# TURANGAWAEWAE / TU'UNGAVA'E: Echoes of a place to stand and belong

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**Abstract**

This paper examines the ways in which Pacific communities in Auckland are located and conceptualised by others in contrast to the ways in which they locate and conceptualise themselves. In particular, it looks at the ways in which, in the face of homeland fracture and socio-economic marginality, neighbourhoods are being reclaimed as places of belonging-ness, places in which informal alliances among Maori and Pacific groups are being forged. It also explores the problematic, often ambiguous, nature of these alliances.

## Introduction: Setting the South Auckland scene

> I'm sick of shittin' myself that poverty is just a phase
> You didn't think that you could keep us down forever did you?
> The Polynesian man is getting bigger, fatter, better!
> They're after somethin' they could never get from you - and that's an IQ
> Teacher's in the house - it's time to pay the dues
> Enough here for you to dream - put you in the pink and have your own degree.
>
> *Otara Millionaires Club* (1996). We are the OMC, On the compilation album *In the Neighbourhood: 18 Hits*: track 5.

I have used the Maori and Tongan terms 'turangawaewae' and 'tu'ungava'e' here in the literal sense to mean 'a place to stand' because the theme of this paper is the search for a place of belonging-ness that underlies the ways in which political tensions and cultural alliances are played out in South Auckland between Maori and Pacific Island groups when they experience living 'out of origin place.'

South Auckland is the *imagined* terrain of brown-skinned urban-ness and migrant Maori and Pacific Island communities in crisis. It is visualised as the Nation's poor house: cheap homes, State housing on market rents, flea markets and backyard sales, island produce and cheap meat off-cuts, white tank-loaves, *pani popo* and *pani maa* from largely Asian owned bakeries, and brown-skinned bodies.

South Auckland is the national icon of Aotearoa/Pasifika culture – a brown-skinned ghetto. This national icon is conceptualised from the outside in terms of 'behavioural deviancy' and 'behavioural modification.' On the one hand, there is a perception of rising crime, graffiti, volunteer services and food banks, decile/docile one schools, unemployment, benefit fraud, overcrowded households, unlicensed drivers and tin-door city (garage doors over shop windows). On the other hand, there is the task blue project (recruitment of Maori/Pacific police trainees to dispatch in South Auckland),



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Maori/Pacific language maintenance programmes, bilingual units, multicultural curricula, alternative learning programmes, performing arts festivals, hip-hop, churches, cultural centres and Marae.

South Auckland as a metaphor for the official urban-Maori/Pasifika territory exists in group allegiances, media images, local government marketing, and national construction. On paper, it is neatly mapped out as Manukau City and Auckland City. However, that neatness collapses in the face of the reality: Howick-Eastern Suburbs resist association with Manukau City/South Auckland and parts of Auckland City (Otahuhu, Glenn Innes, Panmure/Mount Wellington, Ellerslie, and Onehunga) are not demarcated within city wards as Manukau City/South Auckland. Just as the apparent neatness of geographical location collapses in the face of the reality of geographical spread, so the commonly held assumptions about how the 'urban-brown' live, assumptions that underlie paper policies and community consultation, collapse in the face of the realities, realities that include the complex relationships that exist within these communities. The central theme of this paper is an interrogation of one important aspect of these relationships, that is, the ways in which certain Maori and Pacific groups 'read' each other and the relevance of these readings to the reclaiming of neighbourhoods as places of belonging-ness in the face of homeland fracture and socio-economic marginality.

In the context of this paper, the term 'South Auckland Maori/urban-Maori' refers to groups who identify as indigenous to Aotearoa, but who do not see themselves as local tribes-people because they are migrants from outside the Auckland region. The term 'South Auckland Pacific Islanders' is a Polynesian construct which privileges Samoan, Cook Island, Tongan, Niuean, Tokelauan groups - and de-privileges others. The term 'Pacific Islanders' implies that due to their demographic number as the largest Pacific group living in New Zealand. Samoans lie at the centre of how 'outsiders' interpret what 'Pacific Islanders' are, and what this identity category means. A recent demographic breakdown from the Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs argued there are around two-hundred and twenty-three thousand Pacific Islanders living in New Zealand where fifty per cent of this total are Samoan. Consequently, by the year 2050, it is projected that the Pacific Island population will increase to around six hundred thousand where one in five New Zealand school children will be of Pacific Island descent (Lua, 2001).

**We're all migrants, except some of us belong here before others**

The identity of post-colonial New Zealand as it enters the 21st century is an uncertain one. On the one hand, there is the rhetoric of a plural, multicultural nation state. On the other, there is the enduring perception of the nation as a Pacific Island seeking to forge a bicultural identity that is inclusive of the indigenous Maori population and European settlers, one that cannot readily locate or accommodate third parties.

