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DEFENCE NOT DEFIANCE:

THE SHAPING OF NEW ZEALAND'S VOLUNTEER FORCE

A thesis

submitted in partial fulfilment

of the requirements for the Degree

of

Doctor of Philosophy in History

at the

University of Waikato

by

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University of Waikato

1990

ABSTRACT

In the latter half of the nineteenth century and the first decade of the twentieth New Zealand's land defences were primarily the responsibility of its Volunteer Force. This Force over a period of fifty-two years evolved from ill-considered vigilante bands to a well organised and disciplined Army. This thesis examines the evolution of this Volunteer Army in chronological sequence concentrating on the factors which shaped and developed it.

The preface provides a brief outline of this study on New Zealand's Volunteer Force. The thesis then presents the history of the Force in eight chapters. These chapters are in four basic divisions. The first section, of three chapters, examines the origins of the Force, its role in the New Zealand Wars and its subsequent development in the period of tenuous peace during the 1870's. The second section, comprising of two chapters only, examines the transformation of the Volunteers from a military body which primarily looked inward into a Force which concentrated on protecting the nation's main ports. The third section, also comprising two chapters, then views the development of this coastal protection Force into a Colonial Army, able and willing to provide for the

nation's own security as well as expeditionary units to serve with the British Imperial Forces. The last section, of one chapter only, concentrates on the demise of Volunteering and the moves to compulsory militarytraining. The conclusion then draws together the analytical threads of the thesis.

As the thesis is extensive in its coverage of time, it is only possible to outline the very nature of Volunteering. It will be for Regimental Historians to show the uniqueness of each of the 658 different units that comprised the New Zealand Volunteer Force over its fifty-two years of existence. What this broad survey does do, however, is provide a unique window for the examination of the development of an embryonic Colonial Army in the context of a developing nation.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I am grateful for the assistance, help and support of many people and institutions in writing this thesis. My wife and family have had to suffer my disappearances into libraries, archives and local Museums in my hunt for materials while on 'holiday'. Then at home they have often been forced to fend for themselves while I have struggled to write up my findings. Throughout this ordeal they have always proved understanding and supportive.

To the archivists and librarians throughout New Zealand I have pestered I am truly grateful for your help. I am especially appreciative of the efforts of the staffs of the National Museum, National Archives and National Library. I am also grateful to the assistance of the defence librarians and to the reference staff at the Queen Elizabeth II Army Memorial Museum who have continued to be cheerful in their support in my more difficult moments.

Thanks are also due to the rest of the staff, both past and present, of the Army Museum. In particular I wish to acknowledge the important role of Major G. D. Stevenson (retired) the Director between 1982-84. It was he who first encouraged me to undertake this task. For that encouragement I will always be truly thankful. To Mrs Elizabeth Cottrell, my personal assistant as Director I owe a real obligation. She has proved to be a most loyal

and helpful friend and colleague. Not only has she managed to maintain my equanimity she has turned my illegible drafts into readable script.

Many others from the New Zealand Army have also proved helpful in this undertaking. Especially Major General B. Meldrum, Lieutenant Colonels D. Brown, R. Mortlock and W. Collins (deceased) All have been in a variety of ways instrumental in bringing this work to fruition. Individual acknowledgements are due to so many others that I beg their indulgence in a general expression of thanks.

In allowing me to proceed with this work I must also give thanks to the History Department of the University of Waikato. I am grateful for the continued support and interest of Professor J. H. Jensen. Professor L. H. Barber deserves special mention as primary supervisor as well as a friend and colleague who has always proved helpful and supportive. To my dear friend and mentor Dr D. G. S. Simes, and his wife Cheryl, I am indebted. Not only did they provide useful references, they also gave invaluable assistance throughout.

It only remains for me to add that while I have had help and support from many sources I take full responsibility for the conclusions and any short comings in this thesis.

Garry James Clayton

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
December 1990

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Location of major New Zealand Volunteer involvement: North Island



Location of major New Zealand Volunteer involvement: South Island

PREFACE

This thesis presents a study of a much neglected military force, the New Zealand Volunteers. From 1858 to 1910 civilian New Zealanders, some with regular force experience, 'volunteered' to serve in units that were the backbone of New Zealand's defence. At its best the Volunteer movement provided New Zealand with a safeguard against a resurgence of Maori 'rebel' warfare or small scale foreign invasion forces, but at its worst the Volunteer movement was a collection of not so gentlemanly drinking clubs, that soaked up the colony's limited defence budget.

Throughout this study of the New Zealand Volunteer System, its closeness to British models, its origins, development aberrations and demise are examined in detail. The thesis suggests that volunteering was important for the emergence of New Zealand's sense of Imperial identity, as shown particularly in the willingness to participate in the Anglo-Boer War (1899-1902). Conceived when European settlements were first established in the country, New Zealand's Volunteer Force was born in May 1858. It was to survive for a total of 51 years 10 months until its untimely demise in February 1910. During its life span the Force, under the motto 'Defence not Defiance'[1] faithfully served local communities and the country. From an infancy which coupled it to the more senior compulsory Militia the Volunteer Force was to develop into

INTRODUCTION

This thesis presents a study of a much neglected military force, the New Zealand Volunteers. From 1858 to 1910 civilian New Zealanders, some with regular force experience, 'volunteered' to serve in units that were the backbone of New Zealand's defence. At its best the Volunteer movement provided New Zealand with a safeguard against a resurgence of Maori 'rebel' warfare or small scale foreign invasion forces, but at its worst the Volunteer movement was a collection of not so gentlemanly drinking clubs, that soaked up the colony's limited defence budget.

The concept of volunteering was established in the Anglo-Saxon psyche long before New Zealand was annexed by Britain. During Elizabeth I's reign, her subjects voluntarily banded together for training and service against the threatened Spanish invasion. Within living memory the British had revived volunteering to protect the nation against Napoleon. This late eighteenth century manifestation was to provide the basic role model of volunteering throughout the British Empire. Groups of approximately 100 individuals would band together in corps

and offer their service to the Government. Once accepted they would organise their own uniforms, training and administrative structures. The demise of Napoleon was paralleled by a decline in British volunteering.

In New Zealand the establishment of the Volunteer tradition was not simply a response to external foes, both realized and potential. Internally the European colonists were confronted by a warlike indigenous population. Without sufficient numbers of regulars to guarantee security New Zealand volunteers formed their own military units. Faithfully serving the colony for fifty-five years, these units of New Zealand Volunteer Force adopted the general motto "Defence not Defiance".[1] It was an apt motto that clearly identified the role it was given as a citizen army. They were seen as defenders of New Zealand's sovereignty. They were not however products of an unrestrained and defiant militarism which were viewed as the hallmarks of continental forces.

New Zealand was by no means unique in having a citizen force charged with defending hearth and home. In North America, Australia and Africa, British settlers living on the frontiers and fringes of Empire voluntarily banded together for collective security. All these forces were shaped by defence need, cultural heritage, economic constraints and political necessity. In Canada, citizen forces not only protected settlers against the ravages of

hostile Indians, they also provided reinforcements to the campaigns of British regulars against their breakaway cousins in the South. The example set in the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries by the Canadian colonists was to be emulated, both variations, by all other British Settler Societies.

Where appropriate New Zealand's experience in fashioning its volunteer army will be contrasted with the experience of Britain and other colonies. This study is, however, primarily an examination of the origins, development, aberrations and demise of the New Zealand Volunteer Force.[2] It suggests that this force was an effective military organisation. In New Zealand it proved itself in the campaigns against 'rebellious' Maori and later provided a physical means of defence against a feared Russian . Overseas, individuals recruited from, and trained by, the Volunteer Force proved themselves on the veldt against the intransigent Boer. The experience of the battlefield tested the Volunteers and their force, enabling necessary improvements to be identified and implemented. They also provided an opportunity of New Zealand's sense of Imperial identity to emerge.

The thesis, of necessity, views the Volunteer Force and its members against the backdrop of the changing and developing political, economic and social fabric of New

Zealand. It examines the forces which necessitated its existence and fashioned it. That such an overall examination has not been undertaken earlier cannot be explained by insufficient materials. Newspapers, Parliamentary Debates, governmental returns, minute books, correspondence, diaries and a raft of other manuscript materials exist in over abundance. None of these is impossible to access. Reference librarians and archivists are keen to assist wherever pertinent holdings exist. This thesis was written in the hope that it will help overcome the previous neglect. It is hoped that this study will spur an interest in others to undertake detailed research on individual units and their relationships with central authorities, their communities and localities.

New Zealand's Volunteer Force was a military necessity born of economic hardship, political expediency and British refusal to retain regular Imperial troops in the colony. As a military force the Volunteer spanned the interlude between the cultural conflict within New Zealand, and New Zealanders' active participation in Imperial adventures in the latter decades of the nineteenth century. As a social and political force the Volunteers helped to knit the diverse settlements of New Zealand into a unified state. To a lesser degree, the Volunteer also helped in a modest way to stimulate the economic and cultural life of the infant nation.

NOTES FOR INTRODUCTION

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1. Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives 1889 H16 p7.

2 A tabular analysis of the national composition, length of service, governmental expenditure for New Zealand's Volunteer Force given at the Appendix.

CHAPTER ONE

SWASHBUCKLERS TO SOLDIERS: THE ORIGIN AND DEVELOPMENT OF NEW ZEALAND'S VOLUNTEER TRADITION TO 1859

The tradition of European New Zealanders voluntarily banding together in armed bodies goes back to at least 1834. In that year the prominent citizens of Kororareka formed their mutual protection society, the 'Kororareka Association.' An intermittently active association, it was, by 1838, a well organised and armed body. Its members were controlled by an elected central committee and were obliged to equip themselves with a musket, bayonet, brace of pistols and cutlass. Unfortunately the swashbuckling style of this volunteer vigilance committee in protecting property led to them being condemned as little more than lynch law enforcers.[1]

Within two and a half decades Volunteers were to receive the support, if not adulation, of their fellow citizens. In February 1859 the one hundred and fifty men who comprised the two companies of the Auckland Rifle Volunteers were reviewed by the Governor. Equipped and trained in the same fashion as regular British Infantry the 'Royal' and 'City' companies impressed all by their precision in drill and skirmishing.[2] The change in attitude toward voluntary armed bodies appears to have

been caused by changes in the very nature of those bodies. They ceased to be perceived as vigilantes and became, over twenty-five years, recognisably military defenders of hearth and home. This changed perception coincided with an increasing public awareness of New Zealand's need for defence forces to protect the colony from both internal and external foes.

In the mid-nineteenth century European New Zealanders, like most other people, considered tangible means of protection vital. This perceived necessity is not difficult to fathom; the worlds peace was, and most importantly was seen to be, fragile.[3] On average every two years saw a European power or the United States at war.[4] Britain, unquestionably one of the most powerful nations of the age, was not exempt from conflict. From the Crimea[5] to the Cape, from Asia[6] to the Antipodes[7] a multiplicity of foes faced and fought the flags and armies of the British. The British migrants resident in New Zealand avidly followed the causes, the campaigns and the consequences of all these conflicts with special attention being devoted to those which affected the home country. During the latter part of the 1840's and the early years of the 1850's they followed the exploits of the British forces in Southern Africa against the Kaffirs.[8] At the same time they viewed the events in Europe with alarm believing the outbreak of a general conflagration imminent due to the unsettled state of the Italian peninsula.[9]

Within a few short years attention had shifted to the Balkans and the outbreak of the Crimean War.

As the Crimean War directly involved British forces any news or intelligence of the conflict was eagerly devoured.[10] From the time the British and French fleets laid off Therapu,[11] to the final thanksgivings for Peace,[12] local newspapers followed the war informing the public not only about military preparations[13] and operations[14] but also about the diplomatic intrigues which enveloped the affair[15] and finally the peace negotiations which led to its resolution.[16] Press coverage of the Crimean conflict did not simply satisfy a demand for news. It also encouraged an outpouring of support for the homeland. In the legislative councils ambitious speeches declaring wholehearted support were made and well received.[17] In the wider community organisations such as the Patriotic Fund[18] and Nightingale Fund[19] raised money to assist the British combatants. At the same time these organisations clearly showed that though European New Zealanders were far from 'Home' their hearts were turned to it in its hour of need.[20] Some individuals went so far as to return to Britain and volunteer for active service.[21] This outpouring of support for the conflict culminated with the celebrations for peace which was commemorated not only by a general holiday[22] but also by a series of lectures[23] and sermons[24] which carefully scrutinised all facets of the conflict. These discourses

undoubtedly helped make the war an integral part of the experience of the colony binding it even closer to the Empire.[25]

The colony's bonds to the Empire were heightened by the next major conflict Britain became enmeshed in, the Indian Mutiny. It was to be yet another conflict which the New Zealand British migrant community made part of its own experience. From the initial reports of the Bengal Sepoy insurrection and their taking of Delhi[26] to its recapture by the British[27] and the horrific manner of the mutineers' execution by blowing them from 9 pounder artillery pieces[28] the New Zealand public was inundated with the latest news from India.[29]Individual battles were reported [30]and mutineer atrocities highlighted.[31] Further information was provided on the conflict by background lectures on India at meetings called to discuss the insurrection and show solidarity with their suffering countrymen.[32] New Zealand's politicians also expressed whole hearted support for the British cause. They pronounced their willingness to see every soldier removed from the colony to assist in the emergency if required.[33] (Though it was sincerely hoped that such a weakening of New Zealand's defences would not eventuate. It being argued that the lack of an adequate Military Force in India had led directly to the insurrection.[34])

While willing to express, if somewhat Janus like verbal support for the conflict New Zealand's political leaders were loathe to see any attempts to recruit volunteers within the colony for service in India. Wynyard the officer commanding Her Majesty's forces in New Zealand had recommended that a Volunteer Corps be enrolled from the ranks of New Zealand's settlers.[35] The government were not however enthusiastic about the project[36] and the governor declined to attempt the recruiting scheme believing:

> that such an appeal would be attend with no good effect, and would probably be treated with contempt...[37]

This lack of direct support reflected not a disagreement with the British cause but rather the fact that New Zealand was a young colony with its European population dedicated to winning their daily support from the land.[38]

The failure to provide New Zealand recruited troops in the Indian Mutiny did not result in any lack of understanding of the conflict or its consequences. Not only did the public receive generous press coverage, the colony also received a number of immigrants from India who had been intimately involved in the mutiny or its aftermath. Canterbury, for example, became a minor haven

for Indian Officers and civil administrators on retirement.[39] In Rangiora, John Brandon, Westby Percival and Philip Ashton are settlers who can be readily identified as having served as officers in India.[40] In Christchurch few would not know of Sir John Cracroft Wilson, a magistrate in India during the Mutiny, who retired to a 128,000 acre estate in Canterbury, complete with a retinue of Indian servants.[41] The presence of prominent retired Indian officers and civil servants not only reinforced Imperial bonds and added wealth and colour to New Zealand society but also helped remind the colony that insurrections by indigenous populations of martial leanings were extremely bloody. More importantly they helped remind the colony that peace was at best a tenuous state of affairs.

Conflict on the sub-continent and in Europe were not the only reminders that peace was tenuous. From the mid 1840's to the late 1850's France, the ancient enemy of Britain, appeared to be on the brink of hostilities with the United Kingdom. This state of affairs existed despite the two nations acting in concert during the Crimean War. British fears of French intentions were engendered by Louis Napoleon's pandering to his uncles memory, and by their own national press. A constant stream of French invasion literature was translated and published in English.[42] Up until the mid-nineteenth century such literature would have only caused mild amusement in a

confident British public. They had seen in the late eighteenth century two farcical French attempts at invasion. One at Llanwrda when a mixed force of 1,400 French sailors and marines surrendered on landing to a hastily brought together force of 700 British Militia, yeomanry and sailors.[43] A smaller landing at Pendevis suffered a similar fate.[44] In the first decade of the nineteenth century Napoleon Bonaparte's planned invasion of Britain had been a much more elaborate and serious enterprise, but it had failed to eventuate.[45]

The inability of the French to seriously threaten British security at the height of Napoleon's power undoubtedly brought a sense of well being to the general public. This sense of security was to be challenged in the middle part of the century by French willingness to adopt technological innovations in naval architecture. France was the first power to make real progress toward the construction of an ironclad fleet, which rapidly changed the balance of world naval power in the 1840's and 1850's. No longer was it considered absolutely certain that the British navy could defeat the French. It was this uncertainty which gave substance to what Richard Cobden termed the 'Three Panics' of 1846-47, 1851-52 and 1858-59 when the British public believed French Forces were about to descend upon their shores. As Lord Palmerston so aptly put it steam propulsion rendered the Channel "a river passable by a steam bridge."[46] This new

vulnerability made the British extremely anxious especially as most of their regular troops were stationed abroad.

Of the three panics which caused anxiety the last of 1858-59 was by far the most virulent, affecting not only mainland Britain but also her colonies, including New Zealand. Sparking off the last panic was the French public reaction to the attempted assassination of Louis Napoleon. Orsini and Pierri, the Italian conspirators executed for the crime belonged to a sect of assassins who initiated their plot in London. France, angered by the believed complicity of Britain, was seen as hovering on the brink of war, increasing its army and its construction of the steam fleet.[47] This fleet most viewed as designed specifically for the invasion of Britain. New Zealand's British immigrants not only accepted the likelihood of attack on Britain, they also believed that if hostilities broke out, a French squadron would descend upon the colony.[48] Such a descent was believed likely, not because of New Zealand's strategic position, but because of its gold fields which produced an easily transported booty.[49]

Anticipating that hostilities would break out the New Zealand government set aside £50,000 for defence works.[50] Colonel Mould the resident engineer officer was tasked with reviewing harbour defences and making recommendations as to their improvement. Assuming that any threat to the

colony would be relatively small, consisting of privateers or small armoured vessels, Mould believed that only the chief commercial ports of Auckland, Wellington and Lyttelton would be targeted. To counter such a threat, Mould suggested that existing fortifications be repaired, coastal artillery batteries be positioned and Volunteer Rifle, Artillery and Engineer Corps be established to man them. Many political observers considered the plans little more than a waste of money and when the crisis passed all were happy to postpone the proposed expenditure.[51]

Though the expenditure in defence works was postponed the anxiety New Zealand's British migrants felt over possible French intentions did not cease. The continuation of anxiety was principally due to the fact that Francophobia in New Zealand was not simply the product of imported British attitudes. French acquisitions of colonial territory in the Pacific, coupled with the stationing of large French forces, both maritime and land based, in the region, fuelled the suspicions and fears of the British colonists resident in New Zealand. The French were regarded in New Zealand as ruffians and perceived as a growing menace to the colony.[52] They had seized Caledonia and Tahiti turning both into armed camps with a strong fleet and a large body of troops ever ready to descend upon New Zealand's shores.[53] New Zealand's British residents were convinced that the French would not

hesitate to use any excuse to undertake such an operation as it was felt they had an unfulfilled desire to possess the country.

French desire for New Zealand had developed in parallel with Britain's interest. When in the early nineteenth century the Royal Navy were obtaining Kauri spars and dressed flax from New Zealand their French counterparts were obtaining similar supplies.[54] Over two decades later, when D'Urville was undertaking a scientific voyage around New Zealand, Governor Darling, in Sydney, became convinced that he was the standard bearer of a French plan to establish a claim to New Zealand.[55] To forestall this perceived French design two unsuccessful attempts were made to establish some form of British 'New Zealand Company',initially in 1825[56] , and subsequently in 1828[57]. Both failed to achieve their goal of annexation of New Zealand as the British government was reluctant to take on any further colonial enterprise. This reluctance was so great that the British authorities went so far as to announce that they had no jurisdiction whatsoever over New Zealand.[58]

Where British Commercial interests had failed, British missionaries were determined to succeed. Exploiting the visit of the French scientific vessel *La Favorite* they convinced thirteen Bay of Islands chiefs that the French intended to annex the country. To forestall this the

chiefs were prompted to petition King William IV for protection. In response James Busby was appointed the first British resident in 1832[59]. Three years later an Anglophile Frenchman, Baron Charles de Thierry, announced his intention of establishing an independent sovereign state in New Zealand on 40,000 acres at Hokianga. Busby, to forestall de Thierry, organised the Northern tribes into a de facto 'government' of New Zealand under the title of 'The United Tribes of New Zealand.'[60] While de Thierry was acting independently, many believed him to be working in concert with the French government. This belief was entrenched when the French catholic missionary Bishop Pompallier arrived with a Royal introduction to de Thierry as 'The King of New Zealand.'[61]

French desire for New Zealand did not die with the failure of de Thierry. In fact, the 1830's saw a dramatic increase in French commercial interest in colonisation of New Zealand. As the British appeared to be consolidating in the North Island, a number of French entrepreneurs recommended that France should take possession of the South. An opportunity to implement this suggestion came when a French whaler, Captain L'Anglois, returned home with the news that he had purchased Banks Peninsula in 1838 for 6,000 francs (approximately £240). L'Anglois conveyed his news in such a glowing manner that by June 1839 the Marquis de les Marismes was actively promoting the Nanto-Bordelaise company with the aim of establishing

a permanent French settlement in New Zealand. By October 1839 the first French settlers were bound for Akaroa, and by December of the same year the company had negotiated an agreement with the French government whereby colonists would remain French subjects. Details of the scheme quickly reached Britain reinforcing the belief that France desired the annexation of New Zealand. Such a belief was seemingly confirmed when it was revealed that the French King, Louis Philippe, not only approved of the scheme but was also a shareholder in the organising company.[62] The French colony established at Akaroa was to be a constant reminder to the British colonists that France had harboured ambitions of control[63], the more so, as for ten years negotiations dragged on over land titles during which time the French stationed a man-of-war at Akaroa.[64]

Akaroa, with its French man-of-war, was not the only reminder of French ambitions. French Catholic missionaries, led by Bishop Pompallier, were considered little more than agents of France[65]. At the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi, on the 6 February 1840, for example, Pompallier had remained aloof and six months later actually urged the French navy to annex the South Island.[66] It was also believed that the French priests intrigued with disgruntled Maori chiefs urging them to ignore British authority[67], though this allegation appears to be without foundation. During the disturbances of the 1840's Governor Grey investigated the religious

allegiances of the loyal natives in the Bay of Islands and discovered a considerable proportion were Roman Catholics.[68] Unfortunately Grey's investigations did not allay colonial suspicions of the French and their intentions. French traders, whalers and men-of-war were believed to be supplying war materials to the Maoris and they were also believed to have given assurances to potential insurgents that in the event of them rising they would receive direct assistance from the French people and government.[69]

Encouraging sedition was not a crime associated only with French nationals by New Zealand's British colonists. American whalers, traders and settlers were likewise accused.[70] It was considered that their motives were even baser than those of the French. It appeared that they would incite native difficulties solely to ensure that their smuggling operations were not jeopardised. When, for example, in 1844 two American whalers were searched and convicted for smuggling in Northland the acting American consul, Captain William Mayhem, informed Pomare, the local chief, that all the American whalers would leave in protest. He also implied that since annexation the Maoris were little more than British slaves unable to make their own commercial decisions. It appears that the Ngapuhi took this to heart and it provided one of the contributing factors for the outbreak of war in the North in 1845.[71]

For the Americans who operated in New Zealand actual or threatened conflict was good for business. While some Americans acted as gun runners[72] others followed Mayhem's lead and preached sedition. Pointing to British maltreatment of natives in Australia and Jamaica the Americans implied the Maori would have to fight for their freedoms as they themselves had done.[73] The activities of the Americans and their smuggling expertise, highlighted for New Zealand's British residents the lack of a viable Royal Naval presence in the Pacific.[74]

Lack of a deterrent, in the form of the Royal Navy, had a more serious effect than allowing American smuggling operations. It lent credence to a possible Russian threat to New Zealand's tranquility. Czarist Russia, a power with growing imperial ambitions and a burgeoning Pacific fleet, had a reputation, in New Zealand, as the "most aggressive power of the age."[75] Understandably fear of a Russian threat was especially strong during the Crimean War. It was rumoured that the Czarist government was building a fleet in its American territories to launch an attack on Australasia.[76] In New Zealand it was accepted that such an attack would take one of two forms, either the descent of a small squadron[77] or alternatively privateers acting individually in a hit-and-run fashion.[78] Both forms of descent it was thought would involve two

strategies of attack. Harbours and their immediate hinterlands would be attacked directly[79], or attacks might be launched on Maori settlements on the coast to stir them into rebellion.[80]

In response to this perceived Russian threat the New Zealand Government not only arranged to upgrade defence works, it also released press statements in Maori to inform them of the situation.[81] Recent research has indicated that the Russians at no time contemplated an attack on New Zealand and it appears, with the benefit of hindsight, that the reaction in the colony was excessive.[82] Yet in the context of the day it was mild. In all Pacific outposts of the British Empire a dread of a descent by Russian Warships was prevalent. From Vancouver Island to Tasmania British colonists dreaded the expected hostile visits of Russian vessels.[83] Fear of Russian intentions was not alleviated with the cessation of the Crimean War. The continual presence of Russian warships in the Pacific, and the formation of a Russian Far Eastern squadron in 1857, combined to make Russia appear a growing menace to the security of British possessions, in the Pacific.[84] This menace all believed had to be taken seriously given the wanton brutality of the Russians; many being aware of the destructive bombardment of innocent Touabs on the Circassian coast by a Russian squadron. This and similar incidents proved to the satisfaction of most European New Zealanders that the Russians were

capable of perpetrating any barbarity and would not hesitate to wreck havoc on the colony's isolated shores.[85]

Russia, France and the United States were not the only powers which caused concern to New Zealand's colonists. There was also interest in New Zealand by other minor powers. For example, in early 1842 the citizens of Hamburg attempted to form a colonisation company for the Chatham Islands. It was this attempted project which forced the Secretary of State to have the Islands fully incorporated into the colony of New Zealand.[86]The absence of a permanent Royal Naval presence combined with the unsettled nature of global politics and the multiplicity of nations who desired New Zealand provided fuel for the concerns over an external threat. While such concerns were arguably exaggerated they were in keeping with the tenor of the age.

Even without the chronic fears of attack by Britain's European foes New Zealand's British colonists would still have looked to their defences. In the interior of the North Island existed a native people who were described as 'numerous, warlike and independent.'[87] This description was not the product of fantasy but the result of provoked as well as unprovoked acts of violence.[88] Over the first two decades of settlement the European colonists suffered a series of attacks. The unease which these hostile acts created was increased by the realisation that the Maori

possessed the military advantage. They occupied the interior, with an unknown number of men, while the Europeans were scattered along the coast in small isolated settlements.[89]

Given the proven martial capabilities of the Maori and the weak position the Europeans occupied it appears somewhat surprising that until 1845 Europeans consistently underestimated Maori fighting ability. There seems to have existed an overwhelming faith in the white mans' invincibility on the battlefield against native foes. It was confidently assumed, until 1840, that one hundred regular soldiers would be sufficient to quell any Maori force.[90] This belief grew mainly from the results of one military action. In 1834 the well known rescue of the captive Guard family in Taranaki was accomplished by a small force of less than one hundred armed sailors and soldiers. Operating from the warship *Alligator* this small expeditionary force not only rescued the Guards they also attacked and destroyed three major pas with little loss. This action convinced many that, while the Maori fought a good deal, they could easily be tamed by a good thrashing.[91]

Even when the Maori defeated Europeans, excuses were quickly found to explain the aberration. At Wairau on the 17 June 1843, for example, the defeat of the forty-nine special constables under H. A. Thompson was attributed

due to their own cowardice rather than to Maori valour. It was argued that if the Europeans had stood firm against the forces of Te Rauparaha they would not only have forestalled the 'massacre' but also have arrested the chiefs. Such a result would have ensured the survey of the Wairau Land block and put the uppity Ngati Toa in their rightful place.[92]

Realisation of Maori strength and power did not dawn fully on most Europeans until 1844. In that year the local Auckland tribes put on a martial display complete with a 'mock' battle involving several thousand warriors at Remuera. After such a graphic display it was evident to all that European settlements in the North Island existed solely on the sufferance of the Maori.[93] The message so vividly sent by the mock battle of Remuera was reinforced almost immediately by the more deadly battles of the Northern War, as well as the Hutt Valley and Wanganui disturbances of 1844 to 1847.[94] Such disturbances proved beyond doubt the bravery of the Maori, and the necessity for adequate forces to protect the vulnerable settlements. While the disturbances were able to be contained by a combination of political and military manoeuvres it was at a great cost in morale, money and men.[95]

Containment of the Maori threat after the troubles of the mid-1840's was relatively short-lived. Less than a decade after semi-harmonious relations were restored the

resumption of hostilities appeared inevitable. The renewal of tense Maori-European relations resulted directly from a disastrous downturn in New Zealand's economy. By 1856 demand for foodstuffs on the Australian goldfields had declined dramatically, and as a result New Zealand suffered a depression in agricultural prices. This depression caused severe dislocation to both the European and Maori communities.

For Europeans the economic downturn meant prices for potatoes, wheat and flour fell sharply. It also meant less money in circulation to encourage urban industries. Those in urban employment in fact were the hardest hit having no other means to maintain themselves. Consequently there was an increased demand to obtain more land from the Maori for European settlement. For the Maori the depression was equally devastating. Wheat that had fetched up to twelve shillings a bushel returned only three or four shillings. As a result of the dramatic drop in returns many Maori growers simply ceased commercial cropping.[96]

As a simple equation in supply and demand the increased demand for land by Europeans and the decline in use by the Maori should have been complementary. This simple equation however was complicated by Maori social and cultural attachment to land and their general reluctance to permanently alienate it. It was further complicated by

the colonists view of the land. Many colonists saw the land not as Maori property but as belonging to the colony, but encumbered by native occupiers who the government ought to relocate in accordance with the needs of European settlement.[97] Maori attachment to land was however as strong as European desire. While the Europeans coveted the land by 1859 only seven million acres in the North Island, out of a total of twenty-six million, had been alienated from the Maori. This seemingly slow progress in redistributing land enraged many settlers who, as the Governor reported, were determined to take control over all the land:

> *recte si possint, sinan, quo cunque modo*
> [rightly if possible, if not, then by any means at all][98]

Not surprisingly the European desire spurred many Maoris into a determination not to sell any further lands. In Taranaki this led to major meetings to discuss ways of preventing further alienation of the Maori birthright.[99] This anti-alienation attitude prompted covetous colonists to make further demands for the removal of troublesome encumbering natives, who by their actions were creating a sense of unease and uncertainty.[100]

Those who viewed the anti land-selling Maoris as troublemakers viewed the rise of the Maori King Movement

with alarm. It was seen as a great land league formed to prevent the sale of any more land to the Pakehas, rather than a rival to the authority of Queen Victoria and her representatives.[101] Belatedly it was realized that it was also a well organised and armed union with up to 50,000 supporters.[102] The three meetings which established Maori kingship, Taupo in 1856, Rangiriri in 1857 and Ngaurawahia in 1858, brought together a loose federation of tribes with the single aim of preventing the decline of the Maori race. The participating tribes believed that this decline could only be halted by land retention and the provision of law and order.[103] In contrast Europeans suspiciously viewed these developments not as a means of preventing Maori decline but as a cover for the preparation of a war[104], in which the Europeans would be at a distinct disadvantage as against the Maori of the interior, united under a single chief.[105]

Fear of a collision between the anti-land sellers and the Europeans escalated as a result of increased intratribal friction. Maoridom was not united over land sales. A large number of Maori were willing sellers. As a result several arguments, that developed into bloody feuds, broke out within tribes between those willing to sell and those determined to prevent further alienation.[106] European settlers naturally viewed the pro-selling Maoris as allies and called upon the Government to intervene on their behalf.[107] The

Government, realising the dangers of provoking war, refused to recklessly intervene. Instead a start was made on upgrading defences. In Auckland, plans were made for; the enrollment of the Militia, the establishment of assembly areas, the purchase of arms, the organising of training and the construction of redoubts and roads on the frontier.[108]

Government policy and planning was, however, inadequate. It neither prevented intratribal conflict nor guaranteed the security of European settlements. In Taranaki the inadequate, indeed inappropriate, responses by government esculated a tribal land feud into a general conflagration. The feud in Taranaki originated from the attempt by Rawiri Waiaua to sell land to the Government. Katatore a minor claimant to the same land, vehemently objected to the proposal and went so far as to shoot Rawiri when he endeavoured to survey the land. Immediately another pro selling Maori urged the government to bring Katatore to justice. Perceived governmental tardiness led to the pro-sellers taking the law into their own hand. Ihaia, another pro-selling chief, organised the slaying of Katatore. In turn Ihaia was besieged by the forces of Wiremu Kingi, the leader of the anti-sellers. The European population, gravely concerned about the whole affair and anxious lest the troubles should embroil them, nevertheless encouraged the pro-sellers and demanded governmental action.[109]

In response to European pressure, and genuine concern, the acting Governor, Colonel Wynyard, visited Taranaki in an unsuccessful mediation attempt. As insurance he also arranged for the re-deployment of five hundred regular soldiers from Auckland and Wellington to the beleaguered province. Unfortunately Wynyard's efforts seemed to make matters worse. Both sides apparently viewed the efforts as support for their course of action. New alliances were formed and the renewal of feuding on an even more extensive scale was predicted.

It was this fear which ensured the maintenance of the imperial garrison. Determined to see a reduction in Imperial defence costs orders were sent in 1856 for the recall of the 58th Regiment. Wynyard declined to execute such orders, realising that he had insufficient troops for the preservation of peace as it was.[110] Peace was once again shattered by fighting in mid-January 1858. The renewal of hostilities was accompanied by an exponential increase in vengeance. Small scale ambushing and long distance fire fights were replaced by forced evictions and death squads. Many fights occurred around European settlements and several pro-selling Maori were tomahawked in sight of their erstwhile defenders.[111]

European settlers wishing to see tangible support for the pro-selling Maori, but fearful of further escalating

the fighting, looked again to the central government for direction, and most importantly, protection. In turn the central authorities looked to the Imperial garrison. Unfortunately the garrison was under threat. While Wynyard had been able to prevent the reduction of the force in 1856 the British Government was still committed to the policy of withdrawing forces from self-governing colonies. In an endeavour to have New Zealand classified as an exceptional case both the Premier and Governor sent carefully composed despatches to the Colonial Office in 1857. In May of that year, Stafford, the Premier, wrote a memorandum on New Zealand's defence for the imperial authorities. He claimed that it was inequitous to expect New Zealand, a colony of only 17 years standing and with an ordinary revenue of only £100,000, to provide internal defence on the same proportionate scale as New South Wales, which had 70 years of European habitation and an ordinary revenue of £750,000.[112] In August 1857 Governor Gore Browne followed up Stafford's despatch with one of his own. Carefully choosing his words, Gore Browne pleaded for the long term retention of regular soldiers in New Zealand. Pointing out that he did not wish to dictate what protection Her Majesty's Government should provide, he noted simply that New Zealand required troops. The analogy used to make this point is perhaps the most revealing section of the despatch. Gore Browne likened the colony to a wooden house stored with combustibles. All

hoped no explosion would take place, yet to minimise any disaster some form of insurance was essential.[113] Given that it was written shortly after news reached New Zealand about the outbreak of the Indian Mutiny at Meerut Gore Browne's despatch was clearly designed to highlight New Zealand's vulnerability to internal disorders.

Her Majesty's Government were not moved by cries of poverty or internal disorder. In less than a year after receiving the despatches it decided once more to order the withdrawal of the 58th Regiment. When the news reached the colony in June 1858 New Zealand's parliament reacted immediately. Ministers denounced the Imperial Government as self centred misers not interested in the Empire, merely in 'pounds, shillings and pence.'[114] In both houses of New Zealand's legislature the standing orders were suspended and select committees, to work con-jointly, established. This joint committee was tasked with the preparation of a despatch on the troop withdrawal within 24 hours. Such 'unseemly' and 'indecorous' haste was not palatable to all members were happy with.[115] Unseemly or not, the joint committee tabled in both houses a 517 part Address to the Governor within the time limit. The Address, accepted without amendment by both houses, briefly noted their concern over the intended withdrawal of the 58th Regiment. It requested the Governor to advise the Imperial authorities against proceeding with the proposed troop reduction, as the existing force level was

the bare minimum required to guarantee British authority. As the force was already at a minimum the address also urged the Governor to delay the planned withdrawal. Delay it was believed would help secure a lasting peace in New Zealand and enable a larger withdrawal at that time.[116]

Once the Address was forwarded to the Governor the New Zealand Government followed it up with a despatch to the Colonial Secretary. In a similar vein to Governor Browne's submission of 1857 it argued that the Northern War of 1845 in New Zealand had broken out primarily as a result of insufficient troops failing to command respect. To prevent any further hostilities breaking out, which would be injurious to the colony and embarrassing to Her Majesty's Government, it was argued that the troops should be left in place.[117] Like Gore Browne's 1857 despatch the Government's submission was clearly designed to draw attention to similarities between New Zealand and India, a standard argument of the time being that the lack of European troops in India had led directly to the mutiny.[118]

As with earlier endeavours, the Imperial authorities were not moved to change their policy by either the Address or despatch. Their policy was, in fact, confirmed by the 1859 War office committee proposals for self-reliance in defence for self-governing colonies.[119] New Zealand's government and indeed public, still did not

concede defeat. Recognising that the now vastly increased European presence in the Indian Army required a sanatorium for invalids, New Zealand set about marketing itself.[120] Apart from the restorative qualities of the climate it was added that its strategic location dictated the sanatorium be sited in New Zealand.[121] French possessions in Tahiti and New Caledonia made New Zealand the outlying picket of Britain. If New Zealand became the Indian Army's sanatorium, it was argued, the invalids could be organised into an "observation corps" to keep an eye on the untrustworthy French.[122] What was not said, though obviously believed, was that it would also enable New Zealand to maintain at no cost regular troops. Though most New Zealanders convinced themselves that the colony was the ideal location for a sanatorium they failed to convince the British authorities who believed that other unnamed localities were better suited.[123]

Not all European New Zealanders accepted the notion that defence responsibilities should be avoided. Political advocates of self-reliance in defence matters agreed that New Zealand as an established colony ought and most importantly, was able, to defend itself. Advocates of self-reliance noted that the European population in the North Island was almost equal to that of the Maori; that a large proportion of New Zealand European males were ex-servicemen and therefore able to bear arms immediately; and that a well organised and administered militia would

provide sufficient manpower to enable the colony to defend itself.[124]

In support of local initiative the Imperial authorities in 1858 recommended that the New Zealand Government raise a local force.[125] Clearly it was viewed as a means of enabling the Imperial authorities to carry out their stated policy while ensuring New Zealand had adequate means to maintain order. It was also, for a politically inspired suggestion, remarkably feasible. By 1858 New Zealand's European male population numbered nearly 34,000 approximately 2,000 of whom were ex-regular force servicemen. A militia ordinance decreed that nearly all males were liable for military duty and a tradition, both indigenous and imported, existed of voluntary banding together for security.

In fact the first European New Zealand 'military force' was an embryonic Volunteer unit the Kororareka Association. Formed in 1834 the Association had an intermittent existence until 1838 when it became an established organisation tasked with the preservation of persons and property. Each member of the Association was required to arm himself with a musket, bayonet, brace of pistols, a cutlass and thirty rounds of ball cartridge. To provide a veneer of command and control a governing committee was elected, and a formalised set of rules agreed to.[126] Though perceived by many as little more than

armed vigilantes the members of the Kororareka Association were important as the founders of a typological series of volunteer armed bodies in New Zealand. They set the example of communities providing localised defence forces with democratic control structures, which were to be important features of future volunteer bodies raised in New Zealand.

As important, but more popular with its members and parent community then the Kororareka Association, was the New Zealand Company Militia. In September 1839, at Gravesend, just as the first New Zealand Company emigrant ships were about to set sail, G. F. Young a director of the company held a series of meetings to gain support for the establishment of a defence force. The majority of the emigrants were convinced by Young's arguments for the necessity of an armed force to preserve both peace and property, and quickly signed up for the voluntary militia. To provide the requisite infrastructure for a disciplined body the emigrants agreed that males from 18 to 60 years of age would muster for drill under the command of the Company's principal agent for one hour each week. The Company, for its part, accepted the responsibility of arming the militia as well as organising the training programme. As with the Kororareka Association control of the militia was vested in a democratically elected management committee.[127] The nett result of the emigrants ready agreement to form such a body was the reinforcement

of acceptance by European New Zealanders of localised democratic defence forces. It also added the concept of formalised regular training and provision of costly capital equipment by a central authority.

With the signing of the Treaty of Waitangi and consequential formal annexation, central authority, theoretically at least, was exercised by the Governor. One of the many problems faced by Hobson, the first Governor, was maintenance of security. Lamenting that no adequate provision had been made for a defence force for the new colony, Hobson was advised to make his own arrangements for raising a militia or armed constabulary.[128] While it might appear that the logical course of action would have been to develop the existing forces Hobson was apprehensive, that as basically private armies, they would not carry out the directives of the central authorities. His concern was so great in fact that he outlawed the New Zealand Company Volunteer Militia.[129] Unfortunately he did not replace the colonist's self-help measure for defence with any other structure. The result of this neglect was that when trouble threatened, in 1841, settlers readily re-formed their voluntary armed bands. At Kororareka, Auckland and Wanganui 'Volunteer' units sprang up and were quickly organised into squads, and commenced a formal training programme under ex-regular soldiers.[130] For the authorities the message should have been clear, provide an

infrastructure for defence or have the local communities organise their own ad hoc responses to threats as they arise.

This message was reinforced in 1843 by the European response to the Wairau Affray. When news of the fight and its results reached Nelson panic swept through the settlement. Fearing a Maori assault on the town agitated settlers commenced organising their defences. A central defence organising committee of leading citizens was immediately appointed to take charge. A Volunteer force was embodied, arms and ammunition from the New Zealand company warehouse issued, a training programme devised and a redoubt constructed.[131] Across Cook Strait, in Nelson's sister New Zealand Company settlement Wellington, the same alarm gripped the colonists. Fear of a descent from Kapiti and Waikanae by hostile natives panicked a small number of settlers into a hastily departure for Sydney. The majority, however, participated in strengthening the town's defences. A 400 strong Volunteer Militia was formed that met daily for training, redoubts were built, and gun positions constructed.[132]

Active measures for defence by the Cook Strait settlements were in marked contrast to the inactivity of the Governor. Fitzroy, believing the Nelson settlers were in the wrong over Wairau, refused to take any action against either Te Rauparaha or Te Rangihaeata. This

course of action, or more correctly inaction, resulted in a waning of European anxiety as the Ngati Toa responded in a like manner. This waning of anxiety was, however, to be relatively short lived. Within a year the seeds were to be sown for three years of turbulence throughout the Northern half of the colony. From Kororareka to Nelson settlers, troubled by the turbulence, again looked to their defences and again voluntarily banded together for mutual protection. The seeds of this turbulence were sown on 8 July 1844 when the Ngapuhi followers of Hone Heke Pokai cut down the flagstaff at Kororareka. This symbol of British authority was felled in protest by Heke, who was convinced that it challenged the mana of the chiefs. Fearing for their safety the European inhabitants of Kororareka prepared for war. To avoid a collision another prominent Ngapuhi chief Tamati Waka Nene calmed Heke and convinced him to replace the fallen flagstaff. For six months Nene's negotiated calm prevailed, until Heke's followers again brought down the flagstaff on 10 January 1845. Incensed by this second outrage, Fitzroy was goaded into activity. He offered a reward for the capture of Hone Heke, sent for troop reinforcements from New South Wales, and ordered the re-erection of the flagstaff. In response Heke contemptuously had the symbolic stick of British authority felled for the third time on 19 January 1845. Determined not to be bested Fitzroy ordered Kororareka to be put on virtually a war footing. The flagstaff was once more erected, this time sheathed with

iron, while around the town and flagstaff blockhouses, earthworks, and gun positions were constructed. In addition a Kororareka Volunteer unit the 'Civic Guard' was raised and trained to supplement the troops. Unfortunately these preparations were unco-ordinated due to the lack of an overall commander. The result was formidable defence works that existed in splendid isolation, unable to support each other. This lack of mutual support was fully exploited by the assault forces of Heke and Kawiti on the 11 March 1845. They not only toppled the flagstaff but also destroyed the town, leaving it a smoking ruin and killing 13 settlers.[133]

When news of the sacking of Kororareka reached the capital panic reigned. Fearing a direct assault on Auckland itself, large numbers of settlers took the first ship out. Those left behind followed the now well practised pattern of reviewing their defences. To strengthen those defences a Volunteer company was embodied. Unlike previous panics, which tended to be very localised affairs, the anxiety caused by the fall of Kororareka spread throughout the colony. In Taranaki, Wanganui, Wellington and Nelson, settlers believed emboldened Maoris were preparing to challenge British authority.[134] Community leaders quickly channeled the unproductive anxiety into enthusiastic support for local defence initiatives. In Wellington, for example, the resident Magistrates organised; the construction of

fortifications, places of refuge, the raising of a Volunteer corps and election of officers, the distribution of training manuals, the provision of drill sergeants, the production of a training timetable, alarm procedures, patrols, pickets, arms, ammunition and equipment.[135] Similar provisions were made by all settlements anxious lest they be attacked.

It is somewhat surprising, given the disturbed state of the colony, that the Governor did not arrange for the formation of a military force. After all local responses tended to arise from an immediate panic rather than from careful consideration of need. In fact Fitzroy had toyed with the idea of establishing a standardised Militia Force, but was reluctant lest the settlers once armed and trained provoke rather than prevent hostilities.[136] When settlers once again took matters into their own hands, and commenced their own ad hoc and disjointed defensive preparations, Fitzroy was forced to act. On the 25 March 1845 he arranged for the first New Zealand Militia ordinance to be passed by the Legislative Council. This ordinance provided a standardised infrastructure for the raising of citizen forces. Males between the ages of 18 and 60 were liable for military service within a 25 mile radius of their nearest police office. Authority was vested firmly in central government, and one of the Government's first actions under the ordinance was to force the disbandment of the various volunteer companies

that individual settlements had raised. These companies were immediately replaced by units of the new Militia.[137] Defence had finally become a central government concern too important to be left solely to well meaning, but not necessarily well considered, local initiative.

At the same time that Fitzroy's staff were concentrating on providing a force infrastructure, the Volunteers enhanced their role by undertaking active service. A small group of Auckland Volunteers, went with the Imperial expeditions against the Ngapuhi followers of Heke and Kawiti. Acting mainly as assault pioneers these New Zealand Volunteers saw service at the fateful storming of Ohaewai and the siege of Ruapekapeka. Indeed Despard the commander at Ohaewai, endeavoured to blame them for the lack of success by the assaulting force. He claimed that the hatchets, axes, ropes and ladders that they had been tasked to carry to the palisades, for the breaching operation, had been left behind or thrown away making success almost an impossibility. Given the strength of the position and Despard's inadequate plan for battle it is extremely doubtful whether the tools would have made any difference. This may be the implication of his after action report in which he praised the Volunteers for their zeal and energy.[138] Such praise was to be echoed in the wider community, impressed by the 'excellent service' their men under arms had performed.[139] This service had included more than carrying tools and ropes during

assaults. The northern Volunteers were also employed as porters carrying the hospital establishment to forward bases, as artillerymen manning the ship's guns brought ashore to provide additional firepower to the assaulting forces, as engineers constructing roads and stockades and as guides to the Imperial forces.[140] Further south, in Wellington, other Volunteers also undertook active service with the Imperial forces, assisting in several skirmishing operations in the Lower Hutt area as well as serving as garrison troops manning redoubts and conducting patrols.[141] The efficiency and effectiveness of the Volunteers on active service in the 1840's not only won praise, it also proved that the settlers willingness to band together for protection was matched by sufficient military skill to provide that protection. It also provided an embryonic model for working relationships between the Imperial Army and locally raised citizen forces.

The working relationships between the forces of the Empire and colony were significantly enhanced by the number of ex-regular servicemen who made their home in New Zealand. As one politician claimed:

> There were in New Zealand a greater proportionate number of men capable of bearing arms, and accustomed to the use

> of arms than in any other portion of the Queen's dominions.[142]

Of New Zealand's total male population of nearly 34,000 in 1858 over 2,000, or approximately six percent, are readily identifiable as ex-regular force servicemen. This six percent was constituted from three basic categories. The first was composed of those who had been assisted to migrate to New Zealand to establish the fencible settlements of Onehunga, Panmure, Otahuhu and Howick. In the second category were those soldiers stationed in New Zealand and who had requested their discharge in the colony. The last group were those soldiers discharged elsewhere who had subsequently made their own way to the colony. By far the largest group of ex-regulars, or pensioners as they were commonly called, were those who requested their discharge in New Zealand. One Regiment, the 58th, had over one thousand of its members take their discharge in New Zealand between 1845 and 1858. It is more difficult to determine the numbers of pensioners who made their own way to New Zealand. It is believed, for example, that a large number of the twelve hundred who had travelled to Australia between 1849 and 1850 came to New Zealand, but exact figures are unavailable. The last group were the fencibles who were assisted to migrate between 1847 to 1852. Recruited in the United Kingdom the 'Royal New Zealand Fencibles' numbered just over seven hundred.[143] Pensioners acted not only as a link between

the colony and the Imperial Forces, they also provided expertise and, in the case of the fencibles at least, important role models for locally raised forces to emulate.

The Fencibles were a very specialised group of colonists. Brought out at the conclusion of the Northern War, they were to act as a *cordon sanitaire* for the capital. Interestingly they were not settled to the North as would be expected, but rather on the southern approach routes to the capital. Clearly the Ngapuhi were not seen as the major threat by the Governor and his advisers. To the south were the tribes of the Waikato Federation who were to become the stalwarts of the much feared King Movement. To protect Auckland's southern frontier the Governor settled the Fencibles in the same manner as the Roman *limitarei*. They were to act as sedentary part-time soldiers residing on the lands they were expected to defend. The cost to the colony was free passage to New Zealand for the Fencibles and their family, a cottage complete with an acre of land, a regulation uniform, and 1/3d per day. For the Fencibles the cost was a seven year return of service during which time they were required to muster every Sunday, attend twelve days training each year, work no more than five miles from home and be prepared for immediate mobilisation for active service.[144] In its entire existence the Royal New Zealand Fencibles was only once mobilised for service. On the 17th April

1851 they were mobilised to secure vital communication routes and provide an expeditionary force against a two hundred and fifty strong taua (war party) of Ngati paoa. The taua had been despatched to exact utu (revenge) from a Maori constable who had struck Te Hoera, a Ngati paoa chief, on the head during a fracas. Fortunately the good offices of the Ngati whatua defused the situation, and calm was quickly restored.[145]

More dangerous than threatening taua to the Royal New Zealand Fencibles were its much publicised internal squabbles. Often the members of the Fencible corps would be disinclined to carry out their assigned duties. Any attempt by the officers to enforce any unpopular orders resulted in complaining letters to the paper, public protest meetings, petitions and, if all else failed, strikes. Such mutinous action by the Fencibles is not altogether surprising as effective leadership was lacking. Of the eleven officers attached to the corps throughout its service two were court-martialled, two were dismissed, one appeared in the magistrates court charged with assault while another was accused of attempted rape. In addition another three were reprimanded for insubordination or improper conduct. The demoralising effect that the indiscrete actions of the officers must have had on the Fencibles was compounded by the open feuding of their superiors. The commander for example, refused to

communicate with his second-in-command and was forced to use intermediaries for everything.[146]

Despite the obvious internal weaknesses exhibited by the northern Fencibles they were coveted by New Zealand's other North Island settlements. Taranaki settlers convinced of the military, and potential commercial, benefits of the Fencible settlers met to demand a similar scheme for their own province.[147] On the opposite coast the local government undertook its own pensioner settlement scheme in 1859. Worried over the escalation of inter tribal fighting during 1858 and 1859 East Coast officials established the equivalent of a Fencible settlement at Ormond.[148] Yet not all thought of the concept in a positive vein. One local military expert, Colonel McCleverty, condemned them as an ill chosen development for New Zealand's defence, and argued for an efficient Militia supplementing a professional force of approximately 1200 men.[149] McCleverty however did not foresee the long term importance of the Fencibles. Their training programmes consisting of weekly meetings and week long encampments provided a role model for future forces. Further on completion of their seven year return of service the Fencibles were to provide key personnel for subsequently raised defence forces.

Theoretically all former Fencibles along with the bulk of the male population, were immediately members of the

Militia on completion of their seven year service obligation. In practice the New Zealand Militia, after 1847, was in the main a paper force. Though provisions existed for maintenance rolls, balloting of servicemen, assembly points and training, nothing had been done to preserve or develop the Militia. Primarily the lack of a concerted effort to foster the Militia was due to a lack of political will. Militia enrolment was unpopular and as such most politicians were hesitant to see it enforced. Further the cost of maintaining the force was so large many politicians were reluctant to agree to the expenditure.[150] This disinclination to promote the Militia immediately after 1847, given the cost and unpopularity, is understandable. Peace had been restored, the Imperial troops retained and the soldier-settler Fencible villages had been established. From 1855 onwards such unwillingness can only be regarded as criminal negligence. When trouble erupted between land sellers and anti-sellers in Taranaki in 1855 the Militia, in that province at least, should have been immediately reactivated. To try and justify their neglect politicians pointed to the fact that if any compulsory service scheme was put into operation it would result in massed emigration. Given that the alternative was to leave the populace virtually defenceless such justification was shortsighted. It also ignored New Zealand's own tradition of willingly undertaking military training during times of crisis. In fact during the turbulent months of 1855 a

small corps of Taranaki Volunteers trained under the local Militia Commander under Major Lloyd.[151]

Three years later, after an interval of precarious peace, Major Lloyd was again conducting military training for Taranaki settlers. Hostilities had broken out once more between the Maori land sellers and anti-sellers. Fearing that a collision between Maori and European would result from this renewal the Governor in Council decreed that any Maoris fighting on European land would be treated as rebels. To ensure that sufficient force was available to carry out the edict, Militia enrolment was ordered for Auckland, New Plymouth and Wellington. If necessary the Militia was to muster for active service. In addition New Enfield rifles were ordered, and in New Plymouth a formalised training programme was devised for the citizen soldiers by Major Lloyd.[152]

With the activation of New Zealand's Militia came the realisation that the 1845 Militia Ordnance was inadequate. The hostilities in Taranaki highlighted the inflexibility of New Zealand's defence statute which did not allow for partial mobilization, enrolment of voluntary units or exemptions from service. Recognising the need for change the newly established government, meeting in Assembly in its first full session in April 1858, agreed to the introduction of a new Militia Bill.[153] Influenced by politics, culture and geography New Zealand's political

leaders refashioned the 1845 Ordinance into an Act better suited to the times. The 1858 Militia Act, which became law in mid-May, restated the pre-eminent position of the compulsory Militia while at the same time allowing for the establishment of voluntary units. Dividing the colony into relatively small self-contained Militia districts, based on European settlement patterns, the Act provided for the appointment of cadre staffs of officers, non-commissioned officers and buglers. It organised the Militia into companies with appointed officers, and balloted servicemen filling the ranks. Those chosen by the restricted ballot could purchase substitutes if they desired to escape from both the training, and the potential mobilisation that Militia service might entail.[154]

Essentially the new Act was a compromise measure aimed at satisfying often conflicting political, cultural and geographical considerations. Geographically New Zealand in the mid-nineteenth century consisted of six isolated independent provinces loosely linked by a central administration. As a result the European settlers saw themselves not as New Zealanders but rather as Otago, Canterbury, Nelson, Wellington, Taranaki or Auckland colonists. Their provinces were self-sufficient and severed from each other by distance, diverse schemes of colonisation and government. Communication and trade, dependent on sea links, were difficult, irregular and

slow. For example, letters despatched within New Zealand to other provinces in the Colony took between three and five months to be received. This time frame was almost the same as letters despatched to or from the United Kingdom. Not surprisingly few were interested in the happenings or problems of their neighbouring provinces.[155] For defence such isolation meant that each province would have to be self-reliant, and for local commanders it meant they had to be able to use their own judgement. Geography dictated that defence be decentralised as no central authority could prescribe rules for every conceivable contingency.[156]

Decentralisation dictated by geography was reinforced by the cultural bias of New Zealand's European population. Culturally New Zealand's European population was overwhelmingly British. This cultural dominance, consciously as well as subconsciously, influenced every facet of life, including defence. As a people the New Zealand - British colonists were vigorously attempting to adapt within the new land the structures and institutions of the old.[157] For defence this desire meant that the community orientated Militia as the old constitutional force of Britain was acceptable, a large standing army was to be avoided and voluntary service was preferable to compulsory service. These attitudes on defence were fashioned largely from the historical experiences of the British populace. Military service for citizens had from

time immemorial been compulsory. From at least Anglo-Saxon times this service had been formalised. Under the Fyrd system all the able-bodied were expected to defend their hearths and homes. Almost as old as compulsory service was the concept of citizens volunteering for service in times of emergency. From the trained bands mustered against possible landings by the Spanish Armada to the Volunteer units raised in response to the Napoleonic threat the British had shown themselves to be ever willing to voluntarily serve in the defence of the homeland.[158] In contrast to the acceptance of citizen soldiers was the abhorence of a large regular army. Stemming from Cromwellian times standing armies were perceived as threats to political liberty. So worried were the British about this danger that they forced William, soon after his accession, to enact the Bill of Rights which made a standing army illegal, except in time of war, without Parliamentary sanction.[159]

Paradoxically while the British had an aversion to the concept of a large standing army by the middle of the nineteenth century they had a vast military establishment spread around the globe. Britain's Imperial commitments demanded the existence of this large force and its size was hidden by being stationed in far flung reaches of the Empire rather than at home. Such a policy, though ensuring the survival of the military establishment was to result ultimately in Britain considering itself

vulnerable. This perception in turn was to result in a revival of British Volunteering with a consequential flow on effect to the colonies. The foundations for a revival of Volunteering in the United Kingdom were laid by two letters. The first was a letter from the Duke of Wellington to General Sir John Burgoyne published in the Morning Chronicle in 1848 and quickly republished throughout the Empire including New Zealand. The letter forecast the likely results of a war between Britain and France. Wellington declared that if the British fleet failed to prevent a French landing, which was certainly possible given the rise of the steamship, no force then available could defeat them.[160] Four years later Sir Charles Napier also wrote a letter, this one to the House of Commons. Noting the absence of regular troops in Britain Napier advocated the necessity of establishing efficient Volunteer and Militia corps to protect the state. Napier's vision of an efficient volunteer corps was a unit encompassing a cross-section of society. He urged county gentry to form corps which included game keepers as well as labourers, arguing that gentlemen would find no braver comrades, with the additional advantage that if breastworks needed to be constructed they would be more handy with spades and pickaxes than the gentry.[161] The effect of the letters was not immediately observable. Only one unit the Exeter and South Devon corps of Volunteers was accepted for service in 1852.[162] Still they

helped highlight deficiencies in British defences and indicated how to remedy them.

Building upon the awareness of defence deficiencies, Volunteer advocates by the end of the decade had forced the government to formally revive British Volunteering. The three principal Volunteer advocates of the 1850's were the lawyers Hans Busk, Alfred Richards, and the cotton broker Nathaniel Bousfield. Assisted by a host of others these three acting separately organised an extremely effective campaign of public meetings and press articles. By 1859 newspapers such as The Times were supporting the call for a Volunteer revival. Its publication on 9 May 1859 of Lord Tennyson's poem The War (popularly known as 'Rifleman Form') can be regarded as the culmination of effort. Three days after the poem appeared General Jonathan Peel sent a war office circular to Lords Lieutenant authorising the formation of Volunteer units.[163]

The British campaign for Volunteer revival had a much greater impact than General Peel's circular. Throughout the Empire, and in particular New Zealand, the campaign had been followed and to some extent acted upon. Section 24 of New Zealand's 1858 Militia Act authorised the formation of Volunteer Units. Within a month of the 1858 Militia Act being signed into law the Royal Company of

Auckland Rifle Volunteers had been established, to be followed quickly by the City Company.[164] In fact Volunteering appeared so popular in New Zealand that the Governor suggested the unpopular Militia be totally abolished and the colony rely solely on a well-trained Volunteer force for defence.[165] This was in stark contrast to the officer commanding the Imperial troops in New Zealand, Colonel Wynyard, who recommended the formation of a colonially raised regular corps. Sandwiched in between was Premier Stafford who, for political reasons, was forced to reject a colonial regular service and retain the concept of Militia pre-eminence. At a minimum a colonial regular force would have cost £100,000 per annum, a sum the colony simply could not bear. Nor could reliance be placed solely on voluntary endeavour as it would not have gained support from the 'Chelsea Pensioner' faction in the colonial upper house. This group of retired Imperial officers believed in the necessity for a properly constituted and trained force based on the Militia model.[166]

Given the political climate, cultural bias and geographical spread of settlement Stafford's new Militia Act was a brilliant piece of legislative compromise. It was however essentially a conceptual measure outlining governmental policy. It did not provide the administrative or organisational detail required for individual units to function efficiently or effectively.

