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**WRITING PEOPLE AND PLACE:
Discourses of 'Race' and Gender in European Constructions
of 'Native Rebels' in the Auckland Press, 1863**

A Thesis
Submitted in Partial Fulfilment
of the Requirements for the Degree
of
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by
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ABSTRACT

The Governor of New Zealand, George Grey, ordered an invasion of the Waikato region on 12 July 1863. The invasion was predicated on the notion that Waikato Maori were planning to attack Auckland, 'ravage' the town, and murder 'peaceable' settlers. I argue that such notions about the 'danger' of 'savage' Natives gained their rhetorical power from intertextual links to a host of longstanding racialised and gendered discourses about British masculinity and its Other. I illustrate my argument through a discursive analysis of representations of the Waikato Wars in the *Daily Southern Cross*, and *The New Zealander* during July 1863.

This thesis has three objectives. First, I argue that geographic scholarship needs to be situated within the masculinism of the discipline of academic geography in Aotearoa/New Zealand, and within wider theoretical debates about modernity and postmodernity. Second, I argue that 'Native rebels' and the spaces they inhabited were not some pre-existing phenomena which the Auckland press merely 'reported' in its news stories, but instead that they were (at least partly) constructed in newspaper representations of the Waikato War. Third, I argue that notions of 'race' were inextricably tied up with those of gender in the nineteenth-century identity politics that dominated commonsense rhetorics concerning the Wars.

Maori people and the places they inhabited in the 1860s were present in newspaper rhetorics as a significant absence -- that is, they played a part as a gendered, racialised, and negatively valued foil for British notions of masculine superiority, rationality and Enlightenment. Maori were constituted as objects by which a masculine European subject discursively affirmed its own superiority. Social constructions of gender played such an important role in hegemonic European constructions of the masculine Self that they helped reconstitute racialised constructions of the Other.

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Academic work has been constructed within a liberal discourse of 'individual effort', yet anyone who has completed a doctoral thesis knows this to be a fallacy. For one thing, a thesis is produced in the context of the complex interaction between author and her or his colleagues, peers, personal friends, and acquaintances. In this sense, it can never be an 'individual' effort. The following list of people who provided invaluable assistance, at different times, and in their own way, should dispel the myth of individualism as it relates to my own thesis work: Kay Anderson, David Begg, Margaret Begg, John Campbell, Lex Chalmers, Ralph Crane, Joy Crane, Susan Duncan, Margaret Fairhead, Peter Fairhead, Kathie Gibson, Darryl Gilgren, Claire Hanley, Julie Graham, Wayne Hewlett, Richie Howitt, Peter Jackson, Lynda Johnston, Alun Joseph, Gill Joseph, Robin Kearns, Wendy Larner, Jane Ledwell, Yumi Lee, Loretta Lees, Jacqui Lidgard, Robyn Longhurst, Colin McLeay, David Mercer, Radhika Mohanram, Munro Morad, James Muir, Larry Murphy, Ted Ninnies, William Olszewski, Max

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DEDICATION

For Mary, Morgan, and Evan

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I INTRODUCTION

Alleging that the Waikato people were "constantly threatening to come down the river to ravage the settlement of Auckland, and to murder peaceable settlers" ("Proclamation to Chiefs of Waikato", *The New Zealander*, 16 July 1863: 3), Governor George Grey ordered the invasion of the Waikato region on 12 July 1863 (Figure 1.1). According to James Belich (1986: 119), the ensuing conflict, which lasted for fifteen months, "was the largest and most important of the New Zealand Wars." The Waikato Wars were part of a series of engagements between anti-government Maori forces, and settler and British forces which occurred between 1845 and 1872.¹

These so-called 'New Zealand Wars' represent a crucial example of brutal colonial battles for land and sovereignty. But they are also implicated in significant symbolic battles over representations of 'race', gender,² nation and history. As Juniper Ellis (1994: 86) argues, "the narrative wars began contemporaneously, silencing the vantage of the [Maori] opponents far more successfully than any ostensible British military victories did." I agree in principle with the arguments that she is making, especially the idea that the narrative wars had significant and long lasting material impacts. I would, however, argue that rather than silencing the Maori, the narrative wars might better be seen as an ongoing struggle during which Maori were relatively silenced at certain times, while at other times their rhetorics came to the fore. Such rhetorical struggles began much earlier than the actual

¹ The battles include the Northern Wars (1845-46), The Taranaki War (1860-61), the Waikato Wars (1863-64) and the series of smaller engagements involving Te Kooti (1868-72) and Titokawaru (1868-69); see Belich 1986.

² The binary between 'biological' (i.e. natural) sex and 'sociological' (i.e. socially constructed) gender has recently been subjected to a cogent deconstructive critique (see e.g. Haraway 1989; Butler 1990; Rose 1993a, 1993b). Although I use the term gender, it should be noted that I am not making a distinction between sex and gender. Gender in this sense refers to the interrelated socially constructed categories of sex and gender.

armed conflicts of the mid-nineteenth century.

One can, for example, find rhetorical manoeuvres which similarly attempted to silence Maori in James Cook's journals from his circumnavigation of New Zealand. One of the first acts of James Cook's men on making landfall in New Zealand at present-day Poverty Bay on 9 October 1769³ was to shoot and kill one of the 'Indian' inhabitants.⁴ Cook describes the event thus:

the Coxswain of the pinnace who had charge of the Boats... fire'd two musquets over their heads, the first made them stop and look round them, but the 2^d they took no notice of upon which a third was fired and killed one of them on the spot... (Cook 1955: 169, journal entry of 9th October 1769).

Cook's men killed one more Native, and wounded three others that day. They killed two or three more and wounded one or two the following day. In less than ten days in New Zealand waters, Cook and his men were responsible for the death of at least seven Natives and the serious injury of five others (See Cook 1955: 169, 170 and 178, journal entries of 9, 10 and 15 October 1769 respectively). Cook reflected on the killing of at least two men (and possibly a third) on 10 October:

I am aware that most humane men who have not experienced things of this nature will censure my conduct in firing upon the people in this boat nor do I my self think that the reason I had for seizing upon her will at all justify me, and had I thought that they would have made the least resistance I would not have come near them, but as they did I was not to stand still and suffer either my self or those that were with me to be knocked on the head (Cook 1955: 171,

³ In his journal entry of 7 October 1769, Cook (1955: 167) states that he first sighted New Zealand on 7 October 1769. According to J.C. Beaglehole (Cook 1955: 168, editor's note 6) Cook made landfall adjacent to the mouth of the Turanganui River on 9 October 1769.

⁴ Cook (1955) used the terms 'Indian' and 'native' interchangeably in his journal. The term Maori did not come into common usage among Europeans until the mid-nineteenth century; prior to that time, Maori peoples were most commonly referred to as 'Natives' and 'New Zealanders' (see Sorrenson 1979: 59).

journal entry of 10 October 1769).


In an ironic twist, Cook (1955: 172, journal entry of 11 October 1769) named the bay *Poverty Bay*, "because it afforded [him] no one thing [he] wanted". In this juxtaposition of action and rhetoric one can see the co-equal importance of symbolic and material production. Indeed, as Raymond Williams (1981: 12-13) notes, culture is an integral part of the signifying system through which a material social order is communicated and (re)produced. Accordingly, the symbolic realm of culture cannot be separated from the material realm of production:

all human activity is at once both material and symbolic, production and communication. The symbolic appropriation of the world produces distinctive lifestyles (*genres de vie*) and distinctive landscapes which are historically and geographically specific (Cosgrove 1983: 1).

Just as surplus production is appropriated by the dominant group in class societies, so too is symbolic production "seized as hegemonic class culture" and imposed as the norm across all classes (Cosgrove 1983: 5).

Cook's rhetoric and the actions of his men are similar in both their tone and their material outcome to the rhetorics of both government and settlers in Auckland during the 1860s. In this sense, they both can be seen to arise out of a longstanding European geo-historical discourse of non-Europeans, one which marginalized Natives and reinforced European hegemony in their colonialist efforts. This thesis examines one manifestation of this broader discourse on non-Europeans, namely constructions of 'Native rebels' in the Auckland press of July 1863. In the section that follows I will briefly set the study in the context of the existing literature on the New Zealand wars. My purpose here is not to provide a comprehensive literature review, but to indicate the tenor of the narrative context within which this study is situated. This is followed with an outline of the structure of the thesis. The chapter concludes with a brief history of colonisation of the North Island in order to delineate the material context for the study.

Figure 1.1 The Lower Waikato and the British Advance



Source: adapted from Belich 1986, page 121

NARRATIVE CONTEXT

To say that much has been written about the New Zealand Wars would be an understatement. By their very nature, wars are the kind of *public* spectacle that capture the imagination and desires of the masculine discipline known as 'History'.⁵ By 1860, many books and pamphlets had appeared as a

⁵ I emphasize their spectacular public nature to point out one of the key qualities that has

continued overleaf

result of the armed conflicts between settlers and Maori, and they reflected the tensions within Pakeha society concerning support for or against armed conflict. In the discussion that follows I shall concentrate on those which (in some sense) opposed the wars.

In 1860, former Chief Justice of New Zealand Sir William Martin (3rd ed. 1861a) published *The Taranaki Question*, aimed directly at what he saw to be the injustice of the government's policy in the Taranaki War. As Martin was former Chief Justice of the colony, his comments were difficult to dismiss out of hand (Orange 1987: 155). Accordingly, the government responded with publication of its own pamphlet, *Notes on Sir William Martin's pamphlet entitled The Taranaki Question* (Bell et al. 1861),⁶ which attacked Martin for his confusion of issues of 'title' with those of 'sovereignty' (Orange 1987; Barton 1990). Former British Resident to New Zealand, James Busby (1860), added his voice to the fray, opposing Martin with a confused argument about the source of Maori rights (Orange 1987: 156). Finally, Martin (1861b) responded with a rejoinder to his critics entitled *Remarks on "Notes published for the New Zealand Government", January, 1861, and on Mr. Richmond's Memorandum on the Taranaki question, December, 1860.*

Martin had an ally in Octavius Hadfield, Archdeacon of Kapiti, who was also publicly opposed to the government's armed conflict with the Maori of Taranaki. He made a direct appeal to the Colonial Secretary, the Duke of Newcastle, in three published pamphlets: *One of England's Little Wars*

continued

traditionally defined what gets recorded and written about as 'history' -- namely that which occurred in the masculine coded public sphere. While he doesn't focus on the gendered character of historical scholarship, James Scott (1985: xv) notes a similar centering on the state's 'public' interests.

⁶ According to Orange (1987: 286, note 73), the joint authors did not acknowledge authorship of the pamphlet which was attributed to C.W. Richmond. The pamphlet first appeared in 1860 and was revised for later publication in 1861.

(1861a), *A sequel to "One of England's Little Wars"* (1861b), and *The New Zealand War: The Second Year of One of England's Little Wars* (1861c). Hadfield was convinced that war could have been avoided and was deeply angered that government had not attempted to do so (Starke 1990). His critique had little discernible impact for a number of reasons, including the fact that members of the government managed successfully to argue that it was not the place of the clergy to interfere in political matters (Orange 1987). While unsuccessful in changing government policy, these instances of public opposition to the Taranaki wars nevertheless laid the groundwork for later opposition to the government's policies in the Waikato.

Indeed, in 1864 prior to the end of the Waikato War John Gorst published *The Maori King; or, the story of our quarrel with the natives of New Zealand*. Gorst was formerly Resident Magistrate in the Waikato, and he offered what was in some ways a perceptive critique of government policy in the Waikato. In other ways his analysis was merely another example of colonialist rhetoric. According to a biographer, Gorst firmly believed that the Maori King movement was, in the main, a reaction to the failure on the part of the British to provide law and order in the Waikato: "if Governor Thomas Gore Brown had consistently applied law and order to the district there would have been no need for the Maori to set up their own government" (Sorrenson 1990: 154; also see Gorst 1864: chapter iv). In this sense, he was not opposed to colonisation and assimilation of the Maori, but argued instead that such policies could have been undertaken more effectively by means other than armed conflict. Henry Sewell, New Zealand Attorney General during 1862-63, resigned in protest at the government's introduction of a policy to confiscate 'rebel' lands in the Waikato. He also published *The New Zealand Native rebellion: letter to Lord Lyttelton* in which he argued (1864: 40) that it was "essential to determine what is the nature of the Native tenure of land, and in relation thereto, what are the relative positions

of the Crown and Aborigines." Sewell's opinion on this matter fell in line with more recent readings of the Treaty of Waitangi, providing for fuller recognition of Maori rights than the government of the day was willing to concede (see, e.g., pages 40-42).

Notwithstanding these European voices of opposition, the narrative wars were lost by Maori, and their perspectives were quickly buried by less sympathetic representations of the Wars. By 1879, then, we find writers like John Featon (1879: 19) arguing in his account of *The Waikato War* that the war

was a struggle for supremacy of law and order against no law and no order except that of outrage. Such a state of things could not last, impossible, it being against the natural order of things. Law Courts had been formed and native assessors appointed in the Waikato, but when the Taranaki War commenced all semblance of law and order disappeared. The few well-disposed were unable or unwilling to stay the spirit of rebellion so the Governor, Sir George Grey, was compelled to take steps for the future safety of the settlers. The time had come, and may have to come again, and always will have to come no matter when, whenever law and order comes into juxtaposition with no law and no order.

Featon's work was both an apology for and justification of colonial military policy in New Zealand.⁷ Perhaps more importantly, it made a significant contribution to what James Belich (1986: 15) argues has become "a firmly entrenched and widely disseminated received version" of the Wars.

Although ostensibly designed to provide "a better understanding of the Maori side of the struggle", much the same can be said about James Cowan's *The New Zealand Wars: A History of the Maori Campaigns and the Pioneering Period* (1922-23: vol 1: xiii). In a recent review of Cowan's work, Ellis (1994: 88) argues that his representations of the events ascribe "a questionable sense

⁷ I should also note the similarities between Featon's narrative and that found in the newspaper reports I analyse in later chapters of this study. In some instances, his work reads as if he copied it directly from government proclamations or settler newspaper reports.

of 'poetry' and 'romance' to the bloody wars of colonization." Both Ellis (1994) and Belich (1986) view Cowan's work as part of the production of a 'poetic adventure narrative' or 'Frontier myth', which although they do not mention it in their analyses, can be seen as part of the celebration of a certain kind of military masculinity. In romanticising the wars, Cowan also abstracted the narrative from the broader set of power relations that formed the setting for the conflict. In this way his work negated the serious and longstanding political marginalisation that Maori experienced as a result of the armed conflict.

The received version that Belich (1987) speaks of has changed slightly over time. In the nineteenth century it emphasised British blunders, difficulty of terrain, logistical problems, and Maori evasiveness (Belich 1987: 17) to explain the difficulties British forces had in overcoming Maori forces. In these accounts, problems were never attributed to some 'positive' action on the part of Maori but only to small British shortcomings or to 'natural' difficulties which would have affected any forces in New Zealand. In these rhetorics, then, Maori are again (re)produced as objects of British discourse. More recently, commentators have acknowledged Maori courage and certain kinds of military skills, but there has been a continued denial of Maori strategic abilities (Belich 1986: 17). Thus, while James Hight (1933: 138) acknowledged Maori "courage, devotion to their cause, their gallantry, and many chivalrous deeds", he also argued that "from a military point of view the Maoris [sic] had serious defects: they lacked enterprise, perseverance in a single line of action, and a knowledge of the broader principles of campaigning." Hight also reinforced what I believe to be a more significant idea about the Maori, namely that they were somehow responsible for the brutal wars of colonisation in New Zealand:

The wars were kindled in the clash of two widely different cultures -- English and Maori -- each misapprehended by the adherents of the other; and they were *renewed and prolonged* by the hope the

Maoris cherished of restoring *mana* (prestige) of their race (Hight 1933: 120, my emphasis).

This type of thinking plays a role in wider ideas about the relationship between Maori and Pakeha, or what might be termed a hegemonic discourse of 'race' relations in New Zealand. Robin Nairn and Tim McCreanor (1991: 248-249) have nicely summarised the rhetorics of this discourse, so I quote them at length here:

The standard ideology says that Maori/Pakeha relations in New Zealand are the best in the world, rooted as they are in the honourable adherence to the outcome of a fair fight. Mutual respect for each others' strengths and tolerances of idiosyncrasies has integrated the Maori people into a harmonious, egalitarian relationship with the more recent arrivals; the whole working constructively for the common good.

Maori 'failure', in the hegemonic account, is attributable to Maori themselves. Maori are often constructed as incapable of coping with the modern world due to inherent 'racial', cultural, or personal flaws (Nairn and McCreanor 1991; Pawson 1992).

The kind of ethnocentrism described by Nairn and McCreanor has been contested in a number of (relatively) recent scholarly histories encompassing the period of the Wars. I wish to discuss three of these works here because I see them to be emblematic of the shift to revisionist histories: Alan Ward's (1973, revised 1995) *A Show of Justice*, Keith Sorrenson's (1979) *Maori origins and migrations: the genesis of some Pakeha myths and legends* and James Belich's (1986) *The New Zealand wars and the Victorian interpretation of racial conflict*.⁸

Ward set out to document the British policy of "racial amalgamation" in nineteenth century New Zealand. Contrary to the received version of Maori-Pakeha relations in New Zealand, he (Ward 1995: 308) concluded that

⁸ Clearly, they were not the only historians to be writing within the revisionist vein. See, for example, works by Claudia Orange (1987), Ranginui Walker (1991) and Ann Salmond (1991).

the colonisation of New Zealand, notwithstanding the Treaty of Waitangi and humanitarian idealism, was substantially an imperial subjugation of a native people, for the benefit of the conquering race in which the notions of white supremacy and racial prejudice, familiar in other examples of nineteenth-century European imperialism were very much in evidence.

The regime of 'racial' amalgamation had done much to aid attempts to destroy Maori culture and traditions (although not successfully), but very little to provide a genuine equality in economic or social life in New Zealand. Sorrenson's (1979) work is more of an intellectual history, illustrating the ways that Pakeha rhetorics worked to produce Maori people. As he notes in his prefatory comments, he was "concerned with some modern myths and legends *about* not *by* Maoris" (1979: 7, original emphasis). Sorrenson (1979: 82; also see Said 1978) concludes that European racism and preconceptions had played a much greater role in their conception of the Maori than they would admit.⁹

This brings me to the work of James Belich (1986) which is of pivotal importance to this study. Belich is the first author since Cowan (1922-23) to undertake a comprehensive examination of the New Zealand Wars, and his work provides a significant re-visioning of European views of the New Zealand Wars of 1845-72. Belich (1986: Chapter 15) links the received history of the Wars to dominant British understandings of 'race' -- what he terms "the Victorian interpretation of racial conflict". Belich illustrates how Victorian imperial attitudes helped mould both colonialism and the received version of the wars. The British accounts of the war -- which dominated the received version -- exaggerated British victories (and sometimes created fictional ones), minimised Maori victories, overestimated Maori losses,

⁹ He also notes that the Pakeha myths about Maori have been appropriated by Maori for their own purposes, thus acknowledging their agency in these events.

under-estimated British losses, distorted accounts of battles, and generally constructed a picture of the wars that favoured the British. As Belich (1986: 312) notes, the "dynamic force" behind the received version of history, "was the expectation of victory" on the part of the British. Events that did not coincide with this expectation resulted in a kind of cognitive dissonance, and were changed to better fit with the unavoidable outcome of British superiority. With this in mind, Belich (1986: 299) argues that the dominant understanding of the wars should be seen as a myth or legend:

The Legend of the New Zealand Wars assumes that, despite a relatively enlightened race-relations policy, the outbreak of the war was inevitable because of a fundamental material conflict: the competition for land between Maori and settler. Though some historians are ambivalent about Taranaki, there is still a strong tendency to see the British as having been victorious in each war. But the courage and the chivalry of the Maori in their hopeless struggle is said to have created an enduring esteem for them in the minds of their enemies. With the older humanitarian strand in British policy, this respect survived various trials and tribulations to form the basis of modern, model, New Zealand race relations -- so much better than those of settlement colonies in Australia, America, and Africa.

Belich makes a significant contribution to an understanding of both history and historiography in New Zealand, and I am greatly indebted to his work. This study, however, differs from his work in a number of significant ways. First, in revising the history of the wars, and setting it in the context of the Victorian interpretation of 'race', Belich can be seen to be working with certain kinds of binary concepts which I find somewhat problematic. In this sense, his history is like many other revisionist histories that unproblematically reproduce the idea that 'races' exist as some 'natural' artefact of biology. In working within this binary, Belich may reverse the polarity of the binary -- such that Maori are viewed positively and Pakeha less so -- but he leaves the binary itself unchallenged. I attempt in this study to (at the least) destabilise this binary by introducing gender into the analysis. This is an aspect of history that the dominant political strategy of

combating racism has probably led Belich to avoid. His study can in some ways also be seen as a celebration of certain kinds of military masculinity. Belich also works with a concept of history that accepts in some sense the idea of the existence of some singular 'impartial' historical truth which underlies representation. Ironically (given his understanding of the power of British representations of events during the war) he distinguishes between what 'really happened' and what is 'said to have happened'. In so doing, he fails to (explicitly) acknowledge the power of representation in constructing 'realities'. This study, on the other hand, works within a social constructionist frame that is less interested in 'the truth' than in how certain representations come to be seen as true. This approach recognises the textual and contingent nature of our understanding of the world.

Purpose

I have three objectives for writing this thesis. First, I attempt to situate this work within the discipline (in all senses of this word) of academic geography in Aotearoa. Second, I argue that 'Native rebels' and the spaces they inhabited were not some pre-existing phenomena which the Auckland press merely 'reported' in its news stories, but instead that they were (at least partly) constructed in newspaper representations of the Waikato War. Third, I argue that notions of 'race' were inextricably tied up with those of gender in the nineteenth-century identity politics that dominated rhetorics concerning the Wars.¹⁰ This perspective is one which contrasts with those of many historians of the wars (and of New Zealand history in general) who have tended to concentrate upon a binary identity politics focused on ethnicity (Maori versus Pakeha). The thesis is thus an attempt to problematise what

¹⁰ I would also note that class played an important role in these issues, and I have made some tentative steps in this direction also. My main focus, however, is the relationship between 'race' and gender.

has become a taken-for-granted binary opposition that fails to grasp the complex roles that hegemonic forms of masculinity play in the structuring of society and space.

This study focuses upon textual representations of what happened in the Waikato War during 1863. In order to provide a discursive context for my later analysis of newspaper representations of the War, in the section that follows I outline a (particular) revisionist construction of the material context of the Waikato War. My intent is to provide a counter-hegemonic discourse against which to judge normatively those presented in the Auckland newspapers of 1863.

MATERIAL CONTEXT

Archaeologists suggest that the discoverers and original inhabitants of Aotearoa were Polynesian peoples who probably migrated from the region that encompasses the present-day Cook, Society, and Marquesas Islands (Davidson, 1992). The date of first settlement is uncertain, with estimates ranging between 800 and 1100 AD (Davidson 1992: 6; compare Walker 1990: 28). Polynesians had therefore inhabited Aotearoa for at least 500 years before the first Europeans 'discovered' the Islands. The tangata whenua ('people of the land') had developed a sophisticated social structure based upon kinship ties, spirituality and mana, or status. Mana, based as it was upon lineage systems, involved both men and women equally: "Retaining their own identity and whakapapa (genealogy) was of utmost importance and children could identify with the kinship group of either or both parents" (Pere, cited in Larner and Spoonley 1994). Spirituality and mana were (and remain today) closely connected to the land.¹¹ Indeed, the land was more

¹¹ This connection to land is exemplified in the Maori term 'whenua', which means both 'land' and 'placenta'. After a child is born, many Maori continue the practice of burying

than an economic base: "land, kinship, and individual identity were united for the Maori" (James and Saville-Smith 1989: 17). Claims to land were not gender-divided; they could be proven through whakapapa traced through either the male or female lineage (Kawharu 1977: 294).

As Owens (1992) has observed, the term 'New Zealand' was meaningless to its Polynesian inhabitants before about 1840. Some Europeans, on the other hand, had used the name since the late 1600s, some time after it had been 'discovered' by Abel Tasman (see Stokes 1968). The name became more familiar to Europeans after James Cook's best-selling journals were published describing, among other explorations, his circumnavigation of New Zealand (Cook, 1955). Cook and his men referred to the tangata whenua -- who, if they differentiated themselves at all, did so on the basis of iwi (tribe), hapu (sub-tribe) and whanau (extended family) affiliations -- as either 'Natives' or 'New Zealanders'. Later, as visits from missionaries and traders became more common in New Zealand, Europeans came to call the tangata whenua 'Maori' (which means 'ordinary'). The particular cultural politics of people and place implicit in these acts of (re)naming was to continue and evolve for more than two centuries.

The process of conveying (primarily) European names to places was part of a larger process of Europeanising the landscape (Harley 1988b). This began 'officially' in 1840 with the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi by some (but not all) Maori chiefs and representatives of the British Crown (Orange 1987). Much has been written about the important differences between the English and Maori language versions of the Treaty (see Biggs 1989; Cleave 1989; Orange 1987). In highly simplified terms, the British thought the

continued

the placenta in their family land, signifying the spiritual connection between whanau (extended family) and whenua.

Treaty of Waitangi gave them sovereignty; Maori thought it preserved their mana whenua (control of land) and rangatiratanga (chieftainship) (see Orange, 1987: 39-44). Moreover, as far as the British were concerned, if William Hobson's statement to each signatory at Waitangi is any indication, Maori had also taken the first step toward assimilation. Hobson is reported to have repeated to each chief on their signing the Treaty: "He iwi tahi tatou -- We are now one people" (Orange 1987: 55). In 1845, not surprisingly, the protector of aborigines George Clarke, admitted to the colonial secretary that Maori rights of rangatiratanga, ostensibly guaranteed in the Treaty, would eventually have to give way to British authority (Orange 1987: 120). Regardless of the differing Maori and Pakeha interpretations of the Treaty, it legitimated (in European eyes) British annexation of New Zealand and opened the way for colonisation. The Treaty also provided, for a short time at least, the basis for a relationship between British and Maori that differed markedly from that found in other British Colonies (such as Australia; see Reynolds 1976). In fact, Maori flourished in the early years of British colonisation; their communal farming practices, unaffected by rising labour costs, allowed them to compete well in the new capitalist economic order. By the late 1840s, Maori produce fed most of the colonists in New Plymouth and Auckland (Sorrenson 1992).

This relationship was not to last, however, as a rapidly increasing settler population soon raised demands for land beyond the limits of Maori tolerance. Settlers needed land to satisfy individual living requirements, but many were also keen to obtain communally controlled Maori lands -- which they often referred to as 'waste lands' -- to convert them into speculative commodities or to utilise them for capitalist agricultural production (see e.g. Stone 1973; Ward 1974). Pakeha alienation of Maori land was responsible for much concern among Maori peoples, and was to lead eventually to hostilities.

In June of 1843, 22 settlers were killed after attempting to arrest a local Chief who had burned some disputed survey huts in the Wairau valley. The survey huts were part of preparations to purchase land against Maori wishes (Orange 1987: 117; Ward 1995: 60). In July 1844, Hone Heke and followers from the Ngapuhi cut down the British flagstaff at Russell (Belich 1986). Heke believed (quite perceptively) that the flag was a *tohu* (sign) that New Zealand had passed from Maori to British hands (Orange 1987). The flagstaff was re-erected and brought down three more times. Between May 1845 and January 1846, the British launched three separate assaults against Heke and another Ngapuhi chief, Kawiti; each was an attempt to kill Heke or Kawiti and to destroy their forces (Belich 1986: 29). While the received version of events suggests that Heke was defeated, Belich is much more equivocal, arguing that the Northern War of 1845-46 "resulted in defeat for the British, and limited victory for Heke and Kawiti" (Belich 1986: 29; also see his discussion, pages 58-64).

The Northern War was followed by two small outbreaks of fighting in the southern part of the North Island: in the Wellington (March-August 1846) and Wanganui (April-July 1847) regions (Belich 1986: 73). These conflicts were again caused by overly hasty attempts to purchase land on the part of the New Zealand Company.

From this period on, actions of the settlers and the Crown increasingly came to contradict the rhetoric of the Treaty of Waitangi, and friction between Maori and Pakeha was the inevitable result. In late 1846, for example, Earl Grey, Secretary of State for the Colonies, instructed Governor Grey to implement a policy requiring the registration of all Maori lands.¹²

¹² The instructions were included with a new Charter granting self-government to New Zealand. The Charter was rescinded in 1848 (Orange 1987; Sutch 1969).

The policy was supported in the South Island, but opposed by Pakeha in the north, who knew it could lead to war with Maori (Orange 1987: 126).¹³ In 1848 and 1849, a series of settlements for pensioner soldiers, known as the fencible settlements, were established across Auckland isthmus -- ostensibly to buffer Auckland from potential attack by Maori in the Waikato (Allen 1969: 27). In 1852, a new constitution provided for responsible settler government, although New Zealand remained politically subordinate to the imperial parliament. As Orange (1987: 137) points out, the 1852 constitution "transferred the struggle for definition of the treaty from the desk of the Colonial Office to the floor of the colonial parliament." Since many colonial politicians had vested interests in obtaining more cheap land (see Stone 1973), the constitution was not necessarily in the interests of Maori. Moreover, while the constitution was supposed to provide for male suffrage, regardless of 'race', the individual land ownership requirements tended to exclude most Maori, who held land communally. In 1858, Maori voters were disqualified from voting on technical grounds (Orange 1987: 139).

These events probably gave impetus to the development of the King movement, which a number of historians (Orange 1987; Sinclair 1961; Sorrenson 1963; Ward 1973) suggest, originated in 1853 with two Otaki chiefs, Tamihana Te Rauparaha and Matene Te Whiwhi. The idea was later taken up and promoted in Auckland and at a number of meetings in the Waikato by Wiremu Tamihana Te Rapipipi Te Waharoa (Gorst 1864). A large meeting of Waikato Tribes at Ngaruawahia in June of 1858 agreed to the installation of Potatau Te Wherowhero as the first Maori King (Gorst 1864). The king was installed in a ceremony at Rangiaowhia soon thereafter, while

¹³ The press began a sustained attack on the proposals, scoffing at the probability that they could ever be enforced. See, for example, discussions in *The New Zealander* (3, 10, 14, and 16 July 1847) and the *Southern Cross* (10 July 1847).

a meeting at Ngaruawahia on 2 May 1859 "confirmed Te Wherowhero as holding the mana of kingship" (Stokes 1990: 517).

Initially, supporters of the King viewed his role as complementary to the British Crown and its institutions: "The Queen's law, upheld by the governor's mana, would stand alongside the King's laws and mana, with both sides owing allegiance to God" (Orange 1987: 142). This probably changed, however, once tensions between certain Maori groups and settlers increased to the point of armed conflict in the Taranaki. The first Taranaki War erupted at Waitara in March 1860 after a longstanding land dispute between the government and followers of the principal chief at Waitara, Wiremu Kingi Te Rangitake (Belich 1986; Parsonson 1990).¹⁴ To prevent sale of the Waitara block, Te Rangitake and 70 to 80 of his warriors erected at pa, Te Kohia, on the land and refused to leave. On 17 March 1860 the first shots of the war were fired (Belich 1986). After little more than a week, Te Rangitake and his Te Ati Awa warriors were supported by the Ngati Ruanui and Taranaki tribes, and a few king supporters, or kingites (Belich 1986). The first Taranaki war was to end inconclusively almost one year later, when Governor Browne, and his successor Grey, decided to focus their limited resources on what they deemed to be the "root of the problem: Kingite military power and independence" (Belich 1986: 76; also see chap. 5).

On 21 May 1861, having decided to invade the Waikato to suppress the King movement, Brown sent a proclamation to the Waikato, charging that the Maori King was "an authority... set up inconsistent with allegiance to the Queen, and in violation of the Treaty of Waitangi."¹⁵ Brown was replaced

¹⁴ My brief historical outline does not allow for a full analysis of the complex issues relating to the conflict at Taranaki. The reader is directed to more in-depth discussions by Belich (1986: 76-80) and Parsonson (1990: 500-502).

¹⁵ "Declaration by the Governor to the Natives assembled at Ngaruawahia", 21 May 1861,

by George Grey before he could implement his decision to invade the Waikato. One of Grey's first actions on taking up the governorship was to suspend Browne's invasion plans. Over the next two years, Grey undertook two different approaches to the Waikato: "a 'peace policy' and a 'war policy' " (Belich 1986: 119; also see Sinclair 1990). James Belich (1986: 120) suggests that it is plausible that Grey's peace policy -- which included the return of the Waitara block and development of Maori local government structures called 'new institutions' -- was part of larger preparations for war.

Whatever the rationale for his actions, Grey was "determined to strike a pre-emptive blow [against Waikato] and the Domett Government enthusiastically agreed to his plans" (Orange 1987: 165). British imperial troops crossed the Mangatawhiri stream on 12 July 1863, signalling the start of the 15-month long Waikato War. Two days later Grey issued a proclamation (see Table 7.4 and my discussion in Chapter 7) to the Chiefs of the Waikato threatening confiscation of 'rebel' lands (Gorst 1864: 380-1). Grey was able to make good his threat with passage of the *New Zealand Settlements Act*. "The Act, aptly described as the 'keystone' of government policy, authorised the confiscation of lands from those in 'rebellion' in any district of the colony whatsoever" (Orange 1987: 167). Settlers were to reside on these confiscated lands in sufficient numbers to deter Maori from any attempts at resistance. Any remaining land was to be sold to defray the costs of the Wars. Over 1.2 million acres (485,600 hectares)¹⁶ were confiscated from the Waikato people with an official confiscation proclamation issued in

continued

Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives (hereafter cited as AJHR) 1861, E-1b: 11. See the five conditions he required (pages 11-12).

¹⁶ Nearly 3.25 million acres (1.31 million hectares) were confiscated in the Waikato, Bay of Plenty and Taranaki (Orange 1987: 170).

December 1864 (Orange 1987: 170; Ward 1990: 177; also see the maps in Dalton 1967: 213-216).

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On 22 May 1995 the Prime Minister of New Zealand, the Rt. Honourable Jim Bolger signed an historic land claim agreement with the Maori Queen, Dame Te Atairangikaahu, representing the Waikato people. As part of the settlement, the Crown delivered a written apology to the Waikato people:

1. The Crown acknowledges that its representatives and advisers acted unjustly and in Breach of the Treaty of Waitangi in its dealings with the Kiingitanga and Waikato in sending its forces across the Mangatawhiri in July 1863 and unfairly labelling Waikato as rebels.
2. The Crown expresses its profound regret and apologises unreservedly for the loss of lives because of the hostilities arising from its invasion, and at the devastation of property and social life which resulted.
- [3]. The Crown acknowledges that the subsequent confiscations of land and resources under the New Zealand Settlements Act 1863 of the New Zealand Parliament were wrongful, have caused Waikato to the present time to suffer feelings in relation to their lost lands akin to those of orphans, and have had a crippling impact on the welfare, economy and development of Waikato.
- [4]. The Crown appreciate that this sense of grief, the justice of which under the Treaty of Waitangi has remained unrecognised, has given rise to Waikato's two principles "i riro whenua atu, me hoki whenua mai" (as land was taken, land should be returned) and "ko te moni hei utu mo te hara," (the money is the acknowledgement by the Crown of their crime). In order to provide redress the Crown has agreed to return as much land as is possible that the Crown has in its possession to Waikato.
5. The Crown recognises that the lands confiscated in the Waikato have made a significant contribution to the wealth and development of New Zealand, whilst the Waikato tribe has been alienated from its lands and deprived of the benefits of its lands.

6. Accordingly, the Crown seeks on behalf of all New Zealanders to atone for these acknowledged injustices, so far as that is now possible, and, with the grievance of raupatu finally settled as to the matters set out in the Deed of Settlement signed on 22 May 1995, to begin the process of healing and to enter a new age of co-operation with the kiingitanga and Waikato (*New Zealand Herald*, 23 May 1995, sec. 1, p. 7).

As Belich (1986: 76) suggests, the causes of the wars "in striking contrast to their course, have generated more literature than any other issue in New Zealand history." For some time after the 1860s, however, there did exist an 'official' explanation for the invasion. It centres on the notion that the wars resulted from Maori aggression (Belich 1986). While the Crown's apology in 1995 effectively counters the notion of Maori aggression as the root of the wars, the idea was clearly a dominant theme in nineteenth-century European rhetorics. This study is an attempt to provide some insight into one of the processes by which the official explanation for the British invasion of the Waikato came to have this status of 'truth'. In this sense it is neither an exploration of the 'real' causes of the war, nor of what 'really happened' in the war itself, but instead, how a certain social construction of the Native rebel came to attain the status of 'truth'.

This is not to ignore the wider context of material social relations between Maori and Pakeha in New Zealand. I argue that the symbolic and material realms are equally important in the (re)production of society and space in nineteenth century New Zealand. This is the reason I have discussed what I (somewhat arbitrarily) term the narrative and material contexts. While this study does not examine in detail the material setting for the wars, I nevertheless want to make explicit the linkages between the symbolic realm of cultural reproduction and the realm of material production. There are clear links between the European rhetorics about 'rebellious Natives' and 'savage Maori' and the pain, suffering and losses

endured by members of both sides of the Wars.

STRUCTURE OF THE THESIS

This thesis is structured in the following manner. Chapter 2 presents my views on the complex relationship between gender, empirical investigation and theorising in the context of academic geography in Aotearoa/New Zealand. It forms part of the first purpose mentioned above, namely an attempt to situate this study within the wider context of New Zealand geography. It is also an attempt to develop a space for a particular theoretical approach, one that extends an argument beyond the empirical evidence. In this sense, it should be recognised that much of this thesis is speculative. It is an attempt to 'think' relationships, and it certainly does not follow the positivist model of attempting to 'prove' them. I argue that understandings of the 'real' are always already theoretical. Indeed, much of what is taken-for-granted as 'truth' today is filtered through lenses of liberalism and utilitarianism rooted in the works of John Locke (1690), and Jeremy Bentham (1793) and John Stuart Mill (1863) respectively. I make the theoretical character of my assertions much more visible in this study.

Chapter 3 discusses the modernism-postmodernism debates in contemporary human geography. It provides a conceptual underpinning for the thesis while at the same time further situating the work (thus contributing to my first objective above). Somewhat paradoxically, I attempt here to present a logical argument for doing what some might see as illogical. In this regard, I attempt to map the contours of a writing approach situated between modernism and postmodernism, appropriating both complementary *and* contradictory bits from each. Both perspectives embody valuable ideas and I see the investment that many geographers have made in policing their respective boundaries as counter-productive. My approach to writing from between modernism and postmodernism draws on the writings

of Donna Haraway (1988, 1991) concerning feminist objectivity and situated knowledges.

In keeping with my intent to work between modernism and postmodernism I outline in Chapter 4 an attempt to combine the modernist concepts of ideology and cultural hegemony with a postmodernist understanding of discourse. This chapter, along with Chapter 5, contributes to an understanding of the importance of representation to the production of 'truth' (thus helping further my first goal). Longstanding European discourses of 'race' and gender articulated with ideological processes to (re)constitute hegemonic representation of the 'Native rebel' in the Auckland press of 1863. Relying on work by Iris Young (1990a) and David Harvey (1993) I argue for the possibility of making normative judgements about such discourses.

Chapter 5 outlines my approach to doing a discourse analysis of newspaper stories in the Auckland press of 1863. The chapter begins with a discussion of newspapers and the production of news. Following the work of the Centre for Contemporary Cultural Studies at the University of Birmingham, I argue that newspapers do not merely report 'news' in some mimetic reproduction of 'reality', but instead through processes of selection are involved in the active construction of what comes to be seen as 'news'. Moreover, because of their close relationship with the people and institutions of capital and the capitalist state in the 1860s, I argue that newspapers were also involved in the construction of representations of 'consensus societies'. The internal logic of such consensus requires an external Other for its very own identity. Using the qualitative textual analysis software, NUD•IST, I draw on both critical linguistics and social semiotics to analyse the newspaper stories of the early Waikato War to illustrate how some of these exclusions worked to bolster the notion of a consensus society in Auckland. I outline in some detail the kinds of linguistic analytical tools that I draw on

for analysis, but it is important to keep in mind that much of my analysis is rooted in social theories about 'race', gender and identity politics.

A key component of my argument is that Auckland newspaper representations of 1863 draw upon longstanding European discourses about 'race' and gender. With this in mind, I attempt in Chapter 6 to outline a brief history of such thinking in 'Western' thought. As part of my argument, I draw upon an anti-essentialist perspective on the study of 'race' and racism. Within this tradition, it is now accepted that 'races' do not exist as some pre-given natural entity, but instead are constructed within a set of historically and geographically specific power relations. Another key aspect of this thesis hinges on the argument that the racialisation process was inextricably linked with Victorian constructions of gender. I therefore attempt in this chapter to illustrate some of the ways this process worked historically and how these older discourses might be linked to contemporary nineteenth century rhetorics.

My substantive analysis of newspaper texts is outlined in Chapters 7 and 8. Chapter 7 provides an entry into the issues by examining three notices and one proclamation directed at Natives prior to the British invasion of the Waikato. While this chapter deals with issues involving both 'race' and gender, it should be seen as laying the groundwork for my more substantive analysis of the mutually constitutive character of 'race' and gender discourse in Chapter 8. In Chapter 8 I examine in more detail some of the issues I discussed in Chapter 7. Focussing upon the hegemonic binary opposition between civilization and savagery, I illustrate how civilization is both racialised and gendered. I then look at a number of similarly important divisions -- rational/irrational, Christian/heathen, and courage/cowardice -- arguing (with recourse to critical social theory) how each is also defined by mutually constitutive notions of 'race' and gender. In so doing, I hope to complicate the taken-for-granted binary identity politics

so common to much work which examines the relationship between Maori and Pakeha in New Zealand.

II MASCULINITY, PLACE, AND HEGEMONIC EMPIRICISM¹⁷

This chapter is part geo-autobiography, part polemic. As geo-autobiography, it represents my views of human geography in *Aotearoa* (New Zealand), based on my experiences¹⁸ as a Canadian post-graduate student undertaking doctoral studies at a New Zealand university. As polemic, it suggests one of many possible readings of the way that the culturally contingent and place-specific construction of a hegemonic masculinity might articulate with dichotomous concepts of 'theory' and 'empirical investigation' in New Zealand human geography. One of my purposes is to resist this hegemonic construction of masculinity and thereby reduce my participation in the (re)constitution of masculinist geographies. Masculinism circumscribes peoples' geographies in such a way as to be epistemically violent towards 'women' (problematic as that category may be), and all those whose bodies and subjectivities do not fit the position of the unmarked 'master subject' (Rose 1993a: 6) -- that is Western, 'white', heterosexual, bourgeois and male. My discussion is thus anything but 'impartial', nor am I making a claim for some form of universal knowledge. Rather, I claim a partial, situated, contextual and embodied knowledge, one that is accountable to my position (I discuss more fully ideas about situated and embodied knowledges in the following chapter. Also see Haraway 1988, Johnson 1989, and Berg 1993a).

This chapter is partly an attempt to provide a different way of

¹⁷ A version of this chapter (Berg 1994a) entitled "Masculinity, place, and a binary discourse of 'theory' and 'empirical investigation' in the human geography of Aotearoa/New Zealand" has been published in *Gender, Place & Culture*.

¹⁸ The irony of this statement is only too clear to me!

understanding the complex relationship(s) between 'theory', 'empirical investigation' and 'gender'; it is also an attempt to create a new space, or position for my own approach to theoretical and empirical work in later stages of this thesis. In speaking of 'theory' I am referring to a particular form of critical social theory; one that sees theoretical activity as a creative procedure that involves a qualitative jump *beyond* experiential evidence (Abraham 1982). Moreover, such theory does not seek universal (nor trans-historical and gender-blind) truths, but instead attempts to account for the *position* and *partial perspective* of the researcher. This form of theorising is becoming prevalent in recent works in social, cultural, and feminist geography, and can usually be found in journals such as *Antipode* (e.g. Graham 1990, 1992) and *Society and Space* (e.g. Katz 1992; Keith 1992; Duncan and Sharp 1993; also see the essays in the recent anthologies edited by Barnes and Duncan 1992, Duncan and Ley 1993, and Keith and Pile 1993).

Critical social theory of this sort is verifiable in a preliminary way, but one cannot resort (as quantitative-theoretical geographers might) to empirical evidence in order to conclusively 'prove' or 'disprove' theoretical assertions. This is an important idea to bear in mind while reading later chapters of this thesis, where I attempt to theorise the relationship between discourses of 'race' and gender in 1863 newspaper rhetorics. Often, I attempt to push theory beyond the empirical evidence. In the case of 'empirical investigation' I am referring to what geographers (and I have certainly been complicit in this) seem to commonly and quite unreflectively designate as their 'fieldwork'. As James Duncan (1993: 42, original emphasis) notes, this activity came to be called "fieldwork ... in order to professionalise it and thereby elevate its products above the representations of amateurs such as colonial administrators and travellers". Fieldwork -- be it archival study, interviews, or participant observation -- tends to be undertaken *outside* the university office or library, whilst theorising may be (but is not always)

carried out in these two institutional settings. As conventional logic would have it, we can theorise anywhere, but we must go to specific locations (that is *the field*) to undertake fieldwork. Accordingly, the two activities appear to have a somewhat different ontological status. This representation of difference between theoretical and empirical activities is highly problematic for me, however, since my 'theoretical' and 'empirical' sources occupy the same office here at the University of Waikato.¹⁹

Nevertheless, reflecting on some of my own work, I came to realise that I was myself constituting 'theory' and 'empirical investigation' as a binary opposition. Moreover, I had conceived this binary in a hierarchical structure, valorising 'theory' at the expense of 'empirical investigation'. My approach, it seems, was related to the way my own masculinity is structured; although it was also a strategic reaction to the way that 'theory' and 'empirical investigation' are conceived by many human geographers in *Aotearoa*. I am referring here to a particular discourse in which 'theory' is subordinated to 'empirical investigation'. These reflections, along with recent feminist writings (e.g. Bondi 1992; Rose 1993a), prompted me to think about the wider significance of gender and dichotomous thinking in New Zealand human geography. As a result, I argue in this chapter that the dualistic nature of masculinist Western philosophy and the distinct way that a hegemonic masculinity has been constructed in New Zealand implicate human geographers here in the unwitting conceptualisation of 'theory' and 'empirical investigation' as distinct, logically dichotomous, and gendered concepts. My identification of the theory/empirical investigation binary is certainly not new in either geography or feminist studies. However, I hope

¹⁹ I am making a distinction between my 'theoretical sources' (i.e. books and journals stored on my office shelf), and my 'empirical sources' (i.e. newspaper articles from 1863, archived on microfilm and stored in a filing cabinet here in my office).

to add to the literature by illustrating how *place* might play a role in the gendering of theory and empirical investigation.

Feminists have long been aware of a 'theory' versus 'practice' binary in feminist politics in general and academic Women's Studies in particular (see, e.g. Hartsock 1979; Kaluzynska 1980; Evans 1982; Fildes 1983; compare Stanley and Wise 1983). As Sarah Fildes (1983) notes, it is difficult to fully document the perspective of those sceptical of theoretical work as they were usually not part of the academy and they often opposed the writing of academic articles. Notwithstanding this generalisation, writing by feminist activists like Liz Stanley and Sue Wise (1983) linked theoretical activities to masculinist thought. They argued (1983, especially pages 81-84) that women's personal experiences, and not theories created by men, should be the guide for feminist action (Evans 1982; Fildes 1983). Writing in the late 1970s, Nancy Hartsock attempted to bridge the theory/practice divide, arguing for a feminist *praxis* that required a commitment to 'working out a critical and explicit theory' (Hartsock 1979: 58). She suggested that 'making the theory explicit' was a difficult but necessary task if feminists were to improve their work. These sentiments were echoed by Eva Kaluzynska (1980), Mary Evans (1982) and Sarah Fildes (1983) who were writing partly in order to resist what Fildes characterised as "a powerful undercurrent of hostility against women's studies generally and theoretical endeavours in particular" (p. 62).

This theory versus practice binary is related to what Susan Bordo (1986) has termed "the Cartesian masculinization of thought" (which I shall discuss later in more detail). In this sense, masculinity has long been associated with the mind, culture, reason, and rationality while femininity has long been associated with the body, nature, unreason, and irrationality (Jay 1981; Lloyd 1984; Bordo 1986; Seidler 1991; 1994). For those working within this binary, theorising is associated with masculinist constructs of rationality. Similarly,

feminist practice -- based on women's personal (often bodily) experiences -- is associated with femininity. As Gillian Rose notes (1993a: 78-80) this is part of the logic behind the radical feminist celebration of all that is associated with femininity and its critique of masculine theory. There are strong parallels between the theory/practice binary and the theory/empirical investigation binary I wish to discuss here. Feminists, I suggest, have thus spent much time and effort discussing the ramifications of a theory versus empiricism (practice) binary and its relationship to gender identities.

Andrew Sayer (1989, 1991) has discussed the existence of the binary division of 'theory' and 'empirics' in British geography. Sayer outlined the role that this binary played in the locality debate. He argued that theory/empirics had been conflated with another binary, that of thought/reality, such that two closely related problems arise in geographic thought. The first problem arises from the confusion of observational statements with the things to which they refer. The second problem, he suggests, arises when geographers assume that the empirical is somehow theory free or theory neutral (see Sayer 1991: 293-97). Sayer's commentary is a timely deconstruction of certain types of binary thinking in geography, however it does not acknowledge the link between the theory/empirics binary and gender identities. Following Margaret FitzSimmons (1989), Gillian Rose (1993a) suggests that the theory/empirics binary is en-gendered through an implicit association with a Nature/Culture opposition that is implicated in the very foundations of Anglo-American geography.

Knowledge, the social, the theoretical -- all these are associated with the masculine and with the cultural and the scientific, the work of Man. The bodily, the specific, the private, the relational -- these are feminine, and are associated more with the natural, separate from Man (Rose 1993a: 74).

Rose has thus elucidated aspects of the gendering of binary oppositions central to the masculinism of geographic thought. More recently, Steve Pile (1994) has also connected gender ideology to dualistic thinking in

geography. However, neither Pile, Rose or other feminist geographers have examined the role that *place* might play in mediating such relationships.²⁰ Accordingly, I wish to examine the gendering of one such binary opposition, that of theory and empirical investigations, as it is mediated by the social relations of a specific place -- *Aotearoa*. Moreover, I argue that the particular place-specific and culturally contingent construction of a hegemonic masculinity in New Zealand gives rise to a gendering of theory and empirical investigation that is a reversal of that outlined by Rose.

I suggest this dualism has a number of implications for the way geography is (en)gendered here in New Zealand. First, this binary is related to a long line of hierarchical (and highly contradictory) dichotomies in which one pole is gendered masculine while the other is gendered feminine. Because of the way in which a hegemonic masculinity has been socially constructed in New Zealand, I suggest that 'theory' is gendered feminine and 'empirical investigation' is masculine. Second, in this binary discourse feminine 'theory' is the negatively valued measure of masculine 'empirical investigation'. Theory is thus undervalued for its role in *constituting* (and not just explaining) the 'reality' that geographers 'discover' through empirical investigation. Third, the binary implicates researchers in questionable 'mobile positioning'. In this sense, I argue that to 'do theory' within the theory/empirical investigation dichotomy, researchers must somehow do the impossible -- position themselves first 'in theory' and 'out of the empirical'. Empirical investigations then involve researchers positioning themselves 'in the empirical', and 'out of theory'. The result is a kind of

²⁰ Taking the lead of Nancy Duncan and J.P. Sharp (1993: 478) I am not referring here to a place that is based on some concept of bounded essence, but instead see place as a 'site of confrontational discourses'.

'mobile positioning' that is naive at best (and dishonest at worst).²¹ In the end, the pervasive nature of masculinism in geography is underestimated and the gendered construction of Western societies is (re)constituted in the works of New Zealand human geographers. In the sections that follow I shall discuss these issues in turn. Prior to doing so, however, I will briefly outline the relationship between gender and dichotomous thinking in Western thought.

DUALISMS IN WESTERN THOUGHT

The dualistic structure of 'Western' philosophy has now been well described by philosophers such as Friedrich Nietzsche (1967, 1969), Michel Foucault (e.g. 1977b) and Jacques Derrida (1981; also see Johnson 1981). Feminist theorists have cogently argued that this dualistic structure is also gendered (e.g. Jay 1981; Lloyd 1984; Bordo 1986; Le Doeuff 1987; Rose 1993a; Pile 1994; Kobayashi and Peake 1994). Nevertheless, the history of this binary structure bears repeating here, since with few exceptions (e.g. Sayer 1989, 1991), it seems to have escaped the geographical canon.²²

Jacques Derrida (1977, 1981) has concerned himself with deconstructing the fundamentally dualistic nature of Western metaphysics (by which he is referring to both philosophical work and 'everyday' thought and language).

21 I should acknowledge the potential for underestimating the many researchers who do recognise the theory-ladenness of their empirical investigations. Accordingly, my purpose is not to suggest that all geographers do not recognise (or do not wish to acknowledge) the highly theoretical character of their empirical work, but instead to outline the possible consequences for those who do not.

22 I am making a distinction here between feminist geographers, who tend to be marginalised in dominant (masculine) geographical discourse, and other geographers. I would argue that the marginalisation of feminist geography is becoming less marked, but -- if the majority of recent historiographies of Geography' (such as Cloke, Philo and Sadler 1991; Johnston 1991; Unwin 1992; but compare Gregory 1994) that mention feminism only in passing are any gauge -- it will be some time before feminism enters the 'mainstream' of geography.

Western thought, says Derrida, has always been structured in terms of polarities: good vs. evil, being vs. nothingness, presence vs. absence, truth vs. error, identity vs. difference, mind vs. matter, man vs. woman, soul vs. body, life vs. death, nature vs. culture, speech vs. writing (Johnson 1981: viii).

Such dichotomous thinking can be traced back to the very beginnings of Western philosophical thought in early Greece. Indeed, the very notion of philosophy itself is based on the necessity for pressing the bounds of Reason against a recalcitrant Unreason. The early Greeks associated women's power to give birth with the fertility of Nature, but they believed men had the ability to transcend Nature through their capacity for Reason. Writing in the sixth century BC, for example, Thales (c. 624-546 BC) is said to have "introduced the calm light of divine reason to a world governed by blind instinct and savage superstition" (Cavendish 1964: 3). Also during the sixth century BC, the Pythagoreans²³ constructed their 'Ten Principles' -- comprised of ten binary oppositions now known as the 'Table of Opposites' -- which explicitly linked maleness to the concepts of enlightenment, goodness, orderliness and determinacy. Femaleness was associated with darkness, badness, disorderliness and imprecision (Cavendish 1964; Lloyd 1984; see Table 2.1).²⁴ Maleness was thus imbued with superior qualities that were highly valued, while femaleness was associated with 'dangerous' qualities that were to be avoided or transcended.

Much later, Plato (427 - 347 BC) made a distinction between the human soul and the human body (Huby 1964; O'Connor 1964). For him, "...the

²³ According to Cavendish (1964), none of the Pythagoreans' writings survived to the present day, thus our understanding of their thought comes from records left by other writers. Aristotle is the primary source for the Pythagorean Table of Opposites.

²⁴ For now I restrict my discussion of the Pythagoreans to their role in the construction of male/female dichotomies. In Chapter 6, however, I shall return to a discussion of the Pythagorean Table of Opposites and its role in constructions of both gender and "racial" difference.

individual human being was an immaterial immortal soul in a temporary association with a corruptible material body" (O'Connor 1964: 52). Aristotle, a student of Plato, extended the soul/body binary in a slightly different direction, arguing that the human soul and body were part of a single unit. But he also believed that they were distinguishable entities within the single human 'body' (O'Connor 1964: 52; also see Russell 1946: 192). Perhaps more importantly Aristotle distinguished "...between 'soul' and 'mind,' making mind higher than soul, and less bound to the body" (Russell 1946: 192). He was thus at least partly responsible for the now infamous mind/body dualism: "...the mind has the higher function of thinking, which has no relation to the body or to the senses" (Russell 1946: 193; see Johnson 1989 for a contemporary critique of the mind/body dualism in geography).

Table 2.1 The Pythagorean Table of Opposites

male	--	female
limit	--	unlimit
light	--	dark
good	--	bad
one	--	many
right	--	left
rest	--	motion
straight	--	curved
odd	--	even
square	--	oblong

Source: adapted from Cavendish (1964) and Lloyd (1984).

Such dualistic modes of thinking became more entrenched in Western philosophy when Aristotle (384 - 322 BC) outlined his basic laws of formal logical thought. The most fundamental of these rules are:

1. the Principle of Identity (if anything is A, it is A);
2. the Principle of Contradiction (nothing can be both A and Not A); and
3. the Principle of the Excluded Middle (anything, and everything, must be *either A or Not-A*) (see Jay 1981: 42; Hartsock 1987: 194; Young 1990a: 98-99).