Deloria (1998, p. 5) has noted that "[race] has . . . been a characteristic American obsession, . . . the racial imagination [having] been at work on many different groups of people, Indians included." In New Zealand, an obsession with race, initially conceptualised in terms of a 'Maori problem,' has been transformed into an obsession with 'Otherness' that often locates Maori and Pacific migrants in the same 'problem space.' Thus, the reconfiguring of New Zealand's national identity involves a reconstruction in which all New Zealanders (including Maori and Pakeha) can be

assimilated, as migrants, into *our* New Zealand heritage: "our history is the history of migrants" (Belich 2001; King 1999). This type of conceptualisation can operate in a variety of different ways. It may, for example, be intended to defocus the issue of 'first occupancy,' thus creating an imagined space in which Maori and Pakeha can be encouraged to forge a new bicultural national identity out of common migrant origins. If, however, that identity is to be seen as bicultural, then it leaves open the question of how more recent migrant groups are to be accommodated. The type of thinking that attempts to forge a closer identity between Maori and Pakeha and, in the process, ignores the existence of other dimensions of background, can be detected in the following two extracts from articles that appeared in the *New Zealand Listener*. In both, the central concern is how others think of their origins. In the first (Philp, 2001), Charles Royal is cited; in the second (Macdonald, 2001), the writer makes reference to someone to whom he refers as 'this White person':

> Just this week I've been going through my own Pakeha whakapapa . . . I guess the key difference is that Maori ritualise whakapapa. . . . There's so much Pakeha blood in this land, so many Pakeha bodies buried in the landscape, but what Maori do is continue to ritualise it: on that mountain my uncle was buried; over there my ancestor did this, did that.
>
> Maori history was more relevant than European history . . . and it was more important according to this White person that her mixed-race children be aware of their Maori heritage, because that was the side that was most in danger of losing its voice and its memory. . . . [In] a bizarre inversion of conventional ethnocentrism, this person had concluded that the genealogy of others was more worthy of preservation than her own. . . . So it's encouraging to see that New Zealanders are taking a greater interest in their pasts, and not just those already blessed with well-documented family histories or oft-recited whakapapa. One would like to think that an inter-generation memory doesn't also mean that ancient grudges are kept alive . . . history ain't bunk, and the present makes no sense untethered from the past. We should all take more care of our dead.

Post-war arrivals from the Pacific are named migrants too - but migrants of a new kind, migrants who wear identifiable ethnic and cultural *difference*. The underlying production of race in imagining the migrant, its origins, its hierarchy of designating belonging-ness, reconfigures the Nation. Race is now considered an impolite reference. Thus, the elision of race and nationhood that distinguishes between first migrants and recent ones evokes a softer euphemism for new questions of identity, power, and belonging. As Cook, Didham and Khawaja (2001, p. 44) note:

> In 1996, two thirds of all people who registered a Pacific ethnicity in their responses to the census question . . . only recorded ethnicities identified with indigenous people of the Pacific. The majority indicated a single ethnicity - the ethnic group that corresponds with their island 'home' or the place in the Pacific that their parents or grandparents came from. Only four per cent indicated that they were of mixed Pacific Island ethnicity - a surprisingly small proportion given the long history of immigration of Pacific peoples to New Zealand, and the tendency for the larger Pacific ethnic groups to concentrate in particular suburbs in the main cities.

What this indicates is that, in general, migrants of Pacific ethnicity identified with place of origin. There was little sign of that shift towards multiple affiliation and severing of homeland ties that is often associated with miscegenation and inter-generational residency. Nor, it appears, was there much sign of a desire to identify as New Zealanders.

**The Northern Hemisphere question: Why is the Southern Antipodes obsessed with race?**

Mohanram (1999, p. xii) questioned her identity subjectivity while living in New Zealand as an Indian academic who had gained postgraduate qualifications in North American universities:

> In a further twist, after I arrived in New Zealand I was referred to as 'black' – which threw me into utter confusion as I had shaped my adult identity as a minority in the US labelled 'brown.' This continual recategorization – from 'unmarked' to 'brown' to 'black' – goes beyond the classification of race; these terms contain within them the social, economic and cultural history, as well as the markers of the places of domicile, of the subject.

Mohanram analysed how the demarcation of 'brown' in contrast to 'black' has been inscribed onto the ethnic landscape of contemporary New Zealand by applying this rationale to the bicultural versus multicultural debate. She felt that in terms of building alliances between women of race, colour and culture, New Zealand's case was vastly different from that of North America. Mohanram argued that Maori feminists prefer to form alliances with Pakeha women, rather than align with their Asian or Pacific Island counterparts. Their logic for doing so lies in the assumption that if Maori feminists include Asian women in their struggle for equality, their indigenous rights as *Tangata Whenua* would be at risk of collapsing and giving way to multiculturalism. Thus, Maori feminists are suspicious of forming alliances with Asian and Pacific Island women, and believe that it makes straightforward and practical sense to align with Pakeha women because their historical relationship is couched in terms of the Treaty of Waitangi. Thus, the Treaty as a 19th century colonial agreement signed between the Crown and local *Iwi*, ensures that alliances between Maori and Pakeha feminists sustain New Zealand as a bicultural nation for indigenous and White groups first, before allowing immigrants to contest and change the space for 'minority rights.' Mohanram (1999, p. 92) observes that:

> Such clear demarcations in the racial groups make it easier to think of Aotearoa/New Zealand as a bicultural rather than a multicultural nation. Mohanty's argument about a common context of struggle ought to build alliances between the various 'black'/women – Maori, Asian and Pacific Islander – but, in reality, no such alliance appears. Instead, Asians in particular are perceived as usurpers of that which rightfully belongs to Maori, rather than being perceived as similar victims of the global economy. The prevailing feeling among Maori has been that the inclusion of Asian women in the equation will render New Zealand a multicultural nation, completely bypassing indigenous rights and biculturalism. Multiculturalism would be regarded by Maori as likely to prise them from their *tangata whenua* or 'first-people' status in Aotearoa/New Zealand that leads Maori feminists to build

> alliances with Pakeha feminists rather than with their Asian or Pacific Islander counterparts.