To provide the necessary functional framework the Governor in council promulgated a series of administrative decrees. Militia districts were defined and staff appointed to act both as governmental agents and cadres. In addition regulations were gazetted for the guidance of Volunteers. Though issued separately for each Militia District the Volunteer regulations were essentially identical. They fixed the term of Volunteer service at one year during which time their training was not to exceed 168 hours. Officers were appointed by the Governor on the recommendation of duly authorised Volunteer units. Non-commissioned officers were appointed after successful completion of a military examination conducted by their district adjutant. The district adjutant was also required to keep all administrative documents and act as the medium for all communications with the central authorities. Maintenance of discipline was also provided for in the form of a scale of fines to be imposed for everything from not drilling with the appropriate accoutrements to being inattentive on parade.[167]

To provide internal measures for maintenance of control and discipline units were authorised to formulate additional company rules. Initially these rules tended to be general guiding principles, but they were soon revised to become detailed standardised procedures for units to adhere to. The First company of Auckland Rifle Volunteers, for example, agreed to its first set of rules

at inception in April 1858. At that time only four rules existed, the first of which was not strictly a rule but the Company motto 'Ready'. The second rule stated that candidates for admission to the Company had to be recommended by two existing members and voted in by a majority of the ruling committee. The third outlined the duties of the secretary/treasurer who was to be elected annually. The final rule noted the duties of the management committee which, like the secretary/treasurer, was to be elected on an annual basis. Within six months the company, at its first Annual General Meeting on 6 December 1858, agreed to a completely revised set of rules. The new rules, written by the management committee, detailed recruiting and admission procedures, the annual subscriptions to be paid, specific duties of the secretary, treasurer and management committee, days and timings of compulsory drills, the scale of fines to be imposed for misdemeanours, and the procedure for the expulsion of miscreant members.[168]

Even with detailed procedures agreed, and general policy directives provided, problems still arose. Fines were often unpaid, while the question of who actually dealt with the adjutant, the secretary or the officer commanding the unit went unanswered. This resulted in two distinct control channels, the pseudo-civilian office holders and the normal military officers. The situation was not clarified by the higher military authorities.

Volunteers had their own central organisation allied to the Militia. At the head was the Governor as commander-in-chief. Day to day control was by the Deputy Adjutant-General of Militia and Volunteers with a small headquarters staff in Auckland. This Headquarters worked through the Adjutants of the Militia Districts who in turn conducted business with both the officer commanding units and unit secretaries.[169]

Precedent, rather than a desire to create division, appears to have been the reason for the dual system of communications. During the gestation period of a unit all communications were conducted by civilian secretaries. This was done for the obvious reason that no military officers were authorised. When duly constituted as a unit, with appropriate officers gazetted, another layer of a communications network was laid over the top of that already existing.

The existing structure was the remnant of the working committee that had arranged for the unit's establishment. As was the case in Britain the most common method of arranging for the raising of a Volunteer unit was to commence with a private canvass. This canvass, initiated usually by citizens concerned about defence, gauged public response. If the response appeared favourable a public

a Volunteer unit, and delegating organisational detail to a selected working committee. This committee would organise a list of prospective members of the proposed unit and commence negotiations with the appropriate governmental agencies. Concurrently the working committee would frame a set of company rules and regulations including subscriptions, and investigate uniform options for the unit. If the proposed unit was accepted for service a further public meeting was held to enrol volunteers, administer the oath of allegiance, elect officers and agree to company rules and a uniform.[170]

Uniforms for the first Volunteer units tended to be appropriate, inexpensive and readily available. Consisting for the most part of a black cloth cap, serge shirt or tunic, and dark cloth trousers they resembled the work day wear of the colony. Distinguishing it as a uniform were the piping and badges of company and rank.[171] Distinguishing the units as soldiers were the arms and accoutrements of war. Unlike uniforms, which were a unit's responsibility to provide, basic military equipment was issued from government stores. Like the uniforms the equipment was appropriate, inexpensive and readily available. This was largely because the initial issue was of obsolete Imperial equipment. For example when the 65th Regiment was issued the long Enfields in 1859 their returned arms and accoutrements were issued to the 1st Company Wellington Rifle Volunteers.[172]

Retired equipment was not all that the Volunteers received from the Imperial forces. Former, as well as currently serving, regular servicemen were to be of extreme importance to the development of the Volunteers as soldiers. In Auckland a retired instructor from the 58th Regiment, Sergeant John Mitchell, undertook the initial training for both the City and Royal Companies of Auckland Rifle Volunteers. Advanced training was based on current Imperial training manuals upon which officers based standardised lectures for their units. While the training itself was of a standardised Imperial stamp, local conditions dictated how and where it took place. Some units met in each others houses to undergo basic drill, while those with more space and time met on parade grounds two or three times a week. As proficiency increased corps would join together to undertake united drills and where possible would exercise with local detachments of regular soldiers.[173]

Training was only one area in which the ex-regular servicemen were important. Key office holders in Volunteer units tended to be former regular servicemen. Four non-commissioned officers of the 58th Regiment, Robert Hattaway, John Mitchell, William Free and Charles Stapp, who had arrived in New Zealand on active service in the 1840's, were to become officers in the local forces in the 1850's. The skills and abilities transferred to the

local forces by such men were quickly recognised by the colony. The government viewed their participation favourably, seeing that it would render Volunteer corps more readily trained and more effective if required for active service. It also meant that the Volunteers had the outward appearance of regular soldiers. They not only provided spectacular entertainment for the settlements, they also had a comforting effect on communities providing them with a 'professional' defence force.[174]

It was this professional appearance which ensured community support for citizen defence forces generally, and the Volunteer force in particular. The need for defence forces was readily accepted. The world's peace, and more importantly New Zealand's security, was seen to be fragile. Externally New Zealand appeared threatened by Britain's rivals. Internally all were to concede very quickly that the Maori was not to be taken lightly; European settlement on the coastal fringes was largely there on Maori sufferance. These accepted threats, combined with planned troop withdrawal by the Imperial authorities, forced New Zealand's legislature to examine its defence. As a result the Militia Act was agreed to as a means of proving essential manpower. While it placed the compulsory Militia in a central role, it accepted and helped promote New Zealand's Volunteer tradition. Though steeped in their British past, colonists did not simply import this tradition. The concept also had New Zealand

roots. Stretching back to the 1830's, under the guises of the Kororareka Association and the New Zealand Company Militia. This tradition also manifested itself in localised Volunteer units during the troubled 1840's and early 1850's before its formal establishment under section 24 of the New Act. The main reasons that this tradition was able to survive was its ability to adapt with the times. It changed from being the private police forces of the privileged to community based trained troops organised to defend settlements from any potential aggressor. In short, swashbucklers metamorphosed into soldiers.

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CHAPTER TWO

MILITARY FORCE OR MUSIC HALL FARCE: VOLUNTEERING DURING THE SECOND NEW ZEALAND WAR 1860-1872

At the commencement of the second New Zealand War in January 1860 only three Volunteer Infantry Companies were gazetted in the colony. Two were in Auckland and the third in New Plymouth. These units, though relatively well trained, were the junior partners to the compulsory Militia for the Colony's defence. By the war's end in 1872 one hundred and thirty-two Volunteer companies comprised of Cavalry, Infantry, Artillery and Engineers were serving throughout the colony. In the intervening twelve years the Volunteers had seen a massive expansion in their numbers and in their roles. They became not only the corner-stone of the nation's defence but also the main providers of military pomp and spectacle previously supplied by the Imperial Regiments stationed in the colony. The Volunteers undertook these functions despite the often unfavourable reviews given of their performance by some politicians, retired Imperial officers and comic thespians, whose scathing and sarcastic attacks implied that volunteers were only useful as inspiration to writers

of music hall farce. Volunteering as a New Zealand institution undoubtedly had weaknesses. It will be shown that the Volunteers were not as bad as their critics suggested. Indeed, the force established in the minds of most a deserved reputation as credible military ambassadors at home,bashing the drill square, fighting on the battlefield, dancing in the ballroom or dining in the banquet chamber.

The opportunity for New Zealand's Volunteers to prove themselves as a credible military force stemmed directly from Governor Gore Browne's determination to proceed with the purchase of the 600-acre Waitara block in Taranaki. The Governor and his ministry had under-estimated Wiremu Kingi's resolve to prevent further land being taken. They had assumed that once European martial muscle had been demonstrated Kingi and his `land leaguers' would acquiesce. What they had not foreseen was the outbreak of hostilities that would spread throughout the North Island and continue intermittently for a dozen years. Their inability to predict the outcome of their actions is not surprising given that the commander of the Imperial troops stationed in New Zealand, Colonel C. E. Gold, thought that one volley would be sufficient to subdue the anti-land selling Maori.[1] Acting on this advice the Executive Council decided on 25 January 1860 to proceed with the Waitara purchase and survey the land. If any resistance was offered to the survey, martial law was to be

proclaimed and the land was to be held by force if necessary.[2] Accordingly Octavius Carrington attempted to survey the Waitara block on 20 February 1860. The survey was obstructed immediately by Wiremu Kingi's followers. In response Lieutenant-Colonel G. F. Murray, the local commander, declared martial law and called out the Militia and Volunteers for active service.[3] Arms and ammunition were rushed to Taranaki and its citizens were encouraged to prepare for war.[4] Excited and enthusiastic about the possibility of demonstrating their martial prowess, the citizens responded so positively, and in such numbers that there were initially insufficient arms to equip them all.[5] Though the majority appeared to have believed that conflict was now inevitable they would have preferred to have delayed it for as long as possible.[6] Most realized that a racial war would be a calamity costing the colony's fragile economy dearly.[7] Yet they also held a conflicting belief that it was time for the independently minded Maori to be brought to heel by a `good licking' from the barrels of massed muskets.[8] The government's resolve to pursue a course destined to result in conflict was strengthened by the support received for such a policy in the House of Representatives. After suffering a series of defeats in the House the Stafford ministry was saved by its native policy. Of the 53 members in the house, 26 or forty-nine percent gave their support. Interestingly it was the South Island members who were most enthusiastic. Of the 29 North Island members, only 11 or thirty-eight percent

supported the government in contrast to the sixty-three percent, 15 out of the 24, South Island members who sided with the government.[9] Such statistics belie the oft quoted assertion that European North Islanders fostered hostilities to gain the considerable profits available from commissariat expenditure.[10]

For businessmen the blundering into conflict by poorly advised administrators was however to be commercially profitable. Commissariat consumption was to be considerable. To achieve the desired cowering of the "rebellious" Maori, New Zealand staged a massive multifaceted demonstration of military power. At its peak the British military presence was to number nearly 20,000 men.[11] Consisting of Imperial Regiments, locally raised regular units, the militia, loyalist Maoris and the Volunteers, these forces were to experience the complete range of warfare from conventional to counter-insurgency within a relatively short twelve years of conflict. Throughout these turbulent years the volunteer units of the North Island were to serve with distinction. In addition to providing combatant soldiers, volunteer units also acted as assault pioneers, garrison guards and line-of-communication troops. They were also to provide a trained manpower pool for the recruiters of the locally raised colonial regular units.

Interest in volunteering grew exponentially with the outbreak of war. When martial law was proclaimed in Taranaki the single unit of the Rifle Volunteers grew so quickly that it was subdivided into two companies and was quickly joined by a cavalry unit. Quickly trained, armed and equipped these Taranaki volunteers were keen to see service - keen to be part of the decisive blow against the Maori obstruction to settlement.[12] The volunteers were however, forced to wait while additional troops were assembled. The military authorities on the declaration of martial law in Taranaki organised the transfer to New Plymouth of the detachments of the 65th Regiment that had been garrisoned in Auckland and Wellington.[13]

Concurrent with the concentration of the regular troops in Taranaki was the construction of stockades and defence works and the stock-piling of war material. In these tasks the volunteers, working alongside the militia and regular force detachments, were to the fore. At New Plymouth and the out settlement of Omata they not only helped construct the stockades and defence works, but also provided troops for reconnoitering, skirmishing and picket duty as well as assisting military and civilian transport columns by acting as escorts.[14] They also provided protection parties and escorts for civilians moving into New Plymouth from outlying settlements.

On the most famous occasion that the Taranaki Volunteers were taking part in an escort operation of civilian out settlers they became embroiled in a fire fight close to Waireka pa. Taking its name from the pa, the battle of Waireka was of crucial importance to the Volunteers of New Zealand. Though a relatively minor engagement in military terms it was the baptism of fire of the recently raised citizen force and as such was to be of profound psychological importance. The object or mission of the force that was dispatched from New Plymouth on 28 March 1860 was to escort the settlers of the Omata district into the confines of the town. To achieve this Captain J. Paul, the Brigade Major, devised for the Commander, Colonel C. E. Gold, a two pronged march around the Maori camp at Waireka. Lieutenant-Colonel C. F. Murray of the 65th Regiment was to be in overall command and was personally to lead the column that advanced along the road from New Plymouth to Omata. This inland column numbering just under 120 men consisted of a company of the 65th Regiment and a detachment of seamen and marines. The second was to advance from New Plymouth via the beach to Omata and was tasked with escorting the settlers back into town. Under Captain C. Brown this coastal column numbered 130 men of the Taranaki Militia and Volunteers.[15] It was envisaged that the whole operation would be completed during the hours of daylight and Lieutenant-Colonel Murray was given strict instructions to be back at New Plymouth before nightfall. Determined to follow his instructions

to the letter Murray marched out of New Plymouth along the Omata road prepared to engage the enemy. Down on the beach Captain Brown's inexperience quickly showed. He commenced his march without advance guards or flank protection, indeed without any command or control mechanisms. Fortunately for the column he recognised his deficiencies early and called on Captain Stapp, formerly a corporal in the 58th Regiment, to take command. Stapp took immediate steps to impose order. He halted the column and organised it into two companies of equal strength. One company was placed under the command of Captain Atkinson and the other placed under Captain Brown. The companies were then subdivided into half companies and sections with officers and sergeants detailed to command them. In addition Stapp ordered Colour Sergeant Free, another former corporal of the 58th Regiment, to select six men to form an advance guard. Once the Column had been re-organised to Stapp's satisfaction the advance was recommenced.

Shortly after, both columns were subject to attack from long distance Maori snipers. Murray largely ignored the sniping and continued his advance. So sure was he of the strength of his column that he detached two small groups to go and assist the beach column. In contrast the Taranaki citizen soldiers were convinced that the Maori snipers were the advance echelons of a larger body determined to entrap them. Acting on this perception

Stapp withdrew his force to the Jury family homestead and quickly laid out a defensive perimeter. The Maori snipers followed up the withdrawal of the Taranaki citizen soldiers and appear to have been reinforced by a number of the Waireka pa defenders. Murray after reaching the detailed rendevous at Whales Gate highlighted his unwillingness to deviate from orders. To ensure that his force would be back in New Plymouth by sunset he recalled the detachments he had sent to assist the citizen soldiers. Left alone, the beleaguered beach column did not prove to be totally steadfast. Captain Stapp was forced into threatening to kill any more deserters after some of the more frightened of the citizen soldiers fled from their posts. One went so far as to mutilate his clothing before rushing into New Plymouth with the news that the Volunteer and Militia column had been overrun and annihalated. Fortunately before the citizen soldiers ran out of ammunition and nerve, a party from *HMS Niger* under Captain Cracroft rushed the lightly defended Waireka Pa and seized its war flags. The Maori besiegers of the Taranaki citizen soldiers, seeing that their pa had been stormed and their battle standard captured, decided to withdraw. Stapp took the opportunity of the Maori departure to retire to New Plymouth. On its return the citizen force was welcomed by a relieved populace. Cracroft and his force returned to a hero's welcome cast in the light of saviours of the Volunteers and Militia.[16]

There exists some doubt as to whether the citizen-soldiers actually required to be saved in this skirmish. An earlier generation of historians believed that the settler column had been surrounded at Waireka by a large body of Waikato and Taranaki Maoris who had been concentrating for a planned attack on New Plymouth.[17] More recently it has been argued that the outnumbered Maoris manoeuvred around their lightly defended position never actually threatening either European Column.[18] The reality of the situation probably exists somewhere between the two views. Clearly the Waireka position was not heavily manned when attacked by Cracroft's force; however, the citizen soldiers were effectively pinned down, suffering fourteen casualties during the fight. The Waireka pa position itself was also important given the fact that the Maori defenders had run up their battle standards; that it was lightly manned probably indicates that the bulk of the garrison were sniping at the citizen soldiers and drew off when they saw their flags and base position in enemy hands. Whether the skirmish itself was of tactical significance is however relatively unimportant in comparison to its psychological importance. For the New Zealand colonists the battle was one in which their citizen forces had been abandoned on the field of battle by the Imperial Regulars. Instead of being broken in spirit by this situation the citizen soldiers had, with few exceptions, performed credibly. They had demonstrated convincingly that under fire New Zealand's irregular

troops acted as disciplined soldiers,not as an uncontrolled rabble. Their performance was considered generally to be first rate by their peers. Not only were they labelled as the match for the Maori foe but many considered them superior to their regular counterparts. In contrast the Regulars viewed the whole affair as a minor skirmish in which the citizen soldiers did not prove anything as they were not in mortal danger. Indeed they were considered somewhat inefficient, being ill-armed, ill-organised, ill-disciplined and poorly trained.[19]

Neither the scorn of the Regulars nor the praise of the colonial press materially affected the Volunteers, their roles or their duties. After Waireka they were still required to undertake garrison duties; occupy outlying pickets escort convoys; patrol the defensive perimeter and parade in front of their commander as required. Indeed the day after Waireka they returned to the Omata area and completed their original mission by escorting into the town the settlers whom they had been originally sent out to save.[20] The extent of military service devolved to the 600 citizen soldiers, which effectively comprised all the working age males in New Plymouth, strained essential services. To maintain the beleagued garrison a number of the citizens in fact had to be released from service. In particular butchers, bakers, grocers and caterers had to be freed to continue their professional calling, otherwise

the military as well as civilian population of New Plymouth might well have starved.[21]

Those citizens retained for military service in Taranaki were kept busy on garrison duty and excited on the campaign trail. They became an integral part to any expedition which left New Plymouth.[22] In April 1860, for example, Volunteers from Taranaki units accompanied a four day search and destroy expedition along the coast to Warea directed against the Taranaki and Ngati ruanui Maori who had fought at Waireka. This expeditionary force consisted of 180 marines and seamen, 280 of the 65th Regiment, 40 Royal Artillerymen, 20 Royal Engineers and 40 Volunteers and Militia. The column proceeded via Waireka, Makotura and Warea destroying the pa positions and their adjacent wheat stacks and flourmills along the way.[23]

The Volunteers endeavoured to add to their roles in August 1860 at the time that Major-General Thomas Pratt, General Officer Commanding Australia, arrived in New Zealand to take personal command. Pratt had decided to intervene after the British forces had been severely repulsed at Puketakauere on 27 June 1860. Realising that Major Nelson's disastrous attack had been largely due to a lack of clear organisation and a breakdown in communication, Pratt instituted reform. Defences were re-examined and re-organized and detailed assembly points for all the military units including the Volunteers were

itemised, along with areas of responsibility in case of attack.[24] Taking the opportunity of the defence reorganisation, the leading officers of New Plymouth's citizen forces approached Major-General Pratt with a proposal to have their forces struck off routine garrison duty. In its place they asked that the citizen forces be directed to enter the bush and act in a counter insurgency capacity against Maori forces using guerilla tactics. Arguing that the citizens' knowledge of the terrain ideally suited them for this role, they managed to convince Pratt who went on to give whole-hearted support. Unfortunately after setting two or three unsuccessful ambushes the Volunteers lost heart and remained in the confines of the settlement, forcing the General to order them to resume garrison duty.[25]

Pratt did not totally change New Plymouth's defence arrangement. He continued the search and destroy operations initiated by Gold. The largest expedition organised by Major-General Pratt numbered fourteen hundred men including a contingent of Taranaki Rifle Volunteers. It marched from New Plymouth to Kairau and Huirangi on 10 September 1860. During its march the force destroyed four villages and looted all available livestock. This and many smaller expeditions were mounted with the objective of dominating the New Plymouth hinterland by the Crown's forces.[26] Pratt also conducted more orthodox military operations in which the Volunteers played a part. In the

set-piece battle at Mahoetahi pa on 6 November 1860 Pratt used the Volunteers to reinforce his quick attack on the recently arrived Waikato Maori *taua muru* (war party). Using a column of 667 men of whom 153 were Taranaki citizen soldiers, Pratt ordered a two-pronged assault. One of the two assault companies consisted entirely of Taranaki Militia and Volunteers and they were to share equally in the praises bestowed on the column after the successful capture of the position.[27]

Active service and the threat of hostilities escalating resulted in a massive increase in interest and participation in New Zealand volunteering. In Taranaki the Volunteers mushroomed from 100 to 180 servicemen within a month of war breaking out.[28] In Nelson, Wellington, Wanganui and Auckland new corps were formed at a frantic rate. In addition to infantry units, naval and cavalry companies were established, giving a better balance of the military branches.[29] Immediately on their formation many units found themselves on duty. In Wellington, for example, dozens of men rushed to join the Rifle Volunteers on the outbreak of war and no sooner had they donned their uniforms than they were called out for service. Fortunately they were not required to take the field, rather they took over the garrison duties at Mount Cook so that the regular force detachment could be freed for service in Taranaki.[30] Though used mainly as guards and later for construction of defence works the Wellington

Volunteers quickly gained a reputation for being well armed, equipped and trained. Indeed it was confidently expressed that without doubt they would acquaint themselves on the battlefield much as their Taranaki counterparts had done if called upon.[31]

In Auckland the Volunteer Rifles, like their Wellington counterparts, quickly and readily took over the garrison duties of the regular force. Mounting guards over Albert Barracks and Government House, they freed up the Auckland detachment of Imperial Troops 'for active service in Taranaki.[32] At the same time the Auckland Volunteers undertook contingency planning in case hostilities spread to their province. Roles were assigned to ensure the most efficient use of manpower. For example it was envisaged that the Cavalry Volunteers would act as scouts, escorts and couriers as well as patrol and fight as mounted bodies.[33]

The roles that were being envisaged for the New Zealand Volunteers reflected a growing awareness of the force's potential within the colony and the precedents being set in Britain. In the United Kingdom the Volunteer Force was becoming a national institution with a recognised place in the defence of the realm.[34] In New Zealand the force was outstripping its parent body the Militia in popularity. Realising that volunteering was much more popular than the Militia, New Zealand's government decided to give it

further encouragement. The ministry reviewed the service conditions of the Volunteers and allowed them to serve as an independent body rather than as the junior of a Militia-Volunteer combination as originally conceived in the framing of the 1858 Militia Act.[35] At the same time the Government took the opportunity to re-examine the whole 1858 defence framework in the light of its operational use. In addition, the government desired to make the citizen forces both popular and flexible. When the 1858 Militia Act was gazetted it had been received with indignation as it was considered arbitrary in its conception and enactment.[36] Worse than its unpopularity was its inflexibility. If a detachment of citizen soldiers were required, no matter how small, the whole of the Militia and Volunteer force had to be called out for service.[37]Further the maintenance of the Militia rolls was both time consuming and extremely expensive. To reduce costs and overcome the identifiable inadequacies, Frederick Weld, Minister of Native Affairs in the Stafford ministry, piloted through the House the 1860 Militia Act Amendment Bill considered one of the best pieces of legislation he ever introduced.[38] Modelled principally on the Militia acts of British North America, in particular Nova Scotia and New Brunswick, the 1860 Amendment Act provided for, partial mobilization of citizen forces and the reduction in age of those liable for service from 60 to 55. It also placed the onus on those liable for service to ensure that their names appeared on the Militia

Roll. Weld also ensured that the Bill included provisions designed specifically for the encouragement of Volunteer Units Volunteer Units were to be raised in their own right, rather than as part of the Militia. Following the British precedents these independent units were to be allowed to recommend their own officers. Additionally volunteers were to be exempt the unpopular jury service and, after a qualifying period of five years' efficient service, were to be eligible for free grants of land.[39]

The encouragement given to New Zealand volunteering proved extremely successful. In 1860 alone thirty-two new Volunteer Units were formed. Six were in the Auckland province, ten in Wellington and sixteen were in Canterbury, a province having no direct concern in the war effort. Interestingly, no units were formed in Otago in 1860 even though a fear existed that armed Maori schooners might attack the province's undefended coastline looking for booty and a soft target.[40] The growth of interest in volunteering resulting from the war and the government's encouragement was in fact so rapid and overwhelming that the defence authorities were forced to provide an ad hoc general set of regulations outlining the terms which volunteer units would be expected to adhere to. This eight-paragraphed set of regulations gazetted in March 1860 required all volunteers to be available for 168 hours of training per year. The government undertook to supply all basic equipment except uniforms which were to be

selected and supplied by the members of the individual corps. Members were also required to take the oath of allegiance, and commissioned officers would be appointed by the Governor, though on the recommendation of the corps. In addition to the equipment the Government also undertook to provide a regular force cadre for each militia district. Consisting of an Adjutant and Sergeant-Major this cadre was ultimately responsible for training and examining volunteers as well as being responsible for communicating with the higher authorities. For a unit to be accepted individuals willing to be enrolled as volunteers were expected to memorialize the Governor setting forth their names in full. If they resided in an area which had not been duly constituted a Militia district they were also required to intimate the boundaries and estimate the number of householders.[41] The Governor in Council would then decide whether to accept or decline their offer and arrange the appropriate gazette notices to be actioned. This system was far from satisfactory. Not only did it allow the ad hoc growth of units without reference to defence needs it often broke down. The Wellington Rifle Volunteers for example, formed in April 1859, had no gazetted regulations in mid-September 1860. It was only after a pointed question in the House of Representatives that they had their regulations approved and published. In such cases the understanding was that the Auckland regulations were to be followed.[42] Of more concern was the fact that units were

often approved without any thought as to the actual defence requirement of the province or colony. In an endeavour to overcome this the defence authorities issued a general circular seeking information on the nation's actual defence needs.[43]

Regulatory changes and organisational reforms and examinations, while important for force structure and control did little to affect Volunteer roles. In Taranaki Volunteer Units continued to reinforce search and destroy operations, conduct reconnaisance patrols and undertake general garrison duties.[44] Though after a year of war enthusiasm for Volunteer soldiering began to wane. On the eve of the Battle of Matarikoriko for example, only 47 out of 80 of the Taranaki Volunteers mustered. This so enraged the commander of the force, Lieutenant Colonel Carey, that he ordered their dismissal and replaced them with a detachment from the 12th Regiment.[45] This decline in enthusiasm was probably an outward manifestation of a weariness of a war that had no quick or easy victory. All had had enough and many were prepared to accept a negotiated peace. General Pratt meanwhile was methodically reducing pas by the time-consuming and unglamourous sap. By the time he had forced the Te Arei Pa to surrender, even his Maori opponents were prepared to accept a negotiated peace settlement. Articles of peace were accepted though not all considered them binding. Local papers complained that after fifteen months of strife, turmoil and anxiety, Taranaki was still in the same perplexed, turbulent state as when hostilities

commenced. They predicted that the peace in fact was little more than a truce and further hostilities would eventuate.[46]

Media belief that hostilities would be renewed was further fuelled by the Governor's determination to strike a decisive blow against the Maori insurgents. Gore Browne considered that the only way to compel the Maori to fully accept British sovereignty was to force the Kingite alliance into submission. On the advice of his Attorney-General, Whitaker, the Governor forwarded to the Kingites an ultimatum demanding that they acquiesce in the new order.[47] The Kingites, not surprisingly, refused to submit and Gore Browne was forced to contemplate invading the Waikato heartland. The Imperial authorities were dissatisfied with Gore Browne's blundering escalation of hostilities and before he could implement any plans for an invasion of the Waikato he was replaced as Governor by Sir George Grey.[48] On arrival in September 1861,Grey countermanded Gore Browne's orders for an invasion and endeavoured to reconcile the Kingites to British sovereignty by diplomacy. Grey's policy of conciliation was pursued for the next eighteen months. He arranged for representatives of the crown to be stationed in Maori areas while at the same time agreeing to return the contentious Waitara block. Though conciliatory,Grey also prepared for the possibility of war. He organised the reinforcement of the regular force garrisons; arranged for

the construction of a military transport road complete with protective redoubts from Drury to the Kingite border at Mangatawhiri; established a Commissariat Transport Corps and supported the construction of river gunboats in New South Wales shipyards.[49]

One element in Governor Grey's military build-up was the Volunteers. They undertook the garrison duties for Auckland while the regular force detachments were busy constructing the military road south.[50] More importantly the Volunteers were completely restructured. Prior to 1862 the defence authorities in large measure responded to the demands of the citizens. Grey altered this emphasis by instigating yet another examination of the nation's defence requirements and then the overhaul of the citizen forces. Rather than simply encouraging volunteering in general, central authorities began to encourage the formation of Volunteer Units that met the direct defence requirements of the colony. In January 1862 a new set of volunteer regulations consisting of sixteen paragraphs was drafted, agreed to by the Governor in Council and subsequently gazetted. One of the most important provisions of the new regulations was the total disbandment of the existing volunteer force. In addition, all previous regulations were abolished. Similar features were incorporated however. Training was still set at 168 hours per year and all basic military equipment was to be provided by the government. Military competency was

improved somewhat by the more novel features of the regulations. Officers and non-commissioned officers were expected not only to be popular with their colleagues - they were also required to be passed competent in military matters prior to the confirmation of their position. To encourage volunteering the year-long service requirement was dropped and replaced by a no-limit service obligation that could be broken by one month's written notice. In addition a capitation payment of £75 per annum for corps with a minimum of 60 efficient members to offset expenditure was approved. To further encourage to individuals to serve, each Volunteer who completed four years efficient service was exempt Militia service for life.[51]

More important than the regulations encouraging individuals to join units, or the control mechanisms of those units were the decisions on the total force structure. After careful consultation with General Cameron, Grey and his Council promulgated an establishment for the volunteer force. The colony was divided into nine districts with a detailed list of units eligible for enrolment in each. The districts and their volunteer complement were as follows:

District	Cavalry	Infantry
Auckland	1	8
Taranaki	-	2
Wellington	-	4
Wanganui	1	4
Hawkes Bay	-	4
Nelson		4
Canterbury		5
Otago		2
Marlborough		1
Total	2	31[52]

The new structure was significantly different from the previous ad hoc organisation. Prior to the disbandment of the volunteer units in 1862 a total of 43 companies existed in the colony. Six Cavalry, thirty-five Infantry and two Artillery units had been gazetted. In Auckland eight companies had existed: 2 cavalry, 5 infantry and 1 artillery. Wellington province had 3 cavalry units and 10 infantry companies enrolled. Canterbury was to have the biggest change with a predisbandment force of 22 companies consisting of 1 cavalry, 20 infantry and 1 artillery unit. Otago was also to be dramatically changed as prior to the 1862 disbandment it had no volunteer units enrolled. Re-enrolment in the new force was to prove a slow process. Only twenty-four volunteer units, or just over half the

previous enrolled number came forward in 1862 - five in Auckland, seven in Wellington, eleven in Canterbury and for the first time one in Otago. Numbers of individual volunteers also declined. From a high of 1481 volunteers in January 1862 the volunteers were drastically reduced to 1085 by June of the same year.[53]

Offsetting the reduction in numbers and establishment was the approval by Grey for the enrolment of `Regular Volunteer Companies'. Unlike units of the Volunteer force proper which were enrolled under the provisions of the 1858 Militia Act and its amendments, the 'Regular' units were raised under exclusive regulations for purely military duty on an as required basis from 1863 until 1867. This resulted in many being raised within a year as the Waikato was invaded.[54] Interestingly the invasion also saw the abandonment of the carefully considered volunteer establishment. Once battle was joined with the Kingite forces in 1863, colonists once more flocked to the colours. Thirty-four new corps were raised in 1863 alone and as there had been no disbandments a total of 58 units were available well above the theoretical authorised limit of 33. Not surprisingly all the new enrolments were in the North Island, sixteen in Auckland and eighteen in Wellington.[55]

While the Crown and its servants were preparing for the possibility of war, he Kingite alliance was busy preparing

its defences. Enormous stockpiles of war material were created in the interior. Primarily gained from Auckland and Sydney merchants, this material included powder, lead and percussion caps. Realising that the Maori ability to oppose British sovereignty was in proportion to their military supplies, the Government endeavoured to stop this arms trade. A reward of £300 for information on arms traders supplying interior Maoris was offered but it was insufficient. Large numbers of coastal vessels continued to land ammunition in isolated harbours.[56] In addition to stockpiling ammunition, the Kingite alliance endeavoured to win converts to their cause. By letters and emissaries the alliance tried to induce support from as far south as Otago, taking in Wellington on the way.[57] Though it is difficult to gauge the tangible support such actions won, it created an air of unease with settlers in Wellington, Auckland and Wanganui, fearful of a sudden assault by Maori insurgents.[58]

At the time that the colonists were fearful of attack, when the Kingites were preparing their defences and when Governor Grey was following contradictory policies, responsibility for native affairs was ceded to the New Zealand Government.[59] It was a government elected by settlers with covetous eyes upon the land holdings of the interior Maori Tribes. To settlers such land was wastefully shut off from European settlement and should be opened up at the earliest opportunity.[60] The opportunity

came with the renewal of hostilities. Governor Grey, before formally handing back Waitara, ordered the reoccupation of the Tataraimaka block in Taranaki. In response the Kingite allies ambushed two escorts and Taranaki was once again transformed from a garden province to a battlefield.[61] The Taranaki volunteers were once more to the fore, this time actually undertaking the anti-guerilla bush-ranging and aggressive patrolling that they had contemplated when Pratt had first arrived in the colony.[62] Though unlike the first time, they were not struck off garrison duty, so were lumbered with the unglamourous, but important picket duty.[63] Undoubtedly the resumption of war was as important to the expansion of volunteering in the North, as was Grey's administrative and organisational reforms. The thirty-four units that quickly sprang up in the North Island while a positive manifestation of military enthusiasm, stretched the Colonial Defence Department to breaking point. There were simply insufficient resources to supply the overall defence requirements of the colony. As a result priority was given to the North Island, and the South Island units had the arms and equipment withdrawn so that the greatly expanded North Island force could be equipped.[64]

That priority was given to North Island units is understandable given Grey's policy of preparing for war while negotiating peace. It was even more understandable after Cameron crossed his Rubicon, the Mangatawhiri, in

July 1863. The commencement of an escalation in hostilities raised fears of attack throughout the North Island, especially when it was realised that the interior tribes had in fact amassed a large stockpile of arms and ammunition.[65] The fear of native attack was heightened after all Europeans living in the Waikato were expelled. Aucklanders feared destruction of their settlement while lower down the North Island Wellington settlers feared that there was little hope if the capital could not protect itself.[66] Most were relieved when Cameron commenced his invasion of the Waikato. This new phase of the struggle was looked forward to as the one that would ultimately decide whose writ was to reign.[67] Few doubted the outcome would be an overwhelming European success - a success would enable the colony to progress by opening up the land as well as teaching the Kingite alliance an invaluable lesson. First the Kingites would be defeated on the battlefield, then their lands would be confiscated to pay for the cost of that defeat as well as further development.[68]

To ensure success, a massive military apparatus was established around Auckland. Over 10,000 Imperial Troops were gathered from around the globe and they were to be supported by 3,000 citizen soldiers from Auckland. Nearly a quarter of the Auckland Citizen soldiers were volunteers serving in the Cavalry, Infantry and Naval Units. Paralleling what had occurred in Taranaki these units were

used as reinforcements, escorts for essential war materials and personnel, pickets, patrols, guards and garrison troops. A specialist corps of Forest Rangers under William Jackson, later joined by Gustavos Von Tempsky, also undertook bush-scouring operations in the same manner as the Taranaki Bush Ranger Volunteers under Harry Atkinson.[69] Except for the specialist units who were in fact colonial Regulars the Volunteers of Auckland were transformed from untrained irregulars into competent professionals. This transformation occurred not only through the trial-and-error active service but also by the thorough training programmes instigated by the military authorities. While in the Otahuhu base camp all volunteers undertook a course in recruit drill, spending at least four hours per day being exercised. Such training paid dividends for the British commanders and the volunteers when they were called upon to undertake difficult tasks. When Colonel Murray marched on Kerikeri from Papakura in mid-July 1863 to capture its inhabitants, a body of Volunteers from Otahuhu and Drury accompanied him. These Volunteers took an active part in the cordon operation which surrounded the native settlement, they were then involved in the capture of its inhabitants, and finally they were the troops used to escort them into military captivity at Drury. Concurrent with the clearing operations on land was a similar exercise on water. The Auckland Coast Guard Volunteers along with the Onehunga Naval Volunteers undertook a one-week search and destroy

expedition around Manaukau Harbour. During this operation they were able to locate and seize 21 Maori war and transport canoes. More importantly the operation reassured Auckland residents that they would not be surprised by a water-borne attack.[70]

Once Auckland and its immediate environs had been secured the Volunteers moved on to reinforcing attacking, rather than defensive operations. The Royal Cavalry Volunteers, for example, were attached to the Colonial Defence Force in November 1863 and used, in numerous fighting patrols sent out to destroy marauding insurgents whenever sightings were reported.[71] Perhaps the most important operation that the Auckland Volunteers were involved in during the Waikato invasion was the `Miranda Expedition`. Consisting of 900 men, including 100 Naval Volunteers, the Miranda Expedition commanded by Lieutenant Colonel Carey was despatched from Auckland on the 16 November 1863 and proceeded to the Firth of Thames. Its objection was to establish a series of military posts from the Thames Gulf to the Waikato River. These posts were to cut off the North Eastern supply routes to the Waikato as well as to force out of the ranges the insurgents acting in a guerilla capacity. Landing at Thames without opposition the force marched inland and commenced a sweeping operation prior to constructing the proposed redoubts and stockades. While no enemy forces were

contacted the effective and efficient manner in which the operation was conducted, and the competent part played by the Volunteers, highlighted the ability of New Zealand's citizen soldiers on Active Service.[72] While happy to be involved in the operation of securing the beach-head and assisting in redoubt construction, the Naval Volunteers settled unhappily into garrison routine. It was unhappy primarily because of the long separation from their homes. Of the 100 men of the Naval Volunteers on duty, sixty were married and desired to return to their families once the operation became simply garrison duty. After four weeks the married men were in fact relieved, though thirty single volunteers were required for duty for another three weeks. The remaining ten Naval Volunteers were involved in garrison duties without break for over ten weeks.[73]Not surprisingly, therefore, the Volunteers were less than enthusiastic about garrison duties and the Auckland Coast Guard Volunteers at one stage actually refused to build a redoubt, protesting that they had joined to fight, not build redoubts for the regulars.[74]

Less spectacular, but equally indicative of Volunteer resentment of prolonged garrison type duties, was the tendency for individuals to seek leave from the exemption board or, failing that, simply deserting their posts.[75] While such actions by military men were reprehensible, by the Auckland citizen soldiers they were somewhat understandable. The Waikato invasion with its continued

were a drain on the Auckland manpower pool proved debilitating to Auckland and Aucklanders. So constant was the call on their time to undertake military duties that they were incapable of leading their normal lives or following their vocations. The Auckland Cavalry Volunteers for example, in November and December 1863, were on duty for five weeks without a break and with little opportunity for rest or recreation. Within six months of the invasion commencing they were hardly out of their uniforms. They had so few troops available for picket duty, for example, that they were forced to patrol during the evening as well as man outstations and provide despatch riders during the day. To relieve the volunteers the 3rd class Militia had to be called out. At the same time duties and roles were organised so that not all the force was called out at any one time. Defence requirements were streamlined with only strategic patrols, pickets and guards being undertaken. In addition the wives of volunteers, and any dependents were provided with rations to ensure that they did not suffer while their husbands were away.[76]

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as inappropriate at a time when European settlements were still vulnerable to attack. To ensure that at least some volunteers would be readily available to counter this vulnerability the government offered an allowance for mounted volunteers who agreed to keep a horse for active service if called upon. The allowance for such an understanding was reasonably generous at nine pence per day.[77]

More important for defence than selected Volunteers maintaining a mount were those Volunteers who transferred to key positions in the colonial regular units. Many of the leading positions in both the settler Militia and the Colonial Defence Force were filled by Volunteers who had proved themselves on active service. Sergeant Perry of the Forest Rifle Volunteers, for example, was granted an ensignship in the 2nd Regiment of Waikato Militia after displaying cool,capable leadership at the Pukekohe East Church redoubt when it was attacked on the 14 September 1863. From Howick, Lieutenant Hutchinson of the Royal Cavalry Volunteers followed Perry's example somewhat by being appointed a sub-inspector in the Colonial Defence Force. It was not only the settler Militia and Colonial Defence Force in which the Volunteers played a leading part. They were also recruited by the Imperial Forces to work in essential auxiliary units. Units such as the Land Transport Corps and the Water Transport Corps were staffed

by an amalgamation of Volunteer citizen soldiers and Regular Imperial soldiers.[78]

A major reason for the key part played by volunteers in the colony's defence structure was the fact that they proved themselves as soldiers. Some were gallant, some foolish, others totally inept while the majority, had a professional approach to their military endeavours and were perceived as capable troops. One who was well rewarded for his gallant efforts was Charles Heaphy, an Auckland Rifle Volunteer attached to General Cameron's staff as a surveyor. Awarded the Victoria Cross in 1867 for an action in the Waikato on the 11 February 1864, Heaphy was the first colonial and non-regular serviceman to receive the Empire's highest decoration. Under heavy fire, Heaphy, at Waiari, went to the aid of a wounded soldier. After dressing the soldier's wounds, Heaphy managed to drag him to safety in the process getting wounded himself.[79] In sharp contrast to Heaphy was the inept Private Higgleton of the Auckland Naval Volunteers who also in February 1864 came to the attention of the public. While on sentry duty at Government House Higgleton fired on a passer-by who refused to acknowledge his formal military challenge. Not surprisingly Higgleton was soundly condemned for firstly having a loaded weapon without having specific orders and secondly for firing in the middle of what was basically a peaceful settlement.[80]

(He perhaps should have also been condemned for not hitting his target once he had selected it).

Higgleton was by no means the only Volunteer to be condemned by the general public. As with the first Taranaki War the constant requirement to be on duty took its toll on the Volunteers' enthusiasm for the military life. Though the King's capital of Ngaruawahia had been entered on the 8 December 1863, it was not until April 1864 with the fall of Orakau pa that the Waikato operation can be said to have become a garrison duty rather than an invasion. Though the arrival of the Militia settlers reduced the need for volunteers there was still an on-going requirement for units to provide individuals for orderly duty, pickets and to act as escorts. By early 1864 a reluctance to perform these duties can be identified. Relief columns for example, failed to materialise or, as was more often the case, would be a gradual trickling in of ones and twos rather than a body of men. Occasionally this tardy response to duty was due to insufficient warning being given to troops, but generally it was a lack of motivation. This irregularity in response to service was identified as a serious threat to the very credibility of volunteering in New Zealand.[81] Fortunately for volunteering most New Zealand volunteers were considered to be capable and competent soldiers. Imperial commanders praised them for their courage and coolness while the colonial government saw them as

extremely efficient soldiers being more cost effective than their regular counterparts. In recognition of their ability and acknowledgment of their service, but not as payment, Auckland Volunteers who had been on active service were granted land script.[82]

Auckland Volunteers understandably were happy both with the positive and tangible acknowledgment of their service and obviously with the decline of their duty requirement when the Settler Militia arrived. In contrast the Volunteers and citizens of Taranaki were outraged by the decision to strike the Volunteers off the active service roll. It was argued by the New Plymouth settlers that their Volunteers were essential for the maintenance of the town's security. They also noted that if the citizen soldiers were struck off the active service pay roll they would be forced to return to agricultural pursuits in the outlying areas and thereby be exposed to lightning strikes by Maori guerilla bands - bands which had been effectively neutralized by military actions that the volunteers had been part and parcel of. As in Auckland, the Taranaki Volunteers had been employed on garrison duty, on the picket line, on escort operations and on offensive operations such as bush scouring. So constant had the duties of the Taranaki citizen soldiers been that the whole region had fallen into a state of deplorable disrepair. Culverts had collapsed, water courses had been blocked by fallen trees and bridges were decaying. It was

estimated that in 1864 the cost of restoring the roading would be in the vicinity of £5,000. Rather than have the Volunteers struck off service to become vulnerable individuals on isolated farms, Taranaki settlers suggested that they be employed on public works to restore the region's communication infrastructure. This suggestion was eventually taken up.[83]

By 1864 the War in the North Island appeared to be winding down. Rewi Maniapoto had been forced to retreat into the King Country, while in the Bay of Plenty the repulse at Gate Pa had been avenged by the slaughter at Te Ranga. However the de-escalation of the war was not to result in a total collapse of hostilities. Rather it led to a period of transformation from conventional warfare to guerilla cum terrorist campaigns. This new phase in the conflict was ushered in by the rise of the Pai Marire (Good and Peaceful) religion, more commonly referred to as Hau Hau, under the leadership of the prophet Te Ua Haumene. It reached its height under two successful guerilla-terrorist leaders, Te Kooti and Titokowaru on the East and West Coasts of the North Island. At the same time that the nature of the New Zealand hostilities was being transformed the responsibility for internal defence of the colony was also changing. Until 1865 the Governor as Commander-in-Chief had theoretical control over the military, though in practice he delegated his responsibility to the commander of the British Forces. In

1865 significant changes were to occur as a result of the pressure put on the New Zealand colonial government by the Imperial authorities who were determined to reduce the cost of defending the Empire.

The desire of the Imperial Authorities to reduce spending on defence was not new. As early as 1846 Earl Grey had advocated a reduction in Imperial garrisons and the introduction of colonial contributions for local defence. This concept of reduced central spending and increased colonial contribution was more fully developed thirteen years later. An inter-departmental inquiry comprising of representatives from the War Office, Treasury and Colonial Office recommended in 1859 that colonies should make greater efforts in local defence. These calls were followed up in 1861 by a parliamentary select committee under the chairmanship of Arthur Mills. The select committee's report proposed that only strategically important military posts should be manned by Imperial garrisons. All other posts in the Empire, including Canada and the Australasian colonies were to be internally self-reliant. By March 1862 most of Britain's leading politicians accepted the new divisions of responsibility for defence. In that month a resolution was passed through the House of Commons recognising Imperial responsibility for defence against perils arising from Imperial policy but noting that self-governing colonies ought to accept responsibility for internal

order. This resolution was perceived by New Zealand's European colonists as a pointed barb directed primarily at them. Such a perception had some validity. The Duke of Newcastle, for example, believing that the War in New Zealand had been forced upon the Governor by the avaricious colonists. Newcastle's determination was further strengthened by the advice given by J. R. Godley, of Canterbury fame, who argued that colonies should be self-reliant in internal defence for their own benefit and honour.[84]

Perhaps more importantly such a scheme was cheaper for the British taxpayer. Reductions in Imperial responsibilities meant reduction in costs. When Gladstone presented the 1864 budget it foreshadowed a reduction in the military vote. This reduction was to be achieved not only by reducing Imperial garrisons but also by a user-pays policy for troops. The previous year self-governing colonies had been informed that for each Imperial soldier stationed on their shores they would be charged £40 per annum. The New Zealand authorities had been closely monitoring the clear signals emanating from London. Indeed they were constantly endeavouring to counter the Imperial authorities' attempts to force self-reliance for internal defence. At the time of the Mills Select Committee the New Zealand Parliament formed its own secret bicameral committee to investigate and report on its internal defence requirements. It also reviewed what the

colony could, or should pay toward maintaining an Imperial garrison. Given the uncertain state of affairs internally and the size of European population and commerce, the Committee hoped that the colony would only have to contribute £5 per soldier.[85] To answer the criticism that the colony had not done sufficient to prepare its citizens for war the colonial government claimed that they did not wish to project any appearance of aggressive action. Such an appearance they argued could be easily misconstrued by the natives and lead to the outbreak of war which they wished to avoid.[86]

To a large degree the manoeuvrings by the New Zealand government were a waste of effort. Though the Imperial forces were retained for the large-scale invasion operation of the Waikato, the decision to withdraw the garrison remained. By 1870 all Imperial troops were to be recalled from New Zealand. This was a last-ditch effort by the colonial government, who argued that of the 40,000 Europeans living in the North Island only 8,000 were liable for service. Further if they were to be called upon for any prolonged period the economic base of the nation would be destroyed.[87] Realizing that no amount of intrigue would dissuade the Imperial authorities, the New Zealand public demanded that the government renew its efforts to foster a strong volunteer spirit.[88] This call was heeded by New Zealand's politicians who realized self-reliance

could be of some benefit as it would end dual control over native affairs. Leading the political initiatives in New Zealand for assuming responsibility of internal defence were Fox and Weld. Both were in close communication with Godley who advised them to take the opportunity to gain control and responsibility for native affairs. Not surprisingly, when Weld was called upon to form a ministry in October 1864, he did so on the condition that the self-reliant policy for defence would be supported by the Governor. Within weeks Weld had laid before the House a defence policy for New Zealand in a post-Imperial garrison era. To maintain internal security, Weld proposed a small regular force of 1,500 Armed Constabulary manning frontier positions and supported by citizen soldiers as, and when required. Weld's proposals were strongly supported outside the legislature by those who saw in self-reliance an opportunity to show the world how hostilities should be conducted against a native race.[89]

With self-reliance becoming an inevitability it was considered necessary to once again review and modify defence legislation. As a consequence yet another Volunteer Act was prepared in 1865. Once again it was proposed to disband all units then in existence, requiring any who wished to continue in service to reapply for approval. Unlike that which had preceded it however, the 1865 Act linked the Volunteers together. For the first time provisions were made to place all units under one set

of regulations. In anticipation of the Act defence officials suspended all regulatory controls for the Volunteers in 1864. At the same time Defence personnel throughout the colony were asked to comment on the administration structures then in place and how best they could be improved. Resulting from this consultation process was a 23-paged 135-paragraph set of regulations detailing everything from unit size to an ordnance price list. Additional to the controlling legislation and regulations was a Volunteer Land Act passed with the intention of further encouraging volunteering. This Act entitled Volunteers, with five years' continuous and efficient service, to a £30 remission certificate for the purchase of crown land.[90]

Legislative activity was matched by action from Imperial Authorities and local communities, In the two years of 1865 and 1866 the Imperial defence authorities recalled all but one of the British Regiments, and withdrew the final unit in 1870. In response to this and the colonial government's measures, New Zealand's European settlers met to discuss defence. Members of existing units met to discuss the new legislative provisions and decide whether they would again ask for approval for their existence. Elsewhere settlers met to examine how best to defend themselves without an Imperial garrison to look to. Forty-four new Volunteer units were the result of these

meetings between 1864 and 1866, a net increase of ten on the preceding total of thirty-four.[91] To ensure that the new volunteer units were aware of their rights and responsibilities under the new regime the 1865 regulations were printed in booklet form and sold to them for one shilling a copy. In addition briefing sessions were conducted by defence personnel so that no one could claim ignorance or misunderstanding of the legislation and its regulations.[92] Despite the effort to gain acceptance and understanding of the new administration strictures and structures, the colonial government soon found that the Volunteers were dissatisfied. Almost immediately pressure was brought to bear on politicians to have the legislation reviewed by select committees with even more input from the various militia districts. In less than three years this pressure had resulted in yet another general set of regulations being issued, though the only significant change was the applicability to all districts rather than having regulations gazetted for each individual district.[93]

Paralleling the colonial government's reviews of Volunteer controlling mechanisms were individual units' internal control reviews. A great deal of time and effort during the war period was taken up by investigations, reviews and meetings to consider individual units' constitutions and bye-laws. While in large measure these reviews looked at how units were to be managed on a day to

day basis, they also established procedures for a host of activities from conducting of general and special meetings through to recruitment and promotion. Most of the basic administration for a unit was conducted by the Secretary and Treasurer under the direction of a Management Committee appointed by a unit's Annual General Meeting. This in conjunction with recruit selection often gave volunteer corps the outward appearance of exclusive gentlemens' clubs rather than military units. Though embryonic Volunteer Corps often would accept anyone willing to join with the ability to equip themselves, once established this quickly changed. Established units required recruits to be nominated, seconded and voted upon as to acceptability. Some units would accept new members on a simple majority though most balloted and if a recruit received 1 black ball in five they would be deemed not elected. Promotion was not exempt from this club-like approach. Volunteer non-commissioned officers theoretically appointed to their position by their commanding officer after examination by district adjutants, were in the first instance often elected to fill actual vacancies by their fellow volunteers.[94]

Recruit and non-commissioned officer election procedures which highlighted the club-like appearance of Volunteers Units were reinforced by the fact that officer appointments were also filled by election. Officer vacancies were often hotly contested with unit members

being advised of the vacancies and proposed election meetings well in advance of their being filled. As a result, nominations for such vacancies were put forward in plenty of time for units to decide on the merits of candidates after being subjected to a mini hustings complete with canvass. Voting for officers was conducted by all units in one of two ways. The first was with the men on parade openly expressing their preference by a show of hands or presenting their weapons. Alternatively a secret ballot complete with scrutineers was organised to ensure confidentiality and impartiality.[95] Theoretically any individual member could be elected to fill any officer vacancy from the officer commanding position down. In practice such open entry never actually existed. Officers prior to being granted their commissions had to pass a standardised examination. Further the commandants of the Militia Districts often ensured that officers were not disadvantaged by volunteers previously their juniors passing them simply through an election result. The Royal Cavalry Volunteers, Auckland, for example, in 1864, voted 25 to 21 to have Private Frederick Hill fill the vacancy of lieutenant in preference to Cornet Roberts. Lieutenant-Colonel Belneavis, the Commanding officer, on receiving the result simply refused to recommend the appointment and after four months of correspondence the Royal Cavalry Volunteers bowed to his request to have Roberts made up to lieutenant and Hill to Cornet.[96] Further up the chain the Defence Minister could also

refuse to confirm a commission. When the Cavalry Volunteers of Rangiora voted for an Indian Army Veteran Westby Percival to be their Captain the Defence Minister overruled the recommendation as he had been convicted of assaulting a female.[97]

Fortunately during the New Zealand War period most units selected competent, talented and acceptable candidates for commissions. Occasionally split decisions left a great deal of bitterness but more often the community leaders took charge and drew units together. Outward manifestations that Volunteer officers were the community leaders are not difficult to discover. New Zealand's first Victoria Cross winner, Charles Heaphy, for example, was not only a Volunteer officer but also president of the Surveyors Association and the representative for Parnell in the House of Representatives from 1867 to 1869. In Taranaki Harry Atkinson, who was eventually to rise to be Premier of the Colony, was a volunteer officer of repute, a Provincial Councillor and a representative in the General Assembly. In the Waikato, the merchant fraternity, the Agricultural Association, the Highway Boards, Masonic Lodge 450 and the General Assembly representatives were dominated by four Volunteer officers (Major Jackson, Captains Runciman and Cummings and Lieutenant MacDonald of the Waikato Rifle and Cavalry Volunteers). Such dominance of the social structure was in fact the norm throughout the colony.[98]

Given the nature of the Volunteer Force and how the units were established it is not surprising that the prominent citizens dominated the command structure. All volunteer corps that were formed in New Zealand followed the pattern established by the Auckland Rifle Volunteers in 1858. When a community deemed it desirable to establish a unit a public meeting would be called by a small moving group. This group would arrange for a prominent local citizen to take the chair at the meeting and the proposal would be discussed in an orchestrated manner. If the meeting and discussion raised sufficient support for the proposal it would be requested that those desiring to join the unit would put forward their names. At the same time an interim management committee would be established. Normally consisting of the group who had originally organised the meeting, this committee would be tasked with corresponding with the central authorities to offer their services. Working under the assumption that their offer would be accepted, the interim committee would concurrently work on proposals for the unit's constitution, dress uniform and training programme. If their services were accepted the interim committee would call another general meeting when members would be enrolled and sworn, the constitution discussed, a training schedule accepted and a uniform agreed to.[99] Those who enrolled rarely did so for the pleasure of training and wearing a uniform. Volunteers

were induced to come forward for a wide variety of reasons. The most tangible was for immediate protection, when they felt their settlement to be under imminent threat of attack. Another was to avoid the unpopular Militia especially if it involved avoiding unpopular officers appointed for political rather than military reasons. Others came forward for the commemoration of special events such as those ex-regular servicemen who established the Wellington Veteran Volunteers to mark the planned visit of the Duke of Edinburgh in 1868.[100]

For whatever reason they were induced to join, once enrolled the Volunteer and his colleagues quickly arranged for the supply of either suitably ornate or serviceable uniforms depending upon their inclination and taste. Uniforms for the New Zealand Volunteer force were in fact anything but uniform. During the second New Zealand War period three basic colours of uniform were in favour, grey, blue and green. The specific colour selected by an individual unit reflected what the majority believed would be the best for active service conditions. In Auckland for example No 6 Company of the Rifle Volunteers favoured green and were quickly labelled the `Grasshoppers'. In contrast the Rifle Volunteers selected grey believing it would make them invisible in the fern, no doubt being influenced by the debate in the United Kingdom which favoured grey for camouflage. Elsewhere blue was seen as the most suitable colour for both the field and the parade

ground, if for no other reason than it was the colour selected by the regular regiments for active service in New Zealand.[101] Whatever the colour adopted by units the individual members were forced to outlay a considerable sum to have their uniform made up. Depending on how ornately a unit wished to see its members dressed, individual volunteers were expected to pay between 28/- and £5 for the pleasure of dressing as a soldier. As most of the uniforms in this period were actually made in New Zealand this was an important stimulus to local clothing manufacturers. In 1871, Mr Webb of Nelson, for example, supplied 22 corps with uniforms using 6,000 yards of locally produced material.[102]

Volunteer equipment was as motley as their uniforms during the second New Zealand War. For South Island units the war in the North precluded their receiving any equipment until December 1861. This meant that their initial arms drill was often carried out with umbrellas and walking-sticks instead of rifles and bayonets. As a short term expedient the colonial government purchased all types of arms from the community at large. In this way cutlasses, swords, pistols, revolvers, rifles and muskets were acquired which were then issued to units to provide some weaponry for use. Lack of a standard weapon was an obvious weakness. It meant that training programmes in the initial stages were ad hoc and individualised to specific units depending on the weapon with which they had

been issued. To address the obvious inadequacies of non-standardised weaponry the Otago Province arranged its own arms purchase in 1863. It bought 125 serviceable long Enfield Rifles complete with War Department accoutrements from the South Australian government at a cost price of £3-5-4 each. The central government also arranged the eventual purchase of Enfields but it then went on to compound the old non-standardised equipment problem by buying Sniders and Terry-breech loading carbines. Though by 1871 most units had either the short or the long Enfield Rifle. If the non-standardised weapons on issue were not problem enough for the Volunteers it was made worse by their habit of doctoring whatever weapon they were given. Most commonly they would file down the sights and timbers to produce smooth barrels and hair-triggers enhancing the speed at which they could fire them but reducing significantly their efficiency.[103]

Doctoring of weapons was not the only vice of the Volunteers during the war. Over indulgence in alcohol was probably the greatest vice. It led to their whispering in the ranks, refusing to salute, absenting themselves from duty without leave and then having insufficient funds to pay the duly imposed fines. When pressured to pay their debts some volunteers would refuse in the most objectionable manner, with the trading of insults and foul language being not uncommon. If their verbal threats did not suffice to achieve the dropping of charges, Volunteers

would occasionally complain over the heads of their superior officers, direct to district headquarters, or worse, they would write one-sided accounts of the incidents to the local newspapers.[104] Surprisingly the senior officer of the Auckland Headquarters in charge of the Volunteer Force, Lieutenant Colonel Belneavis, claimed that the Volunteers had proved themselves exemplary soldiers, never using uncivil words, never drinking, or indeed breaking the acceptable military code of conduct.[105] The clearest evidence that the Volunteers were not the paragons of military virtue that Balneavis believed, are the court-martial records for New Zealand forces 1864-68. Of the ninety-nine New Zealanders courtmartialled in that period, fifty-eight were Volunteers. These fifty-eight faced in total seventy-four charges. Two were tried for desertion, one for disgraceful conduct, fifteen for insubordination, twenty-eight for drunkenness and another twenty-eight for absence without leave.[106]

The relatively high rate of volunteer court-martials as evidence of a high rate of military misbehaviour is reinforced when it is realised that the Volunteer Force during the War was not an overly large body. It fluctuated at between two and two-and-a-half percent of the total European population. In the early years of the war it numbered between four and four-and-a-half thousand men, by the close of hostilities these figures had risen

by only an additional two thousand despite the implementation of the self-reliant policy. Though relatively small in number the Volunteers were relatively efficient. By the end of the war they were averaging in excess of eighty-percent efficiency though as with absolute numbers this had fluctuated. During the quiet years of the late 1860's efficiency had dropped below fifty percent for North Island units.[107] This drop prompted the government to establish in 1870 yet another select committee to investigate how the colony's military forces might be improved. In addition to the regular inspections by senior officers instigated by the establishment of the appointment of an Inspector-General in 1865, the committee proposed the publication of a simple drill adapted for New Zealand's conditions. The drill book it was hoped would provide a sufficient basis for further training that would include instructional courses for officers and musketry courses for all.[108]

