-determination. In compliance with the Monroe Doctrine of US foreign policy (which was originally proclaimed by President James Monroe in 1823 opposing European intervention in the Western hemisphere), it continued to oppose foreign intervention in countries, particularly in Latin America (Pearson and Rochester, 690, 1998). Pearson and Rochester argue that Monroe Doctrine "officially established the US as an aspiring regional power with an activist 'protector' role" (Pearson and Rochester, 139, 1998). Similarly, its political opponent, the USSR, was not keen on replacing European imperial powers, although its role in domestic political interventions in Eastern Europe and other satellite states was questionable.

Overall, the international public mood was bent towards liberating colonies and their people in order to avoid another human tragedy (see comments by Clarke and Payne, ix, 1987). Giving peace a chance (Cassese, 35, 2001) and building trust and confidence in IR was seen as the central goal of the international community immediately after the Second World War. Many states under colonisation, including SIDS, saw the new era of peace and stability as a guiding light to seek their rightful goal of self-determination and independence.

Decline of European Empires

The fate of island states began to improve only after the Second World War. The dreadful war shook the yoke of colonialism (Cassese, 36, 2001) and forced colonialists to rethink of their hold on these militarily weak and economically vulnerable island states. Nevertheless, to speak of facts, it should be mentioned that European imperial powers began to relax their grip on many of the island states long before the Second World War broke out. Self-governance and democratic elements were gradually introduced to some of the SIDS of which colonial powers benefited very little. In other words, SIDS with less economic or strategic value to colonial powers were allowed to assume self-determination much earlier than other SIDS. For instance, in 1927, democratic elements were introduced in Nauru by the colonial administrator and eventually, in 1968, it became the second Pacific island state to gain full independence (Kurian, 1410, 1987). Another classic example of gradual democratic liberalisation by the British Empire can be traced in the Indian Ocean island state of the Seychelles. A legislative Council and an Executive Council were established in the Seychelles back in 1888 in order to introduce self-governance (Kurian, 1734, 1987). It attained full political independence, however, in 1976 by opting to become a republic within the Commonwealth of Nations. Likewise, political parties were formed and institutionalised with relative political freedom as well in some island states long before independence was granted (Crocombe, 441, 2001). For instance, in Western Samoa, a political party known as the Mau Movement was formed which was opposed to colonial administration, while in Fiji, two political parties known as the Fiji Federation Party and Alliance Party were established 15 years prior to becoming fully independent.

Conversely, the colonial grip was hastened on those island states that had strategic importance for colonial powers. For instance, many of the South Pacific island states were drawn into the conflict when advancing Japanese forces attacked British outposts on these islands during the Second World War. Crocombe comments that Britain decided as early as in the 1950s to relinquish Pacific colonies but having felt it unrealistic to give independence, it asked big neighbours, Australia and New Zealand, to take them within a Pacific Federation. However, both countries declined the proposal (Crocombe, 425, 2001). Regional integration of island states in the form of confederation was another political strategy engineered by the British Empire to streamline and economise the rising costs of colonial administration. This strategy was a political manoeuvring exercise to prepare states for their own self-governance as well as to avoid losing the grip on groups of island states in an uncertain world political climate that was emerging in the post war period.

The tragic war cast a lasting spell on colonial powers, particularly Britain, which controlled almost three-quarters of all SIDS. The economies of European colonialists suffered heavily during the war (Arnold, 1, 1994) and their colonial network worldwide was badly shattered. The one time great powers of Europe were torn down to their knees during the war and consequently post war priorities shifted their attention to drawing capital for reconstruction of their own battered cities rather than focusing on overseas colonies. In fact, rising costs of maintenance of colonial administrations and the coinciding "economic and political decline" (Cassese, 36, 2001) back home, forced imperial powers to look for amicable alternatives for securing the future of colonies without jeopardising their interests overseas. The public mood in these colonial countries too began to change towards relinquishing colonial rule. Cassese argues that colonial exploitations benefited a privileged few in metropolitan countries whereas some military and welfare costs were rapidly rising to maintain the colonies, a dilemma no longer acceptable to mass populations of colonial countries (36, 2001). Therefore, colonial powers became incapable of holding onto their colonial tentacles in the post war period and began voluntarily relinquishing the colonies. Fiji's first Prime Minster, Kamisese Mara was reported as saying for eight years British exerted pressure to facilitate independence despite himself and the ruling alliance being opposed (Keith Ried, cited in Crocombe, 424, 2001).

Therefore, the shift of political and economic policies of colonial powers after the devastating impacts of the Second World War led to the disintegration of European empires. Britain's resources became over-stretched in the period of reconstruction and it was required to relinquish its imperial responsibilities. Such situations worked to the advantage of many SIDS which opted to break free from foreign domination. Also with the East-West division widening and the cold war intensifying after the Second World War, some discretion was available to SIDS to exercise some bargaining power in affirming self-determination. Moreover, the pattern of domination changed during the 20th Century when coercion was no longer used so freely and conquest was not so easily condoned (UNITAR, 51, 1971). As a result, self-governing or autonomous small island territories had a better chance to reaffirm their independence.

Decolonisation and the UN

The end of the Second World War and the winds of change that followed, marked a new era of IR towards multilateral cooperation and collective decision-making. The UN, a world organisation for multilateral diplomacy and for maintaining international peace and security was established on 24 October 1945. In its charter, it was guaranteed sovereign equality for all its members (see Article 2 Chapter I of UN Charter). Its principles also included the need to settle disputes by peaceful means and not to intervene in affairs of internal jurisdiction.

The UN became the most effective inter-governmental organisation in the history of human civilisation that dealt with high politics in IR. It may not be the first of its kind but it had been credited for addressing international disputes and world problems in a timely fashion that avoided another world war since 1945. One of the success stories of the UN is its role in the process of decolonisation and political liberation of many colonies. The Trusteeship Council, one of the six organs of the UN was "charged with facilitating the dismantling of colonial empires" (Pearson and Rochester, 695, 1998). It supervised the transition of colonial territories to attainment of full independence in the post war period which were previously administered by declining European empires as 'trust territories'. These trust territories include mandates in the former League of Nations, territories taken from defeated powers by victorious powers, and those territories placed voluntarily by responsible powers (Arnold, 20-21, 1994). The "trust

territories" comprised mostly island colonies of the European powers, for example Samoa, Nauru, Federates States of Micronesia and Marshall Islands.

While the emergence of SIDS on the world stage can be accounted for by a number of factors, the decolonisation process that was operationalised by the UN can be attributed as the main impetus for the growth of independent SIDS in the post war period (see the comments made by Arnold, 20, 1994; Clarke and Payne, ix, 1987, and UNITAR, 16, 1971). Many newly emerged independent states from the colonised world began to gain a voice in the UN in the late 1950s and 1960s. The primary concern of these states was to help fellow colonies to break free from years of colonial exploitation. Arnold says the increasing desire of states for self-determination as enshrined and advocated for by the charter of the UN generated more momentum towards the UN-led decolonisation process (21, 1994). According to him, this resulted in the well acclaimed UN resolution 1514 (xv) entitled *Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples*, adopted on 14 December 1960 by the UNGA. The operative paragraph 5 of this resolution reads as follows.

> Immediate steps shall be taken in Trust and Non-self-Governing Territories or all other territories which have not yet attained independence, to transfer all powers to the peoples of those territories, without any conditions or reservations, in accordance with their freely expressed will and desire, without any distinction as to race, creed or colour, in order to enable them to enjoy complete independence and freedom (quoted in UNITAR, 17, 1971).

The notion of self-determination institutionalised and executed by the UN set the stage for the attainment of independence by the SIDS. According to Duursma, the term "self-determination of people" was officially mentioned for the first time in the Charter of the UN (Duursma, 12, 1996). Article 76 (b) of the Charter states, "progressive development towards self-government or independence as may be appropriate to the particular circumstances of each territory and its people and the freely expressed wishes of the people concerned" (Chapter XII, Article 76 b of the UN Charter). A number of resolutions adopted by UNGA in the 1960s stemmed from this principle of self-determination, the most famous being Resolution 1514 (XV) of 14 December 1960. However, the colonial powers abstained from this resolution fearing, as the

British delegate indicated, that colonial states might not long endure and if unprotected may lose the political freedom which they now enjoy (cited in Duursma, 19, 1996).

The struggling independence movements in colonised small islands took refuge in the decolonisation process that this resolution had set in motion. The resolution reaffirmed their conviction that the question of territorial size, geographical isolation and limited resources should in no way delay the implementation of the Declaration. According to Duursma, the architect of the decolonisation process, the UN "Special Committee of 24" did not prescribe "as to the size of the colonial population or the territory" (49, 1996). Therefore, the UN, in facilitating independence to colonial islands, did not recognise any numerical parameters for setting qualifying criteria of statehood for SIDS.

A dramatic rise of SIDS since the 1960s can be credited to the role played by the UN as mentioned above. The pivotal role played by the UN in paving the way for independence of small states or SIDS was seen in the continued tasks carried out by the Trusteeship Council and the General Assembly, through the annual examination of reports and petitions, the dispatch of fact-finding missions and the facilitation and supervision of elections and plebiscites in trust territories. The special arm of the General Assembly (GA) that dealt with the political process of decolonisation, the Special Committee of Twenty Four (1961) stated in its report of 1964 UNITAR ,18 1971), that it was convinced that the provisions of the Declaration were fully applicable to smaller territories in the Atlantic or Pacific Ocean, and in the Caribbean. Later on 20 December 1965, the GA resolution 2105 (XX) had the following request made to the Special Committee of Twenty Four.

> To pay particular attention to the small territories and to recommend to the General Assembly the most appropriate ways, as well as the steps to be taken, to enable the population of these territories to exercise fully their right to self-determination and independence (quoted in UNITAR, 18, 1971).

In the prevailing favourable political climate, the 1960s saw a number of small states or SIDS gaining independence and becoming members of the UN. Their dramatic rise as independent states created political implications in IR especially for the UN. It brought into the limelight the question of SIDS' viability in the international system and the potential adverse consequences of their membership in the UN. Some scholars and states were sceptical of their capability to exercise sovereign equality in a competitive and power-driven international system. For instance, at the Security Council discussions on the application of the Maldives to the UN membership in 1965 (the first microstate to be admitted to the UN with a population of under 100,000, according to Duursma (1996), the US delegate said that many of the small emerging entities, however willing, probably do not have the human and economic resources at this stage to carry out Charter obligations (cited in Duursma, 136, 1996). The Maldives admission to UN, therefore, sparked a mini-state or microstate debate that ran for a number of years in the UN circle. The existing dominant members of the UN were worried about the proliferation of microstates, as they feared that the trend might lead to loss of credibility and effectiveness of the UN if all potential applicants were to become members, (Whitaker cited in Blair, 19, 1967). Another critic of the microstates membership in UN commented that "if all potential microstates were admitted to the UN, it was calculated that they would constitute a two-thirds majority in the UNGA, cover 10 percent of the budget but only represent 4 percent of the world's total population (Ehrhardt cited in Duursma, 135, 1996).

Some existing powerful states feared relative decline of their influence, such as election to office at the UN, should the enlargement of the UN continue with membership of mini-states or microstates. Also, the imbalance between the capacity to pay and votes in the UN led to mini-states and microstates being viewed unfavourably as equal states alongside major contributors of the UN. Blair says additional mini-states would clearly mean additional strains on UN facilities, while expenses would be out of proportion to the additional revenue they bring in (15, 1967). Blair also contended that it had long been recognised that states contributing 5 to 10 percent of the UN expenses could theoretically pass appropriations binding on all members. Elaborating further, he said that such a combination succeeded in adopting a disputed

budget of the World Health Organisation in 1966 against the opposition of four major contributors namely, United States, Britain, Soviet Union and France (Blair, 1967).

Ironically it was one of the developing countries, namely Nepal, which contested the unfavourable arguments that dominated the microstates debate and which reflected the Third World's pro microstate stance. Nepal did "not agree with the assumption that increase in membership of the UN as a result of the emergence of what are called 'microstates' would inevitably lead to weakening of the organization" (cited in Duursma, 136, 1996).

It was the Secretary General of the UN, U Thant, who first raised the question of viability of microstates at the UN in his annual report to the UNGA in 1965 suggesting membership criteria for microstates be revised. He stated:

> Their limited size and resources can pose a difficult problem as to the role they should try to play in international life ..... I believe the time has come when member states may wish to examine more closely the long term implications of present trends (quoted in Blair, 20, 1967).

According to UNITAR, from then on the problem of the "mini-states" or "microstates" became a fashionable topic of discussion (UNITAR, 13, 1971). In the years that followed, the question of the membership in the UN of microstates was raised twice by the Secretary General (SG) but no specific guidelines were proposed by the UN as to the lower limits for their membership (UNITAR, 13, 1971). In 1969, the Security Council handed over the question of microstates to a "Committee of Experts" to study the issue with a view to alternate membership in the UN. The Committee submitted its report in 1970 but failed to serve amicable solutions to the microstate dilemma.

Nevertheless, two proposals were enlisted as recommended by Britain and the US. Britain proposed renouncement of certain rights for microstates, in particular, voting and election in certain UN bodies and nominal budgetary contributions. On the other hand, the US recommended associate membership without the right to vote and hold office. According to Duursma (137, 1996), these proposals failed to get adopted due to serious obstacles, for instance they called for the formidable task of introducing

amendments to the Charter if they were to be successfully enacted. The Committee, however, felt that it would be undesirable to open discussion on the Charter, as the opportunity would be seized upon to insert other matters into the Charter. According to Gunter, such a move was feared to result in bitterest rancour and suspicion (cited in Duursma, 138, 1996). Another contrary factor, adding to their failure, was the lack of an agreed definition as to what constitutes a microstate. The French member of the Committee remarked "that the Committee would have great difficulty in producing any definition at all of a microstate, for this would necessarily be arbitrary" (quoted in Duursma, 139, 1996).

In 1971 the United Nations Institute for Training and Research (UNITAR) published a study concerned with the problems of very small states and territories. The study, which was the first of its kind, could not arrive at a universally acceptable definition of the small state. It says that the existence of small states as fully or partially independent states was not a new phenomenon in international life. "They have emerged, survived, disappeared, re-emerged throughout history in one form or another, and their right to existence has not been challenged very often in the past merely on the grounds that they are too small to merit a separate existence" (UNITAR, 11, 1971). The study further stated that interest in the consequences of smallness was a relatively new area of concern either in the academic world or in international organisations.

The controversies of the microstate debate were counter-weighed by more pragmatic views as to the merits that could be achieved by the membership of microstates in International Organisations (IOs). Small states could be assets to IOs since, being small and weak, their survival as independent states depends more on respect for international law and the practice of multilateral cooperation compared to bigger states. It was also contended that if stringent conditions for admission to the UN were applied, qualified members of IOs would shrink, thereby failing to achieve more universal international public opinion (UNITAR, 1971). Others remarked that the Charter of the UN contained a built-in safeguard against General Assembly (GA) majority domination led by small states for those matters of importance which are exclusively reserved and dealt with by the Security Council, which comprises the five veto powers only (Duursma, 1996).

The mini-state debate of the 1960s and early 1970s, did not gain much currency as to a particular treatment of mini-states in IOs. In fact, the prevalent view at the UN was that small states had caused no fundamental problem and so according to UNITAR the matter did not generate specific international actions. Similarly, the proliferation of mini-states was, by-and-large, not observed as seriously jeopardising the UN. Therefore, many SIDS saw the UN as their saviour and it came to be recognised as a catalyst or facilitator of their independence and national development. They took advantage of the conducive climate provided by the UN for their right to self-determination and, one after another, gained admittance to the UN. This provided a more universal public opinion enlarging the accomplishments of the UN.

UN Membership as a Licence for Statehood

Many SIDS were inspired to seek membership in the UN as a testimony of their recognition by the international community as independent states. The Charter guarantees security of all nations, both members and non-members alike (Blair, 12, 1967). It also ensures sovereign equality for all members. For instance, the tiny island state of Nauru took to the International Court of Justice a dispute for compensation against mighty Australia which ultimately won them Australian $107 million in return for their claim (cited in Duursma, 141, 1996). This case itself speaks of the benefit SIDS can obtain from the UN membership. The former Secretary General of UN, Hammarskjold, commented that "it is not ... the big powers which needed the UN for their protection. It is all the others" (quoted in Blair, 12, 1967). Thus, in Dugard's view, the "UN has for practical purposes become the collective arbiter of statehood through the process of admission and non-recognition" (quoted in Duursma, 10, 1996).

Nevertheless, a few SIDS like Samoa and Tonga chose not to join UN after independence, mainly for economic reasons, and instead maintained their political independence. These states joined later when the time was ripe for them to do so. Arguments that disputed SIDS ever becoming truly sovereign states, owing to intrinsic vulnerabilities like small size, were countered with legal precedents, conventions and treaties (Kohr quoted in Blair, 24, 1967). The main eligibility factor for UN membership hinges on the question of ability to carry out Charter obligations. The most fundamental of these obligations according to Rudzinski is to settle international

disputes by peaceful means and to refrain from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state (Rudzinski cited in Blair, 25, 1967). Blair (1967) says these obligations are much easier to assume by small and isolated states than larger ones. SIDS can contribute to enhance the enshrined principles of the UN and to promote international peace, human rights and rule of law to that effect. Now the question is, what really qualifies an entity to become a sovereign state?

A state is meant "to indicate a definite political identity" (UN Secretariat cited in Duursma, 14, 1996). According to the American Law Institute, "A state under international law is an entity which has a defined territory, a permanent population, is under the control of a government and engages in or has the capacity to engage in formal relations with other states" (cited in Wallace, 61, 1997).

If these definitions of states were to be recognised, then the claims of statehood by SIDS are legitimised. Being islands they have definite borders, indigenous populations and have enjoyed self-rule for years. The Maldives, in the Indian Ocean, and Tonga, in the Pacific, hold testimony to this statement.

Another inter-governmental organisation or multilateral forum like the UN that was instrumental in facilitating independence of SIDS, was the Commonwealth. The New Delhi Communiqué of the Commonwealth summit in 1983 gave reference to small states' right to sovereignty similar to the Charter of the UN (CCG, 4, 1985). The Commonwealth Consultative Group says, "This is the principle of the sovereign equality of all nations in terms of their legal rights as independent members of the organisation" (CCG, 1985). The Commonwealth, in fact, had taken much earlier interest in small states, a two-third majority of whose members were considered small. The Institute of Commonwealth Studies (ICS) in London instituted the first comprehensive scholarly study carried out on small states in 1967 (Burton, 1967). It was entitled "Problems of Smaller Territories". This was a collection of research papers that emerged from a seminar instituted by ICS in 1962 for two years aimed at investigating the problems of small territories. In recent years a number of scholarly studies have been conducted by expert groups of the Commonwealth, the most vital

and recent study being published in 1997 and entitled, *A Future for Small States: Overcoming Vulnerability.*

Unlike the UN, the Commonwealth is not universal in character but confined to former British colonies and dominions or dependencies. With the exception of only six member-states of the 39 members of the AOSIS, all are full members of the Commonwealth. Its underpinning objective is to enhance cooperation, foster development and promote democracy among the member states. Also, it was not created to address issues of peace and security as its central goal, but grew out of the British Empire, and membership is not necessarily restricted to independent sovereign states, but any territory that had some historical association with the British Empire. Nonetheless, credit cannot be given to the Commonwealth similar to that of the UN in gaining independence for SIDS, since it did not have a mandate or an agency institutionalised for decolonisation of trust and colonial territories. The Commonwealth is more or less seen as a like-minded club of free association of SIDS.

Geopolitical Factors of Statehood

A close scrutiny of the circumstances and consequences that led SIDS to become independent states attributes a number of other factors to their emergence on the world stage other than the UN's decolonisation process. The UNITAR study cites physical and geographical isolation as the most obvious factor in this regard (49, 1971). It says this element is particularly relevant in the case of islands. Most islands or groups of islands like Western Samoa and Tonga in the Pacific, and the Maldives in the Indian Ocean, had been governed under self-rule for centuries. Their geographic isolation had given them immunity from external aggression. No bigger neighbour or regional power had ever made claims to these island states. Neither were there any territorial disputes. These countries also had less contact with the rest of the world due to lack of resources for trade. The insularity of many island groups had enabled them to develop their own political structures and to live in isolation. Until the break out of World Wars or hegemonic interests developed by big powers, these states had no need to seek contact with metropolitan powers. The insularity factor is illustrated when the British authorities discussed formation of a federation for a number of their colonial island states in the early 1960s. In 1962, Britain as the colonial power planned to form an East

Caribbean Federation for Barbados and the Windward and Leeward Islands with, ultimately, full independence within the Commonwealth. According to Wood (27, 1967), "this attempt to federate proved abortive", because in the West Indies there had been comparatively little contact between the members and much diversity in wealth, population and resources existed. As a result, Antigua withdrew from inconclusive discussions in 1965, while the authorities in Barbados announced that it wanted separate independence.

Historical and Cultural Factors of Statehood

Historical developments, particularly the trends of colonisation, have been identified by UNITAR as the second factor for the emergence of SIDS as separate international entities. The historical colonial domination and administration of these islands and other distinct features, like strategic importance and state of development, were accounted for in this regard. For example, despite racial and language commonality, American Samoa and Western Samoa went their own separate ways at the time of realising self-determination. American Samoa was dominated by America while Western Samoa was largely autonomous. Decisively, American Samoa chose to be a dependent territory of the rich super power USA, seeing more advantages to remain as such. Another historical or accidental factor that determined the course of action for some small states, is shown in the case of The Gambia and Senegal in Africa. The Gambia, being a British colony, had widespread use of English language, and deeply ingrained institutions adopted from the British model, whereas their neighbour Senegal was colonised by France with institutionalised French language and French political, social and economic patterns of life. These differences prevented them from integrating into an independent federation, despite ethnic and even family affinities (UNITAR, 50, 1971; Wood, 25, 1967).

Lastly, the cultural and heritage factor also enabled small territories to become opportunists when the winds of change occurred. As one UNITAR study notes, homogeneity of language, culture, civilisation and standard of living also contributed to keeping small territories intact. For instance, the Maldives had a unified heritage of being bonded by one language, one religion and one ethnicity, which added strength and legitimacy to their call for political independence. Homogeneity is an element that

invigorates nationalism, irrespective of size of the territory or population. For instance, in 1965, some very small island dependencies of Mauritius and the Seychelles were constituted as a separate colony, the British Indian Ocean Territory, under the Governor of the Seychelles. It angered the authorities of Mauritius, which were pushing for independence of all of territories culturally aligned to their country.

In sum, it could be contended that, given the diverse nature of the circumstances and consequences that led to the independence of SIDS since the 1960s, no single factor can be wholly attributed to the explanation or the reason for SIDS emerging as independent states, but rather a combination or host of factors as discussed above. Nevertheless, it can be argued that external factors that unfolded in the international environment were largely instrumental, rather than internal national attributes. Of all those factors, the role played by the UN was the most significant and the pragmatic winds of change that shifted the balance of power and changing national priorities of the European powers.

Early Role of SIDS in IR

This section, as the title indicates, is intended to provide a brief background to SIDS' early role in IR which would aid in grasping the theoretical perspectives described in the small states paradigm.

The emergence of SIDS into IR was truly a historic development. But their role in IR as effective partners in international decision-making was the subject of scepticism. Traditionally, they had no place in world politics because of their inherent vulnerabilities and lack of political clout. In fact, these states had been subjects or subordinates to big powers of the world. Their intrinsic weakness made them marginalised even after independence (Ashe and Lierop, 209, 1999). SIDS were severely constrained in pursuing a larger international role in IR partly due to lack of economic resources and skilled personnel for diplomacy. They were seen as insignificant too because they made only nominal financial contributions to the budgets of the UN and its specialised agencies. Therefore, SIDS were traditionally considered passive actors who exercised their only available political tool, voting rights in

international forums. They were often sidelined by influential states or compelled to follow the footsteps of "big brothers" with whom they had cultural, political, and economic links prior to gaining independence. As already noted, the SIDS balanced their position in international politics by pursuing a policy of non-alignment or by entering into security alliances with strong regional powers (see comments by Clarke and Payne, 1987). SIDS were mostly active in global forums such as the UN and the Commonwealth of Nations as well as regional organisations of which they formed the majority (i.e. Pacific Forum and Caribbean Community).

The SIDS played a passive role in IR prior to the emergence of concern for the global environment. Their involvement was based on individual state interests in various issues. They practiced an ad hoc approach to international issues. For instance, a few diplomatic initiatives had been made by some SIDS, which resulted in fruitful outcomes. However, these were exceptions rather than the norm. In 1967, Malta initiated a new dimension of equity principle at the UN when Ambassador Pardo proposed an agenda item aimed at designating the resources of the seabed as the "common heritage of mankind" (CCG, 72, 1985). This initiation, which gained currency, gradually set in motion the political process that led to the adoption of the comprehensive new Law of the Sea Convention in 1982, 15 years after the launching of the initiative by Malta. It finally came into force in 1994.

A number of submissions and drafts were made by SIDS like Malta, Fiji, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Cyprus for concluding a global treaty known as the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). Fiji's chief delegate Satya Nandan chaired many working group meetings and drafted parts of the negotiating text for the UNCLOS. He later became the first Secretary General of the International Seabed Authority (ISA) in 1994, the operational arm of the Convention and continues to hold the post today. Jamaican chief delegate, Kenneth Rattray held the rapporteurship of the negotiating conference. Jamaica also won the bid for hosting the Secretariat of ISA as a tribute to their role in the Law of the Sea negotiations. Linnex Ballah, the chief negotiator of Trinidad and Tobago was engaged in drafting the main text of the Convention as well. He became a judge later at the International Tribunal for Law of the Sea, another outcome of the UNCLOS. Fiji succeeded in promoting the concept of "archipelagic state" during the UNCLOS negotiations that enabled multi-island states

to gain sovereignty over the waters between islands. According to CCG, in recognition of Fiji's role in this matter, one of the diplomats of the country was later appointed as the UNSG's Special Representative on Law of the Sea Matters (CCG, 73, 1985).

Another front where the SIDS made notable diplomatic efforts was the question of security of small states. This was not without valid reasoning. Occasional incidences stemming from internal and external elements have threatened the sovereignty and territorial integrity of SIDS. At first it was the invasion of Grenada in the Caribbean by the mighty power of the US that triggered the security concerns of SIDS in 1983 (see comments by Secretary General of the Commonwealth in CCG Report 120, 1985). With this surprising invasion, the attention of both the international community and SIDS alike were concentrated on the "vulnerability of small states to external attacks and interference in their affairs" as the Commonwealth Goa Declaration on International Security stated (quoted in CCG 121, 1985). This event prompted the Commonwealth to conduct a study on the vulnerability of small states, which was published in 1985. Describing the extent of vulnerability of small states in his opening address on special needs of small states in July 1984, the Secretary General of the Commonwealth, Shridath Ramphal, stated:

> Sometimes it seems as if small states were like small boats pushed out into a turbulent sea, free in one sense to traverse it, but without oars or provisions, without compass or sails, free also to perish. Or perhaps, to be rescued and taken on board a larger vessel ..... above all, know that small is also weak and fragile and vulnerable and relatively powerless; that they live in a world where the weak are not rewarded for the beauty of their smallness but are ignored, imposed upon and generally discounted (CCG, 119-122, 1985).

The fear of insecurity from external aggression was further reinforced when the Maldives' capital, Male', was attacked by a group of Tamil mercenaries from Sri Lanka and four Maldivian collaborators in November 1988. Having experienced the tragedy that resulted from this surprise armed attack, and realising the insecurity of small states, the Maldives took the matter to the UNGA in 1989 by tabling a resolution. In tabling the issue on the UNGA's agenda, the Maldives contested that, when five members of the UN (five veto powers) are more equal than others, small states could

also raise their concern as the most unequal and most vulnerable states that exist in the UN which have neither veto power nor military strength to deter security threats (Maldives Representative's statement at UNGA, 1989). The issue was briefly debated and culminated in a consensus resolution, which called for protection and security of small states, an item later reconsidered twice at UNGA, but which failed to provoke any action by the UN.

The Maldives continued to raise the attention of the international community to the security plight of SIDS. A new dimension to the threats of security expected from the environmental problem of global warming was highlighted by the Maldives in 1987. Following a series of unprecedented storm surges that struck the islands, the Maldivian President wasted no time in bringing the matter to the attention of the world community. He addressed the matter at first at the Commonwealth Summit held in Vancouver, Canada, on 15 October 1987. Two days later he also spoke at the UN special session held in October 1987 at the UNGA to consider the Report by the Bruntland Commission entitled *Our Common Future*.

According to the credit often given by the former UN Undersecretary General for Economic and Social Affairs, Nitin Desai, it was the Maldives that brought the whole question of environmental insecurity faced by SIDS in the face of global warming to the attention of the international community. (Oral statement made at the Second Committee during 56th session of UNGA where the author heard it). Later, a much hailed coalition of small island states known as AOSIS began to spearhead a broad-based campaign pursuing eco-diplomacy at climate negotiations to seek environmental security for SIDS against global warming.

As discussed above, the protection and security of SIDS has been the persistent goal that SIDS have continued to seek at international forums. Prior to the security issues that concerned Grenada and the Maldives, insecurity that had resulted in communal divisions in Cyprus has been a long lasting but unresolved issue at the UN. Majority Greek Cypriots and minority Turkish Cypriots have lived for years in ethnic division which remains internationally unrecognised. Turkey invaded the country in 1974 when a coup installed a hardline Greek Cypriot in charge of the Government. The UN and the Commonwealth have made periodic attempts to resolve the crisis, but to no avail.

Apart from the security concerns raised at the UN, the SIDS have played minor but constructive roles in IR which are evident from their participation in the work of the UN. SIDS host some UN institutions such as Jamaica hosting the International Seabed Authority. St. Lucia had served the UNGA as the President for the term 2003-2004, while previously Malta and Mauritius have served on the UN Security Council as non-permanent members.

In 1989, the Prime Minister of Trinidad and Tobago, Robertson made another laudable initiative at the UNGA while addressing the session, requesting that the International Law Commission consider the question of establishing an international criminal court (Slade, 2003). This was an issue very much debated in academia and advocated by NGOs, but until the call for serious consideration of the issue by the international community, there was no push for it at the international political circle. The issue was raised by the Prime Minister out of their desire to curb international crime such as illicit trafficking in narcotic drugs which was a national and regional concern for the country at the time (Slade, 2003). The Court came into existence on 17 July 1998 and its statute entered into force on 1 July 2002, located in the Hague, Netherlands.

The SIDS have had a low level of international involvement in the early stage of their independence in IR. On the other hand, their interactions were more active among regional states or in regional bodies as noted earlier, although, their actions were usually of limited consequence to most other members of the international system. Their involvement in IR was largely inhibited due to lack of trained diplomats and facilities overseas to gather information for making informed policy decisions. For instance, Kiribati do not have diplomatic missions accredited to the UN, and Tonga and Tuvalu established missions only in 2001. Even those countries that have representation have minimal capacity to perform an effective role. Many Caribbean, Pacific, and Indian Ocean states have two or three fully-fledged diplomatic staff and share space in a joint office funded by the Commonwealth under a special assistance scheme. These factors inhibit SIDS to mobilise support for their concerns or needs as well as raise their profile in IR. Very few opportunities were seized by SIDS whose few experts played a substantial role in the technical and rule-making aspects of the UN in the past.

Associate diplomacy or collective voice has been used as a medium of representation for SIDS at the UN by some regional groups; CARICOM (Caribbean Community) being a good example. The group always spoke with one voice at UN forums and so made joint statements on issues of common concern. CARICOM SIDS also exerted diplomatic pressure at the UN to liberate Belize. Similarly, the South Pacific Forum SIDS engineered a UN resolution calling for the independence of New Caledonia.

The SIDS have contributed not only to international law and order, but also in maintaining peace in the world. They have contributed soldiers, as in the case of Fiji, to take part in peacekeeping operations instituted by the UN. Their steadfast support to the UN and adherence to its principles make the UN not only indispensable, but the locus of IR for SIDS. Consequently, the UN also has grown with SIDS to be more representative universally. Although SIDS' role in IR previously has been observed as insignificant, with the onset of era of global change they have become a substantial force. In fact, SIDS have been instrumental and contributory in mapping the course of international action on issues of global concern. Previously, the SIDS took more interest in regional co-operation but recently they have grouped themselves into inter-regional groups to address environmental concerns that have a more urgent and direct impact on them. The next section explores their visibility in contemporary IR to this effect.

Recent Visibility of SIDS in the UN

The dramatic changes that occurred on the world stage with the dissolution of the cold war and the onset of global change at the end of the 1980s saw new trends emerging in IR. The occurrences of new developments on the world scene have shifted the actors and the issues dealt with at international forums. Of particular interest in this regard was the high visibility of previously passive and long neglected SIDS in international climate negotiations. SIDS became more involved in addressing global environmental concerns, breaking their silence and raising their profile collectively through a political alliance known as the AOSIS. This Alliance grew as a collective lobby group of SIDS during the Second World Climate Conference held in Geneva in 1990. Their cause was to press for an effective regime that could arrest the crisis of global warming. The

resulting twin dangers of global warming, climate change and sea level rise mean that the most environmentally vulnerable group of countries, the AOSIS, are in danger of extinction.

Not surprisingly, the onset of global environmental change and subsequent insecurity resulting from global warming is most feared by the SIDS. This factor has led them to form a coalition, the AOSIS, with the objective of protecting and promoting their interests in international negotiations (Davis, 1996; Lean 1994). SIDS have become highly visible since 1990 and continue to pursue a policy of eco-diplomacy to champion their cause of environmental security. Thus, traditionally passive and marginalised small island states have become a proactive group with a clear mandate of seeking security and sustainable development against global environmental degradation. Therefore, it can be argued that the importance of SIDS to the UN and their role in IR has become more visible than ever before.

The SIDS were forced to break their silence in IR not without valid reasoning. It was the tiny island Republic of Maldives, which initially blew the whistle to become proactive in IR, having been awakened by the unprecedented tidal waves that shocked the fragile atoll nation in 1987. Its President immediately began to drum up support to begin an international campaign to raise awareness about the plight of SIDS in the face of global warming. The dramatic environmental episodes that struck the Maldives and the increasing scientific consensus pointing to such events as resulting from human-induced global warming provided breaking ground for the Maldives to raise the alarm.

To maintain the momentum generated on the issue, the following year, the Maldives hosted an international conference known as Small State Conference on Sea Level Rise, in November 1989. The 'Male Declaration' adopted at the conference contended that there was "broad scientific consensus that the global mean temperature could rise approximately by 1-2 degrees Celsius by the year 2030". It further said that, as a consequence, "sea level rise would cause extensive damage to the land and infrastructure of these countries and even threaten the very survival of some island states" (Male' Declaration, 1989).

The Conference established a five-nation Action Group to implement decisions and recommendations adopted by the conference. One of its decisions was to mount a campaign to increase awareness of the international community of the particular vulnerability of the small states to sea level rise. It also decided to consider the most effective manner in which the small states can participate in the work of the IPCC and seek assistance for such participation. It also called for negotiation toward a framework convention on climate change to start as soon as possible. The conference was instrumental in mobilising the efforts of SIDS, which previously favoured regional co-operation in addressing their concerns.

Moreover, with the inter-regional small state conference held in the Maldives, the SIDS have kept increasing the momentum and brought the endangered island states into a coalition. Another parallel meeting was held in Majuro, Marshall Islands, by the South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP). Again in 1990, the CARICOM Ministers met in Kingston, Jamaica, where another ministerial declaration was adopted calling for intra-regional co-operation to address the issue of climate change. These efforts finally culminated in the political alliance, known today as the AOSIS. The alliance orchestrated climate negotiations within the UN. AOSIS was ultimately formed during the Second World Climate Conference held in Geneva in 1990. Having been born out of the climate conference, its main objective was to lobby to protect and promote the interests of the most vulnerable states of the world to climate change, the SIDS. According to Geoffrey Lean, AOSIS "succeeded at the World Climate Conference in getting carbon dioxide mentioned in the conference Declaration". He also commented that the Alliance, "soon become a key player in the negotiations over a climate convention" (Lean, 5, 1994). Lean further says, "Before AOSIS, small island states had been marginalised in international negotiations". However with the formation of the Alliance, "they played a vital part in the bargaining that finally brought about agreement on the Convention on Climate Change" (Lean, 5, 1994).

The first Chairman of AOSIS, the Ambassador of Vanuatu, played a key role in the climate negotiations that followed the climate conference. He was elected chair of one of the three Working Groups that were established within the Inter-governmental Negotiation Committee, the body responsible for the negotiations. AOSIS was

instrumental in concluding the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change. The Alliance also succeeded in securing special recognition of islands at UNCED according to Lean (1994). It was also largely instrumental in ensuring that the Commission of Sustainable Development was located in New York instead of Geneva as they could not afford to be represented in both UN centres.

The Alliance was proactive at the Earth Summit held in Brazil in 1992, which adopted the much-hailed Agenda 21 and two important environmental conventions, the UNFCC and the Biodiversity Convention. The occasion also provided a much needed opportunity for Heads of State or Governments to hold the first AOSIS Summit, which increased their profile in IR.

Thus, AOSIS, though an informal alliance with no structured secretariat, has been the "torchbearer" in projecting and publicising the plight of SIDS in the face of global warming. The Alliance pursues a three-tier strategy to spearhead its lobby towards mitigating the problem of climate change and strengthening the Climate Change Convention to that effect. These include consolidating unity within the members, collaborating with other states to strengthen climate regime, and building partnerships with international and local NGOs plus media to raise awareness about their plight and to intensify the lobby against industrial opposition to curbing greenhouse gases.

The first summit of AOSIS notes that "their needs, concerns and interests were assigned relatively low priorities with the UN system" and expressed serious concern over the climate convention contending that it "lacks explicit, specific and meaningful commitments by developed countries" (AOSIS Summit Declaration, 1992). Obviously, the Summit bore testimony to their resolve in mobilising efforts internationally to the cause of protection from climate change and sea level rise. As one of the former chairmen of AOSIS has said, "AOSIS has made a determined and concerted effort to be heard in the global negotiations on this issue" (Slade, 1998).

AOSIS members frequently meet at the UN to discuss concerns of collective interest and to formulate responses to such issues. Having formed a political bloc, AOSIS also get attention from bigger states who courted AOSIS votes in their campaigns for election to various offices of the UN and to the Security Council. AOSIS objectives

and their diplomatic initiatives are well publicised on their website which makes information instantly available about the Alliance. Also, AOSIS has become a platform for mobilising and streamlining the efforts of SIDS to make a coherent and assertive impact on international issues and their website mirrors their visibility in IR in recent times.

The visibility of SIDS reached a high point in May 1994 when the milestone event known as UN Global Conference on Sustainable Development of SIDS was held in Barbados. It was the first of its kind ever to be held to address the issues and developmental challenges of the most vulnerable group of states in the world, the SIDS. It provided a magnificent platform for SIDS to publicise their concerns and to work out a comprehensive plan of action in partnership with the rest of the world. This was the most fruitful outcome of their efforts in IR since the inception of AOSIS, which was also seen as the most tangible deed that translated the lofty goals of Agenda 21 into action, for Agenda 21 adopted at the Earth Summit provided ground for the conference (see Chapter 17 (G) of Agenda 21 (A/Conf.151.4, 22April 1992). Indeed, Agenda 21 stated that the special circumstances that SIDS are faced with in their search for sustainable development would be addressed at a separate international conference.

The Second AOSIS Summit was held in conjunction with the Barbados Conference as a preparatory meeting to facilitate the work of the conference, which has become a customary practice within AOSIS on the eve of every global conference. The Barbados Conference gave birth to two important establishments and another global strategy for sustainable development of SIDS known as the Barbados Programme of Action (BPOA). The first establishment was to set up a permanent office, known as the SIDS Unit at the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs to monitor the execution of BPOA. The other establishment was to set up a comprehensive electronic network for SIDS to exchange information and build capacity, known as SIDS-Net.

One of the key elements contained in BPOA, which has gained wider currency recently, was the recognition of the need to develop vulnerability indices that could determine the state of development for the most vulnerable group of countries in the world, the SIDS. The objective of the exercise was to develop a statistical measuring

tool that could diagnose the value and nature of assistance required for these fragile island states. A number of discussions and studies have been so far undertaken to arrive at a comprehensive vulnerability index, both at the UN and the Commonwealth of Nations, but a well recognisable measurement remains yet to be operationalised.

As the above discussions have explicitly outlined, the visibility of SIDS in IR is mostly felt at international organisations, namely the UN and the Commonwealth. The SIDS' participation and involvement in addressing global issues and protection of their interest in the work of these organisations reflects their emerging role in IR. AOSIS in particular, as an informal political alliance operating within the UN system, have participated and contributed to every meeting related to climate or sustainable development. The annual meeting of the Conference of Parties (COP) of the Climate Convention, which characterise ongoing climate negotiations, was well attended by AOSIS. Collective statements continue to be made in these meetings and have resulted in an orchestrated expeditious and early conclusion of the Kyoto Protocol, the built-in mechanism yet to be enforced as teeth or tangible actions to mitigate the expected climate crisis. Almost all SIDS or AOSIS members have set a startling example to the rest of the world to signify its priority to address global warming by early ratification of the Protocol.

In September 1999, a five-year review meeting of BPOA was held in the form of the Twenty Second Special Session of the UNGA. The session was not an impressive meeting, unlike the Barbados Conference, as AOSIS expressed their displeasure at the slow implementation of BPOA and the lack of financial commitments from developed or donor countries to assist the SIDS to achieve the goals prescribed in BPOA towards sustainable development. The Communiqué of the Third AOSIS Summit, which was held prior to the review session, states that, "little was being done at the international level today to assist SIDS in overcoming their unique problems" (AOSIS communiqué, 1999). Furthermore, it "expressed concern that adequate, predictable, new and additional, financial resources in support of the implementation of the BPOA had not been provided by the international community" (AOSIS communiqué, 1999). Nevertheless, a special donor conference of SIDS was held in February 1999 in the run up to the review session of the UNGA of the BPOA. The conference provided a platform to exchange views on the outcome of BPOA and identification of constraints

which have delayed its implementation. The SIDS seized this opportunity to submit over 300 project proposals for financial and technical assistance from donor countries.

SIDS or AOSIS made their firm imprint in the ten-year review conference of UNCED too, which was held in Johannesburg, South Africa in 2002 under the title of World Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) (see ENB, Vol. 22, No. 51, 6 September 2002). The Fourth Summit of the AOSIS held on 1 September 2002 during the WSSD expressed satisfaction with the agreement on the special provisions contained in Chapter VII of the Plan of Implementation adopted by the Conference about sustainable development of SIDS (Communiqué of Fourth Summit of AOSIS, 1 September 2002). The Summit also reaffirmed its support for the UN SIDS Unit and for AOSIS to remain the forum to promote the shared interests of its members and to strengthen cooperation among SIDS.

Most recently, the SIDS were in the limelight again with the UN International Meeting to Review the Implementation of the Programme of Action for SIDS (ten-year review conference of the Barbados Conference) in January 2005, in Mauritius. The Conference adopted what was called the 'Mauritius Declaration' which contained the Mauritius Strategy, the main agenda for further action towards sustainable development of SIDS (Granich, 2005). The Mauritius Declaration calls upon the international community to provide all support needed by the vulnerable SIDS to cope with climate change, sea level rise and natural and environmental disasters. In his address, the Secretary General of the UN Kofi Annan, stressed a shift in sympathy towards the islands' situation in the wake of the 2004 tsunami tragedy (Granich, 2005).

Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed the historical context that gave rise to SIDS and their developments at the UN where their presence and contribution is mostly felt in terms of IR. Thus it has traced the events, developments, processes, issues and actors that have facilitated their statehood. Lastly it has looked at their early contributions to IR through the UN and recent visibility in IR.

The primary goals of foreign policy of SIDS were the search for security, development assistance, regional cooperation and adherence to neutrality. While they relied on the UN for protection of their sovereignty and territorial integrity, some SIDS entered into bilateral security alliances with regional powers. On a number of occasions, the political independence of SIDS was disturbed by external threats and so the question of security remained their biggest concern as the weakest group of countries in the world.

SIDS became independent largely due to the decolonisation process that was institutionalised by the UN, and the pragmatic world opinion that prevailed after the Second World War in favour of self-determination. SIDS saw the UN as the guarantor of their independence and facilitator of their development. The enshrined principles of the UN Charter were the main springboard that validated the claims of SIDS to statehood and for their full-fledged membership in the UN. Had the Charter of the UN not been flexible nor the process of its revisions easy, the SIDS would have not been able to enjoy sovereign equality similar to bigger states. It can be safely argued that the UN was the saviour of the most vulnerable group of states, the SIDS and one that championed statehood for SIDS. Therefore, it is observed that the importance of SIDS to the UN and their participation in IR has become more visible than ever before.

Although at the time of independence there was uncertainty about their viability and contribution to IR, they proved to be responsible and supportive members of the international community. None of them renounced their independence nor withdrew their membership from the UN. They neither caused danger to world peace, nor breached principles of the Charter of the UN. On the contrary, they were promoters of international law and order. Nevertheless, SIDS maintained a low profile in IR, being observed as passive actors that were largely marginalised in international decision-making in the early days of their existence. SIDS that had little capacity to produce diplomatic initiatives, played a minor role on an ad hoc basis. Their scope for participation in IR was severely constrained due to lack of resources and expertise.