In spite of Mohanram's position, I believe there is evidence that there *are* such alliances between urban-Maori and Pacific Islanders. They are, however, problematic and it is the complex and problematic nature of these alliances among peoples who have been remade as 'outcasts' that is my primary concern here.

In common with Ausubel (1960) and Hanson (1989), Mohanram (1999) is interested in the nature of the ambiguities and political tensions that arise out of concepts of 'race' and 'nation.' Although all three are differently positioned in a number of ways, a common theme is the national anxieties that underlie the social and political landscape, the myth of New Zealand as God's own paradise, a racial and social utopia. Ausbel's thesis, that Pakeha New Zealanders were obsessed with a perceived race problem, met with a mixed reception. He argued that New Zealand was not a racially harmonious modern Nation and that the notion of racial compatibility was a national myth constructed and maintained by the dominant White body. During conversations with Pakeha, Ausbel observed that there was a dominant national construction of Maori as 'lazy' and 'welfare-dependent.' Whereas Pakeha might be seen as 'spendthrift,' Maori would be more likely to be characterised as 'senseless with money.' Above all, he noted that Maori underdevelopment was seen as hampering national progress, a theme that is evident in the following quotation from an article in the *New Zealand Listener* in which Pamela Stirling (2000) comments on members of the extended family of a Maori child who was the subject of serious abuse:

> Fraud is not unknown in this family. . . . Hemopo no longer works: "The children and I asked my darling to give up his trucking job", says Namana. We missed him. He would see the children off at 7.30 but sometimes not get home till 3.00 the next morning". But there is money for cigarettes - Namana chainsmokes - and there is money for alcohol. Namana claims to only go to the pub at lunchtime to put a $2 bet on the TAB, but at the Royal Oak her unborn child was known as "Jack:" short for Jack Daniels.

Ausubel, an American academic, was rebuked by both the liberal and the conservative Pakeha establishment for claiming that the 1960s New Zealand national equation produced racism. How, after all, could an American visitor reach valid conclusions about race relations in New Zealand on the basis of a short visit? How could a White American academic criticise race relations in New Zealand when racial segregation laws – an expression of *true* racism - were institutionalised in America? According to 1960s liberal Pakeha, what had appeared to Ausubel to be a race issue was, in fact, a socio-economic one, which could be solved by full employment and the redistribution of wealth. No mention was made of land repatriation, of Maori grievances in relation to the denial of indigenous rights invested in the Treaty of Waitangi. There was no mention of the fact that Maori players were not permitted in the 1960 All-Black tour of South Africa. A reworked model, one which replaced the concept of 'race' by that of 'nationhood,' would allow for the proper assimilation of Maori into New Zealand citizenship.

Thirty years after Ausubel's observations, the observations of another American academic, Allan Hanson, met with a similarly heated response. Hanson (1989) argued

that contemporary Maori nationalism used *Maoritanga* as a political device to address land confiscation and deferred citizenship. Liberal Pakeha and Maori critics objected, claiming that Hanson's views represented an over-simplification of the dynamics of Maori activism in the context of shifts in contemporary views of nationhood. Visible here was an alliance between Maori and Liberal Pakeha, an alliance that centred on the perceived need to 'speak back' to the centre of global economic thinking. The staunchest criticism of Hanson came, however, from within his own discipline. A number of anthropologists argued that, in overlooking the significance of the emergence of de-colonised, self-determined Maori research, Hanson failed to appreciate the cultural politics involved in redefining the boundaries of knowledge ownership, representation, and resource allocation.

Mohanram (1999) brings yet another North American perspective to bear on the New Zealand social and political scene. In *Black Body: Women, Colonialism and Space* she probes the origin myths of a nation entering the 21st century, arguing that the Treaty of Waitangi (1840) represents the originating moment for the imagining of a New Zealand Nation. She observes that (1999, p. 100):

> The continuing tradition of burying the placenta represents Maori nationalism as timeless and unchanging, whereas signing the Treaty of Waitangi suggests just the opposite – their adaptability to new ways of constructing identity. Both ploys are necessary in the growing bid for Maori nationalism. In oppositional nationalism, a braiding of the unchanging and the changing, the predictable and the political, the Maori plays the role that is expected of her by being timeless and unchanging in her ways while simultaneously going beyond the role assigned to her, being overtly political. By deliberately 'incarcerating' themselves in their relationship to the land, Maori form the contours of the pan-Maori nationalistic movement in Aotearoa/New Zealand.

What she fails, however, to acknowledge is the fact that whereas the Treaty acknowledges the indigeneity of urban-Maori, it does not accommodate their repositioning as migrants removed from their tribal territories. Nor does she acknowledge the fact that, in foregrounding colonizer and indigenous-Aotearoa relations, interpretations of the Treaty effectively create a context in which the potential for alliances between urban Maori and urban Pacific Island peoples is fraught with complexity. Even so, ethnographic overlap between groups who reconstruct their neighbourhoods as places of belonging-ness can, I shall argue, produce *informal* alliances. It is with the problematic nature of these informal alliances that I shall be concerned here.

