INSTITUTIONAL ORDER IN MULTI-STATE SYSTEMS AND SOCIETIES: AN ENGLISH SCHOOL ANALYSIS WITH VIEWS FROM CHINA AND INDIA.

A thesis submitted in fulfilment of the requirements for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy at the University of Waikato by

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ABSTRACT

This thesis carries two main arguments. First, the English School of international relations approach, based around the concept of international society, provides a productive paradigm with which to address both contemporary and historical issues in international relations. The twin concepts of gemeinschaft and gesellschaft are included as essential elements of this paradigm and as prime determinants of the manner in which states of a multi-state system (modern or pre-modern) are incorporated into a society of states. Secondly, that when applied to the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India, this approach enables conclusions to be reached about the manner in which these states are already contributing and may in future further contribute to the contemporary international order. Specifically, the thesis concludes that both China and India continue to be reliant upon gesellschaft type interaction with contemporary international society, although there is evidence of change in this historical trend.

PREFACE AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

This study was stimulated by the development of a view that the concept of international society offered a way to comprehend an increasingly complex international environment. The concept of international society has come to be associated with the English or British School of international relations, although founders of the school are not necessarily English or British in origin - Hedley Bull, for example, was an Australian. None the less, this study retains the English School (ES) title. The reasons for retention of the title are that the ES was generated in England after meetings of the British Committee on the Theory of International Politics in 1958 (funded by a Rockefeller Foundation grant). More importantly, use of the ES title is consistent with its use in contemporary literature.

Criticism of the school may be made on the basis of several apparent weaknesses. First, it displays a penchant for historical (traditional) analysis in preference to pure and abstract (scientific/positivist) methodology. Furthermore, the ES is epistemologically rationalist, which makes the approach vulnerable to the same general criticism that rationalism and modernism may receive. Secondly, in the changing post-Cold War world (where it may be argued that the primacy of the state is under question) calls abound for perspectives that take more account of the role of non-state actors, whereas the international society framework is unashamedly state-centric. Other weaknesses of the approach generally stem from these first two. One of the objectives of the study is to attempt to compensate for these weaknesses.

Chapter One of the thesis introduces and defines the concept of international society. This introduction is largely concerned with outlining and critically assessing the ES approach. Chapter Two sets about expanding on the Chapter One framework in order to accommodate post-Cold War change in relation to the international society. Chapter Two also introduces theory that strengthens conceptual understanding of the development of international society, its relevance in the post-Cold War world and the connection that the ES approach has with the wider discipline of international relations. Chapter Three is concerned to incorporate aspects of international relations theory that explain the impact of rising powers on a system, or society, of states. This is done in order to provide a basis for analysing the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India in rising power terms during Chapters Four and Five respectively. These final two chapters are each divided into three parts. The first part consists of an application of the ES framework to the multi-state systems of ancient China

and India. This enables a historical continuum of analysis on institutional order in multi-state systems and advances the theoretical utility of the gemeinschaft/gesellschaft distinction to explanation of state societies outside of the modernist environment. The thesis aims to emphasise analysis of the advent of institutional order in multi-state systems and the application of the ES approach to China and India individually, in preference to a China/India comparative study. In order to achieve such an emphasis comparative analysis of these two states is purposely limited.

Ultimately, the thesis argues two main points. First, the English School (ES) of international relations approach provides a productive paradigm with which to advance understanding of both contemporary and historical issues in international relations. Underlying this argument is the sub-argument that ordered (in the sense of societies of states) multi-state systems are a preferable structure for international relations than either fully centralised control (empire) or outright anarchy. As Chapters Four and Five indicate, multi-state systems stimulate innovative change as well as inter-state violence. If institutional order is obtained in a multi-state system then the positives of a multi-state environment can be retained at the expense of the negatives. Secondly, when applied to the states of China and India, the ES approach illuminates the manner in which these states are contributing and may further contribute to the functioning of the contemporary international order. The latter point includes the argument that this area of study is crucially important primarily because China and India, as large rising powers, are capable of either bolstering or disrupting institutional order in the evolving international society.

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LIST OF ACRONYMS

ARC	Asian Relations Conference
ARF	ASEAN Regional Forum
ASEAN	Association of Southeast Asian Nations
CCP	Chinese Communist Party
CWC	Chemical Weapons Convention
CTBT	Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
ES	English School
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
INC	Indian National Congress
IPE	International Political Economy
IR	International Relations
FMCT	Fissile Material Cut-off Treaty
LAI	League Against Imperialism
MTCR	Missile Technology Control Regime
NAM	Non-aligned Movement
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organisation

NPT	Non-Proliferation Treaty
PLA	People's Liberation Army
PNE	Peaceful Nuclear Explosion
PRC	The People's Republic of China
PNTR	Permanent Normal Trading Relations
SAARC	South Asian Association for Regional Cooperation
SEATO	South East Asian Treaty Organisation
UN	United Nations
UNSC	United Nations Security Council
US	United States
USSR	Union of Soviet Socialist Republics
WTO	World Trade Organisation

CHAPTER ONE: THE ENGLISH SCHOOL AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

> A *system of states* (or international system) is formed when two or more states have sufficient contact between them, and have sufficient impact on one another's decisions, to cause them to behave - at least in some measure - as parts of a whole.... A *society of states* (or international society) exists when a group of states, conscious of certain common interests and common values, form a society in the sense that they conceive themselves to be bound by a common set of rules in their relations with one another, and share in the working of common institutions.[1]

This chapter concentrates on introducing and defining the concept of international society. This is done mainly in the terms in which the leading writers of the English School (ES) of International Relations first assessed it. However, a few aspects of other theoretical work are merged with the more traditional international society approach. The purpose of doing this is twofold: first, it adds to the explanatory power of the international society framework and, secondly, it creates a better foundation for further study of those issues addressed in later chapters. Barry Buzan's work[2], for example, which merges structural realist theory and regime theory with the concept of international society, is a particularly useful innovation. Buzan's approach allows escape from the historical cul-de-sac in which the ES has been criticised for operating, and also helps to explain the processes and structure behind contemporary international society.

The chapter proceeds by chronicling the way in which the idea of international society has been developed by authors of the ES, including comments on the recent ES revival. A closer look is then taken at the general nature of the society of states, that is, it is defined in relation to other, though similar, terms or concepts and its evolution into its present global form is described. Finally, the role that the institutions of international society play in maintaining

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[1]Bull, Hedley. *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics,* Second Edition, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1995, pp. 9 & 13.

[2]In particular Buzan, Barry. "From international system to international society: structural realism and regime theory meet the English school", *International Organisation*, 47, 3, Summer, 1993. "The English School: an underexploited resource in IR" *Review of International Studies,* 27, 2001. *People, States and Fear: An Agenda For International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, (2nd Edition), Harvester Wheatsheaf, NY, 1991. Buzan, Barry. Jones, Charles, & Little, Richard. *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism*, Columbia University Press, NY, 1993.

order in the society of states is detailed. The chapter is introductory in nature; its principal purpose is therefore to lay foundations for later argument.

The History of International Society Literature[3]

The concept of international society originated from a basic set of ideas about the qualities of cooperation and interaction between states.[4] The jurist Grotius (1583-1645), whose work was mainly in the realm of international law, is commonly listed as among the first to analyse specifically the nature of cooperation among states. The basic ideas behind the concept of international society were present in intellectual realms prior to and after Grotius, but were not addressed specifically as a single concept. It was not until Martin Wight's work was published in the later half of the twentieth century that the idea that states may come to form a unique form of society became truly established as a concept in its own right.[5] Since then there has been a wealth of literature devoted specifically to the consideration of societies of states/international societies.

Because it is argued by the ES that the concept of an international society is an advancement on that of an international system, it was necessary for those promoting this school of thought to first identify what level of interaction is sufficient to classify states as forming a society rather than simply a system. This was a task that was mainly performed by Wight using a method of comparative historical analysis,. The approach involved the identification of examples of ancient states systems and drew upon an eclectic mixture of literature from other intellectual disciplines. Once Wight had established that states systems were a recurring phenomenon in history it was possible for others to question and distinguish when, how, or if, such systems of states would become international societies.

Intellectual debate over the question of whether states can or do constitute a unique form of society is conducted mainly by using the literature of classical political philosophers, for

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[3] Buzan, Barry in "The English School: an underexploited resource in IR" op. cit., pp. 473 - 475 and Zhang, Yongjin in *The English School' in China: A Story of How Ideas Travel and are Transplanted*, ANU Working Paper No. 2000/4, Canberra, December 2000, provides useful summary histories of the development of the ES and its literature.

[4] This is the sense that the term 'international' is from herein understood to mean i.e. interaction *between* states.

example Grotius, Kant or Hobbes. Nevertheless, it is fair to say that Wight and Bull were the modern day founders of the concept of international society. They were the first to deal systematically with the idea of a society of states, and it was primarily the historical research performed by Wight that established the foundations of thought on international society.[6] After this initial literature followed work on the evolution and expansion of international society. These writings presumed the usefulness of the concept of international society and set about plotting the course of contemporary international society's development - that is, from the ancient European states system, through to the modern Westphalian society of states, and lastly expansion into an international society of global proportions. Because they presumed its relevance, they were able to avoid dwelling on questions of the reality of its existence, and instead concentrated on the specific attributes of international society. Of particular note were those attributes displayed during the period when the European society of states evolved to meet the changing circumstances created by European colonialism and expansion. Bull, Watson, and Gong, for instance, are important authors that advanced international society literature within this post-Wight period.[7]

The end of the Cold War has provided an opportunity to examine inter-state relations in a new light. A good deal of international society literature has now moved to consider the value of the concept in relation to specific research programmes and its general relevance in the post-Cold War environment.

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[5] Most influential would be Wight's *Systems of States*, Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1977.

[6] This is admittedly a debatable point. A number of other authors have been instrumental in the establishment of the so-called English School, some of them writing prior to Wight. Most notable is C.A.W. Manning and his work *The Nature of International Society*, reissue, Macmillan, London, 1975. The debate over which authors are 'in' or 'out' of the ES remains contentious. Tim Dunne, for example, in his *Inventing International Society: A History of the English School*, Macmillan, London, 1998, does not include Manning in the ES. With regard to this issue I am inclined to agree with Hidemi Suganami who comments in respect of Dunne's *Inventing International Society* "... even though Dunne thinks in terms of family resemblances when he talks of the English School, he is driven by the felt need to draw a clear demarcation line between those who are in and those who are out. For me, the usefulness of the concept of family resemblances is precisely that it allows us not to think in such rigid terms." Suganami, Hidemi. "C.A.W. Manning and the study of International Relations", *Review of International Studies*, 27, 2001, pp. 91 - 107.

[7] In particular, Bull, *The Anarchical Society* ; Gong, Gerrit W. *The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984 and Watson, Adam. *The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Analysis*, Routledge, London, 1992.

There has been a relative 'revival' of the ES in recent years. The great majority of the literature that has carried this revival has been published in European based journals, for example, the *Review of International Studies*, *Millennium*, the *European Journal of International Studies* and *International Affairs*. Before examining this recent wave of literature it is pertinent to lead up to it with an assessment of the earlier critical debate concerning the utility of the ES, which has taken place now for a number of decades. In a way, this debate has occurred parallel to the literature of the ES authors discussed above who were primarily concerned with working on the ES approach itself rather than theoretical debate over its strength in relation to other International Relations (IR) theory.

The term 'English School', somewhat ironically, was first coined by Roy Jones, who was highly critical of the approach.[8] In Buzan's words, however,

> Jones's call for closure [of the ES]can be largely disregarded. Few people reading his paper now would accept his depiction of an English School largely defined by Manning and Wight as valid. Indeed, his target was not really the English School, but the whole attempt to construct International Relations as a subject distinct from political theory. His objection to holistic and abstract approaches now seems quaint, and his belief that the English School 'has cut itself off from the classical theme of political thought' simply wrong.[9]

Regardless of any possible merits to Jones's and other critical argument it is clear that the ES is an approach to the study of IR that has not only survived but also flourished. The *Review of International Studies*[10] recently printed a Forum debate that critically considered a research programme outlined largely by Buzan. This debate was one product of a BISA Conference on reconvening the ES held at Manchester in December 1999. The number of authors identified with the school continues to rise, although, as mentioned above, it is not always clear or

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[8] Jones, Roy E. "The English School of International Relations: A Case for Closure", *Review of International Studies*, 7:1, pp. 1 - 13.
[9] Buzan, "The English School: an underexploited resource", op. cit., p.471.
[10] Issue published 2001, 27, pp. 465 - 513.

perhaps important who is 'in or out'.[11] The discussion below continues to outline and introduce the concept of international society principally from Bull's perspective. While Bull's work explains the concept of international society and well represents the core of the ES approach it, however, also exhibits some of its weaknesses. While the ES claims to be a holistic IR approach it is yet to clearly establish its relationship with methodological monist approaches (such as world systems and neorealism)[12] and those relatively marginalised models that approach IR from outside the rationalist or modernist perspective. Nevertheless, the attraction of the ES is that it has the ability to "... combine traditions and theories normally not able to relate to each other"[13] and hence the call by Barry Buzan for bridge-building between those engaged in the ES and those in International Political Economy (IPE), regime theory and globalisation debate.[14] The task of drawing links between a clearly still active ES and other approaches will be undertaken in Chapter Two alongside examination of alternate models of order in the post-Cold War world.

An International Society?

The intellectual debate over the existence of international society may be conducted on several fronts. Central to the debate is the condition of anarchy, or the absence of a single, all-powerful, government with an overwhelming advantage in the use of force in relations among states (or credible threat thereof). Depending on the perspective adopted, be it Hobbesian, Kantian, or Grotian, anarchy is a harsh reality to be accepted, a harsh reality that is unacceptable, or a reality that is both acceptable and manageable. Broadly speaking, from a Hobbesian viewpoint relations among states are defined by constant conflict, each seeking to maximise its own interests - cooperation in this case being merely a temporary means to that end. Kant, at the other end of the spectrum, maintains that cooperation is the essence of order in international politics. The anarchy that prevails among states is an abysmal condition that should be rectified by means of increased cooperation, leading toward the establishment of a community of mankind, a world government or a cosmopolitan confederation of states.

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[11] C.A.W. Manning, M. Wight, H. Bull, R.J. Vincent, J. Watson, A. Roberts, M. Donelan, J. Mayall, B. A. Robertson, T. Dunne, B. Buzan, R. Little, N. Wheeler, Y. Zhang, are some prominent authors commonly associated with the ES.
[12] Buzan, "The English School: An underexploited resource" op. cit., p. 483 - 484.
[13] Ole Wæver in Buzan ibid., p. 484.
[14] Buzan, ibid.

Thus, the Hobbesian and the Kantian views work against the maintenance of a multi-state society because the anarchical condition between states is such that the cooperation that does exist is self-interested, fleeting, or insufficient. This anarchical condition inhibits the formation of the social relations that comprise a society - neither perspective considering conflict as a naturally occurring part of human society.[15]

The Grotian perspective contains elements from both extremes. There is anarchy but not necessarily continual conflict and chaos. There are examples of cooperation but certainly no realistic prospect of perpetual peace. The Grotian view of international politics accepts the reality of anarchy among states, but contends that such a condition can be modified and controlled by the establishment of common institutions, rules, and laws. The authors of literature on international society have generally adopted the Grotian view on relations among states and, as a rule, use this perspective as a base point from which to conduct their analyses of international societies.

The existence of international society may also be denied by comparing the characteristics of domestic society with the characteristics of inter-state relations. Although definitions of society can be somewhat nebulous, there is, however, one easily identified difference between relations in domestic society and relations among states. Specifically, domestic society contains a government or authority with a monopoly over the use of violence or force, whereas international society does not. Rather than focusing on the infrequency of international cooperation in an anarchical environment, the argument, termed the domestic analogy, simply states that: if, internationally, there is no such authority that holds a monopoly over the use of violence, (i.e. that international anarchy exists) then relations among states cannot be considered as constituting a society.[16]

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[15]While the term 'society' is often associated purely with cooperation, human society inevitably also involves conflict. A definition of society as either a "...generic term for social relations... [or as]...discrete complexes of social relations which can be distinguished from other such complexes and analysed in a largely self-sufficient manner", does not rule out social relations featuring conflict. Shaw, Martin. *Global Society and International Relations*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 1994, pp. 5 - 6. This is not to argue that cooperation is not an essential factor that enables societies to form. "Society between equals can only exist on the understanding that the interests of all are to be regarded equally." Mill, J.S., *Utilitarianism*, 1861, cited in Simpson, J.A. and Weiner, E.S.C. (eds.), *The Oxford English Dictionary* (2nd Ed.) Vol. XV., Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1989, p. 913. Such a definition inherently requires cooperation but it also does not rule out the inevitability presence of conflict.

[16]ibid., pp. 9 - 13.

Bull convincingly refutes the domestic analogy, generally on the basis that international society possesses unique features distinct from domestic society. It has the ability to exist, albeit in a rudimentary and somewhat primitive form, despite anarchy. A Hobbesian state of nature simply does not exist among states, as there is trade, industry, law, cooperation and moral behaviour in international relations. All of these go some way to disproving the idea that the rule of an overriding authority is an essential precondition to the existence of such societal like behaviour. In short, the domestic analogy argument is undermined on the grounds that international society is unique and cannot always be compared consistently with domestic society.[17]

There are several other arguments that contest the existence of international society and the relevance of the concept in the contemporary era. Changes since World War Two have vastly altered the membership of international society and the structure of international relations in general. It may be argued that research into the basis of the internal strength of member states is a more pressing issue (in contrast to analysis of their external interactions) for the maintenance of international order and security. In addition, the relevance of a state-based society in an environment where transnational relations are increasingly circumventing direct state control may be considered questionable. Such arguments are examined in detail in the next chapter where the relevance of the international society approach in the post-Cold War era is discussed.

The Nature of International Society

The nature of international society can be analysed in a number of ways: by discussing its role in maintaining order amongst its members and distinguishing it from other related concepts; by noting the difference between international system and international society and developing an understanding of how an international system may evolve to form an international society; and finally by documenting the developmental history of contemporary international society - principally the expansion of the European society of states which led to the formation of the contemporary global international society.

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[17]Bull also discusses the domestic analogy and international society as a unique form of society in "Society and Anarchy in International Relations", Butterfield, Herbert and Wight, Martin (eds.), *Diplomatic Investigations*, George Allen & Unwin Ltd., London, 1966, p. 45.

Order and Related Concepts

Order

Throughout this study the concept of international society is primarily considered as a means of understanding how order is maintained among states. This is the same position taken by Bull. He defines order as "...a pattern or disposition of international activity that sustains those goals of the society of states that are elementary, primary or universal."[18] Briefly, the first goal is the preservation of the system and society of states itself, whereby states maintain their positions as chief actors and bearers of duties in world politics. The second goal is the maintenance of the independent sovereignty of individual states, involving reciprocal recognition of jurisdiction over their own subjects and territory (Bull makes the point that states, especially great powers, have treated this goal as subordinate to the first). The third goal is the goal of peace or the absence of war among states of international society - a peace to be breached only under exceptional circumstances (a goal again subordinate to the first goal listed) and not to be perceived as a goal of absolute and permanent peace. The fourth and final goal is the limitation of violence by holding a monopoly over the use of violence and thereby denying it to other (non-state) groups. This latter goal is accompanied by the fact that states place limits on their own behaviour by recognising and observing norms concerning diplomatic immunity and the justice of waging *(jus in bello)* and going to war *(jus ad bellum).*[19]

Other goals, which are regarded by Bull as the common or elemental goals of all social life, include: recognition and respect for pacts or promises among states, namely that treaties should not be disregarded lightly and the maintenance of stability of possession, for example as expressed in international society by the mutual recognition of state sovereignty.[20]

This is a definition of order that clearly is concerned only with order among states. However, because the boundaries between order among states and order among other actors in the international arena are seldom clear-cut, it is necessary to spend some time distinguishing

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[18]Bull, *'The Anarchical Society'*, p. 16.
[19]ibid., pp. 16 - 19.
[20]ibid.

international society and order from other closely associated concepts.

World and Transnational Society

The idea of a world society differs from international society because it is concerned with the development of a shared identity among individuals on a global basis rather than shared identity among states on a global basis. Therefore, world order is defined in terms of the order that exists among mankind as a whole - of which order among states or international order is but one part. Because the idea of the world society is inclusive of the individual rather than solely the state, there are disagreements in the literature on international society between the concepts of international and world society. Buzan argues, in contrast to Bull, that the two ideas need not necessarily be antagonistic. There is no reason to assume that the gradual development of a world society, with rights based around the individual, need necessarily challenge the supremacy of the state and consequently the society of states. As Buzan comments, "...a world society cannot emerge unless it is supported by a stable political framework, and the states system remains the only candidate for this."[21]

Increasing interaction between non-state entities has led to discussion of a transnational society and/or an international civil society. This form of interaction is often also discussed within the concept of a world society. These are important aspects of world and international order where the line is relatively blurred between order among state and non-state entities. When interaction takes place, for example, between an international organisation, such as a multinational corporation, and a state, it is not immediately obvious as to whether this is a concern limited to international, world, or transnational society. For the purpose of restricting the extent of this study, and not out of any desire to treat lightly the importance of these other aspects, it is necessary to reiterate that the attempted focus is on institutional order among states.[22]

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[21]Buzan, Barry. "From International System to International Society: Structural Realism and Regime Theory meet the English School", *International Organisation* 47, 3, Summer 1993, p. 340.

[22] There is a considerable quantity of debate to be had with regard to the issues raised in this paragraph. Conceptually the ES is a modernist project that seeks to rationalise (thereby individuate) international order in terms of international 'persona', although it does not

The Difference between International System and International Society

The passage from Bull's *Anarchical Society* cited at the beginning of this chapter makes clear the distinction between international society and international system. These two concepts interact closely, especially when considering the processes behind the creation and historical development of an international society.

Wight and, more recently, Watson have researched the development of states systems in considerable depth, comparing and analysing relations among ancient groups of states in order to isolate their key characteristics. Wight identified three main examples of past states systems: the Western, the Hellenic/Hellenistic or Graeco-Roman, and the Chinese between the collapse of the Zhou (Chou) empire in 771 B.C. and the establishment of the Qin (Tsin) empire in 221 A.D. He also considered the possibility of a fourth, in ancient Southern India. Wight made important comparisons between the above systems. The Hellenic system, for example, in contrast to the modern Western one "...had no notion of international law... [nor did they possess the]master-institution of the modern western states system...the diplomatic institution of resident embassies".[23]

Wight identified the key institutions of states systems as international law, diplomatic procedures, hegemony and the balance of power. Bull later identified these and other institutions as the means for the provision of order in an international system. Wight himself did not distinguish between international system and international society but used the term 'states system' to define what is later referred to by others as international society. The nature of international society, as analysed by Wight, was largely based on historical examples. In short, it involved identifying the development of states systems along a spectrum ranging from a group of states exhibiting minimal interaction (i.e. an international system) to a group of states that recognise common rules and institutions (i.e. an international society).

Wight, and other authors, assumed the existence of a common history and culture among states prior to the development of an international society. In other words, a common culture, and the values and norms underlying it, were considered a necessary precondition to the

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discount the role of communal association in the sense of 'world' order. This wider discussion is continued in Chapter Two under the sub-title of post-Cold War order.

[23]Wight, Martin. *Systems of States*, Leicester University Press, Leicester, 1977, pp. 51 - 53.

development of the institutions of an international society. This assessment of the formation of international societies has its limitations, especially when considering how international societies might develop when interaction takes place between two separate, culturally distinct, international societies/international systems. This limitation is especially problematic when it comes to explaining the process of the development of international society after interaction began between European states and non-European states.

Buzan constructs a method of analysis that explains how an international society may develop in the absence of a common culture amongst its members. This method also enables better comprehension of how and when an international system becomes an international society by explaining the processes that forms the institutions of an international society.

Buzan utilises the sociological terms *gesellschaft* and *gemeinschaft*, which are defined below.

> The gemeinschaft understanding sees society as something organic and traditional, involving bonds of common sentiment, experience and identity. It is an essentially historical conception: societies grow rather than being made. The gesellschaft understanding sees society as being contractual and constructed rather than sentimental and traditional. It is more consciously organisational: societies can be made by acts of will.[24]

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[24]Buzan, "From International System to International Society" p. 333. The German sociologist, Ferdinand Tonnies (1855 - 1936), developed the words gemeinschaft and gesellschaft as enduring concepts in the field of sociology when he used them to describe the late nineteenth century contrast between urban and rural life. A definition in addition to Buzan's is cited below.

> Gemeinschaft (meaning roughly 'community') refer[s] to a type of social organisation by which people are closely tied by kinship and tradition. The Gemeinschaft of the rural village joins people in what amounts to a primary group. By and large, argued Tonnies, Gemeinschaft is absent in the modern city. On the contrary, urbanisation fosters Gesellschaft (a German word meaning roughly 'association'), a type of social organisation by which people come together only on the basis of individual self-interest. In the Gesellschaft way of life, individuals are motivated by their own needs rather than a drive to enhance the well-being of everyone. City dwellers display little sense of community or common identity and look to others mostly as a means of advancing their individual goals.

Tonnies, Ferdinand cited in Macionis, John J. *Sociology*, (8th Ed) Prentice Hall, New Jersey, 2001, p. 579. An example of Tonnies original work 1887 (translated from German) on the topic is Harris, Jose (ed.). *Community and Civil Society/Ferdinand Tonnies (Gemeinschaft und Gesellschaft)*. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge 2001. There are numerous other

These two notions regarding the formation of society provide a useful framework with which to deal with the discernible cultural differences among states that now exist within a global international society which expanded from Europe to include non-European states. Buzan further extends gemeinschaft and gesellschaft ideas by linking them and the international society concept to structural realist analysis of anarchy and like units.

> ...[W]here military and economic contact between like units is highly developed, the powerful tendency of socialisation (copying behaviour that is successful, or that generates power) and competition (coerced adaptation imposed by the strong on the weak) under anarchy, systematically encourages the development of like units. As the logic of socialisation and competition makes states more alike, it makes the formation of an international society of mutually recognising legal equals easier. This idea identifies the process by which the natural dynamics of anarchic international relations create the conditions for a *gesellschaft* international society to develop. [25]

By using these ideas it is possible to explain the eventual formation of a global international society during and after the period of European imperialism. This is despite the apparent lack of any common culture at the time.[26] By utilising the like units idea it is also possible to see how a gesellschaft international society deserves the term society. Through interaction, units become more alike and develop a shared identity - which is one of the defining features of a society. Moreover, these ideas suggest that, if socialisation and competition work to form shared identity, then, in the long term, units with a shared identity can be expected to establish common value systems and thereby come to form an entity that more resembles an international society of gemeinschaft origins.[27] The distinction between international system and international society is made much clearer once there is a more precise understanding of the processes, be they interaction stemming from a common culture or the logic of interaction

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translated versions and interpretations of Tonnies work available.

[25]Buzan, Barry. "International Society and International Security", Fawn, Rick and Larkins, Jeremy (eds.). *International Society after the Cold War: Anarchy and Order Reconsidered*, Macmillan Press Ltd., London, 1996, p. 262.

[26] The adoption of institutional norms by non-European states also involved the influence of modernist and individuating social processes, such that described by the Macionis/Tonnies citation above with reference to urbanisation. Aspects of these influences are given further consideration in Chapter Two.

[27]Buzan, "From International System to International Society", p. 335.

under anarchy, that possibly allow for the creation of international societies. It was just such processes that took place and are still taking place in the development of the contemporary global international society.

It should be noted that the definitions of gemeinschaft and gesellschaft given above exist principally as an end-product dichotomy. The above paragraphs, however, begin to utilise the terms as a description of process. The noun form describing two kinds of society can also exist in verb form and describe two differing modes of interaction. A matrix could be imagined that explains both the mode of creation and the product. Such a matrix could illustrate that gemeinschaft and gesellschaft interaction are not necessarily mutually exclusive, one may affect the other, producing either a hybrid end product or a hybrid process. In other words, the two terms are used in this study to describe both the interactive process behind the transition of a multi-state system into a multi-state society and the nature of the multi-state society produced.

This study suggests that hybrid multi-state systems/societies (in both process and product) are a common phenomenon. The historical studies of ancient Chinese and Indian multi-state systems does, however, indicate that either gemeinschaft or gesellschaft forms may dominate certain systems. The contemporary international society is discussed as a hybrid, in terms of both product and process. The 'overlay' of modern inter-state practices on to pre-modern, non-European, multi-state systems is a partial explanation of the hybrid nature of contemporary international society (i.e. modern practices were culturally exclusive to the Europeans during colonisation).

European Expansion and the Formation of a Global International Society

The initial expansion of European international society only resulted in the establishment of a geographically larger international system. The formation of a truly global international society did not occur until the majority of non-European states at least nominally adopted the common institutions and norms of European international society, and were then granted membership of the erstwhile 'European states only' club. The expanding European international society was defined by several primary institutions and was challenged at the time by a need to deal with the arrival of non-European political communities into a European dominated international system.

The practical need to conduct relations with non-European states led European states to formulate club membership criteria expressed in terms of a 'standard of civilisation'. This standard of civilisation emerged as an explicit legal principle by circa 1905.[28] Briefly, the standard required a civilised state first to guarantee basic rights, such as those concerning life and property; secondly, to display that it could organise for self-defense and control a political bureaucracy capable of running state machinery; thirdly, to adhere to accepted international law, including the possession and control of a domestic legal system that provided justice for foreigners and nationals alike; and finally, to be able to maintain a diplomatic exchange service and to conform to accepted norms of 'civilised' international society, for example, polygamy and slavery were not considered civilised practices.[29] In other words, meeting the standard of civilisation required the state in question to be able to overtly display sovereign control over its territory and population in relation to other sovereign states i.e. if necessary, to be able to prevent the intervention of others.

Accommodation and adjustment to these standards caused considerable upheaval in societies that had not previously conducted their international relations in accordance with such foreign concepts and principles. Difficulties were exacerbated by the fact that the standard before 1905 usually existed only in general or implicit terms. Although, in theory, international law was blind to issues of culture and geographical location, the standard of civilisation was still perceived as a European standard. Acceptance of it challenged traditional systems of organisation and authority, although if the like units logic is accepted, then adoption of the successful and powerful modern European institutions was somewhat inevitable. Reluctance or inability to conform provided the necessary justification for the militarily superior European states to override the sovereign jurisdiction and non-intervention principles that ordered the Western European international society (as outlined earlier in the section on order in international society) and to impose extraterritoriality agreements and other such similar arrangements. It was not until later that countries like China and Japan learnt to use the language of international law and, perhaps more so, the language of power to

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[28]Gong, Gerrit W. *The Standard of 'Civilization' in International Society*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1984, p. 14.
[29]pp. 14 - 15.

uphold their sovereign jurisdiction.[30] Consequently, there were considerable areas of difficulty when practices of the European international system continued to spread to other parts of the globe.

Communist ideology based around class conflict and a 'withering away' of the state, at least in theory, put the communist bloc outside of a international system based on independent sovereign states. In practice, the Cold War mainly acted to limit fuller interaction by states in the communist bloc with the Western dominated institutions of international society. In other words, despite the Cold War, the states of the communist bloc continued to interact with international society, albeit in a restricted manner.

During the Cold War, especially in the period immediately after World War Two, the membership of international society changed rapidly. The anti-colonial and self-determination movements led to a proliferation of new states in the international system. On the whole, these new states successfully adopted the institutions of international society - as their formation into modern sovereign states testifies. Such a history has stimulated contemporary international society to become a hybrid of gemeinschaft and gesellschaft development.[31] Newly decolonised states and states of the communist bloc tended to have entered international society by way of a contractual and constructed process, while the existing membership had predominantly gained entry through common bonds, experience and identity. The gradual end of the Cold War, however, has removed ideological barriers, allowing for this latter process to exert a greater effect.

As a result of this hybrid nature it is possible to conceive of international society as structured by 'concentric circles of commitment', with a core and a periphery.[32] The core/periphery perception emphasises the difference between gemeinschaft and gesellschaft international society because the gemeinschaft part of international society forms a comparatively stable core, due to a denser network of norms and regimes, which functions to underpin and strengthen the gesellschaft institutions of wider international society. This phenomenon becomes important when analysing the behaviour of particular states in international society

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[30] The principles of sovereign equality and non-intervention are dealt with in further detail in Chapter Two and the country studies.
[31] Buzan, "From International System to International Society", pp. 348 - 49.
[32] ibid., p. 349.

and their level of commitment to the institutions of international society. It is also important for understanding how particular states perceive of each other and are positioned in relation to one another in the present day society of states.

The Institutions of International Society

It has been noted above that the formation and nature of an international society is characterised by the creation of institutions that manage order among its member states. In fact, the way in which a global international society emerged and expanded in a gesellschaft fashion is inextricably linked to the institutions that it contained. What follows is an institution-by-institution analysis that seeks to outline and clarify how these institutions contribute to order in international society. Five main institutions are examined: the balance of power; great power cooperation; diplomacy; war; and international law.

The Balance of Power

The balance of power is a basic institution of both international systems and international societies. After defining the concept and looking at its historical role, some general observations will be made about the main features of the balance of power. These include an assessment of its general acceptance by states and a discussion on whether the concept exists as a policy tool of states, or as an autonomous dynamic of states systems (and thus an autonomous determinant of state behaviour). The aim here is to define the main characteristics of the balance of power principally in relation to order in international systems and societies.

Definition and History

The balance of power concept has been abused to such an extent that some have suggested that it is no longer useful as a theory in international politics. Wight lists nine different definitions of the balance of power and other authors have listed even more. Sheehan suggests that the balance of power defined as action by states aiming to produce an even distribution of power *"...which precludes any one state or alliance from achieving a preponderance...is the closest thing there is to a generally accepted definition of the balance*

of power [italics mine]"[33] This is also the definition that Bull preferred and hereafter the term will be used with this meaning in mind.

Most authors of international politics attach considerable importance to the concept of the balance of power. During discussion of international systems and/or societies it is almost inevitable that reference to the term will be made. Perhaps the main reason for this is that the balance of power is married to the history of states systems.

Although balance of power thinking existed, it was not actually operating in a systematic manner either before the Renaissance (circa fourteenth century Europe) or before the period of the fifteenth century Italian states system. The ancient Hellenic states system is said to have lacked sufficient channels of communication to develop balance of power alliances.[34]

Interestingly, it is Wight's argument that the beginning of the modern West European states system (what is now termed as European international society) was in the fifteenth century, first taking shape during the Council of Constance (1414-18). Wight's point was that during the Council of Constance debate took place among representatives of both declared sovereign nation-states (the basic unit of a states system) as well as representatives of the Church. Wight's account of the genesis of European international society differs from the standard view, which generally identifies the Peace of Westphalia, in 1648, as the beginning of the Western states system. As Wight puts it: "At Westphalia the states system does not come into existence: it comes of age."[35] The embryonic form of the modern European society of states was first regionally apparent in fifteenth century Italy. Several of the institutions of this international society eventually diffused to the rest of Europe as a result of the French invasion of Italy in 1494.[36]

The significance of this with regard to the concepts of the balance of power and international society lies in the fact that, according to Wight and Sheehan, the origins of the West European international society coincide with the origins of a systematic balance of power theory. Butterfield, on the other hand, argues that real development of the balance of power

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[33]Sheehan, Michael. *The Balance of Power: History and Theory*, Routledge, London, 1996, p. 16.
[34]ibid., pp. 25 - 30.
[35]Wight, *Systems of States*, op. cit., p. 152.

idea did not occur until the seventeenth century. However, he writes that Guicciardini, Machiavelli's younger Italian contemporary, described the situation in fifteenth century Italy in a manner that revealed Guicciardini's awareness of system-like forces, but not in a way that explained a general balance of power theory. What was missing at the time, claimed Butterfield, was the notion of a states system.[37]

Nevertheless, if it is considered that a basic precondition for a balance of power to operate, and also for a states system to exist, is the presence of a number of sovereign states, then it becomes reasonable to conclude that the development of a states system is likely to be closely associated with the development of balance of power behaviour and accompanying theory.

The role that the balance of power plays in an international society is as an instrument for the maintenance of order. Its primary function is to preserve the international system and the independence of states. It performs this role in a number of ways. First, it prevents the international system as a whole from being transformed by conquest into a universal empire. Secondly, by the existence of regional balances, it maintains the independence of states from locally preponderant powers. Finally, it provides the conditions under which the other institutions that provide international order (such as diplomacy) can operate.[38]

The ability of both great and small powers to unite, form alliances, or absorb one another, in order to prevent another power from gaining preponderance, maintains a states system. Despite this positive function, there have been times when the balance of power has been criticised as a means of maintaining international order, particularly after World War One. Such opposition is to be expected since the theory accepts war as a necessary means to preserve the balance, giving priority to the preservation of the states system over the prevention of war. In addition, the balance of power generally works in favour of the great powers at the expense of the small. There is an apparently circular logic involved with the theory, by which the chaos of war and the lack of order that results from it are condoned so as to maintain, hopefully, the wider order of the international system or society.

A theory that successfully explains inter-state behaviour cannot, however, be dismissed just

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[36]ibid., pp. 131 & 151.
[37]Butterfield, H. "The Balance of Power", Butterfield and Wight, op. cit., pp. 137 - 8.
[38]Bull, *'The Anarchical Society'*, pp. 102, 103 & 119.

because the behaviour explained is unsavoury. The crucial test for the concept really lies in whether or not effective balances of power are on the whole obtainable and able to prevent systemic warfare. Of particular concern to this study is the idea that the balance of power is more than simply realist theory that explains war as a result of power differences and competition between states. The balance of power is also an expression of, and catalyst for, cooperative inter-state behaviour. In addition, increasingly military confrontation does not feature as part of balance of power relations between states situated in the core of international society. This aspect, and the stability or otherwise of bipolar and multi-polar balances of power, will be discussed further in Chapter Two within the context of the post-Cold War era.

The Balance of Power Dynamic: Fortuitous to Contrived

Power balancing to prevent one power from attaining preponderance may theoretically take place in either a states system or a states society. There are, however, some important differences. Bull describes something of a scale between a purely fortuitous balance of power and a contrived balance. A purely fortuitous balance is merely a point of deadlock between states striving for absolute power. A highly contrived balance exists when states collaborate closely to maintain a balance - they have a sense of responsibility and self-restraint, and all states in the system have the common goal of preserving a balance.[39] It seems logical that the latter is more likely to occur within a system that has attained high levels of communication and interaction. In other words, it is far more likely to occur within an international society.

If a balance is contrived then it may be argued that states are compelled into this behaviour by the very nature of the states system. Sheehan distinguishes two possibilities: balance of power policy and balance of power system. The former is defined by states' policies that are aimed at maintaining a balance of power, and the latter is defined by the neorealist[40] idea that

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[39] ibid., pp. 100 - 102.

[40] "[Neorealism]... severs realism from its critical roots and converts it into a problem-solving device for the foreign-policy makers of the most powerful states. This neorealism, which is very largely an American product of the Cold War, attempts to construct a technology of state power. It computes the components of power of individual states, and assesses the relative chances of moves in the game of power politics. Its epistemology is positivist and it lacks any dimension of historical structural change. The world of inter-state relations is a given world, identical in its basic structure over time. There are no changes of the system,

the balance of power is determined by the anarchic nature of the international system (i.e. power balancing functions are an autonomous dynamic within the structure of a system of sovereign states).[41]

Examination of these approaches reveals it is possible to arrive at a more precise notion of the extent to which the balance of power is controlled and managed by states in a given international system or society. To argue that a balance of power is totally system determined and that states are unable to collaborate in order to create a balance, unable to formulate policies to manage that balance or, perhaps, unable to choose not to balance the power of the threatening state at all, is to ignore historical evidence of just such behaviour.[42] However, considering the views assessed in the discussion on balance of power history at the beginning of this section, it is reasonable to assume that there is a strong and somewhat autonomous correlation between the formation of a balance of power and a states system. Therefore, while not proposing that a sophisticated balance of power arrangement is totally system determined, it is nevertheless reasonable to assume that power-balancing behaviour can also exist as an autonomous dynamic among systems of independent sovereign states. In Kenneth Waltz's words "[the balance of power]is seen by some as being akin to a law of nature."[43]

Recognising the extent to which a balance of power is contrived rests more upon isolating the ability or probability of the balance becoming subject to control by states in the system. If a continuum is imagined between a fortuitous balance and a contrived balance, then the earlier observation that the likelihood of a contrived balance increases as the states system becomes more sophisticated remains pertinent. In other words, a contrived balance is more likely in an international society because interaction and cooperation among states in an international society is more extensive.

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only changes within the system." Cox, Robert W. and Sinclair, Timothy J. *Approaches to World Order*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 505.

[41]Sheehan, op. cit., Chapters 3 & 4. The distinction between balance of power policy and system is also make in Claude, Inis L. Jr. *Power and International Relations*, Random House, NY, 1962, pp. 17 - 25.

[42] A common example is the Concert of Europe when Austria. Prussia and Russia agreed to defend their common interests after the Congress of Vienna in 1815.

Great Power Cooperation

Following a brief discussion of the term 'great power,' below is an outline of the managerial role that great powers exercise in international society. The relationship between international society and great powers is then considered in terms of the special rights and duties that great powers possess and the means available to them to maintain order in the society of states. The difficulties that great powers face in exercising their managerial role in international society will also be considered.

According to Wight, the Greeks did not utilise a term equivalent to 'great power'. They had a system that recognised a president or hegemon, which enabled them, at least theoretically, to establish a more egalitarian states system than the hierarchical type system that would be formed by unfettered great powers.[44] Wight contends that, in theory, the modern definition of a great power goes back to the beginning of the seventeenth century while, in practice, signs of great powers exerting their managerial role in a states system appeared in fifteenth century Italy.[45] There are two main definitions of a great power, employed since the seventeenth century, given by Wight: first, "the ability to maintain oneself against all others, even when they are united", or the possession of an independent war-making capacity and, second, holding universal aspirations or a general interest in the international system.[46]

Bull describes great powers as existing in a kind of club where there are two or more powers of comparable status who are all in the front ranks and comparable in terms of military strength. They are, he contends, "...recognised by others to have, and conceived by their own leaders and peoples to have, certain special rights and duties."[47] As a result of the communicative needs of undertaking such special obligations the idea of a great power presupposes the high level of system interaction exhibited by an international society.[48] In contrast, in an international system, the equivalent of a great power may be recognised as

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[43] Waltz, Kenneth. *Theory of International Politics*, McGraw - Hill, NY, 1979, p. 117.
[44] Wight, *Systems of States*, p. 65. In essence this refers to ideas of hegemonic stability considered further in due course.
[45] ibid., pp. 138 - 139.
[46] ibid.
[47] Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, pp. 194 - 196. It is worth noting the use of the word comparable, as it displays that Bull considers great powers in terms of their relative, rather than their absolute, international power.
[48] ibid., p. 196.

merely a dominant and powerful state without any recognised system-wide special rights or duties.

With reference to these special rights and duties, Bull writes that:

> Recognition of the special rights and duties of great powers by the accord to them of permanent membership of the Council of the League of Nations or the United Nations Security Council is not the source of these rights and duties, but has rather been made possible by the fact that such rights and duties are in any case recognised.[49]

It is made clear, therefore, that great power status and obligation are features of international society that are not necessarily formally institutionalised. It is also worth commenting that a state, although it may be in a position to do so, may not wish to take up any such special rights or privileges. A state's status as a great power may be the consequence more of external recognition than of its own efforts or desire to gain such a status.

> Great Powers exploit "... their preponderance in such a way as to impart a degree of central direction to the affairs of international society as a whole... great powers manage their relations with one another in the interests of international order by (i) preserving the general balance of power, (ii) seeking to avoid or control crises in their relations with one another, and (iii) seeking to limit or contain wars among one another." Furthermore: "They exploit their preponderance in relation to the rest of international society by (iv) unilaterally exploiting their local preponderance, (v) agreeing to respect one another's spheres of influence, and (vi) joint action, as is implied by the idea of a great power concert or condominium."[50]

Great power cooperation has an uneasy role as an institution of international society. International society is largely based upon the principle of the sovereign equality of member states. Great power cooperation and management of international society can contradict this equality principle as they manage international society so as to protect their own interests and therefore the existing distribution of power. As a consequence, some states (especially rising regional or middle powers) may perceive this to be an unequal and unjust order; one that

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[49]ibid.

provides special privileges mainly for the great powers themselves. This contradiction between the explicit sovereign equality principle and the implicit hierarchy among states is undeniable.

In order to perform their managerial role effectively, great powers must seek consent to this from other states. Yet great powers remain unable to formalise the full extent of their special functions because of the sovereign equality principle and the opposition that such a move would probably engender. Hierarchical relations among states are a dominant fact of inter-state relations, although such power-based relations must appear to bow to the equality principle. This is necessary if the managerial role of great powers is to be accepted by the rest of international society.[51] Thus, to some extent, the managerial role of great powers in international society is conditioned and limited by the need to legitimise that role by gaining support from a significant percentage of other states in international society.

Diplomacy

The master-institution of the modern Western states-system is the diplomatic network of resident embassies, reciprocally exchanged. This Italian invention seems to be unique, and found in no other civilisation.[52]

The remarkable willingness of states of all regions, cultures, persuasions and stages of development to embrace often strange and archaic diplomatic procedures that arose in Europe in another age is today one of the few visible indications of universal acceptance of the idea of international society[53]

Diplomacy, defined as simply as possible, is communication or negotiation among states that acknowledge one another's independence. The aim of this section is to outline the role of diplomacy as it functions within a society of states, although it is by no means an exhaustive account of the complexities of diplomatic procedure and tactics. Initially, the historical background of the institution is briefly reviewed and then diplomacy and its relationship to

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[50]ibid., p. 200.
[51]ibid., pp. 220 - 222.
[52]Wight, *Systems of States*, p. 53.
[53]Bull, *The Anarchical* Society, p. 177.

international society is assessed.

One of the hallmarks of the modern Western states system was a means of regular communication. This communication could take the form of summit meetings, conferences, congresses and, most importantly, the diplomatic system of resident embassies. Again, it is the fifteenth century Italian states system that is credited with the first use of resident embassies in the same general form in which they still appear in modern international society. While earlier and ancient states systems certainly had means of regular communication, such as oral or written communication, these exchanges did not take place in a manner that involved the establishment of an 'outpost' hosted by a foreign state. The Greeks made use of a *proxenos* - which involved the employment of a person left stationed in his home state, who acted as a representative and received visitors from his employer's state. The significant difference between this and the modern day diplomatic system is that the *proxenos* system did not involve extraterritoriality or the inherent symbolism that accompanies it. Instead, it approximated to extant secondary representation in the form of Honorary Consuls, for example, a Fijian as Consul for Chile in Suva.

The introduction of Italian diplomatic system institutions into the evolving modern society of states was a significant advance on the previous organisation of communications within ancient states systems. The institutionalisation of this innovative diplomatic system has continued since the fifteenth century, as it spread and developed throughout and beyond Europe. This process involved the legal recognition of the extraterritoriality of ambassadors in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the establishment of diplomatic corps in the eighteenth. There was agreement, during the Congress of Vienna in 1815, to accord precedence to diplomatic missions, as per the principle of equality of states. Non-European states, for example China and Japan, were incorporated into the diplomatic system during the nineteenth century and the codification of diplomatic practices on a worldwide scale during the 1961 Vienna Convention gained the fuller participation of the newly decolonised states.[54]

The importance of diplomacy to the development and maintenance of international society cannot be understated. Diplomatic culture is formed by the common values and ideas held by official representatives of the state and can act as an important force for cohesion in

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[54]ibid., p. 160.

international society. Bull lists several functions for diplomacy in the present society of states, including: communication, negotiation, information gathering, and the pacification of disputes.[55] However, one of the most important roles played by the diplomatic tradition is a symbolic one. All of the other functions could be performed, more or less effectively, without resident embassies. The diplomatic tradition, and the rules and customs that are required to maintain the extraterritoriality of embassies and their staff, provide a visible symbol of cooperation among states. The physical influence of such a small and elite association of people is probably minor in terms of greater international society. Yet the symbolic role that the resident embassy system has played, and continues to play, in the establishment and maintenance of order and cooperation in international society is certainly over and above the actual physical influence and practical duties undertaken by diplomatic representatives.

By definition diplomacy takes place within a multi-state system - independent states must exist if dialogue is to take place among them. Thus, plurality is a condition of diplomacy.[56] Multilateral diplomacy is more likely than bilateral diplomacy within a more advanced international system. In other words, in an international society, where there is a heightened awareness of system-wide common interests, multi-state diplomacy takes place more readily. Diplomacy can be described as the 'glue' that holds a society of states together. The need for communication and the recognition of mutual, system level, interests makes diplomacy an essential feature of multi-state systems and societies. As a system evolves into a society, the more advanced resident embassy system and the increased sophistication of interaction enables and compels states to aim increasingly to further both their individual interests in their dealings with other states, and the interests of the system as a whole (in this regard, and perhaps explained in a constructivist manner (see below), diplomacy is both a cause and an effect of inter-state relations). Although there may be some variation in system-wide aims depending on whether or not a state supports the status quo.

Without a functioning diplomatic medium of some sort, the other institutions of international society struggle to operate. Without effective communication and interaction the formation of alliances against aggressive or expansionist states, for example, would be impaired. As a

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[55]Der Derian, James. "Hedley Bull and the Idea of Diplomatic Culture" in Fawn, op. cit., pp. 84 - 100 provides a detailed account of this and other related ideas as they were perceived by Bull.
[56]Watson, Adam. *Diplomacy: The Dialogue Between States*, Eyre Methuen, London, 1982,

consequence, the most basic aspects of the balance of power would function poorly and the international society as a whole would be more vulnerable to conquest by expansionist states. Recognition of one another's independent sovereign status (in terms of non-intervention and sovereign integrity, as discussed in Chapter Two) is a fundamental precondition of diplomatic negotiation between states. This function alone makes it an essential institution that promotes order in international society.

War

This section considers the role of war as an institution in relation to the state, in relation to a states system and to an international society, and also outlines the close association that war has with the other institutions of international society, especially the balance of power and international law. Collective security as one possible alternative option for avoiding war within international society is analysed, and the variation in the frequency of different kinds of war since World War Two and the theoretical impact of this on the society of states is examined too.

War is concisely defined as consisting of "...organised violence carried on by political units against each other. Violence is not war unless it is carried out in the name of a political unit....".[57] As will be detailed later, there are several variations in the kinds of war, due mainly to the different types of political units that wage them.

From the perspective of an individual state operating independently of a states system or society, war is simply a means (or policy instrument) used to meet its objectives in relation to its external environment, usually in the last resort. From within a states system, war and the threat of war become basic determinants of the shape of the system. This is because war determines whether a balance of power exists, or if a single power dominates, and it

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pp. 15.
[57]Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, p. 178. The use of the term 'political units' in this definition of war is indicative of a liberal and rationalist approach. "The problems with rationalism are numerous, complex and quite fundamental." Smith, Steve. Booth, Ken and Zalewski, Marysia (eds). *International theory: positivism and beyond* , Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 22. Smith et al. provides a good summary in explanation of this point in addition to suggested further reading. Alongside present acknowledgement that the ES is clearly a rationalist approach more discussion with regard to the problems of rationalism takes place in Chapter Two of the present study.

influences the general hierarchy among states in the system. From within an international society the role of war in maintaining order is more complex. International society must attempt to juggle two almost diametrically opposed functions of war. On the one hand, international society seeks to limit war between states in an attempt to curb the disorder that warfare creates. It does this by advancing rules regarding the right of a state to go to war, rules regarding conduct in war, and by seeking to maintain the state as the only entity legitimately entitled to wage war (*jus in bello* and *jus ad bellum* respectively). On the other hand, international society also utilises war positively as a means of enforcing international law, the balance of power, and for making changes to the norms governing international society.[58]

The phenomenon of warfare in international societies or systems is closely associated with the balance of power. The threat of war and the actual pursuit of war are both aspects of war that are necessary to balance of power policy and have been utilised in this role throughout history (as the West European states system has amply demonstrated).[59] The balance of power functions to maintain the states system and thereby the form of international order that the states system promotes. The examples of large wars that are the result of failure of the balance of power to provide peace tend to be more prominent than the examples of where the balance of power, and the threat or use of war as an instrument to enforce it, have managed to avert systemic violence.

Of course, war is a phenomenon that well predates both the balance of power and the idea of international society. However, it is when considering its function as a means of obtaining order in a states system or society that war becomes linked with the balance of power concept and other institutions of international society. In association with the balance of power or international law, war becomes more than a forceful means of furthering an individual state's interests in relation to other states, but also acquires a 'system-like' quality in its role as an institution capable of maintaining the independence of states within a states system or society.

An international society is characterised by high levels of inter-state interaction and communication. In such an environment collective security (as an example to compare with

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[58]ibid., pp. 180 - 183.

the balance of power backed by the threat of war[60]) exists as one possible, if rather ambitious, alternative means of using war and the threat of force to uphold the rules and norms of international society. Collective security is defined as a system whereby a group of states seeks to deter aggression by stating that an attack on one is an attack on all. Deviation from defined norms of behaviour is deterred by the *collective* threat.

Wight makes the point that a system of collective security was written into the Covenant of the League of Nations, which was in fact a prescription for a reversal of past development. In other words, Western Christendom, in the shape of the papal monarchy, was what could be described as equivalent to a 'world' government for Western civilisation. After this form of world government dissolved, there were several attempts at collective security, principally after the fifteenth century. Finally, Western civilisation adopted the balance of power and a states system as the most workable means of defending common interests. Thus, Wight contends, collective security was obsolete and a step backwards - the League of Nations attempted to establish a system that had already been tried and abandoned.[61] From Wight's perspective, therefore, collective security is a very questionable alternative method of enforcing international order.

Types of War

"...strong states are an essential ingredient to peace within and between societies"[62]

Because states comprise the basic membership unit of international society, war occurring as internal conflict inside state borders is also of importance to the security and stability of the society of states.

War, according to Holsti, can take three forms. The first form is institutionalised or

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[59]Sheehan, op. cit., p. 61.

[60]Other comparative models, such as comprehensive security, are considered in later chapters.

[61]Wight, *Systems of States*, p. 149.

