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**PLANNING FOR A POWER STATION:  
INTENTIONS, INTERACTIONS, AND OUTCOMES**

A thesis  
submitted in partial fulfilment  
of the requirements for the Degree  
of  
Doctor of Philosophy  
at the  
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by

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## ABSTRACT

Planning practice involves a complex set of social activities, engaged in by individuals acting in various local and national institutional contexts. These actions are constrained by legislation and policies of central and local government, institutional arrangements, the positions held by officials and the sets of social and spatial constructs held by the participants, both lay and professional. This thesis elucidates the phenomenon of planning in respect of the search for a site for a coal-fired power station.

The search for a site focussed on the Waikato, a region in the North Island, New Zealand. It was conducted by central government officials from the New Zealand Electricity Division of the Ministry of Energy over a six year period from 1979 to 1985. The proposed Waikato Thermal Power Station was part of a national development strategy formulated by the National Party Government to exploit indigenous energy resources as a means of restructuring New Zealand's economic base. The Waikato coal fields became a major focus for the Government's 'Think-Big' programme. Proposals to expand and develop several underground and opencast coal fields and construct another coal-fired power station were imposed on the social organisation of the region without prior consultation. Local and regional authorities with their various planning instruments were expected to co-operate in the implementation of this national plan. In order to facilitate planning for the projects, special ad hoc committee arrangements were put in place by central government officials to liaise with local authority politicians and staff.

The thesis is developed through a reflexive enquiry whereby the phenomenon of planning is shown to be constituted and reconstituted by the participants in the planning process. Thus

the enquiry reveals the intentions, interactions and outcomes which comprise the realities of planning in this case study. This enquiry is presented in three Parts. Following the introduction, Part One sets the methodological, legal and organisational context. Part Two presents the fieldwork investigations. Part Three elucidates the phenomenon of planning and reflects on the research experiences of the writer. The phenomena revealed elucidate the nature of planning practice.

Methods of investigation comprised the conduct of in-depth, unstructured interviews with lay and professional participants; the analysis of interview transcripts; searching of central and local government files; and examining minutes of committee meetings as well as government reports and legislation. A hermeneutic analysis of these texts was used to elucidate the meanings and contexts of participants acting as individuals, acting collectively in informal and formal situations, and in various institutional contexts.

Analysis revealed that meanings and contexts of planning constructs were constantly reformulated by participants as investigations proceeded over the six year period. Reformulation of these constructs occurred in three on-going, interdependent processes; those of people involved practically in selection of a site, people engaged in planning as a phenomenon, and public involvement in site selection and its anticipated consequences. Individual actions were influenced by past experiences, planning constructs and institutional contexts. These understandings explained the ineffectiveness of the construct of regional planning as an instrument in facilitating the implementation of the project.

The thesis concludes with a statement of theoretical understanding that has evolved from the research experience.

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useful background information, not all of which could appear in the text. Sarah Dawson, David Burton, Neville Lewthwaite, and David Hill were happy to answer additional queries as they arose after our interviews.

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## CHAPTER ONE : INTRODUCTION

This thesis inquires into the planning of a coal-fired power station; more specifically the search for a site. Intentions, interactions and outcomes are revealed which comprise the realities of planning. The phenomena so revealed elucidate the ontology of planning: the nature of planning practice.

The nature of the topic lends itself potentially to several modes of analysis. Set in the context of a national development strategy based on the large-scale exploitation of indigenous resources, major energy projects were proposed by the National Party Government in the late 1970s as a means of attracting foreign investment. The National Development Act 1979 was passed to enable central government to 'fast-track' these proposals through the planning system rather than to engage in the established procedures. This strategy was dependent on the exploitation of natural resources such as coal and gas which were located in particular regions. The co-operation of local and regional authorities was essential to expedite the necessary statutory consents and facilitate the implementation of local infrastructure such as roading, port facilities and housing.

Thus potential analyses could draw readily on the theories of public administration, political science, and economic geography. However I have chosen to draw on the insights of the hermeneutic-interpretative tradition rather than positivist or structuralist thought. I have endeavoured to elucidate the phenomenon<sup>1</sup> of planning by uncovering the phenomenal attributes of the planning

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1. My usage of the word phenomenon and its plural references the concept and practice of planning as carried out by lay and professional people. The plural has to do with the variety of concepts and practices found to occur.

processes through an analysis of texts. These 'texts' include in-depth interviews with key participants, central and local government files and committee minutes, as well as government reports and legislation.

Practitioners, both lay and professional, engaged in the practice of planning, draw on the 'rules' established in legislation, and procedural theories of planning. The pragmatic nature of planning activity demands that participants engage in the 'doing' of planning, rather than focusing on what planning is or how it happens in practice. This enquiry sets out to discover what happens in a sequence of events and to uncover the meanings of participants' actions. Thus, rather than imposing sets of theoretical constructs, the thesis is grounded epistemologically in the actors' frames of reference.

Planning, like many other professions, is practised pragmatically and is technical in orientation. Traditional planning theories do not provide the conceptual tools for reflexive analysis, that is where the practitioner reflects on the nature of her/his actions. An academic researcher can include the modes of thinking, knowing and being. To the extent that this thesis does achieve an understanding beyond the pragmatics of planning, it attempts to uncover the theoretical, epistemological and ontological attributes of planning. To do this, I draw principally on the disciplines of Geography and Sociology to provide the necessary theoretical insights to guide analysis.


### IN THE BEGINNING...

Interest in pursuing this research arose out of my observations and experiences as a planning practitioner in the Waikato from 1978 to 1983. During that time I worked as a planner for both rural and urban local authorities as well as for a firm of planning consultants. My work involved close interaction with

local body politicians, other professionals and members of the public. As I began work as a planner, the Town and Country Planning Act had just been reviewed, united councils were in the process of being established, and local body planners were being challenged to work with these new regional authorities who would shortly begin preparing regional planning schemes. Local authority politicians had accepted reluctantly that a new form of regional government would be responsible for the activities of regional planning and civil defence.

However, a further challenge to the planning profession emerged in 1979 when the National Government proposed the National Development Bill to speed up the construction of major public works. This Bill superimposed a new 'fast track' planning process over those provided for in existing legislation. Potentially this legislation provided the means by which the Government could expedite its national development strategy.

This strategy, which became known as 'Think Big', was based on the large-scale exploitation of indigenous resources using capital-intensive technology, as a means of restructuring New Zealand's economic base. The proposal to encourage overseas investment by the National Government began initially as an ad hoc response to an unexpected surplus of electricity in the late 1970s and developed subsequently into a programme of national economic development. Use of energy resources such as coal, oil, hydro-electricity and natural gas became an integral part of this programme. By early 1983 these major development projects included four petrochemical projects in Taranaki and Northland; four electricity projects drawing on coal, geothermal and hydro resources in the Waikato, Central North Island, Central Otago; and expansion in metal processing at two established plants in South Auckland and Southland (Figure One). They each involved capital costs ranging from 200 to 1500 million dollars, construction workforces between 250 to 2600 workers, and



**Figure One Major Energy Projects Referred to in Text.**  
*Source: Stokes, 1978b, Figure 2*

permanent workforces between 40 to 630. These projects were intended to reduce New Zealand's dependence on imported oil and petroleum products and to generate significant export earnings (Taylor and McClintock, 1984).

The Waikato coalfields became a major focus for the Government's 'Think Big' strategy. The proposals to expand and develop several underground and opencast coalfields and construct another coal-fired power station in the Waikato raised immediate challenges for staff of the Ministries of Energy and of Works and Development, as well as Waikato local and regional authorities.

In the midst of this, as a practising planner, I had begun to observe that the Waikato United Council, a newly established authority responsible for regional planning, seemed ineffective in articulating regional policies to plan for the massive infrastructure requirements of the 'Think Big' projects, including a fourfold increase in coal production. This view was shared informally by planners, other professionals and members of the public with an interest in the implications of the Government's 'Think Big' programme for the Waikato coalfields.

Another issue arose for me from this and other observations which interested me academically. This was to understand the way and the extent to which individuals - whether planners, other professionals, politicians or members of community groups - influenced the development of policies towards, and the process of decision-making that affect planning proposals emanating from elsewhere. I was very much aware, as a matter of practice, of constraints imposed by legislation and planning policies and the manner in which local authority politicians and staff could act. At the same time I recognised that individuals were able to influence events in particular ways by proposing or taking certain actions (and conversely by inaction). Although I appreciated the dialectics of these situations in practical terms, it was only later when engaged in my thesis, and working

as an academic geographer, that I came to understand more deeply the theoretical dimensions, of what, for present purposes, may be called agency.

By 1984, there were two 'projects' which I considered would give me the opportunity to explore these issues. These were the selection of a site for a second coal-fired power station in the Waikato, and the review of arterial routes in and around Hamilton City. I had already begun to document the controversy over roading options. There had been a major research project undertaken at the University of Waikato in the School of Social Sciences and the Department of Geography which had monitored the social and economic impacts of the construction of the first Huntly Power Station in the late 1970s (Fookes, 1984). I began to take an interest in the planning of the site for the second power station.

For a variety of reasons I decided to drop further analysis of the controversy over roading options and thereby the potential for a comparative analysis of that with the siting of the second power station. At that stage it appeared that a final siting decision would not be made until 1987. Subsequent events have delayed a decision and it is unlikely that final decisions will be made before the end of 1990. Also, though I was familiar with the monitoring research completed during the construction of the Huntly Power Station from 1976 to 1981, I decided not to pursue further enquiry into that. This research and thesis concerns the process of investigation undertaken by many authorities and advisors intent on identifying an appropriate site for the Waikato Thermal Power Station.<sup>2</sup>

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2. This station is also referred to by participants in the text as the 'second' or 'third' Waikato Thermal Power Station, depending on whether the Meremere Power Station or Huntly Power Station is regarded as the first Waikato Power Station. Later on, when NZE staff began looking for an alternative site to use coal from the Mokau field, the Station was known as 'North Island Thermal No. 1'. Electricity Corporation staff now refer to the station as Meremere B.

## REVIEWING THE LITERATURE

In developing my topic, I searched for New Zealand material which examined planning practice in a reflexivist way. Informed comment on planning practice and related issues can be found in several sources. These include academic journals such as the New Zealand Geographer, New Zealand Journal of Geography, Australian and New Zealand Journal of Sociology, practitioner journals such as Planning Quarterly (formerly Town Planning Quarterly), New Zealand Local Government, New Zealand Planning Institute publications, government reports, environmental impact reports and assessments, conference proceedings, university theses and publications.

The earliest significant contribution to reviews of planning practice is found in Latham's (1973) study on planning objectives. In his review he presented the findings derived from personal interviews with planners and politicians from selected local authorities in an attempt to evaluate the variability of practice throughout New Zealand. A similar, but more broadly based and superficial attempt to evaluate practice 12 years later, was undertaken by Williams (1985). Few discrete publications (other than a few articles in Town Planning Quarterly and Planning Quarterly) consider the context of agency.

A constant theme in various publications has been the institutional contexts in which planning practice takes place. Gow's published thesis (1975) reviews the administration system through which planning is done. About this time the report of the Task Force on Economic and Social Planning (1976) was published, New Zealand At The Turning Point, which foreshadowed the establishment of the New Zealand Planning Council. Reports from the Planning Council (1978; 1980) continued the approach taken by the Holmes Task Force in arguing the need to integrate better national and regional planning with development. The Town and Country Planning Division of the Ministry of Works and

Development was also prominent in co-ordinating seminars on regional planning and in sponsoring reports on the progress of the newly formed united councils in the early 1980s (Fischer, 1984; Memon, 1983; Ministry of Works and Development, 1981a). Many of the themes of the annual conferences of the New Zealand Planning Institute reflect the perspective of the institutional contexts within which planning is practised.

Parallel with this perspective, there emerged a literature set in the context of debates over the use of energy resources and covering the major development projects from the late 1970s. These debates took place largely in submissions presented to forums, such as the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Nuclear Power Generation (1978), papers read at conferences such as the 1974 New Zealand Energy Conference and 1979 Seminar on Energy: Environment Perspectives, and in newsletters published by environmental activists such as Energywatch. Projects such as the Clutha Dam in Central Otago, and the Huntly Power Station in the Waikato, prefigured developments in the practice of environmental and social impact reporting and assessment. These gained momentum throughout the 1970s. Applied research presented in publications from the Huntly Monitoring Project and environmental impact reports for projects such as the proposed Aramoana smelter in Otago and the Taranaki gas projects contributed significantly to the newly emerging practice of social impact assessment.

The urgency of the 'Think Big' programme led to the concentration of literature on how to cope with the immediate problems of rapid growth in small towns and communities. This emphasis offered little of value for subsequent researchers (Taylor and McClintock, 1984). Consequently much of the evaluation of major projects has been prepared in the development frame of reference and focussed on what may be termed functional issues. This line of enquiry has much in common with many planning-related publications, that is, a focus on the pragmatics of coping with

the problems experienced in everyday practice and how practice can be improved within that particular frame of reference.

It appears significant that critically informed comment on planning practice has come not from practitioners but from others in the disciplines of Sociology and Geography. Useful insights into the history of local government reform in New Zealand and the conflict over proposals for a regional tier of government are found in Welch's thesis (1979) on regional development and regionalism. The alliance of the State with multinational capital and the sponsorship of major resource development drew academic analyses of the energy development controversies. These include O'Connor (1981) in his published thesis, Shirley (1982) in his edited volume Development Tracks: The Theory and Practice of Community Development, Tester (1987) who critically analysed the practice of New Zealand environmentalists using a neo-existentialist critique, and Porter (1985) who drew on New Zealand case studies in his doctoral thesis on development practice.

Others, such as Ericksen (1986) and Fookes in the Huntly Monitoring Project Report series (ed., 1981) and the latter's doctoral thesis (1984), have produced academic appraisals drawing on empirical research which focuses to some extent on the context of agency. Ericksen, for example, analyses flood hazard in New Zealand as a social phenomenon. In his analysis he examines the planning practices of local authorities in addressing their urban flood problems. Fookes (1984) draws on concepts of time-geography and Giddens' stratification model of action to develop alternative approaches to the monitoring of social impact assessment.

After reviewing the literature, I concluded that no one had undertaken research attempting to examine in any way the integration of the constructs of national development planning with those of statutory planning, by focussing on the actors'

frames of reference. In other words, I found that the New Zealand literature was deficient in examining how the practice of planning is constituted by participants in specific contexts. Accordingly, I turned to overseas literature in my search for theoretical insights which would be helpful.

In my analysis, I have drawn on the texts of several geographers and sociologists. These include, in particular, those of Eyles and Smith (eds.) Qualitative Methods in Human Geography (1988), Gregory's Ideology, Science and Geography (1978) and Giddens's New Rules of Sociological Method (1976) and The Constitution of Society (1984). Journals which were particularly helpful were Environment and Planning D: Society and Space and the Transactions of the Institute of the British Geographers. The most useful insights into planning practice were those of Forester (1980; 1982a; 1982b; 1982c).

### ORGANISATION OF THE THESIS

The thesis is organised through three parts and ten chapters. Part One sets the context for the enquiry. Part Two presents the fieldwork investigations. Part Three elucidates the phenomenon of planning and reflects on the research experiences of the writer.

Part One comprises three chapters. Chapter Two discusses some theoretical considerations in developing an epistemological framework for analysis. It presents the philosophical tradition in which the thesis is based. The chapter outlines, in general terms, the research methods used to collect the evidence used in subsequent analyses. These included in-depth interviews with key participants, perusal of central and local government files, committee minutes and government reports on the Waikato projects. Chapter Three sets the national context for the enquiry. It discusses the development of several national planning instruments and institutional contexts which were of relevance

for the case study, including the administrative arrangements made for the Waikato projects. Chapter Four outlines local issues and planning instruments as an introduction to the case study. This chapter introduces significant events which occurred prior to the commencement of the case study and which were of importance in shaping the actions of the participants.

Part Two presents the case study and field work. It examines specific events and actions which occurred from 1979 to 1985 while New Zealand Electricity (NZE) officials investigated potential sites for a coal-fired power station. The chapters focus on a particular theme of the investigations. In Chapter Five I discuss the formulation and reformulation of special institutional arrangements by NZE officials as investigations proceeded. In so doing I introduce issues which emerged during the investigations. Chapter Six examines the actions of the Waikato United Council as a newly-created organisation confronted with the imposition of a national development plan on a site in its region. This chapter draws on an analysis of events and views of participants in examining the responses of the United Council. Chapter Seven focuses on the interaction between officials and those community groups outside the official context of action. The chapter addresses the actions of landowners and the Tainui Māori Trust Board as they engaged in the 'consultative' processes of site selection.

Part Three reflects on the phenomena of planning. This part draws the thesis together in three chapters. Chapter Eight identifies and examines the perspectives of planning implicit in the statements of, or taken-for-granted by the participants. This chapter attempts to identify the constructs used by participants as they engaged in the process of planning. Chapter Nine provides some theoretical insights into the phenomenon of planning. It considers, first, the context of individuals acting collectively

in an analysis of selected events and, secondly, individuals acting in institutional contexts. This chapter concludes the case study.

In a reflexive thesis, it would not be appropriate to finish without a reflection on the methods used to interpret the several texts which comprise the evidence used in analysis. Accordingly, Chapter Ten reflects on the particularities of the research experience. This chapter is a statement of my personal involvement in the research process. This is necessary because of the explicit involvement of the researcher as an actor in the elucidation of meanings and contexts of situations researched. This statement can only be made at the conclusion, as a final statement of theoretical understanding that has evolved from doing the research.

The central concerns of this enquiry, therefore, set out to uncover how the phenomenon of planning is constituted and reconstituted by participants in this case study of the search for a site for a coal-fired power station. This search was conducted over a six year period and involved many people acting individually and collectively in a complex set of social activities. These activities took place within local and national institutional contexts. The analysis involves the elucidation of the meanings and contexts of participants' actions in three situations: the self-awareness of the participants, their collective actions in informal and formal situations, and the participants' actions in various institutional contexts. Chapter Two takes up the issues of theoretical and methodological consideration for the enquiry.

## **PART ONE : CONTEXT OF THE CASE STUDY**

Part One sets the methodological, legal and organisational context of the enquiry.

Chapter Two outlines theoretical and methodological considerations. Research methods used in the course of the enquiry are discussed. Chapter Three sets the broad context for the thesis. It explains the several national planning and organisational instruments in place to facilitate 'national development'. The administrative arrangements used to implement the Waikato projects are outlined. Chapter Four introduces the local context of the case study. Particular events which occurred before investigations began to select a specific site for the Waikato Thermal Power Station are discussed. The Chapter also explains local organisational and planning instruments in place at the time site investigations began in 1979.

## CHAPTER TWO : ISSUES OF METHOD

Setting out on any academic enquiry which involves field work investigations, requires an explicit acknowledgement of the theoretical tradition in which the research is based. The theorising engaged in by the researcher will involve choices of what is thought to be required and therefore the choice of methods used to collect and later interpret empirical evidence. For this enquiry, it is appropriate to recognise and review briefly what theoretical approaches might be drawn upon. This chapter is involved with consideration of some broad theoretical traditions along with a review of developments in planning thought. The theoretical constructs used to uncover the complex nature of planning practice are explained. The chapter concludes with a discussion of my chosen research methods.

### SOME THEORETICAL CONSIDERATIONS

It is common practice to accept that the various perspectives exploited by social geographers fall into three separate philosophies (Jackson and Smith, 1984; Johnston, 1989).

The triad incorporates three tensions: between the assumed objectivity of positivist science and the inherent subjectivism of humanist alternatives; between the active view of human agency implicit in humanism and the 'passivé' view of man [sic] adopted in structuralist analyses; between the positivist's interest in externally observable 'social facts' and the structuralist's belief in their subordination to an underlying explanatory structure (Jackson and Smith, 1984, 5).

The positivist approach is "based on the belief that discrete classes of phenomena can be defined" (Johnston, 1989, 54). Although there are various versions of positivism, it can be

characterised by the belief that reality is present in appearances, that objects exist independently of observers, that they may be measured repeatedly to form the basis of laws which can be verified with recourse to empirical fact (Jackson and Smith, 1984, 7).

In the development of geographical thought, logical positivism was very influential in the mid 1950s and 1960s. Logical positivism developed as a break with the positivist philosophy proposed by August Comte in essays and volumes published between 1820 and 1842. Comte coined the term to "describe his systematic reconstruction of the history and development of scientific knowledge" (Halfpenny, 1982, 13). His primary purpose was to distinguish science from metaphysics, religion, individualism and revolutionary utopianism (Halfpenny, 1982, 18). Nineteenth century conceptions of positivism reflected on the general human condition and produced theories of history. In the 1920 and 1930s the Vienna Circle revitalised positivism and highlighted differences from 19th century positivism by calling their programme "logical positivism". Two characteristics were central to their ideas; first, that the scientific tradition is empiricist and positivist; secondly, the aim of scientific effort is to produce an unified science by the application of logical analysis to empirical material (Halfpenny, 1982, 41-42).

Halfpenny (1982, 114) identified twelve positivisms which have been developed, beginning with Comte. In simple terms, the positivist philosophy is reflected in the empirical or analytical sciences. The positivist scientist considers that subject matter can be reviewed according to a set of laws. It usually involves establishing a hypothesis, model-construction, deduction of what should be present, and the continual retesting of hypotheses.

This process, or scientific method, is equated with 'objectivity' and is claimed to be neutral and value free. "Successful empirical science allows for technical control" and the manipulation of the physical environment and society (Johnston, 1989, 62).

The emergence of humanistic geography in the 1970s was in part a response to "a dissatisfaction with the more mechanistic models developed during the 'quantitative revolution' in geography" (Johnston, Gregory and Smith, eds., 1986, 208). This involved the application of statistical and mathematical methodology as well as the construction of formal theories of spatial organisation (Johnston, Gregory and Smith, eds., 1986, 383). Humanistic geography is distinguished by the central focus given to human awareness and creativity. It draws upon a range of constructs from the human and social sciences such as phenomenology, existentialism, ethnomethodology and symbolic interactionism (Johnston, Gregory and Smith, 1986, 208). The purpose of humanistic geography is to enable the researcher to understand the meanings implicit in actions. It is essential that the researcher does not impose procedures, labels and classifications but rather draws them out from the evidence provided by participants under study. Thus humanistic geography involves hermeneutic analysis which

attempts to uncover the nature of the social world through an understanding of how people act in and give meaning to their own lives (Eyles, 1988, 2).

The hermeneutic attribute may be identified as having a double quality. This double hermeneutic involves the social scientist

entering and grasping the frames of meanings in the production of social life by lay actors, and reconstituting these within the new frames of meaning (Giddens, 1976, 79).

The researcher attempts to 'write up' the understanding obtained in a way the reader can faithfully comprehend. Such 'write-up' is also recognisable to the people studied as being faithfully reconstructed in frames of reference with which they can identify. Thus, in order to discover the nature of social phenomena, the researcher is part of, not separate from, the social world under study (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983).

The methodological shift from

empirical to hermeneutic analysis, from quantitative to interpretative social science is one which those steeped in the positivist tradition find most difficult to accept (Jackson and Smith, 1984, 10).

Eyles points out that

while interpretative geography searches for and accepts the definitions and meanings of the social world as given - it reconstructs reality by revealing the taken-for-granted world assumptions of individuals and groups in space - another dimension may be identified...

it can be taken further by researchers so that

a scientific ordering is used to give shape to the meanings derived from everyday experience while others may emphasise the system of relations between words and images as sources of meaning...

Interpretative geography is in sum concerned with the understanding and analysis of meanings in specific contexts (Eyles, 1988, 2).

The scientific ordering that the researcher has to engage in as part of the art of interpreting human collective conduct has taken many forms. The shift from humanism to structuralism is

marked by a change in status from people being viewed as 'subject' to 'object', from "a determining to a determined existence" (Jackson and Smith, 1984, 11). Structuralism is a term which is used widely throughout the social sciences and humanities (Johnston, 1986, 87) and "its use requires careful qualification" (Jackson and Smith, 1984, 124). The structuralist tradition includes Marxist and critical theory and has been drawn on to develop structuration theory.

Critical theory developed from the contributions of the Frankfurt School and later contributions from Habermas. Initially the founding of the School at the University of Frankfurt in the 1920s could be seen as one response to the need to reappraise Marxist theory in a post-revolutionary Europe (Bottomore, 1984, 11). A large part of the School's "theory of society" formulated over three decades focussed on the criticism of positivism and empiricism and attempts to formulate an alternative epistemology and methodology (Bottomore, 1984, 28). Critical theory focuses essentially on the "connections between human agency and social structure which exist under capitalism" and "which can be recognised and restructured (this is vital) through a process of self-reflection" (Johnston, Gregory and Smith, eds., 1986, 81). The goal of critical theory is the transformation of society and human emancipation.

This attempt to synthesise knowledge and purpose, theoretical and practical reason, became and remained a fundamental philosophical position of the Frankfurt School, and the ground of its criticism of the positivist separation of 'fact' and 'value' (Bottomore, 1984, 29).

Simplistically, structural Marxism in geography has been characterised as providing a 'passive' view of human agency and results in an obfuscation that human actions can change the world. Humanism, on the other hand, has been criticised for failing to incorporate the importance of structural constraints

on human intentions and actions (see Jackson and Smith, 1984; Duncan and Ley, 1982; and for a reply, Chouinard and Fincher, 1983). Drawing on both the critical and hermeneutic sciences, Giddens developed the notion of the duality of structure and agency, best explained in his book, The Constitution of Society (1984).

This view of society holds that both the social system and the individual actor are equally important in the explanation of social phenomena (Dear and Moos, 1986a, 231).

Structuration theory is an attempt to overcome dualism in social theory by drawing on both structure and agency. The condition which governs the transformation and, therefore, reproduction of social systems is structuration.

Crucial to the idea of structuration is the theorem of the duality of structuration ...The constitution of agents and structures are not two independently given sets of phenomena, a dualism, but represent a duality. According to the notion of the duality of structure, the structural properties of social systems are both medium and outcome of the practices they recursively organise (Giddens, 1984, 25).

While there have been substantial criticisms of structuration theory, Giddens is cautious in its use for empirical analysis and suggests its concepts should be used no more than as "sensitising devices" (Giddens, 1984, 326).

Although these broad philosophical traditions of logical-positivist, humanist and structural thought have played their part in the development of planning theory, the application of ideas emanating from logical-positivism have been particularly influential.

The best known and dominant paradigm has been the "rational-comprehensive model" and some argue that all subsequent attempts to develop planning paradigms have been reactions to this approach (Weaver, Jessop and Das, 1985). "Rational-comprehensive" planning was developed in the immediate post-war period, from about 1950 to 1965, and "defined rationality exclusively in terms of positive knowledge and instrumental calculation" (Weaver, Jessop and Das, 1985, 158). The purpose of "rational-comprehensive" planning is to apply the most rigorous rationality to decision-making, using means-ends analysis and taking every possible relevant factor into account, so that analysis is comprehensive. Planners are regarded as technicians who implement the values of the politicians (Weaver, Jessop and Das, 1985, 158). This approach was particularly promoted by authors such as Banfield (1959) and Faludi (1973). This rational approach to planning led to the development of a "metropolitan plan-making process" which formed the basis of later transportation studies in Britain, the United States and elsewhere (Breheny and Batey, 1981).

In the 1960s rational planning was further enhanced by the incorporation of ideas from systems theory. In essence, planning was regarded as a continuous process, beginning with devising ways to control the 'system' concerned with continual cybernetic monitoring of the effects, and assessing whether the controls are effective or need modification (Hall, 1982). There was also a move to develop procedural theories of planning separately from a "substantive focus on the objects being planned" (Dear, 1986, 377).

Despite the attempts to develop a new scientism, there were signs during the 1960s of increasing dissatisfaction with the dominant planning paradigm as demands grew for public participation in decision-making. These responses were reflected in what became known as the "liberal political-science critique" (Weaver, Jessop and Das, 1985), identified by the proponents of a "choice theory

of planning" (Davidoff and Reiner, 1962) and the "science of muddling through" (Lindblom, 1959). Essentially, this critique was pluralist and attempted to include citizens in decision-making. A further extension of this approach was termed "advocacy planning" which featured predominately in the United States of America although it spread to Britain in the late 1960s. Both countries were experiencing problems of deprivation in inner cities (Hall, 1982). Planners attempted to act as experts and advocates for economically disadvantaged and politically underrepresented citizens. While these attempts to humanise planning practice did not result in any new theoretical developments, the effect was to "place planning irrevocably on the political agenda" (Dear, 1986, 378).

In the 1970s two new critiques developed. Friedmann's (1973) theory of transactive-creative planning had a wide influence on planning education. As an extension of earlier ideas about involving communities in planning, he argued that "the future would be created by establishing a learning society, re-educating people to work together on small tasks" (Weaver, Jessop and Das, 1985, 161). This approach was "essentially an atheoretical view of planning" (Dear, 1986, 378) and "came in natural progression from advocacy planning" (Weaver, Jessop and Das, 1985, 161). By the mid 1970s, a new radical critique emerged, derived from a neo-Marxist philosophy. Essentially,

critics argued for a social theory of planning which would specifically incorporate its political economic setting [and] emphasised the essentially subordinate role of planning in the context of capitalist urbanisation (Dear, 1986, 378).

Planners were challenged to consider issues such as whose interests they served, how they might act to promote social justice, who benefited from planning and that actions of planning legitimised existing social relations. This came to be known as the "political economy approach" (Hall, 1982, 300). This critique

was concerned with what planning is rather than what planning ought to be, as a sociohistorical phenomenon, rather than as an abstract analytical concept (Scott and Roweiss, 1977, 1097-1098).

By the late 1970s a potential resolution to the split between the radicals and the liberals was offered in the application of critical theory (Dear, 1986). Authors such as Forester (1980; 1982a; 1982b; 1982c) drew on hermeneutical and phenomenological schools of thought to develop new ways of examining theory and practice. Forester has attempted to develop accounts of planning practice, and what planners actually do on a day-to-day basis, in order to make planners more aware of agency and the institutional contexts in which they work. "In short, hermeneutics provided a new theoretical and practical legitimacy where it was urgently needed" (Dear, 1986, 378).

The 1980s have been marked by economic recession in the West and a move away from government intervention in economic affairs towards principles of economic liberalisation and decentralisation of government policies. The Fordist-Modernist tradition of urban renewal and community reform has been replaced by one which considers that allowing the 'market' to operate without restrictions will revive the economy. "Plan has, to a large extent, given way to market" (Cooke, 1989, 251). In this politically conservative climate, there have been moves to redefine planning as land use planning and "to recapture the center ground in planning" (Dear, 1986, 378-379). Breheny and Batey (1981) note that in the "post-rational" period, since the move away from systems planning in the mid 1970s, no dominant alternative has replaced the "systems approach". While planning theorists have had the greatest influence on methods of procedure, the consequences of questioning the validity of procedure appear to have been the removal of theory from practice. Attempts, such as the workshop held in Reading in 1982, to debate the nature and meanings of 'rationality' reflected this concern with the nature and lack of theoretical debate in urban

and regional planning (Breheny and Hooper, eds., 1985).

The need to reconstruct a political epistemology which establishes a basis for a new planning paradigm has been identified by several authors (Dear, 1986; Kiernan, 1983; Weaver, Jessop and Das, 1985). This would require the establishment of a common planning discourse which draws on the strengths and weaknesses of various planning theories; its integration with contemporary issues in social theory (Dear, 1986); and the formulation of a method which recognises the multidimensional nature of social knowledge - "personal, sociological and positive" (Weaver, Jessop and Das, 1985, 165).

#### DEVELOPING RESEARCH METHODS

Planning practice involves a complex set of social activities, promoted and engaged in by individuals acting in various local and national institutional contexts. These actions are constrained by legislation and policies of central and local government, and the nature of the offices occupied by officials and other participants. As well, participants, lay and professional, who engage in planning practice bring with them sets of constructs which influence how they act. I wished to investigate how individual actions influenced policies and decision-making, and thereby how planning as a phenomenon was constituted and reconstituted through an analysis of a specific set of events, namely the selection of a site for a power station.

The nature of the enquiry and the matters I wished to pursue called for the use of methods which form part of the humanistic, geographical tradition rather than those of positivist or structuralist thought. I recognised that the formulation of the research topic to an extent implicitly pre-determined the theoretical tradition in which my research would take place,

although this did not exclude the use of constructs from other theoretical traditions. In turn, this would influence the choices of methods and techniques developed to conduct field work investigations. In other words, my cosmological, ontological and disciplinary presuppositions about the origin, nature and aspects of reality which should be investigated shaped my epistemological approach to the study (Harrison and Livingstone, 1980).

Later, during the writing up, I attempted to draw on the insights of structuration theory. I was, after all, dealing with 'society' and institutions. The constructs of agency and structure as proposed by Giddens and developed by others (Dear and Moos, 1986a; 1986b) were attractive propositions when analysing evidence which dealt extensively with the understanding of collectivities, and the actions of agents acting within institutional contexts. However, I found that in order to apply this model it was necessary to treat organisations as entities, as 'actors', distinct from the individual people who held elected or appointed positions within those organisations. I found structuration theory an inadequate theoretical instrument to explain the 'reality' of institutions in the context of the conduct of the participants as revealed by the evidence. I concur with Gregson that considerable insights from structuration theory can be achieved concerning social practices, intentions, knowledgeability, of actors and the constraining/enabling influence of rules and resources on human action (Gregson, 1986, 199).

I wished to uncover and elucidate meanings and contexts of participants as they acted in various situations in the case study. The heuristic and hermeneutic dimensions of this reflexive enquiry called for the use of hermeneutic-interpretative methods. Quantitative research methods, such as surveys and questionnaires, were clearly inappropriate and would not provide the understanding I needed. I considered the use of techniques such as unstructured interviewing of participants, and analysis

of texts such as files, reports and interview transcripts. These would enable me to identify the many 'realities' of planning implicit in the actions of the participants. It was important for me, as far as is possible, to put aside my professional training as a planner so that I could to reveal to myself taken-for-granted assumptions about the phenomenon of planning;

...phenomena refer to the way in which things and objects which are not things are given to us; the way they are constituted. The use of the word 'phenomenon' thus implicates both object and subject, and again places at the centre of our thinking the intentional structure of knowledge and experience (Pickles, 1988, 249).

I attempted to make myself conscious of my own interests and perspectives in order to maintain a reflexivist position; that is, one where the researcher recognises the integral nature of her/his involvement with the people under study. Given my previous set of experiences it was tempting to focus on the detail, to slip into the positivist mode of explanation, rather than to explore the grounds on which peoples' actions were based. While this was at times a 'problem' in terms of my later interpretations, those experiences were also useful in developing my research methods and reconstructing events which had taken place. My knowledge of planning procedures, for example, assisted me to understand why certain matters were undertaken, in particular sequences and at particular points in time.

My method of enquiry required several sources of 'data'. To assist in understanding and interpreting events and actions, it was necessary to reconstruct events chronologically (see Appendix Three for a list of significant events). Additionally, I needed access to departmental files as well as public documents such as annual departmental reports, New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, policy statements, local body reports, environmental impact reports on specific development proposals, and so on.

Fortunately, staff in the New Zealand Electricity Division of the Ministry of Energy were keen to have an evaluation of the consultative processes which they undertook when selecting a site for the next Waikato coal-fired power station. A research contract was negotiated which enabled me to have open access to their departmental files on the site investigations for the power station. There was an understanding that the case would be used as part of my doctoral work.

Another important source of information for my analysis was to interview the main participants in the site investigations. I wanted participants to talk about their experiences in a way which would reveal their notions of 'planning' without the imposition of a predetermined framework. The most appropriate method of eliciting this material was to conduct in-depth, unstructured interviews. Interviewees would be able to talk freely of their experiences in so far as they felt able to do so. They and I knew we were engaging in a search for understanding.

As part of my contract I undertook to interview key participants in the case study (see Appendix One). I identified these people through my own knowledge and also by asking some of the participants to identify whom they thought should be interviewed. These people included: planners (consultants, local authority and central government planners); local body politicians; New Zealand Electricity (NZE), State Coal Mines (SCM) and Ministry of Works and Development (MWD) officials (mostly engineers); landowners at the two final sites under investigation; representatives of the Tainui Māori Trust Board, Federated Farmers and Watchdog Waikato Inc.

These people were contacted initially by letter which outlined my research and asked if they were prepared to be interviewed (Appendix Two). This was followed up by a telephone call a few days later. They were asked if they were prepared to proceed with the interview and if our interviews could be recorded by tape.

Everyone contacted was willing to be interviewed and everyone agreed that the interview could be taped. The interviews were preceded by a second letter which outlined some topics to be covered in the interview, and confirmed the date and venue for the interview. These topics acted as discussion 'prompts' so that the participants could have some time to reflect on their experiences before the interviews took place. At times these topics changed slightly depending on the background or particular involvement of the individual. Because of the scope of the enquiry it was necessary to provide some direction. While the interviews were directed by the list of topics supplied, the discourse between us was influenced by my attempting to avoid asking leading questions. Nevertheless, "All interviews, like any other kind of social interaction, are structured by both researcher and informant" (Hammersley and Atkinson, 1983, 112-113).

Interviews normally ranged from one to two hours. Verbatim transcripts were offered following the interviews and provided to those people who requested them. Some were returned with minor modifications and clarifications of detail. In some cases I followed up the interviews with informal discussions. In total, 22 people were interviewed over a period of several months, beginning in November 1986 and concluding in April 1987.

The interviews were held nearly two years after the final selection of a site for the power station in April 1985. However, no power station had in fact been built, so the post hoc experience of the event was not one of demonstrable errors, but of thwarted attempts. By this stage the prospect of the power station being built looked increasingly unlikely. Corporatisation of the Ministry of Energy and its Divisions, including NZE and SCM, was about to take place. Projects proposed by NZE and SCM were effectively put on hold. The decision to construct the power station would be made by the newly-formed Electricity Corporation. There was no urgent need to construct the power

station as there was adequate generating capacity to meet consumer demand for some years to come.

While to some extent the participants' discussion of their experiences could be influenced by their ability to recall events, it did not appear to be a problem. Many of the participants were still engaged in some way with ongoing issues associated with the siting of the power station such as land acquisition and provisions for access. Before conducting the interviews, I had read the files in the Wellington office of the New Zealand Electricity Division so that I was familiar with key events as they unfolded chronologically. Accordingly, if requested, I was able to meet questions about specific events or to provide factual details, such as specific dates, during the interviews. On a few occasions I was asked to stop the tape recorder while participants recollected events or related personal anecdotes. On other occasions participants made intriguing comments about specific episodes at the end of the interview which they did not wish to have recorded. Several participants were involved in professional careers and were likely to continue working with people involved in the case in some capacity. I had agreed to respect those confidences before commencing the interviews. Fortunately, the content of some of those comments also came to my attention by other means and I was able to draw on such information in my analysis.

There were two other notable features of my interviews. First, in an unexpected and unsolicited way I was pleased to note how interviewees confirmed and clarified the sequences of events as I had come to understand them. By the time the tapes were transcribed and analysed I was able to provide a reconstruction of events that had involved the people interviewed that I considered to be as chronologically accurate as I could achieve. I was confident that I had covered the significant events which comprised the case study. Secondly, a potential problem in establishing rapport with the interviewees did not materialise.

Because of my experience as a planner in the Waikato, I was regarded as 'known' by the people I was interviewing, which "reduced inhibitions and facilitated disclosures" (Porteous, 1988, 76). In retrospect, by the time the interviews were completed, I was satisfied that a researcher unknown to the interviewees would have had much less success in encouraging the disclosure of information. On the other hand, I was not able to judge with certainty whether the interviewees, perhaps implicitly because I was known to them, were revealing all of their experiences during the interview. I was able, however, to cross-check transcripts which provided confirmation of events or supplemented gaps in information.

The transcripts were analysed in three ways. First, the material assisted to reconstruct events which took place during the six year period of investigation and to confirm information contained in the files. It also established the involvement of particular individuals and identified their interpretation of events. Secondly, common themes which emerged in conversation were identified. These were usually events which were significant for the participants. Thirdly, the transcripts were reviewed to identify individuals' constructs of planning.

One problem facing a researcher who uses the reflexive approach to field work in the situation of this research is that the people interviewed are each officers of a particular institution. Though the people, rather than the institutions, are the actors in events, the institutions as well as their officers are, in reality, construed as having been given responsibilities and functions by Parliament, departmental committees, local government and so on. The officers are conscious of the expectations and duties of their office and responsibilities to report to their superior officers or councils. The researcher, in attempting to narrate or analyse events for the reader, has to take care over keeping separate the office and the person whose activities conjointly make that office effective in practice.

The NZE Division files provided a wealth of information. They included: notes of informal discussions and meetings written by NZE officials; letters to officials in other government departments, local authorities, interest groups, and landowners; recommendations to the Minister of Energy for certain actions to be taken; and extensive minutes of formal committees established during the six years of site investigations. The material was used in two ways: first, to establish a chronological account of events as presented to the files during site investigations; and, secondly, to establish the actions proposed and taken by NZE officials, as well as their documented reaction to certain events. I also reviewed files held in the Waikato County Council offices, partly to confirm details, as well as to review minutes of relevant local authority committee meetings.

It was also necessary to review an extensive range of literature pertaining to the proposed energy developments, legislative, administrative and regulatory reforms which had taken place during the 1970s, specific events which led to these changes, central and local government policies, conferences and so on. This review was necessary for two reasons: first, to identify specific intentions proposed by the Ministry of Energy and to establish how these intentions were constantly modified; secondly, to provide the situational context for the argument and interpretation used in the thesis so that the existing institutional arrangements, legislation and planning procedures could be explained in sufficient detail to assist the understanding of the case.

The next chapter provides the broad context for the thesis. It explains the several planning instruments developed to facilitate 'national development' and the administrative arrangements in place to implement the Waikato energy projects.

## CHAPTER THREE : NATIONAL PLANNING INSTRUMENTS

In New Zealand the State has traditionally been involved in development of natural resources such as coal, water and forestry and the production and distribution of energy. Central government as developer has been involved in the construction and on-going operation of public works such as hydro-electric, coal-fired and geothermal power stations. There has been only a limited amount of investment by private companies and local Electricity Supply Authorities. There is an established tradition, therefore, of the construction and operation of public works undertaken by various government departments specifically created for these purposes.

Concern about the environmental consequences of the construction of major hydro-electric schemes in the late 1960s led to pressures for environmental assessment of major projects and demands for public involvement in decision-making. During the 1970s a complex set of planning instruments were developed to facilitate 'national development' as well as provide for some means of environmental assessment. These instruments were sets of intentions, sometimes formulated as plans or institutional arrangements, and related procedures designed to promote particular objectives of government.

This chapter sets the broad context for the thesis by explaining four instruments and their procedures which are referred to frequently in subsequent chapters. The first is the formulation of the process known as 'energy planning', administered by the Ministry of Energy. This process was designed to facilitate the on-going construction of energy projects. The second is the Environmental Protection and Enhancement Procedures which required the assessment of the environmental effects of government policies and public works. Third is the procedures for

statutory land use planning administered by the Ministry of Works and Development with particular reference to the provisions for regional planning. The fourth is the National Development Act 1979. The chapter concludes with an explanation of the administrative responsibilities for implementing the Waikato projects and an assessment of the planning instruments which were available to central government politicians to facilitate their national development strategy.

#### TOWARDS 'ENERGY PLANNING'

To a large extent, government's energy policy until the end of the 1960s was concerned with the generation of electricity to meet consumer demand (Environmental Council, 1983). From 1915 when the first state-owned hydro-electric power station was constructed at Lake Coleridge in the South Island, the Government assumed responsibility for energy supply (Ministry of Energy Resources, 1976, 14). After World War Two, population growth and increasing industrialisation meant that demand for electricity exceeded supply. The Government pushed ahead with plans for large-scale generation of hydro-electricity on rivers such as the Waikato in the North Island and Clutha and Waitaki Rivers in the South Island. In the late 1950s and 1960s, New Zealand's hydro-electric system was supplemented by thermal power stations. The Wairakei geothermal station, the Meremere coal-fired power station and Marsden oil-fired power stations were built in the 1950s and 1960s.

Specific government departments were created for the management of single resources, evolving largely on an ad hoc basis (Ministry of Energy Resources, 1976, 19). The State Hydro-Electric Department was formed in 1945 and was later renamed the New Zealand Electricity Department in 1958 in recognition of the introduction of thermal generation on a significant scale (New Zealand Electricity Department, 1978, 3). The original authority

for the State to acquire and work coal mines was given in the General Assembly Act of 1901 (Stokes, 1978a, 20). The State took control over the Huntly coalfields under emergency regulations gazetted during the Second World War and by 1943 the Mines Department began opencast mining in the Waikato on a significant scale (Stokes, 1978a).

Early forecasts of electricity demand began in 1958 at a time when power demand was beginning to outstrip supply. In the first report of the State Hydro-Electric Department, the Hon. H. Watt stated;

The provision of adequate quantities of electrical power has proved to be a very difficult matter over a long number of years. Since the early days of the last war, there has been a constant struggle to provide manpower and money, and periods of sufficiency have alternated with periods of shortages.

The rate of growth in the demand for electrical power is such that supply has to be doubled every eight years and this calls for a high rate of expenditure on capital works year by year (Watt, 1958, 1).

In the same year, the Government set up two departmental committees to report on the matter of power planning and to review power requirements. These were known as the Committee to Review Power Requirements (CRPR) and the Planning Committee on Electric Power Development in New Zealand (PCEPD). Annual reports were presented by these committees until 1979.

At the end of the 1960s, the Committee to Review Power Requirements assumed that: growth in hydro electric generation would continue; this growth would be augmented by large North Island thermal stations; and the construction of a nuclear power station would need to start by the late 1970s (Environmental Council, 1983, 2). Until 1973, officials and engineers of the New

Zealand Electricity Department recognised little difficulty in meeting the increasing demand for energy by way of a combination of indigenous resources and imported petroleum.

Concern about the lack of co-ordination in New Zealand's energy policy-making led to the formation of the Ministry of Energy Resources in 1972 (Department of Statistics, 1986). This Ministry was to advise on: energy policy for Electricity and Mines Departments the development, promotion, and co-ordination of New Zealand's energy policies; and to provide a link between the various organisations responsible for the country's production and supply of energy (Ministry of Energy Resources, 1976, 19).

The oil supply embargo announced in October 1973 by the Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) marked the end of the abundant availability of cheap oil. It was also a time of increasing public concern about the environmental impacts of resource development projects and public challenges to the notion of sustaining exponential growth. The environmental effects of large-scale hydro electric generation had triggered conflict between politicians and environmental groups over various development proposals. The Government proposed to raise the level of Lake Manapouri to gain an extra four percent of electrical energy for a multinational aluminium company (Commission To Inquire Into Manapouri, 1970). Public opposition grew until the Government agreed that the lake should not be raised. The decision to save the lake was only one of many decisions taken during the 1970s that came to influence the shaping of energy policy.

The mid 1970s was a time of turmoil in energy policy as New Zealand struggled with the problems of high oil prices, the prospect of nuclear power, the siting of thermal power stations, the development of the Upper Clutha Valley and other hydro resources and the possibility that the Maui

gas the Crown had contracted to buy might not be needed for electricity (Environmental Council, 1983, 3).

These pressing circumstances led the Government to create one single new department, the Ministry of Energy, to manage New Zealand's energy resources. State Coal Mines and the New Zealand Electricity Department were incorporated as Divisions within the new Ministry. In the final report of the New Zealand Electricity Department, the Minister of Energy, Hon. G. Gair, stated the reasons for the merger.

The need for the merger springs from the growing inter-dependence of the various energy forms, both at the consumer and the production level. The Government saw it as a necessity to introduce organisational changes which would ensure greater co-ordination of the production and use of energy forms (New Zealand Electricity Department, 1978, 3).

The Ministry of Energy Act 1977 outlined two main functions for the new Ministry.

- (1) The Ministry shall advise the Minister on the formulation, implementation, co-ordination, and continuing review of effective and efficient policies for New Zealand relating to energy;
- (2) The Ministry shall also have such other functions as are necessary for the formulation, implementation, co-ordination, and continuing review of effective and efficient policies for New Zealand relating to energy... (section 11).

The Ministry's on-going concerns related to responsibilities for co-ordinating exploration, production and consumption of energy. The Ministry was also required to consider the environmental and social consequences of energy use, international responsibilities

of New Zealand, and appropriate methods of organising for the best administration of energy policies (Ministry of Energy Act, section 11).

By the late 1970s severe conflict over several years had occurred between environmentalists and energy officials over methods of forecasting electricity demand. The issues that brought matters to a head were the proposal to construct a gas-fired thermal power station near Auckland (known as Auckland Thermal No. 1) and the debate over the damming of the Clutha river in Central Otago. It had become apparent during the hearings of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Nuclear Power Generation that the power planners had overestimated demand for electricity. In its critique of NZED's proposals, the Royal Commission stated;

1. The attitude of the NZED to the need for a nuclear power programme has changed considerably since we began our inquiry in November 1976....
7. In its later submission 128, the NZED revised its forecast of electricity demand to take into account a more realistic contribution by the end of the century from previously unconsidered indigenous sources....
9. The 1977 CRPR (Committee to Review Power Requirements Report) presented to Parliament in September confirmed this thinking. Its prediction of local demands considerably reduced those given in the 1976 report (Royal Commission on Nuclear Power Generation in New Zealand, 1978, 122-123).

By the time the Commission concluded its hearings, the urgency for an early decision had dissipated because power forecasts had been revised. The Commission concluded that there was no need to make decision on the introduction of nuclear power at this stage and could be left until 1992 to 1996. The Committee suggested that development for future energy demand should be met from renewable rather than nonrenewable resources. The option of nuclear power was not completely discounted (Wilson, 1982).

Major changes in ideas about energy consumption became apparent in 1974. In May at the New Zealand Energy Conference, members took up discussion of the need to conserve energy resources. In August, the Environmental Defence Society (EDS) Newsletter contained two arguments which became central to the debate,

conservation is a rational option for energy planning, more effective than generating potential;

the exponential growth of energy consumption cannot be sustained and ought to be actively discouraged (quoted by Johnson, 1979, 189).

Similar questions were asked of the proposal to construct an aluminium smelter at Aramoana. In 1976 EDS claimed that there was no justification for building Auckland Thermal No. 1, and during the same year over three thousand New Zealanders signed a petition opposing the introduction of nuclear power. A central argument in both these campaigns was that the power planners had overestimated demand for electricity (Johnson, 179, 190).

Despite the growing realisation in 1976 that the power forecasts had to be reduced, the Government still decided to go ahead with Scheme F on the Clutha river because "it provided more power, more quickly, more cheaply" (Johnson, 179, 192). There was still some uncertainty within official circles about the wisdom of adopting revised methods of forecasting.

In adopting these estimates as a basis for its own forecasts, this committee [CRPR] emphasises the importance of continuing explicit recognition of the assumptions underlying these estimates because if this is not the case they may well lead to a situation where deficiencies in electricity supply may result (Committee to Review Power Requirements, 1976, 9).

However, the general principle that government could continue to plan on the basis of meeting an unrestrained growth in demand was in question. The Minister of Energy, Hon. E. Holland instructed the NZED, in conjunction with the Ministry of Energy Resources, to re-examine the criteria on which power planning was based (New Zealand Electricity Department, 1976, 3).

Indications of changing attitudes on the part of officials were signalled in the annual reports of the two power planning committees published in 1978. The Report of the Committee to Review Power Requirements suggested that the present planning arrangements needed to be widened to include consideration of the economic, social and environmental aspects of electricity forecasting and planning (1978, 9). This represented a major shift in thinking from the 'single objective' approach so dominant hitherto. It did not, however, represent any fundamental changes to the basis of their planning methods. It meant simply that more matters needed to be taken into consideration.

The second sign of a change in attitude was contained in the annual Report of the Planning Committee on Electric Power Development (1978). In the appendix to the report, officials reviewed the new provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 which required that the Crown designate sites for public works. This meant that government officials would have to obtain consents to construct public works using procedures in the Town and Country Planning Act 1977. This included public notification of the proposal, opportunities for objections, hearings held by the local authority and the possibility of applications proceeding to the Planning Tribunal.<sup>3</sup>

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3.

The Planning Tribunal was constituted under the Town and Country Planning Act 1977, succeeding the Town and Country Planning Appeal Board under the 1953 Act. The Planning Tribunal is a special judicial body with the powers of a District Court. The Tribunal hears and decides appeals brought to it by appellants concerning decisions made by local authorities in respect of the Town and Country Planning

The report also canvassed two other principal Acts which imposed statutory requirements on project developers, the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 and the Clean Air Act 1972. The report stated concerns about the potential for "unpredictable and possibly lengthy delays" in obtaining statutory consents to proceed (PCEPD, 1978, Appendix 111, 22). Implicit in such statements was a concern that government energy projects would be controlled by statutory requirements administered by officials in other departments. Thus energy officials could lose control over the timing of projects. Given previous concerns about the need for long-term planning, delays in construction could potentially 'recreate' the scarcity problems of the late 1950s. By this stage, appeals by environmentalists and landowners had been lodged with the High Court over the Government's decision to proceed with the Clyde Dam and to issue water rights. It was obvious to government officials that construction of the dam might thereby be delayed considerably by these actions.