**Theorising back from the South Auckland scene/South Pacific Seas**

South Auckland Maori and Pacific groups cohabit urban neighbourhoods. They are situationally coupled, occupying a designated urban-Maori/Pacific Island place on the Nation's fringe in a way that is reminiscent of the 1960s conflation of race and socio-economic status. Thus, these groups are coupled in a process of renaming. Urban Maori and Pacific Islanders are the *new* disenfranchised migrants. Thus, theorising the closure of gaps between dominant groups and urban-Maori/Pacific Islanders produces a reworked assimilation. Reinventing the socio-economic answer to the 'new race problem' involves downplaying racial *difference*, grouping urban-Maori and Pacific Islanders together in relation to policies which aim at "closing the gaps,"

salvaging, conferring citizenship through employment and the redistribution of wealth.

Who constructs race and who wears the construction? Who produces markers of racial equality? Who writes the cultural scripts for urban-Maori/Pacific Islanders in an ethnically challenged socio-economic text? Who decides who deserves citizenship? How does the State know that socio-economic redress will diffuse uneasiness between urban-Maori and Pacific groups? Who manages disenfranchisement when it provokes groups to compete for crumbs from the State's table? The following extracts indicate where the answer to such questions is to be found. The first extract is from an article by Fuimaono Les McCarthy (2001, p. 276) in which it is argued that ethnicity indicates socio-economic status in a national framework; the second, from an article in which Pa'u Mulitalo-Lauta (2002, p. 247), argues that cultural identity can be wielded by social services as a correctional device:

> Identity by ethnicity underpins the analyses of demographic and socio-economic characteristics that were presented at the Pacific Vision Conference [convened in Auckland 1999 by the Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs].
>
> Cultural identity is an important issue for the recognition and survival of Pacific peoples in Aotearoa/New Zealand. Within the context of social services, cultural identity is fundamental to the wellbeing and personal growth of clients. Cultural identity can be used to influence a Pacific person to change for the better.

It is in this context that the Maori writer, Tracey McIntosh (2001, p.151), discusses the Pacific misunderstanding of the institutionalisation of the identity-marker *tangata whenua*:

> The concept of tangata whenua was also problematic. . . . For the Pacific Island community, as for much of the rest of the non-Maori population, the concept was poorly understood.
>
> Biculturalism was similarly poorly represented and misunderstood. The early call by successive governments for a multicultural society was . . . well received. Multiculturalism seemed to offer a definite space of incorporation into New Zealand life for Pacific peoples. Donna Awatere spoke for many Maori when she castigated multiculturalism, claiming that the Pakeha state offered it to Pacific peoples as a means to entice them away from possible alliances with Maori.

At the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, Governor Hobson said "he iwi tahi taatou" (Maori and Pakeha are one). The reality has failed to match the rhetoric. For myself, a Tongan/Maori/Samoan woman, the bearer of a New Zealand passport, the ambivalent inheritor of Western European ancestry, these words represent little more than Hobson's choice. The notion of *our* New Zealand, a New Zealand whose heritage belongs equally to Maori and Pakeha is White mythology, marketed through media, literature, and popular culture by orthodox propagators of heritage affairs. Nevertheless, Hobson's words are rooted in historical memory. They resurface for new migrants in a way that suggests that they are not considered *natural* in terms of

national origin. At the same time, they can provide others with the type of certainty that is indicated in the following excerpt from Michael King cited in a *Listener* article (cited in Revington 2001, p.23):

> For me, to be a Pakeha on the cusp of the 21st century is not to be European; it is not to be an alien or a stranger in my own country. It is to be a non-Maori New Zealander who is aware of and proud of my antecedents, but who identifies as intimately with this land . . . as anybody Maori.

Shaped by Michael King's 'man on the land' story (cited in Revington 2001, p.23), Pacific groups attempt to make sense of their shifting situation in a problematic context, a context in which Pakeha see themselves as 'second wave migrants' who, by virtue of the Treaty of Waitangi, have an incontestable status in relation to national identity, a status that is indigenous-like in character. This way of thinking has the potential to alienate more recent migrants, particularly migrants from Pacific Islands, conferring on them a lesser status as citizens and, in the process, obscuring the many ways in which their struggle is similar to that of urban Maori. Thus, alliances between Pacific Islanders and *Tangata Whenua* are problematized. Political marketing and historical reification of *imagined* bi-nationalism de-privileges Pacific-ness. This national disjuncture complicates Pacific interpretations of what indigeneity and sovereignty means for Maori groups in relation to themselves. The potential for alliances between islanders and Maori is concealed. Opportunities for collectively challenging Nationhood narratives and the socio-economic paradox of racial hierarchy are lost at the same time as New Zealand-born Samoan-ness measures its stakes through citizenship rights as New Zealanders. Thus, in the words of Anae (1997, p. 128):

> [For] New Zealand-born Samoans . . . secured identities can be reached by viewing the identity journey as a series of rites of passage - enforced rituals which challenge one's right to be 'a New Zealander,' and on the other hand, one's right to be a Samoan. . . . [Some] New Zealand-born Samoans can attain secured identities . . . thus becoming much 'healthier' members of wider New Zealand society, and their own 'aiga, church and community groups - as Samoans who are not born in Samoa but in New Zealand.