[62]Holsti, Kalevi J. *The State, War, and the State of War*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. xiii. Also see Holsti, Kalevi J. *Peace and War: armed conflicts and international order 1648 - 1989*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1991 for definition of war associated with the assumption that "... man can build diplomatic institutions, norms, and procedures that will at least reduce the incidence of war." p. xv.

'Clausewitzian' type war, namely 'the continuation of politics by other means', having both the purpose of furthering the interests of the state and government and of resolving disputes between rulers of the state when diplomacy has failed. The second form is total war, involving the mobilisation of the resources of the entire nation and state with the purpose of elimination of the enemy's society. This second type of war is beyond professional war between state rulers as it involves struggles between nations as well as states, and the line between combatant and non-combatant becomes quite blurred. The third form is 'wars of the third kind', or 'people's wars'. This kind of war involves resistance and guerrilla movements, secession, and ideological warfare. It is without organised fronts or declarations of war. Wars of the third kind are pre-state wars, that is, their aim is state creation. In this last category there is almost no distinction between combatant and non-combatant. [63]

According to Holsti, wars of the third kind have been the most numerous since 1945 and weak states are the primary location of wars currently in progress. To repeat Holsti's point, the relevance of this to the present study is that "...strong states are an essential ingredient to peace within and between societies",[64] and therefore order in international society is necessarily affected by the internal security problems of member states. These aspects are also closely linked to the Third World security predicament, and have become problems of international politics that are attracting considerable attention in the post-Cold War environment.[65] For this reason they will be addressed at greater length in the next chapter on post-Cold War international society.

International Law

In its most basic and essential form, international society is a legal construction[66]

This section on international law addresses the subject in two parts. Prior to reaching its present form, international law first underwent some significant evolutionary changes, and it

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[63] ibid., p. 28.

[64] ibid., p. xiii.

[65] The 'security predicament' is a term utilised by Mohammed Ayoob to explain Third World security problems as stemming chiefly from inside the state. His views are also considered with greater depth in the chapters to follow. See Ayoob, Mohammed. *The Third World Security Predicament: State making, Regional Conflict and the International System*, Lynne Rienner Publishers, Boulder, Colorado, 1995.

continues to evolve today. The first part of this section discusses the origins of literature and thought on the law among nations, the connection between natural law, positive international law, the 'standard of civilisation', and human rights, all within the general context of debate over which entity or unit should be the most appropriate subject of international law. This first part aims to exhibit the difficulties that international law principles have faced during attempts to meet with changes in the historical makeup of international society. It also draws attention to the complex and interwoven historical relationship that international law has with the society of states and with the background culture of the states system from which the tradition of specific study of it originates.

The second part, while also explaining the 'standard of civilisation' in more detail, broadly focuses on working through the transition of international law from a largely European international society based concern into a concern of the greater global society of states. Overall, the section aims to explain the role that international law has in maintaining order in international society. Furthermore, by detailing the history of international law in relation to the society of states it is possible to determine the core goals of international society in this respect - goals which have essentially remained unchanged.

History and Evolution

Bull defines international law as "a body of rules which binds states and other agents in world politics in their relations with one another and is considered to have the status of law."[67] This definition is qualified in a number of ways when he argues the case against those who consider international law not as a 'body of rules' but as a social process that is shaped by social, moral, and political considerations. Bull, however, argues that such a normative social process, while worthy of consideration, is meaningless unless it is backed by a previously agreed 'body of rules'.[68] Perhaps a somewhat constructivist 'middle-road' would better reflect reality, whereby social processes and norms interact with agreed rules shaping by one another. None the less, at this stage, the study rests with the above general definition of international law enunciated by Bull. What is of priority in the context of the present question is consideration of the complex and evolving relationship of international law in respect of

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[66]Buzan, 'From International System to International Society', p. 346.
[67]Bull, *The Anarchical Society*, p. 122.
[68]ibid.

international society.

If political theory is the tradition of speculation about the state, then international theory may be supposed to be a tradition of speculation about the society of states... And speculation of this kind was formerly comprehended under International Law.[69]

Furthermore, Wight explains that things 'international' have seldom been the focus of study in their own right, but rather they have traditionally been discussed as part of general political theory and seldom thought of in a context distinct from domestic politics.[70] If Wight's observation is accurate, then it explains why past international theory is generally to be found amongst the writings of historians, statesmen and philosophers, rather than addressed as an independent subject. Thus it is that international law, one of the central institutions of international society, was written about and debated upon before independent international theory was established. If in the past there was no distinct tradition of speculation on international theory, let alone international society, then it is unsurprising that initial thoughts on states systems and societies were made as a part of the study of law. As a result, natural law writers such as Pufendorf, Grotius, Gentili, Suarez, and Victoria considered international society first.[71]

Natural law is discussed below for two main reasons. First, as international society has developed to include different cultures, the tradition of natural law supplies a basis of law that is theoretically independent of cultural bias, since it is based on what is just by nature. Secondly, there are many links, historical and otherwise, between natural law and international law and consequently between natural law and international society. The

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[69]Wight, Martin. 'Why is there no International Theory?', Butterfield and Wight, op. cit., p. 18.

[70]This is a phenomenon that is repeated in other societies and cultures. The Chinese, for example, did not analyse inter-state relations as a distinct international subject during the period of their ancient states system, as will be further discussed in Chapter Four. In passing it should be mentioned that the above assessment of international law is admittedly very Eurocentric. There has been a tendency amongst both Western and non-Western authors to dismiss, or simply ignore the contribution that principles of international law which existed in other ancient cultures have made or could make. Chapters Four and Five of this study pursue this point further.

[71]Bull, The Anarchical Society, p. 27. Bull's view on the historical origins of thought on the notion of international society is contested by Rennger, N.J. 'Discovering Traditions? Grotius, International Society and International Relations', The Oxford International Review,

quotations below illustrate these two points.

> ...it may be argued that there are certain moral premises that are shared universally - that moral rules protecting life, property and the sanctity of agreements, for example, are respected in all societies, including international society. To draw attention to the fact that these very widely shared rules seem to reflect not the conventions of particular times and places but the nature of human beings and the perennial situation in which they find themselves, has been one of the contributions of the natural law tradition[72]

> Natural law and international law are often associated for obvious reasons. As long as there is no organised international community, there is no written law and little customary law in international affairs. Therefore in this domain we depend much more than elsewhere on agreement about what is just by nature[73]

The universal moral premises that Bull refers to in the first quotation above are also those that form part of his definition of order in international and world society. In other words, it may be argued that some moral premises of natural law also form the basic structure of order in international society. (It seems uncontroversial to argue that stability of possession is a universal principle, even the most communal tribal societies have certainly possessed concepts of group ownership vis-à-vis other tribes.) The second quotation highlights a link between natural and international law by pointing out that the norms of natural law are a minimal basis for cooperation even in the most primitive of international systems. The question begged is 'what is nature?' This inevitably leads into wider philosophical or cosmological discussion best addressed comprehensively elsewhere. At least in terms of minimal principles that act to order society it can be seen that common ground exists between natural law and the norms of international law. It is necessary, however, to answer the question as to whether this common ground occurs only at a basic level or whether it continues to exert an influence on the institution of international law and thereby overall international society.

Vol. 3, No. 1, Winter 1991, pp. 47 - 50.
[72]Bull, Hedley, 'Natural law and international relations', *British Journal of International Studies* 5 (1979), pp. 171 - 181.
[73]Yves, Simon. *The Tradition of Natural Law: a philosopher's reflections*, edited by Kuic

There is a concern in Bull's work about those approaches that identify the individual rather than the state as the primary subject of international law. In Bull's view, natural law, human rights, and transnational activity (if applied to the individual person in contest with the 'individual' state) all have the potential to undermine the sovereign supremacy of the state, and, ultimately, therefore, the entire society of states. On the other hand, Ronald Dore, in reference to the effects of activity involving non-state actors (for example, transnational activity, such as human rights activism) suggests that:

> The underlying [transnational]process is arguably a movement towards a world society, a frontier-eroding process inimical to the institutionalisation of a society of states. Yet the effective expression of this process is in inter-state agreements, and the society of states is also strengthened by the increase in the scope and diversity of the binding ties of international agreements, and by the strengthening pressures within the states to see that agreements are kept. The distinction between movement towards a world society and movement toward a society of states is a useful one, but (*pace* Bull, 1979) the two trends can be complementary rather than contradictory.[74]

Natural law tradition may be employed to supply a basic set of 'ready made rules', especially in situations where positive international law is deemed state-centric, biased, or ethnocentric, and when universal values are required. It is not necessarily the case that a choice has to be made between law that endorses the state as the principal subject of law, (positive international law), or law that favours the individual as the main unit of analysis (natural law). In fact, the advent of positive international law involved the attachment of a different emphasis to basic principles very similar to those (largely Christian based) principles of natural law. Despite the 'state versus individual debate', the difference between these two approaches is not as distinct as it may appear. "Ascendant positivist legal notions merely spelled out explicitly what had been implicit historically... such doctrines did not depart that radically from what Vitoria's natural law philosophies had countenanced in the past"[75]

Closely linked to modernisation and rationalism, positivism applies scientific laws to human

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Vukan. Fordham University Press, 1963, p. 35.

[74]Dore, Ronald. 'Unity and Diversity In World Culture', Bull, Hedley. and Watson, Adam (eds.). *The Expansion of International Society,* Oxford University Press, 1985, New York, p. 418.

endeavour while implying linear and empirical progress for humanity. Positivism influenced the evolution of international society by supplanting the universal values of the natural law tradition with particular inter-state laws and standards of membership for entry into the European club of states. Thus, the expression of positive international law in the form of the 'standard of civilisation' was the next step in the historical progression of the relationship being outlined in this section between early natural law and modern international law.

Even though it may appear that what was known as the standard of 'civilisation' (hereafter at times referred to simply as 'the standard') was a Eurocentric attempt to exclude non-European states, the standard was in reality an attempt to make universal natural law principles more explicitly applicable and thereby inclusive. However, considering the European origins of the arguably universal natural law principles and norms, Eurocentricism was probably an unavoidable element within the standard. As Gong writes on this subject:

> It is valid to trace the requirement that countries were not 'civilised' until they passed a formal test so recognising them to the presumptions of positive international law. However, this does not mean that the standard of 'civilisation' emerged as international law shrank from a universal into an exclusive Eurocentric system. On the contrary, the standard emerged not so much to ostracize the non-European countries from the Family of Nations as to include them within the domain of international law.[76]

There is an observably close relationship between natural law, positive international law, the standard of civilisation, and international society. These links are continued in the present day as highlighted by Watson when referring to human rights: "These Western [human rights] demands are the modern equivalent, and indeed the linear continuation, of the nineteenth century demands for observance of Western standards of civilisation as the price for admission to international society."[77]

The impact of these more contemporary questions and issues on contemporary, post-Cold War, international law and international society will be addressed at greater length in Chapter

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[75]Gong, ibid., p. 43.
[76]ibid., p. 44.
[77]Watson, Adam. 'Foreword' in James Der Derian (ed.). *International Theory: Critical Investigations*, New York University Press, NY, 1995, p. XIV.

Two. It suffices at this stage to note the historical and theoretical links between these various aspects in the development of international law, especially when considering the inclusion, or otherwise, of differing cultures into the contemporary society of states.

The Standard of Civilisation

It is worth a more detailed consideration of the standard of civilisation at this stage because from the viewpoint of non-Western countries in recent centuries it had quite an impact upon the evolution of their understanding of international law and their integration into modern international society.

The standard of 'civilisation' is a legal phrase, which obliged states to meet the following requirements before being deemed civilised:

1. a 'civilised' state guarantees basic rights, i.e. life, dignity, and property; freedom of travel, commerce, and religion, especially that of foreign nationals.

2. a 'civilised' state exists as an organised political bureaucracy with some efficiency in running the state machinery, and some capacity to organise for self-defence;

3. a 'civilised' state adheres to generally accepted international law, including the laws of war; it also maintains a domestic system of courts, codes, and published laws which guarantee legal justice for all within its jurisdiction, foreigners and native citizens alike;

4. a 'civilised' state fulfils the obligations of the international system by maintaining adequate and permanent avenues for diplomatic interchange and communication.

5. a 'civilised' state by and large conforms to the accepted norms and practices of the 'civilised' international society, e.g., suttee, polygamy, and slavery were considered 'uncivilised', and therefore unacceptable.[78]

The standard is important in a discussion of international society for a number of reasons. It

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[78]Gong, op. cit., pp. 14 - 15.

has been a prominent feature in the development of international law and was the legal expression of how the European powers sought to contend with non-European civilisations during their colonial expansion. It is therefore crucial to an understanding of the mainly nineteenth century expansion of international society and the growth of international law as a key institution of the society of states. In the context of the objectives of this study it is interesting to heed the following point with regard to the period during which the standard of civilisation was applied:

> The standard view, moreover, neglects the influence of Asian international practices on the evolution of European ones: the international society to which non-European powers came to adhere was not made in a Europe isolated from the rest of the world, but grew up concurrently with the expansion of Europe into other continents over four centuries, and was marked by this experience.[79]

This quotation emphasises a point pursed later; that is, while the evolution of international law outlined above involved the imposition of modern state practices on non-European states, this does not mean that international law did not previously exist in non-European states systems in pre-modern and 'non-positivist' forms.

Definition of the standard of civilisation facilitates some measure of explanation for the laws and/or policy regimes adopted by the European powers during the period of European imperialism, for example, extraterritoriality and the 'unequal' treaty system. Such policies sought to protect the life, liberty, and property of foreign nationals in non-European countries. Gong comments that the emergence of the standard can be traced via records of the nineteenth century treaties signed between European and non-European countries and by reference to the leading international legal texts of the era.[80].

Use of the standard of civilisation declined in the twentieth century for a number of reasons. Chief among these was that membership of international society was decided increasingly in the context of the sovereignty principle rather than that of perceived levels of civilisation - denial of membership to the society of states on grounds of 'civilisational' standards set in

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[79]Bull, Hedley. 'The Emergence of a Universal International Society' in Bull and Watson (eds.), *The Expansion of International Society.*
[80]Gong, op. cit., p. 25.

Europe was increasingly considered anachronistic and insulting to non-European countries, regardless of whether some still considered these standards universal. The changing nature of twentieth century international society made it seem impractical to maintain an exclusive club of civilised states that effectively excluded outsiders from participating as subjects of international law. This impracticality was reflected by a gradual decline in the use of the standard as a principle of international law and led to attempts to replace it in the interest of establishing and maintaining common rules and norms in international society.

Again, the contemporary dilemmas in international law resurface:

> The parallels between the old standard of 'civilisation' and a new 'standard of human rights' are intriguing. They share a common concern for fundamental rights of life, liberty, and property, and individual dignity, though in various forms depending on one's politics. There is an easy and natural transition from concern for 'civilised' rights to concern for 'human rights'...[81]

Gong goes on to comment that the ability to protect human rights has become the new 'standard', especially in Europe.

It is apparent from the preceding discussion on international law that, despite the various forms that international law has taken during its history - a history of stating the rules for conduct of relations between states - its ultimate purpose has always remained the same. International law is a means for maintaining order (at least in Bull's terms discussed earlier) in a society of independent sovereign states. This is done by protecting the state as the basic unit comprising the system, and by stating and encouraging compliance with rules regarding interaction between states and other international actors. The priorities of international law are still evolving. There are challenges to be met by the society of states as it deals with the task of managing international law and order within an environment where the traditional scope of international law (i.e. as principally a concern between states - *vide* Chapter Two on globalisation) is under dispute.

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[81] ibid., p. 91.

Chapter One Conclusion

This chapter began by looking at how the idea of international society has been developed by particular authors of the ES. Debate regarding the very existence of international society was considered and it was concluded that international society is unique and not consistently comparable with domestic society.

The chapter took a closer look at the general nature of the society of states. It defined it in relation to various similar terms or concepts, and also discussed its evolution into its present global form. The role and 'revival' of the ES was discussed in relation to the progress of literature on the concept of multi-state systems and societies. In sum, the society of states is a very active IR approach and is distinct from such concepts as world society and transnational society because it deals essentially with relations among states. International society may develop through gemeinschaft and/or gesellschaft means and, due to historical reasons, contemporary international society may be termed as a hybrid of gesellschaft and gemeinschaft development.

The chapter then assessed the institutions of international society so as to make clear their role in maintaining order in the society of states. These institutions included: the balance of power, great power cooperation, diplomacy, war and international law.

The core contribution that the balance of power institution makes to the maintenance of international order and international society is that it acts to prevent the states system or society from domination by a single power. A balance of power may exist on a continuum between fortuitous and contrived, while it is by no means certain that an advanced international society will invariably possess a contrived balance of power.

The large amount of power and influence possessed by great powers goes hand in hand with increased obligations, rights, duties, and interests in maintaining order in international society. The managerial role of great powers in international society is conditioned and limited by the need to legitimise that role by gaining support from a significant percentage of other states in international society.

The resident embassy system and its representatives carry out a symbolic diplomatic role

over and above their day-to-day operation. Diplomacy helps to maintain order in international society by providing the channels by which the other institutions of international order can function. The existence of a number of independent states is essential to diplomatic interaction and thereby the conduct of diplomacy is inextricably linked to states systems and societies.

War may be positively employed by the society of states to maintain order amongst its members. Widespread warfare threatens chaos in inter-state relations. Therefore, international society also seeks to limit warfare by means of various rules, norms and principles. Since 1945 there have been gradual but significant changes in the frequency of different kinds of warfare, which raises new questions and challenges for post-Cold War international society as it seeks both to limit and to utilise war as an institution for obtaining order in the society of states.

International law contributes to international order by protecting the principle of organising mankind into states within a states system, by stating the rules for coexistence among actors in international society, and by the encouragement of compliance and respect for these rules. There are clear links to be drawn between natural law, positive international law, the standard of civilisation, human rights and the (modernist liberal *vide* Chapter Two) principles and values they all intrinsically contain. The evolution of international law has had a great influence on the inclusion of non-European states into the contemporary international society and vice versa. There are challenges to be met by the society of states as it deals with the task of managing international law and order within an environment where the traditional scope of international law (i.e. as principally a concern between states) is under dispute.

Ultimately, the purpose of this chapter was twofold. First, to introduce the basic framework of the international society/ES approach in order to later utilise this framework in consideration of order and international relations. Secondly, to lay the foundations for analysis of the international society approach in relation to the specific countries of China and India - in particular the roles that these two countries play in maintaining order (in the sense of institutional order within a multi-state system) in international society. So as to pursue these purposes in the contemporary context, the study now moves on to consider post-Cold War international society.

The most fundamental issue of all - the unfinished business inherited from the Cold War, from the century of inter hegemonic wars, and indeed from the half millennium of the system's evolution - is that of the formation of an international society; not in the sense of a club of states with common rules, but of a community of political units united by economic and other transnational ties and characterised by a broad sharing of political and social values. The Cold War was one episode in the evolution of that system.... That challenge is now over, and, as no other plausible answer of global relevance is now apparent, the question is whether the potential for an international society in the stronger sense of the term can now be created by overcoming not only the anarchy of states but also the anarchies of the market and of ethnic identification. This is the unfinished business of the Cold War

Fred Halliday[82]

This chapter is concerned with analysing the influence that the conclusion of the Cold War has had on the development of international society. The topic is approached first by discussing the actual timing of the end of the Cold War and its importance both to this study and to the overall study of international relations. Secondly, a general overview is made of differing perspectives on the post-Cold War order. This leads to an examination of the institutions of international society, how the end of the Cold War has affected them and, ultimately, how they are able to assist with explaining contemporary problems and issues. The general argument is that the concept of international society and the institutions that support it are able to assist considerably in explaining and increasing understanding of the post-Cold War international political order.

The End of the Cold War

The end of the Cold War is considered mainly in balance of power terms, embodied in the sudden cessation of the bipolar world created by a political, military, and primarily

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[82]Halliday, Fred. "The Cold War and Its Conclusion: Consequences for International Relations Theory", Leaver, Richard and Richardson, James L (eds.) *The Post-Cold War Order: Diagnoses and Prognoses,* Allen and Unwin, St Leonards, NSW 2065, Australia, 1993, p. 28.

ideological struggle between two superpowers. The end of the Cold War is often perceived simply as a sudden event that took place over a short period of a few years, centring on the removal of the Berlin wall and the rapid disintegration of the Soviet Union. Lebow (et al.) argues that the relatively abrupt official end to the bipolar confrontation that the fall of the Berlin wall symbolised was not fully indicative of the longer-term ending to the Cold War.. By calling attention to the fact that Gorbachev initiated what was to be the "final stage of reconciliation that had been proceeding fitfully since Stalin", Lebow argues that the end of the Cold War was not just a sudden event but rather a gradual, internal and external, long term process.[83]

This observation suggests two things. First, in terms of general change in the international political environment, the actual timing of the end of the Cold War may not be as meaningful as it at first appears and, secondly, that as a consequence, the inability of international relations theory to predict the exact timing of the end of the Cold War is perhaps not in itself really a failure of any serious consequence. Rather, the inability of international relations theory to simply foresee an eventual end to the Cold War as a consequence of long-term underlying changes emphasises the narrow dominant focus of international relations theory during the Cold War.

Nevertheless, the Cold War's paralysing effect upon international politics, for example, in the United Nations Security Council, was evidence of its impact.[84] The removal of this paralysing effect makes the end of the Cold War a crucial component of this study. However, these effects do not undermine the observation that other changes (increases in wars of the third kind for example) in international order evident today, although temporarily sidelined, were taking place despite the Cold War struggle.[85]

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[83]Lebow, Richard Ned. and Risse-Kappen, Thomas. "Introduction: International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War", Lebow and Risse-Kappen (eds.), *International Relations Theory and the End of the Cold War*, Columbia University Press, NY, 1995, p. 8.
[84]Holsti, *The State, War, and the State of War*, p. 193.
[85]It is pertinent to note in passing that the same argument could be advanced with reference to the post-September 11 'war on terror'. In a recent article, Greg Sheridan suggests that the 'war on terror' is the third stage of post-World War Two history. Stage one, he states, was the Cold War, stage two the post-Cold War and stage three after September 11. "US Ready to Apply Lessons of the Cold War", *The Australian*, 14 March, 2002, p. 11. On the other hand, "Sept. 11 and its aftermath are spurring the alliance and its members [NATO] to think seriously about post-Cold War conflicts." Aguera, Martin "NATO Turns Focus to 21'st-Century Role", *Defense News*, Feb. 25 – March 3, 2002, p. 54. This latter quote implies the

The inability of international relations theory to predict the dramatic and surprising nature of the conclusion to the Cold War forced many scholars to rethink and to attempt to explain the apparent shortcomings in their various theories. The peaceful way that the Soviets allowed the Cold War to end came as a surprise, particularly to international relations theorists of the realist school. It conflicted with their theories on power transition as a superpower war was the expected catalyst for system transformation.[86] Exact prediction of dates becomes less important when a more comprehensive and historically sensitive international relations theory is adopted.[87] The end of the Cold War has freed areas of debate in international relations theory that were previously of issue but not fully addressed.

The dramatic events that began in 1989 and led to the official end of the Cold War should not be viewed as a sudden change that created either new or unknown international power structures or simply revived past ones. Its end brought to the forefront events, actors, and debates that were already increasingly of issue but had been overshadowed by the Cold War conflict. The end of the Cold War has had the effect of widening the scope of international relations theory and thereby enables better maintenance of an historical context when considering the development of international order and society in the post-Cold War era.

The Post-Cold War Order: Models for Consideration

The English School, International Society and World Affairs

In the absence of an all-subsuming superpower bipolar conflict there are many possible ways to view the currently evolving international order. The objective of this section is to locate the ES and the concept of international society in the wider IR discipline. A fair criticism of

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view that 11 September and terrorism is to be classed as a post-Cold War conflict, not as a new strategic era. If the definition of terrorism given in footnote 98 of this study is adopted and then related to the discussion on wars of the third kind then the point could be taken even further i.e. that terrorism in terms of sub-state violence was a trend already in progress during the Cold War and has now simply come to the fore. These points are made in passing in defence of the relevance of the 'post-Cold War era' framework of this chapter, despite the 11 September attacks. They are by no means intended to do full analytical justice to the impact of 11 September on world affairs and are not pursued in later chapters.
[86]Lebow and Risse-Kappen, "Introduction", op. cit., p. 1.
[87]See Herrman, Richard K. "Conclusions: The End of the Cold War - What have we

the ES approach (especially as outlined by Bull in Chapter One) is that it fails to take effective account of the economic and social dimensions of world affairs. This criticism stems from the clear preference Bull had for the strategic dimension and is due to the increasing significance attached to non-state actors and events by diverse IR theories. To place the ES in the wider IR field, and in order to carry the argument that the ES has the potential to 'combine traditions and theories normally not able to relate to each other', it is necessary to step back and assess the ES in wider philosophical terms. The matrix below provides a good starting point for such an assessment.

Figure 2.1

A matrix of modernist world affairs, with its margins (feminist, environmentalist, pre- and post-modernist) present but concealed.

		Politico-strategic	Politico-economic	Politico-social
	Bad	Realism	Mercantilism	Nationalism
Human Nature	Calculating	Internationalism	Liberalism	Individualism
	Good	Globalism	Socialism	Collectivism
	Materialist		Marxism	
Human Nurture	Less materialist/ more idealist		Neo-marxism	
	Idealist		Neo-Hegelianism ('constructivism')	

Source: Pettman, Ralph. "Making sense of International Relations Theory: the metaphysics of world affairs", unpublished manuscript, Appendix 1, 17 October 2001.

Learned?", Lebow and Risse-Kappen, ibid., p. 279.

Halliday[88] refers to a need for the formation of an international society in the post-Cold War era able to deal with the challenge of increased economic ties, shared political and social values, and the anarchies of the market and ethnic identification. What Buzan has referred to as 'bridge-building' between the disparate IR theories, which attempt to explain order in the post-Cold War world, is necessary if Halliday's call is to be heeded.

Figure 2.1 maps the philosophical starting points of the various theories and thereby indicates their policy prescriptions for world affairs. It also enables the ES to be located in relation to them. Ralph Pettman characterises the ES as part of the 'internationalist' dimension to world affairs. This is done because the traditional focus of the ES has been with the politico-strategic dimension and a Grotian approach that stresses " ...general propositions about interdependence and reciprocity."[89] What is more, it is also fair to state that ES literature fits with the 'calculative' view of human nature. This view is consistent with the compromising qualities of the concept of international society, where rivalry in a realist sense is accommodated alongside cooperation in a liberalist sense. With such a philosophic rationale the ES is also most appropriately considered liberalist in a politico-economic sense and individualist in a politico-social sense (*vide* Figure 2.1).

In later chapters, the ES concept of international society is applied to examples of ancient multi-state systems. To do so raises some commensurability questions i.e. is it methodologically proper to apply ideas originating largely as a consequence of the advent of a modern states system to a pre-modern states system? This question will be addressed in direct relation to the ancient multi-states systems of China and India in the introduction to those chapters. At this point the ES will be located in relation to the general modernity project in order to argue later that there is significant commensurability between the inter-state relations of pre-modern and modern multi-state systems.

The ES is undoubtedly a rationalistic project. The international order that the institutions of international society creates, as, for example, Bull outlines, is based upon the actions of "... fictional international persona [states]like 'America' or 'Japan', complying voluntarily with a

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[88] Halliday, op. cit. p. 28.
[89] Pettman, Ralph. "Making sense of International Relations Theory: the metaphysics of world affairs", *Unpublished manuscript*, 17 October 2001, p. 14.

host of international laws, creating organisations and arrangements ('regimes') that expedite statist concerns."[90] There is clearly a normative component to this 'objective' prescription i.e. the order provided by the institutions of an international society comprised of sovereign independent states is assumed to be a desirable thing and a worthy goal in its own right. In this sense the rationalisation/conscious control of world affairs (and the resultant policy prescriptions of the ES) is taken to be a desirable end in itself and not simply a means to an end. The assumption is that the Grotian order provided by a multi-state system of rational international persona is preferable to other alternatives (as discussed in Chapter One).

The rational inter-state order that the ES promotes is inextricably tied to the structure of the modern international system and, indeed, to the evolution of modernity as a whole. It is, therefore, logical to expect theory associated with the purportedly holistic ES approach to attempt to include other dimensions of the modernist project. Considering the above comments regarding the normative dimension to the ES and its affinity with rationalism/modernity, the ES is unlikely to find much common normative ground with theory that is 'anti' or 'non' modernist. Without digressing to a philosophical debate over rationalism versus, say, theological approaches to world affairs, it is still necessary, however, to locate the ES in relation to such approaches - Figure 2.2 and the accompanying explanation (quoted at length below) help in this regard.

Figure 2.2 indicates the different mind-sets involved with non-modernist approaches and allows for explanation of some of the lack of commonality among various perceptions of international order in the post-Cold War world. The diagram and its explanation has a theoretical context itself i.e. it is suggested that the modernist self is 'made', 'constructed' or one could say nurtured. Could it also be possible that the modernist 'mind-move' is a factor of human nature rather than nurture? The diagram usefully locates the modernity concept in relation to the matrix depicted in Figure 2.1 and allows location of the ES approach in the greater scheme of theory on world affairs.

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[90] ibid., p. 15.

Figure 2.2: The self, construed in modernist terms, and in the terms of the context modernity makes.

This diagram depicts the construction of the self in modernist terms, with the non-modernist/anti-modernist concomitants that consequently accrue.

Those born into a modernist society, represented here by the circles inside the large ellipse labelled *non-modernity/pre-modernity*, start culturally unspecified. They are then taught to pull away mentally from their social context, as if from a rubber sheet, the better to prioritise reason as an end in itself (though they remain part of that context, learning gender practices, ethnocentricity, and the like.) They cannot pull, or be pushed away entirely, without eschewing their social instincts; without eschewing community.

Having been taught to objectify, they converse with other individuals, similarly mentally constructed. They become part of a meta-society, represented here by the super-ordinate ellipse *moderate modernity*. The conclusions they come to get read back upon the world as policy prescriptions. The lines of mental conversation are marked, and it is here that we find modernist world affairs being made (see Figure 1.2).

This individuation process can be valorised so highly that a second-order meta-society results. This is represented here by the super-ordinate ellipse labelled *extreme modernity*. We find modernist world affairs being made here too (see Figure 1.2).
Some choose to draw to one side, turning reason back on itself to allow of meta-modernist perspectives. They are rationalists who are critical of rationalism. They are shown as a distortion of both the moderate and extreme ellipses - as *post-modernity*.

The making of the modernist form of the self occludes the extent to which it is embedded in the non-modernist context of Christianity. Modernists objectify, and so for them the Christian mind-move is an anti-modernist one, that is opposed to their own. For Christians, however, modernity is simply part of being Christian, though modernists who pull (or are pushed) away from their religious context usually eschew their spiritual instincts to do so. This is more problematic than the individual being completely pulled (or pushed) away from their cultural context.

The first Christian mind-move is meditation or prayer, and it is represented here by the first subordinate ellipse, *moderate anti-modernity*. Those who go further become saints or prophets - show here as the second subordinate ellipse, *extreme anti-modernity*. Beyond is the *Beyond*, where the self becomes the Self.

The Christian context is not the only one in which modernist projects are currently constructed. There are other politico-spiritual contexts (Islamic, Hindu, Buddhist, Taoist, and so on) hence the "multiple" forms of contemporary modernity. These are represented here by the ellipses within each of the other politico-spiritual spheres. The little circles within these ellipses depict their characteristic forms of self/not-self.[91]

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[91] Pettman, op. cit., Appendix 1, p. 29.

Source: Pettman, op. cit., Appendix 1.

Following is a brief outline of several competing perceptions of the post-Cold War order, with their potential connection to the ES and international society. Comments in the terms depicted by Figure 2.1 and 2.2 are included in the assessment of each model so as to give analytical coherence vis-à-vis the modernist project.

The World Society Model

As discussed in the previous chapter, this model emphasises universal values among individuals. It contains a pluralist and/or liberal approach that accentuates, for example, human rights, economic prosperity and egalitarianism, while downplaying the exclusive interests of states, ethnicity and religion. Called 'enlargement' in the United States, it is a child of the rationalist/modernist approach and rests upon the study of behaviour and interests as the individual perceives them. This model envisages the rising importance of a global civil society or world society that is sometimes portrayed as superseding the state - this notion may be tempered by the observation that in many respects "...there is no available escape from the

national framework of decision-making"[92] In other words, the model may become more useful if its politico-social focus is widened to include a liberalist view of the role of the state in the politico-strategic dimension.

The Collective Security Model

Collective security was an integral part of the international order that the League of Nations was meant to create and maintain. By association with the failure of the League of Nations, and because of the constant historical failure of collective security to prevent war effectively, the concept has met with criticism.[93] The concept of collective security is often considered in historical context (especially between World War I and II) and associated with Wilsonian idealism.[94] Especially in the heterogeneous post-Cold War world, the principles governing international relations are not universally agreed upon to an extent that they can be utilised unanimously and without dispute to control deviants from collective norms - even such basic principles as absolute state sovereignty are contested. However, the goal of common security, which is embodied in the idea of collective security, has survived in various forms and is still in some measure employed in certain security complexes.[95] The model has merit when it is adopted in association with other models and methods of obtaining international security.

In relation to a modernist or otherwise conception of world affairs the idea of collective security would seemingly logically be categorised in terms of the collective 'good' or goodness of human nature i.e. collectivist idealism (*vide* Figure 2.1). However, the model assumes a more calculative view of human nature in politico-strategic terms. A successful collective security agreement relies upon reciprocity and the assumption those parties' self-interests will encourage them to conform to collective security norms. The model has little to offer in the politico-economic dimension, but does assume the state conforms to its

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[92]Mayall, James. *Nationalism and international society*, Cambridge University Press, 1990, p. 110.
[93]Wight, *Systems of States*, p. 49.
[94] For example, Goldstein, Joshua S. *International Relations* (4th Ed.) Longman, NY, 2001, pp. 57 - 58.
[95]"A security complex is defined as a group of states whose primary security concerns link together sufficiently closely that their national securities cannot realistically be considered apart from one another". Buzan, Barry. *People, States and Fear: An Agenda For International Security Studies in the Post-Cold War Era*, (2nd Edition), Harvester Wheatsheaf, NY, 1991, p. 190.

'individual' calculative interests in terms of the politico-social dimension (i.e. the model treats the state in a social context as equivalent to a calculative individual that cooperates with other states for reasons of mutual self-interest).

The New World Order Model

This model is based around the idea of great power leadership and a dominant coalition of like-minded countries (principally democracies). In many respects it is similar to the collective security concept, but refers more exclusively to the idea of a great power club. The term 'New World Order' has been employed in reference to a number of differing visions of both Cold War and post-Cold War order, but has most prominently been associated with President Bush senior's Gulf War rhetoric. The approach is problematic for reasons similar to those affecting collective security, especially if the deviant happens to be one of the coalition members or a great power. There are also the unavoidable concerns that are likely to be expressed by smaller powers and others which are excluded from such an international order.

The idea of a coalition of like-minded countries again assumes a politico-strategic reciprocity in the context of state interdependence and liberal internationalism/institutionalism. The like-minded 'club' aspect to this model, in both a politico-economic and politico-social sense, entails club membership that involves adoption of liberal economic policy and individualistic liberal norms pertaining to, for example, human rights. In other words, this modernist model is supported by a calculative philosophic view of human nature and clearly advocates a liberalist/individualist theoretical framework for world order.

The Pax Americana Model

This model refers to the possibility of the United States establishing itself as a sole hegemonic power in world affairs. The United States' sole superpower status and its relative military and economic superiority in the post-Cold War era has made this model seem a real possibility for those who both favour and fear it. This view is undermined by a debatable, and often overstated, relative decline of American power in relation to other states in the international system and by the clear desire and perhaps necessity that the United States work with other states on both a multilateral and bilateral basis. US courting of multilateral support following the 2001 September 11 terrorist attacks supports this statement, despite apparent

US willingness to act unilaterally if necessary.

This model clearly fits with liberal politico-economic notions related to the need for a hegemonic power to 'referee' the world political economy.[96] In politico-strategic terms there is seemingly a realist bent to this model as a result of the emphasis on relative power and the necessity for a powerful hegemon to lead world affairs. The idea of a hegemonic United States is not always negatively perceived and, in similar vein to the New World Order model, may be perceived as a way to further liberalist practices in world affairs.

The Old World Disorder Model

There are lines of similarity to be drawn between contemporary features of international order and some features that were apparent in past, particularly pre-Cold War, international order. Among these similar features are the continued dominance of international anarchy and its role in determining the nature of inter-state relations within a states system, the possibility of renewed, widespread, neo-mercantilism, and fanatical political nationalism - all of which have been blamed for past international disorder.[97]

This model highlights some points of historical continuity with regard to power politics. It may, however, be contested in a liberalist manner by pointing out the increased number and role for international institutions, greater interdependence apparent among states, and

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[96] Pettman, op. cit., p. 14.

[97] Terrorism also could be included in this list.

> No one definition of terrorism has gained universal acceptance.... Title 22 of the United States Code, Section 2656f(d)... contains the following definitions: 1. The term 'terrorism' means premeditated, politically motivated violence perpetrated against non-combatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents, usually intended to influence an audience. 2. The term 'international terrorism' means involving citizens of more than one country. 3. The term 'terrorist group' means any group practicing, or that has significant subgroups that practice, international terrorism...Domestic terrorism is probably a more widespread phenomenon than international terrorism.
> http://www.state.gov/s/ct/rls/pgtrpt/2000/index.cfm?docid=2419

This definition does not clearly include states as potential terrorist groups. It is more likely that terrorist groups will be identified as subnational. Particularly after the 11 September attacks, the terrorist label has been increasingly blurred and applied to movements previously referred to as secessionist movements, freedom fighters or self-determination movements (for instance the Uighur movement to establish East Turkestan in Xinjiang China). With this in mind, terrorism could equally be included as part of the 'New World Disorder' model below.

examples of improved cooperation and management within the contemporary international system in comparison to earlier international systems. Advocates of realist, mercantilist or nationalist policies may perceive world affairs as not so much in a state of disorder due to the self-help, anarchical system, but conversely ordered by such an environment (*vide* Chapter Three). This model is underpinned by a philosophical rationale that perceives human nature as rational, adversarial, or basically bad and therefore closely conforms to this part of the modernist matrix depicted in Figure 2.1.[98]

The Economic Tripolarity Model

In a world where economic power rivals military power as a source of international influence, it may be suggested that regions will come to separate themselves from one another through the creation of regional currency and/or trading blocs. Such an occurrence would have significant effects upon the international political order, but the model is somewhat narrow in focus (that is, it does not account adequately for the influence of political factors) and underemphasizes the trends and institutions that work in favour of global rather than regional economic arrangements.

This politico-economic model has a mercantilist/realist nature, although the politico-social dimension is more liberalist. Economic factors also determine a number of other possible perceptions of the post-Cold War international order, as is discussed below.

The Clash of Civilisations Model

Eurocentricism, common within international institutions during the earlier expansion of international society, in addition to Western pre-eminence in international affairs, has fostered resentment and some backlash against Western culture by other cultures. Articulated by Samuel Huntington, this model makes culture the determining variable in world affairs and proposes that humanity is split into several different civilisational power groups each vying for influence.

The world will be ordered on the basis of civilisations or not at all. In this world the core

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[98] Pettman, op. cit., p. 15.

states of civilisations are sources of order within civilisations and, through negotiations with other core states, between civilisations.[99]

Huntington does not dismiss nation-states, but rather divides them into groups of states that defend common civilisational values or cultural systems. This is in fact a return to a traditional view of international politics defined by competition for power and influence, only the players are not individual states operating behind state borders, but rather groupings of states with belief, cultural, or civilisational systems comprising the frontiers.[100] This model is usually criticised on the grounds that it oversimplifies, practising a kind of cultural reductionism, and credits the various cultures with more unity than perhaps they really possess.[101]

Huntington's view of the emerging order is based on the problem of identity. The problem of identity is attached to the effects of modernisation on the individual and the state. The effect of modernity (see Figure 2.2) is to stimulate the individual to move away from their social context, which may result in a crisis of identity. Without the Cold War to give identity in a 'them' or 'us' manner states (in liberal terms 'international persona') may also suffer from an identity crisis. Huntington argues that the natural response is to draw political boundaries on the basis of cultural rather than a common strategic identity or purpose i.e. along ethnic, religious/spiritual and civilisational lines.[102] Notwithstanding the comments in the footnote one hundred and two below, this is a powerful thesis and evidence for it can be drawn from the numerous examples of conflict along ethnic and religious lines - the Baltic States come immediately to mind. This model, despite its emphasis on civilisations rather than nations, is nationalistic in nature and underpinned by the view that human nature is intrinsically

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[99]Huntington, Samuel P. *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order*, Simon and Schuster, NY, 1996, p. 156.

[100]Wang, Gungwu. "A Machiavelli for Our Times", *The National Interest*, Winter 1996/7, pp. 69 - 73.

[101] The standoff between Taiwan and the People's Republic of China is an example of states sharing a common 'sinic' civilisation and politico-cultural background without much sign of civilisation-based unity. The confrontation may be explained in politico-social terms, for example in terms of nationalistic desires, or politico-economic differences arising from divergent approaches to modernity (the mainland adopting a Marxist/human nurture materialist view and Taiwan, arguably, a liberal/human nature view). However, it is equally valid to suggest that strategic and geopolitical factors based on power (i.e. a realist explanation) may explain the hostilities equally well. In other words, civilisation-based analysis is not alone sufficient to explain world affairs.

adversarial/bad.

The New World Disorder Model

Globalisation and other related literature points to the rising importance of global issues that, at least partially, give rise to the globalisation trend and generate areas of both cooperation and contention among states. The New World Disorder model refers to a series of contrasting pressures (some of which are not so new): interdependence (internationalism/liberalism) and dependency (world capitalism and North/South[103]) versus isolationism and protectionism (realism/mercantilism), sustainable development (Keynesian liberalism, anti-capitalist Marxism and 'moderate' environmentalism) versus unregulated capitalism (free market liberalism), crime, disease, economic inequality (including gender inequality), ethno-nationalism and so on.[104] In a pessimistic vein it focuses upon the problems for post-Cold War international order. These issues are of crucial significance to the shaping of contemporary international order. In the terms of the matrix depicted in Figure 2.1, this model encompasses a reasonably wide spectrum of theoretical dimensions - including both human nature and nurture approaches. Of particular interest is the large quantity of literature that deals with the globalisation phenomenon. Globalisation literature approaches this subject in enormously diverse ways, ranging from the anti-modernist, pre-modernist, anti-capitalist to the neo-liberal internationalist and 'pro'-modernist. Figure 2.3 depicts globalisation as a phenomenon closely linked to modernisation and displays various aspects for and against this trend.[105]

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[102] Huntington, op. cit., pp. 125 - 126.

[103] There should possibly be another model in its own right mentioned here with reference to dependency literature. There are a number of possible terms that raise the subject, for example, world systems theory (Immanuel Wallerstein), globalism, imperialism, North/South, core/periphery etc. All such literature deals with the world as a single politico-economic system and it is therefore mentioned above in contrast to the isolationist/self-sufficient view (admittedly this not necessarily an uncompromised distinction). The views of dependency literature are found in contemporary debate, such as that about globalisation, for which reason it is included as part of the 'New World Disorder' model.

[104] There may be room here to add terrorism to this list. Since the 11 September 2001 attacks on the US definitions of terrorism have variously identified some of the contrasting pressures mentioned as root (subnational) causes of terrorism (*vide* footnote 97).

[105] There is a vast quantity of literature that carries the battle between, broadly speaking, the anti-capitalist/anti-modernist factions and the pro-capitalist/liberal free traders faction. Some particularly good examples of the latter can be found in the *Economist* and a representative example promoting the views of the former is Mander, J., and Goldsmith, E. (Eds.), *The case*

Figure 2.3: GLOBALISATION: THE UNDERLYING PROCESS

Positives

(Economic) | Increases in trade and the standard of living.
(Alleviation of Poverty)

(Social and Political) | Adoption of associated (liberal) global norms such as human rights, democracy and common language (Peace?)

More advanced states with resources for exploration and research e.g. in space and in health (Progress of Humanity and the rationalist/modernist project)

Changes in the mode of production.
(i.e. industrialisation, commodification, rationalisation (modernisation))

⟶

Results in the creation of 'like-units'
(Social, Economic and Political)

⟵

⟶

Post-industrialisation and/or post-modernisation?

This requires adoption of the most effective behaviour i.e. copying the most powerful
(The forces of Socialisation and Competition. - allowing for multiple modernities)

Negatives

(Environment) | Increase of pollutants from industrialisation.

(Social/cultural) Loss of unique local (traditional) cultural characteristics.

(Economic & Political) Large companies, states and political elites seemingly to monopolise modernisation values, processes and capital.

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against the global economy: and a turn toward the local. Sierra Club Books, San Francisco, 1996. A couple of examples of work that examines the link between modernisation and globalisation are Hirst, Paul. *From Modernization to Globalization: perspectives on development and social change*, Blackwell, Malden, Mass., 2000 and Reich, Simon. "What is Globalisation? Four Possible Answers", *The Helen Kellogg Institute of International Studies.* 1998.

As stated earlier, the ES, as authors such as Bull have outlined it, is a rationalist/modernist approach. It is underpinned by a calculative view of human nature and emphasises the politico-strategic dimension of world affairs. The models above illustrate how the concept of international society can be expanded into politico-economic and politico-social terms, particularly those compatible with a calculative view of human nature. The institutional framework of international society also allows for inclusion of realist politico-strategic ideas, although it tends to consider these ideas and others that stem from an adversarial view of human nature as a matter of underdevelopment. The gemeinschaft/gesellschaft dichotomy discussed above in relation to the ES provides avenues for inclusion of both human nature and nurture (belief systems, values etc) and philosophical rationales, particularly constructivism. The views of world affairs in the margins of the modernist project, i.e. feminist, environmentalist and post-modernist, remain rationalist, and there is no reason why they could not offer insight to the ES approach, should such angles be pursed.

The international society concept struggles to relate to Marxist globalist views because they ultimately advocate the dissolution of an international politico-strategic order based on the state. The ES, however, has a lot to offer in terms of analysis of globalisation and the role that the state can play in the politico-economic realm. In the case of a 'New World Order' based on basically liberal norms, for example, the concept of international society could offer some useful angles of analysis on the structural consequences of such an international economic order. The institutional development processes entailed in the transition of an international system to an international society offer insight on globalisation as a phenomenon related to modernisation, as is argued in the sections to follow. The ES also has limitations with regard to those modernist theoretical orientations that view human nature as essentially good. This is because these orientations generally advocate a collectivist end to state-based political and social order.

Further apparent limitations involved in an adoption of the ES approach, primarily with regard to historical analysis, rest with its clear rationalist and modernist basis. Modernist objective (principally positivist scientific) analysis tends to collapse the context in on the object of analysis.[106] Some critiques of modernist epistemology, for example post-modernist

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[106] Denton, Margaret J. A. *The Influence of Context: Social Movements, Knowledge, and Social Change*, Unpublished PhD Manuscript, Massey University, Palmerston North, 1999, pp. 108 - 112. This tendency of the scientific approach seems to be of particular concern to

feminism or new environmentalism, address such problems utilising the rationalistic mind.[107] In the contemporary context, it is difficult to see how it would be useful to consider the ES approach/international society framework separate from modernist influences, somewhat limiting the approach to inside of the modernist world. This is particularly so with regard to principles such as the legal sovereign equality of the modern state. There is, however, room to manoeuvre in other realms. Politico-cultural and spiritual approaches, for example, which operate on the borders of the modernist world, could be applied to explain the institutional development of order in multi-state systems, without undermining the utility of the international society framework.[108]

The limits just mentioned, however, do not necessarily apply to historical analysis using the ES framework. With the use of rationalist or objective analysis (independent of the modernist project as a whole), it is possible to assess the institutional development of pre-modern multi-state systems and still extract viable conclusions. In other words, rationalism and modernism are not necessarily inseparable, the former took place in international relations before the dominance of the latter. The impact of 'non'-modern values and ideas can be drawn into ES

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environmentalists, who are eager for wider ecological contexts to be considered with regard to environmental concerns.

[107] In this sense the rationalistic mind is employed to criticise rationalism, a self-denying position that is a feature of post-modernist critique, see Pettman, op. cit., p. 11. The ES is not as open to this criticism in comparison to those schools of thought that adopt positivism. The rationalism of the ES is in fact an alternative to purely positivist reason, which allows no room for theoretical thought involving that which we cannot observe. Smith, Steve et al. op. cit., p. 21. The 'extreme-modernity' (see Figure 2.2) of the positivist mind relies purely on empiricism rather than reflective rationalism as its epistemology.

> The discipline [IR] has tended to accept implicitly a rather simple and, crucially, an uncontested set of positivist assumptions which have fundamentally stifled debate over both what the world is like and how we might explain it. This is not true of those who worked either in the so-called 'English-school' or at the interface between international relations and political theory, because these writers never bought into the positivist assumptions that dominated [especially American aspects] of the discipline.

Smith, Steve. ibid., p. 11. The ES does not, however, escape from criticism of rationalism simply because it allows for reflective reason. The clear problems with rationalism, with regard to questions of whether *objective* reason is in fact possible, remain. ibid., p. 21. Ralph Pettman also summarises the strengths and weaknesses of rationalism in his *World Politics: Rationalism and Beyond*, Palgrave, Hampshire, 2001, pp. 2 - 6.This is a huge debate in itself. The ES's endorsement of constructivism, and thereby its acknowledgement that the social scientist is prone to the influence of their social context, does debatably, however, give room for the continued application of rationalism, as long as it is accompanied by efforts to accommodate for the varying social contexts of the rational mind.

[108] See Harrison, L.E. and Huntington, S.P. (eds) *Culture Matters: How Values Shape Human Progress*, Basic Books, NY, 2000 for comments on the influence of culture on modernity.

analysis, particularly with reference to the gemeinschaft type of international society. These points are taken up further in the early stages of Chapters Four and Five. In the *contemporary* environment, the rationalist nature of the ES has become inextricably melded with the modernist project and thus sets some limitations as to the extent the approach can be applied outside of those bounds.

The section to follow analyses the institutions of international society in a post-Cold War context. It suggests that the various models outlined above can be discussed coherently within, or in relation to, the international society conceptual framework. The argument put forward is that, inside of the limitations just described, the ES provides a reasonably flexible and organised conceptual framework with which to assess order in, and capture the confusion and complexity of, the post-Cold War multi-state society.

The Institutions of International Society and International Order Issues in the Post-Cold War Era

War

War has been discussed in the previous chapter as a threat and/or instrument of force available to international society for the maintenance of the balance of power and the norms, customs, and rules expressed in international law. The role of war and the threat of war continue to be central to inter-state relations, albeit with some regional variation, in the post-Cold War era. However, the relative importance of the traditional role of inter-state warfare as an institution for order in the society of states has declined in the face of changes in the nature of warfare since the end of World War Two.

The end of the Cold War was initially welcomed as a 'New World Order' in which the two big post World War Two issues of spreading communism and decolonisation were largely resolved and a united international 'community' or coalition had, at least in appearances, dealt with the Iraqis and their invasion of Kuwait. This enthusiasm was dampened by the bloodshed in the former Yugoslavia, which was a typical example of a trend that continues to issue new challenges to international society in the post-Cold War era.

This section on the institution of war in post-Cold War international society outlines what is

meant by the aforementioned change in the form of warfare since World War Two and the impact that such a change has on the society of states. These issues are approached by explaining intra-state war in respect of the state-making process and by assessing the contemporary structure of the society of states and the security issues that such a structure creates. It is argued that analysis of these security concerns sheds light upon the changing role of war in post-Cold War international society.

Holsti, in *The State, War, and the State of War*, documents thoroughly the trend since 1945 toward wars of the third kind.

> Students of the Cold War, most of whom had been bedazzled by the intricacies of deterrence theory, deployment doctrines, and the introduction of new technologies capable of incinerating millions, discovered that wars of the third kind were ubiquitous in certain areas of the world and that the intellectual tools of the Cold War era strategic studies were not particularly relevant to understanding them[109]

To a certain extent the post-Cold War era is about rethinking or refocusing attention from a superpower bipolar conflict to a kind of conflict that has been predominant within the states system well before the actual end of the Cold War.[110] The level of awareness of this change is indicated by a further comment by Holsti: " The end of the Cold War has not fundamentally changed either practitioners' or academics' views about war", i.e. although there has been observable change in this tendency, war is still often considered as a problem of war and peace *between* states.[111]

An essential element of Holsti's argument is that the shift to wars of the third kind should not be understood simply either as an increase in ethnic rivalry or as a result of the end of superpower suppression of third world conflicts (through their support of weak third world regimes in an effort to maintain Cold War strategic alliances).

> The enduring contest between the forces of state unification and group-sponsored fragmentation transcends both the beginning and the end of the Cold War. Whatever the

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[109]Holsti, *The State, War and the State of War*, p. 123.
[110] See Holsti, ibid., p. 40.
[111]ibid., p. 6.

collaboration between the great powers after 1989, nothing they have done or can do puts an end to the paradoxes of state-making and community survival.... Some states...are on the trajectory of increased strength. Others are moving toward the 'failed state' end of the strength-weakness continuum.[112]

In this manner, Holsti argues that wars of the third kind are best understood by a focus upon state making, the security predicament, and the consequential dilemmas these processes create. How this all relates to international society is best examined under a separate subheading.

Security, War, and International Society in the Post-Cold War Era

Defined briefly as "...the interplay between threats and vulnerabilities and the attempts by a variety of actors to position themselves in this interplay to their best advantage given the circumstances in which they find themselves",[113] comprehensive (*vide* footnote 154) security analysis helps to highlight the effect that the growing trend towards wars of the third kind has on international society. Analysis of the international security/international society relationship also reveals the unique structural features developing in contemporary international society. This subsection demonstrates that international security concerns have changed as a consequence of the predominance of wars of the third kind and that these trends have varied effects on international society because of its core/periphery form or structure.