In 1978, in response to this shift in official thinking as well as public concerns, the Government published Goals and Guidelines: An Energy Strategy for New Zealand. In the foreword, the Minister of Energy, Hon. G. F. Gair, made the observation that "energy matters usually require long lead times between the plan and performance - in some instances decades rather than years (Minister of Energy, 1978, ii). He also reiterated the Government's responsibilities for energy planning.

There is no question that the authority responsible for formulating the plan, regularly updating it in the light of changing events, and progressively carrying out, must be the Government of the day.

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Act. It also acts as a Court of Inquiry and makes recommendations to Government. Apart from the requirements of the Town and Country Planning Act, the Tribunal also hears proceedings under several other Acts, including the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967, Local Government Act 1974 and Public Works Act 1981.

There is also no question, however, that the plan can be formed on a broader base of public consensus and support, updated more effectively, and carried out more expeditiously, and more confidently, if the people and the Government work together in setting the goals and guidelines.

This statement reflected a major change in thinking about the 'end use' of energy resources. During the past two decades concerns of officials had focused on the use of energy as a fuel supply to meet the needs of consumers. The publication of Goals and Guidelines indicated that the 'end use' of energy resources was now seen as being directly involved in the setting of national development goals (O'Connor, 1981, 75) and thereby part of a national economic strategy.

The goals and guidelines programme of the Ministry of Energy included the sponsorship of the Fourth New Zealand Energy Conference and of four seminars held during 1979. This programme was the first attempt by politicians and government officials to consult with those groups and individuals having an expressed interest in influencing energy policies. The seminars covered the following topics: transport fuels; energy distribution; energy forecasting; and environmental perspectives. The proceedings of the conference and seminars were incorporated in Energy Strategy '79 which appeared at the end of that year.

The seminar on environmental perspectives was organised by the Environment and Conservation Organisations of New Zealand (ECO) in co-operation with the Ministry of Energy. In the introduction to the proceedings, Dr R. E. Low expressed the dilemma facing ECO in responding to the Ministry's invitation to participate in organising the seminar.

As a volunteer organisation our time was very limited. The Ministry was frank in making it clear that the regular energy decisions would go on in no way delayed by the Goals and Guidelines debate. Would it not be wiser for us to use our limited time trying to influence those decisions? Indeed could it not be argued now that the major energy decisions of this period - mainly on natural gas and procedure (the National Development Act) - were singularly adverse to environmental beliefs? (Ministry of Energy, ed., 1979 ,3).

Discussion at the seminar centred around calls for public participation in decision-making and the freedom of information; public involvement in relation to the National Development Bill; and procedural issues concerning the Environmental Protection and Enhancement Procedures (discussed later in this chapter). Related discussion focussed on how to resolve conflicts mainly between Government and environmental protectionists. Considerable scepticism was expressed by some Government officials that any such resolution was possible (Ministry of Energy, ed., 1979, 9).

A final report, Goals and Guidelines: a Digest of Public Debate, prepared for the Fourth Energy Conference by consultants, concluded that;

Goals and Guidelines is principally a general statement upon which to base energy policy rather than a definitive energy strategy (Hill and Lee, 1978, 36).

Specific issues of concern were identified. Among these were: considerable support for further development of a programme of wider public involvement in energy planning; widespread dissatisfaction with central government dominance in determining energy policy; energy planning should not be undertaken in isolation from social and economic planning; environmental

planning and energy development are likely to be continuing foci for conflicting lifestyle preferences; and the potential for developing energy resources justifies widespread optimism.

By 1979, government officials had formulated an instrument of government policy known as 'energy planning'. The process of "co-ordinated energy planning" was discussed in the 1979 Report of the Committee to Review Power Requirements and the Report of the Planning Committee on Electric Power Development. Both these reports included statements attempting to defend previous work of the committees over the past two decades and to claim that the new form of "co-ordinated energy planning" was an extension of their earlier efforts.

The assessment of New Zealand's future electricity requirements by this committee, and the formation of an appropriate plan for the expansion of generating capacity by the companion power planning committee, have pre-dated co-ordinated energy planning by two decades. The early provision of arrangements to cope with the forecasting and planning functions of the electricity portion of the energy sector arose from a recognition of the long lead time, the size of the investment involved, and the need to provide adequate long term forecasts to avoid a repetition of the problems with electricity supply in the 1950s (CRPR, 1979, 3).

The Report of the Planning Committee on Electric Power Development in New Zealand (1979) was more explicit.

This year's power plan is the last to be published in the present form. In 1980, electricity planning will form part of a wider energy plan, which will embrace all sectors. The move towards co-ordinated planning in part builds on foundations laid by the Planning Committee on Electric Power Development in New Zealand (PCEPD, 1979, 4).

The Minister of Energy, the Hon. W. F. Birch, commented later, in an address to a seminar at the Central Institute of Technology, that this new approach in energy planning represented a change from "descriptive planning" (defined as providing for needs which may arise) to "normative planning" (defined as an attempt consciously to create a future) (quoted by O'Connor, 1981, 77). This change in thinking, from a pragmatic approach towards meeting electricity demand to a new 'normative' ideology of setting goals, could hardly be claimed an extension of previous attempts to forecast electricity demand. The extent to which 'energy planning' was "co-ordinated", and the nature of the inclusion of economic, social and environmental considerations will be explored in later chapters.

The Energy Strategy, produced at the end of 1979, emerged as a statement of government's energy policy. In the foreword, the Minister of Energy, Hon. W. F. Birch, stated that;

Energy Strategy '79 appears at a timely stage in energy planning for New Zealand. The country stands at the juncture of two energy eras, a break point between a time of growing dependence on imported oil for economic and social activity, and a future era in which New Zealand will move towards energy self sufficiency through taking advantage of its own energy resources (Minister of Energy, 1979, 3).

The goals originally proposed in the 1978 Goals and Guidelines draft were expanded but the environmental goal

- to ensure a balance between the adverse environmental effects of energy developments and their benefits

was dropped without explanation (Environment Council, 1983, 5). This was so despite previous statements that economic, social and environmental effects would be taken into consideration. This

could be interpreted as an implicit acknowledgement by the politicians that environmental considerations could be compromised by their proposals.

The goals of the strategy were stated as being;

- to reduce New Zealand's dependence on imported oil;
- to increase diversity in New Zealand's energy supply system;
- to ensure that energy is used efficiently through the reduction of waste and by using appropriate energy types;
- to transfer energy supplies from non-renewable to renewable sources in the long term;
- to establish a framework for energy planning which provides for changing social and economic circumstances (Minister of Energy, 1979, 21).

The goals outlined in the Energy Strategy were incorporated and elaborated in the first Energy Plan released in 1980, namely;

- to reduce New Zealand's dependence on imported oil by the progressive implementation of substitution measures selected to minimise increases in the costs of energy supply;
- to promote the formulation and implementation of a stable energy pricing policy;
- to ensure that energy is used efficiently through the reduction of waste and employment of appropriate energy utilisation systems;
- to promote the preferential use of renewable rather than non-renewable resources in energy supply where this can be achieved without significantly increasing cost of supply;

- to promote the effective and economic utilisation of indigenous energy resources which contribute to energy supply, assist economic growth, and benefit export receipts;
- to encourage diversity in New Zealand's energy supply system;
- to establish a framework for energy planning which provides for changing social and economic circumstances (Ministry of Energy, 1980a, 6).

The planning period adopted was for 15 years. The Corporate Planning division within the Ministry of Energy co-ordinated the plan while specific reviews of 'sectors' were prepared by the Divisions responsible for electricity, oil and gas, geothermal and coal planning. The Ministry of Energy also carried out consultations with a wide range of energy suppliers, for example, Electricity Supply Authorities, gas undertakings, oil industry and private coal mining interests. The Ministry also consulted with other government bodies (Energy Advisory Committee, 1981, 3).

Along with the introduction of annual energy plans, the Government established the Energy Advisory Committee (EAC) under section 8 of the Ministry of Energy Act 1977. The Government had recognised the need to incorporate public involvement in Energy Strategy '79 (Minister of Energy, 1979). The recommendations of the Fourth Energy Conference included a statement that there should be greater public participation in energy planning. The EAC was set up to provide a link to various interest groups in the community who were not consulted during preparation of the energy plan. The Committee was chaired initially by Professor Meyer, School of Engineering, University of Auckland. The membership was broad and included a representative from the Ministry of Energy. The terms of reference were;

- to examine the current process of forecasting and planning energy supply and demand;
- to assess the social, environmental, economic and technical implications of current energy planning;
- to collect relevant opinion from the wider public through submission and representation;
- to advise the Secretary of Energy on these matters and to make these findings public;
- to carry out other such investigations as the Secretary of Energy may from time to time agree (Minister of Energy, 1979, 89).

It was to act as a focal point for public comment on energy planning. The EAC called for submissions each year on the energy plans and planning procedures and published its own reports based on the submissions received (Energy Advisory Committee, 1981; 1982; 1983; 1984a; 1985; 1986).

The co-ordination of the development of New Zealand's energy resources became a major instrument of economic policy (Environmental Council, 1983). Publications, such as Growth Opportunities in New Zealand published in the same year as the Energy Strategy '79, outlined development potential and investment opportunities in resource areas such as agriculture, fishing, tourism, forestry and energy. Specific reference was made to proposals for a methanol plant, the manufacture of synthetic fuels based on the Mobil process, and to the availability of electricity at concessional rates for industries such as aluminium smelting in the South Island (Minister of National Development, 1979).

The development programme of the early 1980s, that came to be known popularly as 'Think Big', was possible because several decisions concerning the administration and use of energy resources had already been made, namely;

- the Government's energy departments had been incorporated into a Ministry of Energy to help co-ordinate energy planning and operations;
- the Marsden Point Oil Refinery was to be expanded to reduce the country's dependence on imported refined products;
- Maui gas was to be used as a substitute for transport fuels for conversion to methanol, fertiliser and other products in preference to being burnt for electricity generation;
- the Auckland Thermal No. 1 Power Station was cancelled because the fall in demand for power and priority was given to hydro providing a large portion of electricity supply;
- coal was to be used as the fuel for major new thermal stations once the other Maui projects were on stream. Coal was also to be investigated for export possibilities and for conversion to liquid fuels;
- a decision on a nuclear power programme had been deferred until later in the century (Environmental Council, 1983, 4).

Some of these decisions had been influenced by further price rises in oil following the Iranian revolution in 1979, a reduction in the rate of growth for electricity demand, and the prospect of power surpluses (Environmental Council, 1983). Projections made in the 1978 power plan were far below those of previous years. The immediate consequence of the dramatically reduced forecast was that a large surplus of natural gas and electricity had been created (National Business Review, 1984, 11). The identification of a potential energy surplus encouraged government to envisage alternative uses and options. Without public consultation and despite the goals and guidelines programme, the Government proceeded to advertise a large block of excess electricity for sale to bulk users at discount price with a view to enhancing exports. During 1979 negotiations over three proposed projects continued: the aluminium smelter at Aramoana; and the methanol and synthetic fuels plants in North Taranaki.

ARRANGEMENTS FOR STATUTORY PLANNING AND ENVIRONMENTAL ASSESSMENT

Criticism of the social and environmental effects of major engineering schemes during the 1960s had led the New Zealand Institution of Engineers (NZIE) to organise a conference in 1967 to address these issues. Recommendations from the Conference on New Zealand Countryside in 1980 included calls for an expanded Nature Conservation Council with strengthening legislation to make it effective in planning and co-ordinating conservation and preservation; and that an administrative body be set up on a national and regional basis to co-ordinate and direct all aspects of environmental development.

The following year the Government announced that a National Development Conference would be convened to undertake an extensive review of New Zealand's resources and to indicate broad lines of economic development over the decade to 1978/1979. Faced with worsening economic conditions the Government brought together principal parties to gain sectoral, and eventually electoral support for restructuring the economy. The National Development Conference recommended that the Government should establish a National Development Council (NDC) to act as the co-ordinating nucleus for separate councils, each representing the principal sectors; manufacturing, fisheries, environment, forestry development, educational planning, social and tourist development (Davison, 1972, 75-76). Public pressure obliged social and economic issues to be attached to a conference which was strictly economic in conception (Franklin, 1978, 127).

The Physical Environment Committee of the National Development Council and the NZIE jointly hosted the Physical Environment Conference in 1970. One of the recommendations of the Physical Environment Conference was that an Environmental Council be established to co-ordinate policies ensuring preservation and development of environmental quality and to advise Government on their implementation. While the conference rejected the

suggestion of creating one single environmental ministry, it did advocate that at all levels of government the importance of a regional approach to the controlling of environmental problems be recognised. Another recommendation was that the Environmental Council should undertake to review the proper influence and organisation of regional environmental controls. Their relationship to central government agencies was also raised. There was a call for a much wider implementation of the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act that provided for the establishment of regional planning authorities if the Government was to deal with the problems of national development (McMahon, ed., 1970, 237).

At this point conservation and development entered a distinctly new phase. Large-scale developments based on new technologies intruded further into natural landscapes. It was also a period in which the conservationists expanded their philosophy and became environmentalists (Dixon, Ericksen and Gunn, 1989). Several resource development projects became highly contentious as environmental groups such as the Environmental Defence Society (EDS) frequently challenged the Government through the courts.

Institutional arrangements for environmental management fell into three categories. First, there was a number of advisory bodies and administrative agencies whose sole concern was some aspect of environment policy, protection and enhancement. Examples included the Environmental Council, Nature Conservation Council and Queen Elizabeth II National Trust. Some of these bodies were created in the late 1960s and early 1970s; others predated this period.

Secondly, there was a number of government departments and administrative agencies in which environmental protection and enhancement was associated with a management or development responsibility for a particular 'sector'. Examples included the

Department of Lands and Survey, New Zealand Forest Service and Ministry of Works and Development. The majority of these institutions predated the 1970s.

Thirdly, there were government departments and agencies whose sole concern was the management and development of natural resources. These included the Ministry of Agriculture and Fisheries and the Ministry of Energy. Their activities tended to pre-determine the framework in which environmental policies could operate (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1981, 15-16).

During the 1970s, therefore, conservation activities were made increasingly the responsibilities of government agencies, some of which were also responsible for resource development. New institutions, such as the establishment of the Commission for the Environment in 1973, were created apparently to meet needs not being met by existing agencies. Major reviews of legislation were undertaken to modify and improve provisions for environmental administration and protection as well as to improve public participation. Examples include the consolidation of local government legislation in 1974 and the review of the Town and Country Planning Act in 1977.

As the 1970s proceeded, government ministers were rapidly becoming caught in the dilemma of obtaining national economic income from the country's resources, countering the pressure of environmentalists' concerns, and enhancing an ongoing construction programme of engineering developments. The means of coping with this dilemma included the blatant policy of planning for what was publicly expressed as 'national development' and establishment of agencies intended to provide environmental checks. In these circumstances, government ministers were forced to act. In order to expedite proposed large-scale energy development projects, the Government passed the National Development Act in 1979 to 'fast track' planning consents.

I will now elaborate on three other planning instruments developed or enhanced during the 1970s, which are referred to in later chapters: the Environmental Protection and Enhancement Procedures, the Town and Country Planning Act 1977, and the National Development Act 1979.

### THE ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AND ENHANCEMENT PROCEDURES

The Environmental Protection and Enhancement Procedures (EPEP) were drafted in 1973 and became operative in 1974. They arose from the establishment of a ministerial portfolio for the environment in 1972 and the creation of the Commission for the Environment (CFE), a government department, in 1973. The CFE was established on the basis of a Cabinet minute, not under the ambit of a statute so that officials had no statutory powers of enforcement.

These procedures required the assessment of the likely environmental consequences of government policies and operations. The procedures provided for two forms of assessment; environmental impact assessments and environmental impact reports. Environmental Impact Assessments were prepared 'in-house' by the department concerned while Environmental Impact Reports (EIRs) were prepared and published by the project proponent according to guidelines (Commission for the Environment, 1981). It was the responsibility of the department to carry out the process of environmental assessment and, where appropriate, the preparation of an EIR. This was usually a matter of judgement about the scale and environmental significance of the project. The procedures contained a list of questions concerning environmental, social, and economic issues which project developers were expected to address in the preparation of EIRs. Following public notification of the EIR, interested groups and individuals had six weeks to make submissions to the Commission for the Environment. CFE staff then produced an audit

which was presented to the appropriate Cabinet minister responsible for the project. Recommendations made by CFE staff in the audit were not mandatory.

The Town and Country Planning Act 1953 predated the introduction of the EPEP. In the view of senior staff in MWD, the Town and Country Planning Act already included provision for assessment of environmental impacts and additional procedures were not required (Town, 1973, in Fookes, 1984, 47). If more environmental protection measures were required, they could be incorporated within the existing Act. These attitudes led to a feeling of rivalry between officers of MWD and CFE (Fookes, 1984, 47). This was to emerge again when the Town and Country Planning Act was reviewed in 1977. Fookes argued that the inclusion of the words "cultural" and "social", the replacement of "inhabitants" with "people" in the new definition of planning (section 4), as well as the wording of several "matters of national importance" in section 3, indicate that Government's planning advisors were attempting to bring social impact assessment into their responsibilities (Fookes, 1984, 191-192). By this stage MWD staff were considering issues involved in reconciling national and regional interests and the implications of large-scale projects for people in the regions (Fookes, 1984, 190).

#### THE TOWN AND COUNTRY PLANNING ACT 1977: PROVISIONS, PROCEDURES AND ARRANGEMENTS FOR REGIONAL PLANNING

The mid 1970s were a critical period in the development of institutional arrangements for statutory land use planning. These developments were linked with yet more attempts by central government to reform local government. There was also considerable concern about the absence of satisfactory mechanisms for co-ordination of planning decisions of central and local government (Task Force on Economic and Social Planning, 1976, 19). Regional government was seen by many officials as a means of

overcoming the deficiencies of local government as well as the sclerosis of central government (Franklin, 1978, 304). The Task Force on Economic and Social Planning saw the problem in this way.

We believe that the absence of comprehensive regional planning and management has in effect forced New Zealand to opt for a parallel series of centrally administered solutions to local problems. The failure to establish systems with real cohesion at the regional level may indeed have had the contradictory effect of encouraging the formation of more "branch offices" which only have the appearance of "belonging" to the local people. When tested however these bodies prove to be incapable of acting without the say so from Wellington and this adds to the general sense of frustration and confusion (1976, 126-127).

The concept of regional planning was not new. Provision for it had been made in the 1926 Town and Country Planning Act. The preparation of regional planning schemes was voluntary, except where required by the Governor-General. Regional planning schemes applied to rural areas and could be prepared by one county, or jointly by contiguous counties (Allan, 1988). Overall the 1926 Act had little impact and was probably overshadowed by the effects of the depression of the 1930s and the Second World War (Williams, 1985, 1).

Post-war urban expansion into rural areas and the need to provide for expansion of services raised issues of how to plan for orderly development such as providing for community water and sewerage systems and transportation. These issues were usually argued in terms of rights of ownership contrasted with those of the community, with planning seen as the means of resolving conflict when it arose (Allan, 1988). The 1953 Town and Country Planning Act involved local territorial authorities with powers in areas not traditionally administered by them (Williams, 1985). The title of the Act was "to consolidate and amend certain enactments of the General Assembly relating to the making and

enforcing of regional planning schemes and district schemes". While the Act focussed on district planning (the preparation of district planning schemes by local territorial government was mandatory), the provisions for regional planning were extended.

Regional planning was construed in these terms;

...the conservation and economic development of the region to which it relates by means of the classification of the lands comprised therein for the purposes for which they are best suited by nature or for which they can best be adapted, and the co-ordination of all such public improvements, utilities, services and amenities as are not limited by the boundaries of the district of any one local authority, or do not relate exclusively to the development of any one such district.

Every regional planning scheme shall be designed as a guide on matters of regional significance referred to in the First Schedule to this Act to councils engaged in the preparation of district schemes, and also as a guide to the conservation and development within the region of the public utilities, services, industries, amenities and other matters properly dealt with or adverted to in the regional planning schemes (Section 3 (1) and (2)).

The 1953 Town and Country Planning Act made provision for the voluntary establishment of regional planning authorities although there was a power vested in the Minister of Works to require regional areas to be constituted (Hearn, 1987). Authorities were responsible for the preparation of regional planning schemes. The Act included a schedule of matters which should be covered by regional planning schemes. These included: communications and transport facilities; land use, urban development and rural development; public utilities; and amenities. An amendment to the Act in 1973 introduced matters of national importance to be considered by regional and local territorial authorities: preservation of the natural character of the coastal environment; avoidance of encroachment of urban development on good

agricultural land; and the prevention of sporadic urban subdivision and development in rural areas (Section 3 (1)). Approval of a regional planning scheme was required from the Minister of Works and relevant local territorial authorities. Once operative these schemes were binding on all public authorities except the Crown.

The apparent intention of the 1953 Act that regional planning schemes would become the dominant instrument of planning rather than district planning schemes did not occur (Allan, 1988). Only six regional planning authorities were established: in Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch, Dunedin, Hamilton and Northland. While regional schemes were prepared, early attempts to include detail in regional schemes were generally disapproved (Hearn, 1987).

The need for a major review of the 1953 Act was apparent by 1970. A committee was set up by the Government to review the legislation, investigate ways of updating and simplifying the Act and of strengthening regional planning. This was part of a review and change of several planning-related statutes including the Local Government Act 1974, Reserves Act 1977, National Development Act 1979, and the Public Works Act 1981 (Allan, 1988). The 1973 report of the Review Committee stated;

The Committee considers that the regional planning provisions of the Act have not been successful in achieving their intended purpose. Regional planning authorities have been formed in only a few areas and the schemes that have been produced have often done no more than outline vague policies and the broadest of strategies. The key planning issues at regional level - the structuring and programming of the development into efficient yet satisfying patterns and forms, and the maintenance of a balance between intensity of land use and the availability of physical amenities and services - has seldom been dealt with successfully or even recognised as objectives. The committee is therefore of the view that some fundamental changes to the organisation and structure of regional

planning in New Zealand are both necessary and urgent (Town and Country Planning Act Review Committee, 1973, 5-6).

Recommendations of the Committee, measures proposed in the National Party's manifesto, as well as changes shown to be necessary after the Committee's report, were the basis of the 1977 Town and Country Planning Act. While the Committee had concluded that the basic system of local planning was sound, it acknowledged that some important changes were overdue. These were;

- the Act needed simplifying and arranging in a more logical form;
- third party rights should be extended;
- environmental considerations should be brought directly into the planning process;
- more effective links should be created between planning at all levels; national, regional and local (Hearn, 1987, 15).

In the introduction of the Bill into the House (on 24 August 1977), the Minister of Works and Development noted that the Bill provided for the Government to approve all regional schemes but that this carried a commitment that the Government would support approved regional plans. He stated that it was generally agreed that the present regional planning provisions had not proved adequate. The Minister referred to the Report of the Task Force on Economic and Social Planning (1976) which had stated the need for regional planning bodies to be strengthened to provide an effective link between local and national planning (New Zealand Parliamentary Debates, 1977, v. 413, 2408-2411).

Under the 1977 Town and Country Planning Act, regional planning became a mandatory function of the regional councils and of united councils established under the Local Government Act 1974.

The approval of the regional scheme was required by the Minister of Works and Development. The Crown, as well as every local and public authority, was bound by the regional scheme.

The passing of the Local Government Act in 1974 by the Third Labour Government was highly significant for the development of regional government in New Zealand. This Act consolidated the Municipal Corporations and Counties Acts. In effect it established a third tier of government "responsible for most aspects of physical, and, to a lesser degree, economic planning at the regional level" (Welch, 1979, 178). Provision was made for new institutional arrangements of local and regional government: district councils, a new type of local territorial body; community councils; and for the creation of either a regional or a united council with two mandatory functions of civil defence and regional planning. Additionally, the Local Government Commission was to make provision for the regional body to undertake functions of other authorities, such as catchment and regional water boards, harbour boards, and electric power boards. Planning functions were seen by central government ministers and officials as important in the overall framework of local government. Given the prescription for regional planning schemes set out in the 1953 Town and Country Planning Act, the regional councils had acquired a powerful instrument for co-ordination and control (Franklin, 1978, 306).

The central government's emphasis on regions constituted a strong threat to the local territorial and ad hoc authorities who feared becoming secondary to the new regions and having reduced powers. The challenge of the legislation presented a dilemma for the National Party; how to remove the regionalist connotations but leave in place much needed local government reorganisation (Welch, 1985). In announcing its local government policy for the 1975 General Election the National Party stressed its somewhat softened views that the work of the Local Government Commission should be complemented by a greater move towards voluntary reform

on the part of local authorities. It was accepted that the Commission should draw up regional boundaries (Aburn, 1979, 84). A change of government in 1975 saw the passing of the Local Government Amendment Act 1976 which removed from the Commission the right to initiate schemes affecting the ad hoc authorities such as catchment authorities, and stated a clear preference for the establishment of indirectly elected united councils, made up of elected representatives from constituent local authorities. Directly elected councils were to be established in metropolitan areas with a population of more than 325,000. The notion of effective regional government was soundly rejected. In Welch's view "The one hundred years since 1876 represent a period of progressive anti-regionalism in New Zealand" (1979, 169).

The review of the Town and Country Planning Act and the reform of the Local Government Act 1974 provided opportunities to change planning practice and offered potential for local and regional councils to become involved in determining local priorities. The scope of the 1953 Act was broadened beyond land use planning. Concepts now included 'social, economic, spiritual, and recreational opportunities and amenities appropriate to the needs of the present and future inhabitants of the district, including the interests of children and minority groups' (Second Schedule). Changes were designed to enable local people to participate more easily in decisions which affected their community. The Act clarified and extended rights of objections. Section 2 (3) stated the bodies and persons having a right to objection under the Town and Country Planning Act;

- The Minister;
- Any United or Regional Council, regional planning authority, maritime planning authority, combined committee or local authority having jurisdiction in or adjacent to the area to which the district scheme or application relates;
- Any body or person affected;

Any body or person representing some relevant aspect of the public interest.

The First Schedule of the Act enabled a regional planning scheme to indicate 'the scale, sequence, timing, and relative priority of development'; levels of service, amount, type and source of financial and other resources necessary; and identification of agencies responsible for implementation. The scheme itself should include,

...a statement of objectives and policies for the future development of the region, and of the means by which they can be implemented, having regard to national, regional and local interests, and to the resources available. The scheme shall make provision for such matters referred to in the First Schedule to this Act as are appropriate to the circumstances and to the needs of the region (Section 11 (2)).

During 1977 the Local Government Commission issued provisional schemes for every part of New Zealand except Auckland, where a regional authority already existed, and Northland where a provisional scheme had already been issued (Aburn, 1979, 84). The Commission was criticised by the Minister of Local Government for not giving enough weight to local opinion in formulating the regional schemes (Aburn, 1979, 84). In the face of mounting criticism by local authorities and communities, the new national administration introduced the Local Government Amendment Bill (No.2) 1977, which came into force on 1 April 1978. This act substituted a new part 1 to the principal Act and constituted a new three-member commission to replace the Fifth Commission. While the new Sixth Commission had to have regard to the 'public interest' in drawing up regional boundaries, ironically this was one of the Fifth Commission's most important criteria. These amendments to the principal Act were generally regarded by critics as major setbacks to the establishment of regional government (Aburn, 1979; Bush, 1980; Scott, 1979; Welch, 1985).

By the late 1970s, legislative mechanisms which might permit the reintroduction of effective regional government to New Zealand had been effectively dismantled (Welch, 1985).

While the provisions for united and regional councils were weakened in the 1978 Amendments to the Local Government Act 1974, regional planning schemes could potentially be quite powerful tools for resource allocation with central government support. However, doubts were already beginning to be expressed about the capacity of the new arrangements to be effective. Following recommendations of the Holmes Task Force in 1976, the New Zealand Planning Council was established by the New Zealand Planning Act 1977. The establishment of the Council signified another construct of planning. One of the main purposes of the Council (amongst others) is to advise the Government on planning for social, economic and cultural development in New Zealand. The Task Force had argued for a national planning mechanism which would bring economic, social and regional considerations together into the centre of the planning process (1976, xii). Part of that mechanism required the integration of regional and environmental agencies with national economic planning as well as consideration of a better formula for regional development. The Task Force called for new regional bodies to provide an effective link between local and national planning (1976, xix-xx).

The Planning Council stated, in its publication Planning Perspectives 1978-1983, that it did not see 'United Councils' as necessarily the most effective vehicle for development planning in the regions and would generally favour the 'Regional Council' option. The Council saw the regional-council option as being able to link regional planning with management functions.

If Regional Councils are formed they will have the ability to link regional planning to certain management functions (e.g., in public transport, roading and works programmes, water supply, and possibly energy distribution). All these threads can be brought together effectively at the regional

level. There had been a tendency for various aspects of Central Government's relations with regions to be developed in separate compartments. The Council has participated in discussions with Ministers and officials about the possibilities of greater co-ordination. It trusts that these will result in a forward-looking and consistent regional policy and an improvement in co-ordinating machinery (New Zealand Planning Council, 1978, 95).

The mandatory functions of united and regional councils were limited to those of regional planning and civil defence. Additional functions could be undertaken subject to the consent of generally a majority of local territorial authorities within any region. Despite their limited functions, central government ministers were apparently optimistic about the potential of united and regional councils to devolve responsibilities from central to local government and their ability to plan for the development of their region. In April 1979 the Minister of Local Government, the Hon. Mr Highet was reported as stating,

In the United and Regional Council concept we have instruments for a redistribution of political power and political decision-making in New Zealand. They are the instruments for a devolution of responsibilities from the centre. By devolution I mean a transfer of responsibilities and functions from central government to regional government structures that are answerable to their own communities.

This is an essential step if we are to free central government from the deluge of problems which detract from its proper responsibilities and start to make Government decision-making processes more efficient, comprehensible and accessible to the local people in their own regional communities. The defects of centralism and the difficulty of Wellington appreciating regional needs can be eased by devolution. Regionalism is your chance - to direct the drift of events and to bring decision-making closer to the people.

Without a strong regional structure there can be no real shift of responsibilities out of Wellington. United and Regional Councils are thus essential if we are to bring about a meaningful change to our system of government.

The key responsibility of United and Regional Councils will be for regional planning - planning for the most effective development or of equal importance of each region's resources and its major public facilities (quoted by Eyeington, 1982, 2-3).

The following year (1980) in a special report prepared for Cabinet, Planning and the Regions, the Planning Council commented further on the uncertainty about the futures and functions of united councils.

When the Planning Council was established three years ago, the present legislation governing regional planning had not been finally enacted. The Council, nevertheless, was given responsibility to advise the Government on links between national and regional planning.

Since that time the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 has been passed and the Local Government Act had been amended. Beginnings have been made on regional planning schemes and many of the regional bodies provided for have been set up. But there is uncertainty about what regional planning encompasses and about the futures and functions of the united councils primarily responsible for regional planning. Regional development and national development remain separate functions of central government and their relationships with planning have yet to be satisfactorily defined (New Zealand Planning Council, 1980, 5).

The Planning Council commented that the 'basic requirement for effective regional planning is a commitment by central government to improve its own planning and to participate as a partner with local and regional authorities in regional planning' (1980, 30). It made several recommendations to Government.

There is room for improved planning at all levels of government. Some indication of the likely growth and expenditure generally would be very helpful to those planning for economic and social development in the regions;

Provision needs to be made within central government for national policies to be considered in relation to each other for their national and regional impacts. The lack of a national planning mechanism to do this is a major drawback to effective regional/national planning;

There needs to be a more positive attitude by central government, on the one hand, and by local government on the other, to use regional planning as an effective vehicle for the concept of partnership (1980, 30-31).

The Planning Council noted that there was real doubt about the Government's willingness to match its rhetoric with positive action.

This doubt is fostered by what is seen by many as a derisory financial contribution by the Government to regional planning, and the inability, under present organisational and financial practices, for many departments to participate in discussions on regional priorities and the implementation of regional plans (1980, 32).

This discussion reveals two constructs of planning. First, the construct of regional planning was provided for in the Town and Country Planning Act 1977. The intent of the legislation was that regional or united councils would set priorities for development of resources in their regions in regional plans. United councils did not have any financial means or specific management functions so they were reliant on other agencies and developers to implement their plans. Secondly, the construct of regional development planning was promoted by the Planning Council. This construct was not new. Discussion about the need to set priorities for national development had taken place between central government ministers, officials and representatives of

the private sector during the 1960s and 1970s. A regional development programme had operated since 1972, with the assistance of 11 regional development councils, to encourage manufacturing industries to locate in slow-growth regions. The Planning Council argued that the constructs of regional planning and development planning should be brought together. Scott (1979) argued that this integration would provide a strong underpinning to the case for the establishment of strengthened regional government throughout New Zealand.

#### NATIONAL DEVELOPMENT ACT 1979

The introduction of the National Development Bill incorporated, for the first time, the construct of national development planning in legislation. The National Development Bill was introduced in October 1979 following expressions of government concerns about: alleged delays caused by persistent litigation; duplication of procedures under existing planning and water rights legislation; and negative publicity engendered by the Commission for the Environment concerning the construction of the ammonia urea plant in South Taranaki (Hearn, 1987; Tester, 1987). The expressed intention of the Bill was to ensure that the Minister of National Development would be able to make the final decision about a proposed work of 'national importance'. The Government would have the right to submit any project to the process of 'planning' in the 'national interest'. The Planning Tribunal would be restricted to making recommendations only. The Bill overrode 22 other pieces of legislation and combined all necessary consents in one hearing. A significant feature of the Bill was that it provided statutory recognition of the Commission for the Environment. It required the project proponent to prepare an EIR and submit it to the Commission for an audit.

In introducing the legislation, government speakers referred repeatedly to delays associated with the Clutha dam created by

groups using legal procedures to challenge decisions of government. A subsequent report from the Environmental Council later refuted those claims in relation to the Clutha project. The report showed that, in fact, delays were caused by the Government, initially because the power was not needed, and later, in order to complete negotiations with the overseas consortium on the proposed aluminium smelter in Dunedin to justify the project (Coalition for Open Government, 1982a).

The issue of a partnership between central government and local government agencies was one of the questions highlighted by the introduction of the National Development Bill. There was some concern by local body politicians and other groups in the community that not enough opportunity would be given to local and regional bodies to participate in decisions relating to national development (New Zealand Planning Council, 1980, 32).

The Bill was the subject of intense opposition and over 300 submissions were made to the Select Committee (Williams, 1979). While acknowledging the deficiencies of the Bill and the propensity for Governments to provide quick remedies, Williams noted the lack of co-ordination between an increasing number of planning-related statutes and procedures. He suggested that the planning profession needed to examine whether there was a need for an alternative system or streamlining of procedures, and if so, what form they should take (Williams, 1979). This matter of the need to reform environmental administration would not be taken up until the mid 1980s after the election of the Fourth Labour Government in 1984.

The National Development Act was passed before Christmas 1979. The legislation was a response to continuing opposition to the Government's policy of trying to resolve its balance of payments problem through use of the country's energy resources (Tester, 1987, 98). It was revealed several months later that, following a National Party conference in July 1988 where the National

Development Bill was foreshadowed, the oil company, British Petroleum, had put forward specific proposals to the Government for separate planning procedures (Coalition for Open Government, 1980). The intention of the Act was to enable Government ministers to expedite their 'Think Big' strategy and to facilitate investment by the private sector.

#### ADMINISTRATIVE ARRANGEMENTS FOR THE WAIKATO PROJECTS

By 1980 the arrangements for environmental administration were characterised by a high degree of fragmentation. Project developers were required to obtain consents under several resource use statutes such as the Town and Country Planning Act 1977, Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967, Mines Act 1971, and Coal Mines Act 1969. Major government, or government-sponsored, works were also subject to the Environmental Enhancement and Protection Procedures. Alternatively, projects of 'national importance' could be dealt with under the National Development Act, if government ministers agreed.

Crown privilege meant that the State enjoyed some advantages compared with private developers in terms of obtaining the necessary consents for projects. Under the Town and Country Planning Act, the Minister of Works and Development had the final decision concerning requirements for public works and could order the Planning Tribunal to conduct an inquiry and make recommendations. The Crown could apply for water rights under section 23 of the Water and Soil Conservation Act. Private applicants required consent under section 21. The Government, of course, could always grant itself water rights under special empowering legislation which it did when the Planning Tribunal refused to recommend that water rights be granted for the Clyde dam in 1982.

The complex arrangements for environmental administration meant that there were two options available to government to obtain consents to the coal-mining and power station projects in the Waikato. Government ministers could choose to use the National Development Act (to obtain consents with one major hearing) or use existing procedures under the Town and Country Planning Act 1977, and the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967. Choosing the latter option meant that government was reliant on the administrative ability and goodwill of local authority politicians and staff to expedite the hearing of statutory applications. It also meant that potentially there could be more delays if objectors chose to challenge the Government's decisions through the courts. Decisions of the Planning Tribunal, for example, could be appealed to the High Court and Court of Appeal on points of law. Additionally, there would be much less control over planning procedures from the Ministry of Energy's point of view as a developer. The issue of which planning instruments would be used by central government staff to implement the Waikato projects was of concern to local body councillors and is discussed in Chapter Five.

The administrative divisions of responsibilities within government meant that, principally, staff in two departments were responsible for giving advice to government ministers on the Waikato projects. The Ministry of Energy was responsible for implementing government's 'Think Big' energy policies through its NZE and SCM divisions (discussed in this chapter). The Ministry of Works and Development was responsible for overall administration of the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 and Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967. These Acts were administered by regional and local authorities (discussed in Chapter Four). The Ministry of Works and Development also had development responsibilities through its public works division and constructed major public works as agent for the MOE. Despite these different activities of regulation, management and protection, conflicts between government departments had to be

resolved internally. The Crown is regarded, constitutionally, as an individual entity and there can be only one Crown view (Ministry for the Environment, 1988). Early conflict between MOE and MWD staff over the terms of reference for the regional advisory committee is discussed in Chapter Five. Later, a close relationship developed between staff in the two departments as they worked to facilitate the Waikato projects.

The new provisions in the Town and Country Planning Act and Local Government Act 1974 put in place opportunities for newly created united councils to become more actively involved in articulating regional opinion about the implications of government and private sector projects. The potential scale of the Waikato projects was such that a vigorous response could have been expected from the Waikato United Council. Yet this did not occur. The reasons for this are discussed in Chapter Six.

In the next chapter I introduce the local context for the case study. I make particular reference to events and issues which took place before 1980 when investigations for the site of the Waikato Thermal Power Station began.

## **CHAPTER FOUR : LOCAL ISSUES AND PLANNING INSTRUMENTS**

This chapter introduces the local context for the case study. Because I am attempting to reveal individual meanings and constructs of planning, it is important to identify particular events which occurred before investigations began to select a specific site for the next Waikato Thermal Power Station. These events were influential in shaping, by way of experience, the attitudes and perceptions of many of the participants in the study. Some of these events arose from the issues of siting and constructing the Huntly Power Station, although experiences of other siting investigations influenced the approach of senior NZE engineers towards the Waikato investigations. I also discuss events which led to the establishment of the Waikato United Council in 1980. Finally, I introduce the case study with an explanation of the statutory responsibilities of local and regional authorities.

### **SITING THE HUNTLY POWER STATION**

By the end of the 1960s, the Committee to Review Power Requirements had decided that growth in hydro-electric generation would continue, augmented by large North Island thermal stations (discussed in Chapter Three). The decision to proceed with the Huntly Power Station was announced in August 1973 during a period of government concern about shortage of electricity supply to meet an assumed increasing demand and challenges to those assumptions by environmental groups (discussed in Chapter Three). The oil crisis in October that year exacerbated this concern. The debate on the need to produce energy versus the need to preserve the environment was exemplified by the Huntly Power Project. Even in 1973 there were suggestions that the power shortage was

fostered by delays caused by environmental groups (New Zealand Herald, 22 June 1973, cited in Stokes, 1978b, 15). Development plans for the raising of Lake Manapouri had changed as a result of public controversy. The Labour Government undertook to keep the lake within its normal levels and to narrow the base of the Mararoa control structure (Wilson, 1982). There was also growing opposition to the proposed siting of Auckland Thermal No. 1 Power Station in Te Atatu.

Attempts to site Auckland Thermal No. 1, a gas-fired power station, on the northern side of Auckland and, later, on the Manukau Harbour, provided some "varied" experiences of local body politics for NZE officials. These were the first attempts to involve local people early on (Wong, pers. comm., 1987). There was a strong desire on the part of NZE officials to minimise the likelihood of confrontation in the Waikato investigations.

Our experience with previous thermal power station siting investigation indicates that an early consultative approach with local authorities in particular could result in problems being resolved before entering public hearings (NZE file note, 32/7/12, 17 July 1980).

Planning for the Huntly Power Station began in 1969. At this stage, there were no provisions in place for environmental impact reporting; these were introduced later in 1973. The Crown was not bound by the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act 1953. Opportunities for public participation on major projects were limited. Objections to applications for water rights lodged by the Crown under the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 could be made to the local catchment authority. The catchment authority would then make a recommendation to the National Water and Soil Conservation Authority (NWASCA). This government body was responsible for the final decision in respect of granting water rights to the Crown. Similarly, objections and submissions could be made to local territorial authorities in respect of

designations for public works lodged by the Crown under the Town and Country Planning Act 1953. Again, the Minister of Works and Development could override the recommendation of the local authority.

The Waikato Valley Authority (WVA) declined to recommend that water rights be issued to the NZED for the Huntly Power Project and proposed designation of a three-mile stretch of the Waikato River as being of 'national importance' on the grounds that there was insufficient information about the project (Stokes, 1978b, 28). There was particular concern about the effect of hot water on the mixing properties of the Waikato River, enrichment of the river and the effect of increased temperatures. Water rights were subsequently granted to NZED by NWASCA who overrode the recommendations of the WVA. Appeals against the decision were lodged with the Town and Country Planning Appeal Board (now known as the Planning Tribunal under the Town and Country Planning Act 1977) by Hamilton City Council, the Environmental Defence Society and Mr Robert Mahuta on behalf of the Waahi Māori community. In October 1973 the Board dismissed the appeals but added some extra conditions to the water rights.

There had been particular criticism of the Environmental Impact Statement released by NZED (1972) for neglecting to address social impacts. The Huntly Power Project was the first large government project which required the preparation of environmental impact reports following the release of the Environmental Protection and Enhancement Procedures by Government in 1973 (discussed in Chapter Three). The Officials Committee for the Environment recommended that further environmental statements be prepared to demonstrate that adequate provision had been made for environmental needs (Stokes, 1978b). Further environmental reports were produced in 1973 by Mines Division and NZED in 1976. The CFE produced an appraisal of the project in 1976, long after construction of the project had commenced (Commission for the Environment, 1976).

There was a range of local views about the siting of the power station. Two constant complaints were the lack of information about NZED proposals and the lack of opportunity for public participation. Mostly this was caused by urgency on the part of government to proceed with the project. The failure of NZED and MWD to designate the power station site in the Raglan County District Scheme, despite advice from the Officials Committee on the Environment to do so, denied the public an opportunity to lodge objections under the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act 1953. The power station site was still not designated in the 1983 Review of the Raglan County District Scheme. NZE officials considered that the Power Station had been lawfully established as a land use and to designate the site years after construction of the station could provide opportunities for objections (Colson, pers. comm., 1989). Despite the opportunity for public objections, section 118 of the Town and Country Planning Act gives the Minister of Works and Development (now the Minister for the Environment) power to override recommendations from the local authority in respect of a Ministerial Requirement for a designation.

There was a general feeling that central government would proceed with the power station regardless of local opinion (Fookes, 1984; Stokes, 1978b). Once the decision to proceed with construction had been made, local authorities were consulted by government. As provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act had not been used by government, no formal pre-decision activity was required by local territorial authorities (Fookes, 1984, 128). Both local territorial authorities, Raglan County Council and Huntly Borough Council, became involved in conflicts with local groups. At one stage, the Rotongaro Branch of Federated Farmers expressed no confidence in Raglan County's handling of roading matters and decided to approach the Local Government Commission (Fookes, 1984, 128).

## CONCERNS OF THE MĀORI COMMUNITY

Of particular significance, both for planning of the next power station and in addressing Māori cultural values generally in statutory planning, was the inadequate understanding by NZED engineers of the importance of Waahi Marae and the Waikato River to the Waikato Māori people.

The site for the Huntly Power Station is located in the midst of three Māori communities; Waahi, Te Kauri and Rakaumanga, and is directly adjacent to Waahi Marae (Figure Two). Waahi is an important Marae of Ngāti Mahuta and the home Marae of the Māori Queen, Dame Te Atairangikāhu. It is also the focus for the King Movement or Kingitanga. Kingitanga is a Māori institution with its origins in moves towards tribal confederation which took place in the 1850s. With confiscation of land from Huntly to Puniu River under the New Zealand Settlements Act 1863, after the invasion of the Waikato by British troops, Ngāti Mahuta retreated to the south of their territory. During exile in what became known as the 'King Country', the Kingitanga consolidated under the second Māori King, Tawhiao.

To some, the organisation and rituals of the King Movement may seem an anachronistic survival of nineteenth century circumstances. But the events of over a century ago - war, confiscation of land, withdrawal as refugees and resettlement - are but as yesterday in the perceptions of Waikato tribes. The King Movement, and the figure of Queen Te Atairangikaahu, the ariki or leader, are both an expression of past grievances and injustices and symbol of Māori values and institutions which seem threatened by Pakeha domination (Stokes, 1978b, 8).

In evidence presented to the Town and Country Planning Appeal Board by Mr R. T. Mahuta, specific concerns about the proposed siting of the Huntly Power Station were identified. These included: the effect of hot water discharges on sources of




Figure Two Waahi Marae and Huntly Borough.

customary food; disruption to Rakaumanga School and loss of recreation facilities at the school. Concerns were compounded for the Rakaumanga community by extensive earthworks in the course of construction of a stopbank as part of a WVA flood protection scheme. Some land had been compulsorily acquired for these works and some Māori families had been relocated in State houses in Huntly West. Preliminary foundation tests, including pile driving, were also being carried out on the power station site. There was considerable uncertainty for both Māori and Pakeha communities over the amount of land required for the power station site, location of the workers' construction camp and the fate of traditional settlements and land holdings.

Stokes referred to the importance of Waahi Marae as presented in evidence by Mr R. T. Mahuta to the Town and Country Planning Appeal Board.

It is the central base for the Māori King Movement.

All matters of importance to the Waikato tribe, the Tainui Confederation and the Māori people are discussed there.

It is a long established kin-based community which provides a refuge, spiritual sustenance and political stability for the tribe.

The Waikato River is an integral part of the marae complex and for over 100 years has provided the basic requirements necessary for the extension of hospitality and display of mana to important visitors.

The river is the physical embodiment of tribal mana and prestige and an economic resource... (quoted by Stokes, 1978b, 47-48).

In submissions to the Government, the Māori community stressed the need for Town and Country Planning Act procedures to be used in establishing the power station and for special consideration for Māori cultural values in planning that concerns Māori land.

Of significance for planning of the next power station and issues of Māori representation on some of the statutory and advisory committees which were established, they requested, amongst other matters: a representative on the power station committee; a Māori representative on the Town and Country Planning Appeal Board to assist in cases involving Māori land; and explanations by the Raglan County Council, Huntly Borough Council, Waikato Valley Authority, Ministry of Works, and Electricity Department of likely district scheme changes (Stokes, 1978b, 50).

Fifteen years later there are still deeply held feelings concerning the siting of the Huntly Power Station.

The people, of course, still have deeply held feelings about the siting of the first power station....From a Māori point of view it gave strength to the conspiracy theory that the thing was sited there in order to disrupt, to demean and to minimise the power and effect of the Kingitanga ....The nerve centre, really, of the Kingitanga is Waahi and it always has been since the King came back in 1891.

So I don't think that was appreciated by the Pakeha planners at any point. They didn't think that the Kingitanga was something that they had to take any notice of but, if they did have to take notice of it, they thought they could get by by planting some trees and engaging in some happy Marae based p.r. [public relations] activity. They never really realised that they were putting their power station beside the power house of Tainui as a tribal grouping. And then, I think, they didn't really realise how far Tainui itself was coming through on the whole strategy of development that Te Puea had begun back in the early part of the century which indeed was in the prophesies of Tawhiao back in the [eighteen] seventies and the late sixties.

So from the point of Tainui's perspective the power station was simply an intrusion into their ideological space as well as their physical space, their cultural space (Ritchie, pers. comm., 1987).

The Tainui Māori Trust Board was set up pursuant to the Waikato Maniapoto Māori Claims Settlement Act 1946. The Board was established to administer monies paid by the Government as compensation for Waikato lands confiscated after the wars of the 1860s. The beneficiaries of the Tainui Māori Trust Board are defined in section 7 of the Māori Trust Boards Act 1955. They are the members and their descendents of such of the Tainui tribes, or sections of the Tainui tribes, as were owners according to Māori custom of lands which were confiscated in the 1860s under the New Zealand Settlements Act 1863 and amendments. The area which was confiscated is shown on Figure Two. The southern boundary of the confiscated lands was the Puniu River, between Te Awamutu and Otorohanga, while the northern boundary was a line which ran west from the mouth of the Waikato River to Miranda in the east. To the north, blocks of land in the Wairoa and Waiuku districts were also confiscated. The extent of land which was confiscated is still the subject of debate, because, while some hill country lands were returned, not all were returned to ancestral owners. The potentially productive lowlands of Waikato and Waipa were retained by the Crown. These deep seated grievances were part of the background claims now with the Waitangi Tribunal.<sup>4</sup>

Apart from the general administration of assets, section 24 of the Māori Trust Boards Act 1955 also enables the Tainui Māori Trust Board to spend money on the promotion of health (such as installation of water supplies, housing schemes, medical and dental services), social and economic welfare (such as land development, roading and construction of buildings) and education and vocational training.

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4. The Waitangi Tribunal was established in 1975 to investigate Māori claims against the Crown for breaches of the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi. In 1985 the Government empowered the Tribunal to examine claims going back to 1840. The Treaty of Waitangi comprises three articles in which the Māori gave the Crown rights to govern and develop a British settlement, while the Crown guaranteed Māori full protection of their interests, status and citizenship rights.

### ALLOCATION OF AMENITIES GRANTS

A major feature during the construction of the Huntly Power Project was the disbursement of the public amenities grant. In the Electricity Act 1968, there is provision for the Ministry of Energy, as the developer, to pay a 'public amenities grant' to a local or regional body whose district is affected by energy project development (Parsons, 1987). Section 11 (2)(g) states;

The Minister may from time to time:

(g) Provide public amenities in connection with any projected works at a cost not exceeding one percent of these works or in connection with existing works within limits determined from time to time in conjunction with the Minister of Finance.

There is no explanation in the Act of how the clause should be interpreted. Guidelines were subsequently produced by Electricity Division in 1982. Origins of the clause date from the construction of large-scale hydro-electric projects such as Benmore and Aviemore Dams on the Waitaki River in the 1960s where basic recreation facilities (including boat ramps) were provided as public amenities. People could then use the newly created lakes for recreation purposes. It was pointed out by the Auditor-General to NZED in 1970 that this expenditure was not directly related to spending of public funds on electricity generation and the Act was subsequently amended (Fookes, 1984, 131). In Huntly local sports and community organisations had high expectations of receiving large financial grants under this clause.

A case for assistance had to be made through the local body and the site of the amenity had to be vested in that local body. These requirements posed difficulties for the Huntly Māori community on two counts: ownership of Māori land; and public access to a Marae. Eventually, the Tainui Māori Trust Board was

recognised as a public body; and that while certain courtesies prevailed when entering a marae, it did function as a public space (Fookes, 1984, 134). The recognition of the Trust Board in 1977 as a public body meant that the Board was responsible for the administration of the amenities grants in respect of the Huntly Power Station. These were used to redevelop the marae including the building of marae housing, a dining hall and extensions to football clubrooms. This decision was not regarded by the Government as setting a precedent in future cases (Centre for Māori Studies and Research, 1984, 45).

The one percent clause was not intended to cover a wider concern of mitigating social consequences. Amenities grants in respect of the Huntly Power Station were allocated as follows:

SUMMARY OF GRANTS UNDER SECTION 11(2) ELECTRICITY  
ACT 1968 IN RESPECT OF HUNTLY POWER STATION

Tainui Māori Trust Board	\$505,000
Huntly Borough Council	\$1,000,000
Raglan County Council	\$590,000
<u>Total</u>	<u>\$2,095,000</u>

(Source: Fookes, 1984, 135-136)

The decision did not recognise a marae as a public amenity and the arguments were rehearsed again in respect of the Ohaaki Geothermal Power Project in the early 1980s. The Crown wished to construct a power station on nearly 400 hectares of Māori land and use the geothermal resources to generate electricity. The marae was located on the power project site. By this stage, issues elsewhere concerning the use of Māori land had become politically contentious and the Government finally agreed to lease rather than purchase the site under the Public Works Act (Stokes, 1987). Negotiations between the Crown and the Ngāti Tahu Tribal Trust resulted in the allocation of an amenity grant under the Electricity Act to the Trust to upgrade the marae and construct a new dining hall.