To ascertain whether training and efficiency were improving, the Defence authorities relied upon the reports of the senior officers appointed to inspect the forces. By the war's end large-scale inspections had been undertaken by Colonel Haultain in his capacity as Defence Minister and Lieutenant-Colonel Harrington of Auckland in his capacity as Inspector. Harrington took his position seriously and reported in detail on the Volunteers throughout the colony. In 1869 for example he toured the

country and concluded after inspecting all the units that only Otago and Auckland had forces which could be commended. Wellington and Wairarapa Volunteers he judged adequate, while the Volunteers of Wanganui and Canterbury received sub-standard training. In Taranaki Harrington praised the training but damned the worn out equipment.[109] Though these reports highlighted existing deficiencies, they in themselves did little or nothing to improve Volunteer efficiency or effectiveness. One year after reporting on Wanganui's sub-standard training and Taranaki's worn-out equipment for example, Harrington could not see any improvement. Indeed volunteering in the provinces appeared to have almost lapsed entirely. In contrast, Auckland Volunteers whom he had already praised had improved immensely. Harrington was quick to note that this improvement was entirely due to the appointment of Major Gordon to the position of District Commander. He praised Gordon for his unusual zeal and attention to duties which had resulted in the Volunteers of Auckland increasing in both strength and ability. Unfortunately the Defence Department did not seek to fill all command appointments with zealous officers in an indeavour to replicate Auckland's success. Instead they announced in 1872 that any Volunteer unit unable to parade two-thirds of its muster roll at the compulsory annual inspection would be either disbanded or forced to amalgamate. The threat of disbandment or forced amalgamation appears to have had the desired effect. When

Harrington inspected Taranaki in 1872, for example, he was able to reverse his condemnation noting that the Volunteers were making good progress in acquiring a considerable knowledge of their duties.[110]

Throughout the war period coercion and threats were a greater stimulus to volunteering in New Zealand than were positive inducements. Violently opposed to anything resembling a large standing army for New Zealand, most politicians and leading citizens endeavoured to encourage the volunteer citizen soldiers. During the War a raft of inducements were tried in an endeavour to promote Volunteer service. After four years' efficient service a volunteer was granted exemption from Militia training for the rest of his life. After five years he became eligible for a land grant. If on duty or going to a place of parade he was exempt any tolls. Volunteers were also exempt the laborious and unpopular jury service. As an example to all employers the government allowed its own employees a paid half day off each week for Volunteer training. The government also arranged for widows and dependents of Volunteers killed on active service to receive a pension. Insurance companies, such as the Australian Mutual Provident, assisted the government's attempts to take the financial worry out of Volunteer service by providing life cover at no additional cost even while on active service. In addition the government endeavoured to reduce the cost of Volunteering to the

individual servicemen by providing drill and musketry instructors. Provincial governments assisted here by providing subsidies for uniforms and ammunition. Yet for all the positive inducements given none worked so well as the threat of strictly enforcing the enrolment and training of the Militia.[111]

Without the threat of compulsory Militia training enthusiasm for service in Volunteer units was somewhat dampened by expense. In 1869 for example it cost £11-17-10 to outfit one trooper for service in the Canterbury Yeomanry Cavalry. That same year the government paid a capitation grant of 12/-6 for each efficient volunteer. This meant that the whole of the Canterbury Yeomanry Cavalry received £11-17-1 for the training year. Not surprisingly funding was a major problem for all volunteer units. To overcome the shortfall in funds Volunteers were forced to become ingenious fund-raisers. The bulk of the funds were raised by levying annual fees and subscriptions on servicing members. These charges varied from 1/- per month to £10 per annum depending on the unit. Adding to the income from subscriptions was the practice of units allowing Honorary Members to enrol with the privilege of wearing the uniform without attending drill for the cost of the prescribed subscription. Bazaars were another common fund -raising expedient with the Cavalry Volunteers of Christchurch being able to raise £110 in two days in

December 1865. More enterprising schemes were also tried out. The Royal Cavalry Volunteers in Auckland, for example, organised a very successful race day in March 1864 at which hundreds of people paid for the privilege of attending. Volunteer fundraisers were greatly assisted by prominent benefactors. Wealthy individuals like Cracroft Wilson in Canterbury, for example, helped foster the Volunteer movement in their own localities with generous donations to unit coffers.[112]

Money by itself was not sufficient to make a credible defence force of the individual Volunteer units serving throughout the colony. While some units on active service performed well and their expertise in the military art was justifiably praised the lack of higher organisation prevented them from becoming an effective deterrent force. Unsuccessful attempts were made during the war to evolve a regimental system for New Zealand's Volunteer Force. In Auckland and Canterbury, for example, Rifle Battalions and Cavalry Regiments were formed by imposing a headquarters structure over loosely affiliated units. Wrangles over finance, jealousies over seniority and determination to maintain unit independence ensured the failure of these higher organisational experiments. Yet all agreed that it was essential to have a higher organisational structure.[113]

The inability of the Volunteers to evolve a higher administrative and command organisational structure along with perceived inefficiencies in training led to the very concept of volunteering to be damned by critics as a military plaything. Suggesting that volunteers spent their time simply discussing what uniform they would wear rather than in training, such critics demanded that they be replaced by the Militia.[114] This general condemnation was added to by topical songs. Throughout the colony Mr Thatcher's entertaining scores were performed in music halls. Two of these, "The Sham Fight" and "The Volunteer", suggested that the Volunteers were more of a farce than a force.[115] Though well received, Mr Thatcher's songs did little to undermine popular support for the Volunteers support that was manifest in the numerous poems and airs penned to honour their martial skills, manifest also in the names given by owners to prized possessions. For example a successful race horse, yacht and competition cutter were all called `Volunteer'. Perhaps the clearest manifestation of general community support was the provision of unit colours. In Taranaki, for example, the ladies of the province arranged for the finance, manufacture and presentation of the Flags with the battle honour `Waireka', one for the Militia the other for the Volunteers. This example, quickly followed throughout the colony, signalled not only community appreciation but also martial insight. The Battle standard was after all an essential focus for any fighting force.[116]

Despite their Martial trapping and their general popularity Volunteers were still amateur soldiers. They were assisted in the performance of their military duties by the `sprinkling' of discharged regulars in the ranks. Indeed it was argued that only in units where ex-regulars were to be found could any praise be given for their military skill. This belief was predominantly one nurtured by Imperial officers who were willing to admit that individual Volunteers might have zeal, alacrity and pluck but considered that as a rule they were overrated amateurs.[117] Given this professional perception it is not surprising that when the order came in 1870 for the withdrawal of the last imperial regiment, the 18th (Royal Irish) Regiment of Foot, it was greeted by many in New Zealand with alarm and despondence. Though unused in the field since the mid-1860's the physical presence of an Imperial regiment gave the Colony a tangible link with the British Army a link that showed continued British support and could be called upon for assistance in an emergency. What made the withdrawal even harder to take was that the regiment was redeployed to Victoria, a colony all agreed was without a serious internal or external threat. Alarm soon gave way to anger and calls were made to sever the colony's union with the United Kingdom and join instead with the United States. While these calls went unheeded and never developed beyond vocal demands

they did indicate the depth of feeling against the Imperial authorities of the time.[118]

The colonists' antipathy toward the civil Imperial authorities was in part due to the restoration of the British Army's reputation in New Zealand under the leadership of General 'Kerry Bull' Chute. Chute, who took over command from Cameron in 1865 conducted a bold bush campaign in the Taranaki in 1866. Marching around Mount Egmont in late January 1866 Chute conducted a classic search and destroy operation for eight days, scouring the country for insurgents and destroying their habitations and cultivations. Accompanying Chute's expedition were the Taranaki Volunteers who impressed the General with their soldierly excellence and gallantry in the field.[119]

At the very time that Chute was restoring the reputation of the British soldier the Hau Hau phenomena was gathering strength. The Hau Hau militants, or more correctly the followers of the Pai Marire religious sect, were to help transform the New Zealand wars from conventional to counter-insurgency operations. On both coasts of the North Island Hau Hau forces launched offensives against both Maori and European settlements. Having accepted self-reliance as a policy for internal defence, the New Zealand Government was forced to counter these offensives using local resources in particular, colonial troops and loyalist Maoris. For the Volunteers

the Hau Hau threat meant a continuation of their active service responsibilities. On the East Coast these responsibilities consisted of, in the main, providing escorts and guards to transportation convoys, while on the West Coast they provided personnel to undertake fighting patrols and units to scour the bush. The West Coast Volunteers who undertook these patrols had several minor skirmishes with the Taranaki Hau Haus, including Te Whiti who was to rise to prominence in the late 1870's as the leader of the Parihaka dissidents. Apart from service, Volunteers by their very presence, provided a visible defence for isolated settlements. In the Wairarapa, for example, a body of Hau Hau threatened Masterton in May 1865. In response the City volunteers were assembled and the Hau Hau fell back.[120]

The loyalist Maori Forces and the Armed Constabulary supplemented where necessary by the Volunteer Forces restored peace by 1867. Unfortunately it was not to prove lasting. In 1868 the West and East Coasts of the North Island erupted yet again into war. Under the leadership of Titokawaru in the west and Te Kooti in the East, Maori guerilla forces terrorised outlying settlements. Once again the Armed Constabulary, loyalist Maori and Volunteers were used to counter the new threat. While primarily responsible for providing garrison and static defence forces to free the Armed Constabulary for mobile operations, the Volunteers continued to supplement the

field forces. At the battle of Moturoa on the 7 November 1868, for example, the Wairoa Rifles provided guides to Whitmores forces, supplemented and provided stretcher-bearers and escorts for the movement of wounded from the front. Not all service was, however, undertaken with enthusiasm. On the East Coast, for example, the Volunteers employed in the pursuit of Te Kooti's forces were reluctant to leave their own military districts. The reluctance was such that Whitmore was on one occasion forced to hold an illegal drum head court martial. To ensure the forces' total obedience Whitmore pronounced the death sentence and had graves dug, then to emphasise his leniency he pardoned the convicted volunteers. Though the proceedings had the desired effect they led to Whitmore's reputation being sullied in the Hawkes Bay where he became known as the 'grave digger'.[121]

Whitmore as commander of the colonial forces was however able to rise above his grim nickname. His campaigning on both the West and the East Coast led to the neutralising of the guerilla threats. Once the threats had been neutralised they were further contained by harassing search and destroy operations. In these operations the Volunteers excelled. In Waitara, for example, local Volunteer units moved into the bush seeking insurgent settlements and their cultivations which they destroyed. These operations effectively denied refuge for insurgents and starved them into submission. Such drastic

solutions were considered essential to the New Zealand public who believed the 'barbarous' guerillas as savage as the rebellious negroes of Jamaica or the legendary Russian Tartars. Such a perception seemed to be confirmed not only by Titokowaru and Te Kooti's guerilla bands but also by isolated actions such as the murder of a civilian surveyor, Richard Todd, on Mt Pirongia in November 1870 by a Kingite supporter. Fear of isolated attack on the frontiers meant few were willing to return to outlying settlements once the major threat had been overcome. To ensure settler safety and reconstruct the often devastated hinterland, Volunteer companies were often kept on the payroll and used on public works. Roads, bridges and culverts left to fall into disrepair were quickly restored by the colonists' armed navvies.[122]

Volunteers also assisted as adjuncts to the civil authority during the war period. Justices of the Peace for example, were empowered to call upon them for the suppression of riots. In addition they helped track escaped prisoners when called upon. Such duties in combination with their active service experience and responsibilities elicited due praise. It also meant that when in 1871, with the decline of the Titokowaru and Te Kooti threat, defence expenditure was cut, the Volunteer Force was deemed able to provide services no longer catered for by the reduced Armed Constabulary. For frontier districts this led to further encouragement for

the raising, equipping and training of new Volunteer units.[123]

Somewhat surprisingly Volunteer units also flourished elsewhere in the colony during the same period. In the South Island frontier fears were not sufficient for the maintenance of of interest in defence. Nor was it sufficient for the more settled parts of the North Island in the late 1860's. For these areas foreigners and Fenians were the threats that kept alive an interest in the defence needs of the young nation. Throughout the British Empire cells of active Fenians, intent on inciting acts of rebellion, were active. In New Zealand, Fenians, and their sympathisers, raised funds and men for the cause. Formed in America by Irish émigrés the Fenian movement was established in Ireland at Dublin on St Patrick's Day 1858. It spread quickly through the communities of the Irish Diaspora and by its terrorist actions was to become a by-word for fear for the British. This was due to the inability of the authorities to deal with a totally new type of rebellious organisation. Unlike its Irish predecessors, it was a totally decentralised organisation. Though they held a convention in Philadelphia in December 1865 the Fenians never developed a central co-ordinating committee to coherently control its actions. Its organisational framework in fact ensured that no such committee could exist. Determined not to be broken by informers the Fenians grouped

themselves into closed 'circles' with only one member knowing one member of any other circle. While such an organisational structure did not prevent infiltration by informers it ensured its survival. By 1864 the British authorities realised the extent and size of Fenianism and daily expected an insurrection in Ireland. In Ireland large scale drilling took place for an army estimated at 85,000 men while in America preparations were made to reinforce the Irish endeavours as well as plan an invasion of Canada. In preparing to invade Canada, the American Fenians recruited demobilised Irish soldiers from both the Union and Confederate Armies. While Canadian Fenians broke into Orange Lodges, sacking them and mutilating Queen Victoria's portraits, their American brothers attempted an ill-fated invasion. In the antipodes, Fenian sympathisers were caught drilling in Queensland, while in New Zealand funds were raised for families of imprisoned Fenians in Ireland. Itinerant recruiters for the Fenian Army were also busy in Hokitika talking to the young men of the Irish émigré community.[124]

The Fenian recruiters were extremely successful in New Zealand. By 1867, after an unsuccessful rebellion in Ireland, Fenian circles were active from Wanganui to Invercargill. Hokitika, with its large Irish population, became a de facto capital for New Zealand Fenianism. The New Zealand Celt and Father Larkin, champions of the Fenian cause were both firmly established at Hokitika.

When the news of the Manchester Martyrs reached New Zealand it was Father Larkin and the New Zealand Celt which ensured their deaths were noticed. Though executed and buried in Britain the three convicted killers of police sergeant Brett; (Allen, Larkin and O'Brien), were honoured by a funeral in New Zealand. On the 8 March 1868 at Hokitika an empty coffin commemorating the three `Manchester Matyrs' was paraded through the streets followed by a 900-strong cortège. The procession wound its way to the local cemetery where the coffin was buried with full honours by Father Larkin, reputedly a brother of one of the martyrs. Though considered by the authorities a minor demonstration this `mock' funeral brought upon Larkin his Bishop's wrath. It also made the New Zealand public extremely uneasy, many believing the Irish troubles were about to erupt within the colony. This concern was magnified when the Duke of Edinburgh was shot in Sydney on the 22 March by a Fenian sympathiser. Rumours circulated in New Zealand that the assassination attempt on the Queen's son was to be followed by a similar attempt on the Governor. If successful it was to be followed by an insurrection with the rebels armed by a raid on the Auckland magazine. The rumours while far fetched were taken seriously and all the arms in Auckland were centralised in the Albert Barracks. A company of the 18th Regiment was redeployed to Wellington and a detachment of the Armed Constabulary was sent to Westland in case of need. On the West Coast the Armed Constabulary were

supplemented by special constables and three newly raised Volunteer Units, the Westport Rifles, Greymouth Rangers and the Westland Light Horse. To ensure purity of spirit these newly raised Westland Volunteer units blackballed Irish Catholics, believing them all untrustworthy.[125]

Though no New Zealand insurrection took place the Fenian threat did not diminish in the minds of the colonists. Indeed it grew as evidence of its spread came to light. By 1869 the centre of Fenian fear in New Zealand had moved from the West Coast to Thames. The Irish gold miners of Ohinemuri were believed to be preaching sedition to the local Hau Hau sympathisers by linking their cause with that of Fenianism. It seems also that they were not averse to combining their political belief with commercial opportunism. The Fenian leaders at Thames advocated to the Hau Hau the removal of all but Irish gold miners from the field. For their actions the Fenian leaders were banned from the field but the circle remained. Evidence of continued Fenian activity at Thames was highlighted to all in 1870. Father Larkin visited the field in that year and was rewarded for his efforts not only by favourable audiences but also a purse of sovereigns for the cause. It was such blatant manifestations of support that caused continued unease within New Zealand and many believed that an efficient defence force was essential not simply to counter

insurgent Maoris but to deal with any rebellious activities that Fenians might indulge in.[126]

Rebellious Fenians and Maoris were not the only threats which justified the need for adequate defence to New Zealand's settlers. External threats still loomed large. Even when Waitara and Taranaki were erupting into war, not all defence thinking was concentrated inwardly. Colonel T. R. Mould RE, for example, was busy compiling a report on the defence needs of the colony's harbours. This report was considered necessary because of the unsettled state of European affairs. European turmoil, many believed, was likely to explode into a general war. Throughout the 1860's this situation lasted, with all apprehensive that Britain would be dragged into conflict. If this happened it was thought that it would be signalled not by a descent on the homeland but by a raid on the farthest settlement of Empire, New Zealand. This fear was heightened when Canadian and Australian colonies commenced constructing harbour defences and training volunteer units so as to provide an independent defence capability against small-scale naval invasions. New Zealand's lack of such a capability and its apparent unwillingness to rectify the situation led many to think that as the colony lacked any coastal defence it would be more vulnerable as raiders would avoid those colonies who had prepared themselves. In an attempt to provide for external defence the New Zealand authorities approached their Imperial

counterparts. Already forced into heavy expenditure for the war against Maori insurgents the British authorities were reluctant to contemplate further spending in New Zealand. In response individual provinces like Otago purchased their own gunboats to be manned by volunteers to protect the local harbours.[127]

As Britain was seemingly unwilling or unable to provide monies for the defence of New Zealand's coast, pressure was brought to bear on the legislature to pay for the work from the colony's own purse. This call was taken up by the press and to answer it the government undertook a series of defence reviews. These reviews, supposedly designed to provide a blueprint for action, appeared on reflection, to be little more than prevaricating measures. The first detailed survey of defence needs for the whole colony took place in 1864. The survey made the obvious conclusion that all New Zealand's ports were vulnerable to an attack by a privateer or cruiser. In response the authorities sought information on the costs of suitable gunboats. (Most telling was the fact that no orders were placed for any gunboats).[128]

Unfortunately for the government the fear of coastal invasions did not diminish with the production of a satisfactory survey. Lack of real action combined with continued European turmoil and British anxiety ensured that the fear of an external attack was kept to the fore.

When the French were defeated in 1870 it was widely rumoured that the victorious Germans at Versailles were planning an invasion of England. This scare was fuelled not only by the rumours but also the publication of two pamphlets, the first by Alfred Richards entitled "The Invasion of England" and the second by George Chesney entitled "The Battle of Dorking". The British fears soon spread to New Zealand and in their transfer they highlighted yet again the vulnerability of the colony's harbours and coastal settlements. Calls were again made by the public, press and politicians to have coastal defences upgraded. In response the government arranged for more surveys. Two reports and a joint select committee were established to ascertain the defence need and how best to meet that need. Firstly the government directed Captain F. W. Hutton to report on the defence requirements of the colony's ports at Auckland, Nelson, Wellington, Lyttelton and Dunedin against small fast gunboats favoured for raiding and privateer operations. Hutton, after surveying the ports, recommended that a combined gun and torpedo defence scheme be established at each port. Captain Hutton had a major advantage over the other review officer, Major-General Sir WDF Jervois (later Governor of New Zealand), who was asked to make his recommendations after viewing maps and charts forwarded to him by Julius Vogel. Asked to devise a sound but economical scheme of defence, Jervois, like Hutton, recommended gun batteries supported by torpedo

installations. Having secured two reports which advocated much the same scheme the government did not proceed. Rather it established, in September 1871, a joint select committee to examine both reports. Much to the dismay of many New Zealanders the committee reported that at a cost in excess of £40,000 the recommendations of both Hutton and Jervois were too expensive. In contrast to the technical officer's reports the committee argued that two companies of volunteers stationed at each harbour would be sufficient for their defence.[129]

Provincial communities were not impressed by the lack of effective action from central government. In Canterbury, for example, the people called on the General Assembly to take the necessary action to put the defences of the colony in order. In response the government established yet another committee to investigate the colony's defence requirements and yet again no constructive action was taken. This was despite the growing fear that an unannounced attack on New Zealand's harbours was imminent. New Zealand's growing anxiety in the 1860's was not simply due to the general unsettled state of European affairs. It was an anxiety built upon specific fears. Between 1861 and 1864, for example, the Russian autocratic regime crushed a Polish insurrection without mercy. Opposed by Britain and France the Russians became belligerent and it appeared that war was likely. Not surprisingly therefore, when the British Corvette

`Orpheus' fired its distress guns in 1863 after striking the Manukau bar, the local settlers panicked, believing a Russian man-of-war was attacking the town. Such a fear was not totally fanciful. In 1864 it was revealed in the press that the Russian Navy had arranged to obtain privateering vessels in the United States if Britain commenced hostilities in support of the Polish rebels.[130]

Russia was not the only old threat which loomed large in the minds of New Zealand's settlers during the 1860's. The ancient enemy France was still to the fore. In 1860 Britain, it seemed to all, had been threatened by a French invasion. A threat most New Zealanders believed would entangle them by a hostile descent on their shores from New Caledonia. Such a threat was magnified when it was perceived that the French missionaries were little better than fifth columnists. Evidence for this perception was manifested to many by the fact that the hostile Kingites favoured Catholicism. Further it was widely believed, without any evidence, that the French had promised to support the Kingites in their campaign against the British.[131]

More surprisingly for New Zealand, given the protest call in the late 1860's, was the fact that the major foreign threat during the war period was perceived to be the United States of America. The cession movement and

its move to civil war in North America became a major topic of conversation for most New Zealanders in the early 1860's. From the fall of Fort Sumter to the signing of surrender at Appomattox the New Zealand public followed the conflict with avid interest. This was especially so after the Federal Government stopped the British registered mail steamer `*Trent*' on the high seas and imprisoned Mason and Sliddell, two confederate emissaries. This action caused consternation throughout the Empire as it was considered a prelude to war. In the South Island public meetings manifested the alarm that swept the colony. The alarm was fuelled by the success of the confederate privateers. The most famous, the *Alabama*, showed how damaging single raiders could be to trading nations. From its sailing from Liverpool to its sinking by USS *Kearsaye* the *Alabama* captured or destroyed 69 Federal Merchant ships. As the *Alabama* was built in the United Kingdom it further fuelled the concern of the Empire being dragged into the war between the states.[132]

Fear that New Zealand might be dragged into a war with a foreign power, and to a lesser extent the fear of Fenian insurrection, provided the whole colony with a focus for defence planning. If the only threat to peace had been the insurgent Maori of the North it is conceivable that those in the far south would have deemed defence spending a total waste. To many in the South the war in the North was a farcical over-exaggerated conflict which they were

forced to subsidize for the benefit of Northern settlers. This was despite their initial concerns that Northern Maoris were endeavouring to obtain aid from their South Island kith and kin. South Islanders were also suspicious of Militia training believing that they would then be asked to send men to the North Island for war service. Yet they fully recognised the need for defence, especially with the growth of wealth in the south with the opening up of the goldfields. Such wealth would make it profitable for raiders or privateers to attack their ports. In response the South Island provinces gave every encouragement to Volunteer Units. Some have viewed these South Island units as little better than over- dressed toy soldiers capable only of semi-theatrical performances at reviews and fêtes. Such a view is however unfair. While reluctant to fight in the North these volunteers were specifically enrolled to protect their districts from foreign aggression or internal subversion.[133]

South Island volunteers also led the colony in training. By 1870 most New Zealanders agreed that the Otago Volunteers were the most zealous and efficient in the colony. Their success and the fact that volunteers was one of the few movements on a national scale led many, like W. Rolleston the Superintendent of Canterbury, to believe that they would pave the way for a truly integrated New Zealand. Rolleston's view of an embryonic Colonial Army was not however shared by governmental

officials. The two islands of New Zealand were viewed as totally separate and their volunteer units were reported on separately. Indeed some South Islanders wished to further distance themselves from the North, advocating a separate government to avoid the heavy debt burden being imposed by the continuing conflict against the Maori. This was countered by North Islanders who believed that the war had been originally imposed upon them by the votes of the Southern representatives who now wished simply to interfere rather than bringing the hostilities to a satisfactory conclusion. Many believed the South should simply get on with producing the wealth while the North continued to conduct the war.[134]

The divergence in perception of the New Zealand war and its conduct was also reflected in a divergence of perception on volunteering itself between the two islands. In the north, Volunteers were seen as an important adjunct to defence forces ready to take the field at a moment's notice. In the south, volunteering was considered more a healthy pastime to be undertaken not for an immediate threat but for the possibility that a threat might arise. As it was seen as a leisure activity in the south it was seemingly undertaken with enthusiasm. South Island Volunteers devoted a great deal of their spare time in acquiring soldierly skills. In this they were greatly assisted by the willingness of their provinces active to support them, with their political and civic leaders, such

as Colonel Cudgel of Otago, taking an active interest. The end result of these efforts and interest was credible units viewed as equal to any regular force in the Empire.[135] Not all however, shared this exalted view of New Zealand's Volunteers. Colonel Brett, for example, in the Legislative Council was loud in his condemnation of Volunteers. He believed them a disgraceful sight unable to stand properly let alone fight. If they ever took to the field he suspected that they would prove more dangerous to themselves than the enemy. Brett's view was shared by Colonel Harrington, their inspecting officer, who after inspecting one unit was aghast to see that many of the Volunteers were incapable of the very simple, and indeed basic, action of loading their weapons. At a higher level, officers lacked sufficient basic knowledge to actually lead their men. One amusing example of this was when a Wellington Volunteer officer, who either did not know or could not remember marching orders, was faced with getting a column of men through a gap in a fence large enough only for a single file. He demonstrated a certain ingenuity by ordering the column to halt and saying, `Gentlemen you are dismissed for one minute, when you will fall in on the other side of the fence.'

Fortunately the weaknesses exhibited by individual volunteers and their units were by no means the norm. On the whole the Volunteer Force was a well trained body of soldiers. This was due primarily to the care that went

into their training programmes as well as their own individual motivation. Aware that training had to be quick and worked around civil occupations, Militia District commanders and the Volunteer units under their direction organised extremely efficient training programmes. When the Wairarapa was threatened by a Kingite attack in 1863, for example, Major Gorton, the district commander, issued fifty volunteers with arms and ammunition and within half a day had taught them to load, fix bayonets and form fours. He then marched them close to the Kingite encampment and cowered the Kingites into submission. Once that had been achieved the Volunteers commenced a more orthodox training regime.[137]

For the Volunteer Force proficiency in weapon handling was considered paramount and Wairarapa, while exceptional in the speed, was not unique in the emphasis on basic musket drills. Auckland Volunteers were also instructed in loading and firing prior to any recruit drill training. The emphasis on weapon training was carefully thought out. It was felt in New Zealand that above all else the Volunteer needed to be a master with his rifle. It was only through such skills that he could hope to survive if called upon to undertake active service. As for drill it was felt that only very basic manoeuvres adapted to New Zealand's environment should be taught. This policy appears to have been based upon Sir C. Napier's `Seven Standard Rules', outlined in his work, the `Defence of

England.' In that work Napier noted that Volunteers should confine their drill training to simple turns on command, marching in line and column, external and close files, change front, relieve skirmishes and to form squads and advanced guards. To achieve these basic skills volunteer companies organised individually-designed training programmes to suit their particular requirements. Some units believed that the best way to become efficient was to have two or three weeks' saturation training at the outset. This saturation training consisted of parading six days a week for one- or two-hour sessions alternated between weapon handling and drill. More often units would opt for two 1½- or 2-hour sessions weekly, covering the same topics. Once a unit became proficient the parades were normally reduced to weekly events with separate arrangements being made for new recruits who were expected to undergo initial training on a more frequent basis until they caught up.[138]

A major problem for all units in the development of their training programmes was the lack of sufficient instructors. For the whole of the South Island in 1867, for example, there was only one musketry instructor. The single cavalry instructor for Wanganui district in 1871 was perpetually in the saddle either travelling to units or undertaking training. Due to the shortage of training staff it was not uncommon for inefficient units to blame their weaknesses on the lack of instructors to drill their

personnel. Volunteer units became ingenious in overcoming this staffing shortage. While regular units were stationed in the colony they would be approached to second suitably qualified personnel to undertake drill. These tasks the detailed regular servicemen did exceptionally well and were justifiably praised for. Where regular soldiers were unavailable the Armed Constabulary would be called upon in the same way. Where no regular units of the colonial or Imperial service were stationed the well endowed would simply employ their own instructor. The Canterbury Yeomanry Cavalry for example appointed their own Drill Instructor at a salary of £100 per annum in 1871. A cheaper alternative was pioneered by the canny Scots of Otago. Selected representatives from each district of the province were centralised in a depot for training under a single instructor and once they had reached a sufficiently high standard they were sent back to their own units to train their colleagues. The units were then inspected to ensure uniformity and standardisation of training.[139]

Equally as important as training staff for Volunteer efficiency was individual motivation. To motivate Volunteers both the carrot and stick approach was used during the war. To quickly strengthen the Volunteer Force the government discovered that they only had to threaten to call out the Militia for training. Immediately individuals flocked to Volunteer units to escape the

unpopular alternative. Once enrolled, Volunteers were induced to take their training seriously by the offer of rewards for the best skilled soldier. Alternatively inspection parades were used where the deserving were praised and those faltering threatened with dismissal or fines. Individual provinces also assisted. Auckland, for example, commenced paying its Volunteers half a crown for attending two-hour drill sessions. While such expectations did not work for every individual they worked sufficiently for the force as a whole to be regarded favourably.[140]

Providing essential back-up to the instructional staff and the motivational factors was the wide variety of training manuals specifically adapted for the Volunteers. Major Locke of the Shropshire Rifle Volunteers commenced this process in 1861 when he wrote a basic Infantry drill Manual for the Volunteers.[141] In New Zealand Major Locke's work had already been anticipated. The Governor authorised a small pamphlet in 1860 entitled `Extracts from the Field Exercise and Evolutions of Infantry for Use of the New Zealand Militia' which was considered to be useful for both the Volunteers and Militia. In Auckland the Royal Cavalry Volunteers produced their own drill instruction for use by the Corps. These works were followed by a whole host of similar works both imported and produced in New Zealand. These ranged from the New Zealand inspired `The Rifleman's Handbook' through to the

War Office-approved `Field Exercise and Evolutions of Infantry.' To assist the Volunteers to come to grips with the sheer variety of publications on offer, the government was forced in the mid-1860's to gazette those publications authorized for use. The list consisted mainly of those produced by the War Office. To ensure that the authorised publications were those actually used, the Defence Office acted as a distributor. Reliance on simply distributing manuals produced in the United Kingdom to ensure standardisation of training for New Zealand's Volunteers did not however last. Within four years the government was preparing, producing and distributing locally written training manuals.[142]

The locally produced training manuals helped ensure a uniformity of basic training and doctrine throughout the colony, sowing the seed of Rolleston's dreamed of national movement. This seed was nurtured by other training expedients such as field days, encampments and sham fights. These activities were of particular importance for the development of Volunteer Military skills as they brought units together and took them out of the drill shed and off the parade ground and exercised them in the field. The simplest of the training exercises were the day-long field days. For these sessions Volunteers marched to a suitable training location and exercised in their particular specialist area. Rifle Volunteers would undertake light infantry manoeuvres such as skirmishing or

supporting reliefs, Engineers would undertake simple construction tasks. Cavalry units would undertake a variety of evolutions. The Artillery would practise laying their guns, while the Navals would muster on board available warships.[143]

Once the basic skills of field-craft had been mastered in the field days, the Volunteer units would progress to sham fights. Rather than simply practising against an imaginery foe, Volunteer units would oppose each other. These sham fights varied in size from ambushing and skirmishing forces of fifty or so, through to large scale manoeuvres, with hundreds of local Volunteers brought together to practise large-scale defence and attacking tactics.[144] These large-scale manoeuvres were built upon in the most useful of all Volunteer training expedients, the encampment. Ranging from three to twelve days, the Volunteer encampment brought together large numbers for full-time training. They practised mobilization, assembly, camp routine, advanced drill and tactical training. The encampment also provided participating Volunteers with the equivalent of a military holiday camp, where they could socialise with friends and acquaintances.[145]

While providing the opportunity to socialise, as well as practise manoeuvres in the field in relative safety, field days, sham fights and encampments were not without

danger. Volunteers armed with blank ammunition for these occasions frequently got over-excited and it was not unusual for the infantry to fire at the enemy at point blank range hurling rubbish metal into them. Others would get too close to the artillery and were sometimes literally blown to a concussed state. Less dramatically it was not unknown for a volunteer to shoot himself with his ramrod accidentally while reloading.[146] This element of danger in combination with the military pageantry provided by joint training produced for New Zealand's public a marvellous spectator sport. Whenever Volunteers assembled for training or reviews, crowds would congregate in their hundreds and be enthralled for hours. When Sir George Grey visited Christchurch in 1867 over five hundred Volunteers paraded in review order to the delight not only of the Governor but of nearly four thousand spectators who also gathered. Elsewhere similar spectacles were organised for the presentation of gallantry awards, or captured Maori banners and to celebrate the Queen's Birthday. Even encampments were not immune from the gaze of the spectator. The first camp held in New Zealand was at Hillsborough during the Easter break of 1865. Three hundred and fifteen Volunteers,under the guidance of Captain Moor, were introduced not only to camp duties and marching in review order but also to camp entertainment. Sports were organised for the Volunteers which included a race meeting for the Cavalry unit. For the visitors the camp programme meant a balanced range of military and

civil activities almost guaranteed to appeal to all spectators' tastes.[147]

Primarily Volunteer training was not designed for the entertainment of New Zealand's citizens. It was to prepare them for military service. As a citizen force however, it had to accommodate civil requirements. In particular, training had to revolve around the agricultural seasons, otherwise Volunteers would be unavailable. It had to be of immediate use. After basic weapon handling skills and skirmishing had been taught Volunteers' would hone military skills in immaginative ways. In some country districts, units would hunt cattle and pigs exercising their bush skills. Elsewhere, shooting would take place not only on the range against square targets, but in scrub-lined gullies, where realistic Maori figures would be hidden for shooters to find and fire at. Horses were also prepared for active service. When shooting practice took place, it was not unusual to have service horses there so as to become familiar with musket fire. Such practical training was followed up by the more theoretical lecture programmes on weaponry and tactics. War gaming became a favourite pastime for Volunteer officers seeking to improve their tactical skills.[148]

The favourite pastime for Volunteers appears to have been rifle shooting. It would not be an exaggeration to

call rifle shooting a Volunteer fixation. This fixation was largely induced by a nationwide desire to see all European males become marksmen. In the tradition of the Tudor longbow the rifle in skilled hands, would become the nation's guarantee of peace. To ensure that Volunteers became proficient in the use of their weapons, it was considered essential that every encouragement be given. The Government provided rifles, ammunition, ranges, targets and instructors. Official encouragement was added to by the provision of competition prizes. In 1860 the central authorities set aside £300 for prizes to be awarded to the best shots in the colony. The 1860 competition for the colony's best shots was organised for 27 May 1860 (Queen's Birthday). Volunteers fired in their local ranges and the scores were forwarded to Defence Headquarters for compilation into order. The highest-scoring Volunteer, Lieutenant Brighton of the Rutland Company,received £140 and kept the Championship Belt for a year. Other place-getters received case prizes ranging from £50 for second to £5 for 6th. This government initiative was followed by prominent individuals in the provinces. In Nelson, for example, M. Richmond offered a prize of a rifle to encourage rifle shooters in his locality. In addition Rifle Associations were established to promote shooting, and, perhaps more importantly, promote volunteering as a pastime for the nation's youth. These actions quickly reaped rewards. Lieutenant-Colonel Balneavis, the Staff Officer in charge

of the Volunteers, was able to report within months of the first competition that shooting had improved. Unfortunately the general desire to make all Volunteers marksmen never eventuated. While some individuals improved immensely, by and large volunteers never became outstanding shots. In 1871, for example, only 1170 out of a total of 6,568 volunteers (18%) completed classification shooting. In the North Island only Napier and Thames districts undertook the classification shooting with 324 out of 3,832 (8.5%) participating. The South Island were better, with a total of 846 out of 2736 (31%) participating. South Island Volunteers reaped the benefits of taking shooting more seriously than their northern counterparts. During the war a national rifle competition was conducted every year except for 1865 and 1869. Of the ten years that the competition was held it was won only twice by North Island representatives. Though not all took part in the shooting, as with most other Volunteer training the competition provided entertaining spectacles for the wider community. With Publicans in particular, were pleased as they often opened up stalls to provide luncheons and refreshments to the thirsty and hungry crowds. To satisfy their own wants, Volunteers often organised team matches with dinner being the reward to the victors from the vanquished.[149]

Volunteer units were however much more than training formations or spectacles to be viewed. They were also

social and political manifestations of a community. Since they were dominated by the social and political elites of the community it is not surprising that Volunteer units were used to provide pageantry for such diverse activities as turning the first sod on railway lines to laying the foundation stones for civic buildings. They were also used to help raise funds for the destitute and needy of the localities. In addition their bands provided suitable strains not only for marching but for entertaining. They were used to fill in the interludes for sporting fixtures, as dance bands at balls and as general entertainers playing at out-door concerts, fêtes and soirées. Volunteer Bands were in fact forced to undertake a large number of activities simply as fund-raisers to pay for their very instruments. In 1864 a complete set of instruments for a brass band cost approximately £70. If the parent unit was not well endowed the band was forced to become a fund-raising venture. For most this meant approaching prominent citizens for sponsorship or alternatively organising military balls. There were however more ingenious methods. The Waikato Rifle Volunteers, for example, arranged for Dr Carr, a widely acclaimed mesmerist and parenologist, to entertain paying customers in a Hamilton hall with the profits going into the band fund.[150]

Not all entertainment was undertaken for the benefit of the wider community or indeed to raise money. Volunteer

units also organised formal dinners, balls and dances solely to benefit themselves. Organised to celebrate their founding as a unit, for success at shooting or to honour one of their own prominent members, these social activities appear to have helped in bonding individuals to the unit, giving them a true espirit de corps. On a more sombre note, funerals were likewise important Providing escorts, pall bearers, bands and firing parties for funerals of former service personnel, Volunteer units provided suitable sombre military pageantry. Grieving and socialising were not the only activities of Volunteers outside their normal military roles. They also became important for the spread of sporting activities. Cricket, for example was fostered to a large extent by the Volunteers of both Islands as a noble and manly game - a game that developed not only individual skills but teamship and helped alleviate the boredom of garrison duty into the bargain.[151]

Volunteering was in fact so widespread and pervasive throughout the colony that members of New Zealand's commercial community endeavoured to market themselves by aligning their business activities with the force. In Wellington, for example, Mr L. Moss, owner of one of the large merchandising firms 'London House', used dedicated poetry to advertise his products. On the 11 May 1860 Moss had the following published in the Wellington Independent:

THE WELLINGTON VOLUNTEER RIFLE CORPS

When battle's strife was heard around
On Taranaki height
Up rose our settlers at the sound
All eager for the fight
With hearts so stout, and arms so strong
Undaunted by the War
They muster and together throng
To form a Rifle Corps

Now Rowdies Duffers, side by side
Prepare to join the strife;
Each party now must well provide
To save the other life
Success to all; who boldly stand
To defend New Zealand's Shore
All honour to be to that brave band
The Wellington Rifle Corps

L. Moss will gladly this advice,
Import to rank and file,
His goods are very low in price
And of the newest style
Let every one then make a call
At his unrivall'd store,

For he will gladly deal with all
The Wellington Rifle Corps.

London House's proprietor was not alone in realising the potential of targeting Volunteer business and the jingoism that surrounded them. The Australian Mutual Provident Society drew attention of Volunteers and the general public to the special provisions in its life policies. Under Bylaw 19 of their Society the sum insured was void for death on military or naval service, except if such service was as a Volunteer. Militiamen, it was noted, could get a similar exemption only on the payment of an extra premium. The commercial community's endeavour to cash in on Volunteer popularity is not surprising. In selling their products they used whatever was marketable for promotion. Similarly musicians, poets and playwrights also cashed in on Volunteer popularity. At the Royal Olympic Theatre in Wellington, Maddison Morten's `**He would be a Rifleman**', a comical farce on the Volunteer movement, was performed to packed houses. At the same time, `**Our Gallant Volunteer**' was composed by Mr B. Hayden for Mrs W. H. Foley to sing. Meanwhile an anonymous poet penned a poem of '**Martial Heroes**' exalting the men of the Wellington Volunteer units who were willing to defy the weapons of the Maori insurgents. Interest by both the cultural and commercial community helps highlight the popularity and high regard in which the Volunteers were held by their local communities.[152]

That the Volunteers were held in high regard is not surprising. As individuals, Volunteers had proved themselves competent soldiers. They were seen as vital elements within New Zealand's defence scheme against both internal and external foes. Apart from a few vocal critics and tongue-in-cheek thespians the Volunteer force was seen as both well trained and motivated, ideally adapted to New Zealand. On active service they had become masters of the battlefield. For the authorities such abilities were seized upon. Volunteers, while providing a highly visible means of defence, were relatively cheap (especially when compared to the capital works required to adequately defend harbours and their entrances). That the authorities were able to use the Volunteers as the main manifestation of defence rested on their proven ability to adapt to current military needs and their social integration within their local communities. Adapting and modifying standard training programmes, the Volunteers quickly became efficient and effective soldiers. They were able to take on garrison duties, carry out search and destroy missions, or partake in conventional operations. More important, perhaps, was the fact that they also provided for the social needs of their communities. Their entertaining training spectacles, their bands and their social functions wedded and integrated them totally with their communities. Their communities in return readily supported them as they were their `Volunteers.'

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CHAPTER THREE

`THERE MIGHT BE WAR': VOLUNTEERING IN NEW ZEALAND DURING THE UNCERTAIN YEARS OF 1873-1881

Though viewed as the `wretched 70's'[1] by the Volunteers the period from 1873 until 1881 can best be described as one of uncertainty. The belief that the native rebellion had been successfully concluded was a minority opinion[2], as was the view that the international situation was of little importance to New Zealand's security.[3] The majority of colonists held the view that the resumption of the New Zealand Wars was likely. It was also widely believed that New Zealand's shore was extremely vulnerable to foreign aggression. Uncertainty with regard to New Zealand's security was paralleled in economics and in politics. During this period the colonists were to witness and experience the disastrous experiments of unchecked Vogel expansion in the economy. They were also to see a major modification of the colony's constitution with the abolition of the provinces and consequent increase in central authority. The upheavals and changes in the economic and political fabric of New Zealand society in the decade of uncertainty manifested itself in the Volunteer Force by marked fluctuations in support, participation and commitment. When the threat to the realm appeared distant, political support for volunteering waned and the force resembled little more than an adjunct

to civic and social functions. When hostilities seemed imminent support was almost overwhelming and the volunteers struggled to fulfil the defence demands placed upon them. Fortunately, for the Volunteers at least, the decade was one of tenuous peace.[4] As Major Atkinson so succinctly stated in the House of Representatives on 31 July 1873:

They did not know when there might be war either internally or externally..

In retrospect it is easy to dismiss threats to New Zealand's security in the 1870's as mere flights of colonial fantasy. Hindsight provides critical commentators with the indisputable knowledge that peace was maintained. Further, such commentators can simply point to the paranoia over security that existed in the minds of most colonists as reason enough to dismiss their fears. That the colonists were paranoiac is evidenced by probably the greatest hoax in New Zealand's history, the '*Kaskowiski*' (pronounced 'cask of whiskey') raid. Perpetrated by David Mitchell Luckie, this hoax virtually crippled Auckland in mid-February 1873. Luckie as the editor of the Daily Southern Cross published on the 17 February 1873 the following lead article:

WAR WITH RUSSIA: A CALAMITY FOR AUCKLAND. HOSTILE VISIT OF A RUSSIAN IRONCLAD SEIZURE OF GOLD AND HOSTAGES.[5]

Loosely based on George Chesney's famous 'Battle of Dorking' [6] Luckie's piece endeavoured to extrapolate the likely actions of a hostile Russian cruiser that had been able to descend unannounced upon the colony[7]. As the colony did not have its own telegraphic cable link with the outside world, Luckie played on the possibility that war could be declared between Russia and Great Britain over the difficulties in Central Asia with New Zealand being informed, not through diplomatic channels, but by the arrival of a hostile warship. From these premises the warship took form in Luckie's mind. Armed with a submarine pinnace and water gas that could paralyse or blow up its target depending upon the strength of concentrate used, the *Kaskowiski* with its full complement of well-trained marines would enter the calm waters of the Waitemata unannounced and unnoticed. Once there, its submarine pinnance with the deadly water gas on board would be launched to attack and seize the lone British warship at anchor in the harbour. Owing to the nature of the attack the British vessel would be taken without a struggle and Auckland would be defenceless. With the defences of the town neutralised the Russian raider would land detachments of armed men to take possession of key installations. Once this had been achieved a large ransom, in the case of the `Kaskowiski' hoax £250,000

sterling, would be demanded from the local authorities. Luckie allowed only one clue to give the story away as a fiction of his own creation and that was in a footnote at the bottom of the page which stated the events occurred in May 1873, three months into the future.[8]

Reactions to the article by Auckland residents was spectacular. Panic and chaos gripped the city and its economic hinterland. A run on the banks took place, schools were closed and transportation services ceased to operate. Timid individuals either fainted or planned to escape into the interior. Those with more courage or sense determined to conceal their valuables from the pillaging Russians.[9] By the next day the furore had died down and the effect of the article was more in keeping with Luckie's intention. The public became aware of the colony's communication isolation and the lack of adequate defence against a seaborne threat.[10]

While the `*Kaskowiski*' scare can be dismissed as a fantasy that highlights a colonial paranoia this would be both unfair and demeaning to the New Zealand colonists. It was a paranoia but it was a paranoia based on real concerns rather than flights of fancy. The colonists of New Zealand had, ten years previously, followed the exploits of the confederate privateers `*Alabama*', `*Florida*' and `*Shenandoah*' with interest. They knew, without doubt, that a solitary vessel designed for speed

that was well armed and fuelled could easily turn the theoretical acts of the `*Kaskowiski*' into reality. Further, they knew that the Russians were more than capable of authorizing acts of privateering. This despite Russia being a signatory of the Treaty of Paris which specifically outlawed privateering as a means of conducting naval warfare. Russia had, after all, built warships on the Euxine breaking one major provision of the Treaty, and as a proven treaty breaker would probably ignore any other provision if it suited their needs and requirements.[11]

New Zealand's awareness of its vulnerability to small scale raids, heightened by Luckie's article, was to be a constant concern throughout the decade.[12] One immediate reaction was another rush to arms by men throughout the colony, though this enthusiasm diminished almost as quickly as it arose.[13] More considered was the governmental response of yet another defence committee. On re-examination of the nation's external defence requirements the committee recommended the installation of heavy gun batteries complete with an integrated torpedo system. This scheme was not unlike that proposed earlier by Jervois, in 1871, and like the earlier scheme was allowed to lapse with no effective action being undertaken.[14] In part this was due to cost but it was also due to perceptions of responsibility. New Zealand, as a self-governing colony, had been forced to accept

self-reliance for internal security but maintained that Britain should continue to take responsibility for defending the colony from external aggression. It was felt that Britain should bear such responsibility as New Zealand would only face an external aggression as the result of Britain becoming involved in a war with a European power rather than through any action of its own.[15] If Britain could not defend New Zealand from such aggression then it was felt, by some at least, that an independent kingdom should be established so that any war involving Great Britain would not automatically involve New Zealand.[16] The majority opinion was however quite different. Rather than the status and responsibility of total independence from Britain most preferred to have an independent squadron of the British Navy stationed in the colony to secure its shores.[17]

Britain was, however, unable to guarantee the security of New Zealand's shore from every eventuality. While accepting the responsibility of securing the whole Empire against strategic threat, the British authorities made it abundantly clear that they could not prevent isolated attacks by small, fast, well-armed raiders.[18] British shortcomings in providing total security reinforced the feeling of vulnerability that most New Zealand colonists already had. Coupled with growing tensions amongst the European powers and the extension of their rivalries into

the Pacific, New Zealand was gradually forced out of its complacency.[19] France, Germany, and the United States, as well as the continually growing menace of Russia, loomed as potential aggressors. Russia, with its expansionist policy, its practice of sending its modern naval vessels on long distance training voyages, and its threatening base at Vladivostock, became during the decade the predominant external threat.[20]

Russia's position as the number one external enemy for New Zealand was paralleled throughout the British Empire. Yet surprisingly it had little direct connection with that Empire. It was mainly the result of worsening relations between Britain and Russia over the Balkans. Brewing since at least 1873, when Turkey had been forced to fight Serbian rebels, the Near East crisis was to reach its climax in 1878 when Britain and Russia, Germany, Austria and Great Britain busied themselves in diplomatic manoeuvring in an attempt to deal with the problem of a weakening Ottoman Empire. By late 1876 the Russian desire to expand into south-eastern Europe at the expense of the Turks was being actively opposed by the British. To all, including New Zealand's colonists, it seemed that an immense war would break out at any time. Insurance companies, for example, levied an additional 5 shillings per ton on British shipping. In Melbourne worried officials looked at fortifying Port Phillip. Following the Victorian government's lead, New Zealand's politicians

debated yet again the need for harbour defences. While accepting that Russia was a contemptible maritime power they were well aware of the dangers of swift cruisers acting as raiders.[21] While New Zealand's political leaders were still discussing the need for harbour defences their North American counterparts were taking action. British Columbia not only had its requirements discussed, it had had an engineering report written and its authorities had commenced implementing that report by constructing the recommended fortifications.[22]

Following British Columbia's lead the mainland Australian colonies arranged for Colonel W.F.D. Jervois (later Governor of New Zealand) and Lieutenant-Colonel P.H. Scratchley to advise and report on the condition of their local defences. Arriving in Australia in August 1877 Jervois and Scratchley quickly demoralized the Australian colonies by damning their harbour defences as absolutely useless. This damnation was delivered at a time when the Imperial authorities were warning the colonies that while the fleets of Great Britain would perform their duty as they always had, they could not be expected to guarantee all the ports of the Empire against attack from small-scale expeditions. The Imperial authorities' warning could not be taken lightly. Affairs in Europe were extremely precarious. Russia had attacked Turkey and was advancing unchecked to the Mediterranean. In response the Royal Navy occupied the passage between

the Dardanelles and the Bosphorus. All commentators agreed that such a situation threatened the whole European system and the slightest miscalculation by either party would kindle a general conflagration. To make matters even worse the Tsar was contemplating reviving privateering. He appointed a special commission to investigate not only the concept but also the possibility of Russia buying, equipping and arming cruisers in the United States. Amazingly the New Zealand Premier George Grey ignored all the evidence. He not only prevented Jervois and Scratchley from reporting on New Zealand's harbours, he also reiterated the defunct view that the Royal Navy would guarantee the colony's security from any external aggression. Not surprisingly Grey was vilified in the press for his stance which compared so unfavourably with the other Pacific colonies.[23]

Though none could accurately predict when Britain, and therefore New Zealand, might be involved in war, by early 1878 no one doubted that war with Russia was imminent.[24] [25]The Russian army was advancing on Istanbul; in response the British fleet cleared its decks for action in the sea of Marmora, recruited the Brigade of Guards up to war strength and reinforced both Malta and Gibralter. Such signals meant only one thing to commentators, war between Russia and Britain.[26] Of more immediate concern to the Pacific colonies and New Zealand in particular, was the Russian purchase of three merchant ironclads from the

United States. The three ships, the '*State of California*', '*Columbus*' and '*Saratoga*' were refitted and renamed as the Warships '*Europa*' (Europe), '*Asiia*' (Asia) and '*Afrika*' (Africa). In addition Russia ordered the construction of a fourth ironclad at the Crumps shipyard. When news of these purchases leaked, New York insurance brokers raised premiums for British shipping by a further two percent and the Admiralty ordered its vessels at Bermuda and Halifax to be ready to cruise the North American coasts if required. Russian purchases and the international reactions were interpreted in New Zealand to mean that Russia intended to despatch raiders or privateers if hostilities broke out over the Balkans crisis. The most likely target for such privateers for the New Zealand colonists would be their own vulnerable and unprotected shores.[27]

In response to the escalation of tensions the New Zealand Government ordered twenty-four artillery pieces at a cost of £44,000. Before the guns arrived the British and Russian tensions were eased by the agreement reached at the Congress of Berlin. With the threat of war receding the New Zealand Government declined to take any further action for its own external defence.[28] British authorities, however, took more positive action by establishing the Colonial Defence Committee and setting up a Royal Commission under the chairmanship of Lord Carnarvon. Created to enquire and report on the defences

of strategic colonial ports, these bodies undertook the first detailed examination of Imperial defence requirements in the nineteenth century. The Committee was to act as an advisory board for colonies on all matters relating to defence. As such it provided a constant flow of technical reports which gave clear guidelines for defence policy. In addition the Committee also examined local schemes for defence and commented on them appropriately. Carnarvon's commission in contrast only provided general policy guidelines. The commission developed further the concept of colonial self-reliance in defence and noted that while the Royal Navy was responsible for the protection of British trade on the high seas protection of colonial harbours was the responsibility of the respective colonial governments.[29]

New Zealand had little choice but to accept these policy guidelines as the government had declined to send a delegation to the commission's hearings even though they had been invited to do so. The cabinet had decided to decline the invitation as they had not formulated a considered policy on coastal defence - a lack they were to overcome by finally inviting Colonel Scratchley to review the colony's external defence requirements.[30] These basic preparations for defence were essential. Russia's growing naval power was demonstrated in late 1887 by the visit to New Zealand of the cruiser '*Afrika*'. Given the opportunity to closely examine the vessel the colonist

suspicions of its war role was reinforced by the modern ordinance that it was fitted with.[31] The menace projected by Russian purchases and policies was not the only threat to New Zealand's coast. Colonists were also concerned with the ambitions and designs of the French and the United States. The visit of the French man-of-war '*Heigon*' to Rarotonga in October 1881, for example, was viewed with unease. New Zealand had considerable trade with the Cook Islands and wanted action taken to thwart the apparent French decision to establish a political and commercial protectorate over the group.[32] Elsewhere in the Pacific the threat to security appeared to emanate from the United States. In Samoa, another Pacific Island nation eyed covetously by New Zealand, it was believed that American nationals were destabilising the existing order and fermenting trouble among the natives for their own commercial advantage.[33] Implicit in all the concern over rivalry for commercial and political position in the Pacific was New Zealand's vulnerability to external attack.

In sharp contrast to the reinforced and highlighted realisation by New Zealand's colonists that their ports and harbours were extremely vulnerable to external attack was the resurgence of the internal threat.

New Zealand's Defence planers were forced to bear in mind the very fabric of the young society. Irish factionalism,

for example, erupted in early 1880 in both Timaru and Christchurch and the local Volunteers had to be called out under arms ready to quell any potential riot.[34] In addition contingencies had to be considered for the despatch of expeditionary forces to assist the Imperial Regiments elsewhere in the far flung empire. When hostilities broke out between the Boers and the British in 1881, for example, a proposal for a 250-man contingent to be sent from New Zealand was advocated by the Volunteers themselves. In Wellington 95 men of the Naval Brigade immediately volunteered for such service and they were quickly followed by another 50 men from the Thames Naval Brigade.[35] Much more important than proposed expeditionary forces and troublesome Irishmen were the continual acts of Maori resistance in the North Island.