The terms gesellschaft and gemeinschaft are again employed in order to aid understanding of contemporary international society and its related security concerns. Buzan explains that contemporary international society is a hybrid of gesellschaft and gemeinschaft type international societies. Because a gemeinschaft type international society evolves within a common culture inclusive of shared norms and values it maintains interaction through a wider range of rules and institutions than those that feature in a gesellschaft type society. In this manner the gemeinschaft type society has come to form the core of international society and, in keeping with the previously established understanding of the expansion of European international society from Europe to the rest of the world, it is unsurprising that the majority

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[112]ibid., p. 126.
[113]Buzan, "International Society and International Security", in Fawn and Larkins, op. cit., p. 261.

of the membership of this core are Western states. Lacking a common culture and the depth of interaction that accompanies it, the functionally included gesellschaft members of the contemporary global international society tend to be pushed into the periphery - their interaction with the core is based largely on relatively tenuous institutional links. A single definitive line drawn between core and periphery is unable to display the variety of possibilities, so Buzan describes a spectrum of possible relative distances from the core, captured by his concept of concentric circles of commitment.[114]

Such an approach has merit when considering the effects that an increase in wars of the third kind has on international society. War is generally more likely to occur in the periphery, where the power-security dilemma and the security predicament exert greater influence than in the core.[115] The core of international society is usually only indirectly affected by wars of the third kind. This has ramifications for how the various states of international society choose to deal with the trend towards intra-state warfare. The problems created by the differing perspectives and security requirements of states in the periphery, in comparison to those of states in the core, challenge the very integrity of the wider and fragile gesellschaft international society.

Mohammed Ayoob explains that to understand why wars of the third kind predominantly occur in the periphery, the problem should be viewed as one of internal dimensions. He argues that conventional, principally system-level, security analysis, as it reigned before and during the Cold War, does not isolate the true nature of the security predicament in the Third World. The security predicament in the Third World stems from the need for the ruling regime (which is usually presiding over a state and society struggling with the challenges of modernity) to maintain and build its position of authority and it is the result of a state-making process that includes a number of aspects:

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[114]See Buzan Barry. "From international system to international society: structural realism and regime theory meet the English school", *International Organisation*, 47, 3, Summer, 1993, p. 347. In fact the topic under discussion is dealt with comprehensively in a combination of both the article just listed and in his contribution to Fawn and Larkins, op. cit.
[115]The power-security dilemma is a theoretical explanation of a dynamic that occurs among states in an anarchical environment. It is initiated by the build-up of military capability in state A, which stimulates state B to increase its armaments - state B is in a dilemma as it is unsure whether state A's motives are offensive or defensive. State B's military build-up in turn threatens State A and a cycle of insecurity and miscommunication is created. Buzan explains this dynamic in chapter eight of *People, States and Fear*.

1. The expansion and consolidation of the territorial and demographic domain under a political authority, including the imposition of order on contested territorial and demographic space (war)

2. The maintenance of order in the territory where, and over the population on whom, such order has already been imposed (policing)

3. The extraction of resources from the territory and the population under the control of the state essential to support not only the war-making and policing activities undertaken by the state but also the maintenance of apparatuses of state necessary to carry on routine administration, deepen the state's penetration of society, and serve symbolic purposes (taxation).[116]

A weak state, or a state that lacks "unconditional legitimacy for its state structures and governing regimes",[117] faces the dilemma of how to enforce and maintain its integrity without alienating its citizens - an increasingly difficult task as the demands of its citizens often reflect unrealistic expectations of higher living standards such as already exist in the developed world. The ruling elites in weak states tend to support the status quo international order because it helps them to maintain the legitimacy of their domestic rule, for example, international laws protecting existing state boundaries also bolster elites' hold on often contested territory.[118] The link between the state-strength dilemma, the Third World security predicament, the shift to wars of the third kind and the core/periphery structure of contemporary international society is important for understanding the security concerns of the latter and why war as an institution of the society of states needs to be reassessed in the light that such a link sheds on the issue.

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[116]Ayoob, Mohammed. *The Third World Security Predicament, State Making, Regional Conflict and the International System,* Boulder, Colorado, 1995, pp. 22 - 23.
[117]ibid., p. 74. Barry Buzan in *People, States and Fear,* ibid., pp. 65 - 111, expands upon Ayoob's weak state definition in that he analyses the component parts of a state along a weak state/strong state continuum. The three component parts of the state, according to Buzan, are the idea of the state, the physical base of the state and the institutional expression of the state. Weakness in any of these components may result in security problems increasing the likelihood of political violence and secessionist movements.
[118]Ayoob, op. cit., p 74.

This linkage compels consideration of two main aspects of security as they relate to contemporary international society. The first aspect exists because the power-security dilemma is relatively uncontrolled between states in the periphery. The states in the core have escaped from, or have largely mitigated the effects of, the power-security dilemma by transparency in activity designed to decrease mutually perceived threats. They may operate, therefore, within a security community[119], which is more readily achievable in a gemeinschaft type international society.[120] Both the power-security dilemma and the security predicament, as described by Ayoob, prevail in the periphery to various degrees.

The essence of this is that security problems in the periphery of international society will arise more frequently than in the core. As this is much less likely to involve a clear international level conflict, it presents states in the core with the question of whether or not to intervene in the security concerns of peripheral states so to maintain the wider order of the global international society (this question is clearly confronted during the often painstaking application of Chapter VII of the United Nations charter).

The second related security problem highlighted by the above linkages is a consequence of the core/periphery structure itself and also involves the threat of a form of intervention. Buzan also describes the core and periphery in the terms of a spectrum from absolute insiders to absolute outsiders with relative insiders and relative outsiders in between.[121]

> International society generally exacerbates the security problems of outsiders by confronting them with the risk that outside values will be imposed upon them. Absolute outsiders are at serious risk across the board when international society is powerful. Even relative insiders, who are outsiders for specific regimes, face the risk of intervention from the core.[122]

The powerful societal force of homogenisation (*vide* Chapter One) not only threatens the

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[119]Ole Wæver, paraphrased by Buzan in *People, States and Fear*, p. 218, suggests a spectrum ranging between chaos and security community in any given security complex. Briefly, in chaos, relations are defined by enmity. In a security community, none of the members fears, nor prepares for, military attack by others.
[120]Buzan, "International Society and International Security", p. 278.
[121]ibid., p. 271.
[122]ibid., p. 285.

periphery through the possibility of intervention, but may also, through the desire for conformity, threaten the distinctiveness of even insiders "...where the growth of internationalism [modernity] undermines the ability of local cultures to maintain and reproduce themselves."[123] The following figures seek to provide a diagrammatic depiction of what has been discussed in the previous paragraphs. They refer to the levels of development/integration of multi-state systems and are not inclusive of underlying theoretical influences. The first figure should be viewed keeping in mind that a gemeinschaft type international society is most likely to reach the maximal level of development, provided it also features advanced gesellschaft or functional type institutions.

Figure 2.4

Levels of Development	Sociopol. sector	Military sector	Economic sector
Maximal	Confederation	Security Community	Economic union
Middling	Political union	Security Regimes	Common market
Minimal	Mutual Dipl. recognition	Mutual Dipl. recognition	MFN agreements

Figure 2.5

Position in International Society		
Absolute Insiders		Absolute Outsiders
Inner Circles (Core)	Outer Circles (Periphery)	Non-members Members of other international societies
	Relative Insiders or outsiders	

Source: Buzan 'International Society and International Security', Tables 11.1 & 11.2, pp. 270 - 271.

Security analysis in the form outlined reveals that the shift towards wars of the third kind is a

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[123]ibid.

consequence of factors related to the state-making process (for instance the need to establish a clearly defined territory), while it also highlights the problems of an international society whose institutions have been and are still being created by way of both gemeinschaft and gesellschaft processes. These observations require reassessment of the role of war as a tool of international society in the post-Cold War era. The Clausewitzian concept of war as organised military combat between states is no longer as relevant amongst the pluralist security community of the core where "members of a group of states neither expect nor prepare to use force in their relationships with each other."[124]

The traditional use of war as a tool available to international society for managing the balance of power, therefore, is no longer as applicable in the core. The balance of power is now contrived and managed by diplomatic and less threatening means. However, between the spectrum of absolute insiders and absolute outsiders the traditional use of war in its defence of the balance of power is still pertinent to various degrees. In a 'midway' basic international society, for example, the balance of power is managed and is an explicit policy aimed at reducing conflict between states through alliances, transparent agreements, and negotiation.[125] The threat of war still has a role in such a balance of power arrangement, but it decreases in importance and is less likely as parties develop more security regimes and agreements which pave the way towards the formation of a security community.

In the periphery states remain more likely than core states to use war to enforce regional inter-state arrangements because these would more likely be upheld by a fortuitous balance of power. Moreover, in the periphery, where the effects of the security predicament are pronounced, the trend towards wars of the third kind influences the way international society may utilise war as an institution to enforce the balance of power or international law. The intervention of core states in the affairs of peripheral states to uphold the global balance of power or international law is an enforcement procedure that may not have the consent of the peripheral states involved. Moreover, it is not always simply a matter of accusing a state of non-compliance with international norms because the actors involved may in fact be intra-state actors. A more in-depth and considered approach, which accounts for the state-making process (and indeed the relationship that this process has to modernity as a whole) and the

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[124]Deutsch, Karl paraphrased by Buzan in "International Society and International Security", p. 267.
[125]Buzan ibid., p. 278.

security predicament of weak states, is required before international society can effectively, and with undivided support, utilise war to obtain order and to maintain the society of states in the periphery.

Diplomacy

The following section briefly outlines the impact that the end of the Cold War has had on the diplomatic institutions of international society. Generally, it is argued that the end of the Cold War has not affected the core functions of diplomacy as they exist in the society of states, but it has certainly influenced the issues that are dealt with through the diplomatic system.

The central role of diplomacy in international society has been fairly constant since its adoption from the fifteenth century Italian states system. As a functional communicative and negotiating vehicle and, very importantly, through the maintenance of the extraterritoriality of embassies and embassy staff, its symbolic role has always provided a visible example of cooperation among states. One of the strongest, non-violent, expressions of displeasure available to all states is the withdrawal of its ambassadorial representatives or complete embassy closure. The institution of diplomacy continues to play this traditional symbolic and functional role in the post-Cold War era.

What has changed in the post-Cold War era, however, is the range of issues with which international diplomacy is now concerned.

The end of the Cold War and the shift from a bipolar order to a multi-polar order has influenced diplomatic behaviour because it has influenced the way most states perceive the international environment and their national interests. There are several issues that are being reconsidered or have gained greater prominence after the end of the Cold War and therefore test the diplomatic skills of many states. The international security concerns detailed above, for example, have gained more attention in the post-Cold War world. A state's diplomatic abilities in relation to problems of international security influence its position with regard to contemporary international concerns about norms such as human rights.[126]

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[126]Mullerson, Rein A. *Human Rights Diplomacy*, Routledge, London, 1997, pp. 7 - 9.

In addition, the 'information age' is frequently heralded as ushering in a new age of diplomacy. Diplomacy, it may be argued, is no longer a matter for state elites discussing issues in secrecy, but now requires greater consideration of the views of non-governmental actors or individuals representing global civil society. The effects associated with the end of the Cold War have, perhaps, allowed for a 'democratisation' of diplomacy. Much of the debate surrounding the Seattle meeting of the World Trade Organisation in December 1999 generally reflects such a perspective.[127] This point is closely related to the earlier discussion on globalisation and the 'new world disorder'.

The Balance of Power

Despite historical consistency in the general function of the balance of power the institution has still had to evolve and adjust over time to suit particular shifts in the nature of the international system. The preferred means of deterrence in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (at least in the European multi-state system) was the use of alliances and coalitions with fellow states that mutually perceived a threat from another state or group of states. In the late twentieth century (this time in a global sense), rather than focusing on rearranging power to counter aggression through shifting alliance patterns, greater emphasis was placed upon increasing comparative military strength and nuclear capability in relation to a single adversary.[128]

Sheehan details how the nineteenth and twentieth century European systems displayed a move away from an emphasis on warfare to maintain the balance of power toward an emphasis on diplomatic mechanisms. This change from eighteenth century policy was the result of an increase in the efficacy and the destructive power of military technology - the cost of using war to defend the balance of power in the nineteenth and particularly twentieth century increased to the extent that it could not be considered as a viable option, as it had previously been, to defend the balance of power.[129]

Consequently, collective security was attempted - but it failed to provide an order that could

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[127]Retallack, R. "After Seattle: Where Next for the WTO?", *The Ecologist,* 30 (2), 2000, pp. 30 - 34.
[128]Sheehan, *The Balance of Power,* p. 55.
[129]ibid., p. 179.

weather ideological differences between great powers. The result was a compromise or "a modified, managed balance, with a measure of co-operation among the leading states and some rules to govern their interaction that went beyond the avoidance of hegemony."[130] This greater emphasis on the avoidance of war and on deterrence was most obvious during the Cold War, when examples of cooperation between the superpowers in managing the Cold War balance of power perhaps form the greatest legacy of the period.

The most distinctive aspect of balance of power change after the end of the Cold War was the change from a bipolar balance to the semblance (i.e. this is a debatable point, although it is argued elsewhere that unipolarity is not the case either) of a multi-polar balance of power. A bipolar or 'simple' balance of power involves only two states (an example was the Cold War balance between the Soviet Union and the United States) whose comparative power theoretically needs to remain equal in order to maintain the balance and prevent the overwhelming preponderance of either one of them. The number of states needed in a multi-polar or 'complex' balance of power before it is stable may vary, but four or five states may considered to be a minimum number.[131] In a multi-polar balance of power it is not essential that the states involved be of equal strength as they have the option of building coalitions.

There are differing opinions as to the stability of multi-polar systems versus bipolar systems. It may be argued that a bipolar system is a fragile, rigid, zero-sum condition in which a loss by one is a gain for the other - it is therefore characterised by suspicion, enmity and competition.[132] On the other hand, it can be argued that in a multi-polar system the "...number of potential adversaries is greater, alliance patterns are more fluid, interdependence is greater, the problems caused by ethnocentric perceptions are more marked, spheres of influence are vaguer and therefore less likely to be respected."[133] Moreover, compared to a multi-polar system, a bipolar system is characterised by greater predictability and certainty with an easily recognisable enemy and clear, well-defined, issues. Sheehan makes the point that this is a perspective of bipolarity distinctive to the Cold War, whereas other historical examples of

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[130]Mandelbaum paraphrased in Sheehan, *The Balance of Power*, p. 179.
[131] See Waltz, Kenneth. op. cit., Chapters 7 & 8. Goldstein, op. cit., pp. 90 - 93, Rosenau, James N. (ed) *International Politics and Foreign Policy: a reader in research and theory*, The Free Press, NY, 1969, Chapter 4 or Claude, Inis L. Jr. op. cit.
[132]Sheehan, *Balance of Power*, p. 84. The authors cited in footnote 138 also cover this topic.
[133]ibid., p. 197.

bipolar systems do not exhibit these characteristics.[134] This point is one example that suggests that the stability of the balance of power varies according to a number of differing variables *independent* of the type of polarity.[135]

While there has been a shift from bipolarity to multi-polarity after the Cold War this alone is not necessarily indicative of the stability or otherwise of the present day balance of power. A defining characteristic of particular balance of power systems, regardless of whether they are multi-polar or bipolar, is the extent to which they are managed or display cooperation amongst the states involved. Sheehan argues that the balance of power need not be viewed as a concept that belongs only to the realists, and reminds readers that Bull has been one of the few international relations theorists in recent decades to re-link the balance of power concept to a Grotian framework. In other words, Bull considered the balance of power away from its focus on hierarchical military competition and re-linked it to its seventeenth century roots, where the concept was about more than military confrontation and embodied rules and policies that protected against the domination of one power so that the societal components of international society, such as international law, could operate.[136]

This point suggests that what makes the present day, post-Cold War, balance of power distinctive is the extent of cooperation amongst the great powers that manage it. One example of this distinctiveness is found in the many diplomatic measures and procedures, for instance in arms control, which have been inherited from Soviet Union/United States balance of power management techniques created and employed during the Cold War. In short, in order to gauge the precise nature of the post-Cold War balance of power institution, the depth and the quality of its management through inter-state cooperation needs to be examined.

The concept of a core and periphery in international society provides a useful way of examining this depth and quality. Richardson raises the possibility that the realist or Hobbesian action of power balancing among states, enforced by war and the threat of war,

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[134] ibid.

[135] Such an argument is supported in the work of Mansfield who argues that bipolarity, multi-polarity, or other such numerically based variations in the distribution of power are not necessarily indicative of stability as far as the balance of power institution is concerned. Rather, the concentration of capabilities among the major states in the system is more important, in which case the focus of power balancing policy is subtly different. Mansfield, Edward D. *Power, Trade, and War*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994, pp. 72 - 82.

has come to an end in the core.[137] The existence of a security community and the accompanying reduction in the security dilemma in the core is a key feature of this line of reasoning. In this case the quality and depth of balance of power management through inter-state cooperation would be very high. These ideas are considered further by Goldgeier and McFaul who argue that:

> If the nature of the state and the system as well as the definition of state goals has changed [i.e. survival no longer exists as an overriding concern for states in the core], then the logic of state behaviour predicted by realist balance-of-power theory no longer applies. Rather than balancing, core states are seeking to bandwagon, not around a power pole but around a shared set of liberal beliefs, institutions, and practices[138]

If the earlier comments, made in respect of the possibility of perceiving the balance of power concept as more than simply part of the realist approach, are recalled then it can be observed that Goldgeier and McFaul adopt a relatively narrow definition of the balance of power. Using a Grotian definition of the balance of power it is possible to recognise a role for it even within a security community, unless states in the core seek or wish to be dominated by a single power.[139] In relation to this, Richardson makes the point that other members of the emerging multi-power system have not overtly sought to construct a military balance against the strongest power, the United States.[140] This issue relating to US hegemony is taken up further in the next section on great powers.

Goldgeier and McFaul's point remains useful if instead of proposing the balance of power or, as they imply, power itself, as the sole determinant of state behaviour, and rather this aspect disappears within a security community, the balance of power takes on a more Grotian,

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[136]ibid., pp. 199 - 200.
[137]Richardson, James, L. "The End of Geopolitics?", Leaver and Richardson, op. cit., p.43.
[138]Goldgeier, James, M. and McFaul, Micheal. "A tale of two worlds: core and periphery in the post-cold war era", *International Organisation*, Spring 1992, Vol. 6, No. 2, p. 480.
[139] This may be the case when hegemony is perceived as a positive contributor to economic and political stability - as U.S. leadership may be perceived. Hegemony is not the same as leadership nor is it necessarily equal to forced domination in the sense of imperial rule (*vide* Chapter Four and footnote 295). In other words, it is possible for individual states of a security community to maintain their sovereignty and a Grotian balance of power to exist even if the US is considered to occupy a hegemonic role with respect to the liberal and modernist bandwagon.
[140]Richardson, op. cit., p. 44.

institutionalised, or contrived form in the core. It would then become the product of managed policies that still aim to retain the independence of states in the security community. In these terms, the tendency of core states to coalesce around a shared set of beliefs, institutions, and practices is evidence of the high level of inter-state cooperation featured by a gemeinschaft international society, which still may simultaneously accommodate a tame version of the balance of power institution.

Yet another perspective on this may be that bandwagoning around core values and institutions is simply another expression of power politics. Increased cooperation evident in the core and the resultant benefit of greater control over global liberal regimes, for example the International Monetary Fund, are in fact the means by which the core states of the 'North' are attempting to impose hegemonic rule over the peripheral states in the 'South'. In this sense the study begins to drift away from a view of the balance of power as chiefly an institution for order among states and rather heads toward a conception of the balance of power acting to retain the independence of particular groups of states representing differing economic status, belief systems, revisionist or status quo interests, or possibly civilisations (as suggested by Huntington).

These differing views on the post-Cold War role of the balance of power tend to approach the question from the perspective of the core states. It is also evident, however, that the balance of power, in its realist, survivalist, self-interested form is considered to reign supreme in the periphery and as a result there is also further need for military capacity in the core. Peripheral states must deal with a much more competitive power based international environment that generally lacks the higher levels of institutional and law based order that obtains in the core.

How is a Western alliance or a confederation of democracies, usually led by the United States,[141] viewed from the periphery?[142] Do the various forms of this largely Western alliance constitute a preponderance of power? If so, then will peripheral states, pushed by this threat to their independence, attempt to form an opposing alliance backed by war or the threat of

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[141]Nye states that the United States cannot achieve its international goals by acting alone; that is, it is not a unipolar order that is taking shape post-Cold War) ibid., p. 17.

[142]See Fretz, Lewis. "Bill Clinton's New World Order Takes Shape", *The New Zealand International Review*, November/December, Vol. XXII, No. 6, 1997, pp. 16 - 21, for one assessment of the United States' role in a grand confederation of Western, free market, economies.

war? In the final analysis, these questions are very similar to those asked earlier in relation to intervention, which reflects the importance of the periphery/core structure to development of the post-Cold War institutions of international society.

The separation of international society into core and periphery or insiders and outsiders, although crude, offers insights into the role of the balance of power concept in the post-Cold War era. Such a separation indicates a number of possible simultaneous or alternative courses for the balance of power in the post-Cold War environment. It may cease to be relevant in the core, it may have a background role as a managed and institutionalised policy in the core, it may be seen as an expression of power politics in the struggle between North and South or it may continue in a self-help realist form in the periphery.

While there is no definitive line between periphery and core, as Figure 2.5 displays, the distinction still compels realisation of the different requirements for states depending upon their needs and the mechanisms they have available for successful management of a balance of power. The security concerns created by the disparities between peripheral and core states are of particular importance with regard to intervention issues.

The role of great powers in the international order is closely related to this discussion on the post-Cold War balance of power.

Great Power Cooperation

The role of the United States is pivotal to the post-Cold War great power cooperation institution. This section briefly reviews the prospects for cooperation as the great powers adjust to the existence of a sole superpower in international society.

Classification of great powers has proven problematic in the twentieth century because of the presence of a superpower class. The Habsburg/French rivalry of the sixteenth century is described by Wight as a superpower conflict that "retarded or blurred the evolution of a class of great powers".[143] The presence of a superpower rivalry in the twentieth century has also altered the criteria for allocation of great power status. Bull conflates the two classes with the

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[143]Wight, *Systems of States*, p. 152.

result that the two superpowers of the Cold War are classed as the only two real great powers.[144] The end of the Cold War leaves a sole remaining superpower which, by most measures, outclasses other powers, as is described in no uncertain terms by Krauthammer:

By every measure, the extent of America's dominance astonishes. Militarily, there has never in the past thousand years been a greater gap between the No. 1 world power and the No. 2. Not even the British Empire at its height displayed the superiority shown by American arms today. Economically? The American economy is more than twice the size of its nearest competitor. We enjoy, almost uniquely, low inflation, low unemployment and vigorous growth. Culturally?...There has been mass culture. But there has never before been mass world culture. Now one is emerging, and it is distinctly American. ...Diplomatically? Nothing of significance gets done without us...[and so on]...We all...agree on the premise: the bipolar world of the cold war begat not, as predicted, a multi-polar world but a unipolar one with the U.S. standing alone at its apex.[145]

In accordance with the definitions of great power status provided in Chapter One, the above indeed appears to be the case. The United States still possesses superpower characteristics that either place it outside and above the great power class (as the term superpower denotes), or which demote other large powers, with the result that it exists as the only great power. The United States is possibly the only power that would be able to stand alone against all other powers, and certainly the great power club criteria of having two or more states that have comparable military power is not met - the United States possessing an outstanding advantage in military capability. Does this mean that the existence of a single superpower has the same inhibiting effect on the formation of a class of great powers as bipolar superpower rivalry did in the past? Despite United States pre-eminence in many realms, and the unipolar potential as illustrated above by Krauthammer, there is reason to believe that the answer in contemporary circumstances is in the negative. There are at least two reasons for this.

First, there is the argument that the controlling American influence in the post-Cold War era is in fact decreasing despite its status as the only superpower. Without the strength of purpose that comes from the situation of having a clearly defined 'us versus them' type enemy, the United States lacks the rationale for intervention, by invitation or not, into the affairs of

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[144]See Bull in Wight, *Systems of States*, p. 139.

former client states. States, which during the Cold War were eager for an American presence in a common defence against communism, are now quite happy to do as they please, often without the Americans. The end result of this argument is that the United States, capable or not, will not necessarily maintain the hegemonic alliance system required by a preponderant unipolar power.

Secondly, a class or club of great powers appears to be forming that is able to accommodate the inequality of power resting with the United States. A reasonably recent example of the workings of this club was illustrated when "...the Clinton administration intervened in Bosnia after the UN peacekeeping operation, led by Britain and France, had proved utterly incapable..."[146] At that time, "... Clinton used America's position as the leader of NATO to persuade Britain, France, Germany and other European allies to follow its lead in entering Bosnia, and he also used his influence with Boris Yeltsin to persuade Russia to enter..."[147] In such a way, a contemporary class of powers appears to be forming which is inclusive but fairly dependent upon the leadership of the sole remaining superpower. The US is, therefore, simultaneously a great power and a superpower.

The reasons for this ability to work around the dominance of the United States may be generally assessed in several ways. Many of the larger powers are political democracies and therefore mutual threat perception is decreased (i.e. they are part of the gemeinschaft core of international society). This enables the power aspect of inter-state relations to be less important and power inequality to be peacefully managed or tolerated. Global production, financial interdependence, and the accompanying elite culture formed as a result of this interaction has reached a unprecedented depth that works against the possibility of war between states in the great power class. In similar vein, the goals of states are no longer centred on geopolitical rivalries, but rather are concerned with managing the global economy. Nuclear weapons aside, there has been a general change in the attitude towards war in democratic societies rejecting major war as an option (much is made of the fact that, in the short history of this phenomenon, there have been no wars fought between democracies[148]).

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[145]Krauthammer, Charles, Fretz. op. cit., p. 16.
[146]Fretz, op. cit., p. 18.
[147]ibid.
[148] This concept is sometimes referred to as the 'Democratic Peace'. Russett, Bruce *Grasping the Democratic Peace: Principles for a Post-Cold War World*, Princeton University Peace, Princeton, 1993 is an example of work in this area. In his notes, Russett provides a list of

Finally, nuclear weapons provide the ultimate and final foil to major war.[149]

As a result of these circumstances, and as already mentioned, the "...members of the emerging multi-power system show little indication of seeking to construct a military balance against the strongest power, the United States, and negotiations are not undertaken with the unspoken threat of the use of force or the formation of military coalitions in the background."[150] In addition, the United States' superior power position is, arguably, gradually decreasing in relation to other great powers, with the eventual effect of ameliorating the above mentioned problems created by the United States sole superpower status.[151]

The great power cooperation described above tends to assume the depth of inter-state interaction most likely found among the core states of international society. The reasonable post-Cold War success of great power cooperation and unity during the Gulf War, which included at least nominal support from non-core states such as Russia, suggests that all of the factors above, as well as others, are influential. This also suggests the possibility that the international order created by gesellschaft type institutions is strong enough in itself to bring some states, which would ordinarily be peripheral to a gemeinschaft or culturally based order, into the core through the creation of a shared great power role and identity.

Ultimately, a club of great powers is forming that includes the United States amongst them despite its superpower status - a status that greatly affects its behaviour, influence and view of the international system, but doesn't necessarily exclude it from a great power club. Evidence of this is most strikingly found in the existence of the G9,[152] in the continued great

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authors associated with 'robust research' that demonstrates "... in various criteria of war and militarized diplomatic disputes, and various measures of democracy, the relative rarity of violent conflict between democracies still holds up." p. 10.
[149]Richardson op. cit., p. 40.
[150]ibid., p. 44.
[151]Having said this it is necessary to note the so-called decline in American relative power is often overstated. The People's Republic of China is often cited, for example, as a large power that is narrowing the gap between it and the United States' pre-eminence. However, these studies often concentrate on increases in Chinese military capacity alone and forget that the United States' military capacity is not static, on the contrary they are leading and moving ahead in many areas.
[152]Smyser, W.R. "Goodbye, G-7", *Washington Quarterly*, Winter, 1993, pp. 15 - 28. In this article Smyser provides an assessment of the change from great power Group of Five summits to great power Group of Nine summits. The Group of Eight (the number has varied over time) is most often discussed with reference to the most economically powerful nations.

power club as embodied in the United Nations security council, in the formation of a great power society,[153] and also in the view that a confederation of Western democracies forms a concert of great powers or a great power club.

In the post-Cold War era there is the possibility of a new pattern or concert of powers that differs to that found in the European concert of the nineteenth century. Great powers may form a mixed security system whereby great power cooperation is displayed in common, collective, or comprehensive[154] security arrangements as well as through a managed balance of power. Such great power cooperation is necessarily inclusive of Western and non-Western members, periphery and core states, and therefore goes some way in lessening core/periphery security concerns and conflicts.

Great power cooperation remains an essential institution for order in post-Cold War international society. The special obligations and duties of great powers continue in the post-Cold War era. In both a regional and global sense a class of great powers still maintains the states system as they have traditionally done. Despite some disparity in levels of commitment to contemporary international society the joint action of great powers is, if anything, enhanced in the post-Cold War era by the strength of convergent interests (particularly economic ones) in the stability of international society and by the formation of a class of great powers inclusive of the United States despite its superpower, and perhaps hegemonic, status. Increasingly international great power groupings and examples of institutional cooperation reflect their common interests and (essentially in relative power status terms) identity, as well as the diverse membership of the society of states despite historical, cultural, and developmental disparities.

International Law

At the end of the Cold War, there was much talk of a new world order in which the

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See Goldstein, op. cit., p. 89 in this regard.

[153]The formation of a great power society is central in Goldgeier, James. M. and McFaul, Micheal's article "A tale of two worlds: core and periphery in the post-cold war era", *International Organisation*, Spring 1992, Vol. 6, No. 2, pp. 467 - 491.

[154]Comprehensive security is generally understood to include both traditional military based concepts of security as well as security in other realms, such as economics. Buzan, as an example, divides security into the military, political, economic, societal and environmental

sovereign state would be held to democratic account, fundamental rights would be respected, and conflict would be replaced by co-operation based on the rule of law. At the start of the new millennium most of this optimism has evaporated.[155]

Since the principles of international law determine whether the behaviour of states in international society is legal or illegal, it is, therefore, also an institution that provides guidelines on how the other institutions of international society should function. Normative and practical international law issues are among the most controversial and difficult issue areas for international society and order in the post-Cold War era.

After the end of the Cold War the vital roles for international law of maintaining the state as the prime unit of international relations and also of engendering respect for a rules based international order remain. However, "[t]he disintegration of the Soviet Union, the dismemberment of two East European federations and the collapse of communism as a political ideology claiming universal validity and ostensibly offering alternative principles for the organisation of international society, have reopened questions about its basis and constitution".[156] It is apparent that in a few areas the traditional scope of international law is increasingly under challenge.

One of these issue areas concerns the appropriate subject of international law; should it be the individual or the state? Proponents of the view that it should be the individual base their claims on the development of a world society, transnational society, or a global international civil society. These developments are often perceived as antagonistic to the traditional structure of international society as upheld by international law. Such antagonism is not necessarily accurate. As this debate was covered in Chapter One, at this stage it suffices to add that the state shows every sign of continuing to be a significant and essential form of human political organisation in the post-Cold War era. The states' clearly indispensable facilitory role in relation to the majority of new developments in political affairs is evidence of its continuing relevance in the face of contemporary change (see section below on intervention and global responsibility).

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realms. *People, States and Fear*, p. 19.
[155] Mayall, James. *World Politics: Progress and its Limits*, Polity Press, Cambridge, 2000, Cover blurb.
[156] Fawn, Rick and Mayall, James. "Recognition, Self-Determination and Secession in Post-

Chapter One also outlined the developmental path of international law up to contemporary debate on human rights. During and before the Cold War, "[n]otwithstanding the universal commitment to uphold universal human rights, the reach of international law stopped abruptly at the [state]boundary."[157] Now in the post-Cold War environment debate over the enforcement of human rights and the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention has become a major issue confronting the traditional application of international law principles. Which principle, non-intervention, and its close cousin absolute sovereign jurisdiction, or self-determination occupies the superior position in the hierarchy of principles governing inter-state relations?

It has been claimed that at the end of the Cold War there is a new-found acceptance of the legitimacy of humanitarian intervention,[158] with the arguments for humanitarian intervention usually advanced in moral or normative terms. However, Wheeler and Morris argue that erosion of the principle of non-intervention may result in even greater human suffering in the long term and that often humanitarian intervention is ineffective. It may in actuality cloak power- political motives and, moreover, these new norms receive most of their support from only Western liberal democracies. Some states, most prominently China, have differing perspectives of what constitutes human rights and thereby differing perspectives of what are legitimate grounds for intervention. Wheeler and Morris dispute the claim that the post-Cold War environment is more receptive to humanitarian intervention and that such intervention strengthens the normative value of the society of states.[159]

Solutions for international society in the post-Cold War era, in respect of these issues, may come from analysis of the root domestic causes of secessionism in terms of the weak state theory and the state-making processes outlined earlier in the chapter. This would enable establishment of means for limiting and legitimising secessionism and the effects of the self-determination principle. This would in turn aid in establishing guidelines for the limitation and legitimisation of intervention on humanitarian grounds. Guidelines with regard to the legitimacy of secessionist movements would ensure that the principles of non-intervention

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Cold War International Society", Fawn and Larkins, op. cit., p. 193.
[157]ibid.
[158]Wheeler, Nicholas J. and Morris, Justin. "Humanitarian Intervention and State Practice at the End of the Cold War", Fawn and Larkins, op. cit., p. 136.

and sovereign integrity, which are the cornerstones of order in the society of states, are not eroded to the point that their core effectiveness is undermined.

While there were surely other factors involved, the European Community's recognition of Bosnia-Hercegovina, which ignored their internal constitution stating that Muslims, Serbs and Croats were equal 'nations', may have provoked the Serbs into war and serves as an example of present inadequacy with regard to recognition of the internal dimensions of secessionist movements.[160] Moreover, the reluctance of states like the USSR, the PRC, India and Romania to back a military enforcement of a 'safe-haven' for the Kurds of Northern Iraqi in 1991 is more fully understood if it is analysed in terms of the domestic security concerns of the states just mentioned.

In an international environment where democratic criteria offer the most widely accepted principles for legitimate statehood, such criteria may offer a solution to the interrelated questions of legitimacy of secession and humanitarian intervention - albeit there is still no doubt as to the present ascendancy of power political concerns over legal and ethical ones.[161] A power based reaction to insecurity is to be expected while there are few clearly stipulated legal and widely accepted criteria functioning to limit and control the effect of the principles of self-determination and humanitarian intervention on the absolute sovereign jurisdiction of the state.

The end of the Cold War has allowed closer examination of the basic principles of international law in international society. Shortcomings and contradictions between principles, previously overshadowed by the imperatives of the Cold War conflict, are increasingly open to debate. In particular the effective boundaries of traditional international law principles are under question. The principle of non-intervention is deemed by some to simply provide a curtain behind which some states oppress legitimate secessionist claims and mask the suffering of their populations. On the other hand, the principle of self-determination and humanitarian intervention, while usually occupying the moral high ground, may not necessarily bring about decreased human suffering even as it erodes barriers erected by the non-intervention principle. These contradictions remain unsolved problems in the law among

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[159] ibid., pp. 135 - 171.
[160] Fawn and Mayall, op. cit., p. 205.
[161] ibid., p. 214.

nations. Examination of the views of the People's Republic of China, the loudest voice raised against intervention, in subsequent chapters may suggest some possible solutions. Meanwhile, because the principles of non-intervention and sovereign equality are central to order in the society of states the following section examines post-Cold War intervention trends in some more detail before the conclusion of the Chapter.

Humanitarian Intervention, Global Responsibility and Weak States

The question at hand asks how the above discussion on weak statehood impacts upon consideration of newly promoted norms for humanitarian intervention and ideas of a global responsibility that underpin them. This question becomes increasingly crucial in later Chapters when the specific behaviour of rising states such as China and India in relation to such foundational norms of international society is considered.

Humanitarian intervention may be defined as:

> 1. ... unsolicited military intervention in another state's internal affairs with the primary intention of alleviating the suffering of some or all within its borders.[162]

> 2. ... humanitarian intervention aims to stop the gross and widespread violation of human rights occurring within a state; and for that reason it has traditionally been directed against the authority in control of the country in question.[163]

Intervention itself may be defined in more general terms:

> Intervention, quasi-intervention, and positive non-intervention define a continuum of behaviour that seeks to influence or interfere in the internal affairs of another state, ranging from invasion to overthrow a government to quiet diplomacy.[164]

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[162] Wheeler, Nicholas J. and Morris, Justin. "Humanitarian Intervention and State Practice at the end of the Cold War", in Fawn and Larkins, op. cit., pp. 135 – 136.
[163] Sarooshi, Danesh. *Humanitarian Intervention and International Humanitarian Assistance: Law and Practice.* HMSO, Wilton Park Paper 86, London, 1994, p. 1.
[164] Donnelly, Jack. "Human rights, humanitarian crises and humanitarian intervention", *International Journal*, Vol. 15, no.2, Autumn, 1993, pp. 610 – 611.

Where along this continuum of behaviour intervention becomes simply involvement is a matter of some debate. However, the crucial factor of definition is whether the intervention is coercive or not. If not coercive then the term intervention is probably inappropriate. Certainly the term 'soft' intervention pushes the definitional boundaries.

A rash of humanitarian crises in the 1990s (such as the ethnic violence in Somalia, Rwanda and the former Yugoslavia) contributed to ideas advocating interventionist action to uphold humanitarian norms. More generally, this involved the notion that the principle protecting the absolute sovereignty of the state was outdated and that in the modern world a 'permeable' sovereignty better reflected modern problems. At the extreme of these views is the idea that the state itself has ceased to be the most effective means of organising politically the vast bulk of humanity. A world society or global civil society based around rights of the individual is considered to construct the new international political order.

However,

> ... part of the persistence of the norm of non-intervention rests on the fact that it continues to correspond to the true level of development of the international community. For better or worse, states remain the terminal locus of the political loyalties for most people.[165]

In addition, the state

> ... continues to perform an important historical role, as it alone is currently able to provide a stable and democratic [?]structure of authority, to establish the rule of law, to maintain order, to ensure social justice, to manage conflict and to give its citizens a collective sense of agency ...[166]

The state, therefore, remains an indispensable instrument for international political order and the states system provides the 'stable' political framework for a world society to develop. A notion of global responsibility need acknowledge that this is the case and that:

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[165] ibid. p. 638.

Historically, states practice has given little support to the legitimacy of such action [humanitarian intervention], [however]... at the end of the Cold War, some commentators argue that recent cases demonstrate a new-found acceptance of the concept, and argue furthermore that such a development is to be welcomed on the grounds that it strengthens the normative value of the society of states.[167]

In sum, state sovereignty is crucial to international order. Nascent norms of global responsibility for the protection of human rights do not at present make it otherwise. None the less, the notion of global responsibility does dictate the need for new criteria for intervention within the state sovereignty framework.

On what basis could this 'new interventionism' in an era of global responsibility take place? Are democratic criteria a way of recognising secessionist and self-determination movements within the bounds of the existing international order based on absolute state sovereignty? According to Fawn and Mayall "...the prospects of conditioning the future democratic character of new polities, through the 'conditioning' of international institutions, weighs lightly in considerations of recognition." In other words, strategic reasons, national interests and pragmatism have been more likely to govern the decision of existing states to recognise new states.[168] This point is relevant because it indicates that power political factors remain dominant over self-determination principles, which include the notion of global responsibility to human rights norms such as the right to political representation. The bottom line in terms of power versus principle is as Ivor Jennings stated with regard to decolonisation. "On the surface it seemed reasonable: let the people decide. It was in fact ridiculous because the people cannot decide until someone decides who are the people."[169]

The above is not intended to argue that new norms for humanitarian intervention are meaningless in the face of the entrenched principle of absolute state sovereignty and the imperatives of power politics. Rather, it seeks to emphasise the following point.

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[166] Parekh, Bhikhu. *Rethinking Multiculturalism: Cultural Diversity and Political Theory*, Macmillan, NY, 2000, pp. 193 - 194.
[167] Wheeler, Nicholas J. and Morris, Justin. op. cit., p. 136.
[168] Fawn and Mayall. op. cit., pp. 194 – 195.
[169] Ivor Jennings in Mayall, James. *Nationalism in international society*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1990, p. 40.

The causes of human rights violations are largely national (especially where governments do not owe their power to external intervention). The solutions must also be largely national.... External actors often do not have the capability, through humanitarian intervention, to remove an offending regime from power.... Multilateral (and bilateral) actions can provide transitional assistance and continuing financial and political support.... If they are vigilant and respond with firm measures of positive non-intervention whenever backsliding appears, they may have a very important humanitarian impact. But these efforts are supplemental to national efforts. And they point to a humanitarian politics that places minimal reliance on intervention.[170]

This is particularly the case with regard to the People's Republic of China, which is a great power and holds veto rights in the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) - making external (by definition coercive) intervention in the name of humanitarian intervention unlikely. If democratic criteria for intervention are limited by power political concerns, as argued above, and the solutions to human rights violations are national, then international society would be impelled to set new intervention criteria after consideration of the internal circumstances of the target state. Such internal circumstances are wide and varied and, as noted, in the case of the PRC intervention measures to protect human rights would necessarily have limits. It would, therefore, seem reasonable to argue that such criteria would be more effective if they were supplemental to national efforts and included a clear perception of national interests and weak state security concerns. This topic will be taken up again in the Chapter on the PRC.

Chapter Two Conclusion

The end of the Cold War has had a mixed effect upon the institutions of international society. What is apparent is that the issues that have come to prominence were already in the making during the Cold War. As Fred Halliday has drawn attention to, there are a number of questions that are more readily addressed in the post-Cold War environment. The models outlined earlier in this chapter express the confusion of the era and emphasise that no single theme model will suffice to encompass the complexity of present day international order and society. The ES approach, however, despite some limitations due to its close affinity with the

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[170] Donnelly, op. cit. p. 640.

politico-strategic realm and liberal modernism, offers a multi-faceted, holistic framework that is able to include a large number of other international relations approaches.

Analysis of the five institutions that maintain order in international society reveals that they are able to supply a framework from which to approach many of the concerns in contemporary international politics. The overriding argument of the Chapter has been that the various models of the post-Cold War order can be best considered as a whole within the holistic framework provided by the international society approach.

Chief among post-Cold War international order concerns is the gap between levels of commitment to the institutions of international society evident among states within an international society that is at times barely united by adherence to gesellschaft type institutional rules and norms. The post-Cold War international society remains a hybrid of gesellschaft and gemeinschaft development. This hybrid nature may even have become more entrenched in the post-Cold War environment as a result of the increased dominance of core states coalescing around perceivably exclusive liberal democratic principles.

On the other hand, there appear to be some positive developments in the efficacy of great power cooperation and adaptation to the power imbalance created by the existence of a single superpower - this is despite real security concerns and differing security environments faced by states within a contemporary international society complicated by a core/periphery structure. Such a structure has a marked influence on the function of several of the institutions of the society of states after the end of the Cold War. The action of the balance of power and war are especially affected by the varied security requirements of states in the core as compared to those in the periphery. Full consideration of the security predicament, state-making needs and resultant wars of the third kind inside weak states is vital to the effective management of the society of states in the post-Cold War era.

It is the basic agreed principles of international law and order that holds the society of states together. The post-Cold War era provides opportunity to assess closely where the diverse states of contemporary international society differ in their understanding of these basic rules and norms. The diplomatic institution continues to facilitate possible solutions to problems and contradictions in international law that are increasingly evident in the post-Cold War environment. Questions surrounding sovereignty, intervention and human rights are examples

of issue areas affecting the basic principles of the society of states that have gained greater prominence after the end of the Cold War. The above institution by institution assessment has displayed the correlation between the institutions of international society with regard to these contemporary problems.

Rising states such as China and India are considered crucial to providing a way forward on the unresolved post-Cold War problems outlined in this Chapter. Before pursuing this point, and examining how each of these states perceives international society, the general role of rising powers in an international society will be considered.

CHAPTER THREE: RISING POWERS AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

Some of the most crucial questions in studies of international systems surround aspects of system change. Large-scale change within states systems is often engendered by a rising and discontented power. Historically, such change has frequently been a violent process.

Contemporary international society also faces the challenge of adjusting to the effects that changes in relative power have upon international systems. This chapter is concerned with: assessing some of the (modernist) theories that explain change in international systems and societies and how a state comes to be classified as a rising power within a system of sovereign states. It also considers why and when a rising power is deemed to be a threat to status quo powers and the means that international society customarily utilises to accommodate a rising power, including the effect that a rising power has on the institutions of the society of states.

The theories assessed tend to prioritise the politico-strategic realm, as the topic dictates. It also priorities some rationalist/modernist approaches over others.

What is a Rising Power?

Before proceeding to define a rising power the term power itself needs definition.

> Power is like the weather. Everyone talks about it, but few understand it...[power] is like love...easier to experience than to define or measure.[171]

While many lament the difficulty in clearly defining power as a term of analysis, it is, nonetheless, a concept in international relations that is written about so much that it really is not difficult to obtain a general idea of its use in the field. In brief terms,

> ...[P]ower is the ability of one person or group to change the behaviour of another person or group. Behaviour may be changed through inducement, coercion, or exhortation, which requires the power-wielder to have economic, military, institutional, demographic,

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[171]Nye, Joseph. quoted in Rourke, John, T. *International Politics on the World Stage*, The

political, technological, social, or other resources.[172]

This is a definition that differs from the classical definition of power. The classical definition is concerned primarily with power expressed in military terms. What Huntington refers to above as resources are all of the possible sources of state power. These areas can be divided into soft and hard, or co-optive and command forms, of power - with military force constituting the core of the latter. This wider definition of power, which is increasingly utilised, more closely reflects the full extent of the forms of power at a state's disposal in present times than does the narrow classical definition.

Power in international relations is most frequently considered in relative terms. That is, an increase in power is only relevant if it is increasing at a rate faster than that of other states, or, in other words, a power gain by one is equivalent to a power loss by another - a zero-sum game. It is possible to partake in a lengthy discussion on how power is exercised by states, and this brief definition of power has shortcomings. However, for the purposes of this study the above definition of power as given in the Huntington quotation should suffice.

Economic Power Equals Military Power?

Increases in any type of power are made possible by an increase in resources created by economic growth. It is logical to assume that sustained and rapid economic growth increases economic power. In turn, greater economic power increases the potential or actual military capability of a state. Therefore, successful economic growth (in relation to that of other states) enlarges the overall relative power of a state. The relationship between economic power and military power is a commonly discussed phenomenon (for example, in terms of 'guns versus butter', and the military-industrial complex etc[173]) and is relevant to rising powers and international society. This is assessed in more detail below.

With the use of numerous historical examples, Kennedy explains the correlation between economic production capacity and military strength. Moreover, he emphasises that, "...as far

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Dushkin Publishing Group Inc., 1993, p. 226.
[172]Huntington, Samuel P. op. cit., pp. 83 - 4.

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as the international system is concerned, wealth and power, or economic strength and military strength, are always relative..."[174] Thus, a state that records growth figures consistently greater than others will be perceived as a rising power.

Does rising economic power automatically transform into increased military and overall power? This may appear an over simplistic question, as empirical evidence over the centuries largely supports this assumption. There are numerous examples of states exploiting their increased and superior economic power for military purposes- one needs merely to consider the military advantages that an industrialising Britain gained over its rivals as an example. Furthermore, even if an economically successful state did not utilise this advantage to increase its military capability, other states would still consider the possibility of it doing so a threat and respond in much the same fashion as they do to a patently observable growth in military strength.[175]

However, while it is clear that states readily utilise increased economic power for military purposes, there are possible alternatives. By simply considering this fact, it is possible to observe that the tendency for a rising economic power to augment its military capability is not entirely an autonomous dynamic of international systems - purely because it may choose not to invest its greater economic power in the military. There is, however, no doubt that both the anarchic structure of the states system and technological advancement promote defence expenditure. Thus, if the relationship is not fully autonomous then, in order to assess the relationship of increased economic power with military power, the extent to which system level structure influences a rising economic power's decisions on military spending in comparison to spending on other concerns of the state needs to be assessed. Such patterns in military spending are dictated both at the system level by the effects of anarchy, as explained by the security dilemma, and at the unit level, as may be explained by the defence

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[173] See Goldstein op. cit., p. 184 and Pearson, Frederic S. and Rochester, J. Martin. *International Relations: The Global Condition in the Late Twentieth Century*, (3rd Ed.), McGraw-Hill, NY, 1992, pp. 175 - 178.
[174] Kennedy, Paul. *The Rise and Fall of Great Powers: Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*, Unwin Hyman Ltd, London, 1988, pp. XIV & 536.
[175] Although Japan does in fact have significant military capacity, in the form of its Self Defence Forces, it still may serve as an example of a state with large economic production capacity which may be perceived by others in the region as a threat because it provides Japan with considerable re-militarisation potential.

dilemma.[176]

Explaining the Structural Effects of Relative Power Change in States Systems

This section outlines the general theoretical orientations[177] of rationalism, neorealism, liberalism, constructivism and structural realism, all of which attempt to explain the structural transformation of international systems stemming from changes in relative power. This is done so that key features that enable precise understanding of how a rising power affects an international system can be isolated and assessed. These theories also contribute to an explanation of the underlying processes that take place during the construction of a gesellschaft and gemeinschaft international society as well as the evolution of a gemeinschaft international society from a gesellschaft international society.

The following list is a set of basic assumptions about state behaviour that Gilpin uses to explain change in international systems:

1. An international system is stable (i.e., in a state of equilibrium) if no state believes it profitable to attempt to change the system.

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[176]"The defence dilemma arises from contradictions that exist between military defence and national security.... [in]two obvious ways.... because the cost of defence compromises other security objectives, or because the risks of defence appear to outweigh the threats that defence is designed to deter." Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, p. 272. In keeping with defence dilemma reasoning, it may be argued that a state that spends too much on the development of its military capacity, rather than using those resources to invest in further economic development, will risk eventual relative economic and thereby overall power decline. This may be considered as ironic as excessive military spending is often justified on the basis of its role in defending the economic and trading interests of the state. On the other hand, it may also be argued that military spending is not the culprit, rather it is spending on non-productive welfare that leads to eventual decline in economic and then overall power. Arms spending patterns are more fully analysed in Buzan's work on the Arms Dynamic. See Buzan, Barry. and Herring, Eric. *The Arms Dynamic in World Politics*, Lynne Rienner, Boulder, 1998. The security dilemma, the defence dilemma, and the affect of technology on military capacity are covered also by Buzan in *People, States and Fear*.

[177]International relations is an eclectic discipline and many of its general theoretical orientations are borrowed from other fields of study. "General theoretical orientations provide heuristics - they suggest relevant variables and causal patterns that provide guidelines for developing specific research programs." Katzenstein, Peter J. Keohane, Robert, O. & Krasner, Stephen D. "*International Organisation* and the Study of World Politics", *International Organisation*, Autumn 1998, Vol. 52, No. 4, p. 646.

2. A state will attempt to change the international system if the expected benefits exceed the expected costs (i.e., if there is an expected net gain)

3. A state will seek to change the international system through territorial, political, and economic expansion until the marginal costs of further change are equal to or greater than the marginal benefits.

4. Once an equilibrium between the costs and benefits of further change and expansion is reached, the tendency is for the economic costs of maintaining the status quo to rise faster than the economic capacity to support the status quo.

5. If the disequilibrium in the international system is not resolved, then the system will be changed, and a new equilibrium reflecting the redistribution of power will be established.[178]

Clearly, even if a state perceives that there is a net gain to be had from changing the system it must still have the power with which to change it. As power may manifest itself in many forms and is most likely to become available in larger quantities as the result of economic growth, a rising power may then be defined as a state that is in control of resources that are increasing at a faster pace *relative* to other states (especially powerful status quo states) in the international system. However, such a definition does not automatically assume that the rising power will believe it profitable to change the states system. The classification of a state as a rising power only becomes truly significant in terms of international order and security if the rising power wishes change, or is perceived by other states in the international system as desiring change.

In such a case, how is a rising power to be accommodated by other states in the system without them simply resorting to supporting the status quo and thereby, at least implicitly, advocating a policy of suppressing the rise of the revisionist power?[179]

Gilpin's five assumptions are couched in economic language. This reflects a calculative

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[178]Gilpin, Robert. *War and Change in World Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1981, pp. 10 - 11.
[179]Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, pp. 299 - 300.

rationalist approach (*vide* Chapter Two). Rationalism is derived from economic theory and focuses on the behavioural outcomes of states as rational actors. In this case, the broad viewpoint of both rationalism and neorealism (which are often used in accompaniment to one another) is to think of states as rational actors that act in accordance to their perceived interest or profit. The anarchical international system creates a competitive environment of power politics, which determines the choices available to states. As rational actors concerned with their own survival, therefore, it forces them to compete in a self-help system. Neorealist theory assumes that the initiation of interaction between states creates the anarchical international system structure, which is not then amenable to change. In the neorealist case, change is discussed chiefly in terms of shifts of power between states.[180] As a perspective that adopts power as the crucial variable, neorealism appears as logically the best theoretical model for understanding the impact that a state with increasing relative power has on an international system. However, there are alternative viewpoints.[181]

The liberalist approach highlights institutional cooperation evident in the international system despite its anarchical nature. Liberals also adopt the rationalist approach, which focuses on state behaviour and argue that states' perception of one another and themselves is predetermined by the anarchical states system. States cooperate to form institutions because the cooperative benefits derived make it a rational (calculated) choice. The result of this use of rationalist reasoning is that the liberal approach is limited when it comes to explaining changes in system structure - if system level structure is separate or exogenous to the state and is responsible for predetermining states' perception of one another or their identity, then how is it that institutional processes are also capable of altering state interests, identity and ultimately system structure? When it is observed that states in a system no longer perceive each other as a threat and therefore no longer practice power politics, such as occurs in a security community, and because "...transformations of identity and interest through process are transformations of structure",[182] then the structurally determined rationalist approach is left struggling to explain such a unit based alteration of system structure. Hence neorealism

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[180] Waltz, Kenneth. op. cit. provides full explanation of neorealism.

[181] It should be further acknowledged at this point that the analysis is prioritising those 'mainstream' modernist perspectives that perceive the international system in a rationalist 'human nature' light. This is done because these approaches most neatly marry in with the international society concept, although, as noted elsewhere, this does not necessarily preclude the ES approach from integrating ideas from other approaches.