Other influences also can account for the dramatic rise and survival of SIDS in the post-World War Two period. Some unique features of SIDS, such as their isolation,

boundedness and insularity allowed them to affirm sovereignty without much dispute over claims from others when the colonial empires decided to free them. In most SIDS, local self-government prevailed even before their independence, and their traditions and heritage had given them organised societies with cultural autonomy, which enabled their peaceful and smooth transition to political independence. Factors such as historical circumstances, shifts in international order, growth of regional co-operation, respect for human rights and self-determination have led to the emergence of SIDS. Nonetheless, those intrinsic weaknesses had an impact on their role and performance in IR after independence. This trend has also been changing with the onset of an era of global change, which has brought fresh issues and actors on to the world stage.

The previously marginalised SIDS in IR have become proactive members of the international community in addressing environmental and economic issues that have a greater bearing on these countries. The transboundary global problems, global integration by satellite communications and globalisation of trade, the rise of NGOs and the influence of media, and the awakening of the SIDS as to their plight, have all contributed to the recent visibility of SIDS in IR. The formation of AOSIS as a political alliance within the UN, and the recognition of SIDS by the UN as a special group of states requiring special assistance for their development, have made them glow in the horizon of IR with the dawning of the era of global change in late 1980s. These states which previously have been eclipsed in the international orbit, are now producing a substantial impact on world politics alongside bigger states. These trends suggest SIDS are diplomatically maturing and mark their coming of age in the so called 'era of global change'. Their success in raising their profile in IR can be attributed to having grouped themselves into an intra-regional coalition to stand collectively in addressing concerns of common threats and interests. The eventful Barbados Conference especially dedicated to SIDS' concerns speaks of the newly activated island diplomacy in contemporary IR. In the light of the preceding discussions, it could be argued that SIDS have been playing a disproportionate role compared to their size in contemporary IR.

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Chapter 5
RESEARCH METHODS

Introduction

To recapitulate, Chapters 2 and 3 were concerned with a review of the literature and the development of a conceptual framework for the study. A wide body of knowledge relating to the international behaviour or role of small states in IR was reviewed, which revealed the conventional wisdom or theories that explain the role of small states, termed the *small states paradigm.* Within this context, the underpinning explanatory variables for the international behaviour of small states were extracted. These variables included inherent or intrinsic internal factors, namely, the *physical concept of size* and the *structural concept of capacity to act.* Within this paradigm, the small size and lack of capacity to act suggests that SIDS should remain insignificant and passive actors in IR.

In contrast, the review of the background of SIDS and their role in contemporary IR (Chapter 4) reached the opposite conclusion. SIDS *have* been highly visible and proactive in IR in recent times, contrary to the tenets of the small states paradigm. The conventional small states paradigm, being preoccupied with inherent, *internal factors* that lie within the state, seems to have overlooked the possibility that *external factors* may be important determinants of the international behaviour of small states.

This observation then led to the issue of why the role of SIDS in IR has recently been at odds with the conventional paradigm. Are not the external factors that lie outside territories facilitative of this change? Assuming the answer is in the affirmative (as concluded from Chapter 4), the thesis adopts a proposition which argues that the *external factors outside states are facilitative of the proactive and contributory behaviour of small states in IR.*

This chapter first describes the methodology applied to empirically investigate the above proposition. It then presents the data analysis as a basis for the interpretation of the two case studies in Chapters 6 and 7.

The Research Approach

Case Study Investigation

To answer the above question, the case studies were chosen in which SIDS played a significant role in contemporary IR. Two case studies were selected, each of which relates to issue-specific diplomatic, multilateral negotiations held at the UN and which involve initiatives made by SIDS that produced significant outcomes in the form of international law: the Malta initiative towards the Law of the Sea Convention (Ocean Regime); and the AOSIS initiative for the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (Climate Regime).[1]

The international behaviour of SIDS is analysed by exploring their participation in, and contribution to, these two diplomatic negotiations. The roles SIDS have played in these negotiations seem to be the most laudable moves made by SIDS so far in gaining a high profile in IR and thus appear to be illustrative examples for analysing the international behaviour of SIDS. Also, a number of meetings and discussions have been held at the UN over a long period for these negotiations, producing a number of conference documents and records, which are available for analysis. Similarly, a number of diplomats of SIDS and UN officials who were involved in the negotiations of these issues were available at the UN for interviews. They provided an indispensable resource of information and insights of relevance to this study. In short, availability of data was a key reason for selection of these negotiations for empirical investigation.

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[1] Two cases are chosen because the results can be more compelling (Yin, 45, 1994) and more robust (Herriot and Firestone quoted in Yin, 45, 1994), as the comparison of findings can solidify the outcome. Multiple case studies (two or more) are preferred for empirical investigations, to follow what Yin calls "replication logic" in building convincing arguments (Yin, 45, 1994).

As the focus group of this study, the SIDS constitute over 41 states at the UN and given the time, effort and money that would be required to obtain data from all these countries, the author confined his research to a representative sample of states from which in-depth data was collected. This involved five SIDS (Malta, Fiji, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago, and Cyprus) for the Law of the Sea case study and the AOSIS countries (see Chapter 2) for the Climate Change negotiations case study.

Before discussing the specific research methods used in these case studies, it is useful to reflect first on the broader methodological strategy that was followed.

General Methodological "Strategies"

Broadly, Remenyi and Money (2004) argue that there are two types of research strategy, *positivist or quantitative* and *qualitative or interpretive*. *Quantitative research* is based on numbers and statistical analyses, whereas *qualitative research* conversely "produces findings not arrived at by statistical procedures or other means of quantification" (Strauss and Corbin, quoted in Remenyi and Money, 60, 2004). In IR scholarship, the same two broad strategies to research are used which are sometimes termed as *normative* and *behavioural*. The *normative* approach is the same as a *qualitative* or *interpretivist* approach as found in social science research methods (McNabb, 21, 2004; Toma and Gorman, 58, 1991; Pearson and Rochester, 27, 1998; Viotti and Kauppi, 2, 1999). Bevir and Rhodes explain the place of the *interpretive* research approach in political science of which IR is a subdivision (Couloumbis and Wolfe, 19, 1990; Merriam Webster, quoted in Pearson and Rochester, 14, 1998) in the following stance. "The many qualitative research approaches now finding their way into use in political science and the other social sciences and have been grouped together under the label of *interpretive theory*" (Bevir and Rhodes quoted in McNabb, 27, 2004).

Another two IR scholars, Hollis and Smith (1990) regard these two approaches as '*explaining*' and '*understanding*'. The *explaining* approach is research conducted from outside of a process whereas *understanding* is in-depth research carried out from inside of a process. Explaining is an outsider's story "told in a manner of a natural

scientist seeking to explain the workings of nature", while *understanding* is an insider's story "told so as to make us understand what the events mean, in a sense distinct from any meaning found in unearthing the laws of nature" (Hollis and Smith 1, 1990). In social science tradition, *understanding* generally means the same thing as *qualitative research.*

The thesis adopts largely, but not entirely, a *qualitative* or *interpretive* strategy in carrying out its case study investigation. It follows the line of exploratory research in understanding the explanatory variables that mould the international behaviour or role of SIDS in IR. It has chosen this approach, because the study aims at understanding a social process, namely, the role of SIDS in IR and explanatory factors. Qualitative research enables in-depth understanding and generally uses a few samples that are not randomly selected (Remenyi and Money, 62, 2004).

Another scholar of qualitative research, Merriam, identifies four positive characteristics of this approach as follows (5-7, 1998):

i) Qualitative researchers are interested in understanding the meaning people have constructed.
ii) The researcher is the primary instrument for data collection and analysis.
iii) It usually involves fieldwork.
iv) It primarily employs an inductive research strategy.

Thus, a *qualitative approach* was most fitting for this study because it provides detailed evidence and rich and extensive information (Remenyi and Money, 62, 2004). Further, it entails "inductive, theory-generating, subjective and non-positivist processes" according to McNabb (341, 2004). This study favoured a *normative / qualitative / interpretive* approach also because the competing approach, that is, *behaviourist / quantitative* were said to be "actor-oriented" and happen to "overlook structural questions in IR" (Said et al., 12, 1995). This study primarily needed to focus on structural as well other factors outside the national territories of SIDS in order to answer the research inquiry it pursues.

Nevertheless, this paradigm of research is not without limitations. Unlike quantitative and positivist approaches, this paradigm cannot have breadth or a wider parameter since its main strength lies in in-depth (width) analysis. Personal biases can also creep in unnoticeably to the research process as data is collected from people in an uncontrolled environment relating to their views and how they see the world. Also, the researcher himself or herself interprets the data and gives meaning which could also lead to biases. The researcher of this thesis remained cognisant of these limitations as field investigations were undertaken.

Specific Methodological "Tactics"

There are many methods, or what Remenyi and Money (2004) call "tactics", for conducting qualitative research in the social sciences. These include basic or generic study, ethnographic study, phenomenology, grounded theory and case study (Merriam, 10-24, 1998). In political science under the qualitative research approach, McNabb identifies six similar approaches namely, ethnography, phenomenology, case studies, hermeneutics, grounded theory, and action science (348, 2004). Of these methods, the case study method has been chosen for conducting empirical investigation for this thesis. The main reason for this choice was that it helps to draw on multiple sources of evidence, provides meaning in context, and in-depth understanding of the central issues of a process (Remenyi and Money, 73-74, 2004). In case study work, the researcher can also focus on one or a few cases, intensively examining many features over a given time period with focus on several causal factors of a phenomenon (Neuman, 33, 2003). According to leading methodologist of the case study method, Robert Yin, it is a very useful method for studies with research questions containing interrogatives, such as *who*, *why* and *how* (Yin quoted in Remenyi and Money, 73, 2004). The research question of this study begins with 'how' and so this is the most fitting method of research for the empirical investigation of this thesis. Using the case study method, a few cases involving limited subjects can be taken as well. This approach has also been chosen because it is a popular approach in political science and accommodates "great flexibility" (McNabb, 357, 2004).

Research Methods for Conduct of Case Study

The multiple methods known as *triangulation* are adopted for conducting the chosen case studies. These include the multiple methods of data gathering and structuring the format and analysis of the collected qualitative data. These methods are explained below one by one.

A key proponent of the case study method of research, Robert Yin, identifies five stages for the conduct of a case study as follows (Yin quoted in McNabb, 362, 2004):

i) the study question
ii) its propositions
iii) the unit or units of analysis
iv) the logic that links the collected information to the proposition
v) the criteria selected by the researcher for interpreting the case

This study follows these stages in compiling the case studies. It has already identified the research question and its proposition which are spelt in the preceding discussion. Thus, *first* and *second stages* are already completed. The *third stage* is the *unit of analysis*. This stage needs further explanation in relation to the *unit of analysis* in IR scholarship. This phenomenon is conceptualised in IR scholarship as the *level of analysis* (see Couloumbis and Wolfe, 21, 1990; Pearson and Rochester 180, 1998; Singer, 77, 1966; Wilkenfeld, 21, 1980; Goldstein, 12, 1994).

Scales of Analysis

The case studies that constitute the empirical investigation (Chapters 6 and 7) are examined in order to understand how external factors in the international or global environment influence or affect the behaviour of SIDS in IR regarding multilateral negotiations at the UN. In conceptualising analytical frameworks for studying IR, theorists often elaborate on what they call *levels of analysis* (Singer, 77, 1966; Wilkenfeld, et al, 21, 1980; Goldstein, 12, 1994). While different analysts present

varied levels of analysis or units of analysis, the common three levels are conceptualised as *individual*, *state* and *system*.

Individual and State Levels

In the *individual level of analysis*, attributes of leaders or foreign policy key decision-makers are analysed as to the impact they have upon foreign relations of states. In the *state level analysis*, national attributes, such as type of governance, or political system, level of economic development and size of resources, are examined. This level dwells on inherent domestic factors in understanding how much these factors influence foreign policy behaviour. In the literature of the small states paradigm, the analysis of international behaviour of small states is largely confined to this level of analysis. James Rosenau (1969) who is credited as father of foreign policy analysis (Hey, 9, 2003) calls this the *vertical analysis* of behaviour of states in IR.

System Level

In the third level of analysis known as the *system level analysis*, factors outside states that characterise external behaviour of states at the international level are examined (Frankel, 19, 1973). Components of system level analysis include: geographical realities, international developments abroad, and structural characteristics of the global system (Toma and Gorman, 121, 1991). Various analysts refer to this level using different names, such as 'interstate level' (Goldstein, 13, 1994), 'international context' (Coplin, cited in Wilkenfeld et al., 29, 1980), and so on.

Jeanne Hey has said, "if there is one piece of conventional wisdom about how best to explain small state behaviour, it is that the answer lies at the system level of analysis" (6, 2003). Similarly, James Rosenau (1972) also holds the view that external factors outside states are more important than national attributes or internal factors in influencing the behaviour of small states. System analysis basically allows what Rosenau calls a horizontal analysis of foreign policy behaviour of states. It is normally referred to as the unit of analysis for understanding or exploring how the attributes of the international system or external environment affect the foreign policy behaviour of states. For Rosenau, external environment comprises an unspecified

variety of objects, actors and situations that serves a state as stimuli for action (323, 1972).

Global Level

Complimentary to the system level or international level analysis, there is another form of analysis, which has been recognised by some scholars of IR as an independent dimension of analysis (see Goldstein, 1994). It is called *global level analysis*, which closely overlaps with system level components. Some scholars discussed this level of analysis in a fluid manner in the 1980s (see Wilkenfeld et al, 75-81, 1980). According to Goldstein, the global level of analysis "seeks to explain international outcomes in terms of global trends and forces that transcend the interactions of states themselves" (Goldstein, 12-13, 1994).

This global level of analysis appears to be the most suitable for the area of research this study pursues and the global components that it aims at exploring. It is considered to be the most appropriate unit of analysis for explaining the international behaviour of SIDS because it focuses primarily on issues, forces, actors, trends and circumstances that affect the international behaviour of states whether they are small or big. It does not touch on complex issues, such as the international structure or international order of the time, which is of little concern to militarily weak states like SIDS. Similarly, some dimensions of system level analysis look at geopolitical factors, such as size, location, and topography, etc. (Toma and Gorman, 121, 1991), which fall outside the emphasis of this research on exploring external factors that influence or affect the international behaviour of SIDS. Therefore, the global level analysis holds most relevance for assessing the factors that influence international behaviour of SIDS in IR.

Goldstein (1994) identifies the following categories for global level analysis, which offers a promising framework for diagnosing how external environmental factors affect the international behaviour of SIDS.

- north-south gap
- world religion

- European imperialism
- technological change
- global telecommunications
- world environment
- world scientific and business communities
- United Nations (UN)

These categories are relevant in focusing the data collection and analysis needs for the SIDS' case studies. Indeed, having followed the inductive/qualitative research approach guided by theoretically dissected propositions for empirical investigation, this global level of analysis provides flexibility and room for exploration of components of relevance to SIDS.

The *fourth stage* of the case study method is *the logic that links the collected data into the proposition* according to Yin. For this stage, explanation of the methods used for data gathering, structuring of the case and its presentation are given. Data gathering for the case studies is carried by means of two sources. They were conducting interviews with resource persons at the UN in 2004 and analysis of relevant documentation.

Sources of Data

Two sources of data were tapped for the case studies: documentation (primary and secondary) and interviews (primary).

Primary Data

Primary sources of documentation included various records of meetings that facilitated negotiations, such as *policy statements* made by delegates of SIDS and *conference documents* that recorded the proceedings of these meetings. These data enabled the author to analyse the positions, policies, commitments and actions taken by SIDS in relation to various concerns that stemmed from the issues under discussion. They also enabled the author to diagnose problems, constraints and

opportunities that either enhanced or inhibited their role in the negotiations. Finally, these data helped in building an understanding of, and explanation for, the factors or drivers that influenced international behaviour of SIDS in relation to particular negotiations under scrutiny.

For the collection of primary data, the author also undertook a research trip to New York for two and half months from September to December 2004 in order to conduct interviews with resource persons at the UN. The time was utilised as well to undertake research at three libraries of the UN headquarters in New York. A *semi-structured* and *open-ended* interview schedule was used as a *field research instrument* for both cases in order to gain maximum insights from interviewees (see **Appendix I** for interview schedules). Semi-structured interviews helped to accommodate both open-ended questions and structured questions for those who could not be interviewed face-to-face and could not give much time. Except for two interviewees, the rest entertained *open-ended questions*. Open-ended questions accommodated flexibility and in-depth exploration of the subject matter sought. Another advantage of open-ended questions was the provision in this method for the use of 'probes' and 'prompts'. According to Robin, a "probe is a device to get the interviewee to expand on a response when you intuit that he or she has more to give" and "prompts suggest to the interviewee the range or set of possible answers that the interviewer expects" (Robin, 234, 1993).

In conducting interviews based on pre-structured interview sequencing, a 'funneling technique' was utilised for methodical and unbiased flow of information from respondents. This is a technique which enables the interviewer to "move from general opening enquiries to more specific and focused questioning" (Wilkinson and Birmingham, 47, 2003).

Interviews were conducted with diplomats of SIDS, seeking relevant information from their knowledge and experiences. These were resourceful persons from either having been involved in the negotiations or dealing with the issues relating to ocean negotiations and climate negotiations in their respective Missions to the UN. Interviews were also held with representatives of intergovernmental bodies (IGOs) that coordinate the issues of ocean negotiations or regime and climate negotiations or

regime. Furthermore, representatives of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) who were involved in the said negotiations were interviewed as well for gaining alternative perspectives. These three sets of interviews provided the most compelling and direct primary sources of data, as they provided the most purpose-specific data. A total of 20 interviews were undertaken, all of which (except for one) were conducted at the UN in New York.

Secondary Data

Secondary sources of documentation included published works, news articles, commentaries and information available on websites. These data were analysed to identify the trends, issues, forces and circumstances that affect positions, policies, commitments and actions of SIDS in addressing the relevant issues surrounding the Ocean and Climate diplomatic negotiations.

Method for Structure of Interview Schedule and Case Study

The main method adopted for structuring the case studies and interview schedule is a broader analytical strategy described by Lawrence W. Neuman (2003) as the *Path Dependency and Contingency Method.* It is commonly used to "develop explanations of how and why social events unfold across time" (Neuman, 452, 2003). According to Neuman, a researcher begins with an outcome and demonstrates how a sequence of prior events influences this outcome. He further describes this method as follows.

> Path dependency refers to how a unique beginning can trigger a sequence of events and create a deterministic path that is followed in the chain of subsequent events. The path has a causal effect. It contains or limits the directions of the ongoing events that follow (Neuman, 452, 2003).

In the case studies that comprise the empirical investigation in this thesis, *motivational factors* that attracted SIDS to get involved in the negotiations are taken

as *triggering sequences of events,* and *facilitative factors* of their role in the processes are considered to be the *chain of subsequent events.*

The other component of this method is *contingency.* It "refers to a unique combination of particular factors or specific circumstances that may not be repeated". This combination is idiosyncratic and could be an unforeseen situation, but can influence subsequent events (Neuman, 453, 2003). This component offers an additional bonus for the application of Neuman's flexible method, for it can accommodate 'surprises' that may jump out in studying a unique group of states like SIDS. Thus, the *Path Dependency and Contingency Method* holds great applicability for undertaking empirical investigation for this thesis.

For sequencing the interviews with categorisation, the *Path Dependency and Contingency Method* was adopted. In accordance with this method, the proposed categories or sections of the interview outline hang on the following structure.

a) Background to the case investigated (in order to brief how the process was conducted and what results achieved)
b) The role of SIDS in the case investigated (in order to identify the specific role SIDS played)
c) Background factors that motivated their role (in order to identify the elements that triggered the interests of SIDS and reasons for their involvement in the negotiations)
d) Background factors that facilitated their role (in order to identify the elements that facilitated their participation in, and contribution to the negotiations)

The same structure was utilised to present the interpretation and findings of the case studies in a descriptive format (Chapters 6 and 7). However, the final analysis and results of the case studies are presented in Chapter 8 under the title of Conclusions.

The fifth stage of the case study method as described by Yin is *the criteria selected by the researcher for interpreting the case.* Two methods were adopted for this stage. They are explained below.

Methods of Data Analysis and Presentation

To analyse the qualitative data collected from interviews and documentation, this study follows an analytical method used in qualitative data analysis known as "codes or coding" (Miles and Huberman [1994] cited Sarantakos, 317, 1998). It is a broad method for "assigning a symbol or keyword to a section of text, giving a particular meaning to, or labeling a section of the material" (Sarantakos, 319, 1998). These codes can be generated according to Sarantakos before or during, and sometimes, after data collection. According to one of the exponents of the coding method, Lyn Richards, "coding generates ideas and gathers material by topic" and using the results it can "develop ideas and take enquiry further" (85, 2005).

Sarantakos (1993) identifies a *cyclical process* for qualitative data analysis. In the *first stage* known as *data reduction*, data are summarised, *coded and categorised.* In this process main themes and behaviours are identified. In the *second stage*, which is the *data organisation stage*, information is clustered around certain themes and presenting results in some form. In the *third stage* or the *interpretation stage*, patterns and regularities are identified and trends discovered. Miles and Huberman say that looking for patterns or themes in data may enable "something to jump out at you, which make sense" (216, 1984).

Similar to Sarantakos' stages of qualitative data coding, Lyn Richards describes a three-tier coding procedure for analysing qualitative data which is easy to handle and simple to follow. Richards' first stage of coding is called *descriptive coding*. This "involves storing information about the cases being studied" and "entering attributes" as well as "assigning relevant values to the cases considered". The second stage is called *topic coding* which is the task of "labelling a task according to its subjects" or allocating passages to topics. The third stage is *analytical coding*. This stage "leads to theory emergence and theory affirmation". In other words, Richards says this is the stage for interpretation and reflection on meaning (87-95, 2005). The analysis of data in this study involves descriptive coding, topic coding and analytical coding. The tables in **Appendix II** summarise how the qualitative data gathered for this empirical investigation of this thesis is analysed.

Modes of Analysis

The second segment of the final stage of the case study method as described by Yin is interpretation and presentation. In the field of international relations, four broad modes of analysis for data interpretation are applied. These are known as *descriptive*, *explanatory*, *normative* and *prescriptive* (Pearson and Rochester, 1998). Amongst these, description is the basic type of analysis, which "simply tells what reality looks like". Explanation goes "beyond merely reporting a fact and to account for its existence" (Pearson and Rochester, 29, 1998). Normative analysis enlarges analytical capacity of data by "making value (moral) judgments about some reality thought to exist or thought to be possible". The prescription mode of analysis helps, as its literal meaning implies to prescribe "future course of action or policy". All these modes of analysis are somewhat complimentary and as Pearson and Rochester say, researchers use them often all at once (Pearson and Rochester, 31, 1998). For this study, the first three modes of analysis are applied given the nature of the method adopted for data categorisation and processing.

Thus, the organisation of case study chapters loosely follows these modes of analysis. The first two sections of each case study describe the role of SIDS and establish whether there was any role played by SIDS or not. In order to describe this role, indicators of foreign policy behaviour of countries such as diplomatic initiatives, voting patterns, financial and moral support, holding of offices and various positions held in terms of policy, were gathered from key SIDS that contributed to the process. The role of SIDS in the negotiations is explored to find out the extent of international behaviour demonstrated in the process. This indicative information enabled the author to describe the role of SIDS and to make a normative analysis as to whether their role was substantial or not. If the processes explored in the case studies were in any way influenced or impacted upon by SIDS and were factual realities, then it can be regarded as substantial in normative terms. Again, unless a substantial role can be established, the causal factors or variables that led to this role cannot be adequately explored. Information from more than two SIDS countries can be sufficient in qualitative research like this study to establish such a role. Therefore, the order of modes of analysis for the case studies investigated in this thesis will follow from *description* to

normative analysis and finally to *explanation* of the causal variables that address the inductive research question of this thesis.

Accordingly, the two cases that this thesis has investigated are presented in the narrative form in Chapters 6 and 7 and the results and contribution to theory building in Chapter 8 (conclusions).

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Chapter 6

LAW OF THE SEA NEGOTIATIONS AND SIDS

Introduction

In the preceding chapters it has been argued that small island developing states (SIDS) are becoming increasingly visible and have risen to prominence in contemporary international relations. What factors explain this shift in their international behaviour? Is it attributable to internal factors as described in the small states paradigm, or external factors that have been overlooked by the paradigm? This study postulates that the rising visibility and importance of SIDS in contemporary international relations (IR) can be explained by analysing external factors that impinge upon their behaviour. Therefore, it adopts this proposition and asks, are there not, in the global environment, external factors outside states that predominantly influence the international behaviour of small states?

To validate this proposition, this study conducts an empirical investigation by examining two case studies in which SIDS have played substantial roles as important stakeholders. These include the multilateral diplomatic negotiations that have taken place within the UN forum. This chapter comprises the first of the two case studies, entitled Law of the Sea Negotiations and SIDS.

The Law of the Sea negotiations has been chosen because this has been one of the most high profile and successful multilateral negotiations to have been concluded by the international community to date (Annan, 4, 2003; UN, 1, 2002). Its main outcome, the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), has been very significant for SIDS, and offers vast opportunities (Sopoaga [DOALOS] 149, 2002). Moreover, data is abundantly available on these negotiations, which took over 15 years and concluded with a comprehensive 'constitution'. This has often been a referee to govern the use of oceans (Annan, 4, 2002; Koh, 13, 2002; Nandan, 42, 2002). Most importantly, the Law of the Sea negotiations were the result of a diplomatic initiative launched by one of the SIDS (Malta), and its success was made

possible by substantial contributions from other SIDS. This case study provides an insightful account of SIDS role and behaviour in IR and of the underlying causal factors of their action.

The case study will mainly focus on drawing out the background factors that had the role of motivation and facilitation in the Law of the Sea negotiations. The influence of these factors seemed to promote the most laudable efforts made by SIDS to date, gaining them a high profile for the first time in the history of IR.

This thesis pursues an exploratory research paradigm to conduct its empirical investigation, and it follows the Lawrence Neuman Path Dependency and Contingency Method in structuring the case studies. According to this method of research, one begins with a review of the outcome of a social public process and then analyses the background factors that led to that outcome. The method allows provision for accommodating surprises or one-off factors as a contingency variance (Neuman, 452, 2003). Thus, in order to explain the outcome, the chapter will first begin with a brief background to Law of the Sea negotiations and then review the role of SIDS in the process. This will set the tone for discussing the determinants of their role. It will also provide a framework for analysing the background factors observed in the process that have resulted in the international behaviour and role of SIDS.

The central objective of this chapter is to examine the factors that moulded the behaviour or role of SIDS in the Law of the Sea negotiations, and to draw conclusions as to the relevance of factors external to the state in determining the international behaviour of small states in IR. Accordingly, two sections are presented. The first one, 'Motivational Factors', will examine the pre-negotiation factors that motivated SIDS to get engaged in the process and pre-emptively triggered their interest in the Law of the Sea. The next section, 'Facilitative Factors', will examine the elements that facilitated their role during the negotiations from the launch of the initiative by Malta at the UN that led to the adoption of UNCLOS in 1982. Sporadic references will be made to post-conference negotiations after adoption of the Convention in 1982, in order to highlight the continuing role SIDS have played in ensuring effective execution of the outcome. The formal negotiations were conducted through what was called the Third United Nations Conference on Law of the Sea, which ended in 1982

with the adoption of its outcome, the United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS). The post-conference developments and continuing strengthening of the ocean regime thereafter will be briefly mentioned in the background section of the case study.

Similarly, this thesis does not aim to identify the role played by all SIDS at the UN during the negotiations, but instead focuses on the five SIDS whose participation in, and contribution to, the process was most visible and proactive. These countries are Malta and Cyprus in the Mediterranean region, Fiji in the Pacific region, and Jamaica and Trinidad and Tobago (T and T) in the Caribbean region. Although other SIDS will be mentioned, this will be only in a generic context without specific detail. In investigating the explanatory factors determining SIDS behaviour or role at the negotiations, it will focus on identifying the potential elements in the arena that influenced their actions and responses, such as the actors, events, circumstances, trends, issues, actions and developments in and around the process examined.

Data for this case study was collected by means of eight interviews from resource persons at the UN, from speeches made at the negotiations, from conference documents and publications by the relevant bodies of the UN, and academic articles and published commentaries.

Background to Law of the Sea Negotiations

The Law of the Sea is not simply a new subject that shot into prominence at the UN with the 'famous speech' (Kildow, 561, 1974) made by Ambassador Arvid Pardo of Malta at the Twenty Second Session of the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) in 1967. Rather, this took place in light of the emerging new scientific discoveries regarding the mineral wealth of oceans and the advancing technology available to exploit them to the benefit of technologically capable countries (Pardo, 1967; DOALOS, 2002; Sohn, 1997). However, Pardo's revolutionary speech did force a revisiting of matters relating to oceans. It also marked the launch of a ground-breaking diplomatic initiative by SIDS calling for the international community to recognise the deep seabed and ocean floor as the 'common heritage of mankind'

(CHM) and for it to be only used for peaceful purposes (Schori, 31, 2002; DOALOS, ii, 2002). He also called for the producing of a new international treaty to govern the use of oceans. His increasing realization of the importance of oceans and the inadequacy of existing laws to effectively govern ocean affairs was what prompted him to make the appeal (Pardo, 66, 1993; DOALOS, 2002).

Prior to the Maltese Ambassador taking this Law of the Sea initiative, the international community had been addressing issues relating to ocean concerns at the UN since its establishment. An advisory and research body established in 1947, known as the International Law Commission, initially undertook drafting of international laws for the UN. The UN held its first conference to address the matter in 1958. This conference resulted in four conventions, known as General Conventions, which dealt with the territorial sea and the contiguous zone (Koh and Jayakumar, 30, 1985). A second Conference on the Law of the Sea followed suit in 1960. The International Law Commission provided inputs for these conferences. However, these conferences, despite intensive efforts, "failed to produce an agreement on the breadth of the territorial sea and on fishing zones" (DOALOS, ii, 2002; Koh and Jayakumar, 30, 1985). The majority of the newly emerged developing states, including SIDS, were in fact not represented at these conferences, as they joined the UN in the post-conferences period. These conferences nevertheless created awareness amongst UN members and produced an environment for leaders with foresight and interest in world peace that conduced them to step forward. One such remarkable and groundbreaking diplomatic initiative, was made by the visionary Ambassador of newly independent Malta (Bonnici, 8, 2002) in 1967, barely two years after it became independent and joined the UN. Malta initiated an agenda item at the first Committee of UNGA during its 22nd session (November 1967), which was entitled 'Examination of the Question of the Reservation Exclusively Peaceful Purpose of the Seabed and the Ocean Floor and the Subsoil thereof, Underlying the High Seas Beyond the Limits of Present National Jurisdiction, and the Use of Their Resources in the Interests of Mankind' (UN Document, 1967).

When the general debate was opened for considering this item at the First Committee of the Twenty Second Session of the UNGA, the Maltese Ambassador made the historic and moving speech that lasted almost four hours. The speech presented well-

documented facts about the increasing importance of the oceans, and the advancing technological capability and scientific knowledge that was now available to exploit seabed resources. He informed the members of the discovery of seabed wealth and the danger that might erupt if unregulated use of the oceans continued. Most importantly, he warned the international community as to the dire consequences that may be faced by the following words:

> The consequences will be very grave: at the very least a dramatic escalation of the arms race and sharply increasing world tensions, caused also by the intolerable injustice that would reserve the plurality of the world's resources for the exclusive benefit of less than a handful of nations ... the strong would get stronger, the rich richer... (Pardo, 1967).

According to DOALAS, this speech "has often been credited with setting in motion a process that spanned 15 years and culminated with the adoption of the Convention on the Law of the Sea in 1982" (DOALAS, 9, 2002). The Maltese Ambassador is widely credited for identifying the high seas and seabed of the oceans as the common heritage of mankind, a well-acclaimed concept that gained currency at the UN thereafter. In his speech, Ambassador Pardo called for "an effective international regime over the seabed and the ocean floor beyond a clearly defined national jurisdiction", and proposed that UNGA adopt a resolution embodying the following concept and aim.

> The seabed and the ocean floor are a common heritage of mankind and should be used and exploited for peaceful purposes and for the exclusive benefit of mankind as a whole (UN Document, 1967).

This speech marked the beginning of a long process that set in motion the Law of the Sea negotiations. Nevertheless, the real negotiations within the UN forum did not begin until 1973 amongst delegates of UN member states, when the Third UN Conference on Law of the Sea began its course, aimed at concluding a comprehensive treaty to govern all concerns relative to oceans and maritime affairs. Prior to the kick-off of formal negotiations, a span of six years was spent in preparing for the process. Following the historic speech and with the converging views of many other UN

member states, the UNGA adopted Resolution 2340 XXII [1967], establishing an Ad Hoc Committee comprising 35 States to study the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and Ocean Floor (Committee Report, Vol. 1, No 21, A/9021, 1973; cited in Kildow, 561, 1974). In the following year, 1968, by Resolution A/Res/2467 (XXIII), the UNGA established a more permanent body to study the issues to be addressed, known as the Seabed Committee.

The committee's work bore fruit when UNGA in 1970 unanimously adopted its Declaration of Principles on peaceful use of the oceans. In this declaration, for the first time the UN body recognised that the seabed and ocean floor are beyond national jurisdiction, and that resources contained therein are the "common heritage of mankind" that cannot be exploited but are for the benefit of all nations. In the same year, the Assembly also decided to convene the Third UN Conference on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS III) with the objective of preparing a comprehensive treaty to address all the concerns emerging relating to oceans (Report of the Committee, Vol. 1, No. 21 A/9021 [1973] cited in Kildow, 561-2, 1974). The conference finally began negotiations in 1973, which lasted for nine years, a sign of the formidable challenges that needed to be overcome. As the last Chairman of the Conference, Ambassador Tommy Koh of Singapore remarked, "the process of achieving the Convention was almost as important as the Convention itself, highlighting the conflicting interests of groups of states" (UN Press Release, 2002). The negotiations were held in two prime locations of the UN, namely New York and Geneva, except for one meeting in Caracas, Venezuela and the last one in Montego Bay, Jamaica. It was "the largest, most complex and most difficult global negotiations ever hosted by the UN" (Miles, 3, 1998). It involved a total of 11 formal sessions and a number of formal and informal meetings.

At the beginning of the negotiations, 137 UN member states participated, but the number increased to 155 in 1982, with the addition of newly independent states from the developing world (Miles, 4, 1998). The negotiations followed a "package deal" approach, where groups of negotiators focused on clusters of issues, and on making tradeoffs in each other's interests. The package deal concept was meant to be that the "Convention should meet the minimum interests of the largest possible majority while accommodating the essential interests of the major powers" (Koh and Jayakumar, 40,

1985). Miles describes the package deals as an "exchange of navigational versus resource interests" (Miles, 4, 1998). In addition, a recommendation by the Seabed Committee in 1974 endorsed the view that no single article or section was to be approved before all other areas were in place (Jewa, 1999).

These negotiations are recognised as being the most universal of all up to that time. 165 countries and territories participated, eight liberation movements, 12 specialised agencies, 19 international organisations, and 57 NGOs (Paolillo, 3, 2002). The negotiations dealt with multiple issues relating to the use of oceans, ranging from establishing territorial zones to scientific exploration and exploitation of seabed resources. They also covered fair management of living and non-living resources, equitable distribution of their wealth amongst states, protection and conservation of the ocean environment, and settlements of disputes arising from oceanic matters. One analyst of the negotiations process, Uruguayan Ambassador Felipe Paolillo, describes the negotiations as follows:

> Given its wide scope, the far reaching objectives, the complexity of the issue, the multiplicity of the interests involved and the deep political, diplomatic and legal consequences it entailed, the Conference was regarded as an exceptional event (Paolillo, 2002).

The conference, which met for the 11 prolonged sessions in the course of nine years, reached its final verdict with a comprehensive convention, comprising 320 articles and nine annexes, a blend of traditional customary laws of the sea and new innovative concepts that balance the concerns of the two major negotiating blocks of stakeholders, the developing countries and the developed countries.

Diverse groups played a catalytic role in pushing forward the negotiations, which at times appeared to stall and lose momentum. Paolillo (2002) states:

> Working groups, consultation groups, negotiation groups, friends of the President [of the Conference] pullulated and functioned without interruption in parallel with the plenary of the Conference and its main Committee, sometimes outside the official framework of the Conference.

Unique interest groups emerged during the negotiations that were different from the traditional competing power blocs, such as East versus West and the economic status-based North verses South groupings that had been established at UN forums. These groups emerged as countries began to align themselves around centred interests in order to enhance their bargaining positions in a consensus based negotiation. New interest groups appeared, such as coastal states, geographically disadvantaged states, landlocked states, archipelago states, island states, and states bordering straits. These alliances were a mixed groups of states that banded together due to economic interests and perceived disadvantages arising from geographic factors.

The negotiations conference also made history in diplomatic negotiations, when it decided, as a procedural format, to work on the basis of 'consensus' unless an issue could not otherwise be categorically resolved. This consensus procedure was adopted by the conference (A/CONF.62/30) at its second session in 1974, and is known as the 'Gentleman's Agreement' (Final Act [UNCLOS], 1983). The agreement states "the conference should make every effort to reach agreement on substantive matters by way of consensus and there should be no voting on such matters until all efforts at consensus have been exhausted (Final Act [UNCLOS], 165, 1983).

The negotiation conference was divided into three committees, with each committee managed by a bureau of office bearers. The overall conference was headed by a President and assisted by a Vice-Presidents. Work and agenda items were divided as follows for the three committees of the conference.

> *Committee I* dealt with the international regime for the seabed mining issues, archaeological and historical treasures, North-South development issues, and national jurisdictions.
>
> *Committee II* focused on territorial zones, islands, archipelago states, international navigation, exclusive economic zone (EEZ), territorial zones, and claims and activities on the continental shelf and the high seas.
>
> *Committee III* dealt with dispute settlement, scientific research, marine environmental conservation, and transfer of technology.

In addition to these three committees, another three were also set up. They were a General Committee, a Drafting Committee and a Credential Committee (Koh and Jayakuamr, 87-91, 1985). Later, what was called a Collegium of the Conference was constituted, comprising the President, the three Chairmen of the three main Committees, the Chairman of the Drafting Committee, and the Rapporteur-General. This Collegium took the responsibility of drafting what was introduced in the Sixth session, the Single Negotiating Text. This text underwent many revisions, with name changes accordingly (Koh and Jayakumar, 1985).

After the nine years of negotiations, the conference concluded in April 1982, and opened for signature in December at the resumed Eleventh session in Montego Bay, Jamaica. The conference managed to negotiate on most of the content and substance on a consensus basis except for a few procedural and administrative matters for which a vote was needed. Nevertheless, at the final session the United States requested voting on adoption of the Convention. This was because unresolved issues remained with regard to Part XI of the Convention relating to seabed mining provisions over which a few industrialised countries were disappointed. These issues were later resolved in the post-conference period by way of adopted resolutions and agreements complimenting the Convention.

The adoption of the Convention did not mark the end of the Law of the Sea negotiations as a completed product, but rather it continued as a process strengthening its enforcement, capacity and universality. Therefore, in 1994, the year it came into force, a new agreement was concluded on the management of seabed resources that balanced the interests of the previously unsatisfied industrialised states. In 1995, another deal was struck, known as the 'Agreement on Conservation and Management of Straddling and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks'. These post-conference agreements helped to resolve the unfinished businesses of the UNCLOS, and so its relevance and importance increased. A post-conference 'Informal Consultative Process on Ocean Affairs' was established by UNGA resolution 54/33 of 24 November 1999 as a follow up action to UNCLOS, which was aimed at annual reviews of developments in ocean affairs (Nandan, 40-41, 2002).

When the negotiations finally concluded, other new institutions were created. These included the 'International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea' located in Hamburg, Germany, with the mandate to settle disputes between States, and the 'Commission on the Limits of the Continental Shelf', set up in New York to help delimit outer boundaries of the continental shelf for state parties. But the most unique of these institutions was the regulatory arm of the Convention for management of seabed resources, called the 'International Seabed Authority' (ISA), located in Kingston, Jamaica. The ISA made history as the pioneering international organisation engagedin commercial and industrial activities regulated by International Law (Paolillo, 2002).

When UNCLOS was adopted, it was hailed by many as a remarkable and unprecedented historic achievement of the United Nations. The current Secretary General of the UN, Kofi Annan, describes it as "a milestone for the rule of law and for the UN" (4, 2002), and Uruguayan Ambassador Felipe Paolillo comments on it as the "most ambitious, comprehensive and complex diplomatic exercise of modern times" (Paolillo, 2002). Professor Elisabeth M. Borgese describes it as "the first international legal instrument for sustainable development, since it integrates economic development and the protection and preservation of the environment" (24, 1991). Borgese also considers it 'almost a miracle' that it was ever agreed to and signed by an unprecedented community of 159 states (64, 1994).

The Convention is praised for many other qualities it has embodied, particularly for its conception of many new and innovative legal and political concepts. These include the 'Common Heritage of Mankind (CHM)', 'Exclusive Economic Zone' (EEZ), 'Archipelagic States or Waters', 'Innocent Passage', and 'Passage through Straits'. Embodied as one of its most important achievements, the CHM, defined in the Convention as the international area (the Area), is observed to be "a pillar of the Convention" (Valle, 47, 1995).

The Convention did not serve as an all purpose solution to territorial disputes, but as Paolillo remarks, it "made a gigantic step in the promotion of international peace and security in the seas" (Paolillo, 2002). It has established an international order for the use of oceans in a sustainable and peaceful manner and also led to mechanisms to

manage it for the benefit of humanity, having safeguarded the high seas and seabed as the common heritage of mankind.

The UNCLOS holds greater relevance to SIDS than to any other state. It was a real bargain for them since it provides sovereign jurisdiction over 200 EEZ, which not only enlarged territorial boundaries but also exclusive rights to marine resources in the EEZ. Its central premise, the recognition of high seas as the common heritage of mankind, brings SIDS the same benefits as any other state. It also entails a clearer and universally acceptable definition of the 'Regime of Islands' (UNCLOS Article 121) and the concept of 'Archipelagic States'. This spells out their rights and responsibilities without too much ambiguity. Any scientific research within their EEZ is also to be shared with those who have exclusive rights, which may help develop capacity for further utilisation of resources.

The UNCLOS is a win-win convention for all states. It has advanced the framework for North-South cooperation in science and technology development, and regional cooperation including land-locked states. It undoubtedly has the most beneficial environmental laws for particularly vulnerable SIDS. Its increasing universal acceptance brings a promising future for SIDS for sustainable development of their marine resources, the chief industry for most of them. UNCLOS is not an end product in itself but rather a dynamic process (Borgese, 492, 1995) that keeps unfolding with guiding principles of international law for ocean governance.

The Role of SIDS in UNCLOS Negotiations

Seas and oceans are an integral part of island livelihood and heritage. They were the main mode of access to the rest of the world for island states, while fisheries constituted the chief occupation for the islanders. Any concerns or issues that relate to oceans or seas were therefore a matter of heart and soul for SIDS, more than any other non-island states. This indispensable and inseparable nature of seas to their livelihood hooked them into the Law of the Sea negotiations right from the start, beginning with the revolutionary call to recognise the high seas as belonging to no

one individual state but rather it being the common heritage of all mankind (Pardo, 1967).

The SIDS were at the forefront of the negotiations of the Law of the Sea and in fact blew the whistle for the race to begin, aimed towards concluding a comprehensive convention. Interestingly, it was the small developing island state of Malta in the Mediterranean which stood as the 'pied piper' of the treaty negotiations, while many other SIDS, especially Fiji, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago and Cyprus followed the piper with active promotion and contributory participation.

This section reviews the role these five SIDS have played in the negotiations of the Law of the Sea over a period of almost 15 years. These five states are taken to represent the SIDS role as a whole, since many of the SIDS found today at the UN were not formed at the start of the negotiations, or were amateurs learning the new game of diplomacy. This is, however, not to imply that only five states are chosen as a 'statistical sample', but to symbolise the role of the SIDS at the negotiations. Each of these countries is reviewed as to their role in terms of participation in, contributions made, and policy actions implemented in the negotiation process.

Malta

The Mediterranean SIDS of Malta was the lead initiator of the Law of the Sea negotiations. In 1967, within two years of its admission to the UN, Malta's first Ambassador to the UN, Dr Arvid Pardo, made his groundbreaking and well documented statement at the Twenty Second UNGA session. According to long-term staff of the Law of the Sea Office at the UN, it was Pardo who "inspired people to think outside the box, not to look at what has been presented to them but beyond their horizon," (Jorgens, 2004). This historic statement marked the most laudable multilateral diplomatic initiative ever made by a SIDS in world history, one which finally gave rise to what was later commonly referred to as the "constitution of the ocean," namely, the UN Convention on Law of the Sea (Nanadan, 42, 2002; Annan, 4, 2002).

The statement introduced the well acclaimed concept of the common heritage of mankind, which Malta proposed for all high seas and deep seabed, which were to belong to no one country but to all states of the world. In appealing to the world community for enacting the concept of this common heritage of mankind, the Maltese Ambassador stated the following:

> First, the seabed and the ocean floor are a common heritage of mankind and should be used and exploited for peaceful purposes and for the exclusive benefit of mankind as a whole. The needs of poor countries, representing that part of mankind which is most in need of assistance, should receive preferential consideration in the event of financial benefits being derived from the exploitation of the seabed and ocean floor for commercial purposes (Pardo, 1967).