Though the last shots in the New Zealand Wars had been fired in May 1872, colonists were unsure whether they were truly in a state of peace. Maori opposition to surveying and land sales was still widespread and many feared that a resumption of hostilities would occur. This was despite the apparent confidence of the Auckland settlers who, in March 1873, were prepared to pull down the walls protecting the Albert Barracks. While Aucklanders were confident that no hostile Maori would ever enter their city few other North Island settlements shared their optimism. In Coromandel, for example, five canoe-loads of Maori endeavoured to seize the town's powder magazine in

May 1873. Elsewhere in the North Island it was reported that potentially hostile Maori were obtaining large quantities of ammunition from supposedly friendly natives. If Maori stockpiling of ammunition was not worry enough to outlying settlers they were further alarmed by constant Maori obstruction to land development. In Te Aroha, for example, an intertribal dispute in 1877 erupted over the sale of a large block. This dispute became so heated that armed Te Aroha natives scoured the countryside, even going so far as to stop a riverboat, searching for Ohinemuri Maori land sellers. In Thames and the South Waikato roadmaking was obstructed. At Pirongia, Rangiriri, Ohinemuri, and Opotiki surveying was disrupted by the destruction of trig stations and whares, the ordering off the land of surveyors, and if that was insufficient, shooting at the survey parties. Understandably many on the frontier feared that a renewal of a general conflagration was a real possibility.[36]

Fear of a renewal in hostilities with the Maori was most prevalent in the seats of the last war, Taranaki and Waikato. In Taranaki, Parihaka loomed as a potential centre of rebellion. In the Waikato the southern lands of the Ngati-Maniapoto were seen as an asylum not only for the dispossessed and disgruntled Waikato Kingites but also the fierce guerilla leader Te Kooti. Alarms and war rumours were a frequent occurrence for those living north

of the Aukati (confiscation line) which the Kingites enforced as a closed border.[37] On the 25 April 1873, for example, Timothy Sullivan, an employee of E. Walker of Cambridge, was killed on the Aukati by Kingites at Moanatuatu. News of Sullivan's murder was greeted with immense indignation, and public meetings at Cambridge and Te Awamutu demanded that justice be not only done but seen to be done. It was a demand the local media supported even if it resulted in war. In preparation for this eventuality, which many believed inevitable, families flocked into the border redoubts. The Volunteer units at Cambridge and Te Awamutu were called out for active service and armed with the new snider rifles. In addition a new military road was constructed from Cambridge to Alexandra (Pirongia), complete with strategically placed blockhouses armed with swivel guns and a telegraph line, to reinforce the southern defences. Even Auckland was shaken out of its complacency and over 200 Volunteers, including the entire company of Hobson Rifles, came forward to serve in the Waikato if required. By mid-July, three months after Sullivans murder, the anticipated war had not eventuated and the settlers returned cautiously to their homesteads.[38]

From March 1873 until mid-1877 the Waikato settlers continued to view the King Country with apprehension. As a land where no British law or order could be enforced it was to them always menacing, always threatening. Not

surprisingly, when the government decided to reduce the Armed Constabulary Contingent at Kihikihi in August 1877, the local populace howled in protest. They accused the government of abandoning the frontier and predicted that emboldened Kingites would commit unspeakable outrages upon the outlying settlements. Fortunately these predictions proved inaccurate, though settlers near the Aukati were far from happy as they were constantly the victims of sheep stealing and cattle rustling.[39] The government were able to successfully proceed with the constabulary reductions, however, as they combined it with prolonged negotiations with the Kingites. Initiated by Sir George Grey, the talks with the sullen protagonists over the Aukati were designed to establish peace on the frontier. Lasting from early 1878 until mid-1881 the negotiations between the Kingites and the government climaxed when King Tawhiao rode into Alexandra on 11 July 1881 at the head of 600 warriors. With his chiefs and his followers Tawhiao symbolically laid down the weapons of war, signifying to all that peace had finally been made. To cement this reconciliation the king and his party then toured the Waikato settlements where they were toasted and fêted as befitting participants of a royal progress.[40]

Tawhiao's reconciliation, while easing tensions on the Waikato frontier, did not dispel the bogey of an internal threat to the colony's security. On the West Coast of the North Island, for example, a repeat performance of 1860

seemed to be in the offing with Parihaka taking the place of Waitara. Established on confiscated Taranaki land, Parihaka by 1879 had become a citadel of Maori nationalist resistance to governmental authority. Under the joint leadership of Te Whiti and Tohu, the residents of Parihaka were determined to resist the European settlement of confiscated lands until adequate reserves had been set aside for the original Maori owners. Unlike previous resistance attempts, however, Ti Whiti and Tohu were determined to avoid armed conflict. They had realised by 1868 that armed struggle would not succeed. If the Maori of Taranaki wished to retain any of their lands alternative stratagems to war had to be implemented. In response to the identified need, Te Whiti and Tohu at the head of 1600 followers devised a scheme of civil disobedience and passive resistance. This new strategy was viewed by the colonists with suspicion and disbelief. Both Te Whiti and Tohu were insurgent warrior chiefs in the 1860's. They were known to have seen action on at least three occasions; at Hakuarora, Waireka and Sentry Hill. Given the background of the leaders and the history of the province, European suspicion is somewhat understandable. For them any Maori unrest was an outward manifestation of resistance that could, at a moment's notice, erupt into open warfare. A settlement such as Parihaka was to them nothing more than a `nest of sedition' comparable in European terms to what the Republic of Andorra was to the Kingdom of Spain.[41]

When Sir George Grey was premier the Governmental response to this potentially seditious nest was negotiation. It was not, however, a negotiation for peace at any price. While willing to plant a tree of peace in January 1878 Grey was still determined to have a survey of the confiscated Taranaki lands undertaken so that it could be marketed. At first Te Whiti was willing to accept the opening up of the land so long as adequate reserves were defined and publicised. The Government unfortunately proceeded with the survey without detailing the reserves. In response Te Whiti and Tohu implemented their campaign of civil disobedience. In March 1879 surveying parties were stopped, followed by the more notorious ploughing campaign in May. Throughout Taranaki European-occupied land was ploughed up by Parihaka residents to the immense annoyance of the land owners. The cabinet was forced to prepare for war. Both the Premier and Colonel Whitmore visited the province to allay fears. In addition one thousand Ngati Porou under Major Ropata were put on standby. In Taranaki itself new Volunteer corps were formed, with over 1,500 new recruits under training within ten days of the commencement of the ploughing campaign. This forceful demonstration seemingly designed to bolster European confidence and cow the Parihaka dissidents was ineffectual. Ploughing continued and the settlers demanded an escalation in the government's response.[42]

In their demand for a stronger governmental response the Taranaki settlers received support from throughout the colony. Volunteer units from Thames, Welington, Christchurch, Timaru, Oamaru, Temuka, Picton, Cromwell and Queenstown all offered to serve in the West Coast if required. Despite the growing feeling amongst settlers that the question should be settled by force if necessary, the government moved cautiously - so cautiously in fact that in Hawera the inhabitants decided to take the law into their own hands. In late June the residents of Hawera held a public meeting at which they resolved to forcibly clear their lands of Maori ploughers. The Hawera Light Horse Volunteers called themselves out under arms to protect their fellow settlers in their action. To give the proceeding some legitimacy and to highlight the importance of the central authorities the Hawera people also resolved to establish their own republic, complete with its own flag and President. The President was James Livingston, a sergeant in the local Volunteers and as a substantial landowner a major victim of the ploughers. Using his homestead as their headquarters the 100 armed citizens of the Hawera Republic waited for the Parihaka ploughmen to return. When they did they were surrounded and forcibly evicted. The determined actions of Hawera's citizens put an end to all ploughing on their side of the Waingongono.[43]

Hawera's lead was not however followed throughout the rest of Taranaki. Elsewhere the settlers still looked to the government for action. The government finally realised that they could no longer avoid taking more aggressive action in Taranaki. Unfortunately they did not have the means to conduct a military campaign. Both arms and ammunition were in short supply. Those arms that were available were antiquated and fears of a foreign threat to New Zealand were also current. To overcome the shortcomings the government proceeded with a well conceived strategy that was designed to alleviate the immediate concerns of the settlers as well as to provide for long term security. To give the Parihaka residents an immediate sense of security the Governor sent Major Roberts to take command of the local defence arrangements. Roberts was well known in the Province as a brave, resourceful and extremely competent officer who in the last war had won a New Zealand Cross for his exploits against Titokowaru. In addition the government instructed that all the ploughmen were to be arrested if they persisted in their campaign of annoyance. To provide the means of security, arms were recalled from South Island Volunteer units and rushed to Taranaki. In Taranaki itself the Volunteers were divided into two classes: those willing to fight anywhere in the province, approximately 320, who were issued with sniders. The other class were those volunteer units determined to protect only their own locality, who were given the more

antiquated Enfields. At the same time an additional two thousand sniders were ordered from Britain so that all the volunteers would eventually be equipped with modern weapons.[44]

A change of ministry in late September 1879 with Sir George Grey resigning and Sir John Hall forming a new government, did not significantly alter Parihaka policy. The new government was equally as determined to prevent ploughing and just as prepared to arrest those who refused to desist. To ease tensions, however, the new Government established a commission to investigate the Taranaki land question. The government made it clear that while they were prepared to meet genuine grievances they were not prepared to have Parihaka endanger the peace and stability of the colony. So while Bell and Fox were inquiring into the grievances of the West Coast Maori tribes, Harry Atkinson toured Taranaki arranging for the establishment of additional Volunteer units, their training and promising to equip them with the much admired snider rifles. From this position of strength the government accepted the findings of the commission which recommended that the government not only honour the promises of reserves already made but in addition set aside a further 25,000 acres of land. The acceptance of the commission's findings by the Hall ministry however did little to settle the Parihaka question as Te Whiti refused to have anything to do with it.[45]

Though Te Whiti had refused to formally co-operate with the government's commission his speech on the 17 April 1886 to his followers was interpreted as a conciliatory one. It was less verbose than usual but its message was no less potent. It advocated living in peace and quietness in the region. In response the government recommended the development of roading on the confiscated lands using the Armed Constabulary as navvies. Nothing was taken for granted however and the now Colonel Robert organised the work as a military advance. His constables moved at a cautious rate and built military encampments on the line of their advance. Colonel Whitmore on a visit to Taranaki inspected the Parihaka area and commended Roberts on his policy and disposition of forces which now consisted of 800 armed constabulary and 1,500 volunteers. While the constables were constructing redoubts and roads the volunteers trained for war. In New Plymouth, for example, the Taranaki Mounted Rifles organised a sham fight on the 15 January 1886 to practise active service drills. Such caution in hindsight appears excessive yet it was firmly believed at the time that Titokowaru was in communication with Te Whiti and was advocating a resumption of the war. This fear of war's resumption was fuelled when Te Whiti announced that the roading must be stopped at all costs. To achieve this, survey pegs were uprooted and fencing parties took over from ploughers as the outward manifestations of disobedience. Like the

ploughmen before them they were arrested but a seemingly never ending supply of dissidents came forward to continue the campaign. More worrying than the uprooting of survey pegs was the murder of Mary Dobie on the 25 November 1880 by Te Tehui who took refuge in Parihaka. It was widely believed at the time that the murder was the signal for open rebellion.[46]

Rather than open conflict, Mary Dobie's murder signalled an easing of tensions. It was as if all parties had decided mutually to step back from the precipice rather than escalate their responses and fall unwillingly into war. This easing of tensions was unfortunately not permanent, it was simply another lull in the Taranaki storm. When the government offered Parihaka land for sale in February 1881 and received no bids whatsoever it became a political necessity that a solution be found to the problem. This necessity increased as 1881 progressed. Taranaki settlers, their local newspapers and notable politicians such as John Bryce demanded firm action from the government. It was action the government would have to take if it hoped to survive in the forthcoming general election. Te Whiti did not help the situation when he again encouraged his followers to disrupt the peace, this time by erecting fences, clearing land and commencing cultivations on land that had been surveyed for sale. He followed this up with a speech on the 17 September 1881 in which he told his followers to be prepared to take up

their arms and retaliate in like fashion to any provocation Rumours then began to circulate that armed Maori were congregating around New Plymouth itself. While the rumours could be ignored the fencers and electors could not. The government finally realised that firm action had to be taken against Te Whiti.[47]

At the hint of action Volunteers from throughout the colony came forward in droves to be part of it. In early October a rumour circulated in Christchurch that an engagement had taken place at Parihaka between the Armed Constabulary and Te Whiti's followers. In response the local artillery unit (E Battery) the Engineers and the Canterbury Yeomanry Cavalry offered their services to the government. In Wellington the Naval Brigade followed the lead of their Christchurch colleagues and were rewarded with a warning order from the government to have fifty picked men including two gun crews, ready to proceed to Taranaki at 48 hours' notice. At the same time a circular telegram was sent to district commanders calling for a return of Volunteers prepared to serve on the west coast at the same rate of pay as the Armed Constabulary. The government, advised by Bryce, had decided to assemble an overwhelming force to march against Parihaka. A force that would cow any opposition. If for any reason the people of Parihaka proved unwilling to submit then the force would be sufficiently large to quickly crush any resistance. By the end of October 1881 the force that

Bryce had desired had converged on the plains of Rahotu only three miles from Parihaka. Consisting of nearly 1,000 Volunteers and over 600 Armed Constables this assembly was a formidable army. Thiry-three individual units from throughout the colony had by 27 October 1881 been called up for active service. From as far away as Thames and Timaru, Volunteers made their way in uniform to the `Front'. By train and coastal steamer the Volunteers arrived in Taranaki and marched into their tented camp. When they left their homes they were sent off as conquering heros. In Masterton, prior to departure, the local unit was given a celebratory dinner. In Nelson, when the 205-man contingent complete with cannon sailed, they were escorted to the wharf by a torchlight procession. In Wellington the Naval Brigade marched through the city and were cheered by over 4,000 spectators. Before they departed for Taranaki the Volunteers were equipped for guerilla warfare. Snider carbines and revolvers were issued along with new boots, leggings, haversacks, waterproof groundsheets and blankets. Newly equipped and with cheering still in their ears the assembling volunteers were determined to show all that they were genuine British 'warriors'.[48]

Their chance to prove themselves came on 5 November 1881. Aroused from their slumbers at dawn, not by the customary army bugle call but by NCO'S going from tent to tent, the Volunteers and Armed Constabulary prepared to

advance on Parihaka. Issued with two days' rations and forty rounds of ammunition the troops formed up into a large column and marched to the Parihaka turn-off. Here 109 picked men of the Armed Constabulary fanned out into skirmishing order and acted as the advance guard. These skirmishers were directly supported by the other five companies of Constabulary. The Volunteers were divided into three groups. The Thames, Auckland and Nelson battalion moved around Parihaka on the left, the Marlborough, Canterbury and New Plymouth battalions circled the village to the right; while the Volunteers of Wellington and Wanganui followed up the central advance of the Constabulary. As the troops moved forward the surgeons commenced setting up a field hospital in sight of the column and all soberly realised that war was possible. At the head of the column John Bryce rode in overall command. In charge of the Armed Constabulary Colonel Roberts moved forward while the Volunteers were under the direction of Colonel Pitt. As the skirmishers closed on Parihaka they were met not by gunfire but by singing children and a sit down protest. Through this throng Bryce and his immediate entourage entered the centre of Parihaka seeking an assurance that its residents would desist from all further activity. When Te Whiti refused to accept such an understanding, The Riot Act was read and Bryce withdrew. At 11.30 the Armed Constabulary re-entered Parihaka and arrested Te Whiti, Tohu and Hiroki without resistance. These three immediately sent to New

Plymouth escorted by a squad of the Taranaki Mounted Rifles.[49]

The arrest of Te Whiti did not immediately alleviate the tensions of the Parihaka expedition. It was rumoured, for example, that Titokowaru was somewhere in the vicinity with 500 armed men. His capture on 10 November 1881 understandably eased everyone's minds. Though much work still had to be done, war was clearly averted. Spreading out from Parihaka, search parties comprising of both Armed Constabulary and Volunteers moved across the Waimate plains searching for arms caches. In addition Maori residents at Parihaka from other districts were forcibly evicted from their whares and sent home after witnessing the destruction of their living quarters and cultivations. At the end of a week the job had been done and the carefully assembled Volunteers were stood down and sent home. Following the same routes by which they had arrived the contingents were enthusiastically welcomed on their return. The Government endeavoured to reward them for their services by paying them for their month's service and granting them an additional one month's half-pay and the kit that they were issued for active service. Most were happy with this settlement, with the notable exception of the Thames contingent who accepted them under protest. When criticised by Bryce for their conduct the Thames Volunteers responded by burning him in effigy. This manifestation of unhappiness over the

results of Parihaka service was however isolated. Most perceived that Parihaka had settled the fear of a resumption of the New Zealand wars for ever. With the Maori King submitting willingly to the authority of the government and Parihaka failing to ignite the flames of War, 1881 clearly marked the demise of New Zealand's major internal security concern.[50]

Threats to New Zealand's security from potential internal as well as external foes meant that the Colony's defence forces, in particular the Volunteer force, had a clear military function to perform. In addition to their military role, however, the Volunteers during the 1870's consolidated and expanded their importance in the social fabric of the young nation. Volunteer units became providers of entertainment, stimulated the local economy and were an important auxiliary to the civic authorities. Wherever the Governor went, for example, he was met by the local Volunteers who became his guard of honour as well as escort.[51] In fact at any occasion of civic importance Volunteers were prominent. When Hamilton opened its new bridge over the Waikato River in November 1879, for example, the civil procession was marshalled by a senior Volunteer officer, the local Volunteer band led them over the spur, and the cavalry unit brought up the rear.[52] Hamilton's Volunteers were also important as auxilary fire fighters providing invaluable service whenever flames threatened the largely wooden settlement.[53] Elsewhere

Volunteers provided essential backup to the police. In February 1876, for example, Auckland's Artillery Volunteers were helping search for a murderer believed to be hiding in scrub around Orakei.[54] A year later the Te Awamutu Cavalry assisted in the capture of an escaped murderer from the Ngaruawahia gaol.[55] Of greater importance was the large-scale demonstration of power the Volunteers were able to provide their Constabulary colleagues. In Timaru and Christchurch in January 1880 the local Volunteers under arms helped quell the riotous conduct of opposing Catholic and Orange factions.[56] Further north the Nelson Naval Brigade faced the tumultuous climate rather than troublesome celts. In August 1877 they put to sea in their longboat the `*Aurora*' in adverse conditions, to rescue the passengers and crew of the '*Queen Bee*' which had foundered on Farewell Spit.[57] Less dramatic, but perhaps equally as important, was the effort the Wellington Artillery Volunteers made to move the city Time-Gun to the summit of Mt Victoria. The private contractor originally employed could only get it to Marjoribanks Street. With block and tackle the men of D Battery inched the gun up the steep incline at the rate of 100 yards per day throughout the month of November 1877.[58] In aiding the civic powers, whether marshalling citizens or manhandling guns, the Volunteers assisted themselves by using their military skills to achieve real ends rather than simply exercising in the abstract.

New Zealand Volunteers further practised their military skills as they continued to provide much appreciated entertainment. Following the lead of their British colleagues New Zealand's Volunteers during the 1870's were the major spectator sport for their fellow citizens. Their sham fights, encampments, reviews, parades and sporting prowess delighted thousands of people from Cape Reinga to the Bluff. In Canterbury, the province that initiated the training encampment within New Zealand, large crowds visited Volunteer camp sites to observe military life close up.[59] Military activity appears in fact to have been something of a Crown magnate. When the 132 members of the Waikato Volunteer Cavalry organised a Review 1,500 people turned up at the Hamilton Race Course to watch.[60] In Dunedin a Review and sham fight organised for all 1,000 Volunteers in the city drew a crowd of nearly 8,000 at Forbury Park.[61] Perhaps the most impressive display in this decade was given by the Canterbury Volunteers in Easter 1880 at Christchurch Race Course. Nearly 1,800 Volunteers paraded, marched past and conducted an impressive sham fight to the delight of an estimated 15,000 spectators.[62] Large scale Volunteer training became so popular in fact that the railways organised excursion trains to transport the dedicated followers and supporters of spectator Volunteering.[63] So popular was Volunteering as a spectator sport that even the mundane weekly or monthly training parades attracted the attention of a dedicated few.[64]

Spectators of Volunteering were not entertained solely by military manoeuvres. Volunteer units in the 1870's continued to be important for stimulating more conventional sporting activities. In winter they organised football matches while in summer cricket was played by the Volunteers with enthusiasm if not much skill.[65] Cavalry units were still important for their support of racing clubs,[66] while the Volunteer drill sheds became well patronized gymnasiums where young men exercised with the dumbbells and on the horizontal bars.[67] Units also catered for the inner man, and woman, with their picnics, impressive balls, testimonial dinners and dances.[68] For the more cultured, the Volunteer Bands continued to provide a source of contentment. In Auckland, for example, the combined bands of the Artillery, Rifle Brigade and City units performed free public concerts on the lawn of Government House. These concerts held weekly on Monday evenings at 6 o'clock during the summer months were well received by the general public.[69] Equally well received were the multiplicity of concerts given by various Volunteer Bands in choral halls and Literary Institutes, at church parades and picnics, and to welcome pioneering trains or a New Year. Indeed during the 1870's no celebration, function or activity seemed complete unless the local Volunteer band was in attendance.[70]

Volunteer Bands were also important for the more sombre duty of providing the musical accompaniment to military funerals. They along with a picked guard of honour added dignity to the internment of fellow corps members.[71] Dignity was also added to the final resting places of corps members by the practice of units subscribing the funds to provide and erect handsome tombstones.[72] Units also looked after the families of deceased members. Soirées, for example, would be organised to raise funds for dependants; and if the families had decided to move house, sales and associated details were taken care of.[73] Such support was extremely important at a time when few in the colony provided for their families in the event of their premature demise.[74] In this provision volunteers were the exception, as the decade wore on some units expanded their social welfare role from simply looking after dependents of deceased colleagues to establishing benefit clubs similar in fashion to friendly societies, for serving members. These clubs were conceived as a mutual-help association to help members in their hour of need no matter what that need might be.[75] Their social welfare role also expanded to include the wider community. In Thames in July 1876, for example, the Naval Brigade willingly assisted in the fund-raising efforts for the 'Miners Accident Relief Fund.'[76]

Acting as de facto social welfare agencies Volunteer Units enhanced their integral relationship with their

local communities. This relationship was further reinforced by the community focus provided by Volunteer Drill sheds or halls. Buildings used for drill had an importance far beyond their primary function of late-night wet-weather training facility. In most settlements they were to become the community hall. They hosted religious meetings, charity bazaars, dances, political meetings and amateur equivalents of music-hall concerts.[77] Equally as important as the drill hall and welfare activities in bonding Volunteer units to their local communities was spending. Volunteer units requiring uniforms, equipment and occasionally accommodation helped stimulate their local economies. In 1879, for example, it was estimated that each individual Volunteer spent a minimum of £20 per year for the privilege of being a soldier.[78] Units had to clothe their members at an average cost of £9.10s each.[79] They were forced to contribute to the upkeep of local rifle ranges and the payment of markers to the tune of £120 per annum.[80] They also had to advertise training schedules as well as pay for the maintenance and running costs of their drill halls at a cost of £70 per annum.[81] Even their training was a stimulus to the economy. Indicative of the importance that training had, was the provision of free rail passes for Volunteers attending sham fights, reviews, training parades and encampments. It was discovered that such provision generated a large increase in passenger traffic so large, in fact, that it was economical to provide the passes.[82] Apparently friends,

relatives and interested spectators followed their Volunteer units in much the same way that football supporters do today.

Community support for their Volunteers manifest since inception, continued to be more than simply following them in excursion trains to parades and sham fights. Volunteering, though a stimulus to local economies, continued to be dependent upon those local economies. Rarely could the units actually afford the large costs associated with the full range of their military training. To stage the 1880 Canterbury Volunteer Review, the combined units of Christchurch incurred a debt of nearly £400 which they were able to settle only after they held a fund-raising bazaar that was well supported by the local community.[83] Bazaars, though still the most common form of fund-raising, were not the only means by which communities manifested tangible support to their local Volunteers. They willingly bought tickets to the perennial fundraising concerts, drill and assault-at-arms displays, subscribed to corps funds and helped raise money to build the all-important drill hall.[84]

Probably the clearest manifestations of community support for Volunteering during the 1870's were the large contributions made to shooting prizes. The people of Thames, for example, were wholehearted in their support of shooting by Volunteers. It was asserted as early as 1873

that nearly the whole population of the district either supported shooting by either participating or alternatively contributing funds to purchase prizes. This encouragement resulted in the Thames shooters being regarded among the best in the colony.[85] While Thames was unique in the level it was far from unique in the type of support given to encourage shooting by local Volunteers. Throughout the colony communities pooled their resources to provide a vast array of shooting prizes. Kegs of beer, bags of oats, hunting crops, telescopes, opera glasses, gold rings and magnificent gold medals encrusted with jewels were just some of the rewards that successful shooters won on the rifle ranges of the nation during the 1870's.[86] Successful shooters were also able to supplement their incomes. Money prizes ranging from £15 to £100 were regularly competed for and individual volunteers often had £1 bets on the side.[86] In Taranaki poorer shooters were encouraged to perform better not simply by the rewards offered to winning shots. There a medal for the losers was struck in tin with the portrait of a donkey in the centre.[88]

Unfortunately the endless rounds of shooting matches that Volunteers participated in for the proffered rewards resulted in the force being condemned as a degenerating military organisation that resembled little more than a collection of shooting clubs. Colonel Brett, a legislative councillor, went so far as to demand the

abolition of prize firing which he believed both useless and over-expensive.[89] Yet for the Volunteers and their communities shooting was invaluable. It provided essential weapon training for Volunteers, a healthy outlet for youthful energy and entertainment for all. Advocates of shooting noted that it provided the young of the colony with role models to emulate. It was asserted that this activity would induce within them healthy competition and a desire to do something constructive with their leisure time. Without shooting the youth would simply while away their time by over indulging in the demon drink.[90] It was also hoped that the high profile that shooting matches had would encourage an increased interest in Volunteering itself. In fact the National Rifle Association, which controlled all the major shooting competitions, when established in January 1873 had as an avowed aim the fostering and encouraging of the Volunteer movement.[91]

In attempting to encourage Volunteering the National Rifle Association performed an essential service, much to the gratification of the Volunteers themselves.Volunteer officers realised that without the threat of actual hostilities volunteering could only survive if carefully nurtured.The prominent citizens and ladies of Thames clearly showed that when they took an active interest in volunteering their example was emulated by the rest of the community. With wholehearted community support

volunteering thrived. This lesson was not lost on Lieutenant McMurdo of the Auckland Scottish Volunteers who, recognising the languid state of volunteering in his home town, called upon the influential citizens to take an interest in volunteering.[92] Nor was the lesson lost on the Hawkes Bay Volunteers who were pleased that the ladies of their province made a colour for the local Artillery unit. The presentation of this colour was sent as a symbolic gesture of support and encouragement and was gratefully received as such even though Artillery traditionally have no colours.[93] In Christchurch the example set by the Thames populace was seemingly ignored as the local Volunteer officers tried everything else to encourage volunteering. Suburban contingents were established, sports parades and field days organised, monthly parades were abandoned and annual training camps expanded yet all to no avail.[94] What the Canterbury Volunteers needed to realise was that without a community-based interest Volunteering itself would regress and never progress.

Care, however, had to be taken as to the type of encouragement given. Capitation grants and free railway passes along with shooting prizes and battle standards were manifestations of support that appear to have benefited the long-term development of Volunteering.[95] Entitlements to land scrip, on the other hand, appear to have been detrimental to the community at large and eventually to volunteering as well. In 1865 parliament

passed the Volunteer Land Act which empowered provincial superintendents to grant land to the value of £30 to efficient Volunteers after five years service. In 1867 Wellington's Provincial Council passed an empowering ordinance to implement the 1865 Act. After this ordinance was passed, Volunteering in Wellington became extremely popular, with eighteen new units being gazetted within a year and only three disbandments in the same period. Similar results were experienced in the other provinces when they followed Wellington's lead. By 1873, only one year after the initial five-year efficient service requirement for land scrip eligibility, major problems had arisen with the operation of the system in Wellington. Rather than an inducement for closer settlement and a reward for service it became a major drain on the public purse and a depreciation device on real estate. 'In Auckland, for example, most Volunteers did not use their entitlement to obtain land to settle on. Rather they sold it to third parties for ready cash. So much land scrip came on to the market in this manner that it was not unusual for a return as low as 1 shilling for every £1 face value. Realizing that a costly mistake had been made Parliament repealed the initial Act and the empowering provincial ordinances, albeit in the face of Volunteer hostility, for the greater good of the wider community. In the short term however many Volunteers serving with the expectation of personal gain believed they had been cheated of their rightful reward.[96]

In contrast to the decision to revoke the issue of land scrip the government, almost concurrently, agreed to make retrospective awards of the New Zealand Cross. Prominent War heros such as F. J. Mace and A. Rodriquez of Taranaki and S. Austin and T. Adamson of Wanganui found themselves rewarded a decade after the exploits which had made them famous had been undertaken. They were given a unique gallantry award equivalent to the Victoria Cross which bestowed upon them as of right a yearly pension of £10. It also gave the colony a crop of heroes that aspiring soldiers could look to as examples worthy of emulation.[97] In addition the government undertook a concerted campaign of encouragement for the formation and development of cadet units. Many Volunteer units trained under-aged applicants in attached cadet units, but the arrangement was ad hoc and haphazard. Under the 1877 Education Act provision was made for cadet corps to be established in schools, a provision that most believed would benefit the health and morals of the youth while providing a nucleus of trained recruits instantly able to take their place in the defence forces of the colony when called upon.[98] More importantly cadet training was relatively cheap.

Economic uncertainty during the 1870's forced all administrations to constantly review and pare expenditure. For the Volunteers this meant that their capitation grants were constantly under threat. Never enough to cover all

associated costs of training, capitation was completely axed in 1880-1881. Volunteer reaction was, not surprisingly, instant. Many complained of the cost-cutting as injurious to the development of the force. Others simply resigned in disgust. In 1881, 1,325 individual volunteers left the colours, forcing the disbandment of seventeen units.[99]

For the Volunteer Force the government decision to cut capitation and withdraw land scrip far outweighed the heroic role models provided by the retrospective awards of the New Zealand Cross. The Force was in fact lucky to survive the decade. In 1872 a total of 6,043 Volunteers were enlisted, nearly 7 percent of the total population. By 1881 there were more Volunteers, a total of 7,133, but the force had declined to just over 4.5 percent of the population base. If it had not been for the frequent internal and external crises Volunteering would probably have disappeared altogether. In 1878 numbers had actually declined to 5,508, within a year, however, the figure had risen to 8,032. Interestingly only 317 out of the 2524 new Volunteers were enrolled in the South Island. More interesting was the fact that of the 2,207 enrolled in the North Island 1,500 were attested in Taranaki alone. The Eastern Question obviously had some effect but primarily the rise was the result of the protesters resident in the confines of Parihaka.[100]

The short-term survival of the Volunteer Force was undoubtedly dependent upon the willingness of colonists to serve in time of crisis, no matter what previous support had or had not been given. Long-term survival, however, was dependent not solely or simply on crisis but more on well-conceived policies and encouragement. While most politicians and defence planners in an abstract sense realized this, they seemed incapable of addressing the problem in a practical manner. At the commencement of the period most accepted that war, either against an internal or an external foe was likely. So prevalent was this view that a defence committee was established by parliament in July 1873 tasked with reviewing the colony's defence needs. After nearly two months of investigation and deliberation the committee formulated a two-pronged defence plan. To protect the young nation against low level external attacks they proposed an integrated system of torpedoes and heavy batteries be established at the main ports. Against the threat from the interior the committee recommended that the existing citizen forces be reorganised into town and country corps. They further recommended that the citizen soldiers be required to serve for a minimum of two years with a compulsory ballot enforced if an insufficient number of men came forward for training. Training was to stress efficiency and an annual encampment was seen as an essential feature in achieving this. To ensure that the force was efficient and most importantly able to protect the nation the committee

suggested that a thorough inspection be undertaken annually.[101] The committee's recommendations though in no way novel provided a blueprint for the decade from when policy could by developed for implementing effective defensive arrangements against likely threats. That such a policy was not immediately conceived and implemented is not a reflection on the abilities of the 1873 Defence committee or its report. They had not counted on the crusading zeal of Colonel Brett, the cantankerous Canterbury-legislative councillor. Colonel Brett formulated his own scheme for the nations defence in August 1873 and for the next twelve months lobbied for its acceptance by his parliamentary colleagues. He believed that New Zealand's forces should be divided into two distinct parts, for the North and South Islands. The North Island force he admitted was both efficient and effective and should remain unchanged as a deterrent against insurgent or rebelious Maori. He saw a secondary role for such a force as defence against possible external attack. For the South Island Brett envisaged the total disbandment of the existing forces and their replacement with units raised solely to protect the ports of the main harbour towns. Unjustifiably condemning the citizen soldiers for being no more than strutting peacocks dressing up to impress the ladies, Brett recommended that officers be brought over from the United Kingdom to provide the necessary, indeed essential, instruction for the Volunteers. In addition he believed that a Royal

Engineer detachment should be sought to provide expertise on the development of the nation's harbour defences. Like the Defence committee Brett believed that thorough and regular inspections would be necessary to ensure that the revamped forces remained efficient and effective. As the two islands of the colony would be quite distinct in the nature of their forces Brett advocated the employment of two inspecting officers, one for the North and South Islands respectively. Brett's proposals however were not received with whole-hearted acceptance - not because they were ill conceived or considered but because he was tactless enough to openly attack the Volunteers. Serving and retired officers of the force in parliament felt obliged to defend their fellow citizen soldiers and damned Brett for his insulting language. They also sought to undermine his proposals by noting that most of them had already been considered and rejected or were presently under investigation.[102]

While parliamentarians were busy deliberating defence policy for the colony, the defence authorities were conducting their own organisational review. During the 1873 parliamentary recess a circular was sent to all district commanders together with a draft set of revised volunteer regulations for comment. Prior to the general circular being despatched,selected senior officers were asked to give their candid opinions of the proposed changes. Defence Headquarters wished to see the Volunteer

Force divided into two distinct parts like Colonel Brett. Unlike Colonel Brett Defence Headquarters did not see the division as one between North and South Islands, rather the headquarters still saw the division as 'Frontier' and 'Home'. Frontier units comprised the units in the Waikato, Bay of Plenty, Poverty Bay, Wairoa, Taranaki and Patea districts. Home units comprised the units from all other districts not already defined as Frontier. Implicit was the role division of the proposal organisation: the Frontier units would be concerned with neutralising the internal threat while the Home units would prepare to meet small scale invaders or raiders. In both parts of the force, unit strengths were to be between 20 and 71 with the single exception of Navals who were to have an establishment ranging between 36 and 100 members. To encourage recruitment and retain members the authorities also proposed to make capitation an individual payment rather than the property of the corps. When asked for comment, district commanders accepted the proposed organisational changes without murmur. Objections were, however, raised to the concept of individualising capitation payments. Rather than pay individuals in an attempt to encourage training and ultimately efficiency it was suggested that the training year be divided into quarters and during each quarter a week of consecutive training be organised. To reduce individual Volunteer expenditure and ease the burden on units it was further

suggested that a standard uniform be issued by the government.[103]

Prior to implementing any changes to the organisational structure or training methodology the Government appointed the Auckland Militia District Commander Major Gordon, as Inspector of Volunteers. Gordon, an outspoken and controversial officer, conducted an inspection tour of the colony's defence forces in the closing months of 1873 and the opening months of 1874. His report, when produced, seemed to confirm the worst fears of the forces critics. New Zealand's Volunteers were deemed as 'inefficient, lax and wasteful,' often led by lying incompetents. Yet Gordon's observations were clearly meant to be constructive rather than destructive to the Volunteer Force of the nation. He believed that incompetent officers, unqualified instructors, frequent changes to regulations and a meddling press were the obstacles to be confronted and overcome if the Volunteers were to be a truly efficient and effective military force. He recommended that the proposed 1873 regulations be implemented, field training be substantially increased and more modern equipment be purchased. He also recommended that the force be substantially reduced as it was unwieldly, being over-large and unsuited to the defence needs of the nation. He did not offer any specific suggestions on the nature of the reductions and rationalisations of the force; rather he suggested that a

commission be established to decide on a structure that would be both manageable and efficient. Reaction to Gordon's report was extreme, with opinion being polarised almost immediately. Volunteer units and individuals within the force criticised explicitly or implicitly in the report regarded it as a high-handed unwarranted attack that was unbecoming of an officer and a gentleman. To critics of the Volunteer system it was a document worth its weight in gold as it gave objective substance to their expressed concerns. For them Gordon was an officer worthy of immediate promotion as he had shown the force to be nothing more than a sham for incompetents who liked playing at soldiers. Unfortunately neither polarised group looked beyond the harsh comments and criticisms to assess the value of the constructive recommendations.[104]

In an endeavour to improve Volunteering after the exhaustive reviews, investigations and reports of 1873 and early 1874 the government gazetted, on 17 September 1874, the sixth set of general regulations governing the New Zealand Volunteer Force. Aimed at bringing the force to a greater state of efficiency than ever before the regulations consisted of 103 paragraphs in 24 parts. Everything from saluting to stores and precedence to pay was covered. Yet apart from a rise in minimum corps strength, from ten to thirty, nothing of consequence was changed. All the new regulations achieved in real terms was to foster a continuing interest in the debate

regarding the New Zealand Volunteer Force. Immediately the regulations were published, for example, the media in Auckland advocated that they be studied carefully and commented on as they were of immense interest to those serving in the defence forces. In Canterbury, senior officers addressed Volunteers at public parades on what exactly it was that the regulations were designed to achieve.[105] Unfortunately the regulations did not have the hoped for, or planned for, effect. In 1873 the 71 members of the Thames Naval Brigade, for example, were diligent in their training. Officers and NCO's on average met once a week while the rank and file paraded nearly three times per month. The following year this had fallen dramatically and those in the ranks attended less than two parades each month. This poor attendance continued for the next two years and is perhaps indicative of the failure of the new regulations to foster improvements in Volunteer training or effectiveness.(Table 1).

Disciplinary problems were another indication that regulatory control by itself was insufficient to promote efficiency in Volunteer training or service. It was not uncommon, for example, for Volunteers to appear drunk at parades. Indeed the promised for temporising influence that military training was supposed to have achieved did not eventuate. If anything, Volunteering tended to encourage excessive drinking. When the Thames Volunteers,

TABLE 1

YEAR	PERSONNEL RANK	NO	AVERAGE NUMBER OF PARADES GOVERNMENT	COMPANY	TOTAL	PARADES PER NO OF DAYS
1873	O	3	12	36	48	7.6
	NCO	8	11	33	44	8.2
	OR	60	9	23	32	11.4
1874	O	3	11	28	39	9.4
	NCO	9	6	16	22	16.6
	OR	57	7	16	23	15.9
1875	O	3	7	27	34	10.7
	NCO	4	6	20	26	14.0
	OR	91	5	17	22	16.6
1876	O	3	8	23	31	11.8
	NCO	4	7	22	29	12.6
	OR	84	5	20	25	14.6
1877	O	4	6	20	26	14.0
	NCO	5	9	32	41	8.9
	OR	107	5	15	20	18.3
1878	O	3	7	29	36	10.1
	NCO	8	8	26	34	10.7
	OR	86	5	13	18	20.3
1879	O	3	8	31	39	9.4
	NCO	12	10	35	45	8.1
	OR	104	7	20	27	13.5
1880	O	3	9	47	56	6.5
	NCO	14	10	41	51	7.2
	OR	109	7	29	36	10.1
1881	O	4	8	40	48	7.6
	NCO	12	7	29	36	10.1
	OR	110	5	17	22	16.6

PARADE ATTENDANCE BY THAMES NAVAL BRIGADE
(From: NA AD 106/10 Thames Naval Brigade Attendance Register 1871-1886)

for example, travelled by train to Hamilton in 1879 to attend the Easter Review they took the opportunity at every stop to 'liquor up'. While somewhat riotous, the behaviour of the Thames Volunteers was acceptable, unlike that of those taking part in the 1880 Christchurch Easter Review where some Volunteers en route not only drank but, worse, damaged property, indulged in shoplifting, and became embroiled in brawls. Not surprisingly, music halls took great delight in performing popular farces with such pointed titles as 'The Volunteer Review'.[106]

Less worrying than drunkenness, brawls and popular farces was the habit of ill-disciplined Volunteers talking in the ranks. Of much more concern both to the general public and the headquarters staff of the Defence Department was the openly mutinous conduct and behaviour that Volunteers occasionally indulged in. Often led by their officers, Volunteer units were prepared to openly question the orders of any superior they considered incompetent. The members of the Canterbury Yeomanry Cavalry, for example, held a special meeting on 19 April 1879 calling on the District Commander to resign as they believed he was unable to fulfill the position he held. When Volunteers became open in their misconduct they were, not surprisingly, censured and if they continued or if their actions were particularly galling their units were disbanded.[107]

So scandalous was Volunteer misconduct to some of the retired Imperial officers in parliament that they demanded the whole Volunteer system be abolished and replaced by the old constitutional force, a compulsory militia. Volunteering was to them neither useful nor ornamental and to spend money on it was a ridiculous waste. The defence of the nation was too important to be left to such a small undisciplined, disorganised and disobedient Volunteer force maintained seemingly for no other purpose than to provide prominent locals with military titles or the opportunity for the vain glorious to dress in ludicrous uniforms. Against such furious attacks, Volunteer advocates in the legislative chambers pointed out the sacrifices of both time and money that individual Volunteers made to soldier in the force. To sneer or despise Volunteers for the colour of the uniform they wore or the rank they obtained regardless of their ability or pluck was to them unjustified. Even if they were simply show soldiers training only for the amusement of themselves and their local communities, they still provided rudimentary military training and should therefore be encouraged in an age of uncertainty and international tension.[108] In time of crisis even the severest of critics, such as Colonel Brett, saw the value of such arguments. During the Eastern Question crisis, for example, Colonel Brett switched from being one of the most virulent attackers of the force to being one of its most important defenders in the Legislative Council.[109]

Brett played a leading role in the defence debate throughout the decade and his change of stance was important for the survival of the Volunteer force in these troubled times. In addition to his lobbying for major defence reforms in 1873 and 1874 it was Colonel Brett who in 1876 once more drew the attention of Parliament and the people to the defenceless condition of New Zealand's harbours. At a time that European affairs were unsettled and none knew when war might erupt New Zealand had no means of defending its seaboard. In contrast Brett pointed to the Hobson Bay defence units that the colony of Victoria had commenced across the Tasman. The Australian colonies as a group followed Victoria's lead by arranging for the 1877 visit of Jervois and Scratchley to review the defence needs of the Australian mainland. New Zealand initially supported moves to improve Australasia's external defences by extending an invitation to Jervois and Scratchley to undertake a similar defence review for the colony. This simple act was sufficient at the time, to satisfy those interested in the defence debate. They looked forward expectantly to the arrival of the two defence planners. Originally organised to take place in mid-December the Jervois and Scratchley review was cancelled at the last moment by Premier Grey. Grey, believing the colony only required defence measures to neutralise the internal threat, refused to send the government steamer '*Hinemoa*' to pick up Jervois and

Scratchley. Rather than being honest about his decision, Grey informed Jervois that the steamer was required for urgent government business an excuse that Jervois accepted without comment simply requesting the dates for the pick-up to be rescheduled for January 1878. In January Grey once again refused to despatch '*Hinemoa*' effectively preventing any review of New Zealand's harbours by the Jervois-Scratchley team who were required elsewhere. Governor Normandy, upon hearing of Grey's actions, was extremely upset and admonished the Government for being so curt with Jervois and Scratchley. Grey responded to this dressing down by laying all the correspondence before Parliament. In the debate that ensued, governmental supporters argued that it would have been a total waste of tax-payers' money to have a review undertaken as the recommendations that would have been made would be antiquated before they could be implemented. Technology was advancing at such a rate that any system constructed would be vulnerable to the new inventions that were appearing at an alarmingly rapid rate. Defence advocates were furious. Brett noted that Jervois was a world authority on fortifications whose writings were the standard works on the subject throughout Europe. Ignoring an opportunity for his advice was folly at the very least. It was also pointed out that New Zealand's stance in not providing the means for external defence in contrast to the other Australian colonies made the nation more vulnerable to attack.[110]

New Zealand's inaction in providing for external defence did not however last long. Grey's government, weak when it took over the treasury benches in October 1877, was unable to ignore the demands for tangible defence as European affairs worsened. Early in 1878 New Zealand learnt of Russian victories in the Balkans against the Turks and the hasty preparations for war in the United Kingdom. In New Zealand Captain J. S. Small of Thames published a highly controversial pamphlet which highlighted yet again the inadequacies of the existing forces to protect against an external onslaught while in London the assembled colonial Defence Committee recommended that the Australasian colonies implement Jervois' recommendations. New Zealand's government, while without the benefit of a Jervois-Scratchley review, ordered twenty-four 7 inch and 64 pounder rifled guns complete with mounting equipment and ammunition to provide heavy batteries for the protection of the main harbours. This order signalled a major expansion in New Zealand defence spending for the next five years. In the 1876-77 financial year £108,304 had been spent on defence this jumped 57 percent in 1877-78 when £169,948 was expended. The next year, 1878-79, a more modest increase of 3 percent was recorded when a total of £175,143 was spent. 1879-1880 recorded another substantial rise when an additional £55,772 or an extra 32 percent was allocated. This was followed by another modest 3 percent rise in 1880-81 when £237,090 was spent on the colony's defence

forces. For the whole five-year period £921,400 was spent on defence, though it was not always money well spent. The ordnance originally ordered in 1878 at the height of the war scare arrived after the crisis had passed. Instead of the guns being mounted the seemingly parsimonious government decided to save funds by have them put into storage.[111]

Storing the newly arrived artillery was probably not as wasteful as it appears. The government had decided, wisely, to seek expert advice on the best deployment of all defence resources of the colony. Although Jervois was no longer available Scratchley was still hard at work across the Tasman supervising the development of Australia's coastal defence installations. He was invited in early 1879 to advise on the defence of the principal ports of New Zealand, an invitation which he willingly accepted.

Though he had hoped to undertake this task in April/May 1879 it was not until early January 1880 that Scratchley arrived in the colony. For the next month he visited the ports and settlements of New Zealand. With his keen engineering eye, his Australian experience and suitable maps he conceived plans on how best to use the available ordinance. Returning to Australia in mid-February 1880 Scratchley wrote up his findings in a 37-page report which he forwarded to the New Zealand government for its

consideration. Adhering to the principles of antipodean harbour defence that Jervois had established, Scratchley cited four modes of likely attack against the colony's main port facilities. An enemy could attempt to command the ports by forcing the harbour entrances. Alternatively Scratchley believed an enemy might land a force to physically take a harbour for permanent occupation. If neither of these were possible an enemy might simply bombard the port from a distance or blockade the entrances to the harbour. To adequately defend the coast against such attacks Scratchley recommended that fortifications be constructed utilizing the existing heavy artillery pieces and submarine mines. These installations Scratchley believed should be mannned by a nucleus of regular servicemen supported by a totally reorganised Volunteer Force. Volunteer units in the immediate hinterland of the principal ports should be employed either as auxiliaries to the forts or as members of a Mobile Field Force to counter small scale enemy landing. If a corps could not be employed immediately in the Forts or Field Force, Scratchley recommended that it be disestablished. In total, Scratchley believed only 2,400 of the existing 8,032 Volunteers were required to defend New Zealand's principal ports. To the annoyance of many, the government did not act immediately to implement Scratchley's recommendations. The government was determined to make haste slowly, arguing that Scratchley's report was not

complete and they did not wish to take any ill-considered action.[112] Underlying all this hesitancy of the government was the need to retain the interior corps for use if the Parihaka residents escalated their campaign from passive resistance to war.

Scratchley was not the only reviewer of 1880 ahead of his time for New Zealand's existing and perceived defence requirements. Shortly after he returned to Australia Major-General Davidson (an American Civil War veteran living in Taranaki) and Colonel Leckie were appointed Inspectors of Volunteers for the South and North Islands respectively. Davidson undertook his task with great care and after viewing all the South Island units itemised the faults of the existing force and how best to rectify those faults. As a military organisation Davidson believed that the Volunteers were inefficient, they were comprised of too many units and too many individuals; worse, the Volunteers themselves were only partially trained; they lacked a clear command structure and they were led by incompetents. Davidson argued that the force should be reduced by disbanding inland corps and a greater emphasis should be placed on field training. In addition he argued that all newly commissioned officers should be on probation for a fixed period. During that period officers would be expected to successfully complete an examination based on a carefully worked-out syllabus which reflected actual training needs. Davidson's 1880 report, reinforced

the following year when he again inspected the Volunteers, focused attention yet again on the Volunteer Force, its members and their shortcomings. It reaffirmed the comments and recommendations of Major Gordon with as much immediate effect. The government noted the reports and placed them alongside Scratchley's as something worthy of review and promised to establish a commission of inquiry to examine how best to implement the combined recommendations.[113] This was an almost typical governmental response to reviews or reports that were either costly or controversial. To give the appearance of action, however, the government did pass the 1881 Volunteer Act which did little except consolidate the 1865 Act and its amendments of 1866, 1867, 1870 and 1874.[114]

Government prevarication in defence matters was constantly highlighted during the 1870's by its actions, inactions and reactions to the lobbying for the implementation of the musketry theories of J. C. Soall. Soall, an Aucklander, developed in the late 1860's and early 1870's a system of musketry training for raw levies of citizen soldiers. He believed that volunteers must be trained to fire for field conditions, not the rifle range. Since no enemy would willingly make themselves easy prey volunteers had to develop the skills that would enable them to shoot at almost invisible targets. The traditional method of musketry training was to have volunteers fire from known distances on a black bullseye

placed on a white background. Developed by the Imperial service this system was simple and effective. Yet for Soall it was an inadequate way of preparing volunteers for military service. Commencing in 1869 he developed a system of practical musketry designed to develop a rifleman's eye and judgement. Volunteers should fire at targets of a neutral colour without a bullseye, they should practise judging distances and when time permitted use a range finder. To assist them in aiming Soall recommended that back sights be painted white. Soall confirmed his theory on the Mount Eden Rifle Range in Auckland in 1873 and drew the attention of the media, defence authorities and most importantly parliament. His papers on 'Targets and Shooting' were carefully scrutinized and discussed. Demands were made for a thorough investigation to decide whether Soall's training system should be adopted. In typical fashion New Zealand's politicians took three years to agree to such an investigation. Once the decision had been made Colonel Lyon was appointed President of a Board of Inquiry with Captains McPherson and Marshall as members. To induce competitive shooting a prize of £25 was arranged for the trial shooters. On 22 November 1876 the Board convened at the Hamilton Rifle Range and witnessed a squad of 6 Armed Constabulary fire two matches at 200, 300, 400, 500 and 600 yard ranges. Soall's system did not prove superior to the existing training system in this trial, indeed his range finder proved to be impractical as it took too long

to use. Not to be deterred Soall conducted another test. In February 1877, at Mount Eden, ten Volunteer shooters assembled and fired at 200, 400, and 500 yard ranges. The cumulative scores for those using the existing system was 3004 to the Soall system score of 3263. A similar result was obtained when the system was again trialed in 1880 but the scores were not sufficiently impressive for New Zealand to depart from the system of musketry instruction developed by the Imperial forces. After seven years of lobbying and testing the only feature of Soall's system adopted was that of judging distance. In 1874 it was argued that Volunteers did not have the time to develop this skill. After Soall's system had been extensively reviewed it was recommended that judging distances become a mandatory part of Volunteer training and made a requirement for capitation. Within two years this previously neglected military skill was being practised by all New Zealand Volunteers.[115]

Apart from the addition of judging distances to musketry training programmes Volunteer training experienced no innovation in the decade of the 1870's. Weekly drill parades were held as were the monthly inspections with varying degrees of commitment. Some units were so slovenly they were damned for their degeneration.[116] Others were praised for their proficiency and efficiency.[117] Most were somewhere in between, content to learn the evolutions, fire on the

ranges and execute spectacular sham fights. Volunteer units slipped into a Regular systematic training regime. Each spring they would go through a course in recruit drill consisting of approximately six foot and six arms drills. The units would then progress onto company, and where possible battalion drills and skirmishing exercises. Newly recruited Volunteers or those whose skills had waned would be given extra tuition in what was sometimes called the awkward squad to bring them up to an acceptable minimum standard.[118] Barring accidents, little occurred to alter this almost placid routine. Accidents did however occur. In sham fights it was not uncommon for volunteers to suffer minor facial wounds after receiving a charge of powder from blank cartridges.[119] More serious accidents, though less common, also occurred. Seaman C. B. Wilson of the Thames Naval Brigade, for example, was severely crushed under a gun carriage on 11 November 1878 when travelling to a review at Tarau. Though rushed to hospital in a critical condition that few thought he could come through, Wilson survived.[120] Equally as dangerous was an explosion on the Auckland Naval Volunteer pinnace on 17 October 1879. Forty men under Captain Le Roy were practising gun drills when sparks flew into a cartridge. The resulting explosion wounded several and panicked the rest.[121]

More dangerous than faulty training or equipment to the Volunteer force in the long term were inept, untrained and

incompetent officers who occasionally gained command. As early as 1873 calls were made to ensure such individuals were properly trained. To achieve this it was recommended that Schools of Instruction be established for both commissioned and non-commissioned officers.. Though this call went unheeded for the whole of the period it struck an important cord with Colonel Whitmore. In the Legislative Council in June 1880 he defended Volunteer officers, attacked for their lack of military efficiency and experience, not by suggesting that they had such skills but by affirming that they were forced to pick up their military knowledge as best they could. They did not have what their Canadian counterparts enjoyed, a School of Military Instruction able to provide systematic training.[122] Such a school Whitmore saw as essential for New Zealand's military forces as the colony did not possess a leisured class able to devote sufficient time to learning the skills and knowledge required by a military leader. The lack of such a class without a compensating School of Instruction according to Whitmore induced ignorance an ignorance that was seen as the single major cause of Volunteer inability.[123]

Volunteers as a body were not as bad as had been asserted by some critics throughout this uncertain decade. They were still required to pass examinations before a Board and those grossly incompetent or inept were removed.[124] Officers, though not of a leisured class as

Whitmore would have preferred, were still the elite of their local communities. Prominent local politicians, businessmen and landowners normally with some military experience, either in local units or in the Imperial service, made up the bulk of New Zealand's volunteer officer corps.[125] Volunteer weaknesses which undeniably existed were unlikely to be attributable solely to its officers. While they had an impact it was only one factor. Other factors included government support and volunteer willingness to undertake training. Without such a willingness Volunteers might present the appearance of a fine body of men but they would be of little use in the field. Attendance at regular training was one indication of such a willingness,another was taking part in the Volunteer encampments. Throughout the 1870's units organised six-day training encampments to provide an opportunity for full time consecutive training. Normally held over the Easter holiday period or immediately before the harvest these camps were credited with training men better in a single week than years of monthly drills. This is not surprising as from Reveille at 6.30am to last post at 10.30p.m., the day was given over to soldiering. Unfortunately Volunteers did not make the most of these opportunities. In 1880, for example, three major camps were held for the colony in Waikato, Nelson and Oamaru. Of the 7,133 enrolled volunteers only 2,704 or 38 percent attended a camp.[126]

Volunteers were not only poorly trained, they were also haphazardly armed. There was no uniformity in the armaments on issue, as an example the Artillery organised into one regiment in December 1878 with regional batteries was armed in 1881 with a total of 73 pieces of ordinance. They had eleven 7-ton guns 64 pounder guns, and 4 2/5 inch mortars; ten 6-pounder Armstrong guns and 24-pounder howitzers; seven 24-pounder smooth-bore iron guns; six 12-pounder Armstrong guns; three 32-pounder and 12-pounder smooth bore iron guns; and one 40 pounder Armstrong gun.[127] The artillery was at least armed, occasionally Naval units would exist with no boats and Engineer units with no tools.[128] These basic equipment problems were somewhat exacerbated by the lack of uniformity in dress. Volunteer uniforms regulated in colour and pattern by governmental order still managed to defy the term uniform. No two units anywhere in the country dressed in a similar manner and on the occasions when they paraded together they appeared more like participants of a 'masquerade Ball' rather than a serious military force. A constant theme for the 1870's was, not surprisingly, a demand for a standard issue uniform that all would wear. Unfortunately it was a call that went unheeded.[129]

Unheeded calls, uncertainty in economics, fluctuations in the level of commitment from politicians and the unease over the security of the nation led the volunteers to dub this decade wretched or bad.[130] All were aware that the

colony needed a defence force to meet potential dangers of a native uprising or small scale invasion. Yet no government seemed prepared to offer the backing the Volunteers required if they were to become the required bastion and credible force that even the severest of critics would be unable to fault. Recommendations, reviews and reports though commissioned, were largely ignored. That the Volunteers survived was due partly to the consolidation of their social and civic functions. More importantly it was due to the constant political pressures in the Northern Hemisphere that erupted continually in international crises, and the development of a major obstacle to European settlement within the North Island, Parihaka. Together they represented the threads of a shaky social fabric and tenuous peace. It was a peace that could only be assured if the young nation was prepared for hostilities, as none could predict or know when 'there might be war'.

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CHAPTER FOUR

DEVELOPMENT DEPRESSION AND DECLINE: VOLUNTEERING IN THE MERCURIAL YEARS BETWEEN 1882 AND 1890

Failure of the Parihaka problem to ignite a general conflagration marked a major turning point for New Zealand defence policy. The government was able to shift its policy focus from the need to balance limited resources for protection against major threats, from both within and without, to fuller concentration on the colony's external defence needs.[1] External threats could not be ignored in the mid-1880's as existing tensions around the world were exacerbated by the revival of Great Power rivalry. Fearing the worst, the government spent thousands of pounds constructing fortifications, purchasing new equipment, and encouraging the development of an efficient Volunteer Force. Volunteering experienced a 'golden age' which unfortunately did not survive the decade.[2] A world slump, and resulting depression, in 1887-88, saw draconian cuts to defence spending. By the end of the decade the cuts had become so severe that rumours began to circulate that the Volunteer Force was to be disestablished.[3] The instability that fluctuating expenditure engendered for the force was aggravated by the constant, though minor, changes to its organisational structure and administrative procedures.[4] It developed

from a loose grouping of isolated independent units, without any clear direction, into a locally integrated regimental organisation under the guidance of a commandant, and then reverted back within three short years. Volunteer commitment to mastering the soldiers craft rose and fell, in parallell to governmental and business support in this mercurial environment. Defence policy planners felt forced to call for a replacement of the purely voluntary system by either a compulsory militia or a partially-paid organisation which they believed would be more reliable.[5] If it had not maintained its strong social and economic links with the community at large volunteering would have perished in such a climate.

As a citizen based organisation the Volunteer force drew its membership directly from the local communities of the colony and it was not difficult, therefore, for it to maintain strong links with its host communities. Very few of New Zealand's population could claim to have no involvement with the Volunteers by the 1880's. They were either current or former Volunteers; alternatively they were relatives, friends or sweethearts of those Volunteers.[6] This personal link to volunteering was strengthened by the ongoing social and economic roles that Volunteer units played within their local communities. They still provided the ceremonial pomp and pageantry at important civic occasions, whether it be the visit of the

Governor, the opening of a railway line or celebrating anniversaries as diverse as a towns foundation or the monarchs Golden Jubilee.[7] More importantly they continued to be important providers of financial assistance to charitable organisations such as local hospitals and to dependents of deceased Volunteer colleagues.[8] Another enduring community role for New Zealand Volunteer units was the provision of a suitable solemn military presence for funerals of former members.[9] On a more festive note Volunteer Bands continued to provide entertainment. From minor sports functions to major civic occasions the strains of volunteer bands were heard and appreciated.[10] At the annual balls, anniversary banquets, celebratory dances and complimentary concerts those same strains provided the musical magic to wile away the hours. Occasionally the bands would also accompany volunteers on picnics providing musical interludes as well as dance music in between the various activities organised for general entertainment.[11] While most welcomed Volunteer band recitals, they were not universally praised. The concerts organised by the Wellington Garrison Band at the Basin reserve on Sunday afternoons in 1888 for example had to be discontinued after the Reverend Coffey of St Marks complained. He agreed that they were a distraction to Divine service and, interfered with the attendance of children at Sunday school.[12]

Less controversial than Sunday afternoon concerts were the regular sports fixtures that volunteers organised to develop their own skills and espirit de corps and to provide a healthy outlet for excessive energy. Though shooting matches were the most common sporting event organised by Volunteer units, equally important were the long established winter football and summer cricket fixtures. In addition specialist units organised sporting events to assist with their specific training requirements. Naval Brigades for example, involved themselves in oared boat races and sailing regattas to hone the skills of their boat crews.[13]

Community support for their local Volunteer units nurtured by the roles played by the Volunteers, can be gauged by the attendance of spectators at parades, inspections, training encampments, rifle ranges, Volunteer sporting fixtures and military tournaments. Throughout the colony, wherever the Volunteers assembled the inhabitants of their local communities congregated Nearly four thousand gathered on Wellington's reclaimed waterfront in 1885 to witness only 280 volunteers fire a 21 gun salute and feu-de-joie to celebrate the Queen's Birthday[14] Such massing was not unique. In Canterbury annual inspections regularly attracted crowds of between five and eight thousand spectators.[15] The 1886 mock invasion and sham fight at Oamaru attracted a crowd of over ten thousand people.[16] Military tournaments, where

Volunteers displayed their martial as well as sporting skills in everything from parade ground drill to bayonet exercises were equally as popular and often organised by communities as fund raising ventures.[17] Less spectacular but just as important for gauging support was the continued interest taken in the regular training activities undertaken by Volunteer Units. Supporters still assembled at the camp ground, the drill hall and around the parade ground to watch and cheer even the most basic of training.[18]

More important to the Volunteer units than cheering spectators was the continued monetary support provided by the local communities. Special fund raising Bazaars, concerts and promenades were well attended and brought to unit coffers much needed revenue.[19] Such revenue was then ploughed back into the community by the purchase of rations, uniforms, the payment of honorariums as well as the maintenance and upkeep of rifle ranges, drill halls and equipment.[20] This symbiotic relationship that the Volunteer units had with their local communities was continually reinforced throughout the 1880's. Always newsworthy, Volunteering in the 1880's came to be viewed as an institution worthy of its own columns and correspondents. In Marlborough, for example, the 'Daily Times' devoted a column to its local units under the heading 'Our Volunteers.'[21] In Wellington the 'Weekly Herald' used the more prosaic 'Volunteer Items' though its

correspondent showed some imagination by writing under the pseudonym 'Blank Cartridge'.[22]

The sum total of community support to local Volunteer Units was more than massed spectators, subscriptions or scribes. It equated to political influence if not power. Leading politicians such as H. Atkinson and J. Ballance, both of whom held the post of Premier, were former Volunteer officers while C. J. Johnston was still serving with the Wellington Naval Artillery. Such direct connections between community and Volunteers helped ensure the survival of the force in even the most difficult of times. When Major-General Schaw recommended wholesale disestablishment of country corps, and other sweeping changes to the very composition of the defence forces in 1888, the Government refused to implement them as they were politically unpopular. Any government that endeavoured to deprive communities of their own corps ran the real risk of being deprived of the treasury benches,[23] even if maintenance of such corps was impossible to defend on the grounds of need or efficiency. New Zealand communities of the 1880's appear to have demanded the right to an outward manifestation of defence as a mark of 'patriotism' which along with enthusiasm were considered the very hallmarks of volunteering.[24]

It was not, however, an enthusiasm generated by the need to protect isolated settlements from marauding Maori

bands. With Te Whiti as well as Tohu arrested, and Tawhiao having laid down his arms the internal threat was by and large neutralised. Though tensions between European and Maori in the 1880's occasionally threatened to erupt into violence they were perceived to be isolated, and most importantly containable, incidents, not sparks of a general conflagration. Evidence of this perception is abundant. Te Kooti, the scourge of the central districts of the North Island, for example, met the Minister of Native Affairs John Bryce at Kihikihi on the 12 February 1883 and was offered amnesty on condition that he refrain from any acts of rebellion in the future.[25] The next day Bryce, understandably elated by the progress of normalisation of relations with the interior 'rebellious' Maori, wrote to the Governor that congratulations were in order, as conditions within the country were the most favourable for years.[26] Even the challenge to the peace of Mahuki and his twenty-two armed followers on 26 March 1883 to the peace could not dent this euphoria. When the four scouts of the Te Awamutu Cavalry raced to warn Gascoyne that a body of natives were about to descend upon the town the response was orderly and well controlled. The telegraph operator was roused from his slumbers to call out the Te Awamutu Cavalry along with the local detachment of the Armed Constabulary. By the time Mahuki arrived all was ready, and instead of Te Awamutu being forced to surrender to the invaders they were quickly surrounded arrested and sent to Auckland for trial[27] That

Mahuki's actions were able to be treated with equanimity was the result of Bryce's negotiations and Te Kooti's response. Shortly after his amnesty had been granted, Te Kooti proved his good intent by being instrumental in the release of two railway surveyors, Hursthouse and Newsham, who had been first prevented from working then held captive and bound for 41 hours at Te Uira by Mahuki.[28] A more serious challenge to the peaceful co-existence of Maori and European in this period was Tawhiao's opposition to the opening of Kawhia harbour to European trade. When the surveyors moved in to lay out a town, erect guiding beacons and buoy the channel they were met by a determined resistance. In response Bryce sent in a 114 strong Armed Constabulary contingent which was surprisingly well received. It would appear that opposition was seen as futile and rather than escalate the confrontation into conflict Tawhiao decided to accept with good grace the opening up of Kawhia.[29]

Te Whiti at Parihaka was less willing than Tawhiao to resign himself. After his release from prison and return to Parihaka, Te Whiti commenced to rebuild his support base. By the middle of 1886 he was once again able to direct a campaign of passive resistance. Titokowaru and a band of nearly 300 were directed to occupy European land near Manaia, which they did marking out a whare and lighting the symbolic cooking fires. The local settlers, determined not to allow the situation to drag on as it had

in the late 1870's, collected around the encampment. By the time their numbers had reach 400 tempers flared and blows began to be struck. Fearing a serious collision James Livingstone, the one time President of the Hawera Republic, in his role as a local Justice of the Peace, used his influence to calm the Europeans down, as well as to swear in special constables. Once this had been done Livingstone arrested Titokowaru and eight of his lieutenants, nipping the campaign in the bud. Not to be thwarted, Te Whiti ordered Te Whetu to plough land at Oakura which, after consideration, he refused to do. In the lull that followed Te Whiti was once more arrested and the mana which he had painstakingly endeavoured to restore was diminished.[30] Likewise diminished was the fear of a seditious nest at Parihaka plunging the west Coast into war.

