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**METROPOLITAN REFORM AND DECISION MAKING:
DOVE-MYER ROBINSON'S CHALLENGE TO LOCAL BODY
MORPHOLOGICAL FUNDAMENTALISM**

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ABSTRACTMETROPOLITAN REFORM AND DECISION MAKING:
DOVE-MYER ROBINSON'S CHALLENGE TO LOCAL BODY
MORPHOLOGICAL FUNDAMENTALISM

The capacity of New Zealand local bodies to perceive their geographical identities and political autonomy as enduringly useful and to jealously protect these against proposals for structural change is studied in this thesis. This self protective guardianship is termed morphological fundamentalism. The latter word is derived from a theological description of the evangelical movement that considered the truth of the Bible to be unchanging and applicable to any age, while "morphological" pertains to the biological study of form and structure. Taken together, the words denote a dogmatic assumption of structural unalterability. The effect of this determined defence of local body geographical and political integrity has been to contain administrative change despite the emergence of urban and metropolitan communities from the country's colonial settlement.

This thesis is concerned first with a challenge to New Zealand local body morphological fundamentalism posed by Dove-Myer Robinson, Mayor of Auckland 1959-1965, 1968-1980 who campaigned for the reform of metropolitan government and the establishment of an Auckland Regional Authority. The thesis is concerned secondly with Robinson's continued challenge to morphological fundamentalism after the Auckland Regional Authority is established and his failure to become

an authoritative metropolitan decision maker.

The first part of this study of Dove-Myer Robinson's political career is intended to identify the strength of morphological fundamentalism in Greater Auckland and the urgency for reform there of the local body structure, which consisted of thirty two different municipalities of counties and twenty special purpose bodies. Robinson's role in promoting the Auckland Regional Authority concept, his choice of overseas models for the authority, the reactions of local and central government politicians to his proposals and the vexed progress of legislation establishing the Auckland Regional Authority are assessed.

Dove-Myer Robinson played a leading role in Auckland City politics, beginning with his entry into the Brown's Island Drainage controversy in 1944. He became an Auckland City Councillor in 1952, Chairman of the Auckland and Suburban Drainage Board in 1953 and Mayor of Auckland City in 1959. Then in 1960 he began his struggle for the creation of a Greater Auckland Authority, able to coalesce metropolitan opinion and promulgate major metropolitan and regional development. This thesis outlines the reputation Robinson brought to his reform campaign. Robinson was an independent political figure who developed a personal following amongst Aucklanders as well as a strong populist appeal in the working class areas of the city. As such he was unacceptable to the Greater Auckland local body Establishment and particularly to the ruling Citizens' and Ratepayers' Association on the Auckland City Council. His

Jewish and working class origins, his wartime activities, his personal life and his personality were also considered dubious by his opponents.

This study demonstrates the effects Robinson's personal reputation had on those involved in the metropolitan reform process. It also explains how these factors developed into a feud between Robinson and the two political associations on the Auckland City Council - the Citizens' and Ratepayers' Association and the Labour Party. The culmination of the feud - the mayor's loss of office in the 1965 municipal elections - is linked to his loss of position on the fledgling Auckland Regional Authority and his three year exile from political influence on the body.

The second part of this thesis assesses Robinson's declining ability to influence the metropolitan decision making carried out by the Auckland Regional Authority. This study portrays the changing nature of Robinson's battle against morphological fundamentalism during which the mayor became frustrated and finally thwarted by the strength of that mentality.

After the establishment of the Auckland Regional Authority, it was only a matter of time before morphological fundamentalism was again taken up by the municipal local bodies to protect the political authority and pre-eminence they had enjoyed in the preceding local government structure. In deference to the attitudes associated with the preceding Auckland local government - parochial jealousies and rivalries, consultation between municipalities and

inter-municipal agreement on large works, resentment of the central city and timidity in relations with central government - succeeding Auckland Regional Authority chairmen, H.D. Lambie and T.H. Pearce had developed a "benign" regionalism for the Auckland Regional Authority. Its limited objectives were designed to pre-empt any challenge to the body and let the municipal bodies see the body as an extension of their own authority, successfully implementing objectives they had wanted but had not been able to agree on funding. In effect, morphological fundamentalism was being allowed to win by default. Robinson's rapid rail proposals however, challenged this limited conception of the Auckland Regional Authority and placed strains on the capacity of the Auckland Regional Authority to make decisions that enjoyed widespread support amongst its members and the municipal local bodies. In the face of this challenge, the municipal local bodies became openly defensive of their political authority and Robinson clashed with them, and lost. A brief study of the two overseas examples Robinson most closely modelled his authority upon is made to elucidate the problems Robinson had in challenging the residual morphological fundamentalism after the Auckland Regional Authority was established.

The thesis concludes by assessing the impact Robinson had on local body morphological fundamentalism and to what extent his own political methods and reputation had facilitated his challenge.

"A MAN AND HIS CITY"



The Mayor of Auckland, Sir Dove-Myer Robinson,
surveys Auckland City by helicopter.

(With an acknowledgement to The New Zealand Herald)

PREFACE

Dove-Myer Robinson was the Mayor of Auckland City from 1959 to 1965 and after a three year absence, from 1968 until his defeat in the 1980 municipal elections. This thesis examines his role in the local government reform that was undertaken in the metropolis during the early 1960s and it studies his role and influence in the decision making of the Auckland Regional Authority - the agency of government that emerged from the earlier reform process. Robinson's contributions to metropolitan reform and decision making are studied for the challenge they offered to the traditional attitudes, ways of thinking and trends that have pervaded Auckland and indeed New Zealand local government.

Robinson became a unique local body figure because of the political role that he assumed during his mayoralty. New Zealand mayors have few powers - they chair council debates, can cast a tie vote and are seen more to uphold an exhaustive ceremonial and social role like greeting visiting dignitaries, inaugurating new facilities and construction projects and hosting the events of their local social calendars.

Robinson did not limit himself to these activities. He assumed a role as an administrative reformer and used his mayoralty as a vehicle to carry his policies into Greater Auckland - the complex of Auckland City and 31 other borough and county councils that make up the largest

metropolis in New Zealand. After reform was achieved and its product, the Auckland Regional Authority was established, Robinson campaigned for a key metropolitan policy - reform of the urban transportation system through a rapid transit system.

These political roles differentiate Robinson from his contemporaries. For instance Francis Kitts, the Mayor of Wellington City 1956-1974, and perhaps Robinson's most obvious contemporary, preferred a non-political mayoral role - "he devote[d] much of his time and energy to the ceremonial and social aspects of the mayoralty".¹ Other contemporaries like Hamish Hay, Mayor of Christchurch City since 1974, Michael Fowler, Mayor of Wellington City, 1974-1983, and Cliff Skeggs, Mayor of Dunedin City since 1977, have at any rate avoided becoming major figures in local government reform and urban transportation policies. With local body reform, it has been the government that has instituted regional government such as it exists in New Zealand, while local body amalgamation and rationalisation has been attempted by the government body, the Local Government Commission. In this regard, two mayors of Auckland who tried unsuccessfully to bring about some local body reform Arthur Myers (1905-1909) and John Luxford (1953-1956) are the only New Zealand mayors to offer a limited comparison to Robinson.

Additionally the problems Robinson faced in Auckland were not manifest in other New Zealand cities. Overseas comparisons are used to elucidate the reasons why Robinson

1. G.M. Betts, Betts on Wellington, 1970, p.248.

sought reform, and the political difficulties such a proposal brought him when local bodies were faced with considerable change. Robinson was aware of the unique extent of Auckland's problems in New Zealand and sought overseas comparison and solutions himself. Hence the comparability of the reform process in Toronto and Winnipeg and to a lesser extent in Miami and Melbourne to his own reform challenge.

The later history of the two Canadian agencies, the Toronto and Winnipeg Metros, also provides a comparative background for Robinson's difficulties in influencing ARA policy and implementing metropolitan transportation goals through it. The Canadian experiences are particularly useful because in the New Zealand situation the ARA is a sui generis. The top tier authorities, the United Councils, established by the 1974 Local Government Act are not really comparable,² while the Wellington Regional Council does not have the urban transportation responsibilities that the ARA is empowered to deal with.

Even though the overseas examples provide processes and developments comparable to Auckland, it is worth noting at the outset they do not yield a figure that is comparable to Robinson. No mayor there was associated as emphatically as Robinson in the reform process and no mayor challenged the directions of the new authority that emerged from the reform process in a similar way. The political figure who

2. See for instance R. Welch, "Experience of Regional Government in New Zealand: Implications for Regional Planning", in Planning Quarterly, No.78, June 1985, p.23.

does emerge from the overseas examples as a dominant figure in metropolitan government is the Toronto Metro's inaugural chairman, Frederick Goldwyn Gardiner, who served from 1953-1960. Affectionately known as "Big Daddy," the "Metro Goldwyn Mayor" and "Frederick the Great," his biographer wrote of him in 1980:

... superlative tumbles after superlative as the story is spun of "the best known, most maligned, talked about, caricatured, pugnacious, energetic, plain speaking reality conscious dreamer" in the history of the city.³

However, Gardiner was not ^{as} instrumental in the Toronto reform process as Robinson was in Auckland's, and the usefulness of his chairmanship is that it compares so closely with Hugh Lambie and Tom Pearce, successive chairmen of the ARA from 1965-1976 and whose conceptions of the ARA Robinson was compelled to challenge.

Some comment should be made at this introductory stage about the source material used in this thesis. The number of people willing to be interviewed or correspond about their memories of events and persons during Robinson's local body career was considerable. Their recollections included the ARA establishment process, the 1959-1965 Auckland City Councils and relations between the mayor and his councillors, Robinson's mayoral campaigning, the 1962 and 1965 mayoral elections, rapid rail, local body amalgamation, Robinson's personal life and the mayoral years from

3. Timothy Colton, Big Daddy: Frederick G. Gardiner and the Making of the Toronto Metro, 1980, p.150.

1968-1980. I would like to thank the following:

The Hon. A.E. Allen, Mr N. Ambler, The Hon. Michael Bassett, Harry Beaumont, Brian Berg, John Berry, Mr C.A. Cooke, Professor K.B. Cumberland, John Dale, Miss W. Delugar, Alex Dreaver, the late N.V. Douglas, Mr E. Flynn, Jolyon Firth, Mr R.G. Gallagher, The Hon P.T. Gordon, Sir Hamish Hay, Mr Keith Hay, Mr E.A.J. Holdaway, Noel Holmes, Mr F.W.O. Jones, Mrs Beth Keam, Mrs H.D. Lambie, Mr M. Lancaster, Dr R.G. McElroy, the late L.A. Manning, Professor J. Morton, Sir Robert Muldoon, Mr L. Murdoch, the late J.A. Redwood, Mrs Thelma Robinson, Dr D. Rogers, Sir Reginald Savory, Mr F. Schischka, The Hon. W.J. Scott, the late Sir William Stevenson, Dame Catherine Tizard, Mr Justice Turner, and Mr F.G. Turner; and I would like to thank Professor G.W.A. Bush for lending a tape of his interview with the late G.H. Forsyth.

I do not think gratitude would be appropriate for the interview with Mr S.R. Noall, but it was an illuminating experience. I would like to especially thank Sir Dove-Myer Robinson for his availability to be interviewed and his preparedness to talk about so many aspects of his political and personal life. Only once in the hours we spent together do I recall him reluctant to speak on a subject, and understandably that was the sad experiences of his second and third marriages. I appreciated his valuable time and his candour.

While the number of people willing to speak or write about their memories of Robinson's local body career was

considerable, the search for written sources related to the thesis topic was much more frustrating. Published material on Robinson includes G.W.A. Bush's study Moving Against the Tide; Brown's Island Drainage Controversy, 1980, and his article on the election methods and techniques used in the 1968 mayoral election, and some references to the mayor in his work for the Auckland City Council Centennial, Decently and In Order; The Centennial History of the Auckland City Council, 1974. Peter Nicholas' biography Robbie of Auckland, 1974, contains much information on Robinson's life before the mayoralty, but its treatment of the ARA reform process and rapid rail is scant, two and three pages respectively, and some of it inaccurate. With the exception of Robinson, those interviewed could provide little in the way of surviving political papers. One interview subject, Alex Dreaver, Auckland City Councillor 1953-1974, told me how his family had burnt his and the papers left by his mother, Mary Dreaver (Auckland City Councillor 1938-1944, 1953-1961) because they represented such a storage problem. Similar comments provide clues to the fate of other collections.

Important local body leaders like Tom Pearce, Auckland City Councillor 1962-1968, ARA Chairman 1968-1976, and Auckland City Mayors J.A.L. Allum (1941-1953); J.H. Luxford (1953-1956); T.W. Ashby (1956-1957); and K.N. Buttle, (1957-1959) have left no papers. Nor have parliamentarians involved in the ARA process like Leon Gotz, Minister of Internal Affairs, and the Chairman of the Local Bills

Committee, W.J. Scott, and A.E. Allen, left or kept any substantial political papers. The Holyoake papers (Prime Minister 1957, 1960-1971) in the Turnbull Library also proved disappointing. No correspondence between Holyoake and either Robinson, Gotz, Scott or Allen on the subject of the ARA has survived. Robinson's papers, by contrast, contain copies of letters sent to Holyoake as well as the Prime Minister's replies.

The Cumberland papers which Professor Cumberland (Auckland City Councillor 1953-1962) informed me included council minutes, with his comments on meetings pencilled on them, appear to have been lost by either the Auckland University Geography Department Library or the main University Library. Neither could locate them.

The National Archives in Wellington were not able to provide any useful material, except for Railways Department files on rapid rail held by their Regional Office in Auckland. These files were scant and dealt almost exclusively with minutiae - secondment of Railways Department staff to the rapid rail team, arrangement of rental and storage accommodation, office equipment etc. As late as June 1987, the Railways Department could not find any other material related to rapid rail.

After assurances that the Ministry of Works had kept papers related to the combined MWD/Railways rapid rail project, the Auckland office had kept only reports that were available in public and local government libraries.

However, a number of sources of written material were

located. Sir Dove-Myer Robinson's papers included correspondence and reports, special notes and/or other documents on: the ARA establishment, rapid rail, the Brown's Island drainage controversy, the three years 1965-1968 when he returned to private citizenship, his mayoral activities 1968-1980 as well as campaign material - organisational charts, lists of volunteers, lists of financial contributions, and letter writing appeals for funds for the 1959, 1962, 1968, and 1974 mayoral elections.

The Auckland Regional Authority has extensive archival material on the organisation's establishment 1954-1964, including minutes of ARA Establishment Committee meetings, reports made by committee members, census of members' attendance, as well as correspondence between Robinson and many local body figures, both opposed to and supportive of the ARA proposals. It also had material on rapid rail, including minutes and correspondence of the Rapid Transit Committee as well as the Committee's reports. It has the Tom Bloodworth (Auckland City Councillor 1919-1927; 1928-1938; 1953-1968) papers and a collection of submissions for and against the two rival ARA Establishment Bills of 1962.

The Ministry of Internal Affairs has archival material about the ARA establishment, including correspondence about the ARA Establishment Bills between the Minister of Internal Affairs, Sir Leon Gotz and Robinson, between Gotz and his private secretary and between Gotz and other local body leaders, as well as notes on interviews Gotz had with Robinson.

The late L.A. Manning, Mayor of Onehunga during the ARA reform process, lent me some documentary material on the withdrawal of the 1961 ARA Establishment Bill. Mrs H.D. Lambie allowed me to peruse the surviving correspondence of her late husband, Hugh Lambie, when he was Chairman of the ARA (1965-1968).

The Auckland City Council gave me access to the minutes of its meetings during the Robinson mayoralty and to its record of election returns. The Auckland Labour Representation Council files in the Auckland University Library provided information on the Labour Party's decision to run a mayoral candidate in the 1965 mayoral elections. Mrs Beth Keam, Robinson's secretary at Childswear and a close friend of the Robinsons, provided me with the campaign material she had kept, including organisational charts for 1957 and 1965. Mr Jolyon Firth provided me with material on the New Deal, including the policy manifesto its members had to subscribe to before the group was established.

The Auckland Public Library, the New Zealand Herald Library, and Auckland Star Library, the ARA Library and the Ministry of Internal Affairs and the Robinson papers all contained various collections of newspaper cuttings on Robinson's career as they concerned the thesis. The Auckland Public Library also holds source material G.W.A. Bush used in his centennial history of the Auckland City Council as well as a collection of municipal election advertisements.

I am grateful to the staff at the following institu-

tions: The ARA Library, the Auckland Public Library, the Auckland Star Library, the Auckland University Library, the New Zealand Herald Library, the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the University of Waikato Library, the University of Waikato Photographic Department and the National Archives, National and Auckland Regional Offices, who helped me during the course of the thesis. In particular I would like to thank Mr Anthony Richards, Ministry of Internal Affairs officer, Wellington, and Dr Susan Skudder, National Archives, Wellington. I wish to record a special appreciation for the considerable help given me by Mrs Marjorie Warwick, Librarian at the ARA Library.

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LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

AJHR	Appendices to the Journals of the House of Representatives
A.R.A.E.F.	ARA Establishment Files, ARA Archives
I.A.	Department of Internal Affairs Archives
NZPD	New Zealand Parliamentary Debates
R.E.C.C.F.	Robinson's Regional Establishment Committee Correspondence Folder
R.P.C.F.	Robinson's Personal Correspondence File
R.R.R.C.F.	Robinson's Rapid Rail Correspondence File
T.M.B.	Transit Planning Committee and Rapid Transit Committee Minute Book, 1966-1973, ARA Archives

CHAPTER 1

MORPHOLOGICAL FUNDAMENTALISM IN AUCKLAND AND NEW ZEALAND

LOCAL GOVERNMENT

In his book, Beyond The Stable State, Donald Schon¹ postulates "a belief in the unchangeability, the constancy of central aspects of our lives or belief that we can attain such a constancy."² Schon considers this belief, the belief in the stable state, to be strong and deeply held despite our apparent approval of change. "Belief in the stable state is central because it is a bulwark against the threat of uncertainty", and he considers that our talk of change deals with change "small in scale and trifling in comparison to massive unquestioned stability."³

This belief in a stable state extends through our personal lives and is taken up by social systems, organisations and institutions which themselves have developed a belief in their stability or at least a strong illusion of it. Change then to such systems is seen as a threat to the stable state, the more radical the proposed change, the more threatening.

A social system does not move smoothly from one state of its culture to another ... for individuals within the system there is no

-
1. Donald Schon has worked and taught for the Organisation for Social and Technical Innovation, the Harvard Program on Technology and Society and the M.I.T. Department of Urban Studies and Planning, and these experiences provided much of the material for his work Beyond The Stable State. The book formed the basis of the Reith Lectures Schon delivered for the B.B.C. in 1970.
 2. D. Schon, Beyond The Stable State, 1971, p.9.
 3. *ibid*, pp.9-10.

clear grasp of the next stable state - only a clear picture of the one to be lost. Hence the coming apart carries uncertainty and anguish for the members of the system since it puts at risk the basis for self-identity that the system had provided.⁴

Schon argues that the resistance to change is not paralysis or inertia, but instead an active determination to fight off change. He calls this "dynamic conservatism"

a tendency to fight to remain the same. Given internal tendencies towards increasing disorder and external threats to stability, energy must be expended if patterns of the system are to be held stable.⁵

He notes that "in our own time the attack on the stable state has passed beyond what [these] strategies of existence can contain ... the stable state itself is becoming less real."⁶ However this thesis examines an area of New Zealand government where both a belief in the stable state and a comparable display of dynamic conservatism have been strong and continue to exist.

This comparable belief is the commitment New Zealand local bodies hold to the perpetuity of their original form and structure, and it is expressed in their determination to actively oppose and contain change that would bring administrative restructuring. This jealous guardianship

4. Schon, p.56.

5. *ibid*, p.32

6. *ibid*, p.15

of both local body geographical boundaries and political autonomy is termed here morphological fundamentalism.

The term fundamentalist "originates in a theological controversy in the United States over the authority and nature of the Bible. Between 1905 and 1915 twelve small volumes entitled The Fundamentals : A Testimony to the Truth appeared. Those who applauded the conservative beliefs enshrined in these Fundamentals were called "Fundamentalists".⁷ They held that the Bible contained changeless truths - that it was an inerrant compendium of belief and morality applicable to every age and every condition of life. Subsequently the term has been employed to describe anyone who holds rigidly to a formula that is unsuitable to new conditions. The word "morphological" is described in the Oxford English Dictionary as referring to the form and structure of an organism largely without regard to associated functions.⁸ The combination of these two terms in this thesis - morphological fundamentalism - denotes a fixity of almost religious conviction in the enduring usefulness of local government political structures.

The pattern of these structures developed early in New Zealand's colonisation. Almost from the outset the country was governed by both central and local units of administration. The central government, which was eventually located in Wellington, governed the nation as a whole, but it delegated local tasks and decision making to smaller

7. Encyclopedia Britannica, Vol. 9, 1970, p.1009

8. Oxford English Dictionary, Vol. 6, 1933, p.670.

units of local government. While a range of parliamentary and provincial government charters had allowed the piecemeal and erratic creation of various local authorities, it was with the 1876 passing of both the Counties Act and the Municipal Corporations Act that the foundation of New Zealand's present system of local government was laid.

The 1876 Counties Act replaced the existing rural roads boards with county councils which had wider powers. As well as administering road construction, the new Counties gained drainage, sewerage and similar functions and could establish facilities like libraries and parks. The 1876 Municipal Corporations Act regularised existing municipal incorporation, laid down criteria for regularised incorporation in the future, prescribed municipal functions and set both borrowing and rating limits. An 1878 Act established a unified system of harbour boards, while in 1881 existing town boards, which had been created by various provincial council laws and charters, were given full statutory status.⁹

These Acts would set the pattern for fragmented local government in New Zealand. The intention of the Counties Act was for existing roads boards to amalgamate into large county councils, but amalgamation was not compulsory. Local land owners were keen to keep control of their area's roads board and make sure rates were spent where they could see the benefit, and the trend was for roads boards to remain intact in geographical size and to simply emerge

9. New Zealand Statutes: 40° Victoriae 1876, pp.153-98, 287-312; 41° Victoriae 1878, pp.179-279; 45° Victoriae 1881, pp.221-231.

in a new county council guise. The fragmented nature of local government was developing in the towns and cities too. Existing borough and city councils became incorporated under the new Act in their present geographical boundaries while small urbanising areas petitioned to become separate borough councils in their own right.¹⁰

The trend then was for small units of local government and any alteration to boundaries was almost always downwards. For instance in 1911 and 1912, the Selwyn and Ashley Counties divided respectively into seven counties and five counties and a borough.¹¹

Diminution was acceptable to local ratepayers because it met those strong preferences for local control and parochial identity. This was particularly apparent where town boards and borough councils emerged from county administrations. That is where the urban component of a county seceded from the county council and established its own separate existence. Urban and rural dwellers felt this division represented and served their respective communities of interest best.

The weaknesses of this fragmented local government became quickly apparent. Many local administrative units were too small to meet all the demands their residents placed upon them. It became necessary to create or continue

10. See for instance, A. Dreaver, Horowhenua County and Its People: A Centennial History, 1984, pp.72-80; J. Sherrard, Kaikoura: A History of the District, 1966, p.308; B. Bull, The Years Between: The Greytown Borough Council Centenary, 1986, p.9 and J. Mogford, Onehunga: A Brief History, 1977, p.26.

11. W.B. Sutch, "A History of Defeat" in R.J. Polaschek (ed) Local Government in New Zealand, 1956, p.29.

with special purpose bodies - drainage, cemetery, education and hospital boards for example - because the counties and municipalities could not afford to fund all these functions. When local government assumed responsibility for electricity supply and river management, separate electrical power boards and catchment boards had to be established because existing territorial local bodies were too small and poor to administer these functions.¹²

Yet once settled in comfortable boundaries, the local bodies' natural reaction has been to staunchly protect both their geographical and political identities. When faced with structural reform, local bodies throughout New Zealand have been capable of joining forces to oppose this type of change. The efforts New Zealand local bodies have made to secure their political and geographical integrity have been considerable.

In 1912 for instance, morphological fundamentalism won a notable parliamentary success. The then Minister of Internal Affairs, G.W. Russell¹³ placed before a conference of New Zealand county and borough representatives a new Local Government Bill. It would have reduced the number of counties and boroughs. It would also have reduced the number of single purpose boards like the park and cemetery

12. By 1985, there were 38 electric power boards, 15 harbour boards, 18 catchment boards, 60 pest destruction boards as well as a considerable number of non-elective special purpose authorities. New Zealand Official Year Book, Department of Statistics 1985, p.61.

13. G.W. Russell was a cabinet minister in the McKenzie government of 1912. During Ward's illness he was acting leader of the Liberal Party 1912-13 and a minister in the National (Coalition) Government 1915-1919.

boards, and have amalgamated the education, harbour and hospital and charitable aid boards into one body for every province. The local bodies of New Zealand opposed the Bill. Eventually Russell was able only to pass a measure that abolished some superfluous single purpose boards and provided for the reduction in the number of counties with those remaining being given wider powers. There was no amalgamation of education, harbour and hospital and charitable aid boards. Nor were there any municipal amalgamations.¹⁴

It was not until 1945 that the next effort in local body reform was attempted. A bi-partisan parliamentary committee advocated a permanent commission to review local body areas and redistribute their functions. Prime objectives would be the amalgamation of smaller counties, amalgamation of adjoining boroughs and reduction of the number of special purpose bodies. The parliamentary committee recommended that the Commission's decisions should not be subject to approval by a poll of ratepayers.

The general direction of the recommendations was towards larger areas with greater financial resources, a wider view of the needs of the area and the staff and other facilities that could be provided by bigger populations.¹⁵

Yet again it was local bodies' opposition that succeeded in undermining the potential impact of the Bill. The local

14. NZPD, Vol.58, July 4, 1912, p.127. New Zealand Statutes 4° Geo V, 1913, pp.289-299, 383-408.

15. Sutch, pp.29-32.

bodies' representatives made submissions to the government and the Bill was altered. The final Act provided that where the Commission proposed an amalgamation, 20 percent of electors could petition for a poll of ratepayers on the issue. A majority at the poll - that is, not necessarily a majority of ratepayers on the local body roll - could defeat the amalgamation scheme. The Power Boards Association gained a guarantee that the Commission was to have no jurisdiction over them. In 1953 a further Act set up an appeal authority to hear appeals against the Local Government Commission's decisions.¹⁶

In 1960, the Local Government Commission, itself, identified the persuasive nature of morphological fundamentalism amongst New Zealand local bodies. It reported that when it proposed amalgamation plans, "parochial considerations" in many municipalities would over-ride debate on the benefits of reform. For instance, if small local bodies amalgamated they could pool rates revenue, staff and machinery to serve their populations more effectively as well as increase their bargaining power when seeking grants and loans for projects, but these benefits were abandoned in favour of a separate geographical and autonomous existence. It also reported that this parochial sentiment was more pronounced in the smaller local bodies. (Ironically they would benefit most from amalgamation).

The Commission criticised the polls it was obliged to hold to get ratepayer approval of any amalgamation scheme.

16. New Zealand Statutes, Geo VI, 1946, pp.257-68.

Of the 16 amalgamation schemes brought to their final state during the years 1947-1960 (a small number anyway) nine had been rejected in polls conducted on the issue. Its investigation showed that while the majority of rate-payers stayed home, a committed minority came out to defeat amalgamation. In this regard, the Commission noted that "the right of poll is referred to in an atmosphere of challenge to [its] efforts" and it bluntly concluded that so long as the parochial lobby was afforded this right,

the fact must be accepted that the territorial local government structure in New Zealand as it now exists is practically a permanent establishment.¹⁷

It is interesting to consider what has motivated morphological fundamentalism. Schon maintains that self interest is an insignificant motive in the protection of the stable state. He writes:

because the threat of disruption plunges individuals into an uncertainty more intolerable than any danger to vested interest, the self then puts its own conservative energies at the service of the system's conservation.¹⁸

While it may be that local body people's own identity has become linked to the continuance of the structures they work in, it is also easy to detect a vested interest in the continuance of local bodies structured as they are.

17. AJHR, 1960, H-28, p.8. See also Table 1.

18. Schon, p.52.

TABLE 1: Numbers of New Zealand County and Borough Councils

	Counties	Boroughs
1886	75	75
1891	78	87
1896	81	95
1901	91	101
1906	98	103
1911	119	110
1916	125	116
1921	129	117
1926	129	119
1936	129	124
1945	129	128
1951	129	134
1956	125	145
1961	121	143
1966	112	144

These numbers (which include the time period of Robinson's first two mayoral terms) indicate the limited success the Local Government Commission had had in bringing about amalgamations.

Source: New Zealand Year Book / Census figures.

Sutch noted that those who argued that local government should remain small, familiar and accessible to residents were often office holders and council staff, mindful of their political status and job security guaranteed if the status quo prevailed.¹⁹ A long serving Auckland City Councillor, Tom Bloodworth²⁰ commented on these motives in 1955. His mayor, Jack Luxford²¹ wished to reform Auckland local government and Bloodworth noted the poor reception Luxford encountered, and made the following comment.

You will be somewhat disappointed with the lack of response from Mayors and Councillors in your effort to do something about local government in Auckland. I am also a little disappointed though hardly surprised, at the attitude of local body men. I am wondering whether some study of the problem at a lower level than the Mayors might be of any value, although from my experience of Town Clerks in general, I would not be too optimistic. Some of them, like their superiors, do not want to trust any move in case it results in amalgamation and loss of status, if not salary. (They would not be likely to get less salary).²²

The Auckland situation that Bloodworth refers to was a graphic case of fragmented government and manifested a

19. Sutch, pp.12, 17, 24-29. Also R.J. Polaschek "Local Government Reorganisation and Decentralisation" in J. Roberts (ed) Decentralisation in New Zealand Government Administration, 1959, pp.87-88.

20. Tom Bloodworth was an Auckland City Councillor 1919-27; 1928-38; 1953-68.

21. J.H. Luxford was Mayor of Auckland City for one term, 1953-1956. He was defeated by his Town Clerk, Tom Ashby in the 1956 municipal elections.

22. In a letter from T. Bloodworth to J. Luxford dated 8 July 1955, in Tom Bloodworth papers, Box 2, ARA archives.

good deal of morphological fundamentalism. When D.M. Robinson assumed the mayoralty in November 1959, Greater Auckland was governed by a plethora of local bodies - thirty two municipalities and twenty special purpose bodies. The municipalities, each with its own mayor and council, ranged from the largest - Robinson's Auckland City - down to dormitory suburbs like One Tree Hill, Mount Eden and Mount Albert, and pocket boroughs completely encircled by other municipalities like Ellerslie and Newmarket.²³

Their proliferation was the result of Auckland's fragmented settlement. K.B. Cumberland²⁴ described it this way:

... 80 years ago ... you could have enjoyed a pleasant walk through ploughed fields and pasture from Auckland to Newmarket; and being used to walking in those days, you might have gone on to the little hamlet of Mount Eden and still further into the rural openness that reached down towards the Manukau. At that time people building tracks and roads used picks, shovels and barrows. Motor cars did not exist; bulldozers were not dreamed of. Onehunga, Mount Eden and Otahuhu were separate units and had nothing in common.²⁵


Isolated, the settlements established their own councils which needed to have little to do with one another and

23. See Map 1, p.13.

24. K.B. Cumberland was a professor of geography, now professor emeritus, at the University of Auckland. He served on the Auckland City Council from 1953-1962 and represented it on the Auckland Regional Planning Authority from 1956-1959.

25. K.B. Cumberland, "Planning for Urban Growth in Local Government" in R.J. Polaschek (ed) Local Government in New Zealand, 1956, p.8.

Map 1. Greater Auckland



instead cultivated their own autonomy. But as the settlements' boundaries encroached upon each other, the question of their amalgamation into larger municipalities arose. As early as 1905, the then Mayor of Auckland City, Arthur Myers,²⁶ proposed the amalgamation of the existing twenty local bodies. His "Greater Auckland Plan" envisaged one large body controlling all of Auckland.²⁷ From 1905 to 1928 the Auckland City Council did amalgamate with some local bodies, for instance the Parnell and St Heliers Borough Councils, but others refused to join the scheme. By 1928 only ten bodies had joined the plan. Even if others had wanted to, the Auckland City Council's finances were insufficient to absorb the debts of any more borough councils. Finally, the plan was lost in the more pressing urgencies of the depression of the 1930s and the Second World War. During the time Myers attempted to implement his plan, and afterwards when it declined into oblivion, increased population necessitated the proliferation of further municipalities.

When Robinson became mayor in November 1959, there had been only one local body amalgamation since Myers' plan had been dropped in 1928. The geographical boundaries of municipal government had apparently been rigidly protected, a disposition which persists into the 1980s. Only two other amalgamations have occurred since. Manurewa Borough Council amalgamated with Manukau City Council in 1965 and Otahuhu and Mount Wellington Borough Councils amalgamated

26. Sir Arthur Myers was the Mayor of Auckland City from 1905-1909. He later served as M.P. for Auckland Central 1910-1914 and held cabinet portfolios of finance, railways, customs and defence.

27. G.W.A. Bush, Decently and In Order: A Centennial History of the Auckland City Council. 1971, pp.256-258 and 298-306.

to become the Tamaki City Council in 1986.

During the early period of Robinson's mayoralty, the Local Government Commission was attempting to implement amalgamation schemes on the North Shore, in West Auckland and in South Auckland. None of these schemes was successfully implemented. The Commission's 1960 report referred to a situation that indicated a high degree of morphological fundamentalism in Auckland. The Commissioners wrote:

In the main it is fair to state that the Commission representatives were met more by a defensive attitude to maintain the status quo than by a willingness to discuss any reorganisation which in any way would interfere with the autonomy of existing local bodies.²⁸

The following year it reported of the North Shore scheme:

It was made clear by the Mayors of Devonport, Northcote and Birkenhead that their respective Councils were irrevocably opposed to change in the existing structure of local government.²⁹

The Commissioner of Works, detecting a similar attitude, advocated a progressive programme of amalgamation because "any radical changes leading to abrupt loss of present authority can be expected to raise political opposition."³⁰

The political will necessary for amalgamation was certainly lacking in South Auckland. On November 23 1960, five South Auckland local bodies met to discuss Robinson's

28. AJHR, 1960, H-28, p.8.

29. Decision of the Local Government Appeal Authority, Decision No.9, April 1961, quoted in J. Steel, An Examination of Local Government in the Region, p.137, unpublished M.A. thesis, Victoria University, 1966.

30. Auckland Star, March 24, 1960.

suggestion that local body reform be investigated again. They had not met together like this for two years. If this were not evidence enough, the Mayor of Otahuhu, J.D. Murdoch, gave a fair indication of the strength of morphological fundamentalism in this part of the metropolis when he recalled:

When we met previously, there was no great incentive for us to get the South Auckland Local Authority [a South Auckland City] working. The South Auckland Authority had reached the point where it was just about to draw up an Act to bind us together as tightly or as loosely as we saw fit ... we had the unfortunate experience when Papakura and Manurewa walked out and Manukau County also became uneasy ... Papakura has always maintained isolation and insularity like King Canute.³¹

Three years later, when the Local Government Commission brought down a further amalgamation scheme, parochial instincts were as strong as ever in South Auckland. When the Chief Commissioner impetuously wrote to Sir Winston Churchill telling the former British Prime Minister that a New Zealand city was about to be named after him, a vocal storm of protest resounded throughout Auckland. The Deputy Mayor of Papatoetoe, W. Bardon, retorted:

All the local bodies in Auckland seem to be naming our new city. But we haven't yet agreed to the city. There are a lot of godfathers christening an unborn child.³²

The scheme was rejected by the South Auckland local bodies.

31. South Auckland Courier, November 23, 1960.

32. Auckland Star, June 26, 1963.

If morphological fundamentalism meant an unswerving protection of local body boundaries, equally it meant jealous guardianship of municipal revenue. Auckland local authorities persistently declined to contribute money to metropolitan amenities which would be enjoyed by all Aucklanders as opposed to just the people living within their municipality. As a result, the Auckland City Council was forced to subsidise or totally fund many metropolitan facilities and functions. In 1962, Robinson documented the way Auckland City was financing many metropolitan functions, while other local bodies held rigidly to their original financial autonomy and the power to decide how rates were spent. This was a key feature of local bodies' political autonomy.

In his report Robinson detailed some of his council's spending. The city provided the metropolis with a number of parks. For instance in the 1961/62 financial year, it spent £18961 on the Auckland Domain "a general recreation area for the whole of the metropolis". It maintained several reserves including the Titirangi Beach, Brown's Island and Motiuhu Island reserves. Funding of the zoo had cost the Council an average of £25000 per annum in the previous five years. The Council paid the accounting costs of twelve metropolitan/regional organisations including the Auckland Abattoir and the Auckland Community Chest. The City also provided regional facilities like the art gallery and the library. 80% of the latter's borrowers, the report

said, lived outside the City.³³ Robinson concluded his report by stating:

that it was not possible to assess or to convert to terms of money the time spent by the [Auckland City] Council's senior officers on metropolitan and regional matters.³⁴

But when the Auckland City Council raised the issue of cost sharing, the other municipalities, protective of their financial autonomy and rates revenue, often reacted by suggesting the Council was a greedy bully. J.D. Murdoch, the Mayor of Otahuhu, for instance, complained that Robinson's 1960 suggestion of greater cost sharing was

a great attempt to saddle the residents of the outer areas with the rating burdens of Auckland City - it could cost us two million pounds a year.³⁵

The Auckland City Council did not have sufficient resources to pay for all the necessary metropolitan facilities. And while local bodies remained reluctant to give up rates revenue and its attendant limited financial obligations, endless haggling over contributions to major projects ensued. This provides some of the most salient evidence of morphological fundamentalism in Auckland. In the period prior to Robinson's mayoralty there were lengthy delays in the construction of the international airport and the implementation of the Master Transportation Plan.

33. D.M. Robinson, "Notes re Assistance, Financial and Otherwise Rendered by The Auckland City Council to Metropolitan Auckland", 1961, pp.1-4 in Robinson's Regional Establishment Committee Correspondence Folder. (hereafter referred to as R.E.C.C.F.)

34. *ibid* p.4.

35. South Auckland Courier, November 23, 1960.

The latter document was brought down by the Regional Planning Authority - a powerless body unable to force the implementation of its plan to construct a motorway network and to improve public transport. Both the airport and transportation projects lagged for want of a firm schedule of local body contributions. In fact the Takapuna City Council even refused to pay for its share of the costs incurred during the drafting of the Master Transportation Plan, let alone the latter's implementation.³⁶

Addressing Parliament's Local Bills Committee in 1962 the Deputy Mayor of Auckland City, A.O. Glasse, criticised the way parochial attitudes of Auckland local bodies had affected these important metropolitan projects. He told committee members:

The Master Transportation Plan has done more than any other action to consolidate the need for metropolitan thinking. While the plan has the support of the Government and the local authorities and conforms with the subsequent decisions of many local bodies throughout the world, our local authorities have not yet agreed upon a way of financing their share after nearly five years.³⁷

Glasse was even more critical of local body resistance to metropolitan cost sharing when he spoke of the fate of the Auckland International Airport. He told the Local Bills Committee:

The total cost to the local authorities under the Government's 1960 proposals was estimated

36. Master Transportation Plan, ARA Library, Reference UDC 656.

37. A.O. Glasse "ARA Bill 1962: Submissions on behalf of the Auckland City Council, September 1962", p.3. in R.E.C.C.F.

at being in excess of £800,000 but the local authorities, except for the Auckland City Council, refused to contribute any amount in excess of £400,000 which amount was to be paid over a period of six years. The Auckland City Council therefore decided in order that an early commencement of the work could be made and also in the view of the approach of the General National Election, to accept sole responsibility for any costs to the local authorities in excess of the sum of £400,000.³⁸

Because the local bodies refused to compromise control of rates revenue - or did so only in preference to more extensive changes - this meant increased construction costs. The cost of inaction told in other ways too. With the Master Transportation Plan delayed, the congestion on existing Auckland roads in terms of fuel wasted, delays in manufacturing, and wearage on the roads themselves, cost in the order of four to five million pounds in 1960.³⁹

When needs such as transportation problems became so dire, then the local bodies who had protected their financial autonomy so vigorously would usually cede some authority over rates money. That way the present system of local government could continue to function and some other more drastic structural alteration could be avoided.

It is important to realise that morphological fundamentalism was a response that aimed to preserve local body structures but could countenance some limited change as a

38. Glasse, p.7.

39 Auckland Star, April 20, 1960.

means of containing wholesale change. It was not then simply a resistance to change to local government administration per se, although it often has had this appearance. If the consequences of change meant a loss of a local body's geographical and/or political integrity then the fundamentalist response would be triggered. Because so much of the change advocated by successive Ministers of Local Government and the advisory quango, the Local Government Commission, will be seen to have involved loss of one or two of these central aspects that local bodies believed must endure, then it appeared all change was to be resisted. In fact, the expansion of special purpose local bodies, those bodies like the power, drainage and park boards, were evidence that the structure could change if it was in the interests of morphological fundamentalism for it to do so.