One is forced by such logic to conceptualise the 'somewhat different' as the 'absolutely other' -- there is no room for middle ground or shared identities here (Young 1990a; also see my Chapter 3). Centuries later, in *The Philosophy of Right*, Hegel contrasted the 'natural' status of women with the 'cultured' status of men: "Women are educated -- who knows how? -- as it were by breathing in ideas, by living rather than acquiring knowledge. The status of manhood, on the other hand, is attained only by the stress of thought and much technical exertion" (Hegel, in Lloyd 1984: 38). This kind of thinking had significant implications for the contemporary construction of hegemonic gender identities. Nancy Jay's comments are worth quoting at length in this regard:

In societies through the world, *everyone*, "known and knowable," is either male or female, one or the other, but not both. Furthermore, there is no third possibility (*tertium non datur*); neither we nor the Australians sort people into female, male, and "other." Although biologically, sex is a continuum, it is not one socially. A modern transsexual does not move a certain distance along the continuum socially; she or he makes a complete leap from one category into the other (Jay 1981: 43; original emphasis).

All of this must be put in the context of what Susan Bordo (1986) calls the "cartesian masculinization of thought", which resulted from Descartes' separation of knower from known. Descartes (1596-1650) distinguished between human sensory perception and thoughts, concluding that "knowledge of external things must be by the mind, not the senses" (Russell 1946: 588). In this regard, Descartes can also be seen as one of the original proponents of idealism. Immanuel Kant (1724-1804) sustained Descartes's dualistic thought, suggesting that there was a division between 'our concepts of things' (thought) and 'things in themselves' (matter) (Kant 1922; Russell 1946; Warnock 1964). In maintaining the division between 'thought' and 'matter', Kant upheld the Cartesian mind/body dualism that appears firmly implanted in geographic thought to this day (Johnson 1989; Massey 1992a, 1992b). "The mutual exclusion of *res extensa* and *res cogitans* made possible

the conceptualization of complete intellectual transcendence of the body" (Bordo 1986: 450).²⁵ The mind was already associated with the masculine and the body was associated with the feminine, thus Descartes' mind/body dualism laid the conceptual groundwork for the masculine rational transcendence of the feminine irrational. Moreover, as Victor Seidler (1991) has shown, Immanuel Kant believed that rationality was the phenomenon that separated 'humanity' from the animals. For Kant, then, masculine rationality became the norm by which humanity was judged.

The powerful combination of Aristotle's Principle of the Excluded Middle, Descartes' mind/body dualism and Kant's rational/irrational distinction almost forces one to conceptualise gender identities in a hierarchical fashion. For if something must be *either* A or Not-A, then A becomes the dominant identity by which Not-A is measured. Accordingly, 'male' has a positive identity, while 'female' has a negative identity -- 'Not-male'. Femaleness is constructed as a *lack* of maleness (Jay 1981; Lloyd 1984; Massey 1992a, 1992b; Rose 1993a) and is therefore always present in its absence as the negatively valued foil by which maleness is measured in Western thought.

Aristotelian binary logic is not the only way of conceptualising identity, as there are many different forms of reasoning available to draw upon, including metaphor, analogy, simile and inference. Yet despite these other modes of knowing, binary logic predominates in Western concepts of identity (Derrida 1981). This can be illustrated with recourse to Michel Foucault's analyses of the discursive practices of psychiatry (1965), medicine (1973), penal institutions (1977a), and regimes of sexuality (1978). In these

²⁵ Descartes made a distinction between material substance (*res extensa*) and thinking substance (*res cogitans*) and these terms roughly correspond to body and mind, respectively.

studies, he has illustrated the ways in which madness is created as the antithesis to reason (Foucault 1965), diseased to healthy (Foucault 1973), delinquent to reformed (Foucault 1977a), and deviant to normal (Foucault 1978). In so doing, Foucault has illustrated the way that discursive practices delimit their objects of study (or surveillance, discipline, etc.) and then define the legitimate perspective for the knowing subject (Bannet 1989; also see Fabian 1983). He has focused his analysis on the way a dominant identity that is self-defined as *normal* is usually structured in opposition to some external Other defined (by members of the dominant group) in contradistinction to the dominant identity as *abnormal*. Foucault's work clearly reveals the hegemony of binary identity logic in Western thought.²⁶

GENDERING THEORY AND EMPIRICAL INVESTIGATION

The pervasiveness of dualistic and masculinist thought in Western understandings of the world has significant implications for the way in which 'theory' and 'empirical investigations' are conceptualised in geographic thought. As I have attempted to illustrate, Aristotle's formal logic tends to force one to conceptualise almost all forms of identity or difference as binary opposites -- something is either A or it is Not-A. In general, I wish to examine how such identity logic might articulate with a hegemonic notion of masculinity in the context of New Zealand geographic thought. In particular, I am interested to outline which side of the theory/empirical investigation dichotomy is 'A' (and thus dominant), and which is 'Not-A' (subordinate).

It is important to remember that the following discussion focuses on a hegemonic construction of masculinity; I am not suggesting that this

²⁶ I discuss these and other aspects of Foucault's work at much greater length in Chapter 4.

hegemonic subject position is totalising and monolithic. Indeed, as Antonio Gramsci (1971) has pointed out, hegemony can never be absolute nor uncontested, but is instead always contingent and disputed (also see Williams 1977; Mouffe 1979; Lears 1985).²⁷ Gillian Rose (1993a) argues that different men become masculine in different ways, thus only certain men will be attracted to geography and they will react in different ways to the masculinism of the discipline.²⁸ As a discursive practice, geography encodes certain disciplinary actions that enact specific masculinities. She cogently summarises this aspect of the relationship between geography and the politics of identity:

I am not suggesting that no man can escape the masculinities that I identify as central to geography; nor that women cannot occupy a masculine position; nor that women are incapable of producing geographical knowledge. Rather, I argue that both men and women are caught in a complex series of (historically and geographically specific) discursive positions, relations and practices. The relationship of individual men to the masculinism of geography may be highly problematic and unstable (Rose 1993a: 10).

Indeed, individual New Zealand geographers may have highly contradictory relationships with the dominant conception of masculinity, but that does not negate its hegemonic status.

Key to my argument is the idea that gender identities are constructed differently in different places, and this affects the way in which the theory/empirical investigation dichotomy is gendered and hierarchised. I argue that in New Zealand society in general, and geographic thought in

²⁷ I discuss Gramsci's concept of hegemony in detail in Chapter 4.

²⁸ Victor Seidler recounts his own discomfort and ambivalence towards the image of masculinity he was forced to live up to. He goes on to criticise feminist theory because it has often "identified men, as such, with the dominant form of masculinity, so making it impossible to explore the tension between the power men have within the larger society and the ways they might individually experience themselves as powerless" (1991: 17). My own 'experiences' of disempowerment by hegemonic masculinity certainly lead me to agree with Seidler.

particular, 'theory' is gendered feminine (therefore subordinate) and 'empirical investigation' masculine (and thus dominant). Given that masculinity has always been associated with Reason in Western philosophy, it might seem illogical to associate theorising (a form of reasoning) with the feminine. But this type of 'logic' often has little impact on the political economy of masculinism. Cynthia Cockburn (1985: chapter 5) has revealed, for example, how male engineers in Britain called upon highly contradictory hard/soft and rational/irrational binaries to account for their domination of women in both 'hard' physical engineering and 'soft' (and cerebral) professional engineering. She argues that to do so involved "turning an almost complete conceptual somersault" (p. 235). Logic played a role, but it was a logic of domination and not one of rational consistency. Accordingly, it is not surprising to find contradictory examples of gender typing of theory and empiricism. I argue that the particular form the theory/empirical investigation binary takes in New Zealand arises because of the particular way in which a hegemonic *Pakeha* (European New Zealander) masculinity has been constructed here. Such a conception gives a central role to *place* in the politics of identity (Keith and Pile 1993). Moreover, it alludes to the recognition that the politics of identity are also mediated by the power relations that inhere in notions of 'race', culture, sexuality, and class (Rose 1993a).

As Bev James and Kay Saville-Smith (1989: 45; also see Bunkle and Hughes 1980; Pawson 1987a; Phillips 1987) argue, there exists a "gendered culture, which pervades New Zealand life and cultural expression." This gendered culture has its origins in the social relations of nineteenth century colonial life (Phillips 1980, 1987; James and Saville-Smith 1989). Jock Phillips (1980, 1987) suggests that the almost exclusively male communities of the rural and frontier regions of nineteenth century New Zealand played an important role in the development of male culture. It was in such all-male

preserves that the 'kiwi bloke' learned a fierce independence: "far from settled communities, he would have to make and fix his own tools, learn to build his own house, develop skills in hunting and fishing. As one opportunity closed he would be forced to try another" (Phillips 1980: 221).

New Zealand began to 'settle down' in the late nineteenth century, but as the frontier was 'tamed' so there grew a fear that the *Pakeha* male was also being 'tamed' (Phillips 1987; James and Saville-Smith 1989). Crude 'race' theories, the new 'science' of eugenics, and social Darwinism were becoming popular during this time (Stepan 1985; Livingstone 1984, 1991). In addition, it was commonly felt that the city was "effeminate because it was a place of voluptuousness and fashion, of luxury and ease, where men lived a soft life" (Phillips 1980: 228).²⁹ Cities were also inhabited by office workers, not 'productive' farmers and labourers. The combination of such thinking resulted in "the fear that the New Zealand male was losing his manliness" (Phillips 1980: 227). Cities and towns were for women then; the frontier was the true place of the 'kiwi bloke'.

These 'frontier' discourses appear to underpin present-day constructions of the New Zealand *Pakeha* male as fiercely independent, practical, and capable of dealing with anything that comes along. As one of the 100 New Zealand men interviewed for the book *The Jones Men* put it:

I have a very high regard for New Zealand men. I have a lot of contact with them, in the farming scene. That's where you meet the true blue New Zealander.... The New Zealand male's strong points are his resourcefulness and practicality. We have been isolated to some extent and I'm proud to be a New Zealander, because we can be put into any situation and we can always make do, find a way round things and solve problems ('Scott Jones' in Gray 1983: 148).

According to this rhetoric, then, "the true blue New Zealander" is a male

²⁹ Roberta Park (1987: 18-19) notes a similar fear that cities were producing effeminate men in mid-nineteenth century America.

Pakeha farmer (and member of the petite bourgeoisie) who is practical, independent, and resourceful. Ironically, for early nineteenth-century colonists the term *New Zealander* referred to Maori peoples. Nevertheless, in present-day terms the *real* New Zealander is a 'Kiwi battler' -- the White Man who tames the frontier and contributes to capitalist production through ingenuity and hard work. Unspoken in the discourse, but always present in the background, is this Man's heterosexuality. Indeed, heterosexual relations form another key aspect of masculinity; not only is the Kiwi male practical, independent and resourceful, he is also a Family Man (Phillips 1987).

I suggest such attitudes legitimise anti-intellectual notions that academics are "by definition impractical, slightly unworthy, and definitely out of touch with reality" (Roche 1993: 43).³⁰ This appears to be the rationale behind the actions of large-circulation glossy magazines such as *Metro* and *North and South*, which regularly ridicule theoretical academic work in their 'Pseud's Corner' and 'Wanker's World' sections. The notion that academics are somehow 'out of touch with reality' certainly provides an air of acceptability to recent public characterisations of academics as "Woolly Woofers wearing horn rimmed glasses" by the president of the *New Zealand Federated Farmers* (Jennings, in Roche 1993: 43). The feminine and (probably homophobic) pejorative sexual connotations of terms such as 'Woolly Woofers' also indicates the way in which intellectual or academic activity is feminised and devalued in *Aotearoa*.

Against this discursive backdrop, New Zealand geographers -- the majority of whom are male (Boyce 1989) -- have had to carve a niche for themselves in the intellectual division of labour as well as the wider male

³⁰ Mike Roche is here commenting on Jennings' statement (discussed below) about Woolly Woofers, and should not be construed as holding this pejorative view of academics.

culture in which they work.³¹ I suggest that they have successfully done so by privileging empirical fieldwork over critical theorising. I am not the only commentator to reach this conclusion. In his recent review of the history of geography as a social science, for example, Les King (1993) suggests that New Zealand geographers are much less theoretically inclined than their counterparts in North America, Australia and Britain. Drawing on her personal experiences at the University of Waikato, Robyn Longhurst (1994: 16) observes "it seems that a single minded focus on field work exists not only amongst some staff but also amongst some graduate students." She cites a graduate student who complains that

Field work is all anybody ever talks about in the grad. room -- they never talk about what theoretical perspective they have adopted or why, they just talk about how many interviews they have carried out (Waikato Geography graduate student, in Longhurst 1994: 16).

Brian Easton (1993: 48) praises New Zealand geographers because they

...are not like economists who sit in ivory towers on the Terrace in Wellington or in universities, pondering the great questions of life. Geographers get outside to see what is going on.... It appears *de rigueur* among geographers to get one's boots dirty.

Harvey Franklin, Professor of Geography at Victoria University of Wellington, defended this empirical bent during his plenary address to the 1993 conference of the New Zealand Geographical Society. He argued that "...often observation is streets ahead of the statistics and the theories that are available" (Franklin 1993: 1). Franklin went on to suggest that the present crop of theoretically-inclined geographers inhabit "...that enormous and so fashionable geographic reservation Bunkumland" (page 2). Reviewing recent theoretical articles from *The Professional Geographer*, *Geographical*

31 Interestingly, *Southern Approaches* (Holland and Johnston 1987), an edited retrospective of the past 50 years of New Zealand geography and arguably the official presentation of the 'public face' of New Zealand geography in the late 1980s, had 25 male authors and no female contributors.

Review and Antipode, Franklin concluded that contemporary social theorists are engaged in nothing more than "Mataeology, vain or unprofitable discourse" (1993: 3). Professor Franklin's rhetoric is likely a bit of a caricature created for its humorous impact, but I suggest it also reveals certain underlying attitudes about the role of theory and empirical investigation in human geography. That is, theory must *always* be subordinated to rigorous empirical investigation. By placing such an emphasis on empirical fieldwork it would appear some geographers have found a way to fit comfortably into New Zealand masculine culture. According to Robyn Longhurst (1994: 16), "the 'kiwi bloke' tradition of 'get your gumboots on' and 'get out there' still prevails."

This emphasis on fieldwork also reinforces notions of geography as a 'frontier' discipline. Constructing geography as a 'science of observation' (Rose 1992, 1993a) positions it on the frontier between the so-called physical sciences (read as scientific, objective, legitimate) such as astronomy, chemistry and geophysics, and the social sciences (read as unscientific, subjective, illegitimate) such as sociology, anthropology and political science (Longhurst 1994).

With all this in mind, I suggest that in one thread of New Zealand human geographic discourse, 'theory' is unwittingly gendered feminine and subordinated to masculine 'empirical investigation'. In the terminology of Aristotelian logic, 'empirical investigation' is phrased as 'A' while 'theory' occupies the 'Not-A' position in this binary discourse. Just as woman is conceived as a *lack* of man, then, 'theory' is conceptualised as a *lack* of 'empirical investigation'. This binary is constituted from a place-specific construction of hegemonic masculinity, thus place must be seen to play a key role in the identity politics of masculinism in geographic thought.

Conceptualising one side of the binary as a *lack* of the other leads to a devaluation of the subordinate term. Thus, in the case of those New Zealand geographers who conceive theory as a *lack* of empirical investigation, the ways in which theory constitutes our understanding of empirical 'reality' (in addition to explaining it) are underestimated. This is not to say all New Zealand geographers are atheoretical (or have an aversion to theorising). I want to make it very clear this is *not* my contention. Instead, I am suggesting that this particular anti-theory rhetoric enjoys hegemonic status among the many discursive constructs at work in New Zealand geography. As Foucault (1984) suggests, there are always numerous discourses at work in any set of social relations. In this regard, then, we can find examples of other competing discourses here in *Aotearoa*. For example, *Changing Places* (Britton *et al.* 1992), a recent publication of the New Zealand Geographical Society with 50 local contributors, clearly attests to the use of political-economic theory to explain the geography of restructuring in New Zealand.³²

Nevertheless, working in the geographic community here has made one thing evident to me: 'theory' is definitely not as important as 'empirical investigation'. This is difficult to 'prove' conclusively. I suggest it is related to that phenomenon Jacques Derrida (1976) criticised as the Western 'metaphysics of presence', which he believed gave speech greater validity than writing. The speaker's *presence* supposedly makes their intentions transparent, thus a key aspect of this metaphysics is the privileging of presence over absence. James Duncan (1993: 42-3) has translated this into an analysis of the privileging of personal presence in ethnography. He notes

³² Moreover, many of those geographers who commented on earlier drafts of this chapter are actively engaged in opposing the masculinism and anti-theory bias of New Zealand geography.

how the professionalization of fieldwork, through application of the scientific method, further validated ethnographers' claims as to the veracity of personal presence. Derek Gregory (1994: 21-22) suggests that a similar concern for 'visibility' (to the Western Gaze) can be detected in the development of natural history during early modernity. Whether one wishes to term this a 'metaphysics of presence' or a 'scopic regime', this insistence on 'presence' certainly exists in geography, giving higher priority to empirical investigation -- which almost by definition (in geography) requires the researcher's presence -- as opposed to theorising. Indeed, Gillian Rose (1993a: 86-89) notes how this metaphysics works itself out in geography as a conflation of *seeing* with *knowing*. The result, I suggest, is that while it is acceptable to undertake 'fieldwork' without theorising, the reverse does not obtain: theorising *cannot* be undertaken without empirical 'fieldwork'.

The requirement for presence, and the concomitant belief that presence guarantees mimesis, helps to mask the role that theory might play in the constitution of 'empirical' experience. There are many examples one might cite to illustrate the way that 'theory' might be implicated in the constitution of 'empirical reality' (and vice versa). We need only look to the sorry history of scientific racism to see the ways that theories of the world were deeply implicated in empirical understanding of 'reality'. Long before Europeans had come into contact with peoples from different lands, they had in place a complex theoretical system for conceptualising their Other (see, e.g. Baudet 1965; Banton 1967, 1977; Said 1978; Padgen 1982; Livingstone 1987, 1991, 1992; Anderson 1991). By the time Europeans came into contact with the peoples of Africa, Asia and the Americas, these peoples were subsumed by a scientific discourse on the Other that located them as subordinate 'races' in a

hierarchical relationship with their European 'superiors'.³³ Edward Said's (1978) path-breaking critique of 'Orientalism' (also see Young 1990), for example, provides an excellent illustration of the ways that the Oriental Other was constructed in Western discourse (cf. Mani and Frankenberg 1985). The empirical investigations of the Orientalists that Said is so critical of were not free of 'theory', then, but were instead infused with a longstanding theoretical 'mythology' of the East (Barthes 1972: 129). Accordingly, the Orient was not part of some pre-existing ontological 'reality' (just waiting to be discovered by the proper empirical investigation); rather, it must be seen as *both* a theoretical construct *and* a real material object.

Michel Foucault's (1984) notion of discourse as a structure that governs, controls, and produces knowledge in a culture is helpful for conceptualising the way theory works here. One key aspect to Foucault's notion of discursive power is that such power is not just *repressive* in the sense that it prevents action or controls existing agents and outcomes, but that it is also *productive* in that it creates new objects, actions, events, agents and outcomes (e.g. Foucault 1978, 1980b). Following Foucault, Derek Gregory (1991: 18) conceptualises theory as a "series of discourses". In that way, he argues, its embeddedness in social life and its multiple identities are clearly visible, but perhaps more importantly it can be seen as "an intervention in social life" rather than merely a commentary upon it (Gregory 1991: 18). In this sense then, we can see that, just like the chicken and the egg, it is impossible to define which came first, theory or empiricism. Empirical investigations are *always already* theoretical, just as theories are infused with experience.

This is a significant point for my attempt in this study to illustrate how

33 I discuss this process of 'Othering' in greater detail in Chapter 6.

discourses of 'race' and gender were implicated in Auckland newspaper rhetorics of 1863. In this sense, I wish to extend my theoretical arguments past the point at which they might be 'validated' by empirical evidence. I do so partly in recognition of the fact that such empirical evidence gains its power not only from some straightforward mimetic relationship with 'the real', but also through a longstanding and taken-for-granted 'theoretical' tradition of naive realism and utilitarianism in the social sciences. What I am suggesting then, is that empirical validation is not as simple as we take it to be, but instead relies upon a host of assumptions that tend to go unquestioned in 'mainstream' geography (and other social sciences). When non-positivists push against the current (to continue with my hydrological metaphor), these unquestioned assumptions are brought to bear as part of a disciplinary action to maintain accepted ('natural') methods for the production of truth.

MOBILE POSITIONING

Johannes Fabian (1983) has described the kinds of spatial and temporal distancing that anthropologists unknowingly employ when constructing their research object. He argues cogently that anthropologists, through the use of various types of spatial and temporal language, construct themselves in the 'Here and Now' and their research objects in the 'Then and There' (Fabian 1983: 25-35). In a similar vein, and perhaps more familiar to geographers is Clifford Geertz's (1988) discussion of *author-ity* in ethnography. Here Geertz examines the tension between 'Being There' personally, in the field, 'Being There' authorially, in the ethnographic text, and 'Being Here' as an academic producing material for other academics. He argues:

However far from the groves of academe anthropologists seek their subjects -- a shelved beach in Polynesia, a charred plateau in Amazonia; Akabo, Meknes, Panther Burn -- they write their accounts with the world of lecterns, libraries, blackboards, and

seminars all about them. This is the world that produces anthropologists, that licences them to do the kind of work they do, and within which the kind of work they do must find a place if it is to count as worth attention (Geertz 1988: 129-30).

Geertz suggests that, of itself, 'Being There' is much like a tourist experience. The truly important aspect for scholars, he argues, is 'Being Here' because 'that gets your anthropology read . . . published, reviewed, cited, taught' (p. 130).

Both Fabian and Geertz highlight aspects of academic work, namely various forms of 'mobile positioning', that have been roundly criticised by feminist theorists (e.g. Haraway 1988, 1989; see my discussion in Chapter 3). I argue that geographers are forced to adopt similar 'mobile positioning' when they work within the theory/empirical investigation binary. If 'theory' is conceptualised as absolutely separate from 'empirical investigation', as Aristotle's formal logic would have it, then 'doing theory' requires the impossible from researchers -- positioning themselves wholly 'in theory' and therefore completely 'out of the empirical'. Aristotle's formal logic requires a different positioning when it comes time for empirical investigations -- that is, researchers must position themselves fully 'in the empirical' and 'out of theory'.

That is a bold, and perhaps too bald statement. I do, however, think it defensible on theoretical terms. Perhaps the epistemological and ontological difficulty of such 'mobile positioning' will be clearer if I use Geertz's terminology to describe what I mean here. As I have argued, some New Zealand geographers are implicated in a discourse that valorises empirical investigation over theorising. Accordingly, in work undertaken within this discourse, these geographers tend to valorise 'Being There' over 'Being Here'. However, as Geertz has shown, this emphasis on 'Being There', in the field, cannot elide the fact that academics are always 'Here', in academia. Academics can work this way only through the (usually unwitting)

acceptance of Descartes' mutual exclusion of *res cogitans* and *res extensa*. The mind/body dualism allows for the conceptualisation of complete intellectual transcendence of the body (Bordo 1986: 450), thus leading academics to think that they can somehow maintain a separation of the knower from the known.

The arbitrary division between 'Being There' and 'Being Here', also implicates academics in the notion that they can somehow escape the power of discourse. That is, it seems caught up with the idea that 'Being There' somehow allows academics to 'penetrate' (and I use this term strategically) the yoke of discourse to expose some pre-discursive 'truth'. Yet, as Foucault (1980b: 131) has cogently argued,

truth isn't outside power, or lacking in power: contrary to a myth whose history and functions would repay further study, truth isn't the reward of free spirits, the child of protracted solitude, nor the privilege of those who have succeeded in liberating themselves. Truth is a thing of this world; it is produced by multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular forms of power.

Accordingly, we are all caught up in the power of discourse (and that includes this thesis and myself). In following Foucault, I am advocating a (highly circumscribed) form of relativist epistemology,³⁴ but this is not to argue that academics must abandon ethical and political commitments. Indeed, as Margaret Wetherell and Jonathan Potter (1992: 68) suggest, emphasising the universality of discursive power should have the reverse effect, clarifying the need and intensifying the demand for explicit ethical and political commitment.

The binary division between empirical investigation and theory also seems to articulate with a whole host of gendered (and racialised) binary terms such as public/private, fact/value, visible/invisible and

34 I am not, however, advocating a binary distinction between 'objective' and 'subjective' epistemologies. See my discussion in Chapter 3 and in Berg (1994b).

active/inactive (to name just a few). In this sense, masculine fieldwork involves the 'active' collection of 'visible' 'facts' from the 'public' realm. This devalues the often 'invisible' and 'private' realm, so often associated with (a masculine concept of) Woman. As a result, despite claims to a universal knowledge, this kind of work results in highly specific theorisations of society and space. This seems to be a common problem in geography. For example, despite their claims to a (universal) objective knowledge, the specificity of time-geographers allowed them to unwittingly develop a masculine concept of both "human agency and [the] space through which it moves" (Rose 1993a: 38).

Although our individual subject positions may be constantly shifting none of us can ever escape the 'Here' of our cultural, 'racial', sexual, classed and gendered specificity. As feminists such as Sandra Harding (1986), Donna Haraway (1988) and Louise Johnson (1989) observe, attempts to do just that through adoption of 'mobile positioning' is typical of masculinist approaches. It is possible only if researchers conceive themselves as abstract and disembodied, floating above the world of their research objects. Only unsituated and disembodied researchers can commit themselves to 'mobile positioning' and passionate detachment, but only at the expense of maintaining impossibly naive identity politics and epistemologies (Haraway 1988).

CONCLUSION

I have argued for recognition of a binary discourse in which New Zealand human geographers predominantly gender 'theory' as feminine and subordinate it to masculine 'empirical investigation'. This runs counter to the way that Western (masculinist) philosophy has always linked femininity to nature, the body, and experience (i.e. the field) and masculinity to mind, rationality, and reason (i.e. theorising). I argue that it does so, however,

because of the particular way a hegemonic masculinity has been constructed in *Aotearoa*. This gives a central role to *place* in the construction of gender roles and in turn, their articulation with issues of epistemology and ontology.

At least three significant problems arise from such dichotomous thinking. First, the gendered and hierarchical structuring of Western epistemology is reproduced in New Zealand geographic writing and thought; second, masculinised empirical investigations are valorised at the expense of feminised theory, thereby devaluing the role of theory in constituting all understandings of 'reality'; and third, researchers find themselves engaged in unworkable 'mobile positioning'.

My purpose for outlining these problems is *not* to argue for the valorisation of the subordinate pole of the binary. Indeed, as Doreen Massey (1992a; also see Rose 1993a) has observed in her examination of the space/time dichotomy, that would merely reverse the polarity of dichotomous thinking, but would leave the dichotomy in place. This in turn leaves the masculinist structure of geographic thinking intact and unchallenged. I am uncertain whether geographers might be able to avoid such dichotomous thought. However, one means of at least attempting to do so lies in the recognition that 'we' cannot insert ourselves into the world free of 'theory', and neither can such 'theory' ever be unaffected by our experiences in the world. Here, I align myself with James Duncan (1993; also see Hartsock 1979; Evans 1982; Fildes 1983; Sayer 1991), who opposes those "empiricists who deny the theory-ladenness of representations and urge us to simply open our eyes and see an unmediated world that yields its secrets to our gaze" (Duncan 1993: 39). But like Nancy Hartsock (1979) and Andrew Sayer (1991) I go a bit further than Duncan, arguing that we should explicitly acknowledge that the articulation between theory and empirical investigation involves flows in both directions -- 'empirical investigations'

are *always already* theoretical, just as 'theory' is always touched by our empirical experience. It is also necessary to point out, however, that this does not mean that theorising and doing empirical research are identical activities (Sayer 1991). To many (particularly socialist) feminist geographers familiar with the debates of the early 1980s, or with Marx's vision for a revolutionary *praxis*, this will certainly seem like old news. Yet it seems that many so-called 'mainstream' human geographers need to be reminded of the implicit contingencies of culture, 'race', class, sexuality, and gender that mediate their theoretical/empirical gaze upon the landscape.

What I am calling for, then, is a sustained critique of how 'we' are all implicated in the (re)production of binary and gendered thinking. Accordingly, like Peter Jackson (1993a), I am suggesting that 'we' must first attempt to change ourselves as part of any attempts to critically transform the world. But I also have another reason for presenting these arguments about the relationship between theorising and empirical investigations, namely to situate it in the context of New Zealand as both a place and a setting for academic geography.

If there is any core to the undertaking of academic geography, then it is arguably an interest in space and place. Geographers of all stripes, but particularly social geographers, have an interest in elucidating the difference that geography makes to human existence. That 'geography matters' (Massey 1984) to the way social relations are played out is now taken as a given in geographic discourse. The focus is thus not to discuss *if*, but instead *how* space and place affect and are themselves affected by human action. Paradoxically, (although not perhaps surprising given the desire amongst members of the academy to focus their examinations on a distant and exotic Other) while geographers profess an interest in the socio-spatiality of everyday life, they have often directed their gaze outwards, away from the academy and the way that the practice of geography is itself a product of

social and spatial processes.

The notion that space and place make a difference to the practice of geography itself was made clear to me when I came to New Zealand from Canada to undertake doctoral studies. What had heretofore seemed to me to be commonly accepted (in the Anglo-American academy at least) ways of 'doing geography' was clearly not the case. This is indicative of the hegemony of geographical theory produced in the UK and USA, as well as my own arrogance and ignorance. My own construction of a 'universal' Anglo-American human geography³⁵ had failed to account for the way that space does indeed matter to the way 'we' as geographers construct our theories of society and space.

This chapter, then, is partly a reaction to my assertion that geography as a discipline is constructed differently across space, and that this in turn makes a difference to how geographies -- the interface between people and place -- are constructed. This study is *situated* in the discursive frame of academic geography in Aotearoa during the 1990s. As such, part of it is a reaction to my reading of this discursive setting, in particular, the way that understandings of the relationship between theory and 'the real' have developed here. This chapter is thus partly an attempt to grapple with New Zealand geography in an attempt to open a space for theorising a different conception of the relationship between theories of the world and that world itself. I shall elucidate this approach in the following chapters.

This chapter is also a reaction to the situation that many geographers in New Zealand -- a small country far from the 'centres' of academe and the production of metropolitan theory -- find themselves faced with. In this

35 This construction was based on my limited experience and a reading of Ron Johnston's (1987, 1991) books on the subject.

regard, academics in Aotearoa have to deal with many inconveniences that geographers from other Anglo-American academic settings may not be faced with. Two are most important in the context of this thesis and they affect what kinds of geography are undertaken, and when. The first relates to the way the major publishing houses have divided the world distribution of academic books. Given the asymmetries of the world publishing industry, it is not unusual for books to arrive in New Zealand at least one year after they have been available in Australia, the USA, or Britain.³⁶ Secondly, the academic community is small by comparison to USA, Australia or Britain, yet the range of social issues requiring study is as large as that found in these other countries (Lees and Berg 1995). The end result is that many issues that have received much attention in the UK or USA are just now being studied in Aotearoa. This is not meant as a critique of New Zealand geography, but more as an implicit critique of what I call the production of 'metropolitan theory'. Nonetheless, it is important to keep in mind that this study is greatly affected by the issues facing New Zealand geographers.

³⁶ For example, I have been attempting without success to obtain Allison Blunt and Gillian Rose's 1994 edited volume *Writing Women and Space*, but apparently the publisher, Guilford Press of New York is not distributed here.

III WRITING FROM BETWEEN MODERNISM AND POSTMODERNISM³⁷

In recent years many human geographers have undertaken a concerted engagement with critical social theory to gain some understanding of the rapidly changing geographies of modernity and postmodernity (Gregory 1989; also see Bodman 1991). One result of this engagement with social theory has been a resurgence of intra-disciplinary debates regarding the value of various "theoretical" perspectives -- many but not all of which centre on modern *versus* postmodern approaches (Curry 1991; Pile and Rose 1992). Indeed, the literature in this area of geography continues to expand rapidly.³⁸ Moreover, geographers (Graham 1990, 1992; Peet 1992) and economists (Resnick and Wolff 1992) have become embroiled in a debate concerning "anti-essentialist" Marxism, the primary arguments of which closely resemble those in the modernism-postmodernism debate. This chapter is an attempt to situate this study within these wider debates about modernity, postmodernity, and approaches to understanding the 'real' world in academic geography.

Feminist geographers (e.g. Bondi 1990; Massey 1991; McDowell 1992; and Rose [Pile and Rose 1992]) have been quick to respond to the questions raised by postmodernism. They tend to be critical of both modernists and postmodernists for their failure to acknowledge gender issues and patriarchal approaches in the academy and thus, to paraphrase Linda

37 A version of this chapter (Berg 1993a), entitled "Between modernism and postmodernism" has been published in *Progress in Human Geography*.

38 A few recent examples include: Barnett 1993a, 1993b; Cooke 1990; Cosgrove 1994; Curry 1991, 1992; Dear 1994; Dear and Wassmansdorf 1993; de Pater 1993; Hannah and Strohmayer 1992, 1993; Harvey 1992; Ley 1993; Jäckel 1994; Marden 1992; Pred 1992; Sayer 1993a, 1993b; Short 1993; Strohmayer and Hannah 1992; Symanski 1994a, 1994b; Wharf 1993a, 1993b, 1994. What is interesting to me is the 'gladiatorial' tone often adopted in these pieces.

McDowell (1992; also see Christopherson 1989), feminists are both inside and outside the projects of modernism and postmodernism. These authors also note that feminists raised many of the issues central to this debate prior to or at the same time as the postmodernist movement in geography (see the reviews by McDowell 1993a, 1993b).

My purpose in this chapter is to examine some of the questions raised by the modernism-postmodernism debates in geography in order to map out a conceptual underpinning for this study. In so doing, I conclude that the modernism-postmodernism debate has provided the impetus for important critiques of certain excesses of modernist theorising and has increased sensitivity to space and place. However, I am concerned that the debate seems to be dominated by a construction of modernism and postmodernism as unified, monolithic essences situated in opposition to each other. I query the mapping of modernism and postmodernism as polar opposites, questioning whether most postmodernism(s) are really that much different from the modernism(s) they purportedly supplant.

A key question I wish to address here, then, is whether certain postmodern approaches really provide some kind of complete break from modernist ones. This question is difficult to answer, yet I believe that some postmodernist rhetorics are much more closely related to modernist ones than some commentators (e.g. Lovering 1989; Strohmayer and Hannah 1992) have suggested. Indeed, I extend critiques of the modernist strains in postmodernism presented by Michael Curry (1991), and David Harvey (1992), arguing for my part that many postmodern approaches closely parallel the dualistic philosophy of Immanuel Kant that underlies most modernist discourse. I therefore submit that the modernism-postmodernism debate itself is based upon a false dichotomy. This is not to suggest the debate is a waste of time, however, as the tension produced by the debate itself is responsible for many recent "advances" in geographic theorising.

Indeed, this tension has constituted a large portion of the field of human social geography in recent years.

Some geographers (e.g. Jackson 1993a; Lees 1994; McDowell 1993b; Pile and Rose 1992) are attempting to map new routes "around", "beyond", or "past" the debate. Following their lead, this chapter is an attempt to find some position of "between-ness" from which to engage with both modernist and postmodernist approaches. "Between" is the best metaphor I can find to describe the positioning I wish to discuss but it does not completely capture the nuances of my project. Rather than conceiving this position of "between-ness" as confined by epistemological barriers, then, it should be seen as dynamic and fluid, extending along the lines of continuity, tension, and discontinuity between modernist and postmodernist approaches.

Such a position of between-ness becomes possible when it is recognised that certain postmodern and some modern approaches are more closely related than has been acknowledged to date. Although this point seems to have been lost in a debate that essentialises modernism and postmodernism as polar opposites, I would like to suggest that certain modernism(s) and postmodernism(s) fall next to or overlap with each other on a continuum. Clearly, some forms of postmodernism (such as post-rationalism) are very different from some modernisms (such as logical positivism). However, other postmodernisms (like that espoused by Michel Foucault) are much more closely related to certain modernisms (like pragmatic humanism).

As readers will see in later chapters, I have found many aspects of postmodern and poststructuralist discourses very fruitful in gaining at least a partial understanding of particular aspects of the relationship between power, knowledge, and space in colonial Aotearoa. In particular, such discourses provide powerful conceptual tools for opposing certain theoretical excesses -- such as ethnocentrism, masculinism, universalism and abstraction (Haraway 1988, 1991; Gregory 1991; McDowell 1992) --

propagated in the name of Enlightenment rationality and modernist theory.

In the end, however, I still find it necessary to draw upon particular modernist meta-narratives, such as "oppression", "justice" and "equity", in order to make normative judgements about the historical geographies of Pakeha and Maori. Donna Haraway (1988, 1991), in attempting to theorise a feminist objectivity, has grappled with similar problems and I think her comments aptly summarise my own perspective.

So, I think my problem, and "our" problem, is how to have *simultaneously* an account of radical historical contingency for all knowledge claims and knowing subjects, a critical practice for recognizing our own "semiotic technologies" for making meanings *and* a no-nonsense commitment to faithful accounts of a "real" world, one that can be partially shared and that is friendly to earthwide projects of finite freedom, adequate material abundance, modest meaning in suffering, and limited happiness (1991: 187; original emphasis).

This quote might suggest that Haraway may have some "grand" theoretical project in mind, but I do not think that is the case. Similarly, my purpose should not be seen as an attempt to replace old "grand" theory with new; instead it should be viewed as a much smaller project involving an attempt to reconcile my own beliefs in material reality with my beliefs about the power of discourse in structuring that "reality". This chapter is thus an exploration of the potential for constructing some sort of situated and embodied (see Johnson 1989) writing position located in the terrain "between" modernist and postmodernist approaches. Some might accuse me of attempting to 'domesticate postmodernism' (Strohmayer and Hannah 1992) or looking for a 'successor science' (Harding 1986). That may be the case, but in the end I hope my approach might result in a conceptualisation of the historical geography of nineteenth century Aotearoa that is accountable to my own anti-racist and anti-masculinist position.

The chapter proceeds along the following lines. I first present an introductory summary of postmodernism(s) in geography, focusing upon

the crisis of representation and the problem of subjectivity highlighted by postmodernism(s). This is followed with a brief discussion of what I see to be some of the "positive" impacts postmodernism(s) (or at least the tensions between modernism and postmodernism) have had on geographic thinking. Although not explicit, this section is as much a recognition of certain excesses of modernist discourses as it is a review of what I consider to be the "positive" in postmodern ones. I turn then to focus on the modernist overtones in certain postmodernism(s). I review other writers' recent critiques of such modernist overtones, then discuss the postmodern reliance upon a (modernist) Kantian foundation for a supposedly non-foundational knowledge. I follow with a brief discussion of the binary logic which results in the dyadic construction of the modernism-postmodernism debate. My purpose is not to find some spurious reason to dismiss postmodernism(s), but merely to point out the possibility that some versions of postmodernism may not be so radically different from modernist discourses. This leads to a discussion of the possibility for developing a writing position "between" modernism and postmodernism -- a position from which one might avoid the temptation for taking sides, or the "will to power" involved in trying to "win" this particular academic debate.

My purpose in the following section is to summarise the hegemonic conceptualisation of postmodernism. It is important to acknowledge that there are many different types of postmodernism and any attempt to summarise (or "represent") these different approaches may itself be fraught with problems.

POSTMODERNISM/REPRESENTATION/SUBJECTIVITY

Chris Philo (Cloke, Philo and Sadler 1991: 170) notes two aspects to the postmodern phenomenon in human geography: postmodernism as *object* and postmodernism as *attitude*. Similarly, Michael Dear (1988) and

subsequently Michael Curry (1991) describe three related aspects of postmodernism: *style*, *epoch*, and *method*. Philo's postmodernism as object is closely related to Dear's postmodernism as style and epoch. In this regard, postmodernism is viewed by some observers as an object of study, and such study has revealed a change in both the style and epoch of contemporary society. According to Curry (1991: 214), the "somber, univocal, and timeless face" of modernist style has been replaced by the "irony and historical allusion" of postmodernist style. In the arts, for example, postmodernists have collapsed the high art/mass art dualism characteristic of high modernism; in so doing they have embraced the kitsch and pastiche formerly associated only with "pop" art.

It is worth noting, however, that some theorists are somewhat sceptical of the notion that these cultural practices actually form part of some clean break with the past. Frederic Jameson's (1984) reference to postmodernism as the cultural logic of late capitalism is perhaps the most oft-cited case. A more recent example can be found in Nicholas Thomas's (1991: 21) observation that "the erosion of the distinction between high culture and so-called mass or popular culture... was central to Bartok's use of folk themes and dances in otherwise 'avant garde' pieces such as the Piano Concertos and Concerto for Orchestra." Derek Gregory (1991: note 7, p. 37) echoes this sentiment, suggesting that "postmodernism can be seen as affecting a break with *high* modernism but simultaneously maintaining a deep affinity with an earlier, essentially *fin-de siècle* modernism." C. Calhoun (1993: 78) suggests that postmodernism is a recognisable artistic and cultural trend reacting against modernism, but "this is not the same as saying modernity has given way to postmodernity." Even François Lyotard (1984b: 79), a supposed bastion of postmodern sensibility, suggests that postmodernism "is undoubtedly a part of the modern."

Possibly most significant, however, is Nicholas Thomas's (1991: 21)

questioning of "the compulsion to register certain cultural strategies as singular to one time or global phase rather than as possibilities which existed at a number of times". Part of the answer clearly lies in the power relationships which inhere in hegemonic modes of inquiry that are policed by their own "will to truth". As Donna Haraway (1988: 580) observes, traditional science has tended to be both reductionist and masculinist in nature, usually involving "a search for translation, convertibility, mobility of meanings, and universality" (also see Le Doeuff [1987] regarding the philosophical roots of masculinism, and Rose [1992, 1993a] for a discussion of masculinism in geography). Such reductionism leads to the need to classify and order the world, thereby mapping it into "our" (European, "white", bourgeois, male?) universalist preconceptions.

Regardless of one's position concerning postmodern style, there are those who regard it, in turn, as one facet of a new postmodern epoch, where the old "rules" no longer apply (Beatson 1990). Capitalist production and accumulation, once characterised by mass production (Fordism) and scientific management (Taylorism), are said to have shifted to a mode of "flexible accumulation" characterised by post-Fordist, après-Fordist or neo-Fordist production (Jameson 1984; Harvey 1989; Soja 1989; McDowell 1991). Perhaps more significantly, former boundaries between such phenomena as the "economic" and the "social" (see e.g. Gregson 1992), "art" and "science", "illusion" and "reality", have ostensibly become much less well-defined as modernist distinctions "collapse into one another" (Beatson 1990: 132).

In many instances, the study of postmodernism as object has been undertaken by modernist geographers (e.g. Harvey 1989; Soja 1989) who explicate postmodernist style and epoch from a modernist perspective. However, there are those (e.g. Strohmayr and Hannah 1992) who espouse a different approach, one which corresponds to Philo's postmodern attitude and Dear's postmodern method. Postmodernism as attitude or method is

not so much about developing a particular theoretical standpoint as it is about adopting a specific epistemology. In fact, the sometimes-used term "postmodern theory" is a contradiction in terms, since "theory" is a form of essentialism (Graham 1990) and postmodernism is, ostensibly, an anti-essentialist (or anti-foundational) epistemology (Calhoun 1993). Perhaps it might be more appropriate to borrow Gregory's (1991: 18) conceptualisation of theory as a "series of discourses"³⁹ when speaking of postmodernism. In that way, its embeddedness in social life and its multiple identities are clearly visible, but perhaps more importantly it can be seen as "an intervention in social life", rather than merely a commentary upon it (Gregory 1991: 18).

Certain postmodernists are deeply suspicious of essentialism, "grand theories", "metanarratives", or "totalising discourses" such as capitalism, progress, and the Enlightenment (and by implication specific Enlightenment epistemological approaches such as Hegel's dialectic, Marx's historical materialism or Popper's scientific rationalism). Indeed, Lyotard (1984a: xxiv) defines postmodernism as "incredulity toward metanarratives." In a more thorough-going (but perhaps less influential) discussion, Jane Flax (1990) provides a more fitting summary of the postmodernist project. In this regard she outlines six "subjects of conversation" that postmodernists find particularly important to examine:

- (1) contemporary Western culture -- its nature and the best ways to understand it;
- (2) knowledge -- what it is, who or what constructs and generates it, and its relations to power;
- (3) philosophy -- its crisis and history, how both are to be understood, and how (if at all) it is to be practiced;
- (4) power -- if, where, and how domination exists and is maintained and how and if it can be overcome;
- (5) subjectivity and the self -- how our concepts and experiences of them have come to be and what, if anything, these do or can mean;

³⁹ Chapter 4 contains a more in-depth discussion of the idea of "discourse".

and (6) difference -- how to conceptualize, preserve, or rescue it (Flax 1990: 188).

Postmodernism(s) arise in part from the growing recognition of what is now termed the "crisis of representation" in the "human sciences" (Marcus and Fischer 1986; also see Jackson 1991; Hannah and Strohmayer 1992; Strohmayer and Hannah 1992). Zygmunt Bauman (1988: 219; also see Folch-Serra 1989; Jackson 1991), perceptively refers also to a "status crisis" among intellectuals, who are no longer certain of their ability to provide "an authoritative solution to the questions of cognitive truth, moral judgement and aesthetic taste." Interestingly, this 'status crisis' appears to be both gendered and racialised, as few women or people of colour have occupied positions of status from which they might suffer such a crisis (hooks 1990). Nevertheless, the crisis of representation is central to most postmodern discourse, and it is therefore worth reviewing in more detail.

The crisis of representation

Ulf Strohmayer and Matthew Hannah (1992) provide one of the most cogent arguments to date for the adoption of (one form of) postmodern epistemology by geographers. They focus "on the most potentially destructive, and hence most carefully avoided problems brought to light by such writers as Wittgenstein, Heidegger, Foucault, and Derrida" (Ibid.: 30). In this, they are speaking of the "crisis of representation" that has arisen as a result of poststructuralist writers' exposure of the supposed "groundlessness of 'truth' and ... 'right'" (Ibid.). Strohmayer and Hannah here appear to conflate postmodernism with poststructuralism, yet postmodernism(s) have roots in other intellectual traditions including *situationism* (DeBord 1983; also see Bonnet 1991), *feminism* (Massey 1991, 1993b) and the various *pragmatisms* of Dewey, James and Pierce (Rorty 1979). They also tend to concentrate on the purely linguistic aspects of the crisis of representation, although other geographers have more directly related this crisis to the experience of time

and space. Harvey (1989: 147), for example, links the crisis of representation to what he calls "time-space compression" where

..the time horizons of both private and public decision-making have shrunk, while satellite communication and declining transport costs have made it increasingly possible to spread those decisions immediately over an ever wider and variegated space.

For Gregory (1991) this spatial crisis of representation can also be found during the period of early modernism. Citing Jameson (1984), he argues that by the early twentieth century a radical new relation between space and place had developed, one where "the truth of daily experience no longer coincided with the place in which it [took] place" (Gregory 1991: 17).

Nevertheless, for Jacques Derrida, and later Roland Barthes, all knowledge is a social creation, thus *truth* -- based as it is upon such socially created knowledge -- becomes in itself another human creation (Bannet 1989; Milner 1991). Much of the poststructuralist argument concerning the status of *truth* centres on language because of "the realization/belief that language lies at the heart of all knowledge" (Dear 1988: 266). Thus postmodern philosophers like Lyotard (1984a) find the notion that we can represent *reality* through our language makes no sense whatsoever. The same can be said of the *neopragmatist* philosophy of Richard Rorty (1979), for whom there is no "reality" prior to language. Such incredulity towards notions of truth arises from the paradoxes and internal contradictions of language exposed by *deconstruction*, which in turn has intellectual roots in the work of Ludwig Wittgenstein (Strohmayer and Hannah 1992: 36).

According to this line of reasoning, Wittgenstein long ago laid bare the question of representation which now lies at the root of all postmodernisms (Strohmayer and Hannah 1992). This question arises out of his quest to understand the relationship between *signifier* (language, text, sign) and *signified* (reality). In this regard, Wittgenstein demonstrated that "the nominal possibility of a demonstrable identity between signifier and

signified is itself derivative of repetition, rather than the other way around" (Strohmayer and Hannah 1992: 35). This revelation calls into question any claims *about* reality, since such claims *are not* the reality to which they are supposed to refer. Accordingly, for some postmodernists, the

idea(l) that shared language (e.g., a definition) reflects a shared reality is an article of faith which unfortunately can only be 'substantiated' in more language and thus not really substantiated at all. The truth of any statement, scientific or otherwise, which ultimately must rely on some anchoring in order to avoid being completely arbitrary, is *undecidable*. *This in turn does not imply that there is no truth, but rather that if there is, we are incapable of pinning it down.* (Strohmayer and Hannah 1992: 36; original emphasis).

Thus, as I shall expand upon later, Kant's (1781) dualism between reality (noumena, or "things in themselves") and our concepts of reality (phenomena, or "what we can know of things") -- long the foundation of positivist, humanist, and scientific Marxist geographic work (cf. Livingstone and Harrison 1981) -- is maintained in (Hannah and Strohmayer's brand of) postmodernism.

Loss of the subject

Closely related to the crisis of representation is the suspicion of any concept of self or subjectivity not understood as produced by discursive practices (Flax 1990; Bannet 1989; Milner 1991). Some postmodernists, because of their opposition to notions of a transcendental and ahistorical "humanity", hold strong anti-humanist views. According to Paul Patton (1991), suspicion of modernist notions of subjectivity arises from Derrida's (1979) reading of Nietzsche's metaphysics of appearance, in which Being exists only in masks and further masks. This is closely related to Nietzsche's "transvaluation of values" whereby all values -- including *truth*, *goodness* and *subjectivity* -- are exposed as inherently unstable *appearances* (Pascal 1957: xiii). Thus, for poststructuralists like Patton (1991: 32), "there is no truth of Being as such, no truth of man or indeed of woman. In reality, as in Nietzsche's own text, there are only interpretations or *appearances*." A more

accessible version of "the problem of the subject" is provided by Hannah and Strohmayer (1992: 309), who explicitly link the crisis of representation and the loss of the subject:

Since we realize that we are neither completely in control of our language nor capable of determining to what extent we are not, . . . our work must now attend *without hope of legitimation not only to its objects but also to its subjects* (ellipses in original; emphasis added).

Similarly, Michel Foucault argues that history must account for the constitution of subjects as well as of knowledge (Driver 1992). For him there is no possibility of the transcendental subject. Indeed, as Foucault observed in an oft-quoted interview in *Skyline* (1982: 18), "nothing is fundamental. That is what is interesting in the analysis of society". Thus, for some postmodernists (and poststructuralists) human subjects are complex amalgams, multiple rather than unitary, and produced by the mutually constitutive web of social structures, practices, discourses and subjectivity (Davies 1991). Human subjects are not the result of some universal human *essence*.

Many feminist theorists have been grappling with the question of subjectivity for some time now -- primarily in response to androcentric constructions of human subjectivity that are really overgeneralisations from the experiences of (European, "white", bourgeois) male subjects. Diana Fuss (1989), Jane Flax (1990), and more recently Gillian Rose (1991) suggest that, in contrast to the one-sided constructionist argument of some postmodernists, subjectivity might better be theorised as *both* essential and constructed. This may merely be a subtle shift in emphasis, but for me the result is a more sensitive mapping of subjectivity as the result of multiple, overlapping and recursive relations between such phenomena as Self and Other, psyche and text, agency and discourse. But, what does this all mean for geography?

(POSTMODERN) IMPLICATIONS FOR GEOGRAPHY

Postmodernism(s) have clearly affected geographical research, and while

some might dismiss them (e.g. Lovering 1989), I suggest their impact on the discipline has been valuable. The following brief discussion, which follows Flax's (1990) enumeration of the movement's key "subjects of conversation", outlines some of what I see to be the positive impacts postmodern discourses have had on the discipline. The discussion is by no means complete (nor closed to contestation) -- such an endeavour is probably not possible, nor desirable. The focus is on the postmodern debate in general rather than the work of postmodern geographers specifically. Furthermore, I do not imply that the geographers or others whose works are cited in this section are postmodernists (although some might be), instead I suggest that their work has been both informed and transformed by the tension between modernist and postmodernist discourses. Finally, and most importantly, implicit in the discussion is a recognition of certain shortcomings or excesses in modernist theoretical and empirical approaches in geography.

Postmodern discourses have increased geographers' sensitivity to issues relating to culture -- in particular to the relations between contemporary Western culture and non-Western *Others* (e.g. Anderson 1987, 1988, 1991; Jackson 1992; Pawson 1992). Thus geographers have become much more reflexive regarding the politics inherent in their own attempts at "representing" non-Westerners and racialised Others in their writing (see e.g. Crang 1992; Katz 1992; Keith 1992; Rogers 1992; but see my critique [Berg 1993b] of the persistence of certain types of 'racial' representations in geography).⁴⁰ Ostensibly, the postmodern emphasis on the politics of difference has also opened spaces within the academy, albeit small ones, for marginalised "Others" (particularly non-Westerners, women, children and

⁴⁰ The increased interest in 'culture' is also exemplified by the decision of members of the 'Social Geography Study Group' of the Institute of British Geographers to become the 'Social and Cultural Geography Study Group'.

people of colour) to speak against dominant (Western, "white", masculine) discourses (Young 1990a, 1990b), although Linda McDowell (1992) comments on the absence of gender in postmodernist analyses (also see Flax 1990: 210-216). In fact, it is probably fair to conclude that feminists and feminist theory have had much more to do with awakening academics to exclusion of the Other through their universalising and masculinist tendencies than has postmodernism (see e.g. Christopherson 1989; McDowell 1992; Rose 1992). Nevertheless, it is plausible to suggest some versions of postmodernism have had some impact in this area. Postmodern discourses also involve a greater sensitivity to "forms of knowledge" -- what they are, who or what constructs and generates them, and their relations to power (e.g. Foucault 1978, 1980b) -- with a resultant increased awareness of the positionality and situatedness of knowledge (Pile 1991; Barnes and Duncan 1992; Harvey 1992; Jackson 1991, 1993a; Marcus 1992; Pratt 1992). The debate within geography concerning postmodernism(s) has led to an interest in philosophical perspectives new to geography -- including poststructuralism (Strohmayer and Hannah 1991) and psychoanalytic theory (Jackson 1989; Pile 1991). At the very least, in order to engage in the discussion at all, those from all sides of the debate have been forced somewhat to re-examine the philosophical foundations of their own positions in relation to those of their "adversaries".

Questions of power have been central to so-called "radical" approaches that (re)emerged in geography during the early 1970s. Postmodernism(s) have contributed greatly to alternative understandings of relations of power (Driver 1985, 1992). "Power" has been reconceptualised as existing everywhere, inscribed in all social relations. The focus, however, has been upon where and how domination exists, how it is maintained, and how (if at all) it can be bypassed -- but perhaps most importantly, postmodern discourses have shifted the gaze of the academy in upon itself (see e.g.

Barnes 1992; McDowell 1992; Marcus 1992). One key question focuses on the relationship between power and knowledge. As Foucault (1980a: 66) observes,

Science, the constraint to truth, the obligation of truth and ritualised procedures for its production have traversed absolutely the whole of Western society for millennia and are now so universalised as to become the general law for all civilisations. What is the history of this 'will to truth'? What are its effects? How is all this interwoven with relations of power?

While I disagree with Foucault's ethnocentric assertion that science has become "the general law for all civilisations", there is no refuting Foucault's impact on geographic examination of the space-power-knowledge nexus (see e.g. Driver 1990; Philo 1989). Examples of work undertaken in this vein include examination of the power relations underlying such taken-for-granted aspects of geographic work as maps (e.g. Harley 1988a, 1989; Pickles 1992; Wood 1993), and geographers' own texts (e.g. Sayer 1988, 1989; Crush 1991; Crang 1992; Keith 1992; McDowell 1992; Olsson 1992).

Perhaps of key importance to geography has been the postmodernist emphasis on *space* which has, as Soja (1989) suggests, allowed for "the reassertion of space in critical social theory." The work of Foucault (1972, 1977, 1980a, 1980b) is most often cited in this regard (see e.g. Soja 1989; Driver 1985, 1992; Philo 1992). Geertz's (1983) "local knowledge" has also been a source of inspiration, especially concerning the rising interest in the locale -- and the attendant "locality debate" (see e.g. Smith 1987; Cooke 1987a, 1987b; Beauregard 1988; Lovering 1989; Howitt 1992). The melding of spatial sensitivity and social theory, concomitant with the rise of postmodernism, has also seen more critical examination of both the region (e.g. Murphy 1991) and geographical scale in general (e.g. Howitt 1993).