[182] Wendt, Alexander. "Anarchy is What States Make of It", *International Organisation,*

and liberalism are limited by their adoption of this particular rationalist reasoning.

A solution to this limitation comes from the constructivist view whereby self-help and power politics are considered institutional features of social process (i.e. part of human nurture, *vide* Chapter Two) rather than logical extensions of anarchy.[183] The constructivists view the structure of the international system as not rigidly set as an autonomous consequence of inter-state interaction, but rather as a reflection of socialised identity and interests; that is, 'anarchy is what states make of it', the power political, self-help, structure[184] is socially constructed through states' perceptions of one another. If the constructivist view is taken into account then system level structural changes stemming from unit level action are better explained. As a result the changes that a rising power may create can be more readily assessed.

Structural realism is another theoretical approach that also explains change in international systems. In their book, *The Logic of Anarchy*, Buzan, Jones, and Little distinguish structural realism from neorealism. By differentiating the logic of anarchy so as to account for both competition and cooperation, and by recognising the role of structure within the state as well as within the international system, they add a new dimension to the agent/structure question and enable structural realist theory to more comprehensively explain the transformation of international systems than neorealist theory had previously done (i.e. changes in unit level structure alter the agent which creates changes in the system level structure).[185] Despite this

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Spring 1992, Vol., 46, No. 2, pp. 392 - 393.

[183]ibid., p. 395. See also Figure 2.1 and Pettman, Ralph. "Making Sense of International Relations Theory", op. cit., pp. 21 -22, for an explanation of how constructivism fits into the modernist matrix.

[184]At this point the question of whether self-help and power based interests are actually part of the international system structure is raised i.e. the most basic structural component, international anarchy, creates a self-help environment, does self-help then become part of the system structure? Or is it purely a unit level behavioural factor? The latter seems unlikely, as if, for instance, a new state was introduced to the system from outside then it would still have to contend with a self-help environment - one not of its own making. As the constructivist approach suggests, until an influential number of states decided to mutually act contrary to, and alter, the self-help environment, self-help could perhaps be conceptualised as a 'secondary' structural component of the international system.

[185]The differentiation of anarchy allows for explanation of both competition and cooperation in the international system by observing that anarchy does not necessarily force competitive politics. States may cooperate to preserve or transcend the anarchical system, in which case they form either an international society or empire (or maybe world government). See Buzan, Barry. Jones, Charles, & Little, Richard, *The Logic of Anarchy: Neorealism to Structural Realism*, Columbia University Press, NY, 1993, p. 166.

advance, constructivist ideas of cycles of interaction are able to explain the very origin or creation of social structures and thereby explain system transformation at a more thorough and basic level than does structural realism's structuration approach.[186]

The constructivist and liberal approaches certainly have merit when it comes to explaining various structural aspects of inter-state relations, but are they useful in relation to understanding changes in relative power? Certainly the concepts of power and constructivism do not frequently appear together. The usefulness of the rationalist and neorealist approach is that the relationship between economic or other sources of power and system change is made very clear. The rationalist approach explains change in international systems that fits in well with neorealist theory. It is simply a matter of turning to assumptions such as those quoted earlier from Gilpin to understand the effects of increased power on an international system. It is not until international politics becomes increasingly institutionalised that the liberalist, and more so the constructivist approach, become more easily applicable. That is to say, the effects of interaction, socialisation and identity creation are more obvious in an institutionalised environment but the function of power, although still very relevant, is less easily separately analysed.

How then does constructivist theory address the question of the effect of a rising power on the structure of a states system? The ways that increased relative power will affect the identity of the rising state in relation to other states must be understood. The rising power of a state will form a threat to other states unless there is an effort made to limit this almost autonomous process. If the process of identity projection is not actively managed then the rule of power politics and self-help (i.e. a realist explanation) will obtain. In other words, in an anarchical environment that does not feature any form of advanced co-operative interaction between states aimed at advertising that the rising power is not purposely seeking to threaten status quo powers, then anarchy is permissive of conflictual politics.[187] Thus, from the constructivist viewpoint, if the interactive means that enable management of the identity and interest projection of the rising power are created and utilised effectively then they may be employed to ameliorate or perhaps eliminate the conflictual power politics between rising

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[186]Wendt op. cit., p. 406.

[187]However, should the rising power be patently intent upon challenging the status quo then war is inevitable. Japan before and during World War Two was an example of a rising power's behaviour best explained with a realist interpretation of the balance of power and

powers and status quo powers usually permitted by anarchy in the international system.

From a liberal perspective the effect of a rising power on the structure of an international system is determined by the anarchical structure of inter-state relations. However, institutional processes may alter the behaviour of a state or states by highlighting 'net losses' resulting from violent change. The institutional process may lead a state to learn behaviour that enables it to identify itself as operating within a wider group rather than as an isolated state operating within a self-help system. The liberalist viewpoint argues that a state learns to identify its own security as one and the same as that of other states and thereby comes to consider itself as existing as part of a security community. It "...restructures efforts to advance one's objectives, or 'power politics', in terms of shared norms rather than relative power."[188] The disequilibria in the international system caused by rising power and the desire for change will then be resolved ideally by a peaceful redistribution of power inside of institutional frameworks rather than via direct military conflict.

Structural realists would argue that the effect of a rising power on the structure of a states system or society depends on the functional differentiation of the units in the system, and on whether anarchy is being intentionally or unintentionally reproduced by actors in the system. If anarchy is being intentionally reproduced (i.e. an international society exists) then it is very likely that the units involved are co-operating to do so and such a rules based order would increase the likelihood of relative power change being non-violently managed. Actors seek to reproduce themselves in the international system - whether the actors as units have functionally differentiated roles or significantly similar ones will influence the structure of the system and the reproduction process. Therefore, the actor's function in the system and the nature of their internal structure will determine the actor's aims and the effects it will have when applying its increasing power within the international system.[189] Such processes are closely related to constructivism, only structural realism is still utilising a human nature rather than human nurture philosophic rationale

The discussion here has sought to outline the various modernist general theoretical

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anarchy.
[188]ibid., p. 401.
[189]These concepts are an extension of the 'like-units' structural realist theory described during Chapter One.

explanations of how changes in relative power, in the form of a rising power, may alter the structure of an international system. The impact of increased power is that it changes relations within the states system by improving the relative power position of the rising state in question. It may therefore also provide the rising state with the opportunity to alter the status quo, especially if there are rationally perceived benefits from doing so. This, however, is but one of the several foci with which to analyse this issue. Depending on the specifics of the states system under question and upon the theoretical approach adopted, the impact of a state's rising power on the structure of an international system may be analysed through one or several of the following conceptual lenses: power competition, socialisation processes that change identity and interests, institutional efforts to promote cooperation despite the anarchical environment, or structural characteristics at the unit level which determine how the rising state responds to the anarchical international environment (i.e. the rising state will seek to reproduce itself in the international system).

In terms of the twin concepts of gemeinschaft and gesellschaft it is apparent that some of these structural changes will be more accommodating of one kind of development than the other. Structural change facilitated by socialisation processes, for example, is more likely to be associated with and/or result in gemeinschaft development, while institutional efforts will, at least initially, be more likely to be associated with and/or result in gesellschaft development.

Accommodating a Rising Power

The purpose of this section is to examine briefly the ways in which systems of states and international societies react to and attempt to accommodate rising powers. First of all, the spectrum of possible forms that international systems and societies can take and some forces of change that influence them are discussed. This is done so as to highlight the fact that the effect of a rising power on an international system may differ depending on the specific characteristics of the states system in which it exists. Then, the general means by which relative power change may be managed so that stability is obtained within these various systems are considered. Finally, by examining differing classes of rising powers, appropriate means by which to ultimately accommodate a rising power in an international system are suggested.

States systems exist somewhere along a continuum between highly fragmented through to highly consolidated forms. At one extreme, a states system exhibits little or no interaction between the states that comprise it, and at the other there is a single universal empire. In between are levels of order organised around various balances of power alliances and hegemonic rule. Watson lists a spectrum of systems ranging within the four possible categories of independence, hegemony, dominion or empire.[190] At either of the extremes a states system effectively ceases to exist. Kaufman lists four main forces that drive consolidation or fragmentation along this continuum:

> First is the 'self-help' behaviour promoted by anarchy, which encourages not stability but consolidation, as states are motivated to annex their neighbours when they can. The second force is economic interdependence, which also tends to promote state expansion and thus system consolidation. The third force - principles of unit identity - usually pushes in the opposite direction, tending to destabilize empires and promote system fragmentation. The fourth factor is administrative capability, or 'social technology', which acts as a limiting factor: system consolidation depends on the existence of social technologies adequate for administering large units...when all these factors favour a specific degree of system consolidation, the system is likely to stabilize at that level. Highly consolidated systems may be destabilized, however, if any of the four factors strongly favours fragmentation.[191]

Kaufman lists these forces with the purpose of explaining consolidation or fragmentation or simply the forces that dictate the number of units that may exist in a system. In light of the previous section on structural change in states systems, what is the extent to which the various theoretical orientations can be applied to explain the action of these forces that drive system consolidation or fragmentation?

If forces of consolidation and fragmentation are considered from a neorealist perspective, then it may be concluded that a states system will fragment or consolidate depending on the effect of changing power distribution and dynamics upon the four forces postulated by Kaufman.

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[190] Watson, Adam. *The Evolution of International Society*, Routledge, London, 1992.
[191] Kaufman, Stuart J. "The fragmentation and consolidation of international systems" *International Organisation*, Spring 1997, Vol. 51, No. 2, p. 174.

From a constructivist perspective, the anarchically determined structure of the system is subject to modification by unit level interaction and therefore the forces listed by Kaufman may not act as he specifies. The self-help structure, for example, (or in the constructivist view the self-help institution) may eventually be eliminated if the units interact to project a common security identity, making annexation less probable. In such a case the system is still likely to consolidate, but probably because of increasingly entrenched patterns of inter-state relations, or because of the expanded influence of the security community at the unit level of decision making rather than because of outright annexation (i.e. the independence of individual states would not necessarily be lost despite consolidation).

The liberal and structural realist views provide further ways in which to perceive the forces driving system consolidation or fragmentation, they also may be used to criticise Kaufman's approach as a whole. However, the main point to be made here is that change in the form or shape of states systems occurs within a perceptible continuum that can be explained, understood, and maybe controlled. The effects of a rising power may differ within these differing forms of states systems. The four forces isolated by Kaufman tend to, at least partially, individually reflect the particular emphases displayed by the various general theoretical orientations outlined in the earlier section. This suggests that only a combination of the theories would be effective for explaining fragmentation and consolidation of states systems.

Obtaining System Stability

States systems are not simply drifting and shifting along the continuum between independence and empire at the mercy of the forces of fragmentation and consolidation. Individual states in the system have the ability to influence these forces. In the past there have been a number of methods employed by states that have attempted to obtain a minimum of system stability.[192] The aim of establishing a universal empire is one option that has been viewed as a means of obtaining a form of stability, however, this results in the elimination of the independent states system and is therefore not considered in depth during this study.

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[192]System stability may be viewed as support of the status quo - the existing pattern of inter-state relations, maintenance of the existing power hierarchy, or maintenance of the basic order of the system, be it a system of sovereign independent states or an empire.

Since the contemporary world exists as an international society of independent sovereign states it is those methods of maintaining stability in these kinds of systems that are of chief interest.

A formal international body such as the United Nations may act as the entity entrusted with the responsibility of condemning a state that acts contrary or indifferently to *raison de systeme* and therefore ignores its obligations as part of an international society.[193] International disapproval or sanctions can be a powerful deterrent, especially within a highly interdependent system. However, when international condemnation based on the norms of international law fails then other more forceful methods are employed. Historically, the most commonly documented method for maintaining the stability of a system or society of independent states is the balance of power backed by the threat of war. This is a policy or a form of inter-state behaviour, already discussed extensively in previous chapters, that is part of the core of realist theory on international relations. Defined in a more Grotian manner, it may also form part of other theoretical approaches. In this latter case the policy is employed not only to obtain system stability, but also to alter the system structure itself.

All of the institutions of an international society play a role in system stability. Great power cooperation in the form of a concert of powers managing their spheres of influence and the general international system may, for example, function to prevent the force of unit identity from fragmenting the system. The stability equation changes once the system heads towards the empire end of the spectrum. An empire usually exists as a result of successful expansion and, after having learned this behaviour is successful, it follows a dynastic cycle of quite different dynamics than that followed within a system of sovereign states.[194]

Also worth mentioning is hegemonic stability theory - a theory that marries the political and economic sectors of states system analysis. Hegemonic stability theory "...to state it baldly, claims that the presence of a single, dominant actor in international politics leads to collectively desirable outcomes for *all* states in the international system".[195]

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[193]Watson, Adam. *Diplomacy*, p. 210.
[194]The relationship between empire expansion, power, and neorealist theory is discussed in Johnston, Alistair Iain. *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, Princeton University Press, New Jersey, 1995, footnote, p. 56.
[195]Snidal, Duncan. "The Limits of Hegemonic Stability Theory", *International Organisation*, Autumn 1985, Vol. 39, No. 4, p. 579.

This view is criticised by Mansfield who contends that it is the distribution of capabilities that is the crucial variable rather than whether the system is in a period of hegemony or balance of power. In other words (assuming that an open system is a collectively desirable outcome), many small highly developed states or a single preponderant state that favours open trade will both maintain an open system, whereas a system comprised of several large unequally developed states is likely to be closed.[196] A contemporary example of this is displayed in the post-Cold War world where dominant United States power and provision for United Nations peacekeeping operations has been steadily reducing. According to the hegemonic stability view the continued provision of the peacekeeping public good, a collectively desirable good, should have faltered without hegemonic leadership. However, on the contrary:

> ...[I]t is clear that most of the post-cold war period saw an increase in the provision of the public good of the UN PKOs [United Nations Peace Keeping Operations]and in the diversity of contributors and beneficiaries.... we are left with a mutedly optimistic appraisal of the likelihood that system stability can and will be maintained in the coming years, even without a predominant guarantor power as provider.[197]

It is questionable therefore that a hegemonic power is the essential ingredient to collectively desirable outcomes, including a stable international system. Moreover, while hegemonic stability theory certainly has its merits as a tool for analysing the effects of preponderant leadership within states systems, what may be perceived as leadership for the good of all by some states may be perceived as exploitation or imperialism by others. In a diverse society of states that includes states at differing levels of development and of differing historical backgrounds, hegemony is unlikely to gain widespread acceptance as a policy tool for obtaining stability in the international system - even if it were effective.

The Dissatisfied Rising Power

As the previous section noted, international systems may fragment or consolidate depending

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[196]Mansfield, Edward D. *Power, Trade, and War*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1994, p. 181.
[197]Bobrow, Davis B. and Boyer, Mark, A. "Maintaining System Stability: Contributions to Peacekeeping Operations", *The Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Vol. 41, No. 6, Dec. 1997, p.

upon the distribution of forces governing change, especially amongst the most powerful states. A rising power becomes particularly significant in terms of order and security if it seeks to alter the existing order of the international system and has the capacity to do so. Rising powers that wish to alter the status quo are classed as revisionist states. Buzan suggests a three-tier classification for revisionist states which makes it clear that the more moderate revisionists do not aim to alter vastly the basic structure of the international system (i.e. they are unlikely to shift the system along the fragmentation/consolidation continuum to any vast degree).

Orthodox revisionism is purely about power and status. It involves no major challenge to the principles of the prevailing order, but centres on a struggle within the existing order aimed at producing a redistribution of power, status, influence, and/or resources. Such challenges are an inevitable feature of the status quo, in as much as the inherent mobility of the distribution of power will always generate a pattern of rising and declining powers.... Revolutionary revisionism combines a struggle for power within the system with a basic challenge to the organising principles of the dominant status quo.... Radical revisionists fall between orthodox and revolutionary ones. Their objectives extend beyond the simple self-promotion of the orthodox, but fall short of the transformational ambitions of the revolutionary. Radical revisionists seek to reform the system. They want to keep much of the existing structure intact, but to make significant adjustments to its operation.... [on the other hand] Status quo states are those whose domestic values and structures are, on the whole, supported by the pattern of relations in the system.[198]

If a rising power perceives that the status quo is a threat to its security then (at least in rationalist terms) it will have an interest in altering the international system. In such a case a rising power also becomes a revisionist state. Peaceful accommodation of a rising revisionist state within the international system requires an assessment of its type of revisionism and an assessment of the level of its dissatisfaction with the status quo. A revisionist power is acting in accordance with its own security interests and is responding to the pressures of the anarchical system as much as status quo powers are as they seek to maintain the existing pattern of relations among states.[199] Therefore, if the rising revisionist state is to peacefully

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744.
[198]Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, pp. 302 - 311.
[199]ibid., p. 301.

accommodated, status quo powers need to approach the issues that the rising power raises with more than simply the goal of maintaining the present state of affairs. However, are there some basic conditions or institutions of order in an international society that cannot be compromised upon without risking the elimination of the society of states itself?

Rising Powers and the Institutions of International Society

The ultimate aim of this chapter has been to assess clearly the effect that rising powers have within an international society. Much of the above has discussed rising powers and their effect on international systems, without distinguishing between international system and international society. Such a distinction was not strictly necessary since most of the theoretical concepts deal with the concept of a system of sovereign independent states, a structure which is the basis of an international society as well, and, therefore, can be equally as well applied to an international society. However, in an international society the institutions that maintain international order are more advanced than those in an international system. As a result there is a clearer institutional order and body of institutional expectations that a rising power that is part of an international society has to deal with if it wants to pursue change. To what extent can a rising revisionist power in an international society seek to alter the basic institutions of the society of states without undermining the existence of international society as a whole?

> All states, whether status quo or revisionist in relation to the prevailing order, share some minimum status quo objectives.... even the most rabid revisionist state cannot pursue its larger objectives if it cannot secure its home base.[200]

As outlined in Chapter One, order in international society is maintained by sustaining certain central goals. These include: preservation of the system and society of states itself; maintenance of the independent sovereignty of individual states; the goal of peace or the absence of war among states of international society; and the goal of the limitation of violence by holding a monopoly over the use of violence and thereby denying it to other (non-state) groups. This is accompanied by self-limitation norms with regard to waging and

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[200]ibid.

going to war and recognition and respect for pacts or promises among states.[201]

These goals of the society of states, especially those concerned with territorial and sovereign integrity, are very similar in form to those to which Buzan refers to as minimum status quo objectives. Thus it is that in a society of independent sovereign states revisionist and status quo states alike support the basic foundations of international order in international society. Possible exceptions to this support are when a state seeks to build an empire and therefore has imperialist objectives, or a state (or states) willingly cedes sovereignty in the creation of a larger entity.

From the perspective of international society the question of accommodating a revisionist rising power within its institutional framework is therefore a matter of assessing the degree of change sought by the revisionist. An orthodox revisionist is unlikely to threaten any of the institutions, so the society of states is left with the traditional problem of attempting to resolve areas of friction caused by inevitable changes in relative power and status among states in the system. (Although an orthodox revisionist may not wish to alter the institutions of international society, this need not necessarily indicate the level of its threat to status quo. An orthodox revisionist could be as aggressive as any other form of revisionist.)

A revolutionary revisionist state, however, would be a different matter altogether. A good recent example of such a power is the Soviet Union between 1917 and 1989.[202] Arguably, the hierarchical nature of a successful Communist International would have led to the effective removal of the independent sovereign status of subordinate states and thereby to an alteration of the basic international order as it is maintained within an international society. Whether this kind of extreme would have been reached or not, the likes of a powerful revolutionary revisionist like the former Soviet Union certainly pose a threat to the international order that international society upholds. Also of note is the observation that normatively based institutions, such as international law, are more probable targets for change by all types of revisionists than, say, balance of power dynamics.

As with an orthodox revisionist the radical revisionist poses little threat to the basic structural principles of international society. In common with the revolutionary revisionist the radical

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[201] ibid., pp. 16 - 19.

revisionist is most likely to attempt reform of the normatively based principles of international society. A good example of present day radical revisionism is embodied in the contemporary debate over human rights norms versus the sovereignty principle. Neither side aims for the abolition of either principle, but wishes for reform that would change the way such international principles are applied.

Overall, power remains the most important variable governing the impact of a rising revisionist state on the institutions of international society. Even a revolutionary revisionist with dramatically rising power is still not of great significance if it is so small as to never come within reach of even middle power status (although this is not to say that small revisionist powers cannot possess influence beyond their relative size[203]). Without the power required to alter the behaviour of other states the revisionist is limited and, without support, largely unable to initiate the changes it desires. Regardless of through which theoretical lens one chooses to view the rising power and the change it portends for international society, the power variable remains crucial. From a liberalist viewpoint, for example, the actions of a rising revisionist power may be constrained by institutional norms and regimes that condition and teach it to conform to generally accepted international principles. None the less the relative *power* of the rising state still dictates its ability to initiate change or reform of the very institutions that constrain it.

It is important, therefore, when assessing the impact of a rising power on the institutions of international society to identify the general objectives of the rising power i.e. does it have revisionist objectives and is its rising power adequate to challenge the status quo? If it seeks to challenge the status quo, to what extent are its objectives contrary to the pattern of relations and the institutions of international society that govern current order in the society of states? It is answers to questions such as these that will condition the response of other states in international society when facing the challenge of accommodating the changes created by a rising power. Constructivist, liberalist, realist and structural realist theory on structural change all suggest ways in which the change that a rising power causes can be addressed. Depending on the characteristics of the system in question, these theories explain the pattern of development, be it gemeinschaft or gesellschaft, that a rising power is likely to take inside of a given system or society of states.

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[202]Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, p. 306.

Chapter Three Conclusion

A rising power is classed as such if its overall power is increasing at a rate faster than that of other states in the international system. A rising power becomes of particular significance in terms of international order if it seeks to alter the international system or is perceived as wishing to do so by other states in the system. Power is expressed in several forms, but rising power is most likely to be the result of economic growth. Importantly, there is a clear link between increased economic capacity and military capability.

A rising power brings about change in the international system. Change in an international system can be understood through a number of differing theories. The various theories explain how relative power change in an international system can alter the structure of the system and thereby they suggest differing ways in which the changes stemming from the presence of a rising power in the system can be managed. The impact of a rising power on the international system and the changes it precipitates can be explained best by utilising all of the competing theories, depending on the particular characteristics of the states system under examination.

Chapter Three sought to extend the theoretical aspects of Chapters One and Two, especially with regard to explaining the creation and evolution of international societies. The structural realist theory introduced in Chapter One explained the creation of a gesellschaft type international society and could be extended to explain the creation of a wider gemeinschaft type of international society. Structural realists analyse the shape that a system is likely to take as a result of the existing unit identity, while constructivist ideas blur the theoretical line between international and state levels and suggest ways that undesirable international structure may be altered by action at the state level. Constructivist and liberalist ideas, therefore, work well with structural realist ideas to explain the possible change of a gesellschaft system into one with more gemeinschaft type characteristics. The liberalist's institutional approach constructs standard operating procedures within institutional frameworks (gesellschaft development). This process may lead units to learn and develop shared identity and norms (gemeinschaft development).

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[203] ibid., p. 305.

A system of sovereign independent states may vary in shape and form. It can be conceptualised as existing somewhere along a continuum between a highly fragmented independent states system exhibiting little interaction through to a highly consolidated and integrated form. The various international relations theories can be employed to explain the forces that drive a system along the fragmentation/consolidation continuum. System stability has been maintained by states, primarily great powers, co-operating in concert to maintain a balance of power. The impact of a rising revisionist power complicates the efforts of states seeking to obtain system stability or the status quo.

A dissatisfied rising power challenges the status quo in varying degrees. It may be classed as an orthodox, revolutionary or radical revisionist state. These distinctions are useful for status quo states when assessing how best to accommodate a rising power into the international system - without simply resorting to a policy of suppressing both change and the rising power so as to continue the status quo pattern of inter-state relations.

The basic institutions of international society are not necessarily threatened by a rising revisionist power except, possibly, if it is an extreme revolutionary revisionist. The basic institutional order that obtains in an international society is valued by revisionist and status quo powers alike. However, this is not to say that the institutions of international society are not subject to demands for modification or reform from rising revisionist powers, especially, for example, the normative principles that form international law.

This chapter has highlighted four points with which to assess the importance of a rising power in international society. One, a rising power is most significant if its power is substantial and increasing in relation to other powerful states in international society and, simultaneously, if it is dissatisfied with some aspects of the status quo. Two, the impact of a rising power on a system of sovereign states depends on the form of the system (is it fragmented or consolidated) and on the pattern of relations among states in the system (are they typified by a conflictual self-help structure or by a co-operative security structure).

Three, no matter which theoretical perspective is adopted, the influence of power dictates the extent of the impact that a rising power may have on the institutions of international society. Four, successful accommodation of a rising power will require an assessment of its level of dissatisfaction   with   the   status   quo.

CHAPTER FOUR: THE PEOPLE'S REPUBLIC OF CHINA AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

As noted in Chapter Two, there are questions as to the commensurability of applying the ES analytical framework to pre-modern multi-state systems. Apparent limitations involved in an adoption of the ES approach rest with its clear modernist basis. However, this limitation is apparent only. Due to the presence of rationalist or objective aspects[204], although not modernist, it is possible to assess the institutional development of pre-modern multi-state systems using the ES concept of international society. This statement rests on the argument that independent sovereign states may still develop international institutions of order typical of an international society regardless of whether they are modern or pre-modern in nature.

While this argument assumes a state-centric approach it does not necessarily discount the importance of state-making/state-building and the obvious differences in this process between the modern and pre-modern state. What this view asserts is that institutional order among independent sovereign states may develop despite variance in the domestic structure (*vide* footnote 206) of individual states- even if individual states are hostile to the multi-state system and seek to conquer it they are still required to operate meanwhile according to the demands of the system.

This is not to argue that domestic aspects do not to any extent explain changes at the international level - the discussion of structural realism in Chapter Three suggested that they do. The domestic level preoccupation with system domination by the individual states comprising the multi-state system of ancient China led to its eventual demise and could serve as evidence of the effect of domestic politics on the international level. The modern state is the fruit of the modernist project, but processes and institutions (such as the balance of

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[204] What is meant here by 'rational aspects' is rationalism short of "... the free use of the rational mind as an end in itself, by *whole societies*... " Pettman op. cit., p.10. In other words, rationalism prior to its widespread application to all walks of Western life and its eventual integration with modernism. Rationalism was certainly part of the ancient Chinese belief system, for example "... Xunzi [Confucian philosopher c.310-c.220 B.C.] explicitly argued for a humanistic and rationalistic view of the cosmos. He argued that heaven is impartial and human affairs result from human efforts." Ebrey, P. B. *Cambridge Illustrated History of China.* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1996, p. 45.

power[205]) associated with multi-state interaction may exist independent of modernity.

The point, in other words, is that the structure of a system of independent sovereign states dictates certain state behaviour. The advent of the modern state and its unique characteristics[206] encouraged the entrenchment of certain aspects of that behaviour, such as mutually recognised sovereign equality, non-intervention etc. A study of ancient, pre-modern, multi-state systems reveals that institutions of international order associated with the ES are not entirely dependent on a *modern* international system for their creation. This is a

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[205] This Finer quotation below is an example of those that perceive inter-state relations of ancient China as displaying institutional behaviour commensurate with that of the modern European states system. It is common now for the particularly the Spring and Autumn period and the Warring States period to be studied as an example of a multi-state system with its associated institutions. See Cho-yun Hsu "The Spring and Autumn Period", Loewe, Michael and Shaughnessy, Edward L. (eds).*The Cambridge History of Ancient China: From the Origins of Civilization to 221 B.C.* Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, pp. 562 - 575 and Lewis, Mark Edward "Warring States Political History" Loewe and Shaughnessy ibid., pp. 616 - 619.

> The European state, then, was a sovereign, territorially delimited political unit, facing other similar units, each striving for supremacy but never achieving it owing to their rapidly adopted skill of forming combinations that would defeat such a purpose, that is, the techniques of the 'balance of power' first devolved by the Italian city-states in the fourteenth and fifteenth centuries, and very similar to the shifting 'horizontal' and 'vertical' alliances that characterized the Warring States period in China.

Finer, S.E. *The History of Government III: Empires, Monarchies and the Modern State*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1997, p. 1306.

[206] Finer argues that the 're-invented' (modern) state of Western Europe, which was to form the 'world-wide unit' of world affairs, was original and distinct from previous forms of state in three mains ways. Finer identifies these differences as first, legalism, in sum the creation of legal norms that protected the individual in relation to the state i.e. creation of a public/private divide and citizenship rights that included restrictions on a ruler's absolutism etc (basically the politico-social institutionalisation of liberalist principles). Second, the lack of mutability, or the absence of the kind of stability engineered by the mutual reinforcement of the social structure, the political structure, and the prevalent belief system (in China's case Confucianism) by one another, so that imbalance in one is muted by the others. (This kind of mutability led to the eventual relative stagnation of the Chinese civilisation, as well as the longevity and success of the imperial bureaucratic government. This observation is supportive of the argument underlying this study i.e. that, for reasons of innovation, a multi-state system is an international structure ultimately preferable to the alternatives.) Third, the entrenchment of a multi-state system via reciprocal recognition of absolute sovereignty and principles of non-intervention, preventing the systems conversion to empire, as ultimately happened in China. The pre-modern multi-state system of ancient China generally lacked the differences identified above by Finer. *However*, as is argued elsewhere, their absence in ancient China led to the disappearance of the multi-state system, but did not wholly prevent the development of other principles and institutions of international order. Finer, op. cit., pp. 1298 - 1306.

viewpoint that runs contrary to the argument that sovereignty is an 'original' feature'[207] of the modernist state. It holds that sovereignty is possible without the principle of non-intervention i.e. there is a difference between sovereign equality and just plain sovereignty (the clear appreciation of sovereignty held by rulers in ancient China is discussed further below). This view does not seek to contest that for the modern state territory does not enjoy 'unprecedented importance,' and that "... in pre-modern western and non-western polities territory played a largely instrumental role. A polity was distinguished by its way of life, and the latter not territory was its locus of identity and object of loyalty."[208] The simple point made is that relegation of territory to a secondary role for the state does not preclude its existence as a factor in establishing sovereignty or as an influence on inter-state relations in a pre-modern multi-state system. Sovereignty in pre-modern systems dictated a 'defacto equality' while, in contrast, sovereign equality in modern systems dictates a defacto hierarchy. The relevance of sovereignty in pre-modern systems is a viewpoint supported by the work on historical states systems of ES writers Wight and Watson (outlined Chapter One), but one gaining little support in the writings of Bull.[209]

Modernity/individualisation has worked to establish principles allowing for the improved maintenance of multi-state systems. The institutions created by the interaction of a number of sovereign states are created from rational behaviour and are not entirely dependent on modernism in the sense of a 'meta-discourse'.[210] The analysis of the pre-modern states systems of ancient China and India to follow proves this an accurate statement. Modernity and the modern state have been a great boon for international order based on international 'persons', but these revolutions have not been the sole source of such an international order.

The analysis to follow seeks to assess the People's Republic of China (PRC) utilising an ES analytical framework. It is divided into three parts. Part One explores the question of whether a particular period of ancient Chinese history formed an international system or international society. Part Two assesses modern China and its interaction with, and eventual inclusion in, an expanding European international society.[211] Part Three analyses the PRC's role, and its

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[207] Pettman, *World Politics*, op. cit., p. 147.
[208] Parekh, Bhikhu. op. cit., pp. 179 - 180.
[209] See Bull in Pettman, ibid.
[210] Pettman, op. cit., p.10.
[211] There are differing viewpoints of when 'modern China' begins, however, most views focus on significant Western involvement in China's affairs as the most decisive factor beginning

position in relation to other member states, as a rising power in post-Cold War international society.[212]

Part One: Ancient China and International Society

Among others, the ES writers Watson and Wight have cited pre-Qin dynastic periods as examples of ancient states systems. This part of Chapter Four seeks to expand upon their work by reviewing, through the lens of the ES of international relations and the concept of international society, the nature of inter-state relations during this particular period of Chinese history. Such analysis of the ancient Chinese international system is considered useful for advancement of understanding of order in multi-state systems and societies and because of the many insights it offers into historical patterns of behaviour in respect of China and multi-state systems and societies.

Ancient Chinese inter-state relations are most commonly discussed in the context of dominant Chinese philosophical views, such as Legalism, Confucianism, or Daoism.[213] A small number of contemporary Chinese scholars are developing present day international relations theory based on such traditional concepts, for example, Sino-Centrism 华夏中心主

(huaxia zhongxin zhuyi), Heaven's Mandate 天朝礼制 (tian chao li zhi), the Tributary

System 朝献礼制 (chao xian ti zhi), and a 'China as the centre and tribal societies in the

periphery based order' 华夷秩序 (hua yi zhixu).[214] Although ancient philosophies and ideas are still relevant to analysis of Chinese political history, utilisation of the concept of international society to consider inter-state relations in ancient China allows the period to be approached from a fresh perspective, adds a new depth, and contributes to the analytical

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the modern China period. See Hsu, Immanuel C.Y. *The Rise of Modern China*, Fifth Edition, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1995, p. 4. This is not to argue that modernisation is equivalent to Westernisation, but rather that Western influence was the catalyst for the changes that were to push the Chinese state along a path of modern development.
[212]Chinese characters are only inserted where it is considered that they provide clarity or precision, which may have been lost during translation, in respect of the cited idea.
[213] This is despite the probability that such 'schools' were probably not clearly distinguishable until some time into the imperial age. See Loewe, M. "The Heritage left to the Empires" in Loewe and Shaugnessy, op. cit., pp. 982 - 988.
[214]Song Xinning. "International Relations Theory Building in China", *Political Science*, Vol.

versatility of the ES approach.

Scholars, both Western and Chinese, generally accept the view that Chinese dynasties conducted their foreign relations through a tributary system. However, there are some works that question the dominance of the tributary system model. Rossabi's book *China Among Equals*, for example, contends that Song diplomacy recognised other states as equals, rather than simply as inferior tributary states. Moreover, Walker's book titled *The Multi-State System of Ancient China*, is one of the relatively few books that concentrates on considering inter-state relations of the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods as international systems, therefore explicitly challenging the dominant tributary system model.[215]

The Extent of the Ancient Chinese States System and the Ancient Texts

The Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods are also referred to as 'the classical age', or, particularly in Chinese chronological tables, as a later part of the Zhou dynasty era. The classical age was in many ways a transitional era, the old Zhou feudal system was gradually undermined by the independent action of the feudal states, which in turn were eventually conquered and unified under Qin Shi Huang (The First Emperor) and the Qin empire's imperial rule. The classical age was typified by weak imperial central authority and by constant warfare, resulting in a gradual decrease in the number of states (i.e. system consolidation). In the 8th century B.C. there were approximately two hundred states, by 500 B.C. this number had decreased to twenty or less. The states of the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods were located predominantly in the eastern reaches of the Yellow River basin and occupied only a fraction of the territory that future Chinese empires would come to control. The kings of the Zhou dynasty, which had ruled more successfully prior to the Spring and Autumn period, arguably only retained a religious function during the classical age, long after their real power had lapsed. A hegemon or ba (霸) system developed during the Spring and Autumn period whereby, through control of the Zhou kings, the dominant state legitimised institutionally its hegemonic control over other states in the system. The first hegemon was Prince Huan of Qi (685 - 643 B.C.). Peace conferences were

conducted in an effort to maintain the hegemonic system, but these eventually collapsed and the Warring States period began.

The classical age was a rich period of Chinese history. Many of the core inventions and social structures, which were crucial to the eventual triumph of the Qin dynasty and were to form the basis of Chinese civilisation throughout the long feudal period, were made during this era. It was a golden age for Chinese philosophy when a 'hundred schools of thought' (bai jia zheng ming) contended, a phrase to be utilised to considerable effect much later by Mao Zedong. The most famous of Chinese thinkers (Confucius, Mo Zi, and Lao Zi, Sun Zi (Tzu)), and the most influential of disciplines (Confucianism, Legalism, Daoism), all gained prominence in this period, yet the system of inter-state political order that presided over such important conceptual developments has been given surprisingly little credit for this. Instead, the tendency has been to overstate the influence of Zhou imperial rule, while the benefits derived from a system of competing states are more or less overlooked.

Chinese civilisation is one of the most ancient of literary cultures. Therefore there is no shortage of literature available from which to interpret ancient Chinese history. An assessment of the Warring States period through the international society model requires a reinterpretation of the information available on the period. As an in-depth analysis of the actual ancient texts is logistically impractical at this point, this study will sift through more contemporary literature and interpretations of those texts for appropriate information. The literature consulted generally utilises information derived from ancient classics such as *The Spring and Autumn Annals* 春秋 (Chun Qiu), the *Zuo Chuan* 左传 and the *Book of Rites* 礼记 (Li Ji).[216]

The Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods lasted between circa 770 B.C. and 221 B.C. It is suggested that the system of inter-state relations that obtained during the classical age was instrumental in the philosophical, technical, and political advances that took place

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[215] Having written this, consultation of Loewe and Shaugnessy's work (cited above) reveals that consideration of the classical age as a multi-state system has certainly become established.

[216] A guiding text on the subject of early Chinese texts is found in Loewe, Michael (ed). *Early Chinese Texts: A Bibliographical Guide*, The Society for the Study of Early China, Birdtrack Press, 1993.

during the period. Before proceeding to determine whether inter-state relations of the classical age are able to be defined as existing within an international system or international society, some basic concepts need to be assessed in their appropriate historical context.

Political Concepts in Ancient China - State, Sovereignty, and Anarchy

State

The words Zhong Guo 中国 or middle kingdom refer to a group of central Chinese states of roughly equal power that existed during the Spring and Autumn period.[217] These states were considered central as a result of their geographical location as well as on a cultural basis. Their cultural centrality was evident in relation to the surrounding barbarian states, which did not conduct themselves in accordance with classical Chinese custom. The states that existed in the classical age meet most of the criteria of statehood as they are defined today. They had jealously guarded borders, a stable population, a common language, a central government, and a sense of patriotic pride indicating that the idea of the state was strong - at least among the elite.

> In their relations with one another the states of the Ch'un-ch'iu were under no illusions about what did and did not constitute a state. Those states that maintained their sovereignty were treated as equals no matter what their size or nature. Treaties were made with the outer barbarian tribes on a footing of equality because those tribes managed to maintain their independence.[218]

Walker employs a body of literature devoted to analysis of the rudiments of international law, as it existed in the Eastern Zhou period, to prove that a system of sovereign states was present at the time. This literature was written mainly in the late 1930s and early 1940s and appears to have had little influence on contemporary Chinese international relations scholars. None the less, the literature, while dated, still conducts analysis of the pre-imperial period that remains valid. Without direct reference to this 'body of literature', contemporary historians

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[217]Walker, Richard Louis. *The Multi-State System of Ancient China*, Greenwood Press, Connecticut, 1953, p. 21.
[218]ibid., p. 25.

interested in the state-making process are still not only inclined to trace the influence of the classical age throughout Chinese history, but also provide some indication as to the general makeup of states of the era. Evidence that statehood in the classical age was a matter of some importance is displayed in the literature by comparison between those territories that were organised into states and those that were not ('guo', 'ye' duili zhidu).[219]

The question of whether or not states in the pre-Qin period interacted as part of a states system is central to this study, and will be analysed more extensively as the Chapter progresses. At this stage it is sufficient to point out that there is little debate over whether or not multiple independent states existed at the time, rather the central question is about their level of independence in relation to one another.

Anarchy

In relation to international systems the strict definition of anarchy is the absence of a central, overriding, government with an overwhelming advantage in the use of force. This condition, defined as it is in terms of a deficiency, is one factor that has led to anarchy usually being portrayed as a negative condition associated with a lack of order or even chaos. Buzan, while making these points, also explains that anarchy among states need not necessarily result in chaos. He develops the notion of a spectrum of anarchies, *immature* at one end and *mature* at the other. The former is dominated by warfare and a struggle for domination, with none of the units acknowledging the sovereignty of others in the system. The latter is formed by strong states that develop as a society "...where the benefits of fragmentation could be enjoyed without the costs of continuous armed struggle and instability."[220] In other words, with a security based emphasis, he simply rephrases the distinction between an international system and an international society that was made in the first chapter of this study. Thus, the maturity or immaturity of the anarchical environment is indicative of whether or not the system is developing as a society. As will be ascertained below, the states system of the classical age existed towards the immature end of the spectrum.

However, in contrast to the ancient Indian states system (*vide* Chapter Five), anarchy as a

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[219] Yang Kuan. *Zhanguo Shi*, (A History of the Warring States) (Shanghai: Renmin Chubanshi, 1998) p. 151.
[220] Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, p.148 & pp. 175 - 176.

specific concept receives little attention in literature of the classical age. The apparent lack of the development of any clear concept of international anarchy has perhaps contributed to the traditional perception of the classical age as a merely a period of weak Zhou feudal and imperial rule, rather than a system of sovereign independent states.

Sovereignty

States in the classical age had clearly defined territories and populations over which the gentry (usually residing in the largest city) ruled. Treaties and conferences conducted between states indicated clearly that sovereign rule was jealously guarded. However, the true extent of the sovereignty enjoyed by states of the classical period is a matter of some contention. Chinese scholars are split over whether states in the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods existed within a feudal system based around Zhou dynasty imperial rule, or as totally independent states free of imperial constraints.[221] Either way, the classical age is generally considered by Chinese scholars as a domestic rather than as an international system.[222] This view makes it uncommon for contemporary Chinese scholars to make comparative analyses of the Warring States inter-state order with other examples of multi-state or international systems. However, there is a body of literature, one 'set' of which was written largely prior to World War Two (more contemporary work in similar vein does exist[223]), in which a serious effort was made to consider the states in the classical era in relation to modern international relations concepts, such as sovereign equality, as represented by the ES.

Shih-Tsai Chen in his work "The Equality of States in Ancient China",[224] establishes that feudal states of the time enjoyed an independent sovereign status despite differences in relative power. Britton does much the same by working through several customary forms of inter-state relations in 722 - 702 B.C. These, he contends, constituted "...an Asiatic analogue

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[221] Chen Zhangqi. Professor, South China Normal University, Head of the Department of History, interviewed in Guangzhou 10 January, 1999.
[222] ibid.
[223] See, for example, Hsu and Lewis in Loewe and Shaugnessy op. cit.
[224] Chen establishes his point on feudal states' independence principally by analysis of *The Spring and Autumn Annals*. Chen, Shih-Tsai. "The Equality of States in Ancient China", *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law*, Annual Meeting, Vol. 35, 1941, pp. 641 - 650.

to the rudimentary inter-state law of the Greek city states".[225] However, Chen points out that the Zhou kings were not customarily signatories to inter-state treaties and, especially as the titles of the elites in the feudal states were designated by the Zhou kings, he was, in theory, of superior status. Moreover, the central states considered themselves culturally superior to barbarian states further from the centre. This created legal inequalities between core and periphery. Britton contends that when a system of hegemonies began after 700 B.C. state sovereignty began to fail.[226]

The debate over the relationship between states in the classical period is approached from two main perspectives, both of which have bearing on how the basic political concepts of state, anarchy and sovereignty of the time are assessed. The first is the traditional Chinese historical perspective, which has generally been accepted by the majority of Western scholars. It argues that the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods were at least minimally unified under the Zhou dynasty. Hence Chinese chronological tables list the period, as far back as circa 1100 B.C. through to the end of the Warring States and the establishment of the Qin empire in 221 A.D., as simply various stages of the Zhou dynasty. From this perspective it may be argued that a system of feudal imperial rule existed at the time, rather than a states system.

However, the evidence discussed above suggests that, even under Zhou rule, the feudal states had significant independence of action, in which case the system is more in keeping with a suzerain states system, as is described in Watson's work. Such evidence has led to the other perspective, that Zhou unity has been overstated as a result of Han dynasty efforts to manufacture the Zhou period as an ideal model for its own empire. This Han objective biased historical records in order to further the political interests of Han and later dynasties. Walker's argument is that Zhou unity was overstated and that states in the classical age enjoyed independence, despite the remnants of Zhou imperialism. The following section, in keeping with the methodology utilised in this thesis thus far, examines the period under study for the institutions of international society in an effort to clarify this debate.

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[225]Britton, Roswell S. "Chinese Inter-state Intercourse Before 700 B.C.", *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law*, Vol. 29, pp. 616 - 635.
[226]ibid., p.634.

In reference to the above analysis it is assumed that the *independent* states of ancient China did, at very least, form a system of states. It remains to assess where along the spectrum between a mature and immature anarchy the ancient Chinese states system tended to settle, in other words, was the international anarchy, to any extent, ordered by the institutions of an international society?

The Balance of Power

Records of shifting alliances and political intrigue form a large part of the content of ancient Chinese historical texts. The role and struggle for power was central to this. Below is a brief analysis of the political environment during the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods. This analysis assesses whether the alliances, conferences, diplomacy and general inter-state relations of the time featured as a balance of power system, or balance of power policy, as defined in Chapter One.

Beginning with Prince Huan of Qi in circa 679 B.C. a pattern of hegemonic rule was set in place. The hegemon customarily expressed submission to Zhou as a means of allaying the fears of smaller states. In this way a league of states was formed around traditional Zhou customs. This group of states became a league that supported the status quo[227] against non-league states that were located principally in the south. The leader of the Zhou league received tribute from the smaller states, which reveals that the feudal and imperial mind set was still well established. At the beginning of the Warring States period, when the number of states had declined significantly, each ruler declared himself a sovereign king and acknowledged the similar status of the rulers of competitor states. This displayed the increasing irrelevance of Zhou legitimacy and the desire of the larger states of the Warring States period to eventually establish themselves as preponderant powers.

The significance of this hegemonic pattern is that it showed that inter-state relations were dictated generally by the goal of system domination. It conveys that the struggle for imperial rule was never really put aside and a stable system of independent states was not established

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[227]Walker, op. cit., pp. 37 - 38.

as an accepted means of order. Cooperation within the Zhou league, and amongst states of rival leagues, took place in order to gain strategic advantage. When smaller states combined forces it was not to maintain the states system but rather to resist a strong adversary (hezhong ruo yi gong yi qiang).[228]

However, this latter kind of behaviour suggests the existence of a limited contrived balance of power. In other words, although it is clear that states of the time chiefly took part in balance of power behaviour as an autonomous response to the imperatives of their states system, it also appears that, when a balance of power ordered the system, it was not purely fortuitous. Small states gave the relative power of rivals close attention in order to maintain their sovereignty, and the competing larger states, by protecting smaller allied states, constantly sought to maintain their spheres of influence and to prevent any single adversary from upsetting the relative power balance among them.[229] The behaviour of small states towards locally preponderant states is typical of a regional balance aimed at protecting the independence of the smaller states. The larger states formed alliances and absorbed smaller states in an effort, not only to seek preponderance, but also to prevent rivals from gaining it. This kind of behaviour contributed to maintaining the independence of states in the system and the persistence of the system as a whole - typical balance of power functions. In addition, the Zuo Chuan records what could be classified as an example of a bipolar balance between the Zhou states lead by Qi (and later Jin) and those states lead by Chu in the south.

In the main then, the balance of power functioned to protect the sovereign independence of states in the ancient Chinese states system. Regional balances also appear to have prevented locally preponderant states from absorbing smaller states during much of the Spring and Autumn period. It seems likely therefore that the further development of diplomatic exchanges, conferences, treaty customs, and the persistent existence of a multi-state system in ancient China, all owe something to the action of the balance of power. However, it would be exaggerating its role to contend that the balance of power operated as an organised institution of the time. Even during the short period that peace conferences took place they were unsuccessful in establishing rules and principles that formalised a system of sovereign states as an accepted political order. Certainly states collaborated to maintain a balance from time to time, indicating a modicum of a contrived balance, but there is little reason to conclude that

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[228]Yang Kuan, op. cit., p. 351.

they had a mutual sense of responsibility and self-restraint and the common goal of preserving the system, as is required in a highly contrived balance. While balance of power policy played an important part in the multi-state system of ancient China, and definitely functioned in more than simply a fortuitous form, it was also not highly contrived - a system-wide theoretical concept of the balance of power and the crucial goal of system preservation were missing.

Great Power Cooperation

During the classical age states were categorised unmistakably in accordance with their power capabilities. Military power was, unsurprisingly, a means of assessing state power. A state was a power of standing, or a great power (万乘国), if it could muster ten thousand four-horse chariots.[230] During the Warring States period the eight largest states of Chu 楚, Yue 越, Zhao 赵, Qi 齐, Qin 秦, Yan 燕, Wei 魏, and Han 韩 all had large territories with clearly defined borders, assets which surely added to their great state status.[231] Although there are numerous examples of several states uniting to defeat or defend themselves against another state or group of states, especially during the later Warring States period, there is no record of *all* other states in the system uniting to defeat one of the great powers. It is entirely theoretical, therefore, whether these larger states had the ability to maintain themselves against all others, even when they were united. None the less, the larger states certainly possessed independent war-making capacity, universal aspirations, and exploited their local preponderance over smaller powers, making it reasonable to conclude that a class of states, comparable to those defined in Chapter One as great powers, existed in the classical age.

Great power cooperation, however, was minimal and there is little evidence in the literature consulted that the larger states perceived themselves as having any special rights and duties over and above their own national interest. The sixth and seventh century B.C. bipolar-like rivalry between the two leagues of states, based around Qi leadership in the North and Chu leadership in the South, involved inter-state co-operation, but no exclusive great power co-

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[229] Walker, op. cit., p. 49.
[230] ibid., p. 41.
[231] Yang Kuan, op. cit., p. 351.

operation of significance. The Zhong Guo, or central states, exhibited a form of co-operation by their mutual exclusion of barbarous states from their 'family of states',[232] but this was not conducted in terms of great power cooperation, but was rather based on a cultural superiority independent of great power relations. There was no sign that the powerful states of the time sought, in the long term, to prevent or limit wars between them or to preserve a balance of power - nor did they take part in great power concerts and formally agree to respect one another's spheres of influence.

While a class of great powers existed in the ancient Chinese states system they did not engage in system-wide great power management roles typical of a more highly developed order within an international society. The larger states managed their relations with other states and annexed or formed alliances with smaller states mainly to secure strategic advantage. There is little clear evidence that suggests the great powers of the classical age had a clear sense or notion of existing in a states system or formally acknowledged any mutual responsibility to maintain a system ordered by independent states.

Diplomacy

The classical age of Chinese civilisation was a period that featured many significant innovations. During the Spring and Autumn period a series of administrative reforms took place in the many individual states. These reforms, undertaken by the most successful states, established a trend of gradual replacement of the nobility with a merit-based class of professional bureaucrats.[233] These bureaucrats presided over the administration of a more highly centralised state structure. The advent of coinage and a cash economy, alongside improvements in transportation, such as canal systems, also worked to increase central state power, which, in turn, stimulated more frequent inter-state interaction.

The figure below displays this increase in diplomatic activity, as well as the trend towards professional bureaucratic missions on behalf of the ruler. The ever increasing distance covered by Lu missions was because the earlier custom of meeting the other party halfway gave way to Lu making missions all the way to the host's capital - perhaps a reflection of Lu's

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[232]Chen, op. cit., p. 649.
[233]The reform processes and conditions which enabled the rise of the professional bureaucrat is detailed concisely in Yang Kuan, op. cit., p. 213.

fluctuating status and power. (The history of the state of Lu forms the content of the Spring and Autumn Annals.)

Figure 4.1

Diplomatic Missions By Lu Outside Its Borders

	PERIOD			
	I	IV	VII	X
	(720-701)	(660-641)	(600-581)	(540-521)
Number of missions	7	8	10	15
Total mileage involved	780	1650	2580	6360
Av. Miles for each mission	112	206	258	454
Missions by the Duke	7	5	4	3
Missions by the Duke's family	0	2	0	0
Missions by Officers of Lu	0	1	6	12

Source: Walker, The Multi-State System of Ancient China, p. 15.

The frequency of diplomatic missions increased even more during periods when leagues of states were maintained. During such times the strict formality based around customary rites was less important, as the task of maintaining unity forced an increase in more practical diplomatic activity. Ceremonial rules, however, based on former feudal custom as well as on the needs of immediate inter-state contact, remained crucial for portraying a state's wealth, strength, and status. Diplomatic missions were classified into court-to-court visits by rulers, meetings of officials or nobles, emissaries, and hunting party gatherings. The treaties and alliances that resulted from diplomatic meetings ".... were in the main dictated by the security interests of the states rather than by former feudal rank."[234]   This diminution in the importance of feudal rank in favour of security matters is a point supported by Chen[235] and it strengthens the argument that rulers recognised one another's equal and sovereign independence - a crucial aspect of diplomatic activity in a states system.

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[234]Walker, op. cit., p. 75.

While diplomatic interaction was certainly an important part of state survival in ancient China, and its frequency often required envoys to remain in a host's state for extended periods, no resident embassy system was developed.[236] The growth of a vigorous diplomatic exchange system was evidence of an evolving states system, but without the institution of extraterritoriality the symbolic function served by inter-state diplomatic cooperation would have been greatly reduced. Diplomatic activity inside the ancient Chinese states system certainly performed the task of allowing other institutions of an international society to operate. The multilateral and bilateral alliances and negotiations that allowed for balance of power behaviour, and the treaties and international laws surrounding the conduct of warfare, as will be discussed in due course, owed their existence to effective diplomatic exchange.

Overall, although a resident embassy system did not develop, and diplomatic exchanges were unable to achieve stable relations[237] among states of the classical age, a significant amount of well organised diplomatic activity did take place. The frequency of this activity increased as a result of reforms during the classical age that promoted a class of professional bureaucrats and increased inter-state activity. The growth of a vigorous diplomatic system was evidence of the existence of a plural system of states that recognised one another's independent status. Certainly, the diplomatic system of the time allowed other institutions of an international society to function and it contributed to maintaining order, albeit an unstable one, between states in the system.