Just as the West Coast settlers sighed with relief those on the East became apprehensive about the intentions of Te Kooti. In late 1887 Te Kooti proposed a visit to his East Coast homeland, causing a resentful stir that threatened to erupt into open conflict. To ensure matters remained 'calm' the District Commander, Colonel Porter, threatened to personally kill Te Kooti if he endeavoured to return. The government, unwilling to see bloodshed, ordered Te Kooti not to travel to the East Coast. Initially abiding by the ruling Te Kooti in 1889, decided to defy the order and travelled to Opotiki. Colonel Porter and Major Ropata

responded by organising a contingent of Ngati porou to surround the guerilla leader arrest him and sent him for trial to the Auckland Supreme Court. There Te Kooti was confined, by a life sentence, to reside in the Ohiwa harbour area.[31] The arrests without serious incident of Te Kooti, Te Whiti, Titokowaru and Mahuki and the opening up of Kawhia harbour reinforced the message that the internal threat to the colony's peace and stability was no longer a major concern.[32]

The demise of the internal threat to security did not mean that the Volunteers of New Zealand had no military role to fulfill. The interesting combination of xenophobia and jingoism that swayed most British colonies in the 1880's resulted in simultaneous calls from New Zealand settlers for increased defensive measures against possible invaders, and the ability to send contingents to serve alongside Imperial Regiments in the Empire's trouble spots.[33] Fear of invaders and raiders despoiling coastal settlements was one of the continuing threads of concern among New Zealand's defence planners throughout the nineteenth century. During the 1880's this concern strengthened, as technological innovations first drew the world closer by rapid advances in communications, and then destabilised the existing order by the equally rapid advances in weaponry. Not surprisingly it was considered a nervous age, in which any conflict had the potential of escalating uncontrollably into a world war.[34] When

international relations grew tense. New Zealand's populace and their political leaders tended to hastily examine the state of the colony's defences. When Britain occupied Egypt in 1882 conflict with France was only averted by the narrowest of margins. While it did not cause hysteria in the colony it reminded all of the growing presence of the French in the South Pacific, and in particular, of France's desire to annex the New Hebrides group at almost any cost. This desire was so strong that France had offered to cease transporting convicts to her existing Pacific territories if allowed to proceed with the occupation of the island group. Initially New Zealand's cabinet favoured this proposal until they got caught up in the storm of protest whipped up by the Australian colonies. France, ignoring the flow of Australasian complaint, forced the issue by dispatching a garrison from New Caledonia in June 1886. British authorities, however, could not ignore French expansionism or the antipodean protest. After the 1887 Colonial Conference in London they pressured France into withdrawing the New Hebrides garrison much to the relief of the Australian Colonial governments.[35]

France was not the only potential threat to stability within the South Pacific region during the 1880's. Both the United States and an assertive Imperialist Germany were expanding into the region. In Samoa both vied for dominance at the expense of New Zealand's desire for

control and peaceful relations. If it had not been for a hurricane which swept Apia harbour in 1889, destroying German and American vessels alike war would have broken out.[36] More worrying than the posturing of the French, German or American military machines in the South Pacific was Russian expansion in central Asia. In the early 1880's the Russian Army had seized Turkestan and was threatening Afghanistan the last buffer before India, the jewel of the British Crown.[37] In late 1884 and early 1885 the Russian threat intensified, when the Tsarist forces moved in and occupied Merv and Penjdeh. When news of the occupation reached New Zealand, via London, in late January, most believed that war between Britain and Russia was inevitable. Throughout the colony public meetings demanded that the nations defences be improved to meet the revitalized menace. Unlike previous hysteria, which diminished almost as quickly as it arose the Russian threat of 1885 was kept alive by what amounted to a concerted press campaign and, more importantly, by the Russian Armies' slow but continued advance. In March they defeated another Afghan Army, fuelling an already tense situation. New Zealand was asked to help the Empire's defence preparations by confidentially reporting on the movements of Russian warships in her waters. Realising the gravity of the situation the cabinet authorised the temporary mounting of the ordinance purchased in 1878, ordered additional equipment for more permanent arrangements, redeployed the Armed Constabulary

to protect harbours rather than frontiers, and requested a British war vessel be placed on permanent station in New Zealand. For the next three months, until the King of Denmark could settle the boundary issue by arbitration, New Zealanders feared an unannounced Russian assault.[38]

As a result there was a massive upsurge in Volunteering. In March 1885 there were just under 5,000 enrolled Volunteers, three months later they were joined by an additional 3,000 members and thirty-seven new units. Offers of service were so numerous, in fact, that the Defence Minister was compelled to issued instructions to his department to curtail the acceptance rate as they were running out of arms and equipment.[39]

Besides inducing a revival of Volunteer enthusiasm for home service the Penjdch crisis stimulated further a general desire for overseas service. Though the nation had no legislative provision for raising and despatching a force to serve beyond its own shores the cabinet decided to seek parliamentary approval to send a 1,000 man contingent to fight in Afghanistan.[40] Though this was the first time the New Zealand Government formally contemplated taking an active part in the military affairs of the Empire beyond the colony's shores the move was not unpopular. Indeed the government were somewhat behind public opinion in this matter. As early as 1883 calls had been made to prepare for the possibility of providing

contingents for Imperial Service. Just a few weeks before the Russian Scare a renewed call was made by committees from throughout the colony to offer a contingent for service with the British expeditionary force in the Sudan. There the plights of General 'Chinese' Gordon had forced the British government to take punitive action against the Mahdi. Gordon had been sent to Khartoum by the British Government in January 1884 to supervise the withdrawal of the Egyptian garrisons. Before he could complete his task the Sudanese under the Mahdi were in open rebellion and by March had besieged the Khartoum garrison. For the next six months the British government agonised over its response until finally in August they decided to extricate him. Unfortunately the decision came too late, Khartoum and Gordon fell before the expeditionary force reached them. Correctly anticipating that Gordon's rescue force would become the nucleus for a punitive military expeditionary force colonies from throughout the Empire offered assistance. The residents of Sydney, for example, heard of Gordon's fate on the 11 February 1885, the next day W. B. Dally the acting Premier of New South Wales offered a contingent of troops to the British government which were gratefully accepted. When news of Gordon's death reached New Zealand the public, though initially shocked, were determined to show their support for Britain and any action undertaken to avenge the death. They urged the government to follow the lead of New South Wales. Not willing to utilize limited defence resources overseas, the

New Zealand government procrastinated claiming that no decision could be made as Parliament was in recess. New Zealand's public were, however, unwilling to be deterred. Throughout the colony individuals offered their services to fight in the Sudan; more importantly leading citizens offered to raise contingents. A. D. Bennett, for example, a former captain of the Devonport Naval Artillery, went so far as to organise the raising of an expeditionary force that by the end of February had 630 Volunteers ready to serve. The Government, however, were not to be swayed and steadfastly refused to send anyone, or sanction any private efforts. Yet the success of the de facto campaign to assist the Empire is evident by the Government's eagerness to offer a contingent for service in Afghanistan.[41]

While the government had been forced concede on provision of contingents for Imperial service its primary interest was the maintenance of New Zealand's own security. Though British Warships had visited New Zealand's shores on seventy-eight occasions between 1885 and 1890, foreign warships had cruised the same waters on another twenty-seven occasions. Of the foreign vessels which had entered New Zealand's waters during those six years ten had been French, nine German, three American and a further three Russian.[42] Of all visits perhaps the most important was the arrival in Wellington of the Russian clipper *Vestnik* on 23 May 1886. Though the residents of

Wellington hosted the ships company, its visit highlighted the continuing vulnerability of the colony's ports. The *Vestnik* had been able to enter Wellington harbour unannounced, during the hours of darkness without the assistance of the port's pilots, and anchor in a commanding position in the main channel. As was noted at the time what was able to be done in time of peace might be as easily accomplished in time of war. Continued fear of Russian intentions and activities is further highlighted by the reaction in Auckland to the Tarawera eruption of 1886. When the Rotorua volcano blew, on the 10 June 1886, the explosions were heard throughout the upper North Island. Assuming that it was cannon fire most Aucklanders initially panicked, believing a Russian invasion had finally come. Though the invasion was only of the imagination the ongoing fear of Russian designs in the 1880's ensured the defence debate never died.[43]

For the 1880's the seeds of the defence debate were sown not by vague fears and threats but by the tabling of the Scratchley's report. The General's hypothetical scenario of aggressive action by an external enemy directed at the four main ports became the basis for discussions on defence for the rest of the century. Though Parihaka distracted the government and defence authorities from immediate implementation of Scratchley's scheme, it did not stop ongoing consideration or concurrent activity. Cabinet, while awaiting the detailed

fortification plans, set aside £9,000 for initial earthworks.[44] Colonel Reader, the under secretary for defence,circulated Scratchley's report to all officers of the permanent staff and officers commanding corps for comment.

Captain Small, unlike most who simply accepted Scratchley's view, took the opportunity to expand his views on New Zealand's defence requirements. To ensure that his views were not ignored Small had them published in pamphlet form in 1882. In essence Small agreed with the main contentions postulated by Scratchley; New Zealand's harbours were extremely vulnerable to sudden attack by independent cruisers or raiders. Where he differed, was in the detailed response to the identified need. Small wished to see an immediate and total re-organisation of the defence forces as well as a major programme of capital works, to ensure the security of the nation's coastline. He recommended that earthworks be constructed which commanded the harbours with appropriate heavy ordnance mounted. For the channels he advocated a combination of sunken mines and electrically detonated torpedoes. To give forewarning of any hostile intent Small suggested that a series of watchtowers be constructed, connected by telegraph to a central authority and manned by two observers. Realising that costs needed to be kept to a bare minimum Small accepted the principle of a small permanent force manning the fortifications,

supplemented by a volunteer citizen force. The Volunteers would, however, have to be dramatically altered.

Small argued that as it then existed the Volunteer Force if called upon to prevent an enemy landing on New Zealand's shores, would be only able to put up a feeble resistance. This was not because Volunteers were cowards but because they lacked any real control due to a looseness of discipline and being under the command of largely incompetent officers. If an officer commanding a corps endeavored to enforce strict military discipline and an efficient training scheme, Small noted, he would be rewarded by mass resignations or applications for transfer to other units. Any efficiency shown in the organisation was, for Small, a sham. Shooting which all praised, was carried out by only twenty percent of the force, with the majority of Volunteers being positively dangerous with a loaded rifle.

To overcome Volunteer deficiencies Small recommended that the elective system for appointing officers to commissions should be abolished, as it interfered with impartiality and military discipline. Candidates for commissions, Small argued, should have to pass a rigid examination in military subjects. Small, unlike Scratchley, did not think it sufficient for candidates to produce pass certificates from the civil service examination or from a higher degree. He argued that such

prerequisites had not proved their worth, as evidenced by the defeat of Imperial officers by the Boer commandoes of South Africa.

In addition, Small argued, that it was essential to have Volunteers enrol for three years on a partial paid basis. Every drill attended should be rewarded with a payment of 5 shillings with 12 daylight drills of a least three hours duration each, plus two night parades per month and one target practice being compulsory each year. To control this new organisation, Small believed that a board, or New Zealand Horse Guards, should be established with a competently trained and experienced officer being brought out from the United Kingdom to command it.[45]

Small was to to be a lone voice in calling for the appointment of an Imperial officer to command New Zealand's defence forces. The government, determined to carry out Scratchley's suggested scheme, appointed a Board of officers under the chairmanship of Major-General A. G. Davidson on 1 March 1882. The Board was tasked with examining the rules and regulations governing the Volunteer Force and recommending any organisational restructuring required to implement Scratchley's proposals. One of the major recommendations of the Board was the appointment of a commandant, preferably from the Royal Artillery, to help overcome the unsatisfactory administration of the existing defence structure.

The members of the Board concluded that New Zealand's organisational structure was faulty after carefully examining it in the light of the recently completed defence reviews and systems changes in New South Wales, Victoria, South Australia, Tasmania and Western Australia. In New South Wales and Queensland a Royal Commission and Military Committee of Inquiry, respectively, had examined their defence organisations and concluded that a small permanent force of artillery should be established with a Volunteer Militia supplementing them as required. In addition both reviews believed that officer promotion examinations should be stricter, with the New South Wales Royal Commission going so far as to advocate a School of Instruction. The New Zealand inquiry, following the lead given by the Australians, recommended the disbanding of the existing Volunteer Force. It recommended that it be replaced by a totally new organisation structured along the lines advocated by Scratchley. To defend New Zealand's main harbours the inquiry concluded that the colony required two regiments of cavalry, six regiments of Infantry and one regiment of Artillery divided equally between the two main Islands. To be efficient administratively, the Board concluded, the twenty existing military districts should be reduced to six, three for each Island. The Board further argued for a military force divided into two main 'lines' or parts. The 'First Line', was to supplement the permanent forces stationed at

the port fortifications as well as the field force for mobile coast defence. The second line was to provide a reserve consisting in the main of country units at too great a distance from the harbours to be of immediate use.

It was anticipated by the Board that the second line units would undertake a bare minimum of military training, sufficient only to provide a basis for further training if full scale mobilization was required. In contrast the First line units would be expected to enrol for a minimum of three years, reside within 25 miles of their Headquarters and undertake a rigorous training regime to ensure their proficiency if called upon. To provide an incentive for recruits to enrol in the First Line the Board, following Captain Small's suggestion, advocated a personal payment. It recommended two shillings and six pence payment for each parade attended, with an additional 10 shillings capitation payment still being made to the corps fund. In total the Board envisaged a total force structure numbering only 4,399. The First Line was to consist of 2,572 while the Second Line was to number only 1,827. To train this lean force in its new role the Board suggested that a School of Instruction and Musketry be established and up to date technical and professional publications be procured, distributed and used under the guidance of the recommended commandant. The Board also drafted a proposed set of regulations for the overall control and administration of the Volunteer Force.

Consisting of 267 paragraphs in 30 parts with 7 appendices and 2 example forms these 'regulations' were, like Scratchley's report, to become a blueprint for the development of New Zealand Volunteering for the rest of the century.[46]

At the completion of the Board's deliberations it was not apparent that they would have any long term influence on Volunteering. When established it was embroiled in an immediate controversy over membership. In particular Volunteers from Otago, Southland, Thames and the West Coast of the North Island were upset that their regions were not represented on the Board. Once details of the Board's report were known, Corps recommended for disbandment or transformation into Second Line Units were alarmed that the Government might act on the Board's suggestions. Aware that it was a political minefield, governmental spokesmen, such as John Bryce, side stepped the issue by noting that the review was under consideration and the only definite intention of the ministry was to substantially implement Scratchley's scheme.[47] In the end few of the Board's recommendations were to be adopted immediately without considerable modification. The existing Volunteer Force was not disbanded, a commandant was not brought out from Britain, military districts were not reduced, a military School of Instruction was not established and the Capitation System remained unaltered. Scratchley's recommendations were

also allowed to lie in abeyance, not through disregard, nor disbelief of the defence need, but because of debt. The public perceived government spending as being too large and demanded retrenchment, a demand which Harry Atkinson, the Treasurer, responded to by abolishing the Department of Justice, amalgamating other departments and declining to undertake major Capital works.[48]

The only significant recommendation from either Scratchley, or the Board's reports, actioned in the short term was the issue of a new set of general regulations. Using the draft set as a guide, the Defence Department, under the personal supervision of the Minister, arranged for the issue of the seventh set of general regulations governing the Volunteer force, to become effective from the 1 January 1883. Circulated to Volunteers for comment in October 1882 the regulations were gazetted on 24 November 1882. Consisting of 278 paragraphs in 38 parts with 4 appendices, 21 example forms and a price list for stores attached, the regulations grew directly out of those recommended by the Board of Inquiry. Once implemented they formed the basis for Volunteer organisation and administration for the next decade. More importantly they were a major improvement on the preceding set of general regulations which had been issued in 1874 and had consisted of only 103 paragraphs in 24 parts with a single appendix and two example forms.[49]

The expansion in size of the regulations from 1874 to 1883 is indicative of the expansion in scope and detail. Significant changes were brought about in the organisational structure, administration and training of the Volunteer force. For the first time recruits signed on for a fixed engagement. The term was not the three years minimum advocated by most reformers, but a minimum one year with three months written notice for resignation. The minimum age for general recruits was raised from 17 to 18 years. Those who wished to join or remain in the force were expected to undergo additional training to be eligible for the capitation grant. Volunteers were still only required to attend 12 compulsory parades, but from 1883 onwards they were all to be inspection parades rather than the 6 required under the 1874 regulations. In addition to the compulsory inspection parades the Volunteers were also required to undergo an examination in judging distances and fire two class practices on the rifle range. Officers and non-commissioned officers (NCO's) were also required to undergo additional training and testing. On top of the drill and administration examinations, which were conducted for officers from 1874 onwards, officers from 1883 were also required to pass examinations in minor tactics and with respect to their particular arm. NCO's, while still appointed under 'the commanding officers authority, were required for the first time to pass examinations in drill, guard duties, administration and rifle practice.[50]

Even the organisational structure that the Volunteers had been used to operating within changed. New divisions, foreshadowed by the persistent demands of reformers, were created. During the New Zealand War period a psychological division between the North and South Islands can be said to have existed. The 1870's had seen this division, in the Volunteer Force at least, largely disappear, reflecting the slow unification of the colony's provinces into an embryonic nation. Scratchley, supported by the 1882 Board of Inquiry, recommended that a new division be instituted in the Volunteer Force; the division between coast and country. This division would distinguish between those units at the main ports who would have to face any external threat, and those in the outlying districts which were considered to be of no immediate utility. The 1883 regulations, in essence, implemented this recommended division. The Volunteer Force was to be divided by into the Garrison and Country Corps. The Garrison corps were the embodiment of Scratchley's 'Fort' and 'Field Force' units, and the Board's 'First Line'. They were to defend the four main ports and their immediate economic hinterlands. The establishment for each Garrison corps was laid down as a minimum of 43 and a maximum of 63 Volunteers. The Country corps were those recommended by Scratchley for disestablishment, and by the Board for transformation into the 'Second Line.' They did not have an explicit role,

though it would appear that the intent of the regulations was that they should provide a reserve if required in an emergency. The country corps were to consist of a minimum of 30 and a maximum of 50. This new structure, though well conceived, did not retain its original form for long.[51] Many corps had recruited up to the old maximum of 100 and did not wish to discharge any of their members. As a result they successfully petitioned the government for a modification of the establishment provisions within the regulations. The government faced by unit pressure changed the regulations to allow for the enrollment of up to 100 Volunteers per corps, but limited the capitation pay out to a maximum of 63 efficient Volunteers per corps.[52]

Establishment changes were not the only innovation of the 1883 regulations. The permanent staff members attached to the Volunteer Force as administrators and trainers had several alterations made to their terms of reference. For the first time it became mandatory for all correspondence to go through the Military District Office. Permanent Drill Instructors became ineligible to hold Volunteer commissions concurrent with their permanent paid employment. Adjutants were expected to act as 'super-civil servants'. Not only did they have to pass advanced musketry examinations, they had to be qualified to fill out a raft of official returns requested on a regular basis by the Defence Headquarters Staff. One

completely new provision in the 1883 regulations dealt with Volunteer correspondence with newspapers. Under the 1883 regulations it became an offence for any Volunteer to write to a newspaper about any facet of the force. Any Volunteer convicted of this crime was liable to be dismissed.[53] What is most interesting about this particular provision is that it took so long for it to be inserted in the governing regulations for the Volunteer Force. As early as 1874 Major Gordon had been damning the press for meddling in Volunteer affairs, yet no remedial action was taken for eight years.

An immediate result of the dramatic changes ushered in by the 1883 regulations was the desired fall in the number of Volunteers. By 1884 the Volunteer Force numbered only 4,300, compared to the high of 8,000 in 1874. In the longer term the regulations of 1883 proved to be extremely beneficial for the Volunteer Force. The provisions implemented in 1883 were not dramatically altered for over a decade. The two general sets of regulations, framed by committees after consultation with district and Volunteer officers and implemented in 1887 and in 1889, were basically only refinements of this seminal 1883 set. In this the regulations of 1883 provided the stability and continuity so important for any organisation. More importantly they were judged, by inspecting officers and the media, to have instigated a new age of disciplined training that would lead to a marked improvement in the

efficiency and usefulness of New Zealand's Volunteer Force.[54]

The foundations laid by the 1883 regulations and Scratchley's report were to be built upon over the next six years by governments influenced, almost to the point of being manipulated, by Sir William Francis Drummond Jervois. Jervois, the military mentor of Scratchley, was appointed Governor of New Zealand in December 1882, and arrived in the colony in January 1883 to take up his new office. While an experienced Governor, having served in the Straits settlement and South Australia, Jervois was primarily a defence consultant for colonial governments and saw it as his duty to advise his ministers on defence. For the six years preceding his arrival in New Zealand he had been engaged with Scratchley on devising schemes for the defence of Australia. These 'carbon copy' schemes advocated fortifications complete with heavy ordinance to protect harbours manned by small permanent forces supplemented by a Volunteer reserve. Controlled and commanded by an imperial officer these schemes were to be manned by citizen soldiers trained thoroughly at formal Schools of Instruction. After receiving this advice all the Australian colonies commenced the recommended and requisite restructuring and construction.

By contrast when Jervois arrived in New Zealand he perceived no progress over defence preparations. As soon

as he arrived in the country he expressed his determination to take up the defence question, and offered his military expertise to the government who were more than willing to have his advice. Within three months of becoming Governor he had visited and examined the ports of Wellington, Auckland, Lyttelton, Port Chalmers and the Bluff. Realising that Scratchley's initial work had been conceptual Jervois noted that it was essential that a more detailed plan be devised. Unfortunately Scratchley was over-committed, and could not personally do the task, so Jervois suggested that the government apply for the services of another experienced engineering officer. Again the government were happy to accept the Governor's advice and went so far as to allow him to arrange the application for a suitable officer. Having already decided what type of defence works New Zealand required, Jervois sought, with Scratchley's assistance, a competent officer to supervise the detailed execution of his plan. Major Cautley, another of Jervois' understudies, was sent by the Imperial authorities and after consulting with Scratchley en route, arrived in New Zealand briefed to recommend works devised to implement the Governor's proposals.[55]

To gain as much support for his proposals as possible, as well as to keep the defence debate alive, Jervois lectured the New Zealand Institute in Wellington on 4 October 1884. Though a well written and delivered address

this lecture simply reiterated New Zealand's defence needs Recalling the success of the '*Alabama*' and the fact that defence works were currently being undertaken in Australia, Jervois highlighted New Zealand's vulnerability as a nation reliant on maritime communication. Illustrating his address with two maps and 17 diagrams and sketches, he emphasised the impossibility of defending all of New Zealand's ports and harbours. New Zealand with a small population and limited resources could only protect its main harbours of Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch, Dunedin and Invercargill. If done properly, with fortifications, ordinance mines and torpedoes such defences would, though costing £40,000, not only protect New Zealand's coast but also assist the Empire's naval defences, by freeing up ships and providing safe havens of call when required. Jervois went on to reiterate his call for the appointment of a suitably qualified commandant, to ensure the success of the required integrated defence scheme. He concluded the speech by noting that if New Zealand did not fear an attack it spent too much on defence, if the country was concerned about being attacked it did too little. This illuminating address, while not adding anything new to the overall defence debate, focused attention once more on the deficiencies of the colony's defences.

Politicians again raised the issue in the legislative chambers questioning the ministry on what had been done.

More worrying for the government was the distribution of inaccurate versions of the Governor's speech. Almost as if to give the appearance of action, as well as clarify the issues, the government arranged for Jervois' lecture to be published as a pamphlet for distribution to all the public libraries and reading rooms throughout the colony. This gave time for Cautley to complete his report, written in consultation with Jervois which was presented to Cabinet on 29 January 1885. For the next few months, even though the Afghan question became increasingly tense and four spar torpedo boats arrived in the colony, nothing was done. First the Premier was away and then Jervois had gone to Australia to complete the Victorian defence scheme, and to talk to Scratchley. On his return, Jervois was able to use the Russian crisis to speed up progress on defence works. To provide immediate protection a start was made on the planned defence works. All suitable steam launches were to be fitted with torpedoes At the same time Whitehead torpedoes were ordered, and arrangements made to appoint an Imperial officer as commandant.[56]

Unable to secure the services of a currently serving Imperial officer, to take up the appointment of commandant, the government offered the post to George Stoddart Whitmore. Whitmore, an ex-Imperial Officer, had proved himself not only on the battlefield but also on the Treasury benches. Before Whitmore was able to take up his

new appointment a unique piece of legislation had to be drafted and passed through Parliament. As a member of the Legislative Council Whitmore would normally have vacated his seat on taking up the post of commandant. However Whitmore insisted that he be able to return to politics, and a compromise was found with the 'Whitmore Enabling Act of 1885'. Under its provisions Whitmore was permitted to retain his Legislative Council seat, as well as hold the office of commander of New Zealand's defence forces, so long as he did not sit in the chamber or vote in any of its divisions.

Once the Enabling Act had become law Whitmore, newly promoted from Colonel to Major-General, took up his post and began work on improving the efficiency of the defence forces of the nation. It would be easy to make exaggerated claims with regard to the importance of the new commandant. On the surface at least his reforms appear both substantial and all embracing. Whitmore was after all the commandant who was to establish a School of Military Instruction. It was he who insisted on elected officers passing commission examinations three months after their appointment; and it was he who arranged for the establishment of Honorary Reserve Corps as a method of disbanding corps stationed too distant from ports to be of immediate use. Yet none of what Whitmore implemented was novel or innovative. The 1882 Board of Inquiry had identified the need for a Military School, while the 1883

Regulations required officers within six months of their appointment to pass prescribed commissioning examinations. Scratchley in his 1880 report and the 1882 Board in its report had both recommended the disbanding of country units, with the 1882 Board of Inquiry recommending that they be incorporated into the reservist second line. While Whitmore was not important for originality he was still an important appointee; his importance lay in his ability to refine, consolidate and most importantly implement existing policy proposals.[57]

Whitmore was able to implement policy proposals in large part because of the timing of his appointment. He became commandant when Jervois was the Governor, the Sudan Crisis reached a climax and another Russian scare loomed; all of which combined to arouse interest in the nation's defence requirements. Capitalising on this upsurge of interest, Whitmore hastened construction of the fortifications already commenced by Cautley for the four main ports, organised administrative battalions for Volunteer corps and arranged for the passage of a new Defence Act through parliament in 1886. While the new Act, for the first time, regulated all the branches of New Zealand's Defence Forces under one law, and transformed the Armed Constabulary into the Police Force and Permanent Militia, none of its provisions were innovative. In the same year that the Defence Act was passed Whitmore issued yet another new set of regulations for the control of the

Volunteer Force. Gazetted on the 16 December 1886, this, the seventh, general set of regulations was to come into force with effect from 1 January 1887.[58]

Like the new Defence Act of 1886 the new Volunteer regulations did not contain anything novel or innovative. The 1887 regulations consisted of 284 paragraphs in 41 parts, though it would appear that there should have been 43 as both 'Capitation and Pay' and the 'Unattached List', while not separated by a heading, were dealt with as separate items within the regulations. Attached to these regulations were 5 appendices, 21 example forms and a price list for stores. In comparison the 1883 regulations had only 6 fewer paragraphs, 3 fewer parts and 1 less appendix. Obviously some changes were made to the regulations but when they are examined in detail the similarities rather than the differences become apparent. The vast majority of the changes between the 1887 Volunteer Regulations and their 1883 counterparts are of minute detail not substance. For example the minimum age requirement for Volunteers was reduced back to the 1874 limit of 17 years old. Height restrictions were also relaxed allowing units to accept recruits of 5' 4" instead of the previous 5' 5" minimum. Adjutants were no longer required to reside within a two mile radius of their district headquarters. Volunteer officers had to sit their commissioning examinations after three months of their appointment rather than the previous six month rule.

NCO's had some additional administrative and drill examination requirements added to their syllabi, while artillery recruits had to undergo 10 hours gun drill in addition to the thirty hours squad drill all recruits had to suffer. Capitation was divided into three grades, with two additional inspection parades being required for full capitation.[59] There were new provisions in the 1887 regulations such as the establishment of the Council of Military Education designed to teach as well as examine, though it could be argued that this was simply a refinement of the existing situation. Rather than officers cramming and then sitting sudden death examinations the new system was designed to assist in the teaching as well as confirm learning by examination. Unit classification, while appearing new, was likewise a refinement. Instead of the 'Garrison' and 'Country' corps of 1883, 1887 ushered in Volunteer Corps and the Honorary Reserve. Establishment for the units remained basically the same with most units requiring a minimum of 40 and a maximum of 100 though capitation remained payable to a maximum of 63 efficients only.[60]

The year 1887 should have been one of fruition for Whitmore's reforms. The administrative battalions and brigades had been in place for two years, the Defence Act of 1886 had been law for one and his revision of the regulations became effective on 1 January. Yet this year was to mark the beginning of the end for Whitmore as the

Commandant, rather than simply the end to his beginning. Whitmore had not been as successful in promoting military proficiency as he claimed in his annual reports. Though he had drawn units together in his administrative battalions he had been unable to unite them, as corps were still jealous of their independence. His School of Military Instruction, while well conceived, was not well received. Its courses attracted only six officers from throughout New Zealand in 1886 and 1887. One Volunteer Officer, the Wanganui District Commander Lieutenant-Colonel Noake, was unwilling to remain silent. After careful consideration of New Zealand's needs he claimed, in a privately printed pamphlet, that Whitmore was wasting at least £50,000 of taxpayers money per annum. Noake asserted that far from being an efficient form of defence the existing Volunteer Force structure was defective, extravagant and delusive. He advocated a defence scheme based on two essentials, the country's needs and its means. Too much time and money, according to Noake, was wasted on the parade ground and not enough was spent on training in the field. Like Sir George Grey, Noake wished to see an army based on the Swiss and Boer systems where every man was practically trained in the art of war.[61]

Reaction to Noake's pamphlet was not slow in coming. To critics of the existing defence structure and Whitmore's innovations Noake provided clear evidence that

the colony was wasting money. To those who believed Whitmore was instrumental in developing New Zealand's defences, Noake had produced an unwarranted and uncalled for attack upon his superior officer. With the economy in recession, and the colony demanding retrenchment, the government took the opportunity presented by the controversy over Noake's pamphlet to have the defence forces once again investigated. Following the lead of both the New South Wales and Victorian governments the New Zealand Minister of Defence, T. Fergus, invited Major-General H. Schaw CB, RE to review and report on the colony's defence. Schaw, like Jervois and Scratchley, was an expert on fortifications, having lectured on the subject at staff college, and having been on the staff at the Works Directorate of the War Office. Arriving in New Zealand in March 1887, Schaw visited the main harbours and closely inspected their defence works. Having been briefed to reduce expenditure to its lowest Schaw reconsidered the question of New Zealand's defence needs taking into consideration the colony's limited means. After consultation with Whitmore and his staff Schaw was able to ascertain the existing forces available for defence and form an opinion as to the absolute minimum required to protect the colony. He argued that since the struggles with the interior Maori tribes had ceased it was a waste of money to maintain any force for internal defence. New Zealand was still, however, liable to attack from external foes determined to obtain money, coals and

stores as well as inflict injury and humiliation on a portion of the British Empire. Having accepted Scratchley's basic premises, Schaw went on to accept that New Zealand, like any nation with an extended seaboard, was unable to provide defence for the whole coast line. To be both efficient and effective defence resources had to be concentrated at the vital points, the main harbours. For minor seaport towns such as Nelson, New Plymouth and the like Schaw suggested that rifle clubs, which encouraged that art of shooting, and honorary Volunteer Corps could provide the semblance of a military presence. For Auckland, Wellington, Lyttelton and Dunedin a minimum force of 4,314 was required consisting of 343 Permanent Militia and 3,982 Volunteers. Nine hundred and two of the Volunteers were to be in a Garrison Coast Brigade while the rest were to constitute the Mobile Field Force. As the Volunteers numbered 8,403 at the time of Schaw's review he was advocating a reduction of 4,421. More important for the government than the reduction in numbers was the savings in expenditure. Schaw's scheme would save approximately £27,500. While Schaw advocated a reduction in quantity he balanced this by stressing the need for quality. The Garrison Coast Brigade Volunteers, for example, would under Schaw's reorganisation be required to undergo more advanced training in the special duties of serving heavy guns, laying submarine mines and long torpedoes. Patriotism and esprit de corps might be sufficient inducement for more advanced training but Schaw

believed that enrolment for a minimum of three years and increased capitation would be needed to maintain both numbers and efficiency. To provide the necessary expertise to command and train this more efficient force Schaw recommended the appointment of an Education Staff Officer to conduct and superintend a uniform system of training and education based upon British manuals. Examination, he believed, should be undertaken by a Board of Examiners consisting of the commander as president and the staff officer Education as member and secretary. To confirm the training of the whole organisation, and to prepare for all eventualities Schaw suggested that instructional camps should be organised which tested the defences under varying scenarios of attack. To implement this proposed restructuring Schaw believed that yet another revision of the regulations governing Volunteers would be required.[62]

Schaw's report eagerly anticipated was finally presented to New Zealand's Parliament shortly before 2am on the 23 December 1887. Considered by the media as an ably written and valuable document, its findings were considered a challenge to the government. Aggreeing that the internal threat had diminished the press called upon the ministry to have the courage to carry out Schaw's recommendations and transform the Volunteers from merely toy soldiers into serious defence professionals. Though Schaw's report was not revolutionary, being rather a

refinement and an evolution from Scratchley's scheme, many perceived it as totally innovative. To critics it represented a mania for unnecessary change, for supporters it was a plan that would ensure an adequate defence force while allowing essential savings to be made. When reviewed by the imperial 'Colonial Defence Committee' in April 1888 Schaw's plan was complimented and his proposed reductions and alterations considered justified. To ensure that his scheme was published and popularised, Schaw, like Jervois before him, gave public lectures on harbour defences and how New Zealand could adequately defend its vital points against descents by small but hostile squadrons. By June 1888 the government was able to confirm its intention of carrying out Schaw's scheme, and commenced by encouraging the formation of rifle clubs in the interior. When it came to completing the capital works already commenced at the harbours under the Scratchley Scheme, Schaw assisted by examining the detailed plans and the construction proposals, and by advising on any changes required without charging for his services.[63]

In the grips of a major economic depression, and needing to curtail costs, the government happily accepted Schaw's free services. It also accepted the resignation of Major-General Whitmore as commandant, without replacement. Reaction to Whitmore's resignation showed how poorly he was actually regarded by some. The press

viewed it as a 'golden opportunity' to bring to New Zealand on Imperial Officer who was properly qualified to be the commander of the colony's defence forces. For the government, however, it was a golden opportunity to save more money, and his position was allowed to remain vacant with the Undersecretary of Defence acting as a defacto commandant. Non-replacement of Whitmore was not the only cost saving measure pursued by the government in the field of defence. The central School of Instruction and the administrative battalion structure were abolished while the practice of issuing free railway passes to volunteers on duty was discontinued. Perhaps the most objectionable cost saving measure pursued by the government for the Volunteers was the appointment of Lieutenant-Colonel Hume as their inspecting officer. Hume was personally disliked by many but, worse, he was also the government Inspector of Prisons. While some credit was given for his military experience, as a former officer of the 79th Highlanders, his dual appointment was considered 'cheap and nasty' and quickly earned him the derogatory title 'Inspector of Convicts and Volunteers'.[64]

Hume took up his appointment in June 1888, in the same month he joined Lieutenant-Colonel Butts, Captains Douglas, Coleman and Falconer on the Board of a Commission appointed to revise yet again the Volunteer Regulations. This revision was prompted as much by European unrest and tension, due to the Bulgarian crisis, as it was be Schaw's

recommendation that it be undertaken. By September the Board had revised the existing regulations and recommended changes to the Defence Minister, who in turn arranged for them to be discussed by district officers. Assisting in this discussion phase was the Under-secretary of Defence, who explained the proposed alterations to Volunteer meetings throughout the colony. After this review process had been completed the regulations went forward for the Governor's consent, which was given on the 26 November 1888, enabling the eighth set of general regulations governing the Volunteer Force to come into effect on 1 January 1889.

On their publication the 1889 set of regulations were viewed as entirely new in language and substance. A detailed examination of them however, reveals that the substance of the preceding regulations remained with only minor refinements actually being made. A wider variety of establishments were provided for; Naval Artillery units ranging from 60 to 100 men for example, while engineer units ranged from 45 to 65. Two significantly new provisions of the 1889 regulations were the detailing of district establishments, and of minimum ages for commissions. From 1889 lieutenants were to be at least 18 years old and captains 21. That such a provision was considered necessary appears to indicate that Volunteers were becoming younger, or that only young men were offering themselves for commissions. District

establishments for Auckland, Wellington and Dunedin were set at 1140 Volunteers composed of one Mounted Corps, three Naval Artillery Corps, one Garrison Artillery Corps, one Field Artillery Corps and six Rifle Corps per district. Christchurch, surprisingly, was only entitled to 940 men having two less Naval Artillery units then the other districts. While new the concept of detailed district personnel establishments was in keeping with Scratchley's scheme and Schaw's report. Though Schaw had envisaged a smaller establishment advocating Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin should have 610 Volunteers and Auckland 698 Volunteers.

Reaction to the new regulations is perhaps the clearest indicator that they were not innovative. Hume in his first inspection report noted that frequent amendments to regulations had a tendency to unsettle Volunteers, yet few objections had been raised to the 1889 set and any changes were perceived as being beneficial rather than detrimental. The refinements and establishments detailed were considered sufficient to answer all purposes for as long as the current organisation and system existed. Within a year, however, these beneficial regulations required further minor amendment when it was found that they were not being uniformly administered. Hume, for example, discovered that some of the city corps were not paying sufficient attention to the physical requirements laid down by the 1889 regulations.[65]

Hume's eye for detail in 1889 had been honed by his association with Major-General J. B. Edwards CB, RE for whom he acted as staff officer during his inspection of New Zealand Defence arrangements. Edwards, who had served under Jervois, and considered him a friend, was the commander of Imperial Troops stationed in China and Hong Kong when instructed to report on the defences of the Australasian colonies. This instruction was the result of a decision taken at the 1887 London Colonial Conference. Assembled during the Golden Jubilee celebrations of Queen Victoria, representatives of the Australasian colonies not only agreed to give financial support to an Australian Squadron, but also resolved to have their defence arrangement reviewed. In April 1889 the Victorian government proposed that Edwards be invited to undertake the task. This proposal was supported by all the other colonies and finally agreed to by the War Office which issued the appropriate instructions. In late 1889 Edwards visited the Australian colonies and suggested that defence would be best carried out by a federation of the existing military forces. The New Zealand government, deciding not to be part of a United Australian Land Force, invited Edwards to report separately on the colony. By November Edwards had inspected New Zealand's defences, and their associated forces, and his report was forwarded to the Governor as Commander-in-Chief of New Zealand. While accepting that New Zealand's defence requirements differed

from the neighbouring Australian colonies, Edwards believed that certain economies were possible if New Zealand combined with them in obtaining the services of a general officer to be both military adviser and inspector to the various governments. He also believed, like Small and Scratchley before him, that New Zealand could profit by following the Australian example of establishing a partially paid force rather than relying on the existing Volunteer arrangement. Such a system he, and the colonial Defence Committee, believed would render the forces more efficient by binding the men more to the service. Further efficiencies could be realised, Edwards argued, if the practice of officer election, which he and a large number of commentators agreed led to ill discipline, was discontinued if a suitably qualified regular officer was appointed commandant and if the organisational structure was refined. Like most commentators before him Edwards believed that there were too many districts, and advocated that only four should be permitted. These districts, not surprisingly, were to be centred around the main ports which were the focus for New Zealand's defence planning. Though arguing for rationalisation of defence arrangements around the ports, Edwards stressed that this should not be the sole focus of New Zealand's defence policy. He insisted that provision be made for emergencies larger than isolated attacks on harbours. For Edwards rifle clubs were not simply an honorary reserve, they were the nucleus for expansion if the nation was forced to mobilize

all its resources for defence purposes. The forces detailed to provide the immediate defence of the ports, though considered adequate by Edwards, required further refinement. The engineer corps he considered a fine body of men, who were insufficiently trained, while the field artillery were overmanned and lacked essential equipment such as horse harness and modern ordinance. Naval artillery units Edwards believed misnamed, as they no longer served afloat being employed in the same manner as garrison artillery units. Edwards recommended that their name be changed to reflect their new role, and that they be amalgamated with the existing garrison units. To prepare units for active service Edwards suggested that each district hold a large scale annual training camp, a suggestion reminiscent of Whitmore's training schemes.[66]

Major-General Edwards's desire to see an annual training camp highlighted the fact that his recommendations, in large part, were merely refinements of suggestions advocated throughout the decade. The 1882 Board of Inquiry, for example, recognised the value of an annual course of between 5 and 6 days continuous training, in addition to specified drills, but believed the scheme could not be made compulsory as it would strain relations between employers and their Volunteer employees, ultimately rendering Volunteering unpopular.[67] Concern over likely effects to labour relations did not, however, prevent major training encampments taking place. In 1883

the officers commanding units in the Wanganui Militia District unanimously agreed to hold a training encampment during Easter and invite the Volunteers of Wellington, Nelson and Taranaki to attend. Fourteen corps and nearly 500 Volunteers duly turned up to the camp and from 22 to 26 March trained and exercised in the field.[68] Not to be outdone a similar exercise was undertaken by the Wellington Volunteers the following year, with 655 Volunteers turning up to the camp at the Island Bay Park.[69] It was Nelson's turn in 1885, and over 930 Volunteers from 23 different units of the Wellington, Wanganui and Nelson Military districts turned up at Stoke. When the units put on a review and sham fight 5,000 spectators turned up for the spectacle.[70] Further north spectators in Auckland were enthralled, during the same Easter break, when their provincial Volunteers both attacked and defended 'Cruickshank's Mountain' at Papatoetoe.[71] At Christchurch and Timaru similar attacks were going on to the delight of their communities, while in Dunedin it was to the delight of the Volunteers who charged a shilling per head for spectators wishing to watch the event.[72] Volunteer dedication to training and community interest in 1885, largely the result of the Russian War Scare, was capitalised on by Whitmore when he took up his appointment as commander of the Defence forces. In early June he made an unannounced visit to Dunedin and called out the Volunteers in the night. Of

Dunedin's 1,117 Volunteers 1,059 assembled when the alarm was given ready to repel the invader.[73] In Wellington and Auckland the Volunteers assembled less hurriedly but no less skillfully to stage sham fights against equally imaginary invaders on 9 November.[74] Whitmore continued to exercise the Volunteer force in major sham fights for the whole of his tenure in office. He also helped develop the interprovincial encampments into major mobilization exercises. During Easter 1886 over 2,000 Volunteers from Canterbury, Otago and Southland travelled in special trains to Oamaru for a major encampment that culminated in the defence of Oamaru against a naval attack.[75] On a slightly smaller scale 1,300 Volunteers from Nelson, Wellington, Marlborough, Napier, Wanganui and the West Coast of the South Island travelled by train and chartered steamer to Camp Balgawnie, Wanganui for their annual camp and sham fight.[76] Though extremely useful as mobilization exercises, and as unifying bonds for the embryonic army, Whitmore's large scale encampments were criticised for being misdirected exhibitions of energy. To critics the Volunteers massed simply for a holiday and showed a lack of discipline, devotion to duty and martial spirit. More serious was the personal criticism heaped on Whitmore, who reported favourably on the efficiency of the Volunteers and their training at these exercises. Noake in his 1887 pamphlet for example, claimed that years Easter encampment of 2,000 Volunteers at New Plymouth was a deplorable failure.[77]

Economic necessity, Whitmore's resignation and Schaw's review all combined to alter the complexion of Volunteer Easter encampments in the final years of the 1880's Instead of the massive mobilization exercises of the middle years, with units travelling hundreds of miles to attend what were seen by some as merely military holiday camps, they became small localised affairs practising Volunteers in the roles they were expected to fulfill on active service, and over the ground it was anticipated they would have to defend. Approximately the same number of Volunteers attended the camps, in the vicinity of 3,000, but instead of one or two major encampments each region had its own with 300 or 400 Volunteers participating.[78]

Volunteer training during the 1880's consisted of much more than encampments, be they small regional affairs or large scale interprovincial mobilisations. The combination of weekly drills, monthly inspections, field days, attachments, lectures, library study and war gaming provided extensive training opportunities for both individuals and units. As a general rule Volunteer units during the 1880's met weekly in their respective drill-sheds to undergo approximately an hour and a halfs training. If the weather was fine they would march through the streets to a close piece of open ground and practise skirmishing.[79] Units were also obliged to parade

monthly for a governmental inspection, normally conducted by the officer commanding the District.[80] In addition to these parades Volunteers organised regular field days, to practice in the field tactics they envisaged employing against likely foes. Well organised field days had the double advantage of providing realistic training as well as acquainting units with the country they were expected to defend. On 16 December 1887, for example, the 1st Canterbury Battalion held a field day at Kaiapoi and attacked with ball cartridge an enemy position represented by head and shoulder targets stationed in the dunes. More often the combat consisted of small scale sham fights which simply pitted neighbouring units against each other.[81] On a less regular basis was opportunistic attachment training with visiting regular forces. By the 1880's this training was almost exclusively limited to the Naval units who were able to train with the crews of visiting Imperial warships. On such occasions the navals would foresake their cutter races, fishing trips and garrison duties for practice gun drill, repelling boarders, boarding and fire practices.[82] Other Volunteer corps maintained the link with Imperial training methods by adopting the latest training doctrine issued by the War Office. In 1887, for example, New Zealand produced its first Cavalry Drill Manual, which was copied almost directly from its British counterpart.[83] The Artillery units were even more reliant on British doctrine, with lithographs, diagrams, samples of all ammunition and the

various treatises used in training all being those in current use with the regular Imperial forces.[84] Attempts were made to modify the British experience to meet local conditions, by lecture programmes at Garrison Libraries and by articles and discussion papers circulated among the officers.[85] More importantly officers played 'Kreigspiel' the German War game designed to practise commanders at all levels in military strategy and manoeuvres. On large scale maps of their local areas officers moved metal blocks representing their units, through strategic schemes devised to both train them and test their level of ability at the same time.[86]

Though training opportunities in the 1880's were extensive Volunteers appear not to have made the most of them.[87] Whole units were criticised for being a waste of money, as their members were unable to judge distances and were unsteady in the execution of the most simple drill movements. Officers and NCO's were further singled out for criticism for their lack of skill in elementary sword and bayonet exercises.[88] Of greater concern was the lack of military expertise shown by officers and NCO's who had passed their promotion examinations. By 1887 the examination system was being damned as a complete farce, with candidates passing with no practical knowledge of drill or discipline.[89] This was despite a well defined syllabus requiring officers and NCO'S to sit a practical examination before a convened board of three officers, as

well as to answer a series of written questions on duties, exercises, drill, court-martials and regulations.[90] To pass candidates had to receive a minimum mark of 60 in each subject with an aggregate of 75. When this standard proved too difficult to achieve for most candidates the Defence Office took the easy option. Instead of demanding additional commitment to training, they lowered the pass marks to a minimum of 40 in each subject and an aggregate of 60, which appears to have led to the damnation of the whole system as mere farce.[91] The general decline in Volunteer ability in the latter half of the decade was not the result of a lack of enthusiasm by the Volunteers themselves. Their willingness to turn out for their advertised evening parades and early morning daylight drills, along with responding to practice mobilisations in the dead of night, highlight Volunteer dedication.[92] The decline of Volunteer training standards was symptomatic of the economic crisis the colony faced. Volunteers, though enthusiastic, found it increasingly difficult to find time during normal working hours for training. Many employers threatened dismissal to employees whose participation in Volunteering affected their employment in any way.[93] As a consequence unauthorised absences from inspections and parades became more common, and unit commanders were forced to fine or demote offenders. Instead of increasing commitment such punitive action often resulted in resentment and resignation.[94]

The depression of the 1880's affected the discipline of the Volunteer Force in more serious ways than unauthorised absences from parades. It became more common, for example, for destitute officers to fail to pay their bills,[95] and for Volunteers to steal their arms and accoutrements. Illegally obtained equipment would be pawned for ready cash, even though this was a specified offence punishable by imprisonment for a period of up to two years.[96] Perhaps even more worrying was the lack of control Volunteers exhibited when massed in the 1880's. When in camp some Volunteers took the opportunity to practise unauthorised foraging expeditions, and pillaged local livestock to supplement their camp diets.[97] When travelling they were even worse. The Onehunga and Waitemata Naval Volunteers, for example, were disbanded in 1889 after they had been found guilty of stealing an accordion, ham, glasses, bottles of beer and stout and a two gallon jar of brandy from the Mercer Hotel en route to an encampment at Hamilton.[98] Even routine training was marred by Volunteer misbehaviour, most of which appears to have resulted from over-indulgence in alcohol on completion of the formal training. It was common for units to retire to local hotels to toast the health of new recruits, newly promoted NCO's and appointed officers as well as retiring members. So much toasting went on in fact that Volunteer units often resembled well dressed drinking clubs rather than military units. Not surprisingly Volunteers returning home after such

training-cum-drinking parades found themselves, on occasion, running foul of the law through rowdy misbehaviour.[99] In partial defence of the Volunteers it must be remembered that socialising aids in the fashioning of an esprit de corps essential for any fighting force.

To rectify the unacceptable and unjustifiable misbehaviour of drunken soldiers in a volunteer citizen army should have been relatively easy and straight forward; the miscreants should have been dismissed from the service immediately. During the latter half of the 1880's, however, few New Zealand units even contemplated automatic dismissal, as they struggled to maintain numbers. While they opened the decade resembling exclusive clubs requiring all new members to be proposed, seconded and balloted before being accepted, they ended like regiments of the line accepting anyone willing to join. Units were forced to offer bounties to recruiters. In Wellington the Rifle Corps not only advertised in local newspapers, they offered monetary prizes to the unit member who was able to recruit the largest number of new members. The Te Aro Rifles, for example, offered two guineas to the winner of such a competition in 1888, while the Wellington Guards gave a six shilling reward for each new member attested.[100] To arrest the manifestations of decline, and ensure the nation's security, talk was made of enforcing the Militia law which was still on the statutes.[101] Such talk was, however, premature. In

numbers, is nothing else, Volunteering was relatively stable throughout the period. The year after Parihaka, 1882, saw a decline in numbers of only 436 from 7,264 to 6,828. The following year was more drastic with numbers tumbling to 4,242 followed by a minor recovery in 1884 with the Volunteer strength rising to 4,313. In 1885 there was a massive jump to 7,919 enrolled Volunteers and for the next five years numbers fluctuated between 8,000 and 8,500 Volunteers. In 1886 there were 8,253 Volunteers while in 1887 there were 8,403. The next two years saw a minor drop with 1889 recording 7,887 under arms while 1890 closed with 7,671 Volunteers.[102] Units were forced to recruit aggressively, not because of declining numbers per se, but because of the insistence by the Minister of Defence upon the strict observance of Volunteer regulations with regard to the minimum strength of corps detailed in the establishment regulations. Any corps below the minimum was to be disbanded. Such strict control led to three units being disbanded in one week alone in July 1888.[103]

Any Volunteer recruiter who received a bounty for inducing new members to join up during the lean times of the late 1880's undoubtedly deserved it. Not only were they required to convince prospective recruits that it was a worthwhile use of their limited leisure-time they also had to convince them in a time of economic hardship that it was going to be a worth while use of a portion of their

disposable income. This became increasingly difficult as the decade wore on and the government was forced to drastically reduce the amount granted in capitation to efficient Volunteers. The rate set in 1881 was £3 for the cavalry and £2 10s for all other corps. This was standardised in 1885 at £3 for all Volunteers, and remained at that level until the end of 1887. On the 23 December 1887 the Defence Minister issued a circular warning Volunteer companies not to incur any liabilities on the strength of accruing capitation allowance as it was likely to be considerably reduced. On the 29 February 1888 the units were advised that capitation would be set at £1 10s. The new amount was criticised as insufficient, with many predicting that Volunteering would crumble into at best an amusement and at worst a sham. Worse news for Volunteers followed in June, when the government advised that to be classified as efficient Volunteers would have to attend an additional three inspection parades per annum. Rather than struggle under such conditions some units, such as the Alexandra Cavalry; voted themselves out of existence and became simply honorary corps believing that the capitation was insufficient to encourage the new levels of efficiency demanded by their Wellington masters. Realizing that the cuts had been too drastic, the government re-evaluated the level of capitation and raised it again in 1889, not to its former level but to £2 per efficient Volunteer the amount it was to remain at for the rest of the decade.[104]

Capitation reductions in the late 1880's were only one manifestation of the general governmental retrenchment in the defence vote. Overall spending was slashed in draconian fashion in an attempt to balance the books and win popularity. In 1882 the government spent a total of £193,475 on defence, a 19% (£44,730) cut on the previous year. This was reduced another 37% in 1883, when only £122,127 was allocated to the defence vote. The 1884 budget saw defence spending reduced another £20,228 to £101,899. With the Sudan and Afghanistan crises coming to a head it is not altogether surprising that this trend was reversed in 1885. What is surprising is the extent, until the governments massive spending programme is remembered. The defence budget for 1885 mushroomed 197% to a total of £302,434. This level of expenditure was unable to be maintained, and a 27% cut occurred in 1886 when the budget was reduced to £221,785. With the economic crisis worsening the government lowered defence expenditure to £165,126 in 1887, and then down to £71,725 in 1889. The decade closed with only £63,813 being spent on defence.[105]

Expenditure cuts undoubtedly strained the very structure of Volunteering but, amazingly, weaknesses exhibited by the force during the 1880's were rarely blamed on the overall economic climate. Rather the command structure was seen as the prime problem area. While willing to admit that the severity of the depression

had killed general enthusiasm for Volunteering in Auckland, critics of Volunteering blamed the lack of competent commanders and the elective system of appointments to commissions for the forces defects and any discernible decline. It was argued, by critics of the elective system, that competent officers found it almost impossible to flourish in an organisation that used the 'pernicious' and 'evil' practice of election. Under such a system potential officers had to curry favour to ensure a commission making it difficult for them to subsequently command those responsible for their appointments.[106] Though critics of the elective system included military authorities of high standing, such as Scratchley, New Zealand's leading politicians were reluctant to abolish the democratic principle involved, arguing that the Volunteers themselves were the best judges of good officers.[107] The changes politicians were willing to make to the elective system during the 1880's, if anything, tended to make it even more important for officer candidates to be popular with the men. In 1881 only one half of a units efficient strength had to approve an officer candidate for his election to be confirmed by the authorities. Under the provisions of the 1886 Defence Act the percentage was increased to two thirds.[108] It would appear that for New Zealand's politicians, at least, Volunteer weaknesses did not stem from officers being virtually the elected representatives of their units. To them manifest weaknesses stemmed from transient officers

and NCO's endeavouring to command military units though they were ignorant of the very basic duties of their appointments.[109] This fact the Volunteers themselves were willing to admit. A Nelson school teacher, named Bryant, who was also an infantry lieutenant in his local Volunteer Rifle unit, when reminiscing about an annual camp he attended at Palmerston in the mid 1880's confessed that he did not have the 'faintest notion' of what to do with his men in the field.[110] Paradoxically it was the harsh economic climate, and the consequential need for retrenchment which forced the closure of the School of Military Instruction, specially established to eradicate ignorance within the command chain.

The decline in Volunteer fortunes made manifest by the close of the School of Military Instruction, the draconian cuts in defence expenditure and the lowering of training and discipline standards, resulted in a weakened force facing the challenges of a new decade. Though weakened the force had survived and was structurally more sound than at the start of the 1880's. The force had flourished and developed in the middle years of the decade in a 'golden age' that set a standard for emulation. This flourishing was the result of governmental encouragement and international tensions, as well as a multiplicity of reports, reviews, recommendations, regulatory changes and legislation. In combination these threads of encouragement had laid a firm foundation for the development of the

Volunteer Force for the rest of the century. It had been transformed from a loosely organised force, seeking to protect settlements from both within and from without, into an integrated defence structure designed primarily to protect the nation's main harbours. At the same time public pressure had forced policy developers to keep Imperial needs in mind, by considering the demands of providing contingents for overseas service. Public pressure and political influence had also ensured that the democratic principle of officer election not only survived but prospered, though as a concept and policy it was damned by all informed commentators. While inefficient in purely military terms the decision to retain the elective system in conjunction with active participation in all the activities of their local communities ensured that Volunteering survived even in the worst of economic times by remaining a popular pastime with the majority of New Zealanders.

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CHAPTER FIVE

RESUSCITATION: VOLUNTEERING UNDER SEDDON AND FOX 1891-96

At the end of 1890 New Zealand's Volunteer Force was condemned by both the Minister of Defence, Captain W. Russell, and the Inspector of the Forces, Lieutenant-Colonel A. Hume. After carefully considering the 1889 report of Major-General Edwards they had been forced to conclude that the force lacked proper organisation, training and armaments.[1] By 1896 a complete change was reported in the Forces value. In that year Lieutenant-Colonel F. J. Fox, the country's Inspector of Forces and Military Advisor, reported to R. J. Seddon, the Minister, that only fourteen percent of units inspected were inadequate. More importantly he was able to report that out of the 4,958 enrolled volunteers 3,983 (eighty percent) had been deemed efficient.[2] This compared with a seventy-four percent, (4,939 out of 6,7000), efficiency for Volunteers in 1891.[3] The clear reduction in the Force's manpower had been more than offset by qualitative improvements.

The improvement in the quality of the Force can be directly attributed to the improving economic condition of

the colony, continuing international tensions and the new Liberal government, which gained the Treasury benches in the general election of 1891. Seddon the Minister of Defence until 1896, advised by his political colleagues, volunteer officers and the governments Military Advisor resuscitated the Volunteer Force after it appeared to have been given the last rites.

When Seddon took over the Defence portfolio he was faced with the daunting task of reviving a languishing force struggling to maintain its numbers and efficiency. During the years of economic crisis in the late 1880's, Defence, like all other sectors, had suffered from the want of finance. Fortunately for Seddon his task was to be eased by a significant improvement in the colony's economy. By 1895 New Zealand entered a period of sustained and growing prosperity that was to last, with only minor setbacks, for the next twenty-five years.[4] Seddon's task was further eased by a growing concern over increased volatility in both internal and international relations. For New Zealand's European population the threats posed by the old enemies of Germany, France, Russia and the United States were joined by fear of an aggressive Asian power, Japan. Fear of asiatic hordes swamping Australasia had origanated in the 1880's when thousands of Chinese had poured into the goldfields of Victoria and New South Wales. For New Zealand this fear was fueled in the 1860's when four thousand Chinese joined

the rush to its goldfields. To stem the feared tide the government restricted Chinese immigration and placed a poll tax on persons of Chinese origin. This restrictive immigration policy was extended in the 1890's to include all Asiatic races. In contrast Britain had signed the Anglo-Japanese Treaty on 16 July 1894, placing Japan on a most favoured nation footing, and allowing unrestricted entry residence and freedom to pursue any occupation, or conduct any business. When invited to adhere to the Anglo Japanese Treaty's provision New Zealand declined. Its government was determined to prevent Asiatics migrating to the colony under any pretext.[5] New Zealand's growing concern over Asiatic intentions was further fuelled by the 1894-95 Sino-Japanese War fought over Korea. With the two far east Asian powers locked in conflict the possibility of European involvement grew. As the possibility grew so did concern and a minor war scare swept the world. More worrying for New Zealand, however, was the relatively quick defeat of China by the modern and European modelled military forces of Japan. Its success made Japan a major military power in the region.[6]

Japan's rise to military prominence was not the only worry for New Zealand in the middle years of the 1890's. Tensions between Britain and Germany over the Jameson Raid into the Transvaal nearly erupted into open conflict during the first weeks of 1896. The badly planned and executed raid by the four hundred and seventy mounted

riflemen under Dr Jameson allowed the Afrikaaners another easy victory over the British. More importantly the support expressed for the Boer republic by the Germans, in the telegram sent by the Kaiser to Kruger on 3 January 1896, led to a vitriolic press war and a worsening of Anglo-German relations.