This pioneering diplomatic initiative made by Malta, called for the attention of the world community to three proposals:

i) to declare the seabed and the ocean floor a common heritage of mankind;

ii) to establish an effective international regime over the seabed and ocean floor beyond a clearly defined national jurisdiction, so that "the immense resources on and under the ocean floor will be exploited with harm to none and benefit to all (UN Document A/C.2/PV.1516, 1, 1 Nov 150);

iii) or alternatively, to draft a comprehensive treaty to safeguard the international character of the seabed and ocean floor beyond present national jurisdictions (UN Document, 1967; Bonnici, 6, 2002; Pardo, 135, 1968).

At the end of this "memorable speech" that got the ball rolling towards negotiations of a new convention for Law of the Sea, the Maltese proposed "to appoint a small but widely representative group to consult together and to elaborate a draft resolution" (Pardo, 135, 1968).

In retrospect, it was Malta which tabled the new Agenda Item (92) on "examination of the question of the reservation exclusively for peaceful purposes of the seabed and the ocean floor, and the subsoil thereof, underlying the high seas beyond the limits of

present national jurisdiction, and the use of their resources in the interests of mankind," at the First Committee of the Twenty Second Session of the United Nations General Assembly (Final Act, UNCLOS 1983). Subsequently, during consideration of this agenda item, the Maltese Ambassador made a well documented, ground-breaking speech calling for the concluding of a comprehensive International Law of the Sea and "sparked the interest in a lot of people" (Jorgens, 2004).

According to a former President of Malta, the Maltese Ambassador, Arvid Pardo, made two seminal contributions by this statement. These were, "first that the resources of the deep seabed constitute the CHM, and secondly, that all aspects of ocean space are inter-related and should be treated as an integral whole" (Marco, 1999). Ambassador Pardo "continued to pursue his proposal through the adoption of resolutions by the UNGA in December 1967, 1968 and 1969 reserving the ocean floor and its subsoil for purely peaceful purposes" (Bonnici, 9, 2002).

The members and the UNGA favourably received the initiative made by Malta towards considering new international laws to govern maritime affairs. As per the Maltese call, on 18 December 1967, by adopting resolution A/Res/2340 (XXII), the UNGA established an 'Ad Hoc Committee to study Peaceful Uses of the Seabed' (Pardo, 135, 1968). One year later, on 21 December 1968, the UNGA established a more permanent 'Committee on Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and Ocean Floor beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction'. This committee was seen as a preparatory body for convening the formal negotiations by means of the Third UN Conference on Law of the Sea.

The most commonly credited contribution of Malta to the Law of the Sea Convention was the concept of the common heritage of mankind (Sohn, 287, 1997; Schori, 31, 2002; Nelson, 2004). By its resolution (A/Res/2749[XXV]) on 17 December 1970, the UNGA adopted a Declaration of Principles governing the seabed, ocean floor and subsoil, that were beyond national jurisdiction. By this Declaration the international community recognised the seabed and ocean floor as the common heritage of mankind pursuant to the proposal made by Malta (UNGA Resolution 2749 [XXV]) 17 December 1970, operative Paragraph 1). On the same day by another resolution (A/Res/2750 [XXV]), the UNGA decided to convene the Third Conference on Law of

the Sea in 1973 and enlarged the seabed committee from 86 members to 91, while charging it with the mandate to prepare the conference.

Malta was indeed instrumental in pre-empting these developments and can be credited as the "Pied Piper" of the Law of the Sea Negotiations, or the "whistle-blower". The real mastermind behind the Maltese initiative was its first Ambassador, Arvid Pardo. For another Maltese President, Gindo de Marco (1999), "Pardo revolutionised the thinking of politicians, jurists and scientists alike when he proclaimed that the seabed and the ocean floor are the common heritage of mankind and should be used and exploited for peaceful purposes and for the exclusive benefit of mankind as a whole".

When the formal negotiations began on the Third UN Conference on Law of the Sea, Malta made many interventions during the discussions (Jorgens, 2004). A long-time staff member at the Secretariat of DOALAS and the conference, Maurice Jorgens, says "Malta talked a lot and had done its homework; [Malta] came with well articulated propositions or arguments; people respect countries that have done their homework" (Jorgens, 2004). The Chief delegate of Fiji in the negotiations, Satya Nandan, who is now the Secretary General of the ISA, highlighted an important contribution Malta made to the Law of the Sea negotiations. He credits Maltese Ambassador Pardo "for taking initiative on the seabed part" (Nandan, 2004).

Another significant contribution of Malta to the negotiations was highlighted by Dolliver Nelson, the secretary of the drafting committee of the conference secretariat for the negotiations and the current President of the International Tribunal on Law of the Sea. He says that common heritage of mankind was not something new, but "Pardo and his great speech carried this much further....had something more concrete to make....not only the resource of deep sea but also fish and all other things that were commonly the common heritage of mankind" (Nelson, 2004). Many analysts have admired the principle or the concept of the CHM, seeing it as being "in fact a pillar of the Convention" (Halle, 47, 1995). This revolutionary principle is observed as being an 'icon' of the Convention.

Obviously these comments speak of the significance of the contribution Malta has made to the Law of the Sea negotiations. Nelson further credits the Maltese

Ambassador for tying CHM to the peaceful uses of the ocean and prohibiting armaments on the sea, which he considered a fundamental principle that the negotiations must adhere to and finally adopt in the Convention). In describing the role Malta played in the Law of the Sea negotiations, Don Mackay, the current Ambassador of New Zealand to the UN (who was a New Zealand delegate at the later part of the negotiations), believes that "Malta had a huge profile" (Mackay, 2004).

Malta tabled the Law of the Sea item on the agenda of the UNGA Twenty Second Session, proposed draft resolutions to set the Ad Hoc Committee to study the issues raised concerning Law of the Sea, and in 1971 even submitted what was called the "Ocean Space Draft Convention: to the Seabed Committee" (Pardo, 1993; Borgese, 491, 1995). In 1970 the UNGA declared the principle of CHM, which was later reinforced and adopted with more clarity in the Convention (UN Convention on Law of the Sea, Section 2, Articles 136-149). Ambassador Pardo also submitted "all embracing 'working papers' containing a 'draft ocean space treaty' that would deal not only with the establishment of an international regime....but would also governs all other related issues" says Sohn (289, 1997). Its Ambassador carefully followed the Maltese initiative until substantive negotiations began in 1974 at the second session of the Third Conference on Law of the Sea in Caracas, Venezuela.

It may be helpful to recall that the Maltese Ambassador rejected two principles practiced by the maritime powers in customary laws of the sea at the time. These included "laissez faire freedom beyond national jurisdiction, and the unfettered sovereignty of the state within national jurisdiction" (quoted in Sohn, 280, 1997).

Malta proposed a number of ideas that carried 'food for thought' and articulated discussions at the negotiations. However, out of many impressive international institutions suggested for addressing issues emanating from governance of the ocean use, it was only the tribunal proposal which carried weight and was embraced by the conference, according to Sohn, a freelance expert who briefly worked for the President of the Conference (Sohn, 293, 1997; see Koh and Jayakuamr, 118, 1985 for Sohn's credentials).

Malta made considerable contributions in terms of submissions, and acted as a catalyst in setting the ball rolling towards gaining momentum in conceptualising new laws for international ocean governance. The Maltese catalytic role began to fade slightly by 1973, as the Maltese government changed in 1971 and Ambassador Pardo "no longer enjoyed the confidence of the government" (Pardo, 1993). However, he continued to influence the negotiation process by making scholarly contributions at NGO forums. He founded the International Ocean Institute, along with Elisabeth Mann Borgese, in Malta in 1972 and continued to publish articles relating to the process, as an academic professor in the United States (see DOALOS, 238, 2002 and many articles and speeches presented at Pacem in Maribus Conferences organised by the International Ocean Institute).

Finally, Malta offered to host the ISA and intensively competed for this with other candidates. However, there being equally attractive candidates from other SIDS, it lost the bid to Jamaica's chief negotiator, Kenneth Rattray, who had extensive influence in the largest coalition of developing states, the Group of 77 (G77).

Fiji

Next to Malta, Fiji has been the second most prolific SIDS in the Law of the Sea negotiations. Fiji was not yet a member of the UN when Malta launched the ocean regime initiative but after it gained independence and joined the UN in 1970 it took an active part in the negotiations. The all time favourite negotiator of the process happened to be the chief Fijian delegate to the negotiations, Ambassador Satya Nandan (Mackay, 2004; Jorgens, 2004; also, this author interviewed him in New York on 20 November 2004 for this research). He is even now serving the International Seabed Authority as Secretary General, a post he has had for three consecutive terms.

Fiji's contributory role in the Law of the Sea negotiations was more visible during the negotiations process rather than during the stage setting as for Malta. Fiji's chief negotiator, Ambassador Satya Nandan, had much involvement, including leading negotiations, within working groups, making numerous submissions, and acting as an active mediator in bridging differences between competing interest groups that at the

time had tended to stall the negotiation process. He has been a champion of Fijian interests and committed to concluding a comprehensive convention on the Law of the Sea (Navoti, 2004).

Fiji's active role (Jorgens, 2004) in the Law of the Sea negotiations began with the assumption of rapporteurship in the Second Committee of the UN Third Conference on Law of the Sea. This conference provided the floor for nine years of intensive negotiations culminating with the widely acclaimed outcome on 4 April 1982, the UN Convention on the Law of the Sea. The Committees were established at the first preparatory session in March 1971.

Thus, Fiji was involved as a key player right from the start of the real negotiations in 1973. "We spearheaded the interests of the island states in the negotiations to ensure that interests of island states were fully taken care of....there was a lot of resistance to giving the islands the same jurisdiction as any other land territory," said Satya Nandan (Nandan, 2004). His sentiments reflect the commitment of Fiji to safeguard and protect the interests of SIDS at the negotiations. For many SIDS, the sea is their livelihood and any decision on its future by the international community would affect their lives. However, non-island states saw things differently, including those so called land-locked and geographically disadvantaged states (LL/GDS) that comprised one third of the conference. They were against the idea of allowing a large jurisdiction to SIDS because they wanted to minimise the area for the common heritage of mankind (Nandan, 2004).

However, in 1975 the Chairman of the Second Committee that dealt with jurisdictional issues and the rights of limits such as territorial sea and the continental shelf, asked the Fijian rapporteur to prepare the negotiating text. According to Nandan, he prepared the complete package of all jurisdictional issues and traded off stumbling blocks (controversial issues) like jurisdiction over isolated rocks. As chairman of the Negotiating Group 4, Satya Nandan of Fiji made compromise proposals that received wider acceptance both from coastal States and the LL/GDS group (Koh and Jayakumar, 41, 1985). The second committee handled the most important issues of the conference at the early stage of the negotiations, and Fiji was

busy facilitating discussions at this most important of all three committees (Koh and Jayakumar, 51, 1985).

In drafting the negotiating text, Nandan included three seminal contributions to the text. These include the following:

i) Defining what islands are (Article 121; UNCLOS).
ii) Islands would have the same jurisdiction as any other land territory.
iii) Rocks shall not have an economic zone or continental shelf.

At the time of negotiations, the LL/GDS group had already made their own drafts, but when they saw the Nandan-led text with some compromise made in respect to isolated rocks, "they sort of cooled off in their arguments" (Nandan, 2004). The protection and lobby of SIDS interests in the negotiations can be regarded as the most important contribution Fiji made for SIDS in particular, and for the Convention as a whole. The Convention did incorporate the draft of Fiji's delegate that spelled out particular provisions relating to island states. Nandan was aware that the foregoing jurisdiction on isolated rocks may affect some island states in the Pacific and Indian oceans, but he was convinced that this loss could be recovered from the extended jurisdiction of EEZ (Part V: UNCLOS).

Another important contribution Fiji made to the negotiations was the introduction and development of 'archipelagic states' (Part IV: UNCLOS). In lobbying for this concept Fiji teamed up with other key actors, such as Indonesia and the Philippines. These states advocated the recognition of a "special method of drawing archipelagic straight baselines connecting the outmost points of the outermost islands so as to create a sense of political unity" (Koh and Jayakumar, 77, 1985). These like-minded states wanted to exercise sovereignty, analogous to internal waters, to these outermost islands. Fiji actively participated in the informal consultations held between major maritime powers and submitted a paper on the concept of 'innocent passage' (Article 52: UNCLOS). This was modelled on the 'transit passage' discussion held for passage through straits by warships and submarines for international navigation.

Later the British modified the Fiji proposal and came up with the 'transit passage' regime through straits. Fiji co-chaired with the UK an informal negotiating group on straits (Nandan, 2004). Fiji was shuffling between consultations on archipelagic concepts and straits in the interest of finding a common understanding on innocent passage or transit passage that could be well adapted to archipelagic state regimes. Fiji drafted the negotiating text for transit passage and finally struck a deal with opposing maritime powers to create an acceptable archipelagic regime (Nandan, 2004).

The most controversial part of the whole negotiation was the discussion on seabed mining provisions. Even when the Convention was finally adopted this question was unresolved and failed to gain universal acceptance, in particular by the technologically most capable industrialised countries. Fiji's chief negotiator Satya Nandan was charged with the task of forming an agreement on the issue of production policy for deep seabed mining.

Nandan "took careful account of the text on EEZ proposed by the Evensen Group [informal expert group] and the G77 relating to tumbling issues such as territorial seas, high seas and straits (Koh, and Jayakumar, 116, 1985). Issues close to the interest of SIDS, such as EEZ and transit rights, were agenda issues dealt with by the Second Committee. The G77 did not have common positions on these issues and even the SIDS themselves were having diverging views. Thus Fiji lobbied for equal EEZ for islands but Jamaica was teamed with the LL/GDS group and wanted to maximise common heritage areas, which was not in the best interests of most island states (see Koh and Jayakumar, 1985). Koh and Jayakumar (1985) report that the "G77 was not effective in taking a united stand on Committee II matters". This stirred Nandan to utilise his best negotiating skills and quality of leadership. His purpose was to not only bridge the differences between SIDS members, but also those of G77, and to counter the opposition from industrialised states. Therefore, the credit for the balance struck, against the odds, in winning a substantial bargain for the SIDS can go to none other than the contributory role that was played by Fiji and its charismatic leader Satya Nandan.

Until the last hour of the negotiations, Fiji pursued rigorously the outstanding unresolved issues with some major industrialised states regarding deep seabed mining provisions. However, those efforts were not able to achieve a fruitful outcome by the time of adoption in 1982. Consequently, Fiji's chief delegate was invited in 1983 to join the UN Secretariat to continue his efforts in the post-conference period to overcome the obstacles. Nandan was appointed as the Under-secretary General for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea and entrusted with the duty of informal consultation with like-minded states.

Accordingly, in 1983 he requested the UN Secretary General convene meetings in order to continue informal consultations to resolve the outstanding issues relating to seabed mining provisions of the Convention. Nandan prepared the informal papers identifying the core issues and drawing up remedies as to how they could be addressed satisfactorily. The negotiations continued for some time without much headway. At the end of 1992 he left the Secretariat but later returned again as a Fijian delegate. He reconvened the meetings in the Fiji Mission in New York until interested parties could iron out their differences and reach common positions (Nandan, 2004). He was finally successful because "he had established a good working relationship with a number of delegates and had been at the negotiations for more than 20 years" (Jorgens, 2004).

Characterising the benevolent role played by Nandan, the President of the International Tribunal on Law of the Sea, Dolliver Nelson, had the following to say:

> Nandan was one of the characters of the conference. He was always chairing meetings. It is not too surprising to see what he is today (Secretary General of ISA). He is one man of the SIDS who has influenced the conference and post-conference period too (Nelson, 2004).

Similarly, Don Mackay, the New Zealand Ambassador, gave credit to Fiji's prolific role by stating that, "He [Satya Nandan] played quite a pivotal role in this and was a prominent figure in the negotiations of the Convention" (Mackay, 2004). Besides these remarkable contributions Fiji made to the Law of the Sea negotiations and wielding substantial influence for protecting the interests of SIDS, it also attended all

the negotiation meetings and sponsored many resolutions relating to the process (Navoti, 2004). Jorgens says, "People knew him [Nandan] very well. He was an authority, a power figure, and had lots of influence. He knew it inside out" (Jorgens, 2004). Finally, Fiji's chief negotiator also led the negotiations that concluded two complementary agreements to UNCLOS in the post-conference period, namely the Agreement relating to part XI (deep seabed mining provisions) in 1994 and the Fish Stock Agreement in 1995, the latter being of vital interest for SIDS, in particular with tuna fisheries.

Another conference initiative Fiji made, in collaboration with the UK, was in 1975 at the third session of the conference of the private Group on Straits. As co-chairman, they drafted compromise articles on passage through straits for international navigation (Koh and Jayakumar, 107, 1985). In these negotiations the controversy centred on maritime powers wanting uninterrupted free transit through straits whereas archipelagic states wanted innocent passage (non-military and non-commercial passage) without losing their right to sovereignty over archipelagic waters. The private group on straits finally succeeded in drafting a compromise text without island states losing too much of their claims in this issue.

On another key interest of SIDS, EEZ, some differences that existed amongst members resulted in a gulf being created within the group. These differences were between the landlocked and geographically disadvantage states (LL/GDS) and coastal states. Interestingly, Jamaica took the LL/GDS position although it was a SIDS, because it was unlike other SIDS in that it lacked the seawaters of most island states. Thus it sided with coastal LL/GDS due to its disadvantage as far as EEZ is concerned, while Fiji sided with coastal states. The LL/GDS were pressing for a greater area of common heritage from EEZ which would practically shrink the EEZ for SIDS or coastal states. The rift between these groups led to the initiation of informal negotiating groups known as the Nandan Group or Group of 21 on rights of LL/GDS in the EEZ (Koh and Jayakumar, 109, 1985). At the Fifth Session of the conference in 1976, Koh and Jayakumar stated that "negotiations were very difficult" and Chairman Nandan on occasion convened a smaller sub group. During the Seventh Session of the Conference in 1978 in Geneva, the Nandan Group was formalised and absorbed as Official Negotiation Group 4 on LL/GDS rights, and Nandan was assigned to chair it

(Koh and Jayakumar, 110, 1985). Koh and Jayakumar credit this Negotiation Group as achieving the "most progress" in a text issued by the Nandan group in 1978 (Koh and Jayakumar, 127, 1985).

Fiji had been by far the most contributory of SIDS during the negotiations, submitting numerous proposals and lobbying strongly for their acceptance. The archipelagic concept was another proposal it submitted, with the objective of clarifying jurisdiction of the mid-ocean island states. Subsequently, Fiji held informal consultations with major maritime powers to sell this concept (Nandan, 2004). Furthermore, Fiji was also an active member of the Oceania Group which sought to ensure island States in the Pacific were not disadvantaged in establishing EEZ and the continental shelf (Koh and Jayakumar, 79, 1985).

Fiji also put in a bid as a candidate to host the seat of the ISA, but later withdrew when they realised two other island states, Jamaica and Malta, were also seeking this position. However, Fiji's candidature for the post of Secretary General of ISA received overwhelming support. This was attributable, according to many analysts, to the contributions Fiji made to the Law of the Sea negotiations, and the charismatic leadership demonstrated by its leader Satya Nandan. According to Deputy Secretary General, Odunton (2004), he was elected to the post for three consecutive terms due to his competence and negotiation skills.

Fiji's contributory role to the UNCLOS negotiations did not cease with its adoption in 1982, but continued thereafter as the Convention allowed time for further strengthening and elaboration of the treaty, and for unresolved issues to remain, awaiting to be resumed at an opportune time. Therefore, Nandan led the post-conference negotiations from 1983 to 1995 until two agreements were concluded and adopted. One of them was the 'Agreement Relating to the Implementation of Part XI of the UNCLOS', which dealt with seabed mining provisions and took aboard the industrialised states. This negotiation process "became known as the 'Boat Paper' due to the picture of a mining vessel on the cover of the draft document" (Moore and Nordquist, xvii, 1995). This agreement was later adopted by UNGA Resolution 48/213 and is applied as a single instrument supplementing the Convention.

The second post-conference consultations culminated in the agreement relating living resources, especially straddling, and highly migratory fish in the high seas. Also concluded in 1995 was the UN Agreement relating to the Conservation and Management of Straddling Fish stocks and Highly Migratory Fish Stocks (Fish Stocks Agreement).

The contributory and substantial role Fiji played in the Law of the Sea negotiations is impressive and prolific. Malta launched the initiative, but it was Fiji that generated the momentum and continued to sail the ship (conference) as one of the captains, genuinely interested in promoting international law in the area of high seas and protecting the common heritage of mankind. As is evident from the preceding account, Fiji was proactive, submitted many proposals, and skilfully mastered the negotiations either formally or informally. This gave no room for stalling and at the same time protected and advocated for the interests of the most vulnerable groups, such as SIDS. Fiji's credibility and high profile resulted from its keen commitment to UNCLOS and the desire to continue to advocate for and protect interests of SIDS so that they would achieve equal footing with any other state at the UN. To sum up the role played by Fiji's charismatic negotiator, the following is a comment by one analyst, John Moore:

> Indeed it is my assessment that no single individual deserves greater credit for the success of the 1982 Convention than Satya (of Fiji). Satya, we salute you for your leadership in the Law of the Sea (Moore, and Nordquist, 7, 1995).

Jamaica

The next SIDS with an impressive imprint on the Law of the Sea negotiations is the Caribbean island state of Jamaica. It has been the 'flag bearer' of the Law of the Sea negotiations, having won the bid to host the International Seabed Authority (ISA) in its capital, Kingston, Jamaica. The ISA was the most productive outcome of the negotiation, and stands as the operational arm for seabed mining provisions or the custodian of the common heritage of mankind. Jamaica's success in achieving this cannot be considered to be mere luck but was a result of its unwavering commitment and contribution to Law of the Sea negotiations since its commencement.

The charismatic Jamaican leader, Kenneth Rattray, who led the Jamaican delegation, was the only SIDS delegate to hold a high office at the collegium or the conference bureau. He was the elected Rapporteur-General for the whole conference and enjoyed full access to all important meetings and discussions. Rattray was the Jamaican expert who "was active in the evolution of the negotiations and the crafting of the Convention", according to Walker (2005). Kenneth Rattray himself stated that the "Law of the Sea Convention had had a very special place in my heart; it has occupied a very large part of my adult life" (25 years) (Rattray, 55, 1995).

Jamaica began its contribution to the Law of the Sea negotiations by joining the Committee on the Peaceful Uses of the Seabed and Ocean Floor Beyond the Limits of National Jurisdiction, which was set up in 1968. It also sat on the permanent committees formed in 1970 for the preparation of the Third UN Conference on Law of the Sea. When the formal negotiations began with this conference, Kenneth Rattray of Jamaica was elected Rapporteur-General of the conference.

The assumption of rapporteurship gave Jamaica ample opportunity to influence the negotiations and to advocate for the interests of SIDS. During the negotiations, the Jamaican contribution was mostly felt in the discussions about deep seabed mining provisions (Nandan, 2005).

Jamaica was advocating a regional approach to EEZ for the Caribbean as a whole, and proposed that marine resources beyond 12 miles of territorial sea be exploited collectively as the exclusive preserve of the Caribbean countries (Borgese, 8, 1991). Thus, during the negotiations Jamaica campaigned against the interests of the coastal state who were demanding a 200 nautical mile EEZ. Jamaica joined the LL/GDS group in advocating its interests against coastal states and pro-EEZ island states like Fiji and Cyprus. The differences between these two coalitions hinged on the demand by coastal states and pro-EEZ SIDS for extended jurisdiction in particular for EEZ, whereas the demand by LL/GDS was to claim rights to living resources in the EEZs of other coastal or privileged states. In the second committee Jamaica was active in lobbying for rights to EEZ resources from geographically advantaged states (Koh and Jayakumer, 71, 1985). These two competing coalitions within the coalition of

developing States in the G77 surfaced as early as 1972 and continued through to the Committee II discussions. Nevertheless, on most other issues Jamaica stood in conformity with the SIDS and took an active interest (Koh and Jayakumar, 70, 1985).

It is interesting to note that, except for Jamaica, no other SIDS were in the group of LL/GDS on any issue. Nevertheless, taking a positive view, this factor speaks for itself of the proactive nature of Jamaica in protecting its national interests in the negotiations. It was Jamaica that was listed as the most active state in the LL/GDS group from Latin America, by Koh and Jayakumar (75, 1995) two analysts of the negotiations. Jamaica was listed not only as being active in the LL/GDS group but also in the Latin American group in which its activities were within the springboard of G77 that advocated interests of all developing states in general at the UN forums (Koh and Jayakumar, 82, 1985). Jamaica also advanced two ideas that aimed at sharing EEZ resources with LL/GDS, namely matrimonial and patrimonial concepts (Sealy, 2004).

Besides lobbying for issues at the negotiations, Jamaica also made contributions to the negotiations in terms of logistical support. It offered to host two meetings of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea. The first offer was made for the hosting of the Seventh Session of the Conference in 1977 but was lost to Geneva in the secret ballot. However, the second offer was successful, and the concluding or signing session of the Convention was held in Jamaica at Montego Bay from 6-10 December 1982. Jamaica's most successful diplomatic initiative came in 1981 at the resumed Tenth Session of the Conference in Geneva, when it contested Malta for the seat of the ISA. It succeeded in its bid by seven votes (Nandan, 2004). According to Jorgens (2004) , Jamaica mobilised support of Latin American/ Caribbean states to win its bid. Jamaican chief delegate Rattray had extensive contact within G77 and at the hierarchy of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea (Jamaica was again Rapporteur-General) (Jorgens, 2004; Nelson, 2004).

One resource person interviewed at the UN for this research, Maurice Jorgens, who had worked for over 25 years at the UN Office for Law of the Sea, says Satya Nandan and Kenneth Rattray "were probably the two most influential members of SIDS" at the Law of the Sea negotiations (Jorgens, 2004). Others also had converging views

about the Jamaican delegate, who was noted as being very active and outspoken in the first and second committees (Sealy, 2004). Ambassador Rattray of Jamaica was very "dynamic and forthright" in the negotiations (Sealy, 2004). Dolliver Nelson, President of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea and former secretary at the drafting committee of the negotiations conference, attributes the influence and skills demonstrated by Kenneth Rattray as giving them an edge over Malta for winning their bid to host ISA in Kingston, Jamaica: "It did not come as a gift, but he had fought for it in the conference, meeting after meeting" (Nelson, 2004). The Secretary General of ISA echoed similar sentiments and believed Rattray was successful in persuading the Conference to choose Jamaica (Nandan, 2005). Once Jamaica put in its bid for the seat of ISA, it became a strong advocate in promoting a strong economic regime for deep seabed mining (Nandan, 2004).

Jamaica has been indeed instrumental in realising the envisioned goal of preservation and equitable exploration of the common heritage of mankind, and establishing a universally acceptable regime to regulate ocean affairs. Rattray calls the UNCLOS Jamaican Convention, which was opened for signature at the last meeting of the Conference at Montego Bay in 1982, significant in its role in the process (Rattray, 67, 1995).

Right from the start of the Law of the Sea process in 1968, Jamaica contributed to the success of UNCLOS and still does today. It has participated in all meetings, filled the post of Rapporteur-General in the collegium, and finally hosted the headquarters of ISA on its soil, continually waving the flagship of the Convention. The real hand behind the successful contribution of Jamaica was its chief negotiator, the Solicitor General and Ambassador at large, Dr Kenneth Rattray. The tributes paid to him by the Prime Minister of Jamaica upon his passing away in early January 2005, included the following:

> The International Seabed Authority which is headquartered in Jamaica represents a most fitting outcome of his work of eminent persons from the Caribbean Community, led by Dr Rattray who was Rapporteur-General of the Preparatory Commission for the ISA and the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (Prime Minister, Patterson, P. J., quoted in Jamaica Gleaner, 2005).

Trinidad and Tobago

Trinidad and Tobago (T and T), which gained independence in 1962 and then joined the UN, was the next most active Caribbean participant of SIDS after Jamaica in the Law of the Sea negotiations. The chief delegate from T and T, Lennox Fitzroy Ballah, was one time Permanent Secretary at the Foreign Ministry of the country, and was one of the elected Judges at the International Tribunal on Law of the Sea in September 2002 for a nine-year term until his death in March 2003.

With the commencement of negotiations at the Third UN Conference on Law of the Sea, T and T was one of the elected Vice Presidents of the Conference (Final Act [UNCLOS], 162, 1983). Thus, T and T began its imprint in the Law of the Sea negotiations with a credible and notable position. In 1970 when the Twenty Fifth UNGA were considering modes of operation for negotiations on Law of the Sea, T and T joined with Brazil to form a proposal for establishing an *ad hoc* committee for preliminary drafting of the negotiating text (Koh and Jayakumar citing UN Document [A/C.1/L539] 48, 1985).

T and T's contribution to the Law of the Sea negotiations was observed mostly in the discussions of the Second Committee, according to the current Ambassador of the country at the UN, and one of the former delegates to the negotiations (Sealy, 2004). T and T was highly vocal in addressing the controversy that surrounded traditional laws of the sea and in the development of the EEZ concept (Sealy, 2004). When preparation began for the 3rd UN Conference on Law of the Sea, T and T undertook measures at home to fit in with its contribution at the UN negotiations. A Ministerial Committee was established, and a network of co-ordination with the relevant governmental agencies was executed to gather information and develop strategy for protecting the interests of T and T at the negotiations. The prime concern for T and T then was the delimitation of territorial zones with some neighbours that even today is unresolved for the country, particularly with Barbados and Guyana (see Trinidad Express, 2004). According to the Trinidad Express newspaper (2004), "Lennox Ballah played a significant role" in the negotiation process.

According to the current President of the International Tribunal on Law of the Sea, Ballah from T and T was one of the drafters of the first sets of rules for mining provisions of the deep seabed regime. It was overall a Latin American draft but he played a key role in hammering out the first draft (Nelson, 2004). The Latin American equivalent of EEZ, the patrimonial sea concept, was also advocated by T and T, along with the Caribbean SIDS.

As T and T was one of the few SIDS blessed with offshore oil production, the territorial sea was a major economic and industrial concern for the country. When this was added to fisheries, T and T had two most important national industries to be protected at the Law of the Sea negotiations. Thus, they were very contributory and prominent in the consultations that formed the bedrock of the deep-seabed mining regime. T and T also teamed up with the coastal states group, as in the case of Fiji, that was formed in 1972 in reaction to the LL/GDS group that campaigned for the right to access EEZ and for enlarging the area of the common heritage of mankind (see list of Coastal States in Koh and Jayakumar, 73, 1995). Ambassador Sealy of T and T says they were in a difficult position, attempting to balance the interests of coastal state jurisdiction of 12 miles of territorial sea with the 200 nautical miles for EEZ (Sealy, 2004). Within the parental coalition of developing states, G77, T and T was one of the "active and influential delegations" from the Latin American region (Koh and Jayakumar, 82, 1985). This fact echoes what the President of the Tribunal for Law of the Sea had said in describing Ballah's active role in drafting the deep seabed mining provisions in the second committee where most of the energy of G77 was diverted.

Another matter that T and T closely followed in the negotiation was the 'archipelagic states' concept. Although the Pacific SIDS and large South East Asian states like Indonesia and the Philippines were at the forefront in campaigning for adoption of this concept, T and T nonetheless marched behind the group of archipelagic states. In fact, long before the Convention entered into force in 1994, T and T along with other Caribbean SIDS (The Bahamas, Antigua and Barbuda and St. Vincent and the Grenadines) declared, themselves to be archipelagic states (Borgese, 7, 1991). Interestingly, it was T and T that proposed during the negotiations that "the concept of

the Archipelagic apply to the whole arc of Eastern Caribbean islands, regardless of his multinational character" (Borgese, 8, 1991).

T and T has been an active participant and keen promoter of SIDS interests at the Law of the Sea negotiations since its very early stages, being one of the few independent SIDS at the time Malta launched the initiative in 1967. It attended all meetings, made constructive submissions and helped draft the negotiating text, in particular at the second committee that discussed the common heritage of mankind and the regime for deep seabed mining provisions. T and T's chief delegate Ballah was elected as a judge at the International Tribunal on Law of the Sea, which was a fitting testimony of its commitment and contribution to the Law of the Sea negotiations. In addition he served for nine years as one of the vice-presidents of the negotiation conference.

Cyprus

Cyprus was the second only SIDS besides Malta in the Mediterranean region, which stood for championing the interests of SIDS at the Law of the Sea negotiations. It was in fact the most senior SIDS that participated in the Law of the Sea negotiations having joined the UN in 1960. Cyprus can be regarded as the "torch bearer" of SIDS since it is recognised in this study as the first country in the historical sense to meet the definition adopted by this study for SIDS. Although Malta was a late comer (compared to Cyprus) to the UN, and did launch the groundbreaking initiative, Cyprus has played a prominent rather than secondary role from the beginning of the process until today. In 1964, Cyprus unilaterally proclaimed a 12 mile territorial sea, which was rejected by Turkey, its adjacent neighbour (Jacovides, 25, 2004a). Nevertheless, it continued to claim the 12-mile territorial sea until UNCLOS safeguarded it much later in 1994.

Like the previous SIDS, Cyprus began its role in the Law of the Sea negotiations by sitting on the early committees that laid the structure and skeleton for the conference. It was a member of the Preparatory Committee from 1970-73 when the main agenda and key issues were conceived for the negotiations. Later it also contributed one of the three vice-chairmen of the Third Committee of the conference. The predominating

interests of Cyprus in the negotiations lay in the issues of territorial delimitation and dispute settlement (Jacovides, 2004b).

In addition to these key interests, Cyprus was campaigning for new concepts such as EEZ, archipelagic states, the regime of islands, and passage through straits. Jacovides, the Cyprus delegate to UNCLOS, states that one needs to "take a look at a map of Eastern Mediterranean to realise why" Cyprus took such an interest in UNCLOS (3, 2004a). He elaborates his point further by pointing out that Cyprus is an island surrounded on four sides by larger states demarcated by water (Jacovides, 2004b). Therefore, the question of delimitation of those overlapping zones of maritime jurisdiction between coastal states occupied most of the energy of the Cyprus delegation.

The issue of delimitation of the EEZ was one of the hot topics that dominated the Second Committee agenda. The debate stemmed from the controversy over the methods to delimit EEZ and the continental shelf between countries opposite or adjacent to one another. Cyprus was caught in the middle of the debate, as it was of great concern for the country and small states like SIDS. Two principles were tabled to resolve the controversy. One was the principle of *equidistance* or *median line*, and the other was the *equitable principle*. Most SIDS, including Cyprus as spokesman for the group, wanted the principle of median line as the basis for delimitation. On the other hand, major territorial states professed preference for the equitable principle as the solution. The group that favoured the equidistance or median line principle finally emerged victorious (Article 15, UNCLOS), and so islands scored success in bargaining for equality against larger territorial states. The equitable principle would have placed SIDS at a disadvantage as delimitation of opposite or adjacent waters of states were to be demarcated in a subjective manner, such as by size of countries, which would obviously offer advantage to territorially large states.

The definition of islands or setting up a regime for islands was another bargain Cyprus, along with other SIDS, achieved in the negotiations. Many countries had been unsympathetic to the demand of SIDS, aiming instead to establish different categories of islands with correspondingly variant rights to territorial zones (Jacovides 8, 2004a). Cyprus maintained "that no distinction whatsoever should be made

between islands irrespective of the size, population or political status and the continental land masses" (Jacovides 9, 2004). The argument of chief Cyprus delegate Jacovides was, why should the maritime zones of islands of a small size or population be questioned whereas the same zones of continental countries consisting largely of desert have not been open to dispute? The well-articulated and justified positions of SIDS bore fruit when the conference overcame the hurdle and recognized the rights for islands to claim EEZ in the same way as any other state.

The other notable advocacy Cyprus made was in the discussions on the question of third party dispute settlement. Cyprus advocated for compulsory dispute settlement as the scope of UNCLOS was wider and embodied new concepts unlike its predecessor conventions of 1958 and 1960 (Jacovides, 16, 2004a). Jacovides states that during the negotiations some states, including one major power, "were unwilling to submit issues touching upon national sovereignty to third party settlement [Tribunal] entailing a binding decision, and this view prevailed in the end" (Jacovides, 17, 2004a). Cyprus lobbied strongly for a procedure of compulsory conciliation under the provision for dispute settlements. This was because Cyprus was convinced that, in the absence of such a system, small and militarily weak states would be losers in the event that larger and stronger states may be tempted to "claim the lion's share" in the absence of binding third party adjudication (Jacovides, 2004b). Despite the efforts of Cyprus and like-minded countries, this provision failed to gain recognition and third party dispute settlement was adopted as an optional provision under the Convention.

In sum, like many other proactive SIDS, Cyprus has played a substantive role in protecting and promoting the interests of SIDS in the Law of the Sea negotiations. It has filled offices, attended all meetings, made constructive submissions and has performed various functions such as spokesman for the negotiating group and mediating discussions.

Conclusion

SIDS have left visible imprints of their constructive contribution in the most revolutionary negotiations that the international community has undertaken to date. Jamaica hosts the seats for the International Seabed Authority and the flagship of the

UNCLOS, while Fiji's chief delegate has remained for three consecutive terms as the Secretary General of the ISA and is considered to be the captain of the flagship. Similarly, the current President of the International Tribunal on Law of the Sea, located in Hamburg, Germany, is a Law of the Sea expert from Grenada, another SIDS in the Caribbean.

When the negotiations began in 1973, the SIDS were armed with clear national interests aimed at formulating a comprehensive regime to govern ocean affairs. They managed to minimise their structural incapacity (being small under-developed states) and mounted maximum efforts to protect and promote their interests, making a substantial impact at the negotiations and on the Convention. Thus, SIDS skilfully advocated issues close to their national interests, such as the principles of the common heritage of mankind, the provision of EEZ, equidistance for delimitation of territorial boundaries, rights of archipelagic waters, and for a well-rounded definition of regime of islands. On the other hand, the SIDS could not devote much energy to addressing much broader and open-ended subjects such as non-living sea resources, protection of the environment, and marine scientific research.

The United Nations Convention on Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), and the well-acclaimed outcome of the long negotiation process, has brought significant benefits for SIDS. It is a most fruitful international treaty that provides more political, economic and legal equality, and access to marine resources than any other multilaterally agreed international law. It has also helped SIDS to gain larger marine resources under the 200 miles EEZ, consolidated their sovereignty in terms of statehood under the regime of islands, and recognised the concept of archipelagic waters and the principle of equidistance for delimitation of maritime boundaries.

It was striking to me to observe that the eight interviewees spoken to in order to collect data for this section all agree that SIDS have played a substantial role in the Law of the Sea negotiations. They felt that their contributions were most significant, such as recognition of the common heritage of mankind and the call to set up a comprehensive regime to govern ocean affairs. Even the political coalition of developing countries, G77, noted that SIDS such as Fiji, Jamaica and T and T were very influential (Koh and Tayakumar, 82, 1985).

The SIDS came into being as an organised group within the UN system after the 1994 Barbados Conference, but according to Dolliver Nelson, the President of the International Tribunal on the Law of the Sea, one delegate from St. Lucia, Dr Barry August, "for the first time raised the question of SIDS during the negotiations as a discrete or separate issue" (Nelson, 2004). He added that in the 1994 Fish Stock Agreement, SIDS have been more formally recognized. In a similar vein, Odunton, the Deputy Secretary General, said "SIDS made many excellent interventions, pushed for capacity building, and protection and preservation of the marine environment" (Odunton, 2004). Nelson also observed the keen interest taken by SIDS in attending the meetings of the Law of the Sea Conference, despite the then absence of a trust fund established by the UN for such purposes (Nelson, 2004). He further credited the major contribution made by the Fijian delegation, saying Nandan was "one man from the SIDS who has influenced the conference and the post-conference period too" (Nelson, 2004).

The Ambassador of T and T was full of praise for the three charismatic negotiators of the SIDS, Nandan (Fiji), Rattray (Jamaica) and Ballah (T and T), and he believed that "SIDS resources were well protected" in the negotiations of the Second Committee (Sealy, 2004). Ambassador Sealy considers that UNCLOS was the most important convention for SIDS in terms of preserving and exploiting their marine resources and obtaining large territorial zones. "We did protect our interests to the best we can", he added. The sovereign right of SIDS to the 200 mile EEZ was seen by the long-serving secretariat official at the UN Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea (DOALOS) as their greatest achievement (Jorgens, 2004). Similar sentiments were echoed by another prominent NGO analyst, the late Professor Elisabeth Mann Borgese, who said "With the addition of 'aquitories' far more extensive than their 'territories', tiny islands are becoming large countries" (Borgese, 4, 1991).

In sum, it is an undeniable reality that UNCLOS has been a "granduncle" or future "goldmine" for SIDS. Their substantive contribution was well invested at the time of the negotiations, promising a brighter future for sustainable development of SIDS. The Convention promises that seven percent of the profits from seabed mining operations will be redistributed to state parties of the Convention (Borgese, 15, 1991).

It can be argued that SIDS have played an instrumental and catalytic role in the Law of the Sea negotiations, the first of its kind but most laudable still today. Nothing structurally or internally has changed in feature or make-up, but contrary to the traditional belief held about them as being merely small resource-lacking states, they have made a great impact and imprint in the Law of the Sea negotiations.

So now the question is, what explains the contributory role played by SIDS in the process? The next two sections dwell on this question and investigate the clues to find the answer. The first section explores the pre-negotiation factors that motivated the SIDS to cultivate interest and triggered actions accordingly. The next section scrutinises the factors that enabled SIDS to perform so well in the negotiations.

Motivational Factors

The preceding discussions have demonstrated that SIDS have been proactive and highly visible in the multilateral negotiations. They were instrumental in shaping the outcome of the Law of the Sea negotiations and bringing them to a successful conclusion, a Convention that governs more than seventy percent of the earth's oceans. In return, it provides them with large marine territories and equal privileges like any stronger coastal state. The contribution and impact of SIDS on this Convention is phenomenal and warrants attention as to the secrets of their success at the UNCLOS negotiations. Interestingly, their physical attributes such as size and capacity to act, or developmental status, have remained the same since emerging as independent states. Therefore, what kind of attributes or explanatory variables account for their success in UNCLOS? This section aims to scan the possible factors that may explain why they were successful. In doing so, it analyses the pre-negotiation period that generated interest in SIDS towards addressing concerns relating to maritime affairs, and scrutinises the factors that triggered action to this effect by the UN. Each factor that explains the resulting action and policy executed on the part of SIDS is presented in the following discussions. These are not presented in a particular order of importance or hierarchy, but discussed in a more sequential, chronological and thematic order, and each factor separately elaborated.

Equity

Equity stands as the underlying central cause for the revolutionary initiative made by Malta through the famous speech to the Twenty Second of UNGA in 1967. This speech coined the term 'common heritage of mankind' (CHM) and appealed to the international community to declare the seabed and the ocean floor as such, and to be used and exploited "for the exclusive benefit of mankind as a whole" (UN Document, 1967). The speech was made at a time the world was undergoing rapid transformation, with newly emerging states from the developing world increasing their numerical strength at the UN. With so many under-developed states emerging, the central focus of the UN was on the issue of development. Malta's call came within two years of the UN establishing a specialized agency (in 1965) to address this pressing issue, known as the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP). Prior to this development, in 1964 the developing South formed a political coalition at the UN known as the Group of 77 (G77), which was aimed at championing the developmental needs of the states south of the equator (Gorman, 234-5, 2002). This coalition stood as the largest interest bloc during the Law of the Sea negotiations and wielded much influence in the discussions.

The developing South feared that the developed North, which was far ahead in terms of advanced technology, would exploit the last but vast frontier of the earth, the oceans, without due regard for the struggling South and before they could take a fair share (Pardo, 1967; UN Document, 1967). The slogan under which the South bargained in multilateral negotiations was equity for the under-privileged and under-developed states of the world, the majority of which had so far been unfairly exploited for the economic benefit of the developed states. In his whistle-blowing speech in 1967, Ambassador Pardo of Malta stated that, "Leases have already been granted for the mining of phosphate deposits lying well beyond the continental shelf" (UN Document, 1967). The concern for equity, which has triggered action on the part of SIDS, was echoed in the interviews sought from six UN delegates. Ambassador Sealy of T and T stated that:

> There was concern within SIDS about industrialised countries unilaterally going ahead with deep seabed mining and the proceeds flowing back to their treasuries or host countries of multinational corporations (MNCs). The developing states wanted to share these resources and wanted a mechanism to have a 'tax bite' (Sealy, 2004).

He further added, "The idea of unilateral exploitation of the international seabed area has been a factor, which would have encouraged the SIDS to keep fighting for an international regime" (Sealy, 2004). Ambassador Jacovides, The chief delegate of Cyprus at the negotiations, expressed similar sentiments, "Our primary interest was to ensure that islands get no less than the same rights as continental territories" (Jacovides, 2004b).

Similarly, Satya Nandan, the Secretary General of the Seabed Authority and chief negotiator of the Fijian delegation, points out that "an interesting characteristic of this Convention is that it is more equitable. We wanted to protect ourselves [SIDS]" (Nandan, 2004). In the negotiations, the SIDS resolutely stood for equal rights in the negotiations and parity with any other state. Nandan further explained the stand of SIDS at the negotiations:

> We wanted to extend our jurisdiction for resources so that when we are ready with capacity as island states, there will be something for us to do, and all those resources are not totally destroyed by the distant waters fishing states. There was a lot of motivation to protect our interests (Nandan, 2004).