The issue of amenities grants was to arise again in relation to whether the Crown funded costs of monitoring the social effects of the Waikato energy developments, and also to what extent the Tainui Māori Trust Board could participate in the allocation of funds received from central government.

#### AD HOC ARRANGEMENTS FOR PUBLIC CONSULTATION

Three months after the Cabinet decision to proceed with the Huntly Power Station, the Minister of Works and Development announced that the Huntly Planning Forum would be set up. The Forum was not to be a decision-making body but to discuss matters brought forward by the district communities. The Ministry of Works and Development, Huntly Borough Council, Raglan County Council, New Zealand Electricity Department, Mines Department, and the Waahi Māori community were represented on the Forum. The Forum was convened through the District Commissioner of Works in Hamilton. After the first meeting, representations to join the Forum were received from the Rotongaro Branch of Federated Farmers and Waikato County Council. Both groups were invited to attend as co-opted members. The local members of Parliament for the Raglan Electorate and Western Māori also attended the Forum. The intention was that the Forum would channel information about the project and current progress to key community representatives and to facilitate advanced planning and action (Fookes, 1981b).

A Liaison Committee was also established. This committee was much more informal and did not use a tight agenda. Its purpose was to maintain liaison between the project and local people. Fookes notes some confusion between the Forum and the Committee as some membership overlapped. A broad spectrum of local interests was represented at the Liaison Committee. The news media were excluded from the Liaison Committee but welcomed at the Forum.

In reviewing the Forum and Liaison Committee, Fookes (1981b, 19) notes that,

1. The Forum was not a planning committee;
2. Its effective role was public relations. Communication between the project and local representatives could be seen in action and reported by the Press. It served as a safety valve.
3. The Liaison Committee provided a formal opportunity for senior government representatives to meet with local representatives.
4. A review of the Liaison Committee minutes shows that communication was predominately from the project to the community representatives, with little initiative taken by the representatives to provide information on the attitudes and general interests of local residents. Representatives, in general, were not reporting back to their organisations.

Fookes (1981b, 24-25) identified a number of assumptions implicit in arrangements for public participation and considered that planning for the next Waikato coal-fired power station was proceeding with the same assumptions.

1. The public is appropriately represented, in all cases, by local body councillors or staff;
2. the public is a homogeneous body;
3. committees are the most appropriate form of liaison and information exchange;
4. elected, or specially selected, representative automatically function as channels for project information, and as a vehicle for an accurate reflection of attitudes and values within a community;

5. the presence of news media representatives constrains the participation of some individuals (thereby minimising the role of the media generally).

Fookes noted that the Waahi Māori community and Federated Farmers were examples of groups that saw their interests as sufficiently different to justify separate representation on project committees. The local territorial authority (in this case, Raglan County Council) was judged by them to be unacceptable in presenting their views.

A further point was that the Huntly experience showed that it could not be assumed that elected members would automatically channel project information, or accurately represent diverse views, attitudes and values within a community.

The arrangements made for consultation with local authorities by NZE officials were a significant issue to be considered when site investigations for the next power station began. The Waikato United Council had just been established. There were questions about how to involve the new regional authority, as well as landowner groups such as Federated Farmers and the Māori community. These matters, and events which occurred later as site investigations proceeded are discussed in Chapters Five, Six, and Seven.

#### THE HUNTLY MONITORING PROJECT

It was evident in 1973 that considerable social consequences were likely to arise from the construction of the Huntly Power Station. Well before construction commenced, considerable anxiety and stress arising from the apparently uncertain future were experienced by Māori and Pakeha. Farmers and residents who lived near the proposed site were particularly sensitive. The District Commissioner of Works who was Chairman of the Forum,

noted potential problems arising from an almost immediate 50 percent increase in Huntly's population of 6,000 (Stokes, 1978b).

The Huntly Monitoring Project (HMP) was a University of Waikato research contract which ran from 1975-1981. The contract was funded initially by the Ministry of Works and Development but later, from 1979, NZE paid half the contract cost. Initiatives for the project came from two sources. First, an in-house proposal for a Huntly monitoring study had been circulating among staff in the head office of the Ministry of Works and Development. The concept of 'monitoring' was fashionable overseas in some developmental situations. Fookes argued that Town and Country Planning Division staff of the MWD were keen to get involved in this research on the basis that they "could argue later that the CFE's role was redundant" (Fookes, 1984, 47). Second, Tom Fookes, a Senior Lecturer in the Department of Geography, (later appointed as co-ordinator of the HMP) saw the need to monitor the social and economic effects of the Huntly Power Station and the development of the natural gasfield in Taranaki. Impetus for this came from negative publicity about the consequences of the Huntly Power Project and Cabinet's decision to include environmental impact assessments of proposed public works. After extensive negotiations between MWD and University staff a contract was finally approved and work commenced in December 1975.

The terms of reference were;

To measure, assess and report periodically on the social and economic effects of construction and operation of the Huntly Thermal Power Station on Huntly Borough and its immediate environs and on the Waikato Region including the area encompassed by the extreme boundaries of Raglan, Waikato and Waipa Counties and Cambridge Borough, and in particular, to examine the effects on:

- (a) Housing;
- (b) Incomes, employment and manpower availability;
- (c) Availability of material resources;
- (d) Provision of services, including health, education and welfare services;
- (e) Community cohesion;
- (f) Administration and decision-making, and;
- (g) Any other matters that either the Steering Committee or Commissioner of Works consider should be examined.

This examination to be carried out in order to meet three objectives:

- (a) Identify potential problems early enough to take timely remedial action;
- (b) Provide information relevant to the planning of future development projects; and
- (c) Develop effective and efficient procedures and methods suitable for future monitoring development projects (Fookes, 1984, 49-50).

The project was handled in four phases and the contract ran until 31 December 1981. Interim research papers were published as monitoring work proceeded while final outcomes were published in 15 papers in the Final Report Series 1981. Planning for the next power station began before the completion of the HMP.

When NZE officials turned to the planning of the next power station, the HMP, both as an exercise in social research or as an experience inappropriate to disregard, had to be included. The files record two reasons. First, to use their (economic) investment in the project and secondly, because it would be politically awkward to ignore it (MOE/MWD meeting, 14 August 1980, 32/7/12). NZE officials saw value in involving Mr Fookes;

... he had a lot of information about what had happened at Huntly and that was going to be valuable in the demographic, financial and local economics issues... so for whatever reasons we wanted to involve Tom in that initial work (McGlinchy, pers. comm., 1987).

While conscious of the need to avoid past mistakes, another senior NZE staff member did not perceive the findings of the monitoring project as strongly influencing their approach towards planning of the next power station. The HMP had monitored the social and economic effects of the construction of the Huntly Power Station. The attention of NZE staff was now turning towards the selection of a site for the next power station, an issue which had not, at that stage, been canvassed in HMP publications.

It didn't influence us greatly. It was really going down a different sort of track. It was monitoring the current situation at the time when in actual fact we were on another sort of exercise... I felt that we were trying to do things in our own way (Wong, pers. comm., 1987).

Many of the participants in the case study had been involved in the HMP in some capacity. While views about the relevance of the findings of the HMP for planning the next power station were very mixed, two points emerged in the course of my research. First, the informal advice of HMP staff was sought in establishing consultative arrangements with local government as well as establishing means for addressing social effects. Secondly, the large-scale, information-based approach of the HMP undoubtedly contributed to general reluctance on the part of government officials to proceed with setting up arrangements for 'monitoring' the next round of Waikato projects. It also influenced people's views on the appropriate model and organisational arrangements for 'monitoring' these projects (discussed in Chapter Seven).

### ESTABLISHMENT OF REGIONAL GOVERNMENT IN THE WAIKATO

All of the local body politicians interviewed as part of my case study had been involved in earlier forms of regional government in the Waikato region. As Chapter Six demonstrates, these experiences were influential in shaping the attitudes of these people towards determining the extent of involvement of the newly-created Waikato United Council in regional issues, such as the energy developments.

There had been a 'history' of local body 'co-operation' on matters of city boundary extensions and related planning issues by Hamilton City, Waikato and Waipa Counties (Eyeington, 1973). This 'co-operation' had grown out of serious conflict over financial aspects of the 1961 Hamilton City boundary extensions. Prior to these boundary extensions, a Hamilton extra-urban committee dealt with issues such as roading, land-use control of extra-urban land and the extension of city services to rural lands. This committee comprised representatives of Hamilton City, Waipa and Waikato County Councils and Ministry of Works. The extra-urban committee was dissolved after the boundary extensions took place and communication between the Counties and City was restricted to correspondence between senior administration staff (Kenward, 1977, 524).

In 1966 a move was made by Hamilton City Council to re-establish the committee (Eyeington, 1973). The following year a committee called the Joint Committee of Representatives of the Hamilton City, Waipa and Waikato County Councils was established and met from 1967 until 1969. Eyeington noted that there was much concern as to what the committee should call itself and a specific wish by most members to avoid the use of either 'planning' or 'region' in the title (Eyeington, 1973). He gave a number of reasons for apathy towards statutory regional planning;

fear of surrendering independence;

costs of joining a regional planning authority;

lack of conviction that there was a need for a separate authority and that significant results could be obtained through a separate regional body as opposed to district planning schemes;

a shortage of planning staff and costs involved in attracting suitably qualified people (Eyeington, 1973, 3-5).

He went on to note that

In the Hamilton area the major reasons for avoiding statutory regional planning in past years has been the lack of conviction of the need for a separate statutory authority and the wish to retain independence in the taking of formal planning decisions (Eyeington, 1973, 5).

Following the preparation of various reports on extensions to Hamilton City, such as the Gabites and Beard report (1967), a sub-committee known as the Hamilton Area Committee was formed in 1969 and was responsible for the publication of the Hamilton Area Study Report in 1972. The report proposed staged development of the growth of Hamilton City up until the year 2020. Following the production of the report, an investigation on the means of implementing proposals was carried out. It was concluded that: the information contained within the report was more appropriate to regional planning schemes than district planning schemes; a combined district scheme recommended in the report could not be accommodated within the scope of the Town and Country Planning Act 1953; and a Regional Planning Authority which covered a limited Hamilton area should be set up to implement the study proposals.

Early resistance by Waikato local authority members to the notion of regional planning was observed by Kenward (1977). The purpose

of the three local authorities, Hamilton City Council, Waikato and Waipa County Councils, resolving in 1971 to form a committee under section 31 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1953 was to avoid the necessity of establishing a regional planning authority (Kenward, 1977, 527). However, there were legal complications in that the three authorities had existing and proposed district schemes. A year later, the creation of a regional authority was seen as a means of pre-empting plans by the National Party Government to reorganise local government. Accordingly, on July 28 1972, the three authorities resolved to prepare a regional planning scheme for the area under their jurisdiction (Kenward, 1977, 529).

Discussion between the Mayor of Hamilton City, Chairmen of Waikato and Waipa Counties and Ministers of Works and Local Government resulted in agreement that a regional planning authority covering the whole of the Hamilton City, Waipa and Waikato County areas should be established. It was also agreed that the inclusion of other territorial local bodies was not essential but that consideration should be given to the inclusion of local authorities such as Ngaruawahia, Te Awamutu and Cambridge Borough Councils as soon as possible.

The Hamilton Regional Planning Authority was accordingly established on this basis and gazetted on 9 November 1972. The Hamilton Area Study Report 1972 was adopted as the basis of any future regional planning scheme. An early exercise was the establishment of a committee to acquire, develop and maintain land in the Waikato, Thames and Coromandel area as regional recreational reserves. Within a year; it was noted that some five authorities had indicated that they did not wish to participate further in this investigation. Eyeington stated;


This attitude is not unexpected as in general territorial local authorities are still most reluctant to co-operate on a statutory basis unless it can be conclusively shown that it is clearly in

their interests to do so, and that the existing local authority structure and the powers held by each local authority are insufficient or inadequate to satisfactorily meet the particular planning objectives (Eyeington, 1973, 20).

The area of the Hamilton Regional Planning Authority (HRPA) was subsequently broadened to include the territories of Otorohanga County, Cambridge, Huntly, Ngaruawahia and Te Awamutu Boroughs (Figure Three). Later Matamata County, Tokoroa and Putaruru Boroughs were included as associate members. These councils wished to have full membership of the HRPA but were precluded by legislative changes in the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 and the creation of new regions required by changes to the local Government Act 1974. The approach by Matamata County Council to gain membership of the HRPA was an attempt to pre-empt possible inclusion in a region with the Thames Valley local authorities.

Section One of the Regional Planning Scheme was prepared by consultants for the HRPA and drew on previous reports such as the Hamilton Area Study Report 1972. Special attention was focussed on the Hamilton urban area. Section One became operative in February 1976. A short time later, a provisional scheme for the Waikato Region was published by the Fifth Local Government Commission (Local Government Commission, 1977) and new provisions affecting regional planning were introduced in the Town and Country Planning Act 1977.

The boundaries of the region, originally proposed by the Fifth Local Government Commission included the Thames Valley territorial authorities. However there was strong opposition by the majority of the Thames Valley authorities to their inclusion in the Waikato region. The Sixth Local Government Commission heard objections in June 1979 and proposed two regions which were finally approved; the Waikato region (described below) and a smaller Thames Valley region (Local Government Commission, 1979). Ironically, the boundaries of the new Waikato region finalised in



**Figure Three Local Authority and Regional Authority Boundaries (1972 - 1981)**


1989 coincide more closely with those proposed in 1978 by the Fifth Local Government Commission (Local Government Commission, 1988) (Figure Four).

The Waikato United Council (WUC) was established by an Order-in-Council effective from 14 October 1980. The Waikato region comprised the districts of 14 local territorial authorities namely: Huntly, Ngaruawahia, Cambridge, Te Awamutu, Matamata, Putaruru and Tokoroa Boroughs; Raglan, Waikato, Waipa and Matamata Counties; Otorohanga and Waitomo District Councils; and Hamilton City (Figure Three). The United Council had 16 members; three from Hamilton City and one member from each of the other territorial authorities (Eyeington, 1982). Hamilton City Council was the administering authority. Population of the new region had increased from 160,000 in the HRPB area to over 226,000. The United Council had two mandatory activities: regional planning and civil defence.

#### THE DECISION TO PROCEED WITH INVESTIGATION

Following the oil crisis of 1973, coal investigations in New Zealand were intensified. Coal geologists from the Department of Scientific and Industrial Research (DSIR) had been exploring since early 1975 the extent of the Waikato coalfields, as part of a national coal resources survey. In that year, the full extent of the Waikare coalfield (otherwise known as Ohinewai) was discovered (Fowke, 1989).

The Waikato Times reported in April 1975 that a second power station was planned to utilise the now proven coal reserves north of Huntly. The following month the paper reported that the Minister of Mines had announced a further two million dollars for coal exploration and NZED had asked the Mines Department whether



**Figure Four** Waikato Regional Council and Waikato Valley Authority Boundaries. *Source: Local Government Commission, 1989.*

a further 100 million tonnes could be made available for two new stations (Waikato Times, 7 April; 29 May 1975, cited in Stokes, 1978b, 45).

In 1979 a DSIR report assessed the potential of the Maramarua coalfield as a source of fuel for a thermal power station. The report concluded that its properties were suitable for use in a power station. Of later relevance is the comment in the report that the ash properties of Maramarua coal were unsuitable for steel processing (Bowen and Edbrooke, 1979). Two years later, just before the 1981 election, the Minister of Energy announced the extension of New Zealand Steel, based on using Maramarua coal.

A meeting to discuss coal sources for the power station was held in September 1979 in the Mines Division offices, Wellington. Staff from DSIR Geological Division and NZE were in attendance. At the meeting NZE staff explained the importance of proceeding with preliminary investigations although the power station did not, at that stage, appear on the 15 year power plan.

The uncertainty about the long-term predictions for electricity and the need to be prepared for an upturn in demand;

the uncertainty about the availability of gas for use in thermal power stations;

the very long lead time required to obtain environmental clearances and construct a station of at least 1000 MW capacity (NZE file note, 11 September 1979, 32/7/12).

The Waikato Thermal Power Station was first mentioned in the 1979 Report of Committee on Electric Power Development. The 500 MW station was to be coal-fired, using Waikato coal, and to be commissioned by the early 1990s. As an additional 500 MW station could be required, sites were investigated on the basis of accommodating the requirements of a 1000 MW station built in two

500 MW stages. It was anticipated that it would be built over a period of 11 years from 1984-1995; to be fuelled from coal from one or more fields - Huntly, Waikare (otherwise known as Ohinewai) and Maramarua. A construction workforce of about 1450 workers and an operations workforce of about 350 would be needed. In addition, a coal extraction workforce of between 700 and 800 workers to develop and expand the coalfields would be required to provide the two million tonnes of coal needed each year to supply the station. Specific site considerations included the costs of fuel, coal transport and power transmission and the proximity of cooling water. Chapter Seven discusses site selection in more detail.

The complexity of arrangements for environmental administration have already been outlined in the preceding chapter. An early issue for NZE staff was to ascertain what statutory consents would be required from local authorities, what planning instruments should be used and the length of time it would take for planning procedures to be completed.

It was now normal practice for public works to be designated (that is separately provided for in the district planning schemes of local authorities and shown on planning maps). The Huntly Power Station had not been designated in the Raglan County District Scheme (discussed earlier in this chapter). Previously, the Town and Country Planning Act had not been used to designate state coal mines because the specific powers of the Coal Mines Act were considered by SCM officials to override the general powers of the Town and Country Planning Act. Mines Division staff, for example, had chosen not to designate state coal mines in Raglan County for the following reasons;

- the status of mining is not always clear;
- the extent of land associated with underground mines to be designated is not clear;

- designation may give the false impression that local authorities can control coal mining activities (Raglan County Council, 1983, 48).

In the event of the Minister of Energy choosing to use the Coal Mines Act to establish new coal mines such as the Ohinewai coalfield proposal, the designation procedure of the Town and Country Planning Act would be used only for the siting of infrastructure such as road and rail realignments and would not influence whether the Ohinewai development should proceed. By using the provisions of the National Development Act 1979 SCM would obtain necessary consents more quickly to meet tight time constraints imposed in the annual Energy Plans. Ministry of Energy reports indicate a reluctance to specify whether the National Development Act would be used to initiate the Ohinewai development (Mines Division, 1984).

Electricity Division staff, on the other hand, stated their intention explicitly to use section 118 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 to designate the power station site (Electricity Division, 1984). This would involve the lodging of a Ministerial requirement with Waikato County Council (WCC) whose staff would publicly notify the proposal. Council staff were responsible for administering their District Planning Scheme prepared in accordance with the provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act 1977. If objections and submissions were received, a hearing would be conducted by the Councillors who would make a recommendation to the Minister of Works and Development. The Minister would advise the Council of his or her decision which would be open to appeal to the Planning Tribunal. There is also provision under section 119 for the Minister to refer the Council's recommendation to the Planning Tribunal for an inquiry. A recommendation would be made by the Tribunal to the Minister following such a hearing. Such a recommendation could be ignored by the Government in the 'national interest'.

Consents for the power station would also be required under the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967, Clean Air Act 1972 and possibly under the Historic Places Act 1980. While little public participation was provided for under the latter two Acts, water right applications lodged by the Crown would be referred to the Waikato Valley Authority (WVA) for a report and recommendation to the National Water and Soil Conservation Authority (chaired by the Minister of Works and Development). The WVA, established under its own act in 1956, was responsible for administration of the Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act 1941 and the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 and their amendments. It was responsible for flood control, the prevention of damage from erosion, soil conservation and for the control, allocation and management of waters within its area (Waikato Valley Authority, 1985). The WVA area covered the catchment of the Waikato River and its tributaries and western coastal catchments from the Mokau to Waiuku Rivers (Figure Four). Before making its recommendations, the WVA could invite submissions from interested persons and hold a public hearing. After considering the recommendation from the WVA, the National Authority would notify its decision which, in turn, would be open to the lodging of appeals to the Planning Tribunal. The Tribunal's decision could be referred to the High Court and Court of Appeal only on points of law.

Further assessment of the environmental implications of the proposed power station would be provided through the Environmental Protection and Enhancement Procedures discussed in Chapter Three. Environmental Impact Reports were required to be prepared for major public works. The Minister of Energy was not obliged to accept recommendations made by CFE staff in their audit of the power station project.

The principal local authorities which had statutory powers to assess aspects of the various energy projects were, therefore, the WVA and WCC. The WVA was responsible for the allocation of

water rights while the WCC was required to assess land use implications of public works. The Town and Country Planning Act 1977 provided for a district planning scheme to comply with a regional scheme in force in its district (section 37). While the Regional Planning Scheme of the HRPAs was still operative, its policies were very broad and did not provide specifically for the energy projects. The new WUC had only just been established and staff had not yet begun to prepare a new regional planning scheme. Thus the WUC did not have specific statutory responsibilities but rather there was an expectation by central and local government politicians and staff that it would coordinate where necessary with central government departments on behalf of the local territorial authorities. Later in investigations, more detailed planning was needed to deal with matters such as location of project housing. This required the direct involvement of local territorial authorities such as Huntly and Ngaruawahia Boroughs, and Raglan County as well as Waikato County. Chapter Six discusses the effectiveness of the WUC in dealing with issues arising from the proposed energy projects.

In the next chapter I discuss the special administrative arrangements established by NZE officials to consult with local and regional authorities as site investigations for the power station began. The 1980 Energy Plan stated that sites needed to be investigated on the basis of accommodating the requirements of a 1000 MW station, built in two 500 MW stages. Strengthened provisions for regional planning were now in place in the reviewed Town and Country Planning Act 1977. An important question for government officials to consider was the nature of involvement of the Waikato United Council.

## **PART TWO : THE CASE STUDY AND FIELD WORK**

This Part examines specific events and actions which occurred from 1979 to 1985 while NZE officials investigated potential sites for the Waikato Thermal Power Station.

Each of the following three chapters is devoted to a particular aspect of the officials' investigations. Chapter Five describes the special institutional arrangements put in place by Ministry of Energy officials as investigations proceeded. The purpose of three committees is discussed: the Waikato Coal Station Regional Committee, later renamed the Waikato Energy Development Regional Committee (WEDRC); the Social and Planning Effects Study group; and the Waikato Energy Planning and Infrastructure Co-ordinating Committee (WEPICC). Chapter Six examines the responses of the Waikato United Council in dealing with the regional implications of the power station and coal mining developments. Chapter Seven describes the methodologies developed by NZE officials in selecting a site. This includes the officials' consultations with Pakeha and Māori communities and their responses.

## CHAPTER FIVE : AD HOC COMMITTEE ARRANGEMENTS

This chapter examines three institutional arrangements set in place during the early 1980s by Ministry of Energy (MOE) officials as they prepared to implement proposals outlined in government's energy plans. The chapter begins with a description of the early attempts by New Zealand Electricity (NZE) officials to establish procedures for consultations with local and regional authority politicians. Discussions resulted in the establishment of a Waikato Coal Station Regional Committee. This committee became known later as the Waikato Energy Development Regional Committee (WEDRC) when its terms of reference were expanded to include coal mining developments. The second committee is the Social and Planning Effects Study group which was established by NZE officials to consider the social consequences of selecting a site for the power station. The third committee is the Waikato Energy Planning and Infrastructure Co-ordinating Committee, known as WEPICC. This Wellington-based committee was established by MOE officials in 1984 to review infrastructure planning for the energy developments.

### EARLY DISCUSSIONS - TOWARDS A REGIONAL ADVISORY COMMITTEE

Chapter Four referred to the previous experiences of NZE engineers which shaped their attitudes towards the Waikato investigations. Officials recognised the need to consult early with local politicians.

We had already established a practice of involving councils and in the Auckland area, the Auckland Regional Authority. So it followed fairly naturally that when we first perceived this study the first thing we did was to go and visit all of the likely affected councils (McGlinchy, pers. comm., 1987).

In July 1980, NZE officials visited several local and regional authorities in the Waikato to discuss their preliminary proposals and to invite the participation of local body politicians in siting investigations. At those meetings NZE staff outlined their intention to approach the investigations in two phases; first, to decide which coalfield to use, and secondly, to look for power station sites in more detail. They considered that the Waikato United Council was likely to have more involvement in the first phase while local authorities would be involved in the second when it was apparent which local authority districts would be affected. NZE officials considered that there should be some involvement of local authorities, possibly through their planners, to establish and maintain contact at the planning and political levels.

A series of meetings held between NZE officials and MWD, and HMP staff as well as politicians and staff of Waikato County Council, Raglan County Council, Huntly Borough Council and Waikato Valley Authority indicated a demand by Waikato local body politicians for "regional" involvement. The local authority people consulted by NZE staff expressed their dissatisfaction with the lack of consultation by State Coal Mines (SCM) officials and wanted some "local" input into the decision on which coal field to develop to supply the power station. One question which arose in these discussions (from the meeting with Raglan County Councillors) was whether NZE staff intended to use the National Development Act to obtain consents for the power station. NZE staff indicated that they did not intend, at that stage, to use those procedures.

The outcome of the meeting of MWD, NZE and HMP staff was that there was a need for "regional" involvement and that the Waikato United Council should be involved (NZE file note, 8 July 1980, 32/7/12). At that stage the United Council had not been formally established. An injunction had been lodged by the Waitomo District Council on the decision of the Local Government Commission to create a Waikato region under the Local Government

Amendment Act 1978. One local body politician, Harold Sherwin (Chairman of Waipa County Council and the Hamilton Regional Planning Authority), at a meeting with NZE staff and members of the Hamilton Regional Planning Authority (HRPA) on 9 July 1980, expressed the view that

...local government in the past had complained about the lack of involvement but as NZE 'had called their bluff' then they had no choice but to accept (NZE file note, 32/7/12).

Opinions amongst central government officials and HMP staff varied on the type of committee structures which should be set in place. To include some form of local involvement, options canvassed were: a land resources advisory committee as defined in section 7 of the Town and Country Planning Act 1977; a "separate" committee; and a "technically-based" committee, including some politicians, were suggested. Various "levels" of public involvement were perceived: "regional"; "local"; and the general "public". Two phases of investigations were seen by NZE staff as necessary; regional and more site-specific planning.

The general conclusion was that the United Council should be involved or consulted on which coal area was to be used; this is a regional question which crosses county boundaries. Mr T. Fookes considered that regional people should be involved early, partly because they must either be shown to be participating or to be in opposition.

It was recognised that there were three levels of involvement: regional, local and the general population (perhaps represented by Federated Farmers). The question of keeping the public informed is a difficult one (NZE file note, 8 July 1980, 32/7/12).

NZE staff were motivated by the need to be seen to be involving local people. For example, minutes of a staff meeting stated that 'working groups have got to be seen to be involving local

authorities and regulatory bodies' (NZE file note, 21 July 1980, 32/7/12). There was an acknowledgement amongst NZE officials, based on previous experiences, that it was important for the success of their investigations to consult early with local authority politicians to avoid potential problems in obtaining statutory consents later.

File notes of in-house meetings of NZE staff held shortly after the Waikato meetings indicate that staff discussed the outcomes of those meetings. A steering committee similar to the Auckland Combined-Cycle Committee had been suggested, chaired by the Chairman of the United Council instead of the Regional Planner. The Auckland Combined-Cycled Committee had been established by NZED to liaise with Auckland Regional Authority planning staff concerning their investigations for the Auckland Thermal No. 1 Station in the mid 1970s. There had been some differences of opinion between NZE officials and planning officers of MWD and the Auckland Regional Authority (NZE file note, 5 October 1980, 32/7/12). The District Commissioner of Works was reported as seeing the steering committee "exercising more control than was the case in Auckland" (NZE file note, 21 July 1980, 32/7/12). The District Manager of NZE and the District Commissioner of Works also saw the need for another committee under the direction of the steering committee made up of regional and local planners, including the MWD. Apart from those options, NZE staff were preparing to establish several working groups which would operate independently of any steering committee. The "social regional studies" group would include MWD staff (District and Wellington), regional and local authority planners and Mr Fookes. Other study groups, at least one of which included staff from the Waikato Valley Authority, were proposed to examine engineering parameters, geotechnical and foundations, cooling systems options, coal source and transport, air quality, ecology, electricity transmission and visual aspects.

The file notes also stated that "criticism of past Mines Division's action in involving [Waikato] regional interests was quite open". NZE staff considered that "more time" and "broader studies" would be required to counter this view. SCM staff did not share the views of NZE staff on the extent of public consultation that should take place. At a meeting in Wellington of NZE and SCM staff to discuss coal supply for the power station, the Deputy Secretary of Mines Division considered the question of regional participation to be "undesirable" (NZE file note, 5 August 1980, 32/7/12). The unwillingness of SCM staff to consult with local people during the early 1980s, as planning for the coalfields expansion proceeded, was commented on frequently by participants in this case study.

Following on from the July meetings, NZE staff developed a proposal for a Regional Advisory Committee (NZE file note, 7 August 1980, 32/7/12). SCM staff were not directly involved in discussion at this stage but were implicitly included as MOE officials.

The role of the Regional Advisory Committee is intended to provide information and involvement to those regional organisations interested in the power station proposal. Emphasis would be on the planning function and also monitoring local reactions.

Participation at any level, either on this Committee or at working level, is not intended to restrict the right of anyone to object to the final proposal. For this reason, if no other, the role of this Committee should be advisory and not one of executive responsibility.

Membership would comprise the Chairman of the United Council; District Commissioner of Works, Hamilton; and the District Manager of NZE or other delegated officers, as well as a senior member of the Power Development Branch, NZE. Later, it was envisaged that as investigations became more site specific, a

committee similar to the Huntly Forum might be desirable. The purposes of the Regional Advisory committee were: to advise on the regional effects of any proposed site; to facilitate functioning of study groups; to comment independently on the results of siting investigations; to advise on liaison with local authorities; and to monitor information flow and local reactions to siting investigations.

Provisions were also made for working (study) groups. These groups were to: include a Ministry of Energy member who could also act as convenor; and report to the Regional Advisory Committee as well as Ministry of Energy in Wellington. The arrangements were intended to ensure that

responsibility is clearly with the Ministry of Energy;

adequate participation by regional interests;

[and to] enable the local authorities to participate fully in the exercise without prejudice to their right to dissent during the statutory clearance procedures (NZE file note, 7 August 1980, 32/7/12).

MWD Town and Country Planning Division (Wellington) officials advocated a different approach and put their views to the Minister of National Development (Mr Birch) who was also Minister of Energy (NZE file note, 20 August 1980, 32/7/12). They advocated that the Regional Advisory Committee take on the role of a negotiating forum where differences of opinion between the United Council and NZE officials would be resolved by negotiation. Membership would comprise three United Council representatives; a similar number of senior NZE officials with the "middle man" being the District Commissioner of Works. The Commissioner of Works also suggested that NZE officials "might consider selecting chairmen for these study groups according to their seniority and experience rather than purely on departmental

lines". The Commissioner acknowledged that the involvement of the District Commissioner of Works on the Regional Advisory Committee was "a proper expression of their [MWD] role in regional planning" (Ministry of Works and Development, 1980a).

NZE officials reacted sharply to this proposal. An internal file note commented that the approach of Town and Country Planning Division officials had been made in "a most unsatisfactory manner" (NZE file note, 5 October 1980, 32/7/12). NZE officials were unclear if a formal proposal by Town and Country Planning Division officials had been made along these lines to the Minister of National Development. A memo was to be drafted to the Minister of Energy to include the following comments:

...that we will need to have the track well greased to enable us to achieve the challenging power development programme and that from our extensive experience in this type of exercise we are confident that the T and CP [Town and Country Planning] proposal would hinder, not help, NZE. This is because we would lose control of activities for which we are responsible to an organisation which has no direct responsibility.

We must of course stress that we would seek all the assistance T and CP and any other organisation could offer, but their proposal would in effect give MWD, as arbitrator, virtual control.

MWD Town and Country Planning (Hamilton) officials continued to press their case. The District Commissioner of Works suggested that, if the region did not have an effective say in decision-making, there would be a lack of regional co-operation. In his view, expressed in a letter to the Commissioner of Works (11 September 1980), members of the new Waikato United Council "would not stand back allowing government to make a decision in isolation on the siting of this major work". He considered that the committee should be a special committee of the United Council comprising five members, of whom the majority would be United Council representatives. The letter acknowledged that the

proposal might be considered to place "too much power" with the local committee.

But the local committee can only recommend to the Minister and anyway contains a sizeable Ministry of Energy input. Certainly the proposal goes further than Electricity Division have proposed and quite beyond anything Mines Division have ever considered. It may seem revolutionary to them but the proposal will, I believe, provide for regional, local and public participation in the decision made, and with local acceptance ensure that the project can commence without frustration (Ministry of Works and Development, 1980b).

At a meeting in Wellington between NZE and MWD officials, NZE representatives expressed their strong disapproval of the MWD proposal (NZE file note, 24 September, 32/7/12). A modified MWD proposal was presented in October to the Secretary of Energy by the Director of Town and Country Planning Division, MWD. The committee would have the status of a special committee of the Waikato United Council. Membership would comprise up to three representatives from the United Council, up to three representatives from the Ministry of Energy, and the Crown representative on the Regional Planning Committee of the United Council (Ministry of Works and Development, 1980c). The proposed brief of the committee was expanded, as apparently agreed at a meeting between MWD and NZE staff, with more of a "co-ordination" than "liaison" purpose. The brief proposed by MWD officials reflected the intent of the new provisions for regional planning in the reviewed Town and Country Planning Act. For example, one of the proposed tasks of the committee was to consider

... the results of siting investigations, the options these reveal and, in the light of relevant technical, and regional social and economic factors, to make recommendations to the United Council and the Ministry of Energy on the appropriateness of sites for the station, together with recommendations on site related matters such

as roading, housing, and other services, and environmental effects and standards.

A file note (undated, 32/7/12) noted that the proposal was considered unacceptable "if the siting exercise is to reach a speedy conclusion". The note also commented that, following the experience with the advisory committee set up for the Auckland Combined-cycle studies,

political representatives can represent local interest better than executive staff. It is considered that one political member of the United Council may not fully represent all interests and therefore this could create problems. For this reason more than one member may need to join the RAC.

The alternative proposal put forward by MWD officials was formally rejected by NZE and SCM staff in a letter dated 31 October to the Commissioner of Works (Ministry of Energy, 1980b). Reasons given included the following;

- (1) The proposed development consists of two parts, viz, the development of a mine which is the responsibility of Mines Division and the construction of the power station which is the responsibility of the Electricity Division. Both Divisions have their separate statutory responsibilities to complete their tasks and could not place themselves in a position where they would have inadequate control to meet their responsibilities;
- (2) the local bodies would be required to make independent comments on the proposals at various times and this would be incompatible with their complete involvement;
- (3) the only members of the proposed committee who have the technical expertise to fully evaluate the technical aspects of the reports are those from the respective Ministry of Energy Divisions. They are also the ones who have the

delegated responsibility to carry out the work;

- (4) we are not aware of any statutory obligation to have a formal liaison or co-ordinating committee...[or] of any committee which has the powers you would ascribe to this group;
- (5) it is possible that an undue burden could be placed on Ministry of Energy staff explaining every step of their work to the committee to enable the committee to make or approve a decision;
- (6) there could be complications if the proposed committee became the focus of all public relations;
- (7) in the event of disagreement between the United Council and MOE there could be difficulty in making progress. A looser arrangement would allow differences to be smoothed over more easily. In the absence of formal responsibilities, both parties would feel less constrained. In the event of a problem neither party would be inextricably bound to a formal committee.

MOE staff proposed a revised committee structure comprising: up to three members of the Waikato United Council; District Manager, NZE, Hamilton; District Commissioner of Works, Hamilton; Chief Engineer (Development) NZE, Wellington; SCM representative; and Chief Development Engineer (Power), MWD. The function of the committee was to advise MOE (in particular NZE) on "local and regional matters" and to ensure that other local bodies and affected parties were to be informed of the progress of investigations.

The District Commissioner of Works in Hamilton was asked by NZE officials formally to approach members of the Hamilton Regional Planning Authority to participate on the regional committee. At this point, the HRPAA was superseded by the new Waikato United Council (WUC). The proposed brief was discussed at the inaugural meeting of the United Council on 21 November 1980. The Council agreed with the proposal but suggested a maximum of five members.

They nominated four members and also suggested that a representative from Waikato Valley Authority should be nominated. Advice of this resolution was forwarded to the Commissioner of Works on 24 November (Ministry of Energy, 1980c). These suggestions were accepted by NZE officials.

The first meeting of the Waikato Coal Station Regional Committee was held on 2 February 1981. The Chairman of the United Council (Harold Sherwin) was elected Chairman of the Coal Station Committee. NZE staff provided the secretariat. They set the agenda for meetings and wrote the minutes.

Commenting on the arrangement of the committee, the District Commissioner of Works, who was involved in the early discussions between MWD and NZE officials, stated

I think there was certainly some concern as to how the committee would operate....There was concern that some people in Wellington saw it as a public relations exercise whereas locally at least we saw it as a need to really bring in some local views and have these influence the decision (Butcher, pers. comm., 1987).

An NZE (Wellington) official involved in the NZE power station project team saw it this way.

We saw it as our project, our money and our responsibility so we should be doing it. To a certain extent it was Works versus Electricity and that is an issue that is changing very rapidly but it has been with us for a long, long time....We also argued that it was inappropriate for the whole thing to be delegated to the United Council because it was our project and not theirs (McGlinchy, pers. comm., 1987).

Despite the debate over 'control' of the committee, a NZE (Hamilton) official viewed the establishment of the regional committee as being an example of "open planning".

We were trying to keep the whole thing open, the planning open so that people couldn't turn around and say 'Oh they have gone ahead and made a decision without telling anyone' (Chapman, pers. comm., 1987).

The 'open planning' referred only to the inclusion of local government representatives. The same official commented on the reluctance of NZE officials to include groups such as Federated Farmers on the Coal Station Committee as it might encourage demands for representation from other groups.

We at least wanted the people who were in the top level positions to know what was going on... That is later why we expanded it to include the ARA and Federated Farmers....But we were frightened, I think, that if we brought Federated Farmers in, we might have all sorts of groups wanting to be in it (Chapman, pers. comm., 1987).

#### A NEW COMMITTEE - THE WAIKATO COAL STATION REGIONAL COMMITTEE

Early meetings of the Coal Station Committee were attended by members of the Waikato United Council; a representative of the Waikato Valley Authority; District Commissioner of Works; Chief Development Engineer, MWD, Wellington; District Manager, Huntly Mines Division, SCM; and Chief Engineer, Power Development Division, NZE, Wellington. Later, some of the Wellington participants were represented by other staff. Officers of some of these authorities also attended.

Agendas were dominated by reports of work in progress by study groups and concerns about coal supplies and transport. An early

question from the WUC Regional Planner sought clarification of when consultation with regional bodies referred to in the 1980 Energy Plan would take place (discussed in Chapter Three). At the following meeting NZE officials stated that the consultation referred to in the Energy Plan could be addressed in two ways. First, consultation was taking place within the Coal Station Committee. Secondly, it could also take place between an energy planning committee of a regional or united council, and the Ministry of Energy (Coal Station Committee minutes, 5 August 1981). As stated in Chapter Three, the Energy Advisory Committee was established to call for submissions each year on the energy plans.

An issue which arose several times during the first two years of meetings was the clarification of the responsibilities of United Council committee members. The matter arose at the first meeting of the committee in February 1981. The issue for the United Council members was the relationship of the Coal Station Committee to the United Council and to their local authorities. The Coal Station Committee was not a special committee of the United Council and therefore apparently there was no formal obligation to report to the United Council. United Council members and their staff representative wanted information presented to the Coal Station Committee to go to the United Council before it became public. In turn, NZE officials wanted feedback from committee members on local reaction to site investigations.

The matter arose again later in the meeting, on that occasion in relation to the presentation of study group reports. In reply to a question from a United Council member, an NZE official replied that, when completed, the reports would be public documents and as such made available to committee members. Some United Council members expressed views that they should make a contribution to the reports before they became public documents. NZE officials stated that they agreed with this procedure. The matter came up

for clarification at the next meeting on 15 April when several study group reports were presented. One United Council member noted that the reports, because of their technical nature, were difficult to absorb. In response, Mr Wong, the senior NZE official, stated that he thought the committee's task was to

ensure that the scope of the reports was adequate;

ensure that all the organisations that need to be consulted have been consulted;

decide whether the recommendations in the reports made sense, or were they too early?

At the next meeting on 13 August 1981, a paper on the processing of reports was presented by NZE officials. The committee agreed that the purpose of the Coal Station Committee was to provide a "regional input" into the reports which would enable NZE proposals to be modified. Reports would be "received" by the committee as drafts. Until presented at the United Council meetings, draft reports were confidential.

This discussion reflected the uncertainty of the United Council members about the nature of their contribution as committee members. As local authority members they were used to dealing with reports presented by staff and then making recommendations or decisions. As members of the Coal Station Committee they could only make comments to or ask questions of NZE and other government officials. NZE officials moved quickly to 'clarify' the purpose of the committee for United Council members and to retain 'control' over the production and presentation of reports.

There also appeared to be some confusion on the part of United Council members about the nature of the involvement of the United Council itself. For example, the Chairman of the Coal Station Committee (who was also Chairman of the United Council) was reported as saying that once a site had been chosen, the regional

planning committee of the United Council would get involved. This understanding of "regional" involvement was far removed from the brief prepared by MWD staff in the early negotiations with NZE officials over the terms of reference for the committee. In any event, once a site had been chosen, the application for a Ministerial requirement would be dealt with by the local rather than regional authority.

A related source of confusion arose in the way that words such as "regional" and "local" were used interchangeably, particularly by NZE officials. The "regional and local matters" which NZE officials intended that the Councillors would address were not clearly defined, by either themselves or the Councillors. United Councillors on the Coal Station Committee were appointed by their local authorities as regional representatives. The brief of the Coal Station Committee indicated that NZE officials saw the Councillors as representing both the interests of the United Council as well as their local authorities. The consequences of this apparent confusion between their responsibilities as united councillors and as members of local authorities are discussed more fully in the next chapter.

Despite the experiences of siting the Huntly Power Station, representatives of groups such as the Tainui Māori Trust Board and Federated Farmers were not invited to attend meetings of the Coal Station Committee when it was first established in 1981. Membership was very much restricted to central and local government officials and councillors. At this time, these groups were making representations to join the regional planning committee or other committees of the WUC.

The minutes of the 13 August (1981) meeting of the Coal Station Committee state that an approach had been made by Federated Farmers for membership of the committee. Federated Farmers of New Zealand Inc is a national organisation comprising provincial districts with local branches and representing over 30,000

arable, meat and wool farmers in New Zealand. The organisation represents the interests of its members on issues of agricultural policy and economics. United Council members considered that they represented farming interests.

Mr Sherwin [Chairman] stated that the total rural electorate was very well represented on the committee by Mr Holmes [Chairman of Waikato County Council], Mr Chitty [Chairman of Raglan County Council] and himself [also Chairman of Waipa County Council]. It was decided after some discussion that it would not be appropriate to enlarge the committee at this stage. ...Mr Sherwin summed up by saying that the elected representatives on this committee could follow-up community concerns and talk to interested groups...

This issue was raised again when MOE officials proposed to expand the brief of the Committee to include coal mining developments.

By 1981, it was evident that coal-mining production in the Waikato was to undergo rapid expansion. The 1981 Energy Plan anticipated that, "The Waikato will see mining activity on a scale unprecedented in New Zealand's history" (Ministry of Energy, 1981, 60). The main Waikato mines included Huntly West and East, Weavers, Rotowaro and Maramarua (Figure Five). Weavers and Maramarua opencast mines and the Rotowaro underground mine were older coalfields. Weavers coal serviced the requirements of New Zealand Steel while coal from the Maramarua field was supplied to the Meremere Power Station by aerial ropeway. Rotowaro underground mine was to be replaced by Rotowaro opencast mine once the Rotowaro township had been dismantled. This coal was to be used in the Meremere and Huntly Power Stations. Huntly West No. 1 underground mine was being developed to supply the coal requirements of the Huntly Power Station. A second underground mine at Huntly West (No. 2) was also planned for this purpose. Underground and opencast mines were to be developed at Maramarua. A new opencast mine and later an underground mine was




Figure Five Major Coalfield Projects Proposed in the early 1980's.

proposed at Ohinewai. The plan anticipated that the coal requirements of New Zealand Steel would be supplied from the Maramarua field.

By the following year, the 1982 Energy Plan proposed, within ten years, the development of three new underground mines and an opencast mine in the Waikato. This was additional to full production from the existing Huntly mines, in order to meet coal requirements of New Zealand Steel and the Electricity Division. The plan acknowledged that delays in approvals or development could create embarrassment in ensuring coal supply to these customers in years of high demand. These ambitious intentions hinged on the feasibility of achieving production from the Ohinewai and Huntly West No. 2 mines (Ministry of Energy, 1982).

#### WIDENING THE BRIEF OF THE WAIKATO COAL STATION REGIONAL COMMITTEE

Given these intentions, in November 1982, the Minister of Energy requested that a second committee, additional to the Coal Station Committee, be formed to consider coal mining developments in the region. By this stage, the Minister of Energy was dealing with the politically contentious proposal to develop a large-scale opencast coal mine at Ohinewai in his own electorate. This proposal required the purchase of 1150 hectares of farmland in addition to land already owned by the Crown. A total of 1800 hectares was required for dumping, mine excavation and surface facilities. In September 1982, SCM had applied for water rights from the Waikato Valley Authority to dewater a trial pit which would drain into Lake Waikare. Objections to the application were lodged by Waikato Watchdog and South Auckland Conservation Association, D. G. Powell and D. C. Hill, Federated Farmers, Environmental Defence Society, and the New Zealand Insurance Company Ltd and H. M. Horton and P. C. Levin. The objections dealt primarily with lack of information and detail in the application and the high productivity of land in the vicinity of

the proposed trial pit. Local farmers put up over one hundred thousand dollars to employ international experts to challenge the case presented by SCM staff (Dixon, pers. comm., 1987).

Despite earlier reservations by Mines Division (SCM) staff about the undesirability of regional participation, the proposed brief for this second committee stated that;

State Coal Mines therefore sees a need to maintain a good liaison with Waikato interests and local bodies to ensure that they are kept informed of planning, implementation for the mines that are proposed....Experience has shown that considerable benefits can be gained by all parties when formal links are set up between a government organisation with responsibility for a project and local representatives (NZE file, undated, 32/7/12).

The brief also indicated that SCM staff saw a clear distinction between 'technical' and 'regional' interests and did not anticipate that local body representatives would want access to information on the technical issues of mine development. Rather local body interests were seen to relate to the "protection of the physical environment, providing employment and economic development and social and infrastructure concerns" and would be primarily interested in "aspects of coal mine development that impinge upon the objectives of coal mine development". This statement appeared to be an attempt to both define and constrain the extent of involvement by the local body politicians.

An inaugural meeting of the Waikato Mining Liaison Committee was held on 3 November 1982. This meeting comprised representatives of local bodies, local SCM staff and Federated Farmers. NZE officials were not present. The public was excluded from the meeting; a point noted by the local newspaper (Waikato Times, 4 November 1982). At this meeting, it was decided unanimously that the proposed membership was very similar to that of the Coal Station Committee. A resolution was passed recommending that the

terms of reference for the Coal Station Committee be expanded to include coal mining developments and that representatives from Franklin County Council and New Zealand Federated Farmers be included on the proposed reformed power station - coal mining developments committee. Apart from the NZE officials, most of the people present at this meeting were members of the Coal Station Committee which had met a month before this meeting. By this stage, concerns of groups such as Federated Farmers about the environmental implications of the Ohinewai coalfield development were coming to be publicly expressed. The WVA hearing of the SCM application for water rights also assisted to confirm fears held by local farmers and environmental groups that the collective technical knowledge held by SCM officials about the environmental consequences of such a large-scale mining operation was inadequate. Shortly after the WVA hearing, counsel for SCM withdrew its application on 14 December. This action relieved WVA of its obligation to make a decision on the application.

In a file note to Wellington NZE staff, the District Manager of NZE commented that he considered that the attitude of NZE needed to be clarified in relation to the terms of reference and the membership of the committee. He stated

...I see no objection to the committee dealing with coal supply on a regional basis...However, I think it is most important that the committee does not become too involved in environmental matters concerning individual mines, e.g. the proposed Ohinewai mine...

As far as the extended representation is concerned, I do not think we can object too strongly. It is unfortunate that the committee is getting rather large and perhaps unwieldy but I doubt if there is much we can do about it and I think it is still workable (NZE file note, 10 November 1982, 32/7/12).

The proposal for a reformed committee was discussed at the 9 February 1983 meeting of the Coal Station Committee. Mr Wong,

Chief Engineer (Power Development), NZE, was reported as saying that the Minister of Energy had discussed the role of the various committees with the Deputy Secretaries of Mines and Electricity and had agreed that the existing committee be expanded. The minutes note that;

Some discussion took place and it was noted by Messrs Page, Holmes and Sherwin that... the United Council representatives could adequately represent farming interests. Also the existing committee members represent basically regional interests as they were there as members of the Waikato United Council.

The United Councillors were still ambivalent about widening the basis of membership of the committee to include farming interests despite being present at the Mining Liaison Committee meeting which had proposed that representatives of Federated Farmers be included. The United Councillors considered that they represented regional interests and this included those of the farming community.

There is little doubt that the Minister of Energy wished to defuse opposition by Federated Farmers to the Ohinewai proposal by inviting their participation on the Coal Station Committee. It also relieved MOE staff of any obligation to consult separately with Federated Farmers as an organisation. In commenting on his appointment to the regional advisory committee, the Federated Farmers representative said;

My role in the third Waikato power station came about through the appointment to the Regional Energy Committee by the then Minister of Energy, the Honourable Bill Birch.... There had not been a Federation representative appointed to what was largely, a Government quasi local body committee before. I think that there was some concern that the Federation may be one of the more radical groups that were questioning and particularly in my

own role where I think a lot of people saw me as a troublemaker and a stirrer (Lumsden, pers. comm., 1987).

The appointment of a representative from Federated Farmers onto the regional advisory committee did not prevent the organisation from later requesting that the Minister of Energy hold a Commission of Inquiry to ensure full public participation in the planning of the Ohinewai coalfield development. At that stage there was considerable public concern that there would be no opportunity for public objections given that the Coal Mines Act did not make provision for any public participation in respect of State Coal Mines. The Minister of Energy accepted that that was one of a number of ways of ensuring public participation but that the Commission of Inquiry was "inappropriate" at this stage (WEPPIC minutes, 3 July 1984). Two months later, WEPPIC members were advised by MWD officials of the existence of a draft report prepared by a consultant for the Commission for the Environment which recommended a public inquiry into the Waikato energy developments. The meeting resolved that no response could be made until the report had "formally surfaced" (WEPPIC minutes, 4 September 1984).

In keeping with its expanded terms of reference, the name of the Coal Station Committee was changed to the Waikato Energy Development Regional Committee (WEDRC) at the 9 February 1983 meeting.

#### A REVAMPED COMMITTEE - THE WAIKATO ENERGY DEVELOPMENT REGIONAL COMMITTEE

The revised brief, prepared jointly by Electricity and Mines Division staff (NZE file, 11 April 1983, 32/7/12), for the reformed committee, the Waikato Energy Development Committee (WEDRC) was adopted at its 18 May 1983 meeting. The committee was to consider "predominantly regional issues such as protection of

the physical environment, providing employment and economic development, social and infrastructure concerns". The brief was amended to read "It is anticipated that local body representatives will primarily be interested in aspects of development that impinge upon District and Regional Schemes and issues". In response it was noted by Mr Burton, MWD District Planner, that "the committee was unlikely to focus on district schemes in any detail".

The committee's main purpose was clarified as advising MOE on local and regional matters from information presented to meetings by MOE staff. The 'ideal' procedure for dealing with the dynamics of officially generated technical papers through meetings of WEDRC and the WUC was clarified in the following way. The committee would receive information by way of written reports from Electricity (NZE) and Mines (SCM) Divisions. When finalised, the reports would be received by the regional committee and forwarded to the WUC for their formal adoption. At this stage the reports would be considered public documents.

The committee would not have any formal decision-making role and its actions would not be binding on any party. United Council members would have a significant role in ensuring that the council, and through it the other local counties and groups, would be informed about the progress of the investigations and project implementation (WEDRC minutes, 18 May 1983).

This 'ideal' procedure was intended to inform WUC members before information about the projects became public. In practice, it had been necessary for NZE officials to bypass this procedure and publicly release summary reports prior to public meetings, given delays between meetings of the Coal Station Committee and the United Council. In this event, committee members would receive final reports before their public release (WEDRC minutes, 18 May 1983).

So it became a fairly long and drawn out process. And of course, there were occasions when we couldn't wait so we virtually bypassed the system. If the report had to go out, it went out and we sent copies to all the members of the committee and then it was subsequently tabled or noted by the Council...so they were never controlling the situation, we were controlling it. But whenever possible we let the papers go out through them so that it quite clearly was seen as a joint regional effort (McGlinchy, pers. comm., 1987).

The Federated Farmers representative, Malcolm Lumsden, expressed frustration at the need for confidentiality and delays before information became public.