At the same time as British relations with Germany were deteriorating her relations with the United States of America were also edging to the brink of war. There were two catalysts for the worsening of Anglo-American relations. The first was the long drawn out dispute between Great Britain and the United States over rights of passage through the Behring Sea. The second catalyst was the dispute between Britain and Venezuela over the boundary of British Guiana. After some hesitation the Behring Sea dispute was settled by negotiation. The dispute over Guiana's boundary however was only settled by international arbitration after President Grover Cleveland despatched a bellicose telegram. Through Olney, his Secretary of State, Cleveland advised Britain that if she continued to apply pressure on Venezuela over the boundary problems he would consider it a violation of the Monroe Doctrine. Unwilling to go to war over such a minor issue Britain signed an American negotiated treaty settlement in 1897. While Britain was able to avoid a clash of arms to settle the diplomatic disputes it had with Germany and the threat of war loomed large for the

whole Empire. Following the disputes with keen interest New Zealand's colonists and their political representatives gave whole hearted support to the Imperial Government. This support helped underline the continued necessity for local defence measures.[7]

Threats to the Empire in the Pacific in the 1890's also underlined the necessity for maintaining New Zealand's defences. Concern in New Zealand over potential German aggression had, for example, predated the Jameson Raid by at least three years. To the dread of an expansionist minded New Zealand cabinet, Germany looked set to seize Samoan territory during a bloody civil war fought during 1893 and 1894[8]. German moves into the pacific were made more worrying for New Zealand's leaders by their timing. In early 1893 New Zealand had once again re-examined its defence preparations, and it was made patently obvious by this review that the colony was without any co-ordinated scheme for the defence of its shores.[9] New Zealand's vulnerability, exposed by the lack of defence preparations, was further highlighted by the French-Russian Alliance of 1894. This alliance was potentially the most dangerous development of the nineteenth century for New Zealand's security, as it threatened the mainstay of its defence policy, British naval supremacy.[10] At the same time that they threatened British naval supremacy both France and Russia were threatening British interests around the world, Russia in

the East and France in Egypt and Siam. War with either nation, or worse both, was considered a real possibility. In New Zealand it was widely believed that if such hostilities commenced the colony would be fighting for its very existence.[11]

Volatile international relations, and significant changes to the world balance of power, resulted in a mild war scare sweeping the entire Empire. Concern began to be expressed over Britain's ability to maintain its command over the seas. This concern was further fuelled by the publication and distribution of a quantity of invasion orientated literature.[12] In New Zealand Luckie reprinted his famous '*Kaskowiski*' story as a 38 page pamphlet, complete with an updated preface describing the most recent Russian naval developments and the general increase in war preparedness of the European powers.[13] Joining Luckie in fanning the fires of the 1894 war hysteria was an extremely literate author who wrote under the pseudonym Artemidorus. Publishing a pamphlet entitled New Zealand in the Next Great War, Artemidorus described in detail the likelihood of a French invasion of New Zealand staged from New Caledonia. For Artemidorus such a descent was highly probable given the historical precedents. The barbarian hordes he noted attacked the colonies of Rome before marching on the heart of the Empire.[14] Reinforcing the foundations of the invasion fear, laid by Luckie and Artemidorus, was David Batley,

alias Julian Grix, who reproduced a lecture delivered to the Wellington Institute in 1891 as a pamphlet.[15] In the body of this work, Grix noted that:

> The question as to our liability to attack may be taken as settled. It has been fully discussed in foreign military and naval magazines and decided in the affirmative.[16]

Like Artemidorus, Grix viewed the French presence in New Caledonia as a source of potential trouble. In contrast to Artemidorus, however, Grix looked to the Spanish Empire for his historical precedents. He foresaw the possibility of the British being dragged down to the current position of Spain by continued and persistent attacks on her seaborne commerce and her outlying dominions.[17] For those of British descent the Hispanic model was most apt as all were well aware that British privateers had played a leading role in the attacks on Spain's far flung provinces and commerce.

Concern over foreign threats to the colony and the Empire was heightened by the growing realisation that Britain was diplomatically isolated by the mid-1890's. British political leaders endeavoured to portray the Empire's solitary position as a deliberate, indeed splendid, policy. Unfortunately the reality was that

Britain lacked reliable allies in a period of international instability.[18] In an endeavour to make a virtue out of necessity the inter-departmental Colonial Defence Committee was directed by the Colonial Office to write a detailed memorandum on sound principles for the defence of the Empire. This memorandum, circulated only to colonial leaders, though noting the need for local defence emphasised the importance of Britain maintaining sea supremacy.[19] Colonial leaders were easily convinced by the age old argument that if Britain lost supremacy of the seas the Empire would be vulnerable to any maritime aggressor. As a result Britain's colonies, including New Zealand, altered their strategic planning from fortress self-protection to forward defence, with the best security being viewed as providing appropriate assistance to the Home Country.[20]

International volatility was to be coupled with internal disturbances to provide more than sufficient justification for the continued maintenance of New Zealand's defence forces. Though it was generally accepted in the 1890's that the Maori threat had been neutralised, it briefly flared mid-way through the decade. So confident was the nation that relations between the races were harmonious that parliament repealed the Arms Act in 1892. This Act was intended to prevent war material getting into the hands of governmental opponents in the turbulent 1860's. New Zealand's political leaders

were, by 1891, satisfied that the whole country was under their sway.[21] This confidence was somewhat shaken by the Urewera and Ngati-whare' tribes resistance to the surveying of the Urewera between 1894-1895. The government, forced to send a detachment of the Permanent Artillery in case of conflict, was fortunate to have the mediation services of James Carroll, who negotiated a peaceful resumption of the survey.[22] The blocking of survey parties in the Urewera was, however, cause enough for a demand that the Arms Act be reimposed. This call was largely ignored by a government sure that the Maori would not resort to arms.[23] For the government labour unrest was more worrying than potential Maori insurrection by the 1890's. In 1891, and again in 1894, New Zealand along with the rest of Australasia, was plagued by strikes and associated disorder. In Queensland the government responded by calling out its Volunteers to assist the civil power while in New Zealand the Permanent Artillery joined the Police to patrol the streets and maintain order.[24]

Although general agreement existed in New Zealand on the need for defence forces in this time of unrest, few of the colony's leaders were prepared to set an example. By the early years of the 1890's business barons, for example, were accused of treating the Volunteer Force with neglect and indifference. This was contrasted to the early years of Volunteering, when

employers of labour and men of leisure and capital were said to have encouraged their employees to participate by giving them time off to perform military duty, to have subscribed to unit funds and to have participated directly by joining the force themselves.[25] Without such encouragement it was feared that the Volunteer Force would fade out of existence, leaving the colony defenceless. Realising this, leading politicians urged the government to provide economic and social inducements for volunteering. In both the Council and the House representatives argued in vain for the remission of the Horse Tax for mounted Volunteers, for subsidized entrance charges to entertainments, exemptions from Jury service and concession rates on the railways.[26] Fortunately Volunteering was not abandoned totally by community benefactors, nor did it lack inducements for men to join its ranks. In Huntly, for example, Robert Ralph, a large shareholder in the Taupiri Coal Mining company and a large scale farmer of the district, was the commander of the local Rifle Volunteers contributing handsomely to its coffers.[27] While in Huntly men might have joined the force to please the boss, elsewhere those who wished to join the ranks of the Permanent Militia were first required to serve in the ranks of the Volunteers for at least one year.[28] On a different stage, those wishing to become eligible for the allocated colonial commissions in the British Army first served as officers in Volunteer Units.[29] As important as potential personal reward as a

motive for joining the Volunteer Force in the early 1890's was the foundation of the service concept by training in the school cadet units. Fluctuating at approximately 2,000 members, in 38 corps, the Volunteer cadets not only provided the youth of the country with a primary education in military matters, they also acted as important feeders to adult units. In Canterbury alone hundreds of cadets passed into Volunteer Corps during the opening years of the 1890's.[30]

Volunteering was also aided by the constant of social and business links with the local community. Many units, for example, continued to have their uniforms manufactured locally even though the expense was greater. Such local manufacture was supported by the authorities, especially the Minister Seddon, who saw it as a means of providing employment opportunities within the colony.[31] More important, for the majority of New Zealand's settlements, were the entertainment and social facets of volunteering. Volunteer Bands continued to provide the Musical accompaniment to a vast array of community events, while the Volunteers themselves helped organise sporting contest, Military Tournaments, smoke concerts and balls for the benefit of their own coffers and the community at large.[32]

Continued community support for Volunteering, together with threats to the security of the nation, though

insufficient to ensure the forces prosperity, enabled it to survive even in the leanest of times. It was onto this rootstock that Seddon was able to regraft and rejuvenate the country's volunteer force. When he first took up his Defence portfolio it appeared as if he would be remembered as another slasher rather than as a saviour. One of his first acts was not encouragement of growth but further retrenchment. After a hurried tour of inspection of the colony's defence establishments Seddon dismissed an under secretary, three Lieutenant-Colonels and several junior officers, making a further saving of £4,800 per annum in salaries. Seddon was not, however, simply trying to save money. His obvious intent was to have his department run as efficiently and economically as possibly. As soon as he had completed his disestablishment of positions he regarded as surplus, Seddon devolved decision making to the lowest possible level, and emphasised to the remaining employees that they were regarded as efficient and faithful servants. In response those still on the defence pay roll were credited with working with more will, confidence and vigour.[33]

With his ministry refashioned to meet his needs, Seddon set about revitalising the Volunteer Force. From his often overlooked personal experience of Volunteering (as a non-commissioned officer in a Melbourne Volunteer Artillery Corps)[34], his observations of its operation, and the public comments on the forces in New Zealand, Seddon

decided that a three part organisational and financial restructuring programme was necessary. To make the force more professional Seddon wished to see an Imperial officer, conversant with modern military ideas, appointed for a five year term as commandant. Such an appointee, Seddon believed, would bring the requisite expertise to help upgrade and reinvigorate the Volunteer Force. Secondly, to ensure that the best candidates available rose to lead the country's volunteer units, Seddon proposed to replace the 'bottom-up' elective system of officer selection with a 'top-down' nominative system. The new system was to be controlled by the new commandant using the services of the officers commanding the military districts. Seddon also proposed changes to the funding formula for governmental capitation. Instead of a yearly grant apportioned by Parliament, Seddon argued for a three year guaranteed minimum capitation to enable units to make long term financial commitments without fear of overtaxing their resources.[35]

Surprisingly, given his reputation, Seddon failed to implement any of his proposals for the Volunteers in his first five year term as Minister of Defence. This was in spite of the programme being little more than a restatement of pre-existing proposals. As early as 1888, at the time of Whitmore's resignation, public demands had been made for the appointment of a suitably qualified Imperial officer to take up the position of commandant.[36]

The arrival of Lieutenant-Colonel F. J. Fox in May 1892, as commandant designate, at first appeared to fulfill Seddon's first wish. Unfortunately his resignation from the appointment, before he officially took up the position, was a major setback.[37] Another setback was his inability to alter the officer selection procedure, or arrange long term guaranteed capitation grants for Volunteer units despite widespread support. In Canterbury the Lyttelton Times praised and supported the concept of a guaranteed capitation funding formula as well as the abolition of officer election in favour of a nominative system.[38] Seddon's proposals were also strongly supported by Lieutenant-Colonel Hume, the acting Undersecretary of Defence and Inspector of the Forces, in his report of 1891.[39] This support was continued by Hume's successor, Lieutenant-Colonel Fox,who was adamant that officer election worked to the long term detriment of Volunteering, as the best men often refused to come forward.[40] With community and expert support it appeared Seddon had the necessary backing to make any requisite changes to the regulations governing the Volunteers. Nevertheless when he arranged for the gazetting of new regulations,on the 21 February 1895,he allowed the elective system of officer selection to remain and the provisions relating to capitation remained virtually unchanged with the funding being a grant appropriated annually by Parliament.[41]

While it is surprising that none of Seddon's proposals were incorporated into the Volunteer Regulations, it is even more surprising that an improvement in the Force was almost immediately discernible on his taking office. The improvement cannot be gauged in quantitative terms as the Force lost, in the first year of the Liberal ministry, another thousand enrolled members, dropping to a total of 6,700. Of those, it was estimated that five hundred were paper-only soldiers taking no part in training whatever. Nor in strict qualitative terms can the improvement be seen, as only three-quarters of the force were deemed efficient, on par with the previous year. The improvement for the Volunteer Force, like that noticeable in defence generally, was one of attitude. Both officers and men were complimented in 1891 by Hume on their new attitude which was reflected in their more soldierlike appearance and improved proficiency in tactics and drill. To a large degree, Hume implied, the improvement was due to an improvement in training. During the preceding year the Permanent Militia had provided valuable assistance to Volunteers, individually as instructors, and collectively as a body to emulate. Further units commenced a concerted theoretical and practical course of training. Artillery units, for example, combined lecture programmes with practical work on drill guns mounted in training sheds.[42] The improved attitude was not simply the result of positive response to training, or to Seddon and Hume. It also resulted from a growing realisation that if

Volunteering were to fail the alternative would be the calling out of a compulsory Militia. This alternative all knew was being investigated as part of the review of Captain Moritz Bowron's suggestions for the improvement of New Zealand's Defences. Bowron, the Commanding Officer of the Richmond Rifles, argued that the Volunteers as a body were worthless. They lacked numbers, training and financial resources. He urged the government to increase numbers by using the provisions of the Militia Act, and to increase training for recruits from 30 hours to a two year detailed course. In addition Bowron suggested the government encourage units to undertake more field work, and assist corps by providing them with their uniforms free of charge.[43]

While Bowron's suggestions were being reviewed his assessments were supported by Hume's report. Hume, though identifying a discernible improvement in Volunteer attitudes and training, was far from convinced that the force was totally efficient or effective. Like Bowron he reported on a lack of financial security and uniformity in dress. He also noted the lack of medical support services and of effective training at Easter encampments. Hume's response to the identifiable weaknesses in the Volunteer Force was to lobby for Seddon's proposed three year guaranteed capitation grant, the adoption of the recently approved 'Karkee' (khaki) cloth for uniform manufacture, the establishment of ambulance corps and the replacement

of Easter encampments with paid daylight parades on statutory volunteer holidays proclaimed by the Government, if employers proved obstructionist.[44]

The following year, 1892, Hume was once again able to report favourably on the Volunteer Force. Though numbers had decreased further, from 6,700 to 6,582, and many of those remaining were paper-only soldiers, there had been a dramatic rise in efficiency. Out of the 6,582 enrolled volunteers, 5,376 (82 percent) had capitated as efficient, or twelve percent up on the previous year, when only 4,939 (seventy-four percent) out of the 6,700 had capitated. Hume used these figures and statistics to answer those critics of the Volunteers who argued that they were fading out of existence due to the lack of official encouragement. Commenting on the increase in efficiency he noted it would:

> no doubt be somewhat surprising to those sceptics who continually assert that the Volunteer movement is dying out, that the men are disheartened and disgusted with their treatment, and receive no encouragement...these fallacies are completely upset by the substantial increase of... efficients[45]

Efficiency, as recorded by an increase quantitatively, was not the only improvement reported by Hume in 1892. The recommended medical support services had been established, with Hume being able to note that every corp had trained ambulance men on their rolls. Hume regretted, however, the fact that not all his 1891 recommendations had been acted upon. While the Government had refused to assist financially Easter encampments they had not instituted Hume's recommended replacement, the paid daylight parades or the volunteer holidays, statutory or otherwise. Without Governmentally assisted Easter encampments or paid daylight parades, any improvement in the Volunteers during 1892 must have been through hard work on their part rather than official planning. Indeed it was simply their determination which must have carried them through. Even without Governmental financial backing three Volunteer Easter encampments were held, at Wanganui, Christchurch and Bluff. At each approximately 500 men, paying for everything themselves, attended. The bulk of their time was taken up with practical training and instruction. At Christchurch, for example, the Canterbury Mounted Rifles trained and acted as a 'Flying Column' traversing Banks Peninsular while two Rifle Companies camped and trained at Sumner. Owing to the courtesy of the senior naval officer of the Australasian squadron Easter encampments were only one of the continuous daylight training activities available to volunteer units in the early years of the 1890's. The *H.M.S. Ringarooma* while visiting Nelson and

Auckland for a short period became a training vessel taking aboard Naval Volunteers for a crash course on naval gun drills.[46]

Opportunistic training activities, important as they were for Volunteer training, highlighted the central authorities' disregard for Hume's recommendations. This did not mean however that the authorities were ignoring the needs of defence or the Volunteer Force. Following the lead given by the government of New South Wales the New Zealand authorities actively sought the services of an Imperial officer to command its forces. Success in this endeavour came in 1892 when approval was given for the appointment of Lieutenant Colonel F. J. Fox to the post of commandant of the New Zealand Defence Forces.

At the centre of this scheme to secure the appointment of Fox was Seddon. In 1891 he had placed in the defence estimates seven hundred pounds for the costs of employing an Imperial officer as commandant. He then applied through the Attorney General and Governor to the War Office for the services of a suitable candidate for a five year term. The War Office, after considering the application, offered to the New Zealand government the services of Fox, seemingly considered an energetic Royal Artillery officer keen to take on the challenge and responsibilities of commanding the national forces of New Zealand. The promise of such an appointee had helped keep

up the morale of many involved in New Zealand's defences, and had kept some units going with anticipation and expectation of better times. All hoped such an officer would be able to extricate New Zealand's defences from the mire they seemed to have drifted into. On his arrival Fox certainly appeared to be the saviour they were looking for. Instead of formally taking up his appointment Fox obtained the Premier's permission to travel the length and breadth of the country on a tour of inspection. Over a nine month period Fox examined all of New Zealand's installations, units and their officers seeking out their strengths and exposing their weaknesses for scrutiny.[47] This immediate show of dynamism on the new commandant's part, while ultimately resulting in significant improvements to the Volunteer force, initially unleashed a major political controversy which led to his resignation as commandant, a Royal Commission of Inquiry and a conference of Volunteer officers charged with finding the "..best means of placing the Volunteer Force of the colony on a sounder and better basis."[48]

Before the officers met, however, New Zealand was wracked by the controversy prompted by the publication in June 1893 of the combined inspection report by Fox on the state of the colony's defences. Submitted in three parts, between February and June 1893, the report was one of most thorough inspections ever undertaken into New Zealand's defences. Unlike Hume's reports, which simply compared

the state of the forces with the situation in the preceding year, Fox based his comparisons and judgements on what the force should ideally be. Best described as a condemnation of the existing system, Fox's report was to polarise both debate and public opinion on defence issues for the next three years. This result was exactly what Fox seemed determined to achieve, as he believed the previous system of reporting was inaccurate, indeed incompetent. Such reporting, he felt, had lulled the colony into believing its defence forces were more efficient than they in fact were. He saw it as his "...imperative duty to dispel that belief. " In carrying out this self appointed task Fox, in clear and uncompromising language, highlighted the deficiencies of New Zealand's whole defence establishment. When dealing with Field, Garrison and Naval Artillery units, for example, he reported that out of the hundreds of individuals enrolled within such corps throughout the whole country only 254 were capable of fulfilling their duties as artillerymen. Of those capable of acting as artillerymen, all but 20 were from the Naval Artillery, and those 234 artillery from the navals represented less than twenty percent of the Naval Volunteers. Worst of all the Artillery were by no means the least efficient branch of the Volunteer Force. None of the Infantry and only one unit from the Mounted arm, the Otago Hussars, were in Fox's estimation effective or efficient. If the comments on the various corps and branches were not sufficient to

cause indignation throughout the colony, Fox went on to rub salt into the wounds he had opened by commenting on all Volunteer Officers individually. Of the two hundred and sixty-four commissioned officers serving at the time of his inspection Fox was able to classify one hundred and ninety-six (seventy-five percent) as fair to very good. The remaining sixty-eight officers he damned as indifferent or bad.[49]

What surprised Fox, given the poor shape of the Force, was the excellent spirit of the Volunteers themselves, which he seemed genuinely at a loss to explain. It did not appear to be the result of any real interest in defence matters manifested by the country's leaders. It did not seem to be the result of encouragement from the permanent force, who Fox believed were understaffed and overworked. The mystery of the excellent spirit was further compounded for Fox by the fact that the force was badly organised, and given insufficient funds through the annual capitation funding system to fulfill its myriad of roles. Engineer units, for example, had to purchase the bulk of their specialist equipment from their own funds, while capitation for cavalry units barely compensated individuals for the expense of training. Worse many units were poorly equipped and overly manned by paper-strength soldiers.[50]

In an endeavour to overcome the shortcomings of the Volunteer force, and build upon its inherent excellent spirit, Fox argued that the existing regulations governing the force should be revised.[51] For the defence of the colony, Fox believed a totally new defence scheme had to be evolved to meet the current need. Fox's planned defence scheme, as with previous proposals, was designed to provide the colony with adequate defence at minimum cost. New Zealand, according to Fox, was threatened by four modes of attack under two district conditions. The modes of attack Fox identified included the unlikely possibilities of descents by large fleets of heavily armoured vessels or cruisers on New Zealand's fortified centres. Fox also included the more likely dangers such as a small landing or descent by a combination of cruisers and privateers. Against the likely possibilities Fox argued that New Zealand should defend itself. He noted that for defence planning two conditions existed. Either Britain retained supremacy of the seas and New Zealand, along with the rest of the Empire, remained fundamentally secure, or alternatively the British navy could not command the sea lanes and the Empire was lost, vulnerable to unannounced attack by any maritime aggressor.[52] To counter effectively the likely low level threats to the colony's security Fox proposed a major restructuring of defence organisation and administration.

After carefully examining the colony's fourteen Military districts in both Islands, Fox recommended that they be reduced by amalgamation to four major districts centred on Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin together with one minor district based on Nelson-Westland. (It was not until February 1895 that this reduction in the administrative districts actually occured). Fox argued that such radical restructuring would help concentrate defence effort on the most likely targets of any attack, the four main centres and the strategic coal reserves of Westport.[53] To defend each of these new districts Fox advocated major changes to both the Garrison and Field force units. Fox, on completion of his tour of inspection, carefully assessed the minimum manpower and equipment requirements to defend each district he had proposed. For Wellington he believed a 1228 man force, 1111 (ninety percent) of whom were to be Volunteers, was needed. In Auckland he proposed a 1075 man force, of whom 990 were to be Volunteers. Further south in Dunedin Fox argued that the district required a 1127 man force, composed of sixty-four permanent militia and 1063 Volunteers. In Christchurch fifty-six permanent militia and 987 Volunteers were needed for defence. Across the Ranges in the smaller district of Nelson and Westland he believed one hundred and ninety-one men, of whom only two were to be permanent staff, should be able to protect the important coal reserves. The colony's volunteers, under the scheme proposed by Fox, would number only 4,340,

approximately two thousand less than were at that time enrolled. To make the necessary manpower savings Fox recommended the disbandment of forty-one (40 percent) of the existing one hundred and two units. In the main these units were country corps, who Fox believed were of little immediate use and thus a drain on the limited financial and material resources available for defence in New Zealand.[54]

To make the most efficient use of resources available, Fox argued in favour of an armament replacement programme, and changes to training programmes as well as organisational restructuring. The worn out, unserviceable and often dangerous Snider rifles Fox argued, in agreement with most commentators, must be replaced immediately. Interestingly he did not recommend the latest weapons available, the newly released magazine fed rifles. Instead he proposed the colony should purchase the older Martini-Henry breech-loader. The Martini-Henry had a record of twenty years service with the British Army alone, and had proved its worth many times over[55], unlike the newer magazine-fed rifles, which were too delicate for ill trained troops. Fox proposed that six thousand weapons be obtained. Though greater than the proposed number of soldiers, Fox noted that there was also an urgent need for reserve weaponry. In addition Fox argued for the purchase of haversacks, water bottles, great-coats and valises so the Volunteers could survive on the battlefield if called

upon. Fox also argued for the completion of the planned submarine mining defences of the main ports, and the redeployment of the spar-torpedo boats from attack vessels to guard boats. The boats he noted were ill equipped and hazardous for use in their conceived role. He also argued for the scrapping of the majority of Naval Volunteer boats in the colony, which to Fox were little more than pleasure craft provided by the government to leisure seekers at a cost of £450 per annum to the tax payer.[56] One curious feature of Fox's proposals was the lack of forethought for medical services. He commended the Medical officers for their work and noted that there existed no system for the organisation of either field or base hospitals in time of crisis. While he argued that this was not important, as no medical organisation was required, he went on to contradict himself. He suggested that a few ambulances at different points in the defence lines and the creation of a hospital in each of the four centres would be sufficient in war.[57]

The contradictory comments by Fox about medical provision were not repeated when he came to make recommendations on training. His assessment of the existing system was, with one exception, damning. The single exception was the training of Engineer signalers in Christchurch and Dunedin which had established their own Schools of Instruction to train signallers in the arts of telegraphy, as well as military duties. This exception

aside, Fox noted that New Zealand appeared incapable of training its troops effectively. The officers were unskilled commanders incapable of acting as instructors, and the permanent force instructors were out of date, over worked and as a consequence generally inefficient. Fox argued that for training to improve the government would have to appoint at least six additional Imperial Staff officers and instructors. To ensure that training remained current, as well as providing a good soldierly example for the volunteers to emulate, Fox suggested the additional appointees should be unmarried and brought in on three year contracts.

In addition to lacking expertise Fox believed the Volunteers lacked sufficient training time. He believed that there should be an increased number of daylight parades, outdoor training should be undertaken more often, and Easter encampments should be arranged to perfect a planned yearly scheme of training.[58] Fox also wished to see major changes to officer training. He did not object, in principle, to election of officers as long as commanders used the veto power they possessed when required, and as long as a rigorous examination system existed to weed out unsuitable candidates. He noted that under the present system candidates for commissions could cram, sit and pass their examinations for both lieutenant and captain at the same time, without demonstrating any proficiency in tactics or field craft. Fox wished to see

an examination system that was progressive and included outdoor practical subjects together with the existing theoretically based syllabus. All of the training recommendations made by Fox were proposed with the aim of ensuring the Force became both efficient and effective in the military art. To give encouragement to individual volunteers Fox urged the government to increase capitation, as well as provide personal bonuses for Volunteers attending encampments of three or more days. He also suggested a yearly efficiency badge be instituted, as a visible reward for those who proved themselves efficient soldiers. Individual training, by itself, was not however sufficient. Individual efficiency had to be harnessed, and to do this Fox recommended that units be organised into higher formations. Noting that the Artillery corps had already been organised into a single regiment Fox proposed to join together the independent Infantry and Mounted Units into battalions. With such a structure, manned by well equipped and trained troops, Fox was confident the nation could defend itself against low level threats. However he was adamant that his proposals were an integrated scheme that could not have its individual components tampered with. As he himself said:

> ..all the recommendations are intimately connected, and the cutting out of one or the reducing of any of the expenditure proposed will at once alter the whole scheme..[59]

Purely as a scheme of defence for the colony the proposals put forward by Fox were well conceived. When they were critically examined by two other military experts with experience in New Zealand, Jervois and Schaw, both proposals and the author were praised. Schaw, while noting that schemes of defence would always differ to some extent because of differences of opinion, commended Fox's scheme as an able plan penned by a man with immense ability and knowledge.[60] Similarly Jervois was impressed by Fox's able and exhaustive scheme though he had some queries as to the specific proposals for Ripa Island.[61] In later years Fox was also praised by Volunteer officers for both inspiring them to do well and instructing them in their proper duties[62] Fox's scheme was also economical. If carried out it would have resulted not only in immediate improvements in defence preparedness, it would also have saved money. In the first year of operation Fox envisaged his scheme reducing the defence budget from £69,487 to £67,643.[63] Though the proposed scheme was cost effective it did not receive unanimous support in the legislature or the colony. Fox, while an able military officer was an inept politician. His attacks on individual officers and units, when made public, unleashed an unparalleled controversy in the history of the defence debate in New Zealand (Gordon's comments of the 1870's were extremely mild in comparison).

Seddon, aware of the furore that the report was creating, endeavoured as far as he was able to defuse the controversy by his usual techniques of filibustering and stonewalling. Though the report had been made public in early June 1893 it was not debated in the legislature until nearly four months later, in late September. Between the report being made public and the September debate Seddon obstructed all efforts to discuss the report in the House. When questioned by Dr Newman, in early July, as to whether Fox's various recommendations were to be implemented Seddon simply noted that the matter would be discussed by the House before any Governmental action was taken. A month later he used the same response when Wright asked if the country corps were to be disbanded in line with Fox's proposals.[64]

By September Seddon could stall no longer, and was forced to lay Fox's report on the table for discussion. Though the matter had to be discussed, Seddon was determined it would be on his terms. Stonewalling until midnight on the 21 September 1893, Seddon laid the report on the table and then proceeded to speak for one and a quarter hours. When Seddon eventually sat down all that the members wished to do was leave the chamber. The eight members who decided to speak in the debate were given only three-quarters on an hour between them to make known their views.[65] The whole of Seddon's speech appears to be part and parcel of an attempt to defuse the controversy

building up around Fox and his report. He did not simply lay the report on the table for discussion nor move for its acceptance as a whole. Instead he moved:

> ..That the Volunteer Year be extended to the last day of February that the disbanding of the country corps which last year were efficient, and which disbanding has been recommended by Colonel Fox be held over; that the selection of the Martini-Henry rifle be approved..[66]

When he had moved his innocuous resolution, Seddon went on to give qualified praise to Fox and the report. He noted that Fox, as an outside military expert, had produced a straight forward and outspoken report that would undoubtedly promote volunteering throughout the country. Seddon qualified this praise, however, by noting that Fox had gauged New Zealand's Volunteers from too high a standard. He went on to state that some of the recommendations, if carried out, would be destructive to the very well being of the Force. In particular Seddon did not wish to see the disbandment of the country corps, as he regarded them as a valuable recruiting ground for the Permanent Militia as well as being a reserve for the vulnerable points on the coast.[67] More importantly, and something he was unable to express, Seddon could not afford the political fall out from wholesale abolition of country corps. The Government was worried that the

country members would vote against the government if such a policy were pursued. On a more personal front Fox's scheme called for the disbandment of all six Westland corps, in Seddon's own constituency, something he was not prepared to contemplate.[68] Seddon also backtracked on the need for greater control over officer appointments arguing that the existing system helped make volunteering popular.[69] Concluding in an equally bland fashion to his opening Seddon sat down and allowed others to speak to the resolution.

Almost immediately Seddon was severely attacked by his predecessor as Defence Minister, Russell. According to Russell, Seddon had so worded his motion on the report authorized by Fox as to make it a dead document.[70] This view was also held by Allen who believed that had Seddon undertaken to carry out Fox's recommendations new life would have been infused into the "useless" Volunteer movement.[71] Answering the attacks on Seddon were Palmer, Willis and Ward who turned the tables somewhat by attacking Fox. Palmer believed that Fox had slandered the Volunteer officers of the colony[72], while Willis believed Fox clearly held the popular and respected Volunteers in contempt.[73] Ward on the other hand questioned whether Fox had been in the colony long enough to be fully acquainted with the force, its officers and its problems.[74] With the lines of demarcation clearly drawn in the House the first

debate came to an end, but was resumed with equal vigour on the 28th September 1893[75] The same general arguments were used in the resumed debate, though the supporters of Fox were better prepared. Thompson best summed up the stance taken in favour of Fox's report when he stated that

> ...the thanks of the House and the colony were due to Colonel Fox for the report he had furnished. He had simply done his duty, and told some of the mushroom Volunteer Officers of the faults they had...[76]

In response Swan summed up the opponents stance by accusing Fox of knocking back volunteering by 8 to 10 years with his report which had totally demoralised the Force.[77]

The two opposing views on Fox and his report, expressed so vehemently in the House, was reflected in the tone of the reporting by the press. Taking sides the media took the controversy to the people. Those newspapers who opposed the report and especially the adverse reporting of the 68 officers, titled them "Fox's Martyrs". Unfortunately for the media supporters of Fox they were unable to come up with such an emotive catch phrase.[78] Attacked both in the press and in parliament, and unable to rely on his Minister to provide the backing he thought

essential, Fox decided to resign. His resignation, in fact, came before he had officially taken up his appointment as Commandant.

Annoyed by the treatment meted out to Fox, by Seddon in particular, Lord Glasgow (the Governor) attempted to intercede on behalf of the Commandant Designate. He told Seddon that he felt it his duty to recommend that the report drafted by Fox be acted upon. Further he argued that Fox should be given the full powers of Commandant. When Fox tendered his resignation Glasgow went further by bringing the matter to the attention of his superiors in London. He intimated to them that Fox's balanced and well written report had been totally ignored by New Zealand's government and that the colony's defences would remain unsatisfactory until that report and its proposed revisions had been acted upon. In response to the Governor's interference Seddon noted that Fox's report had not been ignored, as was evident from the fact that the majority of its recommendations and proposals had been acted upon. Three thousand of the recommended six thousand Martini-Henry rifles, for example, had been ordered almost immediately after Fox had suggested them as a replacement for the Snider. Seddon was not willing, however, to simply implement Fox's proposals without question. He jealously guarded the powers vested in Parliament and the Governor on defence issues, and was not prepared to hand them over to the commandant.[79]

While Seddon was reacting to the Governor's unwanted attention the controversy generated by Fox's report was further fuelled by his resignation. In early 1894 correspondence relating to the resignation was leaked to the press, and published by the Wellington Evening Post on the 4 April 1894. In response to the leak the Government established a commission of inquiry to discover the culprit. Charles O'Hara Smith, the Commissioner appointed by the Government, reported that the correspondence must have been leaked by one of three men, Sir Patrick Buckley, Mr Cadman or the messenger who carried the correspondence between the two. Unfortunately for Smith his detailed, forty-seven page report when published was considered a fiasco, as E. T. Gillian the editor of the Wellington Evening Post swore a widely believed declaration that none of the three named gentlemen had leaked the information to him. This particular controversy was, however, left to die as action had been seen to have been taken even though nothing was actually achieved.[80]

While the resignation controversy quickly ran its course the original controversy over Fox's report continued unabated. In July 1894 G. J. Smith rose in the House and asked if Fox's recommendations for the reorganisation of the Volunteer Force would be carried out. Seddon testily answered that the Government had already informed the House the previous year how far they

were prepared to go in carrying out the recommendations of Colonel Fox. This was followed almost immediately by Russell asking if Fox was performing the duties of the commandant of New Zealand's Forces. Seddon abruptly answered in the negative informing the House that the connection between Fox and the Defence Forces of the colony were severed.[81] Smith, and the opposition, were not however satisfied with Seddon's replies, and nearly two months later, on the 28th August 1894, Smith asked the Minister if the House would have an opportunity to discuss defence. He asked for the opportunity as it was:

> evident, from the report presented to the House last year, some reorganisation in the defence system was necessary..[82]

Seddon, in a much more conciliatory tone than seven weeks earlier, replied that an opportunity for such a discussion would be provided when he brought down the estimates.[83] The next day O'Reagan asked if Fox had been appointed Military Advisor to the Government at a salary of £700 per annum. Seddon again in a conciliatory tone, and in an about face from his previous statement that Fox had severed all ties with New Zealand defence, answered that an offer had been made to Fox and the Government was still awaiting his reply.[84] When Fox agreed to the appointment, the Governor queried the Minister as to the exact nature of this new position. In his reply Seddon informed Lord

Glasgow that if Fox was agreeable the government intended to employ him as a Military expert under the provisions of Section 61 of the Civil Service Reform Act 1886[85]

Seddon's change of attitude toward Fox was probably stimulated by the minor war scare that swept the colony in 1894, which focussed peoples attention away from public works to the inadequacies of New Zealand's defence. Such inadequacies had been highlighted by Fox's condemnatory report. Seddon, as a popularist politician, instantly perceived the feeling of unease and moved determinedly to dispel it. To ensure that the right military decisions were made, he negotiated with Fox to remain. He then called together a conference of 22 selected officers, including Fox, to discuss defence. This conference, under the chairmanship of Whitmore, met in Wellington for eleven days during late September and early October 1894. All its members were notable for their prolonged attempts to improve the colony's defence by drawing attention to military deficiencies, as well as for providing possible solutions.[86]

The recommendations of the conference, which numbered twenty-six in total, were a summary of those made by almost every inspector of the defences, including Fox himself. To take examples, the conference recommended that uniformity of dress be established, higher formations (brigades and battalions) be organised, the election

system of officer selection be abolished and establishments for the four main centres be laid down. One significantly new recommendation from the conference was that assistance to the New Zealand Rifle Association be discontinued. The conference, in agreement with Fox, believed it detrimental to volunteering. Not only was it a competing attraction, it also undermined discipline as it did not have the necessary control mechanisms in place to act as a defacto defence organisation. When the report was finally presented to Seddon he was extremely pleased. He promised that the recommendations would receive careful attention by the Government, though he was unable to go into detail on all the recommendations as certain of them were confidential by their very nature. As an indication of governmental support a resolution on procuring of war material was framed almost immediately, based on one of the specific proposals from the conference. Seddon also took to opportunity to justify the limited help in the past for the Volunteers. He argued that with the finances available it had been a question of money for Volunteers or money for public works to make land accessible to settlers.[87]

Further governmental support for the conference's recommendations was shown by the issue of yet another set of Volunteer regulations in 1895. Indeed one of the prime reasons for calling the officers together was to assist Seddon frame such regulations. The Minister, had,

himself, been working on this revision project since August 1894 and had:

> come to the conclusion that many of the Volunteer Regulations now in force might be advantageously amended with a view to adding efficiency to the Force and rendering service more popular...

As soon as the conference submitted its findings Seddon commenced an intimate study of their recommendations on regulations with a view to incorporating them into the set he was working on, as well as making any amendments to legislation that was necessary.[88]

Within five months Seddon, with Fox's assistance, was able to promulgate a revised set of defence regulations, and have amending legislation ready for submission to parliament for approval. The Regulations were gazetted on the 28 February 1895, to come into force on the 1 March of that year. As a new issue the Regulations revoked the proclamations made on the 26 November 1888, 11 January 1890 and the 27 March 1890. Surprisingly only minor changes are evident in the regulations. They consisted of 300 paragraphs (though only 299 are enumerated as number 278 appears twice) in 45 paragraphs, with five appendices, 21 Forms and a price list for arms, accoutrements and ammunition. In form they were almost identical to the

sets of the preceding decade. The only discernible change, in line with the recommendations of both Fox and the Volunteer officers conference, were made to establishments. All units, except Naval or Garrison Artillery, were to be allowed a maximum of sixty and a minimum of forty personnel. For Naval and Garrison Artillery Units the maximum was to be 100, with the minimum being sixty. For each of the four districts, Auckland, Wellington, Christchurch and Dunedin, an establishment of 790 men was laid down. These establishments were to consist of one Mounted Corps, three Naval or Garrison Artillery Corps, one Field Artillery Corps, one Engineer Corps, a Rifle Corps and a Garrison Band. That the Regulations did not change things significantly except for establishments was immaterial. That they had been revised was all important. In conjunction with Fox's services being retained, and the Volunteer Officers conference, the Regulations were a manifestation to New Zealand's public that the Government was actively encouraging appropriate defence measures in a time of international unease.[89]

Perhaps a clearer manifestation of governmental interest in defence was seen by what they were willing to spend. Throughout the period the colony made a yearly payment of nearly £21,000 for the maintenance of the Australasian Naval Squadron.[90] In addition a yearly amount was apportioned in the government estimates for defence

expenditure. When the Liberals took control of the Treasury benches in 1891 the colony was spending £83,696 per annum on local defence. Within a year Seddon had reduced defence expenditure by eleven per cent to £74,487. The following financial year (1893-1894) he reduced expenditure by a further four percent to £71,386. In response to the volatility in international relations and the mild war scare sweeping the colony expenditure was raised in 1894-1895 to £78,165. It was raised by another five percent in the following year to £81,812 before rising sharply in 1896-1897 to £103,664.[91]

As significant as the provision of more money was a more generous attitude in its distribution. Capitation, for example, though never enough to cover the actual costs of Volunteering, was more freely given. Seddon, as Minister of Defence, did not adhere strictly to the regulations governing eligibility for capitation. He proved willing to pay capitation to units that had paraded up to twenty-five percent below the minimum stipulated.[92] The government was also more ready to assist volunteers in financial difficulties. The Dunedin Garrison Hall Trustees, who in the early 1890's had borrowed £6,000 to build a Volunteer Drill Hall, were by 1893 unable to repay their mortgage. Determined to support the Volunteers and ensure that they did not lose control of their drill hall the ministry arranged for the passage of special

legislation enabling them to raise money by selling debentures for which the Government acted as guarantor.[93]

Governmental encouragement for volunteering in the mid-1890's consisted of more than providing grants, guarantees and guidelines. Cabinet was also directly involved in Volunteer recruitment, training and retention. In early 1896 the ministry directed that all civil service cadets must serve with the Volunteer Force for a minimum of three years. All existing governmental employees were also to be encouraged to join their local units. Once attested these civil service 'volunteers' were to be given every facility for attending parades and encampments.[94] Such training exercises which were greatly assisted by the publication and distribution of new instructional manuals adapted for New Zealand's specific requirements. These manuals were the result of governmental directives from Lieutenant Colonel Fox to three permanent staff, Lieutenant-Colonel Newall, Captain Coleman and Staff-Sergeant-Major Richardson, to revise all existing training literature. Working with a will they quickly produced manuals for musketry instruction as well as drill manuals for Mounted rifles, Cavalry and Garrison Artillery. The manuals produced were justifiably praised by the user units.[95] To encourage Volunteers to remain in the service after achieving an efficient standard, the government, following the British and New South Wales examples, arranged in 1894 to have a Volunteer Decoration

made available for officers who had served continuously for twenty-years. This type of encouragement was extended in 1896 to other ranks, with the gazetting of the Long Service Medal[96]

One significant drawback to governmental encouragement for volunteering was that it helped highlight existing deficiencies even further. Production of quality manuals for some arms contrasted markedly with those that were not provided for. The Field Artillery, for example, was by the mid-1890's suffering not only from general lack of equipment and training but most importantly a standardised drill manual that would have provided essential uniformity in instruction.[97] A more fundamental weakness for Volunteer Training than manuals, was the lack of reliable topographical maps of New Zealand. Though a major weakness for any military force the lack of maps was, according to Fox at least, a positive advantage. It ensured that any enemy who landed on New Zealand's shores would find it difficult to advance, as they would lack any clear idea of roads, paths, hills or valleys. To overcome the inherent weakness that inadequate mapping presented to New Zealand's forces Fox organised district Volunteer training encampments over Easter in the vicinity of the chief towns. Training was then conducted over the ground that in a time of hostilities the local volunteer units would be expected to defend.[98]

Volunteer Camp training in local regions for the specific purpose of preparing its defences was in stark contrast to the schemes undertaken in the early 1890's. In the opening years of the decade three large scale one week long camps were organised for the whole colony. At a total cost of nearly £2,000 these camps drew together volunteer units from hundreds of miles away to a central site. The drawing together of disparate units wasted an inordinate amount of potential training time in travelling. Time was further wasted by concentrating on basic drill leading to a contrived sham fight. This perceived waste, in a period of economic stringency and accountability, was unacceptable to the taxpayer, government and the volunteers.[99] To maximise training benefits from the camps Fox, realising that the volunteers were eager to learn , replaced the simple drills with more field work and tactical manoeuvres. He was determined to transform the camps into demanding training exercises that would help perfect the professionalism of the citizen soldiers.[100] By 1895 Fox had achieved his goal. The twelve camps held in the five districts were a good test for the nearly three thousand volunteers who attended. Not only were they carefully scrutinized by the permanent staff instructors when they undertook picketing, reconnoitering, night marches, defence and attack exercises, they were also tried by extremely bad weather. The year was noted for its discomfort and all were glad when it was time to return to their normal vocations.

They had by then, proved themselves capable soldiers willing to continue even in the most adverse conditions. As a result Fox was pleased to report that excellent work had been undertaken by the volunteers of the colony.[101]

While pleased with the improvements exhibited by the Volunteers, Fox believed they could be made even better if they had a better quality of instructors. He believed that they were often drilled by incompetent sergeants and instructed by ignorant officers. To overcome these inadequacies he advocated compulsory classes of instruction for officers and more intensive training for units.[102] In this assessment Fox appears to have been too harsh. The officers, NCO's and Volunteers in the majority of units were diligent when it came to training. They organised integrated training programmes that provided initial drill training for new recruits, together with more advanced training for longer serving volunteers. This practical training was then complemented by appropriate lectures, and extra instruction from experts where available. The Otago Hussars, for example, complemented their practical mounted work on reconnoitering with a lecture programme on the aims and objectives of Military Reconnaissance.[103]. In Wellington, the local Volunteer Battery of Artillery devised a four month progressive training programme based primarily on weekly night parades. The battery moved through gun and small arms drill, through aiming and positioning drills,

then onto detachment drills with sword exercises before undertaking Battery exercises under staff Instructor Sergeant Major Richardson.[104] Other artillery units improved their technical skills by training with the gun crews of visiting warships[105] or on drill guns mounted in their Garrison Halls, as well as attending complementary gunnery lectures.[106] Even the training activities Fox considered utterly wasteful had an important part to play. The sham fights, field days and military tournaments, considered of only minimal training benefit, were useful for creating and maintaining esprit de corps as well as cementing links with the community.[107]

Links with the local community manifest by military pageantry were strengthened by military expenditure. The twenty-seven and a half percent tax imposed on all imported uniforms was an important boast to business, local manufacturers having an immediate advantage over their offshore competition. As important as uniforms was ammunition. Seddon organised a contract for a million and a half rounds of small arms ammunition to be manufactured in New Zealand. The cost to the colony was £5 5s per thousand, with the powder being supplied by the government. Primarily a strategic decision to ensure a reserve of quality ammunition, and provide the basis for re-supply, the contract could not help but be a boost to business.[108] The ammunition supply contract was also a help politically for the Liberals. Having arranged local

supply Seddon was able to defuse a potential political crisis when the ammunition reserve was carefully scrutinised by the Opposition. Motivated in part by a genuine concern, as well as a desire to score political points, the Opposition demanded a return on the state and size of the nation's ammunition reserve. In Britain this single issue helped topple the Rosebery Government when the opposition exposed the dangerously low stocks of reserve ammunition.[109]

Undoubtedly Seddon's keen political sense had safeguarded his ministry from serious criticism on defence matters. Yet much capital could still have been made by the opposition if they had read the Defence Reports more carefully. In the Auckland District, for example, Fox reported that in 1895 only 780 members were enrolled for its establishment of 1369. Worse, only fifty-eight percent of the enrolled Volunteers had actually capitated efficient. Because of this he expressed his belief that '...there is no efficient force for the defence of Auckland.' While Fox admitted Auckland was exceptionally bad he believed that all country Infantry corps lacked adequate instruction in their duties. More worrying their officers were ignorant in tactics, field fortifications and military topography. A year later he was still able to declare that few officers could pass examinations in basic military subjects. That the opposition did not make extensive use of such weaknesses, for political advantage,

and attack the Government seems incredible. To be fair, though, they had only sixteen members in the House to oppose the government's fifty-two.[110]

Unlike the political opposition the lack of numbers did not prevent the New Zealand Volunteer Force from improving its position in the minds of the nation. While the colony's economy improved during the early 1890's it still could not support the expense of a large standing army. Informed people realised that the small number of permanent force personnel were of no value without the existence and support of a balanced and efficient citizen arm.[111] By 1896 New Zealand's Volunteer Force was such an arm. With the single exception of Auckland the military districts of the country had sufficient well trained troops to repulse any likely attack. Fox, in his last report on the colony's defence forces, was able to categorise seventy-five out of the existing eighty-seven corps (86 percent) as fair to excellent. Of the 6,198 posts available to be manned 4,949 were filled. Of those under arms 3,983 (80 percent) had capitated.[112] The new efficiency of the force was the pleasing result of Seddon's six years of defence restructuring prompted by his Military Advisor, and his political friends, as well as his foes and the general community. This restructuring had seen the volunteers decline from 6,700 men in 1891 to under 5,000 in 1896. It had also seen the reduction of another twenty-six enrolled units, with thirty-nine

disbandments to only thirteen newly raised corps over the period. The reductions were not as drastic as the statistics indicate on first reading. A significant number of units and volunteers, prior to Fox's vigorous reporting, existed on paper only. Units like the Scottish Rifle Corps of Christchurch which had previously survived with only twenty-one men in reality, while showing three officers and sixty men on paper, were forced to disband. By 1896 such corps no longer existed.[113]

Taking the opportunity of the discernible improvement in the state of New Zealand's military forces and the return of Lieutenant-Colonel Fox to the United Kingdom, Seddon, on the 22 June 1896, handed over the defence portfolio to Thomas Thompson. To replace Fox the Liberal ministry once again asked the War Office, through the Governor, to provide a suitable officer to command the colony's forces. In response to this request the War Office recommended Major Arthur Pole Penton, like Fox a highly regarded artillery officer. The War Office's nominee was accepted, and Pole Penton was offered and accepted the appointment of Commandant for five years. Arriving in late 1896 Pole Penton was gazetted in his new appointment and quietly began to assess the colony's defence requirements and how they were being met.[114]

Pole Penton examined a force that, while still far from perfect, had from 1891 to 1896 been resuscitated and

rejuvenated Six short years earlier this force was suffering under a cloud of official damnation. Inadequately equipped and trained, it was administered through an inappropriate organisation and served what appeared to be an unappreciative populace. Calls for improvements went largely unheeded, while the nation concentrated on what were perceived as more important public works. This was to change with the advent of a new ministry. Seddon, in charge of the defence portfolio, as an aspiring political leader was determined to be seen to be doing something. He commenced by announcing a reform package designed to both encourage and improve volunteering in the colony. This was followed up by the appointment of the enthusiastic, and controversial Fox as commandant. His careful inspection on the state of New Zealand's defences, with its consequential report, though damning, provided the colony with its first clear assessment of their installations and supporting forces. The colony was unable to remain ignorant or complacent about the state of its defences when it was forcibly reminded that as an isolated part of and vulnerable Empire it was always liable to attack. Awakened and intensified by the publication of well written literature on the subject, the realisation that the colony was extremely vulnerable forced the nation's political leaders to find ways of revitalising the languishing Volunteer Force. Through selective retrenchment, re-equipment and restructuring, together with a revision of regulations,

Seddon through Fox provided the requisite encouragement and direction necessary to improve the state of New Zealand's defences. The enrolled numbers in the Volunteer force may have diminished but the all important quality improved immensely. The Volunteers were transformed from a force on paper to a force capable of taking the field, after it seemed to be close to extinction.

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CHAPTER SIX

EXPEDITIONS AND EXPANSION: VOLUNTEERING 1897-1902

During the six years from 1897 to 1902 New Zealand was to raise, and despatch from its shores, fourteen separate army contingents. Ten were sent to South Africa, two to Great Britain and a further two to the Australian mainland. The authorities also gave consideration to sending a fifteenth contingent to Hokianga, a sixteenth to Samoa and a seventeenth to China. In addition to farewelling fourteen contingents, and considering the raising of a further three, New Zealand also welcomed a combined Imperial and Indian Army Ceremonial contingent. This profusion of proposed, departing and incoming contingents was indicative of an increased activity by New Zealand's defence forces. Other manifestations of this increased activity were a massive expansion of the Volunteer Force (from 5,000 to 18,000 men), an improvement in organisation, equipment and training of that Force and acceptance of a defence scheme designed as a co-ordinating plan of action in the event of an emergency. Prompting all this activity was, in the main, the continuation of the extremely volatile international situation. These same six years were to see war between Spain and the United States, the War in South Africa a large-scale rebellion in China, and a major shift in British

diplomacy, which began to move away from a stance of splendid isolation to one of active participation in defence alliances.

At the commencement of this period there was little sign of the major developments in defence that were to occur. In his first report to parliament the new commandant gave the impression that he was predictably pedestrian. After viewing the colony's defences, and apparently reading the reports of committees and advisors for the preceding decade and a half, Pole Penton expressed grave concern about the apathy of New Zealanders. They simply refused to take defence seriously, when the world was constantly on the brink of a major conflagration. In an attempt to overcome this grave complacency Pole Penton pointed out that recent technical improvements in shipping meant that a speedy descent upon New Zealand by a small number of cruisers was more than ever conceivable. Indeed he went on to imply that, if New Zealand did not prepare its defences for such a contingency, the country would be easily overwhelmed by a decisive enemy. This view was accepted by the majority of those interested in the defence debate.[1]

Pole Penton, like all his predecessors, argued that defence preparations consisted of much more than purchasing guns, torpedoes and associated equipment and constructing strong emplacements and fortifications. From

his own inspection of the forces, in early 1897, he perceived several deficiencies that required to be remedied immediately. If action was not taken the colony would be forced to rely for its security on a Volunteer Force that was not only inefficient but also inappropriate for its role. According to Pole Penton the Force undertook insufficient and inadequate training for its officers and men. It lacked an essential feature of all defence forces, a practised and experienced higher command. Worst of all it could not function for any prolonged period in the field as it had no logistics tail or medical support services.[2]

To overcome the major deficiencies, he identified, Pole Penton proposed a major restructuring of the existing force, much along the same lines as those advocated by his predecessors. As the Volunteers were inefficient and could not be relied on, Pole Penton wished to see the regular component of the defence forces expanded. This was to ensure that the main port fortifications would always be adequately manned. To raise the efficiency and effectiveness of the Volunteers Pole Penton proposed a comprehensive series of administrative, organisational and training changes. Administratively Pole Penton recommended the reduction of the number of Military districts, which had once again grown with North Otago and Southland dividing off from Otago. He also recommended the re-establishment of Volunteer Battalions, complete

with headquarters staff. These administrative changes Pole Penton believed, as Fox did before him, would give the Volunteer Force the higher level of command and control required if it were to become a viable army for service in the field. Organisationally Pole Penton, again in line with Fox, argued for the introduction of the nominative system of officer selection. He also argued for the introduction of a standard Khaki uniform for all, and the disbandment of all units in isolated non-threatened areas. Both of these had been argued for by inspectors and commanders for the previous decade with little success. Pole Penton also recommended the completion of the rail links between Auckland and Wellington and between the east and west coasts of the South Island, to enable the quick concentration of troops at any threatened point. To provide an immediate resupply system, and a prototype logistical back up Pole Penton advocated that units make individual arrangements with local business for the use of their horses and wagons during emergencies. The only organisational problem Pole Penton did not have a ready solution for was the lack of Medical support services. To overcome both his own and the Volunteer Force's weakness in this matter he advocated the establishment of a Volunteer Medical Officers Committee, to discuss the problem and formulate solutions.[3]

By themselves, Pole Penton argued, organisational and administrative restructuring would not ultimately benefit the Volunteer Force. A complementary improvement was considered essential in the training of the Force. All military training for the Volunteers should concentrate on outdoor field training, preferably conducted at summer daylight camps, and encouraged by pecuniary reward if necessary. To provide the necessary standard of professional military training Pole Penton recommended the re-establishment of a central School of Instruction.[4]

While Pole Penton had a clearly defined policy plan to instill military professionalism into what he considered the colony's inadequate defence forces, by itself it would not have achieved anything. His itemization of the deficiencies of the force was not novel, nor were his solutions. Pole Penton, however, like Major-General Whitmore, was to be extremely fortunate in the timing of his appointment. The year 1897 was to see the commencement of a discernible and major revival of interest in New Zealand's Volunteer Force. For New Zealand, and indeed the whole of the British Empire, 1897 was to be the year of the 'Diamond Jubilee'.[5] The year was marked by celebrations and monuments to Victoria, who at seventy-eight had been Queen of England, Defender of the Faith, Empress of India and ruler of the British Dominions beyond the seas for a record sixty years. To ensure that the record reign would not be forgotten the Imperial

authorities invited the colonies to send military contingents to the planned public commemoration ceremonies in London in mid-June.[6] In response to this invitation New Zealand sent a fifty-four strong contingent; the first colonially raised military contingent to leave its shores. The importance of the contingent to the development of New Zealand's Defence Forces was out of all proportion to its size. Not only did it assist in raising public awareness of New Zealand's Volunteer Force, it also provided a model for mobilization, training, selection and despatch of military contingents. It was a model that was to be well used over the succeeding five years.

While the Imperial authorities had made the invitation to send contingents as enticing as possible for colonial governments (offering to provide, free of charge, barrack accommodation, rations and horses[7]) New Zealand's politicians seem to have been swayed by the decision of the Australian colonies to participate. Carefully noting that the colony of Victoria, which had decided to send a contingent of twenty-four men, was to provide return passage, five pounds for a new outfit, and a bonus of twenty pounds for non-commissioned officers and ten pounds for the men, New Zealand's Cabinet decided to go one better. At a meeting on the 27 February 1897, Cabinet agreed in principle to send a contingent of seventy-three men. Thirty were to be Europeans from the Mounted Corps of the Volunteer Forces, twenty were to be Maori and the

remaining twenty-three were to be selected from the Permanent Militia. Each man selected was to receive a free outfit, return passage to England, his keep in Britain and a bonus of forty pounds for officers and twenty pounds for the men.[8]

Implementing Cabinet's decision was the responsibility of the colony's newly appointed Commandant. He immediately made arrangements for concentrating in Wellington potential contingent members. Mounted Corps were asked, through their district commanders, to nominate one non-commissioned officer and three privates, preferably 'smart and good men' who could provide their own horse and harness. Those nominated were to assemble in Wellington where they were to be put through a six week course of riding instruction by Captain Coleman. After this short course a selection was to be made of those who were to go as the colony's European Volunteer Force representatives.[9] The Maori section of the contingent were, initially at least, totally distinct from the Defence Forces of New Zealand. Its members were to be nominated by the Native Affairs Department, with whom Pole Penton was given direct liason authority. To overcome legal difficulties, and possible disciplinary problems, the Maori members were enrolled in the Heretaunga Mounted Rifles with H. P. Tunuiarangi, the Rangatira in charge of the party, being gazetted a captain in the same corps.[10] Other senior officers for the combined contingent were

selected in a more orthodox manner. Lieutenant-Colonel A. Pitt the most senior district commander in the colony, was placed in overall command, while Captain (later Major-General) A. W. Robin of the Otago Hussars, was given the honour of commanding the European Volunteers, as he was considered the 'smartest commanding officer in the colony.[11]

By the 24 March 1897 the first stage of the selection procedure for the European Volunteers had been completed. From the one hundred and seventy nominated volunteers, forty were assembled in Wellington to undergo riding training and final selection.[12] After a week of intensive training the European Volunteers were joined by Captain Robin and the twenty-two Maori nominees of the Native Department. Only the Permanent Militiamen needed to be assembled. For the next two weeks, while the European and Maori Volunteers were being outfitted in new khaki uniforms, as well as continuing with their training programme, Colonel Pole Penton was endeavouring to arrange for advanced training in Britain for the whole Force. He wished to see the Permanent Militia section undergo an artillery course at the School of Gunnery at Shoeburyness, and the Volunteers undergo a Mounted Infantry Course at Aldershot. For New Zealand's politicians the whole exercise was becoming overly complicated. Cabinet authorised Seddon to decide whether the Contingent should undergo training in Britain on completion of their duties

at the Jubilee celebrations. Then, in what must have been a cost cutting exercise, they decided that no Permanent Militiamen would be sent with the contingent.[13]

Pole Penton and Cabinet were not alone in preparing for the despatch of the Jubilee contingent. Staff of the Defence Department were arranging for the supply and issue of uniforms, arms and accoutrements. Most importantly transport to and from Britain had to be finalised to ensure the contingent arrived in sufficient time to prepare for the celebrations in London. These preparations, though unspectacular, were as important as the assembling and selection of the contingent members. Without such attention to detail the contingent itself would have been unable to fulfil its assigned role and purpose. These staff officers decided that the contingent should dress in an identical uniform to that used by Imperial Troops on active service. It consisted of a Norfolk jacket of khaki cloth, breeches of khaki cord, brown gaiters, black lace boots, jack spurs, brown belts and a wide brimmed felt hat. As mounted Infantry the men of the contingent were to be armed with the Martini-Henry Rifle, complete with bayonet, while the officers were issued with an infantry sword and revolver. To transport this trained, equipped and armed body to the United Kingdom the Defence Department arranged passage on *HMS Ruahine* departing Lyttelton on the 30 April, with the

contingent proceeding to Lyttelton from Wellington on board the *SS Tutanekai* on the 27 April 1897.[14]

The men of the Contingent had little to do with the behind the scenes preparations. Apart from the time taken over uniforms and accoutrement fitting and issue, they were kept busy by their training programme. Final selection of those who were deemed suitable to represent the colony was made on the 12 April. From then, until 27 April they were moulded in to a distinctive New Zealand Force, one contingent of two peoples, European and Maori. On the night of the 27 April the contingent quietly boarded the *SS Tutanekai* and sailed for Lyttelton with no pomp or ceremony. Captain Robin, critical of the lack of enthusiasm exhibited by the Wellington populace, was to be extremely appreciative of the send off given the Contingent by Canterbury's Volunteers.[15] On the evening of 28 April 1897 the non-commissioned officers of the Canterbury Volunteers organised a large smoke concert in the Chamber of Commerce building. Most of New Zealand's leading military figures joined in and the Contingent was given a 'great reception' The next day the usually quiet and sedate port town of Lyttelton was aflame with excitement. All the local Volunteer units turned out and with their bands playing gave the contingent a marvelous military send off. The contingent had, though, to endure three hours of frustration and boredom as they posed for photographs before being allowed to board ship.[16]

From the 29 April until the 11 June 1897 (the day they landed in the United Kingdom), the members of the Jubilee Contingent had their time taken up with another detailed training programme, consisting of morning and afternoon drill, lectures and shipboard games. This routine was only broken at Montevideo where the Contingent witnesses at first hand a military coup toppling the Uruguayan Government. On its arrival in Great Britain, apart from the want of horses, the contingent was ready. Indeed its first test came immediately on arrival at Chelsea Barracks, where it was turned out to be favourably received by the Duke of Connaught. The next day the Contingent was again turned out for a review, this time by Lord Roberts who was as impressed as the Duke of Connaught. From then until the 22 June 1897, the New Zealanders, along with the other colonial contingents, prepared for the 'Pageant without a Parallel'[17]

On the 22 June 1897 Queen Victoria headed a procession of world leaders and dignitaries, as well as soldiers throughout her Empire, through the festooned streets of London to the immense delight of thousands upon thousands of her subjects. Included in her personal bodyguard that day were four men of the New Zealand Jubilee Contingent who joined similar representatives from other colonies to make it one of the most colourful bodyguards given any Monarch. The remaining members of the Contingent were not

forgotten. The immense London crowd enthusiastically cheered the colonial contingents and they gave none a better reception than that given to the New Zealanders.[18]

The contingent members impressed all by their soldier-like bearing and appearance, with the result that the British public lavishly entertained them at every opportunity. A major spin-off from the contingent's presence in Britain was a heightening of the Home country's awareness of its far flung antipodean colony. Lieutenant Colonel Pitt believed it was an 'excellent advertisement for the colony' and one that all New Zealanders could be proud of. His one and only regret was the lost opportunity of advanced training with British regulars by New Zealand Volunteers. This loss was not due to any cost cutting by the Government and the Defence Department but because the Maori members of the contingent became homesick and wished to return to New Zealand as soon as possible. While the contingent was unable to undertake any advanced training Pitt was gladdened somewhat by the fact that one colonial unit that did have the opportunity, the New South Wales Mounted Rifles, were disappointed in the training they undertook.[19]

Paralleling the Jubilee events held in Britain, New Zealand went mad with Jubilee fever from the 20 until the 27 June 1897. Commencing with church services offering thanks giving for this unique event, the whole week was

spent in spectacular secular reviews and processions. Every town and sizeable settlement throughout the colony had its main thoroughfare thronged with teeming spectators eager to catch glimpses of the colourful processions winding their way through town. In Dunedin a massed choir of 5,000 children sang the National Anthem while in Wellington the local artillery Volunteers fired one hundred and twenty rounds accompanied by the rifle Volunteers firing a *feu de joie* in salute. In Auckland and Christchurch local Volunteers organised military tournaments to entertain the massed multitudes. To ensure that none would or could forget the proceedings, medallions, medals and portraits of the sovereign were produced by the score.[20]

For a month after the Jubilee Procession in London the New Zealand contingent was busy seeing the sights, meeting the Queen and having generally 'a right royal time' Subsequently fourteen members of the Contingent decided to stay on in Britain to enjoy an extended holiday, while the remainder commenced the long sea journey home, arriving back in New Zealand on the 8 September 1897.[21] Whereas Captain Robin had been unhappy with Wellington's send off he had little to complain about its reception on their return. Not only did they receive a warm welcome at the wharves, but they were also entertained to a banquet for good measure. Three days later the Contingent was disbanded with individual members

returning to their home towns where they were again received as returning heroes and treated as such. Prior to their departure from Wellington the Contingent was given one further bonus from the government. The uniforms, arms and accoutrements they had been issued for the duration of the Jubilee celebrations were gifted to them for the services they had rendered.[22]

The involvement of the Volunteer Force in all the local celebrations, in addition to its supplying of men for the 'Jubilee Contingent', was to have a profound effect. General interest in defence, and the Volunteer Force, was revived after years of public indifference. The Defence department was inundated with offers of service of new corps from throughout the colony. These offers reflected in large measure how deep Jubilee fever had run, with names such as 'Queen's Rifles'; 'Victoria Rifles' and 'Imperial Rifles' being prominent.[23] Many commentators on New Zealand's defences have ignored or overlooked this revival as it was quickly overshadowed by the developments, and eventual outbreak of hostilities, in South Africa. Yet it can be argued that the Jubilee revival of Volunteering with its overtly Imperialistic overtones was an essential precursor to New Zealand's involvement in South Africa. The Jubilee celebrations helped bind the ties of Empire even closer, which resulted in a readiness, indeed a willingness, to assist Britain militarily wherever and whenever possible.