For instance in Auckland special purpose bodies gradually took over specific metropolitan functions from the municipalities. These special purpose bodies either levied the Auckland municipal and county councils for revenue, as the Auckland and Suburban Drainage Board did, or operated as trading organisations charging consumers themselves as did the Auckland Electric Power Board. This abrogation of certain responsibilities by the municipalities to specialised Auckland local bodies was a consistently piecemeal process throughout the twentieth century.

The first such special purpose body was established in 1907. It was the Auckland Metropolitan Fire Board.

The establishment of the Fire Board was followed by a host of other special purpose bodies. The next year the Auckland and Suburban Drainage Board, which operated the metropolis' sewers, was set up. (In 1951 the North Shore municipalities established their own Drainage Board). In 1921 the Auckland Electric Power Board was created, followed by the Franklin and Waitemata Boards. The last special purpose bodies to be established were the Auckland Harbour Bridge Authority to run the new bridge that linked Auckland City with the North Shore, and the Auckland Airport Committee to negotiate for an international airport. By 1959, there were twenty special purpose bodies in Auckland and evidently when Robinson became the Mayor of Auckland City this piecemeal redivision of responsibility was continuing.

The creation of these special purpose bodies involved political compromise on the part of the municipalities. It meant surrendering political control of some rates revenue although most ad hoc bodies were self financing or heavily subsidised by the Auckland City Council. It meant surrendering some political autonomy although a number of special purpose bodies were forced to negotiate matters with the individual municipalities. In 1963, A.E. Allen, the National M.P. for Franklin, recalled of his 1956-58 chairmanship of the Auckland Electric Power Board:

As a member of an ad hoc authority which had to deal with 17 or 18 territorial authorities, I know the difficulties when one wants to reticulate power through areas of those authorities. One authority wants the power poles on one side of the street and

another wants them on the other side.
 One authority wants one type of street
 lighting and fittings and another wants
 something different.⁴⁰

The creation of special purpose bodies helped to contain the threat to geographical identity. They permitted the municipalities to remain as they were and metropolitan government to cope with new functions.

This excessive fragmentation of responsibility within an area faced with common problems creates no acute difficulties provided the common problems are never tackled. If they are there is endless consultation, negotiation and delay In the end if anything is to be done to solve the common problems, it must be done by the central government or by a new ad hoc authority, as was the case with the construction of the harbour bridge and as well may be the case with the construction of the new airport facilities.⁴¹

While accommodating new difficulties the establishment of special purpose bodies represented only a small loss of political prerogative, which was preferable to more wide ranging reform. In addition, the sheer number of the bodies concerned helped compound the complex nature of local government and make it a more difficult target to reform. The 1960 Local Government Commission Report commented:

The growth of ad hoc or special purpose authorities is a trend, which if continued, would complicate and weaken the structure of local government. [This could] in the long

40. NZPD, Vol.337, October 17, 1963, p.2550.

41. Polaschek, p.86.

run have the effect of creating such a multiplicity of local bodies and corresponding confusion in the minds of residents that interest in local government would decline still further.⁴²

The political and bureaucratic membership of the special purpose bodies also became as protective of their autonomy, separate existence, and status, as their municipal counterparts, and they were keen to protect the separate political integrity and, where applicable, their geographical boundaries. The three power boards, Auckland, Franklin and Waitemata - have consistently opposed their amalgamation into one Auckland regional supply authority. A characteristic response was that of the Chairman of the Franklin Electric Power Board, F. Sharp, who replied in 1962 to Leon Gotz, the Minister of Internal Affairs, that there would be "nil" advantage in the power boards amalgamating themselves.⁴³

Just as characteristic is the reaction of J.K. Banks, a member of the Auckland Harbour Board, who said he would fight the proposal to incorporate the board into a multi-purpose local authority, because "he did not become a member of the Board in order to see it liquidated ... the board had been in business for 91 years and he would fight to keep it autonomous."⁴⁴

42. AHJR, 1960, H-28.

43. Pencilled notes by an anonymous observer made during the submissions of F. Sharp to the Local Bills Committee in October 1962. In ARA file; Submissions on the 1962 Bills, ARA Archives.

44. New Zealand Herald, May 5, 1962.

Equally strong as evidence of morphological fundamentalism in Auckland was the failure of three major local government reform bids made during the city's history: Myers', Tom Bloodworth's in 1928 and Jack Luxford's in 1954-55. At the same time the local bodies accepted some changes - the creation of a new special purpose body, the Auckland Transport Board in 1928 and an advisory council, the Auckland Metropolitan Council, in 1956 - as a means of placating the two reformers, containing change and preserving their political autonomy.

Myers' Greater Auckland Plan, as outlined, failed. In 1928, Auckland City Councillor Tom Bloodworth advocated a Board of Works that would bring together the existing special purpose functions into one administrative body. The Auckland local bodies did not agree to his plan but offered their support for the establishment of the Auckland Transport Board, since public transport deficiencies had prompted Bloodworth's proposal. Before Robinson's mayoralty, the most recent reform attempt had been that of Auckland City Mayor Jack Luxford. Luxford had advocated what Robinson would actually achieve, a Greater Auckland Authority which would be superimposed on the existing municipalities to carry out essential metropolitan functions.

The municipalities gave Luxford their permission to investigate the proposal. But at the meeting Luxford arranged to get this consent, some of the views expressed were a truer gauge of the way many Auckland local body politicians were thinking. Anderson, the Mayor of Mount Albert, offered this view:

What is wanted is to see whether there is not a sensible formula to be evolved that can improve, even within the existing set up of local authorities, local government in the metropolitan area ... we have, I think, progressed quite satisfactorily over the years in our present set up ... even if we do no more than stock taking, I think we will have achieved a great deal.⁴⁵

The Mayor of Otahuhu, J. Deas, hardly embraced the notion of reform when he commented:

My Council would welcome any scheme of investigation but they would not see themselves as being incorporated in a Greater Auckland scheme. Even if I supported the notion I would not wish that to be looked upon as being committed.⁴⁶

Keith Hay, the Mayor of Mount Roskill, also articulated the prevailing mood of resistance to local body reform:

I feel [he said] if nothing more comes out of this meeting than the fact that we can meet here say, once every six months, and discuss our various problems, such as the Morningside [Railway] Tunnel which affects us all ... we would still be better off ... I would say supporting the resolution ... that it does not commit our people in Mount Roskill in any way whatsoever.⁴⁷

45. Reported in the minutes of The Conference of Municipal Local Bodies and Chairman of Ad Hoc Authorities in the Auckland Metropolitan Area held April 26, 1954, pp.4-5. ARA Establishment Files (hereafter referred to as ARAEF) A1 Folder 1, No.17.

46. *ibid*, p.6.

47. *ibid*, p.6. Keith Hay was owner/director of Keith Hay Homes Ltd, a long serving mayor and ARA member for Mount Roskill and is at present a leading figure in the Coalition of Concerned Citizens.

Luxford did not realise his reform ambitions. He did manage to salvage from his efforts a new body, the Auckland Metropolitan Council. All local body mayors and chairmen were members and through this Auckland gained a forum for discussing metropolitan matters. However, as an agency of metropolitan government, it was powerless. It did not have statutory powers to resolve minor feuding between the municipalities or to make binding decisions on funding metropolitan projects. For instance, it could not settle the problem of a "no-man's land" that existed between the Devonport and Takapuna boroughs because neither party would accept responsibility for the maintenance of the boundary road. Mount Albert, Mount Eden and Mount Roskill refused to co-operate to improve drainage systems that regularly burst into Auckland City properties, including the zoo. The Metropolitan Council was powerless to adjudicate on these matters, nor could it make any binding decisions on the financing of new metropolitan facilities and services. This still remained the prerogative of individual local bodies.

Local bodies' rejection of amalgamation schemes proposed by the Local Government Commission and earlier Ministers of Local Government, their disinclination to compromise control of rates money and their unwillingness to contribute funds to metropolitan projects like the International Airport, and the Master Transportation Plan, and the successful repudiation of Myers, Bloodworth and Luxford's reform proposals, point clearly to strength of

morphological fundamentalism in Greater Auckland. This is the situation Robinson inherited when he became the mayor in 1959.

CHAPTER 2ROBINSON AND THE OVERSEAS MODELS

Among those who had conscientiously followed Luxford's efforts in 1954-56 to establish a Greater Auckland Authority was Auckland City Councillor, D.M. Robinson. This process had whetted Robinson's interest in Canadian metropolitan reform models.

In 1954 the Auckland City Council Town Clerk, Tom Ashby, had suggested to Mayor Luxford that developments in Toronto, Canada, might provide a possible solution to the Mayor's efforts to find a reform arrangement for Auckland.¹ Luxford then authorised Ashby to investigate the Toronto situation and detail it in a research paper. Ashby did so.

In his report Ashby summarised some of the problems facing Greater Toronto during the 1945-53 period. He wrote that Greater Toronto had undergone considerable population expansion during that period. This expansion was concentrated in the suburban municipalities and in particular, in outlying semi-rural areas adjacent to the metropolis. Population increases ranged from 15 percent to 70 percent, while the central city, the City of Toronto had undergone a population decline.² Other authorities confirm Ashby's figures. Timothy Colton, for instance, noted that during the immediate post-war boom, 1946-51,

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1. T. Ashby, Report in Regard to the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, December 1954, p.(i) in ARAEF, A3, Folder 1, No.31.
 2. *ibid.* p.1.

the Toronto metropolitan population had grown by 13 percent. The inner suburbs had experienced some growth but the greatest increases were in the three outer townships - 12 percent growth in Scarborough, 133 percent in Etobicoke and 206 percent in North York. Colton notes that in 1951 the available population projection, which turned out to be conservative, predicted a 50 percent population increase within two decades.³

Ashby's report also indicated that with such rapid growth, suburban municipalities were finding it expensive to cope with the attendant demands made on them.

Tax increases [made by a number of suburban municipalities] showed no signs of levelling off after the municipalities had obtained their maximum growth and this trend must be due to the provisions of new services and more costly standards of service.⁴

A later commentator, Albert Rose, made the same point but he was even more critical of the suburbs' incapacity to deal with their expanding populations. He observed:

The metropolitan re-organisation was born out of a crisis in the late 1940s and 1950s when the population was growing rapidly, when water was in short supply and virtually non-existent in certain suburban areas, and when sewerage disposal and thousands of septic tank installations posed a very real threat to public health and sanitation.⁵

3. T. Colton, Big Daddy: F.G. Gardiner and the Building of the Metro Toronto, 1980, p.67.

4. Ashby, p.5.

5. A. Rose "The Case Against Total Amalgamation in Metropolitan Toronto", in L.D. Feldman, (ed) Politics and Government of Urban Canada, 1969, p.234.

Ashby also made it clear that the suburban boundaries had blurred (even with the outer townships). He wrote:

The boundaries no longer corresponded with recognised divisions of interest of physical barriers which existed when they were created. There were now no open spaces and few substantial physical barriers separating one local body from its neighbour.⁶

and he added:

The 13 municipalities had grown together to the extent that their problems were common and to a great extent they must stand or fall together municipally and economically.⁷

Despite the blurring of municipalities' geographical boundaries, Greater Toronto relied on a system of inter-municipal agreements to fund metropolitan projects and functions. This no longer proved adequate. Ashby reported:

In the opinion of the Board no system of local government organisation based upon rigid territorial divisions of municipal jurisdiction and an equally rigid partition of physical and fiscal assets could be expected to provide the essential local services which must be the responsibility of municipal government.⁸

The Ontario Municipal Board, an organisation like the New Zealand Local Government Commission, agreed. In 1953, after hearing evidence about the inadequacy of Toronto's pre-reform metropolitan government, the Commissioners had commented:

6. Ashby, p.4.

7. *ibid*, p.5.

8. *ibid*, p.5.

These problems of financing metropolitan projects cannot be solved by further reliance upon the process of voluntary inter-municipal consent with its apparently inevitable delays. Apart from the interminable controversies involved in that method it would appear to be practically impossible to hope for the unanimous approval of 13 units of local government when projects involving large capital expenditure to be located within some of the municipalities be financed by using the resources of all.⁹

The Ontario Municipal Board had in fact come down with an historic solution to the metropolis' dilemma and Ashby had cogently explained it in his report to Auckland local body politicians.

Under the Toronto reforms, advocated by the Ontario Municipal Board, the metropolis gained a two tier system of government. The existing municipalities (thirteen) federated into one metropolitan authority to undertake specific metropolitan functions. These included regional planning, provision of basic metropolitan services like sewerage, water supply, motorways and public transit and the provision of metropolitan amenities like regional parks. Meantime the municipalities remained as the lower tier of government. They were not forced to lose their geographical identity or a proscribed political charter so long as they accepted that the top tier had both supremacy in metropolitan decision making and control of crucial metropolitan functions. Their local planning, for instance, had to be compatible with the objectives of the top tier's

9. Quoted in AJHR, 1960, H-28, p.7.

regional planning. Provided the municipalities accepted this system of split authority, they were left to undertake their local concerns, for instance, local roading and local parks.

This two tier system also necessitated the end of autonomous existence for those special purpose bodies who had controlled metropolitan functions assumed by the new top tier authority. This multi-purpose metropolitan structure, called the Municipality of Metropolitan Toronto, or more commonly, the Toronto Metro, was superimposed on the existing Toronto municipal framework in 1953.¹⁰

Ashby emphasised that the reform model had been politically acceptable while the total amalgamation of all Toronto municipalities which had been proposed by the Toronto City Council, the central city authority, had not been.

The other municipalities reacted hostilely to the Toronto City proposal and took their case to the Provincial Government and it was at this point that the Ontario Municipal Board offered its historic compromise. More palatable than amalgamation, the municipalities had accepted the Metro system (although the Toronto City Council remained skeptical of the worth of the two tier scheme).¹¹

In his report to Auckland City local body politicians, Ashby listed some favourable opinions about the Toronto solution and its adaptation in other metropolises with

10. Ashby, pp.3-4; 7-10.

11. *ibid*, pp.6-7; see also T.J. Plunkett, "Canada: Ontario" in D.C. Rowat, (ed) The International Handbook of Metropolitan Reorganisation, 1980, pp.10-15.

similar difficulties. Ashby's report was a fair one. It connected the Auckland difficulties with Toronto's.

It would be difficult [he wrote] to find arguments more parallel to these which have been used in the investigations which have taken place from time to time on local government in the Auckland Metropolitan Area than those placed before the Ontario Municipal Board.¹²

Ashby's report was a small piece of research in the documentation of what was (and remains) clearly a global problem. The fragmented nature of metropolitan government and the problems these have caused, are not confined to Auckland and Toronto. Frank Smallwood, writing of the twentieth century metropolis as a whole:

The metropolis is an economic and social unit but not a political community. Most evidence indicates that the modern metropolis is suffering from a bewildering degree of administrative fragmentation which makes it extremely difficult to identify and implement consensual goals on a metropolitan wide basis.¹³

The resistance to reform in Auckland and Toronto was also as widespread as their administrative problems. Charles Adrian studied the success rate of annexation (amalgamation of a core or central city with outlying suburban areas) in the United States and noted that after a brief flurry of these in the 1940s few have followed since.

12. Ashby, p.8.

13. F. Smallwood, "Metropolitan Political Systems and the Administrative Process" in S.R. Miles (ed) Metropolitan Politics, 1970, p.317.

Recent annexations [he wrote] have been of only a few acres and the larger cities in particular have not annexed much territory. The requirement of permission of all areas concerned combined with the fact that suburban dwellers are likely to take a short view, heavily overlaid with concerns about access representativeness and the maintenance of lifestyles carefully cultivated by fringe-area officeholders protecting their own jobs, all help make this approach a slow moving one.¹⁴

Echoing the New Zealand Local Government Commission on the subject of ratepayer polls on amalgamation, Adrian writes "it is significant that the large annexations usually take place where State laws do not require the direct approval of fringe dwellers."¹⁵ Studying the Canadian experience generally, Donald Higgins found a similar resistance to reform.

One of the common features characteristic of urban municipal re-organisation in Canada is that almost invariably the re-organisation is conceived and implemented by the provincial government ... rather than being initiated locally by all the municipalities in a major urban area. Unless circumstances are really dire, it is only the local politician of the highly urbanised core municipality who will push for re-organisation.¹⁶

Morphological fundamentalism was not a New Zealand phenomenon alone. Donald Higgins could have been speaking

14. C. Adrian, Governing Urban America, 1961, pp.275-6.

15. *ibid*, p.276.

16. D.J.M. Higgins, Urban Canada: Its Government and Politics, 1977, p.157.

of New Zealand local body politicians when he surmised of the Canadians that they do not suffer from a suicide syndrome.¹⁷

But as Ashby's report elucidated, Toronto had found an arrangement that reformed the metropolis' government and had avoided the difficult issue of municipal amalgamation. Robinson was convinced of the merits of the report, but unfortunately in 1954 he could not afford to help Ashby, because he was not prepared to help his rival, Ashby's mayor, John Luxford.

Robinson and a dedicated group of city councillors calling themselves the United Independents had waged a lengthy struggle to gain control of the Auckland and Suburban Drainage Board and to implement an oxidation treatment system, situated at Mangere, as a solution to the metropolis' sewerage needs.¹⁸ Robinson considered some Auckland local body politicians, including Mayor Luxford who wanted the costs of the Board's Mangere oxidation treatment investigated by a parliamentary committee, to be hostile to his own plans and he could not countenance moves such as a Greater Auckland Authority which would bring his autonomous Drainage Board under the influence of these other decision makers.¹⁹ Robinson wrote to Luxford explaining his position on the need for reform:

It is no use envisaging [he said] a new organisation to supercede the functions of

17. *ibid*, p.158.

18. This struggle will be outlined in more detail in Chapter 3.

19. Interview with D.M. Robinson, May 9, 1983.

existing organisations, if those organisations are functioning reasonably satisfactorily. There are so many matters of metropolitan importance which do require co-ordinating that we should concentrate on them rather than interfere with what is already functioning quite satisfactorily.²⁰

But this was simply a strategic move. He wanted his three year term as chairman of the Drainage Board to be completed without any interruption to the Board's oxidation plant project and he would not help Luxford.²¹ This position did not reflect Robinson's belief that extensive metropolitan reform was desirable in Auckland.

Robinson maintained that at the right time and with the right people leading the Auckland City Council, then metropolitan reform and a Greater Auckland Authority, or an Auckland Regional Authority as his friend and fellow councillor K.B. Cumberland termed it, should be pursued.²² 1954 was not the time. Recently he remarked "I agreed with Tom [Ashby's] report - what could be done in Toronto could be done here, it was a matter of timing."²³

Not surprisingly he endorsed Ashby as a mayoral contender in 1956. Ashby had agreed to run for council on Robinson's United Independent ticket, but Robinson suggested a few days later Ashby stand for mayor and Robinson remembers the alacrity with which Ashby agreed to

20. In a letter from D.M. Robinson to "Jack", dated 1955 in ARAEF, A1, Folder 2, No.27.

21. Interview with D.M. Robinson, April 24, 1982.

22. Interview with D.M. Robinson, May 9, 1983.

23. Interview with D.M. Robinson, May 17, 1987.

the suggestion.²⁴ Ashby ran as an independent, but was endorsed by the United Independents.²⁵ Sadly, while Ashby was successful, he died only seven months into his mayoral term.

Robinson then took up mayoral aspirations himself and with it a determination to rationalise Auckland's metropolitan government. During the 1959 mayoral campaign he declared his first step in metropolitan reform would be to establish a single authority to provide metropolitan services. "The principal point in my campaign", he told one audience, "is that I will fight for a United Auckland". Sounding a warning to the morphological fundamentally minded, he continued "I have pleaded guilty to being a troublemaker, but you know a policeman is a troublemaker to larrikins."²⁶

There is ample evidence that Ashby's report on Toronto was a departure point for Robinson. He chose this overseas example as his priority reform model, but in addition he turned attention to reform models closely related to it - especially those in Winnipeg, Canada, and in Dade County, Miami.

Winnipeg's reform process had been similar to Toronto's. In 1960 the central city, the City of Winnipeg, had also demanded that all metropolitan municipalities amalgamate while the second largest, the City of St Boniface, demanded the retention of the status quo. The other suburban

24. Interview with D.M. Robinson, February 9, 1982.

25. United Independents election leaflet, 1956 in Robinson's local body political pamphlet collection.

26. New Zealand Herald, November 20, 1959.

authorities supported the St Boniface position. The Brodie Commission investigating local government reform thereafter recommended both the two tier system plus consolidation of municipalities to eight, but the Manitoba Provincial Government only implemented the former recommendation.

In sum what was created in 1960 was, like Toronto in 1954, very clearly a compromise between the demands of the central city and the demands of the other municipalities in the area.²⁷

Outside Canadian cities like Winnipeg, whose Metros were based directly on that of Toronto, the reform model that bore closest to that of Toronto was Miami's Dade County. The County - the top tier organisation - covers Greater Miami, including the core city, Miami City and 22 other municipalities. The county organisation had operated three important metropolitan functions - regional parks, the hospitals and the port authority - prior to 1957, but that year it was elevated to full top tier status when full metropolitan functions were assigned to it. The municipalities remained to conduct their local business. The reform model was patterned elsewhere in the United States - in Jacksonville, Marion County (Indianapolis), Nashville and Davidson County (Tennessee).²⁸

27. Higgins, p.147.

28. For Miami and other U.S. reforms, see E. Sofen "Reflections on the Creation of the Miami Metro", in M.N. Danielson (ed) Metropolitan Politics, 1971, pp.285-286; D. McKay, "Local Government in the U.S.A.", in Bowman and Hampton (eds) Local Democracies: A study in Comparative Local Government, 1983, pp.125-143; C.R. Adrian, Governing Urban America, 1961, pp.277-281; R.D. Honey, "Metropolitan Governance" in J.S. J.S. Adams (ed) Urban Policymaking and Metropolitan Dynamics, 1976, pp.439-442.

TABLE 2: Populations and Numbers of Municipalities in
Some Metropolises with Two Tier Government.

Metropolitan Area	Population	Central City Population	Number of Municipalities
Toronto ¹	1,174,000	666,000	13
Winnipeg ¹	465,000	257,000	19 *
Auckland ²	549,000	146,000	32
Miami ³	935,000	291,000	23

- Sources:
1. Higgins Urban Canada: Its Government and Politics, 1977.
 2. Auckland City Council population estimates, 1963.
 3. Encyclopedia Britannica.

(Figures are for the approximate time of reorganisation of local government in each metropolis).

* Ten municipalities were completely included, and nine partially included in the Metro's geographical boundaries.

Closer to Auckland, the Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works, established in 1958, was a further example of the two tier system of local government. As one of its chairmen explained to Robinson, it was the two tier system principle in practice,

It is [he wrote] in effect a federation of forty seven municipalities established to carry out those works and projects which individual municipalities cannot.²⁹

There is clear evidence that Robinson's research exercise into these models continued throughout the reform process and that Toronto and its clones became the model for the A.R.A. In March 1960 he announced a study trip to North America, including Toronto and Winnipeg. he said he would return

armed with all the information he [could] gather in time to appear before the Local Bills Committee in support of setting up an interim committee to carry through the Metropolitan Authority proposal.³⁰

On the trip he had talks with both the drafters of the legislation establishing the Toronto and the Winnipeg Metros. He said in a news report that with alterations to the representation provisions, the Metros could be adopted by Auckland.³¹

A letter that the Canadian High Commissioner to New Zealand wrote to Robinson also indicates how the Mayor

29. In a letter from R.E. Trickey to D.M. Robinson, dated November 23, 1961 in R.E.C.C.F.

30. Auckland Star, March 28, 1960.

31. Auckland Star, June 6, 1960.

modelled the ARA on the Toronto Metro. The Commissioner noted "I did not forget your request to say something publicly [sic] about your plans for a metropolitan Auckland Authority patterned after that of Toronto, Canada."³²

Robinson himself told the Minister of Local Government, Sir Leon Gotz:

I feel sure that if some of the positive and beneficial results achieved by the Metropolitan Toronto as contained in this report [the 1963 Annual Report of the Toronto Metro plus a review of the decade 1953-1963] could be impressed on Members of Parliament they would be more favourably inclined to support the enactment of our [ARA Establishment] Bill. The report is not based on "airy fairy" theories but it is the result of ten years practical experience of the organisation on which we have tried to model a proposed regional authority for Auckland.³³

Robinson seems also to have been impressed with the inaugural chairman of the Toronto Metro, Frederick G. Gardiner. Gardiner's biographer, Timothy Colton, argues that Gardiner had a "pivotal role" in seeing that the Toronto Metro became an accepted and effectively functioning agency of metropolitan government. Gardiner's programme for the establishment or expansion of basic functions - new water works, sewage plant, school facilities and freeway extension - was implemented by the authority during his chairmanship, and he enjoyed substantial support for these

32. In a letter from K.J. Burbridge to D.M. Robinson, dated August 2, 1963 in R.E.C.C.F.

33. In a letter from D.M. Robinson to L. Gotz, dated September 6, 1963, in R.E.C.C.F.

policies. "Of the 579 policy decisions taken by Gardiner's councils, 93.4 percent tallied with his recommendations, 33.5 percent of all decisions were unanimously in his favour".³⁴ Robinson in fact, unsuccessfully petitioned Gardiner to help with setting up the ARA.

I am writing to ask if you would be prepared to consider the following proposition ... would you be prepared to come to New Zealand - at our expense - to assist us? ... If it would be possible to obtain the assistance of a person as qualified and experienced as your good self, it would undoubtedly be of enormous benefit.³⁵

Robinson's own ARA Establishment proceedings folder also contains two publications of Miami's Dade County, giving an overview of the Authority. Robinson's research resulted in an article in the Miami Herald about Auckland's efforts to reform its local government. Robinson informed the paper's editor that "we have been able to learn a great deal from your experience with the [Dade County] Metro", and that when visiting Auckland, Commissioner C. Hall "was able to answer many questions and fill in the details we have been unable to obtain from written sources."³⁶

The Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works and to a considerably lesser extent the Sydney Water, Sewerage and Drainage Board, offered further examples of a two tier system for Robinson to investigate. He made a study visit

34. Colton, p.99.

35. In a letter from D.M. Robinson to F.G. Gardiner, dated October 31, 1963. in R.E.C.C.F.

36. In a letter from D.M. Robinson to the editor of the Miami Herald, dated August 1, 1962 in R.E.C.C.F.

to Melbourne, Sydney and Adelaide in November 1961 and returned proposing that a delegation of local body politicians should visit the Melbourne organisation to see its enormous advantages for themselves. Robinson noted to the chairman of the Melbourne authority, R.E. Trickey: "this is the type of organisation we must have in Auckland if we are going to achieve proper planning and implementation of planning."³⁷ He also wrote to the editor of the Auckland Star:

I am sending this [the 1960/61 Annual Report of the Melbourne and Metropolitan Board of Works] because it reviews the work of a Board almost identical in structure with the Regional Authority, which I think, is necessary in Auckland.³⁸

Like Luxford and Ashby before him, Robinson was left with the task of persuading the Auckland local bodies that radical metropolitan reform, based on these models, was needed in Auckland. The active resistance to change that could undermine local government geographical or political integrity quickly threatened to make the process difficult.

37. In a letter from D.M. Robinson to R.E. Trickey, dated November 20, 1961 in R.E.C.C.F.

38. In a letter from D.M. Robinson to O.S. Hintz, dated November 28, 1961 in R.E.C.C.F.

CHAPTER 3ROBINSON'S POLITICAL REPUTATION AND ITS
RAMIFICATIONS FOR LOCAL GOVERNMENT REFORM

Apart from morphological fundamentalism there was another factor that threatened to make the local body reform process in Auckland difficult. Unfortunately for Robinson a deep distrust and dislike had built up against him amongst some of Auckland's local body political community. These feelings were compounded by the personal ambition that his associates detected in his reform campaign. In this chapter Robinson's political reputation and its ramifications for local government reform will be examined and assessed.

Robinson had acquired a reputation for unbridled ambition and unsavoury character during his first mayoral campaign in 1959, and before that during his first foray into local politics - the Brown's Island drainage controversy. The problem of effective and safe sewerage had vexed the metropolis since 1870.¹ The Orakei Works, opened in 1914, had discharged raw sewerage into Waitemata Harbour, but in 1928 the Medical Officer of Health had confirmed in a report that sewage was polluting the harbour. The Auckland and Suburban Drainage Board looked for an alternative while the effects of pollution by poor sewerage treatment became apparent. Some Auckland beaches were declared unsafe for swimming because of high bacterial counts of

1. G.W.A. Bush, Moving Against the Tide: The Brown's Island Drainage Controversy, 1980, p.15. (This particular work cited as Bush hereafter).

of disease carriers such as meningitis, and people were warned not to eat shellfish from them.²

The Auckland Metropolitan Drainage Board³ decided in 1944 to implement the Brown's Island scheme. The plan was to site the metropolis' major sewerage outfall on Brown's Island in the Waitemata Harbour. The plan was to divert sewerage by way of a submarine tunnel to the island and then release it in its raw form into the sea. The plan was endorsed by the Mayor of Auckland City, J.A.C. Allum,⁴ the majority on the Auckland City Council, the Citizens' and Ratepayers' Association and the engineering and civic administrators of the city. Allum and seven of his councillors composed a majority of eight in favour of the scheme on the Auckland Drainage Board, the mayor being ex-officio the Board's chairman. The other seven members appointed from contributing suburban boroughs also supported the scheme.

Into this situation came both a lobby group, the Auckland Drainage League, whose objective it was "to promote a complete, adequate and permanent drainage scheme for the whole of the Auckland and Suburban District"⁵ and a league member, D.M. Robinson. From 1944 until 1953 Robinson, who became the league's chairman in 1946, campaigned against the Brown's Island scheme and ultimately he succeeded.


2. Bush, pp.19-75.

3. The Board was elevated to metropolitan status by statute in 1944.

4. Allum was a city councillor from 1920-29 and mayor from 1941-53. He was knighted in 1950.

5. Auckland and Suburban Drainage League, "Objects" (a broadsheet), 1944, in Robinson's Drainage Controversy collection.

Map 2: Waitemata Harbour and Brown's Island.



Source: **AA**
ALBERT

Moving from the status of an eccentric critic of the scheme, Robinson was elected to the Chairmanship of the Auckland and Suburban Drainage Board in 1953, where he implemented his own solution - an oxidation treatment plant at Mangere, based on the new sewage treatment technology coming out of California. During this lengthy campaign, Robinson inflicted damage on the local body establishment's reputation and on a number of their traditions. He formed his own Civic Party, the United Independents. The group ousted two Citizens' and Ratepayers' Association Mayors and upset the ruling association's majority on the Auckland City Council - a majority that had been held for 15 years.⁶ Robinson used this opportunity to gain control of the Auckland and Suburban Drainage Board, a body the Citizens' and Ratepayers' Association had dominated for a similar length of time. He brought those who had advocated the old sewage scheme into disrepute and implemented his own oxidation plant solution.

Robinson first became involved in the drainage issue when a neighbour persuaded him to attend one of the first meetings of the Drainage League. It was a reasonable enough issue to interest Robinson. He was a passionate composter and nutritionist and the drainage issue related easily - sewage properly treated could be made recyclable as beneficial compost rather than left as a raw, dangerous pollutant.⁷ His interest in the issue was also in part

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6. Auckland City Council election results, see Appendix A p.297.
 7. See for instance, D.M. Robinson, Utilization of Town and Country Wastes Garbage and Sewage, 1947.

a response to his infant son's contracting meningitis while swimming on the beach below Robinson's Glendowie home. The house looked onto Brown's Island - the proposed site of the Drainage Board's sewerage scheme. Robinson was convinced the child had been infected from filth washed up on the foreshore from existing sewage outlets.⁸

While his initial interest came about incidentally, the issue rapidly became an obsession. It was a stormy foray into local body politics and because of it, Robinson's status as a brash and tough iconoclast would precede him into the mayoralty. Robinson moved quickly into the centre of the controversy when he became the vice-president of the Drainage League in 1945 and its president in 1946. His chief objective was to prevent the implementation of the Brown's Island drainage scheme.

Although the Board's scheme was modified during the controversy - trade wastes would be released into the Manukau Harbour and seven outfalls were planned - the linchpin of the scheme was the main outfall at Brown's Island. To overturn the Drainage Board's scheme, Robinson, who dominated the League, had at first to win over or reduce the credibility of J.F. Porter, the Chief Engineer advocating the scheme's implementation. Porter, who joined the Board's employment in 1948 had inherited the scheme from his predecessor and was responsible for the modifications.

Robinson had to also challenge the Mayor of Auckland City and Chairman of the Board, J.A.C. Allum, who always

8. Interview with D.M. Robinson, March 7, 1982.

deferred to professional opinion (in this case Porter's advocacy of the scheme). Robinson needed to cross swords with Allum's fellow Citizens' and Ratepayers' Association City Councillors who made up the rest of the Auckland City Council contingent on the Board as well.

Under Robinson's chairmanship the Drainage League made a number of abortive attempts to overturn the scheme. It gathered a petition signed by 43,000 people. This was the largest petition ever assembled in the Auckland region until this time. It was presented to Parliament in 1945. It called for a stay of action on the scheme while further investigation was made.

While the petition was considered by Parliament, the League intervened in the 1947 municipal elections against the supporters of the scheme. This tactic was unsuccessful. Robinson released a misleading pamphlet that claimed that all Auckland Labour Party candidates contesting the local body elections had pledged themselves to stop the scheme. They had not. They supported further investigation. So, officially, did the Citizens and Ratepayers but because the Association would not be bound to any declared policy on its behalf, its candidates' names did not appear in Robinson's pamphlet.⁹

The mayor, Allum, responded:

I cannot too strongly condemn what can only be described as a wicked action on the part of a self appointed critic having no sense of

9. Auckland and Suburban Drainage League, "Aucklanders: Protect Your Birthright", 1947, in Robinson's Drainage Controversy collection.

responsibility and who is obviously activated by some ulterior motive.¹⁰

A libel case was brought against Allum by Robinson. The case fell into two parts - the issue of the ulterior motive and that of the untruths Allum alleged the League pamphlet made about the Brown's Island scheme.

G.W.A. Bush, a chronicler of the controversy, argued that the mass of conflicting evidence on the scheme's soundness probably neutralised itself in the jury's mind, and so the case came to centre on the ulterior motive.¹¹ Robinson believed the "motive" Allum spoke of was Robinson's hopes to save the property value of his Glendowie home which was threatened by the Brown's Island scheme. Robinson had sold the house two years previously - at a £4000 loss - to insure against the possibility of such allegations. But Robinson's lawyer revealed this to Allum's solicitor. In court, Allum's solicitor then suggested a different ulterior motive - a party political interest in the outcome of the elections.

Allum's lawyer argued that Robinson, for twenty years a member of the Labour Party, wished to promote party interests at the election. He suggested that if the pamphlet had succeeded in its intent, then 19 Labour Councillors, two Independents and no Citizens and Ratepayers would have been elected onto the Council.

10. New Zealand Herald, November 16, 1947.

11. Bush, p.51.

These calculations were dubious but Robinson's political sympathies proved to be embarrassing. While acknowledging nominal membership of the Labour Party, Robinson also admitted, under skillful questioning, that as a young man he had had Communist sympathies. He had been part of what Bush calls "a crypto-Communist group" some twenty-four years before.¹² This association was more "liberal" than it was "communist". It was opposed to Japanese imperialism in China and had grown from a leftist reading circle headed by Robinson's personal friend Andy Lees. Robinson had been a casual member of the circle in the 1920s.¹³ This admission was hardly pertinent to the libel case, but given events in Eastern Europe in 1948, the Communist tag more than anything else blighted Robinson's chances with the jury. They found in favour of the two defendants - Allum and The New Zealand Herald. Robinson had lost his case.¹⁴

After this setback, Robinson's League made representations for a Royal Commission of Enquiry to be established to study the soundness of the sewerage scheme. This request was granted and the enquiry took place in 1949. It found in favour of the Brown's Island proposals. In their submissions to the enquiry Robinson and the League had criticised the original scheme. When J.F. Porter, the Chief Engineer, brought in a modified version of the scheme with seven outfalls, the League was not allowed a right of reply.

12. Bush, p.52.

13. Interview with D.M. Robinson, May 24, 1982.

14. New Zealand Herald, December 14, 1948.

However by 1950, Ronald Hicks, the Board's Chief Chemist began to question the scheme's ability to maintain discharge into the Waitemata Harbour at suitably low bacterial levels. This helped the League when it brought submissions against the Auckland Drainage Board Amendment Bill at the Parliamentary Local Bills Committee hearings in 1950. Even more embarrassing for the Board was Hick's admission that he had had to read a statement in favour of the scheme that Porter had prepared for him. Then the League's solicitor was able to gain an admission from Porter that no float tests had been conducted to verify that sewage would, in fact, move out of the harbour in conditions that theoretically were conducive to it being carried into the harbour.¹⁵ No proper float tests had been done in such conditions, and all the Board's recent corroborative 'tests' were theoretical, that is 'tests' done on paper. The scheme's alleged soundness was based on hypothesis not on scientific finding.

This time the League was successful in creating a great deal of public doubt about the Board's Brown's Island scheme. So much so that the Citizens and Ratepayers dropped Allum in 1950 as their mayoral candidate. The Association was afraid that their past endorsement of the Drainage Board Chairman Allum and the Brown's Island scheme would cost them support at the 1950 municipal elections. Their mayoral candidate, the deputy mayor and city councillor since 1931, L.J. Coakley, who ran against Allum tried to

15. Interview with D.M. Robinson, March 7, 1982.

distance the Association from the Board scheme. He argued it was Porter and Allum's scheme and the Association members on the Board had simply trusted the engineer and the mayor. Coakley argued that they did not any longer.

Allum however was returned as an Independent and began his fourth term as mayor and Drainage Board chairman. Events became more peaceful in 1951. That year the Board was given legislative approval in the Auckland Drainage Board Act to proceed with the scheme while a finding of "no recommendation" was given to Robinson's second petition against the Brown's Island proposals.¹⁶

In the face of apparent defeat over the sewerage issue, Robinson stood for the Auckland City Council at a by-election in 1952. A sitting councillor, E. Howard Hunter, had been debarred from local body office after transgressing currency regulations on an overseas trip, and Robinson seized this opportunity. Robinson's win was the first for for an independent in an Auckland City Council election since 1935¹⁷ - not the first precedent that Robinson would overturn by the time he was finished.

Hunter also sat on the Drainage Board. R.G. McElroy, the Citizens' and Ratepayers' Deputy Mayor, nominated Robinson for the vacant seat. While grateful, Robinson believed the action was a political tactic aimed at winning the Association some support amongst the electorate who were disturbed by the scheme. In 1953, Robinson went on

16. New Zealand Statues 1951, pp.76-77.

17. Auckland City Council Election Results, Appendix A, p.297.

to establish his own party, the United Independents - independent on all issues save Brown's Island on which they were united in opposing the scheme. The group also supported J.H. Luxford, a former magistrate, as a mayoral candidate to challenge Allum.

The Independents concentrated on attacking Allum and the drainage scheme, while Luxford presented a non-partisan and statesman-like mayoral image. Robinson was fortunate that the 1953 elections were not only marked by his entry into the arena, but by Labour successes - a general trend across the metropolis - and also by Citizen and Ratepayers' misfortune. Shortly before the elections, the Citizens and Ratepayers' Executive had fallen out with some of its chief councillors, including R.G. McElroy, H.G. Beechey and W.M. Tongue, for reasons unrelated to the Brown's Island issue. The Executive had refused to renominate these men and to release them from their pledge not to run as independent candidates for council. As a result, the Citizens and Ratepayers ran a number of new candidates who were unknown to the voters, while the Association generally appeared confused and divided. The result was a major victory for Robinson : the Citizens and Ratepayers won nine council seats, Labour won seven and the United Independents five.¹⁸ The Citizens and Ratepayers lost the majority they had held since 1938 and while no single group commanded a majority, Robinson's Independents held the balance of power. Allum was defeated by Luxford, consolidating Robinson's success.

18. Auckland City Council Election Results, Appendix A. p.297.

In this new council, Robinson's Independents used their position to advantage and capitalised on Drainage Board appointments. They had four of their members appointed to the Board, and permitted three Citizens and Ratepayers appointments and one Labour appointment. Bill Butler, the Labour appointee, had long been a critic of the Brown's Island scheme. Labour victories in the suburban boroughs also reflected themselves in the Board's new representation.¹⁹

	<u>Labour</u>	<u>Non-Labour</u>	<u>United Independent</u>	<u>New Members</u>
ACC	1	3	4	4
Suburban	5	2	0	6
TOTAL	6	5	4	10

The United Independents called an informal caucus of a majority of Drainage Board members who sympathised with their position. It settled upon Robinson as the new chairman and he was duly elected. This was the first time that anyone other than the mayor of Auckland City was given this appointment. Robinson had felled another tradition. His capture of the Board was followed by new policies.