The real problem with that committee was that the minutes couldn't be made public until they had been to the United Council and, quite frankly, it was abhorrent. We were never sure when the United Council meeting was. We could have disseminated that information far more widely but felt restricted on those grounds. So really the information was only disseminated to a reasonably close trusted group who were affected (Lumsden, pers. comm., 1987).

The Co-ordinator of Watchdog Waikato expressed his concerns about the danger of co-option of an outside group onto WEDRC.

At one stage, we thought it might be a good idea to have local environmental, cultural, scientific issue groups represented on the Regional Energy Development Committee and making some input to those. But it became clear when Federated Farmers had a representative on that committee largely because of the Ohinewai development and also partly because of the power station...that there was a very great danger in going onto committees of that sort where representatives could be given information and then virtually sworn to secrecy over it so it defeated the purpose (Dixon, pers. comm., 1987).

This raises the question of how United Councillors viewed their responsibilities as WEDRC members to communicate information about the power station investigations with local people. Lewthwaite argues that the politicians saw themselves with a mandate to represent, rather than to consult on a regular basis.

I got the impression that many of the local body politicians involved saw themselves with a very considerable sense of responsibility, I think. They had a mandate to act on behalf of the community. They were not necessarily responsible during that mandate to regularly convey and consult other than on a one to one basis that they normally do on a day to day operation (Lewthwaite, pers. comm., 1987).

Local authority members confirmed that they saw themselves as representing the views of their electorates which included the specific interests of groups such as Federated Farmers, Māori communities and others.

... I felt that the set up of the committee in the early stages, which was a much smaller committee than it turned out to be in the end, was an ideal situation in which you had the representation from the local authorities concerned who were the elected representatives of the people....But ... I think there were far too many things lost in the enlargement of that committee. So apart from representation of local authorities and Federated Farmers and the Māori people I would certainly not advocate representation beyond that (Page, pers. comm., 1987).

I agonise over the fact that when I started out in the business of local government I am elected to represent people ...but then when I get in here I seem to be seen as part of the establishment ... and so a pressure group then feels that they are the only ones that can represent the people. I see it with Federated Farmers, environmental groups, Māori interest groups and I worry that the people in local government are not seen as being able to widely represent the interests of all the people that serve them (Holmes, pers. comm., 1987).

The clarification of the terms of reference for the expanded regional committee confirmed the expectations of MOE staff that United Council members would provide a contribution on regional and local issues which arose from information presented at WEDRC meetings. This time, more emphasis appeared to be placed on 'regional' rather than 'local' issues. There was an attempt to incorporate district scheme matters as well as regional issues although this was modified by the MWD District Planner. The distinction between regional and district planning interests was not always appreciated by MOE officials but was clearly made by the United Council representatives. This distinction by the United Councillors meant that few 'local' matters were raised at WEDRC meetings which effectively undermined the main rationale for the existence of the committee. In setting up their own committee rather than consulting directly with the regional planning committee of the WUC, MOE staff were attempting to consult with both local and regional authority politicians.

The assumption on the part of NZE officials that local authority members would pass on information raises the question of what communities NZE officials hoped would be informed by WEDRC members. A member of Watchdog Waikato, a public interest group, reported difficulties in obtaining copies of WEDRC minutes.

We also had something of a battle to even have access to minutes of those [WEDRC] meetings but when it was pointed out what function the Energy Development Committee was supposed to have the minutes came... It was represented to us by the Electricity Division who said that it wasn't really appropriate for us to have the minutes...When it was put in as an official information request there were no grounds on which it could be denied to us. Particularly, as the members of the Committee should have been able to freely aid the flow of information to the public anyway (Dixon, pers. comm., 1987).

Environmentalists were challenging the assumptions of the 'Think-Big' programme (Coalition for Open Government, 1983). In relation to the proposed power station, groups such as Watchdog Waikato were promoting ideas of energy conservation and co-generation as means of reducing electricity production requirements. Despite the official reluctance of NZE staff to produce copies of the minutes, the NZE project leader did meet the Co-ordinator of Watchdog informally to discuss his concerns. Nevertheless, there was little direct contact with this group although they acknowledged that they were not major participants (Dixon, pers. comm., 1987).

It was evident that NZE officials considered that the main groups to be consulted were the local authority politicians and landowners in the final sites under investigation. This was confirmed by a Commission for the Environment (CFE) official who commented on the 'structured' approach of NZE officials in consulting with local government politicians and community groups.

NZE set itself certain ways of operating. It tended to operate at the officials level and that included at the local authority level.

Now their perception was that the County Councils and the Borough Councils and so on had the responsibility to take the next step...that the Electricity Division would actually talk to individuals who made approaches to them or they considered they needed to make approaches for the point of information or whatever. But it wasn't really their role to encourage or foster any sort of links beyond the official links...I'm not implying that anybody was deliberately excluded from the consultative network. I think the exclusion was really based on structural principles and the principles by which they operated so people were excluded.

I think there's an operational world view you can presume, or that I've presumed with Energy officials and it seems to me that they genuinely talk in terms of these blocks and they set themselves up in that way.

...So your environmental groups, for instance, were covered by Watchdog Waikato, your landowning groups were covered by Federated Farmers and you don't really need to go any further unless you are talking about individually affected landowners...I think there's not much doubt that if you have a disciplinary base and a perception which has efficiency and had time lines and has critical paths etc., then you are going to tend to amalgamate your relevant groups into boxes that you can say "Right, done that" and move on to the next pathway (Hill, pers. comm., 1987).

A frequent comment made during interviews was the extensive amount of technical information which politicians and other representatives were required to assimilate before the quarterly meetings of WEDRC. Sometimes this material would arrive just before the meetings took place.

The first thing coming onto the committee, one was faced with the mountain of material that was presented to you... very suddenly, having no professional training or even training in secretarial work or anything like that, you understand, being a raw recruit from the back paddock (Lumsden, pers. comm., 1987).

One of the real... difficulties... was the volumes of information that were coming through....Perhaps if the information was conveyed in such a way that it was more readable to the layman, shorter, more concise, it would have helped in the flow of information from one level to another (Sampson, pers. comm., 1987).

There were suggestions that NZE staff employed deliberate tactics in giving committee members volumes of information to review quickly before meetings. MOE staff had made it clear in setting the terms of reference for the Coal Station Committee in 1980 that: the only members of the committee who would have the expertise to evaluate technical aspects of the proposals were MOE staff; and there would be an undue burden placed on MOE staff to explain every step of their work to enable the committee to make

a decision (Ministry of Energy, 1980b). The Federated Farmers representative, Malcolm Lumsden, could call on even less administrative and technical support than the United Council members.

Many of them quite openly didn't understand it and there were vast volumes of it. I think that tended to contribute to a sense of cynicism in some quarters about the volume of information. Occasionally I heard comments that I don't think were serious but implied that attitude, questioning whether there was a tactic behind the volume. I think that was, perhaps, an expression of frustration as much as anything (Lewthwaite, pers. comm., 1987).

By not providing succinct summaries of the 'technical' reports, NZE staff effectively restricted the ability of United Council members to comment more than superficially on 'technical' issues raised at Coal Station and WEDRC meetings. This was compounded by the refusal of United Council members to use local authority staff to assist them (discussed in Chapter Six). While the purpose of the regional committee was to enable regional participation without prejudicing the statutory functions of local government, in effect the statutory responsibilities of participants' organisations might well be construed as precluding the extent or intensity of debate on the committee. The 'technical' responsibilities of MOE officials were seen as falling within their domain as engineers in charge of the several projects while United Council members were expected to comment on 'local' and 'regional' issues such as siting of physical infrastructure and social concerns. .

PUTTING THE 'SOCIAL' INTO PLANNING - THE SOCIAL AND PLANNING  
EFFECTS STUDY GROUP

Technical matters were addressed in several working groups established by NZE officials early in 1981. NZE officials recognised the need to examine social issues and that they did not have the expertise to identify what form of social research should be undertaken. They were also keen to use their investment in the Huntly Monitoring Project and approached Tom Fookes, the HMP Co-ordinator, and others, for advice.

... we asked him [Tom Fookes] and Dave Burton [District Planner, MWD, Hamilton] and Bob Eyeington [Regional Planner, HRP/WUC] 'how do we get to grips with the people issues, the social issues of this power station?' Neither Dave Willis nor myself were particularly experienced in this, being engineers. Those three then formulated what is...now the Social and Planning Effects Study Group (McGlinchy, pers. comm., 1987).

The terms of reference for the working groups had been finalised the previous year. Their purpose was defined as follows;

Working groups are a method of gathering information or deriving new information where necessary. Working groups are a means of bringing together people with a wide diversity of expertise and disciplines from various geographic locations. They ensure that regular contact is made between all parties and assist in a regular flow of information (NZE file note, 7 August 1980, 32/7/12).

Working groups would normally have a Ministry of Energy staff member as convenor. Draft reports would be submitted to the Coal Station Committee (later WEDRC) and convenors would be required to discuss progress and work content with the regional committee.

Original members of the Social and Planning Effects Group comprised the District Planner (MWD, Hamilton), NZE and SCM officials, HMP staff, WUC planner and consultants to MOE. Initial tasks were to supervise research contracts and to provide feedback to NZE and consultants. The group was convened by the District Planner, MWD, Hamilton.

...it's role was to act as an advisory body to its client and its client was the Ministry of Energy who advised the Minister of Energy on those matters (Burton, pers. comm., 1987).

A letter from the District Planner (MWD, Hamilton) sought clarification of the functions and responsibilities of the study group in June (Ministry of Works and Development, 1981b). The study group had recommended that NZE employ consultants to assist with the investigations necessary to ascertain the planning and social implications of locality and site alternatives. NZE employed consultants. The task of the study group was to guide their work while the consultants' "client" was NZE. On completion of the report, the study group would forward the consultants' report to NZE with their recommendations.

As the first social and planning effects report was nearing completion the District Planner (MWD, Hamilton) sought further clarification of the continuing purpose of the study group. He suggested a number of tasks in which the study group could assist NZE. These included: considering work which would need to be carried out in the next phase of site investigations; advising NZE on approaches towards site selection; commenting on public participation programmes; and considering methods and timing of provision of financial and other assistance to local government (Ministry of Works and Development, 1981c).

Membership of the group was confirmed by NZE in November 1982 as comprising: the District Planner, MWD; Regional Planner, Waikato

United Council, and representatives of SCM and NZE (NZE File, 32/7/12/2). Professor J. Ritchie replaced Mr Fookes as the Huntly Monitoring Project representative in his capacity as a university social scientist and former member of the HMP Steering Committee. Professor Ritchie also acted in an informal capacity as consultant to the Tainui Māori Trust Board. By June 1983, membership widened to include the County Planner, Waikato County Council. Consultants working on NZE research contracts also attended study group meetings. The following year in August 1984, Mr N. B. Lewthwaite, consultant planner, joined the group representing Ngaruawahia and Huntly Borough Councils and Raglan County Council. Previously he had attended some study group meetings in his capacity as consultant to NZE. The minutes of the 14 August 1984 meeting of the study group note that the question was raised whether the CFE should have been represented on the group. The consensus of the meeting was that if the CFE wanted to become a member, "it should ask". Two MOE officers were to "sound out" CFE staff on this issue. Later, the CFE were formally invited to send a representative. By early the following year (1985), a CFE representative had joined the group (Social and Planning Effects Study Group minutes, 14 February 1985).

Although the purpose of the study group was essentially an advisory one to NZE, the minutes note specific contributions were made concerning issues such as: approaches to public participation; encouraging contact with the Māori community (particularly in relation to coal mining developments); and supporting, in principle, the Tainui Māori Trust Board monitoring proposal put forward by Professor Ritchie to the Secretary of Energy in 1985 (discussed later in Chapter Seven).

Several members of the study group commented that meetings provided useful information about planning for the energy projects which they did not otherwise have access to (Dawson, pers. comm., 1986; Burton; Sampson; pers. comms., 1987).

...another useful function it had was that a lot of information was put through those committees that allowed the technical officers of the local authorities, in particular, to be party to things that they were having difficulty to get any other way...But at one stage there were so many different things happening it was impossible to keep up, even being on the inside. The technical group meeting every two or three months was a great opportunity to get a back of an envelope up date... (Burton, pers. comm., 1987).

I've always found it quite difficult and had to find ways of finding out what's going on but really I haven't had any involvement with the Regional Energy Committee...I've used the study group as my alternative to finding out what's going on...(Dawson, pers. comm., 1986).

As mentioned earlier, and to be developed in Chapter Six, local body politicians sitting on WEDRC were reluctant to pass on information to staff in their local authorities. They saw themselves as representing "regional interests". There was also a reluctance to use staff to assist in analysing technical reports as staff time incurred on energy development work was not reimbursed by MOE officials.

Members of the study group served as technical advisors to MOE officials. They were not directed by their employers to represent any particular views but acted in a professional capacity.

The members sat on it as technicians rather than employees or representatives of specific organisations. It is a bit of an awkward distinction at times (Burton, pers. comm., 1987).

The Waikato County Council planner acknowledged the influence of MWD staff in organising meetings and that the group provided a 'regional voice' on the implications of the energy developments.

In effect, MWD staff were acting as regional planners in the apparent absence of any substantive contribution by WUC.

But the Ministry of Energy has always seen the study group there as an advisor, as a regional group of professional advisors to Ministry of Energy and, I think, Ministry of Works who runs the meetings, sees it that way. So a regional voice is being put through to Ministry of Energy as to how they should (and maybe shouldn't) be doing whatever process they're involved in ...

The MWD has been extremely influential in that study group because (a) they set the agendas and (b) act as chairman and secretary. But I haven't any complaints about how they do that. They have provided a regional voice in the way that the United Council hasn't (Dawson, pers. comm., 1986).

The participants appeared to offer two main criticisms of the study group's operation. First, that the group was not used effectively by MOE, particularly in later years.

We did pretty useful work in the early days, I think, particularly drawing up of briefs, consideration of consultants to do work, overseeing that work, reporting it....I don't think subsequently, though, there was sufficient use made of it really. It also became a bit awkward, I mean none of us was employed or paid to be on it and the amount of time that people were able to give to that became a problem (Burton, pers. comm., 1987).

My impression was that NZE people didn't always accept the opinions of that group but nevertheless took them seriously. I think, quite frequently, their views on matters were influenced to a significant degree by what transpired (Lewthwaite, pers. comm., 1987).

A second and related criticism (made by three social scientists) was that there needed to be more emphasis placed on social issues. In part this related to the control of the group by MOE officials and that the study group had no direct accountability.

Secondly, this criticism also related to the nature of the research being carried out. Another MWD (Wellington) official commented that social issues were dominated by physical infrastructure concerns such as identifying the numbers of houses that would be needed to accommodate workers. No attention was given to addressing needs for community facilities or providing for residents' contributions to the design of housing subdivisions. Social issues were not being handled on a day-to-day basis (Margy-Jean Malcolm, pers. comm., 1987).

Energy didn't inform it or ask its opinion often enough for it to meet often enough. It was a good working group, it was small, it was of professionals largely who knew their job and wanted to see a social plan coming through but the group was foiled by the fact that Energy didn't use it, except when it was convenient to them (Ritchie, pers. comm., 1987).

Sort of a late motive of the meetings that social issues were really there to be discussed but it had no mandate...I mean it's an excellent idea but it should have been set up with some financial responsibility somewhere along the line to actually control the social impact studies and so on, and would have been more fruitful if it had been made accountable in some sense (Hill, pers. comm., 1987).

These views also revealed implicitly the nature of the institutional arrangements in place to implement the energy developments. Management of the several projects was handled by engineers who had specific instructions to implement the proposals outlined in government's energy plans. Although they recognised, as professionals, the need to incorporate social issues in their planning, MOE officials were poorly equipped to handle this task. Despite previous ministerial statements that energy planning would be "co-ordinated" and address social considerations, the social consequences of the energy developments would have to be addressed by other agencies such as the CFE, MWD and local and regional authorities. The 'push' to consider social issues

in a different way came with the later appointment of government social scientists to the study group and to the Waikato Energy Planning and Infrastructure Co-ordinating Committee (WEPICC), as membership of the group broadened beyond MOE and MWD officials.

TO REGAIN CONTROL - THE ESTABLISHMENT OF THE WAIKATO ENERGY PLANNING AND INFRASTRUCTURE CO-ORDINATING COMMITTEE

By early 1983 the impetus of planning for the energy developments was beginning to build up. This can be seen readily in the expansion of material presented at WEDRC meetings. Pressure was coming on local body politicians to act.

The profile of the Waikato projects was significantly higher in 1983-1984 than it was in the early 1980's...there was a growing recognition that the scale of developments in the Waikato was enormous and that very easily one was going to trip into a boom/bust, or an over demand situation for basic housing and services....A lot of pressure on the local politicians to seriously begin to plan and that was coming from a lot of quarters (Hill, pers. comm., 1987).

In September 1983 a Community Overview prepared by consultants for NZE and SCM Divisions of MOE was published (Murray-North Partners, 1983b). It provided an assessment of the likely implications of the proposed power station and coal mining developments for the Lower Waikato region. The report made 29 recommendations relating to the need for: local authorities to commence immediate planning for expansion of housing; boundary adjustments; community monitoring; and community development workers based in Huntly. The report concluded that;

The lead time for development of housing to meet the project requirements is very tight. If specific local planning is not undertaken before final site choice decision or Cabinet commitment to the

projects, significant difficulties are likely to arise, either for project implementation, for local communities, or both. To avoid this and to establish monitoring on a sound basis, financial support to enable local planning, and the local implementation actions recommended above will be necessary and may be required before project commitments have been made. The need is immediate in Huntly Borough, and will soon occur in Waikato County. It should be concentrated on planning for housing development, and setting up community development and monitoring programmes. Assistance to Ngaruawahia Borough and Raglan County may also be required depending on options that are adopted (Murray-North Partners, 1983b, 6).

The publication of this report highlighted the need for urgent action to be taken by local authorities if the timetable for the implementation of government projects was to be met. The efforts of central government officials to consult with local body politicians through WEDRC and planning staff in the study group had not resulted in any practical administrative actions being taken by local authorities. Criticisms were made that NZE and SCM officials "weren't getting their act together" (Willis, pers. comm., 1987). Given the urgent need to co-ordinate the administrative actions of local authorities, central government officials formulated ways and means of retaining control. They moved quickly to set up a new administrative instrument.

Accordingly, a Wellington-based committee of officials from MOE and MWD was established in November 1983 to review infrastructure planning for the Waikato energy developments. Known initially as the Waikato Energy Developments Infrastructure Co-ordinating Committee, a few months later the committee came to be known as the Waikato Energy Planning and Infrastructure Co-ordinating Committee (WEPICC). The change of name to include 'planning' reflected officials' intentions of retaining control over the administrative and planning processes occurring in the Waikato region. The process whereby this control and co-ordination was

brought about was effective in a practical sense but left people affected by it conscious of being manipulated.

Initial membership comprised officers from the Electricity and Mines Division of the Ministry of Energy and MWD, Wellington. It was chaired by the Assistant Secretary (Development and Supply), Ministry of Energy.

WEPICC started because of a perceived lack of co-ordination between ourselves, Electricity and Mines. I think a little bit of it was the fact that Mines particularly, by that stage, had themselves mobilised on their own coal mining projects ... they had got themselves into deep trouble at Ohinewai that they didn't have the time and effort to take into account some of the broader issues. They were slipping and we had, perhaps, a better track record than the Mines people (McGlinchy, pers. comm., 1987).

The sowing of seeds, I think, had a variety of sources. I wrote a lot of letters at various times asking a whole lot of questions and then I would send them off to about as many people as I could think of and all the organisations that were involved and see if they took root somewhere (Burton, pers. comm., 1987).

The committee had two objectives

- to ensure an integrated approach by central and local government to the development of the proposed energy and other public works projects in the Waikato region;
- to review the recommendations made in the infrastructure and social impact study (Community Overview) by Murray-North and Partners. This review should identify priorities and means for implementing the recommendations (Ministry of Energy, 29 November 1983b).

Shortly after the committee was established, the District Planner from MWD, Hamilton, joined WEPICC. He attended meetings of WEPICC in Wellington on a regular basis. Later as the range of topics widened, for example, to include housing and community monitoring, more officers from MOE and MWD attended meetings and officers from other departments, such as Housing Corporation and CFE, joined the committee. When the issue of addressing Māori perspectives arose after the Waahi hui in May 1985 special meetings were held with officers from Departments of Labour, Education and Māori Affairs as well as regular members. The Waahi hui was organised by the Tainui Māori Trust Board to discuss the recommendations arising from the Māori Perspectives Report published by the Centre for Māori Studies and Research in 1984. The hui and subsequent issues are discussed in more detail in Chapter Seven.

In reference to the expansion of membership, a CFE official commented,

I don't think it just reflects the fact that the data base was getting more consolidated so there was more information available ... I think it was because people were asking different sorts of questions....So there was a lot more challenging going on generally and you've got to tie that back to the national economy at the time ... and really the Waikato developments did look as though they were going to help (Hill, pers. comm., 1987).

The same person reported difficulty in gaining permission to attend WEPICC meetings.

As an aside, I only gained access to that committee about the middle of last year at its last meeting before it was disestablished (Hill, pers. comm., 1987).

A MWD official commented that the Chairman of WEPICC and a senior official of CFE had a "fairly direct sorting out of who stood where one day and whilst their feathers were a bit ruffled, I think they knew where they stood" (Burton, pers. comm., 1987).

In July 1984, there was a discussion of the purpose of the committee. By this stage, changes had been made to the timetable for implementation of the projects which alleviated some of the urgency for officials. The minutes (3 July 1984) note that the committee should

- (a) confine itself to policy and strategy;
- (b) maintain a watching brief to ensure a comprehensive 'total' approach and that important aspects were not forgotten;
- (c) provide regular progress briefings to the Minister;
- (d) identify political issues and ensure they are properly managed.

It was also noted that the committee should not get involved in detailed technical aspects. In the minutes the Chairman noted that he was concerned that

...the committee had lost the lead and was spending too much time sorting out the consequent local political 'bushfires' in order to establish some positive forward progress. The committee badly needed an overall programme to co-ordinate by and some form of 'intelligent' secretariat was necessary. At that meeting it was agreed to set up a system of co-ordination and recommend a form of secretariat to service the committee (WEPICC minutes, 3 July 1984).

This form of secretariat included the adoption of a computer systems programme so that the progress and completion of

officials' tasks in respect of the Waikato projects could be monitored.

Changes in government policy also accounted for changes in the brief and membership of WEPICC. Following the change of government in 1984, major reforms of the public service were initiated. One of the first tasks of the Fourth Labour Government was to review the institutional arrangements for environmental administration. Their pre-election policy included a commitment to take environmental considerations into account at the earliest possible opportunity in the planning of development proposals and to rationalise existing planning processes (Minister for the Environment, 1984, 10).

The Government moved quickly to develop its policies into practical proposals and consulted with developers, environmentalists, planners, local bodies and other interest groups (Dixon, Ericksen and Gunn, 1989). A summit meeting was held at Parliament Buildings in March 1985 and was followed by the publication of a post-forum working document (Minister for the Environment, 1985). After modifying some initial suggestions, the final proposals were announced in September 1985. These included

a new Ministry for the Environment (MFE) to replace the advisory functions only of the Commission for the Environment (CFE);

a Parliamentary Commissioner for the Environment responsible to the House of Representatives to carry out the auditing functions of the CFE as well as to report to Government on environmental policies;

a Department of Conservation to manage national parks and reserves, wildlife areas, historic places, marine reserves, and indigenous state forests;

Land and Forestry Corporations replacing the commercial activities of the Department of Lands and Survey and New Zealand Forest Service;

a Ministry of Forestry and Department of Survey and Land Information from the residual New Zealand Forest Service and Department of Lands and Survey (New Zealand Herald, September 17 1985).

Initially, administration of the Town and Country Planning Act, Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act and Water and Soil Conservation Acts remained under the umbrella of the Ministry of Works and Development (MWD). Following the abolition of the MWD in April 1987, these functions were transferred to the MFE.

These reforms meant that old alliances and rivalries between officials in government departments such as MWD, MOE and CFE began to change. A Cabinet directive emanating from the Cabinet Social Equity Committee, following the Waahi hui, instructed officials in MWD and CFE to be jointly responsible for social planning in respect of the Waikato projects (Hill, pers. comm., 1989; McEnteer, pers. comm., 1989).

Members of the Wellington officials committee, WEPICC, had close links with the regional advisory committee, WEDRC. Several central government officials attended the quarterly meetings of WEDRC in Hamilton. One of these officials, based in Hamilton, was also Convenor of the Social and Planning Effects Study Group. One participant commented that the study group was, in effect, a sub-committee of WEPICC as minutes of study group meetings were presented at WEPICC meetings (Hill, pers. comm., 1987). There is little doubt that these links were important in keeping key officials in MOE and MWD in Wellington and Hamilton up to date with the rapidly changing requirements of the Waikato energy projects. There were, however, no formal organisational links between WEPICC and WEDRC. These connections also enabled central government officials to keep control of events occurring in the region. Local body politicians and staff were peripheral to these arrangements.

There are different perspectives on the importance of WEPICC. Local body politicians in the Waikato were aware of the existence of WEPICC but knew little about its operations. One commented that he saw it as part of a frustrating process of bureaucracy in that a decision has to go through all sorts of channels (Page, pers. comm., 1987). One local body planner commented that

WEPICC, I didn't see much at all. I knew what it was there for and it was said a number of times it was to pick up things that had fallen through the cracks ...I know it was an in house, intergovernmental committee, that is how I saw it to a large degree (Sampson, pers. comm., 1987).

One member of WEPICC described the committee in this way.

It wasn't public, the press wasn't involved, local bodies weren't there. This was government's technical attempt to try to ensure that things didn't keep falling through the cracks. And it was also a body to whom things that were inappropriately referred to either divisions specifically or that a division couldn't handle could end up being orchestrated through and perhaps Murray-North's perspectives report is an example of that (Burton, pers. comm., 1987).

Officials in NZE and SCM saw it as having little regional influence.

It was really just a vehicle for passing information from the operating branches to the Secretary of Energy (Hartnett, pers. comm., 1987).

I think it had little regional influence. It worked in Wellington and the Chairman used to go to the Energy Development Committee (WEDRC) and explain the sort of co-ordination he was doing (McGlinchy, pers. comm., 1987).

Another government official (from CFE) saw the influence of WEPICC quite differently.

I guess that committee really was the most powerful of the committees. It seemed to me that that was the committee in which Energy (MOE) was testing the reaction of the regional community to its specifics of the proposals and confirming a lot of its views. And so one has to raise the question of whether in fact it did represent the regions given the role it was being predicated on that group by the Ministry of Energy... (Hill, pers. comm., 1987).

He also suggested that the Wellington officials on WEPICC exercised tight control over planning for the Waikato projects.

... I know that (again it's secondhand reported speech) in actual fact some Wellington officials on that committee were concerned to keep control of the whole process and to make sure that central government, in actual fact, kept the reins in terms of the direction that all the projects were going in. That it didn't, in actual fact, become any sort of devolved structure.

As the issues arising from the energy projects broadened in their complexity beyond the immediate tasks of NZE and SCM officials, WEPICC members assumed responsibility for several matters. These included formulating responses: to a request from WUC for government funding; to issues presented by the Tainui Māori Trust Board at the Waahi hui; to recommendations and requests for community monitoring of the energy projects; and to arrangements for the allocation of amenities grants. These matters are discussed in Chapters Six and Seven.

## REVIEW AND CRITIQUE

NZE staff had developed an approach towards consultation based on experiences of previous site investigations. Responsibilities lay with engineers who had previous experience of hydro-electric and geothermal power projects and power station planning. None had been directly involved in site investigations for the Huntly Power Station although they were aware of the problems which had been created through lack of consultation with local Māori and Pakeha communities. Despite the conflict over the choice of site for the Huntly Power Station and subsequent representation of groups such as the Tainui Māori Trust Board and Federated Farmers on the Huntly Planning Forum, the proposed arrangements for consultation were oriented towards local government representation. No suggestions or attempts were made in the early stages by NZE officials to seek representation of these or other groups. Membership of the initiating committees widened in response to specific issues or to changes in government policy.

A major issue for MWD (Town and Country Planning Division) staff was how to include regional political representation on the proposed regional liaison committee given that the WUC was shortly to be established. The reforms of the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 and Local Government Act 1974 had provided opportunities for newly created united councils to determine regional priorities for resource development. MWD staff, through their responsibilities for administration of the Town and Country Planning Act, had a new function to carry out. Section 6 (f) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 provided "for an officer of the Ministry of Works and Development appointed by the Minister to represent the Crown" on the regional planning committee of each united and regional council in New Zealand. A MWD circular memorandum 1978/30 stated that "the Crown's representative will need to be able as far as is possible to express the Government's views and responses to regional issues and policies" (quoted by Fischer, 1984, 6). In most cases the

district commissioner of works acted as the Crown representative. There was no formal clarification of this position by MWD officials until 1984 (Fischer, 1984). The effectiveness of this position depended very much on the personal contribution of each district commissioner. In the Waikato, the involvement of MWD staff, more particularly the District Commissioner of Works, could be seen as promoting a 'partnership' between central and local government in respect of the Waikato projects.

The debate over the proposed structure of the regional committee signified attempts by MWD staff to integrate 'energy planning' with planning responsibilities of the newly formed United Council. They were also seeking to place more emphasis on the inclusion of social and economic issues in regional planning. The attempts by MOE staff to keep 'planning' processes independent of MWD officials and the WUC demonstrated: the resistance of MOE officials to allow 'control' of projects they were responsible for to pass to MWD officials; a lack of willingness to integrate 'energy planning' with regional planning responsibilities of the new Waikato United Council under the Town and Country Planning Act; and that, while MOE officials were to incorporate environmental, economic and social considerations in 'energy planning', it was not in their interests as project developers to promote 'partnership' with local and regional government. They wished, however, to promote the 'appearance' of a partnership with local government.

The institutional arrangements set in place by NZE and MOE officials ensured that 'control' of the Waikato projects remained firmly in the hands of MOE officials (Figure Six). When it appeared that local authorities might not co-operate quickly enough in making provision for housing and other infrastructure, MOE officials set up yet another committee of government officials in Wellington. Despite their early disagreement with NZE officials over the arrangements for the regional advisory committee, MWD officials subsequently worked very closely with




Figure Six Organisational Arrangements for Waikato Projects.

NZE officials to select a site for the power station. This is evident by the several initiatives taken by the MWD District Planner in his capacities as Convenor of the Social and Planning Effects Study Group and as a MWD official. Consistent with previous attitudes of MWD officials towards the existence of the CFE (referred to in Chapters Three and Four), there appeared to be some resistance by MWD and MOE officials to the inclusion of CFE staff on the study group and WEPICC. CFE officials did not join these committees until 1985. Had there been considerable local resistance by the Waikato politicians and regional community, these centrally initiated processes and gradual expansion of membership of committees may not have been possible.

Information presented at WEDRC meetings was regarded as confidential until presented at meetings of WUC. Often there was quite a time lapse, sometimes up to two months, between meetings of the regional committee and the WUC. There were three apparent reasons for the confidentiality of information. First, there were matters of political significance and changes within organisational structures of public agencies discussed at the meetings. Secondly, central government officials did not want landowners finding out information relating to and with implications for their land through the press before they had been personally contacted (Burton, pers. comm., 1987). Perhaps most importantly, MOE staff wished to be seen to be consulting regional government members and to 'involve' the WUC, even if in a peripheral way. They were prepared to bypass the accepted procedure for processing reports, in order to meet their own requirements (McGlinchy, pers. comm., 1987). This procedure inhibited the dissemination of information to local authorities and landowner communities. Ironically, this action precluded the intention on the part of MOE officials that United Councillors on WEDRC would pass on information to communities. Thus the very purpose of the participation of regional politicians was undermined.

The 'control' of the projects extended to the separation of 'political' and 'technical' interests of Waikato politicians and local body staff. MOE officials wanted politicians, not executive staff, to sit on the regional committee. The United Councillors on the regional committee were leading political figures on their respective councils. Most were chairmen of county or district Councils. The purpose of their involvement (from the viewpoint of MOE officials) was that they would be fully informed of the reasons for selection of the final site, and in their capacity as local authority councillors, presumably to facilitate the granting of statutory consents. Planning staff and consultants of these local authorities and WUC attended meetings of the Social and Planning Effects Study Group which did not report to WEDRC.

The distinction between 'political' and 'technical' interests contributed to the inability of the WUC to formulate a coordinated regional response to the energy developments. These issues will be discussed in the following chapter.

## CHAPTER SIX : THE WAIKATO UNITED COUNCIL

The outcomes of the review of the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 and local government reform were that strengthened provisions for regional planning were put in place, and were to be administered by the new united and regional councils. These were discussed in Chapter Three, along with an explanation of government's attempts to plan the utilisation of energy resources. Chapter Four discussed arrangements for regional planning which existed prior to the establishment of the Waikato United Council. Chapter Five outlined the establishment of institutional arrangements by MOE staff and subsequent practice as they proceeded to implement government's proposals outlined in the Energy Plans. These were the regional advisory committee (WEDRC), the Social and Planning Effects study group and the Wellington-based committee of officials (WEPICC).

This chapter explores the responses of the Waikato United Council in dealing with the regional implications of the energy developments. As the need for co-ordinated planning of the Waikato projects appeared to become urgent in late 1983 and 1984, attention of central government officials, consultants, local authority planners and others came to focus on the inability of the WUC members and staff to produce relevant policies to facilitate the planning for the housing and infrastructure requirements of the energy projects. This inability was attributed by participants to several reasons such as poor funding, conflicting interests of the United Councillors and an absence of a commitment to regional planning. However, there was also an absence of clear instructions from the centre to the local authorities who were assumed by central government officials to be carrying out government's plans. Thus this chapter describes and analyses a series of events which occurred

between central government officials and local government politicians and staff as planning for the power station proceeded.

This chapter explores this apparent dilemma in three sections. The first section outlines events which led to the intervention by government officials to ensure that co-ordination of infrastructure took place by local authorities. The second examines the reasons suggested by case study participants for the lack of initiatives taken by the Waikato United Council. The third concludes the chapter with a review and critique.

#### FORMULATING A REGIONAL RESPONSE

As outlined in Chapter Four, the Waikato United Council was established with two responsibilities: civil defence and regional planning. The activities of the United Council were funded annually by contributions from the 14 constituent local authorities. The Council established the Regional Planning Committee to deal with matters relating to the Regional Planning Scheme.

Several of the local government politicians who had been members of the Hamilton Regional Planning Authority (HRPA) were appointed by their local authorities to the new Waikato United Council. Staff of the Hamilton City Council continued to act as the principal administrative officers for the new United Council, for example, the Chief Executive Officer was appointed as the Principal Officer of the Waikato United Council while the City Planner was appointed as the Regional Planner. The planning officer seconded to work for the WUC initially spent 20 percent of time on regional planning work while the balance was allocated to Hamilton City Council planning matters (Sampson, pers. comm., 1987). The planning consultants, Gabites, Alington and Edmondson (later known as Gabites, Porter and Partners) were appointed to

prepare Section One of the Regional Planning Scheme. This firm of consultants had prepared the Regional Planning Scheme for the HRPAs, as well as district schemes for Waikato and Waipa County Councils which became operative in the early 1980s.

Having the same planning advisors and political representatives from the HRPAs meant that 'experiences' of the previous attempts at 'co-ordinated' planning policies and the HRPAs scheme could be drawn on. The recommendations for urban growth around Hamilton City and adjoining areas arising out of the Hamilton Area Study Report 1972 were incorporated into the HRPAs Regional Planning Scheme. These were used by consultants to prepare policies for section one of the new Regional Planning Scheme. The small regional planning budget was spent mainly on consultants' fees to prepare Section One of the Regional Planning Scheme. Regional planning policies for the region were therefore developed within the context of a limited budget and a part-time staff.

The 1980 Energy Plan anticipated the prospect of two coal-fired power stations in the Waikato and an expansion programme for the Waikato coalfields to supply demands of two large consumers, New Zealand Steel and the Electricity Department. The following year, the WUC planning consultants, Gabites, Alington and Edmondson, prepared a set of energy guidelines for the WUC. These guidelines were prepared in response to the 1980 Energy Plan which was perceived by them to have far reaching implications for the environment and coal resource areas in the northern part of the region (Waikato United Council, 1981, 7). The guidelines recommended that specific energy-related policies should be included in the review of the Regional Planning Scheme and adopted on an interim basis as required to deal with current energy issues. These guidelines were intended to encourage the development of a regional viewpoint on energy matters. The guidelines were also an attempt to 'integrate' regional energy planning and regional planning as provided for in the Town and Country Planning Act 1977.

The consultants' report recommended the establishment of an energy advisory group both to develop regional energy planning policies and to assist with formulating regional responses to the annual Energy Plans, and the establishment of a separate regional energy planning committee. Specific options which were put forward for consideration included:

- setting up a regional energy planning committee in terms of Section 536A of the Local Government Act 1974, or Section 8(2) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1977;
- a non-statutory regional advisory group chaired by a United Council member;
- or a regional energy supply authority under Section 536 of the Local Government Act 1974 (Waikato United Council, 1981, 42-43).

On the basis of a feasibility study, the WUC rejected undertaking responsibilities for regional supply functions for gas distribution. This decision therefore excluded the option of setting up an energy supply authority. The WUC also rejected the proposal to set up a separate energy planning committee. There appeared to be two reasons for this decision. The WUC was only just getting underway and it was preferable to work through the Council's Regional Planning Committee rather than establish another new committee. A second reason was that the Waikato Coal Station Regional Committee had just been established (Sampson, pers. comm., 1989). This committee was established independently of the Waikato United Council. Thus the main source of information for the United Councillors and staff in respect of the power station and coal mining developments was from attendance at meetings of the Coal Station Committee (later known as WEDRC) and the Social and Planning Effects Study Group. As discussed in Chapter Five, these committees were established to achieve the objectives of MOE officials in implementing the intentions of government's Energy Plans.

There was no apparent urgency in 1981 and 1982 for WUC to place priority on energy developments in the northern part of its region. Selection of a site for the power station was expected to proceed over a period of two to three years with construction planned for the mid 1990s. SCM officials were not actively consulting WUC or local authorities over the implications of major coal mining expansion. They were reluctant initially to get involved in consultation with regional and local government politicians, although officials attended meetings of the Coal Station Committee. NZE and SCM officials worked quite independently of one other, despite both divisions being located within the Ministry of Energy. This fragmentation of responsibility meant the attention of WUC was not drawn immediately to the collective regional implications of the coal mining and power station proposals.

Despite this, plans for rapid expansion of coalfields in the north Waikato were evident in the annual Energy Plans for 1980, 1981 and 1982. The WUC did prepare responses to the Energy Plans which were forwarded to the Energy Advisory Committee (EAC). In response to the EAC request for submissions on the 1982 Energy Plan, the Regional Planning Committee recommended that the draft of Section One of the Regional Planning Scheme include an extended section on coal mining and embrace objectives and policies appropriate to planning for areas affected, particularly the Lower Waikato. The Committee also advised the WUC to continue collaborating with government departments, local authorities, the catchment authority, and other bodies to facilitate the consideration of the broader implications of all energy-related developments in the region (WUC Regional Planning Committee Minutes, 21 September 1982). The decision to extend the energy chapter in Section One of the Regional Scheme (as well as other policy matters such as tourism) meant that overall preparation of Section One was delayed. To have produced a separate set of energy policies would have meant even further delays in the preparation of Section One (Sampson, pers. comm., 1987). The WUC

publicly notified its intention to prepare Section One of the Regional Planning Scheme in April 1982. A proposed draft of objectives and policies was notified for public submissions in September 1984 and a proposed Section One was adopted by the WUC in 1986.

By late 1982 the implications of the energy development projects were becoming more obvious to members of the public. Groups such as the EAC, Federated Farmers, Trade Unions, environmentalists and others were beginning publicly to raise their concerns. There was growing criticism of the tight planning timetable for the proposed coalfield developments. The EAC in its review of the 1981 Energy Plan raised the question of whether or not an adequate supply of coal would be available to satisfy the unprecedented rapid build-up in coal demand (EAC, 1981, 41). The 1982 review pointed out that because of difficulties in developing mines such as Ohinewai and geological problems at Maramarua and Huntly, coal output could fall well behind schedule. To meet this possibility the EAC recommended that

- there should be greater attention to formal development of contingency plans to cope with uncertainties in supply and demand;
- the planned conversion of Marsden B power station to operate on Waikato coal be reconsidered in order to reduce coal demand;
- as a contingency measure, the planned Waikato thermal power station be limited in capacity to 500 MW;
- priority be given to ensure adequate staffing, financial and other resources in State Coal Mines to minimise delays in production build-up;
- studies be increased on land restoration after mining, and minimising the effects of mining on the water table, particularly in the Waikato where much of the land is poorly consolidated and/or peat (EAC, 1982, 24-26).

A seminar was organised by the South Auckland Conservation Association (SACA) in Hamilton in July 1982. Speakers from Federated Farmers and SACA were concerned over: loss of agricultural land; environmental impacts of coal mining; adequacy of compensation; and lack of public participation in decision-making.

By early 1983, frustration with lack of progress on preparation of energy policies was being shown by some United Councillors. Both the 1981 and 1982 Energy Plans contained proposals for coalfield expansion with major implications for the Waikato region. It was becoming clear to some local body politicians that action would need to be taken to identify the implications of these government proposals. Who should be responsible for such identification was another matter. The frustration on the part of the politicians arose with the very general nature of the energy policies proposed by the consultants. Already the appropriateness of the Regional Scheme as a useful means of developing regional energy policies was being questioned. In a report to WCC following a meeting of the WUC on 15 February 1983 Cr Holmes (Chairman of Waikato County Council and member of WEDRC and WUC) stated,

It is with considerable regret, but very little surprise that I note in the summary [of submissions on policies to be included in Section One] the consistent desire to include in the Regional Scheme only those matters which appear to have universal approval. This in my view is consensus politics taken beyond its ultimate point and so little is left in the proposals because so little is acceptable to everyone in the region.

I have grave doubts about the ability of the Regional Scheme to be of any benefit to this County or the region as a whole if it fails to address some of the questions to which there is not a universally accepted and agreed answer.

Cr Holmes also referred to comments from MWD planning staff who were equally critical of the proposed policies.

The very substantial expansion of coal mining activities during the immediate planning period have a major implication for transport networks, employment, training needs, housing demands, environment, management, etc. This receives scant attention at present.

WUC staff replied that it might be desirable for a Regional Scheme Section to be prepared immediately that covered areas likely to be affected by coal mining activities. Cr Holmes considered that this expression was "barely enough to protect the interests of the Waikato County and adjoining areas which would ultimately be affected by coal mining". The views of Cr Holmes were shared by the Chairman of the WVA, who was also a member of the Regional Planning Committee, who expressed the need for urgent progress on the energy part of Section One of the Regional Planning Scheme in the WVA's annual report (Waikato Valley Authority, 1983).

The apparent lack of confidence in the ability of the WUC to co-ordinate actions on behalf of local authorities was revealed when the first major report, the Community Overview (Murray-North Partners, 1983b), on the implications of the energy developments for the Lower Waikato was published in September 1983. As discussed in Chapter Five, the Community Overview prepared by consultants for MOE officials, called for a number of major initiatives to be taken by several central and local government agencies, if the timetable for the implementation of the energy projects was to be met. The report did not make any specific recommendations relating to the WUC although there was an implicit task for the WUC to co-ordinate actions of local authorities. The absence of a recommendation reflected two points: that the WUC (politicians and staff) had not actively participated in planning for the projects; and the local

authorities, not the WUC, had particular statutory actions to implement given requirements of the projects (Lewthwaite, pers. comm., 1987).

### Central/regional government interactions

The WUC had forwarded a submission to the Minister of Energy following their consideration of the Community Overview in September 1983. The submission requested

... financial resources necessary to carry out the planning of the areas affected and the subsequent infrastructure [and] that, as the project is in the National Interest, all housing stock must be supplied by the government and located in existing smaller settlement areas in the Waikato region to strengthen such settlements and that no deduction be made from the annual allocation of state housing.

The submission noted a need identified in the Community Overview for more locally-based planning action to complement work already undertaken and in preparing for growth and change.

... because of the [energy] developments, and in light, particularly of the major impacts associated with the developments, only part of the planning to be undertaken could be accepted as normal local authority planning in financial terms (Waikato United Council, 1983).

These concerns were reported in the New Zealand Herald (24 September 1983). The New Zealand Herald reported again in November that local authorities were seeking funding assistance for planning studies following advice from the Ministry of Energy that local authorities were expected to undertake normal planning

responsibilities and to cater for the developments in their district and regional schemes (New Zealand Herald, 26 November 1983).

By this stage, central government officials were sufficiently concerned about the need to co-ordinate the planning of infrastructure for the Waikato projects that they established another committee of officials, known as WEPICC (discussed in Chapter Five). Following the establishment of WEPICC, in December 1983, three members visited six local authorities in the Waikato to discuss what needed to be done in a "planning sense". A report made later to WEPICC, prepared by the officials who visited the local authorities, noted "the danger of a real planning overkill" and "It is accepted [by the officials and local authority people] that only work needing to be done should proceed and further everything does not need to happen at once" (Ministry of Works and Development, 1983b).

Staff in the WUC and Waikato County Council expressed their views to the WEPICC officials that planning work on the expansion of settlements should be funded by central government. An example cited was the funding of a consultant's report to Waikato County Council by NZE on the possible options contained in the Community Overview for expansion of Meremere. The Meremere Village, which already incorporated the Meremere Coal-fired Power Station, was a possible site for the next power station. The report noted that the costs of statutory actions were not generally seen as a charge on the Crown but that to compartmentalise actions in terms of who is going to pay would be wrong. The cost of expanding any settlement needed to be seen as a joint exercise between the Crown and local body. The report also noted that the WUC had not called for an officer's report on the implications of the Community Overview.

In response to the WUC submission for funding, WEPICC minutes of 23 February 1984 note that "not much progress would be made

through the United Council route. The best contact would be through Huntly Borough Council and the two adjacent Counties." Officials had formed this view following the December 1983 visit to Waikato local authorities.

In February 1984, the WUC released a Discussion Draft Section One - Objectives (Waikato United Council, 1984a). There were three main objectives relating to energy including coal utilisation. These were:

- To influence energy supply, use and conservation and to identify the natural energy resource of the region and seek a planned balance in their use for the benefit of the region's development;
- To seek that where energy projects are undertaken the work is done in a manner consistent with other resource use, and the environmental, social economic and amenity objectives of the regional scheme;
- To seek that coal mining is undertaken in a sequence and a manner that safeguards regional environmental, social and economic objectives and is utilised to yield greatest regional advantage (Waikato United Council, 1984a, 89-92).

Policies were outlined under each of the three objectives but did not deal specifically with any particular project on matters such as infrastructure planning or location of workforce housing. Despite the additional time spent by consultants on extending the section on energy policies, there was still a major gap between the intent of the regional policies and the pressing need for government officials to formulate specific policies to deal with the collective regional implications of the projects.

An informal threat by the Mayor of Huntly Borough Council to delay the supply of housing in order to extract other benefits for the Borough prompted MOE and MWD officials to take quick action. Early in 1984 officials proposed to the Minister of

Energy that a study be undertaken to examine areas of land available to accommodate the expected growth in Huntly's population. In the officials' view;

To obtain the co-operation of the local authorities, it will be necessary to provide an opportunity for them to consider the study brief and participate in the administration of the exercise.

A short time later, the Waikato County Council resolved not to participate in the housing study unless it was widened to undertake a range of work similar to that recommended in the Community Overview.

About the same time, in April 1984, Cr Holmes circulated a letter to the Principal Officer, WUC and members of the Regional Planning Committee expressing his concern about the multiplicity of reports being produced about the various projects for NZE and SCM Divisions of the MOE.

Numbers of environmental impact reports are being produced and numbers of planning procedures will be undertaken for the various projects. Where is the co-ordinated overview? It is seen to a certain extent at the Waikato Energy Development Regional Committee but does not appear to be followed up and reflected in any way, other than reporting back, by the members.

I believe that the Energy and Coal Utilisation section of the United Council Regional Scheme would be the vehicle to provide the overview. However if it is going to be a generalised document of policy it may not be. In that case someone needs to put together a definitive overview document compiled by a study group putting together and linking the impacts on the sub-region and the interests of all parties with responsibilities in that sub-region (Holmes, 1984).

By this stage several newspaper reports had appeared which indicated dissatisfaction by local authority members over the need for more information on the energy projects (New Zealand Herald, 7 April 1984; Waikato Times, 7 April 1984). A further submission was made by the WUC in April 1984 to the Minister of Energy requesting a regional overview of the overall effects of the present and planned developments. This request had been prompted by Cr Holmes.

In framing this resolution the United Council was mindful of the fact that the Crown has previously met all the costs in respect of the original Waikato Coal Station Regional Committee and subsequent Waikato Energy Development Regional Committee and would therefore expect the costs of any future studies to continue to be met by the Crown in respect of what the United Council considers are national developments (Waikato United Council, 1984b).

A memo to the Minister of Energy dated 23 May (1984c) from the Deputy Secretary of Energy (Corporate Services) noted two points following the visit of WEPICC members to Waikato local authorities. There did not seem to be agreement amongst some of the local bodies, especially Waikato County Council, with the urban development options outlined in the Community Overview Report and that there was no agreed framework for urban development for the Lower Waikato. This comment referred to the eight options for location of workforce housing identified in the report (see Figure Five). These options were dependent on whether the power station was sited at Rangiriri, or at one of the sites at Meremere. Options one and five involved concentrating the houses required in the nearest settlements (Te Kauwhata, Meremere, Ngaruawahia, Huntly and Maramarua). The remaining options involved varying degrees of commuting so that houses could be built in towns such as Ngaruawahia, Pukekohe or South

Auckland which would reduce the pressures on towns nearest the developments, but increase commuting costs (Murray-North Partners, 1983b, 82).

These matters were discussed by officials at a WEPICC meeting on 11 May. The MWD District Planner put forward two proposals for further studies; an update of the Murray-North findings with a focus on housing and a short-term study of housing options in Huntly. The Huntly study was proposed as a "counter offer" to Huntly Borough. Members considered that the proposal for an update of the Community Overview would allay some of the concerns of the WUC. "This is considered necessary to bring the [Community Overview] report back into the mainstream of debate". The minutes noted that the District Commissioner of Works and the District Planner would meet Cr Holmes on a private basis to check the acceptability of the offer. This was canvassed formally at a meeting of WEDRC a few days later. Officials then advised the Minister of Energy of these proposals and sought his approval (Ministry of Energy, 1984c).

In part the proposal for the Huntly housing study was to enable central government officials to regain the initiative and goodwill of local bodies in the area. Another important reason was to ensure the Crown retained financial control and to reduce the local authorities' ability to use the need for workforce housing as a bargaining point in their dealings with the Crown (Ministry of Energy, 1984b). The preparedness of local authorities to refuse to undertake particular activities signalled a shift in the thinking of local politicians about the energy projects. Previously, they had viewed the energy projects from the perspective of regional councillors. As they became aware of how their territorial districts might be affected, they became more vocal in their concerns. This matter is taken up in the next section.

The adequacy of regional planning was discussed at a WEPICC meeting on 3 July 1984. A paper presented (author unknown) to the meeting noted,

There is increasing concern among some officials and it is implied in the United Council resolution and other statements made by politicians in the region, about the present adequacy of planning at the regional level. This tends to surface in requests for a government provided overview. To officials, however, it appears that it is more important that there is a regional capacity to implement actions proposed by reports such as the Murray-North overview.

The minutes noted that the two studies, the proposed update of the Community Overview and the Huntly housing study, should be used to "positively demonstrate the relationship we need and expect with the United Council" and that the results of the update should be used to gain the United Council's agreement to a broad strategy for infrastructure development. It was also noted that as individual projects became more definite, local forums of government officials, local body and community representatives would be formed. Thus attention on the poor performance of the United Council would be reduced. This statement was an explicit recognition that the regional instrument established by central government was not meeting the needs of the centre.

#### Central government initiatives to formulate a housing strategy

A draft of the Huntly housing study was presented to the WEDRC meeting of 13 March 1985. The minutes note comments from a MOE official on future action to be taken. This included the need for local authorities to decide which housing strategies they preferred (referring to possible locations and numbers) and the need for MOE to decide a longer term strategy on housing requirements. This related particularly to the payment of

allowances and different internal Ministry attitudes (between NZE and SCM Divisions) towards housing of workers. By the time this report was completed, MOE staff were already anticipating some deferrals in the 1985 Energy Plan. This meant that the steady build up of housing requirements indicated in the Community Overview would not occur until the 1990s when demand would be greater.

From the point of view of both central and local government officials, the issue of housing the incoming workforce had to be addressed. To attract workers to the area, some housing had to be provided. Local authorities had a statutory responsibility to provide for planned residential expansion under the Town and Country Planning Act 1977. The WEDRC meeting resolved to set up a working party to consider housing strategy and required action which comprised representatives from counties, boroughs and government departments but did not include a member from the WUC. A file note (14 March 1985, 32/7/12/2/1) commented on the WEDRC meeting and noted;

The Chairman who is also the Chairman of the United Council, resisted suggestions that the United Council be directly involved. I personally do not see how this can be avoided... The group is to report to WEDRC, however, it is unclear who is to convene the group, what its status is and with what authority it will report. I do not think that the government should utilise this working party as a mechanism via which to formulate a settlement strategy.