The Ambassador of New Zealand, Don Mackay, made an impressive observation in respect of the issue of equity and SIDS:

> If SIDS were all rich countries, something like sitting on gold mines, people would have had less sympathy. But in countries like the Maldives, if their resources beyond three miles of their shore are fished out by countries from half way across the world, it is an issue of equity (Mackay, 2004).

The concern about unfair exploitation of seabed resources and the lack of international law to regulate seabed mining, has greatly motivated SIDS to launch the initiative and to advocate for an international regime to replace the old tradition of "freedom of the seas." Maltese Ambassador Pardo clearly illustrated the anxiety over equity in his 1967 speech. He said that those states with seabed mining capability may "use their technical competence to achieve near unbreakable world dominance through predominant control over the seabed and ocean floor." He further explained that if such a trend is not urgently addressed it would cause the intolerable injustice of the world's resources being for the exclusive benefit of a handful of nations, with the strong getting stronger and the rich getting richer (UN Document, 1967).

The call for recognition of the high seas, seabed and ocean floor as the common heritage of mankind came at the right time (Anand, 2, 1980), and was indeed made by the right country, a SIDS for whom seas are their livelihood and reservoir of the greatest national resource. Navoti, a representative of Fiji's Mission to the UN, considered the Maltese initiative the "most honourable suggestion to make" (Navoti, 2004). The Deputy Secretary General of the ISA was also convinced that Malta should get involved in the issue, due largely to its fear that if not, the resources of the high seas would be appropriated by industrialised countries that had the capability to do so before others could join (Odunton, 2004). These anxieties over equity prompted Malta to launch the initiative and introduce the CHM, while the other SIDS followed suit in the negotiations.

Advancement in Science and Technology

There were two "whistle-blowing" factors that motivated SIDS to take up the issue of ocean governance at the UN. These were the advancement in science and the resulting discoveries about mineral resources on the seabed, and the technological development that gave unequivocal advantage to industrialised states. It was evident from the well-documented facts contained in the pioneering speech of the Maltese Ambassador (1967), that scientific knowledge and the accompanying technological advancement were the forces that provided impetus to make the case by appealing to the international community. In fact two-thirds of the contents of the speech spelled out

the latest information about scientific discoveries and the potential of the advanced technologies to exploit high seas and seabed resources beyond imagination. Pardo said, "We have been following closely for some time developments in the field of oceanography and deep-sea capability (UN Document, 1967). The Maltese Government decided to take action at UNGA "because rapidly developing technology makes possible the exploration, occupation and exploitation of the world's seabed and much of its ocean floor" (UN Document, 1967).

Undisputedly, these scientific revelations and technological advancements created both awareness and concern among all SIDS. The Maltese delegation had been taken by surprise when they had earlier learned the extent of the knowledge that had been retrieved from advancement of science and technological development. Therefore Malta took its particular action at the UN in order to protect the interests of under-privileged developing states, and to let the universal rule of law take its course in place of the freedom of oceans practiced by technologically capable forerunners in the industrialised countries.

Ambassador Pardo stated in his speech that, "Ocean floor photography and deep submergence vessels with near-bottom capability now enable us to acquire an ever-increasing store of knowledge about the seabed and the abyss" (UN Document, 1967). To illustrate his observation in this regard he presented well-documented information about geophysical features, known resources and technological capacity to exploit these resources. He listed tools and methods used in recent times to carry out research for exploring ocean frontiers and the capacity of these to acquire wealth. Pardo quoted scientific journals and research centres in building up the argument that the advancement of science and technology called for closer attention to the unfolding value of the oceans.

He quoted Komsomolskya Pravada as reporting on 16 August 1967 on the discovery of rich deposits of oil on the arctic continental shelf of the Soviet Union, and the report by the *Oil and Gas Journal* of 27 February 1967 about an enormous discovery of natural gas under the North Sea, equivalent to 40 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (UN Document, 1967). Ambassador Pardo also referred to a study published by John L Mero entitled, *The Mineral Resource of the Sea* (1965). These sources of scientific

information highly motivated the Maltese delegation to launch the Law of the Sea initiative, and they were indeed influential in creating much momentum towards action at the UN. Malta had followed anxiously the increasing public and private expenditure on oceanographic research and technology in the US, the Soviet Union, and France (projected as $5 billion by 1977) (UN Document, 1967). Pardo appeared to be nervous of the rapid development of technology in a handful of industrialised states that he felt might put developing states at an unparalleled disadvantage, as he saw the world moving "close to vital breakthrough in technology" (UN Document, 1967).

With the progressive development of science and technology, another concern Malta had was the increasing militarisation of the oceans. "A rapid escalation of the arms race in the seas" was what Malta saw at the time, as more than one country was capable of deploying anti-ballistic missiles on the ocean floor in defence of strategic interests (UN Document, 1967). Malta considered such deployment and location would not give due regard to claims of jurisdiction by non-nuclear states. Such a predicament may lead to bitterly contested resentments, and oceans becoming a hostile and risky place. This was the concern that prompted Malta to propose the use of seabed and ocean floor exclusively for peaceful purposes.

The knowledge and information resulting from the advancement of science and technology was the key factor in creating awareness amongst SIDS of the importance of regulating the use of oceans in a balanced and protective manner. As Maurice says, "Knowledge is power and its information bears implications for change" (Jorgens, 2004). Of the eight people interviewed in gathering information about UNCLOS and SIDS' role in it, six of them indicated the importance of technological development in fuelling the interests of SIDS.

Economic Interests

The SIDS is a group of under-privileged and under-developed states whose primary national goal remains the economic expansion of income bases. This is another important reason why SIDS entered into the Law of the Sea negotiations. The revelations made by scientists and research institutions about the economic wealth

that lies on the seabed and the discovery of commercially valued minerals there, were of captivating concern for SIDS. The pioneering speech Malta made at the UNGA in 1967 attracted the attention of not only SIDS but also many states in the developing world, as it spelled out tempting information about potential mineral resources available from oceans. Jorgens says Pardo "held out the possibility that there was trillions of dollars of value in the manganese nodules which had sparked interest in a lot of people" (Jorgens, 2004). He made mention of sunken treasures worth US$3 million that were discovered near the Scilly Islands. Reference was also made to archaeological objects lying on the Mediterranean seabed in excess of the quantity in the combined museums of Greece, Italy, France and Spain (UN Document, 1967).

The rapid exploration of offshore petroleum and natural gas were another factor well documented in his speech that whetted the interests of many states. He cited enormous discoveries of natural gas in the North Sea (40 trillion cubic feet), and rich deposits of oil on the Arctic continental shelf (UN Document, 1967). Moreover, the speech reported on the abundance of newly discovered commercially valued nodules on the seabed, such as phosphorite, and manganese concretions. Of these, the manganese nodules, which looked like burnt potatoes or were dubbed 'black smokers' (Jorgens, 2004), were of particular interest to developing states (UN Document, 1967; Jorgens, 2004). These nodules supposedly covered 20 percent of Pacific Ocean floor and they were said to "contain 43 billion tons of aluminium equivalent to reserves for 20,000 years at the 1960 world rate of consumption" (UN Document, 1967). Citing the US *Forbes Magazine*, Pardo also drew the attention of the delegates to the great potential expected from farming the oceans which, with the improvement in technology for fish husbandry, were expected to become commercially profitable in the 1980s (UN Document, 1967). A curious amount of US $1.5 billion was quoted by *The New York Times* of August 1967 as having been the value of minerals discovered at a depth of 7,000 feet under the Red Sea. The Maltese delegate in fact announced in launching their initiative that "the known resources of the seabed and the ocean floor are far greater than the resources known to exist on dry land" (UN Document, 1967).

Undoubtedly, these economic revelations would have jump-started the interests of SIDS to spare no effort in actively participating in the negotiation, with the aim of securing a share of the economic potential from seabed mining and ocean resources.

The chief delegate of Cyprus at the negotiations, Ambassador Jacovides, illustrated the tempting nature of these revelations by commenting "Because unlike continental territories which can rely on the resources of hinterland, islands rely on the resources of the sea for survival" (Jacovides, 2004b). Fiji's chief delegate Nandan, shared the same view, saying "SIDS are the ones who have huge economic zones, and so they had been front-runners to some extent, to the negotiations" (Nandan, 2004).

Most importantly however, SIDS were concerned about fisheries in their surrounding territorial seas, on which most island states depended as their chief generator of occupation and source of food. They were determined to protect these resources and to gain exclusive rights (Nandan, 2004; Sealy, 2004). Ambassador Sealy of T and T specifically said, "The management and protection of fishery resources was one of the conditions which would have motivated our participation in the conference" (Sealy, 2004). Deputy Secretary General Odunton indicated how the SIDS would have been motivated more than any other states because the Convention gave them an EEZ that was many times larger than their own land size (Odunton, 2004). The President of the Tribunal, Nelson, shared similar sentiments as to how Pacific SIDS would benefit from the wider expansion of the economic zone (Nelson, 2004). Ambassador Sealy recalled the negotiations and said how much SIDS would have been encouraged by economic interests when revelations were made about the great potential for mining manganese nodules in the Pacific Ocean (Sealy, 2004).

The New Zealand Ambassador also pointed out an interesting fact about the economic importance of UNCLOS to SIDS. He recalled the negotiations and explained that economic interests from EEZ were far greater national interests for SIDS like Tuvalu, Tonga and Fiji than geographically disadvantaged European states like Austria and Switzerland. He said if the Pacific SIDS were "in the middle of Europe [their economy] would have been a lot stronger than they are" (Mackay, 2004).

Fisheries, however, were not the only element that attracted the full participation of many SIDS at the UNCLOS negotiations. T and T was at the negotiations not only to protect its fishery resources but also its offshore oil industry, which according to Ambassador Sealy was one of the oldest in the world (Sealy, 2004). Since 1942 T and T has been exploiting oil offshore while under British domination. Therefore, for

T and T, the economic interests of UNCLOS negotiations were two-fold. As a coastal state it was very close to the mouth of many of the major South American river systems, tapping extensive fisheries in addition to offshore oil production.

The paramount interests of the fisheries and natural gas in the EEZ area of SIDS, compounded by the knowledge about offshore and seabed minerals, triggered the interests of SIDS to actively engage in the UNCLOS negotiations. Of all the eight interviews conducted on UNCLOS and SIDS participation, consensus was observed on the factor of economic interests as the overarching motivating factor for SIDS.

Physical Features

The physical features of the SIDS were another driving force that ushered them into the Law of the Sea negotiations. Seas surrounding these states are the mightiest resource for most SIDS and, being islands, any matters relating to seas are of paramount concern. "Cyprus, as you know, is an island state and so we are naturally interested in the Law of the Sea", said Chief Cyprus delegate to the Law of the Sea negotiations, Ambassador Jacovides (2004b). Elaborating on the importance attached to the negotiations by Cyprus, Jacovides observed, "all you need to do is to have a look at a map of the Eastern Mediterranean to realise why" (Jacovides, 2004b). The Maltese Ambassador, in launching the Law of the Sea initiative, clearly explained the reasons why Malta was making the move. He said "The Maltese Islands are situated in the centre of the Mediterranean. We are naturally interested in the sea which surrounds us and through which we live and breathe" (UN Document, 1967).

All the delegates and resource persons interviewed regarding the SIDS role at the negotiations and the reasons for their greater involvement, agreed that physical features of SIDS are an important factor that motivated them. The Chief Fiji delegate to UNCLOS explained that the "sea united the islands rather than divided them". He also observed that SIDS like Fiji were maritime states having major interests like maritime powers, but of course with different causes and extent (Nandan, 2004). The increasing knowledge about oceans which cover 70 percent of the planet and the potential wealth they hold naturally attracted SIDS to the negotiations (Maurice, 2004). The Ambassador of T and T recalled an expression in their language and said,

"we have more ocean space than land space" which helped them recognise the potential of seas for resource exploitation (Sealy, 2004). Another Fijian delegate posits that the "ocean dominates our life literally; it is our main source of livelihood" (Novoti, 2004).

The Pacific SIDS were at a greater advantage than Caribbean SIDS as island states, according to the President of the Tribunal. That was because some Pacific countries had the possibility of claiming a large continental shelf whereas Caribbean islands were more volcanic and less fortunate (Nelson 2004). Nevertheless, those oceans were close to the hearts of every islander as stressed by New Zealand Ambassador Mackay, who said "They had a strong tradition of association with oceans" which form part of their culture (Mackay, 2004). Undoubtedly, islands were to be the greatest beneficiary from UNCLOS, as a well known analyst of the Law of the Sea negotiations noted, "with the addition of 'aquitories' far more extensive than their 'territories', tiny islands are becoming large countries" (Borgese, 5, 1991).

SIDS cannot remain idle when the resources of their surrounding seas are openly exploited by states with technological capability, or their waters are polluted by the dumping of chemical wastes. Thus, being islands with their vulnerable features motivates SIDS leaving no stone unturned in protecting their interests in global negotiations. Their forthright conviction that seas are more vital to their development has prompted them to play a disproportionate role in the Law of the Sea negotiations than their size or means would allow *per se*. Their physical features were the licence for them to enter into the negotiations and demand equal rights with political heavyweights at the negotiation tables. Physical features, therefore, are an undeniable motivational factor for SIDS to engage in the UNCLOS negotiations.

Concern for Fisheries Decline and Mismanagement

Decline of fish stocks and concern for conservation of marine living resources, was another triggering factor for SIDS to become involved in the Law of the Sea negotiations. Fisheries are the main occupation and the best source of protein for most SIDS. Any adverse impact on this their "life blood" certainly would cause outcry or alarm from the resource-poor SIDS. At the time of the Maltese initiative,

there was growing concern about the decline of highly migratory fish stocks or displacement due to unfair practices of distant-water fishing states (Mackay, 2004; Sealy, 2004). Besides, increasing gear technology and sophistication of fish husbandry techniques, were observed to be likely to transform food production in 15 years, according to Maltese Ambassador Pardo (UN Document, 1967).

There was an increasing fear about the decline of global fisheries at least for some species. "Red Herring was fished out to an extent that its population collapsed because there was not enough breeding population to keep ahead of predation and so it just disappears," said the long time Law of the Sea officer at the UN Secretariat (Jorgens, 2004). In the Pacific, the so-called "vacuuming the ocean" by technologically capable distant-water fishing states, were of a great concern to SIDS in the region. The New Zealand Ambassador recalled what he saw as a boy on the shores of New Zealand, "off only three miles there were vessels vacuuming living resources without any regard for conservation by reason of exploitation" (Mackay, 2004).

There was no international law that prohibits such action so close to the shore of other countries, and under the old tradition of freedom of seas, distant water fishing vessels were clearly out to grab whatever they could get hold of from seas surrounding other countries. The New Zealand Ambassador insisted that if "uncontrolled Wild West type fisheries....continued up to the three mile limit, we would have no resource off New Zealand, and neither would our Pacific neighbours" (Mackay, 2004). Ambassador Sealy of T and T was in full agreement of this concern: "Advancement in gear technology threatened to over-fish and deplete our fisheries", whereas SIDS in the Caribbean and Pacific were largely dependent on the fisheries resource as their main occupation and, for some, source of their food (Sealy, 2004). Thus, SIDS were proactive in the negotiations to secure equal rights for EEZ like any other states as Nanadan (2004) has pointed out: "We were determined to ensure our resources are not totally destroyed by the distant waters fishing states".

Every delegate interviewed on the subject of SIDS and their role in UNCLOS strongly agreed that the concern for fisheries decline and mismanagement was a key

factor that had motivated SIDS to participate in the negotiations and seek protection of their marine living resources in the new Convention.

Delimitation

SIDS were attracted to proactively address ocean concerns and to adopt a holistic approach in the Law of the Sea negotiations, due to many pressing reasons. The time it took to conclude UNCLOS (15 years) demonstrates the complexity and multiplicity of issues involved in the negotiations and the wide scope it employed. Delimitation of territorial zones between opposite or adjacent states was another important factor that triggered the interest of SIDS in the UNCLOS negotiations.

This began with Malta including the issue in the groundbreaking speech made in 1967. Besides the economic and legal implications raised in the Maltese presentation, it invited the attention of the UN to some disturbing political implications resulting from unilateral proclamations made by maritime powers and some coastal states. These developments pointed out the increasing need for universally acceptable delimitation of maritime boundaries. The pre-UNCLOS conventions adopted in 1958 and 1960 addressed delimitation issues but failed "to produce binding agreement on limits of the territorial zones and extent of fishing rights" (DOALOS, ii, 2002; Koh and Jayakumar, 30, 1985). The First and Second UN Conferences on Law of the Sea (1958 and 1960) took place before many SIDS had become independent. Thus they were not involved in them, and neither were the many new states that were soon to emerge from the developing world.

Pardo's 1967 speech highlighted the political implication that resulted from the Truman Proclamation of 1945. The United States unilaterally declared jurisdictional control on adjacent seas of the coast, justifying this by saying "modern technology was capable of exploiting the resource of the continental shelf" and that "exercise of such jurisdiction by the contiguous state was just and reasonable" (UN Document, 1967). Pardo argued that the proclamation outrightly rejected the concept of common heritage and that a number of other states followed suit by making various similar claims. The chief delegate of Fiji and Secretary-General of ISA, stated that back as

far as 1952, Latin American states had made a declaration claiming a 200 mile territorial sea for economic reasons rather than strategic ones (Nandan, 2004).

The issue of delimitation was mostly felt in the Caribbean and Mediterranean regions as far as SIDS were concerned. Ambassador Sealy of T and T explained a long-standing delimitation issue with neighbouring Venezuela about which a number of consultations were held. Generally Caribbean SIDS were situated close to each other, with territorial waters at times overlapping. Due to the short distance between some SIDS in the Caribbean, sometimes fishermen fished in the waters of others. Thus some Caribbean SIDS were initially reluctant to accept the 200 mile EEZ, for example Jamaica. Even today there lie outstanding issues between T and T, Barbados and Jamaica with regard to delimitation of their boundaries (Trinidad Express, 2004).

Cyprus was the other leading SIDS country for which delimitation was a major concern. It had already proclaimed a 12-mile territorial sea before Malta made the diplomatic initiative in 1967 at the UN. During the negotiations Cyprus stood as spokesman for the group that favoured the median line or equidistance approach (Jacovides, 2004b). A total of five out of the eight interviewees mentioned the delimitation issue as a vital concern for SIDS at the negotiations. So it was therefore an important triggering factor of motivation for SIDS in getting involved in the Law of the Sea negotiations.

Marine Pollution

Marine pollution was a trendy concern at the time Malta took the ocean initiative of the UNGA in 1967. Apart from the advancement of science and technology as well as the discovery of potential ocean wealth, marine pollution was the next most important topic the Maltese delegate elaborated on. He documented from credible sources how the oceans were threatened by the dumping of radioactive waste due to the increasing use of nuclear energy. Ambassador Pardo expressed disappointment at the fact that international mechanisms were not in place to adequately monitor and regulate such practices despite prolonged consideration of the subject by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) (UN Document, 1967). The Maltese delegate quoted from authoritative sources to document the alarming rate of marine

pollution. He reported "extremely high concentrations of strontium-90 and caesium-137" being detected in the equatorial zone of the Atlantic, and strontium-90 in the Black Sea, while no decrease was found in radioactive contamination in North Sea fish (UN Document, 1967). The Ambassador alerted the international community as to the seriousness of the issue, saying "although hazards to man have not yet reached an acute stage, and although serious damage to the marine environment can be demonstrated only in a few areas, the whole question deserves far greater and deeper consideration that it has received heretofore" (UN Document, 1967).

Radioactive waste was not the only issue raised in relation to the concern for marine pollution, but also the "dumping of detergents, pesticides and heavy metal and petrochemical wastes" (UN Document, 1967).

The milestone environmental world conference in 1972 in Stockholm, Sweden took place just five years after Malta raised environmental concerns at the UNGA. This conference came at an opportune time, as the following year the Law of the Sea negotiations kicked off. The Stockholm Conference can be attributed as having created more momentum and awareness amongst SIDS to urgently address ocean concerns.

Although SIDS experienced no serious marine accidents or environmental pollution even after the UNCLOS, the magnitude of the problem and its fatal consequences was an important factor that motivated them to include the subject in the negotiations. Ambassador Sealy of T and T agreed that it was a motivating concern for his country, and a representative from the Ministry of Energy of T and T was attached to the delegation to follow the pollution aspects of the negotiations (Sealy, 2004). T and T is in fact one of the SIDS who had a well-developed pre-UNCLOS offshore oil industry, which required them to be cautious and keep abreast of any such surprises. Thus, undoubtedly the importance of environmental pollution and accidents were of primary concern to his country.

Five of the eight interviewees quizzed about this factor agreed it was a strong to moderate concern for SIDS in prompting participation at the Law of the Sea negotiations.

Discussion

The preceding discussions and the conceived elements, after thematic analysis of primary data (interviews and speeches) and secondary data (published literature), indicate many catalytic factors as having motivated SIDS behaviour in the negotiations. These include attributes or factors such as equity, advancement of science and technology, economic interests, physical features, concern for fisheries decline and mismanagement, and environmental pollution and delimitation. It has been interesting to observe that none of the national or domestic attributes or internal factors, such as size and developmental capacity, has popped up in the empirical investigation, which leaves an obvious conclusion. The motivational factors were all external elements that impinged upon SIDS within the international environment. These elements can be organised as issues, events, circumstances, actions, developments, and trends. These are the factors responsible for motivating SIDS to launch their revolutionary initiative and to follow through proactively until the successful world-benefiting Convention was finally concluded.

The next section diagnoses the facilitative factors during the negotiation that influenced the behaviour of SIDS or their role in the Law of the Sea negotiations.

Facilitative Factors

According to the findings of the proceeding section, a number of factors external to the state and impinging upon the international environment have motivated the SIDS to get involved in the Law of the Sea negotiations. Now the question is, what factors facilitated their participation in and contribution to the 15 long years of comprehensive negotiations? This section scans and scrutinises those elements that enabled SIDS to play a significant and substantial role in the negotiations. In order to achieve this aim it analyses those elements that have either influenced the actions of SIDS at the Law of the Sea negotiations or provided assistance and a conducive environment to behave as constructively as they did at the Law of the Sea negotiations.

Charismatic Leadership

SIDS success at the Law of the Sea negotiations has been attributed by many analysts or observers to charismatic leadership or personal qualities that negotiators had in steering the negotiations (Jorgens, 2004; Sealy, 2004; Nelson, 2004; Odunton, 2004; Jacovides, 2004b; Nandan, 2004; Mackay, 2004). The great initiative made by the Maltese Ambassador Arvid Pardo has been widely credited for personality in connection with the Law of the Sea negotiations. Pardo himself was an academic having a legal background with a PhD degree and he continued to contribute intellectually to the negotiation process even after his ambassadorial post was relinquished prior to the real negotiations beginning. He kept in touch with the negotiations through speeches at NGO conferences and publications of articles in academic journals (see his speeches at Pacim in Maribus conferences organised by International Ocean Institute and articles published in Oregon Law Review [1984], International Insights [1993], Foreign Affairs [1968]).

The Maltese initiative for Law of the Sea came largely out of personal conviction and knowledge of its charismatic Ambassador Pardo. He personally studied intensively all aspects of the marine environment after learning about the enormous potential of mineral resources in the sea from a US proposal made to the Second Committee of the UNGA (Pardo, 65, 1993). Pardo states the following in this respect:

> I became convinced that the interests of Malta, as those of all members of the community, were deeply involved; that the law of the sea was hopelessly out of date; and that Malta could play a useful role at the UN by seeking international management of the resources of the ocean space through international acceptance of the concept that ocean space beyond national jurisdiction was a common heritage of mankind (Pardo, 66, 1993).

Having been convinced of this effect, it was Ambassador Pardo who personally advised the government of Malta "to attempt to change the Law of the Sea" (Pardo, 66, 1993). He further reported that his Prime Minister gave approval to the initiative without involving cabinet excessively to make the decision. This demonstrates the

personal leadership Pardo had manifested in bringing the issue into the limelight. He was well versed with the issue and presented a blueprint for the ocean treaty (see Pardo, 68, 1993).

Chief negotiator for the Cyprus delegation, Ambassador Jacovides, also felt it was the personality of Pardo that made a difference at the initial stage. Jorgens recalls one encounter he had with Pardo at the initial stage of the issue. Pardo made a forty minute well-reasoned speech at the seabed committee meeting at the very late hour of discussions. As an official at the conference secretariat who kept minutes, Jorgens ran to Pardo after the speech to get a copy of it. But he was surprised to find that he had a piece of paper with only four or five lines noted down. Jorgens says, "He was an interesting person and a real good speaker" (Jorgens, 2004).

The charismatic leadership of Pardo was echoed in a memorial speech the President de Marco of Malta made at the University of South Pacific in Fiji in 1999. He had the following to state in this respect.

> Pardo revolutionized the thinking of politician, jurists and scientists alike when he proclaimed that the seabed and ocean floor are a common heritage of mankind, and should be used and exploited for peaceful purposes and for the exclusive benefit of mankind as a whole (Marco, 1999).

This accreditation speaks the Maltese Ambassador's personal capability while the foreign minister of Malta, Bonnici, credits Pardo on the initiative he made on behalf of his small state: "Arvid Pardo was such a visionary. His great competence as a jurist and as an international diplomat was combined with a very wide human and work experience", (6, 2002). Bonnici further also paid tribute to Pardo, saying he was "A great man from a small nation" (11, 2002).

The second and the last President of the UN Conference on Law of the Sea, Tommy Koh (Singapore) branded him as "Inspirational Arvid Pardo" (Koh, 14, 2002). While a representative of Sweden, speaking on behalf of the Western European and other states at the commemorative meeting of UNCLOS in 2002 elevated him as the "Founding father of ideas leading up to UNCLOS" (Schori, 31, 2002).

Besides the Maltese Ambassador Pardo, it was the chief delegate of Fiji, Satya Nandan, current Secretary General of ISA, who demonstrated the importance of charismatic leadership in facilitating the role played by SIDS in the negotiations. Nandan agreed that he had a personal interest in the issue and when Fiji joined the UN in 1970 he said, "I immediately grabbed the opportunity" (Nandan, 2004). He also came from a law background and was observed by many as an effective negotiator (Jacovides, 2004; Jorgens, 2004; Mackay, 2004; Nelson, 2004; Sealy, 2004). The chief delegate of Cyprus said "Nandan was way ahead of any other delegate of SIDS", while Moore (1994) commended Nandan as the biggest contributor to the negotiation process and post conference developments. Nandan had made numerous submissions, mediated discussions between groups and drafted the negotiating text of the Second Committee. He was "very knowledgeable and established a working relationship with a number of delegations" (Jorgens, 2004). ISA credited Nandan as one of the "conference leaders" at the negotiations (ISA website, 2004). The President of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea credited Nandan as one of the "characters of the conference" who was always chairing meetings and proved to be a dynamic man (Nelson, 2004). He further added, it is not surprising to see him as Secretary General of ISA "because he knows the world and must have leadership qualities" (Nelson, 2004). Ambassador Don Mackay of New Zealand commented that if Nandan had not had such a strong personality and personal role to play, he would not have been so successful as to attain the top job at ISA. He further recalls that Nandan "played quite a pivotal role in this; he was quite a prominent figure". These comments support the view that SIDS' role was successful due to charismatic leadership of those key delegates from SIDS (Mackay, 2004).

Jamaican chief negotiator and one time Solicitor General of the country, Kenneth Rattray, was the other high profiled SIDS leader in the negotiations. He was Rapportuer General of the negotiation conference and has played a very influential role in mobilising the efforts of G77 as the biggest voice of developing states. Nelson agrees to this fact saying, "he was good at winning support of Africa and the Third World for Jamaica" in the bid for hosting ISA (Nelson, 2004).

At the commemorative meeting of the UNCLOS in 2002, the representative of Venezuela, speaking of behalf of the Latin American and Caribbean states, commended Kenneth Rattray of Jamaica for the important role played in the negotiations (Alcalay, 26, 2002). Rattray himself admitted that most of his adult life was spent (25 years) in the exercise of setting up a comprehensive ocean regime (Rattray, 55, 1995). Thus, it could be concluded that Jamaican diplomacy led by Rattray's expertise and leadership in G77 helped Jamaica to become the "Flag Bearer" of ISA, a fitting imprint of their contribution to Law of the Sea negotiations.

The other charismatic negotiator for the Caribbean was the chief negotiator of Trinidad and Tobago (T and T), Lennox Ballah. He was serving the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea as a judge when he passed away in 2003. He led negotiations at the Second Committee of the Third UN Conference on Law of the Sea and was highly vocal in the discussions on the seabed mining regime. He was one of the drafters of the rules for mining the deep seabed (Sealy 2004). A junior delegate at the time of negotiations to UNCLOS from T and T but the current ambassador of T and T to the UN, Sealy recalls Ballah's leadership at the conference. "Listening to Ballah, I think he was probably a very strong charismatic leader with wide experience" (Sealy, 2004).

Lleadership was also demonstrated by Ambassador of Cyprus, Jacovides. He also come from a legal background and has been a seasoned and veteran diplomat of the country. He was a very approachable and active delegate according to long-term staff of the Law of the Sea Office at the UN (Jorgens, 2004). Cyprus' chief delegate to the UNCLOS conference stood as the spokesperson for the median line group or the equidistance principle group at the consultations on the issue of delimitation. He was a strong advocate for equal rights for SIDS as another continental state and was highly vocal in protecting the rights of SIDS in EEZ discussions and defining island regime. The twentieth anniversary commemorative publication issued in 2003 by the UN Division for Ocean Affairs and the Law of the Sea (DOALAS) listed in the Annexes the above five charismatic leaders of the SIDS as being among the "personalities of the Third UN Conference on the Law of the Sea remembered at the commemoration" (DOALAS, 244-247, 2002).

All the eight interviewees spoken to on the subject fully agreed that charismatic personality and leadership of delegates of SIDS were instrumental in reaping the success they achieved at the UNCLOS negotiations. The President of the International Tribunal for Law of the Sea, Dolliver Nelson, who himself comes from a SIDS (Grenada), had the following comments to make to signify the importance of personality in the negotiations.

> It does not matter the size, but it matters the personality. The person who can really get things done, say things eloquently, establish contact with well-known and respectable people. That is a very important thing in the machinery of conference (Nelson, 2004).

UN and IGOs

The intergovernmental organisations (IGOs) are viewed by the SIDS as their saviour. This particularly applies to the UN, because it was largely instrumental in breaking the yoke of colonisation and facilitating statehood to these states since 1960. Therefore, SIDS rely on the UN for protecting and advocating their international concerns. The Law of the Sea negotiations was the first successful diplomatic initiative SIDS made in the multilateral history of the world. Their humble initiative gained momentum due to the easy access of a wider audience of the international community at the UN and facilitation of dialogue at its forums, which provided an economical and one stop platform for bringing the concerns of SIDS to the attention of the international community.

All of the resource persons interviewed agreed that the noble principle of "one seat one vote" adhered to by the UN and equality of states irrespective of size or power before the UNGA was the greatest virtue of the body that enabled SIDS to become proactive and contribute to the negotiations (Sealy, 2004; Odunton, 2004: Navoti, 2004; Jorgens, 2004; Mackay, 2004; Nandan, 2004; Jocavides, 2004b; Nelson, 2004). The UN organised meetings that provided SIDS the opportunity to participate and contribute to the process where their voice was raised and interests shared with the world community. All those SIDS who gained independence and sought membership of the UN where invited to join the conference that negotiated UNCLOS (UN/Final

Act: UNCLOS, 160, 1983). Paragraph eight of the final act adopted along with UNCLOS reads "General Assembly decided by resolution 3067 (XXVIII) to request the Secretary General to invite states members of the UN or members of the specialised agencies .... to participate in the conference" (UN/Final Act: UNCLOS, 160, 1983).

Except for two meetings, one in Caracas, Venezuela and the last signing session of the conference in Montego Bay, Jamaica, all other meetings of the conference were held at UN centres, either in New York or Geneva, where SIDS' diplomatic representation was mostly located. It made participation of SIDS easier and allowed them to follow developments in a timely manner (Jorgens, 2004; Sealy, 2004). The UN also organised the precursor conferences to UNCLOS III, namely UNCLOS I in 1958 and UNCLOS II in 1960, although no SIDS participated in these conferences. However, the outcome of these conferences created awareness amongst SIDS in realising the importance of an ocean treaty. Ambassador Pardo of Malta first learned about the potential of ocean wealth and importance of ocean governance from a US proposal made to the Second Committee of the UNGA (Pardo, 65, 1993). Thereafter, when he made the revolutionary speech and the call for declaration of the deep seabed and ocean floor as common heritage of mankind, the UN adopted action to that effect in 1970. The UN facilitated the preparatory committee of the conference as well. The Secretariat was requested by member states of the UN, particularly the G77 whose membership included those SIDS, to undertake research on the issues of interest relating to ocean governance. The annual reports that were provided by the Secretary General at the request of member states also facilitated updated scientific and legal information about the issues of concern (Sohn, 295, 1997). When the formal negotiations for UNCLOS III were ready to begin, the preparatory seabed committee produced six volumes of documentation as background papers for the conference compiled from its six years of work (Sohn, 288, 1997). It may be recalled from UNGA resolution 3029A (XXVII), that the Secretary General was requested to provide the assistance that might be required in legal, economic, technical and scientific methods. In addition, the UN specialised agencies and other intergovernmental organisations "were invited to co-operate fully with the Secretary General in the preparation for the conference and to send observers to the conference" (UN/Final Act UNCLOS, 159). The head of the conference secretariat was a special

representative of the UN Secretary General under whom professionals and lawyers worked.

As the last President of the Conference, Tommy Koh commented, "a wide range of expertise was needed on a host of subjects" for informed decision making at the conference and "not all delegations were equally able to cope with the complex, and technical demands of the conference" (Koh and Jayakumar, 44, 1985). Many supportive bodies most of which were UN subsidiary bodies such as the Intergovernmental Maritime Organisation (IMO), UNESCO and UNEP filled this gap. The staff and the conference secretariat also worked very closely in drafting and revising negotiating text with conference delegates. The conference secretariat also issued regular news briefs in the form of UN press releases and provided verbatim records of the meetings if delegates wanted to follow up on discussions more thoroughly at a later time. In addition, duplication of formal statements made by delegates were distributed promptly during the negotiation meetings.

The first ever world environmental conference organised by the UN in Stockholm, Sweden in 1972 came at an opportune time just before the negotiations formally kicked off. Many delegates of the UNCLOS conference attend the Stockholm Conference (Jorgens, 2004). This conference gave birth to the UN specialised agency on environment, the United Nations Environment Program (UNEP). A number of research reports were facilitated by the UN agencies during the negotiations, which included the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO) and its subsidiary the Intergovernmental Oceanographic Commission (established 1960). The United Nations Development Program (UNDP) and the International Maritime Consultative Organisation (IMCO) (Jorgens, 2004; Sealy, 2004; Odunton, 2004; Navoti, 2004). IMCO submitted a statement on shipping for the Second Session of the Law of the Sea negotiations in 1974 (Gorman, 227, 2002). IMCO also had been active in creating awareness about ocean dumping problems and to prevent environmentally damaging practices (Kildow, 572, 1972).

In explaining the complimentary role played by UN agencies in assisting SIDS, Ambassador Sealy of T and T said that the Institute of Marine Affairs in his country was established with the assistance of the UN (Sealy, 2004). This Institute was

instrumental in facilitating scientific and technological information for the delegation of T and T. Information provided by reports of the UN agencies were in fact quoted or cited in the speeches or deliberations made at the negotiations (Jorgens, 2004).

One of the former Presidents of Malta speaking at the twentieth anniversary commemoration of UNCLOS at the UN in 2002, described how the UN has helped Malta's Ambassador Pardo to make the pioneering initiative in 1967.

> His service with the United Nations provided him with inside knowledge of the working of the system and made him that much more aware of the feelings within the milieu of international diplomacy ..... provided him (Ambassador Pardo) with the loco through which he could exercise his visionary function ..... Malta's seat at the UN provided him with the first pulpit from which to proclaim his vision of a new law of the sea (Bonnici, 8-9, 2002).

Similarly, the chief negotiator of Fiji and the current Secretary General of ISA, Satya Nandan, acknowledged "the contribution of the dedicated secretariat of the conference" in his remarks to twentieth anniversary commemoration of UNCLOS at the UN (40, 2004).

The last president of the negotiations conference, Tommy Koh, also acknowledged the service provided by the conference secretariat by "Highly trained professionals or lawyers" (Koh and Jayakumar, 66, 1985). It also provided with adequate facilities to carry out functions of the conference.

These remarks converge on the view that the UN as a whole was the "guardian and custodian" of the Law of the Sea negotiations which provided equal opportunities for all states, big and small alike, including the smallest of all states, the SIDS.

Malta's Ambassador who launched the Law of the Sea initiative explains the importance of the UN to SIDS by the following comments "the mere existence of the UN as a global forum based on the principle of sovereign equality of states gives small countries an influence in international affairs far greater than they would otherwise have" (Pardo, 14, 1984).

International relations is observed to be 'full of surprises' and a 'dynamic process' that undergoes changes in structure, actors, issues and norms that impinge upon the system depending on the unfolding of events, creeping trends and needs of the time. The Law of the Sea negotiation process was one aspect of such change and amicable development in IR within its branch of multilateral diplomacy (Kildow, 558, 1973). One such creeping change ushered the emergence of SIDS in IR. The pragmatic winds of change that lifted the UN brought in many changes, mostly leaning towards democratic norms to conduct world affairs and the rule of law to govern global concerns. The transformation of the world scene to this effect gave rise to many new states from the developing world (Pardo and Christol, 652, 1983). Such pragmatic trends accommodated SIDS in joining the UN and initiating issues of global concern.

Thus, in the 1960's when the Law of the Sea initiative was launched, it was a period of unfolding decolonization. This resulted in rising nationalism throughout the international system (Kildow, 558, 1974). Consequently, the UN resulted in a more universal and democratic organisation with diverse agenda items. Emerging global concerns like environmental issues shot onto the UN agenda by the introduction of Law of the Sea concerns pushed for by the Maltese delegation in 1967. Similarly, the UN forums resulted in "a de-emphasis of great power policy in the organisation", reflecting the fact that there had been "a change in cold war politics between the Soviet Union and the United States once manifested in competition for the royalties of the developing states", according to Kildow (559-560, 1974). The trend of increasing membership of UN by the emerging new states from the developing world in 1960's and the 1970's gave importance to such issues that were of particular interest to them. These included mostly development issues. The Law of the Sea issue became a common interest to all states, big or small and a pressing concern for managing global commons due to the shift in the world agenda. Introduction and adherence to new and innovative democratic norms and moral principles at the Law of the Sea negotiations facilitated the participation of small states such as SIDS in the affairs of the organisation.

The first action taken at the Law of the Sea negotiations that gave a lift to the SIDS was the endorsement of what was known as the "Gentlemen's Agreement" (A/CONF.62/30) in 1973 at the second session of the Third UN Conference on Law of the Sea. By this agreement, it was decided to "reach agreement on substantive matters by a way of concerns and there should be no voting" until all efforts had been exhausted (UN/Final Act: UNCLOS, 165, 1983). This decision allowed built in flexibility and greater room for extensive consultation. The Ambassador of Uruguay observed that this mechanism of consensus-based decision-making was the first international instrument that defined consensus that he knew of. (Paolillo, 2002). This approach to conference diplomacy is most effective in taking on board every state's concerns and for working out universal compromises.

The last President of the Conference believed that this was a guiding principle that "those in the majority as well as those in the minority were to make efforts in good faith, to accommodate the interest of others" (Koh and Jayakumar 14, 1985). This approach enabled Fiji, Jamaica, T and T and Cyprus to continue informal negotiations and lobby for protecting SIDS interest in the negotiations despite opposition from the LL/GDS group. For without any one of them strongly disagreeing on a matter, the conference had to listen to them and find a solution before they could proceed. As Nelson posits, "universal participation" was fully granted in the negotiations and so SIDS wanted to be an equal "partner of the game, no matter how small they were" (Nelson, 2004).

New Zealand's Ambassador observed that SIDS had a "moral story" to tell the conference as a group of countries totally dependent on the oceans. Their demands received sympathetic support on moral grounds as they were in a rather unique position to argue the case for equal rights to EEZ (Mackay, 2004). He further added, "if you have a good story to tell and kept at it long enough, people will listen to your message" (Mackay, 2004). The consensus procedure certainly gave manoeuvring capability to stick to their demands.

Another procedural norm adhered to by the conference was the so called "package deal" approach to the negotiation. It helped to arrive at a comprehensive convention covering 25 subjects and issues (Koh, 11, 1985) and prevented any state from going

off the track "to pick what it likes and to disregard what it does not like" (Koh, 12, 1985). If such an approach was not followed, the interests of SIDS or their concerns would have not have received adequate attention and would have been marginalised.

The growing concern over dependence due to globalisation of trade and environmental concerns like the decline of fish stocks also influenced SIDS to put their case in the negotiations. As Ambassador Sealy (2004) comments, most SIDS do not have the capacity to patrol and protect their large EEZ from illegal fishing but the fact they pressed for equal right to those resources was a winning game for them.

The recognition and declaration of a common heritage of mankind principle was the biggest influence SIDS made at the negotiations, which is a clear manifestation of valuing moral principles by the international community. It is an imprint of what Pardo and Christol (658, 1983) call "distributive justice". Oceans and their use were a concern for every state, whether island, landlocked, big or small. They were to be exploited in a sustainable and equitable manner that does not jeopardise their use for future generations. These moral principles were paving the way despite the negotiations being what Edward Miles calls an "unruly horse" to success (Miles, 6, 1998).

It may be recalled that the prime objective of the Law of the Sea initiative was to establish "an international order for use of the deep seabed beyond national justification", which was at the mercy of few technologically capable states following the so called traditional law of freedom of the high seas (Brauninger and Konig, 604, 2002; Sohn, 291, 1997). This was the democratic norm and moral principle that aided the negotiations to answer the call of Malta to establish a world treaty to govern ocean affairs. If these principles were not in place to guide the negotiations, neither the Convention nor the participation of SIDS would have been possible. The conclusion of the "milestone" Convention (Annan, 4, 2002) and what the President of the negotiation called "the first comprehensive treaty... second only to the Charter of the UN" (Koh, and Jayakumar 12, 1985) would not have been possible without such innovative and democratic principles being applied to the negotiations.

Political Coalitions

The Law of the Sea negotiations were at times polarised by political coalitions that had irreconcilable views of policies on certain issues that were under consideration. However, as a major force in facilitating discussions at the negotiations, they were equally contributory to the process. The most dominant and decisive political coalition at the law of the sea negotiations was the Group of 77 (G77) that represents the whole body of developing states at the UN forums. The SIDS were part of this coalition and so had adhered to its overall policies. It was a coalition that advocated economic interests and fairer trade for developing countries and for more developmental aid and transfer of technology to the under-developed South.

Through this coalition SIDS strengthened their bargaining power at negotiations (Jorgens, 2004). The G77 stood for more than 120 countries at the UN (Koh and Jayakumar, 81, 1985) and were developing common positions in relation to issues under discussion based on a broader framework of policy development. Nonetheless, it was not a coalition with homogeneous interests, as micro-divisions existed due to different national interests of member states and circumstantial conditions. A good example of such a division was the debate between coastal state and LL/GDS members of the coalition. However, with diligent efforts over time the divided groups were able to find compromises, develop common positions, and gain numerical strength and a stronger voice when it come to bargaining with political heavyweights that sat on the other party at the negotiating conference, such as industrialised western states. As the last President of the negotiating conference observed, "we considered the issues under dispute as the common obstacles to be overcome" rather than sparks that ignite collective efforts (Koh and Jayakumar, 15, 1985).

The SIDS jointly worked within the broader framework of G77 (Nelson, 2004) while also siding with micro interest groups that united some states more than others due to greater pressing national interests. Nevertheless, in general, G77 was very influential in the negotiations (Jorgens, 2004) and stood as the "torch bearer" for developing states. For instance, in the later session of the negotiations, G77 criticised the United States. To do so it sought the help of "a highly qualified group of legal experts to prepare detailed accounts on the lawlessness of the United States legislations" (Koh

and Jayakumar, 60, 1985). The G77 was mostly unified in the discussion of issues dealt with by the First Committee, namely the deep seabed and ocean floor beyond national jurisdiction, and on the issue of the regulatory body for control of the ocean space (Koh and Jayakumar, 69-70, 1985). The G77 was in total support of endorsing the Maltese proposed 'common heritage of mankind' to the open ocean space and strongly advocated an international authority to regulate it on a fairer basis for the benefit of all states (Nandan, 2004). Fiji's chief negotiator Nandan says "G77 played an important role" in addressing these concerns in the First Committee (Nandan, 2004). On the other hand, the G77 was not unified at the discussion at the Second and Third Committees as divergent micro-group interests existed. Therefore, the coalition was observed as "partly homogeneous and partly heterogeneous" (Koh and Jayakumar, 82, 1985). Some SIDS like Fiji and Jamaica, were very active within the G77 coalition at the negotiations, spearheading the collective interests of their regions specifically.

During the negotiations some observed that industrialised states at times approached "archipelagic states" and attempted to twist their position with baits like promises of foreign aid or distant water fishing agreements (Jorgens, 2004). For SIDS such tactics could have weakened their positions had they stood alone without the support of the much larger coalition like G77. Some SIDS had played a key role in steering the interests of G77 and leading the group at the negotiations. Fiji's chief negotiator Satya Nandan chaired the coalition for two years from 1977 to 1978 (Nandan, 2004). Ambassador Sealy of T and T explained how SIDS were helped by the G77 coalition, "almost all negotiations were subsumed under the G77 and we did not have a separate identity as such" (Sealy, 2004). The indispensable association of SIDS with G77 was further illustrated by the President of the International Tribunal for Law of the Sea, Dolliver Nelson.