Clearly some geographers, particularly feminists but also some so-called "radicals", have always been sensitive to the issues outlined above, but I suggest that postmodern discourses have increased the overall level of

awareness of these issues among geographers. This is not to imply that there is no need for increased sensitivity on the part of geographers, as feminist geographers so cogently argue (e.g. McDowell 1992; Rose 1991, 1992). Nonetheless, it is not implausible to suggest that at least a proportion of those social geographers involved in emancipatory social science for the most part now depict their subjects (and objects) of study in a more variable, context-sensitive fashion than was previously the norm. If for this reason only, postmodernism(s) have thus had a significant impact on geography -- one which has overdetermined or irrevocably changed the discourse of geography (on overdetermination theory see Graham 1990).

This brief review has obviously missed many salient points, but nonetheless asserts my belief that postmodernist discourses have had, and continue to have, a "positive" influence on the discipline. It also presents an implicit critique of some of the shortcomings of modernist geographies. Unlike some commentators who, as Strohmayer and Hannah (1992) suggest, dismiss postmodernism out of hand, I acknowledge its significance for geography. Nevertheless, in so doing I cannot ignore certain problematic aspects of the way postmodernism has been framed in the current debate; I am speaking now about the way "it" is conceptualised as a radical break from modernist discourse.

MODERNIST OVERTONES IN POSTMODERN DISCOURSE

Michael Curry's critique of the modernist strains in postmodernism (Curry 1991) has already provided what postmodernists Matthew Hannah and Ulf Strohmayer (1992: 308) refer to as "a timely and important contribution to the hitherto dilettante debates about postmodernism within Geography...." (but see Pred's [1992] angry response). Curry (1991) concludes that in spite of postmodernists' claims to see the world, and our knowledge of it, in a radically new fashion -- as more complex, relativistic,

and variable than the modernist view -- their geographies seem little different from those of modernists. Thus, like their modernist counterparts, postmodern geographers continue to maintain an "authorial presence, where the author claims ultimate control over the text, which for that reason lies outside of time, as a timeless commentary on a society that is itself ensnared in the logic of epochal change" (Ibid.: 223).

David Harvey (1992; also see 1989) exposes a fundamental paradox in certain types of postmodernism. Postmodernists, Harvey observes, continue to deploy truth terms of their own -- indicating their continued belief in an ultimate line of truth they theoretically claim cannot exist. This paradox reminds Harvey (1992: 322) of William Blake's great aphorism:

'to generalize is to be an idiot; to particularize is to achieve the greatest distinction of merit,' which sounds great (particularly to geographers) until it is recognized as a generalization and therefore self-condemned as idiotic.

Perhaps Harvey's account of postmodernism is a bit of a caricature, yet he certainly points out a most problematic aspect of certain forms of postmodern discourse, namely a self-refuting truth claim regarding the groundlessness of all truth claims.

I wish to extend in a slightly different direction the critiques of postmodernism presented by Curry (1991) and Harvey (1992). In this respect I shall focus my discussion on some postmodernists' reliance upon a Kantian foundational knowledge for a supposedly non-foundational epistemology.

Kantian foundations

Immanuel Kant's influence on geography -- particularly his views on the nature of the discipline elucidated in his lecture course on physical geography presented at the University of Königsberg from 1756 to 1796 -- has long been acknowledged in geography (Livingstone and Harrison 1981; see e.g. Hartshorne 1939). Kant, who died in 1804, is also generally

considered one of the most influential modern philosophers (Russell 1946), but with few exceptions (e.g. Livingstone and Harrison 1981) contemporary geographers have only just begun to discuss Kant's contribution to wider philosophical issues and their implications for geography. This situation is regrettable, for Kant's work forms the philosophical basis of most approaches in the discipline. His dualistic philosophy can be seen as the foundation of logical positivist philosophies underpinning quantitative-theoretical geography, subjectivist philosophies at the root of humanistic geography, and the analytical approaches underlying "scientific" Marxist geography.⁴¹ As David Livingstone and Richard Harrison (1981: 361) observe, "Kant, it seems, has fathered both idiographic and nomothetic, idealist and positivist geography." I suggest that Kant's dualistic philosophy forms the foundation for certain types of postmodern geography as well -- a foundation that places these postmodern discourses much closer to modernist ones than some postmodernists might admit.

One key to the connection between postmodern geography and Kant's philosophy is the dualism he outlined in his *Critique of Pure Reason*. It is here he argued that what we might refer to as the material world causes only "matter of sensation"; our own mental concepts order this sense-matter by supplying the concepts by which we understand *experience* (Russell 1946: 734). In Kant's (1922: 203) own words:

Appearances, so far as they are thought as objects under the unity of the categories, are called *phenomena*. But if I admit things which are the objects of the understanding only, and nevertheless can be given as objects of intuition, though not of sensuous intuition (as *coram intuitu intellectuali*), such things would be called *Noumena* (*intelligibilia*) (original emphasis).

⁴¹ I refer here to the structuralist and analytic approaches associated with writers such as Althusser (1970), not "humanistic" Marxism, underpinned by Hegel's (1931) dialectic, and associated with writers such as LeFebvre (1991).

Here Kant makes the distinction between our *concepts of reality* (phenomena, or "what we can know of things") and *reality* (noumena, or "things in themselves"). Thus for Kant (1922: 204; my emphasis), "through the empirical use of our understanding we know things *only as they appear*."

There are clear parallels between Kant's subjective idealism and the radical relativism espoused by postmodernists such as Strohmayr and Hannah (1992: 36), who suggest that "if there is [truth], we are incapable of pinning it down". Both acknowledge the potential of a truth or reality (Kant's noumena), but assert that we cannot know it. For Kant, we can know only our "concepts of reality" (phenomena); for some postmodernists, we can know only our "representations of reality" (language). Despite its claims to be non-foundational, certain postmodernist epistemology bears a striking resemblance to a Kantian philosophical foundation developed more than 200 years ago. Yet, just as some postmodernists are silent about the truth-status of their assertions of the groundlessness of truth claims, they also appear unable to acknowledge the foundational character of their supposedly non-foundational epistemology. One might well ask why this is so.

Binary logic and false dichotomies

I suggest that the modernism-postmodernism debate, at least as it has been constructed in geography, is based on a false dichotomy. Binary oppositions such as "modernism" and "postmodernism" are, as Jonathan Crush (1991: 398) observes, "the most effective way of forcing choice."⁴² I do not wish to imply that the modernism-postmodernism dualism results from the intentional actions of participants in the debate. Instead, I suggest this dualism is the inevitable consequence of an Aristotelian logic of identity which involves abstracting things from their context as a means of

⁴² A fuller discussion of binary thought is outlined in Chapter Five.

overlying some form of order onto a "messy" world.

As I discussed in Chapter 2, Nancy Hartsock (1987: 194; also see Jay 1981: 42; Young 1990a: 98-99) outlines three principles of concern here: "the principle of identity (If anything is A, it is A), the principle of contradiction (Nothing can be both A and not-A), and the principle of the excluded middle (Anything and everything must be either A or not-A)." Under this formal logic one is forced to conceptualise the 'somewhat different' as the 'absolutely other' -- modernism and postmodernism become two completely different phenomena. I suggest an alternative conception of identity logic -- grounded in a dialectical and contextual approach founded by Hegel (1931) and revised by Marx -- where it is recognised that all things are identifiable only in relation to their context (identity is comprised of both what a thing is and what it is not, or $A = A + \text{not-A}$). Such a conception acknowledges that people can only know what a thing is by setting their concept of it in relation to their concepts of what a thing is not (for example, the way geographers unconsciously identify a 'locale' in relation to its regional, national, and global context). It also acknowledges that phenomena are part of ongoing processes rather than 'things' which can be easily measured and quantified. Utilising such a dialectical and contextual logic of identity, some postmodernist discourses cannot be seen as completely separate from modernist ones, but are identifiable as phenomena entirely dependent upon modernism for their identity. Clearly, some more radical forms of postmodernism are very different from some modernist discourses. However these postmodernisms must be seen in context, as related to other postmodernisms that more closely resemble modernisms. This notion might seem self-evident, especially given the term *postMODERNISM* itself, but it seems to have been lost in a debate that essentialises modernism and postmodernism as unified essences which form polar opposites.

Another possible reason for the binary construction of the debate may

lay in a confusion between what Locke refers to as "real" and "nominal" essences.

Real essence connotes the Aristotelian understanding of essence as that which is most irreducible and unchanging about a thing; nominal essence signifies for Locke, a classificatory fiction we need to categorize and to label. Real essences are discovered by close empirical observation; nominal essences are not discovered so much as assigned or produced -- produced specifically by language (Fuss 1989: 4-5).

I suggest that modernism and postmodernism are constructed in other geographic discourse as "real" essences (absolutely and irreducibly different), when they might more appropriately be characterised as nominal" essences (assigned "difference" for purposes of the debate, as I have done in this paper).

POTENTIAL FOR WRITING FROM "BETWEEN"

So what does the identification of Kantian dualisms and binary identity logic have to do with (post)modern geographies? Perhaps they are not such important revelations on their own, but when taken in concert with other evidence of modernist strains in postmodernism outlined by writers such as Harvey (1989, 1992) and Curry (1991), I suggest they indicate that (certain) postmodernisms are not so radically different from (certain) modernisms. This possibility in turn opens up space for a writing position "between" modernism and postmodernism; for if they are not radically opposed one might borrow freely from both perspectives without treading on epistemologically unsafe ground. But how might one map out such a writing position?

The answer to this question that I have adopted for this study involves adherence to what might be termed a "situated" and "embodied" approach to understanding my subjects and objects of research. Such an approach owes much to the objective idealism of the "early" Marx (although I am not suggesting it is *Marxist*), and recent feminist theorising about objectivity and

partial knowledges (e.g. Harding 1986; Haraway 1988, 1991; Bhavnani 1993).

Marx accepted that human ideas are the result of sensory transactions between the human brain and a *knowable* material world. But Marx and subsequent Marxists have been criticised, particularly by feminists, for their tendency towards universalism and essentialism (Harding 1986). For some feminists, however, the answer to the problem of universalism is not the particularism inherent in the radical relativism of postmodern discourses. Indeed, certain feminists are very concerned about the implications such relativism might have for their own emancipatory projects.

Linda McDowell (1992) is concerned with the failure on the part of postmodernists⁴³ to acknowledge the power relations inherent in "difference". She is clearly in favour of moves toward greater recognition of difference, diversity, contextuality, specificity and positionality -- moves originating in both feminism and postmodernism (see e.g. Haraway 1988; Flax 1987). Unlike feminism, however, some postmodernism(s) do not provide a route for opposing oppressive power relations underlying relations of difference. As a feminist, McDowell (1992: 70) is concerned to ensure geographers do not forget that "differences are hierarchically ranked and that cultural variation is the product of material and historical structures of power and exploitation." Similarly, Nancy Hartsock (1987) notes the need to work to transform oppressive power relations, not ignore or resist them as postmodernists do.⁴⁴ She argues this involves accounting for one's own position as subject and object of history, accepting that systematic knowledge of the world is possible, and developing from theories and experiences plans for changing the world. Haraway is perhaps more scathing, but her focus is

⁴³ She here refers to 'them' as a unified and single essence.

⁴⁴ In so doing, Hartsock also essentialises postmodernism.

not "postmodernism", but instead relativism. She argues that it

is the perfect mirror twin of totalization in the ideologies of objectivity; both deny the stakes in location, embodiment, and partial perspective; both make it impossible to see well. Relativism and totalization are both "god tricks" promising vision from everywhere and nowhere equally and fully.... (1988: 584).

Building on the work of Harding (1986), Donna Haraway's (1988: 581) response to questions about relativism and totalisation is to espouse a doctrine of 'embodied objectivity' or 'situated knowledges'. Embodiment in this sense means to give a tangible, concrete, or 'bodily' form to an otherwise abstract concept (see Johnson 1989). Most research has been undertaken from an abstract 'disembodied' perspective, as if the researcher was floating above the world of 'his' (I use this strategically) research objects.⁴⁵ Indeed, only unsituated and disembodied researchers can commit themselves to mobile positioning and passionate detachment, but only at the expense of maintaining impossibly naive identity politics and epistemologies (Haraway 1988). On the other hand, situated and embodied researchers are locatable, responsible and therefore answerable and accountable for what they (learn to) see and how they (learn to) describe it. In this way, "...objectivity and truth come to be seen as concepts which are historically situated and situationally specific" (Bhavnani 1993: 96; also see both Jackson's (1993a) and McDowell's (1993b) discussions of situated knowledges). They are *not* impartial or disembodied, nor are they transcendent. The purpose of such research is thus to produce neither totalisations nor refractory particularisms but rather objective, partial knowledges. But what might the mechanics of such situated research look like and how might one acquire partial knowledges?

⁴⁵ I would include my own previous work within this category of disembodied research.

Kum-Kum Bhavnani (1993), extending Haraway's project, outlines her own procedure for undertaking situated research and achieving partial knowledges. She is especially interested to outline a "feminist objectivity", but I have found her approach useful as a template for my own anti-racist and anti-masculinist perspective. Bhavnani (1993: 97) suggests there are three key elements to Haraway's conception of situated objectivity: accountability, positioning, and partiality. These key elements raise three questions for the researcher: "Are the researched reinscribed into prevailing notions of powerlessness?, Are the micropolitics of the research relationship discussed?, and How are questions of difference engaged with?" (Bhavnani 1993: 98). I shall discuss each in turn.

First, Haraway's insistence on accountability implies that research should not reproduce or reinscribe the researched in ways that they are already represented by dominant society. In other words, "the analyses can not be complicit with dominant representations which reinscribe inequality" (Bhavnani 1993: 98). My own research focuses primarily on Pakeha representations of Maori, and the ways that these representations worked to disempower Maori. It is important to remember in this context, however, that Maori people were not passive victims. Accordingly, while focussing on Pakeha representation of Maori, I endeavour to point to some of the ways Maori resisted and domesticated the colonisation process to their own ends. Likewise, it is important to avoid reproducing Maori and Pakeha as unitary ('good' and 'bad' respectively) essences. A key aim of this thesis is to illustrate the way that notions of 'race' were cross-cut with concepts of gender. Rather than reproducing the binary Maori-Pakeha identity politics of some anti-racist work in Aotearoa, I argue that there was a hegemonic masculine Pakeha subject that dominated other Pakeha (particularly 'women') and Maori.

Second, the "politics of position" outlined by Haraway make it necessary

for the researcher to both reflect critically and discuss in depth the micropolitics of the research process. In other words, what are the relationships of domination and subordination negotiated by the researcher, and how are they discussed in the dissemination of research findings? These questions are very important, since

the power of the researcher in relation to the researched -- a set of power relationships which are bounded by the imperatives of resource availability -- can define the parameters of the theoretical framework, can control the design of the study, and can inform how the study is conducted, analysed, and written up (Bhavnani 1993: 101).

I suggest that this is even more important in the study of historical geographies, where the researcher represents or 'speaks for' the 'past'. Notwithstanding its importance, however, it is extremely difficult to operationalise. Perhaps the best that I can do when 'representing' history, is to be certain that my own participation in the representation is clear. In this sense, I ensure that I am always clearly *in my text* (through use of a first person narrative, for example), avoiding the use of what Norman Fairclough (1992: 159) terms objective modality, or unequivocal statements of 'objective' (disembodied) fact. This study is an act of interpretation, and I make it clear that it is *my* interpretation (or an intertextually derived variant) that is being presented.

Additionally, many researchers now acknowledge their position, but Bhavnani's argument is that researchers must go much further, not only noting their position, but analysing its implications for their research (also see Jackson 1993a). This is difficult terrain to negotiate, as researchers are generally multiply positioned. For example, I am now anti-racist, yet I grew up in a small community in British Columbia, Canada where I was actively

involved in the production and reproduction of racist rhetorics.⁴⁶ Moreover, despite my anti-racist stance, I am certain that I will never be fully 'non-racist'. Similarly, I am anti-sexist, but clearly have a long way to go before I overcome my own sexism and masculinism. Finally, while I support indigenous land rights, my home and my office at the University of Waikato are situated on raupatu, or confiscated Maori land.⁴⁷ Moreover, as an unmarked member of the dominant White majority, I can choose at times to ignore racist remarks or actions. For me, then, reflexivity involves recognition of what Alistair Bonnett (1993) terms process oriented consciousness. If consciousness is seen as a process rather than a thing, we can acknowledge the contradictions inherent in the process of change. I suggest my own multiple and contradictory positioning provides me with certain opportunities for understanding the anatomy of racism and sexism from the *inside*. This can be particularly important when attempting to (de)construct historical texts written by Pakeha New Zealanders.

The third issue arises from Haraway's concern for partiality and difference. In this regard, Bhavnani (1993) asks how the questions of difference are dealt with in the design, conduct, write-up and dissemination of the research. She suggests (1993: 102) researchers must be sensitive to the difference of interests of those under study. Here again, this is difficult to operationalise, but I attempt to do so in my own work by paying particular attention to the material reasons for the discontinuities of experience and identities of those under scrutiny. Neither Maori nor Pakeha people should be categorised as belonging to unified groups. Social class, ethnic, gender,

⁴⁶ See Anderson (1991) for an excellent genealogy of racial discourse in British Columbia.

⁴⁷ The university also plays a key role in reproducing capitalist social relations that are implicated in racism and sexism.

and sexuality differences crosscut both groups in highly complex ways. In the case of Maori for example, iwi, and hapu identities may be circumscribed by particular whanau, class and gender relationships. Such conflicting positions are clearly illustrated in the case of the Waikato wars, where some Maori kupapa troops, or 'friendly Natives', fought with the Government against other Maori. Such relationships in turn must be placed in the wider context of relations with Pakeha New Zealanders and the social stratifications of British settler societies.

CONCLUSION

Clearly, the modernism-postmodernism debate has had a significant impact on human geography. Like previous intellectual debates in the discipline (e.g. quantitative versus regional, humanistic versus quantitative, or "radical" versus humanistic), the one involving postmodernism(s) has spurred vigorous discussion about the nature of geographic inquiry -- what the focus of such inquiry should be, and how "we" should (or can) carry out our investigations. While some might see such debate as damaging, I prefer to view it as a necessary exercise in reflection, without which geography would be greatly impoverished. Indeed, I think that the postmodern challenge, as Dear (1988) has termed it, is at least partially responsible for geographers' increasing engagement with critical social theory (be it modernist or postmodernist) and thus their entry into what might be termed the mainstream of social sciences.

On the other hand, the hegemonic representation of the debate between modernism and postmodernism constructs the two perspectives as unitary, monolithic, and opposed essences. Such a construction offers little hope of reconciling the supposed postmodernist rejection of all grand narratives with emancipatory desires for normative discourse. I have suggested in this chapter, however, that *some* postmodernisms may not differ so radically

from the modernisms they supposedly replace. I have extended the critiques of modernist overtones in postmodernism suggesting that (modernist) Kantian foundations underlie some postmodernist discourses. Some postmodernism(s) might thus be better conceptualised as occupying various *adjacent* points on a spectrum, rather than *opposite* poles. This in turn opens up the potential for a writing position *between* modernism and postmodernism. I have suggested one possible means of mapping such a position, grounded in the objective idealism of the early Marx as well as feminist theories of situated, embodied, and partial knowledges. There are probably many other options for working within both modernist and postmodernist discourses -- such as the approaches of postcolonial theorists like Gayatri Spivak (1987) and Trinh Minh-Ha (1989). The key point to remember is that such perspectives are neither totalising nor particularising; instead they might just offer the potential for gaining a perspective of *something* from *somewhere*. The following chapter outlines in more detail the ways in which I operationalise this writing position from between.

IV DISCOURSE, IDEOLOGY, AND CULTURAL HEGEMONY

In his Inaugural Lecture of 2 December 1970 at the Collège de France, Michel Foucault (1984: 109) began to explain one of his most important concepts, namely that of 'discourse':

...in every society the production of discourse is at once controlled, selected, organized and redistributed by a certain number of procedures whose role is to ward off its powers and dangers, to gain mastery over its chance events, to evade its ponderous, formidable materiality.

Since that time, Foucault's notion of discourse has informed much theorising about the relationship between power and knowledge in the structuration of society and space (see e.g. Said 1978; Soja 1989). Social theorists, particularly feminists, anti-racists and postcolonial thinkers, have begun to focus on the role of language and discourse in the maintenance of political arrangements of domination and oppression. Much of this work is informed, implicitly if not explicitly, by a postmodernist or poststructuralist sensibility (Bannet 1989). This sensibility is based on the argument that language does not mirror some pre-existing reality, but instead language produces forms of reality (see e.g. Barthes 1967). Indeed, as I noted in the previous chapter, much of the poststructuralist argument concerning the status of truth centres on language because of "the realization/belief that language lies at the heart of all knowledge" (Dear 1988: 266). As Simon Dalby (1990: 5) suggests, this is a shift from positivist approaches and epistemological concerns which

... involves conceptualizing social existence as human practice. Social life is active creation, albeit within created frameworks of custom, economy, power and language. Social life is understood in and through language, and hence the structures of language reflect and create social life.

This is an especially important concept to remember in the practice of historical geography, where construction of 'the past' is reliant almost solely

FOUCAULT'S CONCEPT OF DISCOURSE

Discourse is a difficult concept, primarily because there exist a large number of sometimes conflicting and often overlapping definitions formulated from various theoretical, methodological, and disciplinary standpoints (Fairclough 1992). Nonetheless, two broad 'understandings' of discourse can be identified. Linguists tend to use discourse to refer to extended examples of either spoken or written language. On the other hand, while recognising the centrality of language and text to discursive analysis, social theorists tend to view discourse in a much broader fashion. In much social theory, and particularly that based on the work of Foucault, discourse refers to ways of structuring knowledge and social practice (Fairclough 1992).

Following this latter approach, discourses can be characterised as "frameworks that embrace particular combinations of narratives, concepts, ideologies and signifying practices, each relevant to a particular realm of social action" (Barnes and Duncan, 1992, p. 8). Discourse is somewhat like grammar, in that it is not a thing to be seen and touched, but instead an implicit "set of capabilities, an ensemble of rules by which readers/listeners and speakers/audiences are able to take what they hear and read and construct it into an organized meaningful whole" (Ó Tuathail and Agnew, 1992, p. 193). Discourse is not merely reflective of dominant social values, but is also constitutive: "different discourses constitute key entities (be they 'mental illness', 'citizenship' or 'literacy') in different ways, and position people in different ways as social subjects" (Fairclough 1992: 2). Accordingly, discourse can be seen more as a set of unspoken rules which govern, control, and produce knowledge in a culture (Foucault 1984).

One key aspect to Foucault's notion of discursive power is that such power is not just *repressive* in the sense that it prevents action or controls existing agents and outcomes, but that it is also *productive* in that it creates

new actions, events, agents and outcomes (see e.g. Foucault 1978, 1980b; Cooper 1994). A number of feminist theorists have explored the productive role of power, and two metaphorical concepts are key here: the panopticon and the confessional (Cooper 1994). The panopticon is a metaphor for people's internalisation of the perspective of an (usually dominant) Other which produces a self-monitoring subject. Force is rarely required to ensure conformity, for the (subordinate) subject ensures its own conformity to dominant norms (Cooper 1994; Patton 1994). For example, business people may conform to a certain 'norm' of dress and personal grooming, despite their own personal beliefs about such matters. The confessional is a metaphor for the "social urge to explain, justify and seek forgiveness for intimate feelings, decisions and actions" (Cooper 1994: 438). Played out in numerous settings -- the church, the doctor's office, therapy sessions, the office -- the confessional is "the liberational antithesis of power" (Cooper 1994: 438; also see Bannet 1989: 167-68). In these ways, both knowledge and cultures are *constructed* by the power inscribed in discursive practices. As social constructions, discursive formations have institutional origins and commitments; they are embodied in technical processes, institutions, and patterns of general behaviour (Foucault 1972: 51; 1977b: 200). Thus discourses are "both reinforced and renewed by whole strata of practices, such as pedagogy... and the system of books, publishing, libraries; learned societies in the past and laboratories now" (Foucault 1984: 113). Their knowledges are political products, bound up with power; they are thus both the product and medium of power.

A second important concept associated with discursive power is the way that its relation to the subject is conceptualised. In this regard, Foucault conceptualises power as operating everywhere, and thus he does not see a need to theorise an agent of power. This is distinctly different from other critical theories such as Marxism, which tends to view power as operating

top-down, from the ruling classes (who hold power) to the working classes (who are relatively 'powerless'). This is an important theoretical move which helps to understand power when it is at its most effective -- when power is exercised by everyone, yet by no one in particular. Power works best when it is anonymous and in such cases, it would be misguided attempting to identify the agent of power. As Davina Cooper observes (1994: 438), for example,

the notion that the streets at night are dangerous for women does not originate and cannot be blamed on particular men. Rather it is the product of certain discourses and truths that both men and women circulate and that have the effect of engendering fear in women and disciplining their movements.

In such cases, power cannot be traced to any one particular agent (be it individual or group), but instead exists everywhere. With these issues in mind, I now turn to discuss in more detail Foucault's concept of discourse.

Foucault (1972) suggests that discourse may be identified by the existence of certain 'rules' which he calls 'practices'. Such discursive practices systematically form for the discourse "groups of objects, enunciations, concepts, or theoretical choices" (Foucault 1972: 181). For example, as Foucault (1972: 50-51) suggests with reference to medicinal practices, such rules govern modes of speaking or 'enunciations' by defining the answers to questions such as "who, among the totality of speaking individuals, is accorded the right to use this sort of language? Who is qualified to do so?" Similarly, they govern the institutional *sites* from which the medical practitioner makes such enunciations, and from which this discourse derives its legitimate source and point of application. It is to a discussion of these types of rules that I now turn.

External control

According to Foucault there are a number of socially constructed external 'rules' governing practices and controlling discourses, quite often hidden, implicit, or not clearly articulated, yet fully understood by members

of society. He refers to such 'rules' as *prohibitions*, *divisions* and *oppositions* which intersect, reinforce or compensate for each other, forming a complex grid that is constantly changing. For Foucault, *prohibitions* appear to be quite obvious in Western societies. "We know quite well that we do not have the right to say everything, that we cannot speak just anything in any circumstances whatever, and that not everyone has the right to speak of anything whatever" (Foucault 1984: 109). For example, in early colonial New Zealand, policed as it was by Victorian Christian values and notions of British superiority (Ward 1973; Belich 1986), one might question the status of European suggestions that "the Maoris, as a people, are a community of savages" (*Daily Southern Cross*, 16 July 1863, page 3), and therefore "doomed to fall by the hands of civilized man" (*Daily Southern Cross*, 23 July 1863, page 3). Were these statements merely anomalous and destined to quickly disappear; or were they common to a larger formation of European discourse on the Maori?

The proscription of speech intersects with a second form of exclusion, namely the *division* between reason and madness (see e.g. Foucault 1965).

Since the depths of the Middle Ages, the madman [sic] has been the one whose discourse cannot have the same currency as others. His word may be considered null and void, having neither truth nor importance, worthless as evidence in law, inadmissible in the authentication of deeds or contracts, incapable even of bringing about the trans-substantiation of bread into body at Mass (Foucault 1984: 110).

Madness prevents one from participating in discourse, it is absent from the discussion. Yet madness is also *present in its absence*,⁴⁹ as the negatively

⁴⁹ Jacques Lacan enunciated the way language enables objects to be present even in their absence: "The word", says Lacan, "is a presence made of absence which allows absence to be named" (in Barnet 1989: 17). Similar sentiments are echoed by Derrida in his discussion (1976: 141-143) of the way in which Rousseau's absence from his text assures the presentation of truth (also see Johnson 1981: xi).

valued foil by which we measure our own sanity (Foucault 1965). In the case of colonial New Zealand, I suggest there existed a large number of such divisions between, for example, civilised and savage, masculine and feminine, and Christian and heathen. As I illustrate in later chapters of this thesis, Maori were incorporated into a range of binary divisions and aligned for the most part with the negative side of the binary. They were thus unable to participate in discourse just like those defined as mad in Foucault's terms.

Finally, the prohibition of speech and division between reason and madness trisect with a third exclusionary practice centring on the opposition between truth and falsehood. Foucault sees this division -- via Nietzsche's (1967) conceptualisation of the relations between truth and power -- as a historically constituted 'will to power'⁵⁰:

For the Greek poets of the sixth century BC, the true discourse... the discourse which inspired respect and terror, and to which one had to submit because it ruled, was the one pronounced by men who spoke as of right and according to the required ritual; the discourse which in prophesying the future not only announced what was going to happen but helped to make it happen, carrying men's minds along with it and thus weaving itself into the fabric of destiny (Foucault 1984: 112).

Foucault suggests that this historical division probably gave our present 'will to know' its general form, although this form is the product of never-ending shifts and turns. And as with madness and reason, falsehoods are also present in their absence as the means by which truth is measured. In colonial New Zealand, I suggest that only certain people could define truth and falsehood; those who could not were identified by virtue of their uncivilised or savage 'nature'. Maori people were labelled "ignorant but

⁵⁰ According to Nietzsche, "the so-called drive for knowledge can be traced back to a drive to appropriate and conquer" (1967: 227) and thus "the criterion of truth resides in the enhancement of the feeling of power" (1967: 290). For more on the will to power, see Deleuze (1983: 49-52, 61-64 and 79-82) and Patton (1994: 69-70).

impressionable savages" (*Daily Southern Cross*, 13 July 1863, page 2), but Europeans, by virtue of their European-ness and their power to name, labelled themselves 'civilised' (e.g. Darwin 1958; Pawson 1987b, 1992; Buchanan 1990; Byrnes 1990). Moreover, as I will discuss more fully in Chapter 8, civilisation was conceived in masculine terms, thus marginalising women. As a result, truth and falsehood were proclaimed by a masculine European subject; women and Maori tended to be subjected to a masculine 'will to truth'.

Of the three systems of external exclusion which fashion and police discourse -- the forbidden speech, the division of madness, and the will to truth -- Foucault suggests that the latter is gaining dominance. The will to truth increasingly attempts to assimilate the others, primarily in order to provide them with a foundation (after all, who can argue against 'the truth'), but also to change them. This will to power, having imposed itself for a very long time, is so pervasive that it has become taken-for-granted -- "the truth it wants cannot fail to mask it" (Foucault 1984: 114).

Internal control

Discourses are also policed from within by internal procedures. Foucault (1984: 114) refers to these internal procedures as "principles of classification, of ordering, [and] of distribution". Such internal processes are dominated by what Foucault terms the *commentary*. According to Foucault, certain kinds of discourses are ephemeral, that is they are said in the ordinary course of day to day life, and they vanish once pronounced. There are other discourses, however, that have much greater staying power. They are taken up, reconstituted, reformulated, and re-spoken; in short they "are said indefinitely, remain said, and are to be said again" (Foucault 1984: 115). All sorts of religious, juridical, literary, scientific and particularly, journalistic texts may be deemed to qualify as such ritualised forms of commentary. Racial discourses that defined Maori as members of a separate 'race',

prominent in nineteenth century New Zealand (and in slightly different forms today), provide a specific empirical example of such commentary. The same can be said for Western notions about the immutable differences between 'men' and 'women', and the subsequent semiotic systems for understanding the masculine and the feminine. I will attempt to illustrate in later chapters how 'Race' thus became the rationale for numerous masculinist studies of the non-European Other and for constant discussion about 'their' difference from the masculine European 'norm'. In addition, I shall attempt to illustrate how such binary thinking was complicated by hegemonic concepts of masculinity and femininity.

Foucault notes an interesting aspect to commentaries, namely a tendency to give paramountcy to 'primary' texts, as if these somehow had greater materiality than 'secondary' texts.⁵¹ According to Foucault, this hierarchy between primary and secondary texts plays two roles.

On the one hand it allows the (endless) construction of new discourses: the dominance of the primary text, its permanence, its status as a discourse which can always be re-actualized, the multiple or hidden meaning with which it is credited, the essential reticence and richness which is attributed to it, all this is the basis for an open possibility of speaking. But on the other hand the commentary's only role, whatever the techniques used, is to say at last what was silently articulated 'beyond', in the text. By a paradox which it always displaces but never escapes, the commentary must say for the first time what had, nonetheless, already been said, and must tirelessly repeat what had, however, never been said (Foucault 1984: 116).

In this way commentary limits the chance-element of discourse by allowing for preparation and rehearsal, repetition and similitude. Such repetition leads to the formation of major narratives (such as 'science' or 'journalism') and ritualised ways of obtaining knowledges (the 'scientific method' or

⁵¹ His comments here seem particularly apposite to those engaged in the study of 'history'.

'investigative reporting').

Access control

Foucault suggests that there is a third group of procedures permitting the control of discourse. These procedures are not bound up with externally controlling their powers or with internally policing predictability, but instead focus on "determining the conditions of their application, of imposing a certain number of rules on the individuals who hold them, and of thus not permitting everyone to have access to them" (Foucault 1984: 120). The speaking subjects themselves are controlled; only those who satisfy certain requirements are permitted to enter 'the order of discourse'. Some forms of discourse are open to all while others are largely forbidden to all but a few -- they are differentiated and differentiating (Foucault 1984: 120). I will attempt to illustrate in later chapters that Maori were the objects of colonial newspaper narratives and thus caught up in a masculine European geo-historical discourse, but seldom invited to partake of that discourse. Europeans were also objects of Maori discursive formations, but the material impact of such discursive acts was much different from that which European discourse had on the Maori. This thesis, which focuses upon Pakeha discourse on 'the Maori', does not discuss Maori discourse.

Exchange and communication, as integral components of discursive formations, work within complex systems of access and restriction. Foucault suggests that the most superficial and visible of these systems of restriction is constituted under the rubric of what might be termed *ritual*. Ritual defines the qualification individuals must possess in order to speak; it defines the universe of significations, the setting and circumstances that must accompany certain types of discourse; and it imposes the efficacy of words and their effect on those to whom they are directed. I suggest that one might see 'ritual' at work in the narratives and rhetorics of nineteenth-century colonial New Zealand newspapers via a range of missionary, juridical,

journalistic, and institutionalised political discursive frames.

To ritual can be added the idea of *societies of discourse*. Such societies function to preserve or produce discourses, and access to them is controlled in various ways. Foucault suggests that the book publishing system, politics and medicine might provide examples of societies of discourse in which the number of speaking individuals is limited according to "different schemas of exclusivity and disclosure" (Foucault 1984: 122). I contend that such societies of discourse can also be seen at work in the case of journalists, politicians, police, members of the military, and missionaries in colonial New Zealand. Each of these institutionalised social groups were given special credence to pronounce the truth and falsehood of certain orders of discourse defined from within.

Doctrine forms another procedure for controlling access to discourse. Allegiance to doctrine "puts in question both the statement and the speaking subject, one by the other" (Foucault 1984: 122). The subject is placed in question by the statement which signifies their adherence or non-adherence to the doctrine. That is, if the statement cannot be assimilated within the doctrine, the subject's adherence to the doctrine is put in question. Similarly, the statement is put in question on the basis of the speaking subject because the doctrine always defines its own membership. "Doctrine brings about a double subjection: of the speaking subjects to discourses, and of discourses to the (at least virtual) group of speaking individuals" (Foucault 1984: 123). Maori were exposed to this double subjection through, for example, the doctrines of capitalism, Christianity, and British jurisprudence. Thus, even if they 'spoke' the doctrine of the discourse, they were subjected to suspicion because of their very Maori-ness (and by their marked otherness Maori were, *a priori*, not part of these doctrines)

Finally, Foucault suggests that *social appropriations* form large cleavages that control access to discourse. He utilises education as an example of the

ways certain discourses are appropriated in different ways -- ways that (re)produce certain social cleavages, politics, and relations of power extant in a given social group. Maori were appropriated in numerous discursive frameworks controlled almost entirely by Europeans, journalism being one of the most significant to this study. With few exceptions,⁵² newspapers in Auckland were written by European men, for their own benefit and that of other European men.

To summarise, then, discourses or discursive formations are complex systems of signification governing the production and use of knowledge and meaning in cultures. Cultures themselves are established through the complex interdependent relationships formed between, in, and through discursive practices. Such practices are governed by rules that circumscribe the objects of discourse, the speakers of discourse, and the forms of discussion that may take place in particular discourses. Discourses are governed *externally* through prohibitions of speech, divisions between reason and madness, and oppositions of truth and falsehood. They are also *internally* policed through the application of commentary and ritualised discussion. Finally, *access* to discourse is controlled via speech rituals, societies of discourse, doctrine, and social appropriation. These 'rules' for discourse interlock in intricate ways that are constantly shifting and regrouping such that discursive practices themselves are also constantly transforming and changing in complex ways that are not easily traceable because they cannot be characterised merely as a paradigm shift or change in *zeitgeist*, collective attitudes or state of mind.

The transformation of a discursive practice is linked to a whole range of usually complex modifications that can occur outside of its

⁵² For example, *Te Hokioi e Rere Atu Na*, a Maori language newspaper set up by members of the King movement (including Wiremu Tamihana) to support their cause.

domain (in the forms of production, in social relationships, in political institutions), inside it (in its techniques for determining its objects, in the adjustment and refinement of its concepts, in its accumulation of facts), or to the side of it (in other discursive practices) (Foucault 1977b: 200).

Nevertheless, it is possible to trace the effects of these discursive relationships, and it is to Foucault's method for doing so that I now turn.

The political economy of normality and abnormality

Foucault has utilised his concept of discourse to analyse, among other things, the discursive practices of psychiatry (1965), medicine (1973), penal institutions (1977a), and regimes of sexuality (1978). He has illustrated the ways in which madness is created as the antithesis to reason, diseased to healthy, delinquent to reformed, and deviant to normal (Bannet 1989; Dalby 1990). In so doing, Foucault has illustrated the way that discursive practices delimit their objects of study (or surveillance, discipline, etc.) and then define the legitimate perspective for the knowing subject (see Fabian 1983). Accordingly, he has focussed his analysis on the way a dominant identity that is self-defined as *normal* is usually structured in opposition to some external Other defined (by members of the dominant group) in contradistinction to the dominant identity as *abnormal*. This division between the normal and the abnormal is a key theme in Foucault's analysis of society.

When a judgement cannot be framed in terms of good and evil, it is stated in terms of normal and abnormal. And when it is necessary to justify this last distinction, it is done in terms of what is good or bad for the individual. These are expressions that signal the fundamental duality of Western consciousness (Foucault 1977c: 230).

Foucault's analysis of the normal/abnormal dualism is founded in the work of Nietzsche who analysed the 'fundamental duality' of Western society in terms of three types of questions that have been described as *objective*, *subjective* and *functionary* (Bannet 1989: 98). In *objective* terms Nietzsche (1969: esp. 24-56) asked under what conditions were the value

judgements good and evil constructed. Foucault, translating Nietzsche's questions into a secular society, focused not on good and evil but on normal and abnormal. This examination of the political economy of normality and abnormality is evident in all of Foucault's substantive works, which are devoted to examining the ways in which judgements of normality and abnormality have been constructed. In *subjective* terms, Foucault has extended Nietzsche's (1969: 84-85) notion of religious discourses causing an 'inner split' in the subject. He suggests (1977d: 163) that

[w]here religions once demanded the sacrifice of bodies, knowledge now calls for experimentation on ourselves, calls us to the sacrifice of the subject of knowledge. The desire for knowledge has been transformed among us into a passion which fears no sacrifice, which fears nothing but its own extinction.

The will to know about oneself and to study one's psyche produces a split subject/object whereby the subject's own subjectivity becomes an object for the will to truth. Foucault asks how this inwardly-divided self has come about, and who has benefited from its construction (Bannet 1989: 99). His (partial) answer is that the oppositional discourse of truth and falsehood is somehow implicated in this process, and much of his substantive work attempts to illustrate the way this occurs in specific places and times. Finally, in *functionary* terms, Foucault extends Nietzsche's questions about the role of the 'ascetic priest' in promoting the divisions and dualisms that have come to dominate human thinking in Western societies (Nietzsche 1969: 97-163). Writing in a secular era, Foucault asked what role the 'intellectual' (the educated elite, not necessarily academics) played in the construction and elaboration of the social divisions between true and false, normal and abnormal. How were social divisions created? What power interests were served by these divisions? (Bannet 1989: 99).

Foucault's 'three questions' -- about the divisions between people produced by judgements of normality and abnormality, about inner divisions produced by judgements of truth and error, and about the role of

the educated elite in enforcing or circumscribing these divisions -- provide an appropriate entry point for this study of Pakeha discourse of the 'Native rebel'. This thesis examines the way in which the rhetorics of colonial newspaper accounts aligned with a host of discursive divisions -- such as European/Native, Christian/heathen, friend/enemy, civilization/savagery, courage/cowardice, rational/irrational -- and supported these divisions by policing the opposition between truth and falsehood, normality and abnormality. The rhetoric of the Native rebel was thus, as I shall illustrate later, one produced within a masculine European geo-historical discourse; it was produced *for* a European masculine subject and it was *about* Maori. Maori were the objects of discourse, and they were prevented from joining the discursive fray by all manner of access 'rules'.

General history

Foucault's histories of the discourse of psychiatric, medicinal, penal and sexual practices have been criticised on numerous counts. For example he has been accused of freezing history through his 'archaeological' analysis; his histories are said to be hard to follow because they incorporate so much specific detail that the larger picture seems to be overwhelmed; and his work is said to be historically inaccurate.⁵³ In some ways there is much validity in these criticisms, yet some of them miss the point of Foucault's work altogether. Foucault was attempting to displace the idea of what he called *total history* with that of *general history*. According to Foucault, total history "seeks to reconstitute the overall form of a civilisation, the principle -- material or spiritual -- of a society, the significance common to all the

⁵³ There are many more criticisms of Foucault's work than I have outlined here. Many of these other criticisms focus on questions of power, subjectivity and normative judgement. For further critical discussions, see Bannet (1989: 109-110), Hoy (1986), Macdonell (1986: 82-100), Larrain (1994), and Patton (1994: 60-61).

phenomena of a period" (1972: 9). Thus total history operates through positing the existence of a *central core* or *essence* to history whereby the multiple and specific actions of individual agents and groups in concrete places can be reduced to some overarching and fundamental order -- that thing men⁵⁴ call 'history'. As Chris Philo (1992: 141) observes, Foucault is suspicious of all such moves, because "they introduce a measure of order that arguably remains alien to the details and the differences of history at particular times and in particular places." *General history* is Foucault's response to what he sees as a reductionist homogenisation and flattening of the past. Where total history attempts to draw everything into a central core or essence, general history deploys "the space of dispersion" (Foucault 1972: 10). His conception of history is one which has been termed "truly geographic" (Soja 1989; Philo 1992), because of his interest in the specificity of place.

Furthermore, since as Foucault suggests everything is caught up in discourse, then the study of history itself must be seen as a discursive practice. Foucault suggests that there cannot be one single history but multiple histories, each operating within different discourses; thus his project was not to write "*the* archaeology, but *an* archaeology of the human sciences" (Foucault 1980a: 65). But Foucault goes much further than this, suggesting that his histories are pure fabrications, that he has "never written anything other than fictions" (Foucault 1979: 75). Foucault's fictioning of history was part of both his political and academic projects. In this sense,

Foucault 'fictioned' a space for power and knowledge and a 'politics' for intellectuals that does not yet exist.... He allowed consciousness to fabricate a mode of being that does not yet exist, in which dispersed intellectuals, using the university as their point of

⁵⁴ I use this term purposely.

intersection... act to resist and change the constraints, the disciplines and the regime of truth in the offices, factories, schools and laboratories in which they work (Bannet 1989: 180-81).

My own project is not the same as Foucault's and thus my own conception of the role of the historian also differs from his. Rather than 'fiction' history, I would suggest that I am involved in the active 'creation' of history.⁵⁵ In contrast to fiction, which seems to imply complete fabrication, creation at least opens a space to acknowledge the use of historical narratives (texts) as the foundation of 'history'. The histories created by historians are thus the products of the kinds of situated knowledges I outlined in Chapter 3. Historical texts are products of discursive practices, ideological positions and political and cultural hegemony (see e.g. Stedman Jones 1972). Moreover, these historical texts are then reinterpreted from within the discursive formation inhabited by the historian. As E.H. Carr (1962: 5) once observed, "the facts speak only when the historian calls on them; it is he [sic] who decides to which facts to give the floor, and in what order or context." 'Histories' are therefore the products of a double set of discursive practices; those inscribed in the primary narratives and those inscribing the historian as creator of history. The result, as Eve Tavor Bannet (1989: 110) observes, is that "there are no 'accurate' histories and can be none, because all history is narrative, and narratives, whether literary or historical, inevitable select from the mass of possible materials and order them according to a logic they lack in life."

The concept of discourse has two important implications for this study. Firstly, it provides an important analytical and conceptual tool to aid in the understanding of the way in which Native 'rebels' were constructed and

⁵⁵ I recognise that for some the distinction between fiction and creation might seem arbitrary, but I nevertheless wish to argue that my project differs from that of Foucault, and my understanding of 'history' and my methods of 'doing history' differ as well.

(re)constituted in colonial newspaper narratives. In this sense it forms, along with the concepts of ideology and cultural hegemony to be outlined in the following sections, a key analytical framework underpinning this study. Secondly, the idea of discourse problematises any notion of 'getting history right', for it seems there is no way for the historian to escape discursive formations in order to write an 'objective' history. This is not to argue for a completely relativist epistemology in the creation of history, however. Instead, I propose that the notion of situated knowledges that I outlined in Chapter 2 at least provides for the *possibility* of creating a history that is accountable as a partial perspective situated in a specific (and identifiable) ideological and discursive position.

IDEOLOGY

The meaning and application of the concept of ideology is a subject of continuing debate. There does, however, appear to be some agreement that whatever else it signifies, "the concept *ideology* makes a direct reference to the role of *ideas*" (Hall 1977: 10; original emphasis). The term arose in late eighteenth century France with the group of *idéologues* working in the centre of revolutionary thought of the Institut de France (Hall 1977). It first appeared in English in 1796 as a translation from the French (Williams 1983: 153-54). In this case it was used as a technical expression to describe the 'science of ideas' (Miles 1988; Williams 1983), and it was used in this form until the latter part of the nineteenth century. This perhaps explains why ideology is sometimes invoked as a politically and epistemologically neutral term to refer to systems of values, ideas or beliefs ('political' or otherwise) present in societies. Napoleon Bonaparte is responsible for invoking the concept in a different sense, to attack the democracy movement and the Enlightenment as 'ideology'. Conservative political theorists have appropriated this notion, equating ideology to radical or 'left' political belief

systems (Williams 1983). Through a broadening of Napoleon's attack ideology has come also to refer, in a pejorative sense, to ideas that are erroneous, ignore the facts, or are deliberately deceitful. This latter notion of ideology as 'falsehood' appears to dominate present-day commonsense rhetorics (Hall 1977; Miles 1988; Dalby 1990).

Critical (modernist) theories of ideology

Such conceptions of ideology lack discriminating analytical purchase and with few exceptions have not been taken up in critical social theory. Indeed, contemporary analytical use of the concept tends to reflect the different ways ideology has been theorised by Marx (Hall 1977). One can find three theoretical threads in Marx's own works (Larrain 1983). The first thread is found in the early works of Marx, especially his *Critique of Hegel's 'Philosophy of right'* (Marx 1970 edn.: see especially the introduction). In this case, Marx has yet to mention 'ideology' but he develops a concept of 'inversion' to describe the way in which both religion and Hegel *conceal* the real nature of things (Larrain 1983). In the second instance, outlined in *The German Ideology* (Marx and Engels 1939 edn.), Marx develops an explicit concept of ideology as 'false consciousness' (Larrain 1983). In this sense ideology is a reflection and product of ruling class interests, and thereby obscures the very *fact* of their own subordination from the subaltern classes. Marx's third use of ideology can be found in *Capital* (Marx 1990 edn.). Here Marx no longer refers to ideology, but returns to the concept of inversion which he argues conceals the contradictory character of social relations by focusing on the surface nature of such phenomena (Larrain 1983). Here Marx links ideology to particular material processes, illustrating, for example, the way in which the *true* value of labour is hidden by the surface 'appearances' of the commodity. In all its guises, Marx's concept of ideology maintained both a critical and negative connotation.

Subsequent Marxist thinkers have developed this critical concept of

ideology in a number of different ways. Lenin (1963 edn.), for example, asserted that ideology was related to the interests of the ruling class, while its critique was connected to the dominated classes (Larrain 1983). Viewed in this way, ideology is a more neutral concept referring to the political consciousness of classes -- not to some consciousness rooted in the 'false'. This theme was picked up by George Lukács (1971), who suggested that if bourgeois ideology is false, it is not because it is ideological, but instead because it 'contaminates' proletarian thought. That is, as a dominant ideology it masks or interferes with the development of class consciousness among the subordinated classes (Larrain 1983).

In the decades since these writers, the critical concept of ideology has been interpreted in numerous ways. Indeed, contemporary commentators (see e.g. Hall 1977; Larrain 1983; Eagleton 1991) note the co-existence of multiple definitions of ideology. Attempting to come to grips with this multiplicity, Terry Eagleton (1991: 43) suggests it may be useful to differentiate between three sorts of definitions of the concept of ideology, those that are *descriptive*, *pejorative* and *positive*. In the descriptive sense, ideologies are 'belief systems' composed of discursive and non-discursive elements. This notion of ideology is relatively neutral in power-political terms. In the pejorative sense, ideology is a set of ideas, beliefs or meanings which are viewed critically or negatively for a number of reasons. They may (consciously or unconsciously) support or uphold oppressive power relations. If such support is the result of unconscious motivations they then involve some degree of self-deception. Certain values may also legitimate unjust forms or uses of power. Ideology may also be conceived in pejorative terms if it generates ideas that, either because of their motivation or function, are false. In this sense, the pejorative notion of ideology "is objectionable either because it gives birth to massive social illusion, or because it deploys true ideas to unpalatable effect, or because it springs from some unworthy

motivation" (Eagleton 1991: 43). But there also exist more positive definitions of ideology, ones similar to that outlined by Lenin (see above), where the term refers to sets of values or beliefs that inspire specific groups or classes to engage in political actions judged desirable. In this sense it might be seen to complement notions of 'class consciousness'.

I would like to suggest that there are a number of significant problems with the various conceptions of ideology I have outlined so far. In the case of 'descriptive' concepts of ideology, it seems they offer no critical analysis of power and the role it plays in the structure and production of human ideas and actions. While 'pejorative' concepts of ideology provide an analytic of power, they tend towards totalisations that disavow their partiality. As Eagleton (1991: 43-44) observes, "lurking in the background here is the assumption that the truth resides only in some form of totalization which would transcend the confines of any particular group's perspective." Both 'pejorative' and 'positive' concepts of ideology are policed by an essentialist opposition of truth and error.⁵⁶ In this sense, decisions are made as to the truth or falsehood of certain perspectives based solely on class positions; that is, ruling class interests are 'bad' and therefore 'untrue', while subordinate or working class interests are 'good' and thus 'true'. It seems that such conceptions are essentialisms that flatten the specificity of human experience. They are also economistic and fail to acknowledge other social cleavages such as 'race', ethnicity, gender, and sexuality.

Situated knowledge and ideology

In response to these problems, I would like to suggest a somewhat different conception of ideology, one that is grounded in the notion of

⁵⁶ Truth here seems to be the sole prerogative of the subordinate classes, presumably because, as Hegel (1931 edn.) might have argued, their labour and their subordinate position provides them with the one *true* vision of the world.

situated knowledges and combined with aspects of both modernist and postmodernist notions of ideology.

Firstly, I wish to retain a certain critical edge to the notion of ideology, thus I take it as having certain pejorative characteristics. In this regard, ideology can be seen as any ideas, beliefs or values that uphold oppressive power relations or legitimate unjust forms or uses of power. Power is taken in the Foucauldian sense here as more than a binary relation between ruler and ruled. It thus involves recognising, as Iris Young (1990a: 41) also points out, the productive "effect of often liberal and 'humane' practices of education, bureaucratic administration, production and distribution of consumer goods, medicine, and so on." I take further cues from Young (1990a) who has systematised the concept of oppression as part of her own pathbreaking attempt at outlining a just politics of difference. In this regard, she (1990a: 48-63) suggests that there are "five faces of oppression": *exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, and violence*. David Harvey (1993: 56) has extended Young's work, suggesting that we should acknowledge *environmental degradation* as another form of social oppression. While the arguments for accepting these six forms of social relations as forms of oppression are complex, I shall nevertheless attempt to summarise them here.

Young builds on Marx's theory of class exploitation by adding feminist theories of gender- and 'racially'-based forms of exploitation. She suggests that *exploitative oppression* arises when social processes are in place "that bring about a transfer of energies from one group to another to produce unequal distributions, and in the way in which social institutions enable a few to accumulate while they constrain many more" (Young 1990: 53). Thus exploitative forms of oppression might involve capitalist expropriation of surplus value produced by labour, or men's expropriation of women's household labour, or the segregation of racialised groups in unskilled and

'menial' labour. *Marginalisation*, according to Young (1990a: 53), involves "people the system of labor cannot or will not use." These people are marginalised by the very fact that they are excluded from socially valued labour and are thus unable to participate in social life to the same degree as other people. Their marginalisation also leads to serious (often life-threatening) material deprivation. But marginalisation also has grave psychological implications, often related to constant feelings of "uselessness, boredom, and lack of self-respect" (Young 1990a: 55) on the part of marginals. A third aspect of oppression involves *powerlessness*. Most democratic societies are organised along hierarchical lines, with a very few decision-makers at the top. Few people have *significant* power to regularly participate in decisions affecting the conditions of their lives. However, almost everyone has some decision-making power concerning the way they relate to others, even if they do not have the power to effect policies or results. According to Young (1990a: 56),

[t]he powerless are those who lack authority or power even in this mediated sense, those over whom power is exercised without them exercising it; the powerless are situated so that they must take orders and rarely have the right to give them. Powerlessness also designates a position in the division of labour and the concomitant social position that allows persons little opportunity to develop and exercise skills.

Cultural imperialism is a much different form of oppression from exploitation, marginalisation or powerlessness.⁵⁷ "To experience cultural imperialism means to experience how the dominant meanings of a society render the particular perspective of one's own group invisible at the same time as they stereotype one's group and mark it out as the Other" (Young 1990a: 58-9). It thus involves a process whereby the dominant group's experience and

⁵⁷ In fact, this aspect of oppression is very important to the ideas I will explore in later chapters of this thesis.

culture is universalised and established as the norm. Those who do not fit this dominant norm may be defined as lacking some aspect of normalcy and thus become marked not only as Other, but also as deviant and inferior. The injustice of cultural imperialism thus lies in the fact that

the oppressed group's own experience and interpretation of social life finds little expression that touches the dominant culture, while that same culture imposes on the oppressed group its experience and interpretation of social life (Young 1990a: 60).

Young suggests that we need to see systematic violence as a form of oppression. She provides cogent evidence that members of groups such as women, African-Americans, Asians, gay men, and lesbians "live with the knowledge that they must fear random, unprovoked attacks on their persons or property, which have no motive but to damage, humiliate, or destroy the person" (Young 1990a: 61). She argues that violence is a form of oppression, and not merely a series of random acts, because of its systemic nature and social character. In this sense, violence is aimed at social groups by members of other social groups. Living under the threat of violence merely because one is a member of a social group is oppressive and unjust because it deprives the oppressed group of both freedom and dignity. Finally, there is a growing body of literature that suggests that the negative consequences of environmental degradation are unevenly distributed. Accordingly, Harvey (1993: 56) suggests that environmental degradation should be seen as a sixth form of oppression.

To summarise, then, I wish to use Young's and Harvey's six faces of oppression -- *exploitation, marginalisation, powerlessness, cultural imperialism, violence* and *environmental degradation* -- as measures of the ideological content of discourse. Although I do not engage in an explicit analysis to illustrate how these forms of oppression are brought to bear, I nonetheless use the term 'ideological' to denote discourses or rhetorics that 'produce' any of these forms of oppression.