The author suggested that government, through the District Commissioner of Works in Hamilton, approach the WUC with a view to encouraging them to develop a strategy of energy workforce location.... "...it ought to be their (WUC) job to orchestrate direct involvement of local bodies".

Minutes of a MOE staff meeting held to discuss Waikato housing issues noted that "local bodies (particularly Huntly Borough) would need moral and financial encouragement before the Ministry's requirements for housing were met" (NZE file, 4 April 1985, 32/7/12/2/1). The minutes also noted that WEPICC must persuade the WUC to encourage local bodies to adopt a regional view on the development strategy best suited to the area. On the question of financial assistance for local authorities, the minutes noted that it was preferable for central government to react to requests rather than to initiate approaches to local bodies. It had been the traditional practice of local bodies in the area, particularly of Huntly Borough Councillors, to approach central government ministers directly over coal mining and Huntly Power Station issues.

In part, these statements can be interpreted as a belated recognition by central government officials that local authorities could not be expected to automatically implement the Government's plans without some form of assistance. They also demonstrated, as did their subsequent actions, that central government officials were determined to manipulate some action from the WUC, the regional instrument established to deal with these matters.

A few weeks later than the WEDRC March meeting on 12 April 1985, the WUC established a subcommittee of its Regional Planning Committee with a brief to consider the infrastructure requirements (such as roading, sewerage and water supply systems) and social impacts of housing developments. This proposal was in place of the WEDRC suggestion of a working party. Membership comprised the WUC Chairman (as Chairman of the sub committee), four United Councillors, the District Planner from MWD, Hamilton, and a WUC planning officer. The two planners were full members of the committee. This was an unusual step to take. Usually staff attended council and committee meetings to advise councillors rather than participate in decision-making. It was an

acknowledgement of two points: councillors felt out of their depth in dealing with some of the technical issues and had previously been reluctant to address these issues as United Councillors; and it was an implicit recognition that the councillors wanted to draw on the knowledge of a central government official who had been intensively involved during the previous four years of planning for the projects. Staff from Mines (SCM) and Electricity Divisions (NZE) were also to attend meetings. A memo from the District Planner to MOE officials on 15 May (Ministry of Works and Development, 1985a) advising WEPICC officials of this development confirms that the proposal for the subcommittee was orchestrated by NZE and MWD officials.

A working party of such an ad hoc committee is scarcely an appropriate forum through which such matters should be progressed - particularly in light of the United Council's statutory role. This point seemed to be recognised by the United Council when it met on 12 April. Council recognised that it must get into the act.

The manipulation by central government officials to ensure that the WUC co-ordinated the development of a housing strategy showed that central government officials were no longer willing to initiate and undertake planning work which they considered was properly the responsibility of the United Council.

The Housing Strategy subcommittee of the WUC, at its first meeting, resolved to seek the views of the Secretary of Energy on a possible secondment of a planning officer to the WUC. The committee proposed that this person would co-ordinate planning requirements of the constituent local authorities involved in the energy developments. In accordance with previous statements made by the WUC, that central government should fund planning-related work necessitated by the projects, the subcommittee considered

the cost involved should be met by the Ministry of Energy. This view was conveyed by the WUC to the Secretary of Energy (Waikato United Council, 1985).

A draft job description was forwarded later by WUC staff to the MOE on 12 September and discussed at the 1 October 1985 meeting of WEPICC. The minutes note that some scepticism was expressed as to the ability of the local authorities to identify and articulate their needs, let alone integrate them on a regional basis. There was considerable discussion about the delivery of planning assistance; whether to second a planner from a government department or fund a private sector consultant. Two areas of perceived deficiency were noted: the formulation and co-ordination of an on-going regional response; and the integration of the social impact/community development issues. The majority of people at the meeting considered that the integration of a regional perspective was crucial and that someone with "mana" was needed to fulfil the planning position (WEPICC minutes, 1 October 1985).

Negotiations between MWD and MOE officials in WEPICC and WUC politicians and staff continued over the brief and funding for the position. By this time, a proposal for a community monitoring strategy was being formulated by MWD staff in consultation with government department, local body and some individual university staff in the Waikato region. This proposal had been developed in response to the Tainui monitoring proposal put forward by Professor Ritchie (discussed in Chapter Seven). The person appointed would be required to set up a strategy for monitoring as well as to assist local authorities in developing a housing settlement strategy given the lack of progress on developing regional policies. The position was finally determined as a two year contract with WUC; funded jointly by Mines and Electricity Divisions, MOE. The WUC advertised and appointed a planner, as a WUC employee, early in 1986.

In summary, the first request for financial assistance was made by WUC in September 1983. In April 1984, a second request followed for an update of the Community Overview. In response WEPICC officials with advice from the MWD District Planner, proposed two studies to alleviate local concerns. In April 1985 a further approach was made by WUC for financial assistance, this time for a specified planning position. Agreement on funding and the brief for the position was finally reached by the end of the year; 26 months after the first request was received by the Secretary of Energy. Central government officials tended to view these requests as reflecting an inadequate performance of the WUC's statutory obligation to prepare regional planning policies. On the other hand, WUC and local bodies considered that the Crown, as developer, should meet some of the additional costs incurred by local bodies in meeting their statutory responsibilities. The nature of this debate, however, reveals more about the relationships between two sets of instruments, central and regional. During this time, central government officials moved significantly from controlling events in the region towards encouraging WUC politicians to act more effectively by taking on specific responsibilities.

What was occurring between 1983 and 1985 revealed different understandings of the responsibilities of central and local government. In the absence of any formulation of relevant regional policies and initiatives, central government officials, consultants, local authority politicians and staff were attempting to plan for the regional and local implications of the projects.

... consultants to government departments ... have been trying to develop regional policy on behalf of Ministry of Energy for particular issues quite separately from anything the regional authority has been doing. We have regional matters being considered outside the arena of the United Council. And it tends to be looked at by whoever is available at the time; the local authority planners, Ministry of Works, Ministry of Energy,

trying to do it on their behalf. But they can't really develop regional policy, they're always going to do what's best for them (Dawson, pers.comm., 1986).

I think they [the regional planners] were doing as good a job as they could but the integration of the energy planning never seemed to me to actually have occurred....the energy consultation reports produced by Murray-North and Company didn't somehow come across back into a regional plan (Ritchie, pers. comm., 1987).

Despite the institutional arrangements put in place to inform United Councillors and staff about site investigations for the power station and coal mine proposals, information presented at WEDRC and study group meetings was not used by WUC consultants and staff to formulate regional policies on settlement and infrastructure issues arising from the projects. Neither, however, were specific requests for particular actions issued formally by central government officials to the WUC or local authorities. As a consequence, individuals in organisations, particularly MWD, attempted to 'encourage' a response from both WUC and local authority members and staff while at the same time maintaining control from the centre. These attempts resulted in the establishment of WEPICC, completion of two reports (the Huntly Short Term Housing Study and the Community Overview Reassessment) and the establishment of a WUC subcommittee on settlement strategies for the Lower Waikato.

#### COMMENTARY BY CASE STUDY PARTICIPANTS

Already by 1982, there were questions concerning the effectiveness of united councils as regional instruments. At a conference of united and regional council chairmen in Wellington on 6 July with the Minister and Parliamentary Under-Secretary for Local Government, participants commented that, in some regions, united councils were being confused with regional development councils. They reported that there was a great deal of suspicion

that "United Councils are a third tier of Government and will gobble up ratepayers' money without showing anything for it" (Department of Internal Affairs, 1982, 1). Cr Sherwin (Chairman of the WUC) expressed concern about the financial burden imposed on small territorial authorities in the Waikato region to pay their levies. Some participants commented on the difficulties for principal officers (who were also chief executive officers of local territorial authorities) to remain 'objective' in the face of conflict between local and regional councils. Others considered that it did not matter very much. Participants suggested that regional planning was perceived by the public as an intangible function and the situation could be improved by united councils taking on additional functions. The Minister of Local Government, Mr Highet, stated that he did not see united councils taking over additional functions unless existing ad hoc authorities wished to transfer their functions to the regional level (Department of Internal Affairs, 1982).

People interviewed as part of this enquiry, and who had been participants, identified a number of reasons for the Waikato United Council's reluctance to get involved in planning work related to the energy projects;

- a fear [held by local body politicians] of the United Council becoming a top heavy organisation similar to the Auckland Regional Authority (Holmes; Chapman, pers. comms., 1987);
- the widespread geographic region represented by the United Council which precluded much investment of resources in any one part of the catchment (Page, pers. comm., 1987);
- a fear of spending money and sending out levies to the ratepayers (Dawson, pers. comm., 1986; Holmes, pers. comms., 1987);
- an early emphasis on the statutory planning side of the United Council's work (Sampson, pers. comm., 1987);

- lack of interest and dominance by Hamilton City Council within the United Council (Dawson, pers. comm., 1986).
- a consensus mode of decision-making (Lewthwaite, pers. comm., 1987).

### Inadequate financial resources

Inadequate funding was identified as a major reason for 'inaction' of the WUC in developing specific energy policies and failure to respond formally to documents such as the Community Overview (Murray-North Partners, 1983b) and the Environmental Impact Report on the proposed power station (1984).

As a general rule, united councils, were first set up around about 1980. they have really been ...quite disappointing in what they have achieved. that may be due to the fact that members of the united councils, and certainly the contributing authorities, have tended to adopt a very low key, low activity approach on the basis that if they get involved in anything it is going to cost them money. They have tended to take on minimal staff or have a sharing arrangement with other territorial authorities to share staff.... The united councils that have been most effective are those that have realised that they have got a task to do, decided they need at least some supporting staff and have sat down and tackled the problems. The Waikato United Council has taken a long time to develop, a longer time than perhaps some others. It has been reluctant to spend very much money on planning in particular .... It is all very well to have meetings but you have to have action as well (Butcher, pers. comm., 1987).

This comment was reinforced by one of the leading local authority participants who was Chairman of Waikato County Council and closely involved in discussions on the energy developments through his membership of WUC, WEDRC, and WVA.

The United Council, of course, is just so lacking in resources. One of the great faults of the United Council is, of course, that the parish pump tends to prevail and people live in fear of another ARA [Auckland Regional Authority] starting up down in the Waikato.... So the United Council really does struggle with its goals and objectives, I have got to admit that.... People tend to use it only when they are in trouble, when they have court houses closing or maternity hospitals closing....Its a jolly good forum for having a really good blow out on these sorts of things. But when it comes to really funding a serious project over a long period of time then people start to worry about the cost. That was the only reason we got into difficulty. Once the developer saw a need for it to be done and was prepared to fund it there was no problem. No lack of will on the part of the United Council, just a sheer fear of spending money and sending out levies to the ratepayers (Holmes, pers. comm., 1987).

Other people, not closely involved in site investigations, took a more critical view.

Finance, of course, is an excuse that every regional, local council or government for that matter, uses for not actually coming to grips with the issues (Hill, pers. comm., 1987);

We were appalled at the attitude and the approach taken by the United Council which was epitomised by their not even forwarding a submission [to the EIR] on behalf of their constituency... (Dixon, pers. comm., 1987).

A major reason, however, for not using their professional staff was that local body politicians considered that central government as developer, that is NZE and SCM Divisions of MOE, should be prepared to fund that work necessary for local authorities to assess statutory applications and to facilitate relevant investigations. It was also an issue of priority within local authorities. For both the WUC and Waikato County Council,

the energy developments were located in one area of their respective territorial districts. There were other equally pressing matters to be dealt with;

...and it's been quite strongly stated at Council meetings that I shouldn't spend too much time on energy development because we aren't getting paid for it....So some of the councillors resent too much time, either at political or staff level, being spent on energy development issues (Dawson, pers. comm., 1986).

There were suggestions that, early in the 1980s, NZE staff had informally approached the WUC offering some financial assistance to assist with planning-related work. Consultants for the WUC were anticipating some energy-related briefs (Douglass, pers. comm., 1986). However the offer was rejected apparently on the grounds that: WUC did not want to become dependent on a funding source which might later be withdrawn; and the developer (NZE) should carry out the necessary planning investigations.

I don't think they [United Council] really had the resources to make the sort of technical input that was required. Then, I suppose, you have to ask whether they should have made those resources available given the nature of the issue involved and I think they should have. But they didn't.... I think also they have to bear in mind that there are two ways to go about looking to ensure that the appropriate investigations are done, from the Council as well as anyone else's perspective presumably. One is to get enough resources and do it yourself and the other is to make sure that the agency responsible are doing things that you feel appropriate in order that the issues you think are to be examined are to be done. Probably in the earlier phases, the latter was the way that things were gone about (Burton, pers. comm., 1987).

WUC politicians relied on MOE officials to produce reports on site investigations for the proposed power station and coal mining proposals. These reports dealt with regional and district

planning issues and were presented at WEDRC meetings. NZE staff (in consultation with other members of the Social and Planning Effects Study Group) drew up contracts for consultants to prepare siting reports. A WUC planner attended meetings of the Social and Planning Effects Study Group. WUC politicians assumed that their planners would see that regional planning interests were accommodated in the briefs discussed at those meetings. The study group reported only to MOE so that the WUC did not receive formal feedback (other than advice received from staff) and did not have any control over its operation.

#### Notion of 'consensus'

The notion of 'consensus' decision-making was cited by several people as a reason for the reluctance of the United Council to take regional initiatives in respect of the proposed energy developments. This mode of operation originated in the early days of local body 'co-operation' over roading proposals and boundary extensions in Hamilton City and adjacent Counties (discussed in Chapter Four).

It [the United Council] grew out of the regional planning authority which, in itself, was, in its time, a very significant achievement. It was achieved only at the cost of a commitment to consensus decision-making and a strict avoidance of conflict. The decade that they had been operating within that framework, I suppose, had developed into a habit of approaching issues that way... My impression was that there were people involved who were very much wedded to that view and very much wished to avoid a specific conflict... I perceive it as developing out of the struggles between Hamilton City, Waikato and Waipa [Counties] over roading developments and the boundary changes in the 1960s .... The personalities that were involved in that were still about during the phases of this thing [siting the power station] (Lewthwaite, pers. comm., 1987).

The experiences of Waikato politicians in the previous decade assisted to reinforce consensus decision-making and preclude any contentious matters from being publicly debated. The issues of the previous decade had provided the impetus for the creation of the HRP. These had been largely resolved so that there was no reason for the Hamilton City Council, for example, to promote the interests of the northern local authorities over those of other members (given the much larger territorial area of the WUC). Given the reluctance of constituent authorities to fund regional planning substantially, it was not in the financial interests of any member local authority to raise concerns unless their local government responsibilities or interests were likely to be detrimentally affected in some way. Thus the institutional arrangements of the United Council, where local authority members were appointed to represent regional interests, precluded initiatives from being taken unless an issue was likely to affect a major part of the United Council territory.

The new provisions for regional planning in the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 considerably broadened the scope of regional planning beyond the manner in which it had been practised by regional planning authorities. The potential of regional planning as a tool for articulating 'regional opinion' did not sit comfortably with the consensus mode of operation which the Waikato local authority politicians had become used to in the 1970s. To fulfil properly the requirements of the new Town and Country Planning Act would mean that at times there would be conflict between local and regional interests. Regional policies could, for example, override local interests. As a consequence of the consensus mode of decision-making, regional policies (including energy policies) developed by consultants in conjunction with the United Council were bland and non-specific.

...the actual regional policy has been formulated by consultants who don't live in the region. What seems to be very theoretical and wishy-washy... is nowhere near specific enough to be of any

assistance in developing regional policy about these particular issues (Dawson, pers. comm., 1986).

... it [United Council] made very little in the way of a useful contribution because its regional policies were so broad and bland and it refused to become involved in local issues and strenuously avoided conflict. As a result it placed itself in a position of being unable to express directly and concretely a regional point of view on anything. As a result I am sure NZE were frustrated because, I think, very often they were looking for a regional lead and couldn't get one... (Lewthwaite, pers. comm., 1987).

#### Professional advice

There appeared to be little 'regional' staff contribution on regional planning matters in the early years.

The United Council, at that stage, had one and a half staff members in that the regional planner was very much part-time on regional planning work and the Regional Planning Officer, I'm not even sure if he was full time at that stage, and most of their budget for planning matters ... was spent on consultants. The consultants... were pouring all of their time and effort into getting section one of the regional scheme through the draft and to proposed stages which it has now gone through.... (Burton, pers. comm., 1987).

Staff advising the United Council on regional planning matters were also acting in a similar capacity for Hamilton City Council. This meant that they were required to serve two employers and advise on both regional and local planning matters. The dual functions of Hamilton City Council acting as the principal office for the United Council and as a member authority constrained the United Council from developing as an organisation independent from its constituent member authorities. The dominance of

Hamilton City and lack of direction for staff were cited as reasons for the lack of involvement of the United Council in energy planning matters.

I suppose there are two main reasons [for the United Council not being very involved]. One is that the United Council itself hasn't been very interested in putting a lot of money into having the staff to do the work.... But I also feel that [the staff] haven't had very well defined roles in their heads as to what they do. And I think that comes down from the influence ...that they are really governed by Hamilton City.... The consultants that the United Council have used haven't really been involved in energy planning at all.... They have just been involved in writing the regional scheme...(Dawson, pers. comm., 1986).

One of the United Councillors commented on a need for WUC members to receive staff assessments of information given at WEDRC meetings,

... there was a real weakness there while we were looking at it [WEDRC] as a regional committee with rather loose links back to the United Council. I think those links could have been firmer. It really could only be done by having a staff link back to the United Council who would have assessed what was going on....The only other way would have been for local districtplanners to have worked more closely with those of us who were on the committee. But not all the local Councils involved have a very strong planning department who were prepared to put in the work. They had consultants and were somewhat reluctant to meet the costs of having them closely involved in it (Holmes, pers. comm., 1987).

Division of planning responsibilities also assisted the development of broad policies. The consultants, for example, were not invited by WUC staff to attend Coal Station and WEDRC meetings mainly on grounds of cost (Douglass, pers. comm., 1986). They were preparing policies on the basis of previous regional policies formulated for the HRPAs and in response to submissions

received from member local authorities. They were reliant on advice received from local staff. Local staff attended meetings with member councils on the draft and proposed schemes and liaised with consultants. Committing the substantial part of the regional planning budget for consultants to produce Section One of the Regional Planning Scheme precluded other initiatives which could have been taken in areas such as the energy developments. As Dawson noted

...the United Council seems to be moving along this path of 'we must prepare the regional scheme so let's do section one, section two and so on. And section one's got to be this general section that's done first'. And the consultants that they use have had a history of preparing that scheme in other areas so they just get into their mould and chug along. But really the issues that have been going on regardless of the regional scheme. They may well have been and gone, right now they might be gone. If the regional scheme does get around to writing about and preparing policy to help the United Council deal with these sort of issues it could be far too late (Dawson, pers. comm., 1986).

### Conflict between 'local' and 'regional' interests

Another reason attributable to the difficulty in developing regional energy policies is that local body members on WEDRC saw a 'conflict' between their role as a local body councillor and as a United Council representative. Consequently, in the early years, information about the proposed projects was not passed on to local council members or local body staff by WUC councillors who attended WEDRC meetings. This also had the converse effect in that during 1981 and 1982, when work on the first draft of section one was in progress, concerns about the implications of the projects were not raised at WUC meetings by its constituent members.

...So he sees quite a line between his role as... County Councillor and his role as United Councillor and he has tended to keep the matters that he discusses at the United Council in a separate compartment to what he does at the [County] Council (Dawson, pers. comm., 1986).

The view that regional matters should be kept distinct from local concerns influenced the relationships between local authority members and government department officials.

The original guys saw themselves there as United Councillors and as such as they felt it improper that they used their county staff resources to advise them on this particular job. This really staggered me. It is, I think, one reason why we got into a lot of trouble over the Huntly Housing Study and how we used the update of the Murray-North Overview Report etc. to get things back on the rails... (Burton, pers. comm., 1987).

Because of this attitude, local body politicians were not prepared to use staff in their local authorities to assist them review the technical reports they were required to read before WEDRC meetings. The Federated Farmers representative and NZE project engineer saw this as influencing the ability of those in local government office to understand relevant issues and participate effectively on the committee.

I saw that conflict on that committee where obviously the county chairmen with half a dozen strings to their bows just completely bogged down with work and sometimes from some of the questions I felt that they didn't really understand the base issue (Lumsden, pers. comm., 1987).

I think, in retrospect, the members of that committee often didn't give their reports to anybody. They read them themselves, or tried to read themselves and we suffered (a) because it was a lot of work to read them and (b) because they

didn't always have the technical knowhow to understand them. So the comments that we got were fairly limited (McGlinchy, pers. comm., 1987).

By 1983-84, this situation was beginning to change as local authority members with vested interests recognised the difficulties caused by 'inaction' of the WUC. Cr Holmes, Chairman of Waikato County Council, took initiatives to promote the need for regional overview studies. Waikato County was likely to be significantly affected by these developments, particularly in terms of location of workforce housing and transportation of coal.

#### REVIEW AND CRITIQUE

Several reasons have been identified by case study participants as attributing to the reluctance of the WUC to formulate a regional response to the energy developments. Institutional arrangements put in place by MOE staff (discussed in Chapter Five) and the reform of local government (discussed in Chapters Three and Four) precluded in a practical sense significant involvement of the WUC members and staff in responding to the regional requirements of the government projects.

MOE officials kept control of the committees established to facilitate the energy developments. They chose not to work with the regional planning committee of the WUC but to consult with regional politicians through an advisory committee which operated quite independently of the WUC. In adopting this course of action, MOE staff became much more reliant on internal channels of communication between politicians and staff in both the United Council and constituent local authorities. The arrangement of WEDRC meant that the United Councillors were unable to take initiatives. Some would be involved later, in their capacity as local authority councillors, when hearing applications from NZE officials for statutory consents. The need for political

representatives to be able to remain independent of any decision made by MOE officials was constantly stressed by MOE officials. When it became obvious that the WUC did not have a technical capacity to co-ordinate the regional planning requirements of the energy projects, MOE and MWD officials took actions to protect the interests of the Ministry of Energy as project developer.

The separation of 'political' and 'technical' interests in the institutional arrangements put in place by MOE officials was compounded by the attempt of United Councillors to keep their 'regional' responsibilities distinct from their local authority activities. Neither did the Councillors seek the services of their local body staff to assist in the evaluation of the information. These actions had two implications. First, there was no direct communication between United Councillors and staff in local authorities. Secondly, this meant that politicians and energy officials on the regional committee had little effective dialogue with each other because the politicians were not able to comprehend fully the technical information presented at meetings.

The nature of the institutional arrangements put in place to facilitate regional planning ironically constrained the formulation of regional planning policies. The Waikato United Council comprised members appointed by constituent local authorities who, acting in their own interests, were reluctant to fund the activities of the WUC in any substantial way. Chapter Four raised questions about the 'commitment' to regional planning demonstrated by Waikato political representatives in the 1970s. Several of these politicians were now members of the WUC. Because members of the WUC were, in effect, also representing the interests of their constituent authorities, it became impossible to develop policies which might compromise the interests of some of the constituent local authorities. These policies were essential for planners to work within. The WUC was therefore reluctant to promote actively the interests of the northern local authorities whose combined territories represented only a small

portion of the area of the WUC. Thus the WUC was unable to take decisive action in respect of the energy developments when required by central government officials.

Given the development of separate institutional arrangements and planning instruments, attempts to 'integrate' both regional implications of energy planning (as provided for in the annual Energy Plans) and regional planning policies were never likely to succeed. MOE officials had the responsibility to implement government's Energy Plans and wished to retain control over the management of their energy projects. By their own actions in setting up committees independent of the WUC, MOE officials compounded the problems already inherent in the established arrangements for united councils.

The next chapter turns to an examination of methods used by NZE officials to select a site for the power station. This includes the nature of consultations undertaken with Māori and Pakeha communities.

## CHAPTER SEVEN : COMMUNITY INVOLVEMENT

Chapter Five outlined the institutional arrangements put in place by MOE officials to consult with local body politicians and staff. These were the Waikato Coal Station Regional Committee, later renamed the Waikato Energy Development Regional Committee, the local Social and Planning Effects Study Group and the Wellington-based technical committee of officials known as WEPICC. NZE officials were also involved in consulting with interest groups and landowners, independently of these institutional arrangements. The extent of this consultation was determined initially by the approach taken towards site selection and, later, in response to initiatives of some community groups.

This Chapter examines the approach taken by NZE officials towards developing methods for the selection of a site for the power station. It is arranged in five sections. Section one outlines the approach taken by NZE officials towards site selection. Section two reviews consultations undertaken by NZE officials and consultants with landowners in the final sites under consideration. The third section examines consultations with Tainui Māori Trust Board representatives. This includes discussion of the responses of MOE officials to Trust Board initiatives for assessment of the consequences of the energy projects for Māori people. The fourth section outlines the final events which led to the selection of a site for the power station. The Chapter concludes with a critique of the preceding four sections.

### SELECTING A SITE...

NZE officials began investigations for selecting a site for the next power station in 1979 (discussed in Chapter Four). An in-house discussion paper prepared in October that year identified the need to bring together information on coal resources, "rationales" for determining station size and type, and for "narrowing down" areas suitable for siting the station. The criteria listed under "areas suitable for siting the station" illustrate an emphasis on physical and economic constraints. Despite the social and cultural issues highlighted by the Huntly experience, only "maraes" received specific mention (NZE file note, 31 October 1979, 32/7/12).

The first round of broad areas suitable for sites will be by a process of elimination on the basis of economics and perhaps other constraints, e.g., avoiding open cast mine sites, known extremely poor foundation conditions, ecologically vital areas, maraes and reserve areas.

Items which may be of significant economic importance in siting are:

- fuel cost from alternate sources
- coal transport
- cooling water
- power transmission

In November 1979 NZE staff visited Waikato to assess the suitability of coalfields as sources of fuel for the power station (NZE file note, 27 November 1979, 32/7/12). The file note foreshadowed the possibility of longwall mining at the Huntly West Mine to extract sufficient coal but noted that "high extraction ratios, with acceptable environmental consequences may be a problem with future power stations". Their conclusions were that both the Maramarua and Huntly West Mines had sufficient

reserves for a 1000 MW station and both sites would be considered in preliminary investigations.

The approach of NZE staff towards site investigations was summarised in an internal file note from Electricity Division to the Deputy Secretary of Mines (9 May 1980, 32/7/12).

The trend that has been established on our most recently investigated thermal power station sites has been to set up a number of study groups convened by NZE. Such study groups cover air quality, cooling systems for the power plant, land use, biological and social impacts, civil engineering aspects, fuel supply and transport, etc... These would then lead to the preparation of environmental and planning reports for obtaining water rights, land designation and a clean air licence. Such study groups involve relevant experts from other organisations and our experience is that they function very well. Our desire is to continue with this method of working.

The file note requested a firm commitment for a coal supply from Mines Division and suggested the establishment of an internal working group between Mines, Planning and Electricity Divisions of the Ministry of Energy to consider the matter. Within NZE, a Waikato Coal Station Development Co-ordination Group was established to programme and co-ordinate studies for the power station. Previous chapters have made reference to the formation of technical study groups.


The search for a suitable site was based on a "sieve" approach. NZE staff, in conjunction with consultants, carried out several studies to identify potential sites. The first locality study review was carried out in 1981 (New Zealand Electricity, 1981). Consultants were asked "to profile and analyse the planning and social characteristics of the area of influence for a thermal power station using coal from the coalfields under evaluation" (MOE contract brief no. 793, undated, NZE file 32/7/12/9). Once a decision on locality had been reached, a further and more

intensive study would be carried out which would examine planning and social effects on a site-specific basis.

Consultants reviewed all the communities between Hamilton and South Auckland and considered the capacity of each to cope with the social and economic consequences which would be created by the construction of a coal-fired power station. Various 'constraints' were identified, such as sources of labour supply, provision of housing and utility services, capacities of existing community and social services, roading networks, land tenure, wild life values and land having high value for food production. This report, along with other technical studies completed, identified 10 possible sites (Figure Seven).

Conclusions reached by the consultants were that siting a power station anywhere within the corridor from Huntly to Tuakau would present few problems. There were advantages in locating the station in the northern and southern parts of a corridor on either side of the Waikato River north of Huntly, and extending east to Maramarua and west along either side of the river, to Port Waikato (New Zealand Electricity, 1981, 3). The report noted that the central location (from Churchill/Rangiriri north to Mercer, or along the southern side of the Waikato River downstream to the Tuakau Bridge) was less favourable. Considerable commuting costs would be incurred as the area lay beyond normal commuting distance from the main centres and new housing would necessitate investment in infrastructure. This location would later come under close examination as it contained the two final sites under consideration.

Following detailed site investigations, including a drilling programme, three areas were recommended for further investigation in a second report prepared by consultants. These were localities south of Lake Waahi, north-east of Huntly and between Te Kauwhata and Meremere. The southern localities were seen to have some definite advantages "from an economic and social impact point of




**Figure Seven Locality Corridor and Power Station Locations.**  
*Source: Waikato Coal-Fired Power Station Environmental Impact Report, Figure 3.1.*

view" over the locality between Te Kauwhata and Meremere (New Zealand Electricity, 1982). Minutes of the Social and Planning Study Effects group record that one of the NZE engineers asked consultants to "try and quantify why the central location was a less desirable option" (Minutes, 14 June 1982).

About this time, it was announced publicly that the coal supply for the power station would come from Maramarua. Originally intended to supply New Zealand Steel's requirements for the expansion of the Glenbrook Mill, it was subsequently claimed that Maramarua coal would have technical difficulties for use in the steel-making process. This opinion would later change again. The identification of these technical difficulties resulted in attention being turned northwards as Mines Division staff reassessed their coal allocation plan. It was decided that New Zealand Steel requirements would be supplied from Ohinewai and the first 500 MW of the power station would be supplied from the Maramarua field. A decision was then made by NZE to extend site investigation northwards to cover localities between Te Kauwhata and Tuakau. As a result of these investigations, early in 1983 three additional localities were recommended for further investigation (New Zealand Electricity, 1983). These were: west of Rangiriri, vicinity of Clune Road, adjacent to Meremere Power Station (sites 5,6 and 7, Figure Eight).

These localities were then gradually narrowed down to three specific sites. Criteria used to evaluate these sites included suitability of foundations, sources of coal supply, location of workforce, sources of cooling water, ecological values, air quality and planning constraints. A "settlement by settlement" approach was used by consultants to identify "communities of interest" in the three sites although it was recognised that this approach would not identify every group affected by the energy developments (Murray-North Partners, 1983b).



**Figure Eight Final Power Station Site Options**  
*Source: Waikato Coal-Fired Power Station Environmental Impact Report, Figure 16.1.*

CONSULTATIONS WITH PAKEHA COMMUNITIES AND LANDOWNERS

Chapter Five outlined the early discussions which that took place between NZE officials, Waikato local authority politicians and staff, MWD and HMP staff, to establish arrangements for consultation. It was agreed at those meetings that, in the early stages of site investigations, it was appropriate to consult at a 'regional' level. In the first two years of site investigations, NZE staff had consulted with regional government representatives through the forum of WEDRC. The dilemma over who should be consulted was expressed by one NZE official,

...it is interesting just in terms of power station investigations. People talk of public participation and there seem to be a whole lot of publics out there ....I think we took the right perspective in that we took a wide [approach] and narrowed down to a site which meant that you started out with the consultation with the regional representatives of the community (Willis, pers. comm., 1987).

As investigations were beginning early in 1981, consultants expressed the view to NZE officials that they (NZE) should be cautious over the extent of direct community consultation they undertook,

...because the proposal, its location, its character and its likelihood was so uncertain that there was a risk they would be doing nothing more than stirring people's anxieties without any good cause or anticipations for that matter. And that the extreme generality of studies at that level didn't justify the cost of going into details (Lewthwaite, pers. comm., 1987).

This view was recorded in the minutes of the Social and Planning Effects Group (14 April 1981) when consultants made it clear they did not favour surveys as a means of determining public concerns and expectations but preferred to conduct community level

meetings with selected people of common interests. At a later meeting (27 May 1981), minutes record the following exchange of views.

Mr Willis stated that the Minister of Energy had instructed his department to keep a low profile in terms of the public discussion of major energy projects. This directive was interpreted by the Ministry of Energy to mean that the three community meetings to be arranged by the consultants would have to be shelved. Mr Lewthwaite indicated that he was aware of this directive and, although considering that the meetings formed an integral part of the study programme and were important to the findings of the report, a feeling of public reaction to the siting of the power station in the Waikato could be obtained through alternative channels.

Mr Fookes expressed his concern at the suggestion that the community meetings could not be held and that the interviewing of selected individuals in the community to determine general public concerns, was a much less satisfactory approach.

The consultants modified the extent of community meetings they had intended to carry out. They wished to include a statement in the final report which made explicit that they were requested not to undertake part of the study. The minutes of the June meeting (22 June) note that:

Mr Willis questioned the inclusion of the statement [in the final report]...that the consultants were requested not to undertake part of the study relating to community concerns and expectations. Mr Willis advised that the consultants were only asked to adopt a low profile technique in talking to local people and was concerned that discussions had not been undertaken with certain bodies and individuals in the community, for instance Waikato County and representatives from some of the small townships in the study area.

By March 1982, planning for the power station was sufficiently advanced to hold a public meeting in Huntly. Planning for the project, by this time, was receiving a higher public profile. This meeting was addressed by the Hon. W. Birch, Minister of Energy, and attended by more than two hundred people. Some of these public meetings, such as the one held at Te Kauwhata, were criticised by a landowner as being "information" oriented (D. Cameron, pers. comm., 1987). Three hundred people attended this meeting which was addressed by the Minister of Energy as the local member of Parliament. The difficulties of presenting information in this way were acknowledged by one NZE official.

We had a meeting in Huntly for which we had a very big turn out and there obviously was a lot of interest in what we were doing. But, I mean, how the hell do you get any information from two hundred people in a hall when you are giving a high powered slide show? (Willis, pers. comm., 1987).

The approach taken in these early meetings was criticised by a Watchdog Waikato representative.

There were meetings fairly early in the piece, public meetings such as those we attended in 1982-1983 in Huntly which were deliberately described as 'very preliminary'. The range of site options at that stage was virtually anywhere in the Huntly vicinity and people were clamouring, at that stage, for more information. They were told by politicians and planners in what I think was a fairly patronising way to just sit back and wait. We have got it all under control, if we are going to want to come onto your place, we will be in touch with you (Dixon, pers. comm., 1987).

Early in 1983, a random survey of residents in Huntly, Meremere and Te Kauwhata was selected by consultants as part of their work on the Community Overview (Murray-North Partners, 1983b). Structured interviews were undertaken with community representatives. These people were identified as part of the

field survey work where respondents were asked to name people they perceived as community leaders. The consultants wanted to create an opportunity for these people to comment on whether they believed the consultants' conclusions were in line with their perceptions of the study (Lewthwaite, pers. comm., 1987),

... and that included people like school teachers, headmasters, ministers of religion, people in social welfare, and just people who were active in the community... people who have been residents for a long time but were seen as having some sort of leadership role because of their activity... we were more concerned to get an accurate qualitative impression of the community than number crunching (Lewthwaite, pers. comm., 1987).

Survey results confirmed that little information about the energy projects from WEDRC and WUC meetings was reaching local people although there was widespread support for the energy developments proposed in the area. The main concerns of respondents were the potential effects on agricultural land, noise, and effect on air and water quality. Respondents requested that they be kept informed regularly of further planning procedures and decisions. The majority wanted to be kept informed by distribution of pamphlets and personal contact by senior officials of relevant government departments. The file notes (37/7/12/9) indicate that consultants to NZE provided suggestions on how to feed back study results to people living in the localities under investigation. These suggestions for public meetings, workshops and leaflets were adopted by NZE staff after some discussion with their consultants (Lewthwaite, pers. comm., 1987). These initiatives came from the consultants.

We proposed that approach and discussed it with NZE, as I recall at some length, before it was agreed as desirable. We made a point that those workshops were between the researchers and the community, not the community and NZE (Lewthwaite, pers. comm., 1987).

Later in July 1983, several workshops were held to present information from consultants' field work to people in the three localities under investigation; Te Kauwhata, Huntly and Meremere. Pamphlets were circulated which outlined results of the community survey, options for how many houses might be built and the consultants' conclusions about the effects of these options. Minutes of a study group meeting (8 June 1983) note that these meetings were seen as an opportunity for questions to be asked and answered. "Merit was seen in NOT having MOE in a role where they were giving a slick presentation along the lines of previous meetings. The idea being to encourage locals to participate," thus "MOE officials will play a passive role."

...Neville Lewthwaite [NZE consultant] stood up and said 'Now this is the project, this is what it means to you. We anticipate that there will be so many people move in here for the purposes of constructing and operating a power station and what do you think?' They were very quiet really...but I suppose those small workshops need to be quiet for people to really say what they think as opposed to the bigger meetings we had previous to that... (Willis, pers. comm., 1987).

NZE's consultant expressed the view that those meetings were a very productive part of the exercise partly because some of the communities didn't agree with the conclusions.

One particular example was Meremere where there was a very strong reaction and I think some of the people in the community felt that their community had been painted blacker than it should have been perhaps. My response was that it was a sign of success in that it had touched a sore point and identified something in the community. It had stimulated people to respond and it seemed, from where I sat, that over the subsequent year or two, many of the institutions, organisations or community activities that had become more or less moribund, sprang back to life (Lewthwaite, pers. comm., 1987).

During 1983, NZE had also commissioned consultants to prepare a report on the concerns of landowners and residents in the three localities under investigation (Murray-North Partners, 1983d). The fieldwork for this report was carried out after research for the Community Overview report was completed. Thirty-four respondents from 21 households were interviewed. The report acknowledged that, given the small number of respondents, care had to be taken on the interpretation of the results. Findings provided through this report, released in September, showed that of the three sites, respondents favoured the Meremere site on the basis that it affected fewest people and the least productive land. It was also the closest site to the Maramarua coalfields, the source of coal supply. The Rangiriri site was least favoured because it involved the greatest number of residents and consequently the most social disruption. It was also remotest from the coal supply. The Clune Road site ranked second but was a long way behind the Meremere site (Murray-North Partners, 1983d). NZE staff personally contacted and visited all of the landowners who could be affected by the siting of the power station before the public announcement that the site choice had been narrowed to three.

Towards the end of 1983, the Meremere site was dropped from consideration following further geotechnical investigations and possible social consequences of locating another coal-fired power station at Meremere village. Thus two sites remained for further consideration; Clune Road and Rangiriri (Figure Eight). During 1984, and up until the announcement of the site choice in April 1985, NZE staff kept residents in the Clune Road and Rangiriri areas informed of progress on site selection by the circulation of newsletters,

...when we had got to three sites and we knew that those were the three, we decided that it was essential that all of the landowners who could be possibly affected should be personally contacted and talked to and told "Yes, I am sorry your farm is on one of these sites and within about a week

you will read about it in the papers". So I went around all these people and in the process of doing this I gained a bit in the discussion which was usually over the kitchen table with tea and scones with the husband and wife and others of the family. You got a reasonable picture of their lifestyle and what they did, whether they were sharemilkers or transient, or third generation, and so on and what they thought about the project (McGlinchy, pers. comm., 1987).

Despite some personal contacts and the circulars, little information was passed directly on to landowners by members of WEDRC, WUC or the Waikato County Council. One Clune Road landowner commented that his best sources of information were the news media and the personal visits by NZE staff. The landowners also appreciated visits by CFE staff in the course of their preparation of the audit of the EIR (B. Riddell; D. Cameron, pers. comms., 1987).

An NZE official commented that he considered they failed to talk early enough with local authority councillors and staff once they had narrowed down the choice of sites to localities. He attributed this, in part, to the organisational arrangements of the project and conflict between central and regional instruments,

...because we tied ourselves into the regional committee and ... the social planning study group which were basically regionally orientated. There is a degree of conflict between the local authorities and the regional concept which the Ministry of Works almost foisted onto local authorities. So what that meant in terms of practice was that our communication with local authorities wasn't good (Willis, pers. comm., 1987).

There were also suggestions from participants that a local person could have been employed to liaise between local people and NZE officials in Wellington. This appointment would have served two

purposes: to assist in informing landowners about the project; and to communicate local concerns to NZE officials (Lumsden, pers. comm., 1987; McGlinchy, pers. comm., 1987).

The consultations with communities and landowners from 1981 to 1984 demonstrate that NZE officials, in association with their consultants, were informing Pakeha landowners, as diplomatically as possible, that their capital investment in land was potentially threatened. The methods of consultation show that the contacts were carefully managed to minimise the likelihood of public conflict. NZE officials were seeking the co-operation of landowners, some of whom would be eventually faced with the prospect of being required to sell their properties to the Crown and leave the district. Landowners were aware that they would receive compensation, subsequent to negotiations, in the government tradition of constructing public works in New Zealand. Involving community leaders in small workshops effectively co-opted people into the project which meant that public dissent was less likely to emerge. At the same time, this approach revealed information about the nature of communities to assist consultants to make assessments about how communities would be affected by the construction of a power station in their locality. The circulation of newsletters to landowners in the two final sites under consideration and personal visits by senior NZE officials demonstrated that officials sought to maintain the co-operation of the landowners, being aware of the high level of risks for the landowners involved and the potential political difficulties if the final site was not acceptable.

#### CONSULTATIONS WITH MĀORI COMMUNITIES

This section reviews the nature and extent of consultations undertaken by MOE officials with representatives of Māori communities. The Tainui Māori Trust Board was able to engage actively in planning for the power station through its

relationship with the staff of the Centre for Māori Studies and Research at the University of Waikato. The Centre was established to respond to requests from Māori groups and agencies for research in the context of community action. In providing access to the facilities of the University, staff could contribute to the economic, social and educational development of tribal groups within the University region (Centre for Māori Studies and Research, 1989). Thus the Board was represented on committees by a Pakeha university professor, Professor James Richie who was able to advise MOE officials as planning for the power station proceeded. The involvement of the Trust Board offered the challenge of a Tainui cultural perspective to the Pakeha officials engaged in the project, in a way which they had not previously experienced.

The first part of this section reviews consultations by NZE officials which were carried out independently of the formal institutional arrangements established to liaise with Waikato local authority politicians and staff. The second part reviews resistance by local authority politicians in addressing Māori concerns. The third part examines the initiatives taken by the Tainui Māori Trust Board and Centre for Māori Studies and Research to establish a programme to monitor the consequences for Māori people of constructing the energy projects.

#### Tentative Consultations and Māori Initiatives

A year after siting investigations commenced, NZE officials arranged to meet with Māori groups to explain the project and forthcoming field work. These meetings were held at Waahi Marae in March 1982, at the Tuakau Marae in Franklin County in August, and with members of the Tainui Māori Trust Board in September 1982. Minutes of the 6 October 1982 meeting of the Coal Station Committee note that the Tainui Māori Trust Board advised NZE officials to maintain contact with them as "they are the umbrella

Māori group. Their interests stretch from Mangere to the Mokau River. NZE should also maintain contact with other groups" (see Figure Four). It was noted by the Chairman in the minutes of that meeting that "the waters of the Waikato were of particular concern to the Māori people" (Coal Station Committee minutes, 6 October 1982).

Despite that initial approach, there was no further contact by NZE officials with Māori groups until 1983. During 1983, minutes of the Social and Planning Effects Study Group record some discussion by members on the need for contact with the Māori community (13 January and 8 June). The minutes of 8 June noted reluctance by officials within Mines Division (SCM) to liaise with the Māori community as a separate group. Professor Ritchie was recorded as saying that there had to be an opportunity for the Māori community to tell MOE what their perceptions of development were - not the other way around. It was suggested in the minutes that Professor Ritchie should ask the Māori Queen's advisor to write to MOE to stimulate communication. The need for contact was reinforced by NZE's consultants in a letter to the Secretary of Energy (Murray-North Partners, 1983a) which outlined the proposed programme for public participation. Workshops were proposed. They were to be held in seven settlements to present the growth options under study for each community and to assess the participants' responses. The letter stated,

We do not consider that such a workshop with the Māori community should be embarked upon until formal liaison has been established between the Ministry of Energy and the local Māori hierarchy.

These statements reveal the awkwardness of Pakeha officials and consultants when faced with having to acknowledge and confront the protocol requirements of another culture or world view. Officials were unsure of how, and whom to approach, in order to develop some understandings of Māori views of the project. Until

this point, there had been no apparent pressing need to talk with Māori representatives. After all, individual and discrete households were potentially threatened by the proposed location of the power station. The Māori form of collective organisation seemed irrelevant to officials. In the absence of everyday world constructs to assist them, officials hesitated. They were assisted in their dilemma by the Trust Board representative, a Pakeha who understood how to act in terms of both world views.

As a result of a meeting at Waahi Marae between MOE officials and Tainui Māori Trust Board representatives held in September 1983 it was agreed that the Centre for Māori Studies and Research, University of Waikato, would prepare a study of Māori concerns about the proposed power station and coal mining developments. A summary of the issues would be provided for inclusion in the EIR (Social and Planning Effects Study Group minutes, 14 November 1983).

The significance of this contract was that the project developer had commissioned a community group, in association with the University of Waikato, to prepare their own assessment of the likely consequences of siting a coal-fired power station and developing coal mines in their area. Previously, officials in government departments such as the Ministry of Energy had always employed their own staff or consultants to provide environmental and social assessments of the likely consequences of proposed public works. For a developer this step was not taken without some risk. There was, for example, no means of exercising 'control' over the contents of the report in the way a client could over commissioned work from a consultant. There were also some contractual problems.

The original estimate for the study, agreed to informally by MOE officials in September 1983, was more than tripled by the following March. By this stage, the work for the report was

nearly completed although well behind schedule. An internal memo explained the potentially awkward situation for MOE officials.

If we were to decline the study we could expect substantial opposition to the power station at the formal hearings and in other political forums.

If we agree to the study then we could engender much better relationships with the local Māoris although we will be expected to implement (or support) their recommendations (NZE file, 18 April 1984, 32/7/12/9).

The memo went on to recommend approval for the additional funding sought from MOE by the Centre for Māori Studies and Research at the University of Waikato.

The report, The Development of Coal-Fired Power Stations In The Waikato: A Māori Perspective, was published in August 1984. The eleven recommendations in the report are summarised below;

the basis of the development levy set under the Coal Mines Act should be based on actual completed cost of the project (rather than estimated value);

the recognition of the Tainui Māori Trust Board as the appropriate Māori authority for distribution of the levy;

mediation concerning Māori interests should be channelled through the Tainui Māori Trust Board;

employment of local Kaumātua to advise MOE concerning cultural and spiritual matters;

financial provision for post-construction assessment of impact;

MOE to adopt affirmative action programmes for employment of Māori people in the Waikato energy developments;

MOE staff should be offered regular marae-based training seminars to raise their level of awareness about Māori concerns;

MOE, in conjunction with Education and Labour Departments, to offer training programmes for young Māori;

Places in skilled occupations should be reserved for Tainui workers;

funds should be made available for further site specific research;

a Māori-based monitoring team should be established to monitor developments as they affect Tainui over a ten year period (Centre for Māori Studies and Research, 1984, 126-128).

In May of the following year (1985), a major hui at Waahi Marae was organised by the Tainui Māori Trust Board to invite officials from central and local government and local authority members to discuss and make some commitment to follow up the report's recommendations. Many representatives of government departments, local bodies and other organisations attended. WEPICC members co-ordinated responses to the recommendations made in the Māori Perspectives report. These were formally presented at the hui.

An internal NZE memo (4 April 1985, 32/7/12/2/1) a month before the hui, indicated support for many of the recommendations in the Māori Perspectives report: this included recognition of the Tainui Māori Trust Board as an appropriate agency to disburse development levy funds; and the need for post-construction monitoring and training programmes for young Māori people. The paper also noted that, based on an analysis of development levy distribution in Northland, disbursement of development levies through local bodies was not successful in distributing resources on an equitable basis to Māori people. The recommendations of NZE staff towards dealing with the recommendations influenced the approach taken by WEPICC members in addressing recommendations in the report.

A meeting attended by staff of 11 government departments was held on 10 April, preceding the hui, to discuss the report's

recommendations. The two principal conclusions from the meeting were that, first, there was a need for better vocational education of the local Māori people. MOE proposed to fund tutors to be based in maraes to give education to young Māori people. The meeting felt this was an "exciting possibility". Secondly, MOE officials proposed to recommend that part of the development levy be allocated to the Tainui people. It was recognised that the Tainui Māori Trust Board was the appropriate body, both for consultation and the disbursement of funds (NZE file note, 10 April 1985, 32/7/12/2/1). This action signified that the Trust Board was given the same status as Pakeha local authorities in the allocation of public funds relating to the Waikato projects. The recognition of the Trust Board as a public body had been made previously in respect of the distribution of amenity grants for the Huntly Power Station (discussed in Chapter Four).

Later in August 1985, following the hui, a special meeting of government department officials and representatives was held in Wellington to discuss recommendations from the Māori Perspectives report, and specifically a vocational training proposal, for young Māori (NZE file note, 26 August 1985, 37/7/12/2/1). After some considerable negotiations, agreement was reached to fund the training proposal in 1986. MOE officials also agreed to fund a kaumātua (Māori elder) to advise MOE on cultural concerns.

In commenting on the advice given to NZE officials to examine Māori issues, the planning consultant to NZE observed,

Fundamentally what we said was, or was intended to say that we, as Pakeha people, are not competent to advise you [MOE] on this subject. That you really need to liaise directly with that community and consult them through people who are competent to advise you. I think, as I perceived at the time, the Trust Board had significant influence in that respect. But I don't think the response from, and I say Wellington agencies meaning wider than just NZE, was as vigorous as it should have been. It was necessary that there were, to my mind, people with responsibility to make commitments who actually

came and met people who were able to speak on behalf of the Māori community and took advice from those sorts of people. There were a lot of people in between which prevented the message going through, I think, sometimes. So my impression was that that influence has become greater since the power station siting decision was made than it was at the time it was made. I think the response was somewhat reactive... (Lewthwaite, pers. comm., 1987).

A central government official commented on the reaction of the NZE project leader to the Māori Perspectives report.

Tainui are interesting. They were politically and potentially a problem. The Ministry of Energy had to make a decision as to whether they were going to co-opt that potential dissent by bringing them on board and throwing them the money and allowing them to develop their ideas or whether they would treat them as another interest group. Now that's obviously where historical antecedent becomes important.

I can think of other people who, had they been steering the project, would not have followed that particular line. So I think that the decision to give the contract to Tainui to allow them to do the report... you can read as a confluence both in terms of the politics of Māoridom in the early 1980s but also in terms of the project manager's particular sensitivities. So they got the money... I recall seeing Brian the day after he'd received the report and he didn't know what the hell to do with it. It wasn't the report that he'd expected. He'd some idea what a cultural impact report might look like and it simply wasn't a cultural impact report. I mean it was a general statement on Māori-Pakeha relations and the role of Energy in that, and Bob Mahuta's [Director, Centre for Māori Studies and Research, University of Waikato] particular developmental scheme for Tainui. Brian was quite perplexed. He wasn't sure whether he'd been had or not. Everyone was telling him he had. He was feeling pretty uncomfortable. But credit to him, this was the report they had commissioned, so this is the report they had to go with and so it was published and owned as part of the EIR (Hill, pers. comm., 1987).

The NZE project official commented on his own change of perspective.

The change that came significantly from the Māori point of view, was my initially narrow perception of the need to keep away from Māori land and specific known archaeological sites to the modern Māori perspective. To a certain extent this was sort of a tradeoff between co-operation over the traditional bits and "if we are involved in the development then we won't oppose any specific planning requests" (McGlinchy, pers. comm., 1987).

There was a recognition by Tainui people that their development aspirations could be accommodated by opportunities likely to be created by the power station and coal mining projects. Because of past events, Tainui people were in a unique position, unlike other groups such as Federated Farmers. They recognised their circumstances as a dispossessed ethnic group predisposed government officials to moderate their conduct accordingly. Thus in negotiations they were able to take advantage of this new dimension in political reality as their morally ascendant position.

Look here, we have got our own plan and our own strategy for development, we want you to read that, we want you to understand that, we want to talk about that with you, and then we want to line up our aspirations with your development so that we are going to achieve our goals which substantially are your goals anyway (Ritchie, pers. comm., 1987).

The need to consult separately, and thereby on their terms of negotiation and co-operation with Māori people, was explained by the Tainui Māori Trust Board representative,

...you have to consider Māori things separately first, and then having considered them separately, then you can talk about how you integrate that separate perspective into that wider view. Because

if you start the other way round the Māori perspective just gets swamped out, ignored, lost as has happened with housing issues and other issues (Ritchie, pers. comm., 1987).

The involvement of WEPICC in addressing issues arising from the Māori Perspectives report was endorsed by a NZE official.

In particular relating to the Māori concerns they [WEPICC] had the time and energy to put into responding to that Māori Perspectives report and the outcome of that, I think was very, very good (McGlinchy, pers. comm., 1987).