Robinson speedily confounded his opponents by inviting a panel of overseas experts to investigate the Brown's Island scheme. They found against it. In its place the panel recommended an oxidation plant at Mangere, which

19. This table in Bush, p.121.

Robinson and the Drainage League had been advocating all along. The experts were contracted to design the scheme immediately. This they did. Meantime, Porter the Chief Engineer was deposed. Robinson had made his administrative life difficult and he chose to resign from the Board's employment, after pledging not to make public statements about the issue thereafter. He took up engineering employment in the Bay of Plenty. With a new policy and new staff, the Board committed itself to the Mangere scheme. Robinson was determined to bring the scheme to an irreversible stage during his three year term, because he could not guarantee another.

Early in his term of office, Robinson was accused of implementing the scheme too hastily by his critics; Allum, and those Citizens' and Ratepayers' councillors like R.C.F. Savory and B. Roche, who were still committed to the old scheme, and by some of the press. They were correct. Robinson had stacked the investigative panel with pro-oxidationists. One expert on the panel, who thought the Brown's Island scheme should be persevered with, returned to England suddenly and he was persuaded to suppress his minority report until after the rest of the panel released theirs.²⁰ The speed with which the scheme was implemented (six months) was in strident contrast to usual local body procedure. The Brown's Island scheme had been under consideration for more than twenty years. The rapid speed of implementation also gave rise to inaccurate

20. Bush, pp.137-8, 150.

construction estimates. In haste the panel had been conservative in their estimates and had probably made their calculation in American not New Zealand currency.²¹

As a result of these miscalculations the Board's drainage levy rose $66\frac{1}{3}$ percent in 1955 and there were political repercussions. Robinson became estranged from Luxford, the candidate the United Independents had supported for mayor in 1953. The Auckland City Council, especially the Mayor, Citizens' and Ratepayers' Councillor R. Savory and Labour Councillor P. Curran queried the dramatic levy increase, the latter calling for an investigation into the Board's contracts and financial obligations. Meantime Robinson's long desired efforts to have the Drainage Board made elective - and so removed from Auckland City Council interference - was opposed by Luxford. In Robinson's opinion the mayor by now "had switched sides and joined the Citizens and Ratepayers".²² Indeed, Luxford would run as the Citizens' and Ratepayers' mayoral candidate in 1956. In the meantime he persuaded Parliament - against the advice of the Local Government Commission - to drop Robinson's elective bill and retain representation by appointment. He wished to retain Citizens and Ratepayers Association privilege, when it had a Council majority, to monopolise Board appointments. Then in 1956, as outlined, Luxford took up the idea of a Greater Auckland Authority which would bring Robinson's board into the sphere of a larger body.

21. Bush, pp.157-163.

22. Interview with D.M. Robinson, March 7, 1982.

As these events unfolded, Robinson sensed a conspiracy against him and was confirmed in his suspicions when he heard of Citizens' and Ratepayers' suggestions not to re-appoint him to the Drainage Board if their Association secured a council majority in the coming 1956 elections. In protest, Robinson resigned from the board; an action he later described as "a political publicity stunt"²³ designed to get the public on his side. Few people could understand Robinson's resignation, particularly when he alleges the papers deleted the most important paragraph of his letter in their reports. This explained how he was resigning because of the Citizens' and Ratepayers' threats to oust him from the board. But to most people, still unaware of the threats, the action seemed irrational and inexplicable. At best it was put down to a bad case of pique.

Robinson's resignation told on the United Independents in the elections that year. Two members lost their seats, while the three successful candidates, including Robinson, polled lowly.²⁴ The one bright spot for them was Luxford's defeat. The United Independents had sponsored the retired Town Clerk Tom Ashby for mayor.

Robinson's chances of gaining publicity during the 1956-59 term were reduced because of his loss of the Drainage Board chairmanship and the declining profile of that issue as the Mangere scheme was implemented. This, his second full term as a city councillor, was a quiet period for Robinson. However, this state of affairs came to a halt

23. Interview with D.M. Robinson, March 7, 1982.

24. Auckland City Council voting returns, Appendix A, p.297.

when Robinson announced his intention to run for the mayoralty in October 1959.

After the loss of the Drainage Board Chairmanship, the mayoral election of 1959 gave Robinson his first opportunity to build on the experience and reputation of his Brown's Island Drainage campaign. Coincidentally, the election campaign was conducted with the official winding down of the Drainage League, the lobby group that Robinson had led that had opposed the Brown's Island scheme. The "decent burial"²⁵ of the League gave Robinson further favourable publicity - it not only re-emphasised the flaws of the Brown's Island scheme and by implication those that had supported it, but highlighted Robinson's personal contribution to preserve the safety and recreational pursuits of ordinary Aucklanders.

The League still had a £5000 overdraft for which Robinson was liable as a personal guarantor. A public appeal, signed by a former mayor, Sir Ernest Davis, industrialists Sir William Goodfellow, Sir James Fletcher and food distributor J.B. Donald, helped substantially reduce this amount, but Robinson himself paid the remaining £555. Another newspaper article put Robinson's financial contribution during the lengthy controversy to the Drainage League at £17,000.²⁷

Other aspects of the 1959 mayoral campaign helped establish an image for Robinson based on populist appeal

25. Auckland Star, November 16, 1959.

26. *ibid.*

27. New Zealand Herald, November 17, 1959.

and strident individualism - the mechanics of his political machine, his platform, his political rhetoric and the tactics of those he challenged.²⁸ This was to set a pattern for succeeding contests.

Robinson's platform in 1959 fits relatively well with the populism Tony Simpson identifies as common to New Zealand politics in his essay "Huey Long's Other Island"²⁹ Simpson argues that New Zealand populist politicians act on and implement the will of a remarkably homogeneous majority of the population. The latter expect politicians to make the Government an instrument to help those whom elected them, through assistance on the land and through free education.³⁰ The populist politician provides a system

28. Populist as a label is originally derived from the American experience of the late 19th century. American populism encompassed a rural political movement of small farmers, their associated workforce and people from rural servicing towns, who sought lower interest rates, lower tariffs on machinery, lower and fairer railroad, fuel and utility charges and a freer money supply as a solution to their economic woes of high farming costs, low profits and turnovers, low wages and the threat of foreclosure. Those of populist feeling, numerous in the South and West, detected an international financial conspiracy, with links to the Eastern banking establishment pitted against them. This suspicion remained after the formalised political element of the populist movement - the People's Party of America - was dismantled in an alliance with the Democratic Party.
29. Huey Long was the Governor of Louisiana and U.S. Senator for that State, 1928-1935. His programme sought to help working class people with measures like income tax reform, relief for small landowners, a state financed public works programme to create jobs, regulation of big companies' prices and tariffs and state education. This programme was combined with Long's own brash and confrontationist style and his autocratic control of the state legislative.
30. Tony Simpson, "Huey Long's Other Island", in Stephen Levine (ed). New Zealand Politics: A Reader, in particular pp.152-3, 159-60.

where if people work hard they can share some of the prosperity that the nation's wealthy already do. Robinson at the local body level, wanted to make the city council both accessible to ordinary people and a trustworthy agency that people believed would act to right their concerns and improve their living standards.

In 1959, Robinson ran on a platform that was short on specifics, but promised a mayor who was one of the people and who would be fighting for them. While Robinson called for the implementation of a ward system, an urgency on motorway system construction, local government reform and easing inner city traffic congestion, most of his planks were much less tangible but they had a populist tone and appeal about them. Robinson promised to be accessible to all citizens, to run an open door administration, to seek citizen's advice by way of referenda on major works projects, to devote all his time to the job, to be fair and impartial, to fight abuse of public office and to diminish the role of council bureaucrats in decision making, to help the aged and the infirm and finally to serve Auckland and to give every citizen a fair deal.³¹

Robinson's capacity to better people's lot through the agency of local government is much less than central government's. However, he made up for it with a populist campaigning style. It encouraged people not only to see him as an individual, who would open the council doors to them, but to identify with him in his contest against an established local body association - the Citizens' and

31. "Robinson's 21 Points" in a "Robbie for Results" pamphlet in Robinson's election papers.

Ratepayers' Association who had dominated city politics since the Depression.

In a flamboyant style Robinson was particularly skilled at sensing a conspiracy and exaggerating it. He told one audience that the incumbent Citizens and Ratepayers' Mayor K.N. Buttle and his Citizens and Ratepayers' Association councillors:

have criticised me for being a fighter and then they have criticised me for running away from a fight. They have criticised me because they said I wanted to move too quickly and then they criticised me because they say I am an obstructionist ... They criticise me because they say I try to do so much, but they haven't criticised themselves for doing so little. They have criticised me for challenging their right of perpetual control of council and they have criticised me because I refused to be swallowed up by them. They criticised me because I have initiated so much, whilst they have initiated nothing ... Most of all they criticise me because I have had the effrontery to oppose those who have dominated, controlled and mismanaged the city's affairs for twenty years.³²

To another audience he claimed if elected mayor:

I won't go all highbrow, I [personally] won't change one bit from the past, good or bad as you may think. You might find me there with my coat off and as for vested interest, I will take it up from the mayoral chair and expose it to the fresh air of public opinion. That ought to be enough to kill it.³³

32. New Zealand Herald, November 20, 1959.

33. Auckland Star, November 19, 1959.

Events during the campaign also reinforced the image Robinson was establishing for himself. Some Association members and the major metropolitan dailies, who endorsed the incumbent mayor K.N. Buttle, saw their opponent as quite distinctive, but unsurprisingly did not portray him as populist, nor as a man of the people. Rather they portrayed him as an ambitious newcomer who would be unacceptable to the local body fraternity, including mayors in other parts of the metropolis. Councillor Tom Bloodworth for instance publically stated he would:

very much regret to see Mr D.M. Robinson as Mayor. I doubt [he went on] Robbie would make a good chairman. I doubt if he could sit still and keep quiet. He'd want to butt in all the time.³⁴

He called Robinson "impetuous" and said, "He would not enjoy the co-operation of councillors and other local mayors."


G.E. Myers, another Citizens' and Ratepayers' councillor, referred back to the drainage controversy when he accused Robinson of using the mayoralty to try to win back the Drainage Board chairmanship. Myers said:

Arising from Mr Robinson's declared desire to be reappointed as chairman of the Metropolitan Drainage Board if elected as Mayor [a figment of Myer's imagination] I feel constrained to make some observations as a member of that board ... I would say to him that I think he is ill advised to place his

34. New Zealand Herald, November 11, 1959.

understandable personal ambition in front of the public interest.³⁵

The two main metropolitan papers, the New Zealand Herald and the Auckland Star also endorsed the Citizens' and Ratepayers' Association candidate, Keith Buttle. The Herald's cartoonist Minhinnick gave the following interpretation of the contest:³⁶



"You take the high road and I'll take the low road . . ."

The Star's editor made his own comparison between Robinson and Buttle's personality, in effect echoing the Citizens' and Ratepayers' case against the mayor. He described Robinson as someone whose "personality arouses opposition. He has the unhappy knack [he continued] of

35. New Zealand Herald, November 12, 1959.

36. *ibid*, November 2, 1959.

occasioning factional strife and frequently the strife is bitter and personal". In contrast he opined "Mr Buttle has at all times carried out his official duties in a dignified manner that brought credit to the City and on himself."³⁷

These attacks probably helped Robinson consolidate his image - a populist mayor would not be expected to be a friend of an established ruling civic association and its supporters. Robinson's political individualism was evident in a less public fashion as well. Denying himself traditional avenues into local body power, he also denied himself their electoral resources. These were organisational resources like networks of helpers who manned polling booths and distributed leaflets and financial resources to pay for election costs such as advertising. This meant Robinson had to create his own political organisation to compete favourably against his opponents.

The evidence of this is strongest for the earlier campaigns including the 1959 campaign.³⁸ It is apparent Robinson dominated the election operations and succeeded in maintaining and funding an efficient political machine. In each election, he put into place a central committee that planned campaign publicity and gave direction to a network of volunteers who undertook electioneering duties in their area of the electorate. The whole operation was funded by Robinson himself and by donations from supporters.

37. Auckland Star, November 19, 1959.

38. Robinson's satchel of campaign documents and his personal correspondence file 1966-68, that are among his personal papers, contain information on each of these campaigns, Also interviews with D.M. Robinson, October 26, 1982, and B. Keam, Robinson's business secretary and his and his wife's close friend, August 17 and October 28, 1982.

The central committee was the nucleus of the operation. It made the policy and strategy decisions. It also solicited the campaign funds. To emphasise Robinson's self-reliant inclinations, he effectively made himself the committee. On a 1962 list he assigned himself: deciding on campaign policies, designing campaign advertisements, seeing they were placed in the papers or handed to agencies that would distribute them to householders, finding chairmen for the ten election meetings he would hold, and even handling minutiae like booking the halls for these meetings.

Other committee personnel, like his wife Thelma and his business secretary Beth Keam, gave in the way of advice and administrative and secretarial duties. Other figures like business acquaintances Harry Jolson (1959) and Charles Linden (1965 and 1968) had even lesser tasks. Jolson for instance, appears to have done so little that Keam can hardly remember his presence in 1959.³⁹

As well as canvassing for funds and making the policy and strategy decisions, Robinson also had to field a team of helpers for those campaign duties he could not do alone - driving voters to booths, acting as scrutineers and manning booths to give out literature, and staffing the central campaign's headquarters. In 1968, 500 helpers were needed for instance.⁴⁰ Robinson recruited ten chairmen in ten different parts of the Auckland City local body electorate who in turn enlisted further helpers. These people

39. Interview with B. Keam, August 17, 1982. Mrs. Keam had kept some material on campaign organisation.

40. In a circular from J. De Lowe to Robinson supporters dated July 24, 1968, in Robinson's campaign documents.


were strong supporters - for instance, Sam Temple in Ponsoby, or relatives like the Kissins.

Robinson's part in fielding the helpers was substantial. He advertised for them by word of mouth or by circular or recruited them at public meetings prior to the election ones. He kept lists of past helpers or offers of help made in non-election years, for use in future campaigns. But his biggest contribution in this area was to enthuse the volunteers.

Robinson made himself accessible to any helper. He knew by way of a chart (and later a booklet) where area helpers were, what task they were responsible for and how they could be contacted. There were discussions between Robinson and those helpers whose job it was to report back on opponents' meetings. Robinson met all the volunteer helpers to talk about the campaign generally and to answer queries from them prior to the election.

Robinson's political organisation indicates the lengths he went to both to compete satisfactorily in the elections against his opponents and to stay independent. The election results established the depth of this success as well as his personal popularity and populist appeal. Robinson scored well in the Eastern Suburbs where his campaign against the Brown's Island Drainage scheme had prevented pollution of the beaches there, but his opponent did better in the wealthiest suburbs like Remuera and Parnell. Buttle's victories there were substantial.

Map 3: Auckland City Local Body Electorate.



	Parnell	Epsom/Remuera	
Buttle	2,010	4,125	
Robinson	1,314	2,049	41

However, in the working class Labour Party enclaves - the Western Suburbs and Orakei and Glen Innes in the East - where in the absence of a Party mayoral candidate people were likely to be attracted by a populist rather than Buttle, Robinson polled well.

	Glen Innes	Ponsonby/Herne Bay	Western Grey Lynn	Point Chevalier	
Robinson	1,759	2,691	2,232	1,638	
Buttle	806	1,666	1,348	879	42

These victories were sufficient for him to take the mayoralty.⁴³

It is worth noting at the outset that although Robinson presented himself to the Auckland City electorate as a fellow working man and a champion of the little person, there was an element of myth and image making in this political reputation. Robinson was not an ordinary working man

41. Auckland City Council election results, Appendix A, p.302.

42. *ibid.*

43. The working class nature and the Labour Party preferences in the Western Suburbs and in Glen Innes and Orakei have been documented by a study in 1975. It notes that the Labour Party dominated most of the western city between Waterview and the central city and the south eastern corner of the city. Except for a few elevated areas in the west with sea views, like Herne Bay the Citizens and Ratepayers strength lay in the eastern city during the 1953, 1956, 1959 elections and this continued with some changes in 1971 and 1974. E.C. Majoribanks "Spatial Variations in Voting in Five Selected Auckland City Council Elections: 1953, 1956, 1959, 1971 and 1974" an unpublished MA thesis, University of Auckland, 1975, pp.83-86, 117, 120-121.

who walked off the street into the mayoralty. He was an affluent manufacturer who had made his money from a four factory operation, Childswear, that specialised in the making and production of children's garments. Robinson lived in that bastion of Citizens' and Ratepayers' support, the wealthy Eastern Auckland suburb of Remuera. He financed his campaign not through the contributions of working class supporters (who certainly helped with canvassing duties) but from his own considerable resources. What else he needed he gained from appeals to friends, primarily Auckland businessmen. The donation lists read like a register of prominent Auckland manufacturers, retailers and merchants. Names like Fletcher, Winstone, Kelliher, Kerridge, Rendell, Turner and Courts appear in the list.⁴⁴ Some of the donors were former associates in the clothing manufacturing business and motor industry. A number of the clothiers were wealthy members of the Auckland Jewish community, just as Robinson was. For instance, Nagel, Meltzer, Stern and Koenigher. Together with wealthy Jews in other Auckland businesses like the Paykels, Myers, Nathans and Moodabes,⁴⁵ the Jewish donors made up a quarter of the donors in the 1959 and 1968 lists.

The donations were rarely large, ranging from £5 to £15 in the main. There were some exceptions. Neville

44. Fletcher of Fletcher Industries and Construction; Winstone of Winstone Concrete; Kelliher of Dominion Breweries; Kerridge of Kerridge Odeon Cinemas and Turner of the Turners and Growers produce merchants and distributors. Rendell and Court owned large retail outlets bearing their own names.

45. Paykel of Fisher and Paykel appliance manufacturers; Moodabe of Amalgamated Theatres; Myers and Nathan were prominent retailers and wholesalers.

Walker (owner of the Modern Bags chain) gave £200 in 1965, Bob Kerridge gave \$200 in 1968, George Gonda (a Karangahape Road retailer) \$300 and Norman Clark (of PTY Ltd) \$200.

Robinson appealed for funds himself and he also suggested lists of names for committee members like Jolson, Keam and De Lowe to contact. He also used friends outside the campaign committee to solicit funds. In a letter he asked George Gonda to prompt Owen Rendell (both men were prominent Auckland retailers) and other Karangahape Road businessmen who had promised to help with funds.

You remember how I told the meeting I would need \$6000 and Owen said we the Karangahape Road Businessmen's Association should be able to raise that amongst our own members.⁴⁶

The statement suggests Robinson arranged informal meetings to gain campaign pledges himself. Clearly Robinson, who supported a healthy city business district, enjoyed considerable support amongst the affluent, as he did amongst the working class.

The discrepancies between Robinson's actual financial position and the image he cultivated as a representative of ordinary working people, can be revealed further. In 1962 and 1965 Robinson took out loans of £4000 with the Combined Insurance Company of America - hardly a financial commitment that those on average incomes or below could afford. These loans were arranged through the company's owner/president Clement Stone.⁴⁷ Stone, a multimillionaire

46. In a letter from D.M. Robinson to G. Gonda, dated 26 June, 1968 in Robinson's Personal Correspondence File 1966-68 (hereafter referred to as R.P.C.F. 1966-68)

47. In a letter from D.M. Robinson to C. Stone, dated August 9, 1965. in R.P.C.F. 1966-68.

Republican, met Robinson in Auckland in 1960 and they rapidly became friends. In 1968 Stone donated \$4000 to the Robinson campaign.⁴⁸

In the limited number of studies that have been conducted on the class and occupational background of New Zealand city councillors, Robinson rather than being distinct from the norm fits easily into the pattern.

Austin Mitchell's 1967 study of Christchurch found that the six local bodies operative in Greater Christchurch were dominated by businessmen. 58 percent of the councillors had this background and yet constituted 12 percent of Christchurch's population. By contrast workers who made up 52 percent of the population were represented by only 4 percent of the councillors.⁴⁹ Paul Harris in his 1978 study of Wellington local government found seventeen of the eighteen councillors were businessmen or professionals in 1974 and fourteen of the eighteen were in 1977, and that even the Labour Party councillors were more likely to be professional men living in the wealthier areas of the city.⁵⁰ In comparison, in England, the figures for workers amongst county boroughs was 24 percent and municipal boroughs 21 percent.⁵¹

48. In a letter from C.S. Stone to D.M. Robinson, dated May 21, 1968 in R.P.C.F. 1966-68.

49. A. Mitchell, "Who runs local government in Christchurch" in his Politics and People in New Zealand, 1967, pp.285-6.

50. P. Harris, "Patterns of Party Support in Wellington City Local Body Elections 1974 and 1977" in Political Science, Vol.33, No.1 1981, p.45.

51. P. Harris and J. Halligan, "Local Elections and Democracy" in S. Levine, Politics in New Zealand, 1980, p.246.

A subsequent study of New Zealand local government generally confirms what the Wellington case study revealed.

TABLE 3: Occupational Classification of Councillors in New Zealand Local Government⁵²

Occupation Category	4 Major Cities		13 Provincial Cities		38 Suburban Cities and Boroughs		80 Independent Boroughs		Total	
	All Candidates	Elected	All Candidates	Elected	All Candidates	Elected	All Candidates	Elected	All Candidates	Elected
Higher Professional	24.2	28.5	24.5	27.6	16.2	15.6	15.3	16.6	17.5	18.4
Lower Professional	11.6	12.7	4.5	5.4	3.8	2.9	3.6	3.3	4.5	3.9
Business	33.9	39.9	37.6	34.2	39.9	42.1	42.4	43.1	40.2	41.5
Admin. and Clerical:										
Non-private enterprise	7.7	2.9	5.8	0.6	6.1	5.9	3.4	3.4	5.0	3.7
Skilled & Highly Skilled	3.9	1.4	5.5	4.8	6.1	5.5	7.5	6.6	6.5	5.9
Semiskilled	1.7	0	1.0	1.2	4.0	3.4	3.5	3.4	3.2	2.9
Unskilled	1.7	0	1.4	1.8	1.9	1.8	1.8	2.1	1.8	1.9
Agriculture	0.5	0.6	0.6	1.2	1.7	2.7	3.4	3.4	2.3	2.8
Housewife	6.0	8.5	9.3	12.0	8.7	9.2	7.8	7.0	8.2	8.4
Retired	4.4	4.3	9.3	11.4	5.0	6.1	7.3	7.4	6.5	7.4
Other	4.3	1.4	0.3	0	3.9	2.9	1.0	0.5	2.0	1.3
Not Known	0	0	0	0	2.4	1.8	3.1	2.8	2.2	2.0

Robinson's socio-economic status and occupation equate with, rather than differ from, the predominant category to be found amongst local body office holders. Part of the success of Robinson's populist myth was that he resolved the wealth issue to his advantage. Again the Brown's Island drainage controversy was important here. The £17,000 that he had reportedly spent during the controversy showed he was prepared to spend his wealth in the interests of the Auckland public. But perhaps more important was that he had earned the wealth in the populist philosophy's way.

52. P. Harris and J. Halligan, "Local Government Elections in New Zealand" in *Politics*, XII (1) May 1977, p.145.

Born of poor immigrant stock, he had made his money by his own hard work and efforts. Self made wealth and populist appeal are apparently compatible. In 1959 for instance, Noel Holmes, a seasoned local political commentator noted:

after being closed down during the depression, he reopened [his motor bike business] with a capital of 2/0½d - and still has the cash book to prove it ... war-time petrol rationing closed him down again in 1940. He there upon went into partnership in a clothing manufacturing business and has never looked back since.⁵³

In the following election another commentator wrote:

Robinson was not born with a silver spoon in his mouth, he has achieved success by dint of sheer grit, by determined courage in the face of adversity, by sheer mental and physical drive that carried him to his goals.⁵⁴

But neither his Establishment critics' nor his supporters' attention seems to have been held by the discrepancy between Robinson's personal wealth, his business associates and his populist image. In fact the Auckland City political establishment and those who had sympathised with them during the drainage controversy elsewhere in the metropolis, found other things to criticise Robinson about and these consolidated the populist and individualist nature of Robinson's political standing.

53. Noel Holmes "Same Man But Another Hour" in his Auckland Star column "Just Looking, Thanks!" October 22, 1959.

54. "J.R." in "A Look at Robbie", in Tatler October 8, 1962.

Some focussed on his beginnings - he was of poor Jewish immigrant stock. Robinson's father was a Polish Jew - Moses Rabbinowicz - who had escaped from military service in the Russian Army by fleeing to England. He was classified in his immigration papers as a jeweller. This actually meant he travelled across the country hawking costume jewellery. To eke out a poor living, the elder Robinson would also assemble a houseful of furniture - bought from manufacturers and second hand dealers as cheaply as possible - and then advertise the lot for sale, making out the family was moving.⁵⁵

Robinson remembers his father as a man soured by the harshness of a tough life and a man critical of his children's frivolities, for instance, their buying Penny Dreadfuls or firecrackers with odd job money. Robinson believes his father considered him the most promising of his progeny but showed it by being more critical of him than his other children. He remembers constant differences of opinion with his father when he worked with him in the pawnbroker shop that the elder Robinson established after immigrating to New Zealand.⁵⁶ This shop, situated in Grey's Avenue in the central city, represented an improvement in the Robinsons' financial position, but their social status remained low.

Some of Auckland's political establishment appear to have considered Robinson their social inferior. Harry

55. Interviews with D.M. Robinson, February 8, 1982 and May 24, 1982.

56. *ibid.*

Beaumont,⁵⁷ the Mayor of Manurewa, described it this way:

The old school tie makes a lot of difference when you get into city councils and regional authorities and that, quite a lot, and if you are not in the club, you can be an enemy.⁵⁸

There was also the question of Robinson's Jewishness. Being Jewish had not been a barrier to the Auckland City mayoralty. Five previous mayors had been Jews,⁵⁹ and ironically some wealthy Jewish patricians in Auckland were as irritated by Robinson as their Gentile counterparts. They considered him an embarrassing upstart.⁶⁰

Clearly though, a number of his opponents did not feel completely comfortable with his Jewishness. In a rare public reference to this, Robinson in 1959 said "They have criticised me for the shape of my nose".⁶¹ One prominent Auckland local body figure for instance referred to Robinson as "a manipulating Jew boy" in conversation after his interview with the author. During the drainage controversy the Mayor of Takapuna, J. Guiniven told Robinson he should "go to Palestine to address the Jews and the Arabs".⁶²

Harry Beaumont said:

57. Harry Beaumont was the Mayor of Manurewa Borough from 1962-1968 and he served on the Auckland Regional Authority from 1963-1974.

58. Interview with H. Beaumont, May 27, 1982.

59. They were: P.A. Philips, 1871-1874; I. Issacs, July-December 1874; D. Goldie, 1898-1901; A.M. Myers, 1905-1908; C.H. Davis, 1935-1941.

60. Interview with Jolyon Firth, August 23, 1983. Jolyon Firth served as an Auckland City Councillor from 1968-1983 and was deputy mayor from 1977-1980.

61. New Zealand Herald, November 20, 1959.

62. Bush, p.69.

Although I don't want to name individuals, there were some local body men who had anti-Jewish feelings. Privately they spoke of Robinson's Jewishness in an unpleasant way.⁶³

Robinson detected some of this anti-Semitic feeling himself and it rekindled painful memories from his childhood. Before his family had immigrated to New Zealand in 1915 (when he was fourteen), Robinson had been educated in English schools that had been largely attended by Protestant working class children. These children had imbibed anti-Semitic attitudes from their parents, their ministers and even some of their teachers. Robinson remembers school as a constant flight from children who were eager for a fight. "Sheeny, sheeny" or "Who killed Christ?" his persecutors would jeer. Or their refrain might be:

Jew boy, Jew
Get a lump of pork,
Put it on a fork
And feed it to
The Jew boy, Jew. 64

Robinson was regularly chased home from school by "a hoard of up to forty screaming kids". To escape them, he learnt a trick of hoisting himself up onto the open tray of a lorry while it was moving. One night however he slipped and his foot was crushed by the truck. He was left crying in agony while his pursuers faded away. Escape was not always possible. Robinson was forced into fights in the playground while other children barracked for his opponents. He remembers being put up against a wall and cuffed about the head. He soon learnt to wrestle to defend himself.

63. Interview with H. Beaumont, June 16, 1982.

64. Interview with D.M. Robinson, February, 8, 1982.

He would get as close as possible and place his opponent, who was usually bigger than him, in a hold. He would then hit his opponent's head against the ground until the defeated boy said he had had enough.⁶⁵

Some of the school teachers were anti-Semitic. He believes the punishment of Jewish children was harsher than that of the others. One teacher, Robinson remembers in particular, as a tall gaunt spinster who dressed in black from neck to ankle and had a bunch of keys hanging from a chatelaine around her waist. While in her class, Robinson was caught leaving school early. The other pupils were taking divinity lessons which the Jewish children did not have to attend. Robinson was reprimanded by the head master, but this teacher was dissatisfied with the punishment and meted out her own. She gave him "six vicious cuts over the hand with a ruler". Robinson remembers returning to his seat crying at the rank injustice of it.⁶⁶ Given these harsh childhood experiences, it was little wonder that the anti-Semitism he sensed amongst some Auckland local body politicians was an antipathy towards him that hurt him most.⁶⁷

A further subject of criticism was the way Robinson had acquired his wealth (as opposed to his simply having some). Robinson established Childswear during the Second World War and there was no doubt that it benefited from both war-time shortages of imported clothing and a special

65. Interview with D.M. Robinson, February 8, 1982.

66. *ibid.*

67. Interview with D.M. Robinson, March 7, 1982.

licence granted to it by the war government to import bulk cloth. This brought charges later that Robinson had not only shirked duty - "he should have been fighting for his people"⁶⁸ - but that he was a war profiteer.

Robinson had, in fact, spent time in the 1930s training in the volunteer army as a motor cycle despatch rider and rose to the rank of sergeant. However, when he endeavoured to enlist at the outbreak of war, he was declared exempt on medical grounds. He had suffered injuries to his eye and back in a motorcycle accident.

However his war-time activities have been misinterpreted by some of his opponents. A.E. Allen, Chairman of the Auckland Electric Power Board during the 1950s, for instance remarked:

Robbie was reported to have said "Look at the silly buggers marching off to make war. I'll make their uniforms. I'll make money and I'll make a bit of love on the side". This was bloody Robinson, this was typical of the man.⁶⁹

'Childswear' never made uniforms and the comment on Robinson's sex life is interesting. This was another area some of the Auckland local establishment interested itself in. The strain of Robinson's erratic and failed business ventures and then the toil of Childswear contributed amongst other things to a complicated private life. By 1959, Robinson had five children between two wives, with a brief

68. Interview with A.E. Allen, May 10, 1982. Allen served as National M.P. for Franklin 1957-72. He also served on the Auckland Electric Power Board 1948-77 and was its chairman 1956-1958.

69. *ibid.*

childless union between these two marriages and was by then married for the fourth time. All previous marriages had ended in divorce.⁷⁰ While Robinson could hardly be accused of a monopoly on marital discord, no Establishment counterpart had divorced so many times. All the marriages had ended in Auckland, the third during Robinson's entry into local body politics, the drainage controversy. Given the small and parochial nature of the New Zealand community, it was only natural that speculation circulated. Robinson's private life probably read worse than it actually was. Allen and Norman Douglas, the Labour M.P. for Auckland Central (1960-1975) spoke for instance, of five marriages.⁷¹

Just as dubious to a few were Robinson's past political sympathies. Despite his independent status, there were suggestions of something more sinister. He had admitted Communist sympathies during the 1947 libel case. It was a brief flirtation with the left as a young man but according to A.E. Allen, Robinson was "a card carrying member of the Communist Party and there's no doubt about that."⁷² There is no evidence to suggest this and Robinson denies it. It would have only been Robinson's severest critics who would have considered him a Communist.

However this suggestion of something sinister and duplicitous in his personality was one of the worst labels he brought to the mayoralty from the drainage controversy.

70. Interviews with D.M. Robinson, May 26 1982 and October 27, 1982.

71. Interviews with A.E. Allen, May 10, 1982 and with N.V. Douglas, August 20, 1982.

72. Interview with A.E. Allen, May 10, 1982.

His tactics during the campaign - for instance, loading the investigative panel with engineers who supported oxidation systems and dispatching the panel member who maintained the Brown's Island scheme could be made to work - were the subject of criticism. L.I. Murdoch, Mayor of Papatoetoe, recalled how with some South Auckland local body politicians considered Robinson "was quite suspect because of the way he had handled the drainage issues". They considered he had taken the sewage from one harbour - his harbour - and put it in another, theirs. They thought "he put it over them".⁷³

This relentless pursuit of his goals also added to the unsympathetic way some viewed his personality. Both Allum and Porter considered Robinson should have given up in 1949 and 1953 as any "decent and reasonable" person would have done, while Hicks, the Drainage Board's Chief Chemist, commented on Robinson's determination: "he would not mind too much who he damaged on the way".⁷⁴ Pencilled in Hugh Lambie, Chairman of the Manukau County Council's copy of Robbie of Auckland was not congratulations on the difficult struggle but the indictment "no ratepayers to protest, just a harbour to destroy."⁷⁵

It was not an enviable reputation then that Robinson enjoyed amongst the local body establishment in Auckland City. Although local body politicians in Greater Auckland

73. Interview with L.I. Murdoch, May 19, 1982. Murdoch was Mayor of Papatoetoe 1959-1962 and after a lengthy membership was Chairman of the ARA 1976-1983.

74. Bush, p.179.

75. Lambie served as Chairman of the Manukau County Council 1956-1964, was inaugural Mayor of Manukau City 1964 and served as ARA Chairman 1965-1968.

had been spared most of the indignities Robinson had heaped upon his Auckland City colleagues, it became obvious during the Auckland Regional Authority establishment process that many of them had already formed similarly adverse opinions about Robinson. This had ramifications for the prospects of local government reform. As L.I. Murdoch concluded:

Robinson was a bit suspect so far as a lot of people were concerned because of the way he had handled the drainage issue ... [local body members] thought he'd been sharp [during the Brown's Island sewerage controversy]. They thought if he'd done that then anything he was associated with as far as establishing a regional authority was concerned would be suspect too.⁷⁶


Nor was it difficult to detect an element of personal ambition in Robinson's advocacy of local body reform. Robinson, as outlined, had opposed Luxford's proposals for a Greater Auckland Authority because he did not want to prematurely make the Drainage Board accessible to the Citizens' and Ratepayers' Association and so thwart the Board's Manukau scheme.

But in 1959, Robinson's political position had changed. His Manukau oxidation plant was a fait accompli and he was now Mayor of Auckland City. He had the most influential local body position in Auckland and he was content to remain within that sphere of government. He had rejected a

76. Interview with L.I. Murdoch, May 19, 1982.

parliamentary political career despite approaches from the National, Labour and Social Credit parties. He had decided it was unlikely that he would ever gain a position of influence - a Cabinet post or the Prime Ministership particularly when his forthright and independent manner was unsuited to the partisan loyalty so often needed for Cabinet elevation.⁷⁷

In Auckland, he was mayor already and it was not difficult to see that the Auckland Regional Authority was a means of increasing his influence in metropolitan decision



COCK ROBINSON

Source: New Zealand Herald, December 2, 1959.

77. Interview with D.M. Robinson, May 9 1983.

making. ⁹ he believed that on the Auckland Regional Authority, the mayor of Auckland City could exert considerable influence as the chairman of an important authority committee like policy and finance, or transport - a post he believed the mayor was entitled to.⁷⁸ He believed he could galvanise support for progressive policies in much the same way as the Drainage Board had functioned under him.⁷⁹

The Auckland Regional Authority offered Robinson then much greater political leverage than the mayoralty. It would maximise his political influence within the region as well as maximise the influence he could wield on the region's behalf to get the necessary loans and funds from central government. Potentially it offered him the opportunity to shape Auckland's development in a way no previous Auckland City mayor had had the opportunity to. Of this element of personal ambition, Reginald Savory, a city councillor (1953-1962) and a former Auckland Harbour Board chairman noted:

Very few of the outside bodies [that is municipalities other than Auckland City] entirely trusted him. They all thought Robinson was too smart for them and as local body people they wondered what was in store for them if it [the regional authority proposal] came off.⁸⁰

It was this suspicion of personal ambition and Robinson's reputation from his previous local body activities that Robinson brought to the reform process and was to be an additional ingredient in the opposition to his proposals.

78. Interview with D.M. Robinson, May 9, 1983.

79. *ibid.*

80. Interview with R.C.F. Savory, April 23, 1982.

CHAPTER 4
MORPHOLOGICAL FUNDAMENTALISM AND THE DEMISE OF
1961 ARA ESTABLISHMENT BILL

Robinson began his reform campaign in 1959 with election promises to unify all Auckland. His struggle to have his reform proposals, modelled on overseas examples, accepted by the Auckland municipalities, represents a further chapter in the dynamics of morphological fundamentalism. The reactions of the municipalities and counties to Robinson's proposals and the efforts of those opposed to them to undermine Robinson, are examined and assessed in this chapter.

In March 1960 Robinson sponsored a meeting of 400 Auckland local body politicians who voted to proceed with the reform of Auckland's local government. The reform was to be based on the Toronto two tier system. Within three months almost all municipalities had agreed in principle to the creation of a regional authority and with this consent Robinson was able to have an Establishment Committee set up and empowered by statute. The Committee which Robinson chaired, comprised of every Greater Auckland Mayor plus the chairmen of the two Drainage Boards, the Transport Board and the Planning Authority. Its function was to discuss the regional authority concept and then draft a bill, if there was sufficient agreement, detailing the ARA in specific terms - its proposed functions, its representation and its means of revenue.

The agreement in principle did not commit any local body to the reform proposals. Luxford had been given similar consent to draw up plans for his Greater Auckland Authority and it transpired that sufficient of Auckland's local body politicians were still opposed to the principle of this type of reform. Robinson's efforts to establish the ARA in Auckland rapidly became a protracted struggle between those who supported reform and those who preferred to retain the traditional autonomy of the existing local bodies. Shortly after the Establishment Committee began its meetings, Robinson informed Commissioner A.A. McLachlan of the Local Government Commission that committee members differed considerably in their commitment to the authority concept. "Some are enthusiastic", he reported, "some lukewarm [and] some are secretly or openly opposed to it for parochial or personal reasons."¹

This was not to dismiss the support there was for reform. Robinson's own council supported the reform proposals. It endorsed the ARA in principle in 1960 and in 1961, it agreed to hand over the metropolitan waterworks that it ran at a considerable profit, at no cost to the proposed authority. This was an enormous act of support for Robinson's scheme. The council majority agreed with a joint report submitted to it by the Director of Works, the City Engineer and the City Treasurer. Their report outlined the advantages and disadvantages of the proposed transfer

1. In a letter from D.M. Robinson to A.A. McLachlan dated March 2, 1961 in R.E.C.C.F.

of the water works and recommended that "the proposal put forward by the Negotiation Subcommittee for the Works Committee to be a Water Division of the Regional Authority is a wise one."²

In another report to the council, the Town Clerk discussed the wider financial advantages of the reform proposals to the city. He predicted that with an ARA, regional decisions would be carefully considered, planned and carried out more efficiently and economically. And appealing to the councillors' self interest, he reminded them that:

This Council as the largest local authority in the proposed Regional area, has been called upon to plan and provide for many amenities, the necessity for which has been brought about by a large, rapidly growing metropolitan area. In many instances, the cost of these amenities has had to be borne solely by this Council, whereas for amenities of a metropolitan character Council should have had to pay only its fair proportion.³

The Auckland City Council endorsed both the ARA bills of 1961 and 1962.⁴ The deputy mayor, A.O. Glasse, made very favourable submissions on behalf of the council to the Local Bills Committee which was in charge of the bill. The chairman of that committee, National M.P. for Rodney,

2. Quoted by Robinson in an undated report to members of the Auckland City Council Finance Committee, p.2 in R.E.C.C.F.

3. *ibid.* pp.3-4.

4. The 1961 Bill was withdrawn from Parliament by request of a majority on the Establishment Committee. This will be outlined later in the text.