I would also like to explicitly link ideology to discursive practices. Thus, following a number of theorists that might be categorised as 'postmodern' (e.g. Pêcheux 1982; Thompson 1984; Frow 1985; 1986), I see ideology as intricately linked with discourse. For Michel Pêcheux, all discursive frameworks are complexly embedded in ideological formations comprised of both discursive and non-discursive practices. Every discursive formation is thereby inscribed in ideological relations, but discourse can also be internally moulded by ideological pressure. Moreover, both the partiality of the discourse and its embeddedness in ideology is hidden via a process of *forgetting* (Pêcheux 1982). Thus according to John Frow (1985: 204), discourse and ideology are inextricably linked in complex ways, because "insofar as power invests all discourse, the category of ideology is a description of systems of value in which all speakers are enclosed and which is the productive basis of all speech." Finally, to avoid certain types of totalisation, I wish to explicitly link ideology to situated knowledges. Accordingly, the 'negative' aspects of ideology do not arise from some transcendent notions of good or bad, true and false; they come about instead through my own political positioning as a middle-class, left-oriented, anti-racist, anti-sexist and male academic. Ideas, beliefs and values are thus 'ideological' when they lead to oppression of groups, such as Maori, who are defined primarily in 'racial' terms. Ideology is also employed to describe ideas which contribute to the (re)constitution of the notion that human groups can be divided up according to essentialised categories called 'races'. As a situated knowledge, my anti-racist discourse is implicated in the construction of one form of 'reality'. Indeed, as Frow (1985, 1986) observes, discourse is a socially constructed reality which fashions both the *real* and the *symbolic* and the *distinction* between them (Frow 1985, 1986).

In using the concept of oppression as a 'foundation' for my own understanding of ideology, I am reliant upon a certain kind of universality.

However, it is important to recognise there can be a double meaning to universality which allows for difference on the one hand while still leaving space for moral reflection and normative judgement on the other. As Young (1990a: 105) points out, "Universality in the sense of participation and inclusion of everyone in moral and social life does not imply universality in the sense of adoption of a general point of view that leaves behind particular affiliations, feelings, commitments, and desires." It is the sense of universality as allowing for inclusion and opposing exclusion and oppression that I rely upon in order to make normative judgements in this study.

Finally, there arises another important question about the relationship between discourse, ideology, and the agency (and intentionality) of the subject. I am working within an analytic framework that sees the subject as -- at least partially -- constituted in and through discourse. Thus, I argue that it is not necessary to discern how far actors are in control of their actions in order to undertake discursive analyses. On the other hand, it is sometimes helpful to treat narrative accounts *as if* they are the result of the active intention of a knowing subject. Accordingly, I adopt an approach to discourse analysis that utilises "a double movement between styles of reading that emphasize the constitution of subjects and objects, and those that emphasize the ideological work of discourse" (Wetherell and Potter 1992: 93).

Conceived in this manner, ideology can be seen to function in concert with discourse to partially limit what can be said. This concept of ideology can be invoked as an analytical framework to envision the *politics of discourse*, "marshalling discourses into certain alignments in the cause of larger political aims" (Kress 1985: 71). The purpose of analysis, then, is to illustrate "how a form of ideological scripting masks the limitations, exclusions, and silences connected with the dominant forms of the recognized public-policy

discourse" (Shapiro 1988: 5). Just as ideology is intricated with discourse, it is also inextricably linked to the notion of hegemony (Mouffe 1979), and thus a more complete comprehension of the politics of discourse requires an understanding of the latter concept. Accordingly, it is to a discussion of the concept of hegemony or in particular, one specific form -- cultural hegemony -- that I now turn.

CULTURAL HEGEMONY

Like ideology, the term hegemony is used in an uncritical fashion in everyday discussion and in a much more critical way within the discourse of social theory (Williams 1977, 1983; Dalby 1990). In everyday use it has become synonymous with domination over others and in some cases it has been used in a manner similar to (but not the same as) 'imperialism' to indicate political domination by one state over another (Williams 1977, 1983). In critical social theory hegemony is most often linked to a specific type of Marxism associated with the work of Antonio Gramsci (Gramsci 1971; Mouffe 1979; Williams 1977, 1983; Lears 1985; Dalby 1990; Anderson 1988, 1991). While much uncertainty remains concerning Gramsci's development of the concept of hegemony,⁵⁸ his work is considered to be pivotal in Marxist cultural theory (Williams 1977; Mouffe 1979).

Like other Marxists, Gramsci was interested in the relationship between the bourgeoisie and the proletariat. However, unlike most others writing during his time, his work is not economistic or reductionist; he did not presume that people's culture and ideas could be theorised as mere

⁵⁸ Gramsci's prison notebooks were written during the period between 1927 and 1935, at which time he was interned in an Italian Fascist prison. His work is not easy to understand, as he often had to disguise its meaning from prison censors through the use of metaphor and other literary devices. In addition, he seems to use the idea of hegemony in different ways throughout his prison notebooks.

epiphenomena of the capitalist forces and relations of production. Gramsci was interested to theorise the way in which certain dominant social groups, or 'historical blocs' in his words, secured and maintained their dominance over other subordinate groups. He suggested that a class is dominant in two ways, through "domination" and through "intellectual and moral leadership" (1971: 57). Domination involves the direct use of force or coercion against those opposed to the dominant class; intellectual or moral leadership is reserved for its allies or for those who do not openly oppose it. It is this 'leadership' which is important to Gramsci's concept of hegemony, for it is not limited to specific aspects of social life, but permeates all of it. Moreover, it differs from indoctrination and coercion, involving instead a process whereby

more and more people come to interpret their own interests and consciousness of themselves in the 'unifying discourse.' In accepting the ruling bloc's moral, political, and cultural values, they facilitate the historical 'moment' when the philosophy and practice of a society are fused, when a concept of reality is filtered through a society (Anderson 1991: 25).

Subordinate classes come to ally themselves with dominant classes precisely because they are not coerced into doing so. Instead, dominant groups go beyond their own narrow corporate economic interests to account for the interests of subordinate groups. To do this, dominant groups make compromises (within limits) with other allies who coalesce into a dominant historical bloc. It may be true that societies are structured in dominance, with one particular group dominating the interests of all others;

[b]ut the development and expansion of the particular group [is] conceived of, and presented, as being the motor force of a universal expansion, of a development of all the 'national' energies. In other words the dominant group is coordinated concretely with the general interests of the subordinate groups, and the life of the State is conceived of as a continuous process of formation and superseding of unstable equilibria (on the juridical plane) between the interests of the fundamental group and those of the subordinate groups -- equilibria in which the interests of the dominant group prevail, but only up to a certain point, i.e. stopping short of

narrowly corporate economic interest (Gramsci 1971: 182).

The hegemony of the dominant class is thus based, in part at least, upon the consent of the subordinate classes. Such consent is created and reconstituted through the web of social relations, institutions, and public ideas in a society. This process Gramsci calls "transformism", and it involves "the gradual but continuous absorption, achieved by methods which varied in their effectiveness, of the active elements produced by allied groups -- and even of those which came from antagonistic groups and seemed irreconcilably hostile" (Gramsci 1971: 59).

One key aspect of Gramsci's work is that he did not make a distinction between the economic base and the ideological superstructure commonly theorised during his time. Instead, he argued that not just relations of production, but ideas themselves assume a dense material basis (and thus it was inappropriate to theorise society in terms of base and superstructure). It is in this sense, one commentator argues, that Gramsci's notion of 'hegemony'

...is a concept which at once includes and goes beyond two powerful earlier concepts: that of 'culture' as a 'whole social process', in which men [sic] define and shape their whole lives; and that of 'ideology', in any of its Marxist senses, in which a system of meanings and values is the expression or projection of a particular class interest (Williams 1977: 108).

The Gramscian notion of hegemony goes beyond 'culture', Raymond Williams (1977) argues, because it relates the whole social process to specific relations of power within and between social groups. Thus, in any society there are specific unequal power relations which define who can realise certain goals. What makes his work important is that Gramsci introduced the idea of dominance and subordination into the idea of 'culture', and that culture was recognised as a whole social process. In this way hegemony goes beyond 'ideology', because it argues that what is important is not just ideas and beliefs, "but the whole lived social process as practically organized

by specific and dominant meanings and values" (Williams 1977: 109).

While Gramsci was particularly interested in class relations within capitalism, more recent theorists have extended these ideas to other social groups divided by such (socially constructed) phenomena as ethnicity and gender (Lears 1985; Anderson 1988, 1991; Dalby 1991). Kay Anderson (1991: 23) for example, has illustrated the way in which a "white European historical bloc" has utilised the race concept as a "critical unifying principle" in justifying and consolidating its own rise to cultural hegemony in Canada. Following Williams (1977), she argues that a hegemonic culture is not simply a set of values, "but a 'realized complex' of ideas, practices, and social relations that reflect the interests of a dominant sector and which have come to permeate society's private and institutional domains" (Anderson 1991: 23). As Chantal Mouffe (1979: 181) suggests, a hegemonic group is one "which has been able to articulate the interests of other social groups to its own by means of ideological struggle." But these articulations are never undisputed, for as Gramsci pointed out, transformist hegemony can never be absolute, it is always contingent and contested.

The concept of cultural hegemony indicates that culture itself is a product of ideological struggle. Cultural hegemony, is thus not a totalisation, but instead the product of constantly (re)produced ideological formations that are widely accepted (but not accepted by all) and used to structure social, political and material life. It is in this sense that I use the concept in this study. As such, and while it may come from a different epistemological and theoretical background, it is not incompatible with the concepts of discourse and ideology outlined in previous sections. Here, then, cultural hegemony refers to all social, political and ideological structures of domination, including the mobilisation of particular gendered 'racial' discourses to render the idea of 'Native rebels' acceptable, legitimate and common-sense.

CONCLUSION

I have outlined in this chapter three concepts that will form part of the primary analytical and theoretical framework for this thesis: discourse, ideology and cultural hegemony. These three theoretical concepts arise from differing epistemological traditions; discourse might be seen as a thoroughly postmodernist concept while ideology and hegemony are mainstays of modernist Marxism. I am attempting here to combine them, following my own approach between modernism and postmodernism, in ways that I argue are not incompatible. Moreover, this would seem to fall in line with what Jorge Larraín (1994) has recently criticised in Foucault's own writings on discourse -- namely his unwitting (and contradictory) reliance on a critical notion of ideology.

In this sense then, I suggest that discursive, ideological and hegemonic processes were simultaneously at work in colonial New Zealand. Complex systems of signification governed the production and use of knowledges in the colony. Masculinist Pakeha culture and institutions themselves were established through the complex interdependent relationships formed between, in and through discursive practices. Such practices were governed by rules that circumscribed the objects of discourse, the speakers of discourse, and the forms of discussion that may take place in particular discourses. Such discursive practices were in turn complexly embedded in ideological formations, in particular ideologies about masculinity and femininity, European superiority, the dangers of communism, progress and stagnation, and 'racial' difference and Otherness. Certain ideologies were connected through hegemonic processes to the particular interests of dominant social groups. Discourse, ideology and hegemony thus articulated in such a manner as to form a specific politics of discourse centred on the binary division between European masculinity and its Others. I shall discuss the historic (intertextual) constitution of these binary divisions in chapter six.

In the following chapter I outline my approach to 'doing discourse analysis'.

V DOING DISCOURSE ANALYSIS

The purpose of this chapter is to provide the reader with an outline of my approach to analysing discourse, focusing in particular upon the analysis of newspaper texts. Before I begin, it is important to reiterate my differentiation between the notions of discourse that arise from different theoretical and disciplinary perspectives. Linguists tend to use the term 'discourse' to refer to "extended samples of either written or spoken language" (Fairclough 1992: 3). They also, however, use the term to denote different kinds of language associated with different forms of social practice (e.g. 'Department of Social Welfare discourse', 'academic geography discourse', 'management studies discourse'). On the other hand, 'discourse' is often used in social theoretical works "to refer to different ways of structuring areas of knowledge and social practice" (Fairclough 1992: 3). As evidenced in Chapter 4, it is this latter approach that I have adopted in this study.

Accordingly, when referring to "extended samples of either written or spoken language" ('discourses' in the sense used by linguists), I use terms such as 'text', 'narrative', and 'rhetoric'. Following writers such as Robert Hodge and Gunther Kress (1988), Roger Fowler (1991), Margaret Wetherell and Jonathan Potter (1992), and Norman Fairclough (1992), I attempt in this study to combine a linguistic analysis of written text with a more 'critical' theoretical analysis of socially constructed knowledges or understandings of the world. Hodge and Kress (1988) refer to this type of analysis as 'social semiotics', and Fowler (1991) terms it 'critical linguistics'. Following Fairclough (1992), I refer to my approach as 'discourse analysis'.

The chapter is structured in the following manner. I begin with a discussion of newspapers and the production of 'news'. The discussion concentrates on two important issues, the process of selection and the construction of consensus. This is followed by a description of my

methodology, including the use of the computerised textual analysis program, NUD•IST (Non-numerical Unstructured Data • Indexing, Searching, and Theorising) as an aid to analysing discourse in this study. I conclude with a discussion of the more specific technical aspects of analysing newspaper text. Here I concentrate on the aspects of critical linguistics and social semiotics that I bring to bear on Auckland newspaper texts of 1863.

NEWSPAPERS AND THE PRODUCTION OF 'NEWS'

All newspaper text is a form of *construction*. 'News' does not merely *exist* but rather it is created through social practice. Social processes, involving individuals and institutions, determine which events will become news and which will not (Burgess 1985). Through such processes, certain events are highlighted while others are elided. I do not propose here a 'conspiracy theory' whereby newspaper journalists consciously and actively prevent the publication of certain events while promoting that of others. Instead, I argue that the 'silences' of newspaper text involve issues or ideas that are *automatically* deemed to be unimportant or that go unnoticed because they do not fit the *conventional* notion of 'news' as it has been socially defined in the discursive practice of newspaper journalism. A classic example of this is the way in which events that take place in the (feminised) 'private sphere' of so-called domestic life are seen by the 'quality' dailies as less 'newsworthy' than those in the (masculinised) 'public sphere'.

Selecting the 'News'

As with all types of representation, newspaper reports are the result of 'selection':

The media do not simply and transparently report events which are 'naturally' newsworthy *in themselves*. 'News' is the end-product of a complex process which begins with a systematic sorting and selecting of events and topics according to a socially constructed set of categories (Hall 1978: 53; original emphasis).

This selection process involves a host of ideological reasoning about not only

what constitutes 'truth' and 'reality', but also what constitutes the most important aspects of such 'truths'.

Johann Galtung and Mari Ruge (1973: 69-70) have posited twelve aspects of the process of deciding what becomes 'news'. Their work is specific to 1970s Britain, but I cite it here as a useful heuristic device for thinking about news as *representation*.⁵⁹ For Galtung and Ruge, then, whether or not events become news depends on how they articulate with, or satisfy, the following twelve conditions:

- (F₁) frequency
- (F₂) threshold
 - (F_{2.1}) absolute intensity
 - (F_{2.2}) intensity increase
- (F₃) unambiguity
- (F₄) meaningfulness
 - (F_{4.1}) cultural proximity
 - (F_{4.2}) relevance
- (F₅) consonance
 - (F_{5.1}) predictability
 - (F_{5.2}) demand
- (F₆) unexpectedness
 - (F_{6.1}) unpredictability
 - (F_{6.2}) scarcity
- (F₇) continuity
- (F₈) composition
- (F₉) reference to élite nations
- (F₁₀) reference to élite people
- (F₁₁) reference to persons
- (F₁₂) reference to something negative

'Frequency' (F₁), refers to the time-span of an event. According to Galtung and Ruge (1973: 63), the closer the frequency of an event is to the

⁵⁹ I utilise their classificatory framework here because I feel it offers a useful heuristic device for understanding the constructedness of newspaper representation. I do not mean to imply that the framework can be directly applied to the production of news in the 1863 Auckland Press.

frequency of the news medium, the greater the likelihood that it will be recorded as 'news'. This is a very important aspect of the daily press: "News is short-lived and transitory, yielding to the pressures of all the following days" (Burgess 1985: 196). Moreover, process-type events that take days or weeks to unfold tend to go unreported as news in daily papers until some temporally distinctive event can be identified by the press (see Murdoch 1973). In the end, "the ritualized and cyclical nature of much reporting is a critical feature of the way the world is *made known*. It conveys an impression of eternal recurrence..." (Rock 1973: 78; emphasis added).

'Threshold' (F₂) relates to the point at which an event becomes 'newsworthy', and thus considered for inclusion in the news. Wars, murders and multiple-vehicle road accidents are more likely to receive news coverage than, say, the local flower show (Galtung and Ruge 1973: 63-64). However, the threshold of newsworthiness changes each day, depending on the type of events available for conversion into the present day's 'news'. Unspoken ideas about the public and the private sphere, and their attendant gender mappings, also impinge upon where the threshold of newsworthiness is placed. 'Unambiguity' (F₃), refers to the idea that events with clear and unambiguous meanings are more likely to gain coverage than those with less-clear meanings or implications (see Galtung and Ruge 1973: 64). This latter point is not as simple as implied by Galtung and Ruge. There is much agreement among sociologists that "the world does not appear to reporters as a clearly structured entity" (Rock 1973: 74). Instead, reporters impose 'order' onto a chaotic world of disparate events, thus blurring the boundaries between what one might consider an 'unambiguous' or an 'ambiguous' event.

'Meaningfulness' (F₄), has two components, 'cultural proximity' (F_{4.1}) and 'relevance' (F_{4.2}). Cultural proximity suggests that events that are familiar, which relate to ideas that fit within the news producer's and news

receiver's cultural sphere, are more likely to be reported than those which are not. However, cultural proximity can be over-ridden by 'relevance', if for example a culturally specific event is seen to have universal appeal. Events are also more likely to be seen as news if they are consonant with expectations or predictability (F5.1) -- as in the perception among some Pakeha that 'Maori men are violent' -- or with wants, demands or desires (F5.2) -- such as rugby football scores (for a certain proportion of the population).

While it might seem like a contradiction (especially in relation to 'predictability'), 'unexpectedness' (F6) is another important criterion for events to become classified as news. The concept of 'unexpectedness', however, works in such a way that it is "the unexpected *within the meaningful and the consonant* that is brought to one's attention" (Galtung and Ruge 1973: 65; original emphasis). In this regard, within what is meaningful and consonant with understandings of the world, those events that are either unexpected or rare are more likely to become news. 'Continuity' (F7), refers to the notion that once something becomes classified as news, it will continue to be considered news for some time. Such was clearly the case with reportage of the Waikato war. There were many days when the correspondent from the front began his story with 'not much to report today'. The fact that the story was published regardless indicates how the war had gained momentum to become an 'important story' in itself.

'Composition' (F8), refers to a notion of 'balance' in the compositional structure of news reporting. As Paul Rock (1973: 75) notes,

Policies affecting the layout of a newspaper predetermine what can be reported about the world. They map out the rough system of priorities which will be allocated to the description of unrealized events; decide the proportions that those reports will occupy in the total presentation; and limit the entire volume of events which can evoke a journalistic reaction.

In this sense, media attempt to attain some sort of balance between local,

regional and national events, as well as between events of a certain kind. The Auckland press, for example, maintained a fairly consistent format, with advertisements appearing on the first page, shipping news on the second page, and finally the lead article appearing on the third page. News and opinion pieces rarely comprised more than two pages. This consistent format would seem to indicate that 'news' was designed to conform to specific space constraints. Thus if there were a large number of important news items, the threshold for another important event would have risen (likewise it might have fallen if there were no 'significant' events of that type for the period in question).

Galtung and Ruge (1973: 66) suggest that the remaining four criteria for defining newsworthiness are particularly "culture-bound". This implies that the first eight concepts are not, yet clearly all twelve concepts are culturally determined. Putting this issue aside for the moment, let us look at the final four categories of newsworthiness. News is *élite*-centred (F₉ and F₁₀), and what or who constitutes an *élite* is culturally-contingent. As Fowler (1991: 15) notes, news media encode "a 'superpowers' ideology of the dominating status of North America, Japan, Europe and Russia in world political and cultural affairs." In 1863 New Zealand, this ideology translated as an inclination to concentrate on Britain. Likewise, newspapers tend to concentrate on the 'rich and powerful' to the point of excluding most others (except, perhaps, to reinforce their very 'ordinariness'). This *élite*-centredness is also reinforced by the temporal character of newspaper journalism. Daily deadlines impose themselves on what can be recorded as news, thus encouraging reporters to rely on the sources that are organised to communicate in the language and rhetoric of the newspaper (Hall 1978). These sources tend to be associated with elite members of 'mainstream' society and institutions of the state (Rock 1973; Burgess 1985; Fowler 1991). Following Brian Whitaker, Fowler (1991: 21) outlines a number of *élite*

institutions and organisations regularly monitored by the news media:

1. Sources monitored routinely
 - a. Parliament
 - b. Councils
 - c. Police (and the Army in Northern Ireland)
 - d. Other emergency services
 - e. Courts (including inquests and tribunals)
 - f. Royalty
 - g. 'Diary' events (e.g. annual events like Ascot or conferences known about in advance)
 - h. Airports
 - i. Other news media
2. Organizations issuing statements and holding Press conferences
 - a. Government departments
 - b. Local authority departments
 - c. Public services (transport authorities, electricity boards, etc.)
 - d. Companies
 - e. Trade unions
 - f. Non-commercial organizations (pressure groups, charities, etc.)
 - g. Political parties
 - h. Army, Navy, Air Force.

These sources all have one thing in common, and that is that they occupy a privileged place in society.⁶⁰ They have some form of *official* authority; they are *organised* along bureaucratic lines, with spokespeople and regularly scheduled statements; and, they have the *resources* to ensure that their perspective on issues is heard (Fowler 1991: 22). With this in mind, David Spurr (1993: 109) suggests that the "rhetorical economy of the media creates a demand for images of chaos in order that the principles of a governing ideology and the need for institutions of order may be affirmed."

Newspapers also tend to 'personalise' (F₁₁) their narratives, linking events and actions to individual people rather than to social groups and

⁶⁰ As with the discussion of Galtung and Ruge's (1973) work, I do not suggest the specific elite institutions and organisations in this list applies to the 1863 situation (it would be silly to suggest that airports, for example, are appropriate examples). I use this list for illustration only.

structures. Fowler (1991: 15) suggests that one purpose of the tendency toward personalisation is "to effect a metonymic simplification of complex historical and institutional processes". Thus, in the Auckland Press of 1863, Maori guerilla attacks were reported as personal (and savage) attacks on individual settlers. In contrast, Maori deaths in the war were reported in highly impersonal terms. The following excerpt from the *Daily Southern Cross* (16 July 1863, page 3), editorialising on the "savage murder" of two Auckland settlers, provides an excellent example of personalisation at work:

We don't believe the Waikato to be one whit better than the Ngatiruanui or Taranaki natives. They have each proved themselves bloodthirsty murderers; -- perhaps the Waikatos may be looked upon as the more bloodthirsty. Take the case of Mr. Meredith and his son, and find a parallel for this atrocious crime, if one can, during the entire campaign in Taranaki. There the blood was heated, and fire and sword did execution on both sides. Here we (that is, the Government) have been mild as any turtle dove. The Governor assured them he would not put down the King movement by force. We published the mildest of proclamations, and told the natives in the same breath that if they did not choose to swear the oath of allegiance they might leave the district, and that we would give them safe convoy, arms and ammunition, bag and baggage, to the enemy's country. And how have these men rewarded us for our considerate conduct? By gratitude? No. By orderly behaviour? No. But by brutal and unprovoked murder. The hoary hand of age was not safe from the ruffian hand of the murderer, not did the bloom of youth shield from the felon stroke of the ruthless savage. Two settlers, father and son, -- the one aged and venerable -- the other young and hopeful, have been ruthlessly slaughtered, without provocation and without excuse.

Waikato, Ngatiruanui and Taranaki tribes are homogenised as "murderers", while settlers such as "Mr. Meredith and his son" have a different epistemological status as "father and son, -- the one aged and venerable -- the other young and hopeful" in this report. Personalisation is a key aspect of ideology, because it places the focus on individual agency and victimhood thus supporting an ideology of liberal individualism, and avoiding any discussion of wider social processes of exploitation and oppression. Finally, newspapers tend to focus on 'negative' (F₁₂) events, those often involving

death or destruction of some sort.

Constructing Consensus

I wish to return to a discussion of the concept of 'meaningfulness' (F₄), which turns on an ideology of 'homocentrism', or a preoccupation with constructing boundaries between countries, societies and individuals perceived to be like oneself, and those 'groups' defined as unlike oneself, alien, or threatening (Fowler 1991: 16). Such ideas are rooted in hegemonic constructions of 'consensus societies' where all members of society supposedly share common interests and concerns without conflict (Hall 1973; Hall *et al.* 1978). This is closely related to the ideological processes involved in the formation of what Benedict Anderson (1983) has called "imagined communities". Such imagined communities arise from the closely related phenomena of nationalism and statism.

Nationalism is a complex configuration of emotions, beliefs and attitudes rooted in the perception of singular cultural attributes, myths, and traditions, leading to the belief in a "national community" (Zelinsky 1986: 171-72; also see Blaut 1986). Statism, on the other hand, elevates the idea of the State itself (as opposed to a more abstract notion of community) to a position of paramountcy. The State is seen as "the ultimate social reality, the repository of all that is fine and noble in life" (Zelinsky 1986: 172). Moreover, in many instances the state apparatus is, for all practical purposes, conflated with the nation (Hall *et al.* 1978) such that anyone who opposes aspects of the ideological state apparatus (government, education system, church, etc.) may also be perceived as opposing the national interest.

Nationalist and statist inspired 'communities' are *imaginary* for numerous reasons, including the fact that they are represented as universal -- that is applying to all members of a socio-geographic polity -- when they are actually highly specific to members of the hegemonic class. In certain parts of New Zealand during the latter half of the nineteenth-century, this

hegemonic class was 'White', British, bourgeois and masculine (James and Saville-Smith 1989),⁶¹ or what in a different context Gillian Rose (1993a: 6) termed the unmarked "master subject".

The press is a discursive apparatus that must articulate with the state,⁶² capital, and its readership.

In so far as the Press is a business, it has commercial interests in fostering agreement on a range of consumer-oriented values; in so far as its interests coincide with those of government, it has political motives for conveying approval of a stable, familiar ideology (Fowler 1991: 49).

In mid-nineteenth-century New Zealand, the press was even more closely connected to 'ruling class values', as "newspapers over the 1840-1880 years were journals supporting a developing upper class in New Zealand" (Day 1990: 3). Indeed, during the early colonial period (1844-1853) most newspapers were formed to act explicitly as political advocates for individuals or groups seeking political office.

The *New Zealander* spoke for the official party, composed of the Crown Colony Government officials, the military and their supporters, while the *Southern Cross* spoke for the opposition, known variously as the Radicals, the Senate or the Progress Party (Day 1990: 37).

During this period, the links between the Press and the Auckland élite were quite direct, as the owner of the *Southern Cross*, William Brown, was the recognised leader of the Progress Party. As circulation grew, and following the granting of self-government, these links between press and élite became

⁶¹ Clearly, the hegemony of British masculinity was not evenly distributed throughout New Zealand, but was restricted to the larger urban centres such as Auckland, Wellington, and Dunedin. Full hegemony of what Gramsci might term the British historical bloc did not eventuate until the early twentieth century. Moreover, urban and rural concepts of masculinity continue to be contested today (see Chapter 2; Berg and Kearns 1995).

⁶² Indeed, Althusser (1971) saw the press as part of the 'ideological state apparatus'.

less defined. By the 1860s the press was beginning to be run more as a capitalist enterprise rather than as an explicitly political organ, and this involved at least the semblance of 'independence' on the part of newspapers (Day 1990). It was during this time that the press began to espouse notions of acting as the voice of 'public opinion' and as the representative of 'the community'.

While there are, on the one hand, explicit links between the press and maintenance of existing élite institutions of both state and capital, there are other, less obvious, ways that the press unknowingly supports the existing order. Dale Spender (1985), for example, has shown how 'man made language' is structured so as to maintain masculine hegemony. Within this masculine order, women find themselves in a double bind: in order to become 'full members' of society, they must accede to the use of man made language, which in turn reinforces their subordinate position. If, on the other hand, they refuse to accept the patriarchal rules of speaking and having a voice, then they are not accepted as full members of society. Likewise, Bridget Orr (1994) notes how those constructed as Other in the West (e.g., women, non-Europeans) must either conform to their stereotypical roles (as defined within a hegemonic discourse of Eurocentric masculinism) or identify with European masculinity in a denial of their difference. The press as a 'consumer' and 'producer' of hegemonic understandings of the world, is often unknowingly complicit with such discursive constructions of the Other.

Given the fact that it has a vested interest in maintenance of the *status quo* while at the same time its *raison d'être* is ostensibly to be a 'disinterested' and 'objective' reporter of 'facts', the press finds itself occupying an extremely contradictory position. This contradiction is resolved in and through the ideology of consensus (Hall 1973). Simply stated, the ideology of consensus assumes that for a given group of people (usually articulated as 'the nation'

or 'the community'), "it is a matter of fact that the interests of the whole population are undivided, held in common; and that the whole population acknowledges this 'fact' by subscribing to a certain set of beliefs" (Fowler 1991: 49). Stuart Hall (1973) refers ironically to this as the construction of "a world at one with itself", for it relies upon the construction of an insider 'us' category, which is paradoxically reliant upon an outsider 'them' for its identity. As Patrick Day (1990: 4-5) observes, between 1840 and 1880 "newspapers [in New Zealand] were to regard themselves as the voices of their communities, but within those communities they were to speak consistently only for a minority." The Auckland press, for example, tended to construct its 'us' category around the notion of a unitary 'British settler' whose interests it usually set in opposition to those of 'the Natives'. The following excerpt from *The New Zealander* (lead article, 20 July 1863, page 2) exemplifies some of these ideas:

It is no argument, now, to say that TAMATI WAKA was allied with us during the war of 1845. Times are totally changed. And, indeed, after His Excellency Governor GREY's arrival at that epoch, he did all he could to divert the native mind from the pursuit of war, by finding them employment in road-making and upon other branches of public works, and also by assisting them in the purchase of agricultural implements, and in the prosecution of agricultural pursuits. That he would promote a different course upon the present occasion was therefore impossible. Like the Colony he has been appointed to govern, we feel certain he will be resolved that British supremacy shall be upheld by British hearts and hands. We have positive evidence of this in His Excellency's refusal to the offer of WM. THOMPSON to assist him in re-taking the Tataraimaka block -- and repeated proffers of the Ngapuhi to aid in subjugation of the rebellious Waikatos. If we cannot defend ourselves, woe be unto us. With every desire and hope that those of the natives who call themselves our friends may experience kindness and courtesy at our hands -- for, why should we by roughness or wanton outrage convert even doubtful friends into open and bitter foes? We trust that we shall never again see the day that they shall become enrolled in our ranks engaged against each other. Who could place reliance upon them? Who that would not be more or less disposed to regard them as spies? Would British men band with Maoris against their own countrymen?

And can we expect from the untutored native that fidelity

towards us and *our* cause which we well know it would be impossible for us to render to theirs? "Blood" (whether with the savage or the civilized), "is thicker than water;" it consequently behoves us, at the present conjuncture, to be watchful and wary -- to "wear our eye," as Iago counsels, "not jealous or secure," -- and, above all, not to incur needless animosity. "The heather is" already sufficiently "on fire." We must endeavour to subdue, not to aggravate, the blaze.

The paper is here constructing a series of distinctions between 'us' (British) and 'them' (natives) which are in turn linked respectively to positive (e.g. "British supremacy", "civilized") and negative (e.g. "Who could place reliance upon them?", "savage") attributes. Moreover, this binary distinction appears to have redirected attention away from differences *within* the European community towards those between 'Englishman' and 'Native' in New Zealand.⁶³

There are, however, other more abstract values inculcated in newspaper rhetorics. In this regard, the press reproduces and reinforces a host of taken-for-granted societal values. On the surface, these values are ostensibly 'universal' to all members of society, but they are usually linked to the material interests of hegemonic groups. Steve Chibnall (1977: 21-22) has outlined a number of these dominant 'societal values':

<i>Positive legitimating values</i>	<i>Negative illegitimate values</i>
legality	illegality
moderation	extremism
compromise	dogmatism
co-operation	confrontation
order	chaos
peacefulness	violence
tolerance	intolerance
constructiveness	destructiveness
openness	secrecy
honesty	corruption

⁶³ I use the gendered term purposely here to highlight one of the other cleavages within English settler society.

realism	ideology
rationality	irrationality
impartiality	bias
responsibility	irresponsibility
fairness	unfairness
firmness	weakness
industriousness	idleness
freedom of choice	monopoly/uniformity
equality	inequality

While this list serves to illustrate the dimensions of the system associated with 'consensus', it is important to note that such values change over time. Other oppositions, for example, played a key role in the Auckland press of 1863; these include (but are not limited to) Christian/heathen, civilized/savage, settler/Native, and courageous/cowardly. I discuss some of these binary oppositions in greater detail in the following chapters. For now it is sufficient to note that through its emphasis on consensus, the press plays a key role in legitimating those values articulated on the left-hand side of Chibnall's list.

Roger Fowler (1991) identifies a central contradiction in the theory of consensus, namely that if consensus exists concerning the positive values, then the negative values should not exist -- because the phenomena to which they refer would not occur in a fully consensual society.⁶⁴ But they do exist, "corruption, murder, rape, malpractice, bigotry . . . these are the stuff of newspaper report" (Fowler 1991: 52; ellipses in original). Thus, 'consensus' is a highly problematic cornerstone of newspaper rhetorics, one which can only be overcome by constructing 'us' (those acting within consensus) and 'them' (those outside of consensus) categories and strictly policing these categories.

In summary, following critical media analysts I have argued that

⁶⁴ This contradiction exists at the level of the rhetorical and the material. That is, both rhetorical logic and members of the dominant group require an Other in order to represent the boundaries of the Self. See my discussions in Chapter 7 regarding Affirmation and Debasement.

newspapers do not merely report an existing set of 'facts' that unproblematically fit within the category 'news'. Instead, 'news' is produced through socially constructed processes of gathering, sorting, selecting, and defining information as newsworthy. I have argued that the process of selecting news is ideological (at the very least in outcome if not in intent), and that one of the key ideological processes at work in the press is the construction of consensus. The notion of consensus relies on the ideological construction of a singular group identity with full agreement among group members where issues of importance are concerned. I have further suggested that, paradoxically, consensus relies on the construction of an outsider group in order to reinforce the identity of insiders.

Having provided the reader with a brief introduction to representational issues in newspaper journalism, I would like now to discuss the methodology for analysing newspaper texts used in this study. This is followed with a more general discussion of aspects of critical linguistics and social semiotics which I found helpful in analysing some of the ideological manoeuvres implicated in the construction of people and place in the 1863 Auckland press.

'METHODOLOGY': ANALYSING NEWSPAPER TEXTS OF JULY 1863

This study focuses upon European representations of Native rebels in the Auckland press at the start of the Waikato land wars and, as with all representations, it is necessarily selective and partial. Its partiality is the result of *both* my own position as a researcher having specific abilities, interests and understandings of the world, *and* my limited resources, especially in terms of time.

Selecting the texts

Discourse analysis is a very labour-intensive process that requires close scrutiny of textual materials. Given the large amounts of newspaper text

referring to Maori people during the period in question, I chose to limit both the number of newspapers examined, and the time frame of the study. As a part of this study, I have read widely on materials from the 1770s to the 1880s and I have engaged in many types of discursive analyses of textual material -- ranging from James Cook's journals (Cook 1955), newspapers published in Auckland between 1857 and 1867, *Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives* published in the 1860s, and more recently published works on the Waikato wars (e.g. Allen 1969; Belich 1986; Bell *et al.* 1861; Busby 1860; Gorst 1864; Martin 1861; Morrell 1940; Orange 1987; Sorrenson 1963; Thomson 1859; Ward 1973). The focus of this study, however, is an *intensive* discourse analysis of articles published in English from the *Daily Southern Cross* and *The New Zealander* for the period 11 July to 31 July 1863. The period is important because it begins with the invasion of the Waikato and spans the first weeks of the British push southward into the heart of Waikato territory. It is thus a time of heightened rhetoric which makes for interesting analysis. The two journals are significant because they were the dominant Auckland papers from the late 1840s through the early 1860s.⁶⁵ They were also the only English-language dailies publishing in Auckland at the time the Waikato was invaded, and as such, they represent one of the key 'public' sources of information about the war for 'educated' settlers in Auckland at the time.⁶⁶ Moreover, they each offered different perspectives on the New Zealand Government policy relating to Maori

⁶⁵ Although *The New Zealander* began to decline in importance by the mid 1860s (see Day 1990, especially pages 37 and 132).

⁶⁶ The *Otago Daily Times* was the first Daily in New Zealand, beginning daily publication in Dunedin on 15 November 1861. The *Southern Cross* became a daily (and thus the *Daily Southern Cross*) on 20 May 1862, whilst the *New Zealander* became a daily in 1863 (see Day 1990: 111-132). The *Southern Cross* and *The New Zealander* were also the most well-established Auckland newspapers, publishing since 1843 and 1845 respectively.

people in general, and to the war in particular. By the 1860s, the *Daily Southern Cross*, for the most part, tended towards an overtly 'anti-Maori' perspective, and therefore favoured a policy of 'vigorous prosecution' of the war. The *New Zealander*, on the other hand, "had long been one of the few papers in the country with a pronounced sympathy for the Maori" (Day 1990: 132), which dated back to its original linkage with the Wesleyan Mission in New Zealand.⁶⁷ Indeed, when it was founded in 1845 the title of the paper, *The New Zealander*, alluded not to the present-day concept of New Zealanders as being dominantly of European origin, but instead to the then common practice of referring to Maori as 'New Zealanders'. As such, the paper tended to espouse a much more cautious response to the war.

After reviewing newspaper articles for the ten-year period from 1857-1867, I chose for analysis articles published during the first few weeks of the invasion of the Waikato in July of 1863. I felt this interval to be a key period of conflict -- at least rhetorically if not always physically -- between British settlers and Maori when, to paraphrase James Duncan (1992) and David Spurr (1993), the crisis of authority resulted in the intensification of hegemonic rhetoric and the cultural politics of 'race' and gender would be most visible. Accordingly, after reading (on microfilm) the papers for the time period in question three times, I selected all articles discussing either the war or Maori people more generally (with the exception of articles calling on members of the militia to gather at specific locations) from newspapers published during the first two weeks of the period in question. I then

⁶⁷ As I noted earlier, it was also linked in the 1840s and 1850s with the 'Official' party of colonial government. In this capacity it supported a moderate policy in respect of 'the Native question' -- at least in relation to the *Daily Southern Cross*, which in its support of the 'radicals' and settler government, often took a harder line regarding Maori. Nonetheless, this 'philo-Maori' position was always set within a wider European discourse of the Other.

selected only 'lead articles' from the final week of newspaper publications.

The relatively limited selection of written material raises a number of interrelated issues I feel are important to address at the outset. First, this might seem to be a rather short time frame and small amount of material to be examining as part of a doctoral thesis. Despite the fact that my 'methodology' resulted in the selection of more than 78,000 words for analysis -- a daunting amount of material given the labour-intensive character of discourse analysis -- this relatively small 'sample' is likely to be of major concern for a reader working within positivist epistemological frames. Within these more traditional approaches in geography (and especially that which has until recently dominated in geography in the United States), the small size of my 'sample' might lead to questions concerning its 'representativeness' and predictive power. The purpose of discourse analysis in this instance, however, is *not* to extrapolate results from a sample to a wider population, but instead to illustrate the *existence* of certain discourses through textual analysis (and text is here conceived in its broadest sense). Thus, while I reserve my intensive examination of texts to a relatively short three-week period, this is of little consequence as my purpose is not to illustrate long-term continuity⁶⁸ of a particular discourse, but instead to show that certain discourses of 'race' and gender existed, that they were mutually constitutive, and that they were implicated in European constructions of Maori rebels.

A related problem arises when attempting to discuss the 'method' of discourse analysis. 'Method' is itself the product of a positivist discursive frame which constructs an acceptable set of procedures that lead to the

⁶⁸ Nevertheless, it is not difficult to identify the links between the racism and masculinism in the nineteenth century and that present today.

'discovery' of truth. In the type of discourse analysis I utilise, on the other hand, there is no analogous set of codified procedures for getting 'results' (Wetherell and Potter 1992). As will become clear, discourse analysis relies upon the skills and perspective of individual analysts, and there is no *singular* way of reading texts nor is there a single truth to be 'discovered' by such methods. Moreover, there can never be a *complete* analysis of texts, for there will always be new interpretations that can be developed. It is important to note that in making a distinction between the 'method' of positivist science and the rhetorics of discourse analysis, I nevertheless suggest that science and positivism rely on rhetorics for their own persuasive power. It is just that these rhetorics achieved taken-for-granted (and thus 'transparent') status long ago in scientific approaches. Finally, this does not mean that I accept a *completely* relativist position on these matters, but instead argue that there will be overlaps between differing interpretations. I emphasise the necessity for recognising the *partiality* and *multiplicity* of 'our' perspectives of events. With these caveats in mind, I shall now discuss my 'methods' of analysing newspaper rhetorics.

NUD•IST qualitative data analysis system

Once the newspaper articles to be analysed were selected, they were transcribed from microfilm to a word processor by a research assistant. Unfortunately, the newspapers were available solely on microfilm, thus some of the 'original' semiotic content has been either transformed or lost. After transcription, the 78,352 words of text were then introduced into the NUD•IST⁶⁹ qualitative data analysis computing software system. The NUD•IST system has three main components:


⁶⁹ Readers interested in more in-depth discussion of NUD•IST are directed to articles by Richards and Richards (1991, 1994), and Gorely *et al.* (1994).

- The **document system** provides for processing and maintenance of the on-line and off-line textual or other documents which form the basic data of qualitative research project...
- A hierarchical **indexing system** for the documents, which includes a database of indexing data (references to text units in documents)...
- The **analysis system**... is a set of facilities for manipulating the indexing database in various ways in processes of category creation designed to help the researcher define and explore research ideas, find text relevant to complex ideas, pursue wild hunches in all directions, keep the fruitful ones, and formulate and test hypotheses (Richards and Richards 1991: 308).

I found the second and third components of NUD•IST outlined above to be the most useful for this study. Once the text was introduced to the document system, I undertook a series of complex textual searches in order to build a hierarchical index system of interrelated ideas about the text (see Figure 5.1). Here I used the 'string searches' capability of NUD•IST to identify and index key thematic aspects of the text. String' searches allowed me to search for related terms -- such as 'Native/Maori/New Zealander', 'woman/mother/wife', or 'uncivilised/savage /heathen' -- which I felt were part of important conceptual constellations. The results of each search were then placed in a node on the hierarchical 'tree-structured' index database. These nodes are developed gradually as one works with the material under study. The idea is to create general categories and move onto ever more specific categories as one moves down through the tree structure. Thus in the example illustrated in Figure 5.1, I began with 'Race' and moved down through 'Maori' to 'Native', 'Savage', etc. -- with each node representing a key concept that I had explored in the text and indexed at a particular node. This index database forms a key component of the text analysis system. It has a graphical interface (Figure 5.1) that allows for quick selection of nodes, giving the user simple and easy access to the indexed textual material, as well as access to an individual memorandum field that is linked to the indexed node and allows the researcher to make notes concerning the

indexed text.

Figure 5.1. Portion of the NUD•IST hierarchical tree-structure graphic interface.



Unlike most other computer-aided 'textual' analysis systems, which lack graphic interfaces, NUD•IST's graphic interface offers a new and powerful way to view relationships between different parts of your data. NUD•IST offers an especially helpful way of 'seeing'⁷⁰ relationships between different aspects of textual material or -- because it can also index memoranda about the material being analysed⁷¹ -- relationships between *ideas* about the text itself. It is analogous to a map of where one has been, connected to a database which also stores ideas about the text one has 'visited' (analysed).

NUD•IST is a powerful computerised aid to discourse analysis, but it is no substitute for a good understanding of linguistic, semiotic and social theory. That is, it does not do the analysis for the researcher, but is merely an aid to analysis. Moreover, there is no exact method for doing discourse analysis, so that while the analysis I have undertaken here is the result of much reading about discourse analysis, critical linguistics, social semiotics

⁷⁰ While this visual metaphor is helpful, it is also quite ironic given my critique in chapter 7 of the 'visual episteme'. As one of my committee members noted perceptively, I sustain this irony with a 'refusal' to discuss at greater lengths the visual power of the NUD•IST system.

⁷¹ And those theoretical or conceptual memoranda can in turn be indexed and searched using the database functions of the program.

and social theory, I find it difficult to explain in concise terms just exactly how it is done. As Wetherell and Potter (1992: 101) observe, "much of the work of discourse analysis is a craft skill, something like bicycle riding or chicken sexing that is not easy to render or describe in an explicit or codified manner." Nevertheless, the craft of discourse analysis does rely on specific understandings of the relationship between language and social practice. With this in mind, I attempt in the sections that follow to outline some of the important aspects of linguistics and semiotic relationships which I have found useful in my own discourse analytic method. It is important also to keep in mind that these linguistic concepts form the implicit backdrop for my more explicitly social-theoretical analysis of newspaper texts.

LANGUAGE, SOCIAL PRACTICE AND DISCOURSE ANALYSIS⁷²

Following the linguist M.A.K. Halliday, Roger Fowler (1991: 69) suggests that language performs three key functions:

1. language has an *ideational* function, through which the language/text producer's experience of the world is expressed;
2. language has an *interpersonal* function, through which the language/text producer intrudes into the text; and,
3. language has a *textual* function, whereby language meets the needs of the specific discursive setting (by making links between itself and the situation).

While sympathetic to these key points, Fowler is at odds with Halliday's liberal humanist conception of society (especially his implicit emphasis on a sovereign individual subject) that is instantiated in the conception of these three aspects of language. Instead, Fowler argues that, rather than being the

⁷² Unless otherwise stated, the discussion in this section is based primarily on the work of Hodge and Kress (1988), Fowler (1991), and Fairclough (1992).

subject of free choice, "the ideational, interpersonal and textual are sets of social options" (Fowler 1991: 70). These options are constrained and enabled, in dialectical fashion, in particular social and discursive settings. I will discuss each of them in turn.

The ideational function of language: creating reality

The ideational dimension of grammar is closely linked to 'transitivity' and it is a key way that 'reality' is represented in language (Fairclough 1992: 177; Fowler 1991: 70).

Transitivity is the foundation of representation: it is the way the clause is used to analyse events and situations as being of certain types.... Since transitivity makes options available, we are always suppressing some possibilities, so the choice we make -- better, the choice made by the discourse -- indicates our point of view (Fowler 1991: 71).

Since it can either highlight or elide a 'point of view', or perspective on the world, transitivity is ideologically significant. Of key importance in my later analysis is the way in which *agency*, *causality* and *responsibility* are either made explicit or left vague in newspaper representations of people, place and events (see Fairclough 1992: 181).

There are three important components of transitivity, which are discussed in greater detail below:

1. a semantic nucleus consisting of an obligatory verb or adjective called a predicate (or a 'process' by some);
2. one or more *nouns* or *noun phrases* attending the predicate and referring to the participants in the event or state of affairs; and,
3. the predicate may, optionally, be attended by one or more *circumstances* (which indicate some form of setting; see Fowler 1991: 73).

Transitivity has to do with the types of predicate (process) that are coded in clauses. In this sense, it refers to four types of predicates (see Fowler 1991: 73). First, there are the *relational* predicates, in which case the verb marks a relationship -- such as 'being', 'having', or 'becoming' -- between elements in

a clause. Second, there are *action* predicates where an agent acts on another participant (and is thus transitive) or where no other participant is involved (and is thus intransitive). Third, there are *process* predicates where the verb does not signify deliberate or controlled action. Fourth, there are predicates signifying *states* involving verbs or adjectives which imply no change or development. Actions, processes and states may be *material*, that is, they can apply to the physical, external or perceptible world; they may be *mental*, referring to internal mental actions or concepts such as 'to dream', 'to decide', 'to be tough'; or they may be *verbal*, thus involving words like 'criticised', 'ruled', or 'argued' (Fowler 1991: 73-74).

Participants in the transitivity structure of a clause have two key roles. First, there is the *agent*, or doer of an action. Second, there are the *affected participants*, people and objects that have things done to them (Fowler 1991: 75). There are a number of different kinds of affected participants (see Fowler 1991: 75-76; Fairclough 1992: 177-185).

1. *Object*, where some physical entity (either a being or a thing) is affected in a material way by an action or process. This is the most neutral term for an affected participant.
2. *Force*, an active but inanimate role played by something which is not a sentient being (e.g. 'storms lashed New Zealand last week').
3. *Patient*, an affected participant -- either human, or at least animate -- who has something done to them.
4. *Result*, a role which comes into being as the result of an action.
5. *Beneficiary*, a positive outcome affecting a person or sentient being.
6. *Circumstances*, expressions indicating either the time, place or setting of the event described.
7. *Experiencer*, closely related to the *patient* role, although perhaps less passive (and with fewer pejorative connotations), where the participant is the experiencer of either events, or the actions of others.

8. *Instrument*, where the participant is involved in an action, but as the instrument of another active agent.

It is not difficult to see how important knowledge of these concepts is for understanding the construction of reality. They offer insight into the ways that agency, causality and responsibility are constructed in language. Transformation of the clause is another way in which these concepts are intricated in language.

There are a number of transformations of the clause in grammar, two of which -- the passive and the nominal -- are important to examine here. The passive transformation involves the switching of the left-hand and right-hand noun phrases so that the *patient* occupies the left-hand (subject) position normally associated with an *agent*. Why is this done? It appears that the active clause is used "when the focus is to be on the agent of action, implying clear responsibility" (Fowler 1991: 78). Accordingly, it would seem that the passive transformation 'deletes' the agent, leaving responsibility unclear. The following are two examples taken from the 1863 papers. The first is an example of an active clause: "They attacked the house and fired at their victim as he was standing at the door" ("DRURY" [BY ELECTRIC TELEGRAPH.] (FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT, *Daily Southern Cross*, 25 July 1863, page 3). The second is an example of a passive clause: "A SON of Capt. Calvert, residing on the Wairoa road, near Papakura, was shot by the Natives this morning" (*The New Zealander*, 13 July 1863, page 4). Transformations between active and passive can have ideological significance, depending on what is being highlighted and what is veiled.

Nominalisation involves the transformation of adjectives and verbs into nouns (called derived nominals) (Fowler 1992: 79). Examples of nominalisation include the transformation of *allege* into 'allegation', or *develop* into 'development'. Another form of nominalisation involves the use of nouns that designate actions and processes. For example, although

they are nouns, terms such as 'a call', 'the inquiry', or 'the campaign' imply or designate some form of action or process. Nominalisation offers much ideological purchase because of the way it *reduces* information. As Fowler (1992: 80) suggests, this process is easily illustrated if we compare the nominalisation 'allegations' "...with the fully spelt-out proposition 'X has alleged against Y that Y did A and that Y did B [etc.]'." Nominalisation deletes information about the participants (the agent and affected participant), the modality (the writer's degree of agreement with the statement), and the circumstances. Nominalisation thus has two key outcomes: *mystification* because it permits concealment, hiding the participants, indicators of time or place, and modality; and *reification*, whereby processes assume the status of things (Fowler 1991: 80).

Lexical structure, or vocabulary, is a primary determinant of the ideational structure of language (Fowler 1991: 80). It is possible to distinguish between two types of word-meaning: 'reference' and 'sense'. *Reference* refers to a relationship between a word or phrase and the material (or mental) world; that is, it is a referential relationship. *Sense* refers to the meaning that inheres in the relationship between words. Accordingly, the 'sense' of a word arises from what it is *not* as much as by what it *is*. For example, our understanding of the term 'dog' comes as much from the fact that we 'know' it does not represent 'horse', nor 'house', nor 'cow', as much as that we understand it to represent 'dog'.

Understanding 'sense' as an aspect of lexical structure of language provides an important insight into the way ideas are clustered. Such clusters are signified by groups of related terms that "mark out distinct kinds of preoccupation and topic" (Fowler 1991: 82). This process is called *categorisation* by lexical structure. In the case of 1863 newspapers, there are a number of 'lexical sets' that mark out specific ideas about Maori people. These include, but are not limited to, ideas that fall under the rubric of terms

such as 'natives', 'savages', 'uncivilised', 'barbaric', 'murderous', etc. Understanding the role of lexical sets provides a key entry point for analysing 1863 newspaper texts in this study. Indeed, the index nodes (see Figure 5.1) created using the NUD•IST system are examples of ideas about text categorised according to lexical sets. This excerpt from *The Daily Southern Cross* illustrates the lexical categorisation of Maori people as 'savages':

We need hardly say that the attack upon the escort is a most calamitous affair. Our brave soldiers have been shot down like bullocks -- and that by *savages* who have heretofore enjoyed the name of 'friendly' *Maoris*. Truly the climax has now been reached. Who will sympathise with this heretofore belauded race? *Savages* in the worst sense of the term we found them, and *savages* they will continue to be, unless they are put down with the strong arm of military coercion. The engagement at Koheroa yesterday morning, in which 20 or more of the *rebels* were killed, although no compensation for the loss of our *murdered* country men, is consolatory to some extent, as it will give the *rebels* a taste of what they may expect. Justice and humanity now call for the most stern measures to be taken against the *native* (*Daily Southern Cross*, 18 July 1863, page 3; my emphasis).

Maori people are here explicitly associated with savagery, rebellion, and murder. Furthermore, this negative lexical categorisation is set in opposition to the positive imagery of the 'justice and humanity' of the 'brave [English] soldiers'.

Two other processes form important aspects of lexical structure. The first is *re-lexicalisation*, where a new term is promoted to replace an old lexical category. The second is *over-lexicalisation*, where there exists an overabundance of quasi-synonymous terms for entities or ideas that are problematic in a culture. A key example in contemporary discourse is the numerous (usually pejorative) terms for those constructed as Other (that is, 'women' and non-Europeans). As the above excerpt partly illustrates, over-lexicalisation played an important role in 1863 press representations of Maori.

The 'interpersonal' function of language: creating the subject

As I stated at the beginning of this section, language has an interpersonal function whereby the language or text producer's own subjectivity is made visible in the text. M.A.K. Halliday has discussed the interpersonal aspect of language extensively, and he is worth quoting at length:

Here, the speaker is using language as the means of his [sic] intrusion into the speech event: the expression of his comments, his attitudes, and evaluations, and also of the relationship that he sets up between himself and his listener -- in particular the communication role that he adopts, of informing, questioning, greeting, persuading, and the like (quoted in Fowler 1991: 69).

The interpersonal is thus a way of signifying opinions, attitudes and evaluations about events (or 'things'), and it plays a significant role in the representation of people and place in the press. A key way in which the text producer makes evaluative judgements in the text is through *modality*.

Simply put, modality involves "the extent to which producers commit themselves to, or conversely distance themselves from, propositions" (Fairclough 1992: 142). Likewise, Hodge and Kress (1988: 123), suggest that modality "expresses affinity -- or lack of it -- of speaker with hearer via an affirmation of their affinity about the status of the mimetic system." Modality has been traditionally associated with *modal auxiliary verbs* such as 'must', 'may', 'can', 'should', and so on (Fairclough 1992: 159). Hodge and Kress (1988) have pointed out, however, that there are many other ways to indicate modality. These include *tense*, for example, the simple present tense, *is*, realises a categorical modality; *modal adverbs*, such as probably, 'possibly', 'obviously', and 'definitely'; *modal adjectives*, such as 'likely', 'probable', or 'possible'; and, forms of *hedging*, such as use of terms like 'sort of', 'a bit', or 'something' (see Fairclough 1992: 158-9). In addition, *presupposition*, extends modality one step further, taking factuality for granted (Fairclough 1992: 161). There are a number of different ways that modality may be classified.

Modality may be explicitly *subjective*, as in the case of the phrase 'I think

the earth is flat'. On the other hand, it may be *objective*, where the subjective basis of the text producer's participation in the clause is implicit, such as in the phrase 'the earth is flat' (Fairclough 1992: 159). The press purports to deal in 'fact' and 'truth', and therefore, it tends to have a predilection for categorical modalities in the objective mode (positive and negative assertions). As Fairclough notes (1992: 160-61), "They systematically transform into 'facts' what can often be no more than interpretations of complex and confusing sets of events." The following excerpt from *The Daily Southern Cross* illustrates this aspect of modality in the 1863 press:

the people of Taranaki, who have been, we are heartily ashamed to say it, maligned so greatly by some of their fellow colonists, have set us an example, which we shall do well to imitate. The volunteers of Taranaki *are noted* for their effective discharge of such duties as those of traversing the bush and scouring the open land, with a rapidity and in a manner that have caused them *to be* regarded with a fear, such as has but seldom oppressed the native race with regard to any body of our forces before. The reason of this *is* simple; the men *are* such as have been thoroughly at home in the forest for many years -- men who *can* hit a track with almost unerring certainty, and who *are able* to march through forest perfectly prepared for attack, yet at a pace which the most famous Maori warriors could not keep up for many hours (*Daily Southern Cross*, 15 July 1863, page 3; my emphasis).