War

It is by their arms that Chin [Jin]and Ch'u [Chu]keep the small states in awe. Standing in awe, the high and low in them are loving and harmonious; and through this love and harmony they can keep their States in quiet, and thereby serve the great States. In this is the way of preservation. If they were not kept in awe, they would become haughty. That haughtiness would produce disorder; that disorder would lead to their extinction. This is the way of ruin. Heaven has produced the five elements which supply men's

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235Chen, op. cit., p. 643.
236Walker, op. cit., p. 78.
237The most stable period of the Spring and Autumn period was when the two leagues of states formed a bipolar balance.

requirements, and the people use them all. Not one of them can be dispensed with; -- who can do away with the instruments of war? It is by them that the lawless are kept in awe, and accomplished virtue is displayed.[238]

War was a dominant feature of inter-state relations during both the Spring and Autumn and Warring States periods. Wars were fought for a number of reasons, ranging from the avenging of a diplomatic slight through to the desire for power and conquest. The latter was the most common,[239] especially in the closing stages of the Warring States period, during which the state of Qin pursued an aggressive policy of territorial aggrandisement. What is of interest to this study is whether or not wars were fought in order to maintain the institutions of a society of states.

The quotation above suggests that there existed an awareness of the role of war beyond its function purely as an instrument to further the interests of an individual state. States in ancient China were concerned with maintaining a state hierarchy that preserved, at least, their immediate relative power positions. Great powers utilised their superior war making capacity to maintain alliances and leagues of states centred on their leadership. War certainly functioned to determine the shape of the ancient Chinese states system, either by the establishment of a fortuitous balance of power system, a managed balance of power system, or, for those states which were able, as an instrument by which to hold a hegemonic position or to seek preponderance.

War also functioned to enforce international law. The clearest example of this was when a treaty violation resulted in conflict. In such a case, warfare was utilised to uphold the conditions of the treaty. Laws regarding conduct in war *(jus in bello)* were numerous and detailed. It is more difficult to identify those regarding the justice of war *(jus ad bellum)*. While there were practical, power political, reasons listed in the ancient texts for going to war,[240] these did not equate to general principles justifying resort to force in international relations. In fact, the theoretical moral stance of the time contended that war was never

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[238]The Prime Minister of Sung's [Song] comments in regard to the failure of a disarmament conference held in 546 B.C. The quotation is taken from Walker, op. cit., p. 57.
[239]Ch'eng Te-hsu. "International Law in Ancient China", *The Chinese Social and Political Science Review*, Vol. 11, 1927, p. 261.
[240]For example those given in Ch'eng ibid., p. 260.

justifiable.[241] System-wide principles on the legitimacy of going to war did exist, however, mainly as a legacy of imperial custom and rule. Disputes between feudal lords were judged by the imperial Zhou court in accordance with the standards set by the classical texts, or they were settled by the states involved, again in accordance with the standards of the ancient texts, through the use of force. Nevertheless, these system-wide standards, unsurprisingly since they existed as an imperial legacy, appear not to have included any regarding the legitimate use of war in order to maintain a system of sovereign, independent, states.

In essence, war functioned as an instrument for maintaining a hierarchical order among the states of the classical age. However, its function was not refined enough to be defined as an institution of a society of states. War was used to maintain the balance of power and international law (and also, at times, collective security), but again not at the high interactive level typical of a society of states. There is little evidence to indicate that the states of the time were conscious of a common interest in attempting to limit war amongst themselves, although the rules of war that did exist may have, in effect, performed this function. The system-wide rules that were in place were largely founded on a Zhou imperial legacy and legitimacy, rather than being the sole product of inter-state cooperation. War was utilised to achieve the objectives of a state or group of states and the order, which that state or group of states desired. It was not utilised, even as a pretext for power political motives, to defend the commonly recognised principles or norms of an international society. In short:

> Larger states had improved the methods of warfare, but no one had to any comparable degree improved the methods of avoiding war save enforced unity under a totalitarian regime.[242]

International Law

Frequently, international law is referred to as a concept of purely Western origins, non-

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[241] Alistair Johnston, in his book *Cultural Realism*, argues that during the Ming period a Chinese realpolitik strategic culture, supporting the use of war to further the interests of the state, coexisted with a Confucian/Mencian moralistic condemnation of state violence. Possibly the same situation existed in the classical age. The Mohists, (led by Mo Zi) like the Confucists, contested the idea that war was morally unjustifiable. They advocated the righteous war by which a good king punished a bad one. See Waley, Arthur. *Three Ways of Thought in Ancient China*, George Allen and Unwin Ltd, London, 1939, p. 175.

Western states are supposedly simply to have learned and adopted international law during colonialist times. This is true with regard to most contemporary international law principles, but if international law is broadly defined as a binding body of rules with the status of law then there can be no question that international law is not exclusively a Western invention. Even if the role of the Zhou dynasty was influential enough so as to define the classical age as a period of weak empire, inter-state relations were still certainly governed by a body of rules with the status of law. Pertinent to this point is the fact that law functioned in a different manner in ancient Chinese society than it does in contemporary times - both in the West and (arguably?) in China. Law in ancient Chinese society was primarily concerned with maintaining a particular social order and belief system, i.e. Confucianism and Legalism. In comparison, law in the West has tended to borrow from religion and philosophy while constantly seeking to develop an abstract, autonomous, and secular legal process.[243]

The customs and norms that formed the basis of international law in ancient China were derived from Shang and, principally, Zhou court archives, as well as from ancient annals, such as the *Annals of the Kingdom of Lu* (Spring and Autumn Annals).[244] However, the ancient feudal texts were not the only source of international law of the time, as Walker contends:

> The patterns of inter-state intercourse during the Ch'un-ch'iu [Chun qiu] did to some extent originate in the feudalism that existed in a limited area under the Western Chou [Zhou]. There were, however, other sources of equal importance. There was a growing body of custom which developed as contacts and commerce increased; there were the increased number of treaties which were signed during the period and to which appeal was frequently made; and there were the patterns and rules set up within the league of states.[245]

A reasonable amount of literature regarding inter-state law in ancient China has been

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[242]Walker, op. cit., p. 101.

[243]See Bozeman, *The Future of Law in a Multicultural World*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1971, p. 38 & 143.

[244]These annals chronicle the history of the state of Lu between 722 - 481 B.C. Gernet, Jacques. *A History of Chinese Civilisation*, translated by J.R. Foster, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1982, pp. 83 - 85, gives a good account of the origins of these ancient texts.

published.[246] Both Ch'eng and Britton list extensively the various laws pertaining to state interaction in the classical age. Many of these laws concern conduct during diplomatic exchanges. Treaty law, mediation, and the laws of warfare are also detailed. Treaty negotiation and enforcement involved particular ceremonies and rites of sacrifice, including the innovative procedure of a bond placement, which was forfeited if the treaty was violated, and the use or threat of force.[247] The Zhou king was the ultimate arbitrator and was not himself a signatory to laws drafted during congresses of the feudal states. This fact, and general reliance on Zhou kings to administer inter-state law, brings the effectiveness of the more ancient feudal laws into question because of the doubtful efficacy of Zhou unity and power. Moreover, legal equality only stretched to include the culturally pure central states, not the barbarian states on the periphery. International law, such as the laws of war, were not considered to apply to barbarian states, be they ethnically Chinese or not (some accepted central states were not ethnically Chinese).[248] This refusal to accept barbarian states as sovereign equals must have restricted both the gesellschaft and gemeinschaft development of international law, despite the growth of customary law referred to by Walker.

Although international law in the ancient Chinese states system contained rules concerning the coexistence of states in the system, it did not effectively seek to preserve the state as the basic unit of the system. It is difficult to determine whether its failure to do so was the result of the perennial difficulty that states inside international systems have in finding satisfactory agreed means of enforcing international law, or rather, had more to do with a simple lack of any established principles protecting the sovereign state as the basis of international law.

It appears that compliance with international law was at the mercy of the power political interests of individual states. The mutual values surrounding the *li*, or ancient feudal rites, supported by the Zhou kings, were constantly undergoing reform in a period of political ferment and this offered an increasingly less stable basis for international law. Moreover, from the outset, these principles were imperial in nature and unlikely to function in the defence and development of a states system or society. Thus the limited international law of

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[245]Walker, op. cit., p. 74.
[246]Walker's reference list provides details of this particular body of literature, especially page 131 of his bibliography. See also Bozeman, *The Future of Law in a Multicultural World*, op. cit. and Loewe and Shaughnessy op. cit. for more contemporary discussion.
[247]ibid., p. 86.
[248]Chen, op. cit., pp. 648 - 649.

the time was chiefly upheld by a common feudal political culture and social order. Functional or gesellschaft development was reduced, for example, by few signs of institutional great power cooperation to uphold international law.

The dominant culture of the central states placed more value on the order stemming from imperial rule, and seemingly never considered the order offered by a system of competing sovereign states as a viable alternative.[249] Certainly Qin and the dominant legalist scholars of the time, who advised rulers on how to achieve hegemony and, ultimately, how to rule China in its entirety,[250] did not find any effective international legal impediments to their eventual conquest of the entire system.

Conclusion

Despite the arguments suggesting a considerable role for the Zhou kings in the classical age it is apparent that an international system did exist at the time. The debate over the effectiveness or otherwise of Zhou imperial leadership, concluded either way, only has bearing on the form of the system (that is, whether it was a suzerain or an independent states system) rather than on the question of its existence. This is because the imperial court at no stage obtained total control over the independent action of other states in the system.

The concepts of state and sovereignty were well developed (enabling the existence of 'international persona' and their rational action and analysis), but little mention of anarchy is found in the literature consulted. This paucity of analysis on the idea of anarchy perhaps reflects the distinct lack of a concept of order based around an anarchical system of independent states, and may explain the eventual dominance of the imperial system of order.

Overall, multi-state institutions in the classical age states system were reasonably well developed. The balance of power institution, for example, displayed what Sheehan called both balance of power policy and balance of power system (*vide* Chapter One). The various

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[249] Jenner does a comprehensive study of this civilisational preference for centralised authoritarianism, which appears to be a defining characteristic of the Chinese polity. His study also helps to explain the difficulties that imperial China had when forced to adapt to the liberal (and modernist) principles of the industrialising West. See Jenner, W.J. F. *The Tyranny of History: The Roots of China's Crisis.* The Penguin Press. London, 1992.
[250] Waley, op. cit., p. 232.

states in the system did, from time to time, actively pursue policies so to maintain a balance of power. They were also subject to the autonomous dynamics of international systems and, therefore, automatically behaved in a way that enabled the balance of power to carry out its function of maintaining the independence of states in the system. In many cases the main factor missing within the various institutions, which restricted their further development, was the acceptance of the concept of a system of sovereign states as a viable means of political order. Therefore, to repeat, although the institutions of an international society were developed, they were never considered as a possible alternative order to the stability offered by imperial rule.

Gemeinschaft and gesellschaft type development both played a role in the evolution of the states system in the classical age. The common culture based around the ancient texts enabled the central states, in particular, to conduct and develop their exchanges around common norms. Development of the international law institution was the best example of this, especially with regard to the maintenance of rules and norms based on, in comparison to the West, a non-secular Confucian and Legalist belief system. At the same time, however, the imperatives of inter-state interaction in the classical age led to developments based not on common culture but rather on necessity. In other words, international law also evolved in a contractual, constructed, or gesellschaft fashion.

The ancient Chinese states system exhibited the institutional characteristics of an international society, but no matter how well developed the institutions there was little sign that the states involved considered themselves bound together in the working of these common institutions. There was seemingly no conscious awareness of a *society* of states and acknowledgement of one another's sovereignty was minimal, suggesting that the ancient Chinese states system was closer to the immature end of the spectrum of anarchies. If there was a mutual society consciousness among the peoples of the various states it existed in a cultural or civilisational form and was bound, and later fostered (especially by Han Confucianism), by imperial customs rather than by inter-state organisation and co-operation. Thus, this common civilisation eventually worked to further the establishment of an imperial rule that was to override the system of sovereign states.

Part one has illustrated that the Chinese nation had a rich history of inter-state relations during the classical age. Such an ES analysis of the ancient Chinese international system

contributes to the analytical strength of the approach, especially in respect of the influence of gesellschaft and gesellschaft development, and further challenges the conventional view of historical patterns of Chinese international behaviour. Examination of this period of China's ancient political history also allows for the conclusion that the multi-state institutions developed during the classical age were largely forgotten by the time that China confronted the modern period.[251] The effects of more than two centuries of dominance by *imperial* political rule were overwhelming and it was the imperial mode of thinking that mostly existed when the challenge of modernity arrived.

Part Two: Modern China and International Society

As noted at the beginning of this chapter, the term 'modern China' usually refers to the period of China's history that ensued after significant contact with Western powers began. It is not especially relevant to this study, however, to debate exact dates or precisely what should be classed as significant contact. Undoubtedly, though, China's confrontation with the British empire during the period of the Opium Wars (1839-1842), and the subsequent loss of Hong Kong, made the influence of the Western European powers and the modernist state practices they brought with them a permanent and undeniable part of China's experience of international affairs. It is from around this period, then, that this study begins its analysis of modern China and international society.

The first part of this chapter attempted to demonstrate that China's political history has not been simply a list of successive imperial dynasties, although the dominant interpretation of Chinese history, especially in relation to its early exchanges with Europe, has been justifiably based on the imperial nature of Chinese politics. The tributary system, whereby China received tribute from surrounding states in an overlord and vassal relationship, was a defining feature of imperial Chinese international relations. In this respect the idea of a unified Chinese civilisation since the Xia and Shang dynasties, fostered by the Han dynasty Confucians, whether accurate or not, did successfully establish a sense of civilisational order based around imperial rule, which almost totally eclipsed the ancient states system.

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[251] This point specifically refers to the different attitudes toward international relations created by the multi-state classical age and the centralised bureaucratic imperial age that followed it. It does not suggest that the classical age was marginal with respect to establishing classic

Nevertheless, the regulatory institutions developed in the classical age still influenced imperial Chinese behaviour in the centuries that followed. Rossabi's work demonstrates that the tributary system was not always the dominant form of inter-state relations during the long imperial age. He argues that the general characteristics of Song diplomacy were formed during the Warring States period - a period which saw "...the emergence of many of the concomitants of a multi-state system, including a rudimentary science of international politics."[252] However, this is an approach that is not widely acknowledged and the tributary system model still remains dominant in interpretations of the greater part of Chinese history.[253]

Essentially, then, a Chinese state characterised by Qing dynasty imperial rule based around the concept of a unified Chinese civilisation[254] was the type of state that contended with the arrival of the Europeans and their expanding international society and is the subject of the section to follow.

China's Entry into the European Society of States

Chapter One described the pattern of the expansion of European international society into Asia and other regions of the world. It also outlined the means that European powers utilised to deal with non-European states. Chief among these was the legal, or at times quasi-legal, standard of civilisation. China's entry into international society was greatly influenced by the standard of civilisation, for example, the standard provided justification for the treaty port system/the 'unequal' treaties and extraterritoriality. China's entry into the European society of states is a topic that has been carefully studied by several authors. In *The Standard of 'Civilisation' in International Society* Gong undertook an examination of China's entry into

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Chinese institutions and patterns of government and philosophy. See Lewis in Loewe and Shaughnessy op. cit. and Ebrey, P. B. op. cit.

[252]Franke, Herbert. "Sung Embassies: Some General Observations", Rossabi, Morris (ed.). *China Among Equals: The Middle Kingdom and its Neighbours, 10th - 14th Centuries,* University of California Press, Berkeley, 1983, p. 140.

[253] This is particularly the case with regard to established literature such as that by John Fairbank and C. P. Fitzgerald, but is increasingly less the case with reference to such as Franke op. cit., Finer op. cit. and Loewe and Shaughnessy op. cit.

[254]This sense of belonging to a single superior civilisation was reinforced by the historical absence of any effective rival centre of civilisation. Fitzgerald, C.P. *The Chinese View of*

international society. In a number of articles and books, Zhang appraised this work, as well as that done by Immanuel Hsu, in an effort to clarify when and how China gained entry into international society.[255]

Hsu and Gong have both differing and similar ideas about China's entry into international society. Certainly they agreed that it was by adoption of the institutions of the European society of states that China gained membership, but:

> The limitation of Hsu as a historian is that he did not look beyond 1880 to see how the Family of Nations eventually accepted China and how China was further integrated into the international society in the early years of the twentieth century. The limitation of Gong as a political scientist is his strict insistence that only explicit commitment by the treaty powers to renounce totally their special rights and privileges such as extraterritoriality can constitute the point of entry of non-European states into international society.[256]

Among many things, Zhang's study highlighted that China's entry into international society required both China and the emerging global international society to adjust and adapt to one another. Thus, China entered international society by adopting (not necessarily happily) and utilising Western international society institutions, especially international law and the diplomatic system, in order to meet the standards of membership, as well as to defend its interests and challenge the actions of the status quo states. An example of the latter is China's use of the principle of sovereign equality to argue for the dismantling of the Western treaty port system and accompanying extraterritoriality.

China demonstrated that it recognised the existence of common interests and institutions by, for instance, attending and contributing to the 1919 Paris Peace Conference.[257] By their

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Their Place in the World, Oxford University Press, London, 1964, p. 7.

[255] Zhang, Yongjin. "China's Entry into International Society: Beyond the Standard of 'Civilization', *Review of International Studies*, Vol. 17, 1991, pp. 3 - 16. See also Zhang, Yongjin. *China in International Society since 1949: Alienation and Beyond*, Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 1998 and Zhang, Yongjin. *The 'English School' in China: A Story of How Ideas Travel and are Transplanted*, op. cit.

[256] ibid., p. 8.

[257] Zhang, ibid., p. 16 provides further historical examples of both China and existing members' pre-World War II efforts to mutually participate in the institutional processes of

invitation for China to attend the Conference, the existing members of international society, whether intentionally or not, demonstrated their recognition of China as a member of international society. China was able to make the institutions of international society its own, enabling it to appeal for equal application of the various principles. This forced a gradual realisation that China was a functioning member of the society of states. As Zhang concludes, China entered the society of states more because of the "...negative undeniability of its membership than because of its positive acceptability to the European states."[258]

While the above outline does not do full credit to the detail with which the various authors (Gong, Hsu, Zhang) have advanced their views on the manner of China's entry into international society, it has, for the purposes of this study, sought to emphasise the following essential aspects. China gained entry into what was previously an exclusively European society of states clearly in a gesellschaft manner. In other words, China's integration into an international society that was based around common Western European cultural values or principles was not aided so much by 'bonds of common sentiment, experience or identity' but was 'contracted and constructed' in an organised manner. This pattern of entry conforms very neatly with that explained by the structural realist concept of the development of 'like units', encouraged by socialisation and competition under anarchy, and thereby also conforms to Buzan's explanation of how gesellschaft international societies are formed (*vide* Chapters One and Three).

This observation begs the question as to whether the manner of China's membership of international society, based as it was on functional integration, was enough to provide it with a secure position in the society of states. In addition, did functional or gesellschaft membership provide a platform for gemeinschaft integration to take place? The answer to these questions may be assessed in two ways. First of all, the theoretical considerations offered by constructivist ideas on cycles of interaction, and/or the structural realist ideas on the differentiation of anarchy advanced by Buzan, Jones, and Little in the *Logic of Anarchy*, offer some conceptual answers (*vide* Chapter Three).

Secondly, analysis of the changing nature of China's membership in international society since its entry may provide a practical example of how international society has evolved with

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international society.

regard to China and the gesellschaft/gemeinschaft patterns of development. The section titled 'Isolation/Alienation' to follow aims to assess this latter aspect, with a focus on the period of China's post-World War Two membership of international society until the end of the Cold War. However, in order to provide a background to China's Cold War era relationship with international society the pre-Cold War development of China's worldview is first assessed. This worldview was conditioned by the development of communist ideology in China leading to the establishment of the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) under Mao Zedong's leadership.

The CCP and Mao Zedong

Marxist literature was first published in China during the first decade of the twentieth century. However, the impact of this literature was minor until a series of international events stimulated wider interest in it. Japan's Twenty-one Demands of 1915 (for example) demanded Japanese control of Shandong, Manchuria, Inner Mongolia, the Southeast coast of China, and the Yangtze valley. Moreover, the demands required employment of Japanese advisors in China's governmental institutions, including the military, and China to purchase at least fifty percent of its munitions from Japan. These demands, except for the latter, were accepted by the incumbent Chinese government, which led to popular protest and the rise of an ardent Chinese nationalism. In such a climate the success of the 1917 Bolshevik revolution in Russia left a doubly marked impression.[259]

The final catalyst for real interest in communist ideology was the decision by Western powers at the Versailles Peace Conference in 1919 to recognise Japanese control of German territory in Shandong.[260] The decision in Versailles was followed by a mass demonstration in Beijing known as the May the Fourth Movement. Chinese intellectuals, who had previously been interested in Western democratic or liberal traditions, now turned to Marxism. Communist ideology criticised Western imperialism and simultaneously offered a fresh worldview distinct from the struggling traditions of China's past. The ready offer of Soviet assistance to Chinese Marxists and its offer to negotiate the abolition of Russia's Tsarist era treaties further

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[258] ibid., p. 16.
[259] Hsu, op. cit., pp. 494 & 500.
[260] This decision was the result of a number of secret deals between the great powers. Britain, for example, recognised Japanese control of Shandong in return for Japan's recognition of British control of German territory in the South Pacific.

added to the appeal of Marxist-Leninism in China.[261]

Leading proponents of the early Marxist movement in China were Chen Duxiu in Shanghai and Li Dazhao in Beijing. With the encouragement of the Third Communist International (Comintern) the Chinese Communist Party was formed under the joint leadership of Chen and Li. Its first meeting was held at Shanghai in July 1921. The key difference between Li Dazhao and Chen Duxiu was that Li supported the view that the Chinese peasantry should be an important part of the revolutionary movement.[262] This view varied from the standard theoretical view of a proletarian revolution based on the urban worker that was supported by Chen Duxiu and the Comintern. Li's ideas had considerable influence on his protégé Mao Zedong, who, after decades of civil and international warfare, eventually led a successful Chinese communist revolution based on the support of the peasant masses.

Thus, under Mao's leadership the CCP formally established the People's Republic of China (PRC) in October of 1949. Mao's experiences during his rise to power had a significant impact on CCP policy. In particular, Mao's views on the role of the peasantry and on war and peace (particularly his theory that world war was inevitable) demonstrate the influence that the Chinese leader had on China's Cold War era integration with international society. However, in comparison to India's Nehru, whose individual world view was much more eclectic and therefore unique, Mao's world view may be more easily explained in terms of his support for a single general theory. In other words, Mao's worldview generally reflected a Marxist-Leninist approach based on class conflict and the struggle against imperialism. It was just such a worldview that largely informed the leadership of China's newly independent government in the early stages of the Cold War period.

Isolation/Alienation

The post-war international environment was defined by the bipolar conflict of the Cold War. The communist victory clearly demarcated with which pole the Chinese state initially sided. In accordance with its form and structure as it existed before the Cold War, an international society continued to evolve mainly in the West. Thus, the establishment of a communist regime in the PRC created many obstacles to the further integration of China into a Western

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[261]Hsu, op. cit., p. 515.

dominated Cold War multi-state order.

For the first decade or two after 1949 when the CCP came to power in China, it was less a question of the PRC's isolation from international society, but more a question of PRC's alienation from international society.[263] Zhang lists both systemic factors, such as the bipolar international system, as well as PRC domestic policy, such as its mistrust of the United States, as contributing to the PRC's alienation from international society. His argument against the dominant perception that the PRC isolated itself from the society of states is backed by the fact that China actively interacted with other states in the system, primarily in the Third World, and generally acted in compliance with international agreements. This is despite the deliberate exclusion of the PRC from international organisations, such as the United Nations, and the PRC's status as a revolutionary revisionist. The PRC was a revisionist intent upon supporting the proletarian revolution by, for example, aiding communist insurgency in Southeast Asia and the North Koreans during the Korean war. However, in an article written by Cohen during the Cold War he contends:

> ...Chinese Communists devoutly preach their own version of the Marxist-Leninist challenge to the bourgeois state system and, within the limits of China's capabilities, seek to translate this revolutionary ideology into action. Yet...there is more than one level to China's international relations. Even in the throes of the cultural revolution, the PRC has by and large continued to carry on conventional diplomatic and commercial relations within the bourgeois nation-state framework....[264]

The significance to this study of the alienation rather than isolation differentiation lies in the way that it reveals the importance of, and reliance on, the gesellschaft manner in which the PRC sought to reintegrate and further its role as a member of international society despite the obstacles facing it during the Cold War.

The systemic exclusion of China from multilateral diplomacy, among other things, must be seen as the single most important factor in sustaining China's 20 years' alienation from

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[262] ibid., p. 517.
[263] Zhang, Yongjin. *China in International Society since 1949*. op. cit.
[264] Cohen, Jerome Alan. "Chinese Attitudes Toward International Law - And Our Own" in *Proceedings of the American Society of International Law*, April 27 - 29, 1967, p. 116.

international society.... The exclusion of the PRC from multilateral diplomacy immobilised any possible initiative to modify the alienation. By the same token, the de-alienation of China in international society would depend as much on the systemic changes as on the changing orientation of China's international policies. It is only natural that the process should have started from the admission of the PRC into the UN.[265]

Two other changes predate China's admission into the United Nations (UN) in October 1971 as the beginning of the PRC's de-alienation from the society of states (although they were not systemic changes as indicated above by Zhang, although they certainly had systemic ramifications). First, in January 1964, the French recognised the PRC, the first major Western power to do so and, secondly, in October 1964 China detonated an uranium atomic device. The French diplomatic recognition pales in significance if compared to the flood of diplomatic recognition precipitated by the improvement of Sino-American relations in the 1970's, none the less the French action allowed the PRC into the non-communist diplomatic world. The development of the PRC into a nuclear power gave China prestige and power that significantly altered its influence with regard to the institutions of the society of states - particularly the balance of power and great power cooperation.

Conclusions: Functional Integration

Diplomatic recognition of the PRC, first bilaterally then multilaterally (through invitation into the UN), was representative of the means by which the PRC was to re-engage with international society after its period of alienation. In other words, the gesellschaft path of international society development, as was the case when China was first confronted with nineteenth century European international society, continued to be effective with regard to the PRC and the Cold War global society of states.

Zhang points out that China's integration with international society was still limited in the 1970's because of a revolutionary Maoist world view legacy.[266] The domestic reforms initiated by Deng in the late 1970's allowed the PRC's revolutionary revisionist perceptions of its relationship with international society to gradually change to those of a radical

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[265] Zhang, *China in International Society*, pp. 48 & 58.
[266] ibid., p. 97.

revisionist.[267] China's leaders realised that the interests of their state, which were now focused on economic development, were best served by interaction within the existing international capitalist order, which continued to operate despite Mao's earlier predictions of imminent world war. These changing perceptions may be explained by the dynamics of socialisation and competition. In short, the new approach by the CCP leadership allowed gesellschaft development to continue apace.

If it is recalled that gemeinschaft development involves a contractual construction of society, then it becomes clear that the PRC's integration into international society's institutions since the 1970's took place in just such a manner. There is a multitude of examples whereby the PRC's entry and participation in international institutional frameworks symbolised its willingness to abide by the common rules and institutions of the society of states. Multilateral and bilateral diplomatic recognition, a crucial precondition to effective diplomatic interaction in an international society, has already been mentioned. What about the other institutions of international society?

Nuclear capability and permanent membership of the Security Council automatically provided the PRC with at very least nominal great power status. As far as great power cooperation is concerned, the PRC's eventual involvement in international arms control and disarmament programmes, especially in respect of superpower nuclear disarmament, was an early sign that the PRC was willing to accept some great power responsibilities. The institutional beginning of China's great power status and emerging great power responsibilities were again examples of an organised rather than sentiment based entry into institutional international society.

Economic integration was founded significantly on institutional entry into the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank in 1980 - such economic integration and interdependence symbolises acceptance of the common rules and norms of international commercial law.

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[267]ibid. Chapter Four of *China in International Society*, details precisely the changing perceptions of war, revolution, and interdependence in the PRC during the 1980's. These changes seem largely to have been precipitated by the rise of the economic development imperative, which in turn moderated the PRC's previous revolutionary stance toward the international order. That is, the PRC shifted from a revolutionary revisionist, bent on challenging the structure of the international system, to a radical revisionist (*vide* Chapter Three) advocating reform of the structure of the existing system, but generally aware of its

Varying support for United Nations Peacekeeping expeditions has portrayed a gradual acknowledgement of the importance of war for maintaining order in the society of states and involvement in a post-war contrived balance of power was displayed through the institutional disarmament process.

The PRC's growing relationship with international society during the Cold War period was defined by its historical experience. The common norms and institutions that were part of the European cultural experience were not, by and large, shared by the Chinese state, hence a gesellschaft path of development was the only course by which China could enter the global international society. Part Two of this chapter has sought to display that this path of development, although uneven, unfolded successfully throughout the Cold War period.

The question is again raised as to whether steady gesellschaft integration stimulated gemeinschaft integration. The impact of continued gesellschaft development during the Cold War was that the PRC pragmatically accepted and internalised many of the most basic norms and principles of the society of states. Support by the PRC for the principle of the primacy of the sovereign state is the clearest example of minimal gemeinschaft development fostered by initial gesellschaft integration. The PRC also began to internalise as part of its own identity other principles and norms of international society, especially those relating to international law and trade. It remains to assess whether this gradual gemeinschaft trend has continued and been of influence in the post-Cold War period.

Part Three: Post-Cold War China and International Society

In the post-Cold War environment the PRC has been influenced both by the general effects of the end of the Cold War on international society and also by its status as a rising power that emphasises its potential to initiate change. The PRC's post-Cold War position and present circumstances critically influence its ability to precipitate changes domestically and thereby internationally.

> China occupies an uneasy position in post-Cold War international society. It is neither completely in nor entirely out. It is now the target of international efforts not only to

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advantages and therefore content to accept it.

promote harmonisation of international economic practices but also to facilitate political changes and democratisation. Further integration of China into international society therefore contests its multiple identities: as a non-European culture, as a civilisational-state, as a Communist regime, as a dynamic economy, as a developing nation and as a rising power.[268]

The initial section of this part of Chapter Four discusses the general post-Cold War position of the PRC in relation to the institutions of international society. This leads to an analysis of the PRC as a rising power in international society - performed in an effort to gauge the future course of the society of states and the People's Republic of China.

Chapter Two described the security concerns of contemporary international society as represented by the idea of 'concentric circles' of commitment by member states to international institutions, and by the overall core/periphery structure of global international society. How do these concerns relate specifically to China and its role as a member of international society?

The PRC is either an Absolute Insider, but still positioned in the outer circles or periphery of the core of international society, or a Relative Insider.[269] Thus, China finds itself in the awkward position of being expected to conform to core member levels of organisation and commitment, while in several respects it is still faced with the type of security problems more commonly associated with peripheral and outsider states. This directly influences the way that China is able to utilise the institutions of order in international society. The PRC, for example, is unable to enjoy the benefits of a decreased power-security dilemma, which is enjoyed by the core members operating inside a security community, and instead must contend with the basic balance of power system that tends to exist in the periphery. Moreover, the PRC is plagued by weak state security problems such as separatist movements (for example, the Tibetans in Tibet and the Uighurs in Xinjiang) and territorial disputes (for example, the Diaoyu and Spratly Island groups and the ongoing border dispute with India), which are far less common among core states.

In several ways, China's peripheral position in international society has been made more

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[268]ibid., p. 250.

intractable by the end of the Cold War, which has seen the status quo great powers coalesce or bandwagon around liberal beliefs and practices generally supported by Western capitalist democracies, creating a 'grand confederation of Western democracies'.[270] The PRC's identity as a communist, non-Western, state tends to exclude it from this exclusive great power society. This in turn and to a large extent affects its influence in the great power cooperation institution and limits its ability to integrate in a gemeinschaft manner.

Even more significant are the post-Cold War changes that have involved the emergence of new principles surrounding humanitarian intervention and sovereignty. These evolving principles have directly affected the PRC's position with regard to the institutions of the balance of power, great power cooperation and, especially, international law. These aspects will be analysed in more detail within the section below on the PRC as a rising power.

Changes in international society then, highlighted and encouraged by the end of the Cold War, have revealed limitations to the PRC's gesellschaft type integration into global international society. As core states have increasingly sought to reinterpret the principles of the society of states in accordance with their own common values, the gemeinschaft/gesellschaft split has become more significant.[271] The PRC has found itself more isolated in its views on how international society should be ordered. These factors expose the limitations of gesellschaft development in China's regard - unless, in the long term, this contractual style entry into international society does continue to stimulate the development of common values. The theoretical explanations of gemeinschaft development would suggest that the PRC is likely to acquire the most successful patterns of behaviour through interaction with other states of international society. If this is the case then some change in PRC 's internal structure and identity as a state is likely to occur.

There is the possibility that the PRC will alter the institutions of international society rather than the other way around. China's ability to integrate into international society may depend

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[269] As depicted in the preceding quotation and by Buzan in Figure 1.2.
[270] Fretz, op. cit., pp. 16 - 21.
[271] This observation raises the issue of 'multiple' or perhaps 'competing' modernities in the sense that modernisation can occur differently in the context of differing belief systems (see Figure 2.2 and Eisenstadt, S.N. "Multiple Modernities", *Dædalus*, Winter 2000, v.129, No.1, pp. 1 -29). In turn this raises the 'clash of cultures' question (see Chapter Two) and leads back to the question of whether gesellschaft development can foster common cultural norms.

as much upon its capacity to modify the society of states as upon the reverse. In this respect, as change in an international system is often precipitated by the competitive challenge to the status quo from a rising power, an analysis of the PRC as a rising power in international society becomes important. Such an analysis aims to reveal China's confrontational and/or accommodating behaviour with regard to the changing post-Cold War institutions of international society. It also allows for an answer to the question as to whether the PRC's gesellschaft integration into the society of states will reverse, stagnate, or continue, and ultimately whether fuller gemeinschaft type development with regard to China is possible.

The People's Republic of China as a Rising Power in International Society

The PRC is generally perceived as a rising power by other states in the international system, it is also self-aware of its status as a rising power.[272] In addition, it may even be argued that the Chinese state has the potential to become another superpower. The section to follow evaluates the basis of rising Chinese power and the main perspectives used to approach this issue. This leads into the final section, which is a more careful analysis of the nature of the PRC revisionist threat (if any) to the institutions of international society. It argues that PRC revisionism and its rising power status present some challenges to status quo international society. However, these challenges, despite the probable sustainability of PRC rising power, need not be perceived as intransigent threats to the structure of international society due to the fact that the PRC has adopted a steadily less revisionist stance over the past few decades.

The Nature of the PRC's Rising Power

Increasing PRC power is assumed by several schools of thought, all of which suggest various methods by which the challenge of rising PRC power should be met and understood by other members of the international system. Schweller lists six basic policy options for states responding to rising powers: preventative war, balancing, bandwagoning, binding,

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[272] This point is demonstrated, for example, in the following two articles: Yu Xilai and Wu Zichen "Shijie xin zhixu yu xinxing daguo de lishi jueze" (The New World Order and the Choices in History of Rising Great Powers), D7, *Guoji Zhengzhi: Zhanlue yu Guanli* (International Politics: Strategy and Management), Beijing, 1998. 2. 1-13, p. 50; Li Zhongcheng. "The Role of an Emerging China in World Politics", in *Contemporary International Relations*, Vol. 8, No. 2, February 1998, CICIR, pp. 9 - 22.

engagement and distancing/buckpassing.[273] These six policy options are all variations on the same rationalistic (realist and liberalist only) balance of power theme. Such debate often takes place in reference to the relationship between the United States (US) and the PRC - particularly concerning the choice between the widely publicised 'containment' or 'engagement' strategies.[274]

The containment approach emphasises that the PRC is a threat to US (and thereby Western) security. Moreover, a steadily more powerful PRC is associated with rising Chinese nationalistic sentiment. The containment view argues that this phenomenon is an indicator of the PRC's increasing potential for assertive and violent action with regard to achieving its interests in the international system. It considers the PRC as a dissatisfied, threatening, revisionist power.

The containment view is challenged in two main ways. First, by those who contend that rising PRC power should be considered first and foremost in relative terms. Their argument is that the PRC still lags behind other great powers in military, economic, and overall power and is therefore not able to achieve its interests by using force. The long and short of this perspective is that the threat potential of rising PRC power is overstated.[275] Secondly, there is the view that focuses on the internal role of Chinese nationalism and on the economic development imperative (which acts to reduce any PRC rational interest in dramatic or violent international change). This view argues that Chinese nationalism is in fact a domestic tool used to maintain the legitimacy of the Chinese Communist Party's (CCP) rule. The PRC has too much at stake in economic development through interaction with the outside world to risk those interests and institutional ties by a violent or over assertive challenge to the status quo.[276] Therefore, this perspective contends (in a liberalist manner), that engagement of the

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[273] Schweller, Randall L. in Johnston, Alastair Iain and Ross, Robert S. (eds) *Engaging China: the management of an emerging power* , Routledge, London and NY, 1999, pp. 7 - 8.

[274] A book that focused on consideration of engagement (and as a corollary containment) policy and the PRC is Johnston, Alastair Iain and Ross, Robert S. (eds) *Engaging China: the management of an emerging power*, op. cit. The containment and engagement concepts are also consistently outlined in general IR texts, such as Goldstein op. cit. and Pearson and Rochester op. cit.

[275] Segal, Gerald. "Does China Matter?", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 78, No. 5, September/October, 1999, pp. 24 - 36 is an example of this view considered further below.

[276] Downs, Erica Strecker. and Saunders, Phillip C. "Legitimacy and the Limits of Nationalism: China and the Diaoyu Islands", *International Security*, Vol. 23, No. 3, Winter 1998/99, pp. 115 - 116 is an example of this particular view, also considered further below.

PRC in international institutions will encourage the PRC to act in accordance with international laws and norms and thereby decrease its threat to other states in the system.

To resolve this debate, insofar as it relates to the society of states, an assessment of the rate, relative quantity, and the means by which PRC power is rising needs to be made. This will establish the level of sustainability of PRC rising power and demonstrate that a long term threat factor reduction approach to the PRC's rising power is required.

The reasons behind rising PRC power are especially important from the 'PRC power is overstated' and the 'PRC as a revisionist threat' perspectives. There are many who point to growing Chinese economic power and accompanying increases in military capability.[277] As was discussed in the definitions of power given in Chapter Three, there are several factors that contribute to the achievement of rising power. However, as also indicated earlier, it is economic growth that acts as a catalyst for advances in most forms of power.

This is not to say that the military dimensions of the PRC's rising power do not have significant effects upon regional inter-state relations. China's relations with the Association of South East Asian Nations (ASEAN), for example, are greatly influenced by the ASEAN states' assessment of the PRC's ability to project military force into Southeast Asia. Such assessments are affected by defence expenditure trends, such as documented increases, since the early 1990s, in the amount spent on the Navy relative to the rest of the PLA.[278] The formation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1993, which includes the PRC as a dialogue partner, helped to abate ASEAN concerns over possible aggressive PRC military intentions because "... by participating in this forum the PRC will have to bear an additional diplomatic cost should it resort to force over the maritime disputes."[279] Nevertheless, "... [t]he cost burden of modernising the country's [the PRC's] large military forces in their entirety has

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[277]Roy, Denny. "The Foreign Policy of Great-Power China", *Contemporary Southeast Asia*, Vol. 19, No. 2, September 1997 and Johnston and Ross et al. op. cit., for example.
[278]Nathan, Andrew J. and Ross, Robert S. *The Great Wall and the Empty Fortress: China's Search for Security*, W.W. Norton and Company, NY, 1997, p. 273.
[279]ibid., p. 308. Such a policy is a good example of a calculative liberalist theoretical approach that aims to encourage individual states to achieve their interests through institutional processes rather than by the use of military force. In this case the PRC is inclined to participate in order to prevent itself from being on the wrong side of a influential coalition of states. Participation in the ARF also demonstrates the PRC's acceptance of international/multilateral norms and behaviour.

been acknowledged by the PRC leadership as beyond their capacities in the short term."[280] The PRC government has acknowledged institutional deficiencies that effectively prevent it from catching up with the US as a military power with simply a military modernisation programme. Instead the preferred strategy entails reliance on "... a steady growth in the national economic and technological base, coupled with a non-confrontational diplomacy, to secure the country's strategic interests."[281] For this reason, while the military dimensions of the PRC's power are of great significance, it is the economic dimension which is concentrated on here and which more accurately explains the PRC's status as a *rising* power.

This status as a rising power has been made possible by the extraordinary rates of economic growth China has achieved, principally since Deng Xiaoping's reforms begun in the late 1970's - although, the foundations for this growth were set, somewhat erratically, since the CCP came to power in 1949.[282] Yet other sources of increasing PRC power also exist, for example, the state has demographic power simply as a result of the sheer size of its population, especially if the financial support of overseas Chinese is taken into account, and its institutional power and influence has certainly increased since adoption of the open-door policy. However, it is China's growth in relative economic strength that has made possible its improved position in most other power categories. The link between increasing economic capacity and military capability, detailed in Chapter Three, holds true in respect of PRC military expenditure - it is estimated that between 1988 and 1995 the PRC's military budget doubled.[283] The level of significance and the accuracy of these kinds of statistics is, however, a subject of some debate.[284]

In short, the PRC is perceived as a rising power as a result of the pace of its economic growth which, during the last few decades in particular, has outstripped other states in the international system (over the last five decades China's annual growth rate has been estimated at 7.7 percent, versus 3.0 percent for the rest of the world - such statistics vary considerably depending on the source, but a high comparative growth rate is consistent). Moreover, the

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[280] ibid., p. 274.
[281] ibid., pp. 274 - 275.
[282] Cox, Michael. "New China: new Cold War?", in Booth, Ken, *Statecraft and Security: The Cold War and Beyond*, Cambridge University Press, 1998, pp. 227 - 228.
[283] ibid., p. 238.
[284] Nye, Joseph. "China's Re-emergence and the Future of the Asia-Pacific", *Survival*, Vol. 39, No. 4, Winter 1997-98, pp. 68 - 70.

economy of the PRC is very large scale, making its rising power significant at the great power level. Thus, increased economic power has led to increased overall relative power, allowing the PRC to fit neatly into the definition of a rising power. This leads to questions on the probability of the PRC maintaining this basis for rising power. If the probability is high, does it offer the means by which the PRC will seek to achieve a revisionist agenda?

All economies have their high and low periods. There is no reason to believe the Chinese economy is any exception. However, there are some problems plaguing the PRC's economy that are peculiar to it and are often cited as possessing the potential to derail the high growth rates achieved thus far. Two areas of concern, for example, are the patterns of uneven economic development evident between the various regions of China, especially between Western and Eastern provinces, and the social dislocation created by widespread structural changes in the state sector, such as the problem of unemployment/surplus labour. Such difficulties are complex, interrelated and numerous, but to date the PRC has managed to maintain high levels of relative growth despite them. It is not overly optimistic to expect that above average growth (in relation to world economic growth) will continue in the PRC, at a minimum, for the short to medium term.[285]

Such an assessment means that the basis for rising PRC relative power will also remain - hence the concerns of the containment perspective. However, the counter argument contending that, although rising, PRC power is overstated and is not capable of overtaking the United States in any major sense (at least within the next several decades), is strong and seemingly logical. Some estimate, for example, that Chinese defence technology modernisation is thirty to fifty years away from enabling the People's Liberation Army (PLA) to challenge the dominance of the United States and its allies.[286] However, it is also pertinent to observe that the power of the United States is not at a standstill and in some areas is increasing at a pace faster relative to other states. Certainly, despite impressive gains, the PRC still has a long way to go before reaching anything like superpower status. In fact, it is possible to support an argument that PRC power hardly matters at all and its so-called importance is a triumph for China's theatrics and Western exaggeration, and on all counts,

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[285]This conclusion is supported by Nye, ibid., p. 68 and indirectly by Johnston and Ross, op. cit., p. xi.

[286]Feigenbaum, Evan, A. "China's Military Posture and the New Economic Geopolitics", *Survival*, Vol., 41, No. 2, Summer 1999, p. 73.

economically, militarily, and politically the PRC is at best a middle power.[287]

While elements of these above views may be accurate, they do not undermine the potential long term benefits to international order of taking into account rising PRC power - views such as these do, however, help to remove some of the strategic urgency from the task. Moreover, if the PRC is classed as only a middle power and compared variously to the United Kingdom, France, Brazil, Iraq, or India,[288] then the great power class of states in the international system is blurred to the point that only middle powers and one superpower exist. This suggests middle power status for some of these states may be a conservative estimate based mainly on US pre-eminence. Also worth noting is that, for example, even if it was to achieve new and rapid economic growth, the United Kingdom is restricted from growing to a point were it may compare with the US for simple reasons of population and geographical size. Whereas the PRC does not have such restrictions - although, admittedly, without several more decades of successful development in all realms, these specific large power assets may continue to act more as liabilities.

If detailed debate over its relative size and importance is put to one side, while still at least conceding that the PRC is a state of significance and its power is rising,[289] then what does this mean in terms of the containment/engagement debate? Despite pragmatic merit the power 'overstatement' argument, although forming a defence against the containment perspective, still fails to counter the view that the PRC will inevitably come to present a threat to the West - especially in the medium to long term, when its power may eventually be capable of rivalling the United States or other powerful states. This particular argument against containment is unsatisfactory in the long term, as it postpones the issue rather than dealing with the eventual ramifications of continued rising PRC power. The idea that the PRC is engaged institutionally with the world economy and, therefore, has an interest in promoting its objectives peacefully, even as it gains more relative clout, is a liberal thesis that appears logical when the burgeoning level of international trade and investment that the PRC is involved in, and dependent upon, is taken into account. The objection that is usually raised by the containment school against this argument is that states do not always behave

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[287]Segal, Gerald. "Does China Matter?", op. cit., pp. 24 - 36.
[288]ibid.
[289]Nye also supports the argument that, whether or not growing PRC power will make it a global power comparable to the US, the PRC should still be taken, at least, as a serious

rationally, especially if they happen to have historical grievances to settle.[290]

Overall, the central weakness of both of these arguments against containment is that they assume that the containment thesis is in fact correct. In other words, that rising PRC power should be only viewed as presenting at least a regional threat to Western interests, but it is as yet overstated, insignificant, or needs to be harnessed by international institutions and commitments. These arguments suffer from the same assumption that makes the containment perspective objectionable - they perceive PRC power only as a threat and seek ways to dismiss it for the time being, or to subject it to Western control. The result is that the root causes of security problems created by rising PRC power are not considered or addressed. Moreover, such arguments may be self-fulfilling, making an enemy out of the PRC by treating it as one. Certainly the willingness of the PRC's future active involvement and cooperation in international institutions will be put at risk if the institutions are viewed by the West as a means of manipulating or controlling it.

Because rising PRC power is based chiefly on economic growth, and there are fair prospects for this growth being sustained, so too is the likelihood of the PRC continuing to exist as a rising power. Therefore, the key to accommodating rising PRC power lies first in identifying, and then successfully managing and reducing the threat created by its changing relative power status, both as it is projected from the PRC and as it is interpreted by other states in the international system. Such a constructivist, identity centred approach accepts the inevitability of relative power changes in states systems and societies and thereby avoids the confrontational nature of containment policies, which seek simply to maintain the status quo at all costs. It also enables engagement through institutional responsibilities and obligations

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regional player. ibid., p. 70.
[290] As was noted earlier, the PRC's integration with international society involved the imposition of a standard of civilisation based largely on European state practices. While China attempted to come to terms with such practices parts of its territory were occupied and controlled by various foreign powers. While the return of Hong Kong in 1997 and Macau in 1999 satisfied some of the historical grievances caused by this process, some related, mainly maritime, territorial issues still remain. Moreover, there is the Taiwan issue, which was chiefly a result of the civil war on the Chinese mainland between 1945 and 1949. The PRC's sensitivity to issues involving sovereign integrity may be explained, in part, by its desire to reclaim such territories that it considers to have been lost during the 'century of shame' between circa 1840 and 1949. Another explanation for this sensitivity is that it stems from concern over potential problems arising out of the PRC's weak state circumstances which the PRC fears may lead to foreign intervention - a point addressed further in later sections of the

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to be viewed and utilised in a positive interactive form rather than as restrictive measures. By this manner of engagement the root causes behind the perception of a PRC threat, such as difficulties created by state level identity and governance differences, can be lessened and removed over time without direct high profile confrontation.[291]

The recent granting of Permanent Normal Trading Relations (PNTR) to China from the US provides an example of this kind of approach. This US policy is clearly one of engagement, as it "... [o]bliges the Chinese government to publish laws and regulations and subjects pertinent decisions to review of an international body. That will begin to strengthen the rule of law in China and increase the likelihood that it will play by global rules as well. It will advance our larger interest in bringing China into international agreements and institutions that can make it a more constructive player in the world, with a stake in preserving peace and stability."[292] Thus, this policy can be explained as attempting to allow the PRC to continue with a gesellschaft path of development in the hope that this will lead it to adopt a common identity with the status quo (i.e. gemeinschaft type integration *(vide* Chapter Three)).

However, it could be argued that it is not simply a matter of well-mannered engagement or a fatalistic acceptance of relative power change if the rising power in question, as a result of an uncompromising revisionist agenda, is a threat to the basis of international or regional order and the integrity of the society of states. Therefore, what is the nature and level, if any, of the revisionist aims of the PRC?

Rising PRC Power and the Institutions of International Society

A measurement of the level of threat presented to the society of states by the rising power of the PRC requires an assessment of its acceptance of the basic institutions of international society. Support for the status quo does not necessarily equate to support for the institutions of international society. This is because status quo states do not always support the traditional

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study.

[291]From a structural realist view, this allows for the processes of socialisation and competition to create 'like-units' and thereby lessen state level identity differences i.e. it allows for gemeinschaft development.

[292]U.S. Dept. of State, Office of International Information Programs, "Permanent Normal Trade Relations for China: An Historic Moment for US-China Relations", *White House Fact Sheet*, Sept. 19, 2000 (http://usinfo.state.gov).

institutions and principles of the society of states, although this would be the exception rather than the rule. The status quo, therefore, is discussed here using two different terms. First, there is the status quo as defined by Buzan, i.e. the existing or actual pattern of relations as supported by status quo states, this definition will be referred to henceforth as the 'applied status quo'. Secondly, there is the ES 'theoretical status quo', i.e. the status quo that conforms to the traditional pattern of politico-strategic relations governing international order, as defined by the ES of international relations and the theoretical concept of international society.

It is relevant to note that the theoretical status quo is comparatively static. The concept of international society provides a general theoretical framework that explains the mechanisms that maintain international order as they traditionally function in a society of independent states. Modifications of the theory, as with any theory, certainly take place, but the theoretical concept does serve as a relatively stable benchmark in comparison to the fluctuating applied status quo. The applied status quo is inevitably in a state of flux because of several system level and domestic reasons. The domestic values and structures, for example, of dominant status quo powers, which influence the way status quo states perceive their international objectives, are constantly undergoing modification and, therefore, so is the applied status quo at the international level.

Therefore, overall, two questions are asked in the following assessment of the PRC's revisionist status in respect of international society. First, is the PRC a revisionist state in terms of the institutions of international society or the theoretical status quo? Secondly, is it a revisionist state from the perspective of the applied status quo or contemporary status quo (predominantly core) powers?

In terms of the applied status quo it is immediately clear that the PRC is not a revolutionary revisionist. It accepts, has interests, and is active in too many international regimes, especially in the economic realm, to be judged as threatening the very organisational principles prevailing among status quo states. However, the PRC cannot be considered as a status quo state either. While it certainly shares many objectives with the status quo states, the PRC's domestic values and structures are not, on the whole, supported by the existing pattern of relations in international society. This suggests a hypothesis that the PRC should more accurately be considered as a radical revisionist in reference to the applied status quo. A

brief appraisal of China's support for the institutions of international society should test this hypothesis, and also answer questions on the PRC's position with regard to the theoretical status quo.

The Balance of Power

The CCP leadership frequently issues statements that refute any suggestion that the PRC aims for hegemonic status, either regionally or globally. "They [scholars and leaders]... have a distaste for Western theoretical models of power politics and balance-of-power practices. They refer to them as big-power or hegemonic politics, to which the Chinese say they will never aspire"[293] The PRC leadership also professes a general anti-hegemony policy - a policy often announced particularly in reference to United States preponderance (anti-United States hegemony rhetoric was especially strident after the Belgrade Chinese embassy bombing incident in May 1998[294]).

China perceives that its interests are better served by a multi-polar system, regionally and internationally, rather than by a bipolar or unipolar one. Despite its professed distaste for the balance of power, the PRC leadership has a clear awareness of the concept and policy and actively seeks to influence its shape and formation - as its efforts to achieve, and preference for, a multi-polar order seem to indicate. Examples of the PRC's efforts to manipulate the balance of power (given below) are evidence of more than just the usual reactionary balance of power behaviour patterns usually evident in a system of sovereign states, but rather they reflect the more advanced and contrived form of balance of power behaviour exhibited by a state acting within an international society.

On the whole, despite concern over the level of influence the United States exerts in the region, the current balance of power in Asia is "...widely accepted as an appropriate foundation for building a stable post-Cold War regional order."[295] Generally, the PRC

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[293]Chan, Gerald. "International Studies in China: Problems and Prospects", *Political Science*, Vol. 49, No. 1, July 1997, p. 11.
[294]Excellent examples of this are found in the People's Daily during the period after the bombing incident. For instance, Anonymous, "Lun Meiguo baquan zhuyi de xin fazhan" (Analysis of the New Developments in America's Hegemonism), *Renmin Ribao Hai Wai Ban* (The People's Daily Overseas Edition), 20 May 1999. p.1.
[295]Nathan and Ross, op. cit., p. 229.

displays a willingness to maintain the regional status quo in respect of the balance of power -
although this point is contested by some in reference to outstanding territorial claims which,
arguably, are left unresolved simply because of a shortfall in PRC power projection
capabilities (for example, the disputed Spratly Islands[296]). Although the term is commonly
associated simply with the notion of competitive power politics, and therefore rejected by
PRC official rhetoric, it is also evident that the present day PRC supports the balance of
power institution as a functional instrument for maintaining order in the society of states. The
balance of power acts to prevent the preponderance of any single state or alliance of states
over other states in the international system - a goal that fits neatly into the stated objectives
of the PRC. Whether it is admitted or not, it suits the PRC's purposes to support actively this
primary function of the balance of power institution. In some respects, the PRC's anti-
hegemonic advocacy is more in keeping with traditional balance of power principles than that
displayed by many status quo states, making the PRC a status quo power in terms of the
balance of power and the theoretical status quo.