W.J. Scott, later acknowledged that the strong Auckland City Council support for the bill was crucial in getting it passed.⁵

Outside Auckland City, there were some local body politicians who also strongly supported Robinson's reform proposals. Notably there were L.I. Murdoch, Mayor of Papatoetoe; F.G. Turner, Mayor of Mount Albert; L.A. Manning, Mayor of Onehunga; E.A.J. Holdaway, Mayor of Northcote; F.S. Stevens, Mayor of Devonport and T.O.L. Jenkins, Chairman of the Rodney County Council. Both Turner and Murdoch ran counter to the tradition of morphological fundamentalism. During their term of office, both advocated that their councils amalgamate - one with Auckland City and the other within a proposed South Auckland City. Turner nearly succeeded in bringing off this feat. Murdoch was later a Chairman of the Regional Authority. Manning was a consistently strong supporter of the reform proposal. In a special address to the Establishment Committee, he argued that the ARA (1961) Bill remain in Parliament while the majority of mayors demanded its withdrawal. Holdaway, another reform advocate, proved most helpful when he counselled against a call by East Coast Bays Mayor, W.S. Stredwick, that the North Shore bodies withdraw from the proposed ARA. Holdaway helped undermine this eleventh hour breakaway bid, arguing that "the bill represented the best compromise arrangement which has been found possible", and that "the North Shore must accept it is an integral

5. In a letter from W.J. Scott to the author, dated July 16, 1982.

and inseparable part of the whole region!"⁶

Another group on the Establishment Committee also caused Robinson little trouble during the first eleven months of the Committee's deliberations. This was the group of local body politicians who chose not to attend most of the meetings. From October 1960 until September 1961, when the first census of attendance was taken, ten men (approximately one third of the members) were present at less than seven (half) of the thirteen meetings. They were:⁷

		Meetings attended
R.W. Bennett,	Chairman of the Franklin County Council	5
S.C. Childs	Mayor of Pukekohe	1
A.C. Crocombe,	Mayor of Birkenhead	7
L. Elsmore,	Mayor of Ellerslie (who did send his deputy mayor)	2
I.G. Mack,	Mayor of Papakura	5
R.M. McCulloch,	Mayor of Mount Wellington	7
J. Potter,	Mayor of Northcote	6
J.F. Porter,	Mayor of Glen Eden	7
W. White,	Mayor of Newmarket	3
R.G. Whiteside	Mayor of Waiuku	2

A.B. West, the Mayor of Helensville, joined the Committee in March 1961, when his predecessor died, but he only attended his first meeting in September to vote against the bill.⁸

6. His position outlined in a circular from E.A.J. Holdaway, dated August 21, 1963 in R.E.C.C.F.

7. Attendance census in A.R.A.E.F., A6, Folder 3, No.41.

8. List of ARA members 1960-1963. in A.R.A.E.F., A6, Folder 3, No. 43.

Nor could this absenteeism be interpreted as tacit support for Robinson's reform proposals. Robinson maintains that with the exception of Bennett, who was an open critic of reform when he attended meetings, these men were secretly opposed to reform.⁹ This became apparent in September 1961, when they voted for the ARA (1961) Bill to be withdrawn from Parliament. Seven of those mayors with poor attendance records managed to attend that particular meeting, and all had votes recorded supporting the bill's withdrawal. The other three did not attend.¹⁰

They all also argued that they could not support the bill because their local authorities had not been given sufficient opportunity to peruse and discuss the bill. The New Zealand Herald editorial was not impressed by this viewpoint, nor their attendance record. It noted:

All regional local bodies are represented on the authority establishment committee. Therefore, they all should have taken a share in formulating the plan which some are criticising. Those who, through inattendance, did not play their part, have surely forfeited the right to criticise.¹¹

It was however, a smaller group of local body politicians, whose reaction was characteristic of morphological fundamentalism, who brought this response into the committee deliberations and caused Robinson the most difficulty. From the outset, this group took an active stance against those aspects of Robinson's reforms that would undermine

9. Interview with D.M. Robinson, May 22, 1982.

10. ARA Establishment Committee minutes for the meeting of September 29, 1961 in A.R.A.E.F., A7 Folder 4, No.4.

11. New Zealand Herald, September 22, 1961.

their bodies' political and financial autonomy. Robinson's severest critics on the committee were R.W. Bennett, Chairman of the Franklin County Council; Keith Hay, Mayor of Mount Roskill; W.H. Henderson, Mayor of Takapuna; H.D. Lambie, Chairman of the Manukau County Council and of the regional planning authority; S.R. Noall, Mayor of New Lynn; J.D. Murdoch, Mayor of Otahuhu and W.A. Stevenson, Mayor of Howick.

Robinson's most articulate critic appears to have been J.D. Murdoch, Mayor of Otahuhu. A former headmaster, Murdoch, in the opinion of another South Auckland mayor, was "a sarcastic sort of fellow", who enjoyed attending meetings to exercise his tongue and "make the whole business look silly".¹² Another Committee member, K. Hay, considered Murdoch to be an elder statesman of local government, who was mindful of the benefits and traditions of the existing system.¹³ But Murdoch's statements about reform suggests he was particularly protective of the traditional autonomy and prerogative belonging to the local bodies. In 1960, Murdoch's council had been the only municipality to refuse to agree to the concept of a regional authority in principle. In November that year, he made his celebrated reference to the authority as "a monster" in a speech to the South Auckland Local Bodies Association. In the address (delivered only a month after the Establishment Committee was convened), Murdoch claimed the regional authority was an attempt by the Auckland City Council to extend its influence onto

12. Interview with L.I. Murdoch, May 19, 1982.
(L.I. Murdoch was no relation to J.D. Murdoch).

13. Interview with K. Hay, May 14, 1982.

outer areas and levy them for the expenses of services that it no longer could afford to run itself.

He predicted the Regional Authority's downfall through its sheer size, but only after "hundreds of thousands of pounds of ratepayers' money" had been wasted in the process. He advocated that the South Auckland Local Bodies Association reconvene - as evidence of the degree of local body co-operation, it had been in recession for two years! - for they now had incentive to, namely fighting the Establishment Committee and the Bill.¹⁴

Murdoch's principal objections to the regional authority were two fold. He considered the authority would undermine the political autonomy local bodies now had. "Otahuhu has looked around for some scheme", he said, "to thwart us having this big monster thrust on top of us."¹⁵ In particular, he argued councils would lose control they had over their rates revenue. Murdoch also worried that the ARA would be utilised by the Auckland City Council to force other local bodies to make a larger and unfair contribution to metropolitan functions. "The Council", he alleged, "will saddle us with everything that is run at a loss and it could cost us 2 million pounds. This is very dangerous, in fact it is highly explosive."¹⁶ On another occasion he remarked "Mr Robinson goes around addressing organisations such as The Creditmen's Association on the Regional Scheme as they are all Queen Street boys, they naturally favour it."¹⁷

14. South Auckland Courier, November 23, 1960.

15. *ibid.*

16. *ibid.*, November 30, 1960.

17. *ibid.*, November 23, 1960.

J.D. Murdoch was joined on the Establishment Committee by another South Auckland critic, W.A. Stevenson, Mayor of Howick. A rare supporter of Robinson during the drainage controversy, Robinson maintains Stevenson "turned against me over the regional authority".¹⁸ Stevenson's attitude was never as extreme as J.D. Murdoch's. He spoke of the need for change, but there was an underlying conservatism. In 1960, Stevenson told a meeting of South Auckland local bodies, "I think it is time that we asked that a small committee should be set up to look into the pros and cons of the thing before we get in too deep".¹⁹ Stevenson was a second mayor whom Keith Hay described as "an elder statesman of Auckland local government".²⁰ As such there was a limit to the changes that Stevenson was prepared to countenance. He envisaged change as an alteration to improve, but also preserve, the existing structures rather than as large scale reform. He recalled,

My objection and forecast of what would happen if a big Authority was set up, was that it would become too powerful and would become a law unto itself - its rating system would cripple the other local bodies.²¹

Stevenson therefore consistently advocated slow, cautious scrutiny of any reform proposal. This was an immediate point of conflict with Robinson who felt he had to make rapid progress or see his initiative lost. Increasingly Stevenson became angered with Robinson's speed, and

18. Casual remark Robinson made to author, April 22, 1982.

19. South Auckland Courier, November 23, 1960.

20. Interview with K. Hay, May 14, 1982.

21. In a letter from W.A. Stevenson to the author dated August 5, 1982.

in July 1961, he circulated a letter to local body representatives complaining of the haste with which Robinson was conducting Establishment Committee business.

Another critic from South Auckland was R.W. Bennett, chairman of the Franklin County Council. According to one informant who served with him on the Airport Committee, Bennett was "a cocky" with a deeply conservative outlook towards local government.²²

Bennett however, was not opposed to the reforms per se. He supported them for the Auckland metropolitan area, but considered his authority, the Franklin County Council, should be left out of them. He maintained that he had "never considered the county to be part of metropolitan or greater Auckland";²³ its needs were different, and it was adequately served by the existing regional planning authority. Bennett believed this organisation brought about the necessary level of co-operation between outer areas and urban Auckland and at the same time it did not threaten his county's autonomy.

Two of Bennett's hand-written questions remain in an uncatalogued bundle in the ARA files. They are indicative of his sympathies, reading "Does the Committee consider the Auckland Regional Planning Authority is performing a useful service to Greater Auckland? Yes or No?", and "Would the Committee agree that through the advent of the Auckland Regional Planning Authority there is greater co-

22. Interview with F.G. Turner, May 12, 1982.

23. R.W. Bennett, Submissions to the Local Bills Committee on behalf of the Franklin County Council, p.1. in Ministry of Internal Affairs Archives (hereafter referred to as I.A.) W24/58 No.249, Pt.3.

ordination between local authorities in Greater Auckland today than ever before?"

However the regional authority concept did appeal to Bennett if it could be modified to strengthen his own county council's present status. He advocated a South Auckland authority composed of representatives of Franklin County, Pukekohe, Waiuku and Tuakau Boroughs as a means of protecting the councils' present autonomy and strengthening the county's case for exclusion from the metropolitan Auckland reform project. The South Auckland area "was ideally suited to an eventual all purpose local authority of its own."²⁴ However, this effort to remove Franklin from the orbit of the regional authority did not find favour with at least one other South Auckland local body mayor. The Mayor of Waiuku, R.S. Whiteside, disparaged the Bennett proposal as "another attempt from a particular quarter to establish a regional authority for Franklin."²⁵

Another critic on the committee was S.R. Noall, Mayor of New Lynn. At the March 1960 meeting of 400 local body politicians, he was the first to offer an objection to the scheme. He stated that until the amalgamation between New Lynn and Glen Eden was realised, (it has not been yet) he was not prepared to involve his council in Robinson's reforms.²⁶ Yet when the Local Government Commission brought down an amalgamation scheme in 1962 for West Auckland,

24. Bennett, p.6.

25. In a letter from R.S. Whiteside to D.M. Robinson, dated July 3, 1962. In R.E.C.C.F.

26. Taped meeting of 400 local body representatives in March 1960, in ARA archives.

Noall, as well as every other mayor concerned, opposed it.²⁷ In Robinson's opinion, the New Lynn Mayor persistently offered "totally irrelevant and irresponsible arguments against the proposal."²⁸ Noall wanted an authority that directly issued rate demands to ratepayers rather than one that levied, that is instructed municipalities to gather money for it. He also wanted an authority composing all the special purpose bodies including the profit making authorities like the electric power boards. Noall was prepared to sacrifice the special purpose bodies' political autonomy and separate existence in order to get a self-financing authority, which would not make demands on his council's rates money or its prerogative to decide how to spend it. These conditions would limit the effect of the ARA on his own council.²⁹

Another vocal critic was Keith Hay, Mayor of Mount Roskill. In March 1960 Hay maintained that his council,

supports the [ARA] recommendation clearly on the understanding that we will continue to press for profit making organisations to be included so that the top tier authority can be non-levying, have its own revenue and pay for its own responsibilities.³⁰

27. Auckland Star, September 18, 1962

28. Interview with D.M. Robinson April 22, 1982. Noall himself could not shed any light on his attitude or his actions during the reform process. While he consented to an interview, he then discovered during it that he could recall nothing of the establishment process. 'Interview' with S.R. Noall, August 24, 1982.

29. See for instance Auckland Star, June 22, 1961.

30. Auckland Star, March 26, 1960.

The profit making organisations Hay referred to were special purpose bodies like the Electricity Boards, the Harbour and the Harbour Bridge Authorities. He wanted their surpluses to be used to subsidise other departments of the authority. He also wanted an authority that did not have councils, like his own, collect money for it from ratepayers (levying). He wanted an authority that issued rate demands directly to each ratepayer itself. A largely self financing authority, that had no claim on municipal revenue and was responsible directly to ratepayers, was an obvious insurance policy against the full impact of reform. It helped minimise the intrusion of the top tier on the lower tier councils. Hay was intransigent on this point and he maintains he also tended to defer to the cautious attitudes of those elder statesmen, J.D. Murdoch and W.A. Stevenson.³¹

From the North Shore came a further suburban antagonist who was as troubling as Hay - W.H. Henderson, Mayor of Takapuna. Henderson, who in the opinion of one informant "was fond of his chains",³² seemed committed to the present fragmented local body system and was deeply sceptical of any intrusion on local body prerogative. Robinson maintains that Henderson had become a convert to an ongoing rivalry between Auckland City and Takapuna Borough Councils and appears to have seen the reform proposed from Auckland City in this prejudicial way.

31. Interview with K. Hay, May 14, 1982.

32. Remark made to me by C. Fernie, daughter of a former Takapuna Borough Councillor.

Henderson reflected his suspicion of the Auckland City Council's support for the regional authority and his own misconceptions about the purposes of the proposed authority. In a paper sent to other members of the Establishment Committee, he wrote:

Perhaps a less ambitious scheme to co-ordinate regional services, within the Auckland urban area, would be more likely to succeed. Primarily, the need for an overall authority is to relieve inner city congestion, the re-development of inner city areas, providing recreation reserves for the overcrowded inner city areas, providing sewerage, transport etc. for city and suburban districts etc.³³

The regional authority was designed to serve the needs of the expanding areas of the metropolis as much as it was to serve inner city needs. The Auckland City Council supported the ARA bill not because of the implications for inner city projects (there were no provisions for the authority to undertake specific inner city functions like redevelopment), but because it considered the ARA represented a fairer way of funding those functions of a metropolitan nature.

In a bid to distance the North Shore from the Auckland mayor's reform bid and protect councils' political autonomy there, Henderson ignored the history of contributions the Auckland City Council had made to metropolitan projects that served outer areas. The Council had, for instance, guaranteed the contribution from all Auckland local bodies

33. In a circular marked "Ex Takapuna", in L.A. Mannings' (Mayor of Onehunga) "Withdrawal File", p.1.

so the construction of the Auckland International Airport could begin. Its contribution to the North Western motorway, the Manukau oxidation plant, the zoo and the library service helped to pay for those services. But Henderson asked:

How can the four Counties possibly agree to contribute towards something which is of very doubtful benefit to them, if at all; how can the newly-developing outlying areas who have just paid for their own essential services and facilities sanction a proposal which is likely to commit them to contribute towards the redevelopment of older established and decadent areas? The whole scheme is most unrealistic.³⁴

The last local body figure whom Robinson considered "an enemy on the committee", was H.D. Lambie.³⁵ Lambie does not deserve such blanket condemnation. He tried to caution many South Auckland opponents, especially men like J.D. Murdoch, R. Bennett and W.A. Stevenson. One informant, a former local body reporter for the Auckland Star, maintains that Lambie commanded respect amongst a number of outer Auckland local body politicians and his opinions were treated accordingly.³⁶ Lambie's election to the deputy chairmanship of the Establishment Committee probably reflected this. At the November 1960 meeting of South Auckland local body politicians, Lambie counselled against J.D. Murdoch's

34. "Ex Takapuna" circular, p.1.

35. Interview with D.M. Robinson, May 22, 1982.

36. Interview with J. Berry, August 25, 1982.

call to stop the reform proposals. Lambie told his audience:

What I am concerned about is, we are talking about what might happen; is that a fair go? What is the use of panicking before we know what the position will be? It is premature to condemn it now.³⁷

In September 1961, Lambie was one of the minority who voted against the bill being withdrawn from Parliament, but he did not wholeheartedly accept Robinson's conception of the ARA. He sympathised with the position of Franklin County Council Chairman, Bennett, yet he was also prepared to support the Establishment Committee Bill. He wanted first the existing Auckland Regional Planning Authority, of which he was chairman, strengthened. Its extended powers would include setting aside land for regional roading and regional reserves. He argued that other special purpose bodies could be incorporated into the authority at some subsequent date or dates. Robinson considered Lambie's proposals a reduced and ineffectual version of the metropolitan reform he wanted. Yet Lambie's associate on the planning authority, planning officer F.W.O. Jones, maintains that Lambie saw nothing inconsistent in promoting a strengthened planning authority and working for the Establishment Committee's bill. Lambie considered,

... these weren't opposing ideas. They were not exactly complementary, but sort of supplementary. O.K. if they couldn't get the multi-purpose authority, let's get these added powers.³⁸

37. South Auckland Courier, November 23, 1960.

38. Interview with F.W.O. Jones, May 27, 1982. See also for Lambie's views, New Zealand Herald, April 15 1961.

Robinson, however, considered Lambie's stance ambiguous and he appears to have viewed the committee deputy chairman as more of a foil to his own enthusiasm for structural reform than an obvious ally.

With the exception of Lambie, whose position was a little more complex, this group of local body leaders comprised the most jealous guardians of the existing local body system. They were protective of their councils' autonomy which was guaranteed under the fragmented local body structure, but threatened by Robinson's reform proposal of a top tier authority. In particular, they wished to defend the control they enjoyed over what they had to levy rate payers for and how their councils' rates revenue was to be spent. The reform proposal however represented much less autonomous control of rates revenue and more metropolitan cost sharing, and this did not appeal to them. Some possibly were protective of their personal reputation and status as mayors of councils, a title that would be devalued with a second structure placed over their councils.

There is considerable evidence to show that Robinson's most severe critics' initial actions impeded Establishment Committee proceedings and thwarted the mayor's reform efforts. These effects were compounded by the way reform opponents undermined the agreement that Robinson appeared to bring about in May and August 1961 on a draft bill, and by the way they then led a successful movement in September 1961 to have the ARA (1961) Bill withdrawn from Parliament.

From the outset Robinson had difficulties at Establishment Committee meetings. This is not surprising. In his book Beyond the Stable State Schon writes that:

Given the reality of change, we can maintain belief in the stable state only through tactics of which we are largely unaware. Consequently our responses to attack on the stable state have been responses of desperation, largely destructive.³⁹

The earlier phase of the Establishment Committee proceedings involved a number of unco-ordinated efforts to fight off aspects of Robinson's proposals or to press demands that would diminish the extent of the reform. These together stalled the committee proceedings and almost prevented any draft reform bill emerging from them. W. Stanton, the former Supreme Court Justice commissioned to draft the bill, could not put pen to page until May 1961 because no agreement had been reached by the Committee.⁴⁰

Critics would press their own particular demands that provoked heated debate as well as encouraged hostilities on the committee. For instance at the November 1960 meeting, K. Hay and J.D. Murdoch moved that:

the distribution and sale of electric power be placed on the list of the first ad hoc functions to be taken over by the authority if any authority.⁴¹

The last clause was revealing. Murdoch and Hay saw the

39. Schon, p.11.

40. Auckland Star, May 13, 1961.

41. Minutes of the ARA Establishment Committee for meeting of November 25, 1960, p.9. in A.R.A.E.F. A7, Folder 4.

inclusion of profit making authorities as an insurance policy against the complete intrusion of a regional authority on their own municipalities. Moreso, the Waitemata Electric Power Board refused to support the regional authority even in principle while the Auckland Electric Power Board was not prepared to give an opinion on the matter. Preconditions like Hay's and Murdoch's therefore could effectively ensure the demise of Robinson's reform efforts. The effect of the motion was to encourage dissent by those sympathetic to voluntary incorporation - the special purpose body chairmen who attended committee meetings and Robinson himself. The motion was successfully amended and a clause "as long as the power authorities were agreeable and not coerced" was added.

In another instance, H.D. Lambie came down with a report on the authority's proposed functions and his ambiguous position on reform then provoked a lengthy debate. Lambie called for increased planning powers for the existing regional planning authority and incorporation of other special purpose bodies at later dates. Robinson considered this a complete diminution of comprehensive metropolitan reform. He reacted by claiming that Lambie's proposals reduced the whole concept of the top tier authority. The functions' report was submitted for further consideration by that subcommittee.⁴²

The finance and representation reports were sent back twice for their respective subcommittee's reconsideration. The matter of ARA finance became particularly protracted

42. Minutes of the ARA Establishment Committee for meeting of April 14, 1961, in A.R.A.E.F., A7 Folder 4, No.9.

when the finance subcommittee adopted, as one of its functions, the task of finding alternative sources of local body finance other than the rates revenues. This was presumably another effort to make the ARA self financing and reduce its effects on councils' financial autonomy. This investigation included promoting the controversial idea of a retail sales tax to fund local body functions. The task became so lengthy that new members had to be recruited for the subcommittee in April and their report was reconsidered thereafter.⁴³ Negotiations could not begin with the special purpose bodies wanting to come into the authority because the Committee decided at their November 1960 meeting that the representation, form, financing and functions of the Authority should be decided upon first.

The protracted efforts of the Committee were becoming frustrating and wearying for members and the same ground was constantly covered and the same lack of progress persisted. Hay complained at one meeting that he had heard all this before. Robinson's reply was "You've heard it but your ears haven't absorbed it.". At this point Hay walked out.⁴⁴

The meetings also became unproductive and unpleasant because at times it appears, that they degenerated into personal fighting. Some of the opposition to reform was not just based on fear of its likely effects on councils' autonomy. There was a strong element of anti-Robinson

43. Minutes for the ARA Establishment Committee for meetings of February 3, 1961; March 10, 1961 and April 14 1961 in ARAEF. A7, Folder 4 Nos. 11, 10 and 9.

44. New Zealand Herald, March 11, 1961.

feeling although it would be unfair to say this was the guiding cause of opposition. One of Robinson's predecessors, Mayor Luxford, who did not engender the same sort of hostility as Robinson did, had found local bodies unsupportive also. However it is probably fair to say that J.D. Murdoch, Henderson, Noall, Hay and even Lambie, seem to have disliked Robinson personally, and this compounded the differences present at Establishment Committee meetings.

After the withdrawal of the bill in September 1961, Keith Hay went on record as saying "he had never trusted Robinson to fulfil a major promise to let municipalities inspect the bill",⁴⁵ while S.R. Noall called Robinson "a man who paid lip service to democracy, but used dictatorial methods".⁴⁶

J.D. Murdoch also disliked Robinson. He had already witnessed Robinson's activities during the drainage controversy and one informant maintains the Otahuhu mayor did not like what he had seen. He believed Robinson had had the welfare of his own harbour, the Waitemata, at heart, but had taken a cavalier attitude to South Auckland's Manukau Harbour where Robinson's oxidation plant was eventually sited.⁴⁷ Murdoch also considered that Robinson had used chicanery to achieve this.⁴⁸ He was suspicious of Robinson's ambition and he noted to a meeting of South Auckland local bodies "I tell you that this Regional Authority is going to be the lot, if Mr Robinson cannot get the lot he will not

45. New Zealand Herald, September 30, 1961

46. Auckland Star, October 3, 1961.

47. Interview with L.I. Murdoch, May 19, 1982.

48. See pp.57-58 for the "chicanery" J.D. Murdoch alleged.

be interested."⁴⁹

Henderson had also inherited a personal animosity towards Robinson from his predecessor, Mayor Guinivin.⁵⁰ (He was the man who told Robinson during the drainage controversy, to go to Palestine to address the Arabs and the Jews). Henderson reflected both his dislike for Robinson and his opposition to the potential impact of the Auckland mayor's reform efforts in a newsletter he sent to other local body members in 1961.

The two tier proposals [he wrote] are virtually the brainchild of one person who is not an expert in local government administration. This person admittedly has a zeal and enthusiasm for getting things done (whether it be Drainage, Chlorination, Airport or compost), but it must also be admitted that he is at times a little over zealous, that his enthusiasm at times a little misguided. Local bodies must therefore proceed with greater caution than would normally be the case because of the far reaching consequences of the decisions now being made.⁵¹

Lambie's widow said that her husband found Robinson's demeanour and past history objectionable and that if he had known the focus of the thesis was on Robinson, he would not have wished to help the author.⁵² It is logical to assume that this personal dislike compounded the differences present already at Establishment Committee meetings.

49. South Auckland Courier, November 23, 1960.

50. Interviews with D.M. Robinson, April 22, 1982, and with J. Holdaway, May 19, 1982.

51. In a circular marked "Ex Takapuna" in L.A. Manning's "Withdrawal File", pp.1-2.

52. Conversation with Mrs H.D. Lambie, May 1982.

However, although no written evidence exists of personal infighting on the Committee, a few informants did hint at personality clashes. F.G. Turner, in his diplomatic manner, was prepared to concede that with men of different opinions on the committee, conflict was inevitable.⁵³ Two other informants, H. Beaumont, then Mayor of Manurewa and F.W.O. Jones, then a regional planning authority officer, could not recall specific criticisms of Robinson, but maintained that personal remarks reached unbearable levels and they said that, if they had been in Robinson's shoes, they could not have stood it.⁵⁴ There is more than a hint of the treatment Robinson was receiving in his letter to Local Government Commission Chairman A.A. Lachlan. "I feel", he wrote, "I need the wisdom of Solomon, the patience of Job and the hide of a rhinoceros. I feel I only have the latter quality."⁵⁵

As the October 1960 - May 1961 Establishment Committee proceedings became confused with the actions of Robinson's opponents, and marred by personal infighting, the deadline for the presentation of the ARA Bill drew closer. In April, a worried Robinson called for a two months extension of the deadline. It was J.D. Murdoch, one of the key critics, who suggested that a request for twelve months would be more realistic.⁵⁶

Perhaps the most discouraging aspect of Robinson's continuing confrontation with the opponents of the two tier

53. Interview with F.G. Turner, May 12, 1982.

54. Interview with H. Beaumont and F.W.O. Jones, May 27, 1982.

55. In a letter from D.M. Robinson to A.A. McLachlan, dated March 2, 1961 in R.E.C.C.F.

56. New Zealand Herald, April 15, 1961.

proposals was the way they undermined the significant progress the committee did appear to make in May 1961.

In that month, sufficient agreement was reached for Judge Stanton to draft a bill. It was decided that planning was the proposed body's most important function, but that those special purpose bodies, considered essential for Auckland's development, must be brought in too. It was decided the body would levy the municipalities rather than rate residents directly itself. However, it was agreed direct rating would be introduced when it was considered economic, and that all efforts would be made to find an alternative source of local body revenue. On representation, it was decided members would be elected on a ward system. The wards would be the present sixteen Auckland electorates and each would elect two members. However, to meet the requirements of the Town Planning Act, nine members would be appointed to the body's planning division from the existing local bodies, while for continuity's sake, those special purpose bodies who joined the authority would have their present members appointed for the first ARA term. During this period they would continue to run their bodies as semi-autonomous divisions of the authority. Thereafter with the exception of the planning appointees, the Authority would be elective.⁵⁷

Hay called the meeting "the best we have ever had" while Robinson described it as "the most historic meeting in the history of local government in the city." In

57. New Zealand Herald, May 13, 1961.

superlative tradition, the Committee described themselves as "elated".⁵⁸ But this elation seems to have obscured the real nature of the draft agreement. Generally it was a statement of aims, which went further than agreement for a regional authority in principle, but did not indicate how it was to be effected. It did not specify which special purpose bodies were "essential" and therefore would be included, and in particular made no specific mention of profit making authorities like the electric power boards.

Only the Auckland City Council waterworks and the planning authority had agreed to join unconditionally. The drainage and transport bodies had set rigid conditions for joining. In the latter's case Justice Stanton thought "the control and direction reserved to the Authority would be useless".⁵⁹ It did not set a specific schedule for joining nor a specific deadline for the transition to direct rating. This was kept vague. These were the crucial demands mayors like Hay, Noall and Murdoch wanted defined before they would consider conceding the establishment of the authority. To others, like Bennett and Lambie, who advocated strengthening the existing regional planning, the May agreement was too specific and went too far.

The unsatisfactory aspects of the agreed draft were quickly discerned and then publically criticised by the Establishment Bill's chief opponents. Hay declared on May 20 1961, that the Mount Roskill Borough Council would

58. Auckland Star, May 13, 1961.

59. New Zealand Herald, August 8, 1961.

not support the Bill until all special purpose bodies were included. He commented that "as for us accepting this half baked scheme, we don't want to end up with the Regional Authority controlling only termites."⁶⁰ Noall declared that his council would not support the Regional Authority Bill until some form of financing other than levying could be found. He and his council also demanded the inclusion of all special purpose bodies into the regional authority organisation.⁶¹ Meantime, F. Milne, One Tree Hill's Mayor, was critical of the representation recommendations. He claimed that wards based on the Auckland's parliamentary electorates would bring party politics into the authority.⁶²

But the reservations about membership were also about the provisions for direct election themselves. The municipalities had a greater likelihood of influencing the regional body if they were permitted to appoint the ARA's members from amongst those sitting on the municipal councils. There appears to have been a continued preference by the municipalities for this type of appointive membership. In a later letter to Leon Gotz, the Minister of Internal Affairs, Robinson suggests why this might be. He told the Minister that he hoped the Local Bills Committee would "lean towards" the principle of direct election because appointive membership was a means for local bodies to "introduce their parochial spanner into the works."⁶³

60. Auckland Star, May 20, 1961.

61. ibid, June 22, 1961.

62. ibid, May 17, 1961.

63. From notes of an interview which took place between D.M. Robinson and the Hon. F.L.A. Gotz, at Wellington September 12, 1961 pp.1-3. in I.A. W24.58. No.249, Pt.1. Gotz served as Minister of Internal Affairs 1961-1963 and was appointed High Commissioner to Ottawa in 1965.

Until September 1961 most councils sent criticisms of the draft bill to the committee secretary, N.C. Bell.⁶⁴ These reflected the respective councils' preference for the existing Auckland local government system. None were eager to give up their autonomy, influence and status. At the very least they wanted requirements for representation, financing and functions met so as to minimise the impact of the authority on their own municipalities. Along with Hay and Noall's councils, J.D. Murdoch's; I.G. Mack's; R.M. McCulloch's and L. Elsmore's objected to either the levying aspect or the voluntary inclusion of profit making special purpose bodies or both of these aspects. R. Bennett objected to the embracing of wide functions, while Lambie, taking up his own position, once more called for an extended planning authority only. W.H. Henderson of Takapuna, proceeded to circulate his memorandum warning local bodies against the far reaching reforms the "zealous" and "mis-guided" Robinson was advocating while his counterpart S.C. Childs in Pukekohe rejected the bill. Other mayors and their councils merely reaffirmed support in principle for an authority, but did not endorse the bill. In other words, most Auckland municipalities had come no further than March 1960. They were still unprepared to agree to the degree of change expressed in the two tier concept.

Robinson reacted by characteristically pressing ahead in an effort to make the Bill's deadline. In large part, he ignored the complaints made by numerous municipalities

64. These letters of criticism in ARAEF. A6, Folder 2, No.49.

about the Bill in its draft form, although he altered representation arrangements to include some appointment of membership by existing municipalities. His proceeding with the unsatisfactory Bill gave his critics further proof of his determination to reform Auckland how he wanted, while ignoring their concerns. This gave them greater grievances to inject into the Committee proceedings. From May until September 1961, the conflict between Robinson and his critics increased.

In July 1961, W.A. Stevenson appears to have been especially critical of Robinson's tactics, because he sent Robinson a written explanation of the remarks he had made about the Auckland Mayor during a Committee meeting. In his own defence, Stevenson made the claim that he did not mean that the main project of the Regional Authority was going too fast. "As a matter of fact, I have felt that it is going too slow", but then went on to make the statement "I meant that this particular meeting was going too fast, it was similar to many previous meetings."⁶⁵

In his "Notes on Meeting at 21st July 1961" Stevenson recalled H.D. Lambie's complaints at the meeting that Robinson had both carried out discussions and forged an agreement unsatisfactory to Lambie while the Manukau County Chairman and others were out of the room. Stevenson enlarged on his complaints about Robinson by accusing him of "brushing over facts", and "over-ruling objections" by N.B. Spencer, Chairman of the Auckland Transport Board and K.B. Cumberland.

65. W.A. Stevenson "Notes on Meeting of 21st July 1961", p.1 in R.E.C.C.F.

Stevenson wrote that Robinson's explanations to a number of queries "seemed to leave a lot in doubt".⁶⁶

A.E. Allen, one of Robinson's chief critics, noted of Robinson that he reacts "like one of those saltcellars with a weight in the bottom. No matter how many times it is pushed over, it bounces back".⁶⁷ Robinson continued his bulldozing and on August 11, won a resolution which he claimed was unanimous to proceed with the bill, leaving last minute alterations to a subcommittee of himself, Justice Stanton, L.I. Murdoch, and the Mayor of the East Coast Bays, R. Greville. S.R. Noall gave a different version of the meeting:

Mr Robinson [Noall told the Auckland Star] seems to have conveniently forgotten that Mr Henderson was constantly on his feet, with other members of the committee, objecting to the proposed method of dealing with the bill. It was Mr Robinson who talked down Mr Henderson's point of view for so long that there had to be a motion that "the question be put".⁶⁸

This hardly excused reform critics for what appears to be surrendering a vote in favour of the bill proceeding in order to get home.

After the August meeting, the two sides went about their activities almost independently because by now their objectives were separate. One supported reform proposals, one opposed them, or at least did so if there were no

66. Stevenson, p.1.

67. Interview with A.E. Allen, May 10, 1982.

68. Auckland Star, September 25, 1961.

specific guarantees like direct rating and compulsory special purpose body inclusion that could protect councils' political integrity in the bill.

Robinson seems to have been dubious about the bill's likely reception by the Auckland local bodies because he asked Gotz, the Minister of Internal Affairs, to request the Local Bills Committee to "make a sort of inquest on Auckland, to get the feel of the reaction to the Bill and to satisfy [themselves] whether opposition, if any, was soundly based or whether it was based on parochial considerations."⁶⁹

Gotz rejected both suggestions and Robinson then had the bill placed in the Magistrate's Court for the customary two weeks, before it was submitted to Parliament. Moving away from the committee - where Robinson had obvious impact - his opponents began to hold private "discussions" about the Bill to rally municipal opinion against it and prevent reform. The most publicised was held on September 16, 1961. Convened by W.H. Henderson, it met at W.A. Stevenson's invitation at the Mayor's Parlour in Howick. S.R. Noall, J.D. Murdoch and H.D. Lambie were attendant.⁷⁰

From these meetings, Noall gave notice that he would move that the ARA Bill be withdrawn from Parliament. He maintained that it must be withdrawn because it had not been submitted, as Robinson promised, to each council for its approval before it had been sent to Parliament. Robinson had promised this at the March 1960 meeting of 400 local

69. From "Notes of an Interview which took place between D.M. Robinson and the Hon. L.A. Gotz, at Wellington September 12, 1961" pp.1-2 in I.A. W24.58. No249, Pt.1.

70. Auckland Star, September 16, 1961.

body politicians. Some Establishment Committee members had had Robinson reissue the promise at the November committee meeting and it was recorded in the minutes.⁷¹ Robinson argued that the unanimous resolution to proceed with the bill made in August 11 over-ruled previous procedural decisions.⁷²

There is little to show Robinson ever intended honouring the promise anyway. He maintains now that local bodies had every opportunity to influence the outcome of the committee's deliberations by virtue of their representation on the Committee and that the terms of the legislation empowering the Committee did not require individual approval of the completed draft bill by each council. He therefore had no intention of giving municipalities this final opportunity to upset reform.⁷³ As early as March 1961 he told Local Government Commissioner, A.A. McLachlan:

The bill will be placed in the Magistrates Court by late June or early July [1961] and copies circulated for information only to all participating and ad hoc authorities [his emphasis].⁷⁴

S.R. Noall could correctly argue that no previous Committee resolution could be over-ruled in the way Robinson alleged. A notice of motion that a previous resolution was to be rescinded had to be given, and a specific vote taken, and this had not been done. This procedural issue

71. ARA Establishment Committee minutes for the meeting of November 25, 1960 in A.R.A.E.F. A7, folder 4.

72. See for instance Auckland Star, September, 16, 1961.

73. Interview with D.M. Robinson, April 22, 1982.

74. In a letter from D.M. Robinson to A.A. McLachlan dated March 2, 1961 in R.E.C.C.F.

became a rallying point for opposition to the reform bill. At a special Committee meeting on September 29, 1961, the withdrawal motion was passed 22 - 9.⁷⁵

The majority of local body mayors clearly had deeper reservations about the bill than this procedural one. This was no more evident than in the sudden attendance at the meeting of ten men who had attended less than half the Committee meetings, but now complained their municipalities had not had sufficient opportunity to study the bill.


Committee members were unhappy with the proposals on representation or finance or about the likely number of special purpose bodies that had agreed to join the authority, and the terms under which they had agreed to their incorporation. In the final analysis, the majority of Auckland municipal local bodies were not yet prepared to give up elements of their authority, autonomy and status to this new two tier political arrangement which they considered injurious to their traditional position and as well, potentially beneficial to Robinson's political status.

Robinson's reaction was to put the demise of his bill at the feet of morphological fundamentalism with an additional measure of dislike for himself. He asserted:

One third of the opposition was against the chairman of the establishment committee ... a third was due to parochial interest and a third arose from ignorance.⁷⁶


75. ARA Establishment Committee minutes for meeting of September 29, 1961, p.3, in A.R.A.E.F., A7, Folder 4.

76. New Zealand Herald, October 3, 1961.



"IF WE DON'T PLANT IT SOON IT'LL WITHER!"

Source: Auckland Star, September 29, 1961.



THE ROAD BLOCK

Source: New Zealand Herald, September 29, 1961.

Of his critics he commented:

A percentage of those who stopped the bill have opposed every move for a regional authority. They are opposed to it and they have merely used excuses to hold up the bill - they want to kill it.

I think the real reason is that they wanted to kill it, right from the beginning because it was a threat to their parochial interests.⁷⁷

77. Auckland Star, October 3, 1961.

CHAPTER 5MORPHOLOGICAL FUNDAMENTALISM REFOCUSED:THE ATTEMPT TO DEFEAT THE 1962 ARA ESTABLISHMENT BILL

In 1961, Robinson's metropolitan reform plans had become the latest casualty of morphological fundamentalism. Like Myers, Bloodworth and Luxford, who had canvassed reform schemes before, Robinson's scheme had been rejected. At the request of the majority on the Establishment Committee, Norman Douglas, the Member of Parliament for Auckland Central, withdrew the ARA (1961) Bill from Parliament. The New Zealand Herald remarked that:

[Aucklanders] are content that their city in the widest sense of the term should be regarded as a collection of villages. Hence the laments of Mr D.M. Robinson for the fading of his vision of a regional authority for Greater Auckland.¹

This chapter examines how Robinson resurrected his reform proposals and how the mood of morphological fundamentalism was then taken up by the other partners of the Auckland local body system - the special purpose bodies - who found allies in two parliamentary supporters. The chapter also demonstrates how the latter rekindled the fear of municipal amalgamation to such an extent that the Auckland municipalities came to accept Robinson's reform proposal as a more preferable option. This change in opinion is shown to be crucial for the successful passage of Robinson's reform bill.

1. New Zealand Herald, October 4, 1961.

Robinson's subsequent histrionics - which included weeping at the grave of Captain Hobson because of the injury done to Auckland, and proclaiming his mayoral office to be "Heartbreak House" - did put the reform Bill's opponents on the defensive. Mayors like Hay and Noall, who had voted for withdrawal, were moved to say that they wanted a regional authority. Their complaint was with Robinson's hurried pace. It was at this point that Robinson recommended to the Minister of Internal Affairs, Sir Leon Gotz, that the Committee be given a twelve month extension of life. On at least two occasions Robinson had rejected the idea of a twelve month extension. In March 1961 he had explained this would bring the Bill's deadline into a municipal election year and that:

There is a possibility that in order to win support for re-election they [some opponents] may sacrifice the welfare of their Region as a whole to gain more personal support within their own locality. If this should occur it would destroy any possibility of obtaining agreement on the terms of a Regional Authority during a municipal election year.²

Robinson had again suggested a two to three month extension in September so that the Bill could be presented late to the 1961 parliamentary session. Gotz had offered a twelve month extension so that the Bill would be presented during the 1962 parliamentary session. Robinson had not favoured the idea saying that the local bodies would be

2. In a letter from D.M. Robinson to L. Gotz dated March 8, 1961 in I.A, W24/58 No.249, Pt2.

concerned "with currying favour in the local [body] elections" and he did not consider the Bill would get "a fair or proper consideration."³ But in October 1961 he decided to accept this offer and wrote seeking it. The Minister and his Secretary were still sympathetic and agreed to the request.⁴

Early in the new year, Robinson agreed to sponsor a new ARA Bill that met all the criticisms levelled against its 1961 predecessor. Representation would be partly by direct election, but also partly by appointment from each municipal council. Wards for the authority would be based on existing municipal boundaries. That meant each municipality became a ward with at least one member elected from its area. The ARA would now directly rate Auckland ratepayers rather than levying the municipal councils. All special purpose bodies would be incorporated compulsorily.⁵

The measure was favourably received by the municipalities but the 1962 ARA Bill did not signal the end of Robinson's conflict with morphological fundamentalism. That jealous mood of guardianship was not confined to the municipalities. The special purpose bodies were equally as protective of their autonomy, separate existence and status. Agreeing to their compulsory inclusion to placate his municipal opponents, Robinson was forced to take his reform measure into a new arena of morphological fundamentalism. This refocusing of the struggle saw the municipalities

3. From notes of an interview between D.M. Robinson and L. Gotz, September 12, 1961, p.2, in I.A. W24/58 No.249 Pt.1.

4. In a letter from J.V. Meech, Secretary of Internal Affairs dated October 26, 1961 in I.A. W24.58 No.249 Pt.1.

5. Auckland Star, February 19, 1962.

docile while a number of special purpose body leaders, including two of his own councillors, plus their parliamentary supporters emerged as the new opponents of reform in Auckland.