The newspaper here traffics in unequivocal statements; nothing is ambiguous nor is anything tentative. This language is not merely a matter of personal choice, however, but is instead a key aspect of newspaper journalism whereby particular objective modality practices are actually imposed on those working within this discursive formation (Fairclough 1992: 162).

Fowler (1991: 85-87) suggests that modality is concerned with comment or attitude towards four aspects of a text: *truth*, *obligation*, *permission*, and *desirability*. In the case of *truth*, a text producer must always indicate or imply a commitment to the truth of a proposition. Truth modality varies from absolute confidence (e.g., something *will* happen), down through

various degrees of certainty (e.g., something is *likely* to happen; something *may* happen; something is *unlikely* to happen). With *obligation*, a text producer stipulates that the participants in a proposition *ought to* perform certain actions. Examples of other obligation modal auxiliaries include 'should', and 'must', and their negations, 'should not', and 'must not'. In the case of *permission* modality, the text producer "bestows permission to do something on the participant(s)" (Fowler, p 86-87). Examples of permission auxiliaries include 'may', 'can', and 'allowed'. Finally, there is the *desirability* component of modality, in which the text producer indicates approval or disapproval of the ideas or state of things communicated in any statement. Desirability is implicit in obligation and permission, and is expressed through a range of evaluative adjectives and adverbs (see Fowler 1991: 87).

It should be clear that modality is a key way in which ideology is communicated in the press. The nature of newspaper journalism is such that certain types of modality are favoured over others. Thus, in what are supposedly 'objective' statements of 'the facts', modality reinforces the veracity of certain perspectives and erodes that of others. In this regard, the character of both social structure and the language used to describe events that take place within it, act to reinforce the status quo -- protecting the interests of those in power and devaluing the perspectives of those already marginalised.

Finally, there are two further aspects of the interpersonal component of language that need to be discussed. The first, *politeness*, refers to the overall tone of the text producer's commentary. It is especially important in personal interaction but can play a key role in parts of written text. Politeness is not easy to describe, but rather is more a feeling that one gets from the text. The second, *ethos*, can be equated in some ways to Foucault's notion of discursive formations. Examples include 'medical science', 'common sense', and 'lifeworld' ethos. In describing two different medical

interviews involving a doctor and patient in, first, a traditional medical doctor-patient relationship, and second, an 'alternative' doctor-patient relationship, Fairclough (1992: 166) refers to the former as illustrating aspects of the 'medical science' ethos, while the latter more of the 'lifeworld' ethos. Ethos is an intertextual phenomenon, involving the deployment of models from other discourses as part of the constitution of the 'self' (Fairclough 1992: 166).

The textual function of language: intertextuality

The *textual* is the third of the three Hallidayan functional components of language. It is through the textual function that, according to Halliday, "language makes links with itself and with the situation; and discourse becomes possible, because the speaker or writer can produce a text and the reader or listener can recognize one" (quoted in Fowler 1991: 69). For my purposes, *intertextuality* is the key component of the textual function of language. The term intertextuality was first coined by Julia Kristeva (1986) in the mid 1960s as part of her important discussion of the work of Bakhtin. Bakhtin himself used the term 'translinguistic' to describe his approach, but he is the acknowledged precursor to present understandings of the intertextual character of language and the understandings of the world that it mediates (Fairclough 1992). For Bakhtin,

our speech... is filled with others' words, varying degrees of otherness and varying degrees of 'our-own-ness', varying degrees of awareness and detachment. These words of others carry with them their own expression, their own evaluative tone, which we assimilate, rework, and reaccentuate (quoted in Fairclough 1992: 102).

The notion of intertextuality relates to the fact that all phenomena are set within a web of understanding so that they are always understood in relation to texts of the past. What is important here is that texts are not created in a vacuum, but are instead produced by (and productive of) relations of power. Hegemonic groups thus sustain (whether knowingly or

not) hegemonic understandings of the world. This aspect of intertextuality is important to keep in mind as I discuss the two forms of intertextuality, *manifest* and *constitutive*.

Manifest intertextuality occurs where other texts are overtly drawn upon within a text (Fairclough 1992: 119). There are a number of forms of manifest intertextuality. First, *presupposition* relates to propositions that are taken by the text producer as already given. For example, the following series of phrases taken from *The New Zealander* (13 July 1863, page 4), "the approvers of the Taranaki assassinations -- the banded conspirators who defy the majesty of our Queen and Laws -- the Waikatos", presupposes that the Taranaki war involved assassinations, that the Waikato Maori approved those measures, and that they also defy the Queen and British Law. The reader must understand a host of previous texts, and agree with them, in order to understand this small excerpt.

Second, *negation* is often used for polemical purposes (Fairclough 1992: 121). For example, the phrase 'he did not murder the settlers...' presupposes that in some other text the subject has been accused of murder. Negation works intertextually by incorporating other texts in order to contest and reject them.

Third, *metadiscourse* is a form of manifest intertextuality where the text producer distinguishes at least two different levels of their text and then distances herself from one level (Fairclough 1992: 122-23). They thus treat part of their text as if it were produced by someone else. This might involve 'hedging' (for example, expressions such as 'sort of', 'kind of', etc.), or marking a text as belonging to another ('he said', 'scientists argue', etc). Metadiscourse in some senses constructs the text producer as situated above, or outside their own discourse (Fairclough 1992: 122).

Irony is the fourth and final form of manifest intertextuality. Traditional accounts of irony describe it as "saying one thing while meaning another"

(Fairclough 1992: 123), but this definition misses the intertextuality of irony. Ironic statements 'echo' other statements. Irony depends on receivers being able to recognise that the meaning of an echoed text is not the (ironic) text producer's meaning. Clues to irony include a blatant mismatch between apparent meaning and context (e.g., statements such as 'it's a nice day' when it clearly is not); cues in a speaker's tone of voice or in a written text (e.g., scare quotes); or assumptions about the producer's values. For example, the statement 'we are all aware of the educational achievements of Maoridom' may have different meanings depending on who is making the statement and how they are intertextually positioned in contemporary cultural politics in New Zealand. Having described the four types of manifest intertextuality, I now wish to discuss the constitutive variety.

Constitutive intertextuality relates to the way a text is constituted through a combination of elements of orders of discourse. Thus Fairclough (1992: 124) refers to it as interdiscursivity. Constitutive intertextuality involves the coalescence of a number of discourse types (such as genre, style, activity type, or register) into an overarching and identifiable discursive construction of people and place. I am interested in four types of constitutive intertextuality here: genre, activity type, style, and rhetoric.

The concept of *genre* comes from literary history where it is used to refer to "a set of texts with recognizable formal and stylistic similarities, which relates to some common communication situation" (Fowler 1991: 227). Newspapers contain a number of distinct genres: editorials, financial reports, shipping news, advertising, etc. Each genre signifies "a relatively stable set of conventions that is associated with, and partly enacts, a socially ratified type of activity" (Fairclough 1992: 126). This study tends to focus on one type of newspaper genre, that of the 'war report'; although there are sub-genres -- such as 'eye-witness reports', 'lead articles' (editorials), and 'government statements' -- within that larger frame. Genres are intertextual

because they relate to other texts of their genre. They imply not only different text types, but different forms of production and consumption. "[A] society, or a particular institution or domain within it, has a particular configuration of genres in particular relationships to each other, constituting a system" (Fairclough 1992: 126).

Genres are, in turn, associated with specific *activity types*. An activity type can be specified in terms of the structured sequence of actions of which it is composed, and in terms of the participants involved in the activity. Thus the 'activity' of producing a newspaper article involves news staff researching ideas, one or more writers writing the article, editorial meetings to agree on content, physical production of the newspaper (typesetting, printing), distribution of the paper, purchase of the paper by readers, reader then reads article, and may pass the paper on to other readers, and so on. Activity types are intertextual because they can be seen to specify a range of options for participants. These various options are made available or unavailable through social practices and conventions.

Genres tend to be associated with specific *styles*, although occasionally they can have multiple styles (e.g., formal and informal interviews). Style varies along three parameters: 'tenor', 'mode' and 'rhetorical mode' (see Fairclough 1992: 127). They differ according to the tenor of the relationship between participants in an interaction. For example, styles can be classified as 'formal', 'informal', 'official', 'clinical', 'intimate', or 'casual'. Styles may also vary according to *mode*, that is whether they are written, spoken, or a combination of written and spoken (ie written-as-if-spoken, written-to-be-spoken, spoken-as-if-written). Finally, styles diverge according to their rhetorical mode, and can be classified with terms such as 'argumentative', 'descriptive', or 'explanatory'.

Fairclough defines a fourth aspect of constitutive intertextuality which he terms 'discourse'. I find the use of this term rather confusing in relation to

the more social theoretical meaning that I have adopted in this study, so I have used the term *rhetoric* in its place. Rhetoric corresponds roughly to aspects of texts that have traditionally been termed 'content', 'ideational meanings', 'topic', or 'subject matter' (Fairclough 1992: 128). Use of the term rhetoric acknowledge the constructedness of knowledge, "emphasizing that contents or subject-matters -- areas of knowledge -- only enter texts in the mediated form of particular constructions of them" (Fairclough, p 128). Examples include, 'techno-scientific medical rhetorics', 'scientific racist anthropological rhetorics', 'masculinist rhetorics of sexuality', or 'liberal conservative rhetorics of family'. This concept is closest to Foucault's concept of discourse, although I reserve the latter term for larger and more pervasive constructs.

Intertextuality, and the process of intertextual relations in language, are keys to understanding the (re)constitution of subjects in discourse (Fairclough 1992: 133). It is thus very important to note that analysts cannot escape their discursive positioning any more than can the speaker of the text being analysed. *Coherence* is at the centre of interpreting subject positioning in texts. Coherence is not a property of the text itself, but instead is imposed upon the text by the reader or audience. A classic example of coherence being imposed on a text lies in the statement: "She's giving up her job next week. She's pregnant." It makes 'sense' only insofar as the reader accepts that women will quit their jobs when they get pregnant (Fairclough 1992: 134).

Accordingly, newspaper texts "postulate, and implicitly set up interpretative positions for, interpreting subjects who are 'capable' of using assumptions from their prior experience to make connections across the intertextually diverse elements of a text, and to generate coherent interpretations" (Fairclough 1992: 135). Readers do not always resolve contradictions in text, and may even bring resistant interpretations to bear on

the text. In either case, they are being produced as subjects within the discourse. Moreover, they are also bringing other intertextual chains into the discursive context.

CONCLUSION

In this chapter I have attempted to outline my method of analysing discourse. I prefaced this methodological discussion with an outline of two important aspects of the social construction of newspaper reports, namely the 'selection' of events that become 'news', and the creation of 'consensus' in news reports. I then suggested that it was very difficult to describe in exact terms a specific methodology that could be used for discourse analytic work (or to replicate this study). Indeed, I suggested that my concern was not with positivist constructs of 'objectivity' and 'replication', but instead with explicating the existence of specific discursive constructs of Maori people and places in New Zealand. This implies a different epistemological frame of analysis, one that relies upon critical social theory, critical linguistics, and social semiotics. I introduced the reader to NUD•IST, a software package which provided a significant aid to the qualitative analysis of textual materials in this study. In the final section of this chapter I outlined a number of important aspects of language and text production that I found useful in analysing the texts of 1863 newspaper reports about Maori rebels and the war in the Waikato. I do not suggest that the concepts outlined here are exhaustive, nor do I suggest that I have used all of them in my own discourse analysis. Indeed, I have tended to explicitly privilege a more amorphous set of social theoretical principles in my analysis. It is important, however, to note the implicit role that critical linguistic concepts I outlined above have played in my analysis of 1863 newspaper texts.

VI OTHER PEOPLE, OTHER PLACES⁷³

In this chapter, I examine the historical roots of the 'politics of identity' that underlie British relations with colonised peoples. I am concerned to illustrate two key concepts here. First, I review contemporary critical literature in order to trace the development of a racial discourse which I suggest formed the backdrop for the various rhetorics of 'race' in mid-nineteenth century New Zealand newspaper accounts of the Waikato war(s). Woven throughout this discussion is a contemporary critique of the 'race' idea. Second, I outline how this contemporary literature has until recently tended to focus on 'race' alone, tending to ignore the ways that notions of gender are interwoven with ideas about 'race' such that the two concepts tend to be mutually constitutive.⁷⁴ I begin the chapter with a brief outline of my anti-essentialist perspective on the study of 'race' and racism. From there I discuss a history of racial discourse as a form of identity politics, and its importance as a process of 'Othering'. This process, however, involved more than the construction of a racialised group. Indeed, I argue that the process of racialising 'the Native' was inextricably bound up with Victorian constructions of gender such that 'race' and 'gender' were mutually constitutive categories -- an idea that has recently become a focus of analysis in the literature (see, e.g., Fraiman 1994; Frankenberg 1993; Jackson 1994a; Kaminsky 1994; Kobayashi and Peake 1994; Stepan 1993; Ware 1992).

I conclude with a discussion of the spatial and social implications that

⁷³ Portions of this chapter have been published in Berg 1993b.

⁷⁴ Interestingly, Audrey Kobayashi and Linda Peake (1994) note how (usually socialist) feminist literatures have tended to focus on gender and class, while ignoring 'race'. I suggest this focus has resulted from strategic requirements. My own work results from a different set of strategic necessities.

such discourses of the Other might have for understanding the relationship between discourse, cultural hegemony and masculinist cultural politics in the Waikato during the 1860s. In this regard, I argue that European notions of Maori as completely Other (and inferior) played a key role in the construction of Waikato Maori as dangerous rebels and the Waikato region as a dangerous place. Moreover, I suggest ways that notions of gender and class (surfacing, for example, as the need to 'protect' white, bourgeois, feminine civility from the 'dangers' of libidinous, black, savagery) were imbricated in the construction of Maori difference. In this respect, I hope to provide a theoretical understanding of how and why it became acceptable, and even *necessary*, for (safely masculine) Europeans to conquer (sometimes feminine, and sometimes dangerously masculine)⁷⁵ Maori 'rebels' and tame (savage) Maori lands.

At this point, I think it important to situate my text in order to acknowledge my own, almost ambivalent, position within the various contemporary discourses of racism and anti-racism. It is very easy, as Jeffrey Prager (1982) has noted, for twentieth-century academics to criticise the overt racism of past generations. This is so, he argues (1982: 100), because "each preceding racial ideology [is] perceived as racist; only the currently held view will be seen as overcoming racism." Thus in constructing those in the past as racists, and constructing myself as anti-racist I reconstitute a longstanding intellectual dualism, but may do little to break the cycle of 'collective representations' that help to bolster racial ideologies about Maori people. As writers such as Robert Young (1990a) and David Lloyd (1991) have pointed out, the discourse of 'anti-racism' is located within the

⁷⁵ While Europeans tended to be gendered 'masculine' in this European discourse, Maori could be gendered 'feminine' or 'masculine' depending upon the context of the characterizations.

fundamental structures of Western epistemology, and thus cannot escape the generally racist disposition of the 'West'. As Lloyd (1991: 73) suggests, the rhetorical structure of the contrasting attitudes of Western racism and anti-racism -- founded as they are upon the concept of assimilation -- is one of metaphorization:

The constitution of any metaphor involves the bringing together of two elements into identity in such a manner that their differences are suppressed. Just so, the process of assimilation, whether in bringing two distinct but equivalent elements into identity or in absorbing a lower into a higher element as by metastasis, requires that which defines the difference between the elements to remain over as a residue. Hence, although it is possible to conceive formally of an equable process of assimilation in which the original elements are entirely equivalent, the product of assimilation will always necessarily be in an hierarchical relation to the residual...

The contemporary discourse of anti-racism is active within a metaphoric economy where the difference of the Other is subsumed to the demand for identity. That is, many anti-racists argue for the essential similarity of the Other: They are just *like* Us. Yet, while difference is initially lost, it always remains as a residual that leads to inequality: They can never *be* Us. In the end, the question that I and other Western scholars must ask ourselves, then, is not "am I racist" (and masculinist), but more appropriately, "how does my (masculinist) racism disguise itself?" I think it important to keep this point in mind when reading my interpretation of European 'racial' discourse in the sections that follow.

PUTTING 'RACE' IN ITS PLACE

Until recently, many geographers (perhaps no more than other social scientists) have accepted uncritically the notion that 'races' exist. The influential American geographer Nathaniel Shaler's work in the field of eugenics during the early part of this century may partially explain geographers' stance regarding 'race' (see Livingstone 1984, 1992). Whatever the reasons for their uncritical acceptance of the existence of 'races', such

acceptance has affected greatly the types of questions geographers have asked. For example, geographers have examined such issues as 'racial' segregation (see e.g. Peach *et al* 1981; Waddell 1992), exclusionary urban planning policies instigated by 'whites' (see e.g. Johnston 1984), and the neighbourhood 'transition' which occurs when one 'racial' group moves into a neighbourhood formerly dominated by another (see e.g. Clark 1988).

However, the concept of 'race' as an *a priori* category was challenged by Anglo-American social scientists in the 1930s (see Montagu 1941).⁷⁶ Writers like Ashley Montagu were relying upon work begun almost a decade earlier by population geneticists which began to throw into question the notion that 'races' could be defined by phenotypic characteristics (such as skin colour, skull shape, and body type). These geneticists described the enormous genetic variability among populations we might normally think of as 'races' (Anderson 1991). They stressed the impossibility of neatly categorising human 'races', or of grouping humans by shared genetic characteristics (Wetherell and Potter 1992). Whilst some biologists still use 'race', it is usually in a much more narrow way, referring to geographic populations. Population genetics has made it clear that genetic variability *within* those groups we might call 'races' is as least as marked as that *between* such 'racial' groups (Montagu 1964a; Gould 1981; Miles 1982; Lewontin *et al.* 1984; Appiah 1986; Anderson 1991).

Utilising the work of population geneticists, Anthony Appiah (1986: 31) argues that "the chances of two people who are both Caucasoid differing in genetic constitution at one site on a given chromosome are about 14.3

⁷⁶ On 7 April 1941, Ashley Montague delivered a lecture "On the meaninglessness of the anthropological conception of race" to a meeting of the American Association of Physical Anthropologists. The influential ethnographer, Franz Boas is also noted for his earlier questioning of the 'race' concept (see Boas 1936).

percent, while for any two people taken at random from the human population, they are about 14.8 percent." Even Masatoshi Nei and Arun Roychoudhury (1983: 44) -- two geneticists who argue that human 'races' *do* exist -- have to acknowledge (if somewhat coyly), that "the extent of genic differentiation between human races is not always correlated with the degree of morphological differentiation." In other words, one cannot distinguish human 'races' on the basis of their appearance, genes, skull shape, cranial capacity, IQ, or any of the other measures used in the past to differentiate Europeans from their Other (see Gould 1981; Lewontin *et al.* 1984; Miles 1982; Anderson 1991).

In response to the population geneticists' challenge to commonsense ideas about 'race', some geographers have recently begun to challenge essentialist notions of 'race', and this has changed significantly the focus of their studies. Whereas some geographers give implicit causal power to 'race' difference itself, other geographers are now coming to accept that 'race' is a socially constructed phenomenon which itself must be explained through historical analysis. Peter Jackson, Susan Smith and Kay Anderson have been instrumental in the development by geographers of a theoretical critique of essentialist notions of 'race'. Jackson has also undertaken a number of substantive works, focussing on racial ideology and American attitudes towards Puerto Ricans (1987c); Euro-American constructions of indigenous culture in the United States (1992a); the racialisation of labour in the UK (1992b); the interrelationships between socially constructed notions of 'race', place and nation (Jackson and Penrose 1993a, 1993b; Penrose and Jackson 1993); and more recently, the racialisation of criminality in Toronto (1993b, 1994b), and the relationship between masculinity and 'race' in British advertising (1994a). Smith is well-known for her examination of racial ideology and its role in residential segregation in Britain (1987, 1989b); the implications of political rhetorics of 'racial' segregation (1988); and, the

relationship between racism, nationalism and immigration policies in Canada and the United Kingdom (1993). Likewise, Anderson has been highly critical of essentialist notions of 'race'. Accordingly, her substantive works have traced the articulation of place and institutional practices in the hegemonic process of 'race'-definition in Vancouver (1987, 1988, 1991); similar processes at work in the 'Chinatowns' of Sydney and Melbourne (1990); and more recently, the contested constructions of Aboriginality and space in Redfern, a suburb of inner Sydney (1993a, 1993b).

A number of other geographers are working in a similar vein. David Livingstone, for example, has been prominent in elucidating the numerous articulations between scientific racism and early geographic thought (e.g. 1984, 1987, 1991, 1992). Audrey Kobayashi has examined the historical relationship between Euro-Canadian racial ideology and law in Canada (1990), and the racism of Canada's 'multicultural' policy (1993). Elsewhere, I have argued against essentialist notions of race in academic discourse (Berg 1993b);⁷⁷ I have also explored the role that racial ideology played in delaying resolution of the Aboriginal land question in British Columbia (Berg 1993c), and the racialised and gendered cultural politics of naming places in Aotearoa (Berg and Kearns, 1995).

With the exception of Eric Pawson (1987a, 1987b, 1992), New Zealand geographers have tended to avoid examining issues relating to 'race' and racism. Pawson's work has highlighted the social production of 'Maori' in European rhetorics, linking this directly to the loss of Maori land and general disempowerment in New Zealand society. Much of the anti-essentialist critique in New Zealand has come from sociologists, however, with Paul

⁷⁷ Also see Berry (1993, 1994), Berg (1994b) and Dear (1994b) concerning the debate over political correctness in geography that arose from my (1993b) critique.

Spoonley (e.g., Spoonley 1987, 1993; Spoonley *et al.* 1991, 1994) having been particularly productive in this regard.

Despite this growing body of literature, the anti-essentialist politics common to these authors are neither fully accepted within geography (see, e.g. Waddell 1993) nor without problems of their own. Two problems in particular concern me here. First, with few exceptions (for example, see the contributions to Jackson and Penrose 1993a), these authors have tended to privilege (sometimes implicitly) one discourse over other discourses. In the discussion above, for example, the scientific discourse of population genetics is elevated to the status of an 'accurate' reflection of 'reality', while more commonsense discourses of 'racial' difference are deemed to be 'false', 'untrue', or inaccurate reflections of 'reality'. Science is thus imbued with the power of neutrality, objectivity and mimesis which (because science has colonised the discursive field known as 'truth') other discourses can never approach. This understanding of science is, however, highly problematic in light of recent deconstructive moves by feminist historians of science. Donna Haraway (1989), for example, has illustrated the ways that the dominant (masculinist) discourses of 'race', gender and nature were implicated in Western primatology. Her work has reinforced the notion that none of 'us' (including scientists) can occupy some privileged position outside discourse, but instead always inhabit discursive positions mediated by relations of class, culture, ethnicity, 'race', gender, and sexuality (see, e.g. Foucault 1980b; Duncan and Sharp 1993).

Moreover, the epistemological split between 'reality' and 'representation', implicit in the valorisation of 'objective' science, ignores the *constitutive* role that discourse plays in (re)constructing the 'real'. Indeed, once the constitutive role of discourse is acknowledged, "then the simple distinctions between distorted discourse and truly descriptive discourse become increasingly untenable" (Wetherell and Potter 1992: 61). This does

not mean that some discourses are not preferable to others, or that there is nothing but discourse, but instead all versions and understandings of objects are constructed and understood through historically and geographically specific discursive accounts. The question of key importance shifts, then, from "what is the truth?", to "how did one particular discursive account (rather than another) become accepted as true?" This involves investigating the complex relationships between truth and power (Foucault 1980b).

A second problem arises with the anti-essentialist perspective when it confronts -- and sometimes contradicts -- those racialised groups who now claim 'race' as a speaking position from which to challenge racism (see, e.g. Fuss 1989; hooks 1990; Larner, forthcoming). The African-American feminist bell hooks (1990), for example, reclaims the marginality of blackness as a *political* position from which to oppose racist and masculinist discourses. She is thus recuperating race as *politics*, while at the same time denying race as *biology*. I have certain reservations about some of the implications of this strategic essentialism (see Berg 1993b), especially its potential for a regressive politics of identity, yet I am unwilling to deny its political effectiveness for racialised groups such as African-Americans (hooks 1990) or Maori (Larner, forthcoming). My preference is to follow the lead of Iris Young (1990a) who attempts to recognise both difference and similarity through a process of *identification* rather than one of *identity*.

Accordingly, with some qualifications, I wish to adopt here the anti-essentialist approach to the concept of 'race' that is common to the studies mentioned earlier in this section. I would, however, modify the perspectives taken by some of these authors by challenging the reliance upon 'objective' scientific claims concerning the 'true' nature of 'race'. I am thus less concerned about the ontological status of 'race' than its epistemological importance as a concept that articulates with powerful social interests. It is to a (partial) history of these alignments that I now turn.

GENDER, 'RACE' AND DICHOTOMOUS THOUGHT

In chapter two I outlined the ways that dualistic thinking articulated with notions of gender to maintain masculine dominance. In this section I wish to extend that discussion to include the ways that binary thought has instantiated 'racial' dominance. The concept of national or cultural *difference*, one of the roots of later notions of 'race', can also be traced to early Western dualistic thought. One of the key concepts in this regard stems from the ancient division of the world into *Occidentis* and *Orientis*, or West (Europe) and East (Asia) (March 1974; Said 1978; Dossa 1987; Anderson 1991). The early Greeks -- who considered themselves part of the Occident -- developed a strong sense of their difference from the ~~Muslim~~ peoples of the Orient. However, this idea of difference probably remained unattached to normative notions of 'good' and 'bad' until after the Persian Wars, when the Greeks began to see themselves as superior to the "barbarous" Orientals (Dossa 1987: 346). By then (the fifth and fourth centuries BC), as Schlaifer (1936: 167) notes, "... the general view was that a Greek *ipso facto* possessed... superior culture and that a non-Greek was incapable of receiving it."

What appears to be unacknowledged by authors such as Schlaifer is the fact that 'Greek' in this context probably signified a Greek masculinity, as women and femininity were also excluded from the *logos*. Indeed, through metaphorical slippage⁷⁸ of binary signifiers such as 'Greek/unGreek', 'light/dark', 'enlightenment/ignorance', 'white/black', and 'male/female',

78 I have borrowed this phrase from Michael Keith (1991) who has used it in a slightly different context to illustrate the way in which metaphors and metonyms of place can 'slip' towards negative or positive significations of 'racial' identities. For example, one can argue that in the New Zealand context, 'Ngaruawahia' the place acts as a metonym for 'Maori' the people and a metaphor for a racialized 'ghetto'. The metonym and metaphor may have either positive or negative connotations depending upon the sender and receiver of the message. I shall return to discuss this idea in more depth later in the thesis.

'white' European women eventually became analogous to 'black' African men and women (Stepan 1993).

Such dualistic modes of thinking about gender and cultural difference became more entrenched in Western philosophy when Aristotle (384 - 322 BC) outlined his basic laws of formal logical thought (see chapter two). Closely linked to his non-contextual and un-dialectical formulations of identity were Aristotle's ideas about *form* and *matter*. Here, Aristotle believed that the form of a thing was unique, in other words form was equated to essence; matter, on the other hand, was merely the undifferentiated substance which comprises a thing (in Russell 1946: 187-88). For example, a particular marble statue might be seen as 'form' while the marble it is made of is its 'matter'. According to Bertrand Russell (1946: 188),

the form of a thing, we are told, is its essence and primary substance. Forms are substantial, although universals are not. When man [sic] makes a brazen sphere, both the matter and the form already existed, and all that he does is to bring them together; the man does not make the form, any more than he makes the brass. Not everything has matter; there are eternal things, and these have no matter, except those of them that are movable in space. Things increase in actuality by acquiring form; matter without form is only potentiality.

The links between gender, cultural identity, and Aristotle's metaphysics should be clear. He constructed a way of looking at the world that leads almost ineluctably to essentialist notions of identity: things are what they are, and what they are is clearly indicated by their 'form' (i.e. their appearance).⁷⁹ As Shiraz Dossa (1987: 346-47) has illustrated, Aristotle held very strong views about the unbridgeable difference between the Greeks and Orientals. The Greeks linked speech to Reason, and those they could not

⁷⁹ There may be strong links between Aristotle's thoughts on visible form and later attempts to classify and order the natural world according to visible characteristics. See, for example, Derek Gregory's (1994) discussion on Linné's taxonomic work.

understand (i.e. those who did not speak Greek) were considered to lack reason (Padgen 1982: 16). Aristotle knew that Orientals neither spoke an intelligible (read Greek) language, looked like Greeks, nor inhabited the Greek *Polis*. He therefore concluded that Orientals were not reasonable, intelligent, or civilised (Dossa 1987). He could tell because Orientals were... *different*. Again, however, what most commentators on this period leave unstated is the fact that the discussion centres on Greek masculinity, as Greek philosophy had already excluded women from the *logos* of Greek civilization (Le Doeuff 1987).

Aristotle's metaphysics thus appears to have significant implications for the construction of ethnic (and gender) identities. To borrow Nancy Jay's (1981: 43) comments regarding gender in order to emphasise a present concern with 'race', in societies through the world, *everyone*, "known and knowable," gets assigned to a 'race'. Indeed, despite the fact that 'we' refer to people as 'half-breed', 'mixed bloods', or 'half-caste', these people are always marked as a racialised Other. Although biologically genetic difference is a continuum, it is not one socially.

I shall return to discuss the historical development of the 'race' concept, and the way in which it helped reconstitute gender relations, in a later section of this chapter. Before doing so, however, I wish to examine the philosophical roots of the tendency to structure identities of gender and 'race' within hierarchies.

Hierarchies of gender and 'racial' identity

Just as it does with gender, Aristotle's Principle of the Excluded Middle (see Chapter 2) forces one to conceptualise cultural identities in a hierarchical fashion. For if something must be *either* A or Not-A, then A becomes the dominant identity by which Not-A is measured. Accordingly, Aristotle conceived of Orientals as negation, or *lack* of Greekness (Padgen 1982: 15-17; Dossa 1987: 346-47). As Edward Said has persuasively argued (1978: 55-56),

the Orient was spoken through and by virtue of the Western imagination. The way that negation works here is very complex, however, as gender (exemplified by the non-masculine) soon became metaphorically linked to 'race' (exemplified by the non-white)⁸⁰ (Stepan 1993). Metaphors join together, or bring into cognitive relation two unlike objects or concepts through identification (Beckson and Ganz 1975). In this case, 'race' acted as metaphor for gender, and vice versa. The cognitive relationship between these two 'unlike' concepts was changed by their metaphoric interaction, such that each came to be seen to have some important relationship with the other (regardless of their 'actual' relationship).

Space also played a key role in the political philosophy of Aristotle (and Plato), for it was through the notion of *political space* that *insiders* and *outsiders* were defined. Inside the political space, which was the *polis* spatially defined by the boundaries of the Greek city-states, lay the promise of human rationality and enlightenment; outside lay nothingness (Said 1978; Padgen 1982; Dossa 1987). One could become an insider in only one manner, through an accident of birth, as one was either born Greek or not. The upshot of such thinking is that since outside was not part of the human equation, those who occupied the outside, that is non-Greeks, could never be truly human (Padgen 1982; Dossa 1987).

For the ancient political philosophers, it is not a fortuitous fact that the insiders were Greek: that was the judgement of the gods. Just as the Greeks were the blessed insiders, so the Orientals were the classic outsiders: the crucial point is that the Orientals were not flawed Greeks but unGreek and incapable of becoming Greek (Dossa 1987: 346).

Since Greek *masculinity* was the model for the rational, transcendental, and

⁸⁰ As white men are the unmarked 'master subjects' they are conceptualised as having neither gender, nor 'race'. Women and racialized Others, however, are marked with the categories gender and 'race' respectively.

ahistorical 'humanity' of Enlightenment thought, I would suggest that Dossa's comments refer to this unmarked category, and exclude femininity. Greek femininity was accorded a place in humanity, but because of its association with both Nature and Unreason, it was often aligned metaphorically with the unGreek.

These ideas about political space are closely linked with another key aspect of Aristotle's thought, namely his conception of *natural slaves*. Aristotle argued that it was proper and *natural* for superior men to rule over inferior ones (Russell 1946; Dossa 1987). "From birth, some are marked out for subjection, others for rule; the man who is by nature not his own but another man's is *by nature a slave*" (Russell 1946: 208-9; emphasis added). As it was the mark of true civilization, the *polis* or city-state also provided the best indication of who was, by nature, fit for rule. The Greeks inhabited the *polis*, thus they were fit for rule; all others outside the city state were, by nature, potential slaves. "Ruling [the Other] is an imperative imposed on Greeks by nature itself" (Dossa 1987: 348). Such rule is not only natural, but is also seen to be (by the dominant group) beneficial because it is in the best interests of the Other (Padgen 1982; Dossa 1987).

It is impossible to pinpoint one single origin for the 'race' idea, but a number of authors suggest that we can at least identify certain strands of thought that contributed to the development of the concept. It is also important to remember that always lurking in the background -- and often unstated -- was the metaphoric link between 'Woman' and 'Non-white'. The Aristotelian essentialist discourse of different peoples and different places, for example, played a key role in the social construction of 'Otherness' so fundamental to the European sense of the masculine self. This process of 'Othering' was, in turn, a primary ingredient in the development of the idea of 'race' underpinning European relations with Maori people. With this in mind, I shall now attempt to outline the development of the 'race' concept in

Western thought.

EUROPEANS AND THEIR OTHERS I: THE DISCOURSE OF DIFFERENCE

The idea of the racial type cannot be traced to a single source or era (Anderson 1991). However, as early as the times of Plato (427-347 BC) and Aristotle (384-322 BC) Western thinkers had a highly determinist and essentialist way of conceiving of themselves and their Others in the world. This was driven, in part at least, by the division of the world into the two broad categories, Occidentis and Orientis and three more specific regions: 'Europe', 'Africa' and 'Asia' (March 1974).⁸¹ To Occidental Europeans, the Orient, and later 'Africa' and 'Asia', were Other places inhabited by Other peoples. But more importantly, these places and peoples became the negatively valued foil by which European superiority was measured. "Whereas the Orient, for example, was old, excessive, slavish, despotic, opulent, uniform, and non-Christian, Europe was modern, rational, progressive, free, [and] civilized..." (Anderson 1991: 39).

Europeans were initially ambivalent toward the Other of Africa and Asia when they first came into contact with them on voyages of exploration and trade (Baudet 1965). As James Duncan explains it (1993: 44-45), this ambivalence took the form of two separate strains of thought. In the first strain, the Other is conceptualised as the 'noble savage', uncontaminated by European culture (also see Banton 1967: 21-22).⁸² But from the twelfth to the sixteenth century a second, more negative view of the Other competed with the noble savage in the European imagination, namely that of the un-

81 Also see P.D.A. Harvey's (1991: 19-21) discussion of eleventh century 'T-O maps' which divided the world into three continents, 'Asia' (at the top, thus the map was 'oriented'), 'Europe' and 'Africa'.

82 While the idea of the noble savage dates from this period, the phrase itself dates from the late-eighteenth century.

Christian 'barbarian'. Caught up in this second discourse of the Other, Pope Nicholas V approved the subjugation of heathen Africans to Christians on the grounds they would benefit from exposure to Christianity (Padgen 1982: 29).⁸³ Strands of these contestatory representations of the Other are present even today, where there exists a Euro-American nostalgia for 'traditional' peoples (Jolly 1992) alongside a revulsion against the 'barbarous nature' of the racialised non-Western Other (Said 1978).

Representations of the Other as barbarian seem to have become hegemonic following the advent of the slave trade in the fifteenth century (Baudet 1965; Jordan 1974; Duncan 1993). English explorers and traders were particularly struck by the difference between themselves and 'Africans': "their religion was un-Christian; their manner of living was anything but English; they seemed to be a particularly libidinous sort of people" (Jordan 1974: 4; also see Gilman 1986 on the representation of African libido). These representations arose, in part at least, from what David Livingstone (1987, 1991) calls a *moral discourse on climate*, in which Africa was seen to be a part of the 'torrid' zone, which imparted to Africans fiery and uncontrollable temperaments to match their climate. It was believed that one of the most important 'African' differences, namely their *Blackness* (something European travellers rarely failed to comment upon; see Jordan 1974; Montagu 1964b) was caused by the 'burning' sun of the torrid zone. But blackness was also loaded with other meaning -- it was the binary opposition to European 'whiteness'. As a metaphor for the 'darkness' of unReason, it represented the African lack of European enlightenment. For the European traveller, then,

No other colour except white conveyed so much emotional impact. As described by the *Oxford English Dictionary*, the meaning of *black* before the sixteenth century included "Deeply stained with dirt;

⁸³ Note the strains of Aristotle's concept of *natural slavery* here.

soiled, dirty, foul.... Having dark or deadly purposes, malignant; pertaining to or involving death, deadly; baneful, disastrous, sinister.... Foul, iniquitous, atrocious, horrible, wicked.... Indicating disgrace, censure, liability to punishment, etc." Black was an emotionally partisan colour, the handmaid [sic] and symbol of baseness and evil, a sign of danger and repulsion (Winthrop 1974: 6).

In the European imagination, then, 'Black' Africans were associated with everything which enlightened 'white' Europeans were not, and Africa became the *Dark Continent* that they inhabited (Kiernan 1969; Brantlinger 1986; Jarosz 1992). The opposition between white and black also articulated (via the process of metaphorical slippage I discussed earlier) with hegemonic notions of the masculine and the feminine.

Not long after Columbus's 'discovery' of the New World, 'Indians' and their lands were incorporated into the European economy of the Other. In 1504, for example, a *junta* (commission) of Spanish civil lawyers, theologians and canonists met to advise the King on the legitimacy of Spanish occupation of New World territory (Padgen 1982). Given the inertia of imperialism, the advice legitimating occupation was probably a foregone conclusion. Of more interest, however, is the *junta's* decision, "in the presence and with the opinion of the archbishop of Seville that the Indians should be given [to the Spaniards] and that this was in agreement with human and divine law" (in Padgen 1982: 28). The foundations of such 'human and divine law' lay in Aristotle's concept of natural slavery. As testimony to the contested nature of sixteenth-century representations of the Other, however, the question of the status of the Indians in the Americas did not go away quite as easily as their rights had been dismissed by the *junta* of 1504. For many years to come theologians and rhetoricians argued over the status of Indians, attempting to decide if they were barbarians, and therefore natural slaves, or if they might be considered to be more like children, and thus merely in need of tutoring in the arts of civilization. Around 1548, for

example, the rhetorician Juan Ginés de Sepúlveda argued that the Spanish conquest of American Indians was justified because Indians were natural slaves (see Padgen 1982: 109-18). On the other hand, the theologian Bartolomé de Las Casas argued that Indians were not natural slaves, but merely 'child-like' and thus in need of tutoring in the arts of civilization (Padgen 1982: 119-45). In this regard, de Las Casas replaced *nature* with *culture* as the focus of the debate. Regardless of the seemingly opposed positions taken by men such as de Sepúlveda and de Las Casas, the key point to remember is that Europeans controlled the discourse, and that the discourse always defined the Other as inferior (be it by nature or by culture).

Accordingly, American Indians, like Africans and Asians, were caught up in what Abdul JanMohamed (1986: 78) describes as "the economy of Manichaeic allegory", a representational economy designed to sustain European dominance. Edward Said (1978: 7) suggests that this involved the strategic use of a "flexible *positional* superiority, which puts the Westerner in a whole series of possible relationships with the [Other] without ever losing him the relative upper hand." As such, it did not really matter what characteristics were ascribed to the Other, they were always seen to be negative in relation to the superior qualities of Europeaness. What writers like Said fail to acknowledge (but which is implicit in their use of masculine pronouns), however, is the role that gender played in this representational economy. For this discourse on the Other was promulgated in the name of a hegemonic Western *masculinity*. Western femininity was attached to this masculinity, but like the non-Western Other, its role in the discursive fray was that of a contextual negative.

EUROPEANS AND THEIR OTHERS II: THE DISCOURSE OF 'RACE'

It was against this backdrop, as Kay Anderson (1991: 39) suggests, that "notions of 'race' crept slowly and without coherent or consistent meaning

into the European vocabulary." Despite its slow introduction, 'race' would eventually become a hegemonic metaphor for the difference between superior Europeans and their inferior Others in Euro-American thought. The term 'race' itself first appeared in English during the sixteenth century (Williams 1983; Banton and Harwood 1975; Banton 1967, 1977), when in 1508 William Dunbar referred to it in his poem *the dance of the sevin deidly sins* (Banton 1967). At the time 'race' had a number of different meanings, including i) offspring in the line of descent, or stock; ii) a kind or species of plants or animals; iii) a general classificatory term, such as 'the human race'; and iv) a human grouping (in terms of an extension of forms i and ii, above) (Williams 1983: 248). In an essay written in 1684, Francois Bernier, a French traveller and physician was the first person to use 'race' as a means of classifying humans by appearance (Banton 1967; Banton and Harwood 1975). In 1735, Karl von Linnaeus argued in his famous *Systema Naturae* that Asians were "severe, haughty and miserly", Africans "lazy, negligent and governed by Whim", while Europeans were "light, active and ingenious" (in Anderson 1991: 40). By the time he published the tenth edition of *Systema Naturae*, Linnaeus had added a fourth 'race', American Indians, who were "reddish, choleric, erect" (in Banton 1967: 17). Linnaeus may, by that time, have read David Hume's 1748 essay "Of National Characters", in which he linked intellectual capacity and character with complexion (Anderson 1991: 40). The following year 'race' was introduced into the Western scientific literature by George Louis Leclerc de Buffon, a physical anthropologist who used it to describe six different groups of humanity (Montagu 1941; Cooper and David 1986).

Monogenism vs. polygenism

Buffon and Linnaeus were working within the orthodox biblical framework of the day, whereby all humans were seen to be descendants of Adam (Montagu 1941; Gould 1981: 39). They were thus part of the

monogenist school of thought whose adherents accounted for cultural difference in terms of degeneration (see e.g. Gould 1981; Stepan 1985). According to the monogenists, human 'races' are a product of degeneration from the perfection of Eden (Gould 1981: 39). However, there also existed a school of thought which was based on the belief in multiple origins for humans. Their position, namely that 'races' were actually separate species, provided a convenient excuse to exclude non-Europeans from 'humanity'. Theophrastus Paracelsus is thought to have been the first to argue this *polygenist* line, when in 1520 he suggested that "peoples found in out-of-the-way islands were different kinds of men, not descended from the sons of Adam" (in Banton 1967: 17; also see Stepan 1982: 29). Perhaps the most famous polygenist work was that of Isaac de la Peyrère who, writing in the seventeenth century, suggested that only Jews and Christians were descended from Adam and Eve, all other human groups being descended from a pre-Adamite people (Stepan 1982: 29). In 1774, Lord Kames came close to embracing the polygenist line when he explained 'racial' difference on scriptural grounds (Banton 1967; Stepan 1982, 1985). He suggested that since the times of Adam and Eve,

the confusion of Babel had scattered men over the face of the earth, depriving them of society and rendering them savages. From that state of degeneracy they had been gradually emerging. Some nations, stimulated by their own nature, or by their climate, had made rapid progress; others had advanced slowly, and yet others had remained as they were (Banton 1967: 18).

Although all human groups had the same origins, their differences could be explained *by their own nature*. In the same year, the Jamaican historian Edward Long argued that "... the inability of Negroes and whites to form fully fertile hybrids or mulattoes, proved that the Negro and European belonged to different species of mankind" (Stepan 1982: 29; also see Banton 1967: 19). Long was a believer in the Great Chain of Being, whereby all living organisms could be placed in a static hierarchy of development

extending from God, through angels to people and down to plants and inanimate objects. As Anderson (1991: 41) notes, when it was applied to human groups the Great Chain "offered a ready-made social hierarchy onto which the separately created 'racial' types could be grafted with the sanction of nature." Accordingly, it is not surprising that Long argued that "Ludicrous as the opinion may seem, I do not think that an orang-outang husband would be any dishonour to an Hottentot female" (in Banton 1967: 19). Long certainly had no proof for his assertions, yet they were to form the foundation for later strains of scientific racism. Polygenist theories, which conceived of people from other 'races' as separate species from Europeans, were thus potentially the most menacing line of thought for non-European peoples. Paradoxically, at about the same time polygenism was gathering adherents, the anti-slavery movement was gaining momentum in Britain. In 1807 it achieved the abolition of slavery in Britain and in 1833 slavery was banished from British Crown Colonies (Banton 1967: 23). At the time, the British began to fight the slave trade in other parts of Africa where it was maintained primarily by Africans. Ironically, as Brantlinger (1986; also see Duncan 1993) has observed, this gave the British one more opportunity to paint themselves as the saviours bearing enlightenment to the Dark Continent.⁸⁴

By the late eighteenth century, in British scientific circles at least, the dominant theory of human origins was monogenist (Stepan 1982). For

⁸⁴ Importantly, the anti-slavery movement relied heavily upon the work of a great many white women in Britain and America. Yet, when the first international anti-slavery convention took place in London during June of 1849, "the entire first day of the conference was spent discussing whether or not women delegates should be allowed to participate in the proceedings. With few exceptions the British delegates refused even to contemplate that they should do so" (Ware 1992: 81). This was most likely a form of masculine policing of the appropriate spheres from which men (public) and women (private) could participate in the movement.

example, in 1775 one of the most important monogenist writers on 'race', Johann Blumenbach, identified four 'races' in his *On the Natural Variety of Mankind*: "Caucasian, Mongolian, Ethiopian, American" (Banton 1967). He was later convinced by Joseph Banks (who had been the naturalist on James Cook's first voyage to the South Pacific) to add a fifth 'race', the 'Malay', in his second edition of 1781 (Sorrenson 1979: 12). Polynesian peoples, including the people of New Zealand who eventually came to be called Maori, were included as part of this 'Malay race'. Blumenbach argued that all five 'races' were descendants of a single Caucasian type, which had degenerated under the influence of environment in two directions: "on the one hand, through the American toward the Mongolian; and on the other, through the Malayan toward the Ethiopian" (Stocking 1987: 26). New Zealanders thus fell somewhere on the spectrum between the higher European and the lower 'Ethiopian'. According to Blumenbach, then, it was environment rather than any intrinsic nature of 'races' that led to differences among human groups. Moreover, Blumenbach was explicitly opposed to the notions that human beings fell on different parts of the Great Chain of Being (Banton 1967; Stepan 1982). He argued in his first edition (1775) of *On the Natural Variety of Mankind* that "one variety of mankind does so sensibly pass into the other, that you cannot mark out the limits between them" (in Anderson 1991: 40). Likewise, in 1785 Immanuel Kant proposed a monogenist theory which suggested that the original human stock had been endowed with powers which were evoked or suppressed by environmental conditions (Stepan 1982: 18). His was a theory of the absolute mutability of human groups, as opposed to the immutability of human 'races' implicit in polygenist theories.

This kind of monogenist thought appears to have been dominant amongst New Zealand colonists right into the mid-nineteenth century. The reverend Samuel Marsden, for example, concluded that the Maori were of

Semitic origin, having "sprung from some dispersed Jews" (in Sorrenson 1979: 14). Marsden was an adherent of the theory of degeneration, and he believed that the Maori were remnants of one of the lost tribes of Israel. William Yate, in his 1835 book *Some Account of New Zealand*, enunciated the monogenist line when he suggested that Maori were rapidly becoming civilised through their contact with Europeans. This idea was echoed in 1840 by Joel Samuel Polack in *Manners and Customs of the New Zealanders...* (see Sorrenson 1979: 70-71). As late as 1855, Richard Taylor argued in *Te Ika a Maui* that Maori provided a living example of a group of people that had degenerated from the perfection of Eden: "...in [the New Zealand race] may we not behold one of the lost tribes of Israel, which, with its fellows, having abandoned the service of the true God, and cast aside his Word, fell step by step in the scale of civilization" (in Sorrenson 1979: 16).

Although British scientists and some of their colonial contemporaries -- usually more religiously orthodox than their continental counterparts -- predominantly held to the monogenist line well into the nineteenth century, more and more continental European scientists began expressing doubt about the unity of a single human species in the early 1800s (Stepan 1982). In 1809 Lamarck subdivided 'mankind' into six 'races', arranged in a hierarchy from Caucasians down to Negroes (Curtin 1964: 230). Around this time the polygenetic view of human origins began to present a serious challenge to monogenism with the development of comparative anatomy by George Cuvier and a number of his Parisian associates (Stepan 1982; Stocking 1968, 1987). In 1817 Cuvier presented the argument that 'race' determined culture (Curtin 1964: 231; also see Stepan 1982: xiii; Stocking 1987: 26-7). His later sixteen-volume work *The Animal Kingdom* contained his descriptions of the 'races of man' and they are worth quoting at length:

The Caucasian, to which we ourselves belong, is chiefly distinguished by the beautiful form of the head, which approximates to a perfect oval. It is also remarkable for variations in

the shade of the complexion, and colour of the hair. From this variety have sprung the most civilized nations and such as have most generally exercised dominion over the rest of mankind.

The Mongolian variety is recognized by prominent cheek-bones, flat visage, narrow and oblique eyes, hair straight and black, scanty beard, and olive complexion. This race has formed mighty empires in the China and Japan, and occasionally extended its conquests on this side of the Great Desert, but its civilization has long appeared stationary.

The Negro race is confined to the south of Mount Atlas. Its characters are, black complexion, woolly hair, compressed cranium, and flattish nose. In the prominence of the lower part of the face, and the thickness of the lips, it manifestly approaches the monkey tribe. The hordes of which this variety is composed have always remained in a state of complete barbarism (in Curtin 1964: 231).

Cuvier's work was countered by the English writers such as Sir William Lawrence (see Curtin 1964: 231) and James Cowles Prichard, a Bristol physician who devoted his life's work to disputing polygenism (see Stocking 1987: 48-53). In 1819, for example, Prichard argued that the purpose of ethnology was "to show how all the observed differences between [human groups] could have been produced in the descendants of a single family" (Stocking 1987: 50). It was not long, however, before Prichard's particular form of monogenism -- based as it was upon biblical accounts of the Creation -- became difficult to support in light of archaeologists' and paleontologists' new 'discoveries' about the age of the earth (Stepan 1982: 40).

Scientific racism: measuring bones and brains

Since the eighteenth century, scientists had been attempting to find a link between physical traits and mental abilities (Curtin 1964: 233). The most influential step towards this end came in the early nineteenth century with the development of the science of phrenology. Developed by Franz Gall and Johann Spurzheim, phrenology was grounded in the belief that the human brain was divided into thirty-seven different 'faculties' and that these were in turn, reflected in the external form of the skull (Curtin 1964: 234; Stepan 1982: 21-2; Stocking 1987: 26). While phrenology was originally conceived to explain the psychological make-up of humans, it was eventually to have an

important influence on biology and the issue of 'race'. The importance phrenology was to have in the development of scientific racism was foreshadowed in Spurzheim's (1815; in Stepan 1982: 24) own comments on national types:

It is of great importance to consider the heads of different nations... Though all observations of this kind are very defective, they are yet rather for than against the physiology of the brain. The foreheads of negroes, for instance, are very narrow, their talents of music and mathematics are also in general very limited. The Chinese, who are fond of colours, have the arch of the eyebrows much vaulted, and we shall see that this is the sign of a greater developement [sic] of the organ of colour. According to Blumenbach the heads of the Kalmucks are depressed from above, and very large sideward above the organ which gives the disposition to covet. It is also admitted that this nation is inclined to steal, etc. In this same way, the manner of thinking and feeling of different nations may be compared with their most developed organs.

Spurzheim warned about the dangers of making simple correlations between organ size and behaviour, but in practice, phrenologists made them anyhow (Stepan 1982: 24). This type of phrenology was commonly found in the *Phrenological Journal* during the 1820s and 1830s.⁸⁵

At the time, however, phrenologists were looking at 'national' character, and made no explicit reference to race. That did not happen until 1829, when W.F. Edwards argued in his *Caractères physiologiques des races humaines* that the form and proportion of the head and face were the crucial indicators of racial difference (in Curtin 1964: 235). Edwards' work marked the beginning of what was to become an era of virulent scientific racism (Curtin 1964: 363), much of which centred on attempts to find some sort of 'objective' measure of 'racial' abilities. This empiricist science was brought to bear in

⁸⁵ Stepan (1982: 196, note 15) cites an interesting selection of articles from the *Phrenological Journal*. See e.g. 'On the coincidence between the natural talents and dispositions of nations, and the development of their brains', *Phrenological Journal*, 2: 1-19, (1824-25); and 'Essay on the phrenological causes of the different degrees of liberty enjoyed by the different nations', *Phrenological Journal*, 2: 598-619, (1824-25).

New Zealand as part of attempts to prove the existence of two 'racial' stocks in Maori. Ernest Dieffenbach, the New Zealand Company naturalist, used phrenological methods to support his contention that Maori were an amalgam of two races: the superior Malayo-Polynesians and the inferior Austral-Negroes (Sorrenson 1979: 41-42). Phrenology itself quickly lost its appeal, but it began a spirit of empiricism that swept up many scientists of the day. Scientists thus focussed their attention on phenomena which could be accurately measured and quantified and the result was the 'science' of craniometry.

The American polygenist Samuel Morton developed an hypothesis "that a ranking of races could be established objectively by physical characteristics of the brain, particularly by its size" (Gould 1981: 51; also see Livingstone 1992: 39; Curtin 1964: 367).⁸⁶ Morton wrote much in defence of the polygenist notion that 'races' constituted separate species (see Morton 1847, 1850, 1851), but he is most well-known for his work on the ranking of 'races' according to average brain size. Morton seemed to have a morbid fascination with human skulls -- he began collecting them in the 1820s; by the time he died in 1851 he had more than one thousand. From this collection, Morton measured the average cranial capacity, and therefore 'brain size', of the various 'races' of man. Three major works on brain size and the ranking of 'races' were published by Morton (see Morton 1839, 1844, 1849). He began his first treatise on 'race', the *Crania Americana* (1839), with an extensive discussion on the *essential* characteristics of the various 'racial' groups. The Hottentots, for example, he described as "the nearest approximation to the lower animals...". Of the 'Chinese' he wrote, "so

⁸⁶ Unless otherwise indicated, the following discussion is based on Steven Jay Gould's (1981: 50-69) extensive analysis of Morton's work.

versatile are their feelings and actions, that they have been compared to the monkey race, whose attention is perpetually changing from one object to another" (in Gould 1981: 56). It is perhaps not too surprising, then, that Morton's craniological explorations matched the prejudices of the day: 'Caucasians' were most worthy, while 'Mongolians', 'American Indians', 'Malays' and 'Ethiopians' fell on the racial hierarchy in descending order (Gould 1981: 54).⁸⁷

Morton's racist discourse was perhaps no worse than any others of his day, yet because of his ostensibly 'scientific' and 'objective' approach -- which gave the appearance of mathematical precision to the ranking of races -- his representational discourse on the Other was to have much greater influence. His 'racial' theories were widely published in support of pro-slavery arguments in the American south. They were also seen by British anthropologists as a serious contribution to science (Curtin 1964: 368). His craniological measurement system was even adopted in New Zealand, where Arthur Thomson (1859) "ascertained, by weighing the quantity of millet seed skulls contained and by measurements with tapes and compasses, that the New Zealanders' heads are smaller than the heads of Englishmen, consequently the New Zealanders are inferior to the English in mental capacity" (in Sorrenson 1979: 42). Thomson concluded that the comparative smallness of Maori brains was the result of their failure to exercise the higher faculties, because it was "only natural that generations of

⁸⁷ Morton's craniometry in *Crania Americana* (1839) 'revealed' that the five racial groups had the following mean cranial capacities: 'Caucasians', 87 cubic inches; 'Mongolians', 83 cubic inches; 'American Indians', 82 cubic inches; 'Malays', 81 cubic inches; and, 'Ethiopians', 78 cubic inches. Gould (1978; 1981) has illustrated the numerous statistical and methodological inadequacies of Morton's analysis. Setting aside for a moment the fact that brain size differences of the type 'observed' by Morton have little bearing upon either intelligence or ability, Gould concludes that Morton's craniometric summaries "are a patchwork of fudging and finagling in the clear interest of controlling a priori convictions" (1981: 54; also see Curtin 1964: 367).

mental indolence should lessen the size of brains" (ibid.).

As Steven Jay Gould (1981: 53) suggests, Morton's craniological measurements and his attendant theories of 'racial' ranking "outlived the theory of separate creations and were reprinted repeatedly during the nineteenth century as irrefutable, 'hard' data on the mental worth of human races." Many other scientists followed in Morton's footsteps, extending his work in a number of ways. The Swedish scientist Anders Retzius, for example, developed the concept of the 'cephalic index' in 1840 (see Curtin 1964: 366; also see Gould 1981: 98-100, who refers to it as the 'cranial index'). The cephalic index was easily calculated as the ratio of maximum width to maximum length of the skull. Relatively short skulls (cephalic index of .8 or greater) were called brachycephalic; relatively long skulls (.75 or less) were dolichocephalic. Dolichocephalic skulls, which were thought to predominate among white Europeans, were said to be signs of superior intellect, although this belief had to be revised in response to evidence of brachycephaly in some Europeans and dolichocephaly among Africans and Australian Aborigines (Gould 1981: 99).