The involvement of some MOE officials was also received positively by Professor Ritchie.

I think they saw that, not so much as their responsibility, but their responsibility to help the Māori people to get those issues before government generally....They saw that it was necessary to anticipate trouble and, I think they saw the Perspectives report as a way of both doing that, and creating a favourable developer - community relationship, which it did and it didn't (Ritchie, pers. comm., 1987).

Despite his acknowledgement of the involvement of MOE officials, Professor Ritchie expressed reservations about their understanding of the Māori perspective.

From the Māori perspective, I have never felt secure with any of those people. I never felt that they were going far enough to see what the Māori perspective was really about. So I look back on the whole thing with a certain amount of agony (Ritchie, pers. comm., 1987).

Subsequent events in relation to the recommendations in the Māori Perspectives report were co-ordinated by members of WEPICC rather

than SCM or NZE officials involved in the Waikato energy projects. These recommendations involved matters of policy which fell within the brief of WEPICC. SCM and NZE officials were freed to pursue the day-to-day affairs of project management. This enabled the formulation of a carefully prepared co-ordinated response from officials in government departments. These events confirmed that the action taken by the Trust Board in entering into negotiations with central government was potentially politically advantageous to them.

#### Local authority resistance to Māori representation and concerns

Despite the prominence of Māori issues in the Waikato investigations, it was not until the 20 June 1985 meeting (the fifth year of the committee's operation) that the Tainui Māori Trust Board was formally invited to send a representative to WEDRC. By this stage, investigations by MOE officials were under way on developing new coalfields at Mokau, Taranaki, as a 'backup' source of coal in the event of difficulties with coal supply in the Waikato. Officials were also examining the possibility of locating a 500 MW or 1000 MW power station in the southern part of the Waikato region which would use coal from the Mokau field. It was likely that the station would be constructed either close to the mine, south of the Mokau River or in south Waikato. This station could be constructed either in addition or as an alternative to the Waikato Thermal Power Station, depending on decisions about gas allocation for electricity use or decreased demand forecasts. There were some cost and supply advantages of using Mokau coal compared with coal from Maramarua mines (Ministry of Energy, 1985a, 89).

At this meeting it was decided to rearrange the membership of WEDRC. A number of points were raised in discussion. Members felt that the committee was getting too big; the Mokau coalfield developments were becoming more important and had significant

implications for the Taranaki region; it had been useful to keep the committee together as the two projects were closely related; the current representation of Federated Farmers covered the Mokau region; and "some form of Māori representation was desirable". It was resolved to form a separate committee for the Mokau projects; to invite members from the Taranaki United Council to attend meetings of the Mokau committee; and that the Mokau committee should meet on the same day as the Waikato committee. This would enable people to attend both meetings to obtain an overview if they so wished (WEDRC minutes, 20 June 1985).

NZE file notes (32/7/12/2/1; 32/7/12/2) indicate that there had been considerable discussion on this matter before the 20 June committee meeting. There was some difference of opinion over who would be the most appropriate representative of the Māori community at Mokau to join the Mokau regional committee to be known as (MEDRC); a local person or representative of the Tainui Māori Trust Board. There were questions concerning the jurisdiction of the Tainui Māori Trust Board. The Mokau people of Ngāti Maniapoto are of the Tainui tribes. However no lands were confiscated in the Te Kuiti and Mokau Districts so that the Mokau people could not be described as beneficiaries of the Tainui Māori Trust Board. There had also been indications that the Mokau people did not wish to be represented by the Tainui Māori Trust Board.

By this stage, SCM staff were negotiating intensively with Mokau landowners for their consents to a coal prospecting licence. The coal field was Māori-owned for the most part so that access and ownership of the coal were at issue. At that same WEDRC meeting (20 June), a representative of the local Māori people at Mokau, who was not personally involved in the negotiations, was invited to join the Mokau regional committee. Professor Ritchie, the Tainui Māori Trust Board representative, was to be advised that his appointment was a temporary one until "Maniapoto develop

their own capability to have an articulate and comprehensive view of these matters" (Ministry of Energy, 1985c).

There had been reluctance on the part of WUC members to invite participation by a Māori representative on their regional planning committee. Section 6 (3) of the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 provided for Māori representation on the Regional Planning Committee.

Where in the opinion of the united or regional council there are significant Māori land holdings within its region, the Council may request such Māori District Council as it considers most appropriate to nominate a representative of the Māori people in the region as a member of the regional planning committee.

An investigation of the extent of Māori land holdings in the region was carried out by Hamilton City Council planning staff soon after the WUC was established in 1981. There was some reluctance on the part of WUC to appoint a Māori representative on the Regional Planning Committee because of a perceived difficulty in finding someone who would be representative of the large Māori community in the region. Significant Māori organisations to be considered were the Waikato-Maniapoto District Māori Council as well as the Tainui Māori Trust Board. The Waikato-Maniapoto District Māori Council is a statutory authority established under the Māori Welfare Act 1962 and Māori Community Development Act 1981, and affiliated to the New Zealand Māori Council. The District Council is required to protect and promote the social and economic well-being of the Māori people in its region. The functions of the Tainui Māori Trust Board have already been identified in Chapter Four.

The matter of Māori representation was raised annually by MWD representatives (Burton, pers. comm., 1989). Minutes of the WUC Regional Planning Committee (21 September 1982) record an

approach by the Tainui Māori Trust Board to discuss the place of Māori interests in regional planning. Staff were authorised to discuss the subject with the Trust Board. However no action was taken until the Secretary of the Tainui Māori Trust Board (12 March 1986) raised the issue again and suggested;

My Trust Board being the widest regional Māori body with statutory standing considers that the United Council may well be in need of a representative or representatives reflecting Māori opinion (Tainui Māori Trust Board, 1986).

The United Council consulted with the Waikato-Maniapoto District Māori Council and the Ngāti Maniapoto Pact Trust (an informal group of Māori people, formally established in 1988 as a Māori Trust Board) to confirm that the proposed nominee of the Board was acceptable as the Māori representative on the WUC Regional Planning Committee "reflecting Māori opinion throughout the WUC region". This was confirmed at the 20 February 1987 meeting of the Regional Planning Committee, six years after the establishment of the WUC.

Professor Ritchie, member of the Social and Planning Study Effects Group and appointed as Tainui's representative on WEDRC in June 1985, confirmed the view that local authority politicians believed that they represented all the opinions of their electorates, including those of the Māori community.

There was practically no one on that committee who was saying that there should be anything other than token recognition of Māori perspectives and right through to Harold Sherwin [Chairman of WEDRC] himself a feeling that representations that I was making would be divisive in their communities....So most of those local body politicians took the view that they represented the Māori component of their electorate (Ritchie, pers. comm., 1987).

Comments at committee meetings and in interviews indicated that local body politicians saw themselves as traditionally representing the interests of all their electorates. As discussed in Chapter Five, local body politician members on WEDRC were reluctant to include representation from Federated Farmers as they considered that they represented farming interests. This view was identified by Fookes (1981b) in respect of the Huntly Power Station.

A SCM official commented on the implied reluctance to include Māori representation on WEDRC even after major events such as the 1985 Hui at Waahi Marae,

...putting it simply, it's not traditional to have Māori representatives on such Pakeha committees. There seemed to be an impediment to doing it even at a stage when there seemed to be an expressed willingness by government departments to have that happen. It took another twelve months or more to get any action occurring. So the Māoris were not...as strongly represented as the farming community (Hartnett, pers. comm., 1987).

Some local body politicians were reluctant, and even resented having to deal with representatives of the Tainui Māori Trust Board as a discrete entity or separate group. One spoke of the disproportional influence of the Trust Board. This attitude can be attributed to some resentment held by local authority members over the disbursement of the amenities grants allocated by the Minister of Electricity in respect of the Huntly Power Station (discussed in Chapter Four). The Tainui Māori Trust Board received one third of the grant which totalled \$1.5 million. In 1987 SCM officials were finalising the amount of amenities grants to be distributed to Waikato local authorities in respect of coal mining developments which had taken place. The amount was expected to be several hundred thousand dollars.

I see the Tainui Trust group as closely looking after their own responsibilities, very closely guarding them and their influence seems to me to be entirely disproportionate to their requirements... I wonder why there is so much deference to them by so many people... [in relation to the distribution of amenities grants by State Coal Mines]... I should imagine they would have two fingers and a thumb in it if they had their own way (Wright, pers. comm., 1987).

This suspicion was felt by the Trust Board representative.

So I had the feeling...that I was continually being regarded with a certain degree of suspicion (a) because I was a Pakeha speaking for Māoris, (b) because I was a Pakeha speaking for the Trust Board and not for their Māoris, the ones that are in their electorate which, I think, they think they can control (Ritchie, pers. comm., 1987).

The acceptance by local authority members of the Māori Perspectives report at a WEDRC meeting but refusal to discuss its contents confirmed their reluctance to address Māori concerns. This refusal was not recorded in the minutes (McGlinchy, pers. comm., 1987). The case study demonstrates that there were no formal attempts by local authority politicians to consult with Māori people on issues arising from the energy developments. The politicians demonstrated a reluctance to accept and understand the implications of a world view with which they were not familiar but yet considered they represented in various forums. In part this attitude could be attributed to a reluctance to share the benefits of the energy projects with a group which did not have similar statutory functions and was not involved with traditional local government practice.

Tainui's proposal for monitoring

The issue of monitoring the consequences of the construction of the energy projects on people and their interests had been raised formally in a recommendation included within the Community Overview report (Murray-North Partners, 1983b). The report had also recommended the appointment of two community development workers to work with community groups in Huntly and Meremere. This recommendation was a recognition of an increasingly common practice in other localities to appoint community development workers to work with groups in the community likely to be significantly affected by the consequences of a major project.

A report by the Town and Country Planning Directorate (1984) supported these recommendations. The paper referred to a policy accepted in 1983 in which supplementary funding was provided through the Ministry of Works and Development, usually to united councils. It was suggested that it would be a reasonable expectation that the basic costs (perhaps \$25,000 - \$50,000) be met by the Crown. The report also suggested that funding for the community development workers could come from the Department of Internal Affairs and, possibly, the development levy (depending on legal interpretations). These recommendations were also supported by officers in local authorities when visited by WEPICC members in late December 1983. An updated report to the Minister of Energy from WEPICC confirmed these recommendations (NZE file, 12 June 1984, 32/7/12/2/1).

As discussed in Chapter Four, development levies and amenities grants were designed to assist local authorities and united councils by way of financial aid to enable them to deal with the consequences of major projects. Relevant provisions are contained in the Local Government Act 1974, the Coal Mines Act 1979, and the Electricity Act 1968 (Parsons, 1987). Development levies, not exceeding 0.5 per cent of the capital cost, on any industrial or commercial project where the value exceeds \$100,000 are payable

by private developers under the provisions of the Local Government Act 1974. The Crown, however, is not specifically bound by the development levy provisions. In relation to the next round of Waikato projects, a development levy was not payable although some assistance could be provided by amenities grant clauses of the Electricity and Coal Mines Acts. It was suggested by MWD officers that costs of monitoring be met by the Crown if the Crown was to be consistent in applying the same rules to its own projects as by law it applied to the private sector (Town and Country Planning Directorate, 1984).

The issue did not arise again until receipt of a proposal for monitoring put forward by the Tainui Māori Trust Board to the Secretary of Energy the following year (1985). The proposal was also presented to the Study and Planning Effects Group meeting on 24 July, 1985. In a letter (5 August) to the Secretary of Energy, the Convenor of the Study Group (MWD District Planner) responded positively to the proposal, suggesting that the Ministry of Energy should establish a monitoring system relating to implications of energy projects for the overall community. The letter concluded;

The Tainui Trust Board has got its act together and produced a considered proposal for impact monitoring in relation to the Māori community. Whilst the proposal may not be seen as totally acceptable, it is a long way further than anyone else has got. The Ministry of Energy and the regional community should, as a matter of priority, be looking to establishing a monitoring system to cover the impacts of energy developments for the overall community in the lower Waikato area (Ministry of Works and Development, 1985b).

No immediate official response to the Tainui monitoring proposal was made by MOE officials. The issue had first been raised in the Māori Perspectives report published the preceding year. A letter from Professor Ritchie in response to the MWD District Planner's letter clarified some points about the proposal (30 October,

1985). The letter was discussed at the 5 November 1985 meeting of WEPICC. The MWD District Planner acknowledged the view that the proposal should be tied into the "wider community development" aspects but asked whether this would mean that the Trust Board proposal would be disregarded because the "wider" part of the project planning was not yet geared up. Local authorities were recognised to be "touchy" about "separate development" proposals (such as the training proposal) and proceeding with the Tainui proposal would increase friction with them. It was agreed that the Board's proposal should be part of a wider monitoring effort by MOE in the Waikato.

Consequently Town and Country Planning Division officials of the MWD were asked by MOE officials in January 1986 to develop an outline for a monitoring proposal (Ministry of Energy, 1986a). By this stage, the Centre for Māori Studies and Research, University of Waikato, had been contracted by MOE officials to develop a two part preliminary research project on social monitoring, as it related to the Māori people, and also to the proposed Māori Youth Training Centre to be established at the Waahi Marae. The letter stated the preference of MOE officials for the social monitoring project to be "action" oriented rather than data collection oriented and would like to see a heavy emphasis on information rather than technical data in this project." This was an indirect observation that this project needed to have a different focus than the Huntly Monitoring Project. The letter referred to the request from the Waikato United Council for secondment of a senior planner (discussed in Chapter Six) and their view that this person would put in place a 'monitoring system'. Subsequently, a proposal was developed in consultation with staff in WUC, staff in the Centre for Māori Studies and Research and other Departments in the University of Waikato, MWD (Hamilton), and MOE (Ministry of Works and Development, 1986).

The issue of monitoring was first raised by NZE's consultants in 1983. It was not until the middle of 1985 that action by central

government officials was taken following receipt of the Tainui Māori Trust Board proposal. Several reasons for this reluctance to act on the consultants' recommendations and establish some form of monitoring were suggested by participants. A significant reason was that the Huntly Monitoring Project was perceived by many officials to be an expensive, academic, data collection exercise. A CFE official reported that CFE staff received a lot of that reaction when carrying out the audit of the power station EIR (Hill, pers. comm., 1987). Consequently there was a resistance to the concept of monitoring.

I think monitoring was a dirty word in many respects and I think that has unfairly been brought about in response to the Huntly Monitoring Project which I think took a lot of stick in a somewhat unjustified way (Burton, pers. comm., 1987).

There had also been a lot of resistance to the idea of monitoring...whenever you spoke to anybody, everybody...raised their hands and ran. Tom's work did a lot of unintentional damage by scaring people off the idea of social monitoring. Big expensive projects with apparently nil gains, no lessons for subsequent power stations except for a few broad principles. It (HMP) was generally seen to have been a failure and that perception was without any sort of critical evaluation of the project, but generally that perception was around town (Hill, pers. comm., 1987).

MOE officials had indicated that they were prepared to look at this proposal when it became obvious that the need was there (Hill, pers. comm., 1987). This was confirmed by a NZE official,

...first of all there was a universal acceptance that we were not going to get hung up into another Huntly monitoring...there was nothing we were doing that needed monitoring because all we were doing was investigating...Now we had always seen monitoring as something that you did when you were doing a real project (McGlinchy, pers. comm., 1987).

Other reasons suggested were that there were no committed projects (apart from the power station proposal) and that there was no universal view being pushed forward.

Perhaps one of the reasons why some of those types of things never get sorted really is that there was no concerted and universal view being pushed forward. There was the Trust Board's view, there was the [Huntly] Borough's view which occasionally surfaced, various local body views, perhaps Waikato County being rather more articulate than most, the United Council. But all not coming through a single channel although the United Council attempted to do that (Burton, pers. comm., 1987).

One person suggested that institutional constraints were largely responsible.

It seemed to me that the reasons why various monitoring and liaison proposals didn't get off the ground had more to do with institutional constraints and the diversity of agencies responsible: questions of who was going to pay; who was going to take responsibility; how could one be sure that you could control what these people were doing without embarrassing who was paying; and under whose umbrella they would be controlled and so on (Lewthwaite, pers. comm., 1987).

The events between 1983 and 1986 demonstrate an increasing reluctance of officials to dominate from the centre and a recognition that the united council was the most appropriate organisation in the region to co-ordinate the establishment of a monitoring project. This type of activity was consistent with the responsibilities of united councils envisaged in legislation. During this time, particularly from 1985 onwards, major changes in government policies were occurring subsequent to the election of the Labour Government in 1984. Already there were indications that Cabinet Ministers were looking at the possibilities of united and regional councils taking on more functions. Phillip

Woollaston, Parliamentary Under-Secretary to the Minister of Local Government, stated,

We are looking at the possibility of united councils and regional councils becoming more directly involved with other functions which relate to their regional planning, regional development and regional advocacy role.

The sort of functions, which might be considered in this way, could include the employment advisory role of Department of Labour District Committees, the distribution functions of District Roads Councils and resource management functions, such as those exercised by catchment authorities (Woollaston, 1984).

The wide variation in the performance of united councils throughout New Zealand was becoming increasingly obvious. While some united councils were exercising considerable initiatives in determining what constituted regional planning, others were barely meeting their statutory obligations (Memon, 1983; Carter, 1984). Carter (1984) noted the considerable creative potential for regional planning but anticipated that there would be further reforms on the political agenda of the State.

The urgency to proceed with the projects was slowing as changes in government energy policy allowed more flexibility in timing. Final decisions had yet to be made to proceed with the coal mining projects. Given that central government ministers were embarking on a programme of corporatising commercial state assets, by the middle of 1986 it was becoming doubtful that some or all the projects would proceed.

The other significant feature was that the most vigorous push for proceeding with a monitoring proposal came from the Tainui Māori Trust Board. The Board was able to do this as one of their advisors, Professor Ritchie had been involved in the Huntly Monitoring Project. The Board proposed the use of an instrument

which was unpopular with officials and some local people. Their proposal for separate monitoring for Māori people was also unpopular with local authority people, hence the recommendation of officials to broaden the scope of the proposal. At that stage it appeared that the projects would be constructed over a 20 to 30 year period and the Board was anxious to see the consequences for their people documented. The collation of 'objective data' would have presumably assisted their ability to negotiate compensation with central government, had the projects proceeded.

#### TOWARDS FINAL SITE SELECTION

The publication in September of the Environmental Impact Report (Electricity Division, 1984) marked an important step in the process of decision-making towards site selection. The report presented an evaluation of the two final sites under consideration; Clune Road and Rangiriri. The EIR attempted to assess "measurable and non-measurable planning and social costs" of the two sites. The report concluded,

In terms of commuting and residential expansion costs the housing options for the Clune Road location would be slightly more expensive than for those for the Rangiriri location, but the difference is not significant. The non-measurable impacts listed in the table cannot be reduced to a common basis for comparison as can the measurable or economic factors. The non-measurable factors will be attributed varying degrees of significance depending on the viewpoint of individuals or groups. While the Rangiriri location offers advantages in that housing development could be based on communities with a wide range of facilities available and more established local administration, there would be greater conflicts in lifestyles and values between newcomers and established residents and more people would be displaced than at the Clune Road location. At this point in time there are no significant differences in social impacts between the two locations (Electricity Division, 1984, 209).

The EIR was equivocal in its evaluation of both sites. Clearly, NZE officials were looking for some guidance from submissions to choose one or other site. For the Rangiriri landowners, this was the signal to organise a community effort to oppose the selection of the Rangiriri site (D. Cameron, pers. comm., 1987). The landowners in the Clune Road area were friends and neighbours of the people living in Rangiriri. "So we had to be very careful, any argument we used was very factual and didn't make any comment [on the Clune Road site] at all" (D. Cameron, pers. comm., 1987). They were aware of the potentially divisive effect on the two communities once site choice was narrowed to the two sites and did not wish to exacerbate the situation. The Clune Road landowners did not make any submission on the EIR. In part, this was because they considered that the Rangiriri people had prepared a very good submission which they considered they were unable to match. They also felt outnumbered by the people living in the Rangiriri area who were likely to be affected by the power station (B. Riddell, pers. comm., 1987).

Reaction to the mode of presentation of both sites in the EIR varied. One official saw its contribution towards the final selection of a site in a very positive way.

It is one of the few cases, or the only one that I have been involved in anyway, where in fact the environmental impact reporting process was part of the decision-making in a real sense as to which site you would use (Burton, pers. comm., 1987).

One landowner took a more critical view.

I got the feeling that they were saying "Okay, you tell us which site to choose". I didn't think a lot of that because I felt it very quickly put one community against the other and I think that was the biggest mistake they made (J. Riddell, pers. comm., 1987).

This perception of the presentation of both sites in the EIR was confirmed by another person.

It seemed to me that it was a genuine attempt by NZE to be open and fair with people before it made commitments. I perceived it as being motivated that way but from a local perspective, I don't think it actually came across that way always. A large number of options had, of course, been eliminated long before that and the differences to the two main sites that were being debated were really rather minor in the context of the wider regional range that had originally been looked at. In a sense there were two variations on one site so that I don't think it was quite as big a matter as it perhaps looked in some senses (Lewthwaite, pers. comm., 1987).

A CFE official acknowledged that the NZE officials were looking for the CFE Audit to make their site decision for them (Hill, pers. comm., 1987). Two people commented that they considered that some important decisions on technical issues (such as air pollution, drainage, roading and noise) had not been made and did not consider that sufficient information had been presented to make a really good choice between the sites (Dawson, pers. comm., 1986; Dixon, pers. comm., 1987).

It was 'sort of' implied that another environmental report would be done when a site was chosen but we didn't think there was enough information really to make a very good choice between the two sites...(Dawson, pers. comm., 1986).

The Audit of the EIR was published by CFE staff in February 1985, the following year. CFE staff stated their preference for the Clune Road site but suggested that further consideration be given to siting the station at, or adjacent to, the Maramarua coal mine. Reasons given for this suggestion were that it was an area of existing industrial development; the impact of coal transport would be minimised; the need for upgrading the Maramarua causeway

to carry rail traffic between the mine site and power station over an already modified wetland would be reduced; and there were existing transmission lines close by (Commission for the Environment, 1985, 50). This suggestion was met with surprise on the part of some officials and local body politicians who had been involved in planning work for the power station.

Why they did it, I don't know. I was surprised and quite deeply hurt when they made that recommendation and I felt there was no justification for it. Why they had done it I am not sure because we had certainly looked at it a long time previously and could find no good reason why it [the power station] should go there... (McGlinchy, pers. comm., 1987).

In response, the CFE official responsible for the Audit commented that the audit team saw it quite differently.

From memory it struck the team quite as one that it was a very obvious thing to examine. All the indicators were that in actual fact the coal was coming from Maramarua. We had no reason to believe, despite what the Electricity Division was saying, that the coal was going to come from anywhere else. Given the fact that there were practical difficulties in terms of transportation of coal from Maramarua to any site that was chosen, that there were difficulties with ash disposal and so on - as I said, it struck us as glaringly obvious. We weren't persuaded that the geotechnical evidence that they had produced to the unsuitability of the site was in actual fact terribly thorough and we had an opinion on that (Hill, pers. comm., 1987).

Evidence from the interviews suggested that NZE officials had in mind the potential for developing the station to a two thousand MW station, not just a 1000 MW. Within that scenario the Maramarua mine would not be able to supply the entire amount of coal. So it was the view of CFE officials that to turn away from

sites like Maramarua was based on a much larger scale scenario of power station building (Hill, pers. comm., 1987).

Local authority people commented in the interviews that the Maramarua area had an inadequate water supply which would create difficulties for providing enough water for cooling. NZE staff, in response to the Audit, produced a report which examined the Maramarua site but stated their preference for the Clune Road site (Electricity Division, 1985). They argued that a Maramarua site (which would be constrained to a location four to five km south of the present mine) had an economic penalty of between \$40 to \$200 million which arose from uncertain foundation conditions; distant cooling water supply; and workforce commuting costs (Electricity Division, 1985). A concern, on the part of NZE officials, was that to investigate the Maramarua site thoroughly would take between three to six months and during this time the owners of the land on the other two sites would be kept waiting for a decision (McGlinchy, pers. comm., 1987). Concern was expressed by MOE officials to the Minister of Energy (22 March) about the need to make a decision as soon as possible.

There is growing concern by the local people for the need for a decision on site choice as soon as possible. Comments in the local newspapers and direct contact with the owners confirm this (Ministry of Energy, 1985c).

This was also picked up by the news media (Waikato Times, 18 March 1985). On 26 April, landowners on both sites were advised by letter of the selection of the Clune Road site (NZE file note 32/7/12). The reaction of the Rangiriri people was one of great relief (D. Cameron, pers. comm., 1987) while it seemed inevitable for the Clune Road landowners (J. Riddell, pers. comm., 1987).

I think the biggest problem for everybody involved was the long time that it took for them to make up their minds and, I think, if they could speed that

process up that would be a big help. When it spreads over three years, it is a long time to wait for a decision (J. Riddell, pers. comm., 1987).

The uncertainty experienced by landowners while waiting for a final decision to be made was mentioned by several people. There are different views on the timing of 'public' involvement.

But when it comes to the case of specific proposal, a proposal like this power station being put forward, and a corridor being looked at or a range of options being considered, then that starts to create uncertainty for people, real uncertainty, and they are entitled to some clear indication of what their rights are and what the stage of development is and what input they will have later (Dixon, pers. comm., 1987).

Some interviewees considered that it was inevitable, because of field work activities, to involve the 'public' at early stages in planning for a major project such as a power station; others considered that it was essential. The Tainui Māori Trust Board representative suggested that in order to reduce uncertainty for landowners, it might be preferable to start public discussion about a specific site rather than broad localities on the grounds that people cannot handle a broad perspective approach.

Malcolm Lumsden, himself a landowner at Ohinewai with personal experience of dealing with SCM officials, was hesitant about the timing of public announcements.

Having had the experience in my own situation with State Coal wanting my property and being told at a very premature stage I still have, in my own mind, some cloudiness as to the point at which stage projects should be made public knowledge. My original thinking was the earlier the better. I am not sure if that is now correct. I think that some social upheaval can be saved, some trauma saved or at least the time span shortened by perhaps some

basic homework being done before it gets to the announcement phase (Lumsden, pers. comm., 1987).

The decision to choose the Clune Road site reflected the experiences of NZE officials on previous projects where the choice of sites became politically contentious. It also reflected the views of the senior NZE project engineer who had visited every landowning family in the final sites under investigation.

When we had finished the investigations we then had to make up our mind which site we were going to choose and the choice came down to about twenty five million dollars versus the effects on the two communities. By that stage I had got to know the owners of all the land reasonably well because I had talked to them probably two to three times in their own homes...and so I had a fair idea of who they were and how they were feeling. It became fairly obvious that the Rangiriri community was a close knit community. They were all resident owners, I think without exception...whereas the other site there was very little social interchange and there was only one resident owner and while he might not always admit it, it was known that he was wanting to move. So from that point of view there was less sympathy...

So I campaigned, and ultimately successfully, that we would have a lot of opposition from the Rangiriri site. The people would be opposed to us, they were fairly well politically motivated. One of them happened to be the chairman of Mr Birch's [Minister of Energy] electorate and while they were bending over backwards not to use any political influence, it wouldn't necessarily always be like that. And, as well as the people who would be displaced, there would be neighbours who would be left who would be fairly bitter about the project because they would be literally our 'neighbour'...

Our people eventually decided that it was worth making the extra cost, paying the extra money to do that (McGlinchy, pers. comm., 1987).

The view that the Clune Road locality was the preferred site was not shared by all NZE officials. The other senior NZE engineer on

the project team thought that the Rangiriri site was preferable for technical and cost reasons.

In March 1984 we decided that probably the best site was, from a cost point of view, Rangiriri but Clune Road was only a few tens of millions behind it...The other thing was, I think, they [other NZE officials] didn't think that the difference in cost between Rangiriri and Clune Road was real whereas I am pretty convinced it was... The question was, was that [social considerations] worth us spending something like thirty million dollars more to actually go off to Clune Road. I always felt that additional expenditure wasn't justified (Willis, pers. comm., 1987).

The final report prepared for the Minister of Energy by NZE officials reviewed the two sites under consideration. In terms of site development costs, the Rangiriri location showed a \$25-30 million advantage over the Clune Road site. In addition to better foundation conditions, higher elevation of suitable foundation material at the Rangiriri location offered "more flexibility for design and construction" (Electricity Division, 1985, 6). Costs of coal transport and cooling systems were in the order of \$5-10 million more at the Rangiriri site. In summary, the advantages of constructing the power station were estimated as falling in the range of \$20-34 million, which amounted to 1.5-2% of the \$1400 million project cost for a 1000 MW station (Electricity Division, 1985, 6).

The report noted that "in terms of non-measurable social impacts it is not clear if either location is significantly more suitable overall than the other even though the issues involved are of major significance". The report noted that the "cohesive action" of the Rangiriri residents had focussed attention on the community spirit of the location. "It is the Division's view that the perception of relative community impact between the two sites has increased significantly in favour of the Clune Road site" (Electricity Division, 1985, 2).

The final report acknowledged the difficulties of making a choice where not all considerations could be quantified.

Therefore the Electricity Division is faced with a decision on site choice which hinges mainly on balancing the \$20 million to \$30 million cost advantage of the Rangiriri site against its perceived impact due to noise on the greater numbers of residents remaining at the site location and the greater community disruption caused by the marginally greater numbers of displaced residents (Electricity Division, 1985, 32).

The planning consultant for NZE criticised the way in which NZE officials attempted to justify the findings of the various studies in their final reports.

....it strikes me that there are a number of techniques that could have been available to show the weighting that was being given to the various issues more openly than was actually done. That seemed to be a case of 'well, if this is the result of that particular aspect of the investigation and so overall we come to this conclusion'. The method or means by which that conclusion was actually drawn out of the data was not explicitly identified or quite systematically laid out. There wasn't a clearly identified set of objectives and a ranking of performance of sites in relation to objectives, for example, or ranking of relative importance of objectives. Cost was obviously given considerable weight but not in such a way as it was explicitly possible to identify what the weight was relative to social issues (Lewthwaite, pers. comm., 1987).

Despite these criticisms of the methods used by NZE officials to evaluate the final sites under consideration, the CFE official commented,

But I never had any doubts that the station would go to Rangiriri because I was pretty confident that Brian McGlinchy had a weak spot and the weak spot was community. He was very easily convinced about

the fact that Rangiriri was a much more close knit community and therefore much more capable of being disrupted. And the decision was basically taken on those grounds as I understand it from Energy post-audit (Hill. pers. comm., 1989).

The Clune Road site was announced by the Minister of Energy as the site for the power station on 26 April 1985 (New Zealand Herald, 1985).

On 1 April 1987, nine State-Owned Enterprises were established under the State Owned Enterprises Act 1986. As part of this major reorganisation of the public service, assets of New Zealand Electricity Division of the Ministry of Energy were transferred to the control of Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Limited. Similarly, most of the assets of SCM were transferred to Coal Corporation of New Zealand. Coal Corporation proceeded to reduce coal production and halve the State coal mining workforce. For Huntly, a town of 6750 people, this meant the loss of nearly 500 jobs as plans for the major expansion of coal mines in the Waikato were shelved. For example, the land acquired by SCM for the Ohinewai project has now been offered back to the original owners.

The Clune Road site was transferred to Electricity Corporation (known as Electricorp). Since then, Electricorp has purchased further land between the Clune Road site and Meremere Station so that the Corporation owns a contiguous strip of land between the two sites (Cox, pers. comm., 1990). As yet the Clune Road power station has not been built. A decision to build the power station will be made by the Board of Electricorp but there is no timetable agreed yet. Planning of electricity production has moved from the development, supply-driven mode of the last few decades to a consumer-led, operation. There is sufficient capacity in the electricity production system to postpone construction of new projects for several years. For example, the productive capacity of the existing system can be enhanced.

Electricorp increased hydro-electric generation by 8 percent as a result of improved maintenance and monitoring procedures. Ageing thermal plants such as Meremere can operate past their expected lifetimes by similar improvements (Wyatt, 1988, 22).

Electricorp staff are working on a policy of multiple flexibility in terms of providing electricity from a variety of options such as coal, hydro, gas and geothermal resources. Planning of various power projects, which NZE staff were involved in, is continuing on the basis that sites will be selected (Cox, pers. comm., 1990). Electricorp will then be in a position to determine which projects to proceed with. When decisions are made to proceed with construction, statutory consents will then be sought by Corporation staff. The Clune Road site is identified in the Waikato District Scheme (1988) for energy development. In the event that Electricity Corporation staff proceed to construct the power station, the Waikato District Council will introduce a special purpose zoning. This zoning would contain specific environmental standards and provide the opportunity for public objections and hearings.

#### REVIEW AND CRITIQUE

The methods developed by NZE officials to select a site were, as I will demonstrate, reductionist, systematic and participative in approach. There was no evidence of any application of theoretical planning principles, rather methods were theory-informed through the everyday practice of engineers and planners.

Officials began by examining a broad geographic region of 2500 km<sup>2</sup> and identifying several 'constraints' such as coal supply, availability of cooling water, electricity transmission, and so on. These constraints, and others identified by study groups and consultants, were used to identify possible localities and to narrow down to a limited number of sites. In that sense it was a

reductionist and systematic method. Implicit in this approach was an attempt to proceed in a rational and orderly way, with the publication of siting reports to advise on 'progress' towards selecting the final site. NZE officials wished to apply consistent methods of evaluation. It is evident that they were anxious to quantify social considerations so they could assess the merits of the final sites in dollar figures. This is reflected in the language used in their reports which attempted to 'cost' as many considerations as possible. 'Criteria', such as experience with change, diversity/character of population, conflict of lifestyles, and economic base, which in their view could not be quantified, were described in the Environmental Impact Report as "non-measurable" (Electricity Division, 1984, 210).

Methods were also participative which reflected more recent trends in planning practice. Consultants attempted to provide for community input so that community values and aspirations could be assessed. This provision for community involvement was carefully limited. Once workshops and meetings had been completed, there was no further follow up with participants. The final decision rested with the Minister of Energy on recommendations from officials. Findings from this form of research could not easily be quantified but assisted to make some qualitative assessments about the nature of communities under investigation.

Selection of a site was further dominated by the source of coal supply. Once the decision had been made to use coal from the Maramarua coalfields rather than Huntly fields, attention of the officials focussed on finding a site in the central location. Planning consultants had previously identified this locality as the least desirable on grounds of commuting costs and construction of infrastructure such as housing. Assumptions such as the numbers of houses needed to accommodate workers were highly vulnerable to changes in government policy or delays in construction and were therefore difficult to quantify in any

useful terms. Although the Electricity Division reports never provided explicit reasons for the way in which these concerns were evaluated, the difficulties of quantification made it easier for NZE engineers to assume that potential social problems which might arise could be handled more conveniently. Thus attention came to focus on two sites; Rangiriri and Clune Road.

There is no doubt that consultation by NZE officials with local government representatives, interest groups and landowners was motivated strongly by a desire to find a site which would create as little public conflict as possible. This motivation came from the experiences of senior officials where previous projects became politically contentious. In practical terms this meant advising local government representatives of investigations so that when statutory consents were sought later by NZE staff they were likely to be granted. This was an important purpose for establishing the Coal Station Committee. In practice, this meant that NZE officials established forms of consultation with people whom they felt comfortable with, male rural landowners who held public office and status in their communities. Little information was passed on in this way, and only to Pakeha landowners. The actions of local body politicians demonstrated their reluctance to acknowledge and respond to the views of another cultural perspective. In contrast, central government officials recognised the growing political influence of the Tainui Māori Trust Board and the need to modify their conduct accordingly. Local authorities were not involved in subsequent negotiations with the Tainui Māori Trust Board.

While initially reluctant to consult outside the established official channels of local government, NZE officials did consult with other groups in response to issues as they arose, in particular the challenges presented to MOE officials by members of the Tainui Māori Trust Board. The representatives of the dominant culture were initially reluctant to acknowledge and consider issues presented by a minority ethnic group. These two

different world views were also reflected in the modes of organisation. On the one hand, individual Pakeha landowners were directly and separately affected by the prospect of land purchase. On the other, the interests of the Māori community were not tied to specific properties. In the Māori Perspectives Report, Tainui people laid down a kaupapa or agenda for negotiations with central government. If successful, benefits would be shared collectively with community members. While some issues related to traditional views about resource exploitation, others related to more pragmatic concerns such as housing and employment for their people.

The change of government in 1984 precipitated a marked change in attitude on the part of politicians and officials as they recognised that the issues presented by the Tainui Māori Trust Board would have to be addressed. As broader, policy issues they were dealt with by senior government officials from several departments. The wider membership of WEPICC and the Social and Planning Effects Study Group meant that more disciplinary perspectives were brought to bear on the issues arising from the Waikato projects. Until 1985, the control of the projects was very much in the hands of MOE engineers assisted by MWD planners. The addition of government social scientists to WEPICC and the study group meant that social and community issues began to receive more attention. It also meant that the traditional concerns of officials with physical and infrastructure issues in planning major projects such as the power station were challenged.

The final selection of the site was not dependent on substantial differences in physical and economic considerations. By this stage the need for urgency to make a final decision related more to alleviating the uncertainties of landowners than to any pressing need for electricity. There was some scepticism on the part of NZE officials about the apparent differences in estimated costs of establishing a power station on the two sites.

Ironically, the final choice of the Clune Road site showed that the project engineer was prepared to place greater reliance on his personal judgement of the extent of social and political conflict which might arise from selection of the site than on any apparent systematic evaluation of physical, economic, and social considerations.

In Chapters Five, Six and Seven the complexity of individual actions which occurred within various institutional contexts during the six years of site investigations has been demonstrated. Officials, local body politicians and others engaged in formal and informal discussions at various points in time and space which continuously modified their conduct and influenced outcomes. At times these interactions resulted in new understandings of the processes individuals were engaged in. These actions and events reveal several constructs of the phenomenon of planning. Chapter Eight begins with a discussion of how participants in the case constructed their everyday world of planning.

## **PART THREE : THE PHENOMENA OF PLANNING**

Part Three examines the phenomena of planning and elucidates the nature of planning practice in two Chapters. Chapter Eight interprets the views and perspectives of 'planning' as articulated by the participants in documented records and interview transcripts. Chapter Nine examines the phenomenon of planning in two sections. The first section identifies constructs of planning through an analysis of individuals acting collectively in selected events. The second section considers individuals acting in institutional contexts and places these understandings in a theoretical context.

In a reflexive enquiry, it would not be appropriate to conclude without a reflection on the methods used to interpret the several texts which comprised the evidence used in analysis. The researcher is inevitably involved in the investigation and discourse which comprises the text. Chapter Ten concludes with a statement of theoretical understanding that has evolved from the research experience.

## CHAPTER EIGHT : VIEWS AND PERSPECTIVES OF THE PLANNING PROCESS

The practice of planning is executed by the actions of individuals. Actions occur within contexts of collectively produced meanings. The contexts of this case study include institutional arrangements, administrative government departments, legislation, and central and local government policies. Associated with these is a range of professional people such as engineers, private consultants, local administrators and local people with practical expertise such as miners and farmers. Among these are professional planners employed mainly by local authorities but also, and importantly for the case study, in the Ministry of Works and Development and in private consultancies. In these next two chapters I explore attributes of the phenomenon of planning. In this chapter, I attempt to convey and interpret views and perspectives of 'planning' articulated by participants in the case study.

In the context of the case study, the term 'planning' is used by participants to express particular aspects of the work they were engaged in. These include their constructions of planning for requirements such as a 'national energy plan', planning as a method of approach or of arriving at particular outcomes, as a means of bringing in the public to the process of reaching potentially unpopular decisions, as a means of making predictions about the future, and their views of planning practice. In other words I am examining how participants, both lay and professional, construct their everyday world of planning. Thus I am engaging in the interpretation of texts which involves the double hermeneutic (discussed in Chapter Two). The use of language is central towards understanding how people construct their knowledge and understanding of planning. In examining this, I have drawn on

language used by them in the course of recorded interviews and in minutes of formal committee meetings.

The case study demonstrated two constructs of planning in action identified in Chapter Three. The first was planning as national development, provided for in the National Development Act. The annual Energy Plans became the instrument of this construct. Planning was strategic, based on the exploitation of national energy resources in an attempt to improve the nation's balance of payments by exporting refined carbon products such as methanol and synthetic petrol. Planning was also centralised, because plans, and intentions incorporated in the Energy Plans, had direct implications for the one or more regions which contained the resources. This raised issues of implementation in that the proposals such as exploitation of the gas resources had to be planned and constructed efficiently in order to attract investment from private companies and maintain international competitiveness. For some 'Think Big' projects, particularly electricity generation, the State was the developer in the national interest.

The second construct emerged at the point of implementation. In order to implement the national strategy, it was necessary to engage with local planning instruments to satisfy the legal processes of statutory planning. The new institutional arrangements which established united councils and strengthened provisions for regional planning required that central government officials consult with the newly formed united councils. The construct of statutory planning required that projects such as a power station be designated in local district planning schemes. This point of regional and local implementation tested the ability of local politicians and planners and the planning instruments to cope with the demands imposed by national development planning. The case study is a demonstration of central government officials attempting to put in place a set of intentions, and the interactions which took place with local body

politicians, planners and local people in order to achieve those intentions.

#### PLANNING AS METHOD

The process of identification of a site, which emanates from a decision by central government, the Crown, differs substantially from a request to a local authority to establish a particular land use in the context of a locally prepared district planning scheme. Under the district planning scheme consents are given by the local authority in terms of the Town and Country Planning Act, the district planning scheme and the merits of the application. Decisions of the local authority can be appealed against to the Planning Tribunal. In the context of national development, of strategic national policy, and of political parties elected to office, the selection of a site for a power station has a collective significance beyond that of an ordinary application lodged under a district planning scheme. In any event, the Crown has the power to issue a Ministerial requirement to the local authority, requesting that a particular site be designated for the power station. As discussed in Chapter Four, while the local authority can make recommendations, the final decision rests with the Minister of Works and Development (now the Minister for the Environment). Inevitably, local planners, officials and politicians become caught up in the wider context of purpose and plan. They become instrumental to the national purpose which possibly contradicts local planning policies which they are bound by their office to uphold. Such a compromise is undertaken in the interests of a project of national importance proposed in the Energy Plan.

Considering all the options: selection of a site

The selection of a site involved the application of several methods. Professionals, including scientists, engineers and planners, were involved in various study groups to examine particular aspects of site selection. The findings from the study groups were drawn together by NZE officials and used to reduce the number of localities under investigation to specific sites. This method was described as having two attributes. First was the decision to begin at a very broad level. The complexities of working at such a broad level were not normally encountered in usual day-to-day town planning practice.

I personally think that NZE in their site selection programme followed a desirable course in that they were prepared to go from the very broad, leading down to the much more specific, to find areas of suitability and then sites with promise to evaluate against one another...We started off really from Hamilton to South Auckland...I found that, in the general town planning sense, was very difficult. Planners have always asked to be involved at the start and then get it all right. Not so easy when you actually get that option because you are dealing at such a broad level (Burton, pers. comm., 1987).

Secondly, moving from the broad regional approach to specific sites involved the identification of criteria and elimination of localities on a 'constraints' basis.

All you can really do then, I think, in a town planning sense is to work on a constraints basis. Avoid these areas because of ... and concentrating on the areas where constraints are fewer. And also there are the technical requirements, of course (Burton, pers. comm., 1987).

The application of planning and scientific methods by well-intentioned officials and consultants in the pursuit of a site

was acknowledged by one local body politician. He placed the selection procedures in a political context, recognising that development of energy resources was highly vulnerable to changes in government policy. This was also a recognition of the authority and dominance of central government in the hierarchy of decision-making.

There were a lot of good intentions on the part of the NZE. There was a tremendous amount of planning and scientific approach to it by various parties, consultants etc., and leading up to what was intended to be the start of a selection of site and a date to start and the starting of planning procedures. That was all very laudable but those dates were never kept ... it became, from time to time, a political football. The whole of the electricity scene in New Zealand seems to be very, very prone to political gerrymandering (Page, pers. comm., 1987).

Political considerations of a different kind were important for officials. An engineer justified the approach to site selection on the grounds that not to consider all the options could create problems later on.

The problem you have is to consider all the possible options because if you don't do that people will say "Well, why didn't you look at that particular site?" Against the fact that when people know that you are looking at a development in their particular area it does upset some people; as well, some people are probably quite pleased about it. It is a problem but I believe in the end you must consider all the options. Hopefully you can make a decision quickly (Butcher, pers. comm., 1987).

The "problem" expressed by the engineer touched on the issue of public acceptance which was never far from the thoughts of officials at all levels of the hierarchy of decision-making. Disaffected landowners or organised groups representing aspects of the 'public interest' could make site selection procedures difficult for officials. The public was, in broad terms,

separable into those who would, potentially, be adversely and beneficially affected. All were 'outside' of the official context of action. The closest contact they would have would be with local body politicians, members of Parliament, consultants conducting surveys, senior NZE officials, or by attending public meetings and workshops.

One Rangiriri landowner commented that the public needed reassurance that all options had been considered; adopting a broad perspective achieved this. These comments reflect implicit faith in the methods used by planners and other professionals to select a site. The order and supposed logical rationality of planning is demonstrated as a collective taken-for-granted attribute of the public. It is this attribute which enabled officials and consultants to carry out their investigative work, such as personal visits to landowners, in order to select a site for the power station.

I think they are quite right in throwing open a fairly wide range for a start, purely and simply because people need to know that they aren't just the few that have been selected. It is comfort to have some idea that the planners have considered a wider perspective. I think that is very important. I don't think there is any short cutting it, I would opt for the wide option, or the wide perspective in view, for a start, and I think it should all be revealed because it is important that the public know (D. Cameron, pers. comm., 1987).

The alienation experienced by the delays in choosing the final site was expressed by a Clune Road landowner as "a slow death" (B. Cameron, pers. comm., 1987). Delays in making the final decisions mean that landowners are unable to make decisions about on-farm investment, or that the prospect of selling is considerably reduced. The Tainui Māori Trust Board representative commented on the uncertainties for people which were created by the process, although both participants acknowledged the "rationality" of the method. The "distancing" of people from direct involvement was a result of the decision to begin at a

regional level when information about the proposed power station could only be presented in general terms.

I understood the rationality of selecting a broad corridor and doing preliminary studies in that perspective and then homing down on to a series of sites and then, having studied those sites, selecting the site which would ultimately be the one that they would run with. I understood the logic of that... but from the point of view of the people it created uncertainty. We don't know whether we are involved or not involved. The power station might be way down the road there or it might be right on top of us. Instead of energising people, everybody used that as an excuse to distance themselves from involvement in the planning. It was always going to be somewhere else until finally, klunk, it landed somewhere (Ritchie, pers. comm., 1987).

Once potential localities for the power station had been reduced to two sites, local people became much more involved when their own interests were potentially threatened. They were also aware of the need to take an approach which they assumed used the same language and criteria employed by officials in evaluation of the final two sites. The Rangiriri landowners believed that an issue which potentially affected them intensely could be approached from the point of view of logic and rationality. Ironically, the decision to choose the Clune Road site, was based largely on the potential social upheaval and political conflict which could occur if the Rangiriri site were selected.

I come back to the point of objectivity. Emotion comes into it. There was emotion, there was hopelessness and once we got objective about the thing, the hopelessness disappeared and people got to work and they put down clear and precise thoughts... So from our point of view we had to portray what we considered would be the results and effects of certain actions and that is what I call objectivity. So it is people analysing it and looking at the real effects rather than the imagined or emotional effects (D. Cameron, pers. comm., 1987).

Another view of the approach towards site selection was that it was based on the "line of least resistance" which is not "sound decision-making". The Watchdog Waikato representative referred to another NZE project where six possible routes around Pirongia mountain were evaluated as part of the Huntly to Stratford Transmission Line Project. He argued that analysis needs to be more comprehensive than that undertaken in the evaluation of sites for the power station. Accordingly, he argued that a further environmental impact report should be prepared when the final site had been selected.

But throughout that process everybody was hoping, or tending to think, theirs was the worst place for it to go and they tended to point anywhere else other than their own and the concentration of that feeling seemed that it should go on the Western side of Pirongia. So it is not really a sound process of decision-making to simply choose the site or line of least resistance. It is when there is a final package, a fait accompli to the extent that there is going to be a power station and it is going to be at one of these places. It just depends on how many factors are pushing which way which will determine it. That is when it becomes a problem. It is the extent of the finality, or the perception of the finality of the decision that is being made which is the problem and, I think, there needs to be a graded series of decision making steps where information should be made available to the public so that input can be made no matter what the expense involved for the developer. Something as important as a development like this should be subjected to thorough scrutiny and that by the time we get to a fairly specific site and range of technological componentry then that should be subjected to the most thorough examination of it (Dixon, pers. comm., 1987).

These statements indicate that participants, both lay and professional, implicitly or explicitly accepted the chosen methods as constructs or processes of planning. Any critique was directed towards the application of methods rather than reflection on the grounding of methods. Secondly, landowners experienced difficulties in conceptualising the proposed power

station as 'real' until they were confronted on personal terms. This experience was not unique to landowners. Other participants observed that local authority politicians, and people in communities, found it difficult to comment on a proposal which was not specific and still theoretical (Dawson, pers. comm., 1986; Lewthwaite, pers. comm., 1987).

### Planning as co-ordination

The MWD planners and others, including local body politicians, argued that an overview of the regional implications of the proposed projects was necessary. Projects such as the power station could not be evaluated in isolation from the implications of the coalfield projects, despite the pressing need placed on NZE officials to proceed with their investigations as quickly as possible. The construction of the power station and coal mines meant that follow-on effects such as coal transportation routes, road and rail realignments, location of power transmission lines, local authority boundary adjustments, location of workforce housing and expansion of residential settlements, needed to be considered and planned collectively. This method of planning was part of the traditional practice of local authority planners who sought this type of information, albeit on a lesser scale, from developers. In this case, the projects spanned the districts of several local authorities, hence the need to plan on a regional scale. The identification and planning for the infrastructure requirements of the projects also had consequences for the local district planning schemes in that planning provision for these follow-on effects had to be made.

Planning for the statutory implementation of the infrastructure requirements was not just the province of professional planners. Government departments, as well as local authorities, were responsible for co-ordinating the follow-on effects of the projects. The notion of 'co-ordination' was also reflected in the

institutional arrangements established during the early 1980s. An attempt to achieve a more co-ordinated approach was reflected in the establishment of WEPICC. Until the establishment of this committee, projects were being handled independently by central government officials from NZE and SCM Divisions of MOE. The creation of this committee required that officials from separate divisions within MOE and from other government departments co-operated more closely in terms of planning infrastructure requirements for the Waikato projects.

For a start the Murray-North Overview was the first document that actually was an overview of the Energy Developments as against a coal mine or something. It was an overview of a package of developments and that philosophy was something a number of us had been attempting to bring to the surface and successfully did there. Subsequently I think that philosophy actually became the norm up to a point...(Burton, pers. comm., 1987).

Professional planners and others sought the preparation of overview reports to assist in identifying the collective regional implications of the projects. Given the fragmented nature of project management, and constantly changing assumptions about coal production figures, it was difficult to conceptualise the environmental and social consequences of the projects. These requests represented the issues of implementation created by the imposition of a central government project on regional and local authorities. The statutory provisions of the Town and Country Planning Act 1977, the regional and district planning schemes, were of little assistance in handling the point of implementation. However, methods of planning practice could be employed for evaluative purposes. The issue would then be one of whether local authorities and their planning instruments would be able to integrate national requirements with local planning policies.

### Planning as prediction

Local body politicians expressed their disappointment and frustration with the changing projections of energy requirements which occurred during the early 1980s as site investigations proceeded. Later, proposed energy projects planned on the basis of these projections were radically revised as a consequence of government's decision in 1986 to corporatise assets managed by officials in the Ministry of Energy. They viewed planning as a method of prediction, in this case, the projection of future estimates of electricity demand.

It seemed to me, looking back, that there was not an incisive view of what was required by the Wellington planners in the early stages. They were certainly looking, in those days, at closer engineering parameters than they had when they started this Huntly Power Station. That came through fairly clearly. I think that the early stages with regard to where to put the [next] power station was their prime concern, rather than the size of it, and that always seemed to surprise me. And also the fact that their projections were not particularly concrete as far as power demand... The question I pose and everybody poses who speaks to you is, how did it all go wrong as far as the planning was concerned of the future demands for electricity consumption? That is the thing that is incomprehensible to me and I mull it over and I wonder whether the figures were right and suddenly they will wake up and say "We were on the line with our demands for the year two thousand, and now we have got to catch up." (Wright, pers. comm., 1987).

The politicians assumed that professionals were able to provide accurate predictions about future energy demand. This collective taken-for-granted assumption was also placed in the ability of their own professional staff to look after the technical interests of their local authorities in respect of the power

station. At the first meeting of the Coal Station Committee, in February 1981, when members were discussing responsibilities of the new committee, Cr Holmes was reported as saying,

...the committee would evolve satisfactorily and wasn't too concerned about technical information flow as Mr Eyeington as well as technical staff were on technical working groups.