The PRC generally resents what it perceives as a United States led Western hegemony, as has
been expressed from time to time by joint statements from Beijing and Moscow referring to
their willingness to cooperate in order to balance such an influential coalition of power.
Similar sentiments have also been expressed by China in cooperation with Malaysia. After a
meeting between the then Chinese Premier Li Peng and his Malaysian counterpart, Dr
Mahathir Mohammed, the following statement was reported: "Both leaders have agreed that
other centres of power should also be developed in Europe and Asia. At the moment, so
much attention has been given to the US... this may not be in the interest of the international
community."[297] There are, however, some Chinese scholars who suggest that China can also

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[296]The Spratly Island dispute is a long standing one principally involving the PRC, Vietnam,
the Republic of China (Taiwan), Philippines, and Malaysia. The Spratlys are located in the
South China sea and are frequently cited as an area of concern for relations between China
and member states of the Association of South East Asian Nations. In 1997 Philippines
President Fidel Ramos, citing China's accession to the UN Convention of the Law of the Sea,
stated that the Spratly Islands dispute would be a "litmus test of whether China, as a great
power, intends to play by international rules or makes its own." Ghosh, Nirmal. "Spratlys will
show if China plays by the rules: Ramos", The Straits Times, 8 May, 1997. The PRC has
recently endorsed (September 2002) a 'code of conduct' document between it and the
ASEAN states aimed to solve the Spratlys dispute.
[297]Ho Wah Foon. "Li Peng, Mahathir want to see more centres of power", The Straits Times,
August 23, 1997.

work with and accept a United States led international order.[298] As Western powers dominate the contemporary status quo international order, in respect of the applied status quo, therefore, China's objection to commanding Western influence is an example of orthodox revisionism. The superior position of Western powers in the existing order is a status quo situation that the PRC seeks to reform by drawing attention to the need for a multi-polar, anti-hegemonic, international order.

Unfortunately, the above situation is complicated by the fact that Western status quo powers form what others may consider as a preponderant coalition of states, as well as also generally upholding the non-interventionist, sovereign integrity principle. In other words, Western states do not threaten the ordering principle that the balance of power is devised to protect, despite the fact that they constitute what may be perceived as a hegemonic coalition. This may be explained because, as mentioned in previous chapters, the balance of power functions differently in what is more or less a security community amongst the core Western states than it does in the periphery of international society.

An exception to this Western support of the non-intervention and/or sovereignty principle is made when it is overridden by considerations of humanitarian intervention. In such cases Western dominance is utilised in what may be perceived by the PRC, among others, as typical hegemonic behaviour. The PRC tends to voice its concern about such action taken in contradiction to the absolute sovereignty principle. Its desire to exert greater influence with regard to such issues creates an interest for the PRC towards altering the applied status quo balance of power with the aim of decreasing Western hegemony (the intervention/sovereignty topic is discussed further in the international law section to follow).

The PRC does not threaten the ordering principles protected by the balance of power nor the structure of its operation, but it appears that it wishes to alter the present distribution of power so that it more fully reflects the traditional anti-hegemonic functions of the balance of power institution.

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[298] Zhou Jianming. "Zhengque renshi 'yi chao duo qiang' de guoji geju" (Clearly Recognising the International Structure of 'One Superpower Many Great Powers'), *Shanghai Shehui Kexue* (Shanghai Social Sciences), Second Quarter, 1998, pp. 34 - 37.

International society both seeks to restrict warfare amongst its member states as well as to utilise it to enforce international law and the balance of power. The PRC frequently states its opposition to military alliances, a policy that is supported by its lack of military bases and personnel stationed outside of Chinese territory.[299] While such a policy is part of an effort towards establishment of a comprehensive security approach it has the drawback of making it difficult for China to take an active role when international society chooses to utilise warfare to enforce international law and the balance of power. The most obvious example of this, despite concern voiced by the PRC over the trend towards regional, intra-state, wars, is the lack of Chinese personnel in peacekeeping missions (United Nations mandated or otherwise) in comparison to the high involvement of other influential states like, for example, the United States and India.

Although the PRC has gone from condemnation to participation in United Nations peacekeeping missions (in 1993 and 1994 Chinese personnel sustained their first casualties participating in UN peacekeeping in Cambodia and Kuwait) its involvement is still limited by its frequent refusal to support the use of force in peacekeeping operations.[300] PRC anti-violence, anti-realist, rhetoric provides no clear recognition of the necessary role that force plays in upholding order in international society. As Denny Roy comments in reference to PRC foreign policy: "China sees itself as a uniquely principled actor. The PRC abides by tenets such as the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence, while the other major powers practice *realpolitik*."[301] However, considering the mixed success that the application of military force by the United Nations has had, China's hesitation in supporting some of this action may be quite well justified.

In a recent study Alastair Johnston argued that, throughout a large part of Chinese history, Chinese strategic culture, contrary to popular belief, did not exhibit a minimalist use of force as a strategic preference or a desire to avoid violence when maintaining state security. Rather, such strategies were generally a veneer that disguised what amounted to a dominant

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[299]Roy, op. cit, p. 121. Interviewees frequently referred to this policy during interviews conducted in Beijing 1998/99.
[300]Zhang, *China in International Society*, pp. 147 - 149.
[301]ibid., p. 124.

realpolitik strategic culture.[302]

The PRC's foreign policy focuses on promoting an international environment that is favourable to its continued economic prosperity. The promulgated preference for adoption of a comprehensive security policy reflects this emphasis on obtaining security through economic development and interaction rather than entirely through military alliances or similar arrangements. However, even with a comprehensive security policy there is no denying the continued importance of war as an enforcement measure available to the society of states. There is no doubt that the PRC leadership is aware of the importance of military force on a regional basis, the modernisation of the PLA and the threat to use force if Taiwan should declare independence is proof of that, but there is little active acknowledgement by China that, as an important member of international society, it has a role to play or an obligation to enforce international society's laws and norms. However, there is evidence that, with encouragement from the United States, China is willing and aware of its role in maintaining at least regional stability.[303] Moreover, China's present attitude toward UN peacekeeping is clearly undergoing some change.

The PRC's rejection of military alliances, and its reluctance to acknowledge the role of war and force in the maintenance of other institutions of international society, classes it as a radical revisionist in terms of both the applied and theoretical status quos. If this policy stance is taken at face value, the achievement of its idealistic vision of an international society without military alliances, or the external deployment of military forces, would require significant reform of status quo international structures and agreements that both restrict and legitimise the use of warfare by the states of international society. Nevertheless,

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[302]Johnston, Alastair, Iain. *Cultural Realism: Strategic Culture and Grand Strategy in Chinese History*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1995. This moralistic veneer may be compared to Western states' and the almost unique tendency of the Anglo-Saxon 'mind to disguise power political motives behind arguments of the 'common good'. This point is essentially derived from the words of E.H. Carr, who is quoted in Buzan *People, States and Fear*, p. 300.

[303] Xi Laiwang. "Jiji tuijin jianli Zhong Mei jianshexing zhanlue huoban guanxi" (Positively Promoting the construction of Strategic Partner relations between China and America), *Xiandai Guoji Guanxi* (Contemporary International Relations), Fifth Quarter, 1998, pp. 2 - 3. This article refers to the efforts made to promote a strategic partnership with the United States. This includes China's willingness to not devalue its currency during the Asian financial crisis of the 1990s. Also worth mentioning with regard to this point is the PRC's cooperation with the US over controlling the North Korean nuclear programme during the

there is a need to emphasis the fact that the PRC has changed its view on war significantly since the decades immediately after 1949, when it was certainly a revolutionary revisionist. This is "...a shift in the right direction in concurring with the common perception of war and peace held by other member states as important institutions in maintaining the international order."[304]

International Law

Particularly in the post-Cold War era, the boundaries or reach of traditional international law principles are under question. The principle of non-intervention, for example, is deemed by some to simply provide a curtain behind which some states oppress legitimate secessionist claims and mask the suffering of their governed populations. Yet, on the other hand, invocation of the principles of self-determination and humanitarian intervention, while usually occupying the moral high ground, may erode the entrenched status of the non-intervention principle, and consequently possible benefits derived from the order provided by existing state structures. Moreover, their enactment has often not provided long term solutions in the humanitarian cases concerned. These contradictions between evolving international law principles generally remain unsolved problems in contemporary international law and exert a marked influence on the PRC's relations with other members of international society.

Especially since 1978, China has changed from a revolutionary state to a reformist state, and has gradually recognised international law, not as an exploitative tool of Western states, but as a legitimate institution for regulating inter-state relations.[305] The PRC, for example, signed the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in 1992 and, despite the fact that it was not a signatory, utilised articles in the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR) agreement to legitimise some of its arms sales.[306]

The PRC is a staunch defender of the sovereignty principle as well as a critic of intervention, as the PRC's support of the Serbian position and general opposition to NATO's intervention

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late 1990s.
[304]Zhang, *China in International Society*, p. 113.
[305]Chan, op. cit., p. 22.
[306]In particular, the PRC argued that its sale of ballistic missiles to Saudi Arabia was legal in

during the Kosovo crisis displayed. The PRC's own security concerns may explain this stance. However, the PRC's veto power in the Security Council and its military capability make unwelcome military intervention in the PRC on humanitarian grounds quite unfeasible. Therefore, it is more probable that the PRC's opposition to humanitarian intervention norms is based upon concern over the system-wide consequences of erosion of Article 2 (7) of the Charter. Opposition may be created by the threat that human rights norms pose, particularly those surrounding political representation, to the internal security and the legitimacy of CCP rule domestically, rather than being based first and foremost on its fear of external intervention.[307] Regardless of the reasons, in respect of non-interventionist aspects of the theoretical status quo the PRC is a status quo state. This conclusion requires some further explanation, especially in the light of the discussion regarding sovereign equality in Chapters One and Two.

Humanitarian Intervention and the PRC

Literature on the subject of humanitarian intervention in the PRC is predominantly found within the following interwoven categories: 'new interventionism' and North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) expansionism; American (and Western) hegemony; human rights, PRC-US relations and intervention; and a small amount within international relations theoretical literature.

New Interventionism and NATO Expansion

Even prior to the 1999 bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade a large amount of literature was published in Chinese that interpreted NATO's activities in the former Yugoslavia as an example of aggressive power politics. The humanitarian intervention argument was and still is perceived as sophistry and nothing more than a mask for NATO's territorial aggrandisement. Furthermore, many authors in the PRC think that the US has been

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terms of the MTCR as it stood in 1991. Zhang, *China in International Society*, p. 171.
[307]Wheeler and Morris, op. cit., pp. 162 - 163.

utilising NATO as a tool to gain hegemonic control over the international system.[308] The US's forthright claims of being a world leader are not considered a benign fact by many commentators in the PRC.[309]

Such articles refuse to perceive of the idea of absolute state sovereignty as having limits in the face of humanitarian crises. Western ideas about creating norms for humanitarian intervention or the 'new interventionism' are considered contrary to well established non-interventionist international law. The war in Kosovo is cited as further evidence of NATO's and especially America's plan to extend control over Europe and is thought of as nothing more than power politics in disguise.[310]

However, there is evidence that this intransigent position on sovereignty is undergoing some modification, especially with regard to the realities of economic interdependence. "[S]overeignty is not synonymous with national interests anymore, rather it should be subject to overall national interests, not protected at all costs."[311]

American (&Western) Hegemony

In similar vein to the above, the US's leadership in NATO is viewed by many commentators in China in very realist terms. There is a substantial body of literature, such as that quoted below, that deals with the 'problem' of US hegemony in its own right and these views are

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[308] Indeed, recent calls for the US's European allies to contribute more militarily to the ability of NATO to project force outside of Europe could be interpreted as evidence of just such a strategy – depending on one's perspective. (Examples of such authors are cited below.)

[309] As is commented in a recent Herald International Tribune article, "Americans have become used to running the world." This bald statement makes some smile with the audacity of it. The smiles are not likely to be so wide in China. Ricks. Thomas E. "U.S. Urged to Embrace An 'Imperialist' Role", *Herald International Tribune*, August 22, 2001.

[310] Wang Zaibang, "Guanyu beiyue xin zhanlue yu kongxi nanlianmeng wenti de sikao" (Pondering the problems of NATO's new strategy and its air attacks on the Serbian federation), *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi* (World Economics and Politics), Vol. 6, 1999, pp. 21 – 25 and Pu Ping, "Guoji ganyu yu xin ganshe zhuyi" (International intervention and new interventionism), *Jiaoyu yu yanjiu* (Education and Research), Vol. 5, 2000, pp. 38 – 42, are examples of such articles.

[311] Yan Xuetong quoted in Gill, Bates and Reilly, James. "Sovereignty, Intervention and Peacekeeping: The View from Beijing," *Survival,* Vol. 42, no. 3, Autumn 2000, p. 43.

easily carried over to analysis of the US's aims in respect of humanitarian intervention cases.[312]

> ... guoji ganyu lai yi cunzai de jichu --- jituan anquan zhidu benshen de quexian, shide guoji ganshe ji yi bei da guo kongzhi, lun wei da guo ganshe ta guo neizheng de jiekou. Jindai xifang shengxing de 'xin ganshe zhuyi' shi zai leng zhan jieshu hou xi shi xia, xifang guojia dui guoji ganyu de lanyong, shizhi shang buguo shi baquan zhuyi de ling yi zhong shuofa. [... international intervention is dependent upon already existing structures --- collective security's inherent defects have caused international intervention to be controlled by large powers and provided an excuse for large powers to interfere with the internal politics of other countries. Current Western 'new interventionism' is the misuse of Western states' power in the post-Cold War era and in essence is no more than hegemony in another guise.][313]

> Beiyue dong kuo, tebie shi Meiguo chengba shijie de zhanlue, biding yao tupo xiancun de guoji fa. [The Eastern expansion of NATO, especially the United States' world hegemon strategy, necessarily contravenes existing international law.][314]

Again, Chinese commentators have interpreted NATO's interventionist actions in the Balkans as further evidence of US and Western use of power politics to obtain hegemonic control over world affairs.

Human Rights, US-PRC Relations and Intervention

The debate over human rights is a source of significant differences between the US and China. A large amount is written on this topic in contemporary Chinese publications. Events

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[312] The word hegemony in Chinese (ba quan) has very negative connotations and is associated with arrogant, aggressive and unreasonable behaviour. – this is not necessarily the case in English. The word leadership also appears to be understood differently. When statements are made from the US about *leading* the world they appear to be frequently interpreted by Chinese authors as an indication of the US's desire to *rule* the world. See Wang Jisi, page 76 –78 and Li Shaojun, page 80 in An Wei and Li Dongyan, *Shi zi lukou shang de shijie* (A World at the Crossroads), Zhongguo Renmin Daxue Chubanshe (The People's University of China), Beijing, 2000, for discussion and examples as such.
[313] Pu Ping, ibid., p.38.

in the former Yugoslavia and the humanitarian justification for intervention there are frequently perceived as possible precedents and therefore considered relevant to US-PRC relations. Is there real concern in the PRC that human rights abuses could be used as justification for the US and the West to intervene in PRC affairs?

As mentioned earlier, the PRC has veto rights in the UNSC and is a great power by both military and economic measures. These facts alone make intervention in the PRC's sovereign affairs an unlikely possibility. This is especially the case if it came to conflict in China's interior territories i.e. Tibet or Xinjiang. However, there are those in China who consider the US-Japan alliance as an 'Asian NATO', which could circumvent UNSC approval (as was done in the Balkans) in order to intervene militarily in, particularly, a PRC-Taiwan crisis.[315]

The overwhelming view in China, amongst both academics with a stake in the establishment and 'common' citizens, is that human rights have become of tool of the West and especially the US for manipulating China's internal affairs. The PRC's own citizens perceive China as a weak, but rising, state. External criticism is increasingly seen as endangering the PRC's somewhat fragile system. This is in keeping with PRC justification of its resistance to humanitarian intervention "... with the argument that such interventions might foster domestic turbulence, civil wars, and even regional conflict."[316]

Human rights criticism is, therefore, to some extent missing the mark. Rather than encouraging adoption of human rights standards such criticism is giving credence to the hawks and hard-liners who resent intervention of any kind, particularly that stemming from the US. Nationalistic sentiment and pride is the common response to external human rights criticism. Presently, national unity appears to be a more powerful force than any domestic concerns over human rights abuses, although it is admitted quietly by more moderate voices that human rights pressure from the US has been thankfully partly responsible for the more tolerant Chinese society presently enjoyed.[317]

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[314] Liu Nanlai, "Yi Meiguo wei shou de beiyue cubao jianta guoji fa" (US led NATO crudely violates international law), *Shijie jingji yu zhengzhi* (World Economics and Politics), Vol. 6, 1999, p. 26.
[315] Academics and bureaucrats stated such views to the author during interviews held in the PRC over March 2001.
[316] Gill and Reilly, op. cit. p. 46.

It does appear that a great majority of literature regarding humanitarian intervention takes the defensive line outlined in the paragraphs above. However, there are also publications that are of a more dispassionate analysis.[318] It is noticeable that many such articles contain frequent references to literature outside of the Chinese-speaking world.

An Explanation of the PRC's Attitude to Humanitarian Intervention: State Making and Weak State Analysis

Brown argues that, while rights associated with positive law are not technically *human* rights, citizens must commonly turn to the legal rights upheld by positive law for confirmation of the rights that they hold. However, unfortunately, Brown argues, it is in the states where the rule of law is weak that human rights abuses most commonly take place. Human rights are a product, not a cause, of a civilised and secure society.[319]

> China continues to argue that human rights are the internal affairs of a sovereign state.... [other states'] interference is in contradiction of the principle of non-intervention in international relations. China also insists that its cultural tradition and economic conditions predetermine its human rights policies.[320]

The view that some 'basic' human rights have priority over others while economic development takes place is certainly widely shared in the PRC, especially by those with a stake in the establishment.[321] These opinions are linked to a single general approach i.e. lack of resources or capacity determines a states' ability to maintain human rights. If this is truly the case then outside exhortations to uphold human rights, while maybe setting guidelines,

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[317] These views were stated during interviews held in the PRC over March 2001.

[318] The following article is a good example of this genre of literature. Zhang Chun and Pan Yaling, Youguan rendaozhuyi ganshe de sikao (Thoughts regarding humanitarian intervention), *Shijie Jingji yu Zhengzhi* (World Economics and Politics), Vol., 7, 2000, pp.71 – 75.

[319] Brown, Chris. "Universal Human Rights: a critique," in Dunne, Tim and Wheeler, Nicholas. *Human Rights in Global Politics*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 1999, pp. 107 – 120.

[320] Zhang. *China in International Society*, op. cit., pp. 249 – 250.

[321] This viewpoint was often expressed to the author while in the PRC during March 2001.

will not materially remedy the situation. The need to trade-off human rights in favour of economic development is a common and powerful argument. Rapid social transformation associated with modernisation inevitably involves repression of existing and entrenched interests among the population, making repression in some instances unavoidable, but not necessarily a matter of course - a subtle but important distinction. [322] It is clear that the state plays an important role in the developmental process and that while historically some repression has almost always been the case during such a process there is scope to minimise it.

The repression of civil and political rights for the purposes of development is much more likely in the earlier stages of transition to a modern development system (be it a purely capitalist or a mixed economy). This is because existing structures are more entrenched at this point. As a society reaches more advanced stages of development the repressive measures taken in the name of development become more difficult to justify. This may result in a crisis of legitimacy and reverse cycles of conservative repression and liberalisation. Such a cycle would especially be the case if more liberal government was unable to achieve the levels of economic growth expected of it after it replaced a previously more authoritarian regime.

In the PRC the civil and political rights trade-off is proffered in a more layered manner. In the PRC emphasis is placed on social stability (social stability, of course, requires the existing regime to remain in power). The argument is that repression of some political rights provides social stability and social stability provides the conditions for economic development. Such ideas can be assessed utilising the weak state framework outlined earlier.

If the state ideology is suffering a legitimacy crisis then the idea of the state is likely to be weak. Moreover, if a regime's legitimacy were to become based purely upon successful economic growth then this would indicate that the institutional base of the state is also inadequately formed. [323] What then is the PRC's status with regard to these theoretical

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[322] Donnelly, Jack. *Universal Human Rights in Theory and Practice*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, 1989, pp. 187 – 188.

[323] Admittedly, most modern states to some extent base their legitimacy to rule upon economic prosperity. A poorly performing democratic state and government are likely to lose legitimacy due to economic crisis. Nevertheless, states that have democratic or strong ideological legitimacy to rule (an example of the latter would be CCP and Maoist rule for a

considerations? Is the PRC a weak state? If so, has the result of this led to the repression of human rights or instead more liberalisation? And finally, are such actions taking place under threat of external intervention?

It appears uncontroversial to define the PRC as a weak state. Especially upon mention of possible democratisation, it is common for analysts in the PRC to point to the logistical and possibly destabilising problems that would most probably arise in the event of attempting to gauge popular support for government decisions from a vast democratically illiterate population. This view, while possibly simply blatant paternalism, is evidence that the institutional base and the idea of the state in the PRC is considered inadequate at present to allow for democratic legitimisation of the government to take place. The CCP, therefore, to a large extent relies upon economic growth and general nationalistic sentiment for legitimisation of its rule. This view is supported by Shambaugh who categories China as being in a position of "stable unrest", and furthermore:

> ... weaknesses of the institutional mechanisms for dealing with popular grievances and mobilized discontent are likely to produce crude and coercive regime responses in some instances, leading to continuing human rights abuses... [w]hile we [the U.S.] have a strong interest in China's stability, the ways in which this stability is maintained are likely to include measures we find highly unpalatable. Although we may be able to provide for some forms of assistance that will lessen the chances of social instability – such as through fostering continued legal reform and further development of institutional mechanisms for expressing and resolving grievances.[324]

Shambaugh continues these thoughts with some disparagement of how effective these latter measures can prove to be and asks the question of whether such support is made in exchange for the continued existence of a regime that provides stability but represents a 'failed social movement of an earlier era'.[325]

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period after 1949) would not be as vulnerable to crisis as those that rely solely on the development trade-off.

[324] Shambaugh, D. (ed.) *Is China Unstable?*, M.E. Sharpe, NY and London, 2000, pp. 160 – 161.

[325] ibid.

The answer to this question must surely be a utilitarian one. If this 'outmoded regime' is allowed or pushed toward collapse would not the ensuing chaos quite likely result in a greater humanitarian crisis, for example, an intra-state (civil) war? There is plenty of historical evidence that proves the PRC administration is gradually moving in the right direction and coming to pay more respect to humanitarian norms. Careful assistance made in consideration of the PRC's weak state status, in the form suggested by Shambaugh above, may promote more gradual and less risky developments at the national level. Such development may lead toward greater respect for human rights norms and, in the long term, avoid violent international military humanitarian intervention. This point is made with a long term preventative approach in mind, i.e. such a view would be difficult to maintain after a humanitarian crisis situation has arisen and, therefore, the approach requires a case by case assessment. As Shambaugh comments, this gradual path may well involve reluctant toleration of unpalatable measures.

Further to this case is the fact that the PRC's post-Cold War position and present circumstances critically influence its ability to precipitate changes domestically and internationally. (A security analysis based on the weak/strong state continuum allows for calculation of domestic influences on PRC behaviour as well as further understanding of its international stance.)

As noted at the beginning of this part of Chapter Three, the PRC is either an Absolute Insider, but still positioned in the outer circles or periphery of the core of international society, or a Relative Insider. It has multiple identities and occupies and uneasy position in the post-Cold War international society. The theoretical explanations of gemeinschaft development would suggest that the PRC is likely to acquire the most successful patterns of behaviour through interaction with other states of international society. If this is the case then some change in the PRC's internal structure and identity as a state is, albeit slowly, likely to occur.

In summary, this section on humanitarian intervention has sought to argue that minimisation of human rights abuses need take the developmental processes of weak states, such as the PRC, into consideration. This is particularly so in a post-Cold War era in which wars of the 'third kind' are generating many international security issues and, moreover, the core/periphery structure of international society has become more pronounced. Regime maintenance in weak states will inevitably result in repression, but international organisations

may be able to lessen this with targeted assistance that shores up weak state security concerns.

As a weak state but a great power, criteria for humanitarian intervention in the case of the PRC need consider associated internal security/state-making concerns, taking a long term preventative approach. Such an approach may avoid the need for more confrontational or coercive measures, which tend to give more credence to belligerent nationalistic voices in the PRC - voices that tend to work contrary to a more open, less repressive and interactive society. It is already apparent that the bulk of literature in the PRC concerning humanitarian intervention is unconstructively defensive in nature, perhaps as a result of international criticism. The section has suggested that, especially in the case of the PRC, greater consideration of the chief and vital role that national level efforts play in the maintenance of human rights is needed. In this vein it may be worth noting again (*vide* Chapter Two) that:

> For better or worse, states remain the terminal locus of the political loyalties for most people.[326]

and in addition, the state

> ... continues to perform an important historical role, as it alone is currently able to provide a stable and democratic [?] structure of authority, to establish the rule of law, to maintain order, to ensure social justice, to manage conflict and to give its citizens a collective sense of agency ...[327]

It was pointed out in Chapter One that in the twentieth century the standard of civilisation gave way to the sovereignty principle as a basis for membership of international society. It was also mentioned that parallels could be drawn between contemporary human rights and the old standard of civilisation. The PRC's concern to protect the absolute sovereignty principle against humanitarian intervention norms, which are the thin edge of the wedge in relation to wider human rights norms, can be understood by considering that the PRC's membership of international society is based more upon the former principle than upon

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[326] Donnelly, Jack. "Human rights, humanitarian crises and humanitarian intervention", ibid., p. 638.
[327] Parekh, B. op. cit., p. 193 -194.

respect of the latter. In many ways these issues represent a trend in the reverse of the twentieth century changes mentioned.

Erosion of the sovereignty principle by the principle of humanitarian intervention, and human rights norms in general, is a trend that is resisted by the PRC. It is difficult to assess this as a case of resistance against the status quo as the applied status quo is in a state of transition over this issue. Certainly, the PRC takes an extremely conservative or traditional stance on this issue and defends what is increasingly perceived in the West as an 'outdated' interpretation of international law - although Western states have yet to define clearly these new norms in relation to sovereignty principles. This ambiguous stance of the Western states means that the applied status quo is at variance with the theoretical status quo. Western states may be classed as radical revisionists in respect of this institution of international society. However, status quo international society still officially supports the principles of international law as they exist in international society and is yet to endorse fully a notion of 'permeable sovereignty' that allows legitimate intervention in certain cases, but still manages to prevent total debasement of the sovereignty principle. Presently this ambiguity is solved by stretching the interpretation of Chapter VII of the UN Charter to its limits. At least until the contradictions or inadequacies of contemporary international law are settled, and the dominant status quo states are no longer ambiguous about the international law principles they support, the PRC is a radical revisionist with regard to the applied status quo.

Diplomacy

> The remarkable willingness of states of all regions, cultures, persuasions and stages of development to embrace often strange and archaic diplomatic procedures, that arose in Europe in another age, is today one of the few visible indications of universal acceptance of the idea of international society[328]

Despite a tumultuous history of diplomatic isolation the PRC fully participates in the diplomatic system of contemporary international society. It has its own particular style and manner of dealing with diplomatic issues and there are some contradictions evident between its reluctance to engage in multilateral diplomatic talks on particular issues and its support of

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[328]Bull, *'Anarchical Society'* p. 177.

a multi-polar order. However, there is little reason to conclude that the PRC is not fully supportive of this institution of the society of states. In terms of the diplomatic system the PRC is status quo.

Great Power Cooperation

Great powers are able to exercise a managerial role in international society because they are willing to threaten the use of force and possess the power to do so. The need to prevent conflict among themselves takes precedence over other issues of international order and, therefore, great power co-operative coalitions or concerts are 'safer' than unilateral action by a single great power. Because the PRC is reluctant to deploy its military to support the institutions of international society it is somewhat isolated from great power coalitions that employ war to maintain order in the society of states.

The PRC is, as is any great power, fully aware of the advantages gained by participation in the great power club. However:

> China does not accept the assumptions of most other major states about the collapse of the Communist ideal and, whereas current policy seems to suggest otherwise, China is not satisfied with the existing order. As long as China does not share the values of democracy as well as of the market place, her integration as a full member of any new emerging world order will remain difficult to achieve.[329]

This opinion suggests other reasons as to why the PRC does not participate fully in the institution of great power cooperation. While it is questionable to suggest that the PRC still aims to fulfil any grand communist ideal, it is valid to question whether the PRC will ever create a position for itself, or be allowed a fully integrated position, within the institution of great power cooperation while its domestic identity as a state differs from that of the other major powers. This is especially so when it is recalled that the post-Cold War era has witnessed the formation of a great power society based around Western democratic, liberal, norms and values making the Chinese Communist Party appear even more a relic from the past. Dominant status quo powers make use of their superior positions to promote their

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[329]Wilson, Ian. "China and the New World Order", Leaver and Richardson, op. cit., p. 194.

domestic values internationally - values that are resisted by the PRC leadership. None the less, it is certainly possible that great power cooperation can continue to take place and progress in a functional, limited, manner without shared democratic norms as a prerequisite.

Although special rights and privileges are sought after and exercised it is certainly less than clear whether the PRC conceives of itself as also having special obligations and duties as a great power. The PRC's uncertain position as a regional great power, especially vis-à-vis Japan, makes it difficult for it to exercise its regional great power role effectively, even if it desires to do so. It is important to recall the PRC's status as a weak state struggling with the security predicament and the effects this has on its ability to project its power.

The PRC's uncertain identity and position on the periphery of international society is demonstrated by its comparative lack of involvement in the great power cooperative institution. However, this is not necessarily reflective of a strong desire to alter this institution in international society. Nevertheless, the PRC's policy of avoiding military alliances and coalitions means it is unable to serve fully in its great power managerial role within the society of states and thus, in a passive sense, it can be classified as a radical revisionist in terms of both the theoretical and applied status quos.

Rising Chinese Nationalism, Rising Chinese Power, and Status Quo International Society

The economic success of the PRC in recent decades has fuelled a sense of pride that has, in some instances, burgeoned into chauvinistic nationalism.[330] Rising PRC power is linked by some to the evidence of rising nationalist sentiment within the PRC, raising the fear that the two combined give greater reason for concern over whether China may take a more assertive approach to achieving its interests in the international system. This fear increases the threat potential of the PRC and thereby bolsters the case of the containment approach (or, in other terms, a promotion of the 'bad' view of human nature resulting in nationalism in the politico-social context and realism in the politico-strategic context, *vide* Chapter Two).

The main argument put forward against linking rising nationalism with the PRC's

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[330]Downs, Erica Strecker. and Saunders, Phillip C. op. cit., pp. 115 - 116.

international threat potential is that nationalist sentiment has been largely utilised and fostered by the CCP for domestic purposes, namely to bolster and legitimise its rule - more so now that nationalism has all but replaced communism as the glue of the Chinese nation-state.[331] Moreover, when the use of this political tool provokes international repercussions that clash with the PRC's requirement and interest in a stable international environment for economic development, the CCP leadership generally suppresses nationalist fervour in favour of its economic goals.[332] In other words, rising, chauvinistic, nationalism is in fact incompatible with aspects of rising Chinese power. If it adversely affects the PRC's international identity in the eyes of other states, then it may also adversely affect the principal basis of the PRC's rising power, that is, economic growth and development. The PRC's continued successful growth is dependent upon a stable international trading environment and the favourable foreign relations that facilitate it - an internationally projected rampant, threatening, nationalism works contrary to this.

As long as the PRC leadership does not undergo any dramatic changes in outlook, it is possible to conclude that rising Chinese nationalism is to a large extent nullified on the international stage by the CCP's prioritisation of economic and various international politico-strategic concerns, and therefore, at this point in time, is not a decisive variable in respect of the PRC's role in international society. The balancing act required by a leadership that fans nationalist sentiment for domestic purposes, while simultaneously seeking to suppress its full effects abroad, is, however, a difficult one. As the Belgrade incident illustrated, this task may well prove even more difficult to perform as the Chinese population's contact with the outside world, and vice versa, continues to increase. However, while the influence of rising nationalist sentiment cannot be ignored, presently it is more PRC power interests based on economic growth that dictate how much nationalist sentiment will be allowed to affect PRC foreign policy. With regard to the institutions of international society, the issue of rising power (i.e. aspects of the politico-strategic context) is considered the most crucial factor, rather than rising nationalism (i.e. one possible aspect of the politico-social context).

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[331]Christensen, Thomas J. "Chinese Realpolitik", *Foreign Affairs*, Vol. 75, No. 5 Sept/Oct. 1996, p. 46.
[332]Downs and Saunders, op. cit., pp. 114 - 146.

Chapter Four Conclusion

Part One revealed that gemeinschaft and gesellschaft type development both played a role in the evolution of the ancient Chinese states system. The common culture based around the ancient texts established and enabled the ancient states to conduct and develop their exchanges around common, largely feudal, norms. At the same time, the imperatives of inter-state interaction in the classical age led to developments based, not on common culture, but rather on necessity – in other words, some of the institutions also evolved in a contractual, constructed, or gesellschaft fashion.

The ancient Chinese states system exhibited the institutional advances of an international society, but no matter how well developed the institutions became there was little sign that the states involved considered themselves bound together in the working of these common institutions. There was seemingly no conscious awareness of a *society* of states. If there was a mutual society consciousness among the peoples of the various states it existed chiefly in a cultural or civilisational form and was bound, and later fostered (especially by Han Confucianism), by imperial customs rather than by inter-state organisation and legal norms like sovereign equality.

Part one illustrated that the Chinese nation had a rich history of inter-state relations during the classical age. An ES analysis of the ancient Chinese international system contributed to the analytical strength of the approach, especially in respect of the influence of gesellschaft and gesellschaft development, and further challenged the conventional (tributary/imperial) view of historical patterns of Chinese international behaviour. Despite the relative lack of established sovereign equality norms, the demonstrated existence of institutional order among the states of the ancient multi-state system in China showed that an ES framework is relevant to analysis of pre-modern international relations. Examination of this period of China's ancient political history also allowed for the conclusion that the multi-state institutions developed during the classical age were largely forgotten by the time that China confronted the modern period.

Part Two sought to demonstrate that the PRC's relationship with the early global international society has been defined by its historical experience. The common norms and institutions that were part of the European inter-state experience were not, by and large, shared by the

Chinese state, hence a gesellschaft path of development was the only course by which China could enter the expanding global international society. Part Two aimed to demonstrate that this gesellschaft path of development, although uneven, continued to unfold successfully throughout the Cold War period. It also indicated that successful gesellschaft integration led to limited gemeinschaft integration during the Cold War period.

Part Three, however, argued that prospects for wider gemeinschaft development continue to be limited chiefly by identity differences at the domestic structural level. Gesellschaft integration, however, continues apace.

Figure 4.2

Institutions of Int. Society	PRC in relation to TSQ*	PRC in relation to ASQ*	TSQ in relation to ASQ
Balance of Power	Status Quo	Orthodox Revisionist	Equivalent
War	Radical Revisionist	Radical Revisionist	Equivalent
International Law	Status Quo**	Radical Revisionist	Divergent
Diplomacy	Status Quo	Status Quo	Equivalent
Great Power Cooperation	Radical Revisionist	Radical Revisionist	Equivalent

*TSQ = Theoretical Status Quo, ASQ = Applied Status Quo.

**This classification is made mainly in reference to the PRC's status quo support of the sovereignty/non-interventionist principle but is questionable if the PRC's status as a radical revisionist with regard to other international society institutions is taken into account. i.e. for example, reform of the war institution would also require reform of international law principles regarding the legitimate use of warfare.

Figure 4.2 summarises the results from the analysis conducted in Part Three. Definition of

the PRC in relation to the two types of status quo has mixed results. The hypothesis that the PRC is a radical revisionist in respect of the applied status quo is largely proven correct. With regard to the theoretical status quo, the PRC is shown to desire reform of some of the institutions, but is supportive of others - in some respects more so than status quo states.

The answer to the question of whether rising Chinese power and nationalism is a threat to status quo international society is a *qualified* negative. PRC revisionism and rising power present some challenges to status quo international society, but these challenges need not necessarily be perceived wholly as unavoidable threats. Adoption of a long term stance that seeks to identify and lessen any PRC threat factors, rather than accepting them as inevitable, appears the wiser choice based on the sustainable nature of rising PRC power. Even in the instances where the PRC is judged as a radical revisionist it should be recalled that a radical revisionist does not seek to alter vastly the basic structure of the international order but merely seeks reform. Ever since the 1980's, when the PRC began to perceive the existing international order as advantageous rather than antagonistic to its economic reform it has been shifting towards a view more in keeping the status quo.

In, for example, the case of the institution of war, the PRC's policy of no military bases or personnel outside of Chinese territory is the main obstacle to it acting as a status quo power in this respect, as its view of the role of force in international society has gradually been shifting towards the view held by the core status quo powers. The point here is that, while classified as a radical revisionist, the gulf between the PRC and the aims of the status quo states, which largely maintain the applied status quo, is not particularly wide. The PRC has a foot in both camps in many respects.[333] As was discussed in Part Two, it had a Cold War history of isolation/alienation and association with more revolutionary states, but increasingly has interests that resemble those of a status quo state. The PRC's contemporary revisionist designs in terms of the balance of power are typical of a rising power and are, therefore, reasonably predictable and can be managed by appropriate policy from the status quo powers.

Even in terms of great power cooperation, if domestic politics is not made a divisive issue,

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[333]The Chinese scholars commonly refer to the phrase 脚踏两只船'jiao ta liang zhi chuan' (Standing on two boats) to describe this situation.

and again if the PRC's policy on overseas deployment is modified, then there is every likelihood that a multi-polar class of great powers will continue forming. This class of great powers is inclusive of the United States, despite its superpower status, and of non-Western states such as the PRC and continues its traditional function of maintaining international order. Nationalism is a rising force in PRC politics, but it is circumscribed by the PRC's interest in maintaining stable international relations, which are crucial to the continued increase of PRC power through economic growth.

Part Three indicated that rising PRC power need not be considered a threat to the basic structure of the institutions of status quo international society. This is not a reason to consider the PRC as presently inconsequential and move on to other questions. Rather, the status quo states are presented with an ideal opportunity, while the PRC is not in a relative power position to be overly assertive, to add to the foundations of future international order by positively encouraging the PRC to participate fully as a great power member of the society of states. Such action is in the long term interests of all states within international society. Because of the increasing instance of wars of the third kind and general internal disorder among many of the newer states there is a need to enlist the support of all those powers, such as China, that are able to contribute to order in the society of states.

This chapter has displayed that gesellschaft type integration has been, and continues to act as, the chief means by which the PRC becomes further integrated into international society. At present the PRC lacks the absolute power to alter vastly the institutions of international society. Rather, it is obliged to attempt to accommodate the changes and challenges that an evolving international society requires of it. Hence the obstacles and limitations of its power and peripheral position in international society are exposed, as core states increasingly advocate changes to the principles that first allowed China gesellschaft type entry into the then exclusively European international society. The PRC's identity as a non-Western and, especially in the post-Cold War era, as a communist, totalitarian, state, continues to impede it from establishing the more solid common identity and value systems which underpin states within the gemeinschaft core of the global international society.

If the PRC is to become further integrated into international society and receive the benefits that come from it, such as operating as part of a security community, it will need to integrate further with the gemeinschaft core. In theory, cyclic interaction, engineered by the

development of a gesellschaft type global international society (the creation of which may be explained by the structural realist 'like units' theory), would create a shared identity among units, which in turn would foster the stronger institutional bonds of a global gemeinschaft international society. The path of China's integration into international society to date indicates that such a course of development is gradually taking place. In which case, the advantages created by the competitive nature of a system of competing sovereign units ensures variation, but socialisation processes and the mutual adoption of similar norms and values among the major states, at least, would generate a stable international society.

CHAPTER FIVE: INDIA AND INTERNATIONAL SOCIETY

This chapter is an analysis of India's approach to international order based on its conduct in international systems through the ages. This analysis endeavours both to strengthen the international society approach, by demonstrating its applicability to various international system scenarios, and to extract a uniquely Indian approach to states systems. In order to achieve the latter aim the analysis focuses on those periods when India existed in an environment where it was able to fashion, relatively independently, its own particular style of inter-state behaviour. Three periods are identified: the ancient, pre-Mauryan, Indian states system; the period beginning with the rise of the Indian National Congress through to complete independence, including the term of the Cold War; and, finally, the post-Cold War or contemporary era.

To repeat the argument covered in Chapters Two and Four, there are questions as to the commensurability of applying the ES analytical framework to pre-modern multi-state systems. Apparent limitations involved in an adoption of the ES approach rest with its clear modernist basis. However, this limitation is apparent only. Due to rationalist or objective aspects, although not modernist, it is possible to assess the institutional development of pre-modern multi-state systems using the ES concept of international society. This statement rests on the view that relations taking place between independent sovereign states may still involve the institutions of an international society regardless of whether they are modern or pre-modern (*vide* Chapter Two).

Part One: Ancient India and International Society

The essential task, at this stage, is to clarify whether or not the inter-state relations of ancient India constituted a states system or a society of states. This will help to determine the extent to which, if any, there is a similarity between the behaviour of states in ancient India and that of modern India, which, of necessity, is a member of contemporary international society. This section, therefore, examines inter-state relations in ancient India for the five institutions that order an international society. However, first there follows a brief description of the parameters of the research and an evaluation of some central political concepts in relation to the period under study.

The Extent of the Ancient Indian States System and the Ancient Texts

It is impossible to consider ancient Indian politics without referring to the work of Kautilya. Chanakya, alias Kautilya, was a Brahmin advisor to the Mauryan King Chandra Gupta (c.325 B.C.). Although there is some debate over the issue, Kautilya is generally accepted as the author of the *Arthasastra* - a treatise that details the requisites of successful rule in the political environment of ancient India. The Arthasastra, literally meaning 'The Science of Polity', incorporates ideas from a variety of more ancient texts. It has been suggested that the Arthasastra may in fact be the product of research conducted by an Arthasastra school.[334] The shape and form of ancient Indian political ideas were more or less set by the time of Kautilya. His ideas are central to this study and, as they reiterate pre-Arthasastra ideas, are considered a reasonably wide-ranging representation of the conception of inter-state relations in ancient India. Kautilya's work is discussed in more detail at a later stage.

The main ancient Hindu scriptures consist of the four Vedas, the Vedangas, the Puranas, the Upanishadas, the Epics (chiefly the Ramayana and the Mahabharata) and the various Buddhist Dharmasutras. These scriptures supply the bulk of information on ancient Indian political organisation. Authorship is often anonymous, but most of the texts are linked to the Aryan invaders of India who settled in the Indo-gangetic river valleys in circa 3000 - 1000 B.C.

The above passage mentions the time period of ancient India covered by the study, i.e. primarily the pre-Mauryan period. Admittedly, over the long course of India's ancient history, especially in times of imperial unity, India conducted relations with many non-Indian peoples, such as the Greeks. However, inter-state relations conducted within the regional system of states that was present on the Indian subcontinent itself, particularly during times when weak imperial power permitted a states system to exist, are of central interest to this study. By focusing upon this latter aspect it is anticipated that a form of inter-state relations, peculiar to those states of the ancient Indian subcontinent, may be identified.

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[334]Mukherjee, T.B. *Inter-state Relations in Ancient India*, Meenakshi Prakashan, Meerut, New Delhi, 1967, 1977, p. 153. The case for considering the status of the *Arthasastra* as a rendition of former, more ancient, ideas is also stated by Ruben, W. "Inter-state relations in Ancient India and Kautilya's Arthasastra", *Indian Yearbook of International Affairs*, Vol. 4,

Political Concepts in Ancient India - State, Sovereignty, and Anarchy

State and Sovereignty

Essential to the existence of states systems is the presence of independent states. Of particular interest here are those defining features that enable a state to maintain its sovereign independence in an anarchical states system. The make-up of ancient Indian states was, quite understandably, at variance with the make-up of the modern state. Several of the seven constituents or elements of state strength[335] identified by Hindu statesmen, including Kautilya, conform, however, to generally accepted elements often cited in definitions of the modern state. Altekar discusses several types of states that existed in ancient India, identifying monarchy as the "...normal form of the State in the Vedic period"[336], and also describes republican, aristocratic, and tribal forms of ancient Indian states. All these forms did generally differ from the contemporary state. However, variation at this unit level of analysis, while capable of affecting the overall nature of inter-state relations, does not necessarily affect either the question of the existence of a states system or the presence of the institutions of an international society. Rather, in this respect, the independent sovereign status of the ancient Indian state is the crucial variable.

...whatever may be the state of affairs in the mythical past, Hindu thinkers held that the

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1955, p. 158.

[335]The seven constituents often identified are Sovereign (Swami), Minister (Amatya), Territory including subjects (Janapada), Fort (Durga), Treasure (Kosa), Army (Danda), Ally (Mitra) and some add Enemy (Ari). See Law, Narendra Nath, *Inter-State Relations in Ancient India*, Luzac & Co., London, 1920, p. 14. Jaswant Singh in *Defending India*, Macmillan Press Ltd, London, 1999, pp. 9 - 10, argues that the "...concept of State was alien to [ancient] Indian thought", and that India was united by civilizational unity rather than by universal state institutions. This is a fair point, but in the same paragraph he refers to the political diversity of ancient India, "...from satrapies and kingdoms to village republics." Singh appears to consider the concept of Indian statehood as necessarily requiring the entirety of India to be united by one monolithic state. This was clearly never completely the case prior to British Indian rule. As is argued above, the political interaction that took place in ancient India was between political entities that certainly differ from the modern state. Nevertheless, it is suggested that they may have existed as sovereign entities and, if the term 'state' is given some definitional latitude, (remembering that the term 'nation-state' is different again), then it can be successfully utilised to examine ancient Indian political action as inter-*state* interaction.

[336]Altekar, A.S. *State and Government in Ancient India*, Motilal Banarsidass, Delhi, 1958, pp. 36 - 37.

State was an indispensable institution for the orderly existence and progress of society...[337]

The independence of a state was jealously guarded. A state's jurisdiction lay within its own borders.[338]

There is a substantial quantity of literature that supports the argument that, at the very least, a limited concept of the sovereign state was present in ancient India. The tribal basis of the state shifted to a settled territorial form (rashtra) later in the Vedic period, prior to this any form of sovereignty can only be meaningfully understood as sovereignty over a population. Mutual territorial recognition is a cornerstone of contemporary international society, but it can be argued that territorial stability is not necessarily essential in a states system. Buzan suggests that territorial instability may simply be characteristic of immature states systems.[339] Nevertheless, it seems that Kautilya considered a state to exist only when its government had the loyalty of a particular population as well as a well-defined territory.[340]

Having established that there were political entities that may be referred to as ancient Indian states, the next question that arises is the extent of the independence that those states possessed.

A system of absolutely independent states, and a heterogeneous empire wholly and directly administered from one centre, are theoretically extreme cases. In practice all known ways of organizing diverse but interconnected communities have operated somewhere between these two extremes.[341]

Watson, in reference to Wight, names those systems which have one state that lays special leadership or hegemonic claims, accepted by other states in the system, as suzerain systems. Moreover, if a states system is to exist its members must accept one another's claims to

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[337]ibid., p. 30.
[338]Mukherjee, op. cit., p. 101 (the quotation is made in reference to the time of the Puranas - Sanskrit literature in direct tradition with earlier Vedic literature.).
[339]Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, p. 92.
[340]Chatterjee, Hiralal. *International Law and Inter-state Relations in Ancient India,* Firma K.L. Mukhopadhyay, Calcutta, 1958, p. 18.
[341]Watson, Adam. *The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Analysis,*

sovereign status.[342] Watson's quotation demonstrates that the level of independence that states in an international system have determines the nature of the system. There is some evidence in the literature that ancient Indian states, alongside the concept of sovereignty, valued their independence and freedom from intervention by other states.[343] Prior to Mauryan rule it is unlikely that a suzerain system existed and perhaps more likely that the system was located closer to the other extreme. Certainly, it is questionable whether states accepted one another's sovereign status on any terms other than those of strategic pragmatism, as will be discussed in the next section.

Anarchy

The existence of an empire that has extinguished even the token independence of assimilated states would logically result in the disappearance of a states system type of order. Conversely, the absence of such an empire allows for international anarchy mitigated by hegemonic rule or by institutional mechanisms of order within the spectrum mentioned above.

The maturity or immaturity of the anarchical environment (*vide* Chapter Four) is indicative of whether or not the system is developing as a society; indeed, the view taken of anarchy by ancient Indian states reveals much with regard to the nature of their ancient states system. The quotation by Spellman below illustrates that anarchy in ancient India was generally associated with a lack of order or chaos.

> In ancient India, the fear of anarchy was almost pathological. Underlying every concept of kingship was the doctrine of matsyanyaya - the analogy of the big fish eating up the small fish. In other words, society in its natural state is anarchy, and, without laws and a king to rule, the strong will dominate the weak, just as big fish eat up their smaller companions. Without understanding this idea, there can be no understanding of kingship in ancient India. Although this concept existed in other countries, it was in India that it reached its highest development and became the central theme of political philosophy.[344]

Routledge, London, 1992, p. 4.
[342] ibid., p. 3.
[343] Chatterjee, op. cit., p. 23.
[344] Spellman, John, W. *Political Theory of Ancient India: A Study of Kingship from earliest*

Admittedly this quotation principally refers to anarchy at the unit level rather than at the system level, i.e. it is concerned with the lack of kingship or state rule for local populations rather than with inter-state anarchy or order. However, it remains useful because it portrays a cultural approach to the question of anarchy that is evident in ancient literature such as the Arthasastra. The dislike of anarchy seems to have extended to the system level and was expressed by the constant aim of attempting to establish imperial domination over independent states in the system (in other words, there was no sign of a mature anarchy). This aim did not simply express a desire for ultimate power, but was a goal that the Indian philosophers perceived as a means to bring war and violence between rulers to an end. Thus, in order to further assess the general nature of ancient Indian inter-state relations, the thesis will examine the Arthasastra, which advises rulers on the best means to achieve precisely this desired end.

Institutions for Order in the Ancient Indian States System and Kautilya's Arthasastra

Following from the above analysis it is assumed that the independent states of ancient India did, at very least, form a system of states. It remains to assess where along the spectrum between a mature and immature anarchy the ancient Indian system tended to settle, that is, was the international anarchy, to any extent, ordered by the institutions of an international society? The influence of Kautilya's Arthasastra is such that it requires further mention before proceeding with an institution by institution analysis.

> Kautilya's Arthasastra "...is no more than the fullest statement of a tradition that had been current, in part orally, for several centuries prior to Kautilya's writing.... Many of the terms and the distinctions that are interesting in Kautilya can already be found in the great Hindu epics of the Mahabharata and Ramayana... [the Arthasastra] is no more than a small part of the Sanskrit heritage"[345]

Modelski reiterates the point made earlier about the origins of the concepts in the Arthasastra.

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times to circa A.D. 300, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1964, pp. 4 - 5.
[345]Modelski, George. "Kautilya: Foreign Policy and the International System in the Ancient Hindu World", *The American Political Science Review*, Vol. LVIII, No. 3, September, 1964, pp. 549 - 550.

He also comments that about one-quarter of the Arthasastra is devoted to the subject of inter-state relations. The most important analysis of the Arthasastra with regard to inter-state relations is developed around the theory of Mandala or 'circle of states' theory, as depicted below.

Figure 5.1 THE THEORY OF MANDALA

Vijigiṣu – Invader

Ari – Enemy	Pārṣṇigrāha – Rear enemy
Mitra – Friend	Akranda – Rear friend
Arimitra – Enemy's friend	Pārṣṇigrāhāsāra – Friend of rear enemy
Mitramitra – Friend of friend	Akrandāsāra – Friend of rear friend
Arimitramitra – Friend of enemy's friend	

Madhyama – Intermediare King

Udāsīna – Neutral King

Source: Spellman, ibid., p. 157.

Figure 5.1 illustrates the Theory of Mandala "...which is a theory of inter-state relations which holds that a kingdom is an ally or enemy according to its geographical position with respect to the intending conqueror."[346] The four core kings (invader, enemy, intermediate and neutral) may each serve as the centre of a particular circle of states.

Modelski questions whether the concept of an international system is applicable to the circle of states theory. When devising the theory it is fair to assume that Kautilya was not interested in maintaining a society of states as a goal, but was rather interested in furthering the expansionist interests of the king he was advising. Kautilya develops the circle of states model around the variations in status of the separate states and, as a result, the model is hierarchical in nature. In a Machiavellian manner, Kautilya studies the problems of power and conquest in inter-state relations and does not really accept the limitations of any notion of a states system or international society. However, "[K]autilya's Circle of States may be regarded as the germ of the concept of an international society [because]....In Kautilya's work the solidarity-community aspect of international systems appears in an explicit way mostly in a negative sense of a body of opinion whose views must be taken account of, and which therefore puts a limit upon the freedom of foreign policy."[347]

This description more closely fits the definition of an international system as arguably the idea of a 'solidarity-community' is representative of the minimum level of politico-strategic interaction typical of states that comprise the membership of a system. This begs the question as to the extent to which the anarchical condition among states in Kautilya's system was mitigated by institutions designed to provide order, as within an international society. The following, in accordance with the specific institutions that provide order in contemporary international society, is an institution by institution assessment of Kautilya's model.