It is uncertain whether the European propensity for measuring brains and bones was a cause or one of the outcomes of a perceptible shift in 'racial' thought, but by the mid-nineteenth century such a shift had occurred. According to Nancy Stepan (1982: 4), "it was a shift from a sense of man as primarily a social being, governed by social laws and standing apart from nature, to a sense of man as primarily a biological being, embedded in nature and governed by biological laws." Europeans, it seemed, were certain of their essential or natural superiority over the non-white 'races'. A pivotal figure in this new biological racial determinism was Robert Knox (Curtin 1964; Stocking 1971, 1987; Biddiss 1976; Stepan 1982). An Edinburgh-trained physician, Knox also studied under Cuvier in Paris, and was probably the first author to publish (Knox 1850) a biological argument in support of

polygenism (Banton 1967: 28; also see Stocking 1987: 64-5). In *Races of men* Knox (1850) argued that the 'races' of man could be easily distinguished from each other on the basis of their zoology. Moreover, he felt that human history could be explained by recourse to 'race' (Stepan 1982: 42).

That race is in human affairs everything, is simply a fact, the most remarkable, the most comprehensive, which philosophy has ever announced. Race is everything: literature, science, art -- in a word, civilization depends on it (in Biddiss 1976: 247).

Knox suggested that the Saxon 'race' was about to become the dominant 'race'; it was "fair, blue-eyed, enormously strong, its genius not inventive or artistic, but rather applicative and legal. It had always been this way and always would be" (in Stepan 1982: 42). Of the Celt, Knox wrote:

War is the game for which he is made. Herein is the forte of his physical and moral character... limbs muscular and vigorous... step, elastic and springy; in muscular activity and rapidity of action, surpassing all other European races... Weight for weight, age for age, stature for stature -- the strongest of men. His natural weapon is the sword, which he ought never to have abandoned for any other (in Biddiss 1976: 248).

The spirit of Knox's *Races of men* closely resembles that of the French racist Arthur De Gobineau. However, unlike De Gobineau, Knox had an immediate impact on his colleagues and on racial thought in the mid-nineteenth century (Stepan 1982: 41). Not only was his work widely read by scientists of the day, but it also received notice in the London newspapers.

The release of Knox's *Races of men* marked the onset of a rash of scientific racist publications in France, Britain, and America. The first and second volumes of De Gobineau's four-volume *Essai sur l'inégalité des races humaines* were published in 1853, for example (Volumes III and IV were published in 1855; see Biddiss 1970a, 1970b). Like Knox, De Gobineau believed that the inequality of 'races' offered the key to explaining history, as he makes very clear in the Dedication to his first volume:

I was gradually penetrated by the conviction that the racial question overshadows all other problems of history, that it holds the key to

them all, and that the inequality of the races from whose fusion a people is formed is enough to explain the whole course of its destiny. Everyone must have had some inkling of this colossal truth, for everyone must have seen how certain agglomerations of men have descended on some country, and utterly transformed its way of life; how they have shown themselves able to strike out a new vein of activity where, before their coming, all had been sunk in torpor. Thus to take an example, a new era of power was opened for Great Britain by the Anglo-Saxon invasion, thanks to a decree of Providence.... (in Biddiss 1970b: 41).

In 1854, Josiah Nott and George Gliddon published *Types of mankind*. Nott had previously argued in 1849 that each 'race' was in fact a separate species, and that "the dark-skinned races" were inferior to whites (in Anderson 1991: 41). He was also well-known in the southern United States for his "lectures on niggerology" as he called them (in Gould 1981: 69). In *Types of mankind* Nott and Gliddon (1854) argued that

human progress has arisen mainly from the war of races. All the great impulses which have been given to it from time to time have been the results of conquests and colonizations... those groups of races heretofore comprehended under the generic term Caucasian, have in all ages been the rulers; and it requires no prophet's eye to see that they are destined eventually to conquer and hold every foot of the globe where climate does not impose an impenetrable barrier... (in Banton 1967: 32-3).

They went on to suggest that the "superior races be kept free from all adulterations" lest "the world retrograde, instead of advancing, in civilization" (in Banton 1967: 32). Bulwer Lytton, who later became British Secretary of State for the Colonies, presented his own 'racial' explanation of human history in 1854 (Curtin 1964: 381). In 1857 Nott and Gliddon edited *The indigenous races of the earth*, a volume very similar to their earlier *Types of mankind*. Interestingly, the volume contained J.A. Meigs' chapter on "the cranial characteristics of the races of men" in which he revisited and revised Samuel Morton's (1839) much earlier work on cranial measurement (Livingstone 1991: 39-40).

As writers such as Steven Jay Gould (1981) and Philip Curtin (1964) observe, the scientific racists of this period had a much wider following than

just their immediate peers. When Samuel Morton died, the leading medical journal in the southern United States (*Charleston Medical Journal*) eulogised him as a benefactor to the South, "for aiding most materially in giving to the negro his true position as an inferior race" (in Gould 1981: 69). In 1853, the liberal *Edinburgh Review* attacked Earl Grey's colonial policy because of his failure to account for innate 'racial' differences. The reviewer utilised Knox's ideas to support his case (Curtin 1964: 381). Likewise, the *Westminster* commended Nott and Gliddon's work and highly praised Knox's *Races of man* (Curtin 1964). In 1852, Benjamin Disraeli based his arguments against the emancipation of West Indian slaves on Knox's writings (Curtin 1964). Despite the appearance of unity around the racist themes of Knox and Nott and Gliddon, there were still those who opposed the scientific racism of the day. Moreover, the polygenist foundation of this scientific racism was soon to crumble under the weight of Darwin's evolutionary theories. But as I shall illustrate, this did not put an end to racial discourse, but instead it necessitated a revision of racial ideology to fit within the new evolutionary framework. Prior to illustrating these ideas, I shall review some of the ways in which ideas about 'race' were also gendered.

Scientific racism and gender ideology

The history of 'racial' discourse is well documented by those authors cited in this chapter. However, with few exceptions (e.g. Gould 1981: 80 and 104-5; Stepan 1993), most of these commentators have tended to focus solely on 'race', ignoring the way that gender ideology was directly linked to (and implicated with) the construction of 'racial' ideology.⁸⁸ This is perhaps not surprising given the narrow focus of such studies, but recent works by

⁸⁸ This is not to imply some sort of 'failure' on their part, but instead to acknowledge different political projects from my own.

theorists such as Donna Haraway (1989) have illustrated the interlocking character of 'science', racism and sexism. Accordingly, it is important to note that the racial discourse of the mid-nineteenth century was also a gendered discourse. It was propagated in the name of a hegemonic European masculinity, which was complicit in the ideological construction of both non-white 'races' and 'Woman' as inferior. Just as members of all the non-white 'races' were silenced in this representational discourse, so were 'white' women. In order to understand how 'race' and gender ideology worked in this context, it is necessary to acknowledge their interlocking and often mutually constitutive character. Metaphor and analogy play a key role in this relationship.

Science has long been associated with 'truth' and 'empirical reality' -- so much so, in fact, that its metaphorical character was almost completely ignored or denied (Barnes 1992; Stepan 1993). The logical positivists of the early nineteenth century, for example, made a distinction between 'scientific language' and 'metaphorical language' (Stepan 1993). It is plain to see how this binary distinction aligned with a great many other binary concepts as well, such that scientific language was objective, truthful, masculine, and Western, while metaphoric language was subjective, untruthful, feminine, and non-Western. More recently, however, some philosophers of science have begun to accept that there are no grounds for making clear distinctions between science and metaphor. Thomas S. Kuhn (1979) has argued that analogies are fundamental to scientific reasoning. Richard Boyd asserts that some "metaphors are *constitutive* of the theories they express, rather than merely exegetical" (Boyd 1979: 360; original emphasis). In this sense, then, metaphors are not merely substitutive or comparative -- they do much more than replace some literal (but perhaps more awkward) statement about phenomena or enact some form of similarity (Black 1979). Instead, metaphors are interactive, they bring together into cognitive relations two

concepts (or 'subjects' as Max Black refers to them) that would not normally be brought together in such a way. Through their metaphoric interaction, however, both the concepts and their relationship to each other are changed. Black (1979: 29) explains this process more precisely:

In the context of a particular metaphorical statement, the two subjects "interact" in the following ways: (a) the presence of the primary subject incites the hearer to select some of the secondary subject's properties; and (b) invites him [sic] to construct a parallel implication-complex that can fit the primary subject; and (c) reciprocally induces parallel changes in the secondary subject.

In this way, the interactive (mutually constitutive) metaphorical relationship between 'race' and gender helped to create notions of women and non-whites as inferior.

During the nineteenth century, scientists interested in human difference began to train their eye on sex and gender differences. For these scientists, "gender was found to be remarkably analogous to race, such that the scientist could use racial difference to explain gender difference, and vice versa" (Stepan 1993: 360). For those who argued that brain size was directly related to intelligence, for example, the ostensible discrepancy between brain sizes of whites and non-whites was invoked when scientists tried to understand the relationships between intelligence and gender in white men and women. For these scientists the conclusion that men were more intelligent than women was inescapable -- because of their larger stature men had, on average, larger brains than women.

In this way racist arguments were inextricably linked to sexist ones. In 1854, for example, the German anthropologist E. Huschke wrote that "the negro brain possesses a spinal cord of the type of brain found in children and women and, beyond this, approaches the type of brain found in higher apes" (in Gould 1981: 103). Likewise Carl Vogt, a leading German 'race' scholar, argued in 1864 that

the female skull approached in many respects that of the infant, and

in still further respects that of lower races, whereas the mature male of many lower races resembled in his "pendulous" belly a Caucasian woman who had had many children, and in his calves and flat thighs the ape (in Stepan 1993: 361).

By the latter 1800s, the metaphorical link between white women and savages (and non-humans) was so well-entrenched that Gustave le Bon was able to safely conclude:

In the most intelligent races, as among Parisians, there are a large number of women whose brains are closer in size to those of gorillas than to the most developed male brains. This inferiority is so obvious that no one can contest it for a moment; only its degree is worth discussion. All psychologists who have studied the intelligence of women, as well as poets and novelists, recognize today that they represent the most inferior forms of human evolution and that they are closer to children and savages than to an adult, civilized man. They excel in fickleness, inconstancy, absence of thought and logic, and incapacity to reason. Without doubt there exist some distinguished women, very superior to the average man, but they are as exceptional as the birth of any monstrosity... consequently, we may ignore them entirely (in Gould 1981: 104-5).

For the most part women were ignored entirely, except when they were called upon to provide a 'natural' argument to support notions about the superiority of white masculinity.


Ideas about the inferiority of white women and non-whites also gain their force through metaphorical slippage, or analogous links between women and non-whites, and a whole host of other binary terms (see Figure 6.1). However, the relationship between gender and racist ideologies is often much more complex than I have painted it so far. Although (as I have discussed in Chapter 2) masculinist epistemologies are often structured around gendered binaries, such dichotomous thought can get very complicated when 'race' is introduced into the mix. Vron Ware (1992: 237) has examined these relationships in depth, and I think it worth quoting her at length on this issue:

In some contexts, white women might indeed be associated with the idea that female nature is inherently uncivilised, primitive when compared to men, and lacking self control. In the context of

imperialism or modern racism, the dominant ideology would place white women firmly in the civilized camp, in opposition to non-European women whose lack of social and political rights are to be read as a mark of cultural savagery. This means that *white women can occupy both sides of a binary opposition*, which surely accounts for much of the confusion and ambivalence to be found in the ideology of gender relations (emphasis added).

This points to the necessity for constantly contextualising analyses of the relationship between gender and 'race'.

Figure 6.1. Metaphorical slippage of binary terms



Source: adapted from MacCormack (1980) and Keith (1991).

Post-Darwinian 'racial' discourse

In November 1859 Charles Darwin published an abstract of his book *On the origin of species by means of natural selection*. The first edition of Darwin's book sold out in one day and it had an instant effect on the way science conceived of humanity's place in nature (Banton 1967: 37). To pre-Darwinian naturalists, all species had been created by God and were relatively fixed in their characteristics. For Darwin, however, the earth's species -- including

humans -- were not fixed, but were constantly evolving in a process of struggle, variation and selection of traits necessary for survival (Stepan 1982: 47; Banton 1967: 36-7; also see Darwin 1958).⁸⁹

Darwin's theory of natural selection offered a conceptual framework with the capacity to discredit the racism of the polygenists and their insistence on a permanent 'racial' type. However, despite its anti-polygenist tenor, Darwin's work was highly compatible with earlier forms of racial (and masculinist) discourse (Anderson 1991). On the one hand, his work created the opportunity to fully recuperate the notion of a Great Chain of Being. On the other hand, he offered a 'natural' explanation (i.e. natural selection) for existing social relations of 'racial' and gender dominance and oppression (see Banton 1967: 36-45; Stepan 1982: 47-59; Anderson 1991: 42-44). Herbert Spencer's phrase "the survival of the fittest" (in Banton 1967: 37) became a popular, if simplistic, metonym for Darwin's theories. The phrase was often taken all too literally, especially by those attempting to explain issues relating to 'race' and gender. Thus, it was a simple step for racialists to connect their own theories of the difference between and fitness of the various 'races' with Darwin's views of evolution (Anderson 1991). How could one tell which 'race' was fittest? It was obviously the group that 'survived' best, and this was read off the 'racial' hierarchy. Accordingly, the dominant 'races' (read 'white') were, *ipso facto*, the fittest. Moreover, their position of dominance was *natural*. Similar arguments were invoked to explain male superiority over females.

Although Darwin was not himself a racist in the same sense as many of

⁸⁹ Although 'Evolution' was already well-known to Victorian scientists and naturalists, especially from the writings of Herbert Spencer (whom Darwin called "the great expounder of the principle of Evolution"), Darwin's doctrine of 'natural selection' as the engine of species development provided the missing foundation for the theory of evolution (see Banton 1967: 37).

his colleagues of the day, his theory led him almost inexorably to draw on the racist thought of the day:

[Darwin's] argument was one of continuity -- continuity seemed essential if he were to prove that man's mental, moral as well as physical features had arisen naturally by slow evolution from animal forms. But the argument for continuity led, almost inevitably, to the use of the lower races to fill the gap between animals and man (Stepan 1982: 55).

Scientists later found it very easy to misinterpret Darwin as suggesting that 'races' formed an evolutionary scale within the human species itself (Banton 1967; Stepan 1982). Moreover, (masculinist) scientific racists of the 1860s found it only too easy to adapt their own theories on the inequality of 'races' and 'sexes' to fit within the Darwinian framework. By the mid-nineteenth century, the period on which this study focuses, the notion that non-white 'races' were inferior to whites had become incorporated into a hegemonic discourse of the Other. Hegemonic notions of masculinity and femininity were woven into this discourse in often complex and highly contradictory ways.

CONCLUSION

I have attempted two tasks in this chapter. First, through a review of the contemporary literature on 'race' and racism, I have outlined a history of the 'race' idea and racial discourse up to the mid-nineteenth century. I suggest that the rhetorics of scientific and commonsense racism formed the discursive frame within which New Zealand settlers understood the relationship between themselves and Maori peoples. Second, I have suggested ways that this racist discourse might also be seen to be gendered. Indeed, I contend that to understand fully the relationship between Maori and European settlers in mid-nineteenth century New Zealand, one must acknowledge that ideas about 'race' and gender were mutually constitutive.

Racial discourse has many roots, but it can be traced back at least to

Aristotle's writings on 'natural slavery'. Aristotle himself was working within a binary discourse of 'us' and 'them', in which the Other ('them') was incorporated as a silent and negatively valued foil by which the Western self ('us') was measured. The term 'race' itself first appeared during the Romantic period as a means of describing the Other. The development of Enlightenment rationality in the early Modern period in turn led to the rise of 'racial' science. 'Race' scientists employed the tropes of universal, technical, rational, and objective scientific knowledge to claim that their culturally contingent, and geographically and historically specific theories about the inferiority of the 'darker races' were 'objective'. In this way, "the other [was] incorporated into a history of the self, but referred to an earlier, and more primitive, period, thus reinforcing the superior site of the modern viewer" (Duncan and Ley 1993: 13; also see Duncan 1993). Moreover, the concept of 'race' and the notion of a 'racial' hierarchy became naturalised by the mid-nineteenth century.

At the same time, ideas of 'race' were closely connected to notions about the *natural* inferiority of women. Accordingly, within the scientific discourse of 'race', all that was white and masculine (that is, unmarked) was superior; those marked by colour and gender, namely racialised peoples and women were inferior, devalued, and often dehumanised. In the chapters that follow I shall illustrate how these wider sets of discursive constructs of 'race' and gender were articulated in the rhetorics of newspaper reports of the Waikato war in 1863. Press reports of the war simultaneously drew upon these pre-existing discourses for their power, and they reconstituted those discourses in new ways. While these discursive constructs were often contradictory and contested, I argue that, in the end, they worked to maintain the hegemony of a bourgeois European masculinity.

VII NOTICING NATIVES, PROCLAIMING REBELS

While there were numerous 'official' notices posted during the month of July, there were three 'notices' and one 'proclamation' which were concerned with the potential for armed hostilities in the Auckland region. The texts of these notices and proclamation were ostensibly aimed at a Maori audience. I argue, however, that their 'true' audience was comprised of European settlers, and that their purpose was to reinforce discursive notions of the 'Otherness' of Natives. Although they make up only a very small proportion of the newspaper text for the month of July, I have chosen to begin my substantive analysis of newspaper narratives with these items because they provide an excellent point of entry to discuss many of the themes I wish to examine. I would like to emphasise that I envision this chapter as an *entrée*, an attempt to lay the groundwork for my more substantive analysis of the mutually constitutive character of 'race' and gender discourse outlined in the following chapter; as such it is not meant to be exhaustive. Its focus is the (re)construction of 'racial' difference. This chapter, then, presents a discursive analysis and discussion of the contents of four key documents published in the Auckland press:

1. the NOTICE *To the Natives of Mangere, Pukaki, Ihumatoa, Te Kirikiri, Patummahoe, Pokeno and Tuakau*, dated 9 July 1863 (*The New Zealander*, 11 July 1863, page 3, original spellings; also see *Daily Southern Cross*, 11 July 1863, page 3);
2. the "NOTICE TO THE AUCKLAND NATIVES" dated 9 July 1863 (*Daily Southern Cross*, 11 July 1863, page 3);
3. the "NOTICE TO COASTAL NATIVES" dated 11 July 1863 (*The New Zealander*, 13 July 1863, page 3; also published as "NOTICE TO THE COAST NATIVES" in *Daily Southern Cross*, 14 July 1863, page 3); and,

4. Governor George Grey's Proclamation to the "CHIEFS OF WAIKATO", dated 11 July 1863 (*The New Zealander*, 16 July 1863, page 3).⁹⁰

In addition, I examine other newspaper articles published during the period, as well as portions of a few other published accounts of the war (e.g. Gorst 1864; Sewell 1864; Featon 1879). I argue that these notices, proclamations and narratives were not merely mimetic accounts of some external 'reality' concerning Maori people and places, but instead were actively involved in constituting various 'realities' as they were understood by readers.

CONSTRUCTING AND ENFORCING BINARY DIVISIONS

As my play on words in the title of this chapter implies, on the one hand these notices and the proclamation were directed toward 'Natives', while on the other hand they were equally directed at Europeans -- both in New Zealand and 'at home' in England. Indeed, the fact that all the notices were translated from te reo Maori into English highlights the intended audience. Maori were at least partially 'constructed' in the rhetoric of these notices and proclamation, which arose partly from within the European geo-historical discourse of the Other (discussed in Chapter 6), but which also actively constituted new (and often contradictory) ideas about Maori. I shall begin to illustrate this idea with an analysis of the first notice, "*To the Natives of Mangere, Pukaki, Ihumatoa, Te Kirikiri, Patummahoe, Pokeno and Tuakau*" (Table 7.1; also see Figure 1.1).

Leaving aside for the moment the linguistic intricacies of this notice, I shall begin my analysis with a discussion of the divisions implicit in what is ostensibly an innocent enunciation of its intended audience: "... the Natives

⁹⁰ Although dated 11 July, the proclamation was not issued until 14 July 1863, and did not reach the Waikato until 17 July 1863. It was also published in the *Daily Southern Cross*, 16 July 1863, page 3, the *New Zealand Gazette*, 15 July 1863, and reprinted in AJHR 1863, E-5: 5-6.

of Mangere, Pukaki, Ihumatoa, Te Kirikiri, Patummahoe, Pokeno and Tuakau" (lines 5-6). Here the Governor makes what I see to be a number of very important distinctions.

Europeans and Natives

First, this notice relies upon an implicit binary distinction between Native and European 'races'. In my reading of this distinction, two 'facts' are abundantly clear. It appears to be a simple matter for all involved -- either as readers of the notice or as 'participants' in the events -- to differentiate between a European and a Native. The notice thus draws intertextually upon that long inheritance of essentialist racial discourse I described in chapter 6, one that relies upon supposed visual cues to identify membership of different 'racial' groups. In this rhetorical construction, these visual cues are markers for a host of *essential* characteristics of Europeans and

Table 7.1 Notice to the Natives of Mangere, Pukaki, Ihumatoa, Te Kirikiri, Patummahoe, Pokeno and Tuakau.

A notification, in Maori, of which the following is a copy, was, on Thursday last we believe, distributed amongst the people to whom it is addressed:-	1
[TRANSLATION]	2
NOTICE	3
<i>To the Natives of Mangere, Pukaki, Ihumatoa, Te Kirikiri, Patummahoe, Pokeno and Tuakau.</i>	4
All persons of the native race living in the Manukau District, and the Waikato frontier, are hereby required immediately to take the Oath of Allegiance to Her Majesty the Queen, and to give up their Arms to an Officer appointed by government for that purpose. Natives who comply with this order will be protected.	5
Natives refusing to do so are hereby warned forthwith to leave the District aforesaid, and retire to Waikato, beyond Mangatawhiri.	6
In case of their not complying with this order, they will be ejected.	7
By His Excellency's command.	8
Auckland,	9
July 9th, 1863.	10
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Source: *The New Zealander*, 11 July 1863, page 3.

Natives. Take, for example, the unquestioned acceptance by *The New Zealander* that 'Englishmen' will (by virtue of their 'Englishness' and nothing else) wholeheartedly support the Governor and his policies:

Would British men band with Maoris against their own countrymen? ...

And can we expect from the untutored native that fidelity towards us and *our* cause which we well know it would be impossible for us to render to theirs? "Blood" (whether with the savage or the civilized), "is thicker than water;" (*The New Zealander*, 20 July 1863, page 2, original emphasis).

The term 'Native' itself has a long history in English usage. It came into English as an adjective from the fourteenth century and a noun from the fifteenth century (Little *et al.* 1955: 1311). It derives from the French word *natif* (which had earlier taken the form *naif* and given us the English term naive, as in artless and simple) and the Latin adjective *nativus* meaning innate or natural (see Williams 1983: 215-216). Thus most of the early uses for the term are associated with meanings still discernible today: "innate, natural, or of a place in which one is born" (Williams 1983: 215). As an adjective, the term native gained positive connotations in the late sixteenth century when it became associated with *nation*. At the same time, however, the noun Native had also taken on strongly negative connotations in that it had become a reference to non-European inhabitants of Other places (see Jackson and Penrose 1993b). This conflation of Native with the Other is clear in the "Notice To The Auckland Natives" (Table 7.2) which slips back and forth between "Natives" (line 1) and "Maoris" (lines 4 and 7) without explanation. In this case, Native acts as a signifier of inferiority. David Goldberg (1992: 557; emphasis added) thus makes a distinction between 'native' and 'Native': "those properly of the nation are *native* to it, born and bred at its breast; *Natives*, by contrast, are those natural in racial kind to foreign, hostile, dominated lands."

As an adjective, 'native' signifies a quality (usually) pertaining to people in specific contexts, and its meaning is relatively fluid and shifting. 'Native', on the other hand, is a noun and is therefore a hypostatisation of the fluid characteristics of 'native'. The shift from adjective to noun signals a

nominalising process which places an emphasis upon the so-called 'natural' character of the Native. It signifies a fixed essence which has usually less than positive qualities. Natives, for example, lack culture, art, breeding, and most important of all, a capacity for (masculine) rationality; everything that the properly masculine European can be proud to proclaim as his own. Natives are thus "to be kept in their place, politically [and] geographically" (Goldberg 1992: 557).

As I noted at the outset, a central conceit of the notice relates to the fact that it is ostensibly directed "to the Natives" (line 5), but its real audience is European. It is thus linked spatially to England, and specifically to the Colonial Secretary, whom the Governor had to convince that the appropriate 'Native policy' was being implemented. Natives are the primary objects of this rhetoric, but they are marginalised as subjects.

Spatial distinctions and the trope of surveillance

A second distinction can be discerned between "persons of the native race living in the Manukau District, and the Waikato frontier" (lines 7-8; see Figure 1.1), and those living elsewhere. Clearly, this is a spatialised rhetoric since, aside from 'Native-ness', location provides the only way to identify people who *should* be required to "take the Oath of Allegiance to Her Majesty the Queen" (lines 8-9). This reliance on a specifically geographical process of identifying Natives brings about a paradoxical rendering of space. On the one hand, space is conceptualised abstractly as merely a container for social relations (Natives are the key agents and they move through a 'dead' space); while on the other, space is productive, that is, it has the power actually to define people's identities (it is only through place that dangerous Natives can be correctly identified). By virtue of their *presence* in the Manukau district and the Waikato frontier, then, Natives are defined as *dangerous*.

This rhetoric also relies implicitly upon a naturalised discourse of


surveillance, for it implies that the Governor (or his agents) has been watching Natives in order that he can *know exactly* who is dangerous and where they live. Indeed, the rhetorical convention implying the sweeping visual mastery of a scene is an important feature of the nineteenth-century colonial enterprise (Spurr 1993). While the notion of an objective 'visual mastery' (and its attendant masculine gendering) is implicit in the notice, it is much more explicit in the New Zealand maps of Charles Heaphy. In 1861, for example, he produced "A Map of the North Island of New Zealand shewing Maori and European Territory" (AJHR 1861 E-1c; see Figure 7.1). The map depicted "Native Lands", "European Lands" and "Districts That Have Fed The [Taranaki] War", as well as indicating "the numbers of the Maoris in each locality". Heaphy adopts the 'commanding view' of the Western gaze, and as Foucault (1977a) has shown in his analysis of the history of techniques of incarceration, such visual surveillance is intimately related to the exercise of power. When these relations are -- implicitly or explicitly -- a part of written (newspaper) or pictorial (map) representation, the writer is *placed* in a position of visual advantage (Cosgrove 1985; Spurr 1993).

The writer is placed either above or at the center of things, yet apart from them, so that the organization and classification of things takes place according to the writer's own system of value. Interpretation of the scene reflects the circumspective force of the gaze, while suppressing the answering gaze of the other (Spurr 1993: 16-17).

The notion that one could place oneself in such a position of visual advantage is, in turn, reliant upon the development of the concepts of *linear perspective* and *landscape*.

As Denis Cosgrove (1985) notes, landscape first emerged as both a term and a way of seeing the external world in fifteenth- and early sixteenth-century Italy. The concept was integral to the appropriation of space by the emerging bourgeoisie: "landscape achieved visually and ideologically what

Figure 7.1 Charles Heaphy's Visual Mastery of the North Island, 1861.



Source: AJHR 1861 E-1c

survey, map making and ordinance charting achieved practically: the control and domination over space... its transformation into the property of individual or state" (Cosgrove 1985: 46). The key to landscape was found in

the geometric technique of linear perspective. Developed by Alberti in 1435, linear perspective provided a rational, detached viewpoint for the viewer, one that "gives the eye absolute mastery over space" (Cosgrove 1985: 48; also see Jay 1988). Landscape is a form of visual ideology that -- because it is both seen and understood from the social position of the landowning class -- (re)produces as 'natural' the appropriation of space by members of this class (Cosgrove 1985). However, landscape is not only an ideological reflection of the social order; it also plays an active role in the (re)production of social relations (Mitchell 1994). In this sense, just as the commodity is a reification of labour power, landscape can be seen as a reification of social struggle that *works* to (re)produce social relations of domination.

That such symbolic positionings have material effects is clear from Charles Heaphy's work. His map of the North Island was published as part of his argument that Natives had no reason to fear loss of their lands. Heaphy's "Statistical Notes Relating to the Maoris and Their Territory" was published in the *Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives* in 1861 (Volume E-1c: 3-4). There he presented arguments supposedly refuting any notions that Maori wars might be the result of European encroachment on their land. He noted that

It has been stated in England, and even asserted in New Zealand, that the present war has resulted from a feeling of apprehension on the part of the natives of an encroachment by Europeans on their lands, to such an extent as would shortly leave them a territory insufficient for their wants -- an aggression that, driving tribe upon tribe in its insidious [sic] advance, was monopolizing all but the unfertile land. The decadence of the Native population was also connected in various statements with the extension of the white occupation of territory as to lead to but one inference -- that of the Natives being engaged in a war for the preservation of their land, and with it for their existence (AJHR 1861, Volume E-1c, page 3; the two spellings 'Native' and 'native' are in the original).

Heaphy argued in opposition to this view, that

An examination into the circumstances of the numbers of Natives, their extent of territory, and the amount of land acquired by the

Europeans, will I think, prove that, however jealous the Maoris may have been of the increase of the whites, no fear of being dispossessed of their lands, or driven on each other could have actuated them in having recourse to arms (AJHR 1861, Volume E-1c, page 3).

Based on the somewhat 'shaky foundation' of historical hindsight, it seems that Heaphy's arguments were either anything but dis-interested, or at the very least they fell far wide of the mark. Between 1840 and 1911, for example, the proportion of New Zealand lands controlled by Maori dropped from almost 100 percent to just 11 percent (Pawson 1992: 21; also see Orange 1987; Stone 1973; Walker 1990; Ward 1974). Maori population loss was equally dramatic, dropping from about 80,000 in 1840⁹¹ to just 41,993 individuals in 1891.⁹² Conversely, the European settler population increased from a few hundred individuals in 1840 to more than 770,000 in 1901 (Pool 1991: 61). Although the current state of affairs would not seem to bear out Heaphy's argument, it does illustrate how Heaphy's power-knowledge probably worked to significant effect against Maori people.

Feminist geographers have extended the Marxist critique of landscape, emphasising the masculinism inherent in the concept. Gillian Rose (1993a) argues that not only is landscape a visual ideology supporting ownership of land by the bourgeoisie, but it also reinforces patriarchal gender relations that marginalise women. Indeed, at the time the landscape concept came into being in Europe, land-ownership was an exclusively male prerogative. Not only were women excluded from owning land, they often found that their own bodies were the object of what were then quite 'legitimate' (in juridical terms) proprietorial claims by men. That 'woman' was in 1863 New

91 Pool (1991: 76) suggests that this is the 'best estimate' of Maori population in 1840.

92 Census enumeration (Pool 1991: 76).

Zealand still considered an object of masculine ownership is clear from the Proclamation to the Chiefs of Waikato (Table 7.4, lines 6-8; my emphasis) where Governor Grey asserts that "Europeans quietly living on *their* own lands in Waikato have been driven away; *their property* has been plundered; *their wives* and children have been taken from them." This rhetorical construction links the loss of property and the loss of "wives and children" such that all must be read as property of European men.

Moreover, the detached 'perspective' of landscape relied on the mutual exclusion of *res cogitans* 'thought' and *res extensa* 'things', reinforcing the mind/body distinction so fundamental to masculine concepts of the Self (Bordo 1986). Indeed, the mind/body binary was a key component of the Cartesian masculinization of thought, and it allowed for the conceptualisation of complete (masculine) intellectual transcendence of the (feminine) body (Bordo 1986: 450). Furthermore, given the close association between nature and femininity (Ortner 1974; MacCormack and Strathern 1980), non-Western landscapes have often been coded feminine (Kolodny, 1975). This has led characteristically to the deployment of two master tropes of colonialism: "on the one hand, a rich and fecund virgin land is supposedly available for fertilization; on the other hand, a libidinous and wild land has to be forcefully tamed and domesticated" (Gregory 1994: 129; also see Innes 1994). Landscape serves as a 'way of seeing' (Berger 1972) that naturalises and legitimates not only existing capitalist class relations, then, but also masculinist gender relations.

The concept of landscape, as a visual ideology that reinforces patriarchal capitalism and masculinism, also legitimates the domination of the racialised Other by 'white', masculine members of the bourgeoisie. The slave trade epitomises this argument. It came to prominence in the fifteenth century, contemporaneous with the bourgeois notion of landscape. The emerging dominant classes owned not only land, but also *people* (see e.g. Baudet 1965;

Jordan 1974; Padgen 1982; Brantlinger 1986; Duncan 1993). Moreover, from Aristotle's time, racialised Others were *always already* excluded from the *logos* required for the rational viewing of landscape (Dossa, 1987; Said, 1978). These racialised Others were, more often than not, objects (as commodities or 'resources') in the viewed landscape, but were rarely admitted to the viewing position of (masculine) Western eyes. Understanding the nuances inherent in the notion of surveillance is thus highly significant for comprehending the classed, gendered, and racialised character of the colonial gaze.

Friendly/Unfriendly

A third division is to be found in this first notice to the Natives; one that makes an implicit distinction between what in later rhetorics came to be called 'friendly' and 'unfriendly' Natives. If the logic of this notice is extended, it suggests a number of ways to identify friendly Natives. 'Friendlies', as they came to be called, were those who lived in the region of the Manukau and the Waikato frontier and who had taken the oath of allegiance. They also, ostensibly, included all those who hailed from regions outside the Manukau or Waikato (but not including the Natives of Taranaki... Wanganui... Hawkes Bay and East Cape,⁹³ who had already 'proven' their treachery). Unfriendly, and thus dangerous, Natives were those who lived in the Manukau or the Waikato, but who had not taken the oath of allegiance. The distinction between friendly and unfriendly Natives

93 Two days later, the *Daily Southern Cross* (13 July 1863, page 3) outlined its perception of who comprised unfriendly Natives: "Leaving the consideration of minor matters to another occasion, let us take a glance at the present aspect of affairs.... We find the natives in Taranaki, with a few exceptions, obstinately opposed to us, and for anything we know to the contrary, at this moment engaged in conflict with the Imperial and Colonial forces stationed in that province. We likewise find that to the south, in Wanganui, there is a feeling of decided hostility, which may at any moment assume an active form, and precipitate a struggle in the district of Wellington province. I would be blinking the truth if we excluded from this section of the natives those who inhabit the Hawke's Bay and the East Cape district of Auckland. In the very heart of the country we have also the Waikato rebels in arms against us...."

produces a confusing array of Native 'types': those who have taken the oath and are thus 'friendly'; those who refuse to take the oath and must therefore be 'unfriendly'; those inhabiting the Manukau or Waikato who are by their very presence, potentially unfriendly; and, those from places outside the Manukau and Waikato who may be either friendly or unfriendly, but whose attitude towards Pakeha are considered to be less relevant in this discursive setting. The profusion of friendly and unfriendly Natives makes for a complex identity politics. Interestingly, unfriendliness is reliant -- both rhetorically and materially -- upon an opposing notion of friendliness. Indeed, there must be some possibility of friendly Maori, otherwise the notice would be of little value. Moreover, the colonial administration had to be certain to convince the imperial authorities that it had *some* Native allies. On the one hand, then, settlers were reliant upon the existence of friendly Natives; on the other hand -- as this excerpt from a letter to the editor of *The New Zealander* illustrates -- the settlers found it highly problematic trusting any Natives:

"FRIENDLY NATIVES" Who are they and what should be done with them? This question is first answered by first stating that they are all those that have laid down their arms and taken the oath of allegiance. So far so good; but what assurance or what proof do we have that many are not taking this course that they may remain in the enemy's camp to act as spies, to know all our movements and weak points, and our projects, and from time to time report them. We know that they are sagacious enough for any such proceeding; and of course they have no scruples upon such a course. While we are forming our colonial defence, our naval and our rifle corps, they may be forming "a royal corps of Maori spies" (*The New Zealander*, 18 July 1863, page 3).

It is also interesting that, in some contexts, Natives are stupid, lazy, or unintelligent, while in this context, "they are sagacious enough" to act as spies. This paradox works through European distinction between 'intelligence', epitomised by the mind of the middle and upper class Englishman, and the 'low cunning' of the Native (and women). Such low

cunning is epitomised by the so-called 'inscrutability' of the oriental, and it accounts, in part at least, for the feminisation of the Oriental male who is 'sneaky', 'underhanded', and therefore unmanly (see, e.g. Said 1978; Back 1994).⁹⁴

While settlers wanted to believe in the possibility of friendly Natives, they found they had to act *as if* all Natives were unfriendly. This is clear in the second "Notice to the Auckland Natives", dated 9th July, 1863 (Table 7.2).

Table 7.2 Notice To The Auckland Natives.

Whereas certain evil designed Natives have declared their intention of, or	1
have been talking about, attempting to do some evil in the town; and it is	2
impossible for the police and military, at night time, to distinguish between	3
friends and foes: It is therefore required of all friendly disposed Maoris; that	4
they abide within their houses from dusk in the evening until daybreak; let	5
them not move about outside, lest they get into trouble.	6
It has also been ordered that every Maori found on the streets of the town	7
after dark, be apprehended.	8
Auckland, July 9th, 1863	9

Source: *Daily Southern Cross*, 11 July 1863, page 3

Here, the text expressly acknowledges that "it is impossible for the police and military... to distinguish between friends and foes" (Table 7.2, lines 2-4). Granted, the statement is qualified with the phrase "at night time" (line 3), but this seems to have little bearing on the underlying meaning of the text, for it is difficult to understand how daylight makes any difference to the ability of the authorities to "distinguish between friends and foes" (line 3-4). Of course, it could relate to the metaphorical conflation of 'dark' skinned

⁹⁴ A further example of this trope at work is provided by the *Daily Southern Cross*, in its lead article of 17 July 1863 (page 3): "The Maori race is warlike enough to know the invaluable aid afforded frequently by a good spy, and we can scarcely doubt that the cunning of some of the natives living near town may induce them to remain unarmed and defenceless within our lines in the hope of obtaining some information, the value of which may be far greater to them than the power of individual strength or courage in the hour of battle." What is striking about this excerpt is the way it manages to acknowledge Maori 'cunning' while at the same time casting it in a highly negative image.

people and the darkness of night with evil. Nonetheless, in treating "all friendly disposed Maoris" (line 4) like enemies by requiring them to "abide within their houses from dusk in the evening until daybreak" (line 5) the notice illustrates another problematic aspect of the friends/foes binary. This contradictory notion disappeared from the textual construction of the "Notice to Coastal Natives" published two days later on 11 July 1863 (Table 7.3). No references to friendly Maori appear anywhere. Moreover, the same

Table 7.3 Notice to Coastal Natives.

The following notification, addressed to the natives of the coast, and to those	1
who are in the habit of coming up to town in the canoes and boats, was	2
published on Saturday:-- [TRANSLATION]	3
<i>Notice to the Natives of the Coast, &c</i>	4
All natives are hereby prohibited from sailing their vessels, and rowing their	5
boats and canoes to Auckland during the night time. Should they be	6
overtaken by darkness, when contiguous to Auckland, they must remain	7
outside the anchorage until the morning.	8
It is further notified that no guns or other weapons will be allowed	9
conveyance to Auckland by boats.	10
Auckland, July 11th, 1863.	11

Source: *The New Zealander*, 13 July 1863, page 4

day this notice was published, the *Daily Southern Cross* (13 July 1863, page 2) editorialised that, given the present state of affairs,

may we not look with just suspicion upon the loyalty of every Maori in the North Island! For our own part we distinctly avow cherishing such a suspicion, and we would seriously press the point upon the consideration of the Government.

GOVERNMENTALITY

At this point, I think it fruitful to examine in some detail of the linguistic characteristics of these two notices. In particular, I am interested specifically in two aspects: modality and intertextual linkages. It is interesting, for example, to note the unequivocally 'objective' modality (Fairclough 1992) in the pronunciation of "evil designed Natives [who] have declared their intention of, or have been talking about, attempting to do some evil in town" (lines 1-2, Table 7.2). The use of objective modality, as opposed to the more

explicit 'subjective', has the effect of removing the text producer from their text, thus implying a facticity about the statement that is beyond question.⁹⁵ This manoeuvre turns interpretation into fact. This enunciation leaves no room for doubts about both the *truth* of the statement and the *nature* of the subject it produces: evil Natives. In this way, ideological judgements about the undesirability of Natives are easily communicated to the readers without seeming, on the face of it, to be making any 'value' judgements whatsoever.

In this way both notices (Table 7.2 and 7.3) play with agency so as to hide the role of government in the 'negative' events described and highlight that of Natives. While Natives have supposedly "declared their intention... [of] attempting to do some evil in the town" (Table 7.2, lines 1-2), nowhere does government claim responsibility for imposing a curfew. The notice reads as if it is unavoidable that Natives be subject to curfew: "It is therefore required of all friendly disposed Maoris; that they abide within their houses..." (Table 7.2, lines 4-5). Likewise, the Notice to Coastal Natives makes no mention of government, instead merely stating the 'facts' of the prohibition. This rhetoric serves to link Natives directly to negative acts and events, while distancing government.

The two notices (Table 7.2 and 7.3) are linked intertextually, such that the latter notice, prohibiting Natives "from sailing their vessels, and rowing their boats and canoes to Auckland during the night time" (lines 5-6, Table 7.3) relies on the former notice's enunciation of the 'evilness' of Natives for its rhetorical, ethical and moral force. On July 9th it was felt necessary to justify measures aimed at restricting Native movements by producing an 'evil'

95 As I noted in Chapter 5, linguists have traditionally associated modality with *modal auxiliary verbs* such as 'must', 'may', 'can', 'should', and so on. Writers like Fairclough (1992), and Hodge and Kress (1988) have pointed out, however, that there are many other ways to indicate modality.

Native subject; two days later this was no longer the case as it had already been made clear by the previous notice that Natives were evil and therefore that the boating restrictions were necessary precautions. By then, everyone would know -- *because of the notice* -- that Natives are dangerous at night. Moreover, if Natives continue to roam at night after such action has been officially classed as a 'dangerous' activity, they must be dangerous.

In his lectures on 'Governmentality', Michel Foucault (1979b) discusses what he sees as a slow shift from an emphasis on the 'government of territory' in the sixteenth century, to that of the 'government of things' in the eighteenth century. Citing Guillaume de La Perrière, Foucault (1979b: 10) argues that by the 1700s, government had as its object "the right disposition of things, arranged so as to lead to a convenient end". According to Foucault (1979b: 11),

One governs things. But what does this mean? I don't think it is a question of opposing things to men [sic], but rather of showing that government does not bear on the territory but rather on the complex unit constituted by men and things.

Foucault (1979b: 13) goes on to suggest a further shift concomitant with the move toward the government of things, namely the move away from a reliance solely upon 'natural' laws to reliance on more broadly based *tactics*:

it's not a matter of imposing laws on men, but rather of disposing things, that is to say to employ tactics rather than laws, and if need be to use the laws themselves as tactics. To arrange things in such a way that, through a certain number of means, such and such ends may be achieved.

While ostensibly aimed at a Native subject, the notices (to the Auckland Natives and to the Coastal Natives) instead attempt to create Native *objects* and to set them within a spatialised grid of power. In this sense, rather than changing behaviour of the Native, it merely justifies certain kinds of European behaviour. This attempt to use laws as tactics for the 'convenient' arrangement of things within a European geo-historical discourse of right and wrong can be seen to exemplify what Foucault referred to as

'governmentality' -- that is, the bureaucratic arrangement of the objects of government. It signifies the existence in New Zealand of a form of bureaucratic rationality that Weber (1976) saw as part and parcel of capitalism. But it also signals the construction of disciplinary knowledges of the Native in which the European subject attempts to engineer an appropriate Native object.

The three notices I have analysed thus far have all created (European) subjects and (Native) objects and placed them in hierarchical relations to each other. The rhetorical manoeuvres which contribute to such constructions rely in part upon a number of colonial tropes which I discuss in a later section of this chapter. For now, it will suffice to note that just as the present-day media 'require' images of chaos in order to reinforce the need for (existing) orders of authority, colonial discourse "continually returns to an idealization of the colonialist enterprise against the setting of emptiness and disorder by which it has defined the other" (Spurr 1993: 109). In so doing, colonial discourse *affirms* the necessity for its own power, and the subjugation of the colonised. In an editorial of 18 July 1863, for example, the *Daily Southern Cross* affirmed on page 3 the right to use force against the Maori by portraying military action as the only viable option for uplifting Natives from the chaos of savagery: "Savages in the worst sense of the term we found [the Maori], and savages they will continue to be, unless they are put down with the strong arm of military coercion." Aspects of these types of process are even more clearly illustrated in Governor George Grey's proclamation to the Chiefs of Waikato (Table 7.4), which marked the official declaration of war against the Waikato tribes. I turn now to a discussion of this Proclamation.

A closer look at the Proclamation

In his analysis of this declaration of war, Peter Cleave (1989: 14) reads the proclamation as "a naked expression of power". He argues that this

openly aggressive and directly confrontational approach can be seen as a shift from previously more oblique references by Europeans to their own authority in New Zealand. This is a result of a number of important changes in the relationship between Maori and Pakeha. For example, the Pakeha population increased dramatically while the Maori population was in decline (Pool 1991). Moreover, as a result of the Taranaki war, missionaries and establishment churches in New Zealand, as well as humanitarian groups in Britain, were much less openly sympathetic for Maori concerns (Orange 1987; Sinclair 1961; Ward 1973). In the end, "Grey was given room, as it were, to use the Treaty of Waitangi as an ideological weapon against Maori resistance" (Cleave 1989: 15).

Cleave draws upon changing material conditions in order to help explain the conditions of possibility for different rhetorical constructions. I am interested in a different way of reading the world, namely the way that differing rhetorical conditions opened up spaces (and closed off others) for the development of specific understandings of material conditions. In this sense, then, I wish to examine in closer detail the linguistic construction of the Proclamation. I shall then discuss some of the intertextual relations between the proclamation itself, and a number of broader colonial tropes circulating at the time (and some still existing today).

The first two paragraphs of the Proclamation provide an example of objective modality at its most powerful:

Europeans... *have been* driven away; their property *has been* plundered; their wives and children *have been* taken from them. ...officers and soldiers *were* murdered at Taranaki. Others... *have* since expressed approval.... Crimes *have been* committed in other parts of the island, and criminals *have been* rescued, or sheltered.... You *are now* assembling in armed bands; you *are* constantly threatening to come down the river to ravage the settlement of Auckland, and to murder peaceable settlers. Some of you *offered* a safe passage through your territories to armed parties contemplating such outrages. The well-disposed among you *are* either unable or unwilling to prevent these evil acts. (lines 6-18; my emphasis).

The effect of this objective modality is to remove the Governor from his text thereby rendering up his assertions as simple statements of fact. Moreover, it *distances* the Governor from any association with the actions of Natives in such a way as to elide the history of settler land-grabbing (Stone 1973; Walker 1990) and abrogation of the Treaty of Waitangi by the British (Orange 1989; Ward 1973; Walker 1990).

The Governor returns to his text in line 18: "I am therefore compelled for the protection of all, to establish posts at several points on the Waikato river, and to take necessary measures for the further security of persons inhabiting that district." In placing himself in the text at this juncture, the Governor emphasises his personal responsibility for resolving the 'Native problem'. While this rhetorical manoeuvre highlights his commitment to action, this commitment is tempered by the notion that it is an act that the Governor has been "compelled" to undertake "for the protection of all" (line 18). The Governor utilises a classic trope of political rhetoric (and one that is still common today), namely playing with notions of agency in order to either emphasise or elide one's participation in events. In this instance the Governor claims that he has no agency and thus cannot be held accountable for the outcome.

The latter phrase, "for the protection of all" (line 18), signifies a reliance upon what Anna Yeatman (1992) terms "community discourse", where the concrete specificity of 'the Native' is subsumed by the abstract universality of the 'whole community'. A reliance on ideological notions of 'consensus' (Hall 1973) is also evident here. Traditional concepts of citizenship are tied to the notion of "membership in a community" encompassing various rights and responsibilities (Yuval-Davis 1991: 59). However, in this discourse of citizenship, *community* and *difference* are mutually exclusive terms, because community is constructed as a bounded essence, inhabited by rational,

Table 7.4 Proclamation to the Chiefs of Waikato.

YESTERDAY, a proclamation, of which the following is a translation, was published in the <i>New Zealand Gazette</i> ; :--	1
G GREY,	2
Governor,	3
CHIEFS OF WAIKATO,	4
Europeans quietly living on their own lands in Waikato have been driven away; their property has been plundered; their wives and children have been taken from them. By the instigation of some of you, officers and soldiers were murdered at Taranaki. Others of you have since expressed approval of these murders. Crimes have been committed in other parts of the island, and criminals have been rescued, or sheltered under the colour of your authority.	5
You are now assembling in armed bands; you are constantly threatening to come down the river to ravage the settlement of Auckland, and to murder peaceable settlers. Some of you offered a safe passage through your territories to armed parties contemplating such outrages.	6
The well-disposed among you are either unable or unwilling to prevent these evil acts. I am therefore compelled for the protection of all, to establish posts at several points on the Waikato river, and to take necessary measures for the further security of persons inhabiting that district. The lives and property of all well-disposed people living on the river will be protected, and armed and evil-disposed people will be stopped from passing down the river to rob and murder the Europeans.	7
I now call on all well-disposed natives to aid the Lieutenant-General to establish and maintain these posts and to preserve peace and order.	8
Those who remain peaceably at their own vilages [sic] in Waikato or move into such distriets [sic] as may be pointed out by the Government, will be protected in their persons, property and land.	9
Those who wage war against Her Majesty, or remain in arms, threatening the lives of Her peaceable subjects, must take the consequences of the acts, and they must understand that they will forfeit the right to the possession of their lands guaranteed to them by the Treaty of Waitangi, which lands will be occupied by a population capable of protecting for the future the quiet and unoffending from the violence with which they are now so constantly threatened.	10
Auckland, 11th July, 1863.	11
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Source: *The New Zealander*, 16 July 1863, page 3

reasonable beings having shared beliefs, a common culture, and unity of purpose (Yeatman 1992; Young 1990a, 1990b). Thus, it is not surprising to find the *Daily Southern Cross* (16 July 1863, page 3; my emphasis) editorialising on the benefits that will accrue to the Maori as a result of recent legislation to confiscate their lands:

IT is not long since we commented freely upon the course pursued

by the Government with respect to the long expected Taranaki proclamation of confiscation. We expressed our opinion then, in opposition to other opinions that appeared upon the subject, that the act was not only a necessary, but a strictly correct one, and in full accordance with the position of the Government and of the natives of New Zealand. We endeavoured at that time to point out the highly important results which might be expected to flow from this first step in the right direction, in inducing the Government to venture still further and extend the proclamation to other lands that had not then the same peculiar advantages in Maori eyes for the experiment, by having had an act of murder committed upon them.

This expectation of ours we rejoice to see verified by the result, not as may well be supposed because we bear any hatred to the native race of these Islands; but because we believe now, and have good reason to believe that in this way, and in this alone, the present struggle may be shortly and happily brought to an end that *shall secure to Maori and to European a lasting peace, and the enjoyments of equal and beneficent laws*. The Government are resolved to leave no means untried to save the natives from the fate which their own causeless and mad rebellion is drawing down on their heads.

Such universalistic notions of community have their origins in the Enlightenment, where objective, impartial and putatively universal rationality was elevated above subjective, partial, and particular forms of thought (Seidler 1994). As Iris Young (1990a: 97) has pointed out, the ideal of impartiality produces a whole series of dichotomies: universal/particular, public/private, reason/passion (to name but a few). These dichotomies are aligned with gendered and racialised identities as well. Thus the universal is masculine and 'white', while the particular is feminine, 'black'... and so on (see e.g. Berg 1994b; Jay 1981; Massey 1992; Seidler 1994). More important, however, is one of the ideological functions that the ideal of impartiality serves: "it masks the ways in which the particular perspectives of dominant groups claim universality" (Young 1990a: 97).

Community discourses are far from universal, as one of their primary purposes is to constitute boundaries of inclusion and exclusion. In so doing, they work ideologically to produce an excluded Other. Liberal discourses of community require the individual to bracket out all that is particular, unique

or personal in order to enjoy membership in an homogeneous public community (Mehta 1990; Smith 1990). Republican discourses of community rely on a more participatory notion of community, one that is arrived at through rational consensus; however, this rationality is predicated on a notion of universal normative reason that transcends particularist perspectives. Welfare state discourse is predicated on a dualism of independence and dependency, where dependency is the Other against which independence is gauged (Yeatman, 1992: 4-6). Western discourses of citizenship and community thus require the production of an Other to bear responsibility for the substantive, private, and particular aspects of social life.

The Governor's rhetoric appears to attempt to put 'race' under erasure (Lloyd 1991), at least in the middle passages of the Proclamation. He speaks of acting for "the protection of all" (line 18) "well-disposed people" who "will be protected" (line 21), from "armed and evil-disposed people" (line 22). The true object of his fear and loathing becomes clear, however, with this last passage, as the goal of these evil-designed people is "to rob and murder the Europeans" (line 23). Given the intended audience, the reader is expected to know that it is impossible for "British men [to] band with Maoris against their own countrymen" (*The New Zealander*, 20 July 1863, page 2). The world constructed in this discourse is a simple one where black opposes white. Yet the rhetorical and material requirement for the existence of "well-disposed natives" (line 24) belies this simplicity. On the one hand, all Natives are suspect, but on the other, there must at least be some possibility of cooperation from Natives. In the end, the rhetoric of the Proclamation contradicts itself in such a way as to make clear its true intent and audience. It is an attempt to justify the British invasion of the Waikato on the (spurious) grounds that Natives are threatening war on Auckland.

DISCUSSION

The Proclamation was, however, more than merely a justification for the British invasion of the Waikato. In this sense, and through its alignment with a number of other tropes of colonialism, it can be seen to stand metonymically in justification of the whole colonial project. In the sections that follow, I discuss some of these other colonial tropes and their linkages with the Proclamation.

Classification and the Visual Episteme

I shall begin with a discussion of the trope of *classification* that arose in tandem with the rise of visuality as the hegemonic way of knowing in modernity (Rorty 1979; Foucault 1970; Jay 1988). As I discussed in chapter 4, Michel Foucault (1972) has argued that discursive practices systematically order the world. They define "how a society reflects upon resemblances among things and how differences between things can be mastered, organised into networks, sketched out according to rational schemes" (Foucault 1989: 1). In this sense, discursive practices are imbricated in the ideological practice of classification (Spurr 1993). Notions about what it means to engage in classification, however, have changed over time.

In *The order of things*, Foucault (1970) discusses the evolution of natural history from the Renaissance to the end of the Classical episteme⁹⁶ in the 1700s. He suggests that the Renaissance was an episteme based on *resemblance*, in which -- and unlike today -- the division between "*Observation*, *Document* and *Fable* did not exist" because "signs were then part of things themselves" (Foucault 1970: 129, original emphasis). As a result, then, during the episteme of resemblance

⁹⁶ Episteme might be thought of as a conceptual grid that allows certain discursive practices to define 'truth' and 'knowledge' (also see Gregory 1994: 21).

...to write the history of a plant or animal was as much a matter of describing its elements or organs as of describing resemblances that could be found in it, the virtues it was thought to possess, the legends and stories with which it had been involved, its place in heraldry, the medicaments that were concocted from its substance, the foods it provided, what the ancients recorded of it, and what travellers might have said of it (Foucault 1970: 129).

By the late seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, however, resemblance had given way to *representation*. Words were conceptualised as separate from things; signs had "become modes of representation" (Foucault 1970: 129). The discourse of natural history emerged at this time as an attempt to bridge the gap between signifier and signified (Foucault 1970: 129-130).⁹⁷ In this way, classification of nature came to depend upon a visual strategy for its power to define truth. In so doing, classification became reliant upon visible characteristics to map relationships and differences between phenomena. For natural historians like Linnaeus, then, "the rationality of nature could be disclosed through a taxonomy that classified plants by the visual characteristics of their reproductive parts" (Gregory 1994: 22). With this in mind, Foucault asserts that the emerging 'science' of Natural history can be seen as "nothing more than the nomination of the visible" (1970: 132). While such ideas are not uncontested, they are supported by other theorists. Richard Rorty (1979: 45), for example, suggests that during this period Cartesian perspectivalism, and its underlying reliance upon the visual, comprised the hegemonic model for understanding the world. The emerging modern era can thus be seen as the age of visibility, where the recently discovered people and places of the 'new world' became rendered down in European discourse "as an object of display -- to be viewed,

⁹⁷ The purpose of Natural History at this time, Foucault (1970: 132) suggests, was to reduce the distance between language and things "so as to bring language as close as possible to the observing gaze, and the things observed as close as possible to words."

investigated, and experienced" (Mitchell 1989: 220).