Challenging rights to citizenship is problematic. The Treaty of Waitangi means that *kawanatanga*, or governance, is the vehicle by which Pacific Islanders claim citizenship rights. State practice defines ethnicity as the demographic marker of socio-economic place within Nation. Racial contradiction is exposed. When rights of citizenship disclose that New Zealanders do not cohabit on a level playing field, *kawanatanga*, is exposed as a system of power that privileges White groups and de-privileges others. In this context, some Pacific groups invent their indigeneity and sovereignty in relation to Aotearoa. Thus, for example, Tongan writer Sitaleki Finau (1999, p.49) collapses the difference between Maori and Pacific Islanders by appropriating *rangatiratanga*, rights of indigenous sovereignty in the Treaty of Waitangi:

> Maoris are Polynesians and are Pacificans who have become tangata whenua of Aotearoa before the arrival of the second wave of Pacificans who are now

> called migrants. One day these migrants, if they stay and work long enough, will be of the whenua.

Maori women Donna Awatere (1984) and Tracey McIntosh (2001) have both suggested that alliances between Maori and Pacific groups will undergo renegotiation, arguing that alliances will be generated through reclamation of post-colonial sovereignty which is the consequence of Colonisation. The first extract below is from McIntosh (2001, p.152); the second is from Awatere (1984, cited in McIntosh 2001, p.149):

> Where for many [Pacific] migrants, the situation of Maori was a consequence of Maori failings, it is seen by many of their children as a consequence of colonialism. While marginalisation was an unthinkable fate for many migrants, their own children are often able to see parallels between their situation and that of Maori. Migrants too may be revisiting their views. Those who earlier criticised the Maori for the loss of their language and cultural knowledge now see the same losses occurring among their children and grandchildren. This new awareness may lead to a rethinking and reconstruction of the relationship between them.
>
> The difficulty with Polynesians is not that they are white, but that white culture in the form of Christianity, and its sidekick aggressive materialism has so impacted on their culture. They are ravaged by a desperate need to 'get' white education, material goodies and white status. . . . [which] means that the Pacific Island people are not at this moment prepared to ally themselves with us. But this could change in the long term. All this white education, goodies and status have a high cultural cost, which future generations will have to pay. Perhaps then we can look again.

*Differences* in imagining alliances emerge. McIntosh (2001, p.152), in the first extract below, argues that New Zealand-born generations will form alliances with Maori because they understand systematic disenfranchisement; Awatere (1984, pp.35 – 37), in the second extract below, argues that New Zealand-born islanders are the natural allies of Maori precisely because their sense of identity has survived physical separation from their place:

> One, and in some cases two generations of New Zealand-born Pacific people have now been exposed in schools to accounts of early colonial history and of the extent of systematic abrogation by Pakeha of rights conferred on Maori under the Treaty of Waitangi. They appreciate, more completely in most cases than their immigrant parents, the extent of the historical injustices perpetrated against Maori, and have a more complete understanding of the causes of the marginalisation of Maori.
>
> Pacific Island immigrants are the natural allies of the Maori, in particular the Polynesians: Samoans, Cook Islanders, Tongans. . . . Pacific Island immigrants and their descendants form an uneasy alliance with the White Nation against Maori sovereignty. In the early 1970s Polynesian Panthers . . . challenged Nga Tamatoa for what it called "Maori cultural nationalism". . . . This call for the Maori to abandon our claims to sovereignty arose from the

> emergence of New Zealand-born Pacific Islanders. . . . Maori sovereignty was seen as a diversion from the "real" issue, which was . . . achieving civil rights and coequal rights with whites. . . . This call really represented the identity crisis of the New Zealand-born but Pacific Island-*identified* people. . . . Pacific Island leaders, Rev Sio and Sefulu Ioani supported Maori calls to be awarded tangata whenua status. . . . [They] recognised that multiculturalism was an illusion designed to draw attention away from the real problem of whites, which is to accept biculturalism. Strong support for Maori sovereignty thus came from some Samoan-born leaders. . . . [Their] ability to recognise Maori sovereignty lies in their own strong sense of identity as Samoans. In *Samoa* and *not* in NZ.

Tongan journalist Sefita Hao'uli, and Samoan writer Tapu Misa both demonstrate how the limits of defining ethnic place through a socio-economic formula stigmatises its margins. Pacific groups are coerced through citizenship versus sovereignty dilemmas to remain confined by dominant design. Dominant design prohibits movement outside the bounds of colonial persistence. It forces the margins to fight each other for State favour, White paternalism, and financial gain. The extracts below are from Sefita Hao'uli (1996, cited in McIntosh, 2001, p.149) and Tapu Misa 1995, cited in McIntosh, 2001, p.150):

> Pacific Island people did not come here to hongi with the Maori. We came here because the opportunities were here and, we thought, these came from Palangi, not Maori.
>
> Many Pacific Islanders looked down on Maori for having lost their language and culture without understanding their history. And many Maori regarded Pacific Islanders as uneducated, unsophisticated Coconuts taking away resources that should have gone to Maori.

Tensions between urban-Maori and Pacific groups are read in respect of disenfranchisement via an ethnically determined socio-economic framework. This coerces groups to compete on Nation's margins for contended resources and contested sovereignty/citizenship rights. It can create groups as violent enemies, before permitting them to see each other as allies with a common cause.