> G77 gave a chance for SIDS to make their voice heard .... as a way of making themselves heard, they stood as a bloc within G77, and therefore, SIDS' power was sort of magnified just by the fact of belonging of this group (Nelson, 2004).

According to four interviewees, the victory for Jamaica in its bid for the seat of the International Seabed Authority was largely attributable to the support Jamaica

received from G77 (Mackay, 2004; Nelson, 2004; Sealy, 2004; Jorgens, 2004). Of all the eight resource persons spoken to about the subject, all agreed that SIDS were able to perform the way they did at the negotiations and scored substantial bargains from the negotiations due to their association with G77 and support received to this effect. Thus, G77 has facilitated SIDS' role at the Law of the Sea negotiations and was a catalyst in their success.

Non-Governmental Organisations and Scholars

The UN Secretary General invited as many parties as possible to the Third UN Conference on Law of the Sea in order to allow universal participation and contribution by all potential parties, includes, Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and other resourceful parties to the conference (UN/Final Act: UNCLOS, 159 1983). Consequently, a number of representatives from NGOs attended the conference and helped with information on current developments in the areas under consideration (Jorgens, 2004). NGOs wanted to implement sound policies on fishing practices and prevention of marine pollution and so backed like-minded states in various informal forums. Thus, NGOs helped provide scientific information on issues such as manganese nodules and trends in the decline of fisheries. They held noon seminars, cheese parties or made displays aimed at raising awareness among conference delegates (Jorgens, 2004).

The Maltese Ambassador's 1967 speech was heavily quoted by scholars and academic journals and publications. This was a vivid testimony of how he was informed about the issues by NGO sources. In fact, there was hardly any references found citing local or UN sources to back up his arguments. Satya Nandan (2004) also mentioned that the Maltese Ambassador Pardo, received information about ocean issues initially from a study done by Texas University in the United States. Maurice Jorgens (2004) recalls that one US scholar named Edward Miles was attached to the Micronesian delegation who actively pressed for the interests of SIDS. Micronesia was not a member state of the UN at that time but they availed themselves of the opportunity when the UN Secretary General extended to all parties interested in the negotiations to attend the conference (see UN/Final Act: UNCLOS, 161, 1983).

Four out of the eight resource persons who were interviewed for this case study made mention of a veteran and seasoned scholar of the subject, Professor Elisabeth Mann Borgese, who contributed to the negotiations as a delegate and a resource person. In fact, the author of this thesis had the privilege to assess her contributions to the process first hand as one of her students in the "Politics of the Sea" course she taught at Dalhousie University in Canada in 1984, where she fondly recalled how NGOs had facilitated and influenced the discussion at the negotiations. Professor Borgese was a close friend of the Maltese Ambassador who launched the initiative (Jorgens, 2004). Together they co-founded the pioneering research centres known as the International Ocean Institute (IOI) in 1972 in Malta (see Message from 'Pacem in Maribus Conference', DAOLOS, 238, 2002). She has also written extensively about the Law of the Sea issues and the negotiations in various publications. One such publication directly relevant to SIDS is the UNEP study she authored in 1991 called the *Law of the Sea and the Caribbean.* Ambassador Sealy of Trinidad and Tobago also recalled how useful the annual conferences organised by the IOI known as "Pacem in Maribus" were for interested delegates involved in the negotiations and other scholars (Sealy, 2004). These conferences were held normally prior to the negotiation sessions and so provided a preliminary assessment of the status of the issues and facilitated new thinking or perspectives about the issues under consultation. For the resource-lacking and expertise deficient SIDS these opportunities would have been good "food for thought". Interestingly, the Maltese Ambassador Pardo who also became an NGO person after his ambassadorial post completed, wrote extensively about the negotiations and its underpinning issues in various academic journals and made presentations at NGO meetings (see Pardo's articles in the publications of Pacem in Maribus Conferences organised by International Ocean Institute (based in Malta) and in *Academic Law Journal* of the United States).

Other NGO groups prominent at the negotiations' conferences were the Neptune Group, Greenpeace, and Friends of the Earth, to name a few (Jorgens, 2004). The Neptune Group was not an established NGO but "a collection of NGO representatives who sponsored programmes and receptions at the Conference" (Levering et al., 7, 1999). The group circulated a newspaper called *Neptune* and another newsletter called *Soundings* which provided the latest information about scientific discoveries, and developments on issues under discussion at the conference (Levering et al., 26, 1999).

One representative of the Neptune Group showed a real manganese nodule (which was the most talked about mineral resource at the conference) to conference delegates, "to stir up interest during my speeches" (Levering et al., 21, 1999). Another analyst describing the benevolent role played by NGOs at the conference commented on them as being "walking encyclopaedia of information for delegates at the Conference" (Smith, quoted in Levering et al., 29, 1999). On another occasion in 1982, a Mauritius delegate wrote to a leading representative of the Neptune Group (Miriam Levering) thanking the Group for helping "Third World delegates to understand some of the basic issues concerning the subject matter of the Conference" (Guyan, quoted in Levering et al., 150, 1999).

Mention may be made of some mixed views held by two of the interviewees for this case study. Ambassador Sealy of T and T and Ambassador Jacovides of Cyprus expressed the view that NGOs were not directly influential on the policies or actions pursued by SIDS at the negotiations (Sealy, 2004; Jacovides, 2004b). They saw NGOs as not as active as in recent times during the Law of the Sea negotiations. However, they did not dismiss their role at the negotiations categorically, but were positive in general. The President of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea observed that NGOs were viewed with a certain amount of suspicion in the early stages of the conference. However, some of the NGO persons became close to the SIDS delegations as some of those SIDS could not afford to send delegations to all meetings. Thus, some of the NGO representatives that spoke at informal forums "spoke almost for SIDS and the more it lasted the more in happened" (Nelson, 2004). He further added that he was "astonished with the power NGOs started to yield" in the post-conference consultations, particularly to do with the 1995 Fish Stock Agreement (Nelson, 2004).

Six out of eight interviewees spoken to for the case study agreed that the NGOs were influential and contributory to the Law of the Sea negotiations. Four of them concurred with the view that SIDS' role at the negotiations was enhanced by them or independent scholars to some extent.

Table 6.1 summarises the number of interviewees that identified the factors that have influenced the behaviour of SIDS at the Law of the Sea Negotiations.

Table 6.1: Number of interviewees that identified the factors that have influenced the behaviour of SIDS at the Law of the Sea Negotiations

Interviews	Motivational Factors							Facilitative Factors				
	Equity	Advan. Science & Technology	Economic Interests	Physical Featuring	Concern for Fisheries Decline	Delimitation	Marine Pollution	Charismatic Leadership	UN and IGOs	Democ. Norms	Political Coalitions	NGOS and Scholars
Jorgens, M.		√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
Nandan, S.	√		√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
Jocovides, A.	√	√	√	√	√	√		√	√	√	√	√
Sealy, P.	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
Nelson, M.			√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
Mackay, D.	√	√	√	√	√		√	√	√	√	√	
Odunton, N.	√	√	√	√	√			√	√	√	√	
Navoti, S.	√	√	√	√	√			√	√	√	√	√
Total Count	**6**	**6**	**7**	**7**	**7**	**5**	**5**	**7**	**7**	**7**	**7**	**6**

The Law of the Sea negotiations have been an illustrative case for identifying the role of SIDS in contemporary IR and to scrutinise the factors determining their role or behaviour to this effect. From the preceding discussion it was obvious to conclude that SIDS had played a substantial role in the negotiations. Malta launched the revolutionary initiative and Fiji was one of the leaders of the negotiations whose chief delegate was elected as the first Secretary General of the International Seabed Authority. Jamaica on the other hand, was successful to win their bid to host the headquarters of the International Seabed Authority. It stands a hallmark for the execution of seabed and ocean floor beyond the national jurisdiction as the common heritage of mankind, the most sought after objective of the conference. T and T as well as Cyprus were also instrumental in protecting and advancing the interests of SIDS at the negotiations. These efforts bore fruit for them as they secured the same rights for EEZ as any other state.

The prime objectives of SIDS were achieved in the negotiations, such as recognition of the principle of the common heritage of mankind and equity in exploiting these resources and securing equal rights to 200 nautical miles of EEZ. These successes speak of their contributory and visible role at the negotiations, which raised their profile in IR and raised their importance as proactive state actors in IR.

The case study has also revealed interesting findings about the elements or factors that have been instrumental in ushering this proactive role of SIDS in the Law of the Sea negotiations. A sequential and thematic analysis of the negotiation process and the role SIDS played in the process gave rise to the following factors as determining their role or behaviour at the negotiations. There were two sets of factors identified and grouped into clusters having similar characteristics. The first set were analysed as the "Motivational Factors" which have cultivated interest amongst SIDS and triggered pre-emptive action. These are elements that were conceived from the pre-negotiation or early stage of the negotiations includes:

1) Equity
2) Advancement of Science and Technology

3) Economic Interests
4) Physical Features
5) Concern for Fisheries Decline and Mismanagement
6) Delimitation
7) Marine Pollution

The second set of factors is grouped into a cluster of "Facilitative Factors". These factors were identifiable during the negotiation period and were shown to facilitate the role of SIDS at the negotiations, namely:

1) Charismatic Leadership
2) UN and IGOs
3) Democratic Norms and Pragmatic Trends
4) Political Coalitions
5) NGOs and Scholars

The Motivational and Facilitative Factors were further analysed under a thematic pattern to establish a refined higher order of concepts. This resulted in clustering factors which have similar characteristics under a common concept. These concepts are given below. A schematic diagram of how factors were clustered and further conceptualised into common elements is shown in Figure 6.1.

1) Events
2) Issues
3) Circumstances
4) Trends
5) Actors

These factors were further refined to derive theoretical concepts and were found to be all *External Factors* to the state that impinge upon the international environment as well as the external environment of the state, and are responsible for determining the role or behaviour of SIDS in the Law of the Sea negotiations. Therefore, it can be concluded that *External Factors* were the *Explanatory Variables* that determine the international role or behaviour of SIDS in contemporary IR.

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Interviewees for Law Of The Sea Negotiations

Country Delegates

1. Ambassador Andrew J. Jacovides (b) (retired)
   Chief Delegate of Cyprus to the Third Law of the Sea Conference (1970-1980)
   Ex-Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the UN

2. H. E. Mr. Philip R. A. Sealy
   Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Trinidad and Tobago to the UN
   One of the delegates of Trinidad and Tobago to the Third Law of the Sea Conference

3. H. E. Mr. Donald James Mackay
   Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the New Zealand to the UN
   One of the delegates of New Zealand to the Third Law of the Sea Conference

4. Mr. Sainivalati Navoti
   First Secretary
   Fiji Mission to the UN
   Office in Charge of Law of the Sea Issues

Representatives of Intergovernmental Organizations

5. Mr. Satya N. Nandan
   Secretary General
   International Seabed Authority, Jamaica
   Fiji Chief Delegate to the Third Law of the Sea Conference

6. Mr. Dolliver M. Nelson
   President of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
   Secretary of the drafting Committee of the Third Law of the Sea Conference
   Originally a national of Granada

7. Mr. Nii Allotey Odunton
   Deputy to the Secretary General
   International Seabed Authority

8. Mr. Maurice Jorgens
   Law of the Sea Officer
   UN Division for Ocean Affairs and Law of the Sea (DOALAS)
   One of the longest serving staff at the UN Law of the Sea Office and a member of the Secretariat of the Third Law of the Sea Conference

Chapter 7

CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS AND SIDS

Introduction

No issue has attracted so much attention in the world community in the past few decades as climate change and no issue has caused so much distress and alarm to the SIDS (Paterson, 166, 1992; Stovall, 4, 1996). It is truly the most topical and pressing global development issue of our time and requires to be urgently addressed and remedied before the low lying SIDS disappear from the face of the earth, as predicted by climate scientists (Gayoom, 1998 a). It is the top priority development issue for the environmentally most vulnerable states of the world, the SIDS, as it amounts to life and death for them (Gayoom, 1998 a). Therefore, the issue of climate change has brought the SIDS to the forefront of the climate negotiations at the UN since the 1990 Second World Climate Conference.

This thesis reviews the process of climate negotiations as the second case study in understanding the role played by SIDS at the negotiations and the factors instrumental to that effect. Climate negotiations are chosen because it is a process in which SIDS have taken deep interest and actively contributed to since its start in February 1991. It promises an illustrative case where an investigator can comprehensively account for the behaviour of SIDS in contemporary international relations and identify the causal factors that explain their international behaviour.

The structure of this case study follows that adopted for the preceding chapter on Law of the Sea Negotiations, as it pursues the same objectives: to examine the factors that moulded the behaviour or role of SIDS in climate negotiations, and to draw conclusions as to the relevance of external factors outside the SIDS in determining the international behaviour of small states in international relations (IR). This second case study is presented to strengthen the findings and conclusions towards the research goals. Proceeding this brief introduction, it spins-off the case investigation firstly by providing a background to the issues, actors, actions, events and

developments that shaped the negotiation process. It will also summarise the major outcome of the process and its significance to SIDS. The next section, entitled Role of the SIDS will analyse the contribution, participation, and influence exerted by SIDS in the negotiations. In this respect, it will give a brief chronological development as to the actions implemented, policies followed and leadership demonstrated by SIDS in the climate negotiations. When the role of SIDS in the climate negotiations has been established, the next two sections will examine the factors that have helped or enabled this role to take form. In analysing those factors the sections are divided into two sub-headings, namely Motivational Factors and Facilitative Factors. Under Motivational Factors, it examines the pre-negotiation period that generated interest in SIDS and triggered their action to engage in the process. This is followed by Facilitative Factors which explores the elements that were catalytic or instrumental in facilitating actions of SIDS during the negotiation process. In investigating the factors that explain the behaviour of SIDS in the negotiations, analysis will be focused on elements that influenced or impacted on their behaviour such as actors, events, circumstances, trends, issues actions and developments in and around the process examined.

In the interest of restricting the scope of this case study to manageable limits, the time period for the examination and discussion of the climate negotiations is limited to the period 1985 to 1997 (when the Kyoto Protocol was adopted). The data for this case study were taken from eleven interviews with resource persons at the United Nations and from review of the same documentation as the preceding case study. In the climate negotiations, SIDS have acted as a unified coalition known as AOSIS. A few individual SIDS played a stage setting role prior to the negotiations. Those individual states' roles will be explored initially but the main crust of SIDS role is present under the political coalition of AOSIS which demonstrates collective action in the negotiations. For the analysis of data, a thematic approach was followed where keywords and themes were conceived and clustered around a common category or sub-heading. Details of this analytical method are given in Appendix 2. Finally, this chapter wraps up the climate negotiations case study by presenting a summary of findings as to the factors that facilitated and afforded SIDS to play the role they did.

Background to the Climate Change Negotiations

Two decades after the small island developing state of Malta launched the Law of the Sea initiative at the UNGA in 1967 another small island developing state, the Maldives took up the issue of climate change and its dire consequences that threaten the survival of SIDS at the UNGA in 1987. The President of the Maldives, Maumoon Abdul Gayoom raised the issue at the United Nations Special Debate on Issues of Environment and Development on 19 October 1987 as the first Head of State or Government to address the issue at the global highest political level (Stovall, 1996). President Gayoom was prompted to do so after experiencing in his country what he described as 'unusual high waves at high tide that struck the islands with a ferocity that inflicted an extensive and unprecedented damage throughout the country (Gayoom, 1987). According to the former Under Secretary General for Economic and Social Affairs, Nitin Desai, it was President Gayoom who brought to the attention of the world community the plight of SIDS in the wake of climate change (the author heard Desai make this statement at a UNGA Second Committee Meeting in 1998).

Prior to the Maldives calling for initiating collective or global commitment to mitigate climate change, the issue had been pushed into the international political agenda mostly by the epistemic community and inter-governmental bodies namely World Meteorological Organisation (WMO) and UNEP (UNFCCC, 3, 2000; Borione and Ripert, 78-79, 1994). A series of scientific meetings beginning from First World Climate Conference in 1979 to the Second World Climate Conference in 1990 generated momentum about the seriousness of climate change issues and provided 'food for thought' for the world governments and politicians to act in addressing the matter before circumstances become irreversible. Political recognition of the issue finally occurred when two intergovernmental bodies, namely WMO and UNEP jointly constituted a world scientific panel in 1988 known as the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to assess the science of climate change and the resulting impacts of the phenomenon as well as possible response strategies to mitigate the problem (Djoghlaf, 98, 1994). The Panel includes over 300 experts from more than 50 states (Borione and Ripert, 81, 1994) and their work spanned the informal negotiations in terms of understanding the gravity of the problem as well as issues for agenda setting for formal actions and negotiations.

Some observers of the Climate Negotiations process posit that the negotiations were of a two-track format, namely a scientific track and a political track (see comments by Borione and Ripert, 80, 1994 and Goldenberg 177, 1994). According to Borione and Ripert (80, 1994), IPCC scientific assessments which were produced every five years since 1990 formed the scientific pillar while the formal diplomatic negotiations under auspices of the UN characterised the political pillar. The heat generated in response to increasing realisation of human-induced global warming led by the epistemic community and increasing scientific knowledge about severe consequences resulted in prompting SIDS to initiate action. Subsequently, at the 1988 UNGA session, Malta proposed and sponsored the UNGA Resolution 43/53 on the protection of global climate and the proposal for a framework convention on climate change (First AOSIS Summit Declaration 1992). This resolution marked the launch of the climate change negotiations (Slade, 1998). In March 1989, the First South Pacific Regional Environmental Programme Meeting on climate change and sea level rise was held in Majuro in the Marshall Islands, where Pacific Island states discussed the issue. In November the same year, the First Conference of Small States on Sea Level Rise was held in the capital of Maldives, Male', where ministerial delegations from 14 SIDS met to draw up a programme of action towards addressing the issue of climate change. Parallel meetings were also held in Western cities to drum up international support for timely action against global warming. These included the most widely cited Toronto Conference in 1988, organised by international scientists under the auspices of WMO and UNEP, and another two meetings held in the Netherlands, one at Heads of State or government level (24 Heads of State or Government attended) and another at Ministerial level in March and November 1989 respectively. The declaration of the March meeting highlighted the 'vital, urgent and worldwide' nature of the response that should be given to the greenhouse problem, while the November meeting "affirmed the need to stabilise carbon dioxide emissions as a first step toward a cooperative international response strategy" (Barione and Ripert, 79-80, 1994). The Toronto conference for the first time called on the international community to cut carbon dioxide emissions by 20 percent from 1988 levels by year 2005 (Stovall, 3, 1996; Borione and Ripert, 78, 191994).

This target of emission reduction was later popularly referred to as the 'Toronto Target' (Greenpeace, 2005). This convention was modelled after the Vienna Convention on substances that deplete ozone layer. As Ahmed Djoghlaf, the Vice Chairman of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee remarks, these high level meetings provided 'substantial input' for drafting the climate convention (Djoghlaf, 100, 1994). At the Toronto Conference it was reported that scientists raised "alarm and called for early action to reduce the risks" (Brione and Ripert, 78, 1994).

The timing of the global awakening towards the dangers of climate change incidentally coincided with the 20th anniversary of the first UN environmental conference in 1972 known as the Stockholm Conference. With the increasing realisation of global environmental degradation, the UN community was aiming to assess the global environment at an opportune time (see comments by Porter and Brown, 1-2, 1996; Koh, 165, 1994; Adede, 3-6, 1994). The year 1992 was observed as an opportune time that could serve a dual purpose: a) commemoration of the 20th anniversary of the first UN environment conference; and b) addressing emerging 'second generation' environmental global issues (Adede, 4, 1994). These factors led to the UNGA to adopt Resolution 44/228 on 22 December 1989 by which UNGA established the process for holding the United Nations Conference on Environment Development (UNCED) in June 1992. This was both highly ambitious and the largest world conference ever held on environment and development (see comments by Chasek, 45-46, 1994).

It was most ambitious because it "featured the simultaneous organisation of negotiations on three separate tracks converging towards a single event in June 1992" (Djoghlaf, 10, 1994). It was the largest event because UNCED was the "first global gathering of heads of state or government on environment and development" drawing delegates from more than 175 countries (Chasek, 45, 1994). The three track-negotiations that led to UNCED included the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom) and two intergovernmental negotiating committees on climate change and biodiversity respectively. These negotiations ultimately led to the adoption of Agenda 21 (a world development agenda for the 21st century), the Biodiversity Convention, and the Climate Change Convention.

The run-up to the negotiation of climate change was marked by a significant political event, prior to the commencement of formal negotiations by the UNGA. The climax of scientific consensus on human-induced global warming and its twin consequences of climate change and sea level rise was reached at the Second World Climate Conference in November 1990. The impetus for immediate action was triggered by the historic submission of the First Assessment Report by the IPCC to the conference. This conference was attended by 137 countries which was more than 80 percent of the membership of the UN (Obasi, et.al xii, 1991). The statement and declaration adopted at the conference "called for the urgent negotiation of a framework Convention Climate Change, with a view to signing such an agreement in time for UNCED" (Obasi, et.al xii, 1991). The IPCC Report was to "serve as a basis for the negotiations" (Bolin, 19, 1991; First Chairman of IPCC). Djoghlaf says IPCC "provided a critically important part of the foundation underpinning the negotiations of the Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee" (INC) (Djoghlaf, 100, 1994). The conference echoed the endorsement of "a broad scientific consensus on the nature and potential severity of the greenhouse problem" (Borione and Ripert, 80, 1994).

The Second World Climate Conference also struck a balanced view on the issue of climate change and action needed between the developed world and the developing world which was a concern previously dominated by developed North. The issue of climate change was pushed onto the world agenda previously by scientists and environmental activists of the developed western world (Dowdeswell and Kinley, 117, 1994). Approximately 40 percent of the participants in the scientific and technical sessions of this conference were from the developing world while 55 percent of the attendants at political ministerial sessions were from the developed world (Obasi, et al., xii, 1991). Two Prime Ministers from SIDS, namely Malta and Tuvalu, attended the conference sharing their concern for the plight of SIDS in the wake of climate change. Similarly, the membership of IPCC was accorded much greater international legitimacy in 1990 when participants from developing countries were increased from 11 to 54 (Djoghlaf, 101, 1994).

It was a milestone conference for SIDS too as they managed to organise themselves into a political coalition during the conference to lobby for protection of their interests and to raise awareness about their plight in the climate change negotiations. As noted

this coalition was named the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). The formation of an informal political coalition marked the birth of political maturity of SIDS in international environmental relations. The movement set in motion a proactive eco-diplomacy at the UN. Since this conference, SIDS spoke with one voice under the banner of AOSIS and began to represent a 'moral voice' on the issue of climate change as primary victims of the expected crisis.

The Second World Climate Conference streamlined all the ideas and recommendations generated by the previous scientific and political meetings that addressed climate change issues, and spelt out action-oriented themes and an urgent need for immediate time-bound action (see Ministerial Declaration of the conference in Jager and Ferguson (ed.), 1991). The heat generated by the conference quickly fuelled action less than one and a half months later at the UNGA by adopting action urged by resolution (45/212) on 21 December 1991. However, there was very little time left before the UNCED which was already scheduled for June 1992. Djoghlaf comments "[t]hat this inexorable deadline was a healthy stimulus....promoting a spirit of mutual cooperation among the delegates to the INC on Climate Change" (101, 1994). The Resolution endorsed INC to negotiate a framework convention on climate change under the auspices of the UNGA with an ad hoc secretariat (Stovall, 6, 1996; Djoghlaf, 103-104, 1994). The Resolution also called for close cooperation with IPCC, and established a special voluntary fund for participation in the negotiations of Least Developed Countries and SIDS. In addition, it authorised five meetings with a duration of two weeks each (Stovell, 6, 1996).

The INC held five negotiation sessions within a span of 15 months, between February 1991 to April 1992. The sessions were held in Washington, New York, Geneva, and Nairobi. The negotiations were constrained by multiple factors which explained the time it took and contents it embodied for the final outcome (Dasgupta, 131, 1994). Most importantly, there was little time for a multilateral negotiation on a complex issue like climate change (see comments by Dasgupta 131, 1994; Dowdeswell and Kinley, 116, 1994). In addition, the negotiations were plagued by scientific uncertainty about the real cause of the problem and extent of its impact (Borione and Ripert, 77, 1994) despite the scientific consensus about global warming and its dire consequences. Dowdeswell and Kinley describe the marathon-speed negotiations as

"unprecedented" and a "minor miracle" that would "go down in history" (117, 1994). They further add that "political interest, economic implications, breadth of participation, number of countries" made the climate negotiation a difficult exercise (Dowdeswell and Kinley, 120, 1994). Given these constraining factors, the international community was bent on a "framework convention" modelled after the Ozone Convention. In other words, efforts were undertaken to address the climate change problem on a progressive-phases format building onto the treaty process as time and circumstances necessitated doing so. Thus, the climate negotiations process, like in the case of Law of the Sea process, was not understood as achieving a one-off, all time solution in unprecedented speed, but as gradual actions as and when consensual efforts warranted (see comments of Dowdeswell and Kinley, 128, 1994).

AOSIS came into existence as a binding "coalition of small island and low-lying coastal countries that share similar development challenges and concerns about the environment, especially their vulnerability to the adverse effects of global climate change" (AOSIS Backgrounder). The alliance was guided in their lobby at climate negotiations by 7 principles amongst which included, preventive action, precautionary principle, polluter pays principle, equity, and principle of common but differentiated responsibility (AOSIS Backgrounder). AOSIS was recognised as an important negotiating group according to the Vice Chairman of INC, Djoghlaf, and exerted substantial influence in shaping the outcome of the negotiations (Djoghlaf, 105, 1994).

Some analysts comment that climate change negotiations began informally much earlier than December 1990 when the UNGA assumed formally the mandate of negotiating a climate convention (see the comments of Dowdeswell and Kinley, 116-117, 1994). This fact tallies with those who presumed that the negotiation followed a two-track format. For with the establishment of IPCC in 1988, the advisory or the scientific and technical negotiation of the process had already begun. The negotiation involved new parties to such exercises which included participation of NGO's business and industry representatives and UN agencies. Never in the history of multilateral negotiations had such diverse representations, including non-state actors, been allowed to participate and contribute to the process (Faulkner, 230, 1994). This was one important factor recognised by some analysts as contributing to the success

of the process (Dasgupta, 133, 1994; Dowdeswell and Kinley, 120, 1994). Some NGO representatives were included in the delegations of Australia, Canada (Dowdeswell and Kinley, 120, 1994), and Vanuatu and Tuvalu (Dasgupta, 132, 1994; Werksman, 1994; Ronneberg, 1994). Dowdeswell and Kinley remarked that "[one] can only hope that the openness and transparency demonstrated in the INC have set a precedent for future international negotiations on environmental issues" (Dowdeswell and Kinley, 120, 1994).

The INC began the negotiation process without a draft text as basis for negotiations and an ad hoc secretariat was established that served as administrative facilitator which compiled the submissions made by participating states that had converging views (Djoghlaf, 103-104, 1994). The negotiations were conducted on the consensual basis with no instance of voting occurring on any substantial issues discussed (Dasgupta, 132, 1994). A bureau comprising of 11 members (Dowdeswell and Kinley, 119, 1994) was constituted to spearhead the negotiations and two working groups were formed to comprehensively address issues surrounding the process. Working Group I was allocated substantive issues relating 'objectives,' 'principles' and 'commitments' while Working Group II handled 'mechanisms' or the legal institutional framework such as scientific cooperation, entry into force of the convention and withdrawal from its obligations (Dasgupta, 139, 1994; Djoghlaf, 102, 1994). The INC jump started the negotiations in February 1991 within one and half months of the UN mandating the duty to so (Dowdeswell and Kinley, 117, 1994). However, the progress was slow and pessimism haunted the process given the fact the negotiations were polarised by classic issues of North-South division. The negotiations were indeed 'propelled' by scientific and technical information provided by IPCC but there was no clear or easy direction to take the course of the 'rudder' as from day one of the negotiations 'stormy' issues and disputed science 'infected' the process. There were not only major differences in approach to the issues between the developed North and developing South but also divisions within each major group.

Undoubtedly climate change was recognised as a pressing global issue which required global solutions in order to arrest the problem (Borione and Ripert, 80, 1994). However, the North-South perspectives decelerated the negotiation process, almost paralysing the negotiations as Dowdeswell and Kinley comment, 'virtually none of

the principal issues resolved until the second half of the final fifth session in May 1992' (119, 1994).

The developing world (South) held the developed world (North) responsible for the causes of climate change since historically they have polluted the atmosphere with emissions and continue to be the largest emitters of greenhouse gases (Borione and Ripert, 83, 1994). Nevertheless, the North was not prepared to shoulder the total burden and give into the measures that the South proposed, especially as the proposed emission abatement is likely to have major economic implications, disrupting lifestyles in the developed world and making the costs of abatement economically painful. Emission abatement measures also could disrupt energy use, transportation, agriculture and industries which are dependent on cheap sources of fossil fuel energy, such as coal and oil (Borione and Ripert, 81, 1994; Dasgupta, 131, 1994).

The developing world, in particular the states most vulnerable to dire consequences of climate change, (that is SIDS or AOSIS), demanded binding commitments to mitigate the phenomenon of global warming by setting clear targets and timetables for emission control. The AOSIS in fact lobbied intensively at the negotiations to adopt the so-called 'Toronto Target' which was set by scientists in 1990, and which was a 20 percent reduction of carbon dioxide emissions by 2005 (Borione and Ripert, 78, 1994). The largest emitter of greenhouse gases, the United States, however, rejected any proposal subscribing binding targets on the grounds it will affect the lifestyle and economic progress of the country (Hatch, 1, 1993).

The US argued for further scientific research on the causes of global warming and better assessment of the economic costs prior to finalising binding commitments (Borione and Ripert, 82, 1994). The US was joined by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), in particular Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, who feared economic loss if the petroleum market was affected due to emission control (Borione and Ripest, 82, 1994). The OPEC resentment to binding targets and opposition to carbon tax, which were floated by some like-minded European countries, created divisions within the group of 77 (G77) developing countries (Porter and Brown, 149, 1996). On the other hand, European climate-friendly states (the Netherlands,

Germany, Norway) "were ready to accept time-bound stabilisation targets" (Dasgupta, 134, 1994; Porter and Brown, 149, 1996).

The developing countries were receptive to commitments of a conditional or contractual nature which subscribed to 'new and additional' financial resources to bridge the incremental costs that may occur and transfer of cleaner technology on non-commercial terms (Dasgupta, 132, 1994). The developing world was not prepared to implement binding commitments at the expense of social and economic development for which they have long been aspiring (Bergesen and Sydes, 42, 1992). As one time Deputy Minister for Science and Technology of China said, "developed countries are major polluters and they must accept moral responsibility and pay for it" (Smith, 251, 1994). The debate at climate change negotiations therefore reflected divergent views within two major traditional coalition blocs, namely the developed North and the developing South. The stumbling blocks rested on the thorny issues of emission control measures and provisions for financial resources and technology transfer (Dasgupta, 136, 1994).

The Chairman of INC eventually applied skilful manoeuvring to overcome the divisions and bridge controversies that characterised climate change negotiations at the final stage. The Chairman enlarged the bureau and continued long hours of negotiations with the bureau having distributed a negotiating text prepared by the Chair (Djoghlaf, 102, 1994; Dowdeswell and Kinley, 118-119, 1994). One analyst, Dasgupta (140, 1994) said "negotiations underwent a sea-change in the last part of the final session", and this led to the adoption of a watered-down and toothless convention by consensus on 21 March 1994. It was watered down because no mandatory actions were subscribed either for developed or developing countries. Similarly, it was seen toothless because it had no binding commitments as to emission control targets and timetables. Nevertheless, the adoption of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) as the final outcome of the first phase of the negations was not the end of the story. Rather it was the beginning of a long journey towards arresting the problems of global warming as and when circumstances necessitated, supported by global collective efforts. The process would remain alive, and adequate provisions were accommodated in the framework convention, opened for signature at the UNCED in June 1992. As the First Chairman

of AOSIS, Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Vanuatu to the UN, Robert van Lierop remarked "it's not the most desirable package but it is the achievable one" (quoted in Williams, 33, 1992). These comments echoed those of the Executive Director of UNEP, Elizabeth Dowdeswell, about the outcome of the phase of climate change negotiations, she said, that "while [it was] not perfect, [it] was the best that could be expected at that moment in time" (Dowdeswell and Kinley, 118, 1994). On overall it contained general statements embroiled with wishful thinking. Although the convention contained no mandatory commitments it calls for state parties to adopt voluntary commitments towards emission reduction (UNFCCC, Article 4 (c); Firor and Jacobsen 140, 2002). Article 2 describes the objective of the convention as follows:

> Stabilization of greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. Such a level should be achieved within a time-frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production is not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner (UNFCCC, Article 2).

The ultimate convention was hailed by many with optimistic views as a success (see analysis by Dowdeswell and Kinley 1994; Djoghlaf, 100, 1994) or at least set in motion a process of regime-building and international cooperation to this effect.

Undisputedly, by adopting a framework convention the world acknowledged the gravity of the problem expected from the danger of global warming, the need to collectively work for arresting the problem, the moral obligation for capable countries to assist incapable countries to adapt and help mitigate the problem (UNFCCC, Article 4 [3]). Innovative and new principles were introduced to international law such as the 'precautionary' principle and the principle of 'common but differentiated responsibilities' (UNFCCC, Article 3 (1) and (3)). It also spells out financial mechanisms (UNFCCC, Article II) and settlement of disputes (UNFCCC, Article 14) which were required for implementation of the convention. As for SIDS, the convention recognises their precarious fate in the wake of climate change and calls the parties to the convention to give full consideration to the small island countries in

helping with funding, insurance and transfer of technology to cope with adverse effects of climate change (UNFCCC, Article 4 (8)). Undeniably the greatest strength of the climate convention is the open-ended kind of provision accommodated for further negotiations with convention parties for the adoption of additional protocols or instruments as needed (UNFCCC, Article 15).

The UNFCCC came into effect almost two years after its adoption on 21 March 1994. Coming into force also gave rise to a number of institutions that would serve to translate objectives into action. The most important offshoot was the future governing body of the convention known as the Conference of Parties (COP). This body has assumed the task of further negotiations in the post-convention period and manages implementation of the commitments. Two additional subsidiary bodies were established to provide advice to COP namely, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technical Advice (SBSTA) and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI). The SBSTA is to feed COP with advice on scientific, technological and methodological aspects of the convention (Climate Change Secretariat, 11-12, 2000). The convention also formed a bureau which is elected by COP at the start of each session as a coordinating body of work for COP as well as subsidiary bodies. The bureau consists of 11 members, one place of which is reserved for SIDS (Climate Change Secretariat, 14, 2000).

These institutions are served by a secretariat based in the host city of Bonn, Germany. However, as the most important outcome of the convention, a financial mechanism was assigned to Global Environment Facility established in 1990 by the World Bank, United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) and UNEP. It was supposed to function on an interim basis to provide funds on a grant or concessional basis to help developing countries to implement the convention and which was made permanent in 1998 by a meeting of COP 4 (Climate Change Secretariat, 15, 2000).

As the body charged with the entry into force of the UNFCCC, negotiations continued with COP meeting annually since 1995. The first meeting of COP spawned a renewed process towards negotiating a protocol that would subscribe binding commitments. The meeting had one important submission for consideration, the draft protocol by AOSIS for adopting a timetable for reduction of emissions. The protocol advocated

20 percent reduction of emissions of the 1990 level by 2005 (Werksman, 2004; Slade, 1996). It was aimed to build on the convention as a protocol rather than an amendment with specific commitments on the part of developed countries (Slade, 1996). However, the US rejected the protocol saying it was unrealistic and unachievable. The COP 9 nevertheless adopted what was called the Berlin Mandate, under which parties agreed to enter "into negotiations for reducing emissions through quantitative targets and timelines" as set during the COP 3 meeting in December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan (Climate Change Secretariat, 16, 2004). In the meantime the Second Assessment Report of the IPCC was released in December 1995. It reconfirmed the human-induced global warming and "gave impetus to completing an agreement" (Firor and Jacobsen, 145, 2002). This generated a positive climate at the COP 2 meeting held in Geneva in July 1996. However, the climax for adopting a legally binding commitment was reached in December 1997 as COP 3 adopted what was called the Kyoto Protocol. It subscribes for the first time legally binding commitments on the part of developed countries mentioned in UNFCCC as Annex I countries (Climate Change Secretariat, 16, 2004). The target was five percent below 1990 levels during the timetable period 2008 to 2012 (The Kyoto Protocol, Article 3 (1).

Despite the Kyoto Protocol committing the developing country party (Annex I countries) to binding targets, the historic COP 3 meeting left details of the enforcement procedure pending, to be finalised in successive meetings (Firor and Jacobsen, 145, 2002). In 2001 the IPCC released a Third Assessment Report which reduced the scientific uncertainty relating to the extent and scale of climate change (Climate Change Secretariat) and disclosed that global average temperature would increase by the year 2100 "disturbingly higher than any earlier assessments" (Firor and Jacobsen, 149, 2002). The Kyoto Protocol suffered another blow in 2001 when the US government changed and a new administration rejected the Kyoto Protocol. Nevertheless, in March 2005, the Kyoto Protocol entered into force with its ratification by the Russian Federation in November 2004. This marks the drawing of a new era of legally binding action to mitigate global warming and its dire consequence of climate change. The successive meetings since adoption of the Kyoto Protocol of COP 3 in 1997 have been discussing the unfinished details of enforcement procedures and further streamlining the complimentary action required.

Indeed, the climate change negotiations have attracted much attention and cooperation on the part of the international community since the mid-1980s when scientists began to blow the whistle and alerted the world to the impinging threat of global warming. It has been a complex issue that touches the economic life of all countries big or small, endangers the world with environmental threats, urges unprecedented cooperation amongst the states and non-state actors, and led previously marginalised states of SIDS into the international limelight as microcosms of the expected fate of the planet Earth.

Role of SIDS in UNFCCC Negotiations

This section analyses the participation and contributions of SIDS in the climate change negotiations, in order to establish their role in the process, and to assess its influence and success in the negotiations. The negotiation period reviewed is divided into three phases; pre-convention phase, convention negotiation phase and post convention phase. The research mainly focuses however on the most important period of the climate change negotiation process beginning with the political speech made by the President of the Maldives at the 42nd UNGA in October 1987 up until the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol containing the commitments to arrest the problem of climate change.

Pre-convention Phase

The SIDS came into the big picture of the climate change issue with a groundbreaking political speech made by the President of the tiny island republic of the Maldives, Maumoon Abdul Gayoom in October 1987, who made history in the multilateral cooperation at the UN by becoming the first head of state or government to address the issue at a political forum such as the UNGA (Nash, 48, 2005, Desai 1996, Stovall, 1996). He was prompted to make this diplomatic move having been alerted by "traumatic experiences of environmental disturbance" in his low lying homeland two metres above sea level, in the year 1987. He further explained that unusual "tidal

wave action has risen alarmingly" and "inflicted extensive and unprecedented damage throughout the country" (Gayoom, 1987b).

President Gayoom made a plea with his speech stating that the Maldives "did not contribute to the impending catastrophe.... We cannot save ourselves' [but with] vital collective commitment (Gayoom, 1987b). The plea was made at an opportune time as the 42nd UNGA met in a special debate to discuss issues of the environment and development, and to mark the launch of the widely acclaimed environmental study entitled 'Our Common Future', the report of the UN constituted (1983) World Commission on Environment and Development. The speech attracted the attention of the world community to the plight of SIDS in the wake of climate change and created awareness among SIDS towards making efforts to explore the dynamics of the issue and possible responses. With this diplomatic initiative by the Maldives a rising trend of environmental activism amongst SIDS became visible in regional and international relations. This activism can be characterised as a three dimensional strategy: 1) to explore the gravity of the problem through scientific cooperation from UN agencies; 2) to mobilise efforts within SIDS for collective action to address the problem; and 3) to raise their plight and lobby for urgent global action through an international campaign.

The first hallmark of this environmental activism was unleashed in the form of eco-diplomacy by Malta in the UNGA, striking right at the heart of global diplomacy in 1988. Malta proposed the issue of climate change be placed on the agenda of the 43rd session of UNGA on 9 September 1988 which resulted in consideration of the item at the plenary of the UNGA. In line with the historic initiative Malta made in 1967 for Law of the Sea under the banner of common heritage of mankind, the more recent initiative as well was proposed as "conservation of climate as part of the common heritage of mankind" (Birnie, 2, 1991). The consideration of a newly tabled agenda item on climate change concluded with the adoption of a resolution (UNGA Resolution 43/53) proposed and sponsored again by Malta, urging the international community to initiate action towards negotiating an international convention (Birnie, 2, 1991; Borione and Ripert, 79, 1994).

Taplin (273, 1994) states this was the very first "most important international move in initiating the Framework Convention on Climate Change". Nevertheless a formal call for action towards negotiating a convention at the UN did not come until 21 December 1990, when the 45th session of UNGA adopted an action-oriented and time-bound resolution (Resolution 45/212; 21 December 1990) establishing INC as the negotiating process (Stovall, 5, 1996; Djoghlaf, 101, 1996). In the meantime SIDS intensified their efforts towards greater understanding of the problem and mobilisation of unity within the group. By then one of the forerunner subsidiary bodies of the UN with respect to the issue of climate change (besides WMO), UNEP, was already engaged in conducting in-depth research in analysing the specific threats resulting from global warming to the low-lying island states and coastal regions. Two case studies conducted by UNEP in this regard were studies that relate to SIDS, namely one on the Maldives (1988) and the other on Pacific Island states (1989), and they were eye-opening events for SIDS (Pernetta and Sestini, 11, 1989). The two-member team that conducted a case study on the Maldives was "struck by the clearly articulated and frequently expressed concern of many Maldivians about current environmental problems" (Pernetta and Sestini 3, 1989). Similarly the two teams that studied Pacific Island states noted that by May 1989, many Pacific Island states already had national awareness raising programmes in place as well as impact prediction for planning and policy-making (Pernetta and Hughes, 11, 1989).

Pacific Island states began to profile concerns to this effect at the 18th South Pacific Forum Summit in Tonga in July 1988 and continued thereafter in successive summits (Stovall, 1996). Parallel efforts were made by the Maldives as its President raised the issue of climate change and its perils on the country at the Third Summit Meeting of the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation held in Kathmandu, Nepal in November 1987 (Gayoom 1987b). The UNEP's case studies series under its Regional Seas Programme led to the first consultative meeting of the Pacific region held in March 1989 in the capital of the Marshall Islands, Majuro. It was commented that this meeting under the auspices of the South Pacific Regional Environment Programme (SPREP) could provide a model to be followed by other regions (Pernetta and Hughes 11, 1989). This was not a political event but a regional meeting attended by high level government officials and scientific advisors to discuss the study carried out by UNEP and brief participants on the issue. However, a second meeting known

as the first Inter-Government Meeting on Climate Change and Sea Level Rise of SPREP members took place on the island of Majuro in July 1989. The end product of this political meeting was the Majuro statement which recognised threats posed by climate change as "catastrophic, threatening... the very existence of low lying countries" (Taplin 273, 1994). The statement also called on the developed countries, whom they observed as causing the problem, to provide the South Pacific island states with financial, scientific, and technological resources to deal with the problem (Taplin, 1994). The delegates at the meeting were impatient to propel constructive and timely action to arrest the problem, as the Ambassador of Vanuatu to the UN, Robert van Lierop echoed at the meeting: "we do not have time to wait for the conclusive proof. The proof we fear may kill us" (Buckley, 35, 1992).

Another swift response to this urgency was from the SIDS themselves as within four months delegates of SIDS from four regions (Indian Ocean, Pacific, Caribbean and Mediterranean) gathered at a ministerial conference hosted by the Maldives in the capital, Male' in November 1989. At the end of the Small States Conference on Sea Level Rise, the representatives of 14 SIDS issued an action-packed statement called the 'Male' Declaration'. It stressed that low-lying coastal and small island states would "face a decisively greater predicament" due to climate change and so called on the international community for negotiations towards a framework convention on climate change to begin as soon as possible (Male' Declaration). The conference also decided to mount a campaign to raise awareness in the international community about the danger posed to SIDS (Male' Declaration 2-3, 1989). To follow these goals the conference constituted what was called 'Action Groups'. The action group comprising of Maldives, Mauritius, Kiribati, Malta, Trinidad and Tobago met on the same island, Male', to hold the first meeting of the group in January 1991, one year after the Male' Declaration was adopted (Stovall, 7, 1996).

The historic conference that mobilised the commitment of SIDS to work in unity in addressing the problem set in motion a political momentum amongst SIDS "for what has proved to be the genesis of the world's newest and on the face of it, least likely power block" (Lean, 4, 1994).