New Zealand's willingness to assist Britain militarily was enhanced by the determination of Seddon and his ministry to strengthen the ties of Empire. Along with the other Premiers of the Empires self governing colonies Seddon had attended the Jubilee celebrations and the concurrent Imperial conference in the United Kingdom. Organised by the Right honourable Joseph Chamberlain, the conference, held in June and July 1897, was specifically designed to further the cause of Imperial union. The Premiers were reminded that Britain spent thirty-five million pounds per annum on maintaining its Naval strength. This sum represented a third of the national income, though by necessity it was an imperial rather than simply a British need. In the same discussion the Premiers were asked to contemplate the concept of interchanging colonial with Imperial military units. Originally suggested by Canada, the Colonial Defence Committee viewed the idea of interchange with favour. It would help cement uniformity in the forces of the Empire, provide colonial forces with units to emulate, and provide units from the colonies with advanced training opportunities denied them in their home country. Seddon was much taken by the whole concept and was desirous that a New Zealand Artillery unit be exchanged with one from Britain as soon as possible. Practical problems of cost, control and command were to prevent this exchange, but the

desire for closer military links with the rest of the Empire had been firmly fixed in Seddon's mind.[24]

At home the Volunteers might have been forgiven for thinking Seddon's ministry cared little for the colony's defence. Though stimulated by Jubilee fever the Volunteer Force still experienced a year of varying fortunes. In Canterbury, for example, a planned Easter Encampment was poorly attended, as it was at first cancelled by the defence department seeking ways of further reducing its expenditure, over taxed by the despatch of the Jubilee contingent. The cancellation was itself nullified after sharp criticism by the media and effective lobbying by back bench Members of Parliament determined to see the training camps take place. Another example, from the same province, was a planned field day for Queen's Birthday. It was countermanded by Pole Penton after pressure was brought to bear by local politicians willing to see military events in a 'Record Reign Sports Day' planned for the same day. The Canterbury Volunteers successfully protested against Pole Penton's order, and the field day training was allowed to proceed much to the dismay of the 'Record Reign Sports Day' committee.[25]

If 1897 was a year of varying fortunes for the Volunteers, then 1898 was a year of promise and progress. New Zealand's citizens, Pole Penton was glad to observe, had finally begun to take a genuine interest in the

military position of the colony. They desired to see their politicians and military advisors put 'the defences and the forces of the colony into a trustworthy and efficient state' The newspapers, aware of the renewed interest, pioneered the concept of defence being a national non-party issue. All people and politicians should strive to ensure a proper scheme for the defence of the state. This call the politicians heard and quickly acted on.[26]

Impetus for the growing interest in the colony's defences was not simply a flow on from that generated by Jubilee fever. It was the result of internal as well as international conflicts and conquests. The first, and probably least significant, was the so called 'Dog Tax War' in Northland. Hone Toia of the Mahurehure hapu of the Ngapuhi led a disgruntled group of Maori determined to oppose the dog tax levied by the Hokianga county. In response the central government sent a detachment of one hundred and twenty men of the Permanent Militia, under the command of Lieutenant Newall, to maintain the peace. At the same time arrangements were made to raise an expeditionary Force of one hundred picked men from the Volunteer units of Auckland, under officers with experience in fighting the Maori. Though there was to be no shortage of men from the Auckland district the Defence department received offers from as far south as Wellington. Whole units volunteered, as they desired to

have the opportunity of pitting their skills against the potential foe. Fortunately the affair was concluded peacefully by negotiations conducted by Hone Heke, the local Maori Member of Parliament. Peace did not however come before the colony was reminded of the need to have readily available an effective citizen Force able to supplement the small number of regulars in maintaining internal peace.[27]

Of greater importance for the growth of interest in the colony's defences was the marked upsurge in international tension. Menaced by the forces of Russia in Vladivostock, France in New Caledonia and Germany in Samoa, New Zealand's citizens felt extremely vulnerable. In early 1898 Seddon had warned of the danger to New Zealand's security if Samoa was to fall into the hands of a foreign power. Within a year the Imperial Government, declining to involve itself in the dispute over royal succession ceded any claims of sovereignty to Western Samoa to Germany. Even though New Zealand and the Australian colonies protested bitterly, with New Zealand going so far as to offer a contingent of selected Volunteers to help fight or restore order if required, the Imperial authorities remained adamant.[28] Samoa, however, was far from being the only (or indeed) the most important concern. By the late 1890's the whole of the Western Pacific was becoming an area of strategic rivalry involving all the world powers, including the United

States. A scramble for Chinese territory by Russia, Germany, France and Britain was taking place while the United States was acquiring Hawaii and the Philippines. The nett result was that the contesting great powers were now face to face in the Pacific as well as the Atlantic and on the continent. Any breach of the peace, or moves toward war, by the world powers anywhere would probably pose a direct threat to the security of New Zealand.[29] With Britain isolated and facing hostile continental powers it is not surprising that a realisation of the colony's vulnerability finally dawned on its citizens. Britain itself felt vulnerable in this age of international unrest, and commenced preparations for combat in an expected war that would be both fierce and furious.[30] French refusal to withdraw its small mobile garrison from Fashoda in the Sudan in September 1898 appeared to many as the opening moves of that conflict. Fashoda itself was an insignificant town without strategical merit, but it was where the French Army moving from the west met Lord Kitchener's Anglo-Egyptian Army recently victorious in its campaign of Sudanese subjugation. Britain's demand for French withdrawal, and French refusal to comply, forced both sides to commence war preparations. In New Zealand the tension further stimulated the growing interest in defence matters and the government received offers of service for new Volunteer Corps from throughout the colony.[31] By December 1898 the French authorities, having rethought their position,

decided to withdraw, to the relief of their British counterparts.

While the New Zealand response to the crisis had largely been the formation or offers of service of new Volunteer units, in Britain the crisis led to a perceptible shift away from its vulnerable stance of splendid isolationism towards a commitment to fashioning a network of defensive alliances. The need for Britain to join with other powers in defensive alliances was highlighted even further, for New Zealanders at least, by the success of the United States in its war against Spain in 1898. America's ultimatum that Spain control destabilised Cuba, or have its island colony occupied, resulted, not surprisingly, in Spanish opposition and the outbreak of war. Lasting only a few months the war demonstrated clearly that modern armaments win on the battlefield. Though Britain and the Empire were neutral, most of New Zealand's population sided with the United States. Some individuals went so far as to offer their services to fight for America. This did not prevent America's rapid success causing New Zealand distress. It was not that the United States directly threatened the nation's security, it was more the lesson it hammered home. Spain had been defeated relatively quickly without once being attacked in its European homeland. All attacks had been directed at her most vulnerable points, her colonies and dependencies. For the few in New Zealand who

viewed the colony's isolation as adequate protection the American success was a shattering experience. For the majority who had always seen New Zealand as vulnerable because of its distance from Britain and its dependence on the sea lanes American success was yet another timely reminder. If Great Britain were to go to war with a European adversary she, like Spain, would be attacked at her most vulnerable point, her far flung colonies like New Zealand. Realising this civic leaders were quick to demand that central government upgrade the colony's coastal defences.[32]

In response to the growing awareness of New Zealand's vulnerability its colonists once again took the trouble to organise themselves into Volunteer Units. In 1898 no fewer than seventy-one proposed Volunteer Corps sought permission for formation from the Defence Department. The government in an apparent attempt to foster the revival of interest in defence approved a new establishment for the Volunteer Force which allowed capitation to be paid to a total of 7,000 men. This, according to Pole Penton, effectively meant that the Force could expand up to 8,000 men when non-efficients were taken into account. Existing Volunteer units and their members also exhibited a revival in their enthusiasm. In Canterbury less than eight percent; 85 out of a total of 1,100 men, failed to qualify as efficient in 1898.[33] Attempting to maximize the potential benefits from the revival the government,

through a defence committee in conjunction with senior military officers, re-examined and inspected the country's defences and completed the drawing up of a Defence Scheme. Pole Penton had commenced preparations for the defence scheme in 1897 on his arrival in the colony. In it all key installations were identified and how they were to be defended was outlined. Units were given responsibility for specific tasks and were also informed on how they were to mobilise in case of emergency. Though this Scheme was never made public it was sent to the Colonial Defence committee in London, where it was given a favourable review after careful scrutiny.[34]

The promise of a larger more enthusiastic Volunteer Force, supported by the bulk of the population and possessed of a clear plan of action, was matched by significant developments in the existing structure. Describing 1898 as a year of progress Pole Penton was able to report on the implementation of a number of improvements. Battalion organisation for Infantry units had been instituted for training purposes. The Otago Military district once again included North Otago and Southland. Training for Volunteers had been revamped, with Ministerial sanction given to personal payment of two shillings and sixpence for six daylight parades per annum provided that seventy-five percent of a units enrolled strength were present. To be eligible for the personal

last for a minimum of two and a half hours. Pole Penton encouraged units taking advantage of the payment to train in the field on practical tasks such as they would be expected to undertake in time of war. He wished to see them move out of the drill halls and into the countryside, making maximum use of the railways to simulate mobilization. Medical support services were also improved, ambulance companies and field hospitals were established, with provision also being made for the requisitioning of buildings and existing hospitals if and when required.[35]

Not all of Pole Penton's 1898 report was, however, congratulatory. It appears to have rankled that his recommendations for the expansion of the regular component of New Zealand's defence forces had not been acted upon. Without such expansion he questioned whether the existing fortifications could be adequately manned during an emergency. Pole Penton was also disappointed that nothing had been done to re-establish the central School of Instruction, an institution he viewed as essential if the Volunteers were to be properly trained in their military duties. Finally he was both annoyed and disappointed that uniformity in service dress had still not been enforced. This lack he saw as a severe blow to discipline and, one imagines, the development of an 'Army' as opposed to a unit consciousness.[36] The report also exhibited a growing awareness of New Zealand, its inhabitants and the problems

faced by Volunteer units. Realising that Volunteering in the colony was, for all intents and purposes, competing with other organised leisure activities Pole Penton encouraged the establishment of Volunteer Sports clubs attached to units to attract and help retain the athletically minded. Pole Penton also identified an interesting deficiency in the Volunteer Force, its non-commissioned officers. Unlike his immediate predecessor, Fox, who had condemned a significant number of its commissioned officers Pole Penton viewed them as keen students of the military art held back by the lack of opportunity to learn and develop their skills. In contrast to its officers Pole Penton described the Forces non-commissioned officers as 'the great blot' on Volunteering. To overcome the lack of opportunity for officers and the inadequacies of the non-commissioned officers, as well as strengthen his case for a school of Instruction, Pole Penton issued orders to the effect that frequent classes of instruction were to be held for both groups.[37] Given the strides that Volunteers had already made in providing detailed and progressive lecture programmes and instructional classes Pole Penton's criticisms seem overly harsh. Units and garrison libraries provided the latest publications, and formalised study programmes had already enabled the majority of the Volunteer Forces leaders to improve their military skills.[38]

Pole Penton, however, was not impressed by the overall standard of non-commissioned officers as late as 1899, despite their training programmes and his directive on frequent instruction. In part he blamed the practice of units retaining non-commissioned officers for their usefulness as secretaries and committee members instead of for military aptitude. Such a practice Pole Penton warned was disastrous for the long term viability of units as military forces, for without efficient non-commissioned officers the units themselves could never become efficient. Pole Penton believed this was especially true inasmuch as his permanent staff instructors were already overworked and the government still refused to re-establish the Central School of Instruction. What made such a deficiency even worse was the apparent failure of pecuniary encouragement to increase field training during daylight hours. In an endeavour to salvage the scheme Pole Penton was forced to reduce the stringent condition of having three quarters of a units enrolled strength on parade to two thirds.[39]

The 1899 annual report was not however a catalogue of woe. Pole Penton was happy to report, for example, that while uniformity in uniforms had still not been officially implemented only two corps, out of a total of 118 enrolled, no longer conformed to the 'accepted' and encouraged khaki uniform. He was also able to confirm his 1898 impression that major improvements had been made in

both the drill and overall discipline of the Volunteers which boded well for the future. Further confirmation of a continued revival and improvements in the fortunes of Volunteering was manifested by no fewer than fifty new corps offering their services and having to be turned down as the new establishment was already filled.[40]

Though fifty proposed corps had already been rejected as surplus to requirements by July 1899, Pole Penton and the Government were to be inundated with further offers for the next twelve months. Between the 6 July 1899 and the 6 July 1900 one hundred and twenty-three new corps offered their services for the Volunteer Force.[41] This clear evidence of the continuing revival of public interest in defence and the Volunteer Force was not primarily based on the factors which had given it impetus in 1898. The continuance, indeed growth, of the revival was due primarily to the turbulence in Southern Africa. Hostilities between Great Britain and the Boer Republics gathered momentum, leading to the outbreak of war in October 1899. Two weeks before war was declared Seddon sought approval from parliament to offer to the Imperial authorities a New Zealand contingent for service with the British Army in the Transvaal. Seconded by the leader of the parliamentary opposition, Russell (who was actually sympathetic to the Boer position), the proposal gained overwhelming support. In the House the vote was fifty-four

to five in favour, while in the Council it was thirty-six to one.[42]

There were three basic reasons why politicians of all stripes supported the concept of sending a New Zealand contingent to fight in South Africa. The first was to clearly indicate to the world the loyalty that New Zealand had to the Empire, a loyalty that was prepared for the test of arms if necessary.[43] The second was to teach the Afrikaaners that the British as a people were not to be trifled with and the stain of defeat suffered by Britain's forces at Majuba Hill in 1881 would not be allowed to go unavenged.[44] Lastly, and most importantly for New Zealand's Volunteers, involvement would help inject esprit de corps into the Volunteer Force by providing within its ranks men with active service experience. It was confidently assumed, and indeed later proved, that any force sent from New Zealand's shores would establish fighting traditions worthy of emulation by the country's Volunteer Force as a whole.[45]

In less than a month the Imperial authorities had accepted New Zealand's offer and the first contingent of 214 men were despatched to establish worthy fighting traditions. When the Contingent left Wellington on the 21 October 1899 it was farewelled by an enthusiastic crowd of between forty and sixty thousand well wishers.[46] To the immense delight of all New Zealand this Force was the

first colonial contingent to arrive at Capetown in late November. The enthusiasm shown for the departing contingent was in the space of two months transferred to the ballot box. In 1899 Seddon once again had to face the electorate and to his, and the opposition's astonishment he was swept back to power with a majority of 30, when it was previously predicted he would lose. The results of the December poll were chiefly attributed to the decision to despatch a New Zealand Contingent for service in Transvaal. New Zealanders it seemed were more than happy with the governments endeavours to strengthen imperial bonds by way of an active military commitment.[47]

Given a clear mandate Seddon was more than willing to give further assistance to Britain after the gloomy news of 'Black Week' reached the colony. This week of military disasters, which befell the Imperial Forces in Southern Africa between the ninth and fifteenth of December 1899, strengthened Imperial resolve to defeat the Boer commandoes.[48] New Zealand's first contingent, with only rudimentary theatre training, tasked with early morning patrols and reconnaissances fired its first shots in anger at Jasfontein Farm on 18 December. Holding the position until reinforced, the New Zealand contingents were praised as a credit to the British Army. Similar praise was awarded all subsequent contingents. The second of which sailed on 20 January 1900 reaching South Africa late in the following month.[49] This was followed in the same year by another

three contingents, with a sixth also being raised but not sent until 1901.[50] As New Zealand's commitment to the war increased, its ability to provide trained men decreased. The first two contingents provided consisted almost entirely of men from the existing Volunteer Force. As further contingents were required more and more men had to be recruited from those without any previous military experience. Increasingly the only criteria used for selection were the ability to ride and shoot straight.[51] Though fewer of the personnel came from the Volunteer Force, each of the latter contingents had an important Volunteer input. Key positions were still held by Volunteers and the rudimentary pre-embarkation training was conducted by officers and non-commissioned officers of the Force.[52] Fortunately the New Zealanders were divided into small units and attached to larger British formations which provided them with a suitable model to emulate. In these small groups the New Zealanders proved to be capable soldiers.

Unfortunately at home the commitment to the war effort meant that much needed administrative support and instructional staff were unavailable. All readily acknowledged the short term disadvantages to the Volunteers and noted they would continue for as long as New Zealand had its committment to South Africa. It was however argued by politicians and senior members of the

Defence Department that the predicted long term benefits would make it all worthwhile.[53]

Exacerbating the problems of a Volunteer Force bereft of permanent staff support was the massive expansion it experienced. In one year alone, 1899 to 1900, the Force swelled by sixty-three percent (7,000 to 11,444 enrolled members). This explosive expansion threatened to snap the already overly-stretched Volunteer infrastructure. Lack of staff meant that some newly raised country units had no provision for training. The same lack meant that no worthwhile training could be undertaken at encampments noted only for their record attendances.[54] For Pole Penton this situation, while providing a major problem, also provided more useful ammunition for his campaign to have the School of Instruction re-established. Determined that the Force continue to increase its field training, Pole Penton argued that the best way of overcoming staff shortages was to train the Volunteer Force command element at a Central School of Instruction. With defence issues being politically popular it is not surprising that Pole Penton's desire for the re-establishment of the Central School was finally taken up in Parliament. Considered a popular as well as beneficial measure, agreement was reached to have the School of Instruction re-established.[55]

Acceptance by New Zealands' politicians, albeit belatedly, of the need for a School of Instruction was another manifestation of the general growth of interest in and awareness of defence by parliament. Another indication of this growing interest was the decision by the Premier, Seddon, to renew his personal association with the Defence Department. On the 23 January 1900 he once again took responsibility for the defence portfolio. A third indication that defence was an issue worthy of attention was the instigation of yet another review of the colony's security precautions and preparations. This latest defence review was initiated by a defence statement tabled by Seddon in July. It was undertaken by a Joint Defence Committee formed from both Houses, tasked with investigating all matter affecting the defence of the colony.[56] Prompting this activity by the legislature were three basic factors. The first obviously was the war being waged on the veldt. The second was the resurgence in Britain, with a consequential spill over to New Zealand, of invasion paranoia, fuelled by British regular troops being withdrawn from the homeland for service in Southern Africa.[57] The third factor was the outbreak in June of the 'Boxer Rebellion' in China. Seddon seriously considered the despatch of a New Zealand contingent to help quell this rebellion. He wished to send a newly arrived Field Battery together with a mounted unit to bolster the Imperial ground forces already there. Neither Pole Penton nor the Cabinet shared Seddon's enthusiasm for

yet another Imperial venture. Cabinet went so far as to prevent the commitment of New Zealand ground forces though they were willing to free the Australasian Naval Squadron for service or the Far Eastern Station.[58]

Though failing to get support for sending a contingent to serve in China, Seddon had a great degree of success with the review of New Zealand's defences. In his July defence statement Seddon intimated that he believed the defence forces in the colony should be expanded in both size and scope. He believed that they should also be divided into five categories; the Permanent Artillery, the ordinary Volunteers, an Imperial and Colonial Reserve Force, Rifle clubs and the cadet corps. Using Seddon's vision as a guide the Joint Defence committee reviewed current policy, and had its report ready by August. In it the committee recommended that all offers of service by prospective Volunteer corps be accepted. For New Zealand's Volunteers this meant further expansion. The overtaxed Defence Department had to organise the growth of the Volunteer Force from an already swelled establishment of 11,444 in one hundred and fifty units to 17,000 in two hundred and thirty.[59]

Support for the continued expansion of New Zealand's Volunteer Force was not universal. Some members of the parliamentary opposition, for example were quick to point out that defence was not improved by putting numbers on

rolls. The increase in numbers, they noted, was not paralleled by an increase in the number of competent officers or non-commissioned officers. Rather than simply increasing the number of corps in the establishment it would be better to increase the maximum number allowed for existing corps. This, it was hoped, would mean that key personnel would at least know the rudiments of their military work.[60] It was also questioned whether an increase in the size of the Volunteer Force should occur. Many, including Russell and Pole Penton, believed that New Zealand's strategic situation had not changed from that outlined by Scratchley in 1881. It would be, therefore, cheaper and more effective if a larger contribution was made to the Royal Navy, rather than financing an expansion of the local Volunteer Force, which they believed would have little utility if New Zealand found itself at war.[61]

Opposition to the planned expansion of the Volunteer Force was however unsuccessful. Seddon, the main architect of expansion, had perceived that the enthusiasm shown by the public for Volunteering was an outward or physical manifestation of patriotism, which was sweeping the country as a result of interest in and support for the South African War.[62] It was also a spirit that had secured the treasury benches for his ministry in 1899 and he was determined to foster it for political reasons. To counter any possible criticism that it was he who had reduced the forces, and that it was therefore hypocritical for him to

jump on the bandwagon of expansion, Seddon had recourse to one of his oft used arguments. Defence expenditure, he noted, could not be seen in isolation. It had to be set alongside other priorities of a young nation. The development of New Zealand's infrastructure, land and industries, were as important as defence. As capital expenditure for defence was expensive Seddon noted that in the past it had been curtailed.[63] (A reasonable argument given that it cost approximately £600 to establish a Volunteer corps and another £300 per annum in running expenses.)[64] Implicit in Seddon's argument was that since the perceived threat had been at a low level in the earlier period of his tenure only a low level of expenditure had been thought necessary. As the strategic climate had changed the review of defence measures and expenditure was both justifiable and necessary.

Even with a new strategic climate the Joint Defence Committees recommendations were considered more than the colony could reasonably contemplate. Massive increases in the Volunteer establishment was one thing, but the recommendations for the purchase of new quick firing guns and modern mines, together with the establishment of a new Imperial Reserve, was something entirely different. The proposals were simply too expensive to implement. Seddon was not, however, to be outwitted by mere financial considerations, when a move was politically popular. He reasoned that as it was as much in Britain's interest as

New Zealand's to provide for the colony's defences, the Imperial authority could be easily persuaded to advance the necessary money, repayable at a nominal rate of interest over a prolonged period. Seddon's logic seemed flawless. If New Zealand's harbours were secure the Royal Navy would have a haven to operate from in the South Pacific. The proposed Imperial Reserve forces, designed specifically to fight alongside the British regulars in times of emergency, had been proposed by Chamberlain at the Imperial Conference in 1897.[65]

Not all New Zealand's politicians shared Seddon's confidence in his ability to persuade the Imperial authority to subsidize the colony's expanding defence expenditure. Russell, in fact, identified the scheme's main weakness as its reliance on the Imperial Government to fund it. Britain, he noted, was already heavily committed and was unlikely to agree to further defence undertakings. Another criticism of the scheme was that it lacked balance; it exhibited no internal evidence that any outside expertise had been sought. Elsewhere in the Empire the proposals were received coolly, both by other colonial governments and by the Colonial Defence Committee. The other colonial governments viewed the proposed scheme as an affront to their newly won statehood. The Colonial Defence Committee viewed it as impractical on the grounds noted by Russell, and a year later conceded by Seddon, namely its expense. They also

questioned whether there were sufficient trained officers in New Zealand to make the proposals actually work. Despite its cool reception Seddon pushed ahead with the scheme and piloted it through parliament under the Defence Amendment Act of 1900.[66]

An interesting provision of the Amendment Act, which was still found unacceptable by parliament, was that the long called for nominative selection system for officers should replace the existing elective system.. In the House opponents of election noted the detrimental effects of the elective system and how unsuitable candidates managed to gain commissions. Supporters of the elective system, however, once again defended it. They noted the need to have leaders who were acceptable to the voluntary membership. They further argued that the elected officers were extremely competent. They had proved themselves willing students of the martial science, they were keen not only to read the latest military publications but were also willing to have that study tested by examinations for appointment and promotion.[67]

Such claims were far from being unfounded.In Canterbury for example, the local Garrison Library organised a provincial School of Instruction which met three nights each month. At its meetings the School provided a progressive training programme which took officers through drill, tactics, field fortifications,

formations and Kriegspiels together with visiting expert lecturers as and when available.[68]

Though elected officers appeared to be taking their military education seriously, their commander, Pole Penton, was unhappy that the selection clause was dropped from the 1900 Amendment Act due to political pressure. In his 1901 report on the colony's defences he noted in disapproving terms the decision not to abolish the elective system for officer selection. This disappointment was however offset by his happiness at achieving two long term ambitions. The Central School of Instruction was re-established, and a national uniform was finally adopted. The School, which Pole Penton had long seen as essential, was seen as a tool to improve the military abilities of both the officers and the non-commissioned officers of the Volunteer Force. A standardised uniform would impose upon the Volunteers a unity of purpose, improve their discipline and provide a sense of national identity.[69]

Clothing manufacturers were, no doubt, as happy as Pole Penton over the decision by the government to adopt a national uniform. At a cost of thirty shillings per man, or between £75 and £90 per corps, the new military uniform represented a major expansion of their potential market. (Over ten thousand new Volunteers had signed up between 1899 and 1901 alone.) Not surprisingly political

lobbyists for the clothing industry advocated a monopoly of the potential business for local manufacturers. They argued that all the requisite tailoring should be undertaken in New Zealand, by New Zealanders, as it was for New Zealanders. Unwilling to be committed to possibly uneconomic agreements Seddon promised that if the cloth could be obtained at a competitive rate, and the manufacturing done likewise, preference would go to colonial manufacturers. This preference filtered down to individual corps who tended to look for a local manufacturer in the first instance.[70] Clothing was not the only manufacturing industry to prosper due to the rapid expansion of the Volunteer Force. Taking their cue from the clothing industry, saddlery firms undertook a similar lobbying, with similar results, for all military harness to be manufactured locally.[71]

The massive growth of the Volunteer Force, while generally perceived as beneficial by the local business community, was also a source of major concern. Small retailers and primary producers suffered as a result of the breakdown of control and discipline that occurred within some units unable to manage rapid expansion. At encampments, such as the one held at Blenheim at the turn of the century, orchards were raided by unruly visiting Volunteers.[72] At other camps Volunteers vandalised their surroundings.[73] Worse still, on the way to one encampment drunken Volunteers from Taranaki disembarked from their

troop train at the Woodville station, and ransacked the tearooms, stole supplies of alcohol, tobacco and food before spitting in the face of a protesting waitress.[74]

The decline in standards of conduct of the Volunteers, brought about by expansion, was also matched by a physical decline. The majority of the new recruits attracted into the ranks were from the urban areas. They were unused to outdoor living and had little experience in the use of arms, so common among their rural cousins. Pole Penton believed that South Africa had highlighted one important lesson for all defence forces. To be effective the individuals who made up the rank and file needed to be able to live in the field, and be able to use their weapons over a variety of ranges and conditions. Realising that the newer recruits lacked these basic skills, Pole Penton renewed his efforts for increased field training, with practical musketry over long and unknown ranges at head and shoulder targets.[75] In Britain, faced with similar training and recruit problems, views similar to Pole Penton's held sway and led to the next logical step, compulsory summer field encampments for Volunteer Units. Far from increasing efficiency the camps in Britain resulted in widespread disgruntlement and a decline in numbers.[76] One provincial solution to the decline in the physical standards of recruits was found in Canterbury. There route marching competitions between units over prolonged distances were held. These marches

stimulated ongoing interest in Volunteering, fostered an espirit de corps and improved physical fitness for participants.[77]

Unlike the experience in the United Kingdom, where increased emphasis on outdoor training led to a decline in British Volunteering, New Zealand Volunteering remained strong. This was not simply due to Pole Penton's failure to introduce compulsory encampments, so hated in Britain, it was in large measure the result of defence's continuing high profile. In 1901 New Zealand sent a further contingent, the seventh, to South Africa as well as offering the services of an eighth. It sent another two contingents to Australia at the same time. One contingent of seventy-three mounted rifles was to take part in the federation celebrations. The other, consisting of two hundred and fourteen representatives from all arms, was to take part in the celebrations marking the opening of the first federal parliament in Melbourne.[78] In Australia a combined Imperial and Indian Army contingent had also taken part in the federation celebrations. On the invitation of the New Zealand governments this combined contingent took the opportunity to visit the colony. While here they put on splendid military demonstrations from one end of the country to the other. Pole Penton hoped that in return for the total cost of £4,000 required to transport, accommodate and feed them, their presence would raise the spirit of rivalry within New Zealand's

defence forces, as well as provide a standard to emulate.[79]

The standard set by the Imperial and Indian forces was soon matched. During the visit of the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall and York a spectacular review was held in Christchurch on the 24 June 1901. Four hundred and thirty officers, seven thousand three hundred and thirty four men, and two thousand nine hundred cadets came together from throughout both Islands in the largest muster of men under arms ever held in the colony. Then, on a smaller scale, the scene was repeated at each district headquarters the royal couple visited.[80]

While the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall and Yorks visit was a joyous occasion, which practised New Zealand's Volunteers in massed mobilization the other royal happening of 1901 was mournful. On the 22 January 1901 Queen Victoria finally passed away. Her demise was almost symbolic of the end of an era. For the Volunteers of New Zealand, it was also a turning point. At the end of the year they were to see not only a new monarch but also a new commandant. Pole Penton returned to the United Kingdom at the end of his contract and the government again sought a replacement from the Horse Guards. The first choice as replacement was Colonel St George Charles Henry, but he was unable to accept the position, which went to Major-General James Melville Babington, who was

now numbered only 15,391, a reduction of ten percent on the record number of 17,057 the previous year.[85]

The reduction in the Volunteer Force was, however, insignificant when compared to the exponential growth it had experienced over the preceeding two years. It was also relatively easy to identify the deficiencies the Force still laboured under. Yet it was larger, better equipped, better trained and organised than it had ever been. For the first time in its history the Volunteer Force resembled an 'Army'. Real attempts had been made to provide it with a workable scheme for defending the main ports. A better balance had been achieved between the fighting arms and the logistics tail. It was an 'Army' capable of massed mobilisation, as evidenced in Christchurch for the Duke and Duchess of Cornwall and Yorks visit. It was also an 'Army' capable of partial mobilization, of training and selection of expeditionary forces. Ten such forces were raised for service in South Africa and had proved themselves equal to the challenge of active service. While four went on ceremonial duties to Britain and Australia. That this 'Army' had begun to develop owed much to the perseverance of Pole Penton, the highly volatile international situation, and the wave of patriotism which swept New Zealand at the turn of the century. In combination they had prompted a revival in Volunteer enthusiasm.

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CHAPTER SEVEN

DEVELOPING AN ARMY: VOLUNTEERING 1903-1906

When Richard John Seddon died of a heart attack on the 10 June 1906, on board the 'Oswestry Grange', an era ended for New Zealand defence.[1] Seddon had been a pivotal link in defence planning for a decade and a half, and his loss could not easily be replaced. Two months after the death of Seddon, Major-General Babington, the commander of the defence forces since 1902, declined to extend his engagement[2] In addition to the departure of these two key figures the School of Instruction was forced to close, and a major campaign was mounted for the introduction of universal compulsory military service. In an endeavour to fill the vacuum, and enhance defence planning, the government revised the colony's defence scheme and established a defence council which helped pool the military expertise of the colony. Surprisingly the three years leading up to the epoch-making 1906 are not marked by startling change or innovation. Rather a steady, almost cautious, slow march toward an overall improvement of the Volunteer force can be perceived. This improvement was not marked by expansion as in the past, but by ongoing endeavours to improve the organisation, administration and the training of the Volunteer Force.

Several factors in combination contributed to the Volunteer Forces cautious progress during this period. The first, and one of the most important was the reluctance of politicians to spend money on defence when there were no clearly perceived threats to the nation. With the return of the South African contingents the colony was left without any clearly perceived threat, or any popular overseas conflict. Opposition members of parliament took the opportunity to object to what they viewed as wasteful expenditure on defence,[3] damning it as a "gross public scandal" at a time when money was required for public works to subdue the frontier wilderness.[4] (This damnation was extremely pointed as it was reminiscent of the arguments used by Seddon to justify minimal expenditure on defence during the 1890's[5]) Opposing the clamour for defence cuts were those who viewed peace as simply a short respite between struggles.[6] The termination of the South African War, to such thinkers, was seen not as an opportunity for reducing defence preparedness. They argued the war had made New Zealand more vulnerable to attack.[7] As Carncross so forcibly stated in the Legislative Council:

> ...throughout the world things are in a very troubled...condition we may be sure that in the event of Great Britain becoming involved in war with any power New Zealand will not be neglected by the enemy. We have taken an active part in the

wars of the Empire, and it would be certain that New Zealand would become one of the objective points of the enemy's attack.[8]

The views so ardently expressed by Carncross were, however, insufficient to convince the government, or their treasury advisors, to maintain a high level of defence expenditure. In the financial year 1902-03 a total of £298,207 was spent by the colony on defence, £292,081 of which was allocated to general military expenditure, with the remaining £6,126 for ongoing harbour protection. The following year saw defence expenditure reduced by a massive twenty-five percent. Only £224,844 was allocated to defence, £221,959 of which was for general purposes, and only £2,885 for harbour protection. Cuts were reversed slightly in 1904-05, when the defence budget was increased to four percent of government expenditure. This represented a total of £241,848, an eight percent increase on the previous year. In the 1904-05 budget £239,333 was for general expenditure, while £2,515 was given to harbour protection. 1905-06 saw only £196,328 given to defence which represented a decline on the previous year of nineteen percent, as well as a decline in relationship to general government expenditure from four to three percent of the total. In that year only £1,300 was spent on harbour defence, and £195,028 on general purposes. The decline of defence expenditure relative to governmental expenditure continued in 1906-07 when only £169,359 or two

percent of the total governmental budget went to defence. It was also a further decline in real terms representing a cut of fourteen percent on the previous year. The sum of £167,818 was used for general purposes, with £1,541 being spent on harbour protection.[9]

Cutting the defence budget, which gave a clear impression that defence preparations were of secondary concern, was not only opposed by a minority of politicians, it was also opposed by the Governor and commandant. Sir William Lee Plunket, the Governor, and Major-General James Babington, the commandant of New Zealand's defence forces, both believed the colony ill prepared to meet any emergency. While both admitted that no immediate threat existed, they both believed that threats were not always clearly foreseeable. Not only did New Zealand have to concern herself with the growing Asian threats, she still had to contend with the traditional enemies. To the north was a powerful Japan with the sleeping dragon, China, a close neighbour. In Europe, France and Russia were joined by Treaty obligation, and Germany seemed determined to expand at all costs. No one could predict what coalitions were likely, nor all possible causes of conflict. What could be seen was British vulnerability and international volatility. If this volatility led to violence which involved Britain's forces she would be unable to provide any adequate assistance to New Zealand. This warning, given as early

as 1903 by Babington in his secret defence report, seemed prophetic when hostilities between Russia and Japan broke out in 1904[10]

The Russo-Japanese War led many New Zealand politicians to fear an escalation of the conflict to the point where it would "eventuate in European complications that would involve the whole Empire in a contest for supremacy in the East"[11] This fear of complications was given substance when in October Britain and Russia were on the brink of war after the Russian fleet fired on Hull fishing vessels at Dogger Bank, mistaking them for Japanese warships.[12] The Dogger Bank incident was followed by the Morocco, crisis of 1905. This crisis resulted from another straining of relations between France and Germany over the control of Morocco with Britain giving diplomatic support to France. While neither the Dogger Bank nor the Morocco incidents resulted in direct British involvement in war they both highlighted the continuing tense state of international relations.

In New Zealand the international tensions were examined closely. Japan's war with Russia, for example, caused grave concern throughout, not only New Zealand but all of the South Pacific. Antipodean politicians feared Japan's ultimate intention was the invasion of Australasia. Such a conflict was considered inevitable as Japan required land for settlement.[13] As Sir W. R. Russell so succinctly

stated, New Zealand, along with the other Australasian territories, would have "..to face the question of a very possible incursion of the yellow race within a reasonable time..."[14] Interestingly some politicians believed that Japan had ceased to be a serious threat once war had been joined with Russia. It was confidently asserted by such politicians, most notably Rigg, that Russia would without doubt be victorious. Such a result would then leave New Zealand nothing ".. to fear from Japan for the next fifty years.. "[15] Such confident assurances were completely destroyed along with the Russian fleet at Tsushima in May 1905. Japan unquestionably became the dominant threat in the Far East, and of the Pacific rim. Those politicians in New Zealand who had previously predicted Japan's defeat began to view the balance of power in the Pacific with alarm Distance and isolation shown, to be a weakness by the Spanish-American war of 1898, were confirmed as a liability for defence planning.[16] It was pointed out by Rigg, in a sermon to the converted that

> ..Japan has..in.. thirty years stepped out of what might be regarded as the civilization of the Middle Ages into the position of a first class power, and we have now to take that change into consideration. We have seen in the matter of her wonderful organisation and the way in which she has moved large bodies of well-equipped troops to the front in the war that it would not be such a difficult

matter as we believed it to be previously for Japan to land and maintain a large armed force in Australia or in New Zealand. [17]

With the growing realisation that Japan was able, if she so desired, to field and maintain a large disciplined force in New Zealand came the realisation that the lessons learned in South Africa were already outmoded. It became increasingly clear to all that it would take more than good marksmen mounted on good horse flesh, with veldt experience, to defend New Zealand. Japan's overwhelming success highlighted the need for New Zealand's armed forces to be well trained, disciplined and organised, if they were to survive on the modern battlefield.[18] The War had other consequences besides reinforcing the necessity of having a well prepared army. It also reinforced the ever present fear in New Zealand of unannounced attacks on her ports. Japan had, at the turn of the century 'Pearl Harbour', torpedoed the Russian battle force at Port Arthur, before war was declared.[19] This in turn reinforced the necessity for a strong Royal Navy presence to prevent any hostile descent on New Zealand ports.[20]

Reliance on a strong Royal Navy, as the first line of New Zealand's defence strategy, was in itself fraught with concern. In 1903 the introduction of the Dreadnought class of battleship with its superior firepower, virtually made all existing battleships obsolete.[21] To make matters

worse the Dreadnought was introduced at a time when Germany had only recently committed itself to a massive naval expansion under construction programmes agreed to in the Reichstag. This expansion, already viewed as a direct challenge to the Royal Navy,[22] was doubly serious as the new leap forward in naval technology placed all the major world powers virtually on an equal footing.[23] The perceived German threat was based not only on its naval construction programme. It was also fuelled by the straining of Anglo-German relations during the South African War, the Morocco Crisis and the support given by Germany to Russia during the Russo-Japanese War.[24]

With the perceived weakening in the first line of New Zealand's (and indeed the Empire's) defence, moves were taken not only to rectify the situation, but also strengthen the second and subsequent lines. In 1903 the Defence Committee of the British Cabinet was reconstituted as the Committee of Imperial Defence.[25] The reconstitution of the Defence Committee was seen as allowing the colonies to take a more constructive part in developing policy and in Imperial affairs. Indirectly the Committee of Imperial Defence was supported by those who believed that co-operative defence was the only strategy likely to succeed. Unfortunately the most positive gesture that New Zealand could have made to such a strategic concept, the establishment of an Imperial Reserve, had been allowed to lapse due to expense. This lapse, while significant, was

counterbalanced to a large extent by the quietening of the continuous calls for retrenchment in defence spending, and the renewal of interest in defence matters by the news media.[26]

Renewal of interest in defence resulted in the government's purchase of new ordinance for port defences, as well as the halt to the decline in Volunteer numbers. The Volunteers had been undergoing a gradual decline in their enrolled strength in the initial years of this period. In 1903 their numbers stood at 13,934 a decrease of 1,427 on the 1902 strength. The enrolled strength then fell in 1904 to 13,061, followed in 1905 by a further decrease to 12,867. These years of decline were reversed in 1906 when the enrolled strength of the force rose to 13,165.[27]

It might seem somewhat surprising, given the renewal of interest in defence and the halting of the decline in Volunteer numbers, that Babington in his annual reports was condemnatory of the Volunteers. Though he always reported on some slight improvements in the Volunteer Force, be it with discipline,[28] medical services,[29] artillery training,[30] uniformity in dress[31] or command,[32] he believed that major changes had to occur before he would be able to report that the Force was satisfactory.[33] For Babington the problem was relatively straight forward. The Volunteers, he believed, lacked properly trained

staff, higher command organisation and initiative at the lower command levels, all of which were essential on the modern battlefield.[34] Giving rise to this unsatisfactory state of affairs was the lack of real interest taken by New Zealanders in defence. In a similar vein to Penton's 1897 report, Babington claimed that:

> ..It does not appear to me that the colony takes the question of defence seriously; or gives due attention to a subject that is so important, and one that may at very short notice become of vital interest to her...[35]

The solution to this problem was equally straightforward to Babington, New Zealand must be awakened to its defence needs. This awakening he believed must occur and, in partial explanation of his condemnatory reports, he urged that "..any means.." be used to achieve it.[36]

Babington's annual reports from 1903 to 1906 slated defence generally and specifically identified a long list of improvements needed to transform the Volunteers into an efficient and effective force. Firstly, and most importantly, Babington fervently believed that the Volunteer Force was too large, unwieldly and overly expensive. To rectify these deficiencies Babington recommended that the existing Volunteer structure be replaced by a smaller, better organised and trained force.

He advocated that the existing 13,000 strong Force be reduced to 7-8,000. To compensate for the reduction in quantity he argued that an improvement in quality could be obtained by demanding enrolled members undertake annual camps of twelve days duration. To compensate the Volunteers for the additional training they would be required to undertake, he recommended they be paid for parades. In addition for the annual camp training each officer should receive a £10 bonus, while non-commissioned officers should get £7 and the men £5. Such a restructuring of the defence forces, Babington believed, would be both more efficient and more economic. Though there would be a larger individual payout to enrolled Volunteers, the reduction in overall numbers, he argued, would save the government £10,000 per annum. If the government did not reorganise the defence force as recommended, Babington argued, they would have to submit eventually to compulsory military service to maintain numbers and training standards. Seddon and his cabinet were not however convinced. As advocates of massive expansion, at the turn of the century, they had argued that it was an advantage to have a large number of partially trained citizen soldiers. This they still believed. Seddon also doubted whether sufficient numbers of Volunteers could be released from their normal occupations for a twelve day annual training camp. The doubt was confirmed by a general lack of interest from

Volunteers when called upon to offer their services under such an arrangement.[37]

To gain support for his proposals from his subordinates, Babington organised policy discussion conferences of senior officers. In each district the senior officers were brought together under the Chairmanship of the District Commander. Tasked with reviewing New Zealand's defence, they examined everything from structure through to administration and the command relationships between Headquarters, Districts and units. Babington then brought together, in September 1905, all of the officers who commanded districts to a conference in Wellington. Surprisingly, given the Volunteer input, the conference findings totally supported Babington in his endeavours. Indeed they went further by noting that the preferred option for defence, of the colony's senior officers, was the introduction of compulsory military training. They argued that it was the duty of all citizens to assist in the defence of the realm. If the concept of compulsory service was politically unacceptable, they recommended the use of the Militia to supplement any Volunteer unit or establishment that fell below its minimum strength. Babington seized upon these proposals, and forwarded them to the Defence Minister with his full support. Seddon, however, viewed them together with Babington's own 1905 proposals. He promised they would be considered, then promptly ignored them.[38]

Unable to achieve the restructuring he thought necessary Babington advocated an alternative. In place of the largely fighting force structure of the existing Volunteer Force, Babington recommended a shift of emphasis to service corps. It was his wish to develop a balanced force, that not only had the necessary fighting units but also the requisite communications and logistical structure to support them in the field. For New Zealand's Volunteer Force to be able to take the field as an Army it required (according to the Commandant) supply, transport, ordnance and signalling units. In addition it would need to reorganise its Medical, Engineering and cycle corps to ensure they complemented the other units when in the field.[39] As with his attempt to re-constitute, reduce and improve the existing structure Babington failed to gain support for the establishment of new service units. While unsuccessful in his endeavours to establish supply, transport or ordnance corps, Babington, by clever manipulation of existing corps, was able to establish a de facto signalling corp. Babington argued vainly that a properly organised signalling corps was essential if an army in the field was to be effectively controlled, without unnecessary waste of time or horseflesh. In an attempt to solve the complex problem of training signalling specialists, Babington suggested that they be recruited from the trained signallers employed in the Post and Telegraph department. Unfortunately for Babington his

arguements for a separate signalling corps did not win the necessary political approval. However, he was able to obtain approval for a reorganisation of both the cycle and Engineer Corps. Approval was granted for selected members of the cycle corps to be trained as signallers, and Engineer Units were reorganised into three sections; field engineering, telegraphic and signalling. The reorganisation of both the cycle and Engineer corps gave the Volunteer force the communication specialists it required.[40]

Reorganisation and development of the Medical Services, like the establishment of a de facto signalling service, was another success story of Babington's tenure in office. When he took command of the defence forces the Medical services, though much improved by Penton, were still inadequate. They had scanty equipment, only four ambulance wagons and five bearer corps for the whole country. By 1906, even though there existed ".. a great deal of room for improvement.." Babington had successfully fostered an adequate working Medical service. All regimental units had attached stretcher bearers or first aid men. Significant organisational improvements had been made, and increased equipment holdings had been obtained for all Field Hospitals.[41]

Improvements fostered by Babington in Medical services were paralleled by the general improvement he fostered in

Volunteer training. Earlier commentators sometimes blamed poor training during this period for the declining fortunes of Volunteering.[42] In part this was due to an over-reliance on contemporary detractors of the Volunteer Force who, claimed that Volunteering was being destroyed by monotonous drill that would have to be replaced by a training programme that was popular with the men.[43]

Ironically training that has been subsequently identified as popular, that practised in the early Territorial era, drill and exercises that mimicked actual warfare, were essentially those undertaken by the Volunteer Force under Babington's guidance. Reminiscent of the training undertaken during the 1880's Babington encouraged the concept that Volunteers at encampments should be exercised under a 'General Idea' or scenario with 'Special Ideas' creating situations or incidents that could be expected to occur on active service.[44] Babington's encouragement for such exercises were reinforced by calls from the press. The Lyttelton Times for example, after reviewing the Russo-Japanese War expressed the belief that:

> ..It is desirable that the Volunteers should be given early experience of active service conditions, and the Easter encampments all over the colony this year should be planned with the object of exercising the men in field work.."[45]

Though the implementation of Babington's exercise scenario concept reported some teething problems, with Volunteer Units setting impossible tasks for the size of the forces available, units quickly became adept at scenario exercises. By the end of 1906 extremely realistic raids and manoeuvres were being executed throughout the colony. In Wanganui, for example, in 1905 the local Volunteers were joined by Taranaki units at the local recreation ground. From the ground they practised repulsing small scale landings. Further South the local Rifle Volunteer Battalion of Wellington undertook a similar exercise with the rifle clubs and Cadets at Miramar. Facing this joint force were the capitals garrison forces mobilised to seize the high ground commanding the city. For other static units, in particular the Garrison and Naval Artillery, unable to exercise in the field Babington approved the manning of their war positions at night under service conditions.[46]

In addition to the more realistic training exercises that were being conducted in the field and in forts Babington reintroduced the practice of realistic small arms field firing. A firing practice that took place while firers were actually manoeuvering in contrast to the static range firing. As with the exercise scenario concept there were initial problems with field firing. A significant problem being the extreme cautiousness of those in charge of the shooting practice. The

cautiousness while almost rendering field firing impotent as a realistic training activity was seen as a short term problem for an extremely worthwhile training activity.[47] Though it is important to note that field firing was not intended as a replacement for range firing which introduced Volunteer servicemen to firearm skills. Regular governmental prize firing was still the cornerstone for encouraging Volunteers to become proficient with their firearms[48] and loud complaints were quickly raised whenever the traditional rifle range appeared threatened.[49]

Field firing was not the only back up activity to the more realistic training being conducted by the Volunteers from 1903 until 1906. The School of Instruction, officer clubs, lecture programmes and Garrison Library holding[50] still provided the essential theoretical backup to the practical training being undertaken. Between 1903 and 1905 the School of Instruction, for example, trained 1002 officers and non-commissioned officers, reorganised promotional examinations and instigated a new tactical examination for field officers posted into command appointments.[51] Babington, pleased with the training provided by the school, would no doubt have been extremely disappointed at its closing. In 1906 the School was forced to cease operation when Lieutenant-Colonel R. H. Owen, the officer in charge, returned to Britain at the expiration of his engagement without replacement. The

collapse of the School resulted in a dramatic downturn in available theoretical training for New Zealand's defence forces. In an unsuccessful endeavour to provide the training previously undertaken by the School ad hoc correspondence courses were offered with back up instruction being provided by visiting instructors. Very few officers or non-commissioned officers actually benefitted from the replacement system only 169 of them sitting promotion examinations in 1906 only 65% of the 1905 total.[52] To revitalise the flagging theoretical training Babington unsuccessfully recommended that two staff college graduates, one for each island, be engaged to undertake the necessary instructional visits and correspondence.[53]

Theoretical training and the use of the exercise scenario concept to provide realism in the field were, however, insufficient to produce a credible combatant force out of the various Volunteer units. This was not due to any unpopularity of the available training as supposed by some historians in the past.[54] Nor was it the result of the government ignoring all the commandant's recommendations as argued by the parliamentary opposition.[55] It was due to the lack of time available for Volunteers to exercise in the field and a lack of trained instructors. Infantry units, for example, tended to combine their encampments with normal employment. Each Volunteer would reside at the camp and undertake military

duties in the early morning and late evening. During normal working hours they would pursue their normal civilian occupation.[56] Mounted units, in contrast to the Infantry, tended to attend fulltime encampments during winter months when much time was lost due to inclement weather.[57]

To help overcome the general lack of training time available to Volunteers Babington had all training manuals revised. He directed that all impractical instruction be deleted to ensure maximum benefit was obtained from training programmes. Concentrating on the employment of tactical units, these manuals devoted a great number of their available pages to neglected subjects. In particular they examined the employment of entrenchments and the conduct of skirmishing operations. Once produced they were offered to units for one shilling per copy.[58]

In addition to providing more up to date manuals for training Babington also recommended the Government make Easter Saturday a statutory holiday for defence training.[59] He also recommended that recruitment for units should be limited to restricted areas, many mounted units for example had difficulty in training personnel who were scattered over large areas and consequently were unable to be regular attenders at instructional parades.[60] To help offset the lack of training staff Babington altered the training policy for Volunteer units. Rather than the few

available permanent force instructors being responsible for training all and sundry Babington ordered that they concentrate on training Volunteer officers and non-commissioned officers who in turn would be responsible for training the men directly under them. To obtain the absolute maximum benefit from all available time Babington encouraged the inauguration of competitions with prizes for the best units taking part. Engineers, for example, had a challenge shield vigourously competed for throughout the colony.[61] He also arranged for half yearly senior Volunteer officer conferences to act as an advisory and information disceminating body.[62] Individual units also assisted with units encouraging regular attendance by presentations for the member who attended the greatest number of parades over a given period.[63]

Training the Volunteers was not the sole area of concern on which Babington focussed his attention from 1903 until 1906. He gave careful consideration to all matters which impinged on the smooth operation of the force from officer selection to the type of recruit coming forward and the uniforms available to them. By the end of his tenure Babington was concerned that the Volunteers were not attracting the athletic into their ranks. To overcome this lack he urged that the long advocated gymnasiums be established at all defence establishments to attract the sporting as well as providing a useful and beneficial facility for the existing members [64]

Babington's attitude to officer selection was fairly consistent with previous commandants views. He viewed the elective system as a serious obstacle to efficiency that was not tolerated in any other institution, civil or military, and should not be tolerated in the Volunteers. It was subversive to discipline and, Babington believed, it lost the services of many men who would have made excellent officers.[65] Supporting Babington's call for the introduction of a nominative system of officer selection were the various district commanders[66] and, surprisingly, Thompson the member for Wallace who believed that men with money bought their votes to become officers preventing the able but poor from rising to such positions.[67] Though consistent with his predecessors with regard to officer selection, Babington, over the uniform question took a different stance. Though careful to ensure that the khaki service dress was adopted he was happy to see corp with full dress uniforms which he identified as the "best recruiting sergeant.." available, next to war.[68]

Babington, in fact, viewed everything concerning the colony's defence against the 'war' yardstick. It was afterall what his appointment demanded. In anticipating possible conflict Babington reviewed the country's overall preparedness to respond. During 1905 he revised the Defence Scheme which he presented to the government in 1906. Babington in the 1906 Scheme argued that at most New Zealand would be threatened by a naval force of three

cruisers with assault troops numbering no more than four hundred. (This assumed, of course, that the British Navy maintained its sea supremacy). To meet this likely threat if it ever arose Babington outlined a two part mobilisation scheme. The first phase for this scheme was simply the 'precautionary stage.' It was to be implemented if hostilities seemed imminent. Volunteer units would be called up for more training and strategic points would be manned. If war was declared the second phase was implemented. The 'war stage' entailed full mobilization of the Field Forces in each district with the static harbour defences placed on war readiness. The role of the forces were at all times defensive. The units in the harbour fortifications were designed to prevent naval attacks upon the main ports. While the Field forces were tasked with preventing the establishment of any enemy beach head. If an enemy secured a beach head the Field Force was to undertake a mobile delaying defence campaign. If, for any reason, the state of emergency was prolonged Babington's scheme provided for reliefs. The forces would be manned to a high state of readiness but units not immediately required would be allowed to return home. District commanders would decide when they were recalled and other units stood down. During the stand down periods it was assumed that the Volunteers would return to their normal vocations.This would ensure that the least possible disruption occurred to business.[69]

Babington's desire to improve efficiency and war preparedness while at the same time endeavouring to minimize any disruption to business undoubtedly improved the quality of the Volunteer force and its relationship with the wider community. However Babington's endeavours were neither fast enough nor far reaching enough to allay the colony's fears. Fears aroused by international balance of power shifts and his own condemnatory annual defence reports. The parliamentary opposition noted from Babington's reports that his recommendations for improvements had been largely ignored[70] reducing the Volunteer force to a paper creation that lacked the necessary organisation to defend the colony.[71] Few questioned the raw material of the Volunteers who had so recently proved themselves on the veldt,[72] nor did they question the concept of a land based defence force that the Volunteer organisation endeavoured to provide. What was questioned was whether the **Volunteers** could ever provide the necessary defence. ' The Volunteers to be an effective defence force for the colony had to be properly trained equipped and organised.[73] Increasingly it appeared to many that the Volunteer structure was incapable of providing such a force. One viable alternative that began to be pushed with vigour was compulsory military service. Many politicians, most of the colony's newspapers and a seemingly majority of the population were to quickly give support to such a concept.

The final acceptance of the concept of compulsory military service owed much to the efforts of the 'League of National Defence' an extremely well organised pressure group dominated by senior Volunteer officers. It was established in August 1906 by Lieutenant-Colonel A. Bell, the officer commanding the Auckland Mounted Rifles. The aim of the League was to encourage the government to provide more adequately for the colony's defence. Specifically, the League called for the introduction of compulsory military service in New Zealand.[74] They argued such a move would spur Britain into following suit. It was also necessary to counter the danger of Japanese expansion, and it would improve the youth of the nation mentally, morally and physically.[75] The League's work was not unique to New Zealand, it was affiliated and modelled on the 'National Service League of Britain', founded in 1901,[76] and presumably the 'Australian National Defence League', established in 1905[77] This empire-wide movement was encouraged by the support of Lord Roberts and Colonel Kitchener, brother of Lord Kitchener, who visited New Zealand in 1906. In a letter to the Herald Colonel Kitchener advocated a modified form of conscription, arguing that it would provide the only safeguard against invasion should the fleet fail.[78] Colonel Kitchener suggested that New Zealand's Volunteer Force should form the basis of a new "compulsory Volunteering" force.[79] Though the contradiction in terms of "compulsory volunteering" amused some politicians, many

began to call for universal service with every man serving for a prescribed term in the forces. There remained some who objected, believing that compulsion was impracticable and if forced would simply make the military less popular. As an alternative to adult universal service many began to take seriously Babington's suggestion that all boys should be compelled to undergo military training.[80]

The arguments for and against compulsory military training sparked interest in the reorganisation of other facets of the defence forces. Babington, throughout his tenure, introduced minor modifications. He had the Volunteer regulations revised, and pushed for the introduction of a Defence Amendment Act. As early as 1903 Babington had various Volunteer Regulations changed, a major one being the payment of capitation to individuals for individual training rather than to units for a minimum number in attendance. He also changed back the fixed term of enlistment from three years to one year. While he admitted that one year was insufficient to train a recruit it was better than no training, and those worth keeping would remain for longer than one year.[81] Opposition to this change was particularly strong in the Legislative Council, where members who supported the longer term argued the forces would become less efficient and more costly. Soldiers could not be trained in a year, they argued, and those that left would leave units with a large

stockpile of second hand uniforms, hardly worn, that no one else would wear.[82] The government in the 1906 Defence Amendment Act, however, supported Babington reverting to an enlistment period to one year, as well as paying capitation for individuals (a move it was argued that would prevent false returns being sent in).[83] These changes, however, were minor, and did not satisfy the ongoing demand for a better organised force.