The special status of special purpose bodies in Auckland's system of local government had strengthened their instinct for self preservation. These bodies had become an established and integral part of local government. They tended to be elective, self financing, prestigious agencies which carried political influence with the central government. The Harbour Board, the Harbour Bridge Authority, the North Shore Drainage Board and the three Electric Power Boards were elective bodies. The power, harbour and bridge authorities were self financing through consumer charges and tolls. In comparison to some of the metropolis' smaller mayoralities, the chairmanship of the North Shore Drainage Board carried more prestige and certainly the bridge, harbour and power board chairmanships did. The power and harbour boards were members of their respective national associations who carried influence with the government because of their members' crucial importance to the nation's economy - one controlled power distribution and the other the wharves.

The chairmen of these authorities were committed to their bodies autonomous identity within the Auckland local government system. R.C.F. Savory, the Chairman of the Auckland Harbour Board, upheld the way "successive governments have preserved the fundamentals of autonomy, independence and freedom from state and municipal control for the

specialised management of ports."⁶

In a similar protective mood, N.B. Spencer, Chairman of the Auckland Transport Board and a member of the Auckland Regional Authority Establishment Committee until he declined to attend meetings, spoke for his fellow members when he stated:

Members of special service local bodies have not only a right but a duty to refuse to join the proposed regional authority. Their members are elected with a duty to carry out their activities as efficiently and economically as possible for the benefit of the whole of metropolitan Auckland. To hand their organisations over to the super ad hoc body envisaged in the establishment committee bill would be a breach of this duty.⁷

The chairman of these dissenting boards had a personal stake in keeping them independent. J.A.C. Allum, the Chairman of the bridge authority, had lost the mayoralty of Auckland City in 1953, and only had his board chairmanship left. C.F. Woodall had retired from the Devonport mayoralty and the chairmanship of the North Shore Drainage Board was the only post remaining to him. There was even sympathy for his position in the pro-ARA camp. The feeling L.I. Murdoch recalls was "Clem's getting on now; he's given up the mayoralty; let it [The North Shore Drainage Board] go until he's finished his term and it'll come in then".⁸ In early 1962, R.C.F. Savory was considering confining himself

6. New Zealand Herald, May 9, 1962.

7. Auckland Star, May 29, 1962.

8. Interview with L.I. Murdoch, May 19, 1982.

to the chairmanship of the Harbour Board; promotion to the Auckland City mayoralty being blocked by his wife's objections and Robinson's popularity.⁹ It is worth supposing that H.G. Beechey, deputy chairman of the Auckland Transport Board, was hopeful of replacing the ailing Spencer as head of the Transport Board.

As with the municipality resistance to reform, there was an ingredient of misgiving about the reform architect, Robinson. In Allum, Savory and Beechey's cases it is fair to suggest that dislike of the mayor was as important a motive as their guardianship of their boards' political identity. Shortly before Robinson's first mayoral victory, Allum had advocated the establishment of a metropolitan board of works which would have included responsibility for the bridge.¹⁰ But now that his enemy, Robinson, was responsible for reform proposals Allum apparently changed his mind. Robinson was just as likely to be the inaugural chairman and the thought of subordinating himself to his arch rival must have been an unpleasant one. Savory and Beechey, who were also resentful of Robinson's drainage success and who were engaged in an on-going council feud with Robinson, must have thought like Allum.¹¹

The opening stages of the newest campaign against metropolitan reform quickly began. Allum took the initiative by calling a meeting in March 1962 of special purpose bodies to decide on tactics to oppose the new ARA bill. Beechey

9. Interview with R.C.F. Savory, April 23, 1982.

10. New Zealand Herald, September 18, 1959.

11. See chapter 6, pp.165-70 in particular.

vowed "to put on hobnail boots and fight this to the last ditch".¹² Woodall, Savory, R. White, the Chairman of the Waitemata Electric Power Board and A.T. Gooder, the Chairman of the Auckland Electric Power Board, all publically condemned the Establishment Committee's new bill. They accused Robinson of reneging on a pledge made in March 1960 that nobody would be coerced into joining the ARA. They criticised Robinson's new positions that the non-coercive approach had failed miserably and that the special purpose bodies must now convince the Local Bills Committee that they should be excluded.¹³

This was precisely what Robinson's critics intended to do. The boards intended to defeat reform both by gaining their release from the Bill and supplanting it with a rival measure of their own. Some chairmen refused to have anything to do with the Establishment Committee. In May 1962, Robinson convened a special Committee meeting so that the Bill could be discussed with the metropolis' special purpose body chairmen. But five of them threatened to boycott the meeting, protesting that no opportunity had been promised them to ask questions about the Bill and that the meeting had been called at too short notice. Savory, Allum, Woodall, Spencer and White carried out their threat. Other bodies sent representatives, but not in any official capacity. Auckland City Councillor and Harbour Board member, E.D. Armishaw, told the press that Savory had instructed board members that it was not necessary for them to attend the

12. New Zealand Herald, March 14, 1962.

13. ibid, February 1962; Auckland Star, February 19, 1962.

meeting.¹⁴

Whatever the legitimacy of the chairmen's complaints, the affair hardened the differences between the reformist mayor and his critics. Robinson accused the chairmen of being more interested in their prestige than the well being of Auckland.¹⁵ It was during this period N.B. Spencer became firmly identified with the special purpose body opposition to reform. Previously he had co-sponsored, with Robinson, the historic meeting of March 1960, from which had come the impetus to set up the Establishment Committee. Spencer had regularly attended the committee meetings, but he had always argued against the demands of men like Hay and Noall that all special purpose bodies be compulsorily included. Two informants put Spencer's changed position down to misdirection through ill health.¹⁶ Robinson, however, maintains that Spencer secretly opposed reform which entailed the amalgamation of special purpose authorities, all along. He had become involved in the March meeting of 1960 and with the committee by threats from the Minister of Internal Affairs 1957-1960, W.H. Anderton. Anderton had said he would reform Auckland local government if Aucklanders did not themselves. Robinson alleges that by 1962, with Anderton gone, Spencer "was showing his real colours."¹⁷

At this time Spencer and a legal associate, R.G. McElroy, resurrected a reform proposal that they had originally initiated in October 1961. McElroy was a former deputy

14. New Zealand Herald, May 4, 1962.

15. *ibid.*

16. Interview with F.W.O. Jones and H. Beaumont, May 27, 1982.

17. Interview with D.M. Robinson, May 22, 1982.

mayor of Auckland City and a member of the regional planning authority. He and Spencer agreed to author an alternative bill to be known as the ARA (1962) No.2 Bill. It endorsed the existing local government system in Auckland - including of course the separate status of the special purpose bodies - and aimed to strengthen slightly the power of the existing planning authority. Like H.D. Lambie and R.W. Bennett, Spencer and McElroy intended that the planning authority be given powers to plan for and purchase land for regional reserves and roading.¹⁸

This was clear proof of the morphological fundamentalist outlook that Robinson was being forced to overcome. The drafting of this rival bill shows that the special purpose bodies who endorsed it were not prepared to lose their political autonomy and separate existence. They did not accept Robinson's comprehensive reform scheme but preferred to retain their existing separate identity within the local body structure. While their bill offered a concession to those who argued for reform, it was much more a legislative endorsement of their own structural integrity.

Unfortunately for Robinson, this special purpose body conviction found its way into Auckland City Council politics as well. In May 1962, Savory and Beechey tried to force the council to withdraw its offer to transfer the regional waterworks to the ARA at no charge to the proposed body. They argued that this transfer should not proceed if the ARA Bill continued to permit direct rating of residents.

18. Auckland Star, June 6, 1962.

They argued that the ARA should levy (that is have councils collect the money for it) because this involved less expense than issuing separate rating forms and saved ratepayers' money.¹⁹ Most of the council agreed. Robinson however, offered a compromise that was acceptable to his council and the ARA Establishment Committee. The ARA would rate in those municipalities that preferred this arrangement and levy in those that elected for this. But Savory and Beechey's real intent was to foil the reform bill altogether and an effective strategy was to have the Auckland City Council oppose direct rating in the ARA Bill which most municipalities wanted, and then withdraw both support for the Bill and the offer of the waterworks. During the lengthy council debate, reporters recorded the following exchange.

Mr Dreaver said that if the recommendation from the special council committee was passed [no waterworks if the ARA directly rated] he was afraid the Regional Authority would collapse.

Mr. Savory: That's right.²⁰

Rebuffed by Robinson's compromise measure, Savory decided to bring a strong case to the Local Bills Committee to have his organisation released from the Bill. The chairmen of other special purpose bodies decided likewise. In their submissions they argued that their local bodies were efficient and their separate existence was crucial to this efficiency. Their submissions ignored the issue of co-ordinating the planning and implementation of major metropolitan works. As one commentator pointed out:

19. New Zealand Herald, May 22, 1962.

20. *ibid.*

The multiplication of ad hoc authorities is creating additional problems. Each authority presses its demands for loan money without regard for the needs or relative urgency of the claims of other agencies in the same area. ... no-one has the responsibility for determining a rational priority list of the tasks that the different agencies wish to, or should, undertake.²¹

The likelihood that special purpose separate bodies cost in fact the metropolis money was overlooked and the efficiency argument at any rate became a repeated claim during the during the hearings to enlist support for continued autonomous political identity. The Auckland special purpose body chairmen were supported by their counterparts elsewhere in the country, their national associations, and by related government departments whose stable states too were placed under threat by the ARA Bill. These submissions to the parliamentary committee were evidence not only of morphological fundamentalism in Auckland, but a measure of its strength throughout New Zealand. The Harbour Board, the Harbour Bridge Authority, the Power Boards, the Fire Boards and the North Shore Drainage Board and the Transport Board, gave evidence supporting their release based on the principle of separate identity.

Savory arranged for the Harbour Boards' Association, his organisation's national body, and the Marine Department, to give evidence favouring the separate existence of the Auckland Harbour Board. He himself argued at the hearings against compulsory inclusion and maintained that "methods

21. Polaschek, p.86.

and circumstances in which the Bill was evolved are not conducive to the establishment and progressive development of any Regional Authority". He reiterated "the highly specialist function" of the board and argued for its separate existence on the basis of this and its efficiency.²² Savory also hinted at an ulterior reason for the municipalities' supporting the Bill. He alleged that the offsetting of deficits by one authority function with the surpluses of another, like his board, were not excluded in the proposed piece of legislation.²³ Before giving the submissions, Savory told Robinson that "he would bring every harbour board in the country out against the bill and kill it, if his organisation were not struck out".²⁴ He was a powerful advocate, and the harbour boards' national body of which he was chairman, were in complete sympathy with him on this issue. Robinson believed the government would not be prepared to clash with the nation's harbour boards for the sake of metropolitan reform.

Savory informed the author:

Yes, it was Sir Dove Meyer (sic) Robinson and Professor Parkinson [of Parkinson's Law] who were responsible for its [the ARA's] conception and establishment. Little me and Mr Gooder stopped the Auckland Harbour Board and the Auckland Electric Power Board from being absorbed into what has been, and is, the biggest hoax played on our lovely City.²⁵

22. Submission to the Local Bills Committee relating to the ARA Bill 1962 by the Auckland Harbour Board, September 1962, p.2. in I.A., W24/158 No.249, Pt.4.

23. *ibid.* p.6.

24. Interview with D.M. Robinson, February 8, 1982. Also interviews with R. Savory, April 23, 1982 and L. Murdoch, May 19, 1982.

25. In a letter from R. Savory to the author, dated April 7, 1982.

A.T. Gooder organised the Electric Power Boards' case for their exclusion. His supporters had been petitioning for this since June 1962 at least. On behalf of his Executive Committee, the Secretary of the Electrical Supply Authorities' Association had already tried to persuade Gotz to release the three power boards in Greater Auckland from the Bill. He argued that if the ARA is proceeded with the inclusion of Electrical Supply Authorities could become a pattern for other localities.²⁶

Various power boards, for instance, had indicated their opposition to the dissolution of the three Auckland boards as separate local body authorities. "The Board is deeply concerned", telegraphed the chairmen of the Springs, Elsmere and Malven Electrical Power Boards, "at the implications of the ARA Bill with particular reference to the intended dissolution of three major power boards."²⁷ The General Manager of the New Zealand Electricity Department critically wrote of the Auckland municipalities' willingness to accept some change so long as their criteria of morphological fundamentalism were upheld.

The [Power] Boards would cease to exist ...
The existing territorial authorities on the other hand, while accepting some small measure of subordination in a two tier system, would retain their identities and most of their functions.²⁸

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26. In a letter from N.G. Dunning to L Gotz dated June 21, 1962 in I.A., W24/58, No.249, Pt.4.
27. In a telegram from Roberts and Faulkner to L. Gotz dated July 24, 1962 in I.A., W24/58, No.249, Pt.4.
28. In a letter from A. Davenport to L. Gotz dated July 25, 1962, p.1 in I.A., W24.58, No.249, Pt.4.

At the hearings themselves the Chairman of the Auckland Electric Power Board, A.T. Gooder, argued in his submissions that orderly planning and development were possible in Auckland "without disturbing existing specialist bodies".²⁹ Like Savory, Gooder had arranged similar support at the hearings from his national association, the Electrical Supply Association as well as from the Central Waikato Electrical Power Board and the Electricity Department. An executive member of the Supply Association, H.H. White told the Local Bills Committee it wanted the three boards in Auckland excluded from the authority. He said government policy had been to regard the power boards as part of one distinct industry and the Association had extracted a promise from Prime Minister Keith Holyoake that this would continue.³⁰ The Association's president, W.S.N. Rennie, said that "many of the powers to be given to the [regional] authority if legislation was enacted, would be repugnant to the electrical supply industry". Rennie claimed that imminent government reorganisation of the industry was "based on the strict adherence to the concept of local control of the distribution by elected representatives in close touch with consumers." He considered the ARA Bill undermined this. "The Auckland Bill could set a pattern", he told the committee, "I do not know of any power board that would support being part of a regional authority."³¹

Addressing the Local Bills Committee, the Chairman of

29. Submissions to the Local Bills Committee on the ARA Bill No.1, by A.W. Gooder. p.15 in ARA file "Submissions on the ARA 1962 Bills".

30. New Zealand Herald, October 11, 1962.

31. Auckland Star, October 25, 1962.

the North Shore Drainage Board, C.F. Woodall, maintained that the Establishment Committee Bill spared the municipalities amalgamation - a reform measure that would bring about greater local government efficiency. Conversely he insisted that the special purpose bodies were already efficient and "regional in scope" as well. "Nothing", he reiterated to members of the Local Bills Committee, "would therefore be achieved by altering the status quo on the North Shore."³² Allum spoke similarly: "There would be no benefit gained by dissolving the separate identity of the Auckland Harbour Bridge Authority."³³

The chairman of the New Zealand Fire Service Council, S.S. Dean, made submissions in favour of the exemption of the two Auckland fire boards. He told the Committee that the regular and volunteer Auckland brigades could not agree on their own amalgamations, but they were agreed that they were "totally opposed" to the Bill. They could not accept their compulsory placement in a larger multi-purpose framework.³⁴

Fortunately for the special purpose bodies, they had two supporters on the Local Bills Committee, the parliamentary select committee that heard submissions about the ARA Bills. These were A.E. Allen and W.J. Scott, the government M.P.s for Franklin and Rodney. Allen, a former chairman

32. "ARA Bills Nos 1 and 2: Submissions of the North Shore Drainage Board on the above mentioned Bills to be made by Clement Federal Woodall. 1962, pp.17-18 in ARA file "Submissions on the ARA 1962 Bills".

33. "Submissions to the Local Bills Committee by the Auckland Harbour Bridge Authority Against Inclusion in the ARA Bill No.1, and in support of the Enactment of the ARA Bill No.2 p.10 in I.A., W24/58 No.249 Pt.3.

34. Auckland Star October 18, 1962.

of the Auckland Electric Power Board (and in 1962 still a member), was chairman of the Local Bills Committee. Voluntarily he stood down from the position because of his involvement with the power board, but Holyoake insisted that Allen still sit and vote on the Committee and Scott was made acting chairman.³⁵

Allen's political apprenticeship had been served in Auckland local government and during this time he had developed a belief in the efficiency of special purpose bodies like the Auckland Electric Power Board. During a debate on the ARA (1962) Bill, Allen told Parliament:

The only uniformity [in metropolitan services] that exists has been brought about by the efficiency of the ad hoc authorities that have overridden the inefficiency of the territorial authorities.³⁶

Scott too was prepared to cast a critical eye over the municipalities but he took a more charitable view of the special purpose bodies continued separate existence. He told Parliament during a debate on the ARA (1962) Bill:

We have 32 territorial local bodies in Auckland and nobody apparently wants to do anything about that at all. Everybody seems to want to throw the ad hoc bodies into the ring and play local body politics.³⁷

His position was similar to the Spencer/McElroy line. "I would support a regional authority", he said, "initially

35. Interview with A.E. Allen, May 10, 1982.

36. NZPD Vol.337, October 17, 1963, p.2550.

37. *ibid.* p.2538.

with powers for town planning and regional reserves, but that is as far as I am prepared to support the measure."³⁸

There were other reasons for Scott and Allen's opposition to the ARA Bill. Personal antagonism played a part. For instance, Scott and the Chairman of the Rodney County Council, T.O.L. Jenkins, seemed to have disliked one another. Jenkins was a supporter of the Establishment Committee Bill (and one of the few who had voted against its withdrawal in 1961 from Parliament). According to Scott, Jenkins was "a gentleman farmer who enjoyed going into town on local body business."³⁹ This "hobby", Scott continued, was furthered by the establishment of the ARA, while Scott maintained he reflected best the interests of Rodney County - that it and its needs were separate from metropolitan Auckland. Later Scott unsuccessfully promoted a private member's bill to have Rodney County removed from the ARA's jurisdiction.⁴⁰ With Allen, there was dislike between Robinson and himself. Allen places himself with the local body Establishment that had been so embarrassed by Robinson during the drainage controversy, and he is frank about what he believes are Robinson's failings - being a Communist, a war profiteer a philanderer amongst other things.⁴¹ He openly admits to being a "friendly enemy" of Robinson's although others, for instance L.A. Manning, the former Mayor of Onehunga, have questioned the friendliness.⁴²

38. NZPD, Vol.337, October 17, 1963, p.2538.

39. Interview with W.J. Scott, May 14, 1982.

40. *ibid.*

41. Interview with A.E. Allen, May 10, 1982.

42. Interview with L.A. Manning, May 11, 1982.

During the Local Bills Committee hearings the unpleasantness between Allen and Robinson was quite apparent. On the first day, Allen embarrassed Robinson during two lines of questioning. Allen asked the mayor to explain what the letters printed after his name on the cover of the Establishment Committee's submissions stood for. Robinson had listed FNZIM (Fellow of the New Zealand Institute of Management); MRSH (Member of the Royal Society of Health); MAAN (Member of the American Academy of Nutrition) and Hon.M.Inst.SP, (Honorary Member of the Institute of Sewage Purification). Robinson refused to explain the abbreviations, but Scott instructed him to answer Allen which he then did. Allen gave some witty renditions of these letters (lost to posterity) and then cast doubt on their validity. Wasn't it true he said, that Robinson was a member of an Auckland golf club? Robinson replied that he belonged to the Remuera Club. "Well why didn't you put that behind your name too?" Allen suggested.⁴³

Allen had also managed to procure documentary evidence of Robinson's 1954-56 position opposing Luxford's Greater Auckland Authority. Without naming the author, Allen read some passages and then asked Robinson for his opinion. Robinson replied that the person did not know what he was talking about, only to find out it was a statement that he had made himself. "He just about burst into tears".⁴⁴ Although Scott did not have the same malicious attitude towards Robinson, the foregoing shows Scott allowed Allen

43. New Zealand Herald, September 13, 1962; also interviews with A.E. Allen, L.A. Manning and W.J. Scott, May 10, 11 and 14, 1982.

44. Interview with L.A. Manning. May 11, 1982.

to indulge in some petty point scoring.

Personal differences aside, Scott and Allen's firm intention was to spare the special purpose bodies compulsory absorption into the top tier. Scott admitted that they thought about agreeing to the bodies' compulsory inclusion because this would create "such a ruckus the bill would be knocked on the head". "We could have played silly buggers" he confessed, "but we decided not to."⁴⁵

Robinson had made this unnecessary himself. The mayor was aware of the adverse effects the special purpose bodies were having by protesting to the government to guarantee their autonomous existence, the harbour boards and electrical supply associations in particular. People like Savory had made it obvious this sort of pressure would continue and Robinson did not want to jeopardise the bill's favour with the government.

In June 1962 after the harbour boards and electric power boards representatives had met with the government, Robinson wrote to Holyoake:

If Parliament does nothing but validate the agreement what has been made [with the planning, drainage, water supply, airport, parks and civil defence committees/boards] we will have a strong and effective authority. You may be sure that we will not make the task of the Local Bills Committee or Parliament more difficult than it need be by making the approval of the bill contingent upon bringing into the authority bodies which have refused to join voluntarily.⁴⁶

45. Interview with W.J. Scott, May 14, 1982.

46. In a letter from D.M. Robinson to K. Holyoake dated 27 June 1962 in R.E.C.C.F.

With Robinson's permission, Holyoake had shown this to members dealing with the Bill. Having offered the compromise, Scott gave Robinson permission during the committee hearings to release the Harbour Board, the three Electric Power Boards, the Fire Boards, the Auckland Harbour Bridge Authority and the North Shore Drainage Board. In some cases the submissions these boards had arranged to be heard in their defence were cancelled because their release made them moot.

All but one of the special purpose bodies that rejected political absorption in the proposed ARA had been released from the Bill. An element of political malice can possibly be detected in the Local Bills Committee inclusion of the Transport Board in the ARA functions. While a majority of members probably did consider public transport an important metropolitan function, the inclusion of the Transport Board still did surprise Robinson. However, in Scott's words it made "little sense to hand over profit making authorities to the ARA",⁴⁷ it made perfect sense to grant the metropolitan reformers a board that had made a loss that financial year of £60,000.

Although Scott and Allen had permitted the exemption of the special purpose bodies from the bill, it was not accurate to portray them as morphological fundamentalists. Indeed the special purpose body morphological fundamentalists in Auckland could consider themselves fortunate that their own objectives and Scott and Allen's had been

47. Interview with W.J. Scott, May 14, 1982.

temporarily similar. Despite the parliamentarians' belief that the separate boards were efficient, they considered both the geographical identity and political autonomy of all existing local bodies were open to scrutiny and future reform. For instance on the subject of municipal amalgamation there were immediate differences between the two parliamentarians and the special purpose body chairman they supported. While some of the latter had talked of the need for municipal amalgamation, little was heard on the subject from this quarter after their release from the Bill. Scott and Allen however, called for their rationalisation not just as a means of deflecting attention away from the special purpose bodies, but as a means of bringing greater efficiency to Auckland local government. Moreso, if this could be brought about, then both maintained privately that they were prepared to seriously consider a regional concept and amalgamating a number of special purpose bodies.⁴⁸ It was this reformist nature that brought Scott and Allen into conflict with the Auckland municipalities.

On December 5, 1962, Scott announced his committee had much to resolve on the Establishment Committee's bill. Revealing his and Allen's position quite explicitly, Scott said that his committee was not prepared to proceed with the bill until the number of municipalities had been reduced in Auckland. He said that the Local Government Commission was to be sent to the metropolis early in the new year to

48. Interviews with A.E. Allen, May 10, 1982 and W.J. Scott, May 14, 1982.

implement amalgamation schemes.⁴⁹ Scott and Allen waited for municipal support for the ARA Bill to dissipate.

It did not. Only three mayors - predictably J.D. Murdoch, R.W. Bennett and W.H. Henderson - had appeared before the Local Bills Committee to oppose the Bill. Murdoch had made this one of his last tasks as the retiring Mayor of Otahuhu. He had told the Committee, Auckland was going to end up with "a Metro Goldwyn Mayor"⁵⁰ and little imagination was necessary to understand who Murdoch was alluding to. These councils and Glen Eden Borough and Waiheke County remained opposed to the Bill. Nine other municipalities would only agree to the ARA in principle and not the authority as set out in the Bill. But Robinson argued that the bill was as good as Auckland would get and he pointed to the 20 municipalities - nearly 70% of the metropolitan population - who supported the Bill.⁵¹

Surprised at this level of support, Scott now maintains that the municipalities had become apathetic over reform. He cites the fact that although the municipalities had insisted on the compulsory inclusion of all the special purpose bodies in the Bill, they were quiescent when a number were released. He argued that once the Bill was before the Committee, the municipalities had given Robinson's consultative committee carte blanche virtually to do what it had to to get the Bill passed. Scott cites Hay as telling

49. NZPD, Vol.333, December 4, 1962, p.3043. Also New Zealand Herald, December 5, 1962.

50. New Zealand Herald, October 18, 1962.

51. A claim repeated in a letter from D.M. Robinson to W.J. Scott, dated August 6, 1963 in R.C.C.E.F.

him later "they had let Robinson get away with too much."⁵²

Yet the Establishment Committee voted 28-4 in December 1962 to continue meeting to work for the bill's passage. Day to day dealings were left to the consultative committee certainly, but in November 1962, one of its members, the defeated mayor of East Coast Bays, was replaced by Hay himself.⁵³ He was in the perfect position then to scrutinise Robinson if it were true the mayor had been given "carte blanche".

The real explanation for the continued consensus for the bill lies not with apathy on the part of the Establishment Committee but with Scott and Allen's demands for municipal amalgamation. The tactics of these two rebounded on them. Their demands directed municipalities' uneasiness away from Robinson's reforms and back to their most fundamental fear - compulsory amalgamation. This was a much more basic threat to their existing geographical identities and Scott and Allen rekindled morphological fundamentalism not against Robinson, but themselves.

The municipalities not only heard parliamentary calls for their amalgamation but saw the Local Government Commission given encouragement by them. The Commissioners arrived promptly in January 1963 as Scott and Allen had promised. During February and March, the Commission prepared amalgamation schemes for West and South Auckland. The municipalities in both areas rejected the schemes.

52. Interview with W.J. Scott, May 14, 1982.

53. New Zealand Herald, December 14, 1962.

The Commission also proposed a "four city vision"; that is Auckland amalgamated into four large municipalities.⁵⁴ The four cities would be created by the South Auckland and West Auckland amalgamation schemes, by amalgamating the North Shore municipalities and Auckland City with the central municipalities like Mount Eden, Mount Roskill, Mount Albert, One Tree Hill, Ellerslie and Newmarket. No municipality would be spared, and the "vision" was given wide newspaper coverage. Later in the year the Commission asked the government to amend the Local Government Act so that the ratepayer polls it was obliged to conduct on amalgamation schemes could be dispensed with.⁵⁵

Scott and Allen therefore were identified as the people who had brought the Local Government Commission to Auckland and rekindled its determination, this time, to implement municipal amalgamation. It was not those advocating a regional authority who were now concerning the municipal mayors, but those advocating worse - compulsory rationalisation into larger local body units. Morphological fundamentalism amongst the municipalities had stopped the 1961 ARA Bill, but ironically it now rose to defend the 1962 Bill. This was a similar situation to the reform process in Toronto and in Winnipeg where the central cities demanded the other municipalities be amalgamated with them and the latter accepted a two tier reform system instead.

The Auckland municipalities were similarly mindful of the advantages of Robinson's reform proposals in compar-

54. See, for instance, Auckland Star, May 31, 1963.

55. *ibid*, June 28, 1963.

ison to the amalgamation proposals. Robinson had never proposed amalgamation as a reform solution and gauging the strength of morphological fundamentalism he had told Scott it "was starry eyed optimism" to believe amalgamation would be successful.⁵⁶ Robinson had always suggested the regional authority would encourage a more favourable disposition towards amalgamation (he never said how) but he had, and continued to stress that these amalgamations would be matters for the municipalities to decide themselves. In 1961, for instance, he had told a Papatoetoe audience

So long as people believe that their own local bodies are the best system for their own government, I say that they are entitled to it. No one, not even Parliament, is entitled to force amalgamation.⁵⁷

In 1962, reacting to Scott's demands for amalgamation, Robinson said the authority, if implemented, would pave the way for voluntary amalgamation.⁵⁸ Or as L.A. Manning, one of Robinson's reform allies put it, "nobody at the [June 22, 1962 Establishment Committee] meeting would be against a certain amount of amalgamation ... but this has nothing to do with a regional authority."⁵⁹

In 1963 Robinson began to suggest that Parliament and its agencies were out to enforce their thinking on Auckland, therefore the local bodies must show the government Auckland had decided to reform itself instead, by way of the regional authority proposals and this wish must be

56. New Zealand Herald, December 5, 1963.

57. South Auckland Courier, February 15, 1961.

58. New Zealand Herald, December 5, 1962.

59. *ibid.*



"Comrades, you've nothing to lose but your chains!"

Source: New Zealand Herald, January 11, 1963

respected.⁶⁰ In December 1962 he accused Parliament of making "a plaything of local body members in Auckland"⁶¹ and in June 1963, he told the Establishment Committee,

If your bill is not enacted this session, their [Gotz the Minister of Internal Affairs and Yaldwyn, the Chairman of the Local Government Commission] previous support for the regional authority solution can be regarded as mere lip service, concealing what may be their true objective - the amalgamation of territorial local bodies in Auckland.⁶²

60. Auckland Star, June 22, 1965.

61. New Zealand Herald, December 5, 1962.

62. Auckland Star, June 22, 1963.

There is evidence that Robinson's lines of argument were gaining support. In June 1963 Scott had indicated to the Establishment Committee that the chances of the Bill being passed in the 1963 Parliamentary session were negligible. Hay of all people, responded by saying:

What sort of people have we running this country - asking us to do a job of work and when we have done it willingly and well, this is the answer we get.⁶³

This was quite a conversion from the Hay of 1961!

The June meeting agreed to enlist the support of Auckland parliamentarians to get the Bill passed. Confident of Establishment Committee support, Robinson also suggested a way around the most pressing obstacle other than the municipal amalgamation pre-requisite - the number of representatives on the authority. Robinson offered to reduce the number from 76 to 38, having a first term that was wholly appointive in representation (38 members appointed by their respective councils) and from then on a directly elective authority with the same number of representatives. Robinson noted to Scott:

I have taken the opportunity of discussing this proposal this morning with a few of the leading members of the Establishment Committee and it met with wholehearted approval. I am optimistic enough to believe that provided it were acceptable to the Local Bills Committee and so pave the way for the enactment of the Bill, I might be able to get the Establishment Committee to accept it.⁶⁴

63. Auckland Star, June 22, 1963

64. In a letter from D.M. Robinson to W.J. Scott, dated July 9, 1963, in R.E.C.C.F.

When Scott's Committee were still deliberating on the Bill during the following month, Robinson was able to provide him with further evidence of the sympathetic disposition the municipalities had for the Bill. This time it was a survey of local body opinion showing the same large majority approved of the Bill.⁶⁵

Parliamentary opinion was turning against Scott and Allen as well. With the exception of Rex Mason, an old friend of Sir John Allum, the Auckland Harbour Bridge Authority Chairman, the Labour opposition supported the Bill. Labour parliamentarians like Warren Freer, J. MacFarlane and Arthur Faulkner, offered their view that the Bill was an important step in bringing administrative reform to Auckland.⁶⁶ Freer also accused Allen of having a closed mind on the Bill right from the start and of wanting to save the Auckland Electric Power Board "his own little pet authority" from reform.⁶⁷ MacFarlane hinted at the personality conflict that had added to the opposition to the Bill. He said that "personalities in Auckland have influenced the judgements of some Auckland members" although he did not answer when asked by an Honorable Member "which one?"⁶⁸

The Minister of Internal Affairs, Gotz, and the government politicians such as R.D. Muldoon and G.G. Grieve, also

65. In a letter from D.M. Robinson to W.J. Scott, dated August 6, 1963, in R.E.C.C.F.

66. NZPD, vol.337, October 17, 1963, pp.2534, 2542. 2544.

67. *ibid*, p.2553.

68. *ibid*, p.2545.

supported reform.⁶⁹ Although constantly impeded by Allen and Scott, Gotz had consistently spoken in favour of the regional authority.⁷⁰ He impressed on the government that this "was the first and logical step" in local government reform and although he favoured amalgamation as well (as indeed the Labour Party did) Gotz rightly understood the strength of morphological fundamentalism in the metropolis. He directed members' attention to the failures of amalgamation and declared "that we can no longer attempt to tackle this issue [Auckland local body reform] in the same way as has been tried earlier."⁷¹ Gotz also alerted the Government to the consensus in Auckland behind the Bill. Robinson maintains that Holyoake also saw virtues in the reform proposals but that the Auckland consensus impressed the Prime Minister as well.⁷² This solution was a lot smoother than the irritation that Scott and Allen were causing in Auckland.

The effects of the continued municipal support for the ARA Bill told on the two members. In October 1963, a

69. NZPD vol.337 October 17, 1963 pp.2552, 2554; also vol.336 September 26, 1963, p.2076.

70. Robinson's correspondence in his own papers and the Internal Affairs files reveal that Gotz tried to get Allen and Scott to hear all evidence in Auckland, to deliberate earlier and to finish their consideration of the Bill more quickly - without success. Scott talked of how on one occasion he returned from physiotherapy to find Gotz had assumed chairmanship of the Local Bills Committee. Scott re-assumed his role and ignored all the clauses Gotz and the Committee processed and returned the Committee's attention to the Bill's short title, (clause 1). He also revealed how Gotz and he, who were tenants in the same block of apartments, were barely on speaking terms as the Committee's consideration of the Bill continued.

71. NZPD vol.337, October 17, 1963, p.2546.

72. Interview with D.M. Robinson, April 22, 1982.

majority on the Local Bills Committee dropped the Scott/Allen demands that amalgamation be implemented before the Bill proceeded. Scott angrily denounced his fellow Committee members. He told Parliament, members "had all sorts of excuses as to why it [the prerequisite amalgamation] should be forgotten despite the fact that last year the committee had unanimously passed that resolution."⁷³ In July 1963 Robinson had met with Holyoake and the Prime Minister instructed a reluctant Scott to work out the outstanding difficulties with the Bill - ostensibly the representation aspect - with the Establishment Committee's consultative group.⁷⁴ Robinson does not recall anything that needed to be altered because he had already offered a formula to resolve the membership that Scott considered too unwieldy. Robinson had also offered a compromise on direct rating - another point of difference between the bill's advocates and Scott and Allen. It would be introduced after a two year trial period of levying. Scott had been stalling the bill's inevitable passage. Robinson was grateful to Holyoake for his assistance and for the Prime Minister's support for the Bill; a lead which the mayor considered most government M.P.s took.⁷⁵

After a last spirited debate, Scott, Allen and Mason lost. The ARA 1962 Bill was passed into law as the 1963 parliamentary session ended. Mat Rata, the M.P. for Northern Maori, telephoned Robinson to tell him the news, and the mayor remembers weeping when he heard the bill

73. NZPD vol.337, October 17, 1963, p.2536.

74. Interview with D.M. Robinson, April 22, 1982.

75. *ibid.*

had been passed.⁷⁶

Robinson had become the first person to accomplish metropolitan reform in Auckland. It had been a difficult process and ultimately, it could only be said that the Auckland local bodies tolerated this measure of reform. The dissenting special purpose bodies tolerated it because, with the exception of the Transport Board, they had been exempted from it. They then gave up pressing for their rival ARA Bill. The municipalities had supported it because, threatened with amalgamation by both the Local Bills Committee and the Local Government Commission, they, like their Winnipeg and Toronto counterparts, preferred to opt for the two tier scheme. They had subscribed to Robinson's reforms for different reasons than the mayor, and as such there had been little demonstrable decline in morphological fundamentalism, which Robinson might need to challenge if the ARA were to develop into an independent metropolitan body. It is the mayor's fortunes as a metropolitan influence and decision maker that will now be considered.

76. Interview with D.M. Robinson, April 22, 1982.

CHAPTER 6AUCKLAND CITY COUNCIL SETBACKS AND THE
HIATUS IN ROBINSON'S METROPOLITAN CAREER

In November 1963, Robinson was made inaugural chairman of the Auckland Regional Authority and he served in that position until the local body elections in 1965. This inaugural term was dominated by establishing the ARA's administrative machinery. This involved finalising negotiations for individual special purpose bodies to join the ARA and then getting them functioning as divisions of the new body. The term also involved some work modifying the ARA Act. However, there were other achievements that were more pleasing to Robinson - three regional reserves were bought and De Leuw Cather, the Canadian engineering consultancy, was commissioned to prepare a detailed plan on a rapid transit scheme for Auckland.¹

Robinson's emergence as an influential metropolitan decision maker was, however, brought to a temporary halt because of his election defeats in Auckland City and then on the Auckland Regional Authority itself. In this chapter reasons are proposed for the hiatus in Robinson's political career. The connection between his mayoral fortunes and his position on the regional body is explained. The difficulties his political style and reputation had caused him during the Auckland Regional Authority establishment process are shown to have caused greater difficulties in council politics - both a longstanding feud with the council majority, the Citizens' and Ratepayers' Association councillors and

1. Interview with D.M. Robinson, March 7, 1982.

a developing rift with Labour Party councillors too. In the process, the popular account of Robinson's election defeat in 1965 will be outlined and an opportunity will be taken to demythologise aspects of this campaign while a wider explanation for the 1965 result will be sought.

In October 1965 Robinson lost the Auckland City mayoralty. He was beaten by the Citizens' and Ratepayers' candidate, R.G. McElroy, who had served on the council from 1938 until 1953 and, as outlined, had helped draft the rival Auckland Regional Authority Bill in 1962. After losing the mayoralty, Robinson also lost the chairmanship of the Auckland Regional Authority. The loss of the mayoralty and his Auckland Regional Authority position were connected. Robinson, as described before, maintained that the status of the Auckland City mayoralty merited the mayor an important Auckland Regional Authority committee chairmanship. In his opinion this would be sufficient in itself to bring about the influence he needed on the body. Because he considered that his mayoral position constituted a claim to an Auckland Regional Authority committee chairmanship, this left his position on the ARA vulnerable as a consequence to any change in his mayoral fortunes. The experiences of 1965 and 1968 underline this.

Shortly after his mayoral defeat, Robinson, who had won re-election to the ARA as a member for the Auckland City ward, contested the ARA chairmanship. He lost to Hugh Lambie, the then deputy chairman. In 1963 Lambie had contested the chairmanship against Robinson and lost by 8 votes²-

2. New Zealand Herald, December 13, 1963.

25:17. This in itself was a measure of the lingering doubts most local body mayors had about Robinson. But in 1965 the Auckland Regional Authority membership which included 16 of the 33 inaugural members, need no longer cause an affront to the Mayor of Auckland City by voting against Robinson's candidacy for the Auckland Regional Authority chairmanship. Instead they took this opportunity to oust the man many of them had so little liking for. Those local body politicians from metropolitan Auckland who were opposed to Robinson found fellow sympathisers in the representatives from the Auckland City ward. With the exception of Robinson, the five Auckland City members were Citizens' and Ratepayers' men, including Councillor Pearce and one A.C. Johns. Clive Johns, former Mayor of Mount Eden, had replaced Robinson as Drainage Board Chairman in 1956 and the two politicians heartily disliked one another.³ Robinson was also beaten for the ARA deputy chairmanship. L.A. Manning, an ally during the establishment process defeated Robinson.⁴

Additionally Robinson failed to be elected to any Auckland Regional Authority committee chairmanship or deputy chairmanship. A motion that he replace Auckland City Councillor Tom Pearce as chairman of the Regional Roads Committee was defeated.⁵

In Robinson's scrapbook for the 1965 election is a clipping from an unnamed suburban paper. In it the writer noted that "public reaction has been sympathetic to Mr

3. Peter Nicholas, Robbie of Auckland, 1974, p.137.

4. New Zealand Herald, November 2, 1965.

5. ibid, November 6, 1965.