**Turangawaewae/Tu'ungavae: Echoes of new places to stand through old pasts**

Multiple dialogue informs the making of South Auckland Maori and Pacific Island places of belonging. Cultural sovereignties and reinvented nationalisms are played out in South Auckland territories of cohabitation and marginalisation. Traces of migrant-Pacific identity can mirror indigenous-Maori, and 'Islanders going Native in Aotearoa,' can be self-realised. The first extract below is from an interview with one of my research informants (recorded 16 April 2000); the second is taken from correspondence with another research informant (dated June 2001):

> I asked him, why don't you . . . help Pacific Island people in New Zealand? You are always looking to Europe or Asia, but you are in the Pacific! Pacific Island people have been slaves to New Zealand for a century. We have provided a place to dump your poor quality meat that you can't sell on the European market, and we have provided cheap labour as factory workers for

> New Zealand's industrial development. . . . Why is it when Pacific Island people attempt to come to New Zealand, the Department of Immigration kicks us out of New Zealand? And what about our brothers the Maori people of New Zealand? The New Zealand government has attempted to help them recently, so why won't you help the Pacific Island people in New Zealand? After all, Maori and Pacific Island people are Polynesians and this is the Pacific!
>
> Polynesian mind is short-term, surviving this week to next on the benefit. I blame the churches. Look at our Tongan people in South Auckland. Beneficiaries build the churches, look after the ministers, send money to Tonga. Where the money goes, only God knows. It don't [sic] go back to the people. It goes to the rich, the corrupt. The best thing Tongans can do is get behind tangata whenua. But tangata whenua don't want to waste time with islanders who can't see past their noses, can't think past tomorrow, the next puaka they give for the church. Tongans are getting sicker and sicker. If we don't get behind tangata whenua and work in with Maori, then forget it. We'll be another ethnic minority, same as Asians or Indians. That's sick. Oceania belongs to us, we are tangata moana.

These Tongan men mimic the suspicions of Ranginui Walker (1996, pp.185-203) and Sid Mead (1997, pp.89-93) that multiculturalism undermines biculturalism thus having the potential to reduce Maori to the status of any other ethnic minority. Political distance between Maori and 'islanders' collapses in-between: "Maori and Pacific Island people are Polynesians, this is the Pacific"/ "Oceania belongs to us, we are tangata moana." Pacific Islanders risk disenfranchisement by "Asians and Indians." Thus, in the last extract above, Tongans are urged to "work in with Maori" and reclaim territories and resources which are seen as belonging to "tangata moana."

Tongan historian 'Okusitino Mahina has argued that 'tangata i fonua' and 'fefine i fonua' are Tongan terms that speak 'tangata whenua' in Maori.[1] Mahina resists 'tangata Pasifika' as an identity marker for Pacific Islanders in Aotearoa. He sees it as an alien-migrant inference, as essentially Western. 'Tangata moana', on the other hand, is a Tongan reference to Oceanic groups which alludes to the inter-relatedness of pre-colonial histories, languages, and cultures. It includes Maori in its Oceanic-sovereignty. It acknowledges Maori indigeneity in Aotearoa. Politically, it maps moana-Oceania, as belonging to first tangata-groups, who navigated its oceans, and settled its islands ('Okusitino Mahina 1999, pp.276 – 87). In connection with this, Tongan ethnographer 'Opeti Taliai has argued that the Tongan terms 'kauhala'uta' and 'kauhalalalo' assign social groups into navigators and rowers on canoes. Taliai sees social order as being historically constructed through references to the moana and its tangata.[2]

In *Remembrance of Pacific Pasts* (Borofsky (Ed.), 2000), political disenfranchisement is countered by a process of by re-validating sovereign belonging-ness and inter-connected-ness to an Oceania/moana place, space, and identity. This perspective is similar to that of Sefa Dei (2000, pp.70 – 86) who discusses African development in terms of experiences and interpretations that are continuous and consistent with indigenous worldviews.

South Auckland Tongan groups read Maori sovereignty through public media and via cohabitation of urban neighbourhoods alongside migrant Maori who externally appear de-tribalised from iwi origins. The importance of devolving Maori as a homogeneous identity-marker, and mobilising iwi as an indicator of tribal-ness and locality, can be misapprehended as the following extract from the correspondence of one of my research informants (March 2001) indicates:

> I told him, you should have got me to look at the fisheries quota before. Why do Maori split the fisheries up among tribes? To compete on the global market, you're better to join together. Don't divide it up into small pieces. To move a fisheries company on the international market, you have to put all your pieces into one big pie. That's the trouble with Maori. They want to be tribal. They don't want to work as one.

The informant quoted above reads Maori tribal-ness through his own social-organisation background. During conversations with South Auckland Tongans, it emerged that a general non-experiential understanding of tribal-ness in relation to colonisation meant uniformity was for them the base-line ideal for group organisation and survival. Uniformity was what Maori were perceived to lack.

Homogeneous Tongan-ness is, however, socially engineered. Social differences that are regionally based, or based, more specifically, on village identities are, in fact, relocated from the Tonga Islands to South Auckland where Tongan difference is reproduced through chiefly groups, village/region associations, kava clubs, churches, ministers, non-church goers, extended-kin groups, informal work groups - stone masons, backyard salesmen, women's koloa/craft groups, working class, the unemployed, middle-class professionals, teachers, bureaucrats. Even so, the ideological production of Tongan sameness resurfaces when deciphering Maori tribal-ness. It informs the perceptions of those who seek to mobilise South Auckland Tongan groups to participate in organisations, to raise funds for homeland remittances, to build places to stand in urban-neighbourhoods.