Balance of Power

"In the work of Kautilya we shall search in vain for a balance of power theory..."[348]

This statement by Modelski appears to be conclusive, there are, however, conflicting

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[346]Modelski, op. cit., p. 156.
[347]ibid., p. 555.
[348]ibid., p. 554.

opinions, of which Mukherjee's is a notable one. He specifically states that the concept of balance of power was "...known to the ancient Indians"[349] - although he fails to define in which form it was known. Further reading reveals that the concept is used very loosely, usually in the sense that maintenance of a balance of power was an attempt to gain or maintain hegemonic rule over others in the system. This is an understanding of the concept of the balance of power that is inverse in meaning to how it was defined for use in this thesis in Chapter One.[350]

Pertinent to this question of whether or not balance of power behaviour was evident in the ancient Indian states system is consideration of the goals of the ancient Indian kings. Chief among these goals was the aim of becoming 'lord of the earth' - a universal monarch, a world ruler or Chakravartin. This goal was considered achievable through the successful conclusion of the rather arduous Asvamedha horse sacrifice. Briefly, the Asvamedha involved setting a stallion free to wander across the territory of other kings. One hundred warriors dispatched by the ambitious king protected the horse. After one year, if the horse returned, it was slaughtered and the sovereignty of the ambitious king was understood to extend to all the territories upon which the horse had roamed. Thus the king sought to lay claim to the title of world ruler or Chakravartin (defined as "...a ruler the wheels of whose chariot roll everywhere without obstruction, emperor, sovereign of the world.")[351]

Such a specific tradition, aimed at formally satisfying the expansionist ambitions of ancient Indian kings, makes it clear that the maintenance of a states system, and the sovereign integrity of the states which comprised it, was far from the minds of ancient kings and the individual states that they ruled. Instead, they actively sought imperial domination and thus an end to the states system. This point is supported very precisely by Bozeman:

> Nor could it [the balance of power] have been accommodated in ancient India, even though the territorial organisation of the realm into numerous separate kingdoms is comparable to that of Renaissance Italy and modern Western Europe. For this pluralistic

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[349]Mukherjee, op. cit., p. 97.

[350]Several other authors make similar errors in respect of the balance of power and the ancient Indian states system - in that the idea is poorly defined and used with multiple meanings. This can be traced to the frequent abuse of the term 'balance of power', whereby it is often casually utilised without clear definition (*vide* Chapter One).

[351]Spellman, op. cit., p. 170 - 174.

political order did not suggest the conclusion upon which the Western Europeans were to agree eventually, namely, that it would be unethical or unwise to persist in bids for absolute power, and that the national interest would be served by maintaining an equilibrium in inter-state relations. On the contrary, it gave rise to a science of politics that instructed each sovereign how to pursue his imperialist purposes to best advantage by consulting the Mandala chart of concentric rings on natural friends and enemies.[352]

This statement is contradicted by Chatterjee who claims that states in ancient India were prepared to intervene in each other's affairs in order to preserve the balance of power. Chatterjee cites certain events and passages of the Mahabharata and the Arthasastra as evidence of the efforts made by ancient rulers to preserve a balance of power, claiming that large states in ancient India were guided by this principle of maintaining a status quo power distribution (again a definition of the balance of power at variance with that employed by this thesis). He doesn't make it clear whether this is his interpretation of events or whether the balance of power principle is explicitly addressed in the examples given.[353] The fact remains that if Kautilya did advise the preservation of a balance of power, as Chatterjee claims, then it contradicts the goals of conquest and universal domination that he also advised and appeared to give prominence too.

Therefore, in summary, although balance of power behaviour was clearly evident in the ancient Indian states system, as it is likely be in any multi-state system, it seems to have been only evident in an unmanaged, fortuitous, form. Alliances were made in order to prevent the predominance of any other single state, but these were made for short-term tactical or strategic purposes (or forced by strategic stalemate). They were not contrived for the interest of preserving the states system in its entirety. Given these contrasting opinions, it is not possible to make any thoroughly conclusive statement about the status of balance of power activity in the ancient Indian states system. Nevertheless, the mere existence of debate over the issue and logic suggests that, while balance of power behaviour certainly existed within the system, as policy the concept was by no means fully developed.

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[352]Bozeman, Adda B. *Politics and Culture in International History,* Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1960, p. 495.
[353]Chatterjee, ibid., p. 24.

Literature regarding the ancient Indian states system rarely refers directly to the role or the existence of a class of great powers. However, by inference from related discussions it is possible to arrive at conclusions on this aspect of international society.

There appears to have been, in what was a very hierarchical system, an acknowledgement of states with superior status (i.e. states that were capable of 'holding their own against all others' or at least resisting individually powerful rival states). If system-wide interest or universal aspiration is added, which certainly did exist, then it is possible to meet Wight's definitional criteria of great power status.

Upon considering Bull's assessment of great power roles the relative lack of great power cooperation in the ancient Indian states system becomes apparent. Without a clear concept of the balance of power, as was concluded above, there is little possibility that great powers actively co-operated to manage a balance of power. There was co-operation in the shape of alliances to defeat or foil immediate enemies, but this fails to qualify as co-operation in the general interest of the system. There seems to have been some pragmatism in relations between great or, in this case, superior powers. "Agreements of peace shall be made with equal and superior kings; an inferior king shall be attacked."[354] However, overall, there seems to be little evidence of great power co-operation aimed at containing crises and wars between them, or anything but tactically pragmatic respect for one another's sphere of influence.

An exception to this observation that there was no real great power cooperation may perhaps lie in what Modelski defines as a "loose bi-centricity". This term refers to the relationship between the conqueror or invader (vijigishu) and the 'non-aligned' intermediate king (madhyama) and/or the neutral king (udasina). This relationship is considered unique by Modelski because it proposes that two major powers in an international system need not necessarily be destined to occupy polar positions in relation to one another. Rather, they may both occupy, geographically or otherwise, central positions in the international system. This inferentially suggests that the relationship between the non-aligned and/or neutral king and

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[354]Kautilya in Spellman op. cit., p. 151.

the invader would be co-operative.[355] None the less, there is still no real evidence to suggest that this 'loose-bicentricity' was attempted joint action aimed at maintaining international order in the general interest of the international system.

While there may have been instances of short-term cooperation among superior powers in the ancient Indian states system there was nothing that really resembled great power co-operation as it occurs institutionally in an international society. The lack of any clearly managed concept of the balance of power, and therefore any concept of long term stability among great powers, in addition to the constant aim of establishing a universal empire, were unfavourable conditions in which to encourage great power cooperation.

Diplomacy

There is an extensive literature on the subject of diplomacy in ancient India. This literature leaves little room for argument as to the sophistication of diplomatic contact among sovereign entities in ancient India. The distinctive feature of contemporary international society is the system of resident embassies. While some doubt exists as to the permanent or non-permanent nature of ancient Indian embassies there appears to be a tendency to consider them non-permanent.[356] This stands to reason, as much of the literature that speaks of the permanence of the Indian embassy seems to refer to the status of the individual envoy, or duta, with no reference to actual extraterritoriality - a concept, or something similar, that seemingly would have obtained if permanent embassy buildings had existed.

While it can safely be assumed that no resident embassies, at least in comparison to their contemporary form, were present in the ancient Indian states system there is considerable evidence for the existence of a diplomatic culture. A diplomatic culture is formed by the common values and ideas held by official representatives of the state. It has been mentioned that the main functions of diplomacy in modern international society includes communication, negotiation, information gathering, the pacification of disputes, and, most importantly, a symbolic representation of co-operation among states. Without resident embassies this final function would have been limited, however, within the ancient Indian

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[355]Modelski, op. cit., p. 555.
[356]Rocher, Dr. Ludo. "The Ambassador in Ancient India" *Indian Yearbook of International Affairs*, Vol. 7, 1958, p. 346. Rocher remains undecided on this issue.

diplomatic culture the other functions were all important, including international conferences, although there was no systematic congress or conference system established.[357]

References to ancient Indian diplomatic culture are found in most of the ancient texts including the Arthasastra. These texts specify the role and conduct expected of a variety of differently categorised envoys. Kautilya details functions, such as those listed above, as well as advice for envoys to take advantage of their positions to conduct espionage. More importantly, the ancient texts detail diplomatic immunity rules. In certain situations, however, such as when a spy was apprehended, these were to be ignored.[358] In Watson's words, "It is remarkable evidence of the value which independent states and governments at all times attach to communications with each other that diplomatic immunity remained an established and generally respected practice in spite of clandestine activities of ambassadors and envoys."[359]

Usually diplomatic envoys were high caste Brahmins, who also enjoyed a level of immunity over and above their diplomatic station.[360] This is an important point, as it explains the quite well developed inter-state communication system and culture that existed well before any co-operative and institutionalised state-sponsored arrangements. The Brahmins were able to utilise contacts that they had among their fellow Brahmins in order to carry out diplomatic activity.

It is evident that a relatively active diplomatic culture existed in the ancient Indian states system. There were clear rules and norms regarding diplomatic immunity and the conduct and duties of envoys. Although the ancient political texts detail these rules and norms it appears that because of an apparent lack of formal arrangements made between sovereigns they were maintained, respected and adhered to largely due to the organisational system of the Brahmin priestly caste.

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[357]Watson, Adam. *Diplomacy: The Dialogue between States*, Eyre Methuen, London, 1982, p. 91.
[358]Chatterjee, op. cit., pp. 64 - 65 and Rocher, op. cit., p. 354.
[359]Watson, *Diplomacy*, p. 90.

War is indeed a defining feature of the ancient Indian states system. However, there is little reference to it as an institution that functioned to maintain a balance of power or the states system as a whole. It was more a 'Clausewitzian' type policy instrument utilised, partly, in pursuit of universal empire:

> ...political societies [in ancient India] went to war because their kings went to war, and their kings did so either (a) to acquire wealth for themselves or their subjects, or to give their armies the fun and excitement of a campaign in the hope of booty, or (b) to acquire overlordship, the nominal or actual responsibility for a larger territory and a larger population....[361]

It has been noted that war determines the shape of an international system, in the sense that it is used either in an attempt to maintain the balance of power or in an attempt to establish hegemony or pre-eminence. Kautilya advised attack when the opposition was weak and his schema of the circle of states is certainly based around the use of warfare in the latter sense. Thus, at least in theory, the ancient Indian international system was shaped by the use of war to establish dominance over other members.

It is then apparent that war did not function in the ancient Indian states system as a positive tool employed to enforce international law or the balance of power. However, it has been remarked that an international society attempts to maintain order and to control war by establishing rules and norms aimed to limit violence among its members. This is done so not only by attempting to maintain the use of force as a prerogative of the state, but also by limitations in the methods by which war is fought. While it is conspicuous that war was a generally accepted, in fact glorified, state policy in the ancient Indian states system, it still may be asked whether or not there were co-ordinated attempts made to limit violence among states in the system. Were there any rules or norms present that are indicative of an international society's attempt to institutionally limit violence amongst its members?

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[360] ibid., p. 91

[361] Derrett, J. Duncan M. "The Maintenance of Peace in the Hindu World: Practice and Theory", *The Indian Yearbook of International Affairs*, Vol. 7, 1958, p. 364.

The non-violent character of Indian society is mentioned frequently, especially in association with its many religions, for instance, Hinduism, Buddhism, and Jainism. The idea of good conduct and non-violence is defined by the word Ahimsa, a general term with many qualifications. Violence was legitimate when committed in self-defence, or in protection of one's property and kin, for example. Such rational qualifications explain the frequent wars that were justifiable despite the existence of non-violent principles.[362] None the less, it would seem plausible that such principles would in some way limit and regulate war among Indian states. If so, were these principles institutionalised and recognised as common rules and norms of a gesellschaft type of international society? Or were they upheld purely out of respect for the values of a common culture and religion?

Without becoming embroiled in an exhaustive debate about the morality of war in ancient India, a brief examination of the ancient Indian principles of justice in war may reveal whether there was an institutional framework that governed them. There are various opinions on this issue. Kautilya certainly saw no place for ethics in a discussion of war or politics and, like Machiavelli, seemed to believe that the end justifies the means.[363] Despite such sentiments, there is a reasonable quantity of literature that details the rules of war - *jus in bello* - as they existed in ancient India, for example, rules on who was regarded as a non-combatant.[364] Although it seems that these rules were frequently ignored with impunity, especially in the victor's case, they nevertheless certainly existed.

However, the ideas of morality and rules of war were not part of an official institutional framework drawn up through co-operation and agreement among independent sovereign states. The rules of war that existed, although certainly institutionalised, were followed out of deference to dharma or religious belief in ideas embodying morality and order. A good example of this relationship between the morality of war and religion is when Ashoka, Chandragupta's grandson, preached abstinence from violence and war after conversion to Buddhism - a policy that greatly affected India's foreign policy during his reign.[365] It should be noted though, that this occurred while India was still unified as the Mauryan empire and an Indian states system *per se* did not technically exist.

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[362]ibid., p.383

[363]Chakravarti, P.C. *The Art of War in Ancient India*, The University of Dacca, Ramna, Dacca, 1941, p. VII.

[364]Spellman, op. cit., p. 160, lists some examples of these rules of war.

War did not function to enforce systemic international law and was unlikely to have been utilised to preserve the balance of power in the ancient Indian states system. As an instrument of the state it appears to have been employed chiefly in an effort to establish universal empire. There is little convincing evidence to conclude that war existed as an institution of international society in the ancient Indian states system, on the other hand, it does appear that, perhaps in a de facto manner, inter-state war was limited by means of the organisational and moral power of the various religious belief systems.

International Law

International law is probably the most difficult institution of international society to assess with regard to the ancient Indian states system. There are two distinct and opposing views on the status of international law in ancient India, the first of which is represented in the following quotations:

> ...[In ancient India] are vast fields of inter-state relations in which each king, guided by the principles of *artha*, was forever trying to 'acquire and maintain the earth,' i.e., to outwit and conquer his neighbours. This unabashed philosophical and actual commitment to power and victory, whether rendered through the symbolism of geometry or that of chess - pursuits in which the Indians excelled - was obviously incompatible with anything resembling international law or international organisation *as these terms are understood in the Occident* [italics mine]. The only kind of law governing this Oriental states system was the law of the fishes (matsyanyaya), in accordance with which the big fish eat the small fish, might is above right, and right is in the hands of the strong. Inequality was postulated as the everlasting condition of political existence, power as the only measure of political worth, war as the normal activity of the state, peace as a lamentable condition of inferiority, and espionage as the most reliable, indispensable shield of royal fortune.[366]

> Whatever is said about it, modern international law *is* a creation of modern history, and its foundations happen to have been laid mainly in Europe; it does not go back to Ancient

[365]Bozeman, op. cit., p. 125.
[366]Bozeman, Adda. *The Future of Law in a Multicultural World*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, 1971, p. 128.

India, as little as it would go back to Ancient Greece or Rome.[367]

Bozeman mistakenly assumes that political inter-state relations based on naked power inevitably result in an absence of international law, and are 'obviously incompatible' with international law. On the contrary, conflict may have the end result of forcing opponents to negotiate treaties or other forms of international law.

The other view is supported by Chatterjee, who by making use of generally accepted definitions of international law, is able to construct a persuasive argument as to the existence of international law in ancient India. He contends that because sovereign independent states or 'international persons' certainly existed, then intercourse among them was inevitable, as was the need to have commonly accepted regulations surrounding such intercourse. This resulted in the establishment of a body of rules which formed the "...principles or customs which, in modern times, constitute the basis of international law"[368]

There are two ways to explain these contrasting views. Derrett does so by commenting that Indian scholars have, in reaction to past European domination and sense of superiority, let "...sentiment get the better of scientific objectivity", and attempted to prove that India was a superior culture and the root source of, for example, international law.[369] Thus, he calls into question the objectivity of the school of thought that has international law, not only existing, but also originating in the ancient Indian states system. Derrett may have a plausible case, but Chatterjee's argument, for example, cannot be dismissed on this rather subjective basis alone.

The second explanation, and a more convincing solution to this impasse, requires consideration of the very status of law in ancient India. Chatterjee suggests a way forward when he comments on the binding character of international law in ancient India.

And in the ultimate analysis this concept of 'dharma' becomes one with the concept of religion to a Hindu. That is the reason why observance of its precepts became all the more obligatory upon the people of ancient India... rules of international law were generally respected and observed in ancient India, and there was an *implicit* [italics mine]

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[367]Derrett, op. cit., p. 359.
[368]Chatterjee, op. cit., p. 1.
[369]Derrett, op. cit., p. 359.

understanding among states to this effect. This mutual understanding and reverence for the principles laid down by Dharma constituted the very essence of International Law in ancient India[370]

Bozeman observes, during a thorough analysis of the uniqueness of Western law, that international law is "...a collection of norms adapted from the laws, ethics, religion, and customs of a number of nations related to the Occidental culture realm...."[371]

These last two quotations display that international law developed as a unique construct within the cultural realms of different states systems. "...the Law of Nations falls very short of *universality*... and thus there may be a *different* Law of Nations for *different* parts of the globe."[372] The important point to extract is that, due to a number of distinctive cultural characteristics, international law in the West developed uniquely into unmistakably secular positive international law. (It should not be forgotten that this secular form of international law did originate to a large extent from a Christian moral base.)

> The influence, indeed the need, of philosophical, religious, and ethical considerations was usually affirmed as helping to keep law in touch with life. Yet these considerations were not allowed to supplant law, or to disturb the integrity of law as an autonomous, separate, and, in the field of public order, superior, normative reference.[373]

Eventually it was this conception of the role of law that was to form the basis of positive modern international law, the fact that the development of laws between states in the states systems of non-Western cultures (as was the case in the ancient Chinese states system) did not follow the same path is not alone reason enough to conclude that international law did not exist in these states systems.

Law in ancient India functioned to maintain a religious order and cosmology. Dharma taught its believers to obey the duties of one's station in life. At no stage does it appear that law became a secular, autonomous, pursuit based purely on rational empiricism rather than myth

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[370]Chatterjee, ibid., p. 6.
[371]Bozeman, *Law in a Multicultural World*, p. 46.
[372]Ward, Robert P. cited in Bozeman, *Law in a Multicultural World*, p. 48.
[373]Bozeman, *Law in a Multicultural World*, p. 38.

or religious teachings. The ancient Indian sovereign followed dharma and the teachings of the Mahabharata in his dealings with other states. Hence the aim of becoming the Chakravartin, or ruler of the world, was justified by dharma. Strategy dictates that rules should be made to regulate inter-state relations, especially when foes are evenly matched, even though the eventual aim is defeat of the opposite party. For this reason most of ancient Indian international law focused on rules of war. These rules of war were based on the ancient Hindu texts and gained more respect as a result.

Overall, the varying opinion on the presence of international law in ancient India exists because those that deny its existence are searching for secular, positive, *explicit* maxims of international law as it is considered to exist in modern, contemporary, international society. This kind of international law did not exist in ancient India, and the laws between states that did exist did not meet the criteria of international law as defined by Bull, i.e., it did not aim to protect the principle that the division of humanity and territory into sovereign states is the ultimate form of international political organisation. There was, however, a limited function for international law in ancient India; for example, it did state rules for coexistence among the states of the ancient Indian states system. This limited form of international law largely focused on laws governing appropriate conduct in war, treaty arrangements, and other inter-state interaction, and was *implicitly* upheld by dharma or laws established and maintained through the overarching religious order.

Conclusion

A definite concept of the state and state sovereignty were present in ancient India. These states existed in an anarchical environment in which power and conquest was all important. Sovereigns aimed to establish a universal empire in order to secure eventual peace on the Indian subcontinent. More often than not this aim was not secured and an anarchical environment, where the 'big fish consumed the little fish', persisted.

There is evidence that some of the institutions of an international society were present and provided international order in a limited form. Reliance on secondary literature makes it difficult to be conclusive about the existence, or otherwise, of a few of the institutions, especially the balance of power and international law. However, it seems the role of the Brahmins and the Hindu belief system were instrumental to the institutional maintenance of

diplomacy, war, and international law.

Modelski supports this latter point in his analysis of Kautilya's Arthasastra.[374] His argument is that the Brahmins or priestly caste actually had an interest in limiting royal power as if royal power was to grow too extensive then it may have threatened the position of the Brahmins and indeed the caste system as a whole. The Brahmins preferred a low solidarity or immature international system with little inter-caste communication between regions, except among themselves. This also explains the monopoly that the Brahmins had over the diplomatic system. The stability of the system rested on the caste system at village level, controlled by the higher castes. Hence foreign invaders met little unified resistance, but the basic social system has remained stable for millennia.

In the light of the framework utilised in this analysis a clear viewpoint is discernible. Some of the institutions of an international society did exist in the ancient (pre-modern) Indian multi-state system, but they were present as a result of a common culture and religion rather than as a result of functional inter-state organisational efforts. Only some of the institutions that provide order in an international society evolved, in a gemeinschaft manner, to anywhere near an effective level. As was the case in Western Europe, common cultural norms provided the foundations for limited development of an international society. In contrast, however, it does not appear that in ancient India a society of independent sovereign states ever came to be considered as a viable international political order.

Part Two: Independent India and International Society

For almost two millennia after the decline and collapse of the Mauryan empire the Indian subcontinent was not united under Hindu-based Indian rule. The Guptas did not manage to control southern India to the extent that the Mauryan Empire had. India was either divided or ruled and influenced by foreign powers and their religions until it gained independence from British rule in 1947.

Prior to the establishment of British suzerainty over the majority of Indian states on the subcontinent, relations between European powers and Indian states had been conducted on a

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[374]Modeleski, op. cit., pp. 559 - 560.

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more or less equal footing. In the sixteenth century the Portuguese traded and negotiated with Indian rulers both as allies and enemies in localised conflicts. Their control of the sea made them valuable allies, but their power did not extend on to the land and, therefore, the Moghuls had little need to alter their system of rule to accommodate early European newcomers.[375]

The presence of a strong Moghul empire in the sixteenth century meant that European powers had to negotiate with local potentates in a fashion similar to vassals of the Moghul Empire rather than as independent and equal entities. Moghul decline, and after that Maratha decline, allowed the British East India Company to consolidate their trading position in India. The British incrementally established a suzerainty of their own over various areas of India in competition with other European powers (who retained control of some areas). A gradual export of ideas and practices from the European states system to India accompanied this.

After 1857, the establishment of firm British control over what had been the Moghul Empire meant that India ceased to be an independent actor within the international system. However, the principles behind the European society of states, especially absolute sovereign jurisdiction and legal sovereign equality (along with English liberalism), found their way into the minds of the Western educated Indian elite. This gradual osmosis of ideas facilitated the birth of a nationalist struggle for independence from British rule. With the rise of nationalist sentiment a uniquely Indian perspective on inter-state relations again began to emerge. Not since the exclusively Indian geopolitical environment that existed prior to Greek invasion, which had fostered the unique legends, thoughts, and policies of the ancient texts, had there been such a development of a distinctly Indian worldview.

This analysis of independent India and international society is largely an historical overview of the evolution of a new and unique Indian approach to international affairs. This evolution began in tandem with the growth of Indian nationalism, which was embodied in the rise of the Indian National Congress Party (INC) after 1885. Before and after India gained its independence from the British Raj there were a number of policies and personalities that represented the growing Indian perspective of the international system. The next section aims to interpret how the historical period covered, from the rise of the INC through to the end of

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[375]Bull and Watson. op. cit., pp. 19 - 29.

the Cold War, has influenced India's understanding of, and participation in, the institutions of the global international society.

The Indian National Congress (INC)

British India and its foreign policy, especially prior to the establishment of the INC, was "...wholly controlled by Her Majesty's Government... [and was] directed towards the furtherance of British interests."[376] During the 19th century the British were concerned with limiting Russian influence in the region. A number of buffer states, with the British controlling their external relations to prevent alliances with rival imperial powers (such as Russia), were established along the North and especially North-Western Indian borders. The international outlook of British India was principally concerned with the defence and security of the British Empire and its interests, which included both India itself and outlying British protectorates. In 1885 the INC was established and, even during British rule, it was able to develop policies and views that would form the foundation of India's outlook on world affairs and international society after independence. Knowledge of the outlook of the INC is essential to understanding India's post-independence foreign policy and worldview.

The INC's world view was conditioned by the following several factors: geopolitical proximity to China, Russia, and other countries in the Asian region, accompanied by India's vast size and population and the need to control the Indian ocean; an awareness of 'Greater India' in the form of cultural ties between India and other "indianised" countries - formed largely as a consequence of the spread of Indian religions (mainly Buddhism and Hinduism); the existence of separatist attitudes, principally in the shape of Indian Muslims' religious identification with the Middle East, the foundation of the Muslim league in 1906, and by partition in 1947; social and racial discrimination against Indians by the British and also against Indians overseas, for example, in South Africa; economic backwardness and general poverty - blamed on British exploitation of India's resources to enhance British prosperity and power; and, finally, the quest initially for greater participation of Indians in the administration of their country and, later, independence from Britain.[377]

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[376]Prasad, Bisheshwar. *The Foundations of India's Foreign Policy, 1860-1882,* (2nd ed.) Ranjit Printers and Publishers, Delhi, 1967, p. 263.

[377]Prasad, Bimla. *The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy: the Indian National Congress and World Affairs 1885-1947,* (2nd ed.), Bookland Private Ltd, Calcutta, 1962, pp. 2 - 6.

The nationalist aims of the INC overlaid all other factors in conditioning the INC's attitude toward world affairs. However, possibly because of the links created through the British Empire, the nationalists were not isolationist in nature. Rather, there were mixed attitudes that arose from conflict between a sense of isolation from the power politics of the European great powers and a desire to have an international voice that would enable India to break free of the British and other Great Powers' monopoly over the international system and general world affairs. The use of India's resources to further British interests in Europe fostered resentment in India.[378] European power politics were considered as a British interest only and irrelevant to the nationalist cause in India.

Yet India was a part of the British Empire and, as a consequence, involved in wider international relations. This forced the INC to take notice, to wish for a voice in Great Power co-operative forums, and generally introduced it to the institutional processes and principles of the European society of states. Owing to total British control, India's earlier involvement with European international society was significantly different from those independent or semi-independent, non-European, states (such as China and Japan) that contended directly with the expectations of the standard of civilisation.[379] Although its standards and inherent values were probably used to justify British rule in India, as far as the INC was concerned meeting the standard was not a practical possibility without sovereign independence - highlighting the imperative of complete independence to India's full entry into international society.

India's experience as a British possession led the INC to develop a dislike of foreign

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[378]ibid., p. 8.

[379]None the less, India was indirectly influenced and entangled in the legacy left by the standard of civilisation. The standard and its accompanying extraterritoriality treaties and policies, for example, were tied to India's post-independence relations with Tibet and thereby the PRC. Shortly after independence, Nehru announced that India would not feel bound by treaties about which it had not been consulted, a similar sentiment to that of the PRC towards the unequal treaties. Yet, "India being a successor to a colonial power could not but stick to the boundaries of British India or else there would be no criteria to determine her territory." See Van Eekelen, W.F. *Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China*, (2nd Edition), Martinus Nijhoff. The Hague, 1967, pp. 78 & 104. The difficulty and contradictions involved in disentanglement from what India considered British imperial intervention in Tibet contributed to disagreement over the border with the PRC, which eventually led to the 1962 border war.

occupations and imperialism throughout the world. The INC took a moral and spiritually superior stance against power politics and advocated the virtues of peace and friendship among nations. The INC opposed British expansionist policies and actions; for example, it consistently opposed the British 'forward policy' against Russian influence and also the British annexation of Upper Burma. The Japanese defeat of Russia in 1904-5 was an example of an Asian nation standing up to, and prevailing against, a large European power. This, alongside internal discontent with the British administration of India, led to the first calls for self-government, or swaraj, from INC meetings during 1905 and 1906. The INC and its policies came to be dominated by the leadership of two men in particular. The development of the INC's and India's view of the international system and society of states can be assessed at this point through a discussion of the role and policies advocated by these two men.

Gandhi and Nehru

Mohandas Karamchand Gandhi[380] (1869-1948) emerged as a leader in Indian politics, the INC, and the independence movement during World War I. Gandhi was a trained lawyer, and returned to India in 1915 after campaigning for the legal rights of Indians in South Africa. India's contribution to the Allied war effort and frequent proclamations on the right to self-determination by Allied leaders raised hopes for independence and political reform in India. However, after World War I, the British-Indian government repressed rather than encouraged reform. Gandhi's response was to initiate movements of civil disobedience and non-cooperation - methods that were to become trademark Gandhian policies.

Disappointment with the British response to Indian requests for self-determination led the All Indian Congress Committee in 1921 to approve its first formal declaration of independence from British foreign policy. The object of non-cooperation and rejection of British control over India's foreign affairs was not to isolate India from the West but rather,

> ...the dominant conscious urge of Indian nationalism as it grew under Gandhi's leadership was not isolation, but international cooperation. Alongside absolute determination to free India from foreign rule stood a readiness to shed part of that freedom, if it became necessary, in order to cooperate with a larger group of nations.... The better mind of the

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[380]Or Mahatma (great soul) Gandhi.

world, he [Gandhi] said, desired not absolutely independent states warring one against another, but a federation of friendly inter-dependent states.[381]

These sentiments reveal that Gandhi had a vision of India participating, internationally, more within a society of states than simply within a system of states.

Jawaharlal Nehru (1889-1964) was a Kashmiri Brahmin. He was the only son of a wealthy barrister and therefore enjoyed the benefits of belonging both to the aristocratic caste of the Hindu social system and also those advantages that normally accompany wealth - for example, a privileged education at Harrow and Cambridge.

Nehru, Gandhi, and the INC, objected to imperialism in general, and this also led to feelings of affinity with other Asian countries that had experienced a foreign yoke. Nehru was the INC representative at the International Congress against Imperialism held at Brussels in 1927.[382] This forum greatly influenced Nehru, and through him the INC, and increased Indian interest in other Asian and African nationalist movements, and overall Pan-Asian, anti-imperialist, sentiment.[383] Because the Communists were anti-imperialist and were an active faction in the LAI, Nehru became sympathetic to the communist movement and the Soviet Union. This sympathy was not adequate for a stable relationship with the LAI, as the communists expelled Nehru from the organisation in 1931. In the same period American support for India's call for independence was of growing importance. However there is no doubt that Nehru favoured a Marxist (or at least a socialist), class based, interpretation of history.

Nehru and Gandhi differed on several fronts. Gandhi sought Dominion status while Nehru and other younger INC members sought full independence. On the question of India's defence after the British left, Nehru didn't think that any country was in a position to attack India, he argued that great power competition would not allow any one power to occupy India and other great powers would form a coalition to defend India against the aggressor - in this case Nehru applied classic balance of power theory to support his argument.[384] Gandhi,

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[381]ibid., p. 74.
[382]Later to be known as the League against Imperialism (LAI).
[383]ibid., p. 80.
[384]ibid., pp. 115 - 6.

on the other hand, still considered India's defence in terms of British protection and, failing that, through the application of civil disobedience directed at any invader.

The onset of World War II presented new opportunities for India to further its struggle for independence. Gandhi, Nehru, and the INC set independence as a condition for full Indian support of Britain's war effort. During the war years the INC developed a concept of a new world order in which independent India would have to function and would, hopefully, take a leading role. This concept rested around the eradication of imperialism and involved the creation of a federation of nations. Only this way could the principles of non-violence and the end of war be achieved. Indian independence was a precondition and a firm step on this road towards a peaceful new world order. Feelings of solidarity with China and other Asian nations also increased in this period, and were linked to the idea of a new world order.

> For China and India will have a powerful effect on the shape of things to come, whatever that shape may be. This is not only because of the vast numbers of human beings that live in these two countries... not only because of their rich and tremendous past heritage; but because of their enormous resources and potential political and economic strength. There is much talk of a new order and world co-operation. There can be no stable order or effective co-operation in the world if China and India are ignored...[385]

The history of the INC, and those members who were dominant in its development, especially Gandhi and Nehru, formed the raw material from which independent India's view of international society was eventually created. This view had a revisionist bent, and its anti-imperialist agenda was supported by decolonisation and the resultant establishment of many new states in the international system. Essentially, the INC's early history was centred on gaining equal and independent membership for India in the erstwhile 'Europeans only' international society. This desire was reflected in India's foreign policy after it gained independence on August the 15th, 1947.

The Post-1947 Indian World View - Nonalignment and the Cold War

...the principle source of Indian thinking on the subject of world affairs is neither

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[385]Nehru speaking in 1940, cited by Prasad, *The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy*, p. 188.

Hinduism, Buddhism, Gandhianism, the Western European tradition, nor a rational analysis of reality in terms of India's long-range national interest, but the complex biography of the Prime Minister [Nehru].[386]

This comment, written in the 1950's, raises the question of from whence the Prime Minister's thoughts on world affairs were derived? Nevertheless, it is a reflection of the extent to which Nehru's thoughts dominated India's post-independence foreign policy. Independent India's foreign policy closely followed Nehru's 1944 prison writings. He perceived a big role for India in international society, alongside great powers such as the United States, China, Britain and the Soviet Union. He forecast that the Pacific would come to replace the Atlantic as the nerve centre of the world and that India would exert considerable influence, especially as a regional Asian power, in the Pacific, South East Asia, the Middle East and the Indian Ocean.[387]

-Nehru's emphasis on Asian unity and anti-imperialism would find expression in a number of conferences and movements during this period. These movements provided fora for India to expound its views on the international environment of the time.

India and the INC were disappointed with the 1945 San Francisco conference, which promulgated the charter for the United Nations, for two reasons. It not only denied them a permanent seat on the Security Council, (largely because of India's lack of independent status) but also displayed that the great powers were unwilling to give up their 'non-self governing territories'. This added momentum to India's anti-imperialism and anti-colonialism movements. In the 1947 Asian Relations Conference (ARC) Nehru focused on obtaining the political freedom of Asian and African countries. The ARC in particular conditioned Nehru's attitude toward the Superpowers - importantly, in his mind the Soviets had a better record as non-imperialists.[388]

The first signs of Sino-Indian rivalry for leadership in Asia were seen during the ARC. This kind of rivalry would continue to be a feature of relations between the two countries. None

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[386]Bozeman, Adda. "India's Foreign Policy Today" in *World Politics*, Vol. 10/2, 1958, p. 273.
[387]Prasad, *The Origins of Indian Foreign Policy*, p. 241.
[388]ibid., p. 261.

the less, the two states co-operated in signing the 1954 Sino-Indian treaty, which included 'Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence' or Panchsheel (a term that refers to rules of conduct preached by Buddha).[389] Panchsheel was a vehicle that allowed India to again express its support for the anti-colonial cause and the sovereign independence principle. The 1955 Bandung conference provided another forum for India to push the principles of Panchsheel that, arguably, resemble more closely the UN Charter than the teachings of Buddha. The Bandung conference was an illustration of the strength that the 'Afro-Asian voice' had at the time, although India was concerned that it would favour China's objectives more than its own and therefore came to prefer a more exclusive non-alignment agenda (in accordance with the Belgrade summit discussed below) in preference to an Afro-Asian one.[390] The principles that came out of the Bandung conference were along the same lines, with a few additions, as those expressed in Panchsheel.

India's history of foreign occupation led it to formulate policies that rejected power politics and expansionism in general.[391] The first non-aligned conference was held in Belgrade in 1961 during which the five principles were also raised. The Belgrade summit came out strongly in support of the principle of non-intervention, but added the caveat that intervention could be justified if it protected world peace. The policy of non-alignment was a product of India's history and an expression of its stance against imperialism and colonialism. By promoting the non-aligned movement (NAM) and a general avoidance of military alliances,

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[389]These principles are as follows: "... mutual respect for each other's territorial integrity and sovereignty; mutual non-aggression; mutual non-interference in each another's internal affairs; equality and mutual benefit; and peaceful co-existence." *Foreign Policy of India: Texts of Documents 1947-59,* p. 104, cited in Rajan, M.S. *India in World Affairs 1954-56,* Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1964, p. 51.

[390]Thakur, Ramesh. *The Politics and Economics of India's Foreign Policy,* Hurst and Company, London, 1994, pp. 17 - 18.

[391]The phrase 'foreign occupation' here refers principally to previous rule by the British Raj. Of note is the fact that India continued to foster reasonably amicable relations with Britain after independence. The main vehicle of Indo-British relations was the Commonwealth of Nations. Immediately after independence in 1947, India's membership of the Commonwealth was criticised, especially by the Soviet Union and China, as compromising India's non-alignment policy. However: "From the Indian point of view, then, the Commonwealth was (and is) a free association of independent, sovereign states which for historical reasons has come together and maintained that connexion for the purpose of promoting certain common interests and goals, the most important of which was the maintenance and promotion of international peace and security.... The Commonwealth association was not the political counterpart of a military alliance or pact....", Rajan, op. cit., p. 342. By 1955 this Indian view of its Commonwealth membership was accepted by its non-aligned movement associates.

India sought to free the United Nations from Cold War power politics, and to prevent further bi-polarisation of the international system. For the NAM, and the newly independent countries that by and large supported it, the movement was an assertion of their national identity in a Cold War environment that gave them influence above and beyond their actual military or economic power.[392]

The central concerns of NAM shifted along with changed international circumstances. Its origins unquestionably lay in a reflexive antipathy by the new states towards attempts at assimilating their identity into the Cold War rivalry. The three co-founders of the movement were united in their opposition to great-power alliances: Egypt to the Baghdad Pact, India to the Baghdad Pact and SEATO, and Yugoslavia to the Warsaw Pact.[393]

The development of an overall Indian world view that emphasised moral and principled behaviour is plain to see. This image of India was damaged internationally when it used force to reclaim Goa in 1961. The five principles were undermined when it seemed that they were ineffective in preventing the Chinese-Indian border dispute in 1962. This war also undermined the non-aligned movement, as it became clear that it was responsible for leaving India without an ally to provide military aid or support. Incidents in Kashmir,[394] Goa, and the 1962 conflict with China, made it difficult for India to maintain its moral posture and it had to resort to a more realpolitik policy framework,[395] including a realisation of the importance of relations with Western powers.

The Cold War environment was defined by the bipolar relationship between the two superpowers. Although India made an effort to keep itself and its region free of Cold War alliances, the emergence of Pakistan as a security threat to India led to the eventual embroilment of India in the Cold War stand-off. Failed US attempts to draw India into the

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[392]Van Eekelen, W.F. *Indian Foreign Policy and the Border Dispute with China*, Martinus Nijhoff, The Hague, 1967, p. 2.
[393]Thakur, op. cit., p. 19.
[394]The Kashmir dispute began in 1947 after the Maharaja of Kashmir's accession to the Indian Union in 1947 resulted in occupation of the area by both Pakistani and Indian troops. UN-mediated cease fires, other international mediation and bilateral efforts have all consistently failed to settle the Kashmir issue. Bitterness, hostility and emotional tirades stemming from the conflict in Kashmir were particularly damaging to India's preferred international reputation and to its relations with great powers (particularly the US) during the Cold War. ibid., pp. 56 - 57.

anti-Soviet alliance led to US-Pakistani alignment, which Pakistan used to offset India's superior power in the region, but this had the effect of pushing India further towards the Soviet camp. The early development of this pattern to the Indian-US- Soviet relationship more or less survived until the end of the Cold War.[396]

The 1949 Communist victory in China, its revolutionary demands for change in the international system, and its alliance with the Soviet Union in the 1950's, strengthened India's bargaining power with the West. India appeared as a moderate in comparison to China.[397] India's relations with the superpowers during the Cold War fluctuated in accordance with India's security interests. Sino-American rapprochement in the 1970s, for example, led India to be concerned about Pakistani-Chinese-American interference in its internal affairs, and, on the other hand, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, although not publicly condemned by India, certainly damaged Indo-Soviet relations. Despite non-alignment and non-violent principles as well as rhetoric condemning power politics, India was drawn into, and played an important part in, the bipolar alliance system during the Cold War period.

Conclusions: Marginalised India and International Society

The course of history that led to India's independence in 1947, and events beyond, were crucial to the development of India's future relationship with the institutions of international society. The sections above have illustrated the main forces behind the evolution and conditioning of independent India's perspective on international relations. Specifically, these were: the struggle for independence from foreign domination, resulting in strong anti-imperialist sentiment and strident defence of the sovereignty principle; the personalities and goals of India's charismatic leaders; affinity and institutional ties with other (former) colonised or semi-colonised states (arguably this affinity is as much tied to levels of economic development as it is to a common history); partition and resultant security concerns; and the general strategic environment, in relation to regional level powers, as well as to the overriding superpower stand-off that was the Cold War.

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[395]Van Eekelen, op. cit., p. 78.
[396]Ayoob, Mohammed. *India and South East Asia: India's Perceptions and Policies*, Routledge, London and NY, 1990, pp. 4 - 5.
[397]ibid., p. 4.

The combined influence of these factors generated independent India's radical revisionist stance during the Cold War period, i.e. India generally accepted the existing structure of Cold War international society but advocated reform in certain areas. This stance inevitably influenced India's view on the role of the institutions of international society. In particular, India's strongly idealist views did not enable acceptance of the balance of power as an institution promoting order in the society of states, or the acceptance of war as a tool to enforce it.

However, India's early involvement with the European society of states, through the British-Indian administrative system, led to its early and reasonably efficacious utilisation of international law and diplomatic institutions. India favoured these institutions of order as means to advocate reform of international society during the Cold War period. The adoption of the Panchsheel principles and their similarity to United Nations charter principles were evidence of India's acceptance of the same general legal principles that uphold the society of states. Nevertheless, whether self-imposed or forced by the international environment that then existed, it is argued that, during the Cold War era, India was marginalised in relation to the core of international society.

Since independence India has increasingly positioned itself, or has been positioned, in the periphery of international society. Several factors have contributed to this marginalisation process, many of them stemming from India's world view, and also from the path by which India joined the global international society. India has become part of the society of states incrementally, principally by gesellschaft rather than gemeinschaft means. India's democratic system and its commonwealth membership/history, however, has provided it with a common identity in respect of core states, and which has thereby facilitated some gemeinschaft style entry into the society of states.

Nevertheless, during the Cold War India's world view, very much conditioned by its history, in tandem with a particular gesellschaft type of development, combined to position India in the periphery as a radical revisionist. Unlike the PRC, India was not diplomatically alienated from international society as an effect of Communist Party rule, but was instead marginalised on the periphery as the result of a particular revisionist nature that characterised its gesellschaft manner of integration.

This point is demonstrated by India's Cold War membership of international organisations. India's non-alignment, and other associated policies, effectively encouraged its membership of Cold War organisations which differed from, and opposed, those of the dominant Western states and, thereby, the majority of the most powerful core states of the global international society. Moreover, India and Nehru's clear sympathy with the Soviet camp (exemplified from the West's perspective by the 1971 signing of the Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation with the Soviet Union) pushed India even further away from the Western camp. In general, India's membership of international organisations and attendance at conferences such as the LAI, the NAM, Bandung, and the Asian Relations Conference, added to its marginalisation by the states of the Western alliance and consequently the core of international society.

However, somewhat ironically, it is membership of and attendance at just these kinds of fora, among others,[398] which has contributed to India's gesellschaft type integration into the global international society. Even those organisations committed to reform of the institutions of international society, such as the Group of 77 and the NAM, have still provided evidence of an acceptance of the most basic structure of the society of states, and acted to demonstrate that India advocated reform not revolution during the Cold War era. An example of this, reasonably mild, revisionist stance of India's is found in its early views on the institution of war in respect of United Nations law enforcement.

> Immediately after achieving independence, it was made clear by the Government of India that it would be prepared to adopt *any measures not involving the use of armed force* for the purpose of carrying out effectively the Security Council's decision regarding an offender against international peace.... [However,] [t]he United Nations had to possess sufficient collective force to regulate the use of arbitrary force by individual states.... [and] India itself strongly supported the idea that the force available to the United

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[398]Apart from the regimes associated with nuclear proliferation, India is also presently a member or signatory to a plethora of international organisations and conventions. This includes many United Nations based organisations and conventions concerning human rights (for example the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights) and the environment (for example, the 1987 Montreal Protocol on chlorofleurocarbons). With regard to international environmental conventions, India (along with the PRC) generally argues the case of the developing world. In other words, that the costs associated with sustainable economic development in the 'South' should be met by the developed nations. This was the general stance taken during the 1992 United Nations Conference on Environment and Development in Rio de Janeiro by both India and China.

Nations, whether immediately or potentially, should be stronger than that available to any state or group of states.[399]

Such policy, which reflected India's world view concerning power politics, placed India, in Buzan's terms, in the outer circles (periphery) of international society but none the less still as an absolute insider (see Figure 2.5). Thus, India's membership of revisionist orientated international organisations acted to signal India's basic acceptance of international norms. This, in conjunction with United Nations membership and respect for the institutions of international society, especially international law, allowed independent India to integrate in a functional manner into international society. However, such membership also contributed to India's peripheral position in relation to the core states of the Cold War society of states.[400]

The bipolar conflict made the international environment unforgiving in respect of radical revisionists of the status quo. In a 'if you are not for us you must be for them' climate, regardless of whether anti-imperialism or non-aligned states had communist sympathies or not, they were classed as outsiders. India's support of a revisionist stance with regard to international norms and behaviour, and its association with states that were either revolutionary revisionists, for instance the Soviet Union, or simply in some measure against the predominant capitalist order, forced it into a marginalised or peripheral status. In short, although it increased India's strategic importance, the Cold War environment also acted to reinforce India's revisionist and peripheral status.

Strategic concerns came to challenge India's anti-imperialist, anti-force, views in the mid to late stages of the Cold War, especially after the 1962 border war with the PRC, when India was made more aware of its military vulnerability. India's importance to Cold War alliance systems was of course noticeably diminished in the post-Cold War era. The end of the Cold War has challenged India's world view and influenced how it perceives of international society.

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[399]Rana, Swadesh. "India, the United Nations, and World Peace", in Rajan, M.S. (ed.).
India's Foreign Relations during the Nehru Era, Asia Publishing House, Bombay, 1976, p. 265.
[400]Although, in the case of radical revisionists, acceptance of international norms may be stimulated by a consciousness of their relative power weaknesses and by the recognition that they are not in a position to force concessions to their revisionist agenda from the status quo powers. Consequently, radical revisionist powers perceive that progress can be made only by

Part Three: Post-Cold War India and International Society

Part Three of this Chapter begins by briefly outlining the changes initiated in India's foreign policy and its overall world view as a consequence of the end of the Cold War. This leads to an analysis of India's general position (in the context of the concentric circles of commitment model) in relation to the other states of post-Cold War international society. Finally, in order to gauge India's potential to influence its future role and position in relation to other member states, India is evaluated as a rising power in respect of the institutions of post-Cold War international society.

The conclusion of the Cold War bipolar international system had a significant impact on India. At a conceptual level, the bipolar world encouraged 'self-help' behaviour, which engendering system consolidation (as per Kaufman's four forces of consolidation and fragmentation). The end of this system has promoted system fragmentation through the intensification of the 'unit identity' force, although this trend has been counteracted by increasing economic interdependence, backed by a system with a generally high level of administrative capability or social technology. The initial shift toward system fragmentation confronted India with an uncertain environment in which interactive options increased.

The collapse of the Soviet Union certainly created some strategic concerns for India. These include the formation of several independent Muslim states in Central Asia capable of supporting or even enhancing Pakistani power (forcing India into a greater reliance on US support), the disruption of defence supplies and a major export market, new competitors for foreign aid, and increased vulnerability to unfavourable resolutions in the United Nations.

Besides these relatively clear-cut concerns there has also been some anxiety after the Cold War about core Indian foreign policy, such as the basic thrust of the NAM. The collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War raised questions as to the continued relevance of the movement. To the extent that the NAM provided the basis of much of India's foreign policy, and is representative of India's world view, these questions on the relevance of the policy are a challenge to India's stance on international affairs and to its understanding of its

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negotiation. Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, pp. 309 & 310.

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position within international society.

Without a marked polarity in the international system it appears, at first glance, that the NAM has indeed outlived its relevance. India's increasingly interdependent relationship with Western states, particularly the United States, seems to challenge at least some of the definitional aspects of the non-aligned policy.[401] As Thakur notes: "The end of the Cold War means that nonalignment joins containment [of the USSR] in fading into obsolescence."[402]

However, the 1992 NAM summit at Jakarta was a firm attempt to ensure that the movement did not dissolve. Ninety five out of one hundred and eight members were present in Jakarta, where the NAM was redefined, very generally, as an anti-hegemonic, anti-bloc, movement. It was concluded that the movement should aim to promote UN reform, to ensure the sovereign integrity of states, and to prevent all manner of contemporary ills (not forgetting that there was also suggestion made that the NAM simply be amalgamated into the Group of 77). During this conference "... India continued to insist on the relevance and validity of the policy/movement of nonalignment.... It was, naturally, a signatory to the Joint Declaration of the Tenth (Jakarta) Nonalignment Summit Conference..."[403] This declaration stated that the continued relevance of the NAM was "... corroborated by the recent changes around the world.... The changes that have occurred in the world do not alter, nor do they diminish, the validity of the basic principles and objectives of the Movement; on the contrary, they reinforce the determination to remain free from domination by any quarter."[404]

The above points illustrate that the end of the Cold War, and the considerable change precipitated by it, has had a significant effect on India's place in the international environment. Nevertheless, India still seeks to continue the general thrust of its foreign policy, conditioned by its history of foreign domination and its struggle for independence, as it has existed since the independence movement began. However, although the legacy of

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[401]The Indo-US relationship had already begun to expand prior to the end of the Cold War, with joint military exercises and US support of Indian peace keeping efforts in Sri Lanka. Moreover, the economic liberalisation of the Indian economy, principally since the fiscal crisis of 1991, has increased opportunities for Indo-US trade and relations.

[402]Thakur, Ramesh. "Indian After Nonalignment", *Foreign Affairs*, Spring 1992, p.180.

[403]Rajan, M.S. "The Goals of India's Foreign Policy", *International Studies*, 35, 1, 1998, p. 80.

[404]Final Document, Chapter II, Paragraph 21. UN Document A/47/675, cited in Rajan, ibid., pp. 80 - 81.

history still continues to exert significant influence, it is also clear that changes due to the end of the Cold War are influencing India's contemporary policy structure.

Gordon suggests that India's moralising and judgmental posturing has diminished after the end of the Cold War. "What has been referred to as India's 'great pontifications' on moral issues have also been largely set aside."[405] The Gulf War and the attendant financial crisis brought home to the authorities in Delhi that the international order had indeed changed, i.e. it was perceived by the Indians that the Gulf War occurred as it did because of the lack of a strong Soviet presence in the Middle East.

> The Gulf crisis itself triggered a crisis in Indian foreign policy. Although some senior members of the Congress party... argued for an 'anti-imperialist' stand against the US position, the old shibboleths of the Soviet alliance, the NAM, and even Third World unity, were generally seen for what they were, that is, as totally ineffectual in the world of the new order.[406]

Thus, India's world view faced some shocks and has shifted as a result of the end of the Cold War, but some key factors, with a clear historical origin, continue to exert influence on its position in relation to other members of international society. India is not a permanent member of the Security Council and generally has issue with non-proliferation regimes, especially the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) and the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT). As a non-European state in an international society dominated by states with a strong European cultural heritage it is in a less favourable position to achieve a gemeinschaft based membership. Moreover, India still has a Third World power, anti-capitalist, legacy. As with the PRC (*vide* Chapter Four) India's further integration into international society contests its multiple identities, as a non-European culture, a civilisational state, a developing nation, and as a rising power.

Yet, arguably, India is closer in identity to the core of international society than the PRC because of its domestic democratic system and the effects of its closer historical association with the British. Moreover, increased dependence on international financial organisations,

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[405]Gordon, Sandy. *India's Rise to Power in the Twentieth Century and Beyond*, St Martin's Press, 1995, pp. 337 & 351.
[406]ibid., p. 252.

principally the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank (WB), has resulted, perforce, in the acceptance of some core financial norms contrary to the anti-market, anti-capitalist ones that previously held sway.

India, therefore, finds itself progressing on a path of further gesellschaft integration and, based on its common democratic identity with the core, to some extent gemeinschaft integration into international society - as will be assessed in greater depth below. These processes have been slowed by the influence of both residual but persistent historical views and the security difficulties that India still faces as both a developing and weak state. India is in transition and exists as a relative outsider on the periphery through gradually integrating (and vice versa) with the inner circle or core of international society.

India as a Rising Power in International Society

In order to demonstrate India's capacity to direct its future relationship within the society of states the following section assesses post-Cold War India as a rising power in international society and examines whether India can still fairly be classed as a radical revisionist state. The question addressed in the later part of this section is about India's possible revisionist threat to status quo international society. In other words, are India's revisionist goals moderate enough to allow it to act less as a challenger and more as a status quo state and thereby bolster the international order as it is maintained by status quo international society? After an initial examination of the nature of India's rising power this section will proceed with an institution by institution analysis.

The Nature of India's Rising Power

First and foremost, is India to be classed as a rising power? "The perspective on what constitutes power [in post-Cold War India] has broadened to incorporate competition in the international marketplace and international peacekeeping activities as well as the more traditional emphasis on purely military power."[407] India has always enjoyed a good measure of soft power as a result if its active participation in international organisations such as the United Nations, especially when the Cold War conflict acted to increase India's diplomatic

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[407]ibid., p. 337.

weight. Gordon's quotation suggests that such participation is now much more considered by India as a power base. As was argued in Chapter Four, the strongest argument for classing the PRC as a rising power is its rapidly growing economic strength, is this also the case for India?

> In military terms, India is not yet truly powerful beyond its immediate sphere of South Asia, and even its power in that venue is contested. Nor has India yet obtained the kind of global influence through 'soft' power that might be expected of such a large country. In terms of economic performance, many other Asian nations, such as the mega-population power, China, have been drawing away from India. [However].... as far as India's Indian Ocean region is concerned, its power *potential* [italics mine] is very high when viewed in comparative terms.[408]

This is a typical assessment of Indian power. Economic growth is not, in itself, sufficient reason to consider India as a rising power, although growth in recent years has certainly drawn attention to this aspect. The same can be said about India's military power, and indeed, most of the other possible forms of power available to it. India's contestable classification as a rising power amounts to recognition of the sheer physical and demographic size of the state, particularly in regional terms. Because its huge and burgeoning population, at this stage of development, is as much a burden as a basis for power, it and other related forms of power are frequently considered by many commentators in terms of India's power *potential*.