Robinson". A person "prominent in local government" was quoted as having said:

Were he [Robinson] not such a man of dogged determination ... my advice to him would be to walk out and let them stew in their own juice. They've certainly thrashed him.

An unnamed suburban mayor is reported saying "I suppose the idea is to eliminate Robbie altogether".

He was not eliminated, and Robinson's fortunes in the next Auckland Regional Authority elections were in sharp contrast to his failure to secure a committee chairmanship in 1965. The difference in the outcomes offers the best proof of the relationship between his mayoralty and his claims for a position on the authority. In 1968, Robinson made a successful come back campaign reversing the 1965 mayoral result and defeating McElroy by 6000 votes.⁶

After the 1968 election, Robinson proposed that a committee called the Rapid Transit Committee be established and that he be its chairman. L.A. Manning, contending the ARA chairmanship against Tom Pearce, alleged that Robinson made a deal with Pearce, whereby Robinson would put his status behind the Pearce candidacy for ARA chairman, in exchange for the Rapid Transit Committee chairmanship.⁷ Robinson denies that there was any such deal.⁸ Whatever the veracity of the two men's claims, Robinson's successful emergence from the 1968 Auckland Regional Authority appointments was in stark contrast to the drubbing that he had

6. Auckland City Council election results, see Appendix A, p.300.

7. Interview with L.A. Manning, May 12, 1982.

8. Interview with D.M. Robinson, May 15, 1986.

received as a defeated political figure in 1965. The Rapid Transit Committee was established and Robinson became its chairman.

In 1965 Robinson remembers he could only hope for such a reversal in fortunes. He had been harshly rebuffed by his local body associates, and by the people of Auckland City, and the remaining part of the chapter tries to explain why Robinson's defeat occurred in the first place.

The popular explanation of Robinson's 1965 defeat is that his separation from his fourth wife in 1965 caused so much scandal that it cost him re-election.⁹ On June 29, Aucklanders learnt that the mayor and his mayoress had been hospitalised in different infirmaries where they were "resting".¹⁰ The mayoress stated that she would not receive any incoming telephone calls to the Mater Hospital. In Selwyn Hospital, Robinson had also insulated himself from the press, who meantime persistently sought a statement from Beth Keam, the couple's close friend.

A little over two weeks later, Robinson's picture appeared on the front page of the New Zealand Herald. He unconvincingly stated that he was recovering from "a depressive reaction brought on by the strain of civic duties and a bout of influenzal illness", while the Herald reporter marked on his slurred speech and poor balance. It was also noted that the present whereabouts of the mayoress who had

9. When speaking about Robinson, the defeat and the separation have consistently been the most popular areas of conversation that the author has had with Auckland citizens, as well as openly and in confidence with a number of Auckland public figures. All versions of the separation have been similar.

10. Auckland Star, June 29, 1965.

left the Mater Hospital were unknown.¹¹

Under pressure to reveal his domestic situation, Robinson had his and his wife's solicitors release the news Auckland had been expecting. The mayor and the mayoress had agreed to separate.¹² By now the rumours that would be confronted by this researcher, not only from interview subjects but from members of the public who had resided in the city at the time, began to circulate.

The basis of the election myth is that the Robinsons had been hospitalised after an incident of domestic violence. The versions differed from saucepan battering to stabbing, and there was even talk of Robinson chasing his wife up Victoria Avenue with a meat cleaver. The chances of the Mayor of Auckland about to do violence to his wife with a meat axe on the pavement of a Remuera street seem slim indeed, but the violence tales hold today. Naturally speculation turned to the causes of the separation. The consensus was that it had been precipitated by the infidelity of one of the partners, and it was rumoured that a person boarding in the mayoral home committed suicide shortly after. A subsequent Sunday News article, headed "Take a Rest Robbie", helped to spur the scandal. The writer explained how he had visited Robinson twice and that on both occasions Robinson had spoken at embarrassing lengths of his most personal affairs. This, the reporter said, included:

- The time, place and circumstances in which his wife had announced she was leaving him.
- The kind of life Mr Robinson prophesied for her.

11. New Zealand Herald, July 13, 1965.

12. ibid, July 22, 1965.

- The terms under which the mayor retained custody of a small daughter.
- How much he had spent on clothes for his wife.
- Why he had had his wife's dog put down.¹³

Robinson began libel proceedings against the paper but dropped them in the despair and ill-health that overtook him after the election defeat.¹⁴ The rumours themselves of which the newspaper hints, and the explanation of an electoral defeat because of such scandal, do not, however, stand up to close scrutiny. They have become part of the mythology that surrounds Robinson's political career and it is the intention here to question their credibility.

Robinson and more importantly, the couple's close friend, Beth Keam, deny that there was any domestic violence. Robinson does so blanketly, Keam to the extent that she would have known about it.¹⁵ On the basis of her close friendship she, more than anyone else, would have been in a position to know, and in the two interviews the writer had with her, she gave evidence of being a most frank and unprejudiced person who would have been prepared to reveal such information.

There is further evidence against the violence allegations. The scandal states that the mayoral couple had to be hospitalised because of the injuries they had inflicted upon one another. Yet the Robinsons entered hospital at separate times. On June 15, 1965, Mrs Robinson had told

13. Sunday News, October 3, 1965.

14. Interview with D.M. Robinson, March 7, 1983.

15. Interview with B. Keam, October 28, 1982.

her husband she intended leaving him. The marriage hung in the balance until the 19th when Robinson effectively gave up any chance of reconciliation when he went ahead with with a planned trip to Macedon, Australia, where he was to participate in a civil defence course. He returned to Auckland on the 22nd or 23rd. While he was overseas, Mrs Robinson used her influence with a friend of hers, the matron of the Mater, to procure a room where she could isolate herself from other people and resolve the problems that she had.¹⁶ Robinson arrived back from Australia after he was diagnosed as suffering from a form of nervous fatigue. He was met at the airport by his wife; their friend Beth Keam; Mrs Robinson's solicitor, David Beattie, and his own solicitor, Martelli. Part way back to their Remuera home Mrs Robinson left the car and returned to the Mater Hospital, while the rest of the party drove to the Robinson residence in Victoria Avenue.¹⁷ Once home Robinson was looked after by his daughter's nurse/nanny and Beth Keam. When it was clear his condition was too serious for them to look after him, his physician had him admitted to Selwyn Hospital.¹⁸

The facts that the Robinsons entered hospital at different times - Robinson after his return from Australia when he was suffering from a nervous condition, and Mrs Robinson who left the family house while her husband was overseas - debunks the theory that the couple were hospitalised as a result of marital violence. The rest of the

16. Interview with B. Keam, October 28, 1982.

17. Interviews with B. Keam October 28, 1982 and D.M. Robinson, October 27, 1982.

18. *ibid.*

rumours seem just as implausible. The boarder who lodged with the Robinsons had suffered an injury some time before the association with the Robinsons, and was incapable of sexual intercourse,¹⁹ and this person died, not by suicide but of natural causes, shortly after the separation.

In a letter to the author, Mrs Robinson's account of the separation is far less dramatic. Mrs Robinson was dissatisfied with the life she was living. She told her husband she wanted a career of her own and maintained that her mayoress' duties were a waste of her management qualifications. She writes:

I have lots of strong memories [of the 1959-1965 mayoral years]. The bad ones include - too much flattery, too many hours standing listening to superficial conversations over too much noise, being expected to consume too much food and drink ... one season included 48 balls. The worst aspect was the lack of privacy and no private life. The best story, in that regard is when we were holidaying in Kaitaia over the New Year 1963-64 and drove up to Cape Reinga on a day trip. As Robbie stepped out of the car, the lighthouse keeper came out of the door and said "You are wanted on the phone Robbie".²⁰

Robinson insists too, that his wife's dissatisfaction with the mayoral life and her desire to take up more fulfilling employment caused the break-up. But he also says that his wife would not agree to return to him even when he offered to give up the mayoralty. But by this time the

19. Confidential sources revealed this to the author.

20. In a letter from T. Robinson to the author, dated May 27, 1983, p.2.

offer was too late - Robinson had insisted his wife run with him for a third time and this went against a private agreement the couple had over the mayoralty.

Mrs Robinson writes:

It is true that I suggested Robbie stand for the mayoralty but - and a very important but - we agreed that we would stand for two terms only. Herein lay the seeds of our breakup. We had also agreed when we married that I would continue my very successful management career (as well as having one or two children) and I was prepared to give that up for the necessary two terms if Robbie was successful ... it was the pressure of Robbie demanding that I make (with him) a public declaration of our intention to run for a third term that caused me to quit.²¹

Mrs Robinson sent a copy of this letter to her former husband and he has never chosen to deny its contents.

The actual reasons for the Robinson's separation do not feature anything like the popular and erroneous explanation. The scandalous separation is equally an implausible explanation of Robinson's mayoral defeat. The separation undoubtedly helped to provide an appropriate background for the complaints the Citizens' and Ratepayers' Association had made about Robinson - that he lacked the dignity and decorum traditionally expected of a mayor. But the crucial factors in the 1965 mayoral election were the unresolved feud between the mayor and the Citizens' and Ratepayers' Association and the decision by the Auckland

21. In a letter from T. Robinson to the author, dated May 27, 1983, pp.1-2.

Labour Representation Council to run a party candidate against Robinson. This split Robinson's vote in the Western Suburbs and allowed McElroy to win.

Probably Robinson's greatest electoral assets were his populist appeal and political individualism. But at the same time these had caused him enemies, and the differences between Robinson and the Citizens' and Ratepayers' Association festered during his first two mayoral terms. By 1965, his political style had also disaffected key Labour people, including Councillor G.F. Forsyth, and Robinson had to reckon with this unexpected liability he had incurred with his populist style and political independence.

Briefly, it can be established that the rift between the mayor and the Citizens' and Ratepayers' Association and the Labour Party was not based to any extent on policy differences. In terms of council policy, the mayor and the Citizens' and Ratepayers' Association, who had a majority during both terms (fourteen of the twenty council seats 1959 to 1962 and fifteen from 1962 to 1965), were in basic agreement. Their positions on the three major issues that faced the council in these years were close. Both parties were committed to local government reform, airport construction and motorway development. The negotiations over motorway cost sharing had begun between the council and the government during the term of Robinson's immediate predecessor, K.N. Buttle. However, the motorway concept had been developed from the Master Transportation Plan of

1954,²² which Cumberland and Robinson had initiated. Both the new mayor and the Citizens' and Ratepayers' councillors accepted the need for a motorway network. Within a year of his election, a new agreement had been signed. Robinson's successful negotiations probably even brought grudging respect from his Association critics.²³

Robinson changed his stance on the airport issue and that way agreed with Citizens' and Ratepayers' Association policy. During the 1959 election, Robinson finally accepted Mangere as the site for the new international airport. Until then he had advocated Whenuapai. He was more insistent than Buttle and the Association that the project should cost little or nothing to the city's ratepayers.

By May 1960, the Auckland Airport Committee had negotiated an agreement with Prime Minister Nash. Robinson had participated in the bargaining.²⁴ In 1962, when the committee under the guidance of Citizens' and Ratepayers' Councillor Passmore, came up with an improved agreement with the new Holyoake Government, Robinson endorsed it.²⁵

With the exception of Councillors Beechey and Savory, the Citizens and Ratepayers and Robinson were also agreed on the need for local government reform in Auckland. The Association agreed with the Auckland Regional Authority proposals when they saw the evidence presented for them by council officers in 1961.

22. Master Transportation Plan, ARA Library Reference No. UDC 656.

23. Auckland Star, December 22, 1960.

24. Interviews with D.M. Robinson, February 8, 1982 and April 21, 1982.

25. Auckland Star, October 9, 1962.

They agreed to hand over the metropolitan waterworks to the prospective body as a gesture of good faith while the deputy mayor, A.O. Glasse, gave very favourable submissions on the concept to the Local Bills Committee in 1962. Citizens' and Ratepayers' Association councillor, W. Delugar, recalls "councillors on the whole were well disposed to the creation of a regional authority".²⁶

Not only did the council majority and the mayor agree upon these issues but they both subscribed to the ambitious project of having ten carparks constructed in the city's central business district, one being built every year. By 1965, five had been built. A shortage of local body funds delayed council efforts in pensioner housing, inner city redevelopment and more costly schemes like a two stage library project and a seaquarium, but the two parties were agreed in principle to these projects.

The similarity in policy goals between the mayor and his Citizens and Ratepayers rivals can be gauged in another way - their platform policy statements in 1959 and 1962. The wider fact that these elections were to degenerate into personality contests points to the lack of policy differences anyway.

In 1959 Robinson and Buttle planned the same projects - airport and motorway construction and local government reform. Robinson simply insisted that he, and not the more cautious Buttle, could hasten their implementation.

26. In a letter from W. Delugar to the author, dated July 16, 1982, p.1. Winifred Delugar was an Auckland City Councillor from 1956-1974.

Both candidates spoke of the need for obtaining administrative efficiency in the Town Hall. The only specific policy difference was Robinson's advocacy of a ward system of election which Buttle rejected. He endorsed the existing at large electoral system instead. But there is no evidence that this became an election issue of any importance.

In the 1962 election, the fact that policy differences did not explain the Citizens and Ratepayers/Robinson rift became clearer. That year an Auckland businessman and Masonic Grandmaster, Edgar Faber, ran against Robinson for the mayoralty as an "Independent" candidate; Faber was endorsed by the Citizens' and Ratepayers' Association whose president declared "we will urge our supporters not only to vote for Mr Faber, but also to work actively toward his election."²⁷ Yet this endorsement cannot be explained in terms of the candidates' respective policy statements. There were no substantial differences in policy between Faber and Robinson to justify the Association's preferences for Faber. On the regional authority issue, Faber sounded more cautious than Robinson, on pensioner housing more action. The only real difference between their platforms was effectively erased when, mid campaign, Faber changed his mind on the ward system and endorsed it. Faber's turnabout was in direct contrast to the Association's stated policy - retention of the at large voting system. Faber also advocated using ratepayers' money to accelerate pensioner housing construction and if necessary, subsidise their rents. This was in contradiction to Citizens and

27. New Zealand Herald, May 25, 1962.

Ratepayers policy. The Association agreed with Robinson that local body rates should not be used for pensioner housing, but that the government should make funds available to the council for this.²⁸ Yet the Citizens and Ratepayers endorsed Faber whose platform was not substantially different to Robinson's and, if anything, slightly less favourable to them. Robinson responded to the overt Citizens' and Ratepayers' endorsement of Faber by saying he could not "understand why the Citizens' and Ratepayers' Association is so anxious to get rid of me unless because of personal animosities". "There had been no disagreement on basic policy", he added.²⁹

Robinson's comment about personal animosity was accurate. A brief survey of the Association's chief members indicates the sort of resentment of Robinson's populist appeal and political success that would cause both ill-feeling between Association members and their warm endorsement of Edgar Faber.

Robinson's severest opponent on the council was R.C.F. Savory, a Citizens' and Ratepayers' councillor from 1953-1962 and then chairman of the Auckland Harbour Board. Even with policy similarities, Robinson and Savory could not have been friends. Their enmity dated back to the Brown's Island drainage controversy. They had entered council within a year of one another - Robinson in the 1952 by-election and Savory in the 1953 municipal elections.

28. Auckland Star, October 8, 1962.

29. *ibid*, May 25, 1962

Savory and Robinson's positions on the drainage issue were irreconcilable - one supported the scheme the other opposed it - and Savory attempted to cast doubt on Robinson's motives for fighting the campaign. He maintains Robinson "got offside with Allum" because he built a house in St Heliers. When Robinson sold it the buyer declined to pay the full amount when he learnt the Brown's Island submarine sewer tunnel would be built below it. "Robinson lost a lot of money on the sale and this upset Robinson no end".³⁰ (Robinson had sold his house after he became involved in the controversy to avoid accusations of a vested interest in the outcome of the struggle).

Savory seems to have resented the publicity the issue brought Robinson. This was possibly irritating to a new councillor trying to make a name for himself. The drainage controversy was the local body issue in Auckland in the 1940s and 1950s. From it Robinson emerged, amongst other things, as a repeated target for satirist Minhinnick's cartoons, appearing in a variety of guises which included "Robinson Crusoe" complete with "Long John Allum and a bottle of effluent", to the "Swiss Family Robinson marooned on Brown's Island".³¹ His actions in bringing in an international panel of sewerage experts to evaluate the Brown's Island drainage scheme; of sending one dissenting member home and of pioneering the oxidation process in New Zealand were amongst those widely, if not charitably, covered by the press. Savory talked to me of Robinson's "innate sense of

30. Interview with R.C.F. Savory, April 13, 1982.

31. New Zealand Herald, February 5, 1953 and March 5, 1954.



CONFUSED ISSUE ON BROWN'S ISLAND

MINIPENCIL

Source: New Zealand Herald, February 5, 1953.



SWISS FAMILY ROBINSON

Source: New Zealand Herald, March 5, 1954.

self-advertisement",³² which he certainly possessed, but avoided the fact that the drainage controversy made Robinson automatic news anyway. Savory meantime saw his own association losing political ground as Robinson scored the drainage victory over it.

Savory also resented that Robinson had no ties to either established political association - neither the Labour Party nor his own Citizens' and Ratepayers' Association. He concluded that Robinson had no friends in either camp, and as a result was a loss to the city as mayor. His choice for best Auckland mayor was Citizens' and Ratepayers' Association Mayor John Allum, equally a foe of Robinson as Savory himself was. Savory also had mayoral aspirations of his own, but the chief obstacles were his wife's misgivings - she did not relish the punishing demands placed on the mayoress. Savory was also conscious of Robinson's popularity. Even so, Savory did appear amongst the possible contenders in 1968 and as late as 1974. He admitted to me that the mayoralty would have been a privilege he would have loved to have had. But he confined his local body interests from 1962 to the Auckland Harbour Board for which he was subsequently knighted. Even away from the council he did not miss opportunities to denigrate Robinson whom he detests still. In his interview with the author he called the former mayor "that funny little man", that "very energetic little rascal" and that "very sharp little man who didn't like the mayor [Allum], or anyone else".³³ Robinson feels the same way, calling the former

32. Interview with R.C.F. Savory, April 23, 1982.

33. *ibid.*

councillor "a man whose mind crawls with maggots".³⁴ If this is any indication of their feelings twenty years later, there is no mystery in their clashes on the council.

There was also personal ill feeling between Robinson and one of Savory's closest associates on the council, C.S. Passmore. A comparative newcomer to Robinson's first council, Passmore had won a seat in a 1958 by-election. He was not a participant in the 1953-56 term but certainly a year would have been long enough though to imbibe the characteristic Citizens' and Ratepayers' Association interpretation of Robinson's drainage campaigning, especially when he became friendly with Savory.

The friendship of the two men showed in their actions on council. In 1959, Savory moved that Passmore replace the mayor's nominee, E.C. Armishaw for the traffic committee chairmanship and the mayor's candidate was defeated.³⁵ Savory and Passmore also sat on the Auckland Airport Committee. In 1960 they declined to vote for their own mayor in the election for that committee's chairman. Robinson told a 1962 audience that "two of my councillors voted against me and put in, as chairman of the Auckland Airport Committee, a farmer from 45 miles away."³⁶

Passmore also criticised Robinson personally during council debates. For instance, when the mayor suggested that the council debates be broadcast on the radio, Passmore said that this would result "in even more electioneering

34. Interview with D.M. Robinson, February 8, 1982.

35. Auckland City Council minutes for the meeting of December 14, 1959, p.8 in Auckland City Council Minute Book 1959, Auckland City Council archives.

36. Auckland Star, October 10, 1962.

from the council platform than we get now".³⁷ Another example of their dislike was reported to the press coincidentally. After leading a delegation to council, Auckland Rugby Union chairman, Tom Pearce, remarked on Passmore and Robinson's behaviour. "Mr Passmore and Mr Robinson", he said, "were constantly bickering and were reading a newspaper during the discussions until exception was taken to their behaviour."³⁸

The animosity may have been hardened by frustrated mayoral ambition. In 1965, Passmore retired from local body politics after thanking those who had approached him to run as mayor. It is possible that Robinson's incumbency featured in Passmore's decision not to stand.

Two other Citizens' and Ratepayers' councillors, who had been on council during some of the drainage controversy years, were H.G. Beechey and W.M. Tongue. Max Tongue, who served on the City Council from 1947-1953 and 1956-1971, was a member of an established Auckland family business - a mortician service - and he had seen "bloody service" in World War Two.³⁹ It is possible that because Robinson could claim neither of these that he was unacceptable to Tongue. Robinson thwarted Tongue's mayoral ambitions. The councillor topped the council poll in 1962 and was briefly touted as a mayoral contender in 1965. (Robinson in response quipped that "he wanted to help Auckland, not bury it"⁴⁰).

37. Auckland Star, February 24, 1960

38. New Zealand Herald, July 4, 1962.

39. Interview with F.W.O. Jones, May 27, 1982.

40. Truth, August 4, 1965.

Tongue's resentment ran to deep dislike, if a remark made to his friend from wartime, F.W.O. Jones, is indicative. Shortly after Robinson's marital separation in 1965 Jones told Tongue to stop criticising the mayor. Tongue replied, "when you get a bastard like that down, there's only one thing to do and that's grind your feet into him".⁴¹

Robinson's populist popularity also dimmed H.G. Beechey's mayoral aspirations. Beechey, an Auckland businessman who served on the Auckland City Council from 1947-1950 and from 1959 until his death in 1967, never had any real mayoral prospects. He polled middlingly in 1959, 1962 and 1965 but he did have higher aspirations. When he gave the city its mace in 1947 (the mace that Mayor Robinson would walk behind) Beechey remarked that one day he hoped to have the honour of walking behind it.⁴²

Again the personal animosity between the mayor and Beechey appears to have been considerable. In one council clash, Beechey accused Robinson of secretly organising a deputation of businessmen to wait on himself and make representations in favour of a car park under the Civic Square. The council reporter wrote "white faced with rage, Mr Robinson ordered Mr Beechey to apologise and withdraw [the suggestion]".⁴³ Beechey denied making it, and other councillors called out that it was all a misunderstanding.

41. Interview with F.W.O. Jones, May 27, 1982.

42. Interviews with F.W.O. Jones, May 27, 1982 and D.M. Robinson, August 25, 1982.

43. New Zealand Herald, November 10, 1964.

When Beechey died, his widow thanked Robinson for being gracious enough to attend the funeral, particularly because she knew that Robinson and her husband had never been friends.⁴⁴

With the exception of thwarted ambition, other Citizens' and Ratepayers' Association councillors shared the reservations that these spokesmen had about Robinson's political style, his populist appeal and his political individualism. In the 1959-1965 council nine of the fifteen Citizens' and Ratepayers' councillors were directly acquainted with some of the drainage saga. These councillors were: F.W. Ambler, H.G. Beechey, T.H. Bloodworth, W. Delugar, A.O. Glasse, G.E. Myers, C.S. Passmore, R.C.F. Savory and W.M. Tongue.⁴⁵ Other councillors may well have been educated in the Citizens' and Ratepayers' hostile interpretation of Robinson's actions during the controversy and they would have almost certainly followed the events themselves in the papers.

It was also easy to imagine this conservative group - called by one local body observer the "National Party in mufti"⁴⁶ - finding aspects of Robinson's personality and past - whether true or exaggerated - disquieting. Most of all they were angered at Robinson's political independence. Commenting on one member of the Citizens' and Ratepayers' team, Robinson said, "he adopted the typical attitude of

44. Interview with D.M. Robinson, March 7, 1982.

45. Some Citizens and Ratepayers Councillors distanced themselves from the worst of the feuding, for instance, John Dale (councillor 1959-1968) and Sir Keith Park (councillor 1962-1971). After being dropped from the Association, but winning re-election as an independent candidate in 1962, F.W. Ambler became friendly with Robinson.

46. G.W.A. Bush "The 1968 Auckland City Mayoral Contest" in Political Science, Vol.22, No.2, 1970, p.23.

most of the Citizens' and Ratepayers' councillors - he was opposed to me on principle because I was not a member of the Association."⁴⁷ This attitude towards Robinson explains some Association voting behaviour. For instance in 1959, its members supported two Citizens' and Ratepayers' nominations for council chairmanships over Robinson's nominees when it was traditional to let the mayor make some appointments. The Citizens' and Ratepayers' members also refused to take part in a special meeting that Robinson called in May 1962 so that Savory could apologise for rude language he had used to the mayor at a previous council meeting. At the latter, the mayor had accused Savory of being the "one man" who had destroyed the 1961 Auckland Regional Authority Bill. This was a manifest exaggeration and in the heat of the argument Savory appears to have sworn at the mayor. The Citizens' and Ratepayers' Association councillors refused to attend Robinson's special meeting and nine of them offered a joint statement that "they did not consider a difference of opinion between the mayor and any of his councillors came within the orbit of the council's business".⁴⁸

An examination of the council debates for the period shows that the Citizens' and Ratepayers' attitudes towards Robinson were translated into unpleasant and personal clashes between the two sides. Debating topics included whether the mayor should be granted expenses to make an overseas trip or whether it was "ganging up" if he were not.

47. Interview with D.M. Robinson, August 25, 1982.

48. Auckland Star, May 11, 1962.

Savory did charitably assent, telling the mayor he would be pleased to see him "take leave for five weeks, or five months or even three years."⁴⁹ Another debate concerned the unfortunate remarks that the mayor had reportedly made about the National Party while he was studying local government reform in Canada. He had allegedly said the party was "a bunch of liars", and the quote in a Canadian paper found its way back to New Zealand.⁵⁰

Councillors argued in another debate whether the mayor should have given a copy of papers he had heard in Chicago to members of the Auckland Metropolitan Council before he gave them to his own councillors, whether the mayor had secretly arranged a deputation of businessmen to ask for a car park that they wanted anyway, and whether the mayor was running a "Mad Hatters' Tea Party".⁵¹

No debate highlights the nature of the feud better than that of July 26, 1960. The mayor had given a report of his North American trip to the council as well as presenting each member with a bound volume of the papers he had heard delivered at the Chicago conference of mayors. The latter were gifts made at his own expense. He was expected to be thanked for the report as a matter of course, but there appears to have been some confusion over what was the subject of thanks - the report or the gifts.

Beechey, Savory and Tongue refused to thank the mayor for his present. Tongue and Savory said they would not do

50. Auckland Star, June 11, 1960.

51. New Zealand Herald, February 9, 1965.

so until they had read the papers and determined their value. Beechey called the gift "worthless". Then a number of Citizens' and Ratepayers' councillors refused to agree to the motion put by Councillor Dreaver that the mayor be thanked not only for the gift but for his ably representing Auckland while overseas.

Savory objected to this motion. He maintained that it forced councillors into a position of saying "I love the mayor or I do not". He moved and was seconded by Beechey that the words "ably represented" be deleted from the motion because the motion in its unamended form called for a "hands up my side, hands up your side, situation". "Backpatting in other words" he said. Robinson unable to contain himself asked "was that backpatting or backstabbing?"⁵²

These unfortunate proceedings lasted half an hour. Council officers, ordinarily reluctant to comment, called the level of debate "the worst heard from a public body in recent memory, and all the bickering over a simple motion of thanks". The Star's editorial, usually unsympathetic to the mayor, then went on to condemn councillors for the deplorable level of debate. Although he was unnamed, Savory came in for special criticism as the councillor who had said the motion of thanks required councillors to say "I love the mayor". The paper's editor called for the Association to silence those spokesmen who were "pre-occupied by a dislike for the mayor and promote others who are worthier representatives of the ratepayers."⁵³

52. Auckland Star, July 27, 1960.

53. *ibid.*

The Citizens' and Ratepayers' councillors took no heed of the advice. Council debate continued to be an outlet for Citizens' and Ratepayers' frustration and jealousy and this continued into the second Robinson term. The personal ill-feeling did not go unsounded in the 1959 and 1962 elections.

Like the 1959 mayoral election, the 1962 contest was a window into the personal ill-feeling between Robinson and the Auckland local body Establishment. His abrasive populist style and his political individualism were again criticised by the Citizens' and Ratepayers' Association and the metropolitan dailies who endorsed Robinson's opponent Edgar Faber. Faber was a past president of the Auckland Chamber of Commerce and a Masonic Grandmaster who had helped pioneer Masonic villages throughout New Zealand. The Citizens' and Ratepayers' Association gathered around this gentlemanly figure of sound reputation. Faber's low public profile and his comparative lack of local body experience would be criticised by Robinson, but the Citizens and Ratepayers must have hoped that Faber, with his ties to the Auckland Establishment and his appeal among Labour people because of his services to the aged, could succeed where Buttle had failed in 1959.

Like Buttle, Faber was confined by his image of dignity from engaging in personality politics. However, at one point he lost his patience and called Robinson "a dictator".⁵⁴ In one campaign address, he also referred to the so called

54. New Zealand Herald, September 28, 1962.

secret airport letter affair. Robinson, and Keith Hay the Mayor of Mount Roskill, had claimed to have seen documentary evidence that the Mangere airport completion date was deliberately being delayed to suit the Government owned airline, TEAL, which was not immediately ready to use the new facility. No such evidence existed. The two mayors had but a rumour to base their accusations upon and Robinson later admitted this. Worse, he refused to apologise to the Minister of Transport, McAlpine.⁵⁵ Neither Faber's reference to the affair nor his dictator comment sat well with his image.

However it was other Citizens' and Ratepayers' members and a sympathetic press who tried to impress upon the electors the distinction between the traditionalist mayoral candidate and the populist Robinson. The Citizens' and Ratepayers' Association arranged a deputation to call on Faber and publically extol his qualities. Three former Association mayors, John Allum, Jack Luxford and Keith Buttle, as well as a former deputy mayor, Roy McElroy, were members of the deputation. Allum and McElroy also ventured onto the platform to endorse Faber. Allum impressed upon voters Faber's virtues, which by inference Robinson did not have. He said:

The issue in this election is leadership. Mr Faber has the necessary qualities of leadership - knowledge, experience and quiet but firm dignified determination. He is an honourable man. He is not a flamboyant man.⁵⁶

55. Auckland Star, November 15, 1959.

56. New Zealand Herald, October 12, 1962.

A.O. Glasse, the Citizens' and Ratepayers' deputy mayor, told another audience "a mayor must have the ability to get men to work with him - and Mr Faber has that ability."⁵⁷

Robinson maintains that Savory, Passmore and another Citizens' and Ratepayers' Councillor, F. de Malmanche, had told Faber exaggerated tales of Robinson's personal conduct and his conduct of council and local body business. These stories persuaded Faber to stand for the mayoralty. Robinson further claims that shortly after the election when Faber was dying of cancer, he got word to Robinson to see him. Faber told the mayor that he no longer believed the tales he had been told, and that he regretted the mayoral race because it had worsened his health. He confessed that when he realised he had been told false stories, he had considered walking out of the campaign. Citizens' and Ratepayers' people had insisted that he do no such thing.⁵⁸

When questioned on this, J.A. Redwood, one of Faber's closest friends replied:

I would say there could be some truth in that. Yes, there could be some truth in it. There were those people [Savory and Passmore were referred to in the author's question] they were not jealous or envious of him [Robinson] but they did not like him. They were justified in what they said. I don't think they were telling lies, but on the other hand it was probably a smear. No one could point a finger like that at Faber. This was why Edgar possibly thought he'd do better because his behaviour was so good.⁵⁹

57. Auckland Star, October 12, 1962.


58. Interview with D.M. Robinson, August 17, 1982.

59. Interview with J.A. Redwood, August 23, 1982.

And on Faber's health Redwood said:

Edgar probably realised at the finish it [campaigning] was hard work and he wasn't a well man. I went to see him when he was dying in the Mater Hospital. I felt then that it could have had an effect on his whole life.⁶⁰

Faber was endorsed by the metropolitan papers as he was by the Association. They detailed the personal feuding but sympathised with Robinson's opponents by proposing the voters rid Auckland of Robinson. Minhinnick gave another uncharitable view of Robinson, while the Herald editor accused Robinson of "harbouring a persecution complex" and



A MAYOR'S NEST

Source: New Zealand Herald, October 9, 1962.

60. Interview with J.A. Redwood, August 23, 1962.

suggested "more is expected of the Mayor of Auckland than a flair for publicity". The editor also maintained that in co-operative council ventures, Robinson "tends to appropriate all the credit". In contrast to Robinson, "Mr Faber could serve Auckland well."⁶¹

The Star's editor wrote three editorials about the election, which he concluded by proposing Auckland give Mr Faber "the green light".⁶² He also claimed:

Auckland City and the region needs a leader, not a man who goes around buying fights. It needs a conciliator, an arbitrator who by his innate capacity, record and evident reasonableness will win the support and respect of the Auckland City Council and then of all the other elected local authorities in the metropolis. It is fortunate indeed to have a man measuring up to these exacting specifications: ... Mr Faber.⁶³

Robinson himself was scarcely oblivious to the benefits of exaggerating the feud. Every time he did so he gave strength to his identification as the people's rather than the Establishment's candidate, and his populist image was consolidated. The accusations he made against his opponents during the 1962 election must have sorely tried their patience. He told one audience that Faber and the Association:

had set out to hoodwink the people of Auckland and blind you with a lot of money. I was told they are prepared to spend up to £50,000 to put

61. New Zealand Herald, October 9, 1962.

62. Auckland Star, October 11, 1962. See also *ibid*, October 4, 1962.

63. *ibid*, October 11, 1962.

me out and this is where this is an unusual campaign. It is a conspiracy to put a Mayor out and not one in, as I am standing in their way of controlling everything in Auckland.⁶⁴

Robinson continued to allege the expenditure of this enormous campaign sum, but certainly it must have been an exaggeration. Robinson was always a hefty campaign spender himself, and yet he had budgeted £6,000 for the 1962 contest, a marked difference from £50,000 he claimed his opponent had invested.⁶⁵ He persisted with other hyperbolic rhetoric telling another receptive audience:

I haven't got the National Party or the Labour Party behind me. I haven't got the Lodge, the Rotary, the Lions, the tigers or the wolves. My wife and I are fair dinkum independents.⁶⁶

As Robinson's second term as mayor continued, the unpleasantness was never resolved and in 1965 the Citizens' and Ratepayers' Association nominated a former deputy mayor, R.G. McElroy, for the mayoralty. While Robinson was vulnerable to this campaign, the deciding factor was the decision of the Labour Party to sponsor a candidate. The rift between Robinson and the Labour members of the council had been developing for some time.

In 1959 Labour and the United Independents (Robinson's drainage party) had joined together as Civic Reform. They endorsed, but did not campaign for, Robinson the Independents' former leader who had decided to run as an indepen-

64. New Zealand Herald, October 10, 1962.

65. In a letter from D.M. Robinson to C.S. Stone, dated August 9, 1965, in R.P.C.F. 1965-1968.

66. New Zealand Herald, October 12, 1962.

dent mayoral candidate. By 1962, two Labour councillors, George Forsyth and Alex Dreaver,⁶⁷ had left the coalition to run as Labour Party candidates. In 1962, Forsyth campaigned for Faber, arranging a meet-the-people programme for him and at one meeting he told the audience that Faber "was the man in whom the city could put its trust".⁶⁸ Another member of the Auckland Labour Representation Council, J. Cuthbert, also endorsed Faber,⁶⁹ while the chairman of the Blockhouse Bay branch of the party told a Faber audience that his branch "had affirmed by resolution its full support to Mr Faber as mayoral candidate."⁷⁰

It was true that these Labour Party officeholders did not always agree with Robinson's policies. They had opposed his position on sports ground charges and council salaries (which he wanted raised) and the new airport funding arrangement with the Holyoake government (which he endorsed). But the policy differences were not marked and cannot be exaggerated. The Labour Representation Council Secretary had himself said in 1962 that

all major points of the Labour election policy, with one exception, have been endorsed by both Mr D.M. Robinson and Mr Edgar Faber, the mayoral candidates.⁷¹

As with the Citizens and Ratepayers, reasons other than policy differences were responsible for the minority Labour endorsement of Faber.

67. G.F.H. Forsyth served from 1953-1968 and A.J.R. Dreaver from 1953-1974 on the Auckland City Council.

68. Auckland Star, October, 1962.

69. *ibid.* September 28, 1962.

70. *ibid.* October 9, 1962.

71. New Zealand Herald, September 28, 1962.

Robinson's political non-conformity and populist appeal were as repugnant to Labour officeholders as they were to the Citizens' and Ratepayers' Association. Robinson was not a member of any established political association and although he had been a nominal member of the Labour Party in his youth, he had not renewed his membership since 1949. Forsyth and his supporters were by contrast traditionalists. Forsyth himself was a 62 year old war pensioner, a party stalwart who believed working class people should be given the opportunity at every election to vote for a true Labour Party candidate - that is, a paid up party member totally committed to party principles and policy.⁷² Robinson's political status was not acceptable - such individualism was outside the established routes to local body power. Despite Robinson's policy similarity to Labour's - better public transport, better council housing, more redevelopment of inner city areas and a ward system, for instance - Robinson still was not a Labour man. He was not bound by a commitment to Labour policy even on those issues on which he agreed with them. Michael Bassett, then a member of the Labour Representation Council, later an Auckland City Councillor and from 1984 Minister of Local Government in the fourth Labour government, explained Forsyth and his supporters' point of view:

Labour people tended to regard Robbie as their mayor or at least better than Citizens and Ratepayers. On the other hand, he was always an individualist and many people in the party felt he was getting a free ride. He rode on

72. Interview with G.F. F.H. Forsyth, conducted by G.W.A. Bush, November 19, 1968.

Labour's bandwagon but never paid the fare. Policy wise he was always elusive except on a few issues.⁷³

In both 1965 and 1968 Forsyth campaigned to get a Labour candidate for the mayoralty. At a 1968 Labour Representation Council meeting, which Robinson was invited to attend, Forsyth best showed his purist attitude. If Robinson agreed to rejoin the party and totally subscribe to its principles and policies, then Forsyth said he would support him fully for mayor. Robinson refused, and Forsyth withdrew his conditional support.⁷⁴ Forsyth then failed to persuade the Labour Representation Council to run a Labour Party candidate. When the party declined to do so Forsyth decided to offer working class people a true party candidate - himself. He was forced to run as an independent - Labour Independent he called himself, but he believed himself to be a genuine party candidate.

Forsyth took then an antagonistic attitude to Robinson's political status just as the Citizens' and Ratepayers' Association did to a mayor who "was not one of them". In 1965, Forsyth successfully persuaded his party to run an official party mayoral candidate against Robinson. For the first time, the feud, which had been between Robinson and Citizens and Ratepayers, expanded to include Labour amongst the mayor's opponents. As early as the Labour Representation Council meeting of March 23, 1965, Forsyth had proposed the party run a full council ticket including a mayoral

73. In a letter from M. Bassett to the author, dated July 20, 1983.

74. New Zealand Herald, September 14, 1968.

candidate. This motion was defeated. But the matter was placed for investigation and referred to party branches in the city for their comment.⁷⁵ Forsyth and his supporters received favourable responses from party branches. Michael Bassett recalls the feeling was, that a traditional council ticket would be assisted by a Labour mayoral candidate, and this could bring a number of Labour candidates onto the city council.⁷⁶ It is worth supposing then, that Forsyth's reservations about Robinson's political status were shared by others, as Bassett himself suggests.

Robinson's political individualism also involved a great deal of self-promotion and some Labour members, like their Citizens' and Ratepayers' Association counterparts, found this trait equally as unappealing. Forsyth in particular was irritated by Robinson's self advertisement. In 1962, Robinson said he needed another term as mayor because without him the regional authority would not be brought to fruition. Forsyth responded by saying that "the framework for the authority was laid years ago and for Mr Robinson to think like that only reflects the mentality of a supreme egotist."⁷⁷ In the 1965 election, Forsyth made similar criticisms. He told one audience that "civic leaders are so busy creating an image for themselves they are forgetting the people they should be serving",⁷⁸ and

75. In the minutes of the March 25, 1965 meeting of the Labour Representation Council, p.2. in University of Auckland archives A65, Labour Representation Council Files, Box 5, Vol.12.

76. In a letter from M. Bassett to the author dated July 20, 1983.

77. Auckland Star, October 10, 1962.

78. ibid, September 22, 1962.

later in the campaign he was even less subtle. He called Robinson someone "who had set himself up as a god [and] who thinks it wrong for anyone to stand against him"⁷⁹

This dislike of Robinson's brash individualism explains Forsyth's sympathy for Faber and possibly even for McElroy. Faber was running as an independent but unlike Robinson he had links to elements in both wings of the local body establishment - both the Citizens and Rate-payers who endorsed his candidacy and to Labour members in the Lodge and involved with work to help the aged. Faber was also the candidate who stressed that he was going to act as a team player when mayor - he would listen with respect and act in co-operation. He was then the conciliatory figure Robinson was not, and therefore appealing to Labour people who shared Forsyth's views.