I have already discussed in chapter 6 the implications of the reliance upon a visual ontology for the 'racial' classification of people. I wish to discuss here the way in which the abstract character of European visual classification elides history and ideologically supports colonial rhetoric. Mary Louise Pratt's (1992: 31) comments are particularly instructive:

One by one the planet's life forms were to be drawn out of the tangled threads of their life surroundings and rewoven into European-based patterns of global unity and order. The (lettered, male, European) eye that held the system could familiarize ('naturalize') new sites/sights immediately upon contact, by incorporating them into the language of the system.

What Pratt so aptly describes is the way that visual classification elides the history of its subject. Heidegger referred to this process as one of 'enframing' (see discussions in Mitchell 1989 and Gregory 1994: 34-37). Ostensibly, visibility places the subject of vision and the viewer in a spatio-temporal relationship of similarity. But because of the differential in the power of viewer and viewed, the Gaze recreates the subject of vision as an object which is then drawn into a (masculine) European discursive setting. The Native is literally *enclosed* in a European frame of view. The 11 July proclamation to the Chiefs of the Waikato can be seen as a classic example of this ahistorical classificatory rhetoric. It is devoid of the history of imperialism in general and the impacts that settlement policies have had for many New Zealand Natives in particular. Instead, it attempts to construct Natives as the powerful and threatening characters of (this version of) history -- ones requiring forceful control:

Europeans... driven away;... property... plundered;... wives and children... taken away.... officers and soldiers... murdered. [C]rimes... committed... criminals... rescued, or sheltered. [Natives] assembling in armed bands... constantly threatening to come down the river to ravage... Auckland... and to murder peaceable settlers (lines 6-16, Table 7.4).

John Gorst's (1864: 1-2) contemporary reflections on the mood of European

citizens of Auckland prior to the war suggests that this representation was dominant at the time:

People in Auckland were especially anxious about the course that would be taken by the tribes living on the Waikato River, upon whose forbearance the very existence of Auckland appeared at that time to depend. A range of forest hills was pointed out from the town of Auckland, extending from east to south, and not more than twenty miles distant. Beyond these hills, the stranger was told, lay the Waikato country, inhabited by fierce warlike Maories, whose armed bands could at any moment swarm through the hill-side forests into the plain below, to burn the houses, drive off the cattle, and tomahawk the settlers.⁹⁸

It was certainly present in newspaper representations of Native intentions, even subsequent to the British invasion of the Waikato. The *New Zealander* (29 July 1863, page 2), for example, editorialised as late as 29 July that Auckland was still the prize desired by barbarous Natives:

We stated in our issue of yesterday that an attack upon Auckland was the paramount desire of the native heart, and that great risks would be apt to be run, and strenuous efforts employed to carry that attack into effect. There have been letters, from reliable sources, submitted to our perusal, making mention of the tribes and their followers, who have been told off for this particular service.

According to one writer, "Certain numbers have been named as attacking parties -- 1000 for the town of A----; 400 for another part; and 300 for a third division..... The natives want to measure their strength with the Europeans. They think they can drive all the Europeans off the island, and then reign supreme."

The intelligence is of a kind neither to be despised nor feared; but it is such as should keep us on the *qui vive*, and stay the further weakening of the too much weakened garrison of Auckland. We do not for a moment doubt the result of such an attack; but we would fain avert the loss of life and property which any such attack could not fail to cause; and we are further most solicitous that we should not only be able to repel the enemy, but that we should be in a position to inflict such an amount of punishment upon the would-be

⁹⁸ This European perspective held sway for many years. Writing in 1879, for example, John Featon speaks of "the storm clouds of war... banked up on the Southern horizon of Auckland, and the daily increasing hostile attitude of the Waikato Tribes towards the settlers..." (1879: 5). The reference to the 'tomahawk' is interesting, apparently signalling a connection to the 'Indian Wars' in the United States.

murderers and incendiaries as would be calculated to inspire them with a wholesome dread of our prowess in all time to come.

Yet the enframing impulse of European classification cannot completely silence other 'visions' of events. Gorst (1864: 394) himself 'saw' events much differently than the Auckland settlers he spoke with. As a result, he suggested that the war, and subsequent attempts to confiscate Native lands, were undertaken "upon false pretenses, at the cost of the British Government, and for the benefit of the colonists."⁹⁹ Likewise, in *The New Zealand Native Rebellion: Letter to Lord Lyttelton*, published in response to the *New Zealand Settlements Act*, Henry Sewell (1864) argued that Maori had a right to self-government over their internal affairs, and further, that the Treaty of Waitangi precluded crown rights to confiscate lands.

Debasement of the Other/ boundaries of the Self

Classification can be seen as an attempt to impose a system of European values on the non-European Other. In colonial discourse, this value system usually associates the European with the positive end of the value spectrum and the Native with the negative. Spurr (1993: 76-77) refers to this discursive process as one of *debasement*. In this sense, he suggests, colonial discourse *requires* the constant reproduction of negative images of the colonised as a justification for European intervention. This rhetorical strategy is clear in the Governor's Proclamation to the Chiefs of the Waikato. Natives and their (alleged) activities are painted in a negative light in the early paragraphs (lines 6-17, Table 7.4) in order to justify European sanctions against them outlined in the subsequent paragraphs (lines 18-35, Table 7.4).

However, this is more than merely a rhetorical justification for the exercise of raw power -- it is also an attempt to maintain the European

⁹⁹ Gorst was later castigated by Featon for "...his virulent attacks upon the New Zealand colonists" (Featon 1879: 5).

subject's psychological boundaries through "a necessary iteration of a fundamental difference between colonizer and colonized" (Spurr 1993: 78). The following excerpt from the *Daily Southern Cross* (16 July 1863, page 3) illustrates what is perhaps the classic example of the colonial trope of debasement, that of the savage Native and civilised European:

WE have been asked to believe that the Waikato natives and their friendly allies are gallant men, who would scorn to murder an inoffensive man. We have had them held up to us, from time to time, as exemplars - as men whose actions are worthy of imitation by depraved Europeans. And we confess that coming from so many creditable quarters we have been all along disposed to believe these representations; but with all respect to Maori advocates, we must in future take leave to dissent from their statements. We don't believe the Waikato to be one whit better than the Ngatiruanui or Taranaki natives. They have each proved themselves bloodthirsty murderers; -- perhaps the Waikatos may be looked upon as the more bloodthirsty. Take the case of Mr. Meredith and his son, and find a parallel for this atrocious crime, if one can, during the entire campaign in Taranaki. There the blood was heated, and fire and sword did execution on both sides. Here we (that is, the Government) have been mild as any turtle dove. The Governor assured them he would not put down the King movement by force. We published the mildest of proclamations, and told the natives in the same breath that if they did not choose to swear the oath of allegiance they might leave the district, and that we would give them safe convoy, arms and ammunition, bag and baggage, to the enemy's country. And how have these men rewarded us for our considerate conduct? By gratitude? No. By orderly behaviour? No. But by brutal and unprovoked murder. The hoary hand of age was not safe from the ruffian hand of the murderer, not did the bloom of youth shield from the felon stroke of the ruthless savage. Two settlers, father and son, -- the one aged and venerable -- the other young and hopeful, have been ruthlessly slaughtered, without provocation and without excuse.

Julia Kristeva (1982) argues that debasement of the Other is a way of maintaining the boundaries of the Self. The debasement of the Native in the Proclamation and other newspaper articles can thus be read also as a defensive psychological manoeuvre by which the colonisers assert their fundamental difference from the savagery of the Native. Kristeva sees debasement as signifying a crisis of the subject, where the subject fears its 'indifference' -- or lack of difference -- from the object of discourse. The self-

proclaimed *civilised* identity of English settlers has been placed in jeopardy by the unthinkable savagery of its own members. The crisis of the subject comes about through its own fear of loss of rational control (Spurr 1993), thus much energy is expended reinforcing discursive constructions of its own self-control and rationality. Moreover, writers like Kristeva (1982) and Spurr (1993) suggest that this fear of the Other is rooted in a deep seated *erotic desire* for a return to 'savagery'. In the end, "the constant threat to a precariously established order serves to intensify, in rhetoric as well as in more material forms of oppression, the obsessive repudiation of the Other" (Spurr 1993: 79).

The parallels here with historical events from other places and times may be instructive. A similar response to a threat to order can be discerned in passage of the infamous 'Black Act' of 1723 in Britain, which created 50 new capital offences for which the penalty was death. Many of these newly codified offences were as trivial as cutting down trees or hunting at night with faces 'blackened'. In his study of the Black Act, E.P. Thompson (1975) argued that the draconian measures of the Act were less a response to any perceived emergency -- as the historical canon suggested -- and more an attempt on the part of the British ruling class to maintain 'order' and discipline in the face of increasing public challenges to its *authority* during the 1700s. Similarly, Foucault (1977a) notes the common use of what we might now see as extreme and sadistic measures for punishing criminals in eighteenth century France.¹⁰⁰ This had shifted to a more 'disciplinary' form

100 He describes the 1757 sentence of a murderer, "Damiens the regicide" who was condemned "to make the amende honorable before the main door of the Church of Paris,... taken and conveyed in a cart, wearing nothing but a shirt, holding a torch of burning wax weighing two pounds, then to the Place de Grève, where, on a scaffold that will be erected there, the flesh will be torn from his breasts, arms, thighs and calves with red-hot pincers, his right hand, holding the knife with which he committed the said parricide, burnt with sulphur, and, on those places where the flesh will be torn

of punishment in the nineteenth century. Punishment had been 'reformed' such that torture was no longer acceptable. However, the object of reform was not to reduce the horror (although that may have been an unintended consequence), but instead to rationalise punishment:

to make of the punishment and repression of illegalities a regular function, coextensive with society; not to punish less, but to punish better; to punish with an attenuated severity perhaps, but in order to punish with more universality and necessity; to insert the power to punish more deeply into the social body (Foucault 1977a: 82).

In similar fashion as Thompson (1975), Foucault argues that the purpose of punishment was not strictly retribution, but instead the maintenance of *order*.

[T]he injury that a crime inflicts upon the social body is the *disorder* that it introduces into it: the scandal that it gives rise to, the example that it gives, the incitement to repeat it if it is not punished, the possibility of becoming widespread that it bears within it. In order to be useful, punishment must have as its objective the consequences of the crime, that is to say, the series of *disorders* that it is capable of initiating (Foucault 1977a: 92; emphasis added).

Understanding the need to maintain order in bourgeois society is important, but writers like Foucault (1977a), Thompson (1975) and Spurr (1993) have ignored the gendered character of such attempts to maintain order. Indeed, I would argue that in this fear of disorder one can clearly detect a fear of 'femininity'. As I discussed in Chapter 2, rational order has long been associated with civilization and this in turn has been connected to masculinity. Similarly, theorists such as Sherry Ortner (1974), Carole Pateman (1989) and Ruth Smith (1990) note how the Order/Disorder binary is linked symbolically to the Western separation of Culture and Nature and thus to masculinity and femininity. As a result, a *cultural masculine order* has

continued

away, poured molten lead, boiling oil, burning resin, wax and sylphur melted together and then his body drawn and quartered by four horses and his limbs and body consumed by fire, reduced to ashes, and his ashes thrown to the winds" (Foucault 1977a: 3).

been opposed to a *natural feminine disorder*. The efforts to maintain order are as much about gender, in symbolic terms at least, as they are about maintaining class hegemony.

It is fairly simple to see certain (sometimes contradictory) aspects of what I call the 'order process' at work in the Proclamation to the Chiefs of the Waikato. At a subtle level, for example, the simple use of objective modality serves to reinforce the 'objective', 'rational' and therefore masculine tone of the document. Less subtle, however, is the attempt to paint the Natives in the least flattering light -- as plunderers (line 7), criminals (lines 10-12), ravagers of women and children (lines 13-14 and 7-8), and murderers (lines 8-10 and 13-15) -- so as to justify the repression of Natives and theft of their lands. In some instances 'the Native' (as an object of European discourse) is feminised while in others it is hyper-masculinised. As ravagers of women and children, for example, the Native might be seen as hyper-masculine. As an enemy that sticks to the forest paths, engages in guerilla tactics and refuses to fight in the open (like *real* men) they might be seen as feminine.

The trope of debasement is common to much colonial discourse. It can be found throughout newspaper reports of the Waikato war, as exemplified in this report of "The Advance on Waikato" published in *The New Zealander* (13 July 1863, page 4; original emphasis) three days prior to the Proclamation:

There can, we imagine, be neither reason or necessity for affecting to doubt that war is on the eve of commencement; not in the outskirts of Auckland; not at Drury, or the Mauku; but in the very strongholds of those great *bugbears* -- the feeders and the victims of the last wretched war -- the (alleged) fomenters of the late Taranaki outbreak -- the *approvers* of the Taranaki assassinations -- the banded conspirators who defy the majesty of our Queen and Laws -- the Waikatos -- those bravos who have had the audacity, from time to time, to menace Auckland itself with a murderous assault. Outrage and insult have long been borne with a patience that has elicited comments from the opposition journals of this Colony, and from the ill-informed and hostile press of Australia, -- bordering upon denunciation of Sir GEORGE GREY and his policy. That policy will

yet redound to the glory of His Excellency. Like LOUIS NAPOLEON'S, his policy was "Peace", if peace was practicable -- but when friendly overtures were proved to be in vain -- now that every effort at conciliation had failed -- the last alternative -- that of coercion -- has been un[d]ertaken in a firm and fearless spirit.

Just as in the proclamation (and echoes of the proclamation are certainly visible here) this newspaper article paints a strongly negative picture of the Waikato "bravos" in order to justify (in rational and masculine terms) the attack on the Waikato by European troops.

Also noteworthy in the above passage is the nominalising transformation of the adjectival term 'Waikato people' into the noun 'Waikatos'. This is a typical rhetorical device of colonial constructions of the Other, whereby a geographical term is used to define 'the locals'. Nominalisation here works both metaphorically and metonymically to reduce a complex grouping of different iwi, hapu and whanau and reify them into a singular and unitary group of 'dangerous' Natives. It also elides the processes of colonisation by allowing Europeans to construct themselves as the norm and Natives (or more properly, non-Europeans) as the Other requiring civilization, uplifting, or improvement.

Affirming the Colonial Project

The rhetoric of debasement parallels that of another trope of colonial discourse, 'affirmation'. But whereas debasement can be seen as a justificatory rhetoric, Spurr (1993) -- drawing on the work of Derrida (1976) and media theorists Stuart and Elizabeth Ewan (1982) -- sees affirmation as central to the internal workings of language itself. Derrida theorised that the use of written language involves the subordination of the world to the power of the writing subject. Accordingly, language is fundamentally narcissistic. The Ewans see media as presenting a view of the world as chaotic, but a chaos that can be overcome (rationalised) by the powers of existing institutions (also see my discussion in chapter 5). Spurr (1993: 109) combines the work of these theorists, in order to illustrate how "the rhetorical economy

of the media creates a demand for images of chaos in order that the principles of a governing ideology and the need for institutions of order may be affirmed." Spurr's work is important because it expresses the way that language is implicated in the (re)constitution of material social relations. Language has both symbolic and material impact here.

Affirmation signifies the attempt to invoke power, or at the very least, a desire for power once held (Spurr 1993: 110). Thus, in affirming the right to use power, colonial rhetoric paradoxically admits the possibility that use of such power may be unacceptable. If the right to use power was truly unchallenged, then there would be no need to affirm its use. Affirmation is implicit in the Proclamation, which through its own enunciation announces knowledge of a challenge to European authority. Perhaps the most common example of affirmation at work, however, is the trope of the 'White Man's burden'. This onerous 'burden' rears its head in the Proclamation where it falls on the shoulders of the colonial powers to "prevent... evil acts" (lines 17-18) because "well-disposed [Natives]... are either unable or unwilling" to do so (line 17). But the 'White Man's burden' is implicated more in the metaphorical justification of the so-called 'civilising mission' of the West (Spurr 1993; R. Young 1990), as is evident in this 20 July 1863 report in *The New Zealander* (page 2; original emphasis):

The spirit that prevails is worthy of a colony whose maxim -- that at least of the large majority of its inhabitants from the hour of its foundation -- has been CONCILIATION -- respect for the natives, their lands, and their rights, and scrupulous integrity in every transaction with them, have been the guiding principles. Never since the creation of the world, or since nations commenced to colonise -- never have the aborigines of any land been treated with such affectionate solicitude -- never have such costly experiments been made to civilise, christianise, and elevate them morally, socially, and politically -- as in the case of the native New Zealander. Every effort has been put in practise to advance their interests. Money and kindnesses have been lavishly dispensed. Education and instruction have been provided. In a word, all that the colonists and the Governor combined could contrive to avert the fate which seems to be the doom of coloured races in their contact with whites,

has been sedulously cared for.

CONCLUSION

Through analysis of three notices and one proclamation published in the Auckland press, I have attempted in this chapter to illustrate some of the rhetorical tropes and discursive constructions that are implicated in the social construction of the Native rebel. My intent has been to be illustrative not comprehensive. In so doing I have provided a number of examples of possible readings of these official documents. If one is to take seriously the notion of perspective, it is impossible to be comprehensive, for there are as many viewpoints as there are viewers.

Nevertheless, I would like to suggest that there are good reasons for accepting that a number of the discursive constructions of the Native I have discussed existed in widespread form in 1863. These constructions produced European subjects and Native objects within a European geo-historical discourse. In so doing they created a symbolic economy that fostered the notion of an evil Native Other, to be feared and loathed, but ultimately to be conquered by a superior masculine European rationality. In the chapter that follows, I wish to look more specifically and in greater detail at the mutually constitutive character of discourses of 'race' and gender and how they were implicated in constructions of the Native Other.

VIII 'RACE' AND GENDER IN NEWSPAPER ACCOUNTS OF THE WAR

In this chapter I plan to examine in much greater detail some of the colonial tropes that I introduced in chapter 7. I have two purposes for doing so. First, I wish to develop a more fine-grained analysis at this stage, examining in more empirical detail some of those issues I discussed in the previous chapter. Second, I wish to illustrate how an understanding of the relationship between European settlers and Maori people cannot be gained without also understanding the symbolic relationship between masculinity and femininity. In this sense, then, I argue that the symbolic economy of 'race' and racism cannot be disentangled from that of gender and masculinism. 'Race' and gender are mutually constitutive categories.

As Audrey Kobayashi and Linda Peake (1994: 230) point out,

Racism and sexism of the late nineteenth century were neither simple nor simple minded. They were supported and sanctioned through a complex system of social mores, including religious norms. Because they were systematic, they included women and racialized peoples in such ways that these groups often became complicit in their own subjugation, submitting their own values to the standard of logical, rational, and powerful, white man.

In Chapter 6 I illustrated some of this complexity with regard to the wider (Western) discursive arena. My intention here is to illustrate how such complex systems of social mores -- what I would term discursive settings -- were both reflected and reconstituted in the rhetorics of Auckland newspapers in 1863. I concentrate upon what I detect to be a series of dichotomous concepts constructed in the newspapers. I introduce each of the dichotomous concepts by focussing first on the way a racialised and negatively valued Other was constructed by newspaper rhetoric and counterposed to a positively valued European (British) settler subject. A

number of authors (e.g. Ward 1973¹⁰¹; Buchanan 1990; Walker 1990; Pawson 1992; Belich 1986) have illustrated ways that discursive dichotomies of 'race' worked to marginalise Maori people in nineteenth-century New Zealand. The work by these authors has produced a significant intervention in the cultural politics of identity and difference in Aotearoa/New Zealand and thus they have had a significant political impact in the struggle against racism. My own political purpose differs slightly in that I also wish to contest sexism and masculinism (including my own). Accordingly, I attempt here to extend the argument in another direction, illustrating how the racialised dichotomies of 'difference' are inextricably caught up in a mutually constitutive relationship with constructions of gender.

THE WHITE MAN'S BURDEN AND BRITISH MASCULINE SUPERIORITY

James Walvin (1987) links the British anti-slavery movement, school sports, and masculinities to the changing orders of imperialism and racism. Following the British abolition of slavery in 1838, he suggests, the British were able to congratulate themselves on their moral superiority.

The evangelical drive against slavery, first in British possessions, later against foreign slaveries, itself became a form of cultural imperialism, enabling Britain to hawk its moral superiority around the world, and to insist that others -- Europeans as well as 'native peoples' -- should accord to the standards of the new found morality (Walvin 1987: 243).

During the imperial era, Britain took it upon itself to stamp out slavery among those indigenous peoples whose territories it colonised. "Slavery, along with 'heathenism', was henceforth regarded as the major vice of uncivilised peoples..." (Walvin 1987: 244).¹⁰² British literature, especially

101 After this chapter was written a 'corrected' version of Ward's *A Show of Justice* was reprinted by Auckland University Press (see Ward 1995).

102 A similar relationship evolved in India where the British attempted to halt the Indian

books aimed at boys and young men, was filled with stories of British males confronting and suppressing slavery in hostile regions of the world. Eventually, British success in combating slavery began to reduce the potency of the appeal to anti-slavery. However, by then the discourse of British moral superiority was so powerful it had a life of its own. Indeed, by the mid-nineteenth century, a "view of a benign British imperialism motivated by good will towards less fortunate mankind took hold of most forms of learning, formal and informal, directed towards the nation's young" (Walvin 1987: 248). Rudyard Kipling's poem "The White Man's Burden" is emblematic of how the British envisioned this 'benign' imperialism, and I reproduce a particularly apposite verse here to illustrate just some of its rhetorical power:

Take up the White Man's
burden --

 The savage wars of peace --
Fill full the mouth of Famine
 And bid the sickness cease;
And when your goal is
nearest

 The end for others sought,
Watch sloth and heathen
Folly

 Bring all your hope to
nought.

(Kipling 1941).

As Kipling's poetry illustrates, the notion of a benign British imperialism relied, in turn, upon ideas about the uncivilised nature and savage character of the peoples who inhabited newly colonised lands such as New Zealand. In this sense, then, one finds examples of what I described in the previous

continued

custom of *sati*, or bride burning. This phenomenon has been analysed by a number of postcolonial writers (see, e.g., Mani 1985; Spivak 1985; Sunder Rajan 1990). While decrying the gruesome nature of *sati* itself, these writers point out the symbolic appropriation of it by the British as a symbol of their own superiority.

chapter as debasement of the Other in order to reinforce the acceptability -- indeed, inevitability -- of British imperialism. The British mission in New Zealand was to bring civilization to the Native, as the excerpt from a letter to the *Daily Southern Cross* presented in Table 8.1 illustrates. Here the

Table 8.1. Excerpt from a letter to the Editor of the *Daily Southern Cross*.

As to the expense of the war, that is a question which should be settled as soon as possible, since if it is not to be borne in great measure by the Imperial Government in support of the Queen's dominion, it must be thrown at once upon the enemy, who are so determined to force this war upon us, even to the extent of engaging in it before the right time. "To kill or be killed" is now our only safeguard, and surely the colonists must not be held liable for all the loss and ruin which it may be the pleasure of the Maori to inflict. The confiscation scheme of Sir George Grey on rebellious natives is the most sensible and merciful act which has been applied to them for the past twenty years, and our only regret is that it has not yet been proclaimed as the universal rule throughout the country. It is but fair as well as politic to detach as many of the tribes as possible from the present ruinous warfare; and no means would so effectually accomplish this end as the proclamation of such a policy. To the Maori his land is his life, his God, his religion, his everything, and when he is assured that that treasure will fall a sacrifice to his rebellion, the chances are that he will reconsider the question, and adopt the safest plan. But then he must be made to believe that we are in earnest by seeing the lands so confiscated in our real occupations, or he will be more contemptuous than ever, and the war will be indefinitely prolonged. It is the only way in which this country will hereafter be peacefully and beneficially occupied, and it is the only way in which the natives will ever submit themselves to the restrictions and blessings of a really civilised life. The other plan has been tried long enough, and has resulted in nothing but ruinous and periodical wars, and so it will be to the end unless we grasp the difficulty at once and force the natives to save themselves from misery and extermination. And all this is consistent with the highest sentiment and the deepest Christian feeling towards an interesting but misguided race.	1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27
---	---

Source: *Daily Southern Cross*, 24 July 1863, page 4

correspondent argues in favour of confiscation of 'rebel' lands in order to effect a swift completion of the war, in which the only option open to the settlers is "To kill or be killed..." (lines 5-6). In justifying such draconian measures -- which are both "fair as well as politic" (line 11) -- the author suggests that it is "the only way in which this country will hereafter be peacefully and beneficially occupied, and it is the only way in which the natives will ever submit themselves to the restrictions and blessings of a

really civilised life" (lines 20-22). Ironically, the importance that Maori people give to the land is recognised -- "to the Maori his land is his life..." (lines 14-15) -- but this fact is used to justify its confiscation. The author positions the Imperial Government on the side of civility and Christianity, and the Native as its opposite, as savage heathens. In doing so the author is able, paradoxically, to justify killing Maori and confiscating their lands in order to "force the natives to save themselves from misery and extermination" (lines 25-26). He is able to do so, moreover, because "all this is consistent with the highest sentiment and the deepest Christian feeling towards an interesting but misguided race" (lines 26-27). In other words, the end justifies the means....

This kind of thinking draws on classic tropes of colonialism that can be found throughout the Newspaper reports of the period under examination. Such colonialist rhetorics are particularly evident in the excerpt of an editorial from the *Daily Southern Cross* presented in Table 8.2.

Table 8.2. Excerpts from the *Daily Southern Cross*, 13 July 1863.

DAY after day brings us nearer the final settlement of the native difficulty. Now that action	1
has been resolved upon in earnest, we can perceive many supposed obstacles to our success	2
disappear, and it only requires the Government and the colonists to be true to each other, to	3
ensure the speedy and triumphant issue of the struggle upon which we have entered. As	4
matters now stand we cannot anticipate anything but a straightforward and resolute policy	5
on the part of our rulers. To falter at this crisis would be to embolden the enemy of law and	6
order, and protract the war -- perhaps even to widen the arena. That this would be the	7
inevitable consequence of indecision, in however mitigated a form it might be manifested,	8
appears to us so apparent, that we cannot allow ourselves to think otherwise than we have	10
already expressed, namely, that our dealings with the natives in future be characterised by	11
straightforwardness and resolution. Assuming, therefore, that it is the settled purpose of the	12
Government to reduce the Maori race to obedience to the law of the land, and by so doing to	13
elevate and civilize those who remain, we can promise the Government, on the part of the	14
people, a willing support. It is the duty, as well as the interest of every European in this	15
community to strengthen the hands of those in authority, when they resolve to encounter the	16
enemy of order in the only way that the enemy can be encountered, leaving to another time	17
the adjustment of those political questions which have arisen, through the action of	18
Ministers, since the prorogation of the Assembly. And that duty, we are confident, will be	19
performed without complaining by our fellow citizens, for they can now see something	20
definite for which to make sacrifices. There is no uncertainty as to the result. The duty of	21
Ministers is not now the old but undignified one of speculating whether this or that chief or	22
hapu would be pleased to accept "institution," which they were incapable of decently	23
carrying out and pay for doing what had, in most instances, been better left undone. The	24
solution of the native difficulty has assumed a new, more simple, and withal a more natural	25
form. At length we have the opposing forces of civilization and barbarism brought front to	26
front;-- and who amongst us can doubt the issue? We have only one opinion on the subject	27

-- that the supremacy of the law will be enforced by the General commanding in New Zealand, and that the first great lesson in civilization, namely, to sacrifice a portion of natural liberty in deference to a policy that ensures the enjoyment of substantial and rational freedom, will be taught them at the same time. Leaving the consideration of minor matters to another occasion, let us take a glance at the present aspect of affairs, so far as we know it, and see what the Government and the colonists are mutually bound to do to facilitate the action of the General. We find the natives in Taranaki, with a few exceptions, obstinately opposed to us, and for anything we know to the contrary, at this moment engaged in conflict with the Imperial and Colonial forces stationed in that province. We likewise find that to the south, in Wanganui, there is a feeling of decided hostility, which may at any moment assume an active form, and precipitate a struggle in the district of Wellington province. I would be blinking the truth if we excluded from this section of the natives those who inhabit the Hawke's Bay and the East Cape district of Auckland. In the very heart of the country we have also the Waikato rebels in arms against us, and the old and avowed kingites have just been joined by a number of natives whose proximity to Auckland, and frequent intercourse with Europeans, should have taught them the solid advantage of remaining friendly with us, and the folly of joining their rebel brethren. But so it is; and with such instances before us, may we not look with just suspicion upon the loyalty of every Maori in the North Island! For our own part we distinctly avow cherishing such a suspicion, and we would seriously press the point upon the consideration of the Government. We do so, not because we wish the Government to resort to such extreme measures with such of the natives as may nominally remain neutral during the war, but only to use ordinary precaution that the enemy, against whom our forces have gone forth, will not receive early intelligence of everything that transpires in Auckland. We have instances on record of the rapidity of Maori posts; and we think it would be better for all of us if not a single native postman was allowed to remain in this city or vicinity. We are not afraid of the Maoris, friendly or unfriendly, but as a matter of prudence we put it to the Government whether they had not better provide a safe retreat for all the natives who choose to avail themselves of the offer, and look after their Government. What they have done in reference to the Maoris is only a beginning, stopping short at the point which would ensure the city against conflagrations, and prevent the enemy obtaining precise intelligence of our movements. Another duty of the Government appears to us to be to issue a proclamation, declaring forfeit to the Crown every acre of territory held by rebel natives, and to take speedy steps to obtain an act of Assembly to give legal effect to the proclamation. This course would have a most salutary effect on the native mind, and would go far towards confirming waverers, It would also be a most politic measure, enabling the colony to defer the war charges and to reward those who risk their lives during the war. Half measures will not do. The rebellion is not a local outbreak, nor is to be put down by gentle pressure. It is general and threatening, and it requires a strong hand to deal with it. Circumstances will doubtless arise requiring special treatment, but looking at the subject as a whole, we do not think the Government are justified in hesitating one day longer in regard to the two points raised. The ruling of the Chief Justice likewise renders action in one respect imperative. The belligerent natives are declared to be rebels in arms against the Sovereign, and must be dealt with in all respects as British subjects. From this ruling the Government cannot recede, nor can they avoid its consequences. Let them, therefore, meet the difficulties of the position into which they have been forced, and appeal to the colony for support without ambiguity or hesitation. Between the Government and the colony at this juncture there should be a thorough understanding; and we venture to predict, if this course is now, at the eleventh hour adopted, that the public will be ready to make any sacrifice within their power to strengthen the hands not only of the General in command, but of his Excellency and his responsible advisers.	28 29 30 31 32 33 34 35 36 37 38 39 40 41 42 43 44 45 46 47 48 49 50 51 52 53 54 55 56 57 58 59 60 61 62 63 64 65 66 67 68 69 70 71 72 73 74 75 76 77
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Source: *Daily Southern Cross*, 13 July 1863, pages 2-3

The rather lengthy excerpt in Table 8.2 was taken from an editorial published two days subsequent to the invasion of the Waikato, but one day prior to the

Governor's proclamation to the Chiefs of the Waikato. It is interesting for me because it contains many of the colonial tropes I wish to consider in this chapter.

I begin my analysis with a brief summary of the main points of the editorial. The newspaper makes clear from the outset that it believes much of the problems facing Auckland Province stem from "the Native difficulty" (line 1) -- problems *of* Natives *for* Europeans. Such difficulties arise because the Natives are "the enemy of law and order" (lines 6-7; also see line 17). Accordingly, the settlers are opposed by "belligerent natives" (line 69), otherwise known as "the Waikato rebels in arms... and the old avowed kingites" (lines 41-42). For the newspaper, "The rebellion is not a local outbreak.... It is general and threatening" (lines 64-65). As a result, the *Daily Southern Cross* concludes: "At length we have the opposing forces of civilization and barbarism brought front to front" (lines 26-27). The appropriate European response is not "gentle pressure" (line 65). Indeed, the situation "requires a strong hand to deal with it" (lines 65-66) and "half measures will not do" (line 64). What is called for then, is "action... resolved upon in earnest" (lines 1-2), "a straightforward and resolute policy on the part of our rulers" (lines 5-6). Failure to act resolutely -- "the inevitable consequence of indecision" (lines 7-8) -- would merely "embolden the enemy of law and order" (lines 6-7). "Straightforwardness and resolution" (line 12), however, "would have a most salutary effect on the native mind" (lines 61-62). Moreover, quick action on the part of Government would serve "to reduce the Maori race to obedience to the law of the land, and by so doing to elevate and civilize those who remain" (lines 13-14). In so doing, the European would help to teach the Native "the first great lesson in civilization, namely, to sacrifice a portion of natural liberty in deference to a policy that ensures the enjoyment of substantial and rational freedom" (lines 29-31).

In these passages one can detect a clear relationship between racism and masculinity. For example, the paper argues for "a strong hand" (lines 65-66) and "Straightforwardness and resolution" (line 12) -- qualities associated with a certain kind of martial masculinity. It opposes these valued masculine qualities to the devalued feminine qualities associated with "half measures" (line 64), "indecision" (line 8) and "gentle pressure" (line 65). The masculine qualities are then posited as the appropriate means for dealing with the 'Native problem'. In this construction, then, it is only through specifically masculine actions that the British can "reduce the Maori race to obedience to the law of the land, and... elevate and civilize" them (lines 13-14). Other less confrontational and less violent approaches are associated with femininity and are then ignored except for their use as negative counterpoints to the masculinist and racist approach to conflict resolution.

In summarising the editorial from the *Daily Southern Cross* I have deliberately 'mixed and matched' various key phrases to highlight just how interchangeable was the colonial rhetoric of the newspaper. In other words, it appears that both the positive characterisations of Europeans and the negative characterisations of Natives can be inserted anywhere in the text where, respectively, Europeans and Natives are discussed. This rhetoric creates two opposing subject positions: a positively valued European and a negatively valued Native. As with most identity politics of this sort, the two groups are positioned in stark opposition to each other -- "the opposing forces of civilization and barbarism" (lines 31-32) -- with no recognition of their shared attributes. This, of course, is part of the purpose of such rhetoric, namely to construct a debased Other that is absolutely different from the Self (Kristeva 1982; Spurr 1993). This newspaper editorial is therefore as much about constructing a positive (self) image of Europeans as it is about finding a solution for "the native difficulty". But what exactly were the characteristics of this positively valued European subject?

Certainly, one key component of this subject position is rooted in the Western notion of civilization. After all, it was ostensibly their 'civilizing mission' that brought Europeans to New Zealand in the first place. References to Europeans' civility and their destiny to "elevate and civilize" (Table 8.2, lines 16-17) the savage Native fill the newspaper reports of the war. The binary distinction between civilised Europeans and savage Natives is made quite explicit by the *Daily Southern Cross* when it characterises the current situation and the likelihood of war as "the opposing forces of civilization and barbarism brought front to front" (Table 8.2, lines 26-27). It goes on to argue in favour of the war, suggesting that it is a way to ensure

that the supremacy of the law will be enforced by the General commanding in New Zealand, and that the *first great lesson in civilization*, namely, to sacrifice a portion of natural liberty in deference to a policy that ensures the enjoyment of substantial and rational freedom, will be taught [the Natives] at the same time (Table 8.1, lines 28-31; my emphasis).

I shall return later in my text to discuss the notions of "natural liberty" and "rational freedom", for now I wish to concentrate on the 'civilising mission' of those who wished to vigorously prosecute the war. This idea resonates with those expressed in the lead article from the very same edition of the *Daily Southern Cross*. In that article the newspaper reports on a recent judicial decision of the Chief Justice of the colony which declared that "Every man, Woman, and child domiciled within these shores... are subjects of her Majesty and must obey the laws" (*Daily Southern Cross*, 13 July 1863, page 2). Like the editorial published the same day (see Table 8.2) the lead article links British colonisation -- and victory over the Natives -- to the safety of the country and the civilizing mission of the White Man:

The decision expressed in these words is one of greater importance than might at first sight appear, and this for the simple reason that it narrows, in a very material way, the loopholes of escape for those who, either afflicted with a blindness almost inconceivable, or driven on by the very demon of party spirit, are bent upon finding

some way whereby *the safety of the country, and the civilization of the natives*, may be indefinitely postponed (*Daily Southern Cross*, 13 July 1863, page 2, Lead Article, my emphasis).

Similar themes can be detected in a number of other articles published at this time. Commenting two days earlier upon the unrelated issue of the lack of food among the Raglan Natives, for example, the *Daily Southern Cross* (11 July 1863, page 3, Lead Article, my emphasis) reinforces the civilised/savage dichotomy:

Whatever leads the Maori away from that entire self-dependence so characteristic of the *savage*, and renders him dependent upon the *civilised* community is, so far as the peace of both races, and also his own ultimate progress is concerned, a matter of enormous importance.

In this construction, Native self-dependence is discouraged, while "dependen[ce] upon the civilised community" -- read as 'British' -- is to be encouraged because of its important for "the peace of both races" as well as the "ultimate progress" of the Native. Interestingly, the ideas expressed here contradict common gendered constructions of 'savage Natives' as dependent, and Britons as independent (and masculine). It would seem that Natives are refusing to recognise their dependence on the British, who in turn can be either dependent or independent, depending on the circumstances. The dichotomy engendered here still marginalises the Native subject.

Civilised Warfare

The binary rhetoric of civilization versus savagery escalates once the British invade the Waikato and actual hostilities occur. In this case, however, the binary logic translates as one that posits the civilised British practice of warfare against the barbarous, murderous guerilla tactics of the Maori. In speaking about the aftermath of the engagement at Koheroa, where General

Cameron with 553 men attacked and defeated a small force of Maori,¹⁰³ the *Daily Southern Cross* (25 July 1863, page 3, "FROM OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT") emphasises both the bravery and the chivalry of the general commanding the British forces:

The high-bred chivalry General Cameron has shown the Maoris, one day personally leading the attack against their entrenchments, and the next not only receiving their flag of truce and granting them time to search for their dead, but proposing medical care for their numerous wounded, must have a powerful effect on our barbarian enemy in teaching him the amenities of civilised warfare.

The *Daily Southern Cross* counterposes the chivalric character of the British forces against the less worthy qualities of the "barbarian enemy". It reinforces this dichotomy by reporting on numerous 'atrocities' and 'barbarous murders' committed by Natives. The following selection of excerpts should serve to illustrate this point:

BARBAROUS MURDER OF TWO SETTLERS BY NATIVES NEAR DRURY

The following appeared in our third edition yesterday:--
[FROM OUR SPECIAL CORRESPONDENT.]

July 15.

Having written a short dispatch this morning, I started for the front from Drury, and had only proceeded about a mile from the camp, when I received the astounding intelligence that two settlers had been murdered by the natives half-a-mile further on....

The murdered men are Mr. Meredith and one of his sons -- men deservedly respected in the community (*Daily Southern Cross*, 16 July, page 3).

It is striking how in the above quote it is taken-for-granted that Natives were the culprits behind the deaths of Mr. Meredith and his son. Moreover, as if to emphasise the atrocity and savagery of the Natives, the writer emphasises "deservedly respected" character of the dead. I do not wish to ignore the atrocity of war, or to marginalise the significance of the deaths in this specific

¹⁰³ While the British claimed the Maori numbered between 300 and 400 men, Belich (1986: 134) suggests there were likely no more than 150 Maori and possibly as few as 100.

case which saw two relatively 'innocent' settlers killed by Maori people. Instead I would like to suggest that such atrocities are the inevitable outcome of war itself, and that all those who engage in war are forced by circumstances to undertake violent acts. In this sense, I acknowledge that the murder of Mr. Meredith and his son was a savage act, but do not abstract this act from the larger discursive and material context of the savagery of war itself. The newspaper rhetorics of 1863 tended to ignore altogether this larger frame of reference.

I write this section after returning from two weeks in North America where the American press and electronic news media has been saturated with reports of the bombing of the Federal Government building in Oklahoma City. Immediately, I am struck by the similarities between the discursive moves of war reports in the 1863 Auckland press and the present-day reports of the Oklahoma City bombing. In particular, I see similar discursive moves at work in the attempt to spread the blame for savage acts from a few 'savage people' to a larger marginalised group. While it is now felt that the bombing was an act of a few disgruntled US citizens, in the confusion immediately following the Oklahoma bombing, the media was quick to blame 'middle eastern terrorists'. A related discursive move can be seen in the following excerpt from the *Daily Southern Cross* (17 July 1863, page 3):

If there was anything wanting to stir up a spirit of indignation and horror at the conduct of the rebels, we have it in the recent barbarous murder of Mr. Meredith and his son, and if the authors of, and accessories to this murder cannot be singled out and dealt with as the crime deserves, the least that can be asked is that those who, to all appearances, countenance such acts of atrocity shall, without more delay than is necessary, be driven to a distance, where they will have to contend with an armed force and where it will be out of their power to exhibit their treachery at the expense of the lives of peaceful settlers.

In this quote, the newspaper attempts to construct all Maori (that is "those who... countenance such acts of atrocity") as culpable in the atrocities of war.

Despite the need for 'friendly Natives' which I discussed in the previous chapter, the newspaper attempts to paint all Natives as threats to "peaceful settlers".

Such is not the case with the next excerpt from the *Daily Southern Cross*. It makes a distinction between friendly and unfriendly Natives. Nevertheless, it advocates removal of friendly Natives so that they are "out of harm's way". In so doing, it weakens the distinction and effectively constructs all Natives as dangerous. The very presence of Natives "expose[s] settlers to the most savage murders":

We, however, will not shrink from speaking out boldly that which is the conviction of every settler, and which will soon become evident as an absolute necessity of the country. Arrangements must be made for removing ALL friendly natives out of harm's way, and all others must be hunted down. If there are now three hundred Maoris within our frontier line, we expose settlers to the most savage murders every day that we suffer these barbarians to go at liberty. The task is a fearful one, but it will require to be undertaken and done thoroughly too, and the sooner the better. Settlers could and would do much, but until they are regularly given to understand that arrangements have been made for securing the innocent natives, they will, as Englishmen, be slow to risk the chance of confounding the innocent with the guilty in that sweeping destruction which the barbarism of the latter so pressingly demands at our hands (*Daily Southern Cross*, 21 July 1863, page 3, Lead Article).

The final quote from the *Daily Southern Cross* discusses the killing of Captain Calvert's son. Here the newspaper's description obtains some of its rhetorical power because it describes an event that transgresses norms of public and private (and their associated masculine and feminine codings). War is a masculine spectacle carried out, ostensibly, in the public sphere. In this regard, what might otherwise be considered 'normal' acts of war can become 'atrocities' when the boundary between public and private are transgressed. Thus it is acceptable for a soldier to kill hundreds of other soldiers on a battlefield (the public sphere of war), but if that same soldier were to kill people in their homes (the private sphere) that act would become

classified as an atrocity. This appears to underlie some of the rhetorical power of the following report of the Native attacks on Captain Calvert and the farmer Cooper.

A SON of Capt. Calvert, residing on the Wairoa road, near Papakura, was shot by the Natives this morning. They attacked the house and fired at their victim as he was standing at the door. Capt. and Mrs. Calvert ran into the bedroom, and the former came out with a sword and drove the natives away. The son reached the camp of the 18th, and there died.

A settler of the name of Cooper has also been shot. He went into the paddock this morning to fetch his cows to milk; a number of Maories approached and fired two or three shots, which mortally wounded him, for he only lived two hours. The Maories completed their barbarous work by setting fire to his clothes and burning the body (*Daily Southern Cross*, 25 July 1863, page 3, "FROM OUR CORRESPONDENT").

The *Daily Southern Cross* makes a point in its lead article from 21 July of reinforcing again the essentially civilised character of the settlers, who would "as Englishmen, be slow to risk the chance of confounding the innocent with the guilty". The Natives in the rhetorical constructions from all four examples, on the other hand, are nothing less than rebellious and barbarous murderers who perpetrate acts of atrocity and treachery.

The newspapers (and in this case, the *Daily Southern Cross* in particular) have thus constructed a clear and simple dichotomy between a positively-valued British (or settler) subject and a negatively-valued Native subject. Authors like Ward (1973) and Belich (1986) have already discussed this dichotomous racialisation process, in terms of both the substantive history, as well as the historiography, of the wars (on this latter point see Ellis 1994). I have indicated already, however, that this dichotomy was not as simple as it first appears. In this sense, I argue that it was complicated by (mostly) unspoken discourses of masculinity and femininity. These notions, rather than being explicit in the text of the newspapers, tended to be 'present' in the texts only as significant absences attached to more visible concepts. The civilising mission of the White Man, for example, relied upon a particular set

of gendered notions about what comprised 'civilization' and who could enjoy full membership status as 'citizen' (Pateman 1988; Young 1990a; Elshtain 1993; Seidler 1994).

GENDERING CIVIL SOCIETY

Although the term 'civilization' now generally describes an "achieved state or condition of organized social life", it originally referred to a process or state of change (Williams 1983: 57). During the mid-nineteenth century, both senses of the term applied. According to Raymond Williams (1983: 58; original emphasis),

...**civilization**, from 1C18 [the late eighteenth century], is a specific combination of the ideas of a process and an achieved condition. It has behind it the general spirit of the Enlightenment, with its emphasis on secular and progressive human self-development. **Civilization** expressed this sense of historical process, but also celebrated the associated sense of modernity: an achieved condition of refinement and order.

Williams does not, however, point out the key role that implicit assumptions of *universality* and *impartiality* play in this particularly 'Western' conception of 'civilization'. These implicit assumptions rely, in turn, upon the masculinist dichotomy between the 'public' and 'private' spheres of social life. In the end, these concepts interlock in complex ways to exclude women and others associated with the body, nature, disorder, and desire (Pateman 1988; Young 1990a: Ch. 4; Elshtain 1993).

In masculinist histories, the rise of civilization is linked directly to the development of 'civil society'. As Carole Pateman (1988: 25) argues:

the meaning of 'civil society' is ambiguous and gains its meaning from a series of contrasts and opposition to other social forms. One contrast is between civil society and the state of nature but to picture the state of nature as a pre-social or asocial state is to claim that civil society represents social life -- civilization -- itself.

In hegemonic political theories, then, the concept of civil society is conflated with civilization. In turn, the idea of civil society is based upon the notion of

a 'public realm' which has operated via the interrelated dichotomies between public and private, reason and desire, and fact and value to exclude certain persons and groups (Young 1990a; Pateman 1988; Elshtain 1993). As Iris Marion Young (1990a: 107-108) points out, the "public realm attains its generality only by the exclusion of particularity, desire, feeling, and those aspects of life associated with the body." In Enlightenment philosophy, the civic public associated with the public realm can only be thought in unified terms if the particularity of social life is banished to some other realm. That other realm is inhabited by Woman, children and racialised Others.

Such was not always the case, however, as the newly developing urban centres of eighteenth century Europe saw the development also of a highly differentiated public polity (Habermas, in Young 1990a).¹⁰⁴ According to Young (1990a: 108), "[t]his unbridled public mixed sexes and classes to some degree, mixed serious discourse with play, and mixed the aesthetic with the political." This heterogeneous and playful notion of 'civil society' did not survive republican philosophy, however, which developed the notion of a universalist state grounded in impartial reason partly as a response to this differentiated (and therefore threatening) public (Young 1990a). The political philosophy of Rousseau is paradigmatic of this republican philosophy (Elshtain 1993: Ch. 4). Rousseau argued that the 'narrow' premise of individual desire does not provide an appropriate normative foundation on which to construct common interests. Reason provides the only acceptable means by which people can come together to recognise common interests. For Rousseau, then, it became necessary to oppose a universal dis-interested reason to the particularity of interests, desires, and needs (Elshtain 1993). In

¹⁰⁴ Moreover, as writers like Wheelwright (1987) and Laqueur (1990) have shown, the division between male and female was not as strictly policed in the eighteenth century as it was by the mid-nineteenth century.

arguing for a universal and reasonable public realm, Rousseau needed to develop an appropriate location to dis-place feelings, affections, and the needful qualities of human social life. Accordingly, he believed that these qualities should find expression in the private realm of domestic life "over which women are the proper moral guardians" (Young 1990a: 109).

Rousseau thus conceived of two spheres to social life, the public realm of Man, and the private realm of Woman (Elshtain 1993). Women -- as the nurturers and caretakers of affectivity, desires and needs -- must be excluded from the public realm of civil society (and thus 'civilization'). Their bodily presence in the public sphere could corrupt the separation of reason from desire, mind from body. As Jean Bethke Elshtain (1993: 165) puts it,

If women participated in Rousseau's public sphere on a par with men, the complexly interrelated structure of public and private alike would erode: without someone to tend the hearth, the legislative hallways would grow silent and empty, or become noisily corrupt.

I am not so certain that I would agree fully with the implications of Elshtain's argument, namely that women were completely excluded from the public sphere of civil society. Instead I would suggest that they had to adopt a masculine subjectivity in order to make their way in the public sphere. Civilization was thus a space (both physical and metaphorical) reserved for disembodied, dispassionate masculine reason (Young 1990a: 110). In the sections that follow I wish to outline some of the ways that newspaper rhetorics (re)produced discursively this exclusion of both femininity and the Native from the public realm of Civilization.

RATIONALITY/IRRATIONALITY

The concept of Rationality provides one of the key discursive tropes by which Woman and the Native were excluded from the masculine realm of Civilization. As Williams (1983) observes, the term 'rational' derives from and indicates relationships to a complex constellation of concepts. I am interested specifically in its close relationship to the concept of 'reason'.

From the late thirteenth century reason has had two meanings in English: first as a statement of understanding or account of things, and second, as the human faculty for specific kinds of thought and understanding. To be 'rational' was thus to have or to exercise the faculty of reason. This latter meaning came to have considerable significance in Enlightenment thought in which "the distinction between *reason* and *emotion*, the 'two sides' of human nature became conventional" by the late eighteenth century (Williams 1983: 254; original emphasis).

At the same time, as Victor Seidler (1994: 23) has pointed out, Enlightenment thought constructed knowledge as 'objective', and that objectivity could only be attained through a faculty of reason that was sharply demarcated from emotion, nature and desire: "It is reason that is the source of knowledge, while our emotions and feelings as part of our natural selves merely serve as distractions." As I have already discussed in Chapter 2, reason has long been associated with masculinity while emotion was a specifically feminine trait (Jay 1981; Lloyd 1984; Bordo 1986; Seidler 1991; 1994). Women by dint of their role as childbearers, and Natives because of their marked Otherness, were both constructed as closer to nature, the body and emotions, and thus further from culture, the mind and reason. Reason was almost exclusively the domain of a hegemonic European masculinity.

While the newspaper reports of the time provide few direct references to Rationality and Reason, they can nevertheless be seen as representing a very *public* attempt at displaying a specific kind of European masculine rationality that is linked directly to the rise of modernity. Indeed, newspaper reports embodied the dis-passionate rationality and public face of masculine modernity. The rational-reasonable perspective was so taken-for-granted by the newspapers of the day that there was rarely a need to make its presence explicit in their text. The problem of identifying the strains of rationality is compounded by the fact that the disembodied reason that was hegemonic in

the 1860s closely resembles the forms of rationality and reasoning that dominate textual representation today. It may thus be difficult for analysts or readers who are just as immersed in, and socialised by, hegemonic concepts of rationality and "man-made language" (Spender 1985), to discern how these concepts structured nineteenth century newspaper reports. Nevertheless, there are some clues to rationality's presence in the texts of newspaper reports in 1863.

Perhaps the clearest example of, and the best introduction to a discussion about how these notions of rationality and reason coalesce in the rhetorics of the Auckland press in ways that disempower women and Natives is found in the *Daily Southern Cross* of 13 July 1863 (Table 8.2, lines 27-31):

We have only one opinion on the subject -- that the supremacy of the law will be enforced by the General commanding in New Zealand, and that the first great lesson in civilization, namely, to sacrifice a portion of natural liberty in deference to a policy that ensures the enjoyment of substantial and rational freedom, will be taught them at the same time.

The newspaper constructs a dichotomy between the so-called "natural liberty" of the Native and the "substantial and rational freedom" of civilization. Such rational freedom is available to the Native only once they have been forced "by the General commanding in New Zealand" to give up their 'natural' ways and accepted "the supremacy of the law". In these constructs Natives are equated directly with Nature and the 'liberty' that it affords them. As natural beings, Natives are not bound by the 'responsibilities' that rationality imposes upon civilised peoples. One thus finds other references to the need for Natives to "submit themselves to the restrictions and blessings of a really civilised life" (*Daily Southern Cross*, 24 July 1863, page 4), implying some form of hierarchy of responsibility between the 'freedom' of nature and the 'restrictions' of civilization.

As simple beings who inhabit the metaphorical spaces of nature, Natives

are unable to see or understand the benefits of adopting a more civilised lifestyle. Thus, they must be forcibly brought to realise the errors of their ways, even if this might result in their virtual extermination. The significance of the potential for completely eradicating Natives was not lost on colonisers. It was, however, significantly reduced by the developmental teleology of Western notions of superiority which had decreed that the Natives were "already doomed to fall by the hands of civilized man" (*Daily Southern Cross*, 23 July 1863, page 3).

Women, nature and irrationality

The direct links between Natives and nature point to a further connection between the Native and white Woman. As Vron Ware (1992: 237) observes, there are almost endless numbers of hierarchically ordered binary distinctions in Western thought¹⁰⁵ and when combined with binary notions of gender, 'race' and class, they can articulate in contradictory ways:

Civilization, for example, is the other side of savagery. In some contexts, white women might indeed be associated with the idea that female nature is inherently uncivilized, primitive when compared to men, and lacking in self-control. In the context of imperialism or modern racism, the dominant ideology would place white women firmly in the civilized camp, in opposition to non-European women whose lack of social and political rights are to be read as a mark of cultural savagery.

Indeed, when the *Daily Southern Cross* suggests that "the first great lesson in civilization, namely, to sacrifice a portion of natural liberty in deference to a policy that ensures the enjoyment of substantial and rational freedom, will be taught [the Natives] at the same time", it constructs white women in association with the rational civilization of white men. As I have already pointed out in my discussion of the exclusionary character of Western

¹⁰⁵ It should be noted that these types of binary distinctions are not exclusive to so-called 'Western' societies, but rather they tend to take on a particular significance and power in such societies because of their articulation with Enlightenment Reason.

notions of 'civilization', however, women's supposedly 'irrational' character and their proximity to nature (as childbearers) always bring into question their ability to fully participate in the rational spaces of civilization. In this sense, their Otherness, while at times placed under erasure in order to meet the exigencies of wider racist considerations, can never fully be displaced.

I also suggest that fears of miscegenation, for example (see Bear 1994; Wolfe 1994), represented a deeper fear that (discursive notions about) the 'purity' of the 'European race' was threatened in New Zealand. Although debates about eugenics had yet to gain currency in New Zealand, there were clearly concerns about the 'purity' of a settler society situated so far from 'home'. Women -- both as childbearers and the members of society responsible for ensuring the virtue of the family -- came to represent a potential 'weak point' in the armour protecting the purity of whiteness. In part this explains the concerns that Natives were "constantly threatening to come down the river to ravage the settlement of Auckland".¹⁰⁶ As objects of sexual desire for hyper-masculine Maori men (in the minds of British 'men', at least), then, European women were thus paradoxically, the protectors of virtue and purity, and the potential source of its destruction.

Just as Civilization is a partial and selective construct in relation to Woman, so it is with Natives. Thus, while newspaper rhetorics call for forcibly civilizing the Natives, their Nativeness will always mark them as Other and prevent the Native from full membership in the space of citizenship. Ironically, then, Natives have little choice (in European discourse) but to remain as uncivilised objects of European attempts to discursively civilise them. In the end, Natives never have any real

¹⁰⁶ *The New Zealander*, 16 July 1863, page 3, "WAIKATO" (Governor Grey's proclamation to the Chiefs of Waikato).

opportunity for participating in their own destiny, but instead are caught up as objects in a European geo-historical discourse.