India's potential to rise and become a very powerful state depends on its ability to sustain economic growth at a rate that enables it to increase its power in other areas and, thereby, to stabilise those factors that threaten to derail its progress. Since the mid-seventies, the Indian economy has undergone progressive liberalisation, which, overall, has resulted in an increased economic growth rate far greater than previous pre-reform levels. India, and its various political parties, now appears committed to a process of economic reform and liberalisation in accordance with World Trade Organisation, International Monetary Fund, and World Bank requirements. In the final analysis, notwithstanding some deep-set difficulties that must be overcome, there is reason for optimism about the sustainability of the economic reform programme and, therefore, higher than average growth in the Indian

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[408]ibid., pp. 1 & 13.

economy.[409]

Should India continue to achieve good levels of economic growth then it appears that it will follow typical and expected patterns of converting the advantages of successful economic growth into an expanded military capability. Increased economic growth in India has generally been followed by increased military expenditure.[410] The end result of this is that India's "...technological and productive capabilities are within the next decade likely to outweigh those of any other nation in the Indian Ocean littoral and immediate hinterland, with the possible exception of Australia."[411]

The question of sustainability is crucial to a hypothesis that is based on power potential. Cohen and Park, for instance, agree that India is a rising power with great power potential, but this opinion is almost inevitably accompanied by qualifications.[412] Advantages, such as a good technological base and a grand scale economy and population, are weighed against disadvantages, such as bureaucratic dysfunction and widespread poverty. India is thus portrayed, and sees itself, as a weak-strong power (or in the terms outlined previously India is a large weak state).[413] It is well-nigh impossible, therefore, to make an accurate or certain prediction as to whether rising Indian power is sustainable in the long term and whether India's eventual classification as a great power is inevitable. Nevertheless, it is relatively incontestable to state that India is currently a power on the rise, albeit at an early stage in this process, and that this is largely based on improved economic growth over the past decade. Moreover, especially since independence, India has striven to establish itself as a regional power, and in this respect it is a rising power already of considerable influence. Consequently, India's status as a revisionist state, or otherwise, should be considered first and foremost in regional terms. This perspective is generally reflected in the analysis to follow.

The next section, which assesses India as a rising power in terms of the institutions of international society, is based on the assumption that rising Indian power is sustainable but

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[409]Evans, Mark. "India Strives for Sustainability", *The New Zealand International Review*, September/October, 1998, pp. 14 - 18.
[410]Gordon, op. cit., p. 137. India is currently the world's third largest arms importer.
[411]ibid., p. 150.
[412]See, for example, Cohen, Stephen P. and Park, Richard L. *India: Emergent Power?*, Crane, Russak & Company, Inc., New York, 1978, especially page one.
[413]Gordon, op. cit., p. 337.

the analysis is not oblivious to the point that this assumption is debatable. However, before proceeding, it is necessary to consider India's recently acquired overt nuclear power status as this is a development that has ramifications for several of the institutions of the society of states and for India's status as a revisionist rising power.

India and the Nuclear Question

The following is by no means a comprehensive enquiry into the strategic implications of the reasonably recent South Asian nuclear tests, or of the role of nuclear weapons, either in the region or in international relations as a whole. Rather, it is a brief outline of the Indian perspective on nuclear weaponisation and proliferation. This perspective is summarised in order to provide a background against which the impact on the society of states of India's decision to become an overt nuclear power can be assessed later in this Chapter.

On the 11th and 13th of May, 1998, India conducted a series of nuclear tests and declared itself a nuclear weapons capable state. This action ended India's previous 'open option' policy, whereby, after the 'Peaceful Nuclear Explosion (PNE)' of 1974, India did not weaponise but displayed its technological capability and the availability or 'openness' of its option to develop nuclear weapons. Thus, India was able to manufacture a middle-of-the-road policy, which provided it with a modicum of nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis the PRC, as well as allowing it to continue in its role as a high-principled advocate of total nuclear disarmament.

After the end of the Cold War, the Indian leadership considered its open option policy no longer tenable. This was due to several factors. In May 1995, the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) was extended indefinitely. From India's perspective, this permanently legitimised nuclear weapons and the nuclear weapon status of the existing weapon states (i.e. the non-proliferation goal appeared to have replaced the goal of total disarmament, allowing weapon states to retain their nuclear status indefinitely). Moreover, agreements which had, perhaps debatably, previously existed as interim steps toward eventual total nuclear disarmament, for example, the Missile Technology Control Regime (MTCR), the Waassenar Arrangement, the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty (CTBT) and the Fissile Material Cut-Off Treaty (FMCT), had their original mandates

instead diverted towards strengthening and supporting the non-proliferation regime.[414]

As China and France both joined the NPT in 1992, and Pakistan had made its membership conditional on India's, this left India under considerable pressure to conform. It did not wish to sign the NPT as a non-nuclear power, and therefore cede to what it has called 'nuclear apartheid', or a nuclear have and have-nots club. This was especially so in the context of the regional environment, which was characterised by nuclear asymmetry. [415] Yet international pressure to acquiesce to non-proliferation regimes increasingly did not permit India to continue as a non-weaponised nuclear power either. Hence, in Jasjit Singh's view, India had no choice but to make the decision to implement a nuclear weaponisation programme.

Despite good strategic reasons and legitimate concerns over nuclear asymmetry, India's view on nuclear issues, and its refusal to accept a position as a confirmed non-nuclear state, has regularly left it offside with all but a small handful of states (for instance, when the United Nations General Assembly approved the text of the CTBT in September 1996, only Bhutan and Libya joined India in rejecting the treaty - the vote was 158 to 3).

> India's 'principled' opposition to the Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty is ... caught in a time warp. Whereas its argument in the 1960's that the Non-proliferation Treaty discriminated against the non nuclear states was principled, and was appreciated even by those who disagreed with it, India's hawkish position on the test ban - insisting it be linked to a timetable for total disarmament - is seen as sophistry and outdated power politics. The treaty meets many of India's long standing concerns, and Indians' understandable irritation at U.S. hypocrisy in preaching non-proliferation while practising deterrence should not be allowed to stand in the way of approval. India's signing of this universal non-discriminatory pact, every clause of which applies equally to all countries, should have been the crowning achievement of the campaign against nuclear testing that Nehru began in 1954.[416]

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[414]Singh, Jasjit. "Why Nuclear Weapons?", in Singh, Jasjit (ed.). *Nuclear India*, Knowledge World, New Delhi, 1998, pp. 22 & 23.

[415]Specifically, China's nuclear status and Pakistan's acquisition of nuclear technology from China display that "...India's nuclear policy since the early 1960's has been driven essentially by the China factor." ibid., p. 16.

[416]Thakur, Ramesh. "India in the World: Neither Rich, Powerful, nor Principled", *Foreign Affairs*, July/August, Vol. 76, No. 4, 1997, pp. 21.

India's present stance, after the tests, claims a need for nuclear deterrence vis-à-vis the PRC and Pakistan, but seemingly continues to advocate total nuclear disarmament on the international stage. Indeed, there is a flaw in the logic of a perspective that defends the need for nuclear deterrence at the regional level, yet advocates total disarmament at the global international level. Surely if the former is correct, and genuinely required, then it rules out any possibility of the latter?

None the less, what is important in the context of this study is that India's decision, whether principled, rational, or hawkish, to implement a nuclear weaponisation programme has complicated its position in relation to other members of international society. Since independence India has sought reform of certain regimes and norms of international society, and chief among these is the 'sanctified nuclear apartheid'[417] it saw embodied in the NPT. Although, after the tests in 1998, India imposed its own test moratorium, it is still not a signatory to the NPT. Therefore, before and after the tests, India remains a radical revisionist in this respect. By not bowing to the will of the large number of states behind the non-proliferation movement and by declaring itself a nuclear state and unilaterally redefining the terms of negotiation, India, at least in the short term, alienated itself from them even further. (Conversely, however, the question remains as to whether this 'realist' behaviour in fact works to promote India's identity as part of the great power club.) The following institution by institution analysis reveals the extent that this policy change of India's has affected its position in international society.

India as a Rising Power and the Institutions of International Society

Part Two of this Chapter established that independent India has historically occupied a radical revisionist status in international society. The following section analyses India's changing status in the evolving post-Cold War society of states. It essentially assesses how the changes that have occurred in the post-Cold War institutions of international society have affected India and argues that India's position as a radical revisionist has altered considerably in this era. Moreover, even though rising powers are generally perceived as threatening to the status quo, the section contends that India is likely to continue to work within the existing

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[417]Bhaskar, C. Uday. "Nuclear Tests and the Post-Cold War World", Singh, *Nuclear India*,

international order and offers only a limited revisionist threat to status quo international society. The terms 'applied status quo' and 'theoretical status quo' are again utilised (*vide* Chapter Four) with regard to these issues.

The Balance of Power

India's nonalignment policy was forged in reaction to what it perceived as an unprincipled example of power politics, i.e. the Cold War. As is frequently the case, balance of power policy was demonised as a consequence of its association with a conflict based state of affairs and thus India and other members of the NAM viewed the concept negatively. Unsurprisingly, therefore, balance of power policy has seldom featured as an explicit component of India's foreign policy. Nevertheless, balance of power system (*vide* Sheehan's balance of power system and balance of power policy distinction made in Chapter One) has been, and remains, a part of India's inter-state behaviour.

One Indian view of the post-Cold War balance of power is that of a polycentric system, dominated by one power, in a 'post-nonalignment world.[418] This acknowledgement and concern over the shape of the post-Cold War order, where non-alignment appears to be increasingly redundant, reflects India's changing post-Cold War view of inter-state relations. "India has progressed from a paradigm that would view moral suasion as a significant factor in the international hierarchy of power, to one that holds that 'strength respects strength'."[419] Moreover, "...after 40 years of Gandhian negation of power, the country has realised... that unfortunately [in] the world as it exists today military power counts...."[420]

Thus, India appears to be gradually adopting a more nuanced view of the balance of power and power in general,[421] a view that is significantly influenced by the effective failure of the

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ibid., pp. 251 - 252.
[418]Singh, Jaswant. *Defending India*, p. 277.
[419]Gordon, *India's Rise to Power*, p. 320.
[420]Gordon, Sandy. *India's Security Policy: Desire and Necessity in a Changing World*, Working Paper, No. 236, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Australian National University, Canberra, August, 1991, p. 1.
[421]This new Indian view of power is accompanied by what Gordon refers to as an 'internationalist' view of power (based around the importance of both soft and hard forms of power) which has driven India's economic liberalisation efforts and increased willingness for active involvement in peacekeeping missions. See Gordon, *India's Rise to Power*, p. 10. In

moral suasion approach and also by the nature of India's regional security complex.[422] At the regional level, India must contend with unmanaged, almost fortuitous, balance of power arrangements. "South Asia has been aptly called a 'loveless hothouse where member states feed on each other's fears'."[423] This is typical of the state of affairs described in Chapter Two, whereby states located in the periphery both wish, or are required, to meet standards set in the core, while also having to contend with the difficult security issues faced by weak states operating in a regional inter-state environment characterised by enmity.

India is widely understood to be seeking a role as regional hegemon - this being the case both before and after the Cold War. It has considerable natural advantages that promise success in this respect, and the success, or otherwise, of India's regional ambitions must inevitably influence its view of the balance of power. India has no other great power rivals in the Indian Ocean region, and is simply larger in all senses than other states in South Asia. Other states in the South Asia security complex treat India's regional ambitions with a mixture of suspicion and prudent realism. For instance, the 1987 agreement, under which the Indian Peacekeeping Force was deployed in Sri Lanka, involved the latter's explicit acknowledgement of India's legitimate strategic objectives in the region, though the extent to which this acknowledgement was forced by India's political influence is open to debate. The reduction of 'superpower overlay' after the end of the Cold War has effectively enhanced India's dominant South Asian regional role.

India's regional role is still defined primarily by the enmity evident in its relationship with Pakistan, particularly over the status of Kashmir. This regularly hostile relationship continues to spoil India's involvement in regional arrangements, such as in the South Asian Association for Regional Co-operation (SAARC) and, more importantly, with ASEAN. Existing members of the latter fear that India's involvement inevitably entails entanglement in the Indo-Pakistan feud. In addition, "[i]n South Asia, a pattern has emerged whereby sub-national insecurity is

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reference to earlier discussion this new view also more closely reflects a calculative view of human nature and the internationalist approach to the politico-strategic realm.

[422]See footnote 95 for a definition of a security complex. The South Asian security complex includes India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Sri Lanka, Nepal, and Bhutan. Afghanistan and Burma may be included as buffer states between the Middle Eastern and Southeast Asian security complexes respectively. Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, p. 196 & 210.

[423]Gordon, *India's Rise to Power*, p. 268.

increasingly linked to a form of chronic regional insecurity."[424] A regional environment racked by sub-national as well as regional insecurity also contributes to India's post-Cold War development of a basic realist perspective of the balance of power.[425] This point is confirmed by India's rationalisation of its recent nuclear tests in balance of power terms - as just outlined.

The gradual erosion of India's moral suasion approach brings it more in line with both the applied and the theoretical status quo. With increasingly acknowledgement of the legitimate role of force in international society, India becomes less likely to preach reform of the balance of power institution. As India strives to manage its regional security complex in a contrived manner, it may well expand the depth of its understanding of the function of balance of power policy, as recent trends indicate. India has sought to stimulate co-operation in the region, for example, by collaboration with Bangladesh over water rights in 1997. Such behaviour is "...a common-sense policy for a regional hegemon. India need not *overtly* [emphasis mine] bully its neighbours because everyone - perhaps even Pakistan - knows that it is the pre-eminent regional power and the great powers would not alter that state of affairs."[426] Certainly India, despite its hegemonic ambitions, appears to act in accordance with the principle of sovereign independence and, arguably, upholds it in respect of other states in the region.

In the wider international arena, India has demonstrated over the decades that it is very aware of the need to prevent the international system as a whole from being transformed by conquest into universal empire. India perceives the international order to be still in a state of flux[427] and its interests as being best served by diplomacy that is focused on core national interests. This involves, for instance, working toward normalising relations with Pakistan and China, improving relations with the United States, building relations in the Asia-Pacific and

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[424]ibid., p. 213.
[425]Nevertheless, relations improved between India and ASEAN when India's naval expansion plans collapsed after its financial crisis in the early 1990s. India, with limited success, has attempted to project itself to various ASEAN members as a counterweight to PRC influence in Southeast Asia. Accord to India of ASEAN dialogue partner status was a good indication of India's improving post-Cold war era relations with states in, at least, the Southeast Asia region.
[426]Manor, James. and Segal, Gerald. "Taking India Seriously", *Survival*, Vol. 40, No. 2, Summer, 1998, p. 64.
[427]Singh, *Defending India*, p. 278.

with the new central Asian republics. These foreign policy goals intrinsically accept and anticipate a polycentric order in which management of balance of power policy will require different judgement than was the case in the erstwhile bipolar system.

India's view of the balance of power in the post-Cold War era is conditioned by two major factors. First, the failure of past policy approaches in the wider international arena and responses to that, such as reassessment of the non-alignment policy, and, secondly, its condition as a weak state operating in an insecure regional environment. India is developing a more power-based perspective of the international system and anti-imperialist and similar rhetoric has more or less disappeared (at least from official government statements). There is an apparent trend that accepts that war and force has a positive role in international society and is inescapably involved in the maintenance of the balance of power. Although the balance of power is not mentioned openly as an official policy choice, India does act to support the basic systemic functions of the institution, both regionally and globally. This, arguably, makes India a status quo state in respect of the theoretical status quo. India's desire to improve its own position of prestige and power, regionally and globally, demonstrates that it does not seek to reform but rather to alter the contemporary balance of power so that India's influence is greater - in which case India is an orthodox revisionist in respect of the applied status quo.

Great Power Cooperation

This section initially assesses India's status as a great power in the post-Cold War era and examines the effects of India's involvement in the Gulf War as an example of its participation in great power coalitions. India's great power status is then examined in terms of its recognition as such by other great powers. Finally, India's revisionist stance is considered with regard to the great power cooperation institution.

As early as 1978, Cohen and Park wrote that: "Great power status can imply regional, continental, or global influence. At a minimum it means regional hegemony, which India in large part has acquired."[428] However, they go on to comment that extra-regional dominance is beyond India, although extra-regional influence is possible. As was noted in the section on

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[428]Cohen and Park, op. cit., p. 6.

the nature of India's rising power, India's military capability is not great enough to project beyond its immediate South Asian sphere of influence. Certainly India is not capable of maintaining itself against all others, especially if united, and therefore fails one of Wight's great power definitional criteria. However, India does hold a general interest in the international system, and definitely in the regional sense, is recognised by others to have such an interest, and is seen by its own leaders and peoples to have special rights and duties. India may not be in the front ranks in terms of military strength, but, as was discussed in Chapter Two, the great power institution is evolving to accommodate the gap between the United States and other large powers - among which India must surely rank.

An example of great power behaviour exhibited by India, in terms of Bull's criteria, is India's unilateral exploitation of its local preponderance. A perfect example of policy that demonstrates this point is found in the Indira doctrine, which continued Nehru's policy of preserving India's predominance by, for instance, preventing Nepal from making alliances with outside powers. The Indira doctrine states: "India will neither intervene in the domestic affairs of any states in the region, unless requested to do so, nor tolerate such intervention by an outside power, if external assistance is needed to meet an internal crisis, states should first look within the region for help."[429]

Independent India has a history of frustrated formal recognition of its debatable great power status. Shortcomings in comparative hard power have generally not been bolstered by institutional or soft power. The bitterest example of this, as far as India was concerned, was denial of a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. This situation is unlikely to change in the near future though India is seeking means by which to obtain such a change. As noted above, India was made a member of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) in 1996,

[this was] evidence of both a wider Indian vision and a sense that its strategy of more modern forms of multilateralism may be working. Without a string of such successes, India stands no hope - despite its sterling record in United Nations peacekeeping operations - of a permanent seat on the UN Security Council (UNSC).[430]

The end of the Cold War has altered the South Asian security complex in favour of India's

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[429]Gordon, op. cit., p. 269.

regional great power status. In Gordon's words:

> The ending of the Cold War is thus likely to benefit India more than Pakistan. While both lost the support of their superpower patrons, India is the larger power with the more substantial economy and greater capability to maintain its defence-industrial base without substantial outside assistance.... India stands out because it is one of the few nations with a potential for 'balanced' power. Moreover, with the diminution of the regional role of the superpowers, India - as the only Indian Ocean power with potential strategic reach - stands to gain.[431]

Gordon's views are balanced by further observation of factors that act to limit India's wider regional role after the Cold War, for example, the build up of military capability in Southeast Asia in reaction to the uncertain post-Cold War environment. Nevertheless, the effective withdrawal of the overriding superpower influence in the region certainly provides India with the opportunity to accept an enhanced role as the only state in the South Asian region presently with anything like great power capability. The quotation above certainly indicates that India is seeking to expand its wider regional role and grasp the opportunities presented in the post-Cold War era.

India, however, missed an ideal opportunity to gain standing with the great powers that were involved in the coalition assembled to oust the Iraqis from Kuwait. Due to domestic political pressure and a change of government, permission for American military aircraft to refuel in India was at first denied, then granted, and then denied again. This irritated the United States, yet even such vacillating support for the US-led coalition damaged India's image in parts of the Muslim world. The result was that India made allies on neither side and exposed its limitations for all to see.

Despite the above example, there is evidence to suggest that India is perceived by great powers as, at least potentially, part of the great power club. Beginning with support for India's 1987 peacekeeping efforts in Sri Lanka, the United States has, especially after the Cold War, increasingly reinforced India's role as a regional great power. As the then (1990) US Secretary of Defense commented, "India could be a power that contributes to world

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[430]Manor and Segal, op. cit., p. 65.

stability as the United States will see it... a power with which we could work together much as we try to work together with other major powers now."[432] Moreover, although India's assistance to the US during the Gulf war was at times vacillating it did encourage a rethink in the US on the utility of co-operation with India.

The US's initial reaction India's 1998 nuclear tests was one of 'deep distress'. President Clinton invoked the Nuclear Proliferation Prevention Act of 1994, which required immediate economic sanctions, and the termination of technical assistance and defence sales to India. The US also managed to get enough support from the 24-member Board of the World Bank to postpone US$865 million worth of loans.[433] However, the economic sanctions met with opposition from US business and other quarters and within a month after the tests they were partially eased. Moreover, the tests fostered greater interaction between the US and India in the form of a series of dialogue rounds between the two countries. These talks produced statements such as: "India and the United States today resolved to impart dynamism and greater content to all aspects of bilateral relations, taking into account each other's security concerns and aspirations."[434]

The April 2000 United States Presidential visit to India was an indication of US concern to encourage India's responsible management of its regional environment. The length of time spent in India, in comparison to Pakistan or Bangladesh, signaled that the United States acknowledges India's central role in stability of the region. Furthermore, in the interests of international order, such behaviour by the United States displays the great power management practice of respecting one another's spheres of influence. As, for example, was written into the joint US - India statement by President Clinton and Prime Minister Vajpayee on March 21, 2000, "We acknowledge that tensions in South Asia can only be resolved by the nations of South Asia."[435] This statement also communicates United States' respect for India's sphere of influence and, less directly, perhaps its acknowledgement of India at least as a substantial regional power.

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[431] Gordon, *India's Rise to Power*, p. 3.
[432] Dr Fred Ikle quoted in Gordon, *India's Rise to Power*, p. 256.
[433] Anonymous, "Proliferation-Related Development: India and Pakistan", *Programme for Promoting Nuclear Non-Proliferation*, 2nd Quarter, No. 42 (Insert), 1998, p. 3.
[434] HT Correspondent, "India contradicts US view on easing sanction", *The Hindustan Times,* New Delhi, Feb. 2, 1999, p. 12.
[435] Joint United States - Indian Statement released by The White House, Office of the Press

India's peacekeeping efforts are demonstrative of its willingness to take part in joint great power action (albeit in a limited capacity[436]) and to work with other great powers to preserve the general balance of power. India's nuclear programme has temporarily damaged its international image and relations with other great powers (particularly the US) but, in reality and in the long term, India's confirmed nuclear status will work to confirm its great power status and thereby engender the respect, albeit grudging, of other great powers.[437] Its nuclear weaponisation programme is a clear example of India's desire to climb in the inter-state hierarchy and exert a greater influence, both regionally and globally. This classifies India as an orthodox revisionist in respect of the applied status quo.

India's objection to 'nuclear apartheid', and accompanying rhetoric, may seem to portray a desire for reform of the theoretical great power cooperation institution, as India perceives the weaponised states as part of a discriminatory great power club much in need of reform. However, such an attack on this particular institutional basis of great power co-operation is probably a disguised example of orthodox revisionism. In other words, now that India is a weaponised state, and were India granted membership of the United Nations Security Council i.e. it received an official invitation to join the great power club, would the anti-

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Secretary, New Delhi, India, March 21, 2000.

[436]India's policy of refusing to join another country in a military alliance (*vide* Jaswant Singh, *Nuclear India*, p. 19) may be seen to limit its options as far as great power concerts/joint action is concerned, especially with regard to cooperation in the maintenance of the balance of power. Although, the Indo-Soviet treaty of 1971, and numerous post-Cold War joint naval exercises with, for example, the US and Australia have shown that it is possible for India to enter into arrangements that effectively have the function of military alliances though may not be officially classed as such (Vaughan, Bruce, *National Security and Defence Policy Formation and Decision-Making in India*, Strategic and Defence Studies Centre, Working Paper No. 259, Australian National University, October, 1992, p. 26.). Also, military alliances, as Indian policy indicates to be their view, may at times work against the balance of power and peaceful relations among the great powers and are not a prerequisite to great power joint action.

[437]This is a debatable point as it has been suggested that "India's behaviour is oddly out of joint with the times. The trends have been towards devaluing nuclear weapons as the currency of power". Manning, Robert A., "Civilization and the Bomb", *Far Eastern Economic Review*, June 4, 1999, p. 36. Such arguments seem generally to be based around the fact that there has been a vast reduction in the Cold War nuclear arsenals of the nuclear superpowers. However, such statistical facts are a shaky basis from which to suggest that nuclear weapons are no longer an effective currency of power. Certainly the lack of any real progress towards total disarmament indicates nuclear weapons are not something that the great powers are willing to do without - arguably, only if nuclear weapons technology is

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discrimination rhetoric quietly subside? India's professed willingness to work with the United States to prevent nuclear proliferation is certainly evidence of just such a trend.[438] Therefore, while there are some areas in which India seeks procedural and structural reform, it is questionable that these are enough to class India as a radical revisionist in respect of the theoretical status quo. Rather, the above examples of India's conventional great power behaviour indicate that, after the Cold War, it has, in fact, become supportive of the theoretical status quo structure of the great power co-operation institution.

Diplomacy

> In a post-non-alignment world, what is it that India ought to search for? Essentially it is that philosophical base for its foreign policy, from which it can distil national objectives and, thereafter, a harmonious conduct of diplomacy in service to vital national interests.[439]

This quotation states the obvious in that, in post-Cold War India, the service of diplomacy to vital national interests continues to be its most vital role. Among other functions, the resident embassy diplomatic system continues to facilitate the promotion of India's vital national interests with regard to other states in post-Cold War international society. India's post-Cold War 'internationalist' perspective and economic liberalisation measures (which may be the philosophical base Singh is looking for) have increased contact with international trading regimes, Western states, international forums, such as ASEAN, and have directed India's diplomatic activity in new directions. The Indian diplomatic culture is likely to have undergone some adjustment to this new environment. International reaction to the 1998 tests certainly put the Indian diplomatic machine under severe pressure, when some states withdrew embassy staff from New Delhi (an example of the continued symbolic role that resident embassies perform), and applied economic sanctions etc.

By and large, however, the basic role that diplomacy plays in international society, i.e. the provision of channels by which the other institutions of international order can function continues as before in respect of India and post-Cold War international society.

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superseded will 'devalued' truly become the appropriate term.

[438] As expressed in the rhetoric of the March 2000 US - Indo joint statement referred to above.

As was described in the above section on the balance of power, India's view of international relations has gradually shifted toward one based around the influence of power, in preference to the previous anti-violent, moral suasion, approach. India's recently increased involvement in United Nations military operations, as displayed in the chronological list below, is possibly an indication of this changing perspective, and also of a generally increased acceptance that force is necessary to maintain international order.

India's Major Peacekeeping Operations (1947 - 1997):

A. Bilateral Peacekeeping

1950   To help with the Rana uprisings in Nepal

1971   In aid of civil government in Sri Lanka

1987 - 90 Indian Peacekeeping Force in Sri Lanka

1988 Operation Cactus in the Maldives

B. UN Peace Enforcement Operations

1961 - 63 UN Peacekeeping in Congo/Zaire

1993 - 94 UN Observers Group to overlook elections in Cambodia

1994   UN Assistance Mission in Rwanda II

1995   UN Peacekeeping in Somalia

1992 - 95 UN Peacekeeping in Angola

C. UN Peacekeeping Operations

1953   Korean Armistice Agreement

1956   UN Force in Egypt

1958   Observer Group in Lebanon

1988 - 91 UN Iraq-Iran Military Group

1989   UN Angola Verification Mission

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[439]Singh, *Defending India*, p. 277.

Among other symbolic and power based functions the visible upturn in the number of India's United Nations peacekeeping missions during the 1990's also displays that India is active in its role as a member of the society of states. It shows that India understands the attendant responsibility to use war/force, if necessary, to uphold international law, as well as to restrict its use between member states.

However, in the post-Cold War world, as was discussed in Chapter Two, wars of the third kind are prevalent. This complicates the function of war as an institution of international society, especially in the periphery. This is because peripheral states, including India, are also generally weak states that must contend directly with wars of the third kind and the associated security problems that arise from the state-making process.

Economic prosperity is one desirable tool available to the state for strengthening its institutional base and general legitimacy. India is increasingly aware of the importance of economic growth to the enhancement of military capability and overall security. In *Defending India*, Singh emphasises the need for India to obtain security through economic growth and by combating 'covert' or 'clandestine' war (wars of the third kind).[441] India's commitment to the traditional use of war to maintain the balance of power and international law is undoubtedly influenced by its peripheral and weak state status. India is less likely to be fully committed to cases of intervention that do not take account of state-making security issues and will view the function of war in contemporary international society from the perspective of a weak peripheral state.

In addition, India's view of war as an institution of order in international society is still influenced by its Cold War revisionist, self-reliant, non-aligned, liberal pacifist, legacy.[442] This legacy is instrumental in creating India's contemporary refusal to form military alliances and creates something of a contradiction between, on the one hand, the policy trend that increasingly recognises the need for force and power in international relations and, on the

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[440]ibid., p. 143.
[441]ibid., pp. 270, 274 - 275, & 292.
[442]Mattoo, Amitabh. "India's Nuclear Status Quo", *Survival*, Vol. 38, No. 3, Autumn, 1996, p. 54.

other, the policy legacy that will not allow military alliances, even if they were to enhance the strategic position and power of India.

India participates in utilising war to maintain international order, chiefly through the United Nations. It increasingly appears to acknowledge that war and force has a positive function in the society of states and India therefore contributes to international society's efforts to both limit warfare among member states, as well as to employ it to maintain international order. However, India's status as a peripheral and weak state, and, in addition, a revisionist policy legacy, still influences its contemporary view of the function of war in post-Cold War international society. In many ways India is close now to a status quo stance on the use of war in international society. Yet its advocacy against military alliances still identifies it as desiring reform of what has traditionally been an accepted means to order international society. Chiefly on this basis, India is still a radical revisionist with regard both to the theoretical and to the applied status quo.

International Law

India, it has been noted, has begun to develop a more internationalist perspective in the post-Cold War era. "As a manifestation of this new, outward-looking, perspective, India has emerged as an important player in a number of international conventions in the area of disarmament."[443] Participation in the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC) is one example of India's participation in international regimes that demonstrates its willingness to contribute to the maintenance and development of international laws and norms. Importantly, India is working for change from within regimes rather than criticising them from without, and (as with the CWC example) is as a result gaining a reputation as a 'good international citizen'.[444]

Besides membership of a wide range of international political regimes and organisations, and having an exceptional United Nations peacekeeping record, further evidence that displays India's growing and wider acceptance of the body of rules regarding conduct between states is found in the economic realm. India's initiation of a domestic economic liberalisation programme has enabled it to participate, to a much deeper extent than previously, in the

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[443]Gordon, *India's Rise to Power*, p. 352.
[444]Mattoo, op. cit. p. 54. This reputation has become debatable on some fronts, especially after the 1998 nuclear tests.

international economy. "India has progressed far down the path of economic reform and is dependent upon the support of the international community."[445] The Indian financial crisis of 1991 forced India to seek aid from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank. Unfortunately, this reinforced the argument of those inside India who resent its dependence on international organisations, as well as the entire economic reform programme. However, despite recent changes in government, India has sustained its momentum towards economic reform and its respect for World Trade Organisation regulations,[446] thereby expressing its will to conform to international norms.

There are, however, two vital areas in which India is at odds with the core of international society in respect of international law. These areas undermine India's efforts to maintain a 'good international citizen' image. First, as already discussed, is the nuclear question and the associated non-proliferation regimes - in relation to which India has often found itself isolated from mainstream opinion and the majority of states. The NPT and associated treaties remain a considerable hurdle to India's further integration into international society. Therefore, India remains a radical revisionist with regard to the applied status quo, regardless of the merit or otherwise of its arguments.

Secondly, is India's position on human rights and intervention issues, India assumes an 'Asian' position with regard to these issues.[447] Such a position, in the main, argues that Western democracies should not impose their will or values on the developing world. (Although India's common democratic identity would seemingly enable it to relate more closely to some of the West's impositions.) The link established in Chapter One between human rights norms, the standard of civilisation, natural law, and the Western European states system suggests that India correctly perceives human rights arguments as an imposition of outside, foreign, priorities. While these comments do not do credit to the complexity of this long standing, cultural relativism versus universal human rights, argument the fact remains that India's general stance in this debate deviates from that held by the core states of international society. Although, as discussed in reference to the PRC's position on this issue, the core states are in some instances themselves acting at variance with international law's theoretical status quo. India's status as a weak state with associated security concerns partly

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[445]Gordon, *India's Rise to Power*, p. 343.
[446]Manor and Segal, op. cit., p. 53.
[447]Gordon, *India's Rise to Power*, p. 352.

explains its stance on this issue, especially in respect of humanitarian intervention. Again, it is necessary to remain aware of the difficulties that states in the periphery have as they simultaneously attempt to conform to core international laws and norms as well as advance their individual state-making processes.

India's relationship with the institution of international law has undergone varied change in the post-Cold War era. Its recently increased involvement with the international economy, United Nation peacekeeping, and many other international organisations and regimes, is demonstrative of India's commitment to international law as an institution for the maintenance of order in the society of states. However, India's stance on human rights and nuclear issues tends to be at variance with the majority of the core states of international society. Chiefly as a result of the desire to reform these international norms, India is a radical revisionist in terms of the applied status quo. India is not a signatory to the NPT, but nevertheless its disregard of NPT statutes does not portray disregard of the international law institution. Human rights values or judgements are often cited, and imposed, not always in complete accordance with traditional international law. In short, these areas of difficulty do not preclude India's classification as a status quo state in terms of international law and the theoretical status quo.

Chapter Five Conclusion

The analysis in Part One contended that, during India's ancient history, predominantly gemeinschaft type development of the states system led to the formation of inter-state institutions of the time. The path by which India has become a part of the contemporary global international society has been significantly different to this, i.e. gesellschaft development has been the predominant mode of integration. The structure of the ancient Indian states system is of great theoretical interest and, therefore, capable of explaining formative processes in states systems. The actual patterns of behaviour in the ancient system, however, are only marginally similar to the gesellschaft manner in which India has entered contemporary international society.[448]

Part Two highlighted India's Cold War status as a radical revisionist in the periphery of

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[448]This point was supported by a number of academic and military personnel interviewed by

international society. It argued that this status was essentially a product of India's history, beginning as far back as the nascent Indian National Congress. Part Three suggested that India is a rising power in international society, especially in a regional sense, and argued that the end of the Cold War has significantly influenced India, including pushing it more toward an orthodox revisionist stance with regard to the institutions of the society of states.

Figure 5.2

Institutions of Int. Society	India in relation to TSQ*	India in relation to ASQ*	TSQ in relation to ASQ
Balance of Power	Status Quo	Orthodox Revisionist	Equivalent
War	Radical Revisionist	Radical Revisionist	Equivalent
International Law	Status Quo**	Radical Revisionist	Divergent
Diplomacy	Status Quo	Status Quo	Equivalent
Great Power Cooperation	Status Quo	Orthodox Revisionist	Equivalent

*TSQ = Theoretical Status Quo, ASQ = Applied Status Quo.

**This classification is made mainly in reference to India's status quo support of the sovereignty/non-interventionist principle, but it is questionable if India's status as a radical revisionist with regard to other institutions of international society is taken into account. Reform of the war institution, for example, would also require reform of international law principles regarding the legitimate use of warfare. "A revisionist state may be so only in relation to certain areas or issues, and may behave more like a status quo power elsewhere." Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, p. 310. It is logical to assume that this point also applies in the reverse.

Figure 5.2 is a summary of the analysis performed in Part Three. India's radical revisionism,

the author in New Delhi during early 1999.

or reform based revisionism, of the Cold War era has shifted toward orthodox revisionism in the post-Cold War era. This has significant ramifications when considering the question of whether India, as a rising power, is a threat to status quo international society. In other words, it raises the question as to whether India, as a state seeking reform of some aspects of the status quo, presents more or less of a threat than when it seeks power and prestige and, thereby, an orthodox revision of the present state hierarchy. In answer to this question, the applied/theoretical status quo distinction again becomes useful. An orthodox revisionist may constitute a significant threat to the applied status quo while simultaneously supporting the theoretical status quo. Yet a radical revisionist, if a threat, would probably threaten both. (This also explains the difference between the theoretical and applied status quo evident in Figure 5.2. i.e. India's orthodox revisionism does not necessarily alter its support for the basic institutions of international society.) To make the equation more complicated, it is possible that a radical revisionist simultaneously has orthodox revisionist aims, that is, radical revisionists may seek a power redistribution as well as institutional reform. Importantly, because radical revisionism entails opportunities for negotiation, this type of revisionism does not necessarily involve any greater threat than that of orthodox revisionism.[449]

If, then, there is not necessarily a gradient of increased threat between a radical revisionist and an orthodox revisionist,[450] how is the level of threat posed by a state such as India assessed, and what is the significance of a transition from radical to orthodox revisionism? The answer to both questions is that identification of the type of revisionism makes certain behaviour sets more likely in one case than in the other. The difficulty lies in the identification process and thereby gauging the true intentions of the state in question - a judgement central to identification of threat potential.

With regard to India, the above analysis of its commitment to and role in the institutions of international society reveals something of the character of its changing revisionist stance. The hypothesis that India presents less of a revisionist threat in the post-Cold War era is questionable, as the partial transition from a radical revisionist to an orthodox revisionist is not necessarily indicative of decreased threat potential. On the contrary, in recent years India

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[449]Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, pp. 309 - 311.

[450]Although at the revolutionary revisionist end of the spectrum a much greater security threat is presented to all states in the system, including to the revolutionary revisionist itself. This is because not only a power struggle but also an ideological struggle are both projected into the

has displayed a greater willingness to reject status quo concerns in its effort to meet its orthodox revisionist goals (for example, with regard to the nuclear question). Moreover, it was established in Part Three that, as India is a rising power, this provides India with future potential to meet its revisionist agenda by force. As radical revisionism is inherently a negotiable concern, India's shift toward orthodox revisionism is, if anything, a sign of increased threat potential in terms of classic trends of great power competition and conflict. Orthodox revisionism in a rising great power, while not necessarily representing a threat to the actual institutions of international society, nevertheless threatens systemic warfare.

India's continued gesellschaft type integration into the society of states, during and beyond the Cold War, enabled it to accept the theoretical status quo and partially dismissed its reformist agenda - this especially appears to be the case in respect of India's integration into the international economy. India's general acceptance of the theoretical status quo displays the successful gesellschaft integration it has been part of thus far. This process has certainly been aided by its common democratic identity with the core states of international society, i.e. there has also been an element of gemeinschaft integration. These observations display the method by which India has come to accept the basic institutions of international society. However, the perennial problem created by the power struggle engendered by orthodox revisionism and frequently displayed by a rising power in an international system is still of issue.

A possible solution to what are arguably predictable problems as a rising power, such as India, integrates into international society may be partly offered by structural realism's 'like-units' analysis. As a state accepts the theoretical status quo embodied in the institutions of international society, it is reasonable to assume that it will first change from a peripheral radical or revolutionary revisionist to an orthodox revisionist, and, perhaps eventually, to a status quo state (or core state, provided the core states continue to support the theoretical status quo). The means to this last step, other than violent conflict, may be constructed through cyclic interaction and by a combination of gesellschaft and gemeinschaft interaction. This may lead to the development of like-units and institutional processes enabling gradual power redistribution without systemic warfare. The final result of which would be a common identity among the states involved and the development of a security community.

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domestic and the international arena. ibid., pp. 309 - 311.

While there is potential for India, as a rising power, to pursue a violent orthodox revisionist challenge to the applied status quo, there is stronger evidence indicating that India is willing to engage in the process outlined in the above paragraph. The analysis of the ancient Indian states system revealed the value of the international society approach, and the usefulness of the gesellschaft/gemeinschaft concepts as a means of analysing inter-state relations, regardless of the historical setting. Thus, the developmental processes and concepts described and analysed by this thesis may well offer an explanation of how India may, relatively peacefully, continue on its path to become a core member and further supporter of the international order provided by the contemporary society of independent sovereign states.

CHAPTER FIVE: CONCLUSION

This thesis has sought to advance the approach to international relations represented by the ES and, consequently, understanding of how China and India act as members of a multi-state system or society, especially as rising powers in the post-Cold War era. The task of advancing the ES was begun in Chapter One with a literature review that introduced the concept of international society, defined it in relation to other similar concepts, and outlined the weaknesses and contemporary challenges to the approach. International society was defined as a unique form of society based on state membership. Order in this society of states is obtained by mutual respect for common institutions and associated norms. These institutions are the balance of power, great power cooperation, diplomacy, war and international law.

Barry Buzan's, Kalevi Holsti's, and Mohammed Ayoob's work formed the basis of theoretical 'additions' to the concept of international society. These additions were included chiefly because they strengthened the ES by answering criticism of this traditional approach to international relations, especially by enabling it to better explain issues that have come to prominence after the end of the Cold War.

Central to the ES is the idea of progress in the development of inter-state relations. A system of states, through interaction based on common cultural norms (gemeinschaft development) or contractual type arrangements (gesellschaft development), or both, can form institutions creating order and gradually progress along an international system/international society spectrum. Buzan's integration of structural realist theory and the sociological terms gemeinschaft and gesellschaft with the concept of international society help to explain the processes behind the creation and development of systems and societies of states, beyond purely historical analysis.

The work of Holsti and Ayoob, on the trend toward intra-state war and the effects of internally based security issues in the Third World respectively, emphasised the importance of relatively recent changes in the international arena. Chapter Two concentrated on elaborating these issues specifically in reference to the post-Cold War period. By combining the idea of gemeinschaft and gesellschaft development with Third World security analysis, contemporary security concerns - created by an international society conceptually structured

by 'concentric circles of commitment' - were explained and assessed.

The effect on international security and the institutions of international society of a core and periphery structure, or mixed levels of commitment to the institutions of international society, was a central point during the analysis of Chapter Two. This analysis revealed the heightened importance of obtaining a clear perception of a state's internal circumstances and position or identity in relation to other states in international society before analysing its contemporary (i.e. post-Cold War) behaviour, security needs and its impact on international order. Moreover, especially in respect of international law, the analysis in Chapter Two demonstrated that present changes and challenges to the institutions and basic principles of international society are ongoing and of considerable import but, none the less, these institutions continue to provide a firm basis for contemporary international order.

Included with the above outlined examination of the ES was analysis that located it in relation to the wider IR field. This was achieved by utilising Pettman's analytical framework and matrix of world affairs (*vide* Figure 2.1), which helped to identify the ES's politico-strategic and rationalist nature and thereby conception of the ES in relation to the multitude of approaches to IR and world affairs. While it was conceded that the ES is now inextricably tied to modernist inter-state norms, it was also argued that this did not preclude the utility of the approach to analysis of pre-modern international relations. With reference to Pettman's matrix and other approaches, both the earlier and later chapters of the thesis attempted to demonstrate that the ES framework has great potential for further application outside of the politico-strategic realm.

Chapter Three was devoted to defining clearly the idea of rising power, the various theories that explain the effects of power change in states systems and, most importantly, the nature of revisionist states - it was argued that a rising power is most significant if it has a revisionist agenda. The distinction was made, as in Buzan's work in *People, States and Fear*, between three kinds of revisionist powers, namely, revolutionary, radical and orthodox revisionists. It was noted that only a revolutionary revisionist would offer any real challenge to the basic institutional structure of the society of states, revisionists of other types are more likely to seek greater power within or reform, rather than abolition, of these institutions. It was also concluded in this chapter that the various theories that explain power change and the general dynamics of inter-state relations, particularly the nature of anarchy, all have something to

offer conceptually, i.e. they all add something to a consideration of how international societies may initially form and then expand and evolve. In short, Chapter Three introduced and explained the general significance of a rising power to international society so that the specific revisionist impact of the PRC and India could be assessed in these terms in the chapters that followed.

The analysis of inter-state relations in ancient China through the international society conceptual framework displayed the usefulness of the approach for multi-state system or society analysis. It made apparent that, given a common culture, both gesellschaft and gemeinschaft development may simultaneously feature within a given states system. The most crucial factor missing for the maintenance of the ancient Chinese international system was awareness that it could come to function as an alternative means of political order to universal conquest and empire. These institutional frameworks were not to become part of China's international relations until the pressures of modernisation norms came to bear.

Part Two of Chapter Four demonstrated the pattern of integration that China has followed since it first began to merge with the expanding European society of states. In accordance with Yongjin Zhang's work, this process, particularly during the Cold War era, was described as one of alienation from international society rather than isolation. By a process of gesellschaft integration this alienation gradually lessened, enabling the PRC's further integration and greater involvement with the modern global international society.

After the end of the Cold War there were two clear trends in respect of the PRC and international society. First, the shift from a revolutionary to a radical revisionist/status quo state and, secondly, the continued reliance on gesellschaft type integration with the global society of states. The former trend suggested that the PRC is less likely, post-Cold War, to threaten the basic institutional structure of international society and the latter trend emphasised the importance of understanding the core/periphery, or 'circles of commitment' structure before assessing China's present role in the society of states - developments after the Cold War actually highlighting the PRC's peripheral status with regard to several of the institutions of international society.

It was argued that the PRC can correctly be classified as a rising power and, because of reasonable prospects for continued high levels of economic growth, the basis of this rising

power is sustainable. One significant ramification of this is that the PRC will increasingly be in a position to meet its revisionist agenda by force, if it so desires. However, it was also argued that the likelihood of this is lessened by the trend towards the PRC holding status quo interests and by the PRC's present relative power deficiency. When the theories outlined in the first three Chapters are combined with such conclusions it becomes possible to perceive the most probable processes by which the PRC may successfully develop a more central role in the core of international society. This is not written with any grand predictive attempt in mind, but rather it refers to the idea of a progressive development of international society. In other words, the integration of strong states (as per the weak state/strong state continuum) into international society is part of a maturing process in international society development, and is a desirable and observable phenomenon.[451]

Weak relative power, in addition to identity differences with the core, encourages mainly the continuance and erstwhile successful gesellschaft type integration of the PRC with international society - this is a process that benefits both international society and the PRC, especially as the PRC develops into a strong state. The logic of competition and socialisation means that such interaction stimulates the development of like units, and/or cycles of interaction create social structures that stimulate common identity. These processes in turn allow for the possibility of gemeinschaft type integration to underpin gesellschaft type integration - a form of integration already evident in a limited fashion.

The alternative to this rather pleasing scenario is that, in the long term, the PRC's power will reach a level of relative strength, while its identity remains distinctly at odds with other great powers. This would indicate that the PRC, while not necessarily hostile to others, would still maintain a peripheral role in terms of supporting the institutions of international society as maintained by core states. The worst case scenario is that mutual threat perception would increase and the PRC would then become an aggressive competitor and support an alternative view of how international society should be ordered. This state of affairs is a recipe for

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[451]The idea of progress and international society development is explored by Buzan. He states that 'the idea of progress is not strongly developed in International Relations', he employs the idea of immature anarchies progressing to mature anarchies, and convincingly argues that this is a process of evolution of the international political system, emphasising that this process is one of constant competition between forces of order and chaos - increasing frequency of interaction bringing increasing likelihood of conflict. Buzan, *People, States and Fear*, pp. 178 -180

'standard' international conflict. The onus, therefore, is on both the present status quo powers as well as the PRC to make a systemic effort to understand the processes involved and thereby encourage a more desirable development of contemporary international society.

The thesis has sought to focus on the application of the international society concept to China and India individually in preference to allowing the focus of the thesis to become one of a China versus India comparative country study. However, comparisons between the PRC and India have been made throughout, and since, in the course of gathering final conclusions in respect of India it is interesting and insightful to do so, a limited comparative technique is employed below.

Similar patterns, with regard to India and the processes of international development, were evident in the analysis undertaken in Chapter Five. Briefly, the first part of Chapter Five examined the inter-state relations of ancient India for the institutions of international society. The institutions of the ancient Indian multi-states system were largely structured by the Brahmin priestly caste and the Hindu belief system. Part Two of Chapter Five highlighted India's Cold War status as a radical revisionist in the periphery of international society. It argued that this status was essentially a product of India's history, beginning as far back as the nascent Indian National Congress. Part Three suggested that India is a rising power in international society, especially in a regional sense. It sought to prove that the end of the Cold War has significantly influenced India and, consequently, pushed it more toward an orthodox revisionist stance with regard to the institutions of the society of states. It was noted that classification as an orthodox revisionist is not necessarily accompanied by a threat reduction from the point of view of status quo powers.

The ancient states systems of both China and India displayed simultaneous gemeinschaft and gesellschaft development, although in India's case the latter was very minimal. Of note, particularly with regard to international law, the analysis of both Chapters Four and Five demonstrated that common cultural norms or gemeinschaft development was vital in both ancient systems for inter-state institutional processes. Order in both systems was maintained largely by commonly recognised religious or philosophical belief systems. Neither civilisation came to perceive a system of independent sovereign states as a viable alternative to imperial rule until centuries later under the impact of the norms and institutions of the modernisation process.

In the modern era and also in comparative terms, India is at a slightly more advanced stage in the trend exhibited by both countries from revisionist toward status quo interests - in India's case from radical revisionism to orthodox revisionism/status quo concerns. The most ready explanation is that India, notwithstanding its history as part of the British empire, did not have to alter its policies to as large a degree as the PRC because its revisionist stance during the Cold War was comparatively moderate. India was a radical revisionist during the Cold War era while the PRC, as a result of its ardent communist ideals, existed as a revolutionary revisionist.

There are aspects that modify the above general point. While, for example, India and the PRC have both integrated reasonably well into the international economy, India's integration, especially at the institutional level, is still slowed by the baggage of its past import-substitution economic strategies and ideas. The PRC, however, despite its Cold War revolutionary revisionist beginnings, has more readily embraced, at least in theory, the demands and modes of contemporary politico-economic international trading regimes.

In contrast to the gemeinschaft nature of the ancient Indian states system, modern India has tended to be more reliant on gesellschaft type integration with the global international system. However, India's history as a British colony better enabled its elites to learn, in a gemeinschaft manner, of the principles and rules governing the European states system. Unlike the PRC, India has been able to take advantage of a common democratic identity to merge with international society in both a gemeinschaft and gesellschaft manner. This aspect of common identity with the core states of international society has mitigated the effects of independent India's revisionist agenda.

Overall, India and the PRC both still persist with revisionist policies, which in some respects appear more rhetorical than substantial. These policies restrict their full participation in the institutions that maintain order in international society. However, analysis of these two countries in respect of these institutions demonstrates that in many cases fuller participation is only restricted by one or two policy regimes, a situation significantly different from the past. Upon comparison it is clear that India is more widely and actively engaged with international order principles and institutions, as both support and criticism bear witness. The best example of this is found in attitudes to war and great power institutions. India and the

PRC both reject military alliances as a means of obtaining international order and they are both critical of the role of force in international society. Yet India actively sends troops on UN missions and increasingly appears to recognise that force has a role to play in international law enforcement - more in keeping with the applied and theoretical status quo - despite occasionally voicing rhetoric to the contrary.

The PRC's acceptance of international norms and principles is generally based on the imperatives of its rapid economic development. Economic development has spearheaded wider PRC interaction with external powers and thereby its gesellschaft integration with the society of states. It remains less clear that the PRC is fully internalising and adopting international principles (unless they are seen as necessary to the continuation of its economic development strategy) since there is little sign of a gemeinschaft aspect to its interaction with international society, as there is with India. This, to a large extent, reflects the lack of identification that the CCP leadership has with outside governments and is not to say that gemeinschaft development is not taking place at a 'non-CCP' level. Moreover, it is clear that the PRC government has at least adopted the appropriate language in order to quell allegations of human rights abuse, perhaps an example of the socialisation process in action.

The thesis has argued that strong states are the glue of a stable multi-state society. This is especially so in the post-Cold War era where it is the internal security of states that is of increasing concern, and the reduction of superpower overlay has raised previously suppressed international issues, particularly with regard to international law. Rising powers, often considered as a threat to the status quo, may also be perceived as potentially strong partners for the maintenance of order in international society. Both the PRC and India have this potential. The thesis has sought to make clear the observable processes that are behind the successful integration of rising powers into international society. The variations apparent between the PRC and India are evidence of the need for a careful understanding of these processes so that core states of contemporary international society can work with the rising states of the People's Republic of China and the Republic of India rather than against them, thereby strengthening rather than weakening the international order as it is maintained in an international society.

Appendix: A Foreign Policy Framework

This thesis had a strong theoretical component. It has been concerned with explaining how a number of interacting independent states may create and maintain institutional order amongst themselves. In Waltz's words, however, "[a]ny theory covers some matters and leaves other matters aside."[452] One of the matters that this thesis has left largely to one side is the matter of foreign policy. This brief appendix aims to outline possible foreign policy implications for the findings of this thesis.

"Foreign Policy is presumably something less than the sum of all policies which have an effect upon a national governments relations with other national governments."[453]

This Millar quotation seeks to highlight the fact that foreign policy is not simply all those policies that influence international relations. The past policy of racial apartheid in South Africa, for instance, certainly influenced South Africa's relations with other states, but it was also certainly not foreign policy. Foreign policy is policy that is purposely directed by a state into the international so to promote certain interests.

Allison categories foreign policy into three conceptual frameworks or models: the rational actor or classical model, the organisational model and the government (bureaucratic model).[454] Waltz's criticism of these models allows further expansion of Millar's point. Waltz argues that Allison's categories confuse foreign policy with international politics. The first category, he contends, is about national politics not international politics and the last two of Allison's models are foreign policy models.[455] Waltz effectively creates a case for his well-known levels of analysis approach. A definition of foreign policy based on the above discussion may well go something like this: 'Foreign policy is policy designed by government at the national level and then directed into the international level in order to influence relations with other national governments.'

The thesis has cautiously crossed the imaginary divide between the international and national

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[452] Waltz, Kenneth N. *Theory of International Politics*, op. cit. p. 122.
[453] Millar, T.B. "On Writing About Foreign Policy", in Rosenau, J. N. op. cit., p. 57.
[454] Allison, G.T. *Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis*. Little, Brown and Co., Boston, 1971, pp. 2 – 7.

levels of analysis on several occasions. The first occasion was during the analysis of weak statehood and its influence on member states of international society. The second was during the attempt to argue that, regardless of the differing (national level) state-making needs and methods of pre-modern and modern states, the independent status of both within a multi-state environment enables viable analysis of associated institutional international order. The third, in a limited fashion, was during general assessment of various models of post-Cold War order, when, for instance, theories such as constructivism and structural realism attempted to explain international order in terms of the structures and ideas located inside the state.

If it is accepted that foreign policy is a matter of national level politics then the above 'cross-overs' are clear areas where there are foreign policy implications to be extracted from the present study. This is particularly so in relation to the country studies undertaken in Chapters Four and Five. The ES and its international society approach chiefly provides an international level of analysis framework, what remains is recognition of the policy implications of that framework. In other words, how the international society framework and processes could most effectively be influenced by policies fashioned by national governments (i.e. foreign policy). This is exceedingly general; such policy would need to take into account the numerous factors considered in the thesis that affects a states position in international society. Foreign policy based on deterrence, for example, could be formulated with reference to the balance of power institution. Such policy would be more effective if the state in question accurately assessed its position in international society i.e. is it in the periphery and dealing with a realist balance of power environment or is it located towards the core and dealing with a 'Grotian' environment.

In sum, the thesis still really leaves the matter of foreign policy to one side. This appendix has simply aimed to display that, while it is beyond the focus of the present study, the findings of the thesis offer extensive avenues for foreign policy analysis and creation.

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[455] Waltz, op. cit.

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