SIDS continued their efforts in gathering momentum towards their goal of being heard at appropriate international forums and took action appropriately without waiting for conclusive scientific evidence to arrive. A senior official of Vanuatu, Ernest Bani thus attended IPCC Response Strategies Working Group meeting in Geneva in October 1989, and appealed to the delegates "to prevent [people from the South Pacific] not to become endangered species or the dinosaurs of the next century" (cited in Helu, 13, 1991). Similarly Foreign Secretary of Kiribati, Peter Timeon travelled to Bergen, Sweden, in May 1990 to make a plea at a scientific meeting called to discuss the 'Brundtland Report'. His "passionate statement to the plenary, on the first day brought an unprecedented round of sympathetic applause from many of the 300 plus delegates", said Leggett (34, 1990). In November 1990 came the opportune time for SIDS to group themselves into a political coalition during the Second World Climate Conference held in Geneva. Many delegates from SIDS utilised the opportunity to its maximum when Lincoln Myers, Environmental Minister, of Trinidad and Tobago convened a side meeting for all SIDS attending the conference (Taplin 274, 1994). This meeting materialised the foundation laid in the Maldives towards adopting a common voice for SIDS (Stovall, 5, 1996). Thus AOSIS was born creating political history in the international relations of SIDS. It was said to be another initiative made by CARICOM and SPREP to build on to the Male' initiative (Stovall, 1996).

The name AOSIS was proposed by Lincoln Mayers. Lean says "AOSIS was quickly blooded.... succeeded at the World Climate Conference in getting carbon dioxide mentioned in the conference declaration" (Lean, 5, 1994). The coalition spawned into a 'powerful pressure group' with an initial membership of 28 states (Buckley, 36, 1992). Highlighting the growing anxiety amongst SIDS with increasing scientific consensus on the issue of human induced global warming, the Prime Minister of Tuvalu, Bikenibeu Paeniu, said the following as one of the key speakers at the conference:

> We in the island nations cannot afford to wait for more studies and research. We would like to have firm and pragmatic solutions to curb the negative impact of climate changes on our lives.... We ....contribute little or nothing to the problem

yet we will be the first to suffer. Our survival is at stake', Paeniu, 528-529, 1991).

The Prime Minister of Malta, Edward Fenech-Adami, expressed similar sentiments at the conference. Elaborating on the Maltese initiative in 1988 that introduced Resolution 43/53 he said the resolution did not contain the word "convention" per se but "possible framework" because many doubted at that time whether a convention was actually needed. He held the conference as a testimony to call for a convention which was indeed stated in the conference Declaration (WMO and UNEP, paragraphs 28, 1990). The Declaration recognised the precarious plight of small island states (paragraphs 2 and 27) and encouraged AOSIS to confine its eco-diplomacy towards pragmatic international response (Stovall, 6, 1996).

The repeated references to the plight of small island states in the Ministerial Declaration, in particular dedicating paragraph 27 of the Declaration addressing particular problems faced by 'low-lying coastal and small vulnerable countries, reflected the involvement of island diplomacy and environmental activism generated by SIDS at the conference. No previous conference document had made repeated references to the plight of SIDS with regard to climate change, but this Declaration mentioned the words "survival in small island states" twice (see paragraphs 2 and 8 of the Ministerial Declaration, 1990). The call made by the conference was quickly answered by the UNGA in the next month (21 December 1990) by adopting Resolution 45/212 establishing INC as the mandatory body to negotiate a framework convention on climate change. The resolution established a special voluntary fund for participation of developing countries in the negotiation meetings, in particular the SIDS (INC Resolution 45/212).

The Second World Climate Conference marked a new hallmark of AOSIS or SIDS environmental diplomacy which began to enjoy high visibility at the climate change negotiations. The coalition also gained a high profile as an important negotiating bloc that would influence the course of negotiations thereafter with their voting power. Thus it could be agreed that the efforts generated by SIDS in the pre-convention negotiation phase set an encouraging path for them to ride higher up the ladder of challenges in the second phase of the process, the convention negotiation phase. The

formation of AOSIS marked a new era for IR by the most environmentally vulnerable, resource-poor and militarily weak SIDS. It was a most applicable vehicle for SIDS to champion their cause of environmental protection against climate change. It also demonstrated their determination to ensure their rights are protected in the international decision-making process.

Convention Negotiation Phase

The Inter-Governmental Negotiating Committee (INC) comprising of accredited delegates of UN member states jump-started the formal process of negotiations within two months of adoption of the concerned resolution by the 45th session of UNGA on 21 December 1990. The SIDS were fully prepared to participate in the negotiations and establish an early international regime that would take care of emerging concerns emanating from climate change. Since the first INC meeting in February held in Chantilly, USA the SIDS spoke with one voice under the banner of AOSIS. Prior to the first meeting of the INC, AOSIS delegates attended a two day briefing and information session organised by a British NGO called Centre for International Environmental Law (CIEL) at King's College, London (Taplin, 275, 1994).

Vanuatu's Ambassador to the UN, Robert van Lierop, helped to set up this information session and was later elected at the same meeting as the first Chairman of AOSIS. The first meeting of INC failed to take up any substantive issues to discuss as it was primarily occupied with organisational matters. Nevertheless, AOSIS tabled a set of principles and objectives to be incorporated in the framework convention. These principles formed the foundation of AOSIS participation in the climate regime according to the Third Chairman of AOSIS, Samoan Ambassador to the UN Tuiloma Neroni Slade (Slade, 2003). The principles or objectives included the following.

- the principle of preventive action.
- the precautionary principle
- the polluter pay principle and state responsibility
- the duty to cooperate
- equity
- the principle of common but differentiated responsibility.

Speaking at the first session of INC, the Chairman of the AOSIS, Vanuatu Ambassador van Lierop reiterated SIDS earnest desire to expedite a convention in the face of alarming urgency of the problem of global warming as Ministers expressed at the Second World Climate conference. "We do not have the luxury of waiting for conclusive proof, the proof we fear will kills us" said the Chairman of the AOSIS at the meeting (Lean, 5, 1994). The AOSIS made a number of submissions and took the floor at the negotiations on almost each issue of concern discussed (Ronneberg, 2004, Werksman, 2004). However, individual states still had the opportunity to speak on an independent basis if those states deemed this necessary (King, 2004). It was nevertheless exceptional rather than the norm as SIDS "did speak with one voice 99 percent of the time" (King, 2004). AOSIS would meet two hours before each day's negotiation meetings began, normally at 8 or 9 am, to hold informal consultation within the group to form common positions and discuss emerging concerns or issues. One of the delegates of AOSIS, Wayne King, a former diplomat of the Cook Islands, saw AOSIS "as a very constructive process" while another NGO analyst Jacob Werksman says 'they did really keep their unified voice' (Werksman, 2004). 'Since its inception, AOSIS has always advocated reductions in carbon dioxide emissions accompanied by specific targets and timetables' said the Third Chairman of AOSIS, Ambassador Slade (1995). The first INC did not make much headway to the aspirations of AOSIS members, but they had an optimistic view of the process as the first INC established approximately 1.5 million dollars special fund to facilitate participation of developing countries, especially SIDS and other least developed countries (LDCS) (Taplin, 276, 1994).

More positive momentum was generated in the second session of INC in Geneva in June 1991: AOSIS Chairman van Lierop was elected as co-chair of Working Group II that dealt with legal and institutional mechanisms for implementation (Stovall, 7, 1996). This was an historic achievement for SIDS as Stovall comments "first time that island states as a group attained leadership in a UN Forum" (Stovall, 7 1996). The election to the Chair of the Working Group II of AOSIS candidature was observed by some analysts as recognition of SIDS case as most vulnerable states to the impacts of climate change and "an acknowledgement of newly formed AOSIS" (Taplin, 276, 1994). AOSIS elaborated on the submissions made at INC 1, covering

six basic principles of its presentation and provided a framework structure as to how the expected convention should be developed. However, AOSIS encountered difficulties not only selling their ideas to developed countries like the US, but also within the bloc of developing countries, known as G77 (Dasgupta, 135, 1994). This resulted in failing to arrive at a single text for Negotiations as well as divisions within the coalition of G77. The deepening division between the fossil fuel dependent economies of OPEC and climatically endangered AOSIS reached a climax at the Third INC meeting in Nairobi, (September 1991) when an OPEC representative made an offensive comment about SIDS. He was reported to have said "developing countries cannot sacrifice their economic well-being for the sake of a mere three million people on small islands" (Stovall, 8, 1996). This remark upset the AOSIS group for whom apologies were extended by responsible fellow members of G77. AOSIS renewed its efforts to overcome such bottlenecks occurring within the fatherly coalition of G77 and continued informal contacts with like-minded states both within the G77 and Western Europe. The central focus of the AOSIS diplomacy centred around cultivating a precautionary approach to the convention and prescribing the importance of adaptation mechanisms (Werksman, 1994; King, 1994).

The US and the fossil fuel dependent states of OPEL pursued what was called "no regret" policy in place of a precautionary principle (Taplin, 276, 1994). The OPEC countries were reluctant to adopt any real commitments to emission abatement fearing that it would cause adverse impacts on the oil market and the revenue they generated (Djoghlaf, 106, 1994). On the other hand, the US was concerned about the change it may cause to the lifestyle of the country and incurring painful economic costs in alternating cheap fossil fuel to cleaner technology (Rosa and Munasinghe,, 3, 2002; Bodansky, 29, 2001). These interests were at loggerheads with AOSIS interests as AOSIS pursued a friendly environment and action-oriented goals. Their advocacy in the negotiation session was described by Taplin as follows:

> The six-point AOSIS plan of minimum conditions for climate convention also emphasized: immediate and significant cuts in carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gas emissions from industrialized countries; equitable funding mechanisms which recognise the need to compensate vulnerable island countries; transfer of environmentally sound technologies; the application of the "polluter

pays" principle in compensation for the consequences of climate change; and commitment to binding and meaningful energy conservation and efficiency requirements, and a development of alternative energy sources. These ideals were intensively advocated by AOSIS at the Third INC session only to find they need to be continued in the successive session (Taplin 276, 1994).

In the fourth session of the INC, AOSIS took an innovative initiative by submitting a proposal that could offset loss and damage caused by climate change. It was a proposal for establishing an international insurance scheme to recover costs from loss resulting from impacts of climate change. As a matter of fact while the Fourth session of INC was in progress in December 1991 in Geneva, Cyclone Val hit Samoa, a tragic event, but a fitting testimony for the AOSIS cause (Stovall, 8, 1996). The insurance scheme tabled for consideration of the negotiations was modelled after conventions relating to oil pollution and nuclear damage which were already in place (Wilford, 2, 1993). The move was prompted by the underwriting of climate prone investments in island and coastal states by insurance companies. The proposal, though tempting for many of the climate-prone developing states did not gain much currency except sympathy for the plight from those states historically responsible to the causes of climate change and capable with means to help (Buckley, 36, 1992; Taplin, 276, 1994). The debate between the developed North and the developing South continued in the Fourth session with arousing contentions on various issues as to what measures are best to be adopted. As the steaming controversy on the issue within the coalition of developing countries reached a climax, the Chairman of AOSIS staged a walk-out of a late negotiation session in Geneva when "a single oil producing member of the group stubbornly blocked all discussion of key points in the AOSIS proposals" (News item on Ministerial Conference held in September 2000, Kitakyushu, Japan).

As the negotiations progressed, AOSIS began to be challenged with in its ambitious goals by the powerful US and the OPEC countries that took refuge on the US-led "no regret" position (Taplin, 275, 1994). The US arguments were built around 'scientific uncertainty' that exist in the scientific models utilised to predict scenarios and imprecise understanding of the real cause of global warming; whether the unfolding process is induced by human intervention or is a natural cyclical process (Paterson, 159-162, 1992; Lanchbery and Victor, 30, 1995).

When the climate change negotiations proceeded to the Fifth session of INC, drawing close to the preset deadline for the June 1992 UNCED, the process appeared to be leading to a stalemate (Djoghlaf, 102, 1994). The skilful manoeuvring applied by the Chairman had rescued the process from heading towards a deadlock, paralysed by conflicting economic interests and contentious positions, pursued by various coalitions taking part in the negotiations (Djoghlaf, 103, 1994). The Chairman enlarged the bureau of INC and organised intensive informal consultations at the eleventh hour. Some analysts credit these contingency manoeuvres applied by the Chairman as overcoming the deadlock and reaping success to have it born as at least a framework convent (see comments by Djoghlaf, 102, 1994; Dowdeswell and Kinley, 118-119, 1994).

AOSIS organised a popular party known as "Island Night" during the first half of the last round of negotiations (5th session of INC in February 1992 in New York (Stovall, 9, 1996). This was another "publicity stunt" organised to drum up support from developed countries. Later in the second half (resumed session) of the 5th session of INC in April, the negotiating parties were able to remove all the brackets in the negotiating text and agree on a text proposed by the Chairman after extensive and marathon speedy informal consultations. The bureau of INC was enlarged to include representatives from key negotiating groups behind closed doors for these consultations. Eventually a number of delegations who still had resentment gave up in the spirit of cooperation and concluding work of INC to the fast approaching deadline. Thus, the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) was adopted by consensus on 9 May 1992.

When the UNFCCC was finally adopted, AOSIS became one of the biggest contributors to the convention-making process and in turn subscribing to it as equally important stakeholder. From day one of the negotiation process, AOSIS took part actively, making substantial bargains as the frontline states to the crisis that may result from the phenomenon of global warming and its twin danger of climate change and sea level rise. Two leading proponents of the AOSIS coalition, the first chairman Robert van Lierop and current Ambassador of Antigua and Barbuda, John W. Ashe claimed that UNFCCC 'represented a singular triumph for the geographically

dispersed group of island states and low-lying coastal developing countries' (Ashe and Lierop, 209, 1999). Furthermore, they elaborated on the triumph achieved at the negotiations as follows:

> For the first time in the history of the United Nations, a group of small states, hitherto relegated to the sidelines, was able to develop a specific negotiating agenda addressing areas which are of overriding concern to them and succeeded in having those concerns incorporated in a legally binding Convention of historic importanc (Ashe and Lierop, 209, 1999).

In the same breath, they also acknowledged the fact that they fought an uphill battle against the stubborn industrialised countries of the North in the negotiations who watered down the commitments which otherwise would have given it effective teeth to bite against emission of greenhouse gases. For when the convention was adopted it lacked any target or timetable for control of emissions. It also failed to subscribe clear "financial provisions for adaptive response measures to the adverse impacts of climate change" (Ashe and Lierop, 1999). The AOSIS saw it, however, as a success because many had doubted whether the negotiations would end up having a convention until the last minute when some hope was raised (King, 2004). It was also the first phase of a continuous process which did not appear to stampede the inspirations of AOSIS and their cause for environmental protection against climate change and sea level rise. Most positively, the first phase has provided the opportunity for SIDS to group themselves as a united bargaining force and develop clear goals and strategies for action on their part. Its success does not only count for these intangible elements but also a number of tangible elements. According to Ashe and van Lierop 10 out of 12 objectives that were set by the AOSIS for negations in the first phase were largely achieved as they were incorporated into the convention framework. These objectives included the following:

(i) Recognition of particular problems and needs of small island countries
(ii) Addressing the special needs of small island countries in the body of the convention
(iii) Commitment to the precautionary principle

(iv) Parties' commitment to the stabilisation of concentrations of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere

(v) Requirement for parties to conduct environmental impact assessment.

(vi) Establishment of an international climate change information gathering network

(vii) Commitment by parties to guaranteeing states and individuals access to information on climate change

(viii) Establishment of funding mechanisms to assist developing countries to comply with the terms of the convention

(ix) Obligations for transfer of appropriate environmental technologies

(x) Institutional mechanism for implementation

(xi) Provisions for detailed protocols on specific issues

(xii) Application for 'polluter pays' principle.

Overall, 10 out 12 objectives were incorporated into the framework convention, excluding the "polluter pays" principle and a single fund for compensation to developing countries for foregoing development opportunities (Ashe and Lierop, 219, 1999). Nonetheless, the SIDS coalition of AOSIS made laudable achievements at the first phase of the climate regime. Most important of these was the specific recognition of the status of SIDS in terms of climate vulnerability given by the UNFCCC in its 12th and 19th preambles paragraphs and Article 3.2; Article 4.4; and Article 4.8 (a) (Climate Change Secretariat, UNFCCC Geneva). The convention was observed as a success by SIDS because it was negotiated "in an incredibly short time (15 months) and succeeded in gaining worldwide acceptance of a legal agreement unprecedented in scope" (SPREP, 1996). It was also negotiated in difficult circumstances as the SPREP Meeting Report (1992) remarks, "Science drives the concerns about climate change but economies the policy responses". The SIDS and the developing countries heavily depend on the science defined by IPCC but the science was not so helpful in devising strategies for states to overcome economic challenges (SPREP Regional Meeting Report, 1996). The Convention fell short of expectation of SIDS although it was accepted by AOSIS as what was only achievable at that particular stage (AOSIS, Declaration of First AOSIS Summit, Rio de Janeiro, 12 June 1992) primarily because of the US's non-negotiable stance on commitments (Taplin, 277, 1994). The First Chairman of AOSIS expressed mixed reaction to the

outcome of the first stage of the negotiations. He said, "it was not most desirable package, but it is the achievable one" (Taplin, 227, 1994). Furthermore he highlighted the nature and complexity of the process, "The convention sets in train a process, that can be added to, and evolve later into what is absolutely necessary" (Williams, quoted in Taplin, 227, 1994). In sum, it could be argued that the first stage of the negotiations have led into three positive outcomes as far as SIDS were concerned. It has: 1) raised the profile of SIDS in international environmental negotiations; 2) mobilised their efforts into a political force with clear goals under the banner of AOSIS; and 3) raised awareness within the members and amongst negotiating parties as to the plight of SIDS in the face of the twin dangers of global warming, climate change and sea level rise.

Post-convention Phase

The SIDS having scored modest success in the first phase of negotiations awaited impatiently to begin a more vigorous climate campaign at the post-convention phase. During this period they continued the three-track strategy they had span off in the early stage of agenda setting: 1) the eco-diplomacy at the formal negotiation process; 2) informal political lobby in capitals of developed countries; and 3) build-up of network by means of inter-regional and intra-regional meetings of AOSIS states.

The most prolific initiative in the history of the climate change negotiations came six months in advance of the first meeting of the Conference of Parties (COP 1) when AOSIS in September 1994 submitted a draft protocol to the framework convention which was later formally presented in February 1995 by the Second Chairperson of AOSIS, ambassador Mrs. Annette des Isles of Trinidad and Tobago. The central element of this AOSIS Protocol was the objective of setting an emission abatement target of 20 percent reduction of carbon dioxide from 1990 levels by year 2005 as first step (Slade, 1995; Stovall 13, 1996). This protocol did not seek mandatory commitments from the fellow developing countries but from the developed countries who were held responsible for major emissions of greenhouse gases. This Protocol did not find an easy ride within the coalition of G77 itself as the OPEC countries raised concern fearing loss of revenue from petroleum exports due to implications that could result from such ambitious goals (Slade, 1997). For AOSIS this was an ethical

and moral move warranted by science, economically feasible and politically justifiable (Slade, 1997). On the other hand for OPEC, negotiations are political in nature, leading to economic defensiveness (SPREP, 1996). This led to a split within the coalition of developing countries (G77) as the supporters of AOSIS Protocol distanced themselves as a separate bloc known as the Green Group comprising 77 states (King, 2004; Stovall, 1996). The AOSIS protocol was the only formal proposal before the meeting of COP1 in Berlin in 1995 (Slade, 1995) which provided indeed food for thought. However, besides eyeballing by many delegations, except Germany and the Green Group, the Protocol could not make headway. Nevertheless the initiative by AOSIS was not totally abandoned but led into a process known as the Berlin Mandate. By the Mandate COP 1 established a new subsidiary body known as the Ad hoc Group on the Berlin Mandate with the task of drafting "a protocol or another legal instrument for adoption at COP 3 in 1997" (Climate Change Secretariat, 2, 2005).

After the AOSIS Protocol submission to COP 1, the AOSIS intensified international advocacy campaign with financial help from some European like-minded NGOs such as the World Council of Churches, Greenpeace and the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF). A three member ambassadorial delegation of AOSIS toured six European capitals meeting public media, NGO representatives and holding informal consultations with government officials. This tour was undertaken from 26 February to 3 March 1995 with the objective of soliciting support from like-minded European states for the AOSIS Protocol. Similarly the Vice Chairman of AOSIS travelled to Canada in May 1995 at the invitation of Government of Canada to address the Canadian Council of Ministers of the Environment. In his address Ambassador Slade made a plea for support of the AOSIS Protocol which underpins the so-called "Toronto Target" as its basis for commitment to reduce emissions. He further explained to the Canadian audience that the 'IPCC predictions of increased temperature means that if global warming goes on unchecked, some of the small states might cease to exist, within a human lifetime' (Slade, 15-16, 1995). Ambassador Slade received both a warm reception for this address as well as a standing ovation at the end of the address.

One AOSIS delegate from the Federated States of Micronesia (FSM) who took part in the informal European lobby tour (Stovall, 15, 1996) hints that the AOSIS strategy at the formal negotiations should shift from an emotional stance to a thoughtful stance in order to disallow marginalisation of a group that had had its hey day and may begin to lose the sympathy from international community.. He was also pessimistic of AOSIS winning through the bargain process with its Protocol as the "scientific basis" for the negotiations "was not sufficiently compelling to override political considerations" (Stovall, 1996). For these reasons, the AOSIS Protocol could not gain currency at the COP 1 meeting but momentum was not totally lost either. Eventually, the Green Group in collaboration with OECD like-minded countries worked out a deal which shaped into the Berlin Mandate (Stovall, 1996). The Berlin Mandate was another debate process that kept negotiations alive using the AOSIS Protocol and other inputs to arrive at a legal instrument by the Third COP in Kyoto Japan. This document adopted in COP 1 known as Berlin Mandate established an ad hoc working group which began work in August 1995. When the delegates met in July 1996 in Geneva for the Second Session of the COP, the Second Assessment Report of IPCC was available. The Report confirmed long known impacts on most vulnerable states resulting from human-induced global warming (Slade, 1996). AOSIS was quick to capitalise on the conclusions of the Report and take refuge in it towards intensification of its eco-diplomacy to inscribe legally binding commitments to the UNFCCC with clear targets and scheduled timetable for emission reduction by industrialised developed countries. The Vice-chairman of AOSIS speaking at the Meeting of COP 2 to this effect had the following to say:

> The Second Assessment Report (SAR) sounds a clear warning that we can no longer indiscriminately use the atmosphere as a dump for humankind's waste .... On the basis of the SAR estimates and projects, we believe that the targets and timetables proposed in the AOSIS Protocol remain credible and achievable (Slade, 1996).

The Second COP session in Geneva endorsed the SAR by adopting the outcome of the session known as the Geneva Declaration (Climate Change Secretariat, Information Sheet, 2005).

Following entry into force of the UNFCCC, a Bureau was established as a subsidiary body to guide the functioning of COP sessions. Eleven members comprised this Bureau: two are nominated from each of the 5 UN regional groups and "one place is reserved for representative of SIDS" (Climate Change Secretariat, 2000). According to Werksman, this was one of the significant successes achieved by AOSIS at the climate change negotiations and the most visible imprint of their influence and importance scored at the process (Werksman, 2004). By gaining a permanent foothold on the supreme body of the framework convention by AOSIS, the group secured access to the hierarchy of the decision-making and supervisory processes within the mechanisms of the Climate regime. AOSIS was very vocal and intensively lobbied parties attending the Berlin Mandate process which ran two and half years before culmination into the Kyoto Protocol, adopted in December in the city of Kyoto, Japan. This protocol gave "baby teeth" to the framework convention and it was received with mixed reaction by the strongest advocate of more promising commitments, AOSIS. The chief negotiator and the Third Chairman of AOSIS described the reach on of AOSIS for Kyoto Protocol as follows:

> There is no denying that by the Kyoto protocol the international community has taken major political and policy decisions, a necessary first step, ... Kyoto has also set a future agenda that calls for a great deal of further work .....we will confirm to push for the implementation and indeed the strengthening of these commitments (Slade, 1998).

The Kyoto Protocol had enlarged two aspects of the climate regime: 1) the adoption of legally binding and quantified targets; and, 2) deployment of innovative but untested mechanisms (Slade, 1998). As for targets and timetables, the Kyoto Protocol subscribed to the abatement of greenhouse gas emissions by at least 5 percent from 1990 levels in the period 2008-2012 by Annex I parties to the UNFCCC. It only enlisted voluntary commitments for developing countries (Climate Change Secretariat 6-7, 2000). It also gave birth to three innovative "mechanisms", namely: 1) joint implementation; 2) emission trading; and 3) the clean development mechanism, all of which were aimed at Annex I Parties to help reduce the costs of meeting their emissions targets. These outcomes of the Kyoto process is commented by one analyst, John Hay as "win-win outcomes", which were favoured by industrialised

North while most developing countries see them "as a means to accelerate their development, in a sustainable and environmentally-sound manner" (Hay, 2, 1999). Details of enforcement of these mechanisms are yet to be understood and finalised (Firor and Jacobsen, 145, 2002). AOSIS prioritised these enforcement procedures to ensure these "untested mechanisms move forward in as transparent, accountable and effective a manner as possible" (Slade, 1998). The post Kyoto conferences have focused in these mechanisms as their pressing mandates. The Seventh Session of COP held in 2002 at Marrakash, Morocco, subsequently established two funds known as the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) Fund and Special Climate Change Fund. The Kyoto Protocol finally came in to effect in February 2005 with its ratification by the Russian Federation.

The role AOSIS had played in pushing through the negotiations since its submission of a draft protocol in late 1994 has been instrumental in giving skeleton and shape for the Kyoto Protocol according to one analyst of the process, Jacob Werksman (2004). Overall, SIDS has been a forerunner in the Climate change negotiations. All the 12 resource persons interviewed strongly believed that AOSIS was "torch bearer" of the process and "moral voice" whose climate diplomacy never waved down since becoming a bargaining force in 1990 in the form of AOSIS. Its contribution throughout the process of climate change negotiations provided impetus for discussions. They were the 'first movers' of the international response against climate change as stated below by the Third Chairman of AOSIS, Ambassador Slade.

- Maldives, host to one of the first Ministerial Declarations on the Impacts of Climate Change;
- Malta, sponsor of the UNGA Resolution that launched the Convention negotiations;
- Vanuatu, who submitted the first outline of elements for a Convention;
- Mauritius, the first state to ratify the Convention, followed quickly by Seychelles and the Marshall Islands;
- Trinidad and Tobago, sponsor of the AOSIS protocol that spurred the Berlin Mandate process;

- Fiji and Antigua and Barbuda, the first to ratify the Kyoto Protocol (Slade, 12 November, 1998).

The SIDS or AOSIS pursued a number of principles and strategies in the negotiations most of which were realised successfully (Ashe and Lierop, 1999; Slade, 1996). Two important strategies they advocated were the concepts of mitigation and adaptation, of which adaptation was of great importance for SIDS in meeting the challenges brought about by the twin perils of global warming – climate change and sea level rise. Mitigation refers to the option available for overcoming the changes through engineering and economic restructuring and related activities (Slade, 1996). The Clean Development Mechanism that gained a foothold after the Kyoto Protocol as an alternate mechanism for multi-party or bilateral co-operation in the area of emission reductions, incorporated adaptation requirements largely as a result of AOSIS's efforts (Slade, 2000).

The role of SIDS in the climate change negotiations has been impressive and contributory to the negotiation process as evidenced by the preceding discussion. They have created a large bargaining force in the name of AOSIS, controlling one-fifth of the voting power at the UN (Slade, 1997) and sought international recognition as a moral voice (Mackie, 2004) at the climate negotiations. This was apparent when SIDS secured a reserved seat on the bureau of COP and follow up institutions of the Kyoto Protocol (Werksman, 2004). The AOSIS coalition has been triumph in raising awareness amongst the SIDS themselves about the plight of SIDS in the face of climate change and spearheaded a proactive international advocacy in arresting the problem of climate change (Davis, 1996). As the Vice Chairman of INC has commented, "the most important group of developing countries which emerged as an actor in the INC negotiations was unquestionably the AOSIS" (Djoghlaf, 105, 1994). Another analyst and one time adviser to Tuvalu, Professor, Jackson Davis argues that AOSIS is "one of the potentially most important developments in international environmental diplomacy of the decade" and praised AOSIS as "played a key role in these negotiations" (Davis, 2-3, 1996). It may be fitting to quote Executive Secretary of Climate Change Secretariat, Joke Waller Hunter about SIDS in the negotiations. This sums up the initiating role played by SIDS or AOSIS which has earned them

prominent attention in international environmental relations and created headlines in the world media. These states were previously known to be sleepy, marginalised states of the world.

> Since the negotiations that led to the United Nations framework Convention on Climate Change began one group of parties has been particularly active and vocal: the small island developing states, or SIDS (Hunter, 2005).

In conclusion, this section has examined the role SIDS played in the process of climate change negotiations and establishes that they have played an important and contributory role that has had substantial impact on the outcome of both the UNFCCC and Kyoto Protocol. The next two sections investigate the factors that have facilitated this role and what elements can be counted as explanatory variables that determine the international behaviour of SIDS in IR.

Motivational Factors

Having established the fact that SIDS have played a proactive and contributory role in the climate change negotiations, this section analyses the data collected from 12 interviews with resource persons at the United Nations as well as documentation, to examine what factors were instrumental in facilitating this role. By applying thematic analyses and keyword searches of the data, two major types of factors were observed: 1) elements that triggered interest of SIDS in the issue of climate change and activated pre-emptive action towards addressing the issue that are clustered as pre-negotiation motivational factors; 2) elements that largely facilitated the participation and contribution of SIDS in the negotiation during the unwinding process. The first set of elements being motivational, this section examines the motivational factors and how they have influenced the behaviour and role of SIDS in relation to the issue of climate change.

Episodic Events

High on the list of motivational factors that triggered the interest of SIDS in the issue of climate change comes the events that unfolded around the world where SIDS are situated during the later half of the 1980s. The whistle blower to the precarious fate brought about by the climate change for SIDS was the President of the Maldives, Maumoon Abdul Gayoom. He was prompted to travel to the UN and other available international forums like the Commonwealth Summit of the South Asia Association for Regional Cooperation (SAARC) to raise the alarm to unprecedented events that awakened the tiny low-lying island state of the Maldives in 1987. The President of the Maldives became the first head of state or government to raise the issue of climate change at the highest international political forum known as the UNGA (similar comments were made by Stovall, 1986; Desai, 1998; Sopoaga, 2004).

In April 1987 the events that struck the world's lowest-lying nation above sea level (McFarlane, 501, 1991) the Maldives, skyrocketed the issue of global warming and its impacts of climate change to SIDS into the international scene. Unusual stormy waves washed ashore of the whole archipelago inundating large parts of those islands with floods and causing heavy damages. The damage incurred to infrastructure was estimated at around US $30 million (Gayoom, 4, 1995). The authorities in Maldives were strongly suspicious of global warming and its impacts on climate change as main cause for this unprecedented event in the country's known history (Gayoom, 9, 1992). The events coincided with predictions that scientists were making about anthropogenic interferences in nature and consequent impacts of global warming (Gayoom, 1987b).

The President of Maldives raised the plight of island states in the wake of these episodic events internationally by first addressing the matter at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting held in Vancouver in October 1987. Speaking of the sea level rise of about 50 centimetres to 2 meters (18 inches to 6 feet) in the next 100 years, he warned that such a rise "will be sufficient to submerge our entire country. It will be the death of a nation" (Gayoom, 1987b). By the time he rang the bell, the Maldives had experienced three episodes of high tidal swells, in April, June and September of 1987 (Gayoom, 1987b).

Two days after making the "Death of a Nation" speech at the Commonwealth Summit, the President of Maldives then flew to New York to address the matter at the UNGA special debate held to consider the Report by World Commission on Environment and Development, known as "Our Common Future". This debate was capitalised on as the most appropriate and timely forum to raise the environmental plight faced by SIDS in the face of global warming to the larger international community. At this debate, referring to scientific predictions he said greenhouse gases caused by human and industrial activities are raising the Earth's temperature and consequently change its climatic patterns. Such global warming would expand the oceans and raise the sea level by one metre within a century. President Gayoom's speeches delivered at the Commonwealth Summit and at the UNGA in 1987 marked the beginning of the climate diplomacy intensively pursued thereafter by SIDS towards the noble cause of environmental protection from climate change.

As the Undersecretary General for Economic and Social Affairs of the UN, Nitin Desai often credits, it was President Gayoom who brought to the attention of the world community the flight of SIDS in the wake of global environmental change (author heard him saying this in an oral statement to the UNGA Second Committee, 1998).

Besides the Maldives in the Indian Ocean, in the two frequently visited SIDS regions of the Caribbean and Pacific, episodic events unfolded in the late 1980's triggering a wave of concern about the phenomenon of climate change.

In 1987, Hurricane Sally in the Cook Islands alerted every country in the region. According to one of its former climate negotiators, Wayne King, coral bleaching was another major concern in the 1980's and early 1990's that caused extreme worry for some Pacific SIDS (King, 2004). In the Cook Islands the Aitutaki Lagoon had noticeable effects of coral bleaching (Ramsden, 2004). According to King, there was a big coverage in both the local and regional media that aroused interest in the issue of climate change and its predicted impacts. The regional agencies and funding institutions were quick to respond to assess the situations in the Pacific (King, 2004). Similar reasons were mentioned by the former chief negotiator of the Marshall Islands

in the climate change negotiations, Espen Ronneberg, as the awareness about the issue of climate change increased. "The start of this was a series of a large number of extreme events in the 1980s" he said (Ronneberg, 2004). It was reported that Fiji suffered as many cyclones as in the past forty years alone in the 1980's while in Vanuatu cyclone Uma devastated the country in February 1987 (Fiji Times, 25 June 1992).

Events that unfolded around the regions of SIDS in the world have alerted or awoken the sleepy island states towards the adverse consequences of climate change. A total of 10 resource persons out of 12 mentioned in their interviews episodic events that occurred around the world, especially leaving lasting impacts on the most vulnerable of all states for tropical cyclones, the SIDS. Therefore, it can be concluded that extreme weather events have awoken the SIDS to jump-start their eco-diplomacy to seek safety from adverse consequences of climate change.

Science, Epistemic Community and IGOs

The climate science, its proponents or epistemic community and environmental Intergovernmental organisations have been catalytic in triggering pre-emptive action by SIDS towards climate diplomacy at regional and international relations. The revelations made by independent scientists and scientific organisations about the causes and impacts of global warming since the mid-1980s, as well as the work being encouraged and publicised by WMO, UNED and UNESCO have provided impetus in cultivating interest in SIDS about the issue of climate change. These sources provided much needed facts and information to present their plight and cause for environmental protection from climate change to the international community. This was quite evident in the very first speech made by President Gayoom at the 1987 UNGA sessions. He had learned about the global impacts of the global warming from case studies conducted by a number of scientists and organisations, including the UNEP, UNESCO (Man and Biosphere Programme) and the United States Environmental Protection Agency (Gayoom, 1987b). The President had extensively cited these sources in his speech as stunning revelations and worrisome developments in the state of the environment of the world. He explained that "a number of scientists and organisations have independently carried out preliminary case studies on the

possible effects of sea-level rise on different key coastal areas of the world such as the Netherlands, the US, Egypt, Bangladesh and the Maldives". He further added 'Scientists all over the world now accept the fact that concentrations of atmospheric carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gasses will continue to increase coming decades mainly as a result of human and industrial activities' (Gayoom, 1987b). In his pioneering speech on the issue of climate change he congratulated 'the UNEP, and UNESCO's Manual Biosphere Programme and the United States Environmental Protection Agency for their commendable pioneering efforts in the fight to save the world's threatened environment' (Gayoom, 1987b).

Similar to references made by the President of the Maldives in his speech, leaders of other SIDS, namely Tuvalu and Malta made references to these sources in their speeches made at the Second World Climate Conference, the conference which provided immediate impetus for UN to initiate a climate negotiation process. At this meeting, Tuvalu Prime Minister Bikenibeu Paenui, referring to the source of information he gathered for his remarks, said:

> The scientists have confirmed that global warming is now a certainty. The findings of the international scientific community finalized in Sweden this year [Report of IPCC, 1990], have now been confirmed by the experts gathered here last week.... We know from all the scientific evidence collected to date that the fragile and delicate atmospheric balance on which life and our existence depends has been upset (Paenui, 527-8, 1991).

The Maltese Prime Minister, Edward Fenech-Adami referred to the scientists and their revelations in making his case in calling for immediate action by the international community to arrest the problem of global warming. "Since the mid-seventies, scientists had been sounding various alarms about the weather. In fact, a great deal of research work in connection with this problem was undertaken by a number of scientific organisations", remarked the Prime Minister at the Second World Conference in Geneva in 1990 (Adami, 523, 1991). He also praised the work of IPCC, saying that "the IPCC's first assessment report will in itself stand out not only as a masterly analysis of the state of the art, but also as a milestone in the new emerging field of environmental diplomacy" (Adami, 524, 1991).

In hindsight, it may be recalled that the number of scientific meetings that generated concern for climate change in the 1980's which were carefully monitored and took into account of the scientific and response information provided by the events although SIDS were not directly involved in these events.

The scientists or epistemic communities initially attracted the attention of the world community to the issues of global change and their implications as it has been evidenced in the foregoing account of remarks by SIDS' leaders. The mounting scientific consensus and the subsequent international events held since the mid-1980s, (Bodansky, 27, 2001) marked the global awakening towards the irreversible trends of global change. The SIDS were no exception to this phenomenon. They began to pay attention to the revelations of scientists and cultivated keen interests in their research, particularly with the arrival of the era of global change. More precise knowledge about the most perilous issue of climate change began to unfold with the pioneering scientific event of the Villach Conference in 1985. However, no SIDS took part in this conference.

The Villach Conference organised jointly by ICSU International Council of Scientific Union), UNEP and WMO was the first breeding ground of the science and impacts of global change. The Conference concluded that significant climate change was highly probable and therefore, recommended states to initiate the consideration of developing a global climate convention (cited in Bodansky, 25, 2001). Bodansky identifies 5 periods in the development of climate change regime and sees the period from 1985 to 1988 as the agenda-setting phase (Bodansky, 23, 2001). Many analysts of climate change regime accords credit to the epistemic community of Western scientists (Bodansky, 26, 2001) as bringing the issue of global warming and its impact of climate change into international agenda. The initial role the scientists played in the environmental awakening of international community including SIDS can be illustrated by the following comments of Bodansky:

> These scientists acted as "knowledge brokers" and entrepreneurs, helping to translate and publicize the emerging scientific knowledge about the greenhouse effect through workshops and conferences, articles in non-specialist journals such

as *Scientific American*, and personal contact with policy makers (Bodansky, 27, 2001).

The Villach Conference was attended by scientists from 29 countries mostly form developed countries although scientists from India, Nigeria, Egypt, Kenya, China, and Brazil took part in the conference. However, no scientist or representative from SIDS was present at the conference except for a scientist from US dominion, Costa Rica. This fact demonstrates either lack of concern about global change or ignorance on the part of SIDS about global environmental issues or perhaps lack of financial and technical capacity to follow such events during the pre-climate change era. The Conference concluded that increasing concentration of GHGs are expected to cause a significant warming of the global climate in the next century (Report of the Villach Conference, 1-3, 1986). The most striking revelations made by the conference that concerned SIDS based on "consensus of current basic scientific understanding" was as follows.

> It is estimated on the basis of observed changes since the beginning of this century that global warming of 1.5 degree C to 4.5 degree C would lead to a sea-level rise of 20-140 centimetres. A sea level rise in the upper portion of this range would have major direct effects on coastal areas and estuaries. A significant melting of the West Antarctic ice sheet leading to a much larger rise in sea level, although possible at some future date, is not expected during the next century (Conference Statement, Report of the Conference, 2, 1986).

The conference recognised uncertainties that remained in predictions of changes in global regional precipitation and temperature patterns plus imperfect understanding of ecosystem responses. However, it concluded that the greenhouse question is sufficiently developed and governments plus regional inter-governmental organisations should take the conference's assessments into account (Conference Statement in Report of the Conference, 1-3, 1986,). The conference explicitly declared, "While some warming of climate now appears inevitable due to part actions, the rate and degree of future warming could be profoundly affected by governmental policies on energy conservation, use of fossil fuels and the emission of some greenhouse gases" (Conference Statement in Report of the Conference, 1-3, 1986).

Therefore, it called upon governments to control emission of radioactive gases. The conference did not elaborate on the impacts of climate change on SIDS per se as it was seen to be a very initial effort to establish a framework for research and action. In the final quarter of 1987, two important workshops were held by scientists prior to intergovernmental bodies officially picking up interest in the emerging issues that constituted the phenomenon of global change. These were direct follow-up actions resulting from the Villach Conference held in 1985 which addressed the issue of global warming and climate change. Of these follow-up meetings, one was held in Villach again and the other in Bellagio, Italy in 1987.

The workshops examined the climatic change resulting from GHG concentrations plus technical, financial and institutional options available for adapting to climate change. Many alarming revelations were made by these workshops such as declaring that atmospheric concentrations of a number of trace gases are increasing as a result of human activities. This would in turn raise the global mean temperature by more than human history had ever experienced. The conclusions of the Workshops also endorsed that GHG-induced global warming could accelerate the present sea level rise, probably giving a rise of about 30 cm and possibly as much as 1.5 m by the middle of the next century. The effects of these were said to include; "erosion of beaches and coastal margins; land-use changes; wetland loss, increased frequency and severity of flooding; damage to port facilities, coastal structures and water management systems (Summary of the Discussions and Recommendations of the Workshop, WMO/UNEP, 1988).

It was also reported "tropical storms might extend into regions where they are less common". These revelations certainly surprised SIDS and triggered their concern to become more receptive and to monitor the situation. As the President of Maldives has said to the UNGA meeting, island states have to prepare much sooner than others to combat the crises given their vulnerability and proneness to fatal consequences (Gayoom, 1987a).

The following year in June 1988, a ground-breaking conference was held in Toronto as per the call made by the previous two Workshops. The Toronto Conference, "The changing Atmosphere: Implications for Global Security" declared scientific

conformity as to the changes predicted in the wake of atmospheric changes caused primarily by human activities. The Conference focussed its discussion beyond scientific discoveries to political and legal implications resulting from global change. Therefore, it spelt out for the first time specific measures needed to be taken to further investigate the implications and actions to mitigate expected crises. The Conference truly transformed the game of climate politics from epistemic communities to state government for taking charge of the matter without whose commitment and support the world may be heading towards environmental disaster. The Toronto Conference declared that atmospheric changes "represent a major threat to international security and are already having harmful consequences over many parts of the globe" while echoing the same anxiety expressed in previous similar conferences beginning with Villach Conference in 1985. "Far-reaching impacts will be caused by global warming and sea level rise which are becoming increasingly evident as a result of continued growth in atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide and other greenhouse gases" (Statement of Toronto Conference, 1988). The Conference further signalled the precarious nature of the environmental issues warning the international community as it concluded that, "best predictions available indicate potentially severe economic and social dislocation for present and future generations, which will worsen international tensions and increase the risk of conflicts among and with nations" (Statement of Toronto Conference, 1988). "It is imperative to act now", said the statement issued by the Conference. The Conference was the biggest gathering of its kind ever held (before intergovernmental UN bodies took charge of the matter) where 300 scientists and policy makers from 48 countries participated.

A number of flashing themes and their emphasis at this conference were also more visible than at similar previous events. Repeated references to global warming, global security and sea level rise were noticeable. The conference also stressed the role of carbon dioxide as the major contribution to global warming. Recognising that "no country can take this problem in isolation", it called for international cooperation and urged governments to work towards an Action Plan for the protection of the atmosphere (Statement of Toronto Conference, 1988).

As for SIDS, the Toronto Conference signalled smoke in the air in terms of their susceptibility and vulnerability to global warming. It said global warming would

accelerate the present sea level rise, which could inundate coastal lands and islands and reduce coastal water supplies by increased salt-water intrusion. Another new perspective emanating from atmospheric changes was the question of global insecurity that may be caused by global changes. The conference said "Anticipated and unplanned change may well become the major non-military threat to international security and the future of the global economy" (Statement of Toronto Conference, 1988). Highlighting specific measures urgently required, while recognising carbon dioxide as the main pollutant of the atmosphere, it advocated for the first time a well-defined target and timetable for control of emission of CO2 as best cure. "An initial global goal should be to reduce CO2 emissions by approximately 20 percent of 1988 levels by the year 2005", declared the Conference. Subsequently it urged governments, the UN system, NGOs, industries and educational institutions to take immediate actions to address the rapidly increasing problem. To this effect the conference called for the initiation of "a comprehensive global convention as a framework for the protection of the atmosphere". It also called for vigorously pursuing this task at subsequent conferences such as Second World Climate Conference in June 1990 with the desire of having a convention ready for consideration at the intergovernmental conference in 1992 (Statement of the Toronto Conference).

It was undoubtedly a consensus fact among all the twelve resource persons interviewed for this case study that the power of science and work of the epistemic community primarily awakened SIDS to the fateful issue of global warming. The scientific information provided them with a "bargaining chip" at the negotiations and added a "moral voice" to their arguments as the prime victims of the expected crisis from climate change. Delegates or representatives of SIDS were invited to some of the later meetings of scientists and publications of work on the issue by WMO and UNEP galvanised the interest of SIDS to the issue (King, 2004) and created increasing awareness amongst SIDS (Koonjul, 2004). The importance of the scientific community in creating awareness about the phenomenon is explained by the following statement by the current Chairman of AOSIS and Ambassador of Mauritius to the UN, Jagdish Koonjul.

> Our biggest supporters have been the scientific community, who have carried out research and change.... I think by making use of scientific knowledge we receive from independent scientists, we can make the case to the rest of the world in alerting world opinion (Koonjul, 2004).