Despite this faith, events showed later that the politicians did not request sufficient advice from their staff to assist them in understanding information supplied by officials concerning the regional implications of the energy projects.

Professionals involved in the case study viewed the use of projections or figures more pragmatically as a means of estimating the likely needs for infrastructure such as housing. They were also aware that the annual reassessments undertaken in the preparation of the Energy Plans (discussed in Chapter Three) regularly updated projections for energy demand over a twenty year planning period. Part Two discussed how officials dealt with this pressure. The decision to investigate the possibilities of using coal from the Mokau field as an alternative source of coal for the power station, and later to allocate Maui natural gas for use as a fuel source, alleviated the apparent pressure on officials to meet these deadlines. The change in predictions provided officials with much needed flexibility in meeting the requirements of the Energy Plans.

The Community Overview was done in 1983 when a lot of things were fairly fluid and it was fairly obvious that the figures were out of date in the sense of when power stations and when coal mines were going to start up, and the impacts in terms of population that that would have...It was a good exercise to do that because it did look at the communities again three or four years further on... It restated all the numbers that were then expected by all the projects and by the time things would

happen. The irony probably was that by the time it was finished it was out of date. There was a discussion, several discussions, at WEPICC on the need to provide updates and updated figures for the Housing Strategy. In the end, the whole thing went away...(McGlinchy, pers. comm., 1987).

The politicians reflected a view that instruments of planning such as the Energy Plans should have been able to provide certainty so that planned projects would proceed to a final decision and an outcome in the form of actual construction. Professionals were more pragmatic in recognising the implications of changing circumstances, and modified their planning accordingly. Their statements indicate that as practitioners they viewed methods as 'tools' for achieving proposed outcomes, and did not regard outcomes as 'given' as assumed by the politicians and landowners.

#### PLANNING AS DECISION AND OUTCOME

Engaging in a process of site selection led to expectations of participants that a decision would be made and that an outcome, the construction of a power station, would take place. In other words, the abstract concept or proposal would actualise in 'real' terms. In reflection on processes and outcome, different interpretations emerged. While officials involved in site selection evaluated the success of method in terms of outcome, other participants considered what principles were involved in the processes of decision-making.

#### The methodology works: no public opposition

Some officials took the view that the methods used to select a site were successful because there was no public opposition once the site was announced.

I guess the measure of how well it worked is that when we finally announced Clune Road as our choice there was no public opposition and we were able to purchase all the land that we required, again, without any real trouble. There is no doubt about it, the methodology works (Wong, pers. comm., 1987).

It was a successful operation in that there was little criticism of the final site selection. There was some criticism through the Audit of the Environmental Impact Report which I didn't really feel was justified. The area suggested [Maramarua] as being an alternative to be considered, had been considered, and had been discarded for appropriate reasons (Burton, pers. comm., 1987).

Another NZE official commented that the local body politicians were satisfied with the logic of the method the officers used to select a site. He took the view that the politicians assisted significantly because there was no negative public reaction.

They [local body politicians] were comfortable with what we were doing because they knew that there was a team of people and that we had a logic and a justification for where we were going from the total region to the ten sites to the three sites and so on. They saw our studies so I think they were able to "appease the natives", if you like. I don't know, completely, how they did that. Some of them reported to their councils and I think perhaps some of them didn't because they saw themselves as United Councillors. But we didn't get any anti reaction from the public or the individual councils so from that point of view they made a massive contribution (McGlinchy, pers. comm., 1987).

The local body politicians anticipated that, as a result of the application of the methods of prediction and approach, there would be an outcome or decision, in this case, to proceed with the construction of a coal-fired power station.

They can never make their minds up as to what they are going to do and therefore things went on and on and on and on ad infinitum. All the good intentions

of the NZE and all the work that was being put into it by the committee [WEDRC] itself has led really to not very much decision-making at the top level. That became a very frustrating exercise because you like to know that at the end of the day you have made a decision and something tangible results from it (Page, pers. comm., 1987).

I guess one of the disappointing things, of course now in hindsight, was that we spent so much time over such a long period of time very, very involved with a project... now nobody knows if or when it is going to go ahead. And so the cost in time and effort and everything, to people like myself, and Council staff, and others has not been wasted, but it makes one wonder how interested and excited one should get about being involved in projects at an early stage (Holmes, pers. comm., 1987).

These views demonstrate good faith. They were prepared to become involved in a new activity where they met with project developers on a regular basis to participate in selecting a site for a power station. As discussed in previous chapters, they did not have any control over the processes which led towards selection of a site. They had expectations that the time they invested in attending meetings and reading reports would result in an outcome. They believed implicitly that the constructs of planning were 'real' and were disappointed when the intended object of their efforts, the construction of the power station, did not eventuate.

For the professionals involved the outcome was almost irrelevant. They had been required to find a site for a power station and, in their views, had completed the task successfully. Rather than engaging in any critical reflection on method, they judged success in the identification of a site and in the absence of any public opposition.

#### Planning: wise and orderly decision-making

Officials and community groups outside of the official context of action took rather a different view of the decision-making

process than the so-called 'partnership' approach envisaged by government officials. The perspective of planning as achieving 'wise decision-making' was suggested by the Co-ordinator of Watchdog Waikato. Part of this attribute of planning also relates to the rights of the public to participate in decisions relating to the choice of technology and sources of coal.

We tried to take a fairly general overview of it [the EIR] and place it in a planning context of whether this was wise decision-making or not which really hinged, to us, on whether people were going to have another say when the decisions were closer to being made when a site specific proposal with specific technology, specific cooling systems, a preferred source of coal etc, when those issues were finally resolved and presented to the public. The concern is, of course, that after going through the process once the developer is reluctant to go through it again because of the expense involved and tends to present the decisions as a fait accompli saying to the public that you have had your chance to make comment (Dixon, pers. comm., 1987).

A similar view of planning was expressed by the Federated Farmers representative who referred to government decisions, made as part of the 'Think Big' programme promoted by the National Government. His statements reveal a view that the activity of planning should provide for "wise" decision-making. Despite his view that the Waikato coalfield projects, particularly the Ohinewai coalfield development, were examples of "bad planning", his comments still demonstrate faith that the activity of planning can result in ordered decision-making.

I think that really there should have been an inquiry into the process of what went on because there was a mad scramble, at one point prior to the election, I am not sure which date the election was, it was the time the decision was made for New Zealand Steel to go ahead. There was a mad scramble of decision-making that bore no relation to an orderly planning process and that is where the

whole thing came unstuck. You have seen the results of it ...

Our questions and the points that we made about being bad planning, about unwise development, about being too costly as a fuel resource have all borne fruit (Lumsden, pers. comm., 1987).

These statements indicate a faith in the perspective of planning as a process which leads to an outcome. This was also identified by the local body politicians. Others referred to the perspective of planning as wise decision-making. Implicit in this latter view is a notion that the application of planning principles should lead to orderly decision-making.

Despite this faith in the process of planning, a CFE official observed a need for accountability by project developers to those people who have participated in decision-making. In his view, if the final decision is taken in another forum, there is little purpose in inviting participation by members of the public.

The proof of the pudding is always in the terms of decision-making and who makes decisions. There's very little point in opening up any process to participation if the final decisions are taken in some other forum, without any accountability to the participation that's gone on. So to the extent that decisions to go or not go will be taken behind closed doors by non-accountable individuals, then I guess there is no purpose to participation (Hill, pers. comm., 1987).

Despite these views, the outcome of the officials' investigations showed that their approach to site selection and structured participation was very effective in achieving the selection of a site without political conflict. In some respects this relied heavily on the constructions of the planning process held by local politicians and landowners. Their collective taken-for-granted attribute of the planning process enabled their

engagement in the process of site selection and implicit acceptance of the final choice of site.

#### VIEWS OF PLANNING PRACTICE

Several perspectives of planning practice emerged in discussion by participants. These reflected, first, the views of those participants involved in selecting a site for the power station acting on behalf of central government and, secondly, those of participants involved locally in processing the infrastructure requirements of the power station and coal mine projects.

#### Views of the officials: taking people with you

Several participants commented on the need "to take people with you in decision-making". This phrase, or variants of it, was used in the course of discussion by several participants. The statement includes two implicit assumptions. First, that if people are informed about a project, they will support rather than oppose the final decision which is taken by the project developer and may predispose others with whom they talk on an day-to-day basis. Secondly, it is an implicit acknowledgement that participants will share similar constructs of planning.

The more you can take people along with you the better. And, in any development such as this where site investigations are going on there is an area of uncertainty. Through the process I closely questioned my own conscience on the point at which people should know (Lumsden, pers. comm., 1987).

The question of who should comprise the people to be consulted was clarified in the following observations. In the early stages, NZE officials were keen to inform the local body politicians so that they would support the proposal to site the power station in

their region which, in turn, would assist NZE officials to obtain the statutory consents needed to construct the power station.

I am not sure if I was involved in the actual decision-making [about the arrangements of the Coal Station Committee] but I was certainly involved just afterwards in deciding that we had better get a group of people, particularly the local bodies who were concerned, around the table to keep them posted otherwise we felt that they would turn against us if they found that we were imposing things on them. We wanted to carry them along (Chapman, pers. comm., 1987).

Thus the NZE officials were not prepared to consult on the basis of informing a wide range of community opinion simply to exercise any 'public service' attribute. Their approach was to consult the people they assumed would have the status and power to assist their site investigations. Consultation with this group of people effectively reduced the possibilities of official opposition at a local level. One participant described this consultation approach of NZE officials as "technocratic in its orientation" (Hill, pers. comm., 1987).

Another aspect of planning practice arising out of the consultative approach of NZE officials was identified by the MWD District Planner. He commented that the relationship which developed between the developing agencies and the senior local body politicians meant that the politicians became committed to the project. He saw the development of that partnership as a good "planning philosophy".

The local authority, the politicians, the relationship that was established between the senior local authority politicians and the developing agencies via the Energy Committee, I think, was a very important relationship. It was a very supportive relationship, supportive each to the other. I think they see that as their power station, their development, they are part of it and that is useful from the developer's perspective but

it is also a bloody good general planning philosophy, it brings everyone along with the decision that is involved (Burton, pers. comm., 1987).

The senior NZE official stated that it did not concern him whether they received useful technical comments from the politicians or their staff. What mattered was that the politicians were informed of their investigations at every opportunity. This statement does raise questions about the extent to which the contribution of politicians, through forums such as WEDRC, and their staff, through the various study groups such as the Social and Planning Effects Study group, influenced the course of investigations by NZE officials.

We were taking them along every step of the way and it didn't matter to me whether we got good technical comments from, say, technical officers of the regional authority or the local bodies. It didn't worry me too much because they are not really specialists in the sorts of things that we are trying to do (Wong, pers. comm., 1987).

The partnership between the officials and local body politicians was not an equitable arrangement. It enabled the NZE officials to pursue the selection of a site independently of the Waikato United Council and maintain control over that process. The local body politicians attended WEDRC meetings in an advisory capacity only. Analysis has revealed that the two 'partners' had different expectations of the processes they were engaged in. For the officials, it was completing the task of site selection. For the local body politicians, it meant selection of a site and construction of the power station.

Local perspectives: infrastructure requirements, realities of the planning process

Local authorities did not become directly involved in issues of implementation until planning became more site specific by late 1983 and early 1984. Up until the publication of the Environmental Impact Report, Council members and planning staff of the Waikato County Council had not been very involved in formal discussions about the proposed power station. These had been carried out through the instrument of WEDRC. Chapter Six showed that until issues of implementation became clearer, United Council members of WEDRC did not communicate information to their local authorities. They perceived that such communication would compromise their responsibilities to represent regional interests and in any subsequent local authority hearings for obtaining statutory consents.

The Waikato County Council had the opportunity to formulate a response to the EIR published in 1984. As the County Planner explained, the Council had never formally decided whether it supported the construction of the power station. The Council had not been directly approached by central government officials for its views. The only formal opportunity available to them would have been to submit views to the Energy Advisory Committee which sought comment sought each year on the annual Energy Plans. However, there was no firm indication that the power station would be sited in their district. In practical terms, until the localities under investigation became reduced to specific sites in Waikato County, there was little effective action which could be taken by councillors and staff.

So my role, as I saw then [following publication of the Environmental Impact report], was to assess (from the point of view of a planner and from the point of view as the Council's representative) the impact of the power station on the two sites; on the people living in the county and the environment of the county; to make those views known; to

assess the differences between the two sites; how that would affect the people living in the County and the County itself; and to try and push for one or the other as well as pushing for whatever remedial actions we needed to take. I think by the time I was involved the Council had already made a conscious decision, I think probably only in its mind, that they were in favour of a power station so I don't think the Council ever made that decision formally. They were probably never advised whether they should or shouldn't by previous staff. I didn't take it upon myself to go over that ground again. I could have but it would have been a wasted effort as far as I was concerned because at that stage the Council tended to think that a power station in an appropriate location, appropriately controlled, would be a benefit to the County and the number of extra people and money it might bring into the County...So even at that stage we had got past the decision of whether a power station was necessary or not. I think the Council, and even I had, by that stage, felt that the national pressure to have a power station was beyond us overcoming. It was just a matter of making the best of it... (Dawson, pers. comm., 1986).

Her observations explain her position as a co-operating participant in the planning process. On a day-to-day basis planners have to operate within a context which requires that they present their own views as planners as well as representing the views of their employing organisation in submissions and in discussion with project proponents. The Waikato County Planner also explained the context of the processes the councillors and the planning staff became engaged in with the prospect of the power station being located in their County. The proposals of central government politicians encompassed in the Energy Plans overrode the local planning instruments. In effect the planning policies of the Waikato County Council (1982) and views of the councillors on whether a power station should be located in the County could readily be construed as irrelevant. The councillors could readily recognise a requirement to put forward their views in terms established by central government officials. Given the situation as locally understood, the best they could hope to achieve was to ameliorate the likely environmental consequences

for residents living adjacent to the final site. The county planners' responsibilities were to assist the Council prepare submissions on the two sites and ensure that all relevant planning issues were considered. Later, these tasks would include, potentially, the processing of a Ministerial requirement to designate the site once construction was imminent.

The view of the Waikato County Planner that the councillors never formally considered whether they thought a power station should be established in their County was confirmed by the County Chairman. His statements imply an acceptance that the coal resources would be used within the County but they were concerned about the consequences of their extraction.

My Council certainly never sat down and thought basically whether we wanted power stations or we didn't want power stations in that part of the county. I guess we just have an instinctive feeling that that is where the resources were, they were going to be used somewhere and we saw no real fundamental problems in them being established anywhere in the County. Really, when you got down to specifics of exactly where they were going to be established and what their impacts were on the locality, I guess we started pricking up our ears more (Holmes, pers. comm., 1987).

The task for the regional planners was much less defined. The Regional Planner for the WUC expressed his views of the planning process he was engaged in;

A couple of words, and this reflects on the nature of the philosophy of regional planning in the Waikato, co-ordinating, facilitating... facilitating contact by the developer with the local communities, local authorities and local communities and vice versa. The other way as well. And as an advocate for concerns that initially the local authorities brought forward. The assistance of the United Council was required in getting certain action and more latterly, towards the end

of the study ...[it acted] as a catalyst itself  
(Sampson, pers. comm., 1987).

His reflections on the nature of regional planning philosophy, that the WUC members and staff were engaged in, was not apparent to others. The WUC was observed by other participants as not performing the tasks of co-ordination and facilitation on behalf of the local authorities in respect of the energy projects. The establishment of WEPICC and the manoeuvres which took place over the establishment of the WUC housing committee reflect, in part, the views of central government officials that the WUC was not co-ordinating actions needed to be taken by local authorities. The actuality of the situation was that the statutory responsibilities of the WUC were not as clearly defined as for local authorities. They were not involved in the processing of statutory applications and had not defined the tasks which they could potentially undertake in a regional capacity. They were pre-occupied with preparing Section One of the Regional Planning Scheme.

The lack of specificity of the planning responsibilities of the WUC reflected a poorly developed notion of the concept of regional planning. In part this reflected past experiences of statutory regional planning in the Waikato (discussed in Chapter Four). This was implicitly confirmed by a WUC member who commented that "the United Council really does struggle with its goals and objectives" (Holmes, pers. comm., 1987).

#### Duality of planning: benefits and restrictions

The Waikato County Planner stated that the councillors have an ambivalent view of statutory planning. While they view development as being "good" for the County, in that it enables the Council to obtain additional revenue to spend on physical infrastructure, they also perceive statutory planning as being

"inhibitive" in that it can impose costs and therefore hinder development opportunities. At the same time, statutory planning can be used to further particular developmental opportunities such as the construction of the power station.

I think they're still in two minds about planning and they don't have very good memories when it comes to planning. It depends a lot on what's going on at the time. I think it's got past the stage of thinking that planning is something they're required to do by law so they'd better do as little as possible. They've got past that stage and they do see planning as being something that can help influence the development of the County in a way that's more beneficial than if it's allowed to just go ahead without any sort of planning being applied to it. But they do tend to still see it as a bit inhibitive.

Now where they see it as being inhibitive depends on who's involved as far as the applicant goes. I mean if they see what they think to be a good development, something that will bring money into the county, or people being prevented by, say zoning, they will tend to resent planning on that account and they tend to underestimate their own influence as far as developing policies for the Council goes (Dawson, pers. comm., 1987).

An NZE official stated that he found the Waikato politicians much more supportive than those he had encountered in Auckland in relation to another project. In his view they saw the project as bringing benefits to the region and therefore implicitly supported the siting and construction of the power station in their region. The politicians were of the view that resources of the region should be used within the region (Sampson, pers. comm., 1987).

So from that point of view the Waikato people were much more supportive and helpful because they saw that it was a project that was going to be of benefit to them...it was going to bring work and employment into their region and they saw that we were going about it in a constructive and helpful

way and that they were able to influence the direction of things. While they didn't influence it, that is not because they were incompetent, I think it is just because they agreed with what we were doing (McGlinchy, pers. comm., 1987).

The apparent benefits of the Waikato projects were taken-for-granted by the local body politicians. They assumed that their local authority districts would benefit from an influx of workers with their additional demands for housing, other services and indirect job creation. At the same time, this assumption was not unqualified. They expressed some concerns about the consequences of construction for county residents living nearby and siting implications of the power station.

#### Planning practice: views of the actors

Several participants made observations about planning practice and on the contribution of professionals. A NZE engineer commented that he viewed the planning process as one in which problems were addressed as they arose. This statement acknowledges that issues became problematic because they were incongruous with a plan which officials were required to implement. These problems therefore needed to be addressed in accordance with the plan. Thus the day-to-day actions taken by those people engaged in selecting a site for the power station were important. The statement is also an acknowledgement of the implicit realities of practice for those involved in the case study.

Some of the [local authority] chairmen [on WEDRC] handed on their reports straight off to their engineers and secretaries to look and see if there was anything that they felt they ought to comment on but I think others didn't and so, once again, you get personalities coming into it then. That is difficult but, after all, this is what the planning process is about, trying to weave your way through

all these little problems (Chapman, pers. comm., 1987).

Participants implicitly recognised that the implementation of the proposal through various co-ordinating activities is reliant on the willingness and ability of participants to act. This may occur through a set of hierarchical arrangements or through several independent units which are not hierarchically arranged or a combination of both. The NZE officials effectively controlled the formal institutional arrangements which they established in the Waikato. Consultants engaged by them, while reporting to committees such as the Study Group, were directly responsible to NZE officials. MWD officials reported to them as well as WEPICC which was also administratively controlled by MOE officials. There was also a considerable amount of informal information sharing through these networks. The case study demonstrated that unintended consequences for central government officials arose from the apparent inability of local body politicians to take initiatives at appropriate times or, alternately, when they refused to participate in order to negotiate funding from central government. These situations arose because the local politicians were effectively outside the official context of action until they were included within the detailed implementation of the projects.

The same NZE engineer offered his views on the contribution made by the MWD planners. He suggested that the planners were more interested in the means of achieving a final site than in the construction of the power station. The statement reflects some impatience with the planning methods which were perceived to be potentially delaying the outcome, that is the selection of the final site. This statement implicitly recognises two interconnected aspects of practice. The planners offered a different disciplinary perspective towards the project compared with the pragmatic approach held by the engineers, one which focussed on concern with 'means' rather than 'ends'. Secondly,

the statement reflected differences in professional practice. The engineers were responsible for construction of the power station. While the planners were involved in achieving that goal, they were also conscious of having to liaise with planning colleagues in local government in order to achieve some consistency with local planning policies. They were aware that local planning requirements had to be satisfied. In part this was a recognition of the need to smooth the way in order to avoid political conflict.

...I sometimes got the feeling that they were more interested in planning than they were in the power station. That is about the nearest I can get to it, that it was almost an end in itself in the planning for it, rather than the getting on and getting the power station built (Chapman, pers. comm., 1987).

The MWD planner asserted that planners do not make final decisions but that they attempt to influence events which lead towards a decision being made. The case study demonstrated repeatedly that various initiatives were taken by professionals, often as interventions as unintended consequences developed, in order to achieve particular intentions, such as regaining apparent control of events. This statement is an acknowledgement that as part of the final implementation, decisions to proceed with construction of the power station and to recommend the granting of statutory consents would be taken by politicians at different levels of government.

Technical people, we made our contributions where we could. Technicians don't make decisions when it comes down to the end of the day, but one can play around the edges and try to influence where you can (Burton, pers. comm., 1987).

In the context of individual action, this view understates the contribution of professionals in this case. The nature of the

contribution was far more than the recommendations on particular research proposals, and actions which should be adopted by various authorities. It related to the day-to-day practice of officials and the application of professional knowledge on the part of engineers and planners. What emerges in this case is that the 'partnership' was one of professional relationships between engineers and planners to achieve a particular outcome, rather than between officials and local body politicians. The results of this latter 'partnership' could not be tested until statutory applications were sought by officials to enable construction to proceed.

Finding a site to construct a power station was far more than simply finding a location which met engineering and geological criteria. It meant the testing and potential integration of two planning constructs. The power station was part of a national development plan. The choosing of a site in a region which contained the coal resources meant that local planning authorities and communities had to be consulted. Unlike previous national projects, the new instrument of regional planning had to be included as part of the process of integration. Once a site had been chosen, statutory consents from the local authority and Waikato Valley Authority would have to be obtained. There was always the prospect that the National Development Act 1979 could be used to 'fast track' consents if construction became urgent in terms of national energy requirements. The use of this legislation would, however, still require the co-operation of local authorities.

The NZE engineers could not have succeeded in finding a site without the assistance of the MWD planners who understood the more subtle dimensions of the context of agency. Many of the actions of the MWD planners over the six years of site investigations demonstrated their attempts to integrate the two constructs through the instrument of regional planning, both in

their planning approach and in their attempts to encourage the WUC actively to participate in planning for the energy projects.

#### CONCLUDING COMMENT

This chapter has identified a set of planning constructs held by various participants involved in the case events. These constructs were influenced, to a greater or lesser extent, by planning instruments such as the national Energy Plan, the Environmental Impact Report, siting reports and the Waikato County District Scheme as well as the institutional contexts and previous planning-related experiences of participants.

The chapter also revealed that the doing-of-planning is engaged in by many people, lay and professional, only some of whom are professionally-trained planners. The practice of planning is informed by theoretical constructs, although on a day-to-day basis there is little acknowledgement of the theoretical tradition of planning. Participants referred to idealised constructs such as prediction, orderly and rational decision-making, overviews and considering all the options, as means of explaining the purpose of their actions, or how they saw that others, such as government officials, should act. Some of these constructs were specifically proposed by professional planners to assist professional and lay people in the identification of the potential implications of the projects. The suggestion of an overview of the projects was proposed by planners as a means of integrating the requirements of the projects so that those people immediately involved in their implementation could more easily see what administrative actions would be required of them.

These constructs are embodied in the rational models of traditional planning theories, briefly referred to in Chapter Two. The practitioner on a day-to-day basis reformulates these constructs to suit the particular task at hand. Planning practice is therefore theory-informed but the pragmatics of day-to-day

activities requires that participants address the 'problems' at hand. This does not easily allow time for theoretical reflection. The processes of planning are, after all, established to facilitate resource use development, whether a major government project or private sector proposal. Because so many people engage in the processes of planning, it may appear to the casual observer that planners have a set of skills frequently shared by other professionals.

The planners involved in the events outlined in this case study used their professional training and experience within the particular institutional contexts in which they were operating. They were acting in the context of central and local government as advisors to their employers or to their clients as consultants. They were co-operating participants in the processes they were engaged in. Their activities demonstrated that their particular skills as planners lay in their ability constantly to reformulate their technical knowledge with an understanding of the contexts of agency, each individual part of complex processes.

The next chapter identifies constructs of planning through an analysis of actions and events which have already been outlined in Part Two of this thesis. The second section of the chapter draws on some theoretical insights to discuss the phenomenon of planning.

## CHAPTER NINE : THE PHENOMENON OF PLANNING

Planning practice comprises a set of constructs which planners, engineers, politicians, other professionals and lay people engage in both as individuals and collectively in organisations. These constructs are both socially and spatially constituted through institutional arrangements, legislation, planning schemes and everyday practice. Chapter Eight identified and examined the perspectives of planning implicit in the statements of, or taken-for-granted by participants in the case study. This chapter considers the phenomenon of planning as exemplified by the case study. Section one considers the context of individuals acting collectively through an analysis of events. Section two considers individuals acting in institutional contexts.

### IDEAS ABOUT THE WORLD OF PLANNING

It is difficult to capture the constructs of planning practice on paper. Planning practice as encompassed by a nationally-driven government project comprises a series of actions by individuals and groups of people which occur both informally on a day-to-day basis and formally in various organisational contexts. These organisations have different spatial attributes, that is they may be nationally, regionally or locally-based. The boundaries of these spatial units may be culturally-derived (for example, tribally), catchment-based to provide for a specific set of functions such as water and soil management, or more arbitrarily defined on the basis of what becomes largely historical reasons (for example, local authorities). Actions occur within the context of these different spatial constructions or a combination of spatial constructions.

In this capacity, I attempt to uncover the constructs of planning which participants in collective contexts revealed by their actions. I have selected four events to reveal, by illustration, abstract ideas and meanings of the planning process. These events are the establishment of WEPICC, the Huntly 'bushfires', the development of a housing strategy, and the challenge of Tainui.

#### Establishing WEPICC: intra-governmental integration

The establishment of the officials' committee, known as the Waikato Energy Planning and Infrastructure Co-ordinating Committee or WEPICC, occurred in November 1983. The events leading to its establishment and some of its activities were described in Chapter Five.

When the Coal Station Committee was set up by central government in 1981, its officials were not prepared to enter into arrangements which placed the Waikato United Council on a partnership basis with central government, despite earlier Ministerial statements about the need for strengthened provisions for regional planning (discussed in Chapter Three). That action signified the unwillingness of politicians and officials to involve regional government, even partially, in the process of decision-making despite changes to the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 and the Local Government Act 1974. These legal changes of the late 1970s provided for strengthened regional government with the creation of united and regional councils.

Two years later, in 1983, when it became obvious to central government officials that some further action was required to ensure that infrastructure could be put in place in time to facilitate the requirements of the power station site and coal mines, they established WEPICC. Initially, this committee was intended to provide advice to the Minister of Energy. In 1985, following a change of government, and when urgency to implement

the projects was no longer apparent, suggestions were made by NZE officials at meetings of WEPICC that WUC staff could provide the secretariat function for WEDRC meetings. The following year, it was suggested by NZE staff that WUC staff could chair the meetings of the Social and Planning Effects Study Group. By this time additional staff were in place at the WUC. The issue of interest is what is signified by the establishment of WEPICC and the subsequent actions taken by members.

The actions of the Minister and NZE, SCM, and MWD officials reveal several perceptions of planning and the processes in which the practice of planning takes place. First, their actions were centralised and impositional. Officials bypassed the WUC in order to achieve the objectives placed on them by central government ministers. The WUC was dispensable. Officials were aware, however, that the construct of regional planning had been given more weight as a result of legislative changes. This meant that the WUC had to be considered formally in some way so that central government ministers and officials were seen to be observing the intentions of legislators. It was the intention of MOE officials that they would be kept informed through the arrangements of WEDRC. This meant that the WUC were not consulted directly on a regular basis. When urgency of implementation gave way to consideration and the Waikato projects had dissipated, MOE officials encouraged WUC officials to assume specific responsibilities such as providing the secretariat for WEDRC meetings.

Second, the notion of a 'partnership' between central and local government was an idealist construct. There had been no tradition of formal implementation. While the Crown in a legal sense was bound by the provisions of regional planning schemes, the Minister of Works and Development was required to approve each regional planning scheme prepared under the Town and Country Planning Act 1977. By 1981 the WUC had only begun to prepare Section One of the Regional Planning Scheme and felt the

obligation to complete this statutory task. Thus the establishment of the Coal Station Committee, independently of the United Council, became a fait accompli while the WUC was legally deficient. This may have been fortuitous but there never was an intention on the part of central government ministers to cooperate with United Council members. Rather, in respect of the Waikato projects, central government officials expected that the United Council would act in a co-ordinating capacity to implement the plans devised by central government. This was the responsibility of a local executive, not a partner, in project planning. This expectation was revealed explicitly in a paper (author unknown) presented at a WEPICC meeting to discuss 'the region's role in development planning'.

At the present time, the MOE/MWD Co-ordinating Committee [i.e. WEPICC] is having, in effect, to orchestrate this regional response itself in a variety of time consuming (and sometimes unproductive) ad hoc arrangements. This is well demonstrated in the Huntly housing saga.

Clearly the present Regional Energy Committee (serviced by the Electricity Division) is only serving as a means of intermittent exchange of information about projects: it is not a planning or action-oriented group.

#### Proposal

That the United Council be encouraged to take a more active role in addressing the various development issues about which they are concerned and thereby assist the Government to formulate an effective response.

To enable the United Council to more effectively participate in the planning and implementation of the Waikato developments it needs a capacity to collect its own intelligence, undertake its own analysis and be able to consult and liaise with the various parties involved in the planning exercise on a day-to-day basis (NZE file, 3 July 1984, 32/7/12/2/1).

The WUC was expected to respond to demands placed on it and to implement national development plans. There was no view that the WUC should plan creatively in an independent sense or that the WUC might formulate an opinion which might not coincide with the intentions of central government ministers and officials. Local government legislation did not specify functions for co-ordination to regional government, other than for regional planning and civil defence. In this light, the expectations of MOE officials that the WUC members shared the same assumptions about the purpose of the activities they were engaged in and would take appropriate actions were unrealistic. What this analysis reveals is that central and local government officials had different understandings of what I term intra-government integration. This is taken up again in the discussion of the housing strategy.

Third, in the context of WEPICC, 'planning' had attributes of co-ordination, development and implementation. The reason for the deliberate amendment to the name to include 'planning' soon after WEPICC was established was not revealed in the files. I suggest that the addition of 'planning' was an ex post facto recognition of what was involved. 'Planning' was viewed by officials to include more than the formulation of infrastructure requirements. It included all the necessary details of implementation which required the co-operation of local authorities and other government departments. Given other comments noted in WEPICC minutes about the WUC's lack of capacity to assist with implementation of the projects, the change of name also reflected an assumption that WEPICC members were in effect acting as they thought regional planners should.

The actions of MOE officials in excluding CFE staff from the early meetings of WEPICC suggested that officials in charge of the project did not want to be challenged by people who were perceived to hold different views. The MWD planners were 'acceptable' as they operated within the institutional

arrangements of the Ministry of Works and Development. This department was responsible for the construction of public works, including power stations, as well as the administration of the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 and Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967. Officials from the CFE were not compromised by their institutional allegiance in the way that the MWD planners were. Thus the presence of CFE officials potentially threatened the approach taken by the MOE engineers towards investigations for the coal mines and power station, particularly concerning the evaluation of environmental and social issues.

Neither was it in the interests of the MWD planners to encourage their presence given the rivalries between senior officers in the department concerning which agency should be responsible for the assessment of environmental and social impacts of major developments (discussed in Chapter Three). To some extent, these actions demonstrated dimensions of interest-protection. They also reflected the reluctance of officials to expose the construct of national development planning to potential scrutiny by other central government officials. These officials, by the nature of their office, would be very likely to present views which would have conflicted with those of officials responsible for implementing the project. The energy projects had potentially serious environmental consequences for the lower Waikato region. Inherently, this meant that central government was compromising regional environmental concerns in the interests of proceeding to implement national development plans.

By 1985, central government officials involved in WEPICC were indicating a willingness to involve WUC officials more closely in the tasks of implementation. By this stage, the WUC had engaged more actively in regional matters with the assistance of funding from central government. These actions reflected three points; first, the urgency to proceed with the projects was dissipating; secondly, that it was now appropriate for united councils to become more directly involved in the implementation of government

projects and thirdly, the election of a Labour Government foreshadowed the likelihood of devolution of some central government functions to the regions.

#### Huntly 'bushfires': local reactions to national plans

An informal threat by the Mayor of Huntly Borough Council to delay the supply of housing in order to extract other benefits for the Borough prompted MOE and MWD officials to take quick action. As mentioned in Chapters Five and Six, discussion in December, 1983, between WEPICC members and local body representatives and officials revealed that there was disagreement with the urban development options outlined in the Community Overview report. Early in 1984, officials proposed to the Minister of Energy that a study be undertaken to examine areas of land available to accommodate the expected growth in Huntly's population. The purpose of this suggestion, as discussed in Chapter Five, was to ensure that the Crown retained financial control of this planning work and to reduce the local authorities' negotiating ability in their bargaining with the Crown (Ministry of Energy, 1984b).

A short time later, the Waikato County Council resolved not to participate in the housing study unless the brief was widened to undertake a range of work similar to that recommended in the Community Overview report. Officials proposed that the Community Overview report be updated, with an emphasis on housing. This proposal was acceptable to the local politicians. Thus two proposals for further research were approved in order to obtain the co-operation of the local authorities; the Huntly housing study and the Community Overview update. This interchange of views and outcomes was referred to in a paper presented to a WEPICC meeting as an example of "time consuming (and sometimes unproductive) ad hoc arrangements...well demonstrated by the Huntly housing saga" (NZE file, 25 June 1984, 32/7/12/2/1).

This episode revealed several dimensions. First, that central government officials acted to reassert the position of the Crown and to resume the dimension of intra-government relations which they assumed existed. This, as already revealed above, had come to mean that local authorities would take various actions to provide for the necessary infrastructure, such as housing, which would be required of them as a result of the projects. Implicitly they expected local body representatives and officials to co-operate without encouragement and direction from central government officials.

Secondly, the proposals were put forward as acts of placation and motivation to encourage local authorities to proceed with the necessary planning actions (for example, rezoning of land to provide for more housing, and boundary adjustments with adjoining local authorities to bring more land into the Borough). The officials recognised that the local authorities could exercise their statutory powers potentially to delay implementation of the projects. They could, for example, take several years to organise boundary adjustments, rezone land and approve subdivisional plans before the construction of new housing could begin.

Thirdly, the actions of both Huntly Borough and Waikato County Council demonstrated a duality of the construct of statutory planning. Politicians in both authorities recognised that investigations were necessary to evaluate the capacity of Huntly, and some settlements in Waikato County, to accommodate housing. They had already indicated that they considered such studies should be funded by central government because they were part of national development projects. They were not prepared to commit their funds to evaluate the local planning implications of national projects. They were also aware that the projects would bring additional people into their respective districts with subsequent benefits in the provision of additional employment, demand for goods and services and so on. Their actions demonstrated that they were prepared actively to protect their

interests while at the same time they were aware of the potential benefits of the projects, and in the case of Huntly Borough, actively sought the location of the power station in its area as early as 1981.

Fourthly, the actions of the local authorities and the responses by central government officials raised questions about the involvement of the WUC. Other than seeking government funding for a regional overview of the effects of the developments, this episode confirms that the WUC was not intending to take any active part in co-ordinating necessary local authority activities. It demonstrated that, in the absence of statutory requirements, the WUC was effectively irrelevant and that it was more important for central government officials to consult directly with local authority politicians and staff. It also demonstrated that the WUC was not prepared actively to protect the interests of its local authority members, such as Huntly Borough, Waikato and Raglan County Councils. Its actions suggest that the United Council members did not perceive any regional interests to be potentially threatened by the proposed energy developments despite public concerns about the environmental consequences of coal extraction.

Fifthly, the episode also demonstrated compromises for the parties involved. As a result of the agreements reached, central government officials committed more government funding to undertake planning-related investigations. The request for a regional overview of all the implications of the Waikato projects, sought by the WUC and Cr Holmes, was met in the form of an update of the Community Overview produced in September 1983. The request for an overview several months after the publication of the Community Overview report implied that the first report did not provide the information sought by the politicians. The politicians were placated by a proposal which was a cheap alternative to what they actually sought. In the light of mounting public concern about the collective environmental

implications of the projects, including a call for a public inquiry into the Waikato projects from Federated Farmers, it was hardly in the interests of central government officials to provide such documentation.

#### Development of a housing strategy

A third episode which I have chosen to examine is the attempt made by central government officials to encourage the development of a regional housing strategy. Chapter Six outlined the establishment of the WUC subcommittee in 1985 which occurred following completion of the two reports, the Huntly Short Term Housing Study (Harrison Grierson Consultants Ltd, 1985) and the Community Overview Reassessment (Murray-North Partners, 1985). Of particular significance is the initial attempt at a WEDRC meeting to set up a working party to consider housing strategy, which comprised representatives from local authorities and government departments; but not the WUC. As mentioned in Chapter Six, the Chairman of WEDRC, also the Chairman of the WUC, resisted suggestions that the WUC be involved. The District Commissioner of Works approached the WUC to suggest that they take a more active part in developing an appropriate strategy. The Waikato County Planner commented that the local bodies in the area had already begun to meet on an informal basis.

They [WUC] did take a bit of a role in developing a housing strategy but the role that they took was forced upon them pretty much by Raglan, Huntly and Ngaruawahia and Waikato County who were involved anyway, wanted something done and set up their own little subcommittee of the United Council (Dawson, pers. comm., 1987).

The NZE project engineer expressed his frustration at their attempts to encourage the WUC to develop some specific policies.

So we said to the [United] Council, as developers we don't much care where the people live, what would you like? It took several years and a lot of plodding and assistance before we could even get them to understand the question. It was all laid out for them in the Murray-North report and they didn't see it.

Then we did that little pamphlet and had a grand launching up at Cooks Winery and I think there was one submission on all that. And then there was a committee formed by the United Council which again couldn't really get to grips with the subtlety of what we were asking them. It is only now, some years later, and now that the urgency has gone off, that they are really putting in some work to try to get to the answers (McGlinchy, pers. comm., 1987).

The question raised by this episode is why were the WUC members reluctant to engage in a task which appeared to others to fall very much within their responsibilities for regional planning?

First, the WUC members and staff were engaged in the statutory task of preparing Section One of the Regional Planning Scheme. They had commenced this in 1981 and had engaged consultants to prepare draft objectives and policies. Concerns were raised in 1982 about the lack of progress with the preparation of Section One, in particular with the formulation of energy objectives. However, a decision was made not to prepare separate energy policies but to continue with Section One on the grounds that a delay in the completion of Section One was not acceptable. The expectations of WUC members in the early 1980s were that specific energy policies were going to be produced by the consultants. When it became obvious in early 1983 that the energy policies outlined in Section One were unlikely to be of specific assistance the politicians began requesting funds from central government to provide a regional overview of the implications of the projects. What these actions suggest is that the WUC was engaged in its own parallel processes separately from the activities pursued by the MOE officials. The Waikato power station was irrelevant in the context of the regional planning

scheme under preparation. The processes engaged in by the WUC members and staff were not sufficiently flexible or advanced enough to enable the development of specific policies which could be agreed upon by its local authority members in time to meet the needs of the national energy development plan.

What this attitude also reflected was that the WUC members did not have a vision of what the practice of regional planning could achieve other than that provided for in the Town and Country Planning Act 1977. It could be argued that the suggestion by MOE to develop housing policies provided a creative opportunity to plan integrally but which the WUC as an institution was unable to grasp. The WUC members did not share in common the assumptions of central government officials that they were required to facilitate the infrastructure for the projects such as developing specific policies to locate workforce housing. The view implicitly held by the Chairman of the WUC (Cr Sherwin) was that this task rested with the relevant local authorities who would be directly affected. Had his local authority, Waipa County Council, been involved, his view may have been different. The politicians did not believe in the construct of regional planning, other than as an administrative task to fulfil their statutory obligations to prepare a regional planning scheme. They were, therefore, reluctant participants in the implementation of a national development project.

As stated in Chapter Eight, local body politicians took for granted that the projects would bring benefits to their districts and region. The WUC members never took actions which implied that they were opposed to the projects. Their actions showed, however, that they were not prepared to commit funds to evaluate the regional implications of the Waikato projects or to examine the ways in which 'benefits' could be utilised for the region. There were suggestions that in the early 1980s the WUC informally rejected proposals for government funding to assist them with planning work in relation to the power station. They relied

implicitly on the developer agency, MOE, to provide this evaluation until an agreement was reached in 1985 for MOE to fund a WUC staff planning position. Their actions demonstrated, therefore, that they were not prepared to oppose the government projects but neither were they prepared actively to support them. The compromise of institutional arrangements meant that the WUC could operate little more effectively than to liaise between central government officials and local authorities.

### Tainui: challenge and response

One of the unintended consequences for MOE officials was the manner in which they were challenged by members of the Tainui Māori Trust Board. Chapter Seven outlined a series of events which occurred between 1983 and 1985 where Tainui people presented their planning perspective to central government officials. These events included the preparation of the Māori Perspectives report which formed part of the Environmental Impact Report, the hui at Waahi Marae in 1985 where the recommendations from the Māori Perspectives report were discussed, and Tainui's proposals for monitoring the effects of the potential 20 to 30 year construction period of Waikato projects for their people. Chapter Seven also outlined the resistance by local body representatives towards dealing with the particular concerns presented by Tainui.

These events revealed several dimensions of planning. The Tainui Māori Trust Board had developed a vision of a development strategy for its people. This had been made possible through a close relationship with staff in the Centre for Māori Studies and Research at the University of Waikato. This strategy had been presented in the Tainui Report (Centre for Māori Studies and Research, 1983). The preparation of this report had been prompted by other developments in the region such as the extraction of ironsands for the New Zealand Steel mill at Glenbrook. The

experience of the Huntly Power Station and the allocation of an amenity grant to the Board had provided an initial impetus for development of these ideas. The next round of Waikato projects foreshadowed the likely prospect of further funding through allocation of amenities grants in relation to the power station and coalfield proposals. The Tainui representative, Professor Ritchie, acknowledged that the Māori world is very much issue and event oriented:

It is terribly hard to get things going in the Māori world on a day-to-day maintenance basis because that is not the way a hui is run. A hui is run when the word goes out and everybody gathers and there is an issue to be dealt with or when someone dies and there is a tangi and everybody rallies. In the pattern and response, which is the Māori mode of operation, you have got to have a challenge. And so New Zealand Steel's development at Huakina and the Clune Road development was the challenge that brought about the development in the Waahi marae area (Ritchie, pers. comm., 1987).

Tainui people adapted planning principles skillfully to put their development strategy into action. The Waikato projects were irrelevant in terms of then current Tainui development strategy, but provided the means by which some of their objectives could be achieved. Accordingly, they used planning instruments such as the Environmental Impact Report, and developed their proposal for monitoring to put forward requests for government funding. They developed a much clearer vision of what benefits the construct of national development planning could achieve for their people than the WUC demonstrated in responding to the regional implications of the energy projects.

Their actions in approaching MOE officials reflected this mode of challenge and response. Certainly, their challenges placed MOE officials in the position of having to formulate responses to their requests. Some responses took several months to be formulated, an example being the time taken by officials to

respond to Tainui's request to set up a monitoring system. Professor Ritchie suggested that the approach taken by Tainui disrupted the proceedings engaged in by officials and local body representatives but that part of the difficulty was that there was no mechanism established to deal formally with Tainui.

What I did, of course, all the time was to bring to any of those meetings a prepared statement either from the Perspectives report or from other documentation that the Trust Board would produce... The Māori people were always putting forward a well prepared position. I think that being thrown into those proceedings sort of disrupted their game plan a bit. People felt that this was an intrusive element. They wanted to include it because we are all one people, you know, but they really didn't have the understanding or the background or, I guess, the mechanism or the machinery to be able to include it (Ritchie, pers. comm., 1987).

In part this reflected that there was no legislative recognition of the Trust Board in the way that there was for the local authorities and the United Council. So the negotiations which took place between central government officials and Tainui representatives were "outside" the formalised processes. In the absence of statutory provisions officials were not certain how to deal with their requests.

The actions taken by the Trust Board members demonstrated several attributes. They were entrepreneurial, assertive and opportunistic. They sought, for example, statutory recognition as an appropriate authority to disburse development levies. They actively sought to share in the benefits of the energy developments. Tainui people saw those developments as an opportunity to redress their economic and social position which resulted from the land confiscations in the 1860s. They demonstrated that they were able to use effectively various planning constructs both in the formulation of their position and

in becoming active participants in the regional implementation of the national Energy Plan.

#### THEORETICAL INSIGHTS ON THE PHENOMENON OF PLANNING

Section one revealed several constructs and collective positions which were implicit in the actions of participants. It is now appropriate to interpret these understandings in a wider context, which includes the historical and geographically specific experiences of the participants, as well as other events which have influenced their construction of knowledge. In effect I am engaging in a third level of analysis "that between researchers and their intellectual 'community of interest'" (Smith, S. J., 1988, 33) where theoretical insights can be drawn out from the field work.

Historical aspects of agency and structure have already been addressed in the thesis. Chapter Three outlined the development of three planning instruments and new institutional arrangements for regional planning and regional government which took place during the 1970s. Chapter Four outlined specific events which occurred in the Waikato and elsewhere prior to the commencement of the case study. These included the conflict over the siting of the Huntly Power Station and concerns of the Māori community, the establishment of the Huntly Monitoring Project and the development of regional government in the form of the Hamilton Regional Planning Authority. These experiences have, consciously or unconsciously, shaped the knowledge of many of the participants and influenced their actions.

In the context of the case study, individuals engaged persistently in a series of actions. These were influenced by their past experiences and knowledge and also by the institutional context in which participants operated. This context included the professional training of officials to meet

the requirements of their jobs, legislation, central and local government policies, the particular set of responsibilities of the official and of the department, local authority or organisation in which elected representatives held office etc.

Giddens viewed agency as a series of repetitive practices which are engaged in by knowledgeable actors. The individual is regarded, and regards her/himself, as knowledgeable but acting within a social system which bounds the activities of the agent. The social system comprises the reproduced relations between actors or collectivities organised as regular social practices (Giddens, 1984, 25). Structures are the rules and resources which are organised as properties of social systems. These do not exist in time-space but have their existence in being drawn upon by individuals and thereby being reconstituted in their daily practices.

Structural properties of a social system are characterised by three dimensions which occur in the process of interacting: signification, domination and legitimation (Giddens, 1976, 118-126). Structures of signification exist through the communication of meaning. Domination refers to the mutual recognition of authority in interaction: its operation or practice on the mobilisation of two types of resources, allocative and authoritative. The term allocative resources refers to those capabilities which generate command over material and instrumental phenomena while authoritative resources refer to types of transformative capacity generating command over persons or actors. Legitimation refers to the application of beliefs and norms through interaction.

In all three cases, the structures enable the interaction (the medium of interaction) to occur; and the application of these structural properties in interaction acts to reconstitute those structures (the outcome of interaction) (Dear and Moos, 1986a, 233).

Earlier sociological thinkers, such as MacIver (1921), recommended the term 'institution' to refer to the regular, persistent and proper mode of conduct in collective affairs. Thus, analytically, a social system could be construed as made up of a set or series of institutions. The conduct of actors was understandable to themselves when acting in terms of the 'system' and to the observer through the order and regularity of that conduct. Though such a construct enticed the criticism of being teleological, it nevertheless constituted a useful means of understanding the discipline and orderliness of human conduct when expressed in organisational terms.

Institutions exist only to the extent that members of a community believe that through them they are accomplishing a set of actions. Institutions are therefore constructed as part of their 'reality'. For example, local authorities and government departments are usually recognised as autonomous entities by the general public. People refer to 'the city council' as though the council is an object. Institutions come to be autonomous actors instead of comprising individuals who act within one or more institutional contexts and who also draw on their own knowledge and experiences. In this way institutions come to constitute the realities of professional actors as something more than organisation alone implies. Their conduct is not only professional per se, but is concurrently 'of the office' through which their conduct is carried out. In this capacity their conduct has a strategic quality.

In the research analysis of strategic conduct, primacy is given to discursive and practical consciousness and to strategies of control within defined contextual boundaries while institutional properties are assumed to be 'given' (Giddens, 1984, 288). Agents are assumed to be knowledgeable by the analyst. Giddens's (1984, 5) "stratification model of action" acknowledges conditions which bound the action of the agent but do not determine the action of the agent. This model shows the actor as reflexively

monitoring her/his actions. Actors not only monitor continuously the flow of their activities, they also monitor the contexts in which they operate. Giddens distinguishes between rationalisation of action and motivation for action (Giddens, 1984, 6). In other words most actors can report discursively about the reasons for their actions but cannot necessarily do so for their motives. He suggests that overall plans or programmes provide the motives within which a range of conduct is enacted. In terms of the case study, many of the motives for day-to-day action were drawn from the institutional contexts within which actors operated.

Thrift (1985, 368) noted that the ability of actors to draw on and generate knowledge is simultaneously limited by the experience and production of practices and the continual monitoring and reinterpreting of this experience in the light of subsequent experience. He argued that what we know is an important constraint on what we think and do. He suggested that four interwoven limits constrain action. These include an actor's biographically unique experience, the particular habitus (for example, being a member of the same social class), position in time and space, and the communication of knowledge among actors.

I now consider both strategic conduct and the manner in which professional participants were influenced by particular institutional contexts. The empirical events outlined in Chapters Five, Six and Seven provide the substance of my analysis.

The case study showed several groups and individuals were involved in the making of decisions. These included NZE and MWD engineers and planners, local government politicians (regional and local), and Tainui Māori Trust Board, represented by their consultant, Professor Ritchie. There were also others involved. These included central government politicians and local government planners who from time to time were involved in particular events. Officials from MWD in Hamilton were involved in land acquisition on behalf of NZE and negotiated with

landowners to purchase land required for the power station. MWD officials from the Power Directorate were involved in geophysical site investigations and studies of options for ash disposal. Other NZE officials in Wellington and Hamilton were involved in aspects of site investigations as were staff from the WVA in Hamilton. SCM officials attended meetings of WEDRC and WEPICC but worked quite independently of NZE officials, other than on matters of mutual interest such as coal supply and planning of the infrastructure requirements for the coal projects. The case showed that NZE officials consistently took the lead in consulting with local authorities and communities and consequently were respected much more by local people. There was little trust of SCM as a government department. There had been a history of poor communications with local people in the Huntly district by SCM officials about their coal mining activities. The lack of preparedness of SCM officials to implement the proposed fourfold expansion of the Waikato coal mines only served to confirm local fears.

Frequently, participants would represent more than one institution. For example, the MWD District Planner was a member of WEPICC, a central government official and a professional planner. Professor Ritchie was a HMP representative, a university social scientist, consultant to the Tainui Māori Trust Board and later, a member of WEDRC. Cr Page was a member of WVA, WUC and WEDRC. Local body politicians would be members of their local authority, the WUC and WEDRC. The WUC comprised members appointed from constituent local authorities. Sometimes there was confusion over which institutions were being represented, for example whether WUC members represented regional interests or the interests of their local territorial authorities. At times certain actors would be involved in particular events and not others.

The implementation of these national projects was very much driven by officials, engineers and planners, from central

government departments. Accordingly, local politicians were reliant on the advice of these officials and their own local authority staff, if they chose to request such assistance. The case study revealed varying degrees of ability amongst the politicians to comprehend the technical complexities of investigations. As one example, officials met regularly with the Chairman of WEDRC immediately prior to meetings to ensure that he understood the content of the agenda prepared by NZE officials. On the other hand, the Mayor of Huntly Borough and Chairman of Waikato County were effective in putting forward their concerns to various forums and achieving some concessions from officials. During the six years of site investigations, members of these groups interacted with each other with regularity through committees, correspondence and informal discussions. Many of these actions were invisible to the outsider and people on the periphery who were not involved in the official context of action. Some, such as informal conversations which took place face to face, or by other means of communications such as the telephone, were not documented on files or records. These communications occurred within one or more organisational contexts. Proposals were 'sounded out' informally between co-operating individuals before being pursued more formally or recast in a different way for further discussion. Yet it was by way of individuals talking through relevant issues that came to frame the manner in which particular actions were formulated and presented in more formal settings such as committee meetings, planning hearings or recommendations to government ministers.

Our frames of reference are thus negotiated with respect to our past experiences and with respect to one another (Gregory, 1978, 135).

The urgency for MOE officials to implement the Government's Energy Plan and to engage the co-operation of local and regional authorities were important in understanding the institutional

dimensions which both constrained and enabled the activities of participants.