McElroy too fitted more readily into the Forsyth ideal. Although from an opposing political philosophy, he was an association man, a traditionalist and again someone who stressed his desire to be a team player. Bassett notes that Forsyth's endeavours to get a Labour mayoral candidate in 1965 were aided "by silly people [who] thought that it mattered little as to whether one had McElroy or Robbie in the Chair".⁸⁰ In fact some may have preferred McElroy and knew Forsyth would help his chances. Forsyth himself was complimentary during an interview with Graham Bush about McElroy's term, claiming the mayor had worked well

79. Auckland Star, September 29, 1962.

80. In a letter from M. Bassett to the author, dated July 20, 1983.

on redevelopment and council housing in "his quiet way".⁸¹ McElroy never attracted the criticism from Forsyth that Robinson did during the election and the Citizens' and Ratepayers' candidate thanked Forsyth for conducting himself like "the gentleman I know him to be".⁸² This was the same gentleman who had accused Robinson of "setting himself up like a god."

Forsyth's demeanour towards McElroy was so sympathetic there were even rumours of their collaboration. This charge was resurrected in 1968, when Forsyth chose to run again against his party's wishes. Forsyth was sensitive to the allegations of collusion. He offered an explanation in 1968 when he and McElroy were seen to "accidentally" meet outside the public relations firm engaged by Mayor McElroy in that election. In the ensuing publicity given to the incident, the firm declined to work for McElroy and the Citizens' and Ratepayers' Association any further.⁸³

Forsyth and his supporters resented Robinson's independence from the two traditional local body associations, they disliked his strident individualism and what doubtlessly annoyed them as much, was that Labour people themselves voted for Robinson. Robinson's appeal was populist and it was aimed in particular at the Labour enclaves of the Auckland City Western Suburbs and Glen Innes in the east.

The following table indicates the extent of Robinson's support in the working class areas of the city.⁸⁴

81. Interview with G.F. Forsyth, conducted by G.W.A. Bush, November 19, 1968.

82. New Zealand Herald, October 8, 1965.

83. *ibid.* September 18, 1965.

84. Auckland City Council results in Appendix A, p.304.

	Ponsonby/ Herne Bay	Westmere/ Grey Lynn	Point Chevalier	Tamaki ⁸⁵ (Glen Innes)
Robinson 1962	2,137	1,952	1,517	1,276
Faber 1962	1,428	972	881	692

These majorities were enough for Robinson to offset the smaller Citizens' and Ratepayers' majorities in the Eastern Suburbs and win the mayoralty.

When Forsyth led the Labour Party into the local body political Establishment feud with Robinson, he changed all that. Enough Labour voters either preferred to vote for a party candidate rather than one who supported some Labour policies, or they shared those unsympathetic attitudes Forsyth had about Robinson's self promotion and style. The effect was to split Robinson's vote in the Western Suburbs and Glen Innes where he needed to retain the sorts of majorities he had gained in 1959 and 1962. Robinson trailed McElroy's 17,132 votes by just over a thousand at 15,973. Robinson's 1962 vote was down about 3,000 and the size of Forsyth's was 3,373.⁸⁶ In Glen Innes and the Western Suburbs it was clear how Forsyth's candidacy had eroded Robinson's previous wins there, as the following table illustrates.⁸⁷

85. The Council polling booths labelled "Tamaki" do not include the wealthy areas of Kohimarama, Mission Bay and St Heliers, that are in the Takami parliamentary electorate.

86. Auckland City Council results, Appendix A. p.304.

87. *ibid.*

	Ponsonby/ Herne Bay	Westmere/ Grey Lynn	Point Chevalier	Tamaki (Glen Innes)
Robinson 1962	2,137	1,952	1,517	1,276
Robinson 1965	1,684	1,503	1,302	957
Forsyth 1965	429	465	366	257

This same vote splitting effect would have happened in 1962 because a similar Labour vote would have reduced Robinson's lead over Faber. However in 1962 while the Citizens and Ratepayers - Robinson feud was intense, the Labour-Robinson animosity was in its initial stages. In 1962 it was strong enough for a few Labour protagonists to personally endorse Faber, but by 1965 these people were strong enough to commit the party to run a Labour mayoral candidate. The Citizens' and Ratepayers' feud, compounded by the Labour entry, cost Robinson the mayoralty in 1965.

CHAPTER 7RAPID RAIL AND MORPHOLOGICAL FUNDAMENTALISM 1968-1973

The hiatus in Robinson's political career continued for three years during which he was excluded from real influence on the Auckland Regional Authority. But in 1968 voters in traditional Citizens' and Ratepayers' enclaves joined those in Labour areas in giving Robinson a considerable mandate. He beat McElroy who sought re-election by 6000 votes.¹

The victory marked a turning point in Robinson's relations with the Citizens' and Ratepayers' Association. The memory of the drainage controversy had eased and Robinson's position was seen by an increasingly new group of Citizens' and Ratepayers' people as a considerable accomplishment. They also valued Robinson's ability as mayor unlike their predecessors whose prejudices had prevented them from doing so.² Robinson's populism, which had become such a double-edged sword during his first two terms, mellowed and there was an accommodation between him and his former foes. In 1971 and 1974 they chose not to run a candidate against him and as the feuding dissipated, he began to feel more secure about his tenure of the mayoralty.³

With council politics more harmonious, Robinson began to put the three year exile behind him and concentrate on metropolitan matters. Where the sewerage dilemma had

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1. For Robinson's support in Citizens' and Ratepayers' enclaves see Auckland City Council election results, Appendix A, p.305.
 2. Interview with Jolyon Firth, Auckland City Councillor 1968-1983, deputy mayor 1977-1980, August 26, 1983.
 3. Interview with D.M. Robinson, March 7, 1982.

concerned him in the 1940s and 1950s and metropolitan reform in the early 1960s, it was urban transportation that now gained his attention. The effects that increasing private motor vehicle use and a declining public transportation system were having on the planning and development of the Auckland metropolis became the metropolitan issue that absorbed him most.

Under his inaugural chairmanship in 1964 the Auckland Regional Authority had assumed responsibility for the de Leuw Cather Consultancy's investigation into Auckland's transportation. The Auckland Regional Planning Authority, which was by then incorporated into the regional authority, had commissioned the Toronto based de Leuw Cather consultancy firm to design an updated transportation scheme for Greater Auckland.⁴ While the scheme included the completion of the motorway network under construction, it also proposed the construction of a separate wide gauge (4'8") electrified rapid transit line carrying a modern transit fleet from South Auckland into the Central Auckland isthmus and then running to the North Shore via an underground harbour tunnel.

The Auckland Regional Authority then commissioned the Toronto transportation consultancy to detail the rapid transit component of the scheme in a further plan. It became clear that the intent of rapid rail was to provide a quick, comfortable service that would encourage private car users back into modern public transport. Expenditure

4. de Leuw Cather Auckland Transportation Study Interim Report and de Leuw Cather Regional Transit Plan, in ARA Library, Reference No.656.

on regional roading, bus feeder services and car parking facilities would be complementary to the transit project. Bus passengers and motorists would be helped to be brought into and parked beside the rapid rail line so they could take transit over the greater part of their journey. The Auckland Regional Authority accepted and adopted the plan in 1966. It was a key plank too in Robinson's re-election platform in 1968 and the acquisition of the Rapid Transit Committee chairmanship was the first step in Robinson's campaign to remedy and reshape Auckland urban transportation. Yet by 1974, at the conclusion of Robinson's fourth term on the body and six years of rapid rail advocacy, the scheme had still not been implemented even in a modified form.

This chapter endeavours to account for Robinson's failure. In particular, it examines the contradiction between Robinson's metropolitan policies and the direct and indirect effects of morphological fundamentalism as it occurred to contain the top tier's political authority and preserve that which had been traditionally enjoyed by the lower tier municipal councils. The outcome of Robinson's renewed challenge to morphological fundamentalism is assessed.

The Auckland local bodies had accepted the Auckland Regional Authority not in ardour but as an act of political compromise to save their geographical identities from the threats of the Local Bills Committee and the Local Government Commission. Their reaction coincides with the analysis Schon presents in Beyond the Stable State:

Recognition of dynamic conservatism explodes the rational myth of intervention ... which envisages social change as a process made up of analysis of objectives, examination of alternatives and selection of the most promising routes to change. Quite apart from its questionable claims to knowledge the rational myth assumes implicitly that transformation occurs in a vacuum rather than in the plenum of self-reinforcing systems.⁵

The implication of Schon's argument is that the same self-reinforcing systems of the old structure continued into the new situation, that is, in Auckland the evolution of the Auckland Regional Authority's role and identity. This was what had happened in Winnipeg, the city whose metropolitan style of government Robinson had modelled the ARA so closely upon. A brief examination of Winnipeg's problems elucidates the potential difficulties Robinson and Auckland might expect.

The Winnipeg municipalities resented the loss of their planning powers. The Metro assumed control of all planning decisions in the metropolitan region and while the municipalities could make suggestions to the Metro, it was the only local government agency legally empowered to plan. Some municipalities, however, tried to thwart the Metro's planning decisions. They were also critical of the considerable cost of the Metro's construction programmes and this was a constant source of complaint from some municipalities. Others, however, complained that the Metro was not implementing particular projects fast enough.⁶

The City of Winnipeg which had sought fairer metropol-

5. Schon, p.59.

6. Higgins, pp.147-148 and S.G. Rich "Metropolitan Winnipeg: The First Ten Years", in R.R. Krueger and R.C. Bryfogle Urban Problems, A Canadian Reader, 1971, pp.360-363.

itan cost sharing through the amalgamation of all the Greater Winnipeg municipalities, had in fact, lost most in the transfer of power and responsibility to the top tier organisation. It became most critical of the Metro and continually objected to aspects - in particular the cost - of a number of Metro projects that directly affected it. As a result many projects like downtown redevelopment and new transportation programmes were forestalled and the City's Mayor Stephen Juba became a consistent critic of the Metro.⁷

Following the 1965 Metro Review Commission, the municipalities could appeal planning decisions to the Manitoba Municipal Board. This permitted greater conflict, while the Manitoba Provincial Government's reduced support for the Metro encouraged the latter's critics. The municipalities' open resistance of the new tier's political authority did not bring a return to their old stable state. In 1971 the Manitoba Provincial Government dissolved the Metro, replacing it with Unicity - in effect, one huge City of Winnipeg, comprising all the old municipalities and divided into fifty wards.⁸

Robinson would be brought into immediate disagreement with lower tier committees if they attempted to do what their Winnipeg counterparts had. He had been quite explicit about the autonomy vested in the ARA. During the reform process he had maintained for instance:

7. Lloyd Axworthy, "Canada: Winnipeg", in D. Rowat (ed) International Handbook of Metropolitan Reorganisation, 1980, p.35.

8. *ibid*, pp.35-36. Rich, p.370.

No machinery or organisation exists whereby this essential regional co-operation and action can be taken. The old wearisome process of negotiating, duckshoving, buckpassing and procrastination has to be gone through every time. [The ARA will be] an organisation powerful enough and farsighted enough to plan the future development of Auckland ... an organisation that at long last can and will speak with one voice for Auckland.⁹

But there were people who had opposing viewpoints. They were prepared to question the Auckland Regional Authority's policies and in doing so they were endeavouring to preserve their political autonomy within the new two tier style of local government. For instance the Mayor of Auckland City, R.G. McElroy (1965-1968) maintained that:

You could not wear two hats ... be the mayor of Auckland and a member of the Auckland Regional Authority at the same time, because the city's interests and the region's interests would at times clash. The job of the mayor was compromised by a position on the Auckland Regional Authority. The mayor when necessary had to take on the Auckland Regional Authority and impress - if possible enforce - on it the city's position on an issue.¹⁰

Later in the rapid rail campaign, events in Auckland would resemble those in Winnipeg. But during the first nine years at least of the ARA's existence, there were only separate incidents of the sort of tension that had occurred

9. D.M. Robinson, "Metropolitan Government with particular reference to the new Auckland Regional Authority" a speech to the New Zealand Institute of Public Administration, November 22, 1960, p.14. in I.A. W24/58 No.249 Pt. 2.

10. Interview with R.G. McElroy, August 19, 1982.

in Winnipeg. The outcome of this initially smooth transition period had much to do with the philosophies of the second and third ARA chairmen, H.D. Lambie, who served 1965-1968 and T.H. Pearce who served from 1968 until his premature death in 1976.¹¹ Their position is aptly summarised by a statement by Lambie to the Auckland Regional Authority Policy and Finance Committee in August 1967:

Parliament set up the Auckland Regional Authority to do things which no other Authority was capable of doing. In other words Parliament infused into the structure of Government something between central government and local government ... I have felt it imperative that the Auckland Regional Authority should create an image of co-operation and tolerance with an overriding willingness to serve rather than to control. If there was any suspicion that central government or local government would suffer as a result of Parliament creating this new creature, it could well be prevented from performing satisfactorily.¹²

Much the same tolerance had developed between the Metro and municipalities under the inaugural chairman of the Toronto Metro, Frederick Gardiner. He has been credited with the

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11. Lambie had been Chairman of the Manukau County Council, Mayor when the County became Manukau City in 1964, Chairman of the Regional Planning Authority that had preceded the ARA and deputy chairman of both the Establishment Committee and the inaugural ARA. Pearce was a city businessman, former All Black, Chairman of the Auckland Rugby Union, and manager of the All Black tour of South Africa in 1960. He served on the Auckland City Council 1962-1968 and came third in the poll in the 1965 municipal elections.
 12. H.D. Lambie, "Notes for the Auckland Regional Authority Policy and Finance Committee, August 28, 1967" p.1. in a file of ARA material which Mrs Lambie permitted the author to peruse at her home.

strong beginnings the Metro made in Toronto. Certainly Gardiner's personality, powers of persuasion and his political skills were of high quality, so much so that one Metro representative remarked "by the time I arrived Gardiner had been right so often there was a general inclination to go along with him."¹³ Gardiner also secured the selection of two or three compatible members to the Metro's Executive Committee and with his own vote was able to secure Executive Committee backing for most of his proposals.¹⁴ This was important because the Committee has the authority to initiate contracts and to prepare the Metro budget. "Executive recommendations are rarely overturned, particularly on financial questions where the Council [the Metro proper] can bypass an Executive Committee decision only by a two thirds majority."¹⁵

But there were other factors that were important. The Metro's evolution deserves a short examination to help elucidate the ARA's early development and to understand Lambie and Pearce's conception of the ARA and their successful advocacy of that conception. Gardiner's success in Toronto was such because most of all he pre-empted the type of defence the Winnipeg municipalities had made of their own political autonomy. He endorsed a programme of metropolitan development that emphasised the rapid establishment or expansion of basic functions - water works, sewerage

13. Colton, p.101

14. H. Kaplan, "The Policy Making Process in Metropolitan Toronto", in M.N. Danielson (ed) Metropolitan Politics 1971, pp.202-203.

15. *ibid*, p.202.

plants, school facilities and freeways - to bring about municipal support for the Metro based on tangible improvements.¹⁶ The programme emphasised basic works that the premetropolitan structure had wanted but had been unable to agree upon funding. The municipalities were encouraged then to feel their programme was being taken up by the Metro.

In pursuing this policy, Gardiner allowed the municipalities - through their appointed representatives - to preserve traditional ways of arriving at metropolitan decisions. For instance, Gardiner balanced old jealousies and rivalries inherited from the premetropolitan structure. He studiously balanced particular gains (over and above what could be considered the general metropolitan benefit of a project) made by one sector of the metropolis with projects that advantaged others. Particularly here he balanced suburban and city interests because old suburban hostility for the City of Toronto endured. For instance, when he secured approval for a limited amount of transit extension which benefitted the central city and closest suburbs most, he then successfully instituted a policy where the City would give up preferential water rates, agreed as a compromise in setting up the Metro, and which the suburban local bodies had always considered an inequity.¹⁷

Because the Metro was responsible for the allocation of all local body loan finance he allowed himself one tenth of the Metro budget for "manoeuvre". He would grant small

16. Colton, p.112.

17. *ibid*, pp.113-114.

parochial projects in districts in return for support by those representatives for his own metropolitan programme.¹⁸

As his programme suggests, Gardiner tried above all to avoid those metropolitan issues that were likely to cause deep sectional resentment. Kaplan maintains that Gardiner deliberately focused the Metro's attention on non controversial projects first - the expansion of water supply and sewage treatment plants, new roading and new schools - and tabled vexed issues like public housing, redevelopment and integrated transportation solutions. "This strategy not only meant taking the big issues one by one, but was also designed to secure municipal loyalties to the Metro system with tangible and dramatic construction projects."¹⁹ Gardiner opposed far wider Metro powers in 1955 because this would have caused division and upset the schedule of non controversial construction projects.

Under Gardiner the Metro implemented a number of major metropolitan projects and the efficiency it brought to Toronto was creditable, given the slowness and discord that had characterised metropolitan development previously. Gardiner's record on balance is more mixed however. The Metro's emergence may have been smooth, but its status as the paramount Toronto local body remained in limbo while municipal councils were encouraged to see the Metro programme as their own. Until the Metro moved away from such a bland philosophy then the municipal councils' defence of their

18. Colton, pp.112-113, 115.

19. Kaplan, p.200.

autonomy and the Metro's reaction remained untested.

T.J. Plunkett describes it like this:

The political and administrative machinery that proved so effective in dealing with concrete services such as the construction of major collector sewers, water production plants and sewerage treatment plants did not in fact for the first ten years of its existence at least, have to deal with genuine political controversy.²⁰

Gardiner stalled the evolution of a metropolitan role and identity for the Metro. He did not press the representatives from their old attitudes and by default, morphological fundamentalism was allowed to contain the change represented in the new tier. During Gardiner's term, the position of the Metro as a new distinctive form of local government was not resolved because it was not allowed to be addressed.

In Auckland a similar pattern emerged. H.D. Lambie became the Auckland Regional Authority chairman after Robinson's brief inaugural term. He had a conservative conception of the Auckland Regional Authority role and he was sensitive to the doubts local body politicians had about the authority. Lambie had taken an ambivalent view of the Auckland Regional Authority as Robinson had conceived it. He believed it politically more strategic to work also for a narrower conception, strengthening the Regional Planning Authority, that he chaired, with the powers to buy land for regional roading and regional reserves. Lambie saw his support for his own conception of the

20. Plunkett, p.23.

Auckland Regional Authority and for Robinson's Bill as complementary - if the Robinson/Establishment Committee Bill failed, then his alternative was preferable to the existing local government structure.

Lambie had also believed that the special purpose bodies were doing an efficient job on their own. F.W.O. Jones, Lambie's close friend who served as Director of Planning for the Auckland Regional Authority (1963-1974), recalled that Lambie felt the regional authority should emerge with the following "Lincolnian" philosophy:

We developed a theme on Abraham Lincoln's definition of government. The function of government is to do those things that need to be done and cannot be done at all or as well by the individual acting alone. We applied that to what was being done not by individuals but by individual local authorities. There were individual local authorities dealing with water, sewerage, transport and such things like that, but there were no authorities dealing with regional parks or co-ordinating regional roading. Looking back and following this through the right form of the authority was not a multi-purpose authority, but one that would handle functions not already performed and could have other functions added rather than taking them all in.²¹

Jones commented on the way people forgot the efficiency of existing special purpose bodies which could have been left alone, but he felt he and Lambie's view "lost out".

There was scope in this philosophy for the authority

21. Interview with F.W.O. Jones, May 27, 1982.

to take on considerable political independence by determining itself what the "individuals" could not do for themselves. Lambie did consider public transportation to be a function the existing local bodies could not administer by themselves and he supported the rapid rail scheme, as it emerged from the de Leuw Cather consultants commissioned by Robinson's Auckland Regional Authority in 1964.

However, there was a pervading belief that the ARA performed separate and particular functions for the lower tier local bodies in Lambie's philosophy, rather than a conception of the authority as a leader organisation, which espoused an integrated plan for metropolitan development. This belief may well have militated against the sort of integrated planning and administrative approach that Robinson wanted of the authority and that was essential for an integrated transportation solution. Malcolm Latham, a Director of Planning for the Auckland Regional Authority, wrote in 1977:

The [Auckland Regional Authority] Committees are strong in their loyalty to the functions with which they are entrusted, sometimes excessively so, to the detriment of the idea of integrated services.²²

Lambie confined the Rapid Rail scheme to a little known Transit Planning Committee which began meeting late in 1966 rather than using this committee as a vehicle to transmit the project to the whole Auckland Regional Authority.

22. M. Latham, "The Auckland Case Study", paper for the Symposium on Metropolitan Government Organisation and Structure in Yugoslavia, 1978, p.23.

Quite quickly the Committee ran into difficulty over important issues with the Holyoake government. The government had informed the Transit Planning Committee it was not ready to make a target starting date, but that it considered the 1980s appropriate.²³ It was not prepared to service the interest charges on the capital outlay for the scheme and the Auckland Regional Authority was not prepared to accept this financial responsibility either.²⁴ Lambie told his committee "that anything we can do to clear these [outstanding] issues should be done as rapidly as possible"²⁵ but it is apparent Lambie privately accepted Prime Minister Holyoake's position "that no promises could be given" on a starting date.²⁶ While Robinson and a more determined Lambie might have been able to accommodate one another, this was even less likely with Lambie's successor, Tom Pearce who served as Auckland Regional Authority chairman until his premature death in 1976. Pearce had an even more conservative view of Auckland Regional Authority functions and of rapid rail's place in them.

Pearce managed to integrate the different committees on the authority more effectively but his outlook on Auckland Regional Authority functions was similar to Lambie's

23. In a report of government proposals, Appendix "A" of the minutes of the Transit Planning Committee for the meeting of December 1, 1967 in the Transit Planning Committee and Rapid Transit Committee Minute Book, 1966-1973, ARA archives, (hereafter referred to as T.M.B.)

24. *ibid.*

25. In a report by the ARA Chairman to the Transit Planning Committee, Appendix 'A' of the minutes of the Transit Planning Committee for the meeting of February 2, 1968, p.3. in T.M.B.

26. Noted in a letter from P.C. Laing, Commissioner of Works to H.D. Lambie, dated August 3, 1966 in Lambie's Auckland Regional Authority file.

and close to Toronto's Gardiner. Latham maintains that under Pearce:

a benign regionalism had begun to emerge fostered by a chairman who had a strong view of the Authority as a regional body, even though its functional growth bothered him.²⁷

An inspection of the creditable and considerable achievements which Latham shows the authority made under Pearce (and Lambie) reveals not surprisingly an emphasis on projects and functions of non-controversial nature - its regional parks programme, its extension of water supply and sewerage, improved regional roading and bus services, and effective water, soil and maritime conservation planning. This is similar to the success Gardiner achieved with his authority - provision of essential and desirable metropolitan functions that the premetropolitan government wanted but had not been able to provide.

The Auckland Regional Authority leadership worked then, to reassure the membership and the lower tier local bodies that there would be no great departure from the metropolitan programme like providing regional roading, better sewerage and regional reserves which the pre-metropolitan structure had agreed upon and had struggled to achieve in its clumsy fashion before the inception of the Auckland Regional Authority. At the same time, this emphasis upon basic functions did not engender parochial jealousy among the municipalities. The ARA was likely to be seen as implementing the policies of the lower tier municipalities. The latter were being encouraged to see the ARA as

27. Latham, p.23.

an extension of their own political authority, rather than as a separate, paramount body accountable only to itself and its levied ratepayers. While the Lambie/Pearce programme continued, the ARA's role and political position were unresolved. More importantly, local body councils' political autonomy was not challenged and morphological fundamentalism was allowed to win by default. The ARA was being accommodated by those within it into the former local government system.

When Robinson was returned to influence in 1968, he came to challenge this programme of accommodation and this conception of the ARA. Once again he challenged morphological fundamentalism, though not in the direct way he had challenged local bodies to give up the defence of their political autonomy and agree to metropolitan reform. He challenged the considerable impact morphological fundamentalism had had on local body leaders' ways of thinking, in effect the way that it had encouraged Lambie and Pearce and others, to consciously and possibly unconsciously, make the ARA acceptable to the local bodies' strong views on their own political autonomy and prerogative. Robinson renewed his challenge through his rapid rail proposals.

While the old structure of local government had arrived at goals on the basis of intermunicipal consultation and in the face of a common, often dire need, the rapid rail project was quite different. According to the present District Commissioner of Works for Auckland, rapid rail "would have made Auckland the first metropolis to effectively

solve its transportation crisis before it had one."²⁸

Rapid rail was the product of a thinking and acting role for the Auckland Regional Authority that went way beyond the old process of procrastinated inter-municipal decision making and left the lower tier municipalities far behind as the origin of metropolitan policy in Auckland.

On face value, rapid rail did seem simply to aim to improve the speed and comfort of travelling on public transport. It was intended that it do so, so effectively, that people would take rapid transit instead of their cars (over most of the journey at any rate). This would have the effects of reducing petrol consumption, fumes, noise pollution, road wearage, congestion, road injuries and the attendant medical costs, thereby making the metropolis a more attractive and safer place to live. The benefits for the national economy were apparent as well.

But the scheme in fact demanded both a radical analysis of present authority transportation planning and of the loyalty built up to road transportation within the authority. That is, it questioned the objectives that the old local government structure had agreed upon - except for the funding - and were now encouraged to see promoted through a new political extension, the ARA.

Malcolm Latham noted in his contribution to the Yugoslav conference of metropolitan governments,

Transportation planning, always a strong force
in regional planning, since before the Authority's

28. Interview with M.R. Lancaster, July 10, 1987.

formation, has helped to provide Auckland with a road transport system it may not have achieved otherwise.²⁹


This was a reference to the Master Transportation Plan and the de Leuw Cather consultancy transportation scheme. The former had been blueprint for the motorway and regional roading system in Auckland while the latter endorsed this but also advocated greater public transportation by rail. The Auckland Regional Authority commissioned a further study from the de Leuw Cather firm on rapid rail. Despite the duality of the de Leuw Cather scheme it is important to realise that the Auckland Regional Authority proceeded to implement the road transportation planning while accepting in principle the concept of rapid transit. Motorways and regional roads were being built while Latham also notes the Auckland Regional Authority investment in an extensive bus service. (This was a large, long term upgrading of the fleet taken over by the Authority when the Auckland Transport Board became incorporated into the new body in the 1963 Auckland Regional Authority Act).

Because of the enormous expense of both the motorway/ regional roading scheme and the rapid rail scheme, Robinson's advocacy of the latter necessitated an analysis of the directions in transportation the Auckland Regional Authority had taken. The Auckland Regional Authority was being asked if it were sensible for the metropolis to invest so heavily in road transportation when this encouraged private motor use and its attendant effects of congestion, wearage,

29. Latham, p.17.


accidents and pollution, when it facilitated urban sprawl which impinged on the region's rural food producing areas and when it nurtured a seemingly ceaseless appetite for more and quicker roadways. Robinson's scheme proposed maintenance of the existing roading, but a shift of priority and investment into the rapid rail part of the De Leuw Cather transportation plan.

TABLE 4: Trends in Population, Traffic and Public Transport; Greater Auckland.



Source: Auckland Comprehensive Transportation Study Review: A Background Report, ARA, 1977, p.3.


Map 4: Proposed Rapid Rail Route



Source: The Report of the Rapid Transit Steering Committee, 1972.

Map 5: Motorway Construction in Greater Auckland

Source: The Report of the Rapid Transit Steering Committee, 1972.



The Manager of the Auckland Rapid Transit Project (set up by Hugh Watt in 1974) confirmed earlier predictions that Stage 1 of the scheme would save \$70 million worth of motorway construction. It delayed the need for the Avondale-Southbound route; the North Shore extension and a second harbour crossing; and a parallel route to the Auckland-Hamilton motorway on that part between Mangere and the central city - for at least 30 years.³⁰

Rapid rail was to be lifted out of de Leuw Cather Plan and given preference over expenditure on motorways, regional roading and bus transportation. This project was not one that could be scheduled amongst a number of necessary non-controversial works as the Auckland Regional Authority was operating. It represented a critique of the then directions in transportation and urban planning. By reducing its huge investment in roading and investing it in rapid rail, the Auckland Regional Authority was asked to endorse a plan to centralise urban transportation - and associated metropolitan planning - around a public not private transportation focus. It represented then a considerable departure from the goals that the pre-metropolitan local bodies had set for the metropolis and that the Auckland Regional Authority had continued actively implementing.

In 1972, the Steering Committee of government, railways and Auckland Regional Authority officials, that was set up after the Auckland Regional Authority had adopted rapid rail in principle, brought down a rapid rail plan and

30. In a copy of a letter from J.A. Mead to Chief Civil Engineer, Auckland, dated August 14, 1975 in National Archives Auckland Regional Office, 474 335 80/1 No.137.

estimates of costs and patronage. In their report the committee members argued for both the motorways/regional roads and the rapid rail projects but admitted it presented Auckland with a real dilemma - the necessity to finance two extremely expensive projects from the limited resources available.³¹

Others saw the options offered by rapid rail more clearly. The sole Auckland Regional Authority representative on the Steering Committee, E.A. Flynn, the general manager, resigned from it, bringing down a minority report of his own. In it, he expressed his reservations that rapid rail would entice people out of their cars, especially if the Auckland Regional Authority proceeded with roading objectives. The greater the expenditure on quicker roading routes Flynn believed, the less likely the movement away from cars into public transport. Flynn recognised that road transportation and the transit scheme were not complementary at all.³²

Another critic of the scheme, Brian Dudson, also saw that a decision had to be made either for road or for transit transportation. He considered the idea of funding both extensively was unrealistic. Dudson, a former planning officer of the Auckland City Council, drew the analogy of an indebted man building a house (the motorway system) and finding it too small for his growing family (the motorway system congested). Would he, Dudson asked, logically turn around and build another house (the rapid rail system)

31. Report of the Rapid Transit Steering Committee, 1972.
ARA Library, Reference No.656.3

32. Interview with E.A. Flynn, December 22, 1986.

and continue extending his first house? Would he do this when at the end of the building he would be ruinously in debt and either house would be sufficient for his needs and the other (Dudson predicted the second house, rapid rail) would be redundant?³³

George Gair, the National Member of Parliament for North Shore, and later a Minister of Transport in the Muldoon Government, was another rapid rail critic. He saw the mutual exclusiveness of rapid rail and existing Auckland Regional Authority transportation goals. He maintained:

I believe first priority must go to the completion of motorways and connecting regional roads. It is important the present network be finished before resources are siphoned off into more expensive modes of transport.³⁴

Rapid rail presented the authority with some difficult decisions. It was this sort of problem that began to trouble the Toronto Metro in the 1970s.

The Toronto Metro found that a schedule of non-controversial improvements could not continue indefinitely. Toronto's expressway construction originally supported almost universally, was to be concluded in the 1970s with the Spadina Expressway. This motorway would penetrate the central city from the northwest. Some Toronto City politicians and vocal pressure groups, composed of central city residents, opposed the project. (Some city representatives supported the expressway and roading transport

33. B. Dudson, "Transport or Status Symbol" Appendix to the Minutes of the Rapid Transit Committee for the meeting of March 5, 1973, p.14, in T.M.B., ARA archives.

34. New Zealand Herald, October 4, 1971.

generally however, as a means of bringing commuters and shoppers into the central business district). The opposition to the expressway had considerable ramifications for Metro's transportation and urban planning. The critics wanted central city residential areas saved from further motorways and the attendant traffic congestion, noise, pollution and health hazards. They wanted to preserve the quality of life and character of central city neighbourhoods. They sought to stop expressway construction because its ill effects encouraged people to move out to the suburbs, depopulated the central city and ironically created a need for more expressways. Many suburban dwellers drove into the central city for work and with an increasing exodus to the suburbs, more roadings were naturally going to be needed. A number of the expressway's opponents also favoured investment in public transportation to get commuters (and their cars) off expressways.

The resolution of these conflicting transportation goals was difficult, if possible, and although a majority on the Metro favoured the expressway, its opponents took their case as far as the Ontario Provincial Assembly which vetoed an Ontario Municipal Board decision that had approved the project. This opposition had obvious ramifications for Metro's noncontroversial political role, and its likely retention of lower tier political support.

Issues like transportation, the siting of public housing and the type of housing, (given the effect of high density housing on the character, tranquility and traffic patterns of existing neighbourhoods) all put considerable

strain on the Metro's decision making processes, on its political reputation and on its acceptability to some members and their municipal constituents.

The effect of these new issues was in sharp contrast to the days of following out a simple agenda of basic works like building sewers, waterworks and schools. T.J. Plunkett writes that:

The emergence of these issues has brought into question the metropolitan structure's ability to give genuine political expression to conflicts that inevitably emerge and to provide the political accommodation that results in decisions that have reasonably wide support.³⁵

In Auckland Robinson had precipitated the sort of difficult issue that came to vex the Toronto Metro. He effectively challenged that conception of the ARA that would accommodate the top tier authority into the previous local government structure, and that situation which allowed the ARA to become an extension of borough authority effectively allowing morphological fundamentalism - the jealous defence of local body political autonomy - to succeed in the new local government structure without having to exert itself. The evidence suggests the authority leadership - Chairman Tom Pearce and lesser figures Transport Committee Chairman John Allsopp-Smith and General Manager E.A. Flynn - recognised the challenge and wanted a harmonious resolution to the issue. Sensing that this was unlikely because

35. Plunkett, p.11. Professor Plunkett outlined some of the transportation developments in a letter to the author, dated November 4, 1983. In his letter he also referred to Magnusson and Warren's "Toronto" in Magnusson et al (eds) City Politics in Canada, 1983, pp.115-116.

rapid rail was not compatible with their conception of the Auckland Regional Authority, but rather with a more dynamic one, they instead acted to meet the challenge by stalling any early resolution of the issue and undermining Robinson in the hope that the scheme would die a death of attrition. When a political accommodation that would result in reasonably wide support emerged on the issue, they eagerly accepted it.

What statements Pearce did make about rapid rail's position in the ARA objectives must serve as the basis to determine his position. This is not so easily done. At the closing stages of the rapid rail campaign, Robinson said that:

The Chairman of the Authority has made so many statements varying from lack of enthusiasm to fullest support [for rapid rail] that no-one knows exactly where he stands on the matter.³⁶

Pearce probably best concluded his position on rapid rail when he said in July 1973, "he had never been known as a great advocate of rapid rail."³⁷ He had occasionally

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36. D.M. Robinson, "Notes for Opposing Recommendation One (disbandment of Rapid Transit Committee) of Item 12 at Policy and Finance Committee and Moving Amendment for ARA meeting at August 20, 1973", p.l. in Robinson's 1973 Rapid Rail Reports File. It is difficult to be certain about Pearce or Allsopp-Smith's position on rapid rail. Pearce died in 1976 and this research has not unearthed any Pearce papers. Allsopp-Smith has declined to answer letters, including registered ones, soliciting interviews and answers to questions about his and Pearce's attitudes on rapid rail. Flynn did consent - hesitatingly - to an interview, but it proved a fairly circumspect affair.
37. Auckland Star, July 31, 1973.

seemed to vigorously endorse the scheme. In the approach to the 1971 local body elections he said he supported the scheme, but the fact that he made the press statement to clarify doubts the electorate might have about his attitude to rapid rail says just as much about his position.³⁸ In June 1969, he had written to the Minister of Finance, R.D. Muldoon asking for an urgent decision on financing the scheme, "the cornerstone" to other transportation decisions the Auckland Regional Authority needed to make.³⁹ In retrospect it is worth imagining that on this occasion, Pearce had acted as Robinson had asked him to. For despite his imploring for an urgent decision, no further correspondence exists in the Rapid Transit Committee Minute Book between Pearce and the National Government Ministers on rapid rail funding.

Indeed this same Pearce declined to pressure the government during the 1969 and 1972 elections and the 1971 municipal elections for a commitment to the scheme. He told a press conference in 1969 that "there was no desire on the part of the authority to pressure the Government into a final decision before the election."⁴⁰ Robinson reluctantly agreed and said "the authority was bound by Mr Pearce's commitment not to embarrass the Government before the election."⁴¹ Pearce agreed that the Labour promise to fund the scheme was "much more in line with the authority's

38. Auckland Star, October 19, 1971.

39. In a letter from T. Pearce to R.D. Muldoon dated June 17, 1969, Appendix B to the Minutes of the Rapid Transit Committee for the meeting of July 15, 1969, in T.M.B.

40. Auckland Star, September 11, 1969.

41. *ibid*, November 12, 1969.

thinking",⁴² but when the National Party was returned in 1969 Pearce said he would not pressure them at the time of the 1971 local body elections for a decision. This was five years after a National Government had agreed in principle to rapid rail. He was not going "to stampede the government" Pearce said, "there would be no pressure until the technical report on the scheme was available."⁴³ As well as these means of prolonging transit decisions Pearce also encouraged the important transit planning to be confined to a special investigative committee which Robinson had no authority over, and indeed little access to.

Pearce had agreed to the establishment of a Steering Committee of government, railways and Auckland Regional Authority officers. The committee, proposed by the Minister of Transport, was to write a report detailing the likely route, gauge, costs and patronage of the rapid transit scheme. Robinson was not a member of this committee. The Auckland Regional Authority was represented by its general manager, E.A. Flynn. He made progress reports to Robinson's Rapid Transit Committee but otherwise this division of responsibility left the mayor "completely in the dark".⁴⁴

The Steering Committee took from 1969 to 1972 to bring down its report. Flynn was having real difficulties with his brief. He believed that because of Aucklanders' preferences to move by car, the scheme was not feasible. He admits he "chain-dragged" because he could not resolve

42. Auckland Star, November 4, 1969.

43. *ibid.* October 6, 1971.

44. *ibid.* September 29, 1971.

his position with the majority on the Steering Committee. Finally he submitted his own confidential minority report. In an interview with the author he spoke of the reservations he described in his report - rapid rail would not be economically viable until the roads were sufficiently congested to attract people into public transport. The more money that was spent on roading the less likely this was. He also considered public transport in a decentralised metropolis of Auckland's population size "a money loser", and until patronage was increasing on buses (and it had been shrinking since the last war) then it was not an appropriate time to invest heavily in public transport extension.⁴⁵

Robinson became increasingly frustrated with the slowness of the Steering Committee's deliberations and finally he grew so impatient that he moved that he would bring down a motion of no confidence in the general manager. Flynn responded angrily, telling the Minister of Transport:

I am unable to agree fully with the majority view of the [Steering] Committee and in view of the personal attacks and threats being made I feel myself in an impossible position as Chairman.⁴⁶

Flynn resigned as Chairman of the Steering Committee and brought down his minority report against the Committee's findings. At that time he also retired from the Auckland Regional Authority. He later joined a private lobby group

45. Interview with E.A. Flynn, December 22, 1986.

46. Copy of a letter from E.A. Flynn to P.B. Allen, dated July 18, 1972 in Robinson's Rapid Rail Correspondence File (hereafter referred to as R.R.R.C.F.), January-December, 1972.

which, as will be seen, canvassed local body opinion on the merits of an all road/bus system for Greater Auckland.

Robinson had been impeded by the slow publication of the Steering Committee report. He could not negotiate in detail without it and as Pearce had said there was little point in negotiations at the time of the 1971 municipal elections without it. Flynn had said, "coincidentally" he put it, that "the report would not be available till just after the 1971 elections."⁴⁷


The General Manager's personal opinion tied in with the road transportation policies of the premetropolitan Auckland local bodies effectively taken over by the authority, and indeed his own because his professional experience had been with road engineering. Despite his personal position, he believed the project and the decision to proceed with it or not was a political one.⁴⁸ Pearce's actions indicate he did not consider the Auckland Regional Authority was ready to make that sort of political decision.

There is no evidence Pearce did anything to speed the report's publication or Flynn's departure from the Steering Committee, where the General Manager's own reservations were delaying its work. Asked if Pearce had been sympathetic to Flynn's difficulties on the Steering Committee and his final position on rapid rail, Flynn preferred to answer indirectly. The Chairman of the ARA and the Chairman of the Transport Committee had not thought so poorly of his

47. Auckland Star, September 29, 1971.

48. Interview with E.A. Flynn, December 22, 1986.

work in this area that they did not give effusive speeches of tribute at his retirement. At a different point in the interview Flynn also mentioned how he and Pearce had only had two policy disagreements and these over the appointments of particular persons to the authority staff.⁴⁹



"DO WE BURY WHAT WE'VE GOT OR MAKE A CASE FOR IT?"

Source: Auckland Star, July 20, 1972.