As the foregoing events and statements from SIDS' leaders illustrate, the epistemic community of the UN has brought about the environmental awakening of SIDS to climate change. The power of climate science has been the greatest motivational factor that cultivated interest to explore more and to follow through the issue of climate change. For many of the SIDS, there were no priorities in environmental issues before the issue of global warming climbed onto the world agenda since 1988.

Physical Vulnerability

Having learnt of the scientific revelations from reports and publication issued by the epistemic community the next most important factor that aroused interest in SIDS towards the issue of climate change was their state of physical vulnerability to the expected crisis from climate change. This factor was repeatedly mentioned in numerous speeches made by AOSIS leadership at the climate change negotiations. As the steering wheel of their concern to climate change, the Declaration of the first AOSIS summit notes physical vulnerability of SIDS. It underscored the "physical survival of small islands and low-lying coastal developing countries and their cultures as a consequence of their vulnerability to the adverse effects of human induced climate change" (Declaration of First AOSIS Summit, 1992).

The leaders of AOSIS have largely focused on the vulnerability factor of their low-lying island states in drawing attention of the international community to the plight of SIDS in the face of global warming. Their central argument in the climate change negotiations was based on their position as the states most-prone to climate-led natural disasters and sea level rise. The President of Maldives made the following statement to this effect in his speech at the UNGA in 1987:

> As for my own country, the Maldives, a mean sea-level rise of two metres would suffice to virtually submerge the entire country of 1190 small islands, most of

> which barely rise over two metres above mean sea-level. This would be the death of a nation (Gayoom, 1987a).

The Prime Minister of Tuvalu echoed similar sentiments at the Second World Climate Conference. "All our nine islands are low lying coral atolls dispersed over an area of 1.2 million square kilometres of the South Pacific Ocean, not rising more than 2 metres above sea-level". Therefore, his country was "amongst the most vulnerable to culminate change and sea level rise in the world", the survival and existence of which depends on the help of the global community (Paeniu, 527, 1991).

Physical vulnerability was the founding basis for the political coalition of AOSIS. A memorandum of the Alliance states that it "is coalition of small island and low-lying coastal countries that share similar development challenges and concerns about the environment, especially their vulnerability to the adverse effects of global climate change" (Memorandum provided by Samoan Mission to the UN; Sopoaga, 2004). The Executive Secretary of UNFCCC Secretariat, Waller Hunter asks why climate change is so important to SIDS and following is what she said in her "foreword" to the publication by the Climate Change Secretariat entitled Climate Change and SIDS, 2005.

> The answer is simple: these small nations are among the most vulnerable to climate change impacts, which will become critical if no appropriate action is taken.... SIDS are among the Parties least responsible for climate change and are dependent on others to ensure that significant action is taken in support of the Convention (Hunter, 1, 2005).

SIDS are most prone to climate change consequences as they are low-lying states with the least capacity to overcome challenges posed by the phenomenon (Werksman, 2004; Koonjul, 2004). Events occurring in the regions where SIDS are located are robbing them of their livelihood and hard-earned development (Elisaia, 2004). Storm surges destroy protective reefs that provide defence for the islands from high waves and disrupt habitat for shallow-water fishes. Two main industries found in most of SIDS, tourism and fisheries are at stake due to adverse impacts caused by climate change (Climate Change Secretariat, 17-18, 2005). Warming of ocean temperature

and coral bleaching adds to the constrains already felt by reefs and dislocation of fishes. As early as in 1987 (Gayoom, 1987a) and 1990 (Paenui, 6 November, 1990) SIDS claimed that they were already experiencing consequences predicted by scientists in line with the phenomenon of global warming. In 1989, at a meeting of the IPCC Working Group on Response Strategies, a Vanuatu representative appealed to the world community 'to prevent us [South Pacific Island states] from becoming endangered species or the dinosaurs of the next century' (Helu, 13, 1991). Similar comments were echoed by other SIDS leaders at the time of early negation of the problem of climate change.

The threats posed to SIDS are not only tangible in nature due to their physical vulnerability to climate change. A host of issues intangible in nature are also equally a worry to SIDS which made them jump-start their fight against global warming. These questions cannot be provided with easy answers, as the issues involved are quite complex and far-reaching. As the President of Maldives and the President of Kiribati have said, the rising sea levels could drown the low-lying small island states beneath the oceans before the end of the next century. This would lead to political and legal challenges for the international community. For long before the islands are vanished from the surface of the earth, their long-lived inhabitants may become environmental refugees (Lean, 4, 1994). If these states cease to exist what would happen to their statehood and sovereignty? Even if an able country rehabilitates them in its country, how will they rehabilitate their age-old heritage and culture? How can future generations of these disadvantaged communities be provided with intergenerational equity, let alone handle the nightmare of restoring self-governance or sovereignty?

These are the anxieties and uncertainties that are driving SIDS to take up the issue of climate change with a sense of urgency. As the Foreign Minister of the Marshall Islands told the 1992 Earth Summit, the rising seas 'could annihilate the Marshall Islands as effectively as a nuclear bomb' (cited in Lean, 4, 1994). The SIDS certainly have time to wait for conclusive proof as the First Chairman of AOSIS Ambassador van Lierop said, the proof they fear will kill them (Lierop cited in Lean, 5, 1994). Therefore, the physical nature of the SIDS and which make them most vulnerable to climate change motivated SIDS to become forerunners and torch bearers of the issue

of climate change in establishing an effective regime that could arrest the problem (see comments by Lean 1994; Davis 1996). The twelve resource-persons interviewed for this case study agreed that physical vulnerability of SIDS is the overarching factor that motivated SIDS to engage in climate negotiations and continue to sustain a high profile in the process.

The next section examines the elements that have facilitated the role of SIDS in the negotiations after being engaged in the process. It analyses the factors that were most instrumental and contributory in the participation of SIDS in the climate change negotiations.

Facilitative Factors

The empirical investigation undertaken to compile the case study of SIDS in the climate negotiations led to conceiving of seven facilitative factors that shaped the role of SIDS in the negotiations process. To conceive of these facilitative factors, data collected from interviews of resource persons and documentations were analysed by means of thematic content approach and clustered into major categories. These categories and the clustering of information under each are present as separate sub-sections.

United Nations and IGOs

As climate change is a global problem that cannot be arrested or abated by a single state or group of states, the SIDS saw the global platform of the UN as the most appropriate forum to take up the issue (Drayton, 2004; Elisaia, 2004). The fact that almost all SIDS were represented in the UN (Chasek, 2004) was quickly capitalised on by SIDS to launch climate-diplomacy. The UN platform provided a one-stop window for reaching out to the world community and to collaborate with fellow SIDS (Elisaia, 2004; Chasek, 2004). The usefulness of the UN and its subsidiary agencies as the greatest source of facilitation is described by the Third Chairman of AOSIS and the former Ambassador of Samoa to the UN, Tuiloma N. Slade as follows:

> The presence of many SIDS Missions at the UN in New York mostly and... Considerable goodwill and support from many developed countries and the UN agencies.... Helped to facilitate their [SIDS] attendance and their direct participation in important negotiations / meetings (Slade, 2004).

It is recalled that Malta initiated the process of climate change negotiations by introducing a resolution at UNGA (Resolution 43/53 [6 December 1988]) and that AOSIS was formed during the Second World Climate Conference organised by the two intergovernmental bodies known as WMO and UNEP. The special fund established by the UN with voluntary contributions from developed states during the first INC session also financially enabled SIDS to participate in the negotiations (Werksman, 2004; King, 2004; Koonjul, 2004; Sopoaga, 2004). The first phase of negotiations that led to UNFCCC was held at UN centres such as New York, Geneva, and Nairobi except for the First Session which was in Washington, USA. The membership of UN also provided SIDS with one-fifth voting power at the UN, which was observed as by far the single largest, unified voting block (Davis, 1996). It was reported that AOSIS has become an important group within the UN as "powerful countries have begun to court the small islands" large block of votes in their campaigns for election to the UN' (Lean, 5, 1994). AOSIS functions within the UN system as an ad hoc lobby group for promotion and protection of SIDS interests in the UN negotiations (Sopoaga, 2004). It primarily functions through SIDS Missions in New York chaired by an elected Ambassador of the group while his or her mission facilitates administrative requirements (Slade, 1997). AOSIS has no formal structure unlike G77 and it operates as a "willing coalition" that aims to strengthen bargaining force of the SIDS particularly in climate change negotiations. If not for the UN, AOSIS would have not be born and survived as it does today.

The greatest help the UN system has offered to AOSIS in relation to climate change is the advice and information provided through IPCC constituted by WMO and UNEP in 1988 (Werksman, 2004). The publication of the first report on climate change by IPCC in time for its consideration at the Second World Climate Conference in 1990 marked the height of public awareness rising on climate change for SIDS (Ronneberg, 2004). The report compiled by the three Working Groups that constitute IPCC spelled out in detail and in theory the scientific knowledge known about the

phenomena of global warming. It also documented the response strategies that could be adopted to mitigate the expected crisis from climate change. Since its first publication in 1990, the IPCC has been updating and revising their report every five years (IPCC, 1990). The reports were warmly received by the SIDS who saw it as a springboard to capitalise on their eco-diplomacy as well as a "bargaining chip" to champion their cause of protection from climate change. It also provided much anticipated guides for action and were seen to be a "flag bearer" for publicising the plight of SIDS against global warming. It was the best handbook SIDS ever wanted.

Another IGO body of the UN; UNEP also has been a fore runner in facilitating specific information required by various groups of SIDS. In 1987, the UNEP began a very important series of research on climate change impacts under its Regional Seas Programme. It established what was called the Task Team on implications of climate change for six regions. The objective of these case studies was "to prepare regional overviews and case studies on the possible impact of expected climate change on the coastal and marine ecological systems" (Pernetta and Sestini, 1989). It was recommended, that one such study should focus on the Maldives as to a full analysis of ecological and socio-economic implications expected from climate change (Pernetta and Sestini, 11, 1989). Thus, the case study on the Maldives provided much needed information for SIDS on a localised self-help approach to mitigate the expected impacts by adaptation. Similar studies were carried out on Pacific SIDS too, which resulted in organising one of the pioneering meetings of Pacific SIDS in Majuro, Marshall Islands in 1989.

The catalytic role played by the UN and its subsidiary IGOs in facilitating the participation and contribution of SIDS in the climate change negotiation was highly agreed upon by all twelve resource persons from whom data was collected for this case study. The multi-faceted and holistic nature of their role was observed as indispensable to the success of AOSIS and SIDS' climate diplomacy. This factor appeared to rank first on the list according to the emphasis given by the respondents.

Political Coalitions

The political coalitions that existed at the UN and in particular operated at the climate change negotiations were second in rank to the UN as the greatest facilitators of SIDS' role in the climate change negotiations, according to interviews conducted in understanding the elements that assisted SIDS to perform as they did in the process. Two important coalitions were mentioned: AOSIS; and, the larger umbrella group of developing states, known as the Group of 77 (G77). Of these two, it was AOSIS which was the "torch bearer" or "flagship" of SIDS. All the SIDS that were engaged in the process of climate regime creation, were members of the informal political coalition, AOSIS. The common concern of SIDS about climate change and their inherent vulnerability were the binding purpose for the creation of this political coalition (Climate Change Secretariat, 17-18, 2000). It gave numerical strength (Slade, 2003) to stand with one voice and political power (Werksman, 2004) to interact with the political heavyweights like the European Union (EU) (Climate Change Secretariat, 18, 2000). Indeed it was a "strong vehicle" for promoting and protecting interests of SIDS in the climate change negotiations without which SIDS would have been marginalised like in the past (Werksman, 2004). In many of the responses given by the interviewees it was quite noticeable that they synonymously used AOSIS in place of SIDS. In fact many of the commentators or analysts have used on AOSIS to describe the group with the biggest stake in the issue and being most proactive (see comments by Djoghlaf, 105, 1994; Lean, 5, 1994; Davis, 1996; Taplin, 276, 1994).

AOSIS was the secret of the success of SIDS' role in the climate negotiations. It enabled SIDS to build bargaining power in the negotiations, afforded voting power as a group, and raised awareness among SIDS relating to climate change. It helped develop uniform positions and policies on issues; build stronger partnership with SIDS; conduct joint lobbying; organise demands of SIDS; build partnerships with NGOs; seek funds to organise meetings and workshops; and, finally to coordinate inter-regional networks of cooperation amongst SIDS (Slade, 2004; King, 2004; Ronneberg, 2004).

Prior to the start of formal negotiation sessions, AOSIS usually met for an hour to discuss and arrive at common positions on issues (King, 2004). The discussions would focus on new issues to be introduced, submissions to be made, deadlines for various submissions and comments on drafts by members. One of the former lead negotiators of the AOSIS from the Cook Islands, Wayne King says, "it was a very interactive and productive process" (King, 2004).

The seat reserved for the SIDS in the bureau of COP is usually filled by the candidate nominated by AOSIS. The Chairman or his nominee occupies the position to this effect. The former chief negotiator of the Marshall Islands and the current Inter-regional Advisor to SIDS at the UN Division for Sustainable Development, Espen Ronneberg argues that "without AOSIS there would have been no common position for SIDS" (Ronneberg, 2004). Similar comments were made by one NGO analyst, the founder and the editor of the conference reporting service called Earth Negotiation Bulletin (ENB), Pamela Chasek:

> When AOSIS begins to talk, it makes a difference because as a group they are talking about the lives of millions of people.... Then it makes you more of a negotiating force, because you are being backed by many countries (Chasek, 2004).

"There is a sense of affinity with like minded countries and therefore you speak with one voice", says the current Ambassador of Samoa to the UN, Ali'ioaiga F. Elisaia, while the First Secretary at the Barbados Mission to UN, Selwyn Hart comments "the AOSIS have had and continues to have a tremendous impact" in the negotiations (Elisaia, 2004; Hart, 2004). The next political coalition that has been facilitative of SIDS' role in the climate change negotiations is G77. It is an umbrella group that comprises of most of the developing states at the UN and has a formalised structure as the legitimate advocate of interests of the developing world. AOSIS largely operates within the G77 coalition but at times has experienced rifts between G77. Some staunch advocate of climate friendly measures like Tuvalu, Kiribati and Nauru are not members of G77 (Climate Change Secretariat, 2005) as they wanted to keep their independence from pressures to champion their cause of protection from climate change (Sopoaga, 2004). There was a mixed reaction from resource persons as to the

helpfulness of G77 in facilitating climate diplomacy pursued by SIDS. Nevertheless, none of them rejected association with G77 as the AOSIS bloc at times came at loggerheads with the OPEC who outrightly opposed stronger commitments to emission reduction, fearing that such measures would badly impact on their oil industries (Ronneberg, 2004; Sopoago, 2004). Ronneberg comments that the G77 at times tried to reconcile the contradictory positions pursued by two of its sub-groups, AOSIS and OPEC but to no avail (Ronneberg, 2004). The controversy between the two groups reached its height after the submission of AOSIS Protocol to the first meeting of COP, as AOSIS decided to go ahead without the G77 coalition if compromise could not be reached. This led to the formation of the Green Group, comprising of 73 members of like-minded states within the G77. For one and a half years the split continued, but returned to coalition when other groups outside G77 were equally resistant to the ambitious protocol submitted by AOSIS (Ronneberg, 2004; King, 2004). Wayne King expressed the view that the protocol would have reaped some success had the larger fossil fuel dependent developing countries cooperated in reducing emissions of greenhouse gases by joining forces with developed countries (King, 2004). Many respondents were of the view that there were merits to being in alliance with G77 for AOSIS as it is the coalition that advocated and lobbied for the interests of the developing world, not only in climate but all other development issues (Sopoaga, 2004; King, 2004). After all, important members of G77 coalition, like India, Indonesia, Philippines and many others were very sympathetic to the cause of AOSIS (King, 2004).

There were differences on many issues with two opposing blocs within G77 which made the negotiating power of G77 weak (Drayton, 2004). Except for a few issues, common positions were difficult to arrive at (Ronneberg, 2004). However, with common positions, G77 demonstrated a strong advocate for the AOSIS cause, on issues such as technology transfer and capacity building (Chasek, 2004). One area of controversy between these two groups was the issue of mitigation and adaptation. According to the former research officer at the Commonwealth Joint Office for Small States at the UN and ex-delegate of Guyana who chaired some meetings of G77, Allison Drayton, the source of tension stemmed on the issue of energy sources (Drayton, 2004). There appears to be more power with the OPEC group within G77, led by oil producing countries like Venezuela, Iran, and Nigeria than AOSIS (Chasek,

2004). However, major players of G77, China and India lobbied AOSIS not to break rank with G77 (Werksman, 2004) while leaders of AOSIS instructed their negotiators to stick to the coalition (Ronneberg, 2004). The helpfulness of G77 was most visible to micro groups of AOSIS during the preparatory process for the UN Global Conference on SIDS in Barbados in 1994 when G77 handed over the chair to the Chair of AOSIS to "steer the wheel" as they wanted to address development concerns in a holistic manner (Chasek, 2004). In sum, most of the resource persons interviewed on this question agreed that AOSIS was the strongest vehicle of support for SIDS' role in the climate change negotiations while G77 was rated as moderately helpful although one interviewee was sceptical of its usefulness (Ramsden, 2004).

NGOs and Scholars

The next important factor that has been instrumental in facilitating the role of SIDS at the climate change negotiations is the role of civil society actors such as NGOs and independent scholars. These parties appear to have played a very supportive and dominant part in championing the cause of SIDS (Koonjul, 2004; Werksman, 2004; King, 2004). They had extended technical and scientific information to present arguments on relevant issues for SIDS and practically teamed up to negotiate with stubborn partners in the negotiations.

A number of NGOs such as the Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development (FIELD) which was initially called the Centre for International Environmental Law (CIEL); Greenpeace and World Wildlife Fund (WWF) have been very supportive and contributory to the work of AOSIS at the negotiations (Werksman, 2004; Taplin, 276, 1994). The third Chairman of the AOSIS and the former Ambassador of Samoa to the UN, Tuiloma N Slade, admits this fact by the following statement:

> The SIDS, through the AOSIS (of which I was the Vice Chairman from 1994 to 1997, and Chairman from 1997 to 2003), was strongly supported by many NGO's, including the FIELD. From the beginnings of AOSIS in 1990, FIELD had helped with legal and general advice on SIDS engagement in multilateral negotiations, at first on climate change issues' (Slade, 2004).

Similar comments were received from almost all the interviewees spoken to on the question of non-state actors and their role in facilitating the eco-diplomacy pursued by SIDS in the climate change negotiations. The SIDS being a resource constrained, immature group in international law making "were surrounded by a very capable group of NGOs who share with SIDS technical and scientific knowledge relating to the issue" (King, 2004). Former Cook Islands' diplomat Wayne King describes the interaction with the NGO's as an "open door policy" where SIDS listened to them and took what was most applicable to SIDS (King, 2004).

There were some representatives of NGOs and independent scientists who sat on the official delegation of some SIDS at the climate change negotiations. These included representatives of FIELD, included as official delegates of Vanuatu (Werksman, 2004) and Professor Jackson Davis from Environmental Studies Institute of the University of California, USA included on the delegation of Nauru as Scientific Advisor (Davis, 1996). One such representative who sat on the delegation of Vanuatu as FIELD officer was Jacob Werksman who was interviewed for this case study. He cautioned not to generalise his role as a pure representative of NGO who worked to promote their interests at the negotiation, as he also helped Vanuatu as a legal adviser. He insisted the difference between formally recruited advisers and fully accredited NGO representatives, as in the case of the US delegation. The role of FIELD in the case of Vanuatu was not to advocate but to offer advice as needed, and it was up to the government either to accept or reject what was offered (Werksman, 2004). Nevertheless, he admitted that AOSIS received a lot of support from NGO's in facilitating their active role in the climate change negotiations. Werksman mentioned Bill Hare of Greenpeace International as having worked closely with AOSIS to provide support. Another such supportive hand of NGO for AOSIS during the early negotiations was Joy Hyvarinen and Marilyn Machanzie Hedger from Switzerland based WWF (Werksman, 2004). According to Werksman these NGOs helped AOSIS by means of holding briefing sessions, mostly on scientific developments. The author also heard that at the initial negotiations, Dr Joe Fasman, the scientist who made the famous discovery of the ozone hole and Dr Jeremy Leggett of Greenpeace provided briefings in this respect to AOSIS.

The major contribution of NGOs to AOSIS was said to be help in drafting the AOSIS Protocol in 1994 (Werksman, 2004; Newell, 144, 1998).

The current Chairman of AOSIS and the Ambassador of Mauritius to the UN also greatly appreciated the timely and helpful support extended by well-knowledgeable and competent NGOs. Nevertheless, he draws the point that some NGOs can present extreme views and may be pushing their own agenda. If recipients are cautious of this fact, a mutual relationship can exist between small states and NGOs (Koonjul, 2004). He admits that "they [NGOs] certainly have been great support; if for nothing else they go out and talk to people; they are able to sensitise and mobilise international opinion" (Koonjul, 2004). It is true that NGOs often share similar views and sympathise with SIDS on the issue of climate change (Ramsden, 2004; Latheef, 2004). They have been instrumental in raising awareness about the issue and mounting international advocacy. Another NGO analyst Pamela Chasek cautioned the role of NGOs advising not to be over optimistic of their Samaritan role. For they can use politically and economically weak SIDS "as a means to an end" with a utilitarian agenda, explained Chasek. Nevertheless, she also had converging views as to the benevolent role NGOs play particularly with the issue of climate change (Chasek, 2004). In this breath, she mentioned a Greenpeace scholar from Australia, Ian Fry who worked for Tuvalu on its delegation as a much needed adviser (Chasek, 2004).

Another important assistance NGOs extend to all negotiating parties of climate regime is the reporting service and new briefs provided on a daily basis during negotiations. The far most active newsletter to this effect is the ECO newsletter published by Climate Action Network. These newsletters provide news, views, commentaries, and analysis of the day to day negotiations while in progress. A similar news report service is provided by the Canadian International Institute of Sustainable Development called Earth Negotiation Bulleting (ENB). This serves as a non-biased news reporter on daily events and speeches made at the negotiations. Both of these services were of great help to the SIDS delegations who were usually understaffed and overloaded with meetings. These newsletters helped them to keep up to date of the negotiations and alert delegates of the important happenings at the time of negotiations.

The benevolent and complimentary role played by NGOs and independent scholars is of great help to SIDS. As all resource-persons interviewed on this question agreed, they were quite instrumental and catalytic in facilitating the proactive and visible role SIDS play at climate change negotiations. Without such assistance resource-constrained and expertise-lacked SIDS would have remained as relegated states in international relations.

International Norms and Morals

One important running theme from the responses of the interviewees as to the reason why SIDS managed to become a proactive forerunner in climate negotiations and play a substantial role in climate negotiations was the international norms and democratic principles the UN upholds and so adhered by all member states. The democratic principle of "one seat one vote" at the UN provided equal opportunity for militarily weak, economically vulnerable and politically cloutless SIDS to take centre stage in the debate on climate change at the world's most democratic institution, the UNGA. Malta would have not been possible to table the issue of climate change on the agenda of UNGA in 1988 neither reached consensus to adopt it without the democratic principles adhered by the United Nations. All of the resource persons to whom the question of UN's democratic principle was posed, strongly agreed that SIDS's role in the climate negotiations was greatly facilitated by the Charter's unconditional guarantee of equal right before the organisation to all its members.

Highlighting the fatherly care given by the UN to all its members whether big or small, the Third Chairman of AOSIS and the Ambassador of Samoa to the UN had the following to state at an address delivered at Temple University, Philadelphia, USA on the subject 'The making of International Law: The Role of Small Island States':

> All would have taken to heart the keynote concepts of the magnificent declarations in the preamble of the UN Charter, including the reaffirmation of the equal rights of nations large and small and respect for international law.... For the small, there is always safety and strength in numbers (Slade, 2003).

The negotiations were consensus based where if any bloc of countries objected, any element of the UNFCCC or Kyoto Protocol would have failed to get adopted. Although some interviewees saw this as a disadvantage for SIDS to produce a strong climate regime as they would have liked (King, 2004) this procedural mechanism equally benefited SIDS who could have not counterbalanced the moves by political heavy weights at the negotiations. The First Secretary of the Barbados Mission to the UN Selwyn Hart made an interesting point referring to a comment made by the UN Secretary General in 2002, while inaugurating the UN Building in Georgetown, Barbados. Hart said, "SIDS are today able to box above their weight" due to international norms established by the UN and its facilitation of their needs (Hart, 2004).

The moral dimension of the issue of climate change is another key factor that respondents raised in their answers to the questions relating to the reasons as to why SIDS were so prolific in the climate change negotiations. Being the frontline states to the expected crises from climate change, SIDS were recognised as bearing a "moral voice" to whom every delegation listened (Drayton, 2004; Ramsden, 2004; Werksman, 2004) "SIDS have a position of moral imperativeness which takes them so far", said Allison Drayton. She further elaborated that she heard Ambassador Slade say to her that G77 began to take SIDS seriously after stopping to say to them, that they have to stand with AOSIS, because it was the right thing to do; instead started saying climate change do matter to small island states (Drayton, 2004). This statement demonstrates the magnitude of the problem and the moral responsibility of those states which are largely responsible for the problem, due to their extent of contribution to emissions.

Some respondents saw the reservation of a seat on the bureau of COP for SIDS as a recognition of their importance to the negotiations as an undisputed moral voice (King, 2004; Werksman, 2004). For they will be the first to suffer from the expected crisis, but the least responsible for the cause (Paenui, 1991; Hussain Shihab, Maldives Director of Environmental Affairs (1989) cited in Lean, 4, 1994). Currently Tuvalu occupies the SIDS seat on the bureau of COP since 2002 (Sopoaga, 2004). The AOSIS is unshakably unified due to a perceived common threat to their survival and fortified by scientific evidence (Davis, 1996). These factors give SIDS a moral right

to cry survival at the negotiations. Jacob Werksman identified four means or ways that the climate regime can be strengthened. These include: 1) political power; 2) economic power; 3) legality; and, 4) morals. He was of the view that the last two of the means are available to SIDS and if rightly applied SIDS may champion their cause (Werksman, 2004).

Finally, it is quite convincing that international norms and morals have influenced the role of SIDS in the climate change negotiations, despite being marginal in the norms of political and economic clout in international relations.

Charismatic Leadership

Charismatic leadership demonstrated by key negotiators of AOSIS was observed as another factor by resource persons as having contributed to the success of the AOSIS in the climate change negotiations. These leaders possessed an academic background required for dealing with international law making and traits for diplomatic negotiations such as experience and diplomatic skills. The two negotiators who had been regarded as icons of success in this regard were the First Chairman of AOSIS and the former Ambassador of Vanuatu, Robert van Lierop and the Third Chairman of AOSIS and the former Ambassador of Samoa, Tuiloma Neroni Slade (Davis, 1996; Drayton, 2004; Ramsden, 2004). Both of these leaders come from an international law background and were said to be very skilful negotiators.

The initial spin for gathering momentum towards formation of AOSIS and the pursuit of a proactive role by SIDS came from individuals rather than countries, according to Wayne King. The countries and group efforts towards addressing the issue of climate change came later according to him (King, 2004). Having undergone the experience, he argues that "individual or personal effectiveness in the negotiating context reaps success in diplomatic negotiations" (King, 2004). He ranked Robert van Lierop followed by Tuiloma N. Slade as responsible for the success AOSIS has achieved in the climate change negotiations. Jacob Werksman also partially attributed the success of SIDS in the climate change negotiations to the chairs of AOSIS. He views excellent chairs with diplomatic skills without which some members may feel left out,

as very important in this regard. Thus, Werksman saw van Lierop and Slade as skilled chairs who kept the coalition together (Werksman, 2004).

Alison Drayton was another respondent who was impressed by the skill and competence of these two leaders. She noted that Ambassador van Lierop was "very active, very engaged and very aware" of the whole process, and that AOSIS tried very hard to work to collaborate with everyone in the negotiations. She commented, "I attribute a huge amount of that effort to the character and personality of Ambassador Slade" (Drayton, 2004). She further added that AOSIS had stellar negotiators and the "one that has been the longest and in general most respected was Ambassador Slade". She was quite impressed by Slade and says "he was admired and liked by everyone who dealt with him" (Drayton, 2004). The current Ambassador of Samoa, Ali'ioagia F. Elisaia expressed similar sentiments about Slade and his contributions to AOSIS. He was very passionate about the issues that concerned SIDS and his ability to present the case at various meetings effectively helped to recognise the special needs of SIDS to a large extent according to Elisaia (Elisaia, 2004). Elisaia further explained that "most of the time he was looked upon to take a lead in the negotiations".

Another analyst of the climate negotiations process, Jackson Davis, made the following comments in an article about the important role the leadership of AOSIS had played in winning substantial success in the negotiations.

> Leadership has also been a vital factor in the success of AOSIS. The first Chair of AOSIS Ambassador Robert van Lierop, an African American lawyer who represented Vanuatu for more than a decade at the United Nations, skilfully guided AOSIS through its early years (Davis, 18-19, 1996).

There were reports that when van Lierop was recalled from the ambassadorial portfolio at the UN suddenly, the Pacific diplomats expressed displeasure at the move according to the Pacific Island Monthly (Pacific Islands Monthly, 3.3, 1994). It said, "whatever the domestic reasons, the decision could not have come at a worse time [January 1994] for the Pacific and other small island states".

It is quite evident from the foregoing remarks by the resource-persons that the charismatic leadership of the AOSIS Chairs has been instrumental in gaining substantial success for SIDS in the climate change negotiations. Therefore, leadership has played a role as a factor that reaped positive outcomes for AOSIS eco-diplomacy.

Communicational Advancement

Communicational advancement in the climate change era has come as a bonus for SIDS, without which their capacity to coordinate and network within AOSIS in preparation for climate change negotiations would not have been easy and more financially expensive. This was a factor highlighted by many respondents. Many identified internet, fax, and electronic devices for having facilitated instant communications amongst SIDS and between SIDS missions in New York and their foreign ministries back in the capitals (Elisaia, 2004). Wayne King says the internet was a very much an interactive process that facilitated rapid exchange of information among SIDS regarding various notifications on issues, drafts and deadlines (King, 2004).

He further observed that SIDS are spread across the globe but with modern technology, information dissemination, awareness raising and formal correspondence back and forth with relevant parties have been made simple and cost-effective (King, 2004). A number of documents relating to the negotiation process and commentaries on issue top of news were instantly available twenty-four hours a day and seven days a week. After the first meeting of climate change negotiations the Secretariat posted the documents on an electronic board according to Werksman (2004). The development in mass communication was appreciated by the current Chairman of AOSIS, Ambassador Koonjul of Mauritius. He says with this new revolution in information technology, "one can follow meetings that are taking place anywhere through web casts and follow-up press coverage that is something of great assistance" (Koonjul, 2004). The Vice Chairman of AOSIS, the Ambassador of Tuvalu to the UN, Enele S. Sopoaga was highly impressed by the efficient coordination facilitated by advancement of technology. He mentioned that within 10 to 15 minutes replies are received from sources on issues of an urgent nature from not only capitals but also regional organisations.

Email communication was highlighted by many respondents as an extremely useful medium of communication for exchange of records and large amounts of position papers. Espen Ronneberg says "email helped tremendously to facilitate groups in New York and Geneva" (Ronneberg, 2004). The editor of the Earth Negotiations Bulletin Pamela Chasek pointed out the usefulness of the communicational advancement by saying, "one can read and review ENB online and follow climate negotiations sometimes without physically being at the meeting" (Chasek, 2004). Today there are abundant resources available electronically on internet such as SIDS net, Small Island Voice and on website of climate change Secretariat (Slade, 2004; Werksman, 2004; Ramsden, 2004).

In summary, 10 out of 12 resource persons interviewed for data collection of this case study concurred that communicational advancements have been instrumental in facilitating the work SIDS or AOSIS had carried out in preparation for climate change negotiations. It had also created awareness about the issues and made unfolding developments relating to the issues easy to follow by delegates. Table 7.1 summarises the frequency of factors mentioned by interviewees as influencing the role of SIDS at the Climate Change Negotiations.

Discussion

The SIDS proved to be the forerunner in spinning the "wheel of action" towards addressing the issue of climate change by the international community. The President of Maldives alerted the UN as to the events the low-lying island states were experiencing in the wake of global warming. Malta introduced the subject as agenda item and called for the initiation of a framework convention. As the scientific consensus on the fact of human-induced global warming intensified and disclosure of the plight of SIDS in the face of climate change were made known by scientists, the SIDS were the first to react and begin a search for survival. They mobilised their efforts and created an informal political coalition known as AOSIS which became the "flagship" of SIDS in their eco-diplomacy against climate insecurity. AOSIS has been proactive and highly influential in charting the course of climate change negotiations and strengthening the climate regime that comprises of UNFCCC and the Kyoto

Protocol today. The AOSIS was instrumental in subscribing a number of elements to UNFCCC, namely the precautionary principle and adaptation provision. It also secured a reserved seat on the supreme governing body of COP called the Bureau. All these achievements scored by SIDS illustrate a prolific role played by them at climate change negotiations. The process, therefore stands as a startling case study that demonstrates the visible and contributory role SIDS have made to international relations.

Having established the fact that SIDS have played a significant role at the climate change negotiations, the focus of the case study then shifted to analyse what factors were attributable to this role. This case study offers a number of insightful elements to this effect. A surgical synthesis of the data collected for this investigation from interviews and documentations helped identify two clusters of factors. These two clusters are captioned as Motivational Factors and Facilitative Factors. The first cluster is called motivational because they were instrumental in motivating the SIDS to become proactive and initiate pre-emptive actions in addressing the causes and fateful consequences resulting from global warming. In other words, motivational factors have implanted the interest in SIDS on the issue and triggered action to arrest the problem. The following three factors are motivational factors. These factors are identifiable in the 'stage setting' period or in the pre-negotiations period.

1) Episodic Events
2) Science, Epistemic Community and IGOs
3) Physical Vulnerability

As was illustrated in the preceding discussions, the episodic events alerted the SIDS to awake from their "sleepy and reactive status" in the international relations and begin search for environmental security from climate change. Similarly the increasing scientific knowledge produced by epistemic community assisted SIDS to realise their plight in the face of global warming. Finally, the physical vulnerability of islands to climate change as most disaster-prone and frontline states to the expected crisis led SIDS to jump-start their climate diplomacy and seek protection from climate change.

Table 7.1: Number of the interviewees that identified the factors that have influenced the behaviour of SIDS at the Climate Change Negotiations

Interviews	Motivational Factors			Facilitative Factors					
	Episodic Events	Epistemic Community & IGOs	Physical Vulnerability	UN and IGOs	Political Coalitions	NGOS and Scholars	International Norms & Morals	Charismatic Leadership	Communicational Advancement
Ronneberg, E.	√	√	√	√	√	√		√	√
King, W.	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
Sopoaga, E.	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
Chasek, P.		√	√	√	√	√		√	
Koonjul, J.	√	√	√	√	√	√		√	√
Elisaia, A.F.		√	√	√	√	√		√	√
Werksman, J.	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
Hart, S.	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
Ramsden, M.	√	√	√	√	√	√		√	√
Drayton, A.	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√
Latheef, M.	√	√	√	√	√	√		√	√
Slade, T.N.	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	√	
Total Count	**10**	**12**	**12**	**12**	**12**	**12**	**6**	**12**	**10**

The second cluster of factors that were conceived from the data synthesis as attributable to the role SIDS pursued are the Facilitative Factors. These are factors or elements that were identifiable during the negotiations processes and include the following.

1) United Nations and IGOs
2) Political Coalitions
3) NGOs and Scholars
4) International Norms and Morals
5) Charismatic Leadership
6) Communicational Advancement

The UN provided a global platform for SIDS to bring their concerns to the attention of the international community, while the UN affiliated IGOs helped them with scientific and technical information. The political coalitions enabled SIDS to generated political bargains and wield influence in the negotiations. NGOs and scholars have been supportive hands in complimenting their needs such as scientific information and mounting of international advocacy. International Norms and Morals have given them equal rights and moral voice to address the issues that concerns them at the UN. Charismatic leadership of leaders of AOSIS has helped to successfully mobilise SIDS' efforts and organise their goals. And finally, communicational advancements have facilitated quick and cost-effective coordination amongst the fellow SIDS and wider networking with relevant parties and organisations.

The two clusters of factors, Motivational and Facilitative are further synthesised to understand their character and significance. In doing so, it refined the factors to conceptualise a higher order of concepts that could best describe theoretically the explanatory variables determining the role or behaviour of SIDS in this case study.

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Chapter 8

CONCLUSIONS

This thesis on 'Small Islands and Global Action: Coming of Age in Global Change' aimed at advancing the theoretical understanding of the role of small island developing states (SIDS) in contemporary international relations (IR), by examining their interaction, participation, and contribution to IR within the framework of the United Nations (UN). SIDS were defined as *those sovereign states largely surrounded by water, inhabited by a population of 3 million or less and developmentally challenged due to limited resources, insularity and environmental fragility.* They were characterised as a unique group of states that fall within the category of small states (Chapter 2).

This final chapter draws together the main findings from the theoretical literature on small states including the SIDS and the empirical case studies on Law of the Sea and Climate Change negotiations at the UN to help strengthen current theory regarding the role of SIDS in IR. The first part recapitulates the main components of the thesis. The second part searches for commonalities and generalisations from the theoretical and empirical research, in order to show how conventional theory on the role of SIDS in IR and the small states paradigm can be strengthened. The thesis concludes with limits on the research and possibilities for future research.

Summary of Research on Role of SIDS in IR

The first part of this chapter summarises the research by: 1) restating the research question and objectives; 2) highlighting the theoretical proposition that was explored through two empirical case studies; and 3) summarising the main findings from the Law of the Sea and Climate Change cases.

Research Question and Objectives

A review of the literature on IR with regard to small states and the small states paradigm, clearly showed that the international behaviour (or role) of SIDS in IR is best explained by *internal* factors, such as size of the country and its resources and capacity to act in terms of military strength or development status (Chapter 3). In other words, if the country is small in terms of land territory, population and resources, the realist theory that underpins the small states paradigm argues that the country cannot play a significant role in IR (Vogel, 1983; Pettman 1976). Similarly, if the country is militarily weak or developmentally challenged then it would remain as a passive actor in IR (Vital, 1967; East, 1973; Rothstein, 1968).

Thus, these theoretical concepts (physical size and resources and structural capacity to act) prescribe a pessimistic role in IR for small states. These mainstream theoretical concepts are taken together as '*closed ground dimensions*' in the small states paradigm, leaving SIDS as insignificant and passive actors in IR and having little or no impact in the course of IR.

A review of literature on SIDS's activity in the UN over the past 40 years suggested that conventional theory and the small states paradigm are inadequate for explaining the role of SIDS in IR. Thus, the following research question was posed in Chapter 1: '*how can the small states paradigm in IR be strengthened to better explain the rising importance of the role of SIDS in contemporary IR?*'

To answer this question three objectives were developed. These were:

- *Objective 1*: to identify the factors, circumstances and / or forces that could theoretically explain the international behaviour or role of small states or SIDS in IR, in order to develop propositions for this study.
- *Objective 2*: to document the empirical experiences of SIDS in IR by carrying out two case studies for testing the propositions identified in Objective 1.
- *Objective 3*: to develop an improved theoretical framework for explaining the rising importance of the role of SIDS in contemporary IR and further research on the subject.

It was presumed that if *internal factors* described in the small states paradigm as determining the international behaviour or role of SIDS are inadequate, then it must be *external factors* that make the difference. It was assumed that while *internal factors* are quite static, *external factors* could be quite dynamic in ways that enable small states to overcome the internal constraints and thereby play a meaningful and contributory role in IR. It was, therefore, presumed that it is the *external factors* that provide wider opportunities for SIDS to pursue a positive role in contemporary IR. To this effect, a proposition was derived to guide the examination of two case studies that help exemplify the roles that SIDS have played in globally important UN negotiations and the factors that facilitated these roles (Chapter 5).

The proposition argues: the *external factors outside states are facilitative of the proactive and contributory behaviour of small states in IR.* This proposition was tested by examining the role of SIDS in "Law of the Sea" and "Climate Change" negotiations at the UN (Chapters 6 and 7).

To help answer the main research question and this proposition, an empirical investigation comprising two qualitative case studies were conducted. The case studies relate to two diplomatic negotiations that were held at the UN in which SIDS have played a substantial and laudable role: the first case study involved the Law of the Sea negotiations and the other second investigates Climate Change negotiations. The empirical investigation was carried out in order to uncover factors that were instrumental in facilitating the contributory roles played by SIDS in the IR processes.

The *global level of analysis* was utilised to conceive contributory factors for the role of SIDS in the two case studies while *data coding* and *thematic analysis* were applied to analyse the qualitative data collected from interviews and documentation. Similar elements that constituted a broader factor were topic-coded under a relevant heading. Interrelated headings or factors were clustered further into two broader categories (analytic coding) denoting the character, nature and timing of the factor. Thus, the two broader categories termed as *Motivational Factors* and *Facilitative Factors* were used

to organise the factors in a logical manner and to enable conceptualisation of the theoretical concepts.

Main Findings from Law of the Sea Case Study

The case study on the Law of the Sea negotiations and the role of SIDS provided insightful clues as to the *potential* role small states can play in IR, despite conventional realist theory consigning them to a passive role due to static internal factors (Chapter 6). It also offered new concepts as factors that were instrumental in affording small states to become influential and contributory to the IR process by overcoming internally-led constraints. Moreover, the case demonstrated that some SIDS played an important role in the Law of the Sea negotiations, the course of which was effectively influenced by them. To begin with, it was the visionary ambassador of Malta who launched the initiative at the UN in 1967, introducing the issue and generating momentum in the international community to give serious thought to a question already warranting action. Malta not only introduced the issue to the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) and tabled it on the agenda, but also submitted drafts of issues for consideration. It also introduced the widely acclaimed concept of the common heritage of mankind and suggested a regime to address this overarching concern. Jamaica held the rapporteurship of the negotiations and actively participated along with Fiji, Trinidad and Tobago and Cyprus. The chief delegate of Fiji chaired a number of negotiation groups and led selective negotiations. Fiji and Cyprus strongly advocated the right for SIDS to have an exclusive economic zone (EEZ) just like other larger territorial state. In the final outcome, the Maltese objective of recognising the deep seabed and high seas as the common heritage of mankind and the call for an international regime to regulate use of the high seas and deep seabed was successful, as the United Nations Convention on Law of the SEA (UNCLOS) was finally concluded. Jamaica, too, was a central player in the negotiations as it won the bid for hosting the operational arm of the regime in Jamaica known as the International Seabed Authority (ISA). The chief delegate of Fiji (Satya Nandan), who was a veteran negotiator and contributor to the IR process, was elected as the Secretary General of the (ISA) for three consecutive terms since its establishment. These achievements of SIDS in the Law of the Sea negotiations speak for themselves of the important and

contributory role SIDS played in the process. It was evident that SIDS had played a meaningful and substantial role in the Law of the Sea negotiations.

The case also provided helpful insights as to what explanatory variables account for the shift in the role small states play in contemporary IR. Accordingly, it was found that a number of motivational and facilitative factors were instrumental in achieving this success for SIDS in the Law of the Sea negotiations. The pre-negotiation factors that prompted the SIDS to take pre-emptive action in order to bring their concern to the attention of international community were *Motivational Factors*, including:

1) Equity
2) Science and Technological Advancement
3) Economic Interests
4) Physical Features
5) Fisheries Decline
6) Delimitation
7) Marine Pollution

The second set of factors or elements that helped SIDS to participate in, and contribute to, the IR process were *Facilitative Factors*. These factors influenced their behaviour or role during the negotiations process, and include the following:

1) Charismatic Leadership
2) UN and Intergovernmental Organisations (IGOs)
3) International Norms and Pragmatic Trends
4) Political Coalitions
5) NGOs and Scholars

Thus, a total of twelve factors were observed as being instrumental in affording the globally important role that SIDS played in the Law of the Sea negotiations. They collectively provide an explanation for their active behaviour or role in the IR process. This is of vital theoretical interest for strengthening the small states paradigm.

Main Findings From Climate Change Case Study

The second case study related to the role of SIDS in the recent UN Climate Change negotiations. It too, offered interesting clues and insights as to the shift in the behaviour or role of SIDS in contemporary IR and the explanatory variables that account for this shift (Chapter 7). It compliments the findings of the first case and builds on the emerging understanding that SIDS have become proactive and significant actors in contemporary IR. It was again a SIDS, the Maldives, which brought to the attention of the international community the dire consequences expected from the alarming environmental issue of global warming and its twin perils of climate change and sea level rise. With this pioneering initiative at the UNGA in 1987, Malta quickly moved to introduce the subject onto the UNGA agenda and discussions followed culminating in the adoption of an action-led resolution in 1988. SIDS activated an international campaign with respect to climate change by pursuing climate diplomacy and advocacy and by profiling their plight at climate-related international conferences, thereby raising the world's awareness of the issue.

In 1990, Vanuatu took over the chairmanship of a newly formed informal political coalition known as Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS). This coalition was proactive, highly visible and contributory to the UN Climate Change negotiations. AOSIS tabled a number of submissions on various important issues to be included in the negotiations of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). SIDS also secured a reserved seat on the bureau of the Conference of Parties (COP). AOSIS was the first group to submit a draft protocol to the negotiations. They were instrumental in subscribing many important provisions to the Convention, such as the precautionary approach, and adaptation to, and mitigation of climate change effects. Thus, SIDS have played a significant and contributory role in the Climate Change negotiations and this case study also stands as testimony for the important role small states can play in IR.