### NZE officials

The NZE officials were both centrally placed and specifically arranged. In this context they formed the most powerful group of actors in the events outlined in this case study. They were responsible for implementing the requirements of the Energy Plan, controlled the committees established to facilitate the co-operation of local people, and were authorised to expend money in search of a site for the power station. The activities of the NZE officials were set within the context of the institutional history of energy planning. The identification and organisation of NZE gave the institutional authority for NZE engineers, along with other MOE officials, to maintain control over the complex series of events which formed the case study. Prior to 1977, separate departments, SCM and NZED, were responsible for managing resources such as coal and electricity. The Ministry of Energy Act of 1977 combined these departments, and the Ministry of Energy Resources, into the new Ministry of Energy. NZED became a Division of the Ministry of Energy. A new policy instrument, the Energy Plans, were introduced by central government in 1979, in an attempt to integrate the use of energy resources. These resources were region-specific, hence the re-arrangement at the centre was played out in the region. In order to facilitate the Energy Plan, new institutional arrangements had to combine centre and region in an almost routine way.

Despite reformulation of planning instruments and the challenges presented by environmentalists during the 1970s, the case study suggests that the ideology of previous attempts to develop energy resources continued to guide the practices of politicians and officials. The apparent commitment to the co-ordination of energy planning with the inclusion of economic, social and environmental

considerations was illusory. In other words, emphasis continued to be placed on single-objective development of indigenous resources. This was demonstrated by the reluctance of officials to engage in any form of collaboration with the newly formed WUC which precluded opportunities to integrate the instruments of energy planning with those of regional planning. Within MOE, officials within Divisions still tended to operate independently, which reflected the former departmental arrangements of SCM and NZED. Officials, when confronted with the requirements of the Waikato projects, were forced to establish a new form of institutional arrangement, WEPICC, to encourage integration of themselves as officers, to co-ordinate technical capacities and to establish regional terms of reference. The array of conventional practices had to be reformulated to execute this part of a national plan. These new arrangements had to be reformulated by those involved.

An example of an attitude embedded in past practices was the rivalry between officials in MOE and MWD. This accounted for the debate which took place between officials from those departments over the proposed structure of the regional advisory committee in 1980. Essentially it was an argument over which departmental officers would have control of the committee. As a department, MWD was responsible for the construction of public works. Traditionally in the case of power projects, MWD undertook construction on behalf of NZED and later MOE. Another example of institutionalised practices which incorporated the intention of maintaining control over the processes of site selection was reflected in the reluctance of MOE officials to invite representatives of the Commission for the Environment onto their several committees.

The actions of the MOE officials were sanctioned within the context of the State through the legitimisation of policy documents such as the Energy Plans and legislation. These policies enabled the officials to achieve the stated goals of the government's

'Think Big' programme. The institutional apparatus of the State also enabled the officials to act within the authority of the government department which employed them and from which they spoke. The NZE officials operated in terms of statutes including the Ministry of Energy Act 1977, which set out specific functions for the department, and the Electricity Act 1968, which, amongst other matters, authorised the allocation of amenities grants. The State, through allocations of the Cabinet Works Committee, was also responsible for funding the investigations of MOE officials and later would have funded the construction of the power station. The State had powers of political and economic control which were exercised through the development of the 'Think Big' programme and the decision to fund the Waikato investigations.

The establishment of new institutional arrangements by MOE officials, such as the Coal Station Committee, later revamped as WEDRC, and WEPICC indicated that officials recognised rather experientially that they could not operate solely within the existing institutional arrangements of departmental offices and local authorities. By the time WEPICC was formally disestablished in 1986, officials had come to regard this form of institutional arrangement as a model which could be applied in similar developmental situations in other regions.

The establishment of WEDRC showed that officials from various institutions represented on this committee wished to retain control over 'their' project and explicitly bypassed the WUC, the new regional instrument, which central government had established. By so doing, a new instrument for regional consultation was created. The establishment of WEPICC, in particular, indicated that the officials, who were by this stage under some pressure to take urgent action, were prepared to develop a new collective instrument for reasserting the authority and leadership of the State relative to other agencies of governmental administration they could have used.

An analysis of strategic conduct shows that the NZE officials also brought with them a set of experiences gained from other energy projects with which they had previously been involved. These experiences added to their stock of knowledge in a particular socio-political capacity which they drew upon and reproduced in their day-to-day experiences. These experiences were verbalised and acted upon in the debates over the control of the regional advisory committee which took place in 1980. The consultative processes which were established during the project were also shaped by these experiences and their professional training as engineers.

Various events which took place during the six years of the investigations illustrated that their stock of knowledge, particularly in a cross-cultural sense, expanded as new situations arose. They had to deal with constantly changing circumstances throughout the site investigations which required them to take particular actions to ensure they retained control of their investigations. Their actions demonstrated that they, in association with the MWD officials, were constantly engaged in the reformulation of the 'reality' of the projects' requirements. Significant examples included developing proposals for further studies when local authority politicians suggested that they might not act to facilitate infrastructure requirements of the projects; the constant readjustment of the timing of the implementation of the projects which had consequential effects for a series of actions which needed to be undertaken by various agencies; and the manner in which MOE officials responded to the challenges presented by members of the Tainui Māori Trust Board.

These experiences were brought to a conclusion by the senior NZE engineer. The senior level of this official who personally visited the landowners in their homes symbolised the institutional importance of the project. He took particular care to make his own personal assessment of the consequences of the final siting decision for the two groups of landowners and was

quite explicit about the way he exercised that judgement. He was not concerned about the need to quantify social considerations but recognised implicitly that it was not possible to assess community disruption other than in a qualitative and subjective manner.

These actions signified that in the course of investigations his stock of knowledge expanded beyond those of a professional engineer to include insights from other disciplines such as social sciences. While highly motivated to find a site which would be acceptable to as many people as possible, his actions demonstrated that he was enabled by the institutional contexts in which he operated to exercise a considerable degree of personal influence over some possible consequences that could have eventuated at the critical time of identifying the specific site. He acted in a way that combined the office, the profession of engineer, the status and dignity of being the most senior of all the officials involved; he represented 'the project' of site selection. In effect, the proposals of the Energy Plan were taken to the homes of the people who owned land on the two final sites under consideration.

#### MWD officials

The MWD officials identified in the case study had long experience of the institutional record of planning. The MWD, as a government department, had been dominant in the 1970s in the national and local administration of the Town and Country Planning Act. The department had a regional office located in the Waikato at Hamilton. There had been little progress made in the Waikato with regional planning in the 1970s although by that stage considerable experience was accruing to local body politicians in the administration of district planning schemes. The reviewed Town and Country Planning Act 1977 and the new Local Government Act 1974 and subsequent amendments formulated new

provisions for regional planning. The new Town and Country Planning Act offered challenges for MWD officials to facilitate the development of strengthened statutory provisions for regional planning. There was provision for a Crown representative on the regional planning committees of the united councils, usually occupied by the district commissioners of works. This legislation enabled the MWD officials to have potentially powerful involvement in the practice of regional planning generally, and specifically in the context of the Waikato projects. This did not occur through the instrument of the WUC. Instead MWD officials became involved in the reformulation of institutional arrangements for the Waikato projects independently of the WUC.

The MWD officials, comprising planners and engineers, operated within the institutional ambit of the Ministry of Works and Development. They had experience of co-operating together, along with staff from legal and property sections of MWD. This department was responsible for the administration of legislation, including the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 and the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967. They were responsible for acting on behalf of the State in planning and water and soil conservation matters. They co-ordinated the statutory planning requirements of government departments, including NZE, and conveyed those to the relevant local authorities for inclusion in their district planning schemes. Officials in the department were responsible for land acquisition and construction of major public works. There was also the National Development Act 1979, which could be used by central government officials to expedite the statutory consents necessary for the power station to proceed. Thus the two constructs of national development planning and statutory planning as provided for in the Town and Country Planning Act 1977, were present in the responsibilities of the department. In the context of the Waikato region, officials were required to integrate the intentions of the Energy Plan, that is, to find a site for the power station and to arrange for its on-going construction, with local requirements of district planning

schemes. The powers of domination and legitimation were subtle but utterly essential for the site selection and the enduring construction phase of the power station as officials interacted with other participants in the course of site investigations.

While MWD officials were acting within the constraints of legislation, the functions of the department, and professional planning practice, the case study showed they were able to exercise considerable initiatives, both formally and informally. Both types of actions were taken to facilitate the interests of the State in achieving the goals prescribed in the energy plans, and the particular set of aspects unique to that department. They worked closely with NZE officials to achieve the goal of site selection. In effect, MWD officials liaised between central government officials and local body politicians and staff to identify what actions needed to be taken by various agencies and to foster the understanding appropriate for the locals to keep going 'on course'. They were, therefore, central to this analysis. The case demonstrated that they were enabled by their departmental responsibilities, as well as their professional training, to act at particular points in time-space when unintended consequences became evident. Thus they acted as they and others had anticipated that the regional planners of the WUC might act. They were, in consequence, acting in the interests of the State and the 'national interest' rather than of local government. The absence of a strong, regional institutional presence with a record of experience and respect for local government in the form of a regional administration also enabled the MWD planners to take the initiatives they did.

#### Local body politicians

Of particular significance to the understanding of the actions of the members of the Waikato United Council was the institutional history of Waikato local government in the 1970s. The practice of

regional planning had developed for political reasons, in the form of the HSPA, as an attempt to pre-empt plans by central government to reorganise local government, and operated very much on a consensus basis of agreement between friends. Subsequently, United Councillors brought with them poorly developed notions of the practice of regional planning. What had been accomplished in the 1970s was the preparation of a regional planning scheme developed out of the agreed urban policies of three local authorities, Hamilton City Council, Waipa and Waikato County Councils. Thus their discursive knowledge of regional planning was considerably limited by the specific knowledge of their past experiences.

The case study has demonstrated that the United Council politicians were not influential as a group and that they were compromised by their institutional arrangements. The compromises related to the confusion between regional interests and local authority interests of United Council members who were directly appointed to the United Council by their local authorities. The new institutional arrangements for united councils required that member local authorities fund the activities of the council on a basis proportionate to population. This meant that funding for united councils would always be constrained, given the lack of commitment to regional planning and fear of overcommitting their local authority budgets. Thus the WUC did not have powers of economic or political domination in respect to its member local authorities. Its only legitimate powers were the responsibilities for regional planning and civil defence.

In the early stages of operation of the WUC, Councillors did not extend their limited knowledge of regional planning because the WUC consultants were still preparing Section One of the Regional Planning Scheme. Thus other opportunities of getting involved in the practice of regional planning were precluded. As the WUC did not have any specific statutory functions to perform on a regular day-to-day basis, they were not effectively engaged in the

practice of regional planning. Subsequently, the WUC was poorly prepared as an institution to respond to the requirements of the government energy projects. Neither were the members able to grasp the creative potential of regional planning in the sense of examining how the benefits of the energy projects could be used to meet their regional objectives. WUC members, such as Cr Holmes, then began to act in their capacity as local authority councillors when they realised that the interests of their local authority districts would be affected by the infrastructure requirements of the projects. These actions indicated that they were more knowledgeable about their responsibilities at the local government level. They had much more experience administering the 1953 and 1977 Town and Country Planning Acts as local government councillors than as regional councillors. In effect their actions as local authority members implicitly confirmed the inability of the WUC as an institution to be made to act on their behalf.

#### The Tainui Māori Trust Board

The Tainui representatives brought with them a long collective history coloured by the loss of an economic base through land confiscations last century. This was kept alive by a continuing sense of grievance and periodic representations to central government seeking redress. More recent events included the insensitive siting of the Huntly Power station next to Waahi Marae, negotiations over access to development levies, preparation of statutory submissions in respect of the Huntly Power Station and increasing industrial use of natural resources such as the waters of the Waikato River. These issues were documented in the publications of the Huntly Monitoring Project. The context of these experiences was important in shaping the recommendations prepared in 1984 for appropriate action by government departments to assist in improving the economic base of Tainui. One outcome of the conflict over the siting of the Huntly Power Station revealed that the statutory provisions of

legislation, such as the Town and Country Planning Act 1953 and Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967, did not accommodate Māori concerns. These experiences led, in part, to the inclusion of section 3(1) (g) in the Town and Country Planning Act 1977. This requires recognition of the relationship of the Māori people and their culture and traditions with their ancestral land.

The Tainui Māori Trust Board emerged as an influential and informed group as official investigations proceeded. They were a group established by legislation but which operated largely outside the apparatus of the State. They had few statutory functions other than operating within the terms of the Māori Trust Boards Act. They did not have substantial funding to allocate or authority to exercise in respect of other groups in the case study. The change of government in 1984 brought with it a new group of central government politicians wishing to redress Māori land grievances. So Tainui were able to exercise new political influences while other landowner groups, such as Federated Farmers, could scarcely expand beyond those traditionally used by them. Consequently, the Trust Board was consulted separately by MOE officials outside the formal committee arrangements. This was also an implicit recognition by central government officials that a working relationship between local authority politicians and the Trust Board was lacking.

The actions of the Tainui people demonstrated that the Trust Board was not constrained by legislative responsibilities or the absence of financial resources. Indeed, this situation enabled the Trust Board to take initiatives. These included the proposals for the Centre for Māori Studies and Research to prepare a report for the Environmental Impact Report on the implications for the Tainui people, the Waahi Hui and the monitoring proposal. In response to the Waikato projects and others, Tainui people created their own procedures to respond and to promote their own objectives.

### CONCLUDING COMMENT

The publication of siting reports and environmental impact reports, public meetings, hearings, and final decision on a site, are visible symbols to outsiders of official action occurring in the context of a particular project. The apparent invisibility of activities occurring within institutional offices emphasises the significance of the signs of the planning process. These in turn constitute events which signify 'steps' towards decision-making. Signs of the planning process represent attempts to demonstrate to the public that proper actions are being taken by the application of an orderly approach to decision-making. This is reflected in legislation such as the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 in terms of the definition of planning, provisions for procedures to deal with the preparation of regional and district planning schemes and the processing of various forms of applications such as notified applications, scheme changes and ministerial requirements. Similarly, the attempt to formulate goals and objectives in regional and district planning schemes to guide land use decisions by councils reflect these principles.

These signs, in the context of a government project, frequently represent the efforts of professionals in applying their technical skills to a particular task. The technical skills employed by planners are implicitly theory-informed and draw on elements of the rational-structural models common in planning thought. The presentation of information in the form of reports shapes others' knowledge and beliefs and their ability to act and organise (Forester, 1982c, 6). Thus the manner in which reports are presented frames the reference in which subsequent discussion or debate takes place.

With the publication of the Environmental Impact Report (Electricity Division, 1984), NZE officials hoped that submissions would assist to determine which site should be selected for the power station. Previous reports had been much

more general in their presentations. Consequently, there was little public reaction other than calls from local authority politicians for central government to fund planning-related work. The publication of the EIR was a signal for the Rangiriri community to mobilise resources and act to protect their property interests. Their submission was shaped in response to the information presented in the report.

Similarly, the publication of the EIR provided the Waikato County Council with its first formal opportunity to comment on specific sites located within its district. The response was therefore framed in terms of an evaluation of the two sites and how county residents and services would be potentially affected. While information was criticised by some participants for its lack of specificity in a comparison of the two sites, the report was used by NZE officials as another 'step' towards the formulation of a final decision. The various siting reports, Community Overview report, Environmental Impact Report and Audit collectively structured and refined potential debate as professionals progressively reduced localities to specific sites.

The various events which occurred throughout the years of site investigations were also the means by which various actions of individuals and organisations came to focus on specific points of the site investigations. These were points of public exposure of the site investigations. In effect, the reports and meetings were catalysts for further actions as people in various organisational contexts responded and created new understandings of the dimensions of the projects. An example of the production and reproduction of new understandings was the debate highlighted by the publication of the Māori Perspectives report and the Waahi Hui. The actions taken by the Tainui people resulted in developments in government policies in direct response to Tainui submissions.

The foregoing discussion demonstrates that the process and practices of planning encompass an understanding of human action concurrently with the application of technical skills. While a structural-functionalist perspective was embodied in the process of site selection established by project officials, the process itself was constantly modified as a result of both individual and collective actions which in turn reconstructed 'reality' for participants and for the public in respect of the signs provided.

In one sense, therefore, three interdependent processes were occurring. The first was the implementation of the plan, that is the on-going, day-to-day management of the processes established to select a site. This was the orderly application of a programme of site investigations, writing up of research, presentation of reports at committee meetings, with decisions made to reduce localities under consideration to specific sites. It was completed when the final site was announced by the Minister of Energy. This process can be described as people-planning-for-a-site.

The second was an emergence on the part of participants of an understanding of the planning constructs held more or less in common by various participants and embodied within institutional contexts. The little discord which did occur was quickly redressed by officials. This understanding was derived from particular events and was reflected by actions taken by participants in response to those events. This phenomenal form of understanding was not consciously acknowledged or articulated by participants but implicit in their actions. This process can be described as people-engaged-in-planning.

The third process was the public involvement, the signs of the planning process, the voices of concern, the media and the official responses to the public. This included the public meetings addressed by the Minister of Energy, publications and statements about the environmental implications of the Waikato

projects issued by various organisations, reporting by the media, community workshops, and interviews conducted by consultants. A much wider and more diffuse group of people was involved in these public interactions with government politicians and officials although not all sections of the public who might be affected were necessarily included. This process can be described as the public-involved-in-planning.

One notable feature of the case study was the invisibility of women in key consultative processes. Women were involved as landowners and as professionals in local and central government and consultants' firms. Women were, however, largely absent from senior decision-making positions in central government. Neither were there any women members of WEDRC and, initially, of WEPICC. It is unlikely that the inclusion of more women in decision-making capacities would have affected the outcomes of the processes which took place during the investigations. Johnson (1989) suggests that the discourses used in land use planning and decision-making are constructed in ways which are oppressive to women. These include the patriarchal type discourses operating in institutions and texts which comprise planning practice. Thus gender-bias is embedded in everyday practice without participants necessarily being aware that methods and practices are male-centred. The male participants interviewed did not raise gender-bias as an issue. However, the women professionals were aware of the male-dominated contexts in which they operated.

The extensive coal resources of the Waikato region, particularly between Huntly and Maramarua, were of strategic importance to the objectives of the national Energy Plan, and, in turn, the economic strategy of central government. Coal production from the Waikato coalfields was to quadruple over a 15 year period to meet the increase in North Island demand for coal. These intentions with their potentially significant environmental consequences were imposed on the social organisation of the region without

prior consultation or preparation. Local and regional authorities with their various planning instruments were expected to facilitate the physical implementation of these intentions.

The selection of a site for a power station occurred in a nationally-driven but regional context. The issues of implementation of the national Energy Plan drew on the spatially and socially constructed knowledge of local body politicians, planners, engineers and lay people residing in the region. Cooperation of these people and the institutions they represented was essential to effect the initial goal of site selection. The final site embodied the constructs of national development planning, regional and local planning.

The past and present experiences of local participants, and in some cases the people they represented, as well as the institutional contexts in which they operated, were important in shaping their perspectives and constructs of planning. These constructs were also influenced by the spatial context in which participants operated. The construct of the region had been imposed on reluctant local authorities in the Waikato region (discussed in Chapter Four). Welch (1979, 42) states;

The region is a cultural space construct ("is something of people" - Groenman, 1972, 102) and as such its validity and usefulness is determined by the level of consensus as to its definition. The arbitrary imposition of a regional framework without this consensus is only of limited short-term value.

Local body politicians demonstrated little commitment to the construct of the region and regional planning. They were more comfortable and experienced with the construct of local statutory planning which took place within spatial units which had been largely unchanged for one hundred years. There was a greater sense of purpose and immediacy to act in the interests of the

local authority unit than the region, which did not appear to the politicians to have any useful and immediate purpose.

The imposition of a national plan with its apparent urgency tested the ability of local government to co-operate by requiring the execution of various administrative and planning actions. This revealed that local participants, including the Tainui Māori Trust Board and local body politicians, were engaged in their own practices and agenda. They were not committed to the national Energy Plan as project partners in any sense but recognised that some regional benefits could be gained by the construction of these projects. Despite the reluctance of local body politicians to co-operate regionally rather than locally, central government officials continued to work with both local and regional instruments of government. The construct of regional planning had, after all, been created by central government, and in the context of regional and local implementation of a national development plan, could not be ignored by officials. By the time the Waikato projects had been effectively postponed in 1986, as a consequence of corporatisation of NZE and SCM, the WUC was in an improved position to co-ordinate local efforts more effectively.

This thesis has reviewed how planning as a phenomenon was constituted and reconstituted as various 'realities' by participants engaged in the search for a site for a coal-fired power station. The participants were well-intentioned people who acted in terms of their past experiences, constructs of planning and institutional contexts. During the course of six years, their understandings of the processes they were engaged in were reformulated as a consequence of on-going interactions with others. The irony of the case is that the proposed outcome of the officials' intentions and interactions with others, the construction of a coal-fired power station, has still not eventuated.

In a thesis based in the interpretative tradition, the researcher becomes inevitably involved in the investigation and discourse which comprises the text. The final chapter reflects on the research process engaged in by the writer during the preparation of this thesis.

## CHAPTER TEN : REFLECTIONS ON THE RESEARCH PROCESS

The process of research for this thesis drew on three disciplines: geography, planning and sociology. As I was writing up my research, I became aware that I was being informed in an interdisciplinary way as an academic researcher.

From my perspective as a planner, I began with an understanding of the search for a site in terms of physical requirements such as the need for suitable geotechnical foundations, coal and water supplies, relevant controlling and enabling legislation, central and local government policies, institutional arrangements and their reformulation, and the mechanics of the planning processes engaged in by participants. This understanding was inadequate, however, to address the central concerns of the process of decision-making about a specific land use. As a geographer, I was confronted with the analysis of processes which led to the identification of a physical site for a power station as part of a national energy resources plan. This process of decision-making was integral with a set of individual and collective social and spatial realities engaged in by officials, politicians and others over a period of six years. The search for an appropriate combination of the physical factors above could not account for many of the individual actions and episodes which occurred during the site investigations.

Thus my attention had to focus on the actors involved in the complex set of social activities comprising the search for a site. As I reconstructed the details of this process my knowledge became grounded in the reciprocation of theorising by the participants and the 'data' collected or envisaged as being required. In the process of uncovering the meanings imputed by others, I enhanced my own understanding of events, processes and

outcomes. In textual-interpretative analyses, the researcher becomes unavoidably part of the research investigation and discourse of understanding.

As Schwartz and Jacobs (1979) graphically put it, we are in the reality construction business: the tortuous business of learning to see the world of individuals or groups as they see it. The existence and relevance of orderings and knowledge of such individuals and groups are accepted and used as the basis of examining the social world (Eyles, 1988, 1-2).

It is therefore appropriate to reflect on the involvement of the researcher, the interpretation of the selection of evidence, and the formulation of the argument presented as part of the research effort. So, in this final chapter I reflect on my experiences and the writing up of this thesis.

#### ENGAGING IN THE PROCESS OF RESEARCH

Using the interpretative method obliges the researcher to be aware of the mental baggage brought to the inquiry. This may take many forms such as experiences, dispositions towards modes of theorising, the use of particular jargon etc. In planning and carrying out of the research and field enquiries I could not put aside the practical and problematical aspects of planning practice. My enquiry was precisely within that field. The discipline of the reflexivist approach to enquiry requires of the researcher an awareness of the presence of others' thought and realities that reveals the logic of their personal and collective endeavours and achievements. Lawrence (1990, 307) aptly commented,

To be engaged in a reflexive research process is to be constantly aware that the relationship between the knower and the known is problematical.

Engaging in dialogue with the participants, and later with my supervisors, reflecting continually on the interviewing, the transcripts, and evidence in file and committee minutes, I became very much aware of a continuous process of change occurring in my understanding. My initial analysis was in the form of a research contract prepared for NZE officials (discussed in Chapter Two). This began the process of evolving self understanding and thereby was integral to what followed. This report was a descriptive and sequentially-ordered account of the selection of a site for a power station by officials. I needed to 'make chronological sense' of my material in this way so that I was confident I 'knew' of all the significant events and episodes which formulated the case study. My field work revealed numerous events which occurred both centrally and locally during the six years of investigations, a complex set of institutional arrangements, procedural matters concerning the process of site selection, and many participants.

I first needed to establish who had been involved, what institutional arrangements had been created and gain an understanding of specific events which occurred. Seemingly unrelated matters or coincidental events would gain more significance when pieced together with other information. I was then able to embark on a more meaningful explanation of individual actions and events. Sequence occurred because the purposes of those involved were explicitly time and space grounded for them. At the beginning urgency was uppermost in the minds of officials. On occasions, it was not until I had pulled together material in a careful, factually-derived way, together with my interpretation of other material, that I could understand, for example, how individuals had been severely compromised by the institutional arrangements they operated within.

In the course of research which takes place over several years, it is not easy to capture these exciting moments on paper. Rather

they become integrated into the text and quickly develop with the next set of insights. Consequently, I found myself engaged in a constant dialogue with my own writing as my thesis took shape.

### SOURCES OF 'DATA'

In Chapter Two, I identified my sources of 'data'. These included the interviews with participants, minutes of meetings, file notes and local knowledge which I used, for example, to assist in identifying the people with whom I thought I should talk. My sources of 'data' represented three time-space individual and collective constructions of 'realities'. These were the 'realities' the participants were engaged in at the time of the events, which I constructed from an analysis of files and committee minutes. Secondly, those reconstructed by participants during our interview, and thirdly, as they viewed their participation while engaged in 'creating' the next event. Schutz (1967, 63) referred to the "reflective glance" which enables participants to view their actions as discrete and meaningful experiences. In other words, it is not until actions are completed that they become discrete events which can be reflected upon by the actors. Thus understanding comes through subsequent reflection on their actions (Lawrence, 1990, 305).

I was privileged to have ready access to government files and the utmost co-operation from NZE officials. These files contained letters, minutes and informal notes of meetings. I was aware, from what I was told by various people throughout the course of my research, that the files did not always contain notes of staff discussions as they addressed pressing issues of the day. I noted an instance in Chapter Seven when a significant action on the part of local authority politicians was not formally recorded in the minutes of a WEDRC meeting. Allan (1986) talks of the need to account for the silences of those who have not registered themselves in historical discourses. Fortunately, through my

involvement as an 'insider' and my access to informal anecdotes, I was able to account for 'silences' in the evidence of which I became aware.

The evidence I chose to collect and later interpret was selective. I did not attempt to pursue an 'objective' inquiry, although at times it was easy to view matters under investigation, such as legislation and organisations, as 'objects' and to impute to them a reified quality. The issue of whom I chose to interview, after taking advice, was a matter of my personal judgement. The files I chose to review were also a matter of personal judgement. I could have, for example, sought to have reviewed more local authority files as a means of further verification of the 'facts'. However, as a researcher, I judged that I had reached an appropriate point in my 'data' collection when it appeared that various accounts had been independently verified and I could accept the veracity of the evidence.

#### ANALYSIS: FROM APPEARANCE TO REALITY

The Greek word for truth is alētheia which in literal translation means "un-hiddenness" (Macquarrie, 1972, 105). In order to enhance my understanding, I needed to elucidate meanings. This involved me in the process of uncovering meanings as conveyed to the researcher through texts of interviews, files and minutes of meetings.

Truth 'happens', as it were, when concealments are stripped away and when things emerge into openness (Macquarrie, 1972, 105).

When engaging in the process of research, this means allowing the evidence to be revealed for what it 'really' is. In other words, I attempted to interpret other texts, the worlds of the participants as they had interpreted them. This involved a

complex unlayering of meanings which emerged from personal statements, individual and collective actions revealed in files and minutes, and through analysis of selected events. These meanings were verified in many ways, but often by other actions and events which occurred over time, during the six years of investigations.

I understood initially "what was going on in what took place" (Marsh, 1968, 18). In the uncovering of meanings, I became aware that I was moving from an understanding of how individuals acted and collective actions occurred to why they happened. In other words I moved from an understanding of "what took place to what was going on" (Marsh, 1972, 18). It is difficult to encapsulate how this process of analysis occurs. As the researcher, I became engaged in a second order, as it were, interpretation of the meanings of the actors I was describing and whose activities I was interpreting.

At the time of these analyses I became aware that I was also engaged in the interpretation of the on-going text event, the creation of text. Rose (1988) in "a note on method" stated;

Dilthey's hermeneutics took the signs of the text to be indicative of what lay behind the signs but modern hermeneutics urges that we look with the text at what it says to successive generations of interpreters thereby involving the text, the interpreter and the interpretation in an on-going text-event...

Hence the text, qua text, is not the object of study, the 'object' arises out of the 'linguisticity' of the event of interpretation. We are apprised of some aspect of 'being-in-the-other' because we ourselves (as interpreters, and as actors) have contributed to it and as we continue to interpret other texts we encounter ourselves as 'authors' of the text event. To continue this encounter while at the same time being concerned with other people's actions is the aim of the modern hermeneutical endeavour (Rose, 1988, 173-174).

In this encounter with other texts and the text I was creating, my theorising became grounded in the meanings imputed by the actors and the 'data' collected. I attempted to avoid placing theoretical constructs on the data, rather I let constructs emerge from the evidence.

An important aspect of this analysis, therefore, is the classification used by the researcher during the writing up of the research. Just how does the researcher classify material in a manner which does not impose unintended boundaries but yet is presented in a coherent form for the informed reader? By necessity, any chapter does impose boundaries on the argument presented in the text. This was a particularly important issue in the writing up of the field work.

The complexity of events and institutional arrangements, the numerous participants, both lay and professional, and the issues posed potential possibilities of ways in which phenomena could be analysed. At some point a decision on the ordering of material had to be made. In one sense the classification used emerged from the 'data'. The nature, variety and sequence of the institutional arrangements and their reformulations were useful means of elucidating meanings. The theme of the centre-to-region-to-local was dominant throughout the case study. The involvement of organisations and people outside the official context of action became significant. Similarly, the elucidation of the phenomena of planning emerged through an analysis of several texts. The decision to identify perspectives from individuals, through selected events, and through an analysis of groups of actors (in other words from individuals and individuals-acting-collectively in organisations and committees), seemed an appropriate method of analysis in the context of the inquiry.

The central concerns of my thesis, as outlined in Chapter One, were to understand how individuals acting within institutional contexts were able to influence events in planning processes. I

had previously recognised that legislation and planning policies imposed constraints on individual action. I was also aware that individuals were enabled by institutional contexts, such as the policies of their employing organisation, professional training and previous experiences, to act effectively in particular situations. I was interested in exploring the relationship between central, regional and local government and the effectiveness of regional government with respect to planning matters. Given my professional experiences in the Waikato region, I chose a nationally-driven but locally-based case study to explore these matters further.

By the time I began writing my thesis, the institutional contexts and planning instruments discussed in the case study had been reformulated by central government in major reforms of the public service, local government and resource management law reform. The corporatisation of departments, such as the Ministry of Energy and its divisions of New Zealand Electricity and State Coal Mines, signalled that central government would no longer be involved in construction of major public works such as coal-fired power stations and coal mines. The Ministry of Works and Development has been disestablished, with its planning and water and soil functions transferred to the Ministry for the Environment. The devolution of the functions of the former Department of Māori Affairs to iwi (tribal) authorities throughout the country is under way.

Local authorities, such as city, borough and county councils, have been reformed into new city and district councils. The number of territorial local authorities nationally was reduced from over 200 to 72. Catchment authorities, united councils and many other ad hoc authorities such as pest destruction boards, noxious plants authorities and drainage boards, have been merged into 14 new regional councils throughout New Zealand, with strengthened provisions and new functions, some of which were devolved from central government.

Major resource use statutes, including the Town and Country Planning Act 1977, the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967, the Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Act 1941, the Mining Act 1971, the Coal Mines Act 1969 and the Geothermal Energy Act 1953 were consolidated into a new Resource Management Bill in 1989. The bill provides for new planning instruments to be prepared by the reformed authorities. At the time of writing, this Bill is yet to be enacted.

Given the above, it was potentially easy to dismiss my research as historical and of limited value for future application. As Gregory (1978, 125), in discussing reflexive explanation in geography, argued,

Implicit in the problematization of discourse is the belief that there are constraints on social action which are so much part of the taken-for-granted life-world of the actors that they are unable to verbalize them or would consider it irrelevant to do so. It must be the part of the task of a critical science to disclose the structures, and this has to go beyond the moments of a purely reciprocal contemplation which might, as Buttner (1976, 289) suggests, help to 'elucidate' how moorings in past experiences can influence and shape the present' but which inevitably has 'little to say about future directions'.

Hence my thesis is more than a phenomenological reflection on the events in the case study. It is a textual-interpretative analysis which endeavours to describe participants' meanings and interpretations, taking account of local and national institutional contexts in which the actors were placed. Thus the case demonstrated attempts by officials to integrate the constructs of national development planning with those of local planning practice.

The selection of a site for the power station occurred in the context of the 'Think-Big' strategy pursued by the National

government in the early 1980s. The officials operated with the knowledge that the National Development Act 1979 could be used to expedite the projects if necessary. Further, the Public Works Act 1981 contained powers of compulsory land acquisition for essential public works. The Government also had powers under the Town and Country Planning Act 1977 and the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 to grant consents to its own applications. Officials, however, sought the co-operation of Waikato local and regional authorities and the public to locate the power station in their region.

Yet despite such specific or limiting features, the research experience has provided me with a much deeper understanding of the processes of planning in the terms of the actor frame of reference than those I began with when I commenced my inquiry. I am now much more able as an academic geographer to engage in the elucidation of the meanings of individual and collective actions. In doing so I am able to identify,

...sets of constructs founded in our unquestioned past experiences which allow us to anticipate the meanings of our future encounters with the world and which may themselves be changed as a result of our engagements (Gregory, 1978, 135, on Schutz, 1967).

Further, the case study demonstrated the constant reformulations of realities on the part of participants. These realities were constructed from past experiences, a set of institutional contexts and constraints, and that essential attribute of human activity - a purpose. In public affairs particularly, this purpose has to be expressed through collective endeavours.

The new set of institutional arrangements and planning instruments, likely shortly to impinge on planning practice in New Zealand, is a reformulation of previous institutional contexts and instruments. The findings of a case study cannot,

with ease, be used to derive sets of generalisations about planning practice per se. Nevertheless I am able to draw upon the research experience and make some observations about the processes which take place in decision-making and to raise some issues for examination. For example, I can identify three principles derived from my research and analysis but which arguably have application for planning processes beyond this case.

The first principle I identify as 'construct consensus'. By this I mean the extent to which participants in planning processes agree on the constructs of the social realities in which they operate. In my research I showed that the local authority politicians could not identify with the social construct of 'region'. This meant that there was no effective consensus between local authority politicians and the agents of national development with their planning instruments.

The second principle, that of 'experiential limitation', concerns that phenomenon of people being limited in their capacity to act by remaining constrained by their past experiences. Again, as my research showed, local body politicians gave evidence of an inability to move out of the parameters of their traditional modes of operation. This meant that there was a reluctance to embark upon new dimensions, for example a reluctance to negotiate with and relate to the Tainui Māori Trust Board. Such relating had not been part of their experience and this imposed a limitation on their ability to engage in the planning process.

Finally, the third principle that I have identified I would call 'horizons of understanding'. By this I mean the different dimensions - or horizons - of meaning and concept within which people work. Such horizons are determined by the previous two principles, that is, construct consensus and experiential limitation. My research revealed that different groups of actors in the planning processes operated within different frames of

reference. Horizons of understanding were clearly not congruent. This means that any given planning instrument, in order to be enacted, must necessarily be subjected to a whole raft of human actions and strategies to take account of the different horizons of understandings.

Such principles as these, together with the insights I have gained from my research experience, will inform my on-going research into planning practice. Specifically they will enable me critically to consider the implications of the recent legislative and organisational changes to planning practice. My research suggests that, while some of the contexts which impinge upon planning practice will change, participants are likely to continue to act in similiar ways. They will be guided by their sets of constructs and past experiences which will be mainly reformulated by on-going day-to-day actions. Enactment of legislation, to be effective in practice, requires the congruent agency of actors. Innovative change to legislation will always need to reckon with the constancies whereby the actors act. Thus, the success of any legislative reform requires the willing and co-operative engagement of the participant actors.

## APPENDIX ONE : INTERVIEW PARTICIPANTS

- Butcher, Barry. 1987: District Commissioner of Works, Ministry of Works and Development, Hamilton, and Member of Waikato Energy Regional Development Committee. Interview Transcript, 13 February.
- Burton, David. 1987: District Planner, Ministry of Works and Development, and Convenor, Social and Planning Effects Study Group, Hamilton. Interview Transcript, 30 January.
- Cameron, Don and Lynn. 1987: Farmers, Rangiriri. Interview Transcript, 19 February.
- Chapman, Peter. 1987: Formerly District Manager, New Zealand Electricity, Hamilton. Interview Transcript, 4 March.
- Dawson, Sarah. 1986: County Planner, Waikato County Council, Hamilton, and Member of Social and Planning Effects Study Group. Interview Transcript, 26 November.
- Dixon, Brian. 1987: Co-ordinator, Watchdog Waikato Inc., Hamilton. Interview Transcript, 12 February.
- Hartnett, Tony. 1987: Environmental Engineer, State Coal Mines, Wellington. Interview Transcript, 27 January.
- Hill, David. 1987: Senior Investigating Officer, Commission for the Environment, and Member of Social and Planning Effects Study Group. Wellington. Interview Transcript, 23 February.
- Holmes, Kenneth. 1987: County Chairman, Waikato County Council, Member, Waikato United Council and Waikato Energy Development Regional Committee, Hamilton. Interview Transcript, 9 February.
- Lewthwaite, Neville. 1987: Consultant Planner, Murray-North Partners Ltd., Hamilton and Member of Social and Planning Effects Study Group. Interview Transcript, 5 February.
- Lumsden, Malcolm. 1987: Farmer and President, Waikato Division of Federated Farmers, Ohinewai, and Member of Waikato Energy Development Regional Committee. Interview Transcript, 19 March.
- Malcolm, Margy-Jean. 1987: Social Planner, Town and Country Planning Division, Ministry of Works and Development, Wellington. Interview, 13 March.
- McGlinchy, Brian. 1987: Senior Power Development Engineer, Development Division, New Zealand Electricity, Wellington. Interview Transcript, 28 January.

- Page, Ronald. 1987: Formerly Hamilton City Councillor; Member of Waikato United Council, Waikato Valley Authority and Waikato Energy Development Regional Committee, Hamilton. Interview Transcript, 25 February.
- Riddell, Basil and Joan. 1987: Farmers, Clune Road. Interview Transcript, 19 February.
- Ritchie, James. 1987: Professor of Psychology, University of Waikato, Consultant to Tainui Māori Trust Board, Member of Social and Planning Effects Study Group and Waikato Energy Development Regional Committee. Interview Transcript, 10 February.
- Sampson, Christopher. 1987: Regional Planner, Waikato United Council and Member of Social and Planning Effects Study Group, Hamilton. Interview Transcript, 24 February.
- Willis, David. 1987: Power Development Engineer, Development Division, New Zealand Electricity, Wellington, and Member of Social and Planning Effects Study Group. Interview Transcript, 28 January.
- Wong, Stanley. 1987: Formerly Assistant General Manager (Development), New Zealand Electricity, Wellington, and Member of Waikato Energy Development Regional Committee. Interview Transcript, 12 March.
- Wright, Robin. 1987: Mayor, Huntly Borough Council, Member of Waikato United Council and Waikato Energy Development Regional Committee. Interview Transcript, 2 April.

#### OTHER PERSONAL COMMUNICATIONS

- Burton, W.D. 1989: Formerly District Planner, Ministry of Works and Development, Hamilton. Personal communication, 9 January.
- Colson, S. 1989: County Planner, Raglan County Council, Ngaruawahia. Personal communication, 25 January.
- Cox, B. 1990: Production Development Manager, Electricity Corporation of New Zealand Ltd, Wellington. Personal communication, June 7.
- Dawson, S. 1990: Consultant Planner, Davie Lovell Smith and Partners, Christchurch and formerly, County Planner, Waikato County Planner, Hamilton. Personal communication, 21 March.
- Douglass, M. 1986: Principal Officer, Canterbury United Council and Formerly of Gabites, Porter and Partners, Christchurch. Personal communication, 19 May.

- Fowke, N. 1989: Coal Geologist, Coal Corporation, Huntly.  
Personal communication, 25 January.
- Hayward, J. 1988: Director, Centre of Resource Management,  
University of Canterbury and Lincoln College and Formerly  
Chairman of the Environmental Council, Christchurch.  
Personal communication, 19 December.
- Hill, D. 1989: Formerly Senior Investigating Officer, Commission  
for the Environment, Wellington. Personal communication, 17  
April.
- Hughes, H. 1988: Formerly Assistant Commissioner for the  
Environment, Wellington. Personal communication, 14  
December.
- McEnteer, J. 1989: Formerly Environmental Officer, State Coal  
Mines, Hamilton. Personal communication, 17 April.
- McGlinchy, B. 1990: Formerly Senior Power Development Engineer,  
Development Division, New Zealand Electricity, Wellington.  
Personal communication, 7 June.

## APPENDIX TWO : EXAMPLE OF LETTERS SENT TO PARTICIPANTS

Department of Geography

3 February 1987

Cr R. Wright  
Huntly Borough Council  
Private Bag  
Huntly

Dear Cr Wright

Re: Siting of Third Waikato Coal-Fired Power Station

I am a lecturer in the Geography Department at the University of Waikato. I am carrying out some research for New Zealand Electricity on reviewing the planning processes used to select a site for the Third Waikato Coal-Fired Power Station. I also intend to use this research for my doctoral thesis which is looking at wider planning issues in the Waikato region.

I am interviewing a number of people who have been involved in some aspects of planning for the power station including engineers, planners, local body councillors and landowners. As you have been involved, I would like the opportunity of talking with you.

I propose to contact you shortly by telephone to see whether you are willing to be interviewed, and if so, to arrange a convenient time. I would then send you a list of topics which could be used as the basis of discussion.

I look forward to meeting you.

Yours sincerely

Jenny Dixon

Department of Geography

26 March 1987

Cr R. Wright  
Huntly Borough Council  
Private Bag  
Huntly

Dear Cr Wright

Re: Siting of Third Waikato Coal-fired Power Station

Further to our discussion, I appreciate being able to see you on Monday, 10am in the Council room. In case you need to change this appointment, I can be contacted here (62-889, ext 8434 or ext 4046, Geography Secretary). My home phone number is 69-806.

The purpose of my research is to review (for NZE) the planning process used for selecting a site for the third Waikato Coal-fired Power Station. I also intend to use this research for my doctoral thesis.

I propose that our interview will take the form of a discussion between you and myself based around topics set out below. Obviously additional ones may arise and indeed I don't wish to constrain discussion. Rather than take notes I would prefer to tape record the interview which will be transcribed later. This will help a smoother flow of discussion and also allow for an accurate record of what is said. The issue of confidentiality may arise and I will discuss this with you at the beginning of our discussion. I will also be happy to forward a copy of the transcript for any clarification by you if you so wish.

General topics I wish to discuss include the following:

- your involvement in planning the siting of the Third Waikato coal-fired power station;
- your view of the way in which NZE consulted regionally and locally (i.e. agencies, landowners etc.) in selecting a site for the power station;
- your view of the effectiveness of organisations and committees such as MWD, WUC, WREDC, WEPICC and the Social and Planning Effects Study Group;

- to what extent you perceived local initiatives in planning for energy developments to be taken (or constrained) and, if so, by whom?
- your views on the roles exercised by professionals, central and local body politicians, individual landowners, environmental group members during the process of site selection; how influential were individuals (as opposed to their agencies) in planning of this project?
- whom did you see as taking initiatives in consulting with landowners and public interest groups (i.e. individuals and/or agencies);
- how influential did you see the findings of the Huntly Monitoring Project on early planning for the power station and coal-field expansion, and on more recent monitoring proposals:
- likely implications of corporatisation on similar proposals in the future and on the "planning process" (including implications for local and regional planning);
- what improvements you would suggest for consultation in the planning of any future power stations.

I envisage the interview taking up about 1 hour to 1½ hours of your time.

I look forward to seeing you.

Yours sincerely

Jenny Dixon

### APPENDIX THREE : CHRONOLOGY OF SIGNIFICANT EVENTS

- 1979            Waikato Thermal Power Station first mentioned in 1979 Report of the Committee on Electric Power Development.
- Visit by New Zealand Electricity (NZE) staff to Waikato in November to assess suitability of coal fields as sources of fuel for the Power Station.
- 1980            Energy Plan 1980 refers to new Waikato Coal-Fired Power Station.
- Visits by NZE staff to Waikato local authorities in July to discuss arrangements for consultation.
- Inaugural meeting of Waikato United Council (WUC) on 21 November.
- 1981            First meeting of the Waikato Regional Coal Station Committee held on 2 February.
- Establishment of Social and Planning Effects Study Group, comprising central and local government officials and Huntly Monitoring Project staff early in the year.
- First preliminary siting report (New Zealand Electricity, 1981) published by NZE in December.
- 1982            Second preliminary review of localities (New Zealand Electricity, 1982) published by NZE recommends that suitable localities are south of Lake Waahi, North-east of Huntly and from Te Kauwhata to Meremere. Preference stated for southern localities.
- Minister of Energy addresses public meeting about the Waikato coal projects in Huntly on March 11.
- Switch from Huntly coal to Maramarua coal as fuel source for the Power Station announced in May.
- Inaugural meeting of Waikato Mining Liaison Committee held on 3 November. Meeting resolves that members instead join the Coal Station Committee.

- 1983
- Review of 1982 studies (New Zealand Electricity, 1983) published by NZE in February recommends that three localities be examined; adjacent to Meremere Power Station, vicinity of Clune Road and west of Rangiriri.
- First meeting of expanded Coal Station Committee, now called Waikato Energy Development Regional Committee (WEDRC) on 9 February. Federated Farmers representative joins the committee. Incorporates proposed Waikato Mining Liaison Committee.
- Minister of Energy and officials explain plans for the Power Station at a public meeting held on 2 May in Te Kauwhata, attended by more than 350 people.
- Community Overview report prepared by Murray-North Partners, published in September.
- Establishment of central government committee of officials in Wellington, Waikato Energy Planning and Infrastructure Co-ordinating Committee (WEPICC) in November.
- Meremere site dropped in late November, leaving two sites for consideration: Clune Road and Rangiriri.
- Visit to Waikato local authorities in December by WEPICC members to ascertain necessary planning work.
- 1984
- Draft of Waikato Regional Planning Scheme: Section One - Objectives (Waikato United Council, 1984a) released by WUC in February.
- Proposals for update of Community Overview report and Huntly housing study finalised by officials in May.
- Publication of Māori Perspectives report by Centre for Māori Studies and Research in August.
- Power Station Environmental Impact Report (EIR) published by NZE in September.
- Draft Section One: Waikato Regional Planning Scheme released by WUC in September.
- 1985
- Environmental Impact Audit of the Power Station EIR released by Commission for the Environment in February.

Final siting report (Electricity Division, 1985) published by NZE staff in April, recommending Clune Road as the site for the power station.

WUC establishes a housing subcommittee on 12 April.

Minister of Energy announces Clune Road as the site on 26 April.

Waahi Hui organised by the Tainui Māori Trust Board in May. MOE agrees later to fund a kaumātua position, a Training Centre for young Māori, and proposal to monitor consequences of energy projects for Māori people.

Tainui Māori Trust Board is represented for the first time at WEDRC meeting on 20 June.

Agreement reached over funding of planning position for WUC by Ministry of Energy (MOE) in December.

1986

MWD Town and Country Planning Officials asked by MOE to develop a monitoring proposal for Waikato projects.

Reorganisation of MOE structure in April to enable establishment of NZE and SCM as State-Owned Enterprises by 1 April the following year.

Disestablishment of WEPICC on 16 June as no longer required in new commercial trading structure.

WUC release Proposed Section One: Waikato Regional Planning Scheme in June.

Final meeting of WEDRC on 26 September.

1987

WUC Regional Planning Committee agree to Māori representative joining the committee at 20 February meeting.

Electricity Corporation and Coal Corporation established as new State-Owned Enterprises on 1 April.

## GLOSSARY OF MĀORI TERMS

ariki	leader, first born male or female in family of high rank
hui	coming together for a purpose, such as a meeting
iwi	tribe
Kaupapa	plans, agenda, guidelines
kaumātua	Māori elder
Kingitanga	A Māori institution based in the Waikato with its origin in the 1850s in moves towards tribal confederation and election of a Māori king in 1858.
mana	prestige, power, authority, pride
marae	complex of buildings including the meeting house and enclosed space in front, dining hall and ablution blocks.
pakeha	person of predominately European descent
tangihanga	funeral ceremonies, rituals

## ABBREVIATIONS USED IN THE TEXT

CFE	Commission for the Environment. CFE was responsible for the administration of the Environmental Protection and Enhancement Procedures (EPEP). These procedures applied to government departments who were required to prepare environmental impact assessments, and, where appropriate, environmental impact reports of proposed works.
CRPR	Committee to Review Power Requirements, a government committee of officials established in 1958 and abolished in 1979.
DSIR	Department of Scientific and Industrial Research
EAC	Energy Advisory Committee, established under the Ministry of Energy Act 1977 to co-ordinate public input into energy planning.
ECO	Environment and Conservation Organisations of New Zealand, an umbrella group representing most environmental groups in New Zealand.
EDS	Environmental Defence Society, an environmental group based in Auckland.
EIR	Environmental Impact Report
EPEP	Environmental Protection and Enhancement Procedures (see CFE)
HMP	Huntly Monitoring Project. This project was based in the School of Social Sciences, University of Waikato, to monitor the social and economic consequences resulting from the building and running of a 1000 MW thermal power station at Huntly. The project was initially funded by MWD (Town and Country Planning Division) and, later, MOE (Electricity Division).
HRPA	Hamilton Regional Planning Authority, established in 1972 and comprising Hamilton City, Waipa and Waikato County Councils. Later broadened to include Otorohanga County, Cambridge, Huntly, Ngaruawahia, and Te Awamutu Boroughs.

- MEDRC Mokau Energy Development Regional Committee, established in June 1985. It was decided that the Mokau coalfield developments were becoming sufficiently important to justify the creation of a second regional advisory committee so that the Mokau and Waikato projects could be addressed separately. From then on, WEDRC members considered matters mainly relating to the Waikato projects.
- MFE Ministry for the Environment, created in 1986, taking over the advisory functions of CFE and later, the water and soil administration, and statutory planning functions of the MWD.
- MOE Ministry of Energy. It was created under the Ministry of Energy Act 1977 and originally consisted of four Divisions: the Planning Division; the Energy Policy Division; the Mines Division; and the Electricity Division. Later the Energy Policy Division became the Oil and Gas Division and a Corporate Services Division was established to help with the corporate affairs of all four Divisions.
- MW megawatt is the most common unit for expressing electrical power and equals 1 MJ/second
- MWD Ministry of Works and Development, a government department responsible for the design, construction and maintenance of public infrastructure. In the early 1980s it comprised several Divisions, including the Town and Country Planning, Water and Soil, Architectural, Mechanical, Roading, Mechanical and Electrical Engineering, Civil Engineering and Power Divisions. During 1984, the Department was reorganised into new Divisions comprising Corporate Services, Buildings and Property, Engineering Services, and Development and Planning. The Town and Country Planning Division was reorganised as a Directorate within the Planning and Development Division.
- NDC National Development Council
- NZE New Zealand Electricity, otherwise known as Electricity Division, an operating and trading Division of MOE.
- NZIE New Zealand Institution of Engineers, now known as IPENZ, Institute of Professional Engineers of New Zealand.
- NZED New Zealand Electricity Department, established in 1958 and later incorporated into the new Ministry of Energy in 1977.

NWASCA	National Water and Soil Conservation Authority (see NWASCO)
NWASCO	National Water and Soil Conservation Organisation established under the Water and Soil Conservation Act 1967 to oversee water and soil administration in New Zealand, comprising the National Water and Soil Conservation Authority, the Soil Conservation and Rivers Control Council, and the Water Resources Council. Later reorganised as NWASCA in 1984.
OECD	Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
OPEC	Organisation of Petroleum Exporting Countries
PCEPD	Planning Committee on Electric Power Development, a government committee of officials established in 1958 and abolished in 1979.
SACA	South Auckland Conservation Association, an environmental group based in the Waikato.
SCM	State Coal Mines, an operating Division within Mines Division, MOE. Mines Division also had responsibility for exploration, mine planning and development, licensing, inspection and coal marketing.
WCC	Waikato County Council.
WEDRC	Waikato Energy Development Regional Committee, a liaison committee of central government officials and Waikato local authority politicians, formerly known as the Coal Station Committee.
WEPICC	Waikato Energy Planning and Infrastructure Co-ordinating Committee, a committee of government officials, established in 1983 to oversee the Waikato projects.
WUC	Waikato United Council, established in 1980 representing Huntly, Ngaruawahia, Cambridge, Te Awamutu, Matamata, Putaruru and Tokoroa Boroughs; Raglan, Waikato, Waipa and Matamata Counties; Otorohanga and Waitomo Districts; and Hamilton City.
WVA	Waikato Valley Authority, established under its own Act in 1956, responsible for soil and water management in the Waikato River catchment. It was renamed the Waikato Catchment Board on 1 April 1988.

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