Robinson found no ally in the Auckland Regional Authority Transport Committee Chairman, John Allsopp-Smith. His committee continued its administration of the Auckland Regional Authority bus services, separate from the work Robinson was doing on the Rapid Transit Committee, and the

49. Interview with A.E. Flynn, December 22, 1986.

work of the Steering Committee. Through 1968-1972 period, the Transport Committee's only real involvement in rapid transit was to adopt Robinson's report that the capital charges must be serviced by the government. Later Robinson indicated Allsopp-Smith took a more supportive role towards Pearce's position. The mayor notes in a letter to Watt, the Minister of Works:

You may be aware that Tom Pearce has been unco-operative lately. I am sure that he is being egged on by John Allsopp-Smith who is a dyed-in-the-wool bus man, and I fear secretly anti-rail.⁵⁰

One of the significant points here is that Allsopp-Smith's position still had to be guessed at. Here was the chairman of the Transport Committee whose task it was, if he did not agree with rapid rail, to articulate a comprehensive public transport programme of his own. Allsopp-Smith came to the Auckland Regional Authority from the Auckland Transport Board which had run a loss making bus service through part of the metropolis prior to the Auckland Regional Authority's establishment. The Transport Board had wanted to remain outside the regional body but was incorporated into it by the Local Bills Committee. Allsopp-Smith was (and remains) a strangely silent figure throughout the rapid rail years with the exception at one point of lamenting all the "crackpots" proposing different schemes to the Transport Committee.⁵¹ He wanted a resolution of the issue he said, but he had done nothing to expedite

50. In a letter from D.M. Robinson to H. Watt, dated June 11, 1973 in R.R.R.C.F., June-December 1973.

51. New Zealand Herald, March 6, 1973.

it himself by pressing the Authority to endorse and act on whatever transportation plan he wanted. His previous local body experience and his gradualist actions to build up what has become an extensive modern authority bus fleet suggest he was uncomfortable in his wider role and as a result of its complexity, equally unsure of rapid rail. There is no evidence that he resisted the actions of Pearce and Flynn in extending the rapid rail issue's resolution.


In a parallel arena, Allsopp-Smith and Pearce indicated again their willingness to decelerate progress on rapid rail negotiations and planning. This time Robinson gave them an opportunity to do so. Initially Robinson did not wait for the Steering Committee Report to be completed before he himself began negotiations with government ministers on rapid rail funding. Possibly he did not anticipate it would be three years before the report would be complete, and at any rate, he wanted an early indication whether the government position had changed from the period when Lambie had negotiated with the government over a starting date and costs.

In 1969 Robinson was informed by Finance Minister, Robert Muldoon,⁵² that the government would not be prepared to service the interest on the capital costs of the rapid rail scheme and that the Auckland local bodies would have to do so.⁵³

52. R.D. Muldoon served in the Holyoake/Marshall governments in that capacity 1967-1972. He succeeded Marshall as leader of the National Party in 1974 and was Prime Minister of New Zealand from 1975 until July 1984.

53. Interview with D.M. Robinson, August 22, 1982.

TABLE 5: Public Transport Patronage Trends in Greater Auckland.



Source: Auckland Comprehensive Transportation Study Review: A Background Report, ARA, 1977, p.39.

The ARA provides a widespread, modern bus system that has also compensated for declining private bus services as well as making modest increases in patronage. It has not however, succeeded yet in bringing the large proportion of car users out of their vehicles into public transport.

Robinson was angered. He made a speech at a Rotary Club function criticising the Auckland politicians whom he believed had refused to give sufficient support to the rapid rail project. Afterwards Robinson maintained that he was criticising Auckland local body politicians which was partly true. He was impeded by the Auckland Regional Authority's inability to take a decisive course on his bold plan and its inability to lobby the government for funds as he had hoped it would. But he must have also meant Auckland M.P.s because he had made the remark that the only man to enter Parliament with honest intentions was Guy Fawkes.⁵⁴

Robinson's speech drew an angry response from parliamentarians. A group of them wrote a letter threatening legal action while there was talk of bringing him before the bar of the House to apologise for his remarks. Robinson gained a retraction from the editor of the paper that had printed the statements he had made, but as suitable punishment the three Ministers associated with the rapid rail negotiations - Muldoon, P.B. Allen, the Minister of Works and P.T. Gordon, the Minister of Transport, refused to have any more dealings with Robinson or his project. "Robinson's remarks were so extravagant and insulting that it was no wonder the Cabinet Ministers took the action they did", Muldoon maintains.⁵⁵

Given this rebuff, Pearce and Allsopp-Smith assumed

54. Interview with D.M. Robinson, August 22, 1982.

55. In a letter from R.D. Muldoon to the author, dated January 30, 1987.

responsibility for the negotiations.⁵⁶ They took this opportunity - that Robinson's tactlessness had offered them - to consolidate their deviation of Robinson's rapid rail advocacy. Nothing of substance transpired between April 1970 and March 1972 when Robinson wrote to the new Prime Minister, John Marshall, who made a concilliatory gesture and Robinson was returned to favour.⁵⁷ But he was still without the Steering Committee report to negotiate with.

Even after the crucial Steering Committee report's publication, the chairman continued to undermine Robinson. In October 1972, Pearce agreed with Finance Minister Muldoon that financing the rapid rail scheme should not become an election issue. In the presence of the Minister and Robinson, Pearce said "there will be no pressure on the Government. We are too genteel for that" (laughter).⁵⁸

By the end of 1972, it was evident that at the very least, Pearce, Allsopp-Smith and Flynn had acted in such an indecisive fashion over rapid rail that they were themselves unhappy about the complexities and difficulties inherent in the project. After three years Flynn had finally made up his mind, issuing a report against rapid rail. He then left the authority. But the actions of the three men during the 1968-1972 period suggest something

56. Interview with D.M. Robinson, August 22, 1982. Also in a letter from D.M. Robinson to J. Marshall, dated March 27, 1972 in R.R.R.C.F. January-December, 1972.

57. *ibid.* John Marshall was deputy Prime Minister in the Holyoake National government and assumed the Prime Ministership in 1971. He lost that office in the 1972 general election.

58. New Zealand Herald, October 6, 1972.



Robinson (right) and ARA Chairman Tom Pearce seen perusing the Report of the Rapid Transit Steering Committee. Pearce did not share Robinson's enthusiasm for the report's proposals.

(With an acknowledgement to the New Zealand Herald)

stronger. They were nervous of the challenge such a scheme posed their own philosophy - confining the Auckland Regional Authority's energies to projects that caused them, their membership and the lower tier municipalities little discomfort. Rapid rail would mark a move away from these bland metropolitan objectives. Their actions - Flynn's "chain dragging" over the Steering Committee's report, Pearce's failure to speed the report's presentation, Pearce and Allsopp-Smith's failure to negotiate when Robinson was quarantined by three government ministers, and their continued extensions of the negotiation period with the government - suggest that they were in fact prepared to deliberately shield the Auckland Regional Authority from this vexed issue and keep the body's attention set on a course of what Latham calls "benign regionalism".

The pervasive nature of this philosophy amongst the Auckland Regional Authority membership began to show as well. When the Auckland Regional Authority was established, there was no guarantee that members would not bring their own interests in the welfare of their particular municipality to the Auckland Regional Authority. The likelihood of parochial interests influencing members' regional outlooks was considerable. In Toronto for instance, Gardiner had tried to balance metropolitan projects that had advantages for the central city with those that favoured the suburban areas. But after Gardiner's chairmanship this became more difficult and voting took on a sectional nature. As T.J. Plunkett explains:

It will be noted from this table of municipal populations that the City of Toronto now has about 29% of Metro's total population and just over 30% of the total members of Metro Council. And of those issues supported strongly by the suburbs and opposed by the City the latter has little chance. This does not mean that every issue necessarily breaks down into a suburban vs. city conflict, but some of the major issues do, particularly in transportation, planning and development.⁵⁹

Earlier in the Metro history Gardiner had contained this factionalism by his balancing act, but most of all because his programme stressed necessary works like sewerage and water supply, which were of even benefit.

The same containment of sectional jealousies was evident on the Auckland Regional Authority. Even rapid rail did not become a confrontation between those municipalities on the transit line and those not. For instance, there was no obvious Auckland City lobby for the project with the exception of Robinson. Pearce was an Auckland City ward representative, but he was certainly not actively supporting the project. He wanted to avoid that sort of divisiveness and being an Auckland City chairman it is worth supposing he was more sensitive to the potential of an Auckland City backlash than others. The majority of the Auckland Regional Authority membership appear to have accepted the directions Lambie and Pearce had developed.

As Malcolm Latham noted:

the early expansionist ideals led through to a period from the late 1960s to 1977 when it

59. In a letter from T.J. Plunkett to the author, dated November 4, 1983.

was hard to define where a member came from by hearing the debates.⁶⁰

The Lambie/Pearce conception of the ARA was favoured by a majority of the membership then. An ARA member for North Shore, John Morton⁶¹ who supported rapid rail writes:

My assessment of it [rapid rail's] failure was that there was no prominent ARA figure actually opposed to it, from reasoned arguments. It was rather that there weren't enough Aucklanders or members of the ARA prepared to give the needed backing to Dove-Myer Robinson's staunch and imaginative advocacy.⁶²

The conception of the body accepted by the Auckland Regional Authority membership and encouraged by the Auckland Regional Authority leadership, was allowing morphological fundamentalism to succeed by default. The municipalities' political autonomy was being preserved because the Auckland Regional Authority was prepared to forgo the opportunity of becoming an independent political regime, which made decisions and then superimposed those on the municipal councils. Instead it preferred to implement the councils' old objectives - establishment and improvement of basic metropolitan works. This indirect form of accommodation of the Auckland Regional Authority into the previous local government

60. Latham, p.23.

61. Robinson's chief converts were John Morton member for North Shore, E.A.J. Holdaway member for Northcote, Assid Corban member for Henderson and Brian Berg, member for Waitakere and deputy chairman of the Rapid Transit Committee. There was no co-ordination amongst them. Berg was the only permanent member of the Rapid Transit Committee.

62. In a letter from J. Morton to the author, dated December 19, 1986.

structure might have continued had Robinson been prepared to give up his challenge.

But in 1972 he ignored Pearce's position that rapid rail would not be made an election issue. Immediately after Pearce told Muldoon the ARA were "too genteel" to press the government for a commitment, Robinson told the same press briefing he wanted a commitment from the government. His dictum on the 1968-1972 period was that "the [rapid rail] issue had received scant attention from the Government"⁶³ and this time he broke ranks with Pearce, writing to Hugh Watt and Norman Kirk asking that they promise again to fund the capital charges of the rapid rail if elected in November 1972:

This is a wonderful opportunity [he wrote] for you to repeat the Labour Party promise to provide Auckland with a rapid rail and not expect Auckland ratepayers to pay for the cost of providing it, but only the cost of operating it and [rolling stock] replacements.⁶⁴

Robinson then wrote to all candidates in the forthcoming elections asking them to indicate whether they and their party were prepared to support the rapid rail project. Pearce was furious and letters crossed between Robinson and the chairman. Robinson acknowledged that "you have made your position quite clear - rapid rail should not become an election issue, but I have also made it clear that I do not agree with your point of view". Robinson

63. Auckland Star, September 6, 1972.

64. In a letter from D.M. Robinson to H. Watt, dated October 21 1972, in R.R.R.C.F. January-December 1972.

maintained:

Of course, members of the present government are naturally anxious to avoid making any commitments but it is our responsibility as members of the Regional Authority representing the interests of Auckland to make it an issue. [his emphasis]⁶⁵

Robinson continued campaigning for the Labour position, while on the authority at least Pearce retained his dominance of the issue. The press noted:

Sir Dove-Myer's criticism has been toned down and most of the statements on rapid transit are conciliatory and now coming from the Auckland Regional Authority chairman, Mr T.H. Pearce."⁶⁶

Up till this point, Robinson had challenged the ARA leadership and membership who had acted to make the ARA acceptable to the previous local government structure. Up till then, ARA policy had accorded with the objectives the pre-metropolitan structure had set for itself and the ARA was developing as an extension of municipal local bodies' political authority. There was no particular incentive for local bodies to defend their political autonomy in the post-reform structure because very little intrusion had been made on it.

Robinson was not prepared to allow morphological fundamentalism to win by default, and seemed to have succeeded when the Labour Party promised rapid rail, if elected.

65. In a letter from D.M. Robinson to T.H. Pearce, dated November 13, 1972 in R.R.R.C.F. January-December 1972.

66. New Zealand Herald, October 6, 1972.

But when the Labour Party became the government in 1972, some of the municipalities perceived the ARA now successfully on a course away from basic metropolitan objectives, and they began to question the project.

They had three main criticisms of the scheme. First, some considered rapid transit, especially if it were not a proper wide gauge transit track, would run at a loss and municipalities would have to make an increased transport levy on their ratepayers on the Auckland Regional Authority's behalf. Second, some considered rapid rail disproportionately favoured Auckland City and its central business district to the disadvantage of suburban shopping complexes in outer municipalities like Manukau City. Third, some considered the construction of the rapid rail line would be disruptive to peaceful borough life.

Fred Thomas, Mayor of Takapuna, was the most vocal critic of rapid rail and unlike some of his counterparts, had been for some time. As early as October 1969, he had written to the Rapid Transit Committee:

I support 100% the upgrading of the existing rail system and believe this to be a Government responsibility. However the more grandiose scheme, rapid rail, needs further careful study.⁶⁷

In November 1972 he alleged that:

All the rapid rail systems that have been

67. In a letter from F. Thomas to D.M. Robinson, Appendix C of the minutes for the Rapid Transit Committee for the meeting of April 1, 1969, in T.M.B. Thomas served as the Mayor of Takapuna 1968-1983 and as Chairman of the ARA 1983-1986.

mentioned in support of the Auckland case for rapid transit system by the Mayor of Auckland, Sir Dove-Myer Robinson, were running at a loss.⁶⁸

Thomas believed that an express bus system, which had right of way lanes on regional roads, was a cheaper alternative and more applicable to the sprawling Auckland metropolis. Most of all he maintained heavy investment in public transport was not wise. "Patronage on all public transport, including rapid rail systems, was diminishing all over the world", he warned one meeting of North Shore residents.⁶⁹ The Mayor of Ellerslie, A.T. Bell, feared operating losses if there was no "firm promise" on the gauge, that is, a proper wide gauge for speedy transit traffic.⁷⁰

L. Witten, a Manukau City Councillor, was probably the most outspoken rapid rail critic in south Auckland. He was concerned at the gains that Auckland City would make out of rapid rail. He maintained:

by expanding this very large sum of money to take people to the Auckland [City] Central Business District, we are going to have a lot of private capital and public investment and further employment concentrated in the Central Business District, forcing more and more people to travel long distances.⁷¹

while his council colleague, Pearl Baker argued "the main purpose of rapid rail is to take people out of the suburbs and bring them for shopping, into Auckland City."⁷²

68. New Zealand Herald, November 26, 1972.

69. *ibid*, March 29, 1973.

70. *ibid*, December 13, 1973.

71. South Auckland Courier, April 4, 1973.

72. *ibid*.

A majority of the Manukau City Council disagreed with these councillors and agreed to support rapid rail. However sectional interests were evident in the council's decision. It supported rapid rail on the condition that Manukau City was to be served by a station at Wiri.⁷³ The Wiri station was not part of the Steering Committee's proposals.

The South Auckland critics of rapid rail were joined by a New Lynn borough councillor, G.A. Hill, who maintained that "it is obvious that the Mayor of Auckland, Sir Dove-Myer Robinson, wants to bring shopping traffic into downtown Auckland."⁷⁴ The Mayor of Mount Eden, R.C. Mills, also said rapid rail was designed "to send everything into Queen Street, this is the area of benefit - it should pay."⁷⁵

Although the ARA had made so little claim on local body autonomy, it was not, in fact, the first time the municipalities had defended their own political autonomy against Auckland Regional Authority decisions. Lambie had already set a precedent in his term as ARA Chairman that other lower tier bodies could emulate in defending their political autonomy, as they would in the rapid rail events. Lambie's chief municipal antagonist had been the Mayor of Auckland City, R.G. McElroy, who had defeated Robinson in 1965. McElroy had never accepted the need for the Auckland Regional Authority as conceived by the Robinson bill and still does not today.⁷⁶ With N.B. Spencer he

73. South Auckland Courier, April 4, 1973.

74. Auckland Star, February 2, 1973.

75. *ibid.*

76. Interview with R.G. McElroy, August 19, 1982.

had co-sponsored the rival bill that the special purpose authorities had supported. It would have strengthened the then existing Auckland Regional Planning Authority by giving it powers to buy land for regional roading and reserves.

During McElroy's term as mayor, he took the position that he could not serve both the interests of his own municipality and those of the Auckland Regional Authority because they could, potentially, be contradictory. Additionally however, McElroy also believed that the municipal officeholder should strenuously oppose Auckland Regional Authority policy that detrimentally affected his local body.

There had been difficulties between McElroy and the Auckland Regional Authority for most of his term. Lambie for instance, remarked in a letter:

I have been greatly saddened and disturbed during much of the past year as a result of the consistent rumour that there is a feud between the Town Hall and the Regional Authority and more particularly between Mayor and Chairman.⁷⁷

Lambie offered to act with "the active co-operation of every agent responsible for Auckland's growth and development." This appeal did not bring McElroy's co-operation. In May 1968, the mayor demanded that his council receive a guarantee that the Auckland Regional Authority transport levy would be postponed until that division's finances had been

77. In a letter from H.D. Lambie to R.G. McElroy dated January 28, 1967 in Lambie's Auckland Regional Authority correspondence file.

investigated and audited. If he did not get such an assurance, he threatened to apply for a Supreme Court injunction to prevent payment. McElroy's bluff was called and the threat was dropped.

Robinson revealed to a correspondent that Auckland Regional Authority members from the Auckland City ward, for instance Tom Pearce and Ian McKinnon, were furious with McElroy and that he had heard privately their Association had threatened to drop support for the mayor and find an alternative candidate at the coming local body elections.⁷⁸ One city councillor and Auckland Regional Authority member told the press McElroy's letter to the authority "was the most ill advised irresponsible and ill judged letter that had ever been sent by the council to a responsible organisation."⁷⁹ It is worth supposing that some of this anger was triggered by the fear that McElroy's actions could precipitate an anti-Auckland City feeling on an authority trying to develop a "benign regionalism" devoid of parochial friction.

Even Robinson was surprised at the Auckland Regional Authority reaction. He wrote:

My present impression is that until a few weeks ago most members, particularly the Chairman [his emphasis] were prepared to coast along. However McElroy's threat of an injunction and the obvious attempt to wreck the Authority did get a strong reaction and for once I had the support of all members when

78. In a letter from D.M. Robinson to J. Steel dated June 13, 1968, p.2. in R.P.C.F., 1966-1968.

79. G.W.A. Bush, Decently and In Order: A Centennial History of the Auckland City Council, 1971, p.438.

I denounced his action as an election year stunt.⁸⁰

Lambie had wavered and though McElroy had been quietened, the precedent was there for a more determined mayor to follow. Shortly Henderson Borough Council would begin its own dispute with the Auckland Regional Authority on exactly the same area of discontent - the transport levy.

Lambie had on another important occasion undermined the Auckland Regional Authority's position as Auckland's "voice" and its supremacy over municipal local bodies. During preliminary negotiations on rapid rail, the government had invited the Auckland Regional Authority to meet with it and the Auckland City Council at the council offices to discuss the issue. John Steel, the first Auckland Regional Authority general manager, had objected to the venue and when he was not asked to chair the discussions, he had walked out.

Opinions differ on Steel. F.W.O. Jones, Lambie's intimate, believed Steel to be "egotistical and arrogant", a person who took insult easily and who caused unnecessary friction by his own tactlessness.⁸¹ A.R. Turner, an Auckland Regional Authority member and now a Justice of the Planning Tribunal, believed Steel to be "a first class advocate for the Auckland Regional Authority who was undermined by Lambie".⁸² Despite his brash methods, Steel was expressing a principle about the Auckland Regional

80. In a letter from D.M. Robinson to J. Steel dated June 7, 1968, p.2. in R.P.C.F., 1966-1968.

81. Interview with F.W.O. Jones, May 27, 1982.

82. Interview with A.R. Turner, August 27, 1982.

Authority's paramountcy, especially when it is considered that the Auckland City Council, under McElroy, opposed the Auckland Regional Authority project of rapid rail, yet was invited by the government to take a major part in the negotiations.⁸³ Rather than support Steel, so as to set a precedent for the Authority's position, Lambie told the Auckland Regional Authority:

I think also that we should not necessarily insist on talking only on our terms. If we do, then we run the risk of losing the initiative rather than keeping it. I believe in the present circumstances we have at least temporarily lost the initiative [for rapid rail negotiations] which has passed to the Government and to some extent the [Auckland] City Council.⁸⁴

An ambiguous element in the relationship between the top and lower tiers of Auckland's new local government structure had emerged during the Lambie term. One of the lower tier was prepared to defend his council's political prerogative and status and this had the potential to develop into a more concerted campaign by the Auckland municipalities to defend their political autonomy. After the Labour Party's victory in 1972 this happened, and Robinson was brought into conflict with resurgent morphological fundamentalism.

In December 1972, a number of local bodies demanded a further meeting with the Auckland Regional Authority over

83. Interview with R.G. McElroy, August 19, 1982.

84. H.D. Lambie "Notes for the Auckland Regional Authority Policy and Finance Committee August 28, 1967", p.2. in Lambie's Auckland Regional Authority file.

rapid rail but when Robinson fixed the date at short notice, the Mayors of Waitemata, Devonport, Birkenhead; Northcote, Takapuna, Mount Albert, Mount Eden, Newmarket, One Tree Hill, Onehunga, Howick, Mount Wellington, Otahuhu and Papatoetoe, sent Prime Minister Kirk a telegram protesting at what they considered their cavalier treatment. New Lynn went further, saying it would not support rapid rail as laid out in the Steering Committee report.⁸⁵

The Government signalled that it wanted local body agreement on the project. Takapuna's Fred Thomas called for another meeting date or he said he would arrange one of his own.⁸⁶ In fact some mayors, including Thomas, had done just that. Ten mayors met in 'secret'. Among them were the Mayors of Mount Eden, Mount Albert, Birkenhead, Northcote, Onehunga, New Lynn, One Tree Hill, Mount Wellington, Takapuna and Devonport. They telegraphed the Prime Minister asking that there be no government decision to begin the project until there had been further consultations amongst the local bodies and the Auckland Regional Authority.⁸⁷ At Pearce's bidding, Robinson offered them another meeting. Five North Shore mayors decided to boycott this meeting, where they were to hear a report from the Transit Committee, protesting again at the lack of notice given to them.⁸⁸ Pearce agreed there could be other meetings and agreed that rapid rail could not be implemented without the agreement


85. These municipalities' positions in a letter from F. Thomas to D.M. Robinson, dated December 8, 1972 in R.R.R.C.F. January-December 1972.

86. Auckland Star, December 12, 1972.

87. *ibid*, December, 8, 1972.

88. New Zealand Herald, December 11, 1972.

of the municipal local bodies.⁸⁹ This was a different philosophy from Robinson, who believed the Auckland Regional Authority must work in the interests of the region, and over the opinion of individual municipalities if necessary. Rapid rail events were becoming a watershed for morphological fundamentalists in Auckland local government. The municipalities were acting to protect their own political autonomy by openly disputing Auckland Regional Authority policy.



Ten little Parish Pumps, standing on a line . . .

Source: New Zealand Herald, December 12, 1972.

Robinson continued to challenge the local bodies' renewed defence of their political authority. It is worth supposing that Robinson had deliberately scheduled the first meeting at short notice, and of the next one, he

89. Auckland Star, December 11, 1972.

maintained it was an opportunity for local body councils to hear about the project, but not to question its legitimacy. Robinson said:

they [the mayors] want the Auckland Regional Authority to abrogate all responsibility in making decisions on rapid transit. They want to make a cockfight for all the local bodies of Auckland.⁹⁰

There were a few others who felt the same way and challenged the borough councils' morphological fundamentalism, while both metropolitan papers deplored this resurgent disunity - a traditional characteristic of Auckland local government, perpetuated the municipalities' efforts to make the Auckland Regional Authority amenable to their own thinking.

The New Zealand Herald, went so far as to call for the amalgamation of the municipalities into four cities to silence their efforts.

Everyone suffers, [the editor opined], when a lot of local fragments go their own ways and fail to see the wider interest. The sooner parochialism is wiped out the better.⁹¹

John Morton, an Auckland Regional Authority member for North Shore also advised the Rapid Transit Committee:

if we are to plan and govern the region in a regional way, we should be growing out of this chronic nervousness of the [other] local bodies.⁹²

However, Robinson's remarks about the ARA's and municipal councils' posture did not go undefended by the latter.

90. New Zealand Herald, December 11, 1972.

91. *ibid.* December 18, 1972.

92. J. Morton, "Paying for Public Passenger Transport" Appendix 13 of the minutes of Rapid Transit Committee for the meeting of December 5, 1972, p.2. in T.M.B.



CHRISTMAS DAY IN THE AUCK HOUSE

Source: New Zealand Herald, December 21, 1972.

The Mayor of New Lynn commented, "We've had a bit of a gutsful of Robbie's intolerance of anybody opposed to his schemes. Somebody's got to stand up to him."⁹³ Robinson kept up his struggle against the local bodies renewed morphological fundamentalism and at a meeting, that he and Pearce called at Prime Minister Kirk's suggestion, he successfully argued for rapid rail and a supportive concensus by the councils. 22 municipalities agreed to the rapid rail proposals, four did not. But Robinson's dominance in the ARA arena was not matched outside where discordant

93. New Zealand Herald, December 20, 1972.

opinions were again heard. From this point, local bodies became increasingly successful in the defence of their political autonomy. Some local body members, for instance, joined a private lobby group which promoted an all bus solution to the metropolis' transportation needs. Co-chairman was Thomas, and other members were Councillor Witten of Manukau, Onehunga's Mayor T.V.G. Beeson, New Lynn's Deputy Mayor V. Watson,⁹⁴ and E.A. Flynn, lately General Manager of the Auckland Regional Authority, who addressed some of their meetings.⁹⁵ Part of their aims were:

To ensure that all local authorities are consulted in relation to planning matters affecting their areas in any public transport scheme adopted for Auckland and that due note is taken of their opinions.⁹⁶

Robinson was embarrassed and thwarted by the resurgent morphological fundamentalism. The Action Committee also indicated its intention to see the Prime Minister and also arranged public meetings to air their opposition to rapid rail. At one public meeting where the lobby group and the Auckland Regional Authority were represented, J.N. Kirk, a Waitemata County Councillor and member of the Auckland Harbour Bridge Authority, argued for limiting rapid rail to the inner city and spending the rest of the money on roading/bus/ferry proposals for the rest of the metropolis.⁹⁷

94. City and West End News, February 28, 1973.

95. For instance, New Zealand Herald, February 23, 1973.

96. In a coupon style letter from Auckland Public Transport Action Committee, dated March 30, 1973 in Robinson's 1973 Rapid Rail Reports File.

97. Auckland Star, March 29, 1973.

The integrated nature of rapid rail was being undermined. Kirk's Harbour Bridge Authority had begun a study on the feasibility of a second harbour bridge to solve transport problems. This body was a remnant from the special purpose bodies who had fought to be excluded from the Auckland Regional Authority Bill. Its autonomous existence was an anomalous legacy of morphological fundamentalism - the bridge was an intimate part of the regional roading network that the Auckland Regional Authority was in charge of. The body was now trying to ensure its longevity by promoting a second bridge that it wanted to run. Its study was in direct contradiction to Robinson's rapid rail that depended on a tunnel crossing for transit traffic to the City and the Shore.

Robinson was angry at this further challenge from a partner in the old local government structure and he endeavoured to prevent its political involvement in metropolitan decision making. Ultimately he lost patience and wrote to the Minister of Local Government, H. May, offering his own solution. He said:

... it seems to me quite clear that the Harbour Bridge Authority in spending money to investigate the route for a new harbour bridge is wasting public money and is acting ultra vires its powers.

Of course it is quite obvious that if some action is not taken to prevent this overlapping and abuse of authority, we could be presented with a fait accompli by the Harbour Bridge Authority, and this could place the Government and everybody concerned in a very embarrassing position.

At the very least, the present action of the Harbour Bridge Authority emphasises the need for it to be incorporated in the Auckland Regional Authority as soon as possible.⁹⁸

The divisive opinion emanating from Auckland on rapid rail and the Auckland Regional Authority's reluctance to stem it was a sign that Auckland local bodies morphological fundamentalism had not vanished when the Auckland Regional Authority was established in 1963. It was also a sign that Robinson's challenge to this was failing. Robinson bitterly criticised this as "the usual fragmented disruptive argumentative tactics which have been the curse of Auckland since its establishment".⁹⁹ Echoing this, the Tamaki Residents and Ratepayers' Association wrote in their annual report in 1973 that rapid rail was "an unfortunate casualty of Auckland's disunited and fragmented local government".¹⁰⁰ So entrenched were old protective instincts then, that the mayor and the Association might just as well have been talking about Auckland before metropolitan reform.

The dissent continued in a persistent fashion. Ralph Witten in Manukau began a series of articles criticising the rapid rail in the South Auckland Courier.¹⁰¹ Fred Thomas remained intransigent and his Auckland Public Transport Action Committee held meetings against the proposal and gained an audience with the Prime Minister. The New Lynn Mayor, C.J.R. McCorquindale left on an overseas trip

98. In a letter from D.M. Robinson to H. May, dated July 12, 1973, in R.R.R.C.F. June-December 1973.

99. New Zealand Herald, December 8, 1972.

100. Auckland Courier, May 23, 1973.

101. South Auckland Courier, April 4, 1973; May 30, 1973; June 13, 1973; June 20, 1973; June 27, 1973; July 4, 1973.

determined to bring back information that cast doubt on the cost effectiveness of rapid transit; the East Coast Bays Borough Council called for a further cost/benefit study of rapid rail by the Auckland Regional Authority and the Government;¹⁰² and the Harbour Bridge Authority continued its investigations into a second harbour bridge crossing, the member for Waitemata, J.N. Kirk now giving it publicity.

Pearce was tiring of the controversy rapid rail had unleashed, and the tension that it was bringing to Auckland Regional Authority-lower tier relations. The chairman was agitated by Robinson's fierce advocacy of rapid rail that characteristically intensified in the face of the municipal dissent. His irritation with Robinson and rapid rail began to show publically and Robinson's challenge was further undermined.

Pearce succumbed to North Shore protests by agreeing that "it would be relatively easy to eliminate the North Shore from Auckland's rapid transit if that's what the people there want".¹⁰³ This completely undermined Robinson's consistent position that:

Completion of Stages 1 and 2 [connecting Manurewa to the Wairau Valley in Takapuna] will form part of a comprehensive, integrated transport scheme which will relieve traffic congestion and be capable of expansion wherever and whenever required whereas a new bridge would mean re-routing much of the already built and planned motorway system and probably require additional

102. Auckland Star, April 12, 1973.

103. ibid, February 22, 1973.

motorways without in any way reducing traffic congestion on the isthmus but rather intensifying it.¹⁰⁴

Pearce also condemned Robinson's fact finding trip to North America to gather corroborative evidence of the benefits of rapid transit. Pearce called the mayor's exercise "useless".¹⁰⁵ Pearce also told the municipalities he would issue further invitations for them to discuss rapid rail proposals again.¹⁰⁶

Pearce denied Robinson the opportunity of bringing out overseas expertise to speak on behalf of rapid rail. During his May trip to North America, the Canadian Government had offered to send an expert team to New Zealand at its expense to assist rapid rail in any way it could if Robinson could persuade the New Zealand authorities to issue an invitation. This was just the sort of positive publicity that Robinson wanted for rapid rail, but Pearce was not keen. Robinson told Watt on June 11 that:

As you are probably aware, for some reason Tom Pearce has been most unco-operative lately ... for this reason I have not spoken to Tom about this renewed suggestion to you that you accept the offer from the Ontario and Canadian Governments.¹⁰⁷

While convalescing after a hip replacement operation, Robinson had Pearce meet privately in his home for two and

104. For instance in a letter from D.M. Robinson to H. Watt, dated May 10, 1973 in R.R.R.C.F. January-May 1973.

105. Undated newspaper clipping, also referred to in a letter to the editor of the Auckland Star, March 29, 1973.

106. Auckland Star, May 31, 1973.

107. In a letter from D.M. Robinson to H. Watt, dated June 11, 1973 in R.R.R.C.F. June-December 1973.

a half hours.¹⁰⁸ There was a brief gain for Robinson. Pearce sent a letter protesting at the Prime Minister's decision to hear a deputation from the Auckland Public Transport Action Committee headed by Fred Thomas. Robinson's involvement is fairly transparent. Pearce tells the Prime Minister:

May I also point out that the group which you have invited to make submissions to you have consistently opposed the scheme and to date have not accepted repeated invitations from Sir Dove-Myer Robinson ... to hear tape recordings of world authorities in the United States and Canada made in April of this year. The fact that this group has not so far shown any interest in hearing the opinions and experiences of these world authorities indicates that they are blindly opposed to the scheme.¹⁰⁹

This co-operation evaporated readily and Pearce reverted to his more characteristic attitudes to rapid rail.

Robinson later wrote to the editor of the New Zealand Herald telling him:

For your personal information ... Mr Pearce has always been a reluctant supporter of rapid transit proposals, and I have had considerable difficulty in getting him to maintain at least public support for the scheme.¹¹⁰

108. In a letter from D.M. Robinson to R. Sayers, dated July 23, 1973 in R.R.R.C.F. June-December 1973.

109. Copy of a letter from T.H. Pearce to N. Kirk, dated June 29, 1973 in R.R.R.C.F. June-December 1973.

110. In a letter from D.M. Robinson to J. Hardingham, dated August 6, 1973, in R.R.R.C.F. June-December 1973.

If the Auckland Regional Authority could not demonstrate that it was the superior Auckland local body agency, then it could not effectively lobby the government. Unchecked dissent in the lower tier together with an ineffectual regional authority, invited governments to exploit the divisiveness. On rapid rail, the Labour government proved no exception to its predecessors. This consequence had been feared as soon as the local bodies began to question the project. Robinson, for instance, had said the divisive action of the municipalities:

would give the Government a glorious opportunity, if it wished, to take advantage of it and say: "If Auckland can't make up its mind what it wants, the Government can't take any further action until it is presented with a united policy."¹¹¹

The New Zealand Herald editor echoed this, writing:

The dissident voices now heard in Auckland would give any government the chance to save its money - to shrug its shoulders and say it would listen when Auckland made its mind up, knowing full well that it would be almost permanently immune from any need to act.¹¹²

The Government itself was in fact coming to some unpopular conclusions about supporting rapid rail. The scheme was going to be expensive. It had already caused the jealousy of some other areas of the country whose disposition towards the metropolis in the North had never been sympathetic. The Mayor of Tauranga, R.A. Owens, had said

111. Auckland Star, December 8, 1972.

112. New Zealand Herald, December 18, 1972.

that "if Auckland wants its rapid rail, Auckland should pay for it."¹¹³ Robinson had replied:

Mr Owens can go jump in Tauranga Harbour.
Tell him to mind his own business. And you
can publish that. I would like Mr Owens to
tell the world ... who will benefit from the
Kaimai Tunnel and the new wharves at Tauranga.¹¹⁴

Meantime the New Zealand Railways Department and the Railways Union realised that their own interests might be disadvantaged by rapid rail. They decided to oppose rapid rail proposals if the transit scheme used a separate gauge because the existing suburban passenger service would become redundant and a railway responsibility would pass to the Auckland Regional Authority. Perversely at the same time they viewed freight traffic as "their bread and butter" and considered passenger services "something they had to put up with".¹¹⁵ They were not therefore prepared to give suburban rail the right of way on existing lines.¹¹⁶

The Labour Government decided to defer to municipal opinion, in effect passing a judgement of acceptance on the municipalities' morphological fundamentalism. It indicated that there had to be a considerable measure of unanimity amongst the Auckland local bodies and it was up to the Auckland Regional Authority to win it. Robinson wrote:

114. New Zealand Herald, September 29, 1972.

115. In an interview with M.R. Lancaster, July 10, 1987. Now District Commissioner of Works for Auckland, Lancaster was a member of the Auckland Rapid Transit Project Team set up by Watt in 1974. He maintains that railways members on the projectscheme did not subscribe to the attitudes of their parent organisation, but were loyal to the Project Team.

116. *ibid*, and for the position of New Zealand Railways on rapid rail, see also New Zealand Herald, July 31, 1973, and a letter from D.M. Robinson to National Party Opposition, dated September 17, 1973, in R.R.R.C.F., June-December, 1973.

....as usual the curse of Auckland has struck again. Owing to our fragmented local body system, at the last moment many of the local bodies are raising all sorts of trifling objections, and the Government has virtually made it a condition that before further negotiations between the Regional Authority and the Government take place, we must ensure the local bodies and the Regional Authority have a reasonable measure of unanimity.¹¹⁷

Hence its insistence on meetings between the ARA and the municipal local bodies as well as hearing representations from the Auckland Public Transport Action Committee and from groups of local body mayors.

When no consensus formed, it exploited the divisiveness amongst local bodies on the issue, and the conflicting signals it had been sent from the Auckland Regional Authority itself. On July 1973, Watt came down with proposals that bore no real resemblance to Robinson's rapid transit. Watt proposed to upgrade the existing suburban rail services in South Auckland by extending the line to Papakura and underground into downtown Auckland City. But there would be no separate wide track gauge essential for rapid transit, no modern transit fleet, no line servicing the suburban municipalities on the isthmus, no lines to West Auckland, East Auckland, the airport, and to the North Shore, only two downtown underground stops and the 'new' rail services would not have right of way over rail freight traffic whose lines they would share.¹¹⁸ These were not

117. In a letter from D.M. Robinson to P.A. Scott, dated January 26, 1973 in R.R.R.C.F. January-May 1973.

118. Auckland Star, July 18, 1973. New Zealand Herald, July 19, 1973.

rapid transit proposals and it would have been farcical to suggest otherwise.

Robinson's challenge to the local bodies' jealous defence of their political autonomy and prerogative had failed. They had not been silenced and had now given the government a way out of an expensive scheme. The government and lower tier local bodies had been aided by those on the authority who had undermined Robinson's initial challenge to the conception of the ARA. His rapid rail project, all along, had been the only serious contradiction of that conception.

In Watt's proposal, Pearce saw a way of quietening the dissenting elements of the lower tier and bringing the ARA back into a safer role. If he advocated that the ARA accept Watt's proposals then there would be improvements in public transportation but more importantly the scheme would fit into the authority's philosophy and direction - it was being offered by government and did not involve aggressive lobbying, it was compatible with road transportation objectives currently undertaken by the Auckland Regional Authority and by local bodies before it; it did not call for switches in funding priority or set the authority on an innovative urban transportation course; it did not advantage certain municipalities to any great extent; it would be palatable to the Auckland Regional Authority membership who shared Pearce's philosophy of "benign" and bland regionalism and it would be acceptable to the lower tier municipalities. Pearce pursued the Watt scheme with vigour, calling it "an offer from the Godfather. It is one

we can't refuse"¹¹⁹

Meantime Robinson who had advocated such bold metropolitan thinking found Watt's proposals unpalatable. He commented that the latter represented:

merely an extension and upgrading of normal railway department facilities and should be available to any area in New Zealand requiring suburban passenger railway services.¹²⁰

Robinson concluded the Watt scheme "a breach of the Government's solemn election promise to provide Auckland with a Rapid Rail service."¹²¹ It was this very innocuousness that Pearce found attractive. "This railway, which Goodness knows I never pushed very hard, is being given us on a plate", Pearce said.¹²² Sensing an accommodation on rapid rail that would be acceptable to himself, the bulk of the membership and the Auckland municipalities, Pearce urged the scheme's acceptance, and at the same time undermined both Robinson's calls for the Watt scheme to be given more critical scrutiny by the Auckland Regional Authority and the mayor's capacity to resurrect his version of rapid rail and challenge the authority again.


Before the Auckland Regional Authority voted on the proposals, Robinson wanted to draw its attention to vagaries in the scheme. First, since it was a unilateral

119. Auckland Star, July 18, 1973.

120. In a report "Government's Offer to Provide a Suburban Rail Service to Papakura", from D.M. Robinson to the Rapid Transit Committee, Appendix B of the minutes of the Rapid Transit Committee for the meeting of July 20, 1973, in T.M.B.


121. *ibid.*

122. New Zealand Herald, July 31, 1973.



Source: Auckland Star, July 18, 1973.

decision on the government's part to supplant rapid rail with its own scheme, Robinson felt the Auckland Regional Authority should not be bound to levy the municipalities for operating deficits. Robinson also wanted to make sure that the suburban passenger trains would have right of way over freight traffic on the lines that they would share.



THE BEST LAID SCHEMES O' MICE AN' MEN ...

Source: New Zealand Herald, July 19, 1973.

Robinson asked for clarification on these issues before the full Auckland Regional Authority meeting was scheduled to vote on the scheme. Pearce countermanded the letter to be sent to the Minister via Auckland Regional Authority offices. It was clear the Government would

expect local bodies to incur operating deficits and given the Railway Department's position on freight traffic, there was no chance of right of way for passenger traffic. Pearce did not want Robinson to have corroboration of this and Robinson described:

On July 29, when I phoned the Secretary [of the Auckland Regional Authority] to ask what reply had been received from the Minister, I was horrified to be told the