For urban-Maori and Pacific Island groups, Mohanram's assumption that Maori and Pacific Islanders are politically non-aligned and that that alignment should be forged formally through official organisations and networks is problematic. Views such as this echo the post-modern rhetoric of trans-national freedom of movement. They prioritise ethnic minority rights of citizenship and group global consciousness. They emphasise socio-economic mobility via political activism, which is officially placed *inside* the formal system of power. However, political alignment between urban-Maori and Pacific groups takes place within grass-roots community contexts. It resurfaces through sites of popular culture. It is played out through linguistic and conceptual interchanges. It echoes Turangawaewae in its claim that this place is part of the wider Pacific region, which belongs to us, not Pakeha/Palangi. It is relived through reclamations of language, territory, and history. It shifts through cultural sovereignties and postcolonial nationalisms within, and between, groups whose membership is made up of poor, urban-migrants who cohabit communities in crisis. It transitions informally in-between the movement and messiness of cohabitation and marginalisation as is indicated in the two extracts that follow. The first is from an interview with Daryl Thomson aired on Radio New Zealand (August 1999); the second is from Galumalemana Hunkin-Tuiletufuga (2001, p. 198):

> I am a Tongan, I am a Fijian, I am a Hawaiian, I am a Tahitian, I am from the Marquesas. I'm all of that. I'm a Coconut, I'm Islander, I'm a Maori. It's only the media and the *Pakehas* who separate us. There are no such things as Maoris and Polynesians. Where are we? We're in Polynesia. We're on the triangle. I hate that shit, and I hate it when my people say it. I read the paper every day. "The perpetrator was a six foot bald headed guy with a beanie believed to be Maori or Polynesian." But you know we deal with that, we deal with it. We deal with that by not looking at it. And it's not turning away, we just don't say, "We're Polynesians too." Just don't say it, don't worry about what people's thinking right, get on with the bigger picture.
>
> There's a growing awareness that Pacific Islanders can provide a way for Maori to rediscover their Pacific roots. As Witi Ihimaera wrote . . . Maori are the youngest of Pacific peoples: 'Maui Potiki, Maui was the last born. . . . We who live in Aotearoa are the potiki of the Pacific. It is time we took our rightful place on the marae of the Pacific, which is the court of us all.

Foucault (1990, p.99) reminds us that resistance to power is not produced outside the system of governance, that resistance does not stand in binary opposition to power. Nevertheless, in line with Baudrillard, I argue that the reinvention of place and belonging to which reference has been made here signifies "mental resistance to colonisation" (Baudrillard: Public Lecture, Auckland Town Hall, 2000). To paraphrase Said (1977, p.17; 1999, p.5), mental resistance to colonisation expresses itself consciously because one has been bodily and territorially displaced. One becomes intimately aware that one's identity group is living 'out of place,' while concurrently embodying and staking out claims to a new place. The rhetoric of renegotiating a place, a new place of belonging, selectively emphasises a consistency with a pre-colonial past. Thus, communal ties among Maori and Pacific ethnicities are prioritised while marked differences are accepted.

Colonialism is a metaphor for cultural and historical discontinuity. Colonialism is the point of entry, the point at which certainty of place and belonging is ruptured. Colonialism provides the common ground from which new proclamations of place and belonging are spoken for.

The following lyrics (in which I have highlighted critical sections) by Auckland-based Aotearoa/Pasifika hip-hop crews sum up much of what has been said here. The first crew - *Lost Tribe* - is made up of six Samoan, Tongan, and Niuean men all of whose parents are homeland-born islanders. They reclaim South Auckland as their urban-place of identity. The second performer - Che Fu - is Maori-Nga Puhi/Niuean. He claims Ponsonby, Auckland-central as his urban-place of belonging. Daryl Thomson of Ngati Kahungunu, who grew up in Porirua, Wellington and who now lives in Grey Lynn, Auckland-central, performs the mixing.

> Some in search of different shores, cruise jump off in a wharf, fresh off boats [FOB] to a new port
> I stow away with **my cousins up north**; we came all the way
> But hey, many brothers taking trips that we're gonna freakin' overstay

**Migrate in the South AK** [South Auckland] **as our place, brown colour** joining in the bloody rat race
At the starting line they work in factories from five to five, they can't debate
They gotta put the food on the plate
We're moving slow, but pickin' up pace
Aotearoa, quantum leap anti-clockwise, can see through my forefather's eyes
To explore shores for more joy, no warning attack
Just a ukulele in my cheap back-pack filled with no formal plan of attack
Aotearoa, the last destination from **streams of Hawaiiki**
Can somebody tell me how migrations of Pacific cousins became unhappy upon arrival to New Zealand in the seventies
Facing **a place that's been man made**, it might be enterprising
Dawn raids, planting seeds that demons spawned against us
Separates us through the **baby boom brown race**
**Still here today inheriting the bunga ways**, that calls upon the voice of today
Don't let the sun go down, Polynesians all around the world [my emphasis].[3]

Well I grew up in Ponsonby
They take the Gluepot now they're coming for me
But hell no --- I won't go away
Ponsonby, where I live, Ponsonby, where I stay
I never asked you to put a café in **my street**
Looking at me like another **refugee**
No I will not go; I won't be living with my hurt in a hole
Drag me, shoot me, stab me --- I know that you would do it most gladly
Picking like a vulture, rape my people, rape my culture
Come make my chains, come help me out --- living in the city ain't so bad
I ain't forgotten where I did come from
I be down with the **brown-skinned** Polynesian [my emphasis].[4]

*Lost Tribe* perform the movement of ideas from one culture to another by caulking a Nga Puhi/South Auckland reference to "my cousins up north" and by merging it in-between island experience of "stowing away" on a boat to an Aotearoa wharf. Urban-Maori/Pasifika hybridity – "I stow away with my cousins up north" - sets the scene for reconstructing Aotearoa as "the last destination from streams of Hawaiiki." This South Auckland Samoan, Tongan, Niuean group appropriates Hawaiiki as an ancestral place of origin. Hawaiiki is the homeland of Maori and Pacific ethnicities, the place from which we all originated before travelling to, and arriving at, the southernmost Pacific borders.