Similar to the first case study, a number of elements or factors were conceived from the case of Climate Change negotiations that enabled them to play such a prolific and active role in the IR process. The pre-negotiations phase, where awareness was

generated about the issue of climate change and helped to trigger the pre-emptive action of SIDS, were observed as *Motivational Factors.* The elements that were observed as aiding SIDS to perform actively in and contribute to the IR process during the negotiations phase was taken as *Facilitative Factors.* The *Motivational Factors* in this case study included the following:

1) Episodic Events
2) Science, Epistemic Community and IGOs
3) Physical Vulnerability

The *Facilitative Factors* observed from the climate change negotiations case study were as follows:

1) UN and IGOs
2) Political Coalitions
3) NGOs and Scholars
4) International Norms and Morals
5) Charismatic Leadership
6) Communicational Advancement

Strengthening the Small States Paradigm

This second part of the chapter searches for commonalities and generalisations from the theoretical and empirical research, in order to show how conventional theory on the role of SIDS in IR and the small states paradigm can be strengthened. It is, therefore, central to showing the extent to which the research question has been answered and an original contribution to knowledge made.

Commonalities and Generalisations

What are the commonalities between factors drawn from the two case studies that highlighted the attributes that were instrumental and catalytic in ushering in the visible, proactive, and contributory role played by SIDS in contemporary IR? Further

conceptualising these common factors will help to establish a refined higher order of generalisation towards theory building. A number of promising theoretical concepts are forthcoming. These theoretical concepts can be derived by clustering those factors exhibiting similar characteristics or features into one common group. Conceptualising a higher order ranking of the concepts for the purpose of theory building has led to the 18 common factors being grouped into 6 general dimensions as depicted in Table 8.1 below.

Table 8.1: External factors and their dimensions that help explain international behaviour or role of SIDS in IR

Individual External Factors	**EXTERNAL DIMENSIONS**
Scientific and technological advancement Communication advancement	**DEVELOPMENTS**
Marine pollution Fisheries decline Episodic events	**EVENTS**
International norms and pragmatic trends Morals	**TRENDS**
Equity Economic interests Delimitation Science	**ISSUES**
Physical features Physical vulnerability	**CIRCUMSTANCES**
UN and IGOs Political coalitions NGOs and scholars Epistemic community Charismatic leadership	**ACTORS**

Accordingly, the factor of *science and technological advancement* conceived from the Law of the Sea Negotiations case study and the factor of *communicational advancement* from the Climate Change Negotiations case study can be grouped under the headings of ***Developments***. These are indeed technological developments that motivated and facilitated the role of SIDS in the negotiations. The increasing scientific knowledge about the ocean wealth and the sophistication of the ability of the technology to exploit the seabed resources and fishery resources alerted the Maltese to make the initiative towards regulating the use of the deep seabed and high seas. Similarly, communicational advancements in recent times helped SIDS to easily

build networks amongst fellow states as well as cost-effective management of the negotiations process by keeping abreast of updates and communication. Thus, ***Developments*** are conceived as a key factor for SIDS' active participation in the negotiations.

The next cluster of common factors from both cases could be conceptualised as ***Events*** since they denote fateful events that triggered the interest and action of SIDS towards addressing the concerns at international forums. These include *marine pollution, fisheries decline*, and *episodic events*. The increasing reports of marine pollution due to dumping of radioactive waste that contaminated fisheries in certain parts of oceans were major events that triggered the Maltese law of the seas initiative. In the same vein, the decline of fisheries in 1960s and 1970s were alarming events for SIDS. This was due to overfishing by technologically capable states against the interests of island and coastal states whose resources were believed to be plundered unfairly due to lack of international governance on common resources such as fisheries. Similarly, *episodic events* around the SIDS' regions towards the second half of 1980s were of concern, particularly ocean swells, tidal waves, coral bleaching and increasingly frequent and intense hurricanes and cyclones. Such events were becoming more common and led to extensive damage to the infrastructure and livelihood of disaster-prone SIDS. Thus, calamities such as marine pollution, fisheries decline, and episodic events are grouped into a common concept of ***Events***.

Again, factors such as *international norms*, *pragmatic trends* and *morals* could be clustered together as a common concept of ***Trends***. The increasing democratisation of rules of engagement at the UN, the subscription to internationally accepted norms, such as equality of all states before the UN and consensus-based international decision-making are setting a universal trend towards legal and ethical rule of engagements in IR. Such trends are giving more leverage for diplomatic manoeuvres by SIDS. Similarly, with the onset of global issues such as climate change since 1980s, SIDS have become a moral voice against the predicaments. The increasing subscriptions to such principles are setting pragmatic trends for SIDS that enable them to become proactive members when their national interests are at stake. Thus, factors such as *international norms*, *pragmatic trends* and *morals* can be clustered into a common concept of ***Trends***.

The next set of common factors identified from both case studies are, *equity*, *economic interests*, *delimitation* and *science*. These factors could be grouped into a common concept of ***Issues***. These factors can be classified as issues because they formed the backbone of the SIDS' advocacy and concerns at the UN during the negotiations. The concept of 'common heritage of mankind' introduced during the Law of the Seas negotiations stemmed out of the concern of SIDS for equity in the distribution of the world's common goods. The awareness of abundant wealth that lies in the ocean space and SIDS' duty to protect their marine resources for economic interests were issues that SIDS capitalised on for national benefit. Delimitation was again an issue that was extensively debated during the Law of the Sea negotiations in finding fair procedures for resolving delimitation problems with states with common marine borders. Finally, science has been the biggest issue at the climate change negotiations that influences the course of action in combating climate change. The more the certainty of climate science and verification of the causes and impacts of climate change the greater the role SIDS can play at the climate negotiations. This is an issue of vital interest for SIDS. Thus, factors such as *equity*, *economic interests*, *delimitation* and *science* can be grouped into a common concept of ***Issues***.

Factors such as *physical features* and *physical vulnerability* could be generalised into the concept of ***Circumstances***. In the law of the sea case study, it was observed that physical features were a motivational factor. Most island states' physical features came to the forefront as a bargaining chip for SIDS since they are all surrounded by large waters that house rich marine resources. These features represented circumstances in favour of SIDS to advocate for their rightful share of/in ocean governance as states with natural links to the sea. Similarly, physical vulnerability was a prominent factor for SIDS when it came to addressing the issues of climate change and sea level rise. They are the frontline states for the expected crisis from global warming just because they are small islands scattered in the middle of seas. This is another undeniable circumstance beyond the control of SIDS, yet it enabled them to assume a moral voice on the issue. Thus, physical features and physical vulnerability are common factors that fit well into the concept of ***Circumstances***.

Finally, those factors that exhibit commonalities, such as the *UN and IGOs*, *political coalitions*, *NGOs and scholars*, the *epistemic community*, and *charismatic leadership* could be clustered into one general group known as ***Actors***. These factors exhibit commonalities of human features and actions. They either constitute individual traits or groups of traits that helpfully facilitated the role of SIDS in the two negotiations. Factors comprising political coalitions and charismatic leadership were state actors while others were non-state actors. The group also included institutions such as the UN, IGOs and NGOs. Nevertheless, all these elements have a commonality since all of them comprise of humans and thus can be grouped into the common concept of ***Actors***.

When all these clustered factors or dimensions, namely ***Developments***, ***Events***, ***Trends***, ***Issues***, ***Circumstances*** and ***Actors*** are further synthesised to understand their character and significance to the inquiry of this thesis, they all stand together as ***External Factors***. These are the attributes that were observed in the empirical investigation of the SIDS' role in contemporary IR as determining or moulding their international behaviour or role. Therefore, it could be theorised that ***External Factors*** were the main attributes that account for the ***explanatory variables*** in understanding the international behaviour or role of SIDS in contemporary IR.

Implications for the Small States Paradigm

The research findings and conclusions drawn from the preceding empirical investigations illustratively help to answer the research question that this thesis has pursued: *how can the small states paradigm in IR be strengthened to better explain the rising importance of the role of SIDS in contemporary IR?* The answer is simple: the small states paradigm needs to be extended to include the theoretical concepts that constitute *external factors*. Without incorporating these new concepts the conventional paradigm is inadequate to explain the rising importance of the role of SIDS in contemporary IR. It may be noted that these factors were normally overlooked or ignored in IR scholarship in the discussion of the small states paradigm. Nevertheless, IR is a dynamic process that accommodates surprises and keeps changing its structure, players, issues and how conduct of business in line with the

time and circumstances. As a result, the paradigm needs revisiting from time to time in order to keep abreast of unfolding realities. By incorporating ***external factors***, the paradigm can be revisited and strengthened, which in turn helps to increase its applicability or usability, as well as its validity.

In the meantime, it may be emphasised that the founding tenets of the small states paradigm still hold relevance, to some extent, to explain the international behaviour or the role of small states in IR. As some of the resource persons interviewed for the empirical investigation mentioned (Slade, 2004; Sealy, 2004; Mackay, 2004; Werksman, 2004; Koonjul, 2004; Chasek, 2004; Elisaia, 2004; Latheef 2004), small size and limited resources do constrain the choices available for small states to act more influentially and proactively to protect and advocate their interests in international decision-making. Thus, *internal factors* have not become obsolete attributes as small states cannot alter this fact of life. However, this does not mean that it is the end of the story for small states like SIDS. Through the changing face of IR and the adoption of new strategies, they were able to overcome to some extent these physical constraints and become meaningful and contributory players in contemporary IR. The shift has, therefore, given rise to new explanatory variables as determining or moulding the international behaviour or the role of small states in recent times. These *external factors* can be taken as newly discovered ***explanatory variables*** for SIDS or small states to understand their international behaviour or role in contemporary IR. These factors can be conceptualised as "***open-sky dimensions***". On the other hand, the existing mainstream concepts in the small states paradigm recognised in this study as *internal factors* can be referred to as "***closed-ground dimensions***". Figure 8.1 summarises the contribution that the open sky dimensions (external factors) conceived from the two cases make towards explaining the international behaviour of SIDS in IR. Figure 8.1 also summarises the contribution of "***closed ground dimensions***" (internal factors) prescribed in the conventional small states paradigm for SIDS in IR. Together these constitute the *explanatory variables* that account for the role of SIDS in IR.



Figure 8.1: Summary of the *explanatory variables* combining the newly conceptualised "*open-sky dimensions*" and conventional mainstream "*closed-ground dimensions*".

Views on Significance of SIDS

All the resource persons who were interviewed for the two case studies were asked about their views regarding the mainstream belief in the small states paradigm, that SIDS would play an insignificant role in IR. None of the 20 respondents gave a decisive reply to this query by saying ***yes*** or ***no***. Instead, they all cautiously recognised the inherent weaknesses of SIDS, but principally felt that they were playing a substantial role in contemporary IR. In fact, none of them fully supported the pessimistic view prescribed in the paradigm for small states and further explained the reasons for not buying into the pessimistic view by citing recent experiences of SIDS.

The former chairman of AOSIS, Judge Slade, and current chairman of AOSIS, Ambassador Koonjul, recognised the inherent weakness of SIDS resulting from lack

of resources, but ascribed the following comments as to the role of SIDS in contemporary IR.

> As a generalisation perhaps [small states are insignificant in IR] but not necessarily so in all cases. In the UNFCCC context, group action through AOSIS is the answer to the "small size" constraint .... Small states do make important contributions internationally and cannot be simply tagged into "insignificant" roles (Slade, 2004).

> One cannot just say that our [SIDS] role is insignificant. I think we have something to contribute. Singapore and Mauritius have served in the Security Council recently and the President of UNGA for the last session (2003) came from St. Lucia (Koonjul, 2004).

Similar sentiments were expressed by the President of the International Tribunal for Law of the Sea, Judge Nelson, who stressed that "it does not matter the size, it matters the personality of the man who can really get things done". According to him, with group dynamics like the backing of the coalitions such as G77 and AOSIS, SIDS can become important in conference diplomacy (Nelson, 2004). The Ambassador of New Zealand, who was chairing the preparatory sessions of the UN for the international meeting on SIDS in Mauritius in January 2005, also recognised the potential of SIDS as having a proactive role in IR based on his personal experience. He said, "a smaller country which has clear and recognised national interests can make a difference". According to Mackay (2004), these states need to leverage off each other, capitalise on their numerical strength as a united coalition and keep focused on issues of vital interest for them. He further explains as follows the position of SIDS in special cases.

> Tuvalu for example, speaking on climate change where it is acknowledged to be at risk, has a voice much stronger than the size of Tuvalu [population, 8000]. People have to listen to them ... that counts for something; that gives them more influence than a medium-size state that does not have clear national interests (Mackay, 2004).

The Secretary General of ISA and the chief negotiator for Fiji during UNCLOS negotiations, Mr. Nandan, echoed similar sentiments regarding the contributory role of SIDS in IR with the help of external sources of strength. He comments, "SIDS

have formed a coalition [AOSIS] and have become a voting bloc; all that has given them a disproportionate role and they are courted henceforth for their votes". As long as they remain as a bloc Nandan (2004) thinks SIDS will be recognised.

There were converging views amongst interviewees as to the proactive and contributory role SIDS play in contemporary IR, in particular with reference to UNCLOS and UNFCCC negotiations. Thus, it was observed that small states, including SIDS, have a better future in contemporary IR in terms of their role if ***open-sky dimensions*** were fully exploited and made maximum use of in a timely manner. From this observation it can be concluded that ***open-sky dimensions*** can make the *international behaviour* of small states more *proactive* and their *role* in IR more *contributory*.

Revisiting the Small States Paradigm

In light of these implications and conclusion drawn from empirical investigation, the small states paradigm can be revised with new theoretical extension. The ***external factors*** that were observed to contribute to the visible, proactive, and contributory role played by SIDS can be theorised as ***'open-sky dimensions'*** because, unlike ***closed-ground dimensions***, they are dynamic, flexible, and open elements like the sky which provides far wider potential and opportunities for small states in IR.

The intergovernmental organisations, such as the UN and its affiliated bodies, the epistemic community and the NGOs, and the charismatic leadership of diplomats of SIDS have all greatly facilitated SIDS to become participatory and contributory to IR. Similarly, the political coalitions based on numerical strength and international rule of law based on democratic, legal, ethical and moral principles are also complimentary factors assisting SIDS to play a meaningful role in contemporary IR and to stand up for their rights. Again, the shift in worldly concerns, particularly with the onset of the era of global environmental change, afforded SIDS a 'moral voice' as a bargaining chip for negotiations, while diffusion of science and advancement of technology in communication have assisted SIDS to achieve cost-benefit interactions in contemporary IR. These developments have enlarged SIDS' choice for foreign policy manoeuvrability and give more room for capitalising on strategic advantages.

In summary, the two set of theories namely, ***closed-ground dimensions*** (internal factors) and ***open-sky dimensions*** (external factors) can be taken together as ***'inputs'*** to the small states paradigm and offer more explanation and understanding as to the international behaviour or the role of small states in contemporary IR. If these factors are taken together as ingredients or tenets of the paradigm then the ***outputs*** from the paradigm would look more comprehensive and valid. Accordingly, with the new ***inputs*** to the paradigm, its ***outputs*** could prescribe SIDS or small states as more visible, proactive, contributory, and significant actors in IR. Undisputedly, it has been proved from the empirical investigation that in recent times, the smallest and weakest of all states, the SIDS, are playing a disproportionate role in IR to their size. Thus, the **proposition** that argued that *the external factors outside the states are facilitative of the proactive and contributory behaviour of small states in IR* is valid.

This conclusion leads one to argue that SIDS have come of age in the era of global change and their future looks better. As well, the revised small states paradigm looks promising for better explaining the rising importance of the role of SIDS in contemporary IR. A revised small states paradigm, as developed by this thesis, is summarised in Figure 8.2.



Figure 8.2: Schema for a revised small states paradigm

Limitations and Future Research

As any academic research such as this would encounter, this thesis has some limitations which provide scope for research goals for future studies on the subject of SIDS and the small states paradigm. Nonetheless, it has provided insightful theoretical concepts to strengthen the small states paradigm in relation to the explanatory variables concerning the international behaviour or the role of SIDS. Similarly, the study has also opened up new frontiers of research in order to further build on the paradigm.

The first limitation encountered in this research was its narrow base of SIDS in the investigation of the first case study where only five states were examined as to their role. In the second case study, it was mostly the political coalition of AOSIS where the most focus was directed. A number of factors led to these outcomes. In the first case, only five SIDS were active and contributory to Law of the Sea negotiations. In the second case, as an overarching strategy, SIDS acted in the Climate Change negotiations as a power bloc and thus most actions were taken collectively. This forced the author to examine the coalition of AOSIS, rather than the actions of individual states. As a matter of fact, SIDS did not play much of a role as individual states in the process.

Nevertheless, the SIDS is a large group of states and is not homogeneous in terms of development status and physical size. There are striking differences between states and between regions where the SIDS are located. Trinidad and Tobago is a fairly resource-rich state, while the Bahamas and Fiji enjoy relatively prosperous economies. The SIDS in the Caribbean and Pacific have fairly developed regional co-operation, while SIDS in the Indian Ocean region lack such co-operation. Two prosperous Mediterranean SIDS, namely Malta and Cyprus, also graduated from the SIDS list in May 2004 when they were admitted to the prosperous European Union. Thus, future research in the field needs to aim at more coverage of SIDS in terms of sampling.

Another limitation of this study was its reliance on two diplomatic negotiations that stemmed from environmental issues. Law of the Sea and Climate Change are similar issues being global in character and classified as low politics in IR. They call for global solutions based on ethical and moral principles. IR comprises diverse issues some of which concern not only global action, but also bilateral and regional action. Thus, future research needs to incorporate issues of high politics, such as security and peace-keeping which may be bilateral and regional in scope.

Finally, the two case studies investigated for this research are confined to multilateral negotiations within the UN framework. The results of the cases may be different if they were issues or matters relating to other organisations, like the Commonwealth of Nations headed by the British Monarch. Similarly, cases based on SIDS' interaction within regional organisations may also offer different results that could be more effective than global and complex institutions like the UN.

In sum, the width and breadth of the chosen case investigation could be further enriched if wider coverage of states was given and dissimilar issues and frameworks were adopted. These are food for thought for future research in the field. Thus, future research projects on the subject of small states and their role in IR should enlarge their scope to include more small states for investigation, diversify the issues examined beyond environmental and global common issues, and widen the framework of the IR perspective by including other international and regional organisations.

To sum up, it was not the scope and aim of this thesis to elaborate on the potential strategies SIDS can pursue to enhance their role in IR towards protecting their interests and subsequently become proactive in IR. However, in light of the findings of this research project, a number of such strategies can be drawn. These strategies are given for reference to the interested readers or researchers as an Annex in Appendix III of this thesis.

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Interviews

Ali'ioaiga Feturi Elisaia (H. E. Mr.), Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Samoa to the UN

Dolliver M. Nelson (Mr.), President of the International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, (Secretary of the drafting Committee of the Third Law of the Sea Conference originally a national of Granada)

Donald James Mackay (H. E. Mr.), Ambassador and Permanent Representative of the New Zealand to the UN (One of the delegates of New Zealand to the Third Law of the Sea Conference)

Jacob Werksman (Mr.), Senior Advisor, Global Inclusion, The Rockefeller Foundation in New York, Ex-Adviser to Vanuatu Delegation to Climate Change Negotiations, Former Director, Foundation for International Environmental Law and Development, (FIELD) which provided legal aid and assistance to AOSIS during the early negotiations of climate change

Jagdish Koonjul (H. E. Mr.), Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Mauritius to the UN, Current Chairman of Alliance of Small Island States

Mohamed Latheef (H. E. Dr.), Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Maldives to the UN

Pamela Chasek (Dr.), Founder and Editor of the Earth Negotiation Bulletin which has covered reports on many UN meetings of climate change negotiations since Intergovernmental Negotiating Committee meetings that led to UNFCCC

concluded in 1992, Assistant Professor, Government and Political Science Department, Manhattan College, New York

Philip R. A. Sealy (H. E. Mr.), Ambassador and Permanent Representative of Trinidad and Tobago to the UN (one of the delegates of Trinidad and Tobago to the Third Law of the Sea Conference)

Satya N. Nandan (Mr.), Secretary General, International Seabed Authority, Jamaica (Fiji Chief Delegate to the Third Law of the Sea Conference)

Appendix 1

INTERVIEW SCHEDULES

LAW OF THE SEA NEGOTIATIONS AND THE SIDS (Case Study I)

A) Pre-negotiations Phase: Questions (Factors or Causes that Motivated SIDS to Involve in the Process

Before the SIDS began to get involved in the Law of the Sea Negotiations, there were some important matters that influenced SIDS' views on ocean concerns which could be termed as precursors or prompts for awareness raising. I like to begin my interview by asking about these precursor factors.

A-1) What raised awareness of your country towards concern for oceans and high seas?

Probes: - International Geographical Year 1957

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- First UN Conference on Law of the Sea in 1958

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- Second UN Conference on Law of the Sea in 1960

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- Third UN Conference on Law of the Sea in 1973

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- physical features of the country enables to recognize importance of oceans

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

- UN meetings and reports

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

  .....

- workshops and publications / reports issued by intergovernmental bodies

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

  .....

- domestic elements (local university and scholars)

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

  .....

- recognition of natural changes to ocean (depletion of fish stocks or pollution)

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

  .....

- UN observance of special themes in specific years

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

  .....

- Accidents or episodic events that raised concern for ocean regulation

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

  .....

- reports and studies by UNESCO, UNEP etc.

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

  .....

- 1972 UN Conference in Stockholm

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

  .....

- revelations by NGOs

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- any other comments to add

A-2) Which non-state actors were influential in the views of small island developing states (SIDS) towards oceans?

Probes

- intergovernmental bodies

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- scholarly commissions

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- independent scientists

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

a) What was the nature of their influence?

Probes: - these sources were mentioned in the official statements

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- scholars were invited to address meetings of negotiations

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- publications and reports from them were given media coverage in home countries

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- helped as consultants or advisers

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

- .....
- requests made with them for help in specific projects that related to the issue

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

  .....
- any other comments to add

A-3) Malta proposed the concept of "Common Heritage of Mankind" and was actively involved the Law of the Sea Negotiations. Do you know what prompted Malta to do that?

Yes / Don't Know

If yes, then what was it?

Probes: - charismatic character and experience of Ambassador Arvid Pardo

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- Malta had territorial deputes with neighbouring states ☐

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

  .....
- ambitious character of Maltese foreign policy

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

  .....
- changes in domestic politics and economic policies

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

  .....
- physical features of the country enables to recognize importance of oceans

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

  .....
- opportunistic position held by Malta's delegate in the ocean negotiations in the UN

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- domestic elements like Malta University research

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- any other comments to add

.....

B) Negotiation Phase: Questions (Role of SIDS in the Negotiations and Facilitators or Impediments)

Once SIDS began to participate in the negotiations, there were a number of factors that influenced SIDS' role and participation. I would like to ask you now about these factors that influenced the role or participation of SIDS in the process.

B-1) What were your country's contributions to the Law of the Sea Negotiations?

Probes: - diplomatic initiatives

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Many / Few / One / None / Don't Know

.....

- offices filled or elected

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Many / Few / One / None / Don't Know

.....

- financial or material contributions

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Many / Few / One / None / Don't Know

.....

- resolutions sponsored

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Many / Few / One / None / Don't Know

- .....
- motions, intervention or decision moved or proposed

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Many / Few / One / None / Don't Know

.....

- meetings attended or hosted

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Many / Few / One / None / Don't Know

.....

- notable positions held in terms of policy

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Many / Few / One / None / Don't Know

.....

- notable success achieved

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Many / Few / One / None / Don't Know

.....

- Any other comments to add

B-2) Were there contributions by other SIDS?

Yes / No / Don't Know

If yes, what were they? Were they important?

Probes: - diplomatic initiatives

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Many / Few / One / None / Don't Know

.....

- offices filled or elected

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Many / Few / One / None / Don't Know

.....

- financial or material contributions

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Many / Few / One / None / Don't Know

- resolutions sponsored

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Many / Few / One / None / Don't Know

-

- motions, intervention or decision moved or proposed

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Many / Few / One / None / Don't Know

  .....

- meetings attended or hosted

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Many / Few / One / None / Don't Know

  .....

- notable positions held in terms of policy

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Many / Few / One / None / Don't Know

  .....

- notable success achieved

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Many / Few / One / None / Don't Know

  .....

- Any other comments to add

  .....

B-3) Is there any reason why the Seabed Authority was established in Jamaica and not In another country?

Yes / No / Don't Know

If yes, what were they?

Probes: - lobby of SIDS

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- Jamaica offered to become the host

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- in recognition of Jamaica's contribution to UNCLOS

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

  .....

- other important factors that favoured the location

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- any other comments to add

B-4) A Fiji diplomat was appointed as the first Secretary General of the Seabed Authority. Do you know the reason for that?

Yes / No / Don't Know

If yes, what was it?

Probes: - lobby of Fiji or SIDS

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- charismatic and contributory role played by the Fiji's delegate

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- in recognition of Fiji's contribution to UNCLOS

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- any other comments to add

B-5) What factors facilitated SIDS' participation in, and contribution to, the Law of the Sea Negotiations?

Probes: - UN meetings provided them the opportunity to participate in, and contribute to the process as negotiations were held in UN locations

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- one vote one seat principle adhered by UN Charter gave them equal opportunity to participate in the negotiations

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- financial help for participation in the meetings

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- UN facilitated specific requests made by SIDS and G-77

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

any other comments to add

B-6) What factors (if any) impeded the efforts of SIDS in the Law of the Sea Negotiations?

None / Don't Know

Probes: - growth of MNCs and expansion of their explorations to seabed

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- lack of resources to fully participate in the negotiations

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- lack of training in delegates to optimise their contribution

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- lack indigenous of expertise and knowledge on the issues involved

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- lack of political clout to advance specific interests of SIDS

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- any other comments to add

I would now like to probe more deeply into the factors that influenced the role of SIDS in the Law of the Negotiations.

B-7) Did NGOs play any role in influencing the contributions of SIDS to the process?

Yes / Don't Know

If so what was the nature of this role?

Probes: - NGOs were sympathetic to SIDS' concerns and backed them in their lobby

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- provided legal assistance and advice

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

- helped with drafting of positions

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

  .....

- helped with coverage in the international media

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

  .....

- financial help for participation in the meetings

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

  .....

- facilitated updates of meetings and summary of developments

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

  .....

- any other comments to add

B-8) Did political coalitions influence the role of SIDS?

Yes / No / Don't Know

a) If yes, how did they influence the role of SIDS in the ocean negotiations?

Probes

- positions of G-77 have to be adhered to by SIDS for having belonged to this political coalition

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

  .....

- notable contentious issues and divisions within G-77 coalition

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

  .....

- helpfulness of G-77 coalition for SIDS in pursuing their interests

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

b) Which was the most important political coalition that influenced SIDS' role?

.....

- any other comments to add

B-9) Did development issues influence the role of SIDS in the process?

Yes / No / Don't Know

a) If yes, how did they influence the role of SIDS in the ocean negotiations?

Probes: - differing elements of North-South perspectives influenced overall politics in the negotiations

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- notable events or developments within North – South dichotomy that influenced SIDS' positions on issues

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

b) Which was the most important issue that influenced SIDS' role?

- any other comments to add

B-10) Did technological advancements in mass communication influence SIDS' role in ocean negotiations?

Yes / No / Don't Know

a) If yes, how did they influence the role of SIDS in the ocean negotiations?

Probes: - impact of direct telephone and telex communications in facilitating rapid and timely consultation with capitals

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- TV and radio news updated developments of negotiations enabling timely decisions to take

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- development of gear technology in fisheries and seabed mining feared SIDS and G-77 coalition

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

c) Which was the most important technological advancement that influenced SIDS' role?

- any other comments to add

B-11) Small states theories suggest that <u>internal factors</u> (like small size of the country and population; lack of resources and limited capacity etc.) mean that SIDS will play an insignificant role in international relations. Do you agree with that view?

Yes / No / Don't Know

a) If yes, why and in what ways?

Probes: internal factors

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

b) If no, why and what ways?

- external factors

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

B-12) Do you have any other comments or observations to make on any other aspects of the Law of the Sea Negotiations?

Probes: - final thoughts

.....

- personal opinion on the issues discussed

- future of SIDS

THANK YOU FOR YOUR TIME AND VALUABLE INFORMATION PROVIDED

CLIMATE CHANGE NEGOTIATIONS AND THE SIDS (Case Study II)

A) Pre-negotiations Phase: Questions (Factors or Causes that Motivated SIDS to Involve in the Process)

Before the climate change negotiations got underway, there were some important matters that influenced SIDS' view on climate change which could be termed as precursors or prompts for awareness raising. I like to begin my interview by asking about these pre-negotiations factors.

A-1) What raised awareness of your country towards concern for climate change?

Probes: - scholarly reports (NASA reports and Report of the UN Commission on Environment and Development, 1987, etc)

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- actions and revelations of scientists (workshops and meetings held by scientists [1988 Toronto Conference])

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- reports and studies issued by UNESCO, UNEP and WMO

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- increasing episodic events or increasing awareness about global change

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- emergence of environmental issues on world agenda

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

- UN observance of special environmental themes in designated years

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

  .....

- revelations by NGOs

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

  .....

- world media news about global environmental degradation

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

  .....

- Any other comments to add

A-2) Which non-state actors were influential in the views of Strong island developing states (SIDS) towards climate change?

Probes

- intergovernmental bodies

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

  .....

- scholarly commissions

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

  .....

- independent scientists

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

  .....

a) What was the nature of their influence?

- these sources were mentioned in the official statements

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

- scholars were invited to address meetings of negotiations

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

  .....

- publications and reports from these sources were given media coverage in home countries

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

  .....

- helped as consultants or advisers

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

  .....

- sought help to conduct specific researches or compile reports relating to the issue

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

  .....

- requests were made with them for help in specific projects that related to the issue

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

  .....

- Any other comments to add

A-3) The President of Maldives took up the issue of climate change at the UNGA session in 1987 as the first head of state of SIDS to address the issue at the UN. Do you know what prompted him to do that?

Yes / Don't Know

a) If yes, then what was it?

Probes: - charismatic character and experience of the President

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- Maldives was alerted to the phenomenon by sudden episodic events that struck the country in 1987 (unusual tidal waves caused major destructions)

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- Maldives learnt about the danger of climate change from scientific reports

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- physical features of the country enabled to recognize the importance of climate change on its own

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- changes in domestic politics and ambitious foreign policy

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- Any other comments to add

B) Negotiation Phase: Questions (Role of SIDS in the Negotiations and Facilitators or Impediments)

Once climate negotiations started in 1991 there were a number of factors that influenced SIDS' role and participation. I would like to ask you now about these factors that influenced the role or participation of SIDS in the process.

B-1) What were your country's contributions to Climate Change Negotiations?

Probes: : - diplomatic initiatives

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Many / Few / One / None / Don't Know

- offices filled or elected to

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Many / Few / One / None / Don't Know

- .....
- financial or material contributions

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Many / Few / One / None / Don't Know

.....

- resolutions sponsored

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Many / Few / One / None / Don't Know

.....

- motion / intervention / decision moved or proposed

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Many / Few / One / None / Don't Know

.....

- meetings attended or hosted

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Many / Few / One / None / Don't Know

.....

- notable positions held in terms of policy

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Many / Few / One / None / Don't Know

.....

- notable success achieved

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Many / Few / One / None / Don't Know

.....

- Any other comments to add

B-2) Were there contributions by other SIDS?

Yes / No / Don't Know

a) If yes, what were they? Were they important?

Probes: - diplomatic initiatives

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Many / Few / One / None / Don't Know

.....

- offices filled or elected to

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Many / Few / One / None / Don't Know

.....

- financial or material contributions

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Many / Few / One / None / Don't Know

.....

- resolutions sponsored

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Many / Few / One / None / Don't Know

.....

- motion / intervention / decision moved or proposed

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Many / Few / One / None / Don't Know

.....

- meetings attended or hosted

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Many / Few / One / None / Don't Know

.....

- notable positions held in terms of policy

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Many / Few / One / None / Don't Know

- notable success achieved

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Many / Few / One / None / Don't Know

- Any other comments to add

B-3) What factors facilitated SIDS' participation in, and contribution to, the Climate Negotiations?

None / Don't Know

Probes: - UN meetings provided them the platform to participate in, and contribute to the process, and in particular by holding of meetings of negotiations at the UN headquarters in New York

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- one vote one seat principle adhered by UN Charter gave them equal opportunity to participate in the negotiations

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- financial help from the UN for participation in the meetings

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- intergovernmental panel on climate change greatly facilitated information, policy options and strategies

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- UN facilitated specific requests made by SIDS and G-77 relating to climate change

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

- .....
- Any other comments to add

B-4) Were factors (if any) impeded the efforts of SIDS in the Climate Negotiations?
None / Don't Know

Probes: - policy differences among various lobby groups within G-77

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- industrial lobby of developed and fossil fuel dependent economies

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- scientific uncertainty surrounding the issue of global warming and climate Change

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- lack of political commitments or will power by majority of developed and industrial countries

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

- Any other comments to add

I would now like to probe more deeply into the factors that influenced the role of SIDS in the climate change negotiations.

B-5) Did NGOs play any role in influencing the contributions of SIDS to the process? Yes / No / Don't Know

a) If yes, what was the nature of this role?

Probes: - NGOs were sympathetic to SIDS' concerns and backed them in their lobby

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- provided legal assistance

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

- .....
- helped with advice in drafting of positions

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- helped with lobby and giving coverage in the media

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

- .....
- helped with financial help for participation in the meetings

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- helped with online updates of the meetings and summary of events surrounding each meeting

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- Any other comments to add

B-6) Did political coalitions influence the role of SIDS in the climate negotiations?

Yes / No / Don't Know

a) If yes, how did they influence the role SIDS in the climate negotiations?

Probes

- positions of G-77 have to be adhered to by SIDS for having belonged to this political coalition

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

  .....

- notable contentious issues and divisions within G-77 coalition

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

  .....

- helpfulness of G-77 coalition for SIDS in pursuing their interests

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

b) What was the most important coalition?

.....

- any other comments to add

B-7) What influence did Alliance of Strong Island States (AOSIS) have on the role of SIDS in climate negotiations?

Don't Know

Probes: - enabled bargaining power in the negotiations

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

- afforded voting power as a group

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- raised awareness among SIDS relating to climate change

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- helped develop uniform positions and policies on issues

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- helped build stronger partnership within SIDS

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- helped joint lobby efforts of the SIDS

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- helped organize demands of SIDS

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- helped build partnership with NGOs

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- helped to seek funds to organize meetings and workshops

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- helped to coordinate inter-regional networks of cooperation

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- Any other comments to add

B-8) Did development issues influence the role of SIDS in the process?

Yes / No / Don't Know

a) If yes, how did they influence the role of SIDS in the climate negotiations?

Probes: - differing elements of North-South perspectives influenced overall politics in the negotiations

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- notable events or developments within North – South dichotomy

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- any other comments to add

.....

B-9) Did technological advancements in mass communication influence SIDS' role in climate negotiations?

Yes / No / Don't Know

a) If yes, how did they influence the role of SIDS in the negotiations?

Probes: - satellite transmission of coverage of UN meetings enabled easy following of issues and updating of developments without additional staff and resources

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

.....

- internet enabled rapid and economical communication with capitals of SIDS for holding effective and timely consultations and making decisions

Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

- impact of TV and radio and other media sources enabled raising of awareness about climate change and sea level

  Voluntary ☐ Probe ☐ Strong / Moderate / Slight / Don't Know

  .....

- Any other comments to add

B-10) Small states theories suggest that internal factors (like small size of country and Population; lack of resources and limited capacity etc.) mean that SIDS will play an insignificant role in international relations. Do you agree with that view?

a) If yes, why and in what ways?

b) If no, why and what ways?

.....
.....
.....

B-11) Do you have any other comments or observations to make on any aspects of the Climate Change Negotiations?

Probes: - final thoughts

.....

- personal opinion of the issues discussed

- future of SIDS

Appendix 2

SAMPLES OF DATA ANALYSIS

Table 1: Sample of Data Analysis for the Case Study of Law of the Sea Negotiations

Descriptive Coding	Topic Coding
- "Common heritage of mankind" (Pardo, 1967) - To declare the seabed and the ocean floor to be exploited "for the exclusive benefit of mankind as a whole" (Pardo, 1967 - North ahead of South in terms of advanced technology - Leases have already been granted for the mining of phosphate deposits lying well beyond the continental shelf Pardo, 1967) - "There was concern within SIDS about industrialized countries unilaterally going ahead with deep seabed mining and the proceeds flowing back to their treasuries or host countries of MNCs" (Sealy 2004) - "The developing states wanted to share these resources and wanted a mechanism to have a tax bite" (Sealy, 2004) - "The idea of unilateral exploitation of the international seabed area has been a factor which would have encouraged the SIDS to keep fighting for an international regime" (Jacovides, 2004) - "Our primary interest was to ensure that islands get no less than the same rights as continental territories (Jacovides, 2004) - "An interesting characteristics of this convention is that it is more equitable. We wanted to protect ourselves" (Nandan, 2004) - "We wanted to extend our jurisdiction for resources so that when we are ready with capacity as island states, there will be something for us to do, and all those resources are not totally destroyed by the distant waters fishing states" (Nandan, 2004). - "There was a lot of motivation to protect our interests" (Nandan, 2004) - "If SIDS were all rich countries, something like sitting on gold mines, people would have had less sympathy. But in countries like the Maldives, if their resources beyond three miles of their shore are fished out by countries from half way across the world, it is an issue of equity" (Mackay, 2004). - "Use their technical competence to achieve near unbreakable world dominance through predominant control over the seabed and ocean floor." (Pardo 1967) - strong getting stronger and the rich getting richer (Pardo, 1967). - common heritage of mankind came at the right time, made by the right country, a SIDS (Anand, 2, 1980) - "most honourable suggestion to make" (Navoti, 2004). - fear that if not the resources of the high seas would be appropriated by industrialised countries that had the capability to do so before others could join (Odunton, 2004)	Equity

Table 2: Sample of Data Analysis for the Case Study of Climate Change Negotiations

Descriptive Coding	Topic Coding
- whistle blower President of the Maldives, Maumoon Abdul Gayoom. - travelled to the available international forums like the UN, Commonwealth Summit, SAARC - to raise the alarm to unprecedented episodic events that awakened the tiny low-lying island state of the Maldives in 1987 - President of the Maldives became the first head of state or government to raise the issue of climate change at the highest international political (Stovall; Desai 1998; Sopoaga 2004) - In April 1987 episodic events that struck the Maldives - the world's lowest-lying nation above sea level (McFarlan, 501, 1991) - the damage incurred to infrastructure was estimated at around US $ 30 million (Gayoom, 4, 1995). - the authorities in Maldives were strongly suspicious of global warming and its impacts on climate change (Gayoom, 1992). - the President of Maldives raised the plight of island states in the wake of these episodic events internationally by first addressing the matter at the Commonwealth Heads of Government Meeting held in Vancouver in October 1987. - 50 centimetres to 2 meters (18 inches to 6 feet) in the next 100 years". "will be sufficient to submerge our entire country. It will be the death of a nation" (Gayoom, 17 October 1987) - episodes of high tidal swells, in April, June and September of 1987 (Gayoom,1987)	Episodic Events

- "Death of a Nation" speech at the Commonwealth Summit, the (President of Maldives)
- then flew to New York to address the matter at the UNGA special debate held to consider the Report by World Commission on Environment and Development, known as "Our Common Future"
- he said greenhouse gases caused by human and industrial activities are raising the earth's temperature and consequently change its climatic patterns.
- In UNGA in 1987 marked the beginning of the climate diplomacy intensively pursued thereafter by SIDS
- it was President Gayoom who brought to the attention of the world community the flight of SIDS in the wake of global environmental change (Nitin Desei ,1998)
- in the Caribbean and Pacific, episodic events unfolded in the late 1980's triggering a wave of concern as to what the phenomenon of climate change
- 13 of the extreme events out of 25 countries that suffered a great number of natural disasters in the 1970's and 1980's were SIDS (UNCTAD, quoted in Pelling and Vitto, 49, 2001)in
- In 1987, Hurricane Sally in the Cook Islands alerted every country in the region (Wayne King, 2004)
- coral bleaching was another major concern in the 1980's and early 1990's that caused extreme worry for some Pacific SIDS (King, 2004)
- in the Cook Islands the Itataki Lagoon had noticeable effects of coral bleaching (Ramsden, 2004).
- the regional agencies and funding institutions were quick to respond to assess the situations in the Pacific (King, 2004).
- 'The start of this was a series of a large number of extreme events in the 1980's (Ronneberg, 2004)

- the UN as the most appropriate forum to take up the issue (Drayton, 2004; Elisaia, 2004) - almost all SIDS represented in (Chasek, 2004) - UN platform provided a one-stop window for reaching out to the world community and to collaborate with fellow SIDS (Elisaia, 2004; Chasek, 2004) - "The presence of many SIDS Missions at the UN in New York mostly and... Considerable goodwill and support from many developed countries and the UN agencies.... Helped to facilitate their [SIDS] attendance and their direct participation in important negotiations / meetings" (Slade, 2004) - Malta initiated the process of climate change negotiations by introducing a resolution 9at UNGA (Resolution 43/53 [6 December 1988] - AOSIS was formed during the Second World Climate Conference organised by the two intergovernmental bodies known as WMO and UNEP - a special fund established by the UN with voluntary contributions from developed states during the first INC session to enable financially for SIDS to participate in the negotiations (Werksman, 2004; King 2004; Koonjul, 2004; Sopoaga, 2004) - the first phase of negotiations that led to UNFCCC was held at UN centres such as New York, Geneva, and Nairobi except for the First Session which was in Washington, USA - the membership of UN also provided SIDS with one-fifth voting power at the UN, which was observed as by far the single largest, unified voting block (Davis, 1996) - 'powerful countries have begun to court the small islands' large block of votes in their campaigns for election to the UN' (Lean, 5, 1994) - AOSIS functions within the Un system as an ad hoc lobby	UN and IGOs

group for promotion and protection of SIDS interests in the UN negotiations (Sopoaga, 2004) - elected Ambassador of the group while his or her mission facilitates as administrative requirements (Slade, 14 November 1997). AOSIS has no formal structure unlike G77 - and it operates as a 'willing coalition' that aims to strengthen bargaining force of the SIDS particularly in climate change negotiation - the UN system offered to the AOSIS in relation to climate change is the advice and information provided through IPCC constituted by WMO and UNEP in 1988 (Werksman, 2004) - the publication of the first report on climate change by IPCC in time for its consideration at the Second World Climate Conference in 1990 marked the height of public awareness rising about climate change for SIDS (Ronneberg, 2004) - the report compiled by the three Working Groups that constituted IPCC - since its first publication in 1990, the IPCC has been updating and revising their report every five years (IPCC, 1990) - for SIDS saw it as a springboard to capitalise on their eco-diplomacy as well as a 'bargaining chip' to champion their cause of protection from climate change - were seen to be a 'flag bearer' for publicizing the plight of SIDS against global warming - UNEP also has been a fore runner in facilitating specific information required by various groups of SIDS - in 1987, the UNEP began a very important series of research on climate change impacts under its Regional Seas Programme.	

- it established what was called Task Team on implications of climate change for six regions - the objective of these case studies was 'to prepare regional overviews and case studies on the possible impact of expected climate changes on the coastal and marine ecological systems' (Pernelta and Sestin, 1989). - similar studies were carried out on Pacific SIDS too, which resulted in organising one of the pioneering meetings of Pacific SIDS in Majuro, Marshall Island in 1989	

Appendix 3

Recommendations for Future Strategies for SIDS

- SIDS should continue to promote the rule of law and democratic norms in international decision making and addressing global problems
- It should also aim at promoting moral principles and ethical responsibility in finding solution to global problems
- Strengthen the AOSIS alliance with further resources and a permanent structure of administration to become more productive and effective lobby group
- Train diplomats of SIDS not in numbers but in quality to gain skills and expertise in international diplomacy and negotiations and to learn how to capitalize on available opportunities
- Develop institutional and research capacity of diplomatic missions with cost-effective means of advancement in mass communications and diffusion of scientific knowledge
- Stress on the early development of Vulnerability Index for SIDS as a yard stick to assess their precarious developmental challenges
- Build coalition with NGOs in both developed and developing countries
- Build strong partnership with epistemic communities
- Strongly advocate for strengthening Climate Change Convention with binding commitments towards reducing greenhouse gases
- Continue efforts in seeking sustainable development goals in accordance with Barbados Programme of Action
- Aim at wider participation and representation in international meetings and events that addressed issues of concern to SIDS
- Enhance inter-regional and intra-regional cooperation among SIDS for build up of research capability and exchange of information about environmental and developmental issues that concern them
- Make maximum use of advancing telecommunications and technology
- Publicize and raise profile of success stories of development projects in SIDS

- Build institutional and legal mechanism at home country to make all domestic policies environment-friendly
- Carefully monitor developments and events that pose threats to environment of SIDS
- Strengthen the international campaign about raising awareness in developed states and developing large states about the plight of SIDS in the face of climate change
- Begin to plan for contingency plans for SIDS already becoming victims of unfolding episodic events
- Establish a trust fund with the help of an international carbon tax for subsidizing SIDS for environmental disasters
- Trade issues are becoming equally important for SIDS at recent times and so there is need for broadening their scope for international diplomacy to aim for preferential treatment for SIDS in trade negotiations
- Build partnership with like minded international NGOs and citizen's groups to seek environmental peace and justice from global warming