CHRISTIANITY/HEATHENISM

Christianity, and in particular the Protestant variants encouraged and legitimated by British governmental interests in New Zealand, is deeply implicated in Western notions of both modernity and civilization (Seidler 1991, 1994).¹⁰⁷ Although I found few *explicit* examples of the Christian/Heathen binary in newspaper rhetorics, I suggest that this dichotomous concept forms an essential component in the British construction of the Self and the Other. In this sense, I argue that Christianity -- as a label for a constellation of ideas about work (the Protestant work ethic), domesticity (the biblical construction of the woman's place), family (the heterosexual nuclear family), morality, and community -- also provides another common rhetorical trope by which British settlers to New Zealand disempowered Natives. Given the paucity of empirical evidence for my argument, however, it is important to view it as an initial theorisation about *one* of the roles that Christianity might have played in newspaper rhetorics of 1863. In emphasising its part in maintaining British hegemony, I do not wish to marginalise its potential for emancipation. Clearly, a number of Christian organisations (The Aborigines Protection Society, for example) worked to promote the interests of Native New Zealanders. Likewise, individual clergy such as Octavius Hadfield, archdeacon of Kapiti, worked tirelessly to promote Native rights. Nevertheless, I wish to argue that in rhetorical terms,

¹⁰⁷ Although not excepting Catholicism from critique I do not wish to make it my focus here. While there certainly were many Catholics in New Zealand at the time under examination in this study, I argue that my focus on Protestantism is not entirely inappropriate given the dominance of the Protestant mission in New Zealand and the support it received from the British government. For more on missionaries in New Zealand, see Yate (1835), Owens (1968), Binney (1969), and Fisher (1975).

Auckland colony who do support the war by asserting that their maxim "has been CONCILIATION -- respect for the natives, their lands, and their rights, and scrupulous integrity in every transaction with them" (lines 5-6, original emphasis). The newspaper asserts that these are not just ordinary efforts on the part of settlers to treat the Natives 'properly', however, but they are instead extraordinary undertakings. As the paper exuberantly put it: "Never since the creation of the world, or since nations commenced to colonise -- never have the aborigines of any land been treated with such affectionate solicitude" (lines 7-8). But that is not all, for it goes on to argue that "never have such costly experiments been made to civilise, Christianise, and elevate [the Natives] morally, socially, and politically" (lines 8-10). In this last statement one can see a complex intertwining of complicated, and contradictory, notions of British superiority, civilization, Christianity, morality, and modernising progress.

The logic of Christian teleological thought is visible here as well. This internal logic requires that Natives accept Christianity before they can ever become 'equal' to the British. Moreover, the process is constructed such that the Native subject is placed in a hierarchy where Christianity occupies the pinnacle and all other perspectives and spiritual approaches are inferior. The ability to "elevate" the Natives "morally, socially and politically" was so inextricably linked to the civilising mission of Christianity and the Enlightenment project of modernity, however, that it was impossible to differentiate the various strands of Christian moral thought from more secular 'political' and social concerns.¹⁰⁸ Nevertheless, it is important to recognise the importance of Christian ideals to these wider notions. I shall

¹⁰⁸ I would argue that the ability to elevate so-called 'uncivilised' and 'heathen' peoples was a teleological requirement built into the very heart of Christian rhetorics.

return to discuss the wider implications of this civilising mission later.

In a move which reflects thinking common at the time, and which shared an intellectual foundation with Social Darwinism, the *New Zealander* raises the spectre of "the fate which seems to be the doom of coloured races in their contact with whites" (lines 13-14). In presenting these concepts, the paper draws on a discourse of *natural* causes for the decline of Natives. Such discursive orderings constructed a teleological worldview in which New Zealand was *naturally* destined to be ruled by the fittest 'race', namely the British (e.g., Stocking 1968; Sorrenson 1979; Bolt 1984). According to this racist rhetoric, while it is regrettable that events should have lead to war, and that the Natives may even be exterminated,¹⁰⁹ this is merely the natural course of events.

Despite the inevitability of history, the *New Zealander* finds it necessary to affirm that the settlers' "hands are unstained by wrong", that their "consciences [are] untainted with injustice" (lines 16-17), and finally that "the war has been forced upon" the settlers (line 15).¹¹⁰ Interestingly, as David Spurr (1993) has observed of colonial discourse in general, the rhetorical

109 After all, "[o]f the result of the struggle, no one entertains a second opinion" (lines 20-21).

110 The idea that the war was forced upon the settlers is found in a number of newspaper reports. A lead article published in the *Daily Southern Cross* of 15 July 1863 (page 3, my emphasis), for example, repeats this notion in several locations:

"IN looking round us at this time, as all are no doubt doing as well as ourselves, with a view to ascertaining the amount of strength which we possess within ourselves to *resist the attacks of the rebel tribes* of Waikato."

"We have tried as never Englishmen tried before to *avoid fighting the Maoris*, and they have seen it; *when forced to fight* we have tried to do it on our own ground, and they have seen through and mocked at our attempt"

"[N]ow that we are on the eve of a great struggle, which must partake, in not a few respects, of the characteristics of the early American settlers' warfare with the Indians, we repeat the same opinion, we did not desire it, but we are ready to face it when it is *forced upon us*."

requirement to affirm these 'facts' points to the very contested quality of the issues raised. In this sense, if the settlers' consciences were as clear as the newspaper claims, there should be no need to even raise the matter. That it does so, and expends so much effort justifying the settlers' actions, places the veracity of its claims in doubt. Thus, it becomes questionable indeed whether the settlers were, in fact, "invited... to share" (line 18) Native land, or that the Natives "have been fully, fairly, and abundantly paid" (line 19). At the very least, the newspaper's rhetorics about "honest and honourable circumstances" are suspect.

Christianity, through its close symbolic and material connections to modernity and civilization, was complexly implicated in the newspaper's discursive attempts to disempower Natives. The newspapers relied upon notions of the heathen character of Natives, and therefore the British imperative to save their souls by introducing Christianity. For the newspapers (and the colonial 'community' they represented) the Natives were heathens who worshipped false idols. As I quoted earlier in the context of a different analysis, a correspondent to the *Daily Southern Cross* (24 July 1863, page 4, letter from an 'Observer', 22 July 1863) argued that "To the Maori his land is his life, his God, his religion, his everything". As I already noted, in colonial discourse, the heathen Natives were conceptualised as being close to an evil Nature that Christianity had overcome through reason. Moreover, in (re)producing the familiar dichotomy between Christian settlers and Heathen Natives, the newspapers could claim they were acting in God's Name for the good of all. As the *New Zealander* put it (Table 8.3, lines 19-20), "under such honest and honourable circumstances, we may fearlessly exclaim 'God defend the right!' " In so doing, the newspapers helped (re)produce the rhetorical and material disempowerment of Natives and contributed to their eventual objectification within the symbolic economy of colonial representation. But this economy was no simple

dichotomy, for just as the rhetorical tropes of the civilising mission of Christianity disempowered Natives, so too were they connected to masculinist practices that disempowered women and others lacking the 'appropriate' qualities necessary to be associated with hegemonic masculinity.

Gender and Christianity

Jean Bethke Elshtain (1993: 56) argues that "Christianity ushered a moral revolution into the world which dramatically, and for the better, transformed the prevailing images of male and female, public and private." While accepting Elshtain's comments about early Christianity -- especially as they were made to differentiate it from Greek thought -- I nevertheless wish to make a preliminary argument that in later times, and particularly in its Protestant variants, Christianity was deeply implicated in the repression of women and the construction of a masculinist hegemony (see, e.g. Walvin 1987; Kanitkar 1994). In order to understand this, it is important to acknowledge the myriad ways that Protestantism came to be associated with the rational, objective and masculine concepts of modernity so characteristic of Western thought (Weber 1976; Berman 1982; Mosse 1985; Mangan and Walvin 1987; Seidler 1991, 1994; Kanitkar 1994).

Modernity is organised around a specific concept of the rational subject "who is able to guide his life through reason alone" (Seidler 1994: 45).¹¹¹ The Enlightenment established a specific identification between modernity and masculinity (Seidler 1991: 65). The rational subject of modernity is reliant upon notions of impartiality and universality for its moral, ethical and political efficacy. Yet, as I and others have already noted, these notions of

¹¹¹ I suspect that Seidler purposely uses the masculine pronoun 'his' in this context to emphasize the connections between masculinity and reason.

impartiality and universality have ideological origins and effects. As Young (1990a: 97) so aptly puts it, impartiality "masks the ways in which the particular perspectives of dominant groups claim universality, and helps to justify hierarchical decisionmaking structures." The universalism and impartiality of modernity is thus exclusive rather than inclusive (Pateman 1988; Young 1990a; Seidler 1991, 1994). Modernity is grounded within the experience of men, and thus "it sets up this experience as an ideal that others have to fulfil if they are to be allowed, even temporarily, within the magic circle of humanity" (Seidler 1994: 45).

Protestantism, in its secularised form, has provided much of the terms by which these aspects of modernity are understood in the West (Weber 1976; Mosse 1985; Seidler 1991, 1994). As Seidler (1991: 65) suggests, the modern age may have constructed a secular world, "but it fundamentally offered a secularised form of Protestant culture as the source for its universal conception of reason and agency." In this sense, Christianity provided the "common sense" of modernity (Seidler 1994: 48; also see Weber 1976; Mangan and Walvin 1987).

As a rhetorical construct, Christianity occupies a contradictory position in the history of ideas. On the one hand, 'Christian values' underpin oppositional and emancipatory movements. Thus one finds the *Daily Southern Cross* (18 July 1863, page 4, "THE WAR IN AUCKLAND -- ENGAGEMENTS AT SHEPHERD'S BUSH AND KOHEROA -- HEAVY LOSSES") reported on the Bishop of New Zealand having warned the settlers against their own insecurity, and

... on more than one occasion, [having] drawn a historical parallel between Maoris and the Scots at Culloden, and the united Irishmen -- [who] are fighting for a nationality, and of course should not be blamed.

On the other hand, Christianity is implicated with, or at the very least, acquiesced in, the denigration of nature, the commodification of people as

slaves, and the subordination of Woman to Man. While it is difficult to find in the Auckland press of 1863 explicit reference to illustrate these assertions, some examples of the kinds of rhetorics of Christianity that disempower Natives can be found. The letter to the editor of the *Daily Southern Cross*, which I earlier excerpted in Table 8.1 provides one such example. I repeat a portion of that excerpt here for ease of reference:

To the Maori his land is his life, his God, his religion, his everything, and when he is assured that that treasure will fall a sacrifice to his rebellion, the chances are that he will reconsider the question, and adopt the safest plan. But then he must be made to believe that we are in earnest by seeing the lands so confiscated in our real occupations, or he will be more contemptuous than ever, and the war will be indefinitely prolonged. It is the only way in which this country will hereafter be peacefully and beneficially occupied, and it is the only way in which the natives will ever submit themselves to the restrictions and blessings of a really civilised life. The other plan has been tried long enough, and has resulted in nothing but ruinous and periodical wars, and so it will be to the end unless we grasp the difficulty at once and force the natives to save themselves from misery and extermination. And all this is consistent with the highest sentiment and the deepest Christian feeling towards an interesting but misguided race (*Daily Southern Cross*, 24 July 1863, page 4).

As I read this excerpt, the correspondent is suggesting that the only way to ensure that the Natives submit to civilised life, is by threatening confiscation of land -- and backing up that threat with force. What is interesting is the way that the correspondent opposes the "restrictions and blessings of a really civilised life" with the "misery" of Native life. Given that the attempt to force Natives to accept civilised life is seen as being "consistent with the highest sentiment and the deepest Christian feeling", I suggest that "civilised life" involves acceptance of Christian values. Accordingly, one can read this passage as setting up a dichotomous set of values linking lack of civilization, heathenism, and Natives on the negatively valued end, and civilization, Christianity, and British peoples at the positively valued end of the dichotomy.

Christianity is also implicated in the separation of mind and matter so

important to the development of an objective and rational masculinity. The Protestant tradition is imbued with notions of placing a rational externalised Mind over the internalised matter of our 'natural' Body. In this context, Seidler (1994: 46) argues that "[p]eople are radically to distrust their natures within Luther and Calvin, for the source of justice and morality lies externally beyond people's natures." Thus it is only by forsaking one's nature -- rather than reworking it and developing some kind of direct relationship with it -- that people are able to open themselves to salvation. But this route to salvation was not equally available to all. Indeed, as I observed in Chapters 2 and 7, modern Western thought has long conceptualised Woman as closer to nature than Man. In Christian thought, then, women were (and still are) rarely able to attain the same status before God as were men. In this sense Christianity constituted both Natives and women as inferior beings in relation to white European men and their ability to enjoy a direct relationship with God (or one mediated by male ministers and priests).

Christianity was connected with the oppression of women and Natives in another significant way. During the early Victorian era when liberalism was gaining sway, Christianity offered notions of equality which came to the aid of liberalism's inability to explain away the unjust structures and oppressive social relations arising from capitalism (Seidler 1991). In this regard, Christianity instigated a split between the spiritual world, where all people were equal before God, and the material world where social inequalities were rife. Not only did Christianity develop a conceptual split between the spiritual plane and the material world, it also valorised the former over the latter. Christianity thus taught people to *discount* the differences in material and social experiences that they experienced in everyday life. On the one hand, Christian notions of equality before God underpinned protest against forms of oppression against groups defined by

class, ethnicity or gender. On the other hand (and regardless of the intentions of the Church Fathers, which are open to question), Christianity bolstered the inequities of capitalism which in turn supported the hegemony of a bourgeois masculine subject and led to the oppression of non-masculine and non-European Others such as women and Natives.

Furthermore, the dichotomy between the spiritual plane and the material world was closely aligned with the gendered private/public dichotomy. As late as the seventeenth century,¹¹² women had been represented as a site of sexual appetite and bodily desire (Pateman 1988; Poovey 1989). But by the mid-nineteenth century, the dominant discourse on women represented them as the opposite, as sites of virtue (Poovey 1989; Tosh 1991).¹¹³ Virtue and Christian morals thus became important gendered components of nineteenth century British society. By that time, Woman had become (symbolically) the moral hope and spiritual guide for Man. As Mary Poovey (1989: 10) points out "this transformation proceeded alongside -- and was an integral part of -- the consolidation of bourgeois power and the redefinition and relocation of the idea of virtue."

Indeed, rather than being articulated through inherited social position in the form of 'noblesse oblige', virtue was increasingly articulated through femininity in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries (Poovey 1989; McClelland 1991; Tosh 1991). As representations of social, economic, and political relations came to be dominated by liberal rhetorics of 'rights' and

112 This kind of reasoning dates back to the biblical representation of Eve's responsibility for The Fall of Man.

113 A couple of caveats need to be kept in mind here. First, these two contradictory representations of 'Woman' were likely present in both periods, but they were hegemonic at different times. Second, while this 'virtuous women' discourse applied primarily to the middle classes, it had some lesser application to those in the working class. See McClelland (1991) and Walker (1991) for discussions of the gendered spheres of nineteenth-century working class Britons.

'contracts' (see Pateman 1988), Christian morality and virtue became associated with the domestic sphere, which was at the same time being abstracted from the masculine public sphere of competition, self-interest, and economic aggression (Poovey 1989; Tosh 1991). The symbolic and rhetorical separation of spheres and the image of domesticated, feminine morality played a significant role in the consolidation of power in the hands of a masculine bourgeoisie which was able to secure and accumulate ever more wealth through self-interest and competition while secure in the fact that women ensured the preservation of virtue without inhibiting economic success (Poovey 1989: 10).

But women paid a high price for their Christian virtue, in that they were prevented from effectively participating in the public sphere for fear that their morals would be polluted. This was exacerbated in colonies like New Zealand, which were seen by many British men in the 1860s as places where they could quite literally distance themselves from British feminine domesticity, by going overseas. As John Tosh (1991: 67-68; also see Kanitkar 1994) concludes,

The Empire beckoned young men in reaction against domesticity just as the Frontier did in the United States. Emigration, the armed services and colonial administration all attracted plentiful recruits.... The Empire now also occupied an unprecedented place in the masculine imagination; in the work of popular writers like Kipling and Henry it had become an imaginative space where male companionship and male hierarchies found their full scope, free from feminine ties.

As Jock Phillips (1987) points out, this gendered imperial imagining led to a particularly masculine and masculinist culture in colonial New Zealand. But it is important to remember that these ideas and events are inextricably intertwined with notions of Christian virtue and morality in ways that worked in some instances to empower women and Natives, and in others to disempower women and Natives.

COURAGE/COWARDICE

The binary concept of courage/cowardice provided another common trope used by the newspapers to represent settlers in a positive light and Natives in a negative light. The tenor of newspaper representations suggest that Englishmen were -- by nature -- a courageous lot who produced a "gallant soldiery" ready for "active and arduous service in a new and untried country" (*The New Zealander*, 14 July 1863, page 3, "THE STATE OF THE WEATHER"). This emphasis on British courage, implicitly articulates with an opposing negative term to form a binary distinction between the courageous British and their less gallant Native foes.

Descriptions of two important events of the early phases of the Waikato war, the engagements at Koheroa and Martin's Farm, exemplify the newspapers' attempts to paint a picture of an heroic British soldiery. In the first of the two engagements, as James Belich (1986: 134) tells the story,

[General] Cameron with 553 men attacked a Maori force that had just begun to entrench at Koheroa. The British were checked by the Maori fire and began to falter. Cameron rushed twenty yards in front of his men and urged them on. They rallied, renewed their advance, and carried the 'partly formed' rifle pits. The Maoris withdrew slowly until they reached a ravine, then fled.

Belich (1986: 134) suggests that British soldiers may have outnumbered their Maori opponents by as much as five to one, although at the time the British claimed there were as many as 400 Maori. Moreover, despite the overwhelming numerical superiority of the British, Maori casualties were limited to 15 men (but contemporary casualty estimates went as high as 150 Maori dead).

The newspapers of the day portray events in a much more positive light (from a British perspective) than Belich, focussing especially on the bravery and gallantry of the British soldiers. The excerpt from the *Daily Southern Cross* outlined in Table 8.4, for example, illustrated just how different were newspaper representations of the same events. In this account, the British

were subjected to "exceedingly heavy fire" (line 1), causing their advance to falter, but "only for a moment" (line 4). In response, the General rushed to the front of his men "calling on his troops to turn the enemy out of their rifle pits at the point of the bayonet" (lines 6-7). The British soldiers "instantly obeyed, and with a cheer the enemy's position was rushed" (line 8). In the end, "that inimitable weapon in the hands of a British soldier -- the bayonet -- soon settled the business" (lines 9-10). British numerical superiority is downplayed, as is the fact that they faltered in the face of enemy fire. The newspaper concentrates instead on the gallantry of the General (line 7), and the quick routing of the enemy by a cheering British soldiery (lines 8-10).

Table 8.4 Excerpt from the *Daily Southern Cross*, 23 July 1863.

When within range the enemy opened an exceedingly heavy fire on our	1
advance as they came up the slope to the attack. The first volley could not	2
have been less than from 300 pieces. Our advance faltered. I believe it was	3
their first time under fire; but it was only for a moment. General Cameron	4
rushed forward at least twenty yards in advance of the men, and waving his	5
cap in the air, cheered them on, calling on his troops to turn the enemy out of	6
their rifle pits at the point of the bayonet. The order of the gallant veteran was	7
instantly obeyed, and with a cheer the enemy's position was rushed. Many	8
stood in the trenches, and fought well, but that inimitable weapon in the hands	9
of a British soldier -- the bayonet -- soon settled the business.	10

Source: *Daily Southern Cross*, 23 July 1863, page 3, "THE WAR IN AUCKLAND"

This type of positive representation of British soldiering is reinforced in a similar report from *The New Zealander*, outlined in Table 8.5. As with the report by the *Daily Southern Cross*, this article represents the battle in highly positive terms: "a gallant affair which ended in the discomfiture and rout of the Waikato braves" (lines 1-2). It is interesting to note the ideologically charged imagery evoked by the descriptors used in these passages. The British officer Colonel Austen, for example, is described as moving "promptly" against the Natives (lines 3-4). The soldiers of the 12th and 14th Regiments are said to have "*charged* down one steep hill and up the opposite ascent" (line 9; my emphasis), and "gallantly charged" (line 12) the Natives. In contrast, the Natives "took to flight... some to hide in the neighbouring

swamps" (lines 12-13).

Given the climate in which these kinds of representations were so common, it is not surprising to see General Cameron -- as reported by *The New Zealander's* frontline correspondent -- publicly congratulating the British forces for their victorious attack on the enemy:

The following complimentary order was issued yesterday:--
"The Lieutenant-General Commanding congratulated the force under his comand [sic] on their successful attack on the enemy at the Kohiroa yesterday, and thanks the troops engaged for their conduct on that occasion: particularly Lieutenant-Colonel Austen and the 2nd battalion 14th regiment, who had the honour of leading the attack, and who distinguished themselves by their gallantry in charging the enemy's rifle pits" (*The New Zealander*, 23 July 1863, page 3, "WAIKATO").

Not only does this rhetoric fortify notions of British gallantry, but it also reinforces notions about the appropriateness of military hierarchy -- and the dominance of those (officers) who occupy its top positions.

Table 8.5 Excerpt from *The New Zealander*, 22 July 1863.

We had a battle to-day on the Kohiroa land, a gallant affair which ended in the	1
discomfiture and rout of the Waikato braves. A body of natives having been	2
observed by Colonel Austen, of the 14th regt., in the neighbourhood of his	3
encampment this morning, that officer moved promptly against them, with	4
that portion of the battalion of the 14th regt. under his command....	5
The first shots were fired by the Maoris at half-past eleven o'clock, and at	6
twenty minutes to twelve the 14th opened fire.	7
The detachment of the 12th having joined them, they both, at twelve o'clock,	8
charged down one steep hill and up the opposite ascent, on which the enemy	9
were congregated in great force, under a sharp and continuous fire. On rising	10
the ridge of this hill, the fire was the hottest on this day's engagement; but the	11
enemy being gallantly charged at the point of the bayonet, took to flight, some	12
across the Wangamarino, and some to hide in the neighbouring swamps.	13

Source: *The New Zealander*, 22 July 1863, page 3, "WAIKATO"

Belich (1986) makes it clear that while General Cameron deserves credit for his bravery in leading the charge against the enemy, the skirmish at Koheroa was clearly a minor action. He argues that the emphasis placed on this event "obscured the far greater strategic significance of a tactically comparable Maori victory which occurred the same day, well behind British lines" (Belich 1986: 134). In this case, a war party of Ngati Paoa warriors

attacked a convoy and its escort at Martin's Farm, on the Great South Road approximately half the distance between Drury and the Queen's Redoubt. The escort was eventually rescued by another unit, but not before losing 16 men , or one-third of its complement, to death or injury. By comparison, one or two Maori attackers were killed (Belich 1986: 134-135). Of greater importance however, was the strategic impact of this small encounter, as it forced the General to assign more than 500 men to protect his supply routes from guerilla attack (Belich 1986: 135).¹¹⁴

Again, the newspapers report the guerilla attack at Martin's Farm in much different terms, eliding its strategic significance and emphasising both the bravery of the British soldiers who had been attacked and the savagery of the attackers. Table 8.6 presents an excerpt from the *Daily Southern Cross* which describes events starting from the moment the British escort was attacked.

The "carefully planned and skilfully executed" trap provides a further example of the low cunning of the Natives that I discussed in the previous chapter. Not courageous enough to fight their battles like true (British) soldiers, the Natives resort to sneaky guerilla tactics. Yet despite the underhanded tactics of the Natives, "the gallant men did not quail" (lines 11-12). Instead, "[t]hey returned the fire of the enemy with spirit" (line 12). Eventually, following their Captain's "order to fix bayonets and charge" (lines 16-17), "the gallant fellows went at their savage assailants" (lines 17-18). Further reinforcing the courageous/cowardly binary, the newspaper offers a striking dichotomy between the stalwart British soldiers who "carefully retreat[ed] and prevent[ed] their assailants surrounding them" (lines 12-13),

¹¹⁴ Also see the discussion of the General's orders for new redoubts on the Great South Road in *The New Zealander*, 23 July 1863, page 3, "WAIKATO".

and the cowardly Natives "who fled precipitately into cover" (line 18).

Table 8.6 Excerpt from the *Daily Southern Cross*, 18 July 1863.

When the rear guard had advanced about 100 yards into the bush, at about	1
two o'clock, fire was opened on them from both sides by the natives, who	2
mustered in great force. The Maoris crossed the road in front, after delivering	3
fire, and attempted by a flank movement, to cut off the retreat of the handful	4
of men, two of whom soon fell mortally wounded. At the same time the	5
enemy opened a flanking fire on the advance guard, by extending their line,	6
keeping well under cover of the bush. The escort had thus fallen into a trap,	7
carefully planned and skilfully executed. The advance guard had enough to	8
do with their own opponents to help their comrades in the rear; and indeed,	9
the enemy had rendered a junction of the parties an im possibility [sic].	10
Outnumbered and beset on both sides and in the front, the gallant men did	11
not quail. They returned the fire of the enemy with spirit, carefully retreating,	12
and preventing their assailants surrounding them. At length the rear guard	13
was reduced to ten men, and the Maoris, to the number of sixty, left their	14
cover, and attempted to close with them. But this phase of the affair	15
suddenly changed. Instead of a retreat, Captain Ring gave the order to fix	16
bayonets and charge. The order was answered by a cheer, and on the gallant	17
fellows went at their savage assailants, who fled precipitately into cover, and	18
renewed their fire.	19
In the meantime the advanced guard fought their way through the bush and	20
was met as I have described.	21
The men are reported to have behaved admirably under fire, and burn with	22
eagerness to return the compliment with interest.	23

Source: *Daily Southern Cross*, 18 July 1863, page 3-4

In summing up the skirmishes between British soldiers and Natives at Koheroa and Martin's Farm in its lead article of 18 July 1863, the *Daily Southern Cross* continues to ignore the significance of the Maori victory at Martin's Farm, focussing instead on the symbolic importance of the Koheroa victory. Yet again, the paper draws a distinction between the gallantry of the British soldiers and the savagery of the Natives.

We need hardly say that the attack upon the escort is a most calamitous affair. Our brave soldiers have been shot down like bullocks -- and that by savages who have heretofore enjoyed the name of "friendly" Maoris. Truly the climax has now been reached. Who will sympathise with this heretofore belauded race? Savages in the worst sense of the term we found them, and savages they will continue to be, unless they are put down with the strong arm of military coercion. The engagement at Koheroa yesterday morning, in which 20 or more of the rebels were killed, although no compensation for the loss of our murdered country men, is

consolatory to some extent, as it will give the rebels a taste of what they may expect. Justice and humanity now call for the most stern measures to be taken against the natives (*Daily Southern Cross*, 18 July 1863, page 3).

The newspapers thus (re)constructed and continually reinforced a binary distinction between a courageous British soldiery and a cowardly Native opponent. In so doing the paper drew upon longstanding discourses of the 'racial' superiority of the English, and the inferiority of all other non-English peoples. But there are other, less explicit discourses being drawn from in the newspaper rhetorics, and I shall discuss one of these discursive constructs in the following section.

Hegemonic masculinity and courage

James Belich (1986), in his important revisionist history of the New Zealand Wars, deals extensively with aspects of the binary distinction between a courageous British soldiery and its cowardly Native opponent. He argues that what he calls the "Victorian interpretation of racial conflict" had coloured the historiography of the wars, resulting in a hegemonic 'received version' of events which elided Maori courage and skill on the battlefields. Just as with the newspapers of 1863, the received version of history paints a positive picture of the British and settlers, while producing a negative portrait of Maori. While Belich (1986: 17) acknowledges that the majority of present-day historians "follow the more enlightened contemporary commentators in noting Maori courage, chivalry, and some types of skill" he nevertheless concludes from the outset that "British victories continue to be exaggerated, and entirely fictional triumphs continue to be seen as real" (1986: 16).

Belich's revisionist history counters this received version of the wars, illustrating the skill, courage, tenacity, and success of the Maori warriors in combating, and in some cases even defeating, British and colonial forces that vastly outnumbered them and which had access to greater resources and

firepower. Belich thus reverses the polarity of the racist binary distinction between British and Maori. In his history of the wars Maori are constructed in positive terms (the star of the British shines less brightly).

Nevertheless, even though Belich reverses the polarity of this binary distinction, his work implicitly reinforces the binary thinking which leads to oppression in the first place. Accordingly, while representing an important step in New Zealand history and historiography, his work does little to break out of the bounds of binary thought. Although it has shifted the position of oppressed and oppressor, it thus has the potential still to be just as oppressive. Moreover, it tends to focus solely on the relationship between Pakeha and Maori. This is understandable given its anti-racist politics, but it does tend to avoid questions relating to how a hegemonic Pakeha masculinity relates to its subordinated Others. To come to grips more fully with this notion requires an understanding of the history of hegemonic masculinities in general, and their articulation with military masculinity specifically.

Bob Connell (1993: 608) argues that by the 18th century, it was possible to discern a hegemonic masculinity in Britain. The hegemonic masculinity in Britain at this time was found among men of the gentry classes. The gentry was closely linked to the state, in fact, it supplied the people who embodied the state apparatus. The gentry also supplied the officers for armies and navies. Gentry masculinity was not characterised by today's emphasis upon rationality and individuality. Instead, it was tied to kinship and lineage (position in the state structure, for example, was determined by family position and patronage). Gender identities were also less severely policed during the time, and there are a number of examples of women taking on 'male' identities prior to the nineteenth century. Julie Wheelwright (1987) notes that many women, who in real life dressed as their male counterparts to go to war or sea, played an important role in the British military,

performing a wide variety of services until the mid-nineteenth century. In the eighteenth century, stories, songs and ballads about female soldiers enjoyed an enormous popularity and serve to challenge our contemporary notion that Florence Nightingale was the first woman to work in a modern combat situation.

The Amazons' stories, however, changed over time and by the nineteenth century had to be sanitised to conform to a more genteel and fixed concept of masculinity and femininity. Gender had increasingly become identified as a *biological* entity rather than a *social* and external construction. Female soldiers eventually came to be regarded as aberrations of nature rather than slightly risqué heroines, and military historians rewrote earlier armies into all-male institutions (Wheelwright 1987; also see Poovey 1989). The strict policing of gender identities in the early nineteenth-century coincides with political upheavals, growth of industrial capitalism, and development of the bureaucratic state which saw the displacement and remaking of gentry masculinity into more calculative, rational, and regulated forms of masculinities (Connell 1993).

The nineteenth century saw the development of the ideology of 'Manliness', a conspicuous ideology of masculinity. According to John Tosh (1994: 180), manliness "was treated as the essence of civic virtue and the root of heroic achievement, while at the same time being scaled down to everyday proportions as a guide for the little man." Manliness was one of the key concepts in the moral universe of Victorian Britain. At the same time, as part of the splitting and bureaucratisation of masculinities, violence was separated from political power. As Connell (1993: 609) puts it, "violence became a specialty." Mass armies were institutionalised during this time, requiring also an institutionalised 'officer corps' to run them. Members of

the officer class became the torch bearers for a new code of honour that was the depository for much of the gentry code (Connell 1993).¹¹⁵ At the same time violence was directly linked to rationality through the development of military science. This had significant implications for the colonial projects of imperialist states like Britain. Indeed, as Connell (1993: 609) observes,

It was bureaucratically rationalized violence as a social technique, just as much as superiority of weapons, that made European states and European settlers almost invincible in the colonial frontier expansion of the nineteenth century.

The linking of violence with rationality, bureaucracy and masculinity had other important implications as well. Military masculinity, as part of a larger hegemonic masculinity, prescribed certain acceptable actions and modes of existence for heroic, 'manly' soldiers. At the same time it proscribed other ways of being, forcing many men to conform to its narrow strictures while excluding women and other men (gay men, non-Europeans) who could never conform to the dominant ideals of manliness.

It is important here to make a distinction between a hegemonic masculinity and the multiple masculinities that may exist in different places at any one time. Mike Donaldson (1993) argues that the view that hegemonic masculinity is hegemonic insofar as it succeeds in relation to women is true, but partial. He suggests that instead, hegemonic masculinity must be examined as a question of how particular groups of men inhabit positions of power and wealth, and how those positions are legitimated and reproduced through social relationships that generate their dominance. Donaldson concludes that most men benefit from the patriarchal control of women, but that hegemonic masculinity provides certain men with the control of other men.

¹¹⁵ Certain kinds of sexuality are also closely linked to a hegemonic 'Military Masculinity'. See Mosse 1985; Jeffords 1988; Farmanfarmaian 1992.

To put it another way, the crucial difference between hegemonic masculinity and other masculinities is not the control of women, but the control of men and the representation of this as 'universal social advancement,' to paraphrase Gramsci (Donaldson 1993: 655).

Understanding the difference between hegemonic masculinity and other masculinities provides the foundation for understanding how the rhetorical trope of 'courage' -- so common in the newspaper reports of the Waikato war -- could just as easily disempower and oppress certain (British) men and women as well as Natives.

Certainly, women were excluded from the heroic public sphere, and it was difficult for them participate in the symbolic economy of 'courage'. Accordingly, it is not surprising to find the *Daily Southern Cross* (22 July 1863, page 3, "THE WAR IN NEW ZEALAND") suggesting, matter-of-factly,

As there is no probability of our present difficulties speedily coming to an end, the wives and children should, I think, be removed to Auckland, and let the men shoulder the rifle. It will be the duty of all to throw their energies into action, and to do all in their power to crush the rebels.

Crushing the rebels, then, required different actions from men and women. Men must "shoulder the rifle", while women should "be removed to Auckland". In linguistic terms, men are constructed as active 'agents' while women have passive 'affected participant' roles. Men are the doers and women are the done to. Similar sentiments about the proper place of women (and children) are implicit throughout the newspaper articles of the period. In reporting without comment, for example, that "All the females and children have left [Waiuku] and the men are forming themselves into a defence corps" (*The New Zealander*, 25 July 1863, page 3), or that "The settlers' wives... went down to Drury by yesterday's escort" (*The New Zealander*, 20 July 1863, page 3), the newspapers indicated just how taken-for-granted was the idea that women had no place in war -- and thus no role to play in the symbolic economy of masculine courage. In the Victorian gender ideology which dominated newspaper representation of the time, women were too

frail to indulge in the violence of warfare.

I detect another reason women were excluded from public recognition of their role in the war, namely they were considered to be too irrational for the kind of rational violence ostensibly engaged in by the military. I have no direct evidence for this, but for a suggestive excerpt from the *Daily Southern Cross* of 30 July 1863 (page 2, my emphasis):

We are well aware that the same feeling which renders *women and persons of feeble nerves* so proverbially fond of hearing tales to make the flesh creep and the hair stir, while they cower round a good fire in all the luxury of high-wrought feeling; or which makes them think no story so good as a modern sensational novel, is all arrayed against us in the effort we are about to make to raise our protest against what we conscientiously look upon as *a most unhealthy and un-English frame of mind*. If any one indulges himself or others in such a state of mind as we are referring to, in the idea that any possible good can result from it either to the individual or to the state, we most decidedly dissent from his view of the case. The only result which we can see as likely to flow from so very poor a spring is, that he will hear sounds of alarm in every breeze of wind coming down his chimney, and see terrible forms in every one whom he meets in the dark. These things may lead to many ridiculous positions, and to an opinion in the native mind but little favourable to our courage as a people; they may even lead in some cases to more serious consequences, but we cannot see how they can serve to strengthen our hands in the hour of danger, should such an hour really arrive. For our own part we believe that *nothing so tends to unnerve and to unman men* as the feeling cherished and thought over for a long time, of how dangerous and how difficult to escape from their position is; and we should feel not the smallest surprise in the event of evil ever actually approaching such individuals, to see them the very first to give way and to become helpless and useless in their terror.

As I read it, the newspaper here equates women with "persons of feeble nerves". This kind of irrational thought that women are "so proverbially fond of", results in "a most unhealthy and un-English frame of mind", which in the end will tend to "unnerve and unman men". In other words, women's hysteria is contagious and women must therefore be removed physically from proximity to rational, masculine soldiers.

CONCLUSION

A number of writers (e.g. Ward 1973; Belich 1986; Walker 1990) have made the connection between racist ideology and the British invasion of the Waikato. Following in their footsteps, I have tried to illustrate the ways that the symbolic economy of newspaper representation was also reliant upon racist discourse for its own epistemic violence aimed at Maori people. While supporting the important anti-racist strategy of these writers, I have a somewhat different political project and hope to illustrate the wider relations between racism and masculinism. Accordingly, I have 'extended' the work on Maori-Pakeha relations in the nineteenth century by arguing that one needs an understanding of the symbolic relationship between masculinity and femininity if one is to more fully understand ethnic relations in colonial New Zealand.

To support my argument, I have examined a number of binary rhetorical tropes commonly used by the Auckland press to represent the Waikato war and the place of Maori and Pakeha peoples in that series of events. These included Civilization/Savagery, Rationality/Irrationality, Christianity/Heathenism, and Courage/Cowardice. In each case I have attempted to illustrate first how the trope constructed a negative subject position for Maori and a positive one for British settlers. I have then problematised the binary distinction between Native/European by illustrating the way that ideologies of gender disempowered white women and secured the dominance of a hegemonic British masculinity. Some might criticise this approach as one that merely 'adds gender' in. However, I argue that the concepts of 'race' and gender were so inextricable linked (as metaphors, for example) that they acted mutually to (re)constitute notions about the other. Accordingly, the symbolic economy of 'race' and racism cannot be disentangled from that of gender and masculinism.

IX CONCLUSION

I set out to accomplish three goals with this thesis. First, I wanted to situate this work within the discipline (in all senses of this word) of present-day academic geography in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Second, I wanted to illustrate how 'Native rebels' and the spaces they inhabited were not merely some pre-existing phenomena which the Auckland press unproblematically reproduced as mimetic 'news' reports, but instead that they were (at least partly) constructed in newspaper representations of the Waikato War. Third, I wanted to problematise what has become a taken-for-granted binary opposition between Maori and Pakeha. This binary construct fails to grasp the complex roles that hegemonic forms of masculinity played in the structuring of society and space. In this sense, I wished to problematise the binary by illustrating how discursive notions of 'race' were inextricably tied up with those of gender in nineteenth century identity politics. I shall deal with each issue in turn, but before doing so I shall mention a few caveats about the thesis.

First, it is important to note that I have not set out to examine newspaper rhetorics of the mid-nineteenth century in order to illustrate how 'bad' things were back then, and by implication, how 'good' they are now. To do so would be to fail to recognise the intimate connections between power, knowledge, and the production of 'truth' in the West (e.g. Gregory 1994; Rose 1993a). As Foucault (1980b: 131) has argued, "truth isn't outside power, or lacking in power.... Truth is a thing of this world; it is produced by multiple forms of constraint. And it induces regular forms of power." All of our 'truths' are caught up in the power of discourse -- and that includes those produced in the academy in general, and this study in particular. With this in mind, I have focused on mid-nineteenth century newspaper rhetorics precisely because they rely on less transparent and taken-for-granted

discursive constructs than would more contemporary texts. While I do not feel confident in positing direct causal relationships between what we term the 'past' and the 'present', I do nevertheless hope to highlight the transparency of present-day racist and sexist rhetorics through an analysis of those in the past.

Second, I have focused on the production of newspaper texts in this study, choosing deliberately to say little about the reception that these texts might have had among the European readers of the papers. In some senses, I have suggested, at least implicitly, that the newspaper texts were successful in constructing Native rebels. In so doing I may leave myself open to accusations of simplistically reading off 'causes' from 'effects'. One can see this logic at work: the Waikato was invaded, and the invasion was subsequently rationalised or justified with recourse to a rhetoric of 'Native rebellion' (see, e.g., Featon 1879), therefore the newspapers must have been successful. No matter how compelling the evidence, however, it was not my intention to 'prove' that the newspaper rhetorics were 'successful' (although that is probably the case), nor was it necessary to do so to fulfil my goals.

Finally, I deliberately chose not to examine 'Maori' texts or the possible range of 'Maori' responses. I have two reasons for doing so. First, I was interested solely in European constructions of Native rebels, and thus Maori texts would be secondary to my purpose. Second, the issue of translation raises a host of thorny issues relating to cross-cultural understandings and discursive colonisations. In the end, however, the decision whether or not to analyse 'Maori' texts may be less a question of epistemological concern and more one of strategy. Given the present state of discursive conflict in Academia regarding cultural 'property rights', I suggest it would be more effective for a Maori scholar to undertake analysis of Maori texts. While I know this might reinforce essentialist ideas about immutable differences between Maori and Pakeha, my reasons for avoiding 'Maori issues' do not

stem from such notions. They arise, instead, from a recognition of the current contested character of academic cultural politics in Aotearoa/New Zealand. They also stem from my desire to respect the wishes expressed by many Maori scholars that Maori people should be given space to examine issues of importance to them. Accordingly, while I do believe the question of Maori interpretation of these issues to be a significant one, I have left that task to another scholar to take up.

SITUATING THIS STUDY

I began this thesis with a discussion of the complex relationship(s) between 'theory', 'empirical investigation' and gender (Chapter 2). Some might be uncomfortable with my representation of geography in New Zealand, seeing it as constructing a negative image of the discipline. That was not my intent, however, as I was trying both to contest the masculinism that characterises academic geography in most nations, and to come to grips with my own contradictory ideas about 'doing geography' in Aotearoa. This study unfolded in relation to my own embodied experiences as a masculine heterosexual Euro-Canadian post-graduate student undertaking work in New Zealand. In this sense, I argue that space and place made a difference to my own practice of geographic production. There are a number of strands to this argument.

For example, I began this study having certain expectations about the process of doing a thesis which were developed out of my experience as an MA student in Canada. While I had never really reflected on it at the time, Canada is situated near the centre of the academic publishing industry in the United States, thus I had relatively free access to a large range of books and serials. Moreover, the city I lived in had a number of well-stocked bookshops, including one that sold academic remainders. Contrast this with my experiences in New Zealand, a small island nation far from the centres of

the academic publishing industry that manufacture the kind of theoretical 'knowledge' I am reliant on, and often not part of the asymmetrically structured distribution of books and serials.¹¹⁶ On average, books cost two to three times what they do in Canada, while they may take as long as one year from date of publication to arrive in New Zealand.¹¹⁷ The story is much the same for overseas periodicals, which can take between three to eight months to arrive in the library, and cost the library significant sums in overseas postage.¹¹⁸ Overseas interlibrary loans can take up to six months to acquire and they can result in charges of up to NZ \$60.00 per article in some cases. The upshot is that there are fewer books and periodicals available in New Zealand, they arrive later than in Canada, the USA or UK, and they are much more expensive when they do arrive. All this has a significant impact on the practice of geography, affecting, for example, how and when metropolitan 'theory' is incorporated in the discipline of geography in Aotearoa.

This leads to a second thread to my concern for situating this study, namely what I see to be an overt reliance upon positivist and empiricist epistemologies in New Zealand geography (Berg 1994a). In this sense, my emphasis upon theorising in this thesis can be seen as a reaction to what I perceived to be a hegemonic discourse of masculine empiricism. As a result,

116 It is important not to underestimate the significant impacts of globalisation here. There are multiple centres of publishing, with different objects of publication. Aotearoa/New Zealand has an impressive publishing industry, but its object rarely coincides with my 'need' to consume 'metropolitan' theory.

117 For example, Kay Anderson's (1991) excellent study of racial discourse in Canada, sold for Cdn \$35.00 in Victoria and NZ \$150.00 in Hamilton. Moreover, because of the circuitous links in the world distribution of books, her book would have taken 6-8 months to obtain in New Zealand.

118 All four issues of the 1994 volume of *Antipode*, for example, arrived in the university of Waikato library in December of that year.

the thesis is partly an attempt to open certain spaces for constructing geographies; yet it also offers up its own set of discursive closures (probably related to my own relationship to the hegemonic masculinity of Geography) that elides other possible constructions of the historical geographies of mid-nineteenth century New Zealand. The thesis is thus neither disinterestedly objective, nor innocent. Instead, it is partial and interested, and thus, I hope, is able to actively construct more *interesting* geographies.

Finally, there is the question of how I have situated this study within wider debates about modernity, postmodernity, and approaches to understanding the 'real' world in academic geography. In this sense, I attempted to map out a position of "between-ness" from which to engage with both modernist and postmodernist approaches. Throughout the thesis I have relied on concepts that could be characterised as either modern (for example, 'ideology') or postmodern (such as 'discourse'). I have thus argued that geographies are constructed in rhetoric and discourse, but that these semiotic constructs have significant material impacts. The recent apology by the state for the invasion of the Waikato, the confiscation of Maori lands, and the devastation of Maori social, economic and cultural life is a reflection of the long lasting material and symbolic implications that arise (in part) from discursive manoeuvres. I have used both modernist and postmodernist approaches because I have wanted to make normative judgements about 'real' historical events. But I have also wanted to illustrate how my understandings of such events are always historically specific and culturally contingent semiotic constructions.

SOCIAL CONSTRUCTIONS OF 'NATIVES'

One of my goals in reviewing the historical development of the 'race' idea and its articulation with notions of gender (Chapter 6) was to illustrate the discursive continuities in rhetorics about 'race' and gender. But it was

also my intent to depict the changes and contradictions in discourses of 'race' and gender so as to highlight their constructed character (see Jackson and Penrose 1993b). The continuities and contradictions in constructions of 'race' and gender are linked intertextually to representations of 'Native rebels' in the Auckland press of 1863. This in turn suggests that newspaper representations played a significant role in the contested politics of identity in mid-nineteenth century New Zealand. Identity, in this sense, was not given; rather it was 'made' in the contested process of cultural (re)production. In this way, newspaper reports of the War played an important part in the European construction of Maori identity.

Newspapers and their reporters were not exempt from the cultural politics that exemplified social relations between settlers and Natives, but were fully embedded within them. For one thing, Newspapers of the 1860s were operated by conservative bourgeois European men (Day 1990). Rather than being disinterested observers and reporters of 'news', these newspapers, through their owners, had a direct stake in what happened in the Waikato War. This is not to suggest that there was a conspiracy among members of the ruling classes, but instead that the newspaper owners and their reporters occupied a specific discursive position within the material and symbolic order of New Zealand society and space. Negative constructions of Natives and women had such long histories in European thought (Chapter 6) that they were taken-for-granted as 'truth' in New Zealand. These discourses provided a foundation for hegemonic rhetorics on Maori people which underpinned much of what was taken as 'common sense' in newspaper representations of the War. Whether or not there existed a ruling class conspiracy would have been irrelevant to the discursive production of this set of hegemonic meanings. Indeed, the range of meanings required to construct such a conspiracy would itself have been the products of discourse. Accordingly, whether conscious of it or not, the newspapers and their

reporters could never be 'disinterested' in what they reported. In the everyday production of news, they both relied upon, and actively reconstituted, taken-for-granted constructions of Natives and their role in the War.

On the one hand, newspaper stories of the Waikato War contributed a powerful source of 'raw' material for European constructions of Natives and their role in the Wars. On the other hand, this 'raw' material was linked intertextually to longstanding hegemonic discourses of gender and 'race'. The press did not merely report 'facts' but was actively -- although often unwittingly -- involved in the construction of truth. In this sense, 'facts' can be seen as historically specific and culturally contingent discursive 'products'. The very taken-for-grantedness of the discursive frames that they arose from gave them all that much more power as representations of 'reality'. This highlights the power of ideological discourse when it attains hegemonic status. Hegemonic notions of masculinity, femininity, and the absolute Otherness of Natives, while they may have been contested, nonetheless had the power of 'truth'. These 'truths' were constantly reproduced and reconstituted in the discursive setting of newspaper reports. In so doing these hegemonic ideas worked to reconstitute both symbolic and material aspects of society and space in mid-nineteenth century New Zealand. In this sense they helped justify the invasion of the Waikato by British troops; they assisted in underpinning the rhetorics of capitalists who wished to obtain more land for 'development'; they helped foster notions of hierarchy based on ideas of 'race', gender and class; and they helped rationalise the deaths of hundreds of European soldiers, Maori warriors, and 'civilians' on both sides of the conflict.

DECONSTRUCTING BINARIES

Many authors commenting on New Zealand cultural politics posit a binary opposition between a hegemonic Pakeha group and a subordinate, oppositional Maori group (see, e.g. Barber, 1989; Belich, 1986; Kelsey, 1990; McCreanor, 1993a, 1993b; Nairn and McCreanor, 1990, 1991; Pawson, 1987b, 1992; Spoonley 1993; Walker 1990; Ward, 1995). These authors and their works play an important role in the fight against racism in Aotearoa. If one acknowledges, however, that subjectivities are constituted through complexly intertwined discursive constructions of 'race', gender, class, and sexuality, it becomes increasingly more difficult to support this binary construction of cultural politics. Focusing on the mutually constitutive character of 'race' and gender, I have argued instead for recognition of hegemonic Pakeha masculine subjects, and numerous subordinate, but contestatory, subject positions. This is different from a simple Maori/Pakeha binary, as the hegemonic subject position can, for example, encompass women and Maori who display an appropriate form of (usually bourgeois) masculinity.¹¹⁹ In the same way, the numerous subordinate subjectivities can include men and women, working-class and middle class, Maori and Pakeha. Thus, while acknowledging that the European invasion of the Waikato was contingent upon the existence of a binary concept -- European/Native -- that was very dear to European understandings of the world, I have argued in Chapters 7 and 8 of this thesis that such binary thinking articulated with a host of other gendered and racialised binaries which problematise simple Pakeha/Maori oppositions.

A series of notices and proclamations published in the Auckland press

¹¹⁹ It is important to recognise, however, that those Maori and women incorporated into the hegemonic masculinity will always bear the residual trace of their Otherness as 'Native' or 'Woman' (or both).

from just prior, and up to, the start of the Waikato War, reinforced existing oppositional discourses of European versus Native, constructing a positively valued British subject in relation to a negatively valued Native object. Chapter 7 concentrates on this binary distinction, examining and illustrating some of the often implicit and contradictory tropes that contributed to the ideological construction of a 'dangerous Native'. I focused in this chapter upon three ideologically charged discursive practices used by the British in New Zealand. First, Maori were subjected to a regime of classification, where they were rendered as visual objects, to be displayed, viewed, investigated, and experienced through a European gaze. This visual ontology supported existing European discursive constructions of *difference*, and upheld these ideas through a natural scientific discourse of naive empiricism. The emphasis on the visual helped elide the history of power relations between Europe and its Others, further supporting ideological constructions of the Maori as an inferior 'race', and New Zealand as the rightful property of the British Empire. Significantly the supposedly disembodied 'objective' gaze of classification arose contemporaneously with Enlightenment notions of rationality, and can thus be viewed as complicit with the construction of a masculine European Self. Classification can be seen as an attempt to impose a system of masculine European values on the non-European Other. Second, this masculine European value system involved debasement of the Other in order to bolster images of the Self. Maori were painted in strongly negative terms to reinforce the positive characterisations that the British had ascribed to themselves. In this way, colonial discourse required the constant reproduction of negative images of the colonised as a justification for British intervention in New Zealand. Third, this intervention was reinforced through a process of affirmation. Affirmation was central to the internal workings of language itself. By this I mean that in affirming the right to use power, the internal logic of colonial

rhetoric paradoxically admitted the possibility that use of such power may be unacceptable. The Proclamation to the Chiefs of the Waikato, for example, affirmed the 'murderous' intent of the Waikato people. Paradoxically, in so proclaiming their murderous character, the proclamation admitted the possibility that they were not.

The Auckland newspaper produced a range of ideologically charged and racialised binary constructs -- including civilization/savagery, rationality/irrationality, Christianity/heathenism, and courage/cowardice -- in their reports of the early stage of the Waikato War. I illustrated in Chapter 8 how these dichotomies articulated with a host of gendered binary constructs, such as mind/body, culture/nature, strength/weakness, action/inaction, and powerful/powerless (to list a few), so as to reinforce the hegemony of a bourgeois masculine European subject. Notions about 'race' were so intertwined with those of gender that they mutually constituted each other.

This happened, for example, when taken-for-granted notions of masculinity were seen as providing the *only* options for civilizing the Natives. Masculine-coded qualities such as conflict, strength and action were viewed by the newspapers as the sole means of subduing the Native rebels. More feminine-coded qualities such as caution, inaction (a form of action in itself), or diplomacy did not receive serious consideration in the rhetorics of the Auckland press. But the constellation of discursive notions that underpins this masculinist perspective was itself constituted in relation to constantly (re)circulating discursive rhetorics about the 'danger', 'savagery' and hyper-masculinity of the Native. The relationship between the notion of 'European masculinity' was so inextricably bound up with that of 'Native savagery' as to be impossible to define where one stopped and the other began.

Likewise, when the *Daily Southern Cross* (13 July 1863, page 3)

constructed a dichotomy between the so-called "natural liberty" of the Native and the "substantial and rational freedom" of civilization, it was working with specifically gendered and racialised concepts of civilization. Full participation in 'civilization', as exemplified in constructs of civil society, required an ability to work within masculine constructs of 'rationality'. Men were, by 'nature', rational beings. Women, on the other hand and by dint of their proximity to an uncultured nature, were often as not, constructed as irrational in masculine discourse. As a result, women were often excluded from full participation in the specific civil society engendered within commonsense newspaper rhetorics. Similarly, Natives were also excluded from the rational spaces of civilization because of their 'natural' uncivilised state and their supposedly childlike ways. On the one hand, European rational civilization was inextricably linked to the dominant construction of civilization. On the other hand, because of their metaphorical connection to an irrational 'nature', Natives were inextricably linked to irrationality and a lack of civilization. Women occupied a complex contradictory position in these binary identity politics (Ware 1992). In some instances they were clearly linked with masculinity and civilization. But in other cases women were linked with nature, irrationality and a lack of civilization. Moreover, regardless of their position in the symbolic economy, they were rarely admitted to full participation in the public sphere of civil society.

It is important to keep in mind that my argument depends upon recognition of the existence of a hegemonic form of masculinity in mid-nineteenth century New Zealand -- one which dominated both feminine subjectivities and other forms of subordinate masculinities (see Donaldson 1993). Individual men and women (both Pakeha and Maori) would have articulated with this masculinity in a range of ways, some actively supporting the hegemonic masculinism and others opposing it (and perhaps thereby aligning themselves with dominant constructions of 'Maori',

'Women', 'Africans', 'homosexuals', etc). According to this hegemonic identity politics, the Maori Other was everything that masculine Europeans were not.

While I have not addressed the subject directly in this study, class relations also played a role here, as the discourse of 'us' and 'them' took different forms within different class settings. For members of the ruling classes, a Great Chain of Being was constructed in this masculinist and racist discourse such that ruling-class men were situated at the apex, followed closely by other European men and women. At the 'bottom' of the Chain were the women of the most 'savage races'.¹²⁰

This social exclusion also had a spatio-temporal component, for as part of their vision of themselves as the epitome of modern civilised 'man', upper- and middle-class Europeans envisioned themselves in the 'here and now' and Maori in the 'then and there'. In this European vision, the Maori inhabited a 'place' in the past that was coded as close to 'nature', and thus distant from the 'culture' and modernity of "the civilized country of Auckland" (*Daily Southern Cross*, 22 July 1863, page 3). Given the close association between nature and femininity (Ortner 1974; MacCormack and Strathern 1980), non-Western landscapes were often coded feminine as well. This has characteristically led to the deployment of two master tropes of colonialism: "on the one hand, a rich and fecund virgin land is supposedly available for fertilization; on the other hand, a libidinous and wild land has to be forcefully tamed and domesticated" (Gregory 1994: 129). I venture that

¹²⁰ Of course, these relationships were much more complex than my schematised representation admits. For example, the 'Othering' was more pronounced at the 'top' of the chain than at the 'bottom'. Paradoxically, then, "the civilized European woman was less like the civilized European man than the savage man was like the savage woman" (Stepan 1993: 367). Likewise, the Great Chain took many different forms at different times and in different places.

the latter characterisation more closely resembles the European construction of the Waikato. Like Natives from other lands (e.g. Brantlinger 1986; JanMohamed 1986; Massey 1992; Jarosz 1992; Duncan 1993), Maori people and Maori places were present as absence (Trinh 1989); they played a part as a gendered, racialised, and negatively valued foil for European notions of masculine superiority, rationality and Enlightenment. The hegemonic European discourse in mid-nineteenth century New Zealand involved a conversation in which -- in many but not all contexts -- Maori and women were silenced. Speaking about racism, colonialism and sexism in another context, Trinh Minh-Ha (1989: 67) provides a telling framework for understanding nineteenth century relations between the masculine European 'us' and the feminine or hyper-masculine Maori 'them':

'Them' always stands on the other side of the hill, naked and speechless, barely present in its absence. Subject of discussion, 'them' is only admitted among 'us,' the discussing subjects, when accompanied or introduced by an 'us' member, hence the dependency of 'them' and its need to acquire good manners for the membership standing.

In this sense, Maori were constituted as objects by which a masculine European subject discursively affirmed its own superiority. Social constructions of gender played such an important role in hegemonic European constructions of the masculine Self that they helped reconstitute racialised constructions of the Other.

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