While the commandant, politicians and interested officers were continually demanding Volunteer improvement their local communities were making quite different demands. For them the social role of New Zealand's Volunteers was almost as important as its military function. Ceremonial guards, formal balls and entertaining bazaars provided by units were part of an ongoing community demand which they were able to fulfill to everyone's satisfaction.[84] Equally as important for the local communities was the ongoing business volunteering generated. Local business, for example, provided everything from firewood to straw, and meat to bread, for training encampments.[85] In addition the ongoing requirement to outfit the Volunteers in service uniforms was still an important stimulus to the colony's protected clothing industry.[86]

Despite its importance to the local community for generation of business and provision of social spectacles

the Volunteer Force was continually attacked. Babington and his supporters never slackened in their push to have the Force reorganised and streamlined.[87] Likewise those who believed in the precedent set by the Boer commandoes continued to support the concept of a nation of marksmen.[88] By 1906 the impasse was to be broken by a third group who took the view that New Zealand's forces would never become effective while Imperial officers were brought out as commandants. They argued that such officers were only interested in creating "Tommy Atkins" out of the Volunteers,[89] or alternatively such commanders were only interested in increasing the size of the Permanent Forces in the colony.[90] To these politicians the answer to the problems faced by the defence forces was the establishment of a Council of Defence, established on similar lines to the British model. When first proposed Seddon argued fervently against it stating that the:

> circumstances of the colony, and the situation in the Mother-Country which led to the appointing of a Council of Defence, differ materially from those which obtain in this colony.[91]

He was, however, quick to point out that the matter would be discussed when the Defence Act Amendment Bill was introduced.[92] After the sudden death of Seddon his governmental colleagues looked more seriously at the

establishment of a Military Council complemented with the services of a highly trained military expert.[93] They took this a stage further when the Defence Act Amendment Bill was introduced. Clause Two allowed for the formation of a Council of Defence to direct, in conjunction with the Minister of Defence, the Defence Forces of the colony.[94] Unfortunately the salary of £550 for the complementary military expert was insufficient to attract any British officer of standing[95] Following the precedents set by Britain, Canada, Natal and Australia[96] the New Zealand government, though unable to attract a military expert, established a Council of Defence. The New Zealand Council consisted of the Defence Minister, the Chief of General Staff, a Finance Minister and a Secretary.[97] The government was aware that the defence organisation was not working as smoothly as it should. They noted that the commandants had expressed concern that they lacked any freedom of action, while the Defence Minister rejected a considerable body of the advice given by commandants on the grounds that it was impractical or excessively expensive.[98] It was hoped, by the government, that the new structure established by the Council of Defence would solve the differences and remedy the failings of the past.

The replacement of a commandant with a council was a major innovation for the defence forces of New Zealand. For the Volunteers the new structure was to be the penultimate transformation prior to its demise and

re-emergence as the Territorial Force. Along with improvements in training, equipment and personnel the establishment of the Council consolidated the moves toward a Volunteer Army set in motion at the turn of the century by Colonel Penton. For the first time all the decision makers; the Minister, his Chief of Staff and the civilian functionaries, were wedded together under one unified structure. This structure was to hold the unfulfilled promise of success for the Volunteer Force, as a National Army ready and prepared to take the field.

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CHAPTER EIGHT

FINAL YEARS: VOLUNTEERING 1907-1910

At midnight on the 28 February 1910 the 'Last Post'sounded in Dunedin, marking the end of New Zealand's Volunteer Force. One minute later the same bugler announced the introduction of the New Zealand Territorial Force with 'Reveille'[1] The change for New Zealand's land based defences was more fundamental than simply one of name. The very principle on which the Volunteers were founded voluntary enlistment, was swept away to be replaced by compulsory service. This major shift from voluntary to compulsory service was not without warning or intense debate. Both within and outside of parliament advocates and opponents of compulsory service ran a running battle from mid 1907 until the end of 1909. Success finally went to the advocates of compulsory service not simply because they were the best prepared, which undoubtedly they were, but because New Zealanders were again reminded of how vulnerable their isolated island nation was.

The opening salvo in this final battle in the New Zealand campaign between voluntary versus compulsory military service advocates was fired by the Council of Defence. On the 7 August 1907, six months after assuming

its duties, the Council submitted its first report on New Zealand's Defence Forces. On the first page of this report a warning was given to the nation that:

> ..should the Volunteer force not be maintained or brought up to an efficient state, volunteering has had its last chance. If the general public are in earnest as to defence, they must themselves assist and ensure that under the Volunteer system sufficient enlistment is made, and that once men are enlisted they attend regularly. The alternative is a system of universal or compulsory training, whereby the burden of service in the Defence Forces will be more evenly distributed...[2]

Reaction to the warning was swift. Supporters of the Volunteer system in the House of Representatives questioned the validity of the report. They pointed out that the force was efficient, well equipped and of an adequate strength for the needs of the nation.[3] Defending the council's report in the House, Ward and McNab were forced to qualify the warning emphasising the fact that a committment had been given to the Volunteer system.[4] (This commitment was to be reaffirmed time after time over the next two years.)[5] Compulsory service, they pointed out, was only to be considered as an alternative if the existing system failed through lack of pubic support.[6]

The opposition to compulsory service, exhibited in the House of Representatives in 1907, was paralleled in the Legislative Council. In October Loughman, prompted by the activities of the Australian National Defence League, moved:

> ..that, in order to effectively defend the Dominion against possible enemies, it is imperative that all able bodied adult males should be trained to the use of arms, and instructed in such military or naval drill as may be necessary for the purpose..[7]

In the ensuing debate while Loughman received some encouragement from his colleagues, who supported the concept of young men undergoing military training, the vast majority of councillors opposed compulsory service. Only 4 out of 21 Legislative Councillors, who voted in the division, supported the motion.[8]

While the first round in the parliamentary battle of voluntary versus compulsory military training went to the supporters of the status quo the ultimate victory was to go to the advocates of compulsion. Ultimate victory went to them because their well organised pressure group the 'National Defence League of New Zealand' was able to seize opportunities and play on the fears of the people.[9] The Defence League wished to:

> ..create a sentiment which would induce the patriots of the land to bind themselves together for the creation of an efficient force to look after the interests of the country in case of conflict...[10]

Specifically the Defence League wished to see the introduction of compulsory military training based on the Swiss concept of every citizen a soldier.[11] By 1907 the campaign organised by the Defence League was gathering support. Enlisting senior Volunteer officers, the Auckland Volunteers journal The Haversack, and men of all ranks and professions, the Defence League quickly convinced even the Prime Minister that New Zealand needed compulsory military training.[12] In addition to having the support of The Haversack the Defence League launched its own journal Defence, to spread its message.[13]

Added momentum was given to the campaign by events in both Britain and across the Tasman. In December 1907 the Australian government announced its decision to institute a system of universal and compulsory military training.[14] The decision brought to a successful conclusion the campaign of the 'Australian National Defence League'. Not surprisingly the Australian success spurred on the members of the 'National Defence League of New Zealand.' New Zealand's Defence League members were also acutely

conscious of Imperial precedents and needs. The year 1907 had seen the introduction of Haldane's 'Territorial and Reserve Forces Bill' into the British parliament,[15] as well as the establishment of the Imperial General Staff. Born out of the 1907 Colonial Conference, the Imperial General Staff was tasked with the responsibility of combining the autonomous forces of the Empire into a homogeneous Imperial Army in an emergency.[16]

At the 1907 Colonial Conference, which met from the 15 April until the 14 May, it was Haldane who had successfully pleaded for the creation of the Imperial General Staff. He argued that it was essential for the very basis of any Imperial defence strategy. For Britain, Haldane outlined his intention of implementing a defence plan consisting of three lines. The first line, as always, was the Navy. The second and third consisted of the Army in the form of an Expeditionary Force for service abroad and a Home Defence Force. To ensure compatibility, Haldane argued that the military forces of the colonies should be organised in a similar fashion.[17] At the conference New Zealand's representative, Sir Joseph Ward, argued against Haldane's proposals. He reaffirmed New Zealand's willingness to assist Britain whenever required, but believed that The Volunteer Force was more than capable of providing for both New Zealand's own defence needs and expeditionary forces, without alteration.[18] Yet three months later Ward tabled the defence report of the

Council of Defence containing the final warning to New Zealand's Volunteer Force. The apparent contradiction is partially explained by the fact the conference delegates were reminded, in no uncertain terms, that the British Fleet might not be able to defend colonies against raids. The reminder, given to further encourage colonies to make certain of their defences, was heeded by Ward. While in Britain, he took the opportunity of consulting with the Chief of Imperial General Staff, General W. G. Nicholson, on New Zealand's land forces. Nicholson reviewed New Zealand's defence requirements and recommended a force of 30,000 men, divided equally among the four main military districts.[19]

Ward, and clearly the Defence Council, appear to have heeded both the Admiralty's warning and Nicholson's recommendations. New Zealanders were however generally satisfied with the existing defence force structure. Such satisfaction is easily explained and understood. In 1907 volunteering in New Zealand reached a post-South African War high in numerical terms; 13,384 Volunteers were enrolled compared with the 13,165 of 1906.[20] More importantly, the Volunteers maintained their symbiotic relationship with their local communities. They were still important to local business, especially woollen mills and leather goods manufacturers, who supplied clothing and leather accoutrements.[21] Socially they were still an essential feature of each settlement, continuing

to provide military dignity to civic occasions in addition to providing well organised entertainment.[22] Further, there was no immediate threat to the security of the nation. The fear of an Asiatic invasion which flared brightly immediately after the Russo-Japanese War had settled down to a smouldering concern.

Concern generated by a likely Asiatic invasion was kept alive in New Zealand not by any hostile act, but by politicians, journals and imported fiction. Fear of Asia in both the United Sates and Australia had given rise to an extremely popular series of "Yellow Peril" books dealing with the coming Asian, and especially Japanese, menace.[23] In New Zealand the general expectation, voiced in both the press and by politicians, was that sooner or later a 'struggle between the white and yellow races for domination of the South West Pacific would take place.[24] This expectation was in spite of the Anglo-Japanese alliance, which the majority of New Zealanders believed was a short term expedient. Japan was not viewed as a long term ally of the Empire as its interests were considered basically alien to the long term interests of Europeans. The fear of an Asian struggle was magnified by those who viewed China as a 'sleeping dragon'. Should China rise from its slumber and organise itself, as the Japanese had done, the region would be threatened by:

'a thousand million Asiatics

muttering and mustering.[25]

The enormity of the perceived long term threat posed by the Asiatic races forced New Zealand not to look at its own internal defences but to an outside alliance. New Zealand was already allied to the rest of the British Empire. Joined by a common heritage and aims, it was assumed that the Empire would combine against any Asian threat. Yet the Empire alone was considered insufficient. To ensure survival in any coming struggle it seemed essential that a combination of all Anglo-Saxon nations should be forged. The perceived natural ally for the Empire, in such a union, was the United States of America. To help forge an alliance of Anglo-Saxon nations New Zealand invited to its shores, in 1908, the American 'Great White Fleet'. The Fleet, a physical embodiment of American strength was sent to the Pacific by Roosevelt, as a demonstration against Japan at a time of strained relations between the two nations. For New Zealand the Fleet's presence provided a physical means of defence that by its very presence lessened the likely danger of Asiatic aggression.[26]

When the American Fleet called at Auckland, on the 8 August 1908, New Zealanders with few exceptions, went 'crazed with delight'.[27] Those who took exception to the visit did so on grounds of expense, at a time when New Zealand was still recovering from a minor economic

recession, or the fact that an official invitation was sent to a country which had labelled citizens of the British Empire 'foreigners'.[28] For the vast majority of the nation costs and labels meant little as compared with having the fleet visit. One hundred thousand people, from throughout the Dominion, lined the hills and shores of Auckland harbour to catch a glimpse of its arrival in a line ahead formation.[29] Then for the next six days the country lavishly entertained the American sailors. Parliament was prorogued for 'Fleet Week' so that the members could attend the State Ball, Banquet, race meeting and a host of other functions organised by the 'Fleet Entertainment Committee' and 'Fleet Entertainment Commissioners.[30] While the American Feet undoubtedly was a welcome presence, providing a sense of security during its visit, its very presence must have also highlighted the overall vulnerability of the nation due to the noticeable absence of the Royal Navy in the Pacific.

This vulnerability was intensified as Britain joined France and Russia in an anti-German combination. As early as 1906 the British military authorities had held conversations with their French counterparts on the British role in a European War. This had been followed in 1907 with the Anglo-Russian agreement. In the same year, at the Hague Conference, Campbell-Bannerman made unsuccessful attempts for a reduction in European armaments. (The attempts proved fruitless as Britain was

convinced of its need for naval preponderance while Germany was convinced of its right to build any sized navy she chose.)[31] The anti-German combination was strengthened by the Balkan crisis of 1908. Austria with Germany's support annexed Bosnia and Herzegovina and war was barely averted.[32] No sooner had the Balkan crisis been settled than a naval panic swept the Empire. In March 1909 the Admiralty made public a pessimistic calculation which indicated that the German Navy's shipbuilding programme, conceived under the German Fleet Law of 1908, would overtake Britain's, with dire consequences for British Naval supremacy.[33] In response to the panic an extraordinary Imperial Defence Conference was called in August 1909. The main purpose of this conference was to discuss the naval defence needs of the Empire with agreement being sought, and reached, on common standards of construction, armament, training and discipline.[34] As a gesture of solidarity with the Homeland, in its bid to retain world naval supremacy, the New Zealand government offered to pay immediately for one Dreadnought for the Royal Navy, with the offer of a second one if it was necessary.[35]

New Zealand's offer to provide a Dreadnought for the Royal Navy was indicative of the willingness of the government and people not only to consider defence needs but also to pay for them. The threat posed by Germany was undoubtedly the catalyst. Unlike the vague long term

threat of a slumbering Asiatic Dragon, Germany was a challenging dynamic industrial giant well prepared for war. To combat German preparation the Empire likewise had to prepare. As the member for Clutha, Malcolm, noted:

> ...we know that Germany - which is the chief menace to the peace of the world at the present time - over-ran Denmark, over-ran Austria and then over-ran France, chiefly because she had made years of steady preparation which these other powers had neglected..[36]

If the nation had been convinced of the ability of the Volunteer Force it is unlikely that the naval scare would have resulted in anything more than the Dreadnought offer. Unfortunately for the Volunteers three years of campaigning by the Defence League, along with the critical reports of the Defence Council, had undermined public confidence in their ability to defend the nation.

After the defeat of the universal military training proposals of 1907 the 'National Defence League of New Zealand' stepped up its campaign. In addition to publishing its views through Defence, the League took an active part in politics. During the 1908 general election campaign some League members stood for Parliament. Others questioned opposing candidates on their views of military training, and then made those views public.[37] In addition

public petitions were launched, and well orchestrated meetings, with well informed speakers, were organised throughout the country to heighten public awareness.[38] Two important speakers for this campaign were Colonel Davies, the Inspector of the Forces, and McNab, a former Defence Minister.[39] McNab was of especial importance as he had been converted, at the time of the German Naval Scare, from being a sincere supporter of the Volunteer System. The campaign was given further stimulus when the 1909 German Naval Scare swept the country. The Defence League seized the opportunity to call further meetings, and resolutions were engineered calling for the institution of universal military training as an absolute necessity for the safety of the country.[40] Supporting the open public meetings, groups as diverse as the Farmers Union and the Hamilton Borough Council, also called for universal training.[41] Adding fuel to the demand was the press. Unanimous in its support for the campaign since 1908, the press closely scrutinised the existing Volunteer Force and concluded that it was inadequate, being moribund and too widely scattered to be of any real use.[42]

Damned as inadequate by the press, and in public meetings organised by the Defence League, the Volunteers were increasingly criticised within New Zealand's parliamentary chambers. By June 1909 a majority of the House appeared convinced that the general public were in

favour of a change to the basis of New Zealand's defence forces.[43] Largely in response to public opinion Massey, the leader of the Opposition, on the 14 June 1909, informed the House that he was convinced that the:

> Volunteer system had proved inadequate for the defence of this Dominion...and should be replaced by universal training for defence purposes...[44]

Unlike the reaction to Loughman in the Council Chamber in 1907, Massey's statement received a large body of verbal support, though some members qualified that support by demanding to know at what ages military training would be undertaken.[45] Allen, the main Opposition spokesman on defence, to allay any fears aroused by the prospect all age-groups being drafted into service, announced that he would move a scheme of universal training for Members to consider before the end of the session.[46] However it was to be Massey again, coming back to his same basic theme, who two days later moved:

> That this House, being satisfied that the existing Volunteer system has proved inadequate for the defence of the Dominion is of the opinion that it should be replaced by universal training for defence purposes..[47]

Justifying the need for such training Massey, almost paraphrasing Harry Atkinson forty years previously, argued that every nation on earth was arming and though no one could predict when hostilities would break out he was certain they would.[48] The majority of the House were supportive of the motion, though most felt it was best to leave the matter till the following session as there was insufficient time to discuss it in detail.[49]

While it was true there was little time for the discussion of military training, one of the major reasons the matter was postponed was that the government were in the process of once again examining New Zealand's defences.[50] Another review of New Zealand's defences was a political necessity for the government. Not only did it have to forestall Opposition attempts to gain political capital,but it had also to convince Volunteer supporters that any changes were to be made for the overall benefit of the nation and not simply the Defence Department. It was essential for the government to convince the Volunteer supporters of the need for change for two reasons. Firstly they had successfully prevented all previous attempts to introduce compulsory service. Secondly the Volunteer Force, though far from perfect, was patently not as inadequate as its opponents endeavoured to make it appear. Indeed the leader of the Opposition, himself, did not think the Volunteers were inadequate through any fault

of their own. Massey believed that the Council of Defence was not working hard enough to encourage Volunteering.[51] Further, he claimed the government was deliberately trying to kill the Volunteer System so it could replace it with conscription.[52] While Volunteer supporters did not necessarily agree with Massey's allocating of blame many were convinced that there was a conspiracy to destroy Volunteering. For such supporters, officials in the Defence Department, hiding behind red tape, were doing all they could 'to discourage Volunteers, so as to get conscription.'[53] In fact a major argument used by defenders of volunteering was that its only defect lay in the lack of official encouragement.[54]

Endeavours to place all the blame for volunteering's deficiencies on officialdom could not stand up to close scrutiny. The Council of Defence, citing increased allowances, personal payments for parades, free travel warrants and a host of other concessions, showed that officialdom was doing all it could to encourage volunteering, to no avail.[55] More effective as a defence of the status quo were the improvements already made to the Volunteer Force, especially in their training. While critics continued to argue that the Force had fallen into disrepute for spending too much time on trivialities and on monotonous drill rather than field training,[56] supporters were able to show how well trained the modern Volunteers were. The training undertaken, argued

supporters, was extremely testing and severe, covering all aspects of the military art.[57] Even Ward, while arguing in late 1909 that the Volunteer Force no longer provided for the defence needs of the nation, was forced to concede that it was not decrying as some would have it.[58] It might be argued that Ward was simply soothing the bruised egos of the Volunteers and their supporters. His views, undoubtedly coloured, were however supported by the Defence reports of the period. Though the force gradually shed numbers over this period; dropping from 13,384 in 1907[59] to 13,049 in 1908,[60] and 12,625 in 1909,[61] its overall efficiency improved. In 1907 81% of the established force were considered efficient, a figure which rose to 85% for 1908, and then to 87% in 1909.[62]

Composite statistics of Volunteer efficiency, while an overall guide, hide as much as they reveal. In 1907 the newly appointed Council of Defence reclassified the defence forces into a Coast Defence Force, composed of the Permanent Force, the Garrison Artillery Volunteer Divisions and the Submarine Mining Volunteers; and a Mobile Field Force, comprised of all the other branches of actively serving Volunteers.[63] Efficiency in the fighting arms of these reclassified forces left a great deal to be desired. In 1909 for example only 5,000 officers and men of the Mobile Field Force undertook any training in the field, this figure constituted only 52% of the 9,632 men enrolled in the force.[64] Another problem related to

overall efficiency was the inability to maintain units at an adequate enrolled strength. The Garrison Artillery Volunteers, for example, the most efficient branch of the Volunteers in 1908, had 975 members, only 60% of its 1,608 man establishment. This effectively meant that the Garrison Artillery would not be able to provide reliefs to enable the harbour defences to be worked during hostilities.[65] These problems were not, however, new. Further it can be argued, with justification, that the Volunteer Force was at its peak at its disbandment.

Volunteering had reached its peak in 1909, due primarily to the efforts of military advisors, Commandants and the Council of Defence over a period of two and a half decades, often under extremely trying conditions. Fox, Penton and Babington had all contributed to the gradual improvement of the Volunteers, and the Council of Defence continued in a similar vein. The Council established as an advisory body to the Minister of Defence on all defence matters, was also an important link in Imperial Defence co-operation. New Zealand's Council, working in combination with the Council of Defence of Great Britain,[66] was tasked not only with organising forces for home defence but also for any overseas contingent that might be required. Other tasks devolved to the Council included the formulation of regulations that would make the forces more popular as well as encourage enlistment

and efficiency, and the decentralisation of command and control of the forces.

The Council immediately proceeded to fulfill its duties as best it could. Between 1907 and 1909 it revoked 71 regulations, made an additional 81 and amended 238 in its endeavours to encourage the Volunteer System.[67] To implement the government's wish for decentralised control of the forces, the Council gave District Commanders more authority and responsibility over their districts.[68] To ensure maximum defence capability the Council established an Intelligence Branch. The Intelligence Branch not only provided local strategic information on everything from available horses to roads and bridges to landing places, it also reinforced Imperial links by working closely with its British, Canadian and Australian counterparts.[69] Tactical intelligence was also provided for the battlefield. For the first time in New Zealand all major exercises utilized Intelligence Officers.[70] The active collection and use of military intelligence, useful on the battlefield, also enabled the Council to prepare its regulations and instructions for mobilization. Designed to assemble and equip at short notice Volunteer units, and mould them into an effective force capable of resisting attack, the Council's mobilization plans were greatly assisted by technological developments but hindered by organisational deficiencies. Concentration of mobilized forces was vastly improved by the completion in the North

Island of the main trunk line. It was hindered, however, by the continued absence of an 'Army Service Corps' able to provide logistical back up to the forces, which would be essential if the army wished to survive on the battlefield.[71]

Unlike the elusive 'Army Service Corps' the Council of Defence was able to greatly improve the medical branch. New regulations were drawn up by the Council for Field Ambulance units, a Sanitary Branch was formed, provisions were made for the employment of the St John's Ambulance Brigade during hostilities and a reserve of Medical officers and Nurses was established.[72]

Improvements were also made to Volunteer training. In an unsuccessful endeavour to gain maximum participation in field training, and therefore raise the efficiency of the Volunteer Force, the Council offered further pecuniary inducements to those attending encampments.[73] Though numbers attending encampments were disappointing the training arranged was more than satisfactory. Determined to get the utmost benefit from field training the Council arranged for training schemes to be issued months in advance, and it arranged for comprehensive evaluations to be made of all exercises undertaken. It was intended that the early promulgation of camp instructions would enable the Volunteers to be well prepared for the exercises.

This intent the Volunteers fulfilled by organising preparatory drills and lecture programmes well in advance.[74]

Volunteers, well prepared by their additional instruction, were well tested by the Council's exercises. Active service conditions and realism appear to have been the mottos for the exercises during this period. An implied 'as you train so will you fight' philosophy started to be developed. In 1908 the Council revised the defence scheme of New Zealand, promulgating the instructions to districts on the phases of mobilisation and conduct during operations.[75] This scheme was then tested in the 1908 four day encampments held in Auckland, Wellington, Canterbury, Otago and Nelson. The General Idea prepared by the Headquarters Staff was that the Dominion was threatened with enemy raids in the main centres. Each district was divided into northern and southern portions with the forces from each pitted against one another. The operational exercises, consisting of three phases, was designed to mimick conditions likely to prevail during actual hostilities. Mobilisation, manning of war stations, undertaking initial reconnaissance and preparing defensive positions constituted the first phase of the exercise. The second phase involved the participating Volunteers taking up and holding the prepared defensive positions. Finally the third phase involved the troops moving to camps and bivouac from which

they could harass and counter attack the enemy. During all three phases staff officers made detailed observations that were consolidated into an evaluative report ensuring lessons learnt were not forgotten.[76]

Some of the lessons learned in the field were to hasten the demise of the Volunteer Force. Reviewing the exercises conducted in 1908 and 1909, the Council concluded the Field Force was incapable of fulfilling the requirement of the 1908 Defence Scheme. It was therefore incapable of defending the nation. The lack of a service corps, insufficient equipment and shortages of both officers and men meant the force would be unable to survive on the modern battlefield.[77] To overcome the deficiencies of the Field Force the Council urged the government continuously to establish an effective 'Service Corps' and purchase necessary military equipment. In a concerted effort to improve Volunteer officers tactical knowledge, staff rides, tactical exercises, daylight weekend parades, formal evening instructional classes, informal lecturers programmes and war games were all conducted or encouraged by the Council.[78] This tactical training was extremely successful. An increasing number of officers who sat promotional examinations passed. In 1907 out of 131 candidates who sat examinations 106 or 80% passed.[79] This was followed by an 87% pass rate in 1908, when 146 out of 168 candidates were successful.[80] Then in the final year

of volunteering 89% of officers who sat examinations passed, 152 out of 170.[81] The Council also introduced a promotion Board which vetted candidates prior to them being allowed to stand for election.[82] The Board, founded on similar lines to those existing in Britain and Australia, consisted of three members, the Inspector-General, the officer Commanding the District and the Senior Combatant Officer of the arm of the service to which the candidate under consideration belonged.[83] The Council would have preferred to do away with the elective process completely, which it believed was detrimental to obtaining men of ability[84] but was unable to gain enough support in Parliament until the introduction of the 1909 Defence Bill.[85] Defenders of the elective system, as always, claimed that it was both popular and successful, in terms of command and efficiency. Such claims enabled the election system to be prolonged to the very end.[86] Though the improved selection process and instruction raised the quality of the Volunteer officers it did not provide the quantity required. No short term solution could be found for the problem but a long term one appeared to be the establishment of officer training companies. The Council arranged for the raising of officer Training Companies at the University Colleges of Otago, Canterbury and Victoria, and for junior divisions to be raised at Kings College in Auckland and Wanganui Collegiate. It was hoped such companies would provide a pool of potential leaders for New Zealand's defence forces

as well as give basic military education for those who wished to become officers in the Imperial Army.[87]

Basic training for the Imperial Army was not restricted to those who were potential Imperial officers. Following the path pioneered by Pole Penton and Babington the Council aligned the training of New Zealand defence forces more closely with the Imperial Army. Imperial training manuals and instructional pamphlets were purchased, and provided to the Volunteers for training purposes. To assist with the implementation of the more imperially-aligned training, instruction staff visited each district.[88] The training organised by the council was obviously designed to reinforce Imperial links and ensure that any contingent sent from New Zealand would be able to take its place in the envisaged 'Homogeneous Imperial Army'. It also provided for expansion of the force due to either increased popular support or governmental direction. The Council continually urged and encouraged both officers and non-commissioned officers to qualify for a rank at least one above that which they held.[89] While great strides were being made in training to ensure that personnel were capable of joining an Imperial force if required, the comparatively minor problem of uniforms continued to plague the Council. The ongoing uniformity problem took a new twist during this period. No longer was it a problem of wide varieties of style and colour, it was now one of shading. The Council continually

complained about the variety of shades of khaki used in the manufacture of uniforms.[90]

Khaki uniforms, while causing some concern to the Council, were not considered of great significance. The single most important issue was the lack of manpower. The Volunteers trained as effectively and efficiently as they could given the circumstances. Those who had given their time willingly were congratulated for doing so, but it was argued the time had come for all to assist in the protection of the country.[91] This view was especially prevalent after the German Naval Scare. At that time it was estimated that 80 to 90 percent of the country supported the concept of compulsory military service to ensure the nation's defence.[92] Advocates of the existing system however continued to argue that not enough had been done to encourage volunteering.[93] Some went so far as to ignore the available evidence and continued to claim that the people of New Zealand did not want compulsory military service. Carncross, for example, while admitting that many enthusiastic meetings had passed resolutions calling for compulsory training pointed out that those who willingly passed such resolutions were not those who would be effected.[94]

On Ward's return from the 1909 Imperial Defence Conference the question of compulsory service was raised almost immediately. Loughman, the man who had opened up

the long running campaign, once again brought the Legislative Council's attention to bear on the need to abolish the Volunteer System and replace it with a compulsory force.[95] His wish, though not immediately granted, came true three months later. On the 2 December 1909 a new Defence Bill was presented to parliament.[96] In just under two weeks the Bill was pushed through its three readings, its committee stages, and signed into law. To satisfy the demands of the press, the public and the Defence League, which viewed the voluntary system as inadequate, but viewed conscription with suspicion. The Act introduced into New Zealand a Defence Force modelled on the Swiss Militia.[97] The Swiss System, adopted by the Australian authorities, was settled on because it had been favourably reported on by both a federal parliamentary committee, and the Chief of the Intelligence Department of the Commonwealth. It provided for a compulsory part-time force where civilians would be given basic military training, without the objectionable features of conscription.[98] Interestingly, while the Volunteers were defended as a force, the main objection to the Act was not its compulsory nature but the fact that it was rushed through parliament.[99]

Unlike its parliamentary progress the implementation of the Act was extremely slow. It was postponed until after the visit of Field Marshall Viscount Kitchener who had been invited to visit New Zealand and make recommendations

on its defence preparations, in conjunction with a similar visit he was making to Australia. Under the new Act a Territorial force of 20,000 was established, to be administered under four Military Districts, Auckland, Wellington, Canterbury and Otago. Each Military District was to have a Field Force based on modern establishments. Each was to have four Brigades of Mounted Rifles (12 Regiments), four Brigades of Infantry (16 Battalions), four Brigades of Field Artillery and two four gun battery ammunition columns, four Engineer Companies, four Field Ambulances, and eight supply column corps (4 mounted and 4 infantry). The scheme provided for 27,000 Territorials, between the ages of 18 and 19, to be available for training each year 2,700 to pass into the reserves annually. Another 38,000 cadets were to be trained, divided into 'junior cadets' from 12 to 14 years old, and 'senior cadets' from 14 to 18 years old. Males between 18 and 21 were to join the 'General Training Section' before entering the 'Reserves' from 21 to 30.[100]

Kitchener, after reviewing all of New Zealand's Volunteers at specially organised 'Kitchener Camps',[101] had very few modifications to recommend to the proposed Scheme. He believed a commandant should replace the Council of Defence, a quota system for districts should be introduced, and that the General Training section should cater for 18 to 25 year olds. The Reserve should control those from 25 to 30.[102] Kitchener was not however essentially in the country to make detailed

recommendations. Like French, who was visiting Canada at the same time, he was to help 'unify the forces of the crown throughout the whole of the Empire.[103] He was a figurehead for the reform rather than the reformer. Kitchener's report, forwarded to the Federal Parliament as a "Memorandum on the Defence of Australia", which constituted the basis of his New Zealand report, was formulated not by the Field Marshall but by James Gordon Legge.[104]

In July 1910 an Amendment Bill to the Defence Act was put to Parliament, to implement Kitchener's recommendations.[105] This was followed in September by the announcement that Colonel Godley, with the temporary rank of Major-General, would take up the duties of Commandant of New Zealand's defence forces, in place of the Council of Defence.[106] The rationale for the forces had not changed, even though the system was transformed. It was still accepted that the New Zealand defence forces had two basic functions, the first being to defend the country against invasion or raids and the second, the provision of an expeditionary force as required. Godley, as an Imperialist, was to place more emphasis on the preparation of an expeditionary force then on home defence.[107]

With the embarkation of the main body in 1914, Godley's preparations came to fruition. It is inconceivable that the Volunteer Force could have matched the new Territorial

Force in providing a contingent of nearly 8,500, while managing to sustain a viable organisation that was able to recruit, train and despatch reserves for active service. This does not indicate that the Volunteers were therefore useless or decaying in their final years. The quality of the force had never been as high as it was when disbanded. Nor had its equipment, inadequate though it was, ever been any better. It was however numerically deficient for prolonged or large-scale hostilities. With the rise of the German threat, and its growth after 1909, this major deficiency of the Volunteer Force was clearly seen as needing immediate response. One solution to the defect was to somehow make Volunteering as popular as football. The other was for the state to demand every citizen undertake military training in the same way the state compelled all to undertake basic educational training.[108] Given the climate created by the international tension, defence reports, and the campaign of the Defence League, the latter solution was favoured. The long drawn out campaign ended with a victory for compulsion.

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CONCLUSION

Willingness by New Zealanders to defend their hearths and homes through Voluntary service, in community based and orientated military units, is buried deep within their psyche. Its greatest manifestation, to date, was exhibited during the second world war. Nearly 125,000 'volunteers' served in the Home Guard ready to defend isolated and vulnerable New Zealand against the massive Japanese military threat.[1] Like its mid-twentieth century manifestation the 'volunteer' spirit of New Zealanders revealed itself in the nineteenth century to counter threats to isolated and vulnerable settlements. Unlike its more modern manifestation, the earlier Volunteer bands were raised to protect such settlements against internal as well as external foes. Further the nineteenth century manifestation, unlike its twentieth century counterpart, was as much a social, economic and political phenomena as it was a military necessity.

The foundations for New Zealand volunteering clearly grew out of a political, geographical, economic and cultural matrix. New Zealand's politicians whenever they were considering defence policy were aware that they had to satisfy often conflicting demands. Throughout the colony, and in particular in the legislature and key colonial offices, former regular soldiers demanded the establishment of a properly constituted, trained and

equipped force, whereas the scattered settlements perched precariously on New Zealand's coastal fringes initially demanded autonomous forces. As a young pioneering nation, struggling to establish itself in a wildly fluctuating world economy, New Zealand only had limited resources. This forced politicians to accept that the nation's defence would be reliant on its citizens under arms in times of crisis. These citizens, being predominantly British, demanded that Imperial models be adapted to meet the colony's defence needs. This demand wove a continuous thread through nineteen century New Zealand to the extent that the relatively new Dominion in 1910 was prepared to subjugate its individual defence requirement to comply with the needs of a conceptualised homogeneous Imperial Army.

In conjunction with examining the matrix from which New Zealand's Volunteer system emerged, this thesis has closely examined how the threats to New Zealand security necessitated the formation of military forces. Internally New Zealand's European settlers had, primarily, to be prepared to defend themselves against 'rebel' Maori alliances. From the commencement of European settlement until 1881, when Tawhiao, the Maori king, laid down his arms in Alexandra and Te Whiti along with his lieutenant Tohu were arrested at Parihaka, the greatest threat to New Zealand's security came from the interior. North Island settlements in particular, felt threatened in the

1840's, by the well armed and warlike Maori. In response the settlers, initially without official sanction or support voluntarily banded together to defend their homes. This in turn prompted official action to be taken to establish a properly constituted Militia. When the Maori threat re-emerged in the late 1850's, coupled with planned Imperial Troop withdrawal, settlers once again forced governmental action on defence by re-establishing volunteer units. The popularity, and flexibility of response, that volunteering provided the government in defence planning, resulted in its being harnessed through legislative as well as regulatory controls. When the government refashioned the colony's Militia in 1858 it incorporated the volunteering system, and encouraged it in a way that was to enable it to develop into the mainstay of the nation's defence until 1910.

As this thesis demonstrates, New Zealand's Volunteer Force was not simply shaped by the need to protect settlements from actual, or potentially, hostile Maori, even though the need for defence forces to counteract that threat existed through to at least the 'dog-tax' war of 1898. The Fenian threat on the goldfields of both the West Coast, and in Thames, together with militant unionism in the 1890's, helped fashion the Volunteers into a body able to assist in maintaining internal stability. Externally New Zealanders viewed with alarm growing great power rivalry which directly threatened British interests,

and indirectly the colony's coast. French, Russian and German desire for colonies and territorial expansion in the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries stimulated interest in protection of New Zealand's harbours against invasion. This interest was further awakened by American activity, until the turn of the century when they were transformed from potential antagonists to natural allies. While views of America radically altered its place as a potential external aggressor was taken by the awakening Asian power, Japan. Xenophobia reached its peak in New Zealand in the mid 1880's when the Russian threat loomed largest. As the phobia peaked so did expenditure, with massive sums being spent on harbour fortifications. At the same time the Volunteers, along with the small cadre of regular troops, were transformed from counter insurgency specialists ready to fight foes in the bush, into garrison forces prepared to repel an invader from the sea.

After examining the transformation of the Volunteers into primarily garrison troops the thesis highlights moves by New Zealand's defence planners toward forward defence, a concept whereby the defence of the realm was to be secured by partaking in Imperial actions. New Zealanders expected that forward defence would neutralise potential enemies at a distance, as well as attract aid from the remainder of the Empire should their own security be directly threatened. In part this was the result of New

Zealand being a relatively young nation of predominantly British extraction. It was also the result of rapid advances in technology and communication. Such advances highlighted the vulnerability of a small maritime nation, on the edge of a Great Empire besieged by aggressive rivals. Fully aware of their own vulnerability, and that of the Empire, New Zealanders advocated the provision of direct assistance to the 'Home land'. This resulted in a further transformation of the Force in the late 1890's, from an Army of guards to protect the exposed coastal settlements, into an Army able to provide men to garrison local fortifications as well as supplement any Imperial Force committed to combat. In this penultimate transformation New Zealand's Volunteer system was judged wanting. As this thesis has indicated, once judged, Volunteering was doomed. Its critics, using standard pressure group tactics, orchestrated its demise and replacement by the compulsory Territorial Force.

From its conception to demise, New Zealand's Volunteer Force proved to be more than a military organisation. This thesis has also examined its economic and social impact on the development of the nation. New Zealand's Volunteer Force, as a disciplined and accoutred body, stimulated the local economy by its demands on local business. Producers of clothing, ammunition and saddlery, together with allied manufacturers, directly benefited from the expenditure of the Volunteers. New Zealand also

benefitted from the social impact of its Volunteer Force. Though occasionally rowdy and riotous from over indulgence in alcohol, they generally provided their host communities with socially acceptable entertainment. Their British based training system of monotonous square bashing, fieldcraft and ceremonial drill were sought-out spectacles of the entertainment by hungry settlers. Their bands provided aires not only for martial manoeuvres but also for balls, concerts and stage shows held in local halls. Often the provision of entertainment was a calculated business activity undertaken by financially embarrassed Volunteer units seeking alternate funding sources to provide for dependents of bereaved or destitute members, as well as capital expenditure.

As important as its social and economic roles was the political impact of the Volunteers. Their very existence as a visible means of defence was used in the arena of international politics as a mark of New Zealand's loyalty to Empire. Nationally, as a democratically inspired community based organisation, the force played a significant part in the development of New Zealand. It provided aspiring politicians with an opportunity to hone hustings skills by being elected to positions of responsibility. More importantly it was a powerful lobby group in its own right, that could not be ignored by politicians if they wished to retain their seats. Only when it was subverted from within by key office holders

did that power base crumble. As this thesis has shown, New Zealanders Volunteer Force before its final eclipse as a political institution had proved itself beneficial to the nation. It was in its early years one of the few national bodies that by its very formation and subsequent development knitted together diverse and disjointed settlements into a single colony.

As an embryonic army the Volunteer Force helped knit Imperial bonds. The ability to defend hearth and home, together with providing reinforcements for Imperial adventures, tied New Zealand to mother Britain. The ability to provide expeditionary forces did not, however, give rise to militarism. The young nation always considered its citizen force to be one of **Defence not Defiance**

NOTES FOR CONCLUSION

1. Hancock, K. R. New Zealand at War (Wellington, 1946) pp 294-296

APPENDIX

TABULAR ANALYSIS OF NEW ZEALAND'S VOLUNTEER FORCE

The average Volunteer was a 5' 8½" twenty-three year old working class European male. He would have served less than three years in an Infantry units raised in and named after the locality in which he resided. In his unit another sixty-nine volunteers, nine non-commissioned officers (NCO's) and three officers would also be serving. (In total those in the Force represented, at any one time, less than 1.5% of the total European population which equated to nearly 2.5% of total European males). Equal in height to the Volunteers he commanded the average officer was a thirty-two year old professional while his NCO's counterpart was a twenty-nine year old tradesman.[1] In contrast to the Volunteers the average officer and NCO served in excess of three years. Further they had the respect of those they commanded having themselves risen through the ranks. On average the men that made up a typical Volunteer unit would attend one training parade per fortnight as well as take part in four days full-time field training each year.[2] Each year the government would spend approximately 4.3% of its total expenditure or less than 13 shillings per head of population on defence. This meant that the average unit received £113 11s 0d in

capitation grants which was less than their average routine expenditure of £114 2s 1½.[4] The constant need for fund raising to pay for capital items such as uniforms, musical instruments or new equipment often resulted in a waning of general interest. Not surprisingly units tended not to survive for any prolonged period with the average life expectancy being only nine years from time of acceptance by the governor to disbandment.

While interesting as an academic exercise the sketching of an average Volunteer or his unit is somewhat misleading. Each unit, or corps as they were most often referred to throughout the Force's existence, were raised separately by individual communities. Thus each was unique in its own right. Though predominantly named after the local communities volunteer units occasionally fitted themselves after their ethnic origins, like the Scottish Horse of Waipu.[5] Alternatively they named themselves after prominent individuals such as the Sir George Grey Rangers.[6] To add confusion titles were not mutually exclusive and units would sometimes combine ethnicity and locality with loyalty to produce such grand sounding names as the Auckland Royal Irish Rifles.[7] The nett result of this multiple and confusing titling was that for the 658 individual corps there are 771 different ways of viewing their names.(Table 1)

Just as volunteer unit names were complex, so too was ethnic composition. Though predominantly European, the Volunteer Force was not exclusively so. In the mid 1870's the Thames Native Volunteer Company

under Captain Taipari and Lieutenant Raika Whakarongotai existed.[1] Followed in the 1880's by the Papwai Native Volunteer Rifle Corps.[2]

As with the endeavour to describe an average Volunteer Corps masks as much as it reveals so too does viewing average governmental expenditure. The government tended to respond to threats, real, potential or simply perceived by spending. Conversely when peace seemed assured or priority was given to book balancing spending was reduced. Not surprisingly at the height of the second New Zealand War £4. 10s per head of European population was spent in defence while during the depression of the late 1880's less than 2 shillings per head was expended. More graphically in 1885 at the height of the Russia scares 7.4% of governmental expenditure was given to defence. In 1890 the nadir of the depression only 1.5% of government expenditure was so allocated (Table 2). Unit capitation also fluctuated from a low of approximately £30 to a high of just over £187.[3]

Correlated to official support in defence manifest by governmental expenditure was community interest manifest by the number of units and volunteers coming forward to serve. Volunteer numbers peaked at 4.4% of European males in 1869 with the renewal of hostilities during the New Zealand Wars. (Table 3) Interesting new units wishing to serve in times of crisis tended to be one year in advance of individuals coming forward. Hence in 1868 an

additional 37 units were enrolled prior to the numerical increase of volunteers being recorded a phenomenum paralleled in 1899-1900. (Table 4). Conversely disbandments were least in time of crisis and peaked during economic cut backs.(Table 5). Structurally the Force appears to have coped with these waxes and wanes due to a key number of units that had a prolonged existence. They seem to have provided a skeleton framework upon which the more temporary units existed around.(Table 6)

TABLE 1

VOLUNTEER CORPS UNIT TITLES

ARM NAMED AFTER	MOUNTED	INFANTRY	ARTILLERY	ENGINEERS	MEDICAL	TOTAL (%)
LOCALITY	195	366	94	29	6	690 (89.5)
ROYAL/IMPERIAL	15	23	0	0	0	38 (4.9)
NATIONALITY/ ETHNIC ORIGIN	2	27	0	0	0	29 (3.8)
PROMINENT INDIVIDUALS	4	10	0	0	0	14 (1.8)
TOTAL	216	426	94	29	6	771

Source: New Zealand Gazette passim

TABLE 2

DEFENCE EXPENDITURE (£)

YEAR	DEFENCE VOTE	GOVT EXPENDITURE	DEFENCE %	EUROPEAN POP.,	DEFENCE VOTE/HEAD
1858				59,413	
1859	29,154			71,593	0.4
1860	64,192			79,711	0.8
1861	53,778			9,021	0.5
1862	203,682			125,812	1.6
1863	730,055			164,048	4.5
1864	957,239			172,158	5.6
1865	306,575			190,607	1.6
1866	271,676			204,114	1.3
1867	458,975			218,668	2.1
1868	300,440			226,618	1.3
1869	309,047			237,249	1.3
1870	261,373			248,400	1.1
1871	163,916			266,986	0.6
1872	175,026			279,560	0.6
1873	174,029			295,946	0.6
1874	170,629			341,860	0.5
1875	151,057			375,856	0.4
1876	108,304	4,283,000	2.5	399,675	0.3
1877	169,948	4,311,000	3.9	408,618	0.4
1878	175,143	4,212,000	4.2	432,519	0.4
1879	230,915	4,365,000	5.3	463,729	0.5
1880	237,090	3,845,000	6.2	484,864	0.5
1881	238,205	4,020,000	5.9	500,910	0.5
1882	193,475	3,676,000	5.3	517,707	0.4
1883	122,127	3,825,000	3.3	540,877	0.2
1884	101,899	3,924,000	2.6	564,304	0.2
1885	302,434	4,101,000	7.4	575,226	0.5
1886	221,785	4,283,000	5.2	589,386	0.4
1887	165,126	4,311,000	3.8	603,361	0.3
1888	122,405	4,212,000	2.9	607,380	0.2
1889	71,725	4,226,000	1.7	616,052	0.1
1890	63,813	4,257,000	1.5	625,508	0.1
1891	83,696	4,370,000	1.9	634,058	0.1
1892	74,487	4,418,000	1.7	650,433	0.1
1893	71,386	4,325,000	1.7	672,265	0.1
1894	78,165	4,455,000	1.8	686,128	0.1
1895	81,812	4,352,000	1.9	698,706	0.1
1896	103,664	4,370,000	2.4	714,162	0.1
1897	107,536	4,510,000	2.4	729,056	0.1
1898	124,947	4,602,000	2.7	743,463	0.2
1899	190,298	4,859,000	3.9	756,505	0.3
1900	160,178	5,140,000	3.1	768,278	0.2
1901	257,156	5,480,000	4.7	787,657	0.3
1902	298,207	5,915,000	5.0	807,929	0.4
1903	224,344	6,214,000	3.6	832,505	0.3
1904	241,848	6,434,000	3.8	857,539	0.3
1905	196,328	6,636,000	3.0	882,462	0.2
1906	169,359	7,122,000	2.4	908,726	0.2

YEAR	DEFENCE VOTE	GOVT EXPENDITURE	DEFENCE %	EUROPEAN POP.	DEFENCE VOTE/HEAD
1907	200,997	7,775,000	2.6	929,484	0.2
1908	213,748	8,214,000	2.8	960,642	0.2
1910	214,205	8,991,000	2.4	1,002,679	0.2

Sources: Prime Ministers Papers PM 13/3 F. D. Bell to Premier 18 May 1887 held at National Archives
The New Zealand Official Year Book 1898 (Wellington, 1911) p712
ibid 1909 (Wellington, 1909) p 50,
ibid 1911 (Wellington, 1911) p 712
ibid 1914 (Wellington, 1914) p 270
ibid 1925 (Wellington, 1925) p 881
Bloomfield, G. T. New Zealand:A Handbook of Historical Statistics (Boston, 1984) pp 42,44,333

TABLE 3

SERVING VOLUNTEERS AS A

PROPORTION TO GENERAL POPULATION

YEAR	VOLUNTEERS SERVING	MALE POPULATION	TOTAL POPULATION	% VOL/MALES	% VOL/TOTAL
1858	233	33,769	59,413	.69	.39
1859	426	41,107	71,593	1.03	.60
1860	1,216	45,394	79,711	2.68	1.52
1861	1,314	61,062	99,021	2.15	1.33
1862	1,481	79,680	125,812	1.86	1.18
1863	1,229	105,978	164,048	1.16	.75
1864	2,418	106,580	172,158	2.27	1.4
1865	4,498	117,376	190.607	3.38	2.36
1867	3,779	131,929	218,668	2.86	1.73
1869	6,158	140,112	237,249	4.4	2.6
1870	5,407	145,732	248,400	3.71	2.18
1871	6,568	156,431	266,986	4.2	2.46
1872	6,042	162,404	279,560	3.72	2.16
1878	5,508	240,627	432,519	2.29	1.27
1879	8,032	257,894	463,729	3.11	1.73
1881	7,133	274,986	500,910	2.59	1.42
1882	8,318	283,303	517,707	2.94	1.61
1883	6,828	294,665	540,877	2.32	1.26
1884	4,332	306,667	564,304	1.41	.77
1885	7,919	312,125	575,226	2.54	1.38
1886	8,253	317,646	589,386	2.60	1.40
1887	8,029	324,558	603,361	2.47	1.33
1888	8,064	324,948	607,380	2.48	1.33
1889	7,776	328,588	616,052	2.37	1.26
1890	6,700	332,557	625,508	2.01	1.07
1891	6,582	336,174	634,058	1.96	1.04
1897	5,121	384,703	729,056	1.33	0.70
1898	4,500	392,124	743,463	1.15	0.61
1899	7,000	398,679	756,505	1.76	0.93
1900	11,444	403,628	768,278	2.84	1.49
1901	17,057	414,223	787,657	4.12	2.17
1902	15,391	425,908	807,929	3.61	1.90
1903	13,934	439,674	832,505	3.17	1.67
1904	13,061	453,992	857,539	2.88	1.52
1905	12,867	467,366	882,462	2.75	1.46
1906	13,165	481,651	908,726	2.73	1.45
1907	13,384	492,649	929,484	2.72	1.44
1908	13,049	510,329	960,642	2.56	1.36
1909	12,625	520,406	982,926	2.43	1.28

Sources: Governor's Papers G16/2, G17/5 held at National Archives Wellington
Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives passim
New Zealand Official Year Book 1911 (Wellington, 1911) p712

TABLE 4

VOLUNTEER CORPS ENROLMENTS

YEAR	MOUNTED	INFANTRY	ARTILLERY	ENGINEER	MEDICAL	TOTAL
1858	0	2	0	0	0	2
1859	0	1	0	0	0	1
1860	4	26	2	0	0	32
1861	2	6	0	0	0	8
1862	1	22	1	0	0	24
1863	8	23	3	0	0	34
1864	3	6	2	0	0	11
1865	2	11	0	1	0	14
1866	4	10	4	1	0	19
1867	2	5	3	0	0	10
1868	12	24	1	0	0	37
1869	2	9	2	1	0	14
1870	5	16	0	1	0	22
1871	5	19	0	1	0	25
1872	1	3	1	0	0	5
1873	2	6	1	0	0	9
1874	0	1	1	0	0	2
1875	2	1	3	0	0	6
1876	0	4	0	0	0	4
1877	1	3	0	0	0	4
1878	1	4	2	3	0	10
1879	1	37	1	1	0	40
1880	2	2	1	0	0	5
1881	1	13	2	0	0	16
1882	0	0	0	0	0	0
1883	1	6	4	0	0	11
1884	0	3	2	0	0	5
1885	6	34	10	3	0	53
1886	2	10	0	0	0	12
1887	2	6	2	0	0	10
1888	0	0	0	0	0	0
1889	1	0	0	0	0	1
1890	0	0	0	0	0	0
1891	2	1	0	0	0	3
1892	0	1	0	0	0	1
1893	0	0	0	0	0	0
1894	0	0	0	1	0	1
1895	1	4	1	0	0	6
1896	0	2	0	0	0	2
1897	1	12	1	0	0	14
1898	6	23	2	2	2	35
1899	2	4	0	1	2	9
1900	48	47	0	4	0	99
1901	5	8	1	0	1	15
1902	1	4	0	0	0	5
1903	1	0	0	0	0	1
1904	0	3	0	0	0	3
1905	2	0	0	0	0	2

YEAR	MOUNTED	INFANTRY	ARTILLERY	ENGINNER	MEDICAL	TOTAL
1906	2	0	0	0	1	
1907	0	5	2	0	0	7
1908	0	1	0	0	0	1
1909	3	1	0	1	0	
1910	0	0	0	0	0	0
TOTALS	147	429	55	21	6	658
%	22.3%	65.2%	8.3%	3.2%	1%	

Source: New Zealand Gazette passim

TABLE 5

VOLUNTEER CORPS DISBANDMENTS

YEAR	MOUNTED	INFANTRY	ARTILLERY	ENGINEER	MEDICAL	TOTAL
1858	0	0	0	0	0	0
1859	0	0	0	0	0	0
1860	0	0	0	0	0	0
1861	0	0	0	0	0	0
1862	6	35	2	0	0	0
1863	0	0	0	0	0	0
1864	0	0	0	0	0	0
1865	2	3	0	0	0	5
1866	3	25	1	0	0	29
1867	2	1	0	0	0	3
1868	2	6	0	0	0	8
1869	2	7	0	0	0	9
1870	6	7	0	0	0	13
1871	4	4	2	1	0	11
1872	1	3	1	0	0	5
1873	2	7	0	0	0	9
1874	6	19	1	2	0	28
1875	2	13	2	0	0	17
1876	4	6	0	0	0	10
1877	2	5	1	0	0	8
1878	1	5	0	1	0	7
1879	3	7	0	0	0	10
1880	1	11	0	1	0	13
1881	1	9	1	1	0	12
1882	0	18	0	0	0	18
1883	2	16	1	3	0	22
1884	3	1	0	0	0	4
1885	0	1	0	0	0	1
1886	1	3	0	0	0	4
1887	1	4	2	0	0	7
1888	2	6	1	0	0	9
1889	0	15	5	0	0	20
1890	0	9	1	0	0	10
1891	1	5	1	0	0	7
1892	0	6	0	0	0	6
1893	1	10	1	0	0	12
1894	1	3	1	1	0	6
1895	2	2	2	1	0	7
1896	0	1	0	0	0	1
1897	1	2	5	0	0	8
1898	0	5	5	0	0	10
1899	0	3	1	0	0	4
1900	1	4	2	1	0	8
1901	1	5	0	0	0	6
1902	1	1	0	0	0	2
1903	0	0	0	1	0	1
1904	1	2	0	0	0	3
1905	5	5	0	0	1	11

YEAR	MOUNTED	INFANTRY	ARTILLERY	ENGINEER	MEDICAL	TOTAL
1906	0	3	0	0	0	3
1907	3	2	1	1	0	7
1908	2	1	0	1	0	4
1909	1	2	0	0	0	3
1910	67	121	15	6	5	214
TOTALS	147	429	55	21	6	658

Source: New Zealand Gazette passim

TABLE 6

VOLUNTEER CORPS LENGTH OF SERVICE

YEAR	MOUNTED	INFANTRY	ARTILLERY	ENGINEER	MEDICAL	TOTAL
< 1	2	11	1	1	0	15
1- 2	15	50	2	3	0	70
2- 3	14	55	4	1	0	74
3- 4	7	37	4	1	0	49
4- 5	10	34	3	2	1	50
5- 6	9	17	3	3	0	32
6- 7	6	14	4	0	1	25
7- 8	8	10	0	1	0	19
8- 9	7	13	2	1	0	23
9-10	5	16	4	1	1	27
10-11	35	43	1	1	0	80
11-12	5	17	2	0	1	25
12-13	7	32	3	3	2	47
13-14	2	15	1	0	0	18
14-15	2	9	0	0	0	11
15-16	1	5	1	0	0	7
16-17	0	1	0	1	0	2
17-18	0	3	1	0	0	4
18-19	0	4	0	0	0	4
19-20	2	2	0	0	0	4
20-21	0	1	0	0	0	1
21-22	0	0	0	0	0	0
22-23	0	0	1	0	0	1
23-24	1	2	0	0	0	3
24-25	1	2	0	1	0	4
25-26	3	6	3	1	0	13
26-27	0	1	1	0	0	2
27-28	1	4	3	0	0	8
28-29	0	0	0	0	0	0
29-30	1	1	1	0	0	3
30-31	0	1	1	0	0	2
31-32	0	4	2	0	0	6
32-33	0	0	1	0	0	1
33-34	0	0	0	0	0	0
34-35	0	3	0	0	0	3
35-36	0	0	0	0	0	0
36-37	0	1	1	0	0	2
37-38	0	1	1	0	0	2
38-39	1	0	0	0	0	1
39-40	0	0	0	0	0	0
40-41	0	2	0	0	0	2
41-42	0	1	0	0	0	1

YEARS	MOUNTED	INFANTRY	ARTILLERY	ENGINEERS	MEDICAL	TOTAL
42-43	1	3	0	0	0	4
43-44	0	2	2	0	0	4
44-45	1	0	0	0	0	1
45-46	0	3	0	0	0	3
46-47	0	1	1	0	0	2
47-48	0	1	1	0	0	2
48-49	0	1	0	0	0	1
TOTAL	147	429	55	21	6	658
TOTAL YEARS	1,247	3,845	848	168	54	6,162
AVERAGE	9	15	8	9	9	9

Source: New Zealand Gazette passim

Individuals tended to serve for a much shorter period than the period that their units existed. Though key positions held by officers and NCO's always had a core of long serving individuals. (Table 7) These individuals acted in a similar way to long serving units, they provided essential expertise and experience around which shorter serving Volunteers could be trained.

Providing the legislative and regulatory control necessary for military training for the individual Volunteers and their units were four main acts of parliament[10] and ten sets of general regulations.[11] Complete with amendments these controls guided the destiny of the Volunteers and earned it the name of 'The Army of Regulations'.[12] A most apt title when the governmental controls were joined with the internal byelaws and rules that each unit adopted to maintain internal control. The necessity for control mechanisms for a military force is self-evident. Without them the units would have resembled little more than undisciplined, ill-organised armed gangs. What is less clear is the rationale for the sheer number of changes. Though apparently done in an ad hoc manner the amendments did assist in the guiding and evolution of the Force into a recognisable Army.

At its base this Army was founded on individual Volunteers' who served as much for social camaraderie as for the development of the martial spirit.[13] The corps in which they served were likewise as much manifestations of pageantry as of patriotism[14] while those who commanded them were the very leaders of their host communities.[15] Over the nearly fifty-two years of its existence these units were to see several failed attempts to establish the more complicated battalion and regimental structure before final success in the late 1890's.[16]

TABLE 7
VOLUNTEER LENGTH OF SERVICE

YEARS	RANK & FILE VOLUNTEERS (%)	NCO'S (%)	OFFICERS	TOTAL (%)
0- 1	1180 (31)	37 (8)	17 (9.3)	1234 (28)
1- 2	930 (25)	35 (7.5)	18 (9.8)	983 (22)
2- 3	578 (15)	63 (13.5)	17 (9.3)	658 (15)
3- 4	353 (9)	70 (15)	19 (10.4)	42 (10)
4- 5	221 (6)	58 (12)	15 (8.2)	294 (6.7)
5- 6	164 (4)	48 (10)	19 (10.4)	231 (5.2)
6- 7	110 (3)	43 (9)	15 (8.2)	168 (3.8
7- 8	66 (1.7)	26 (5.6)	14 (7.7)	106 (2.4)
8- 9	56 (1.5)	22 (4.7)	9 (4.9)	87 (2)
9-10	37 (1)	24 (5.1)	10 (5.5)	71 (1.6)
10-11	27 (0.7)	19 (4)	7 (3.8)	53 (1.2)
11-12	22 (0.6)	9 (2)	3 (1.6)	34 (0.8)
12-13	16 (0.4)	5 (1.1)	5 (2.7)	26 (0:6)
13-14	5 (0.1)	3 (0.64)	2 (1.1)	10 (0.2)
14-15	3 (0.08)	1 (0.21)	3 (1.6)	7 (0.16)
15-16	1 (0.03)	1 (0.21)	2 (1.1)	4 (0.09)
16-17	0 (0)	1 (0.21)	2 (1.1)	3 (0.07)
17-18	1 (0.03)	1 (0.21)	1 (0.55)	3 (0.07)
18-19	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0.55)	1 (0.02)
19-20	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0.55)	1 (0.02)
20-21	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0.55)	1 (0.02)
21-22	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0.55)	1 (0.02)
22-23	0 (0)	0 (0)	1 (0.55)	1 (0.02)
TOTAL	3770	466	183	4419

Sources: Army Department Papers
AD 106/13 Thames No 1 Rifle Coy Papers
AD 106/15 Coromandel Rifle Volunteers Attendance Register
AD 106/18 Eketuhuna Mounted Rifle Papers
AD 106/19 Invercargill City Guards
ARM 41/1911/4a - 4k (ii) Auckland Artillery Volunteer Capitation Returns.
ARM 41/1911/ 18a - 18k Auckland Engineer Volunteers Capitation Returns.
ARM 41/1911/17 1A-AS Canterbury Yeomanry Cavalry Capitation Rates held at National Archives.

NOTES FOR APPENDIX 1

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1. Army Department
AD 106/13 Thames No 1 Rifle Company Papers
AD 106/15 Coromandel Rifle Volunteers Attendance Register
AD 106/18 Eketahuna Mounted Rifles
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