Tracing multiple roots back to a Hawaiiki homeland legitimises South Auckland as *our place*. The emphasis on "exploring new shores" implies that the journey of migrant Pacific Islanders echoes a similar past in the pre-contact voyages from Eastern Polynesia. There is no mention of rivalry for economic resources between South Auckland Maori and Pacific groups. There is no mention of iwi groups who reside in South Auckland. There is no mention of the fact that working-class Maori were the first brown-skinned migrants who embodied South Auckland neighbourhoods.

Che Fu defers from an iwi-based/Maori-based claim to a claim for Ponsonby as his Turangawaewae. He utters the visual-marker of *Lost Tribe* - that brown-skinned Polynesian-ness stakes out one's place of belonging in an urban neighbourhood. His Ponsonby *streets* of belonging are threatened by cafés, an allusion to the fact that up-market Whites are taking-over inner-city Auckland and disenfranchising urban-Maori and Islanders, re-mobilising them southward and westward. Che Fu sees new White-arrivals as discriminating against his brown-skin in his own neighbourhood. He is becoming a *refugee* who is bodily out of place in up-market Ponsonby.

Brown-skin visually maps out an Auckland territory to which one belongs. Brown-skin is the identity-marker of strategic essentialism. Brown-ness represents the origins of Hawaiiki and Polynesian-ness, in contrast to Whiteness, which represents colonialism and European-ness. Brown-skin represents the site of bodily resistance to territorial displacement by Whiteness and aggressive Capitalism. Brown-skin means one *naturally* inherits the bunga ways, or the Polynesian-ness of an origin homeland, despite migratory movement. Brown-skin means bodily confinement within the physicality of race. It means that skin and body are bound to an Aotearoa/Pasifika place of local and regional belonging.

**Final word from the South**

Finally, South Auckland urban-Maori and Pacific groups who reconstruct their neighbourhoods as places to stand, perform an informal economy of exchange. They selectively align histories, and renegotiate their identities in respect of each other and the newness of urban-migrant relocation. The political tensions they navigate through are consistent with being disenfranchised groups who are bodily, territorially, and economically displaced. Their performances reveal the discontinuity of making new places to stand, while realising the uncertainty of belonging-ness in living outside of origin place.

In-between the too-ing and fro-ing of cultural ideas, and merged within the politics of marginalisation, urban cohabitation, and fathoming relationships between people and place, Maori and Pacific groups perform a shared practice. They practice remaking turangawaewae by imagining and locating the Native. Ironically, they locate the Native by interrogating their own subjectivity through origin homeland fracture and group disjuncture on Nation's margins.

Those who inhabit South Auckland Maori and Pacific margins creatively imagine and reconstruct relationships to places they cohabit *because* they are marginalised. Like Said (1978; 1999), I argue that the capacity to resist mental colonisation, and to transgress boundaries by reinventing new Native belonging-ness emerges because they understand, because they re-adapt to the subjectivity of displacement. Belich (2001) and King (1999) claim that Pakeha are the next Natives in line to Maori. In contrast, Pacific groups reclaim shared Oceania-moana sovereignty.

Echoes of turangawaewae reverberate through historical memory and language. Turangawaewae as a metaphor for belonging informs the origins of urban Native-ness that are inscribed in the national ethnoscape. The postcolonial paradox is that a new Native practice is to represent the land through parallels with the landlessness of the ocean.

The final voice here is a Maori voice, the voice of one of my informants as recorded in personal correspondence (July 2001). It illustrates how the narrowness of socio-economic marginalisation influences perceptions and shapes the ways in which groups read each other:

> Migration for islanders means they can go anywhere in the world, plant roots, get citizenship. They want to be equal to Pakehas, they want what Pakehas have, but they don't ask who was here first 'cos it's not in their interests. They'd rather be friends with Pakehas than us, until they figure out Pakehas don't want to help them; they're only islanders. When they work it out, then they want to know the Maoris. Not 'cos they see Aotearoa is Maori land, not 'cos they respect our people, language, tikanga, but so they can see what we're doing and copy. Alliances between Maoris and islanders in South Auckland won't cement 'cos islanders don't have a kaupapa. They're too busy scrapping; Samoans versus the rest of the moana. I don't know why they say Pacific Islanders, 'cos really, it's Saa-tanga in Aotearoa. I've been to official fono in Auckland, always ruled by Saas, sat there and watched them scrap about money, how to get freebees off the government. That's their kaupapa - money, not fighting for our knowledge, tikanga, our freedom to take back control of what's ours. That's why they came here in the first place; to get rich, show their whanau in the islands they're big-time villagers in New Zealand.

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**Endnotes**

**1.** 'Okusi Mahina, Personal Correspondence, June 2001.
**2.** 'Opeti Taliai, Personal Correspondence, June 2001.
**3.** Lost Tribe, 'Summer in the Winter', Cassingle, Track Four, 1999.
**4.** Che Fu and DLT, 'Chains', Cassingle, Track Two, 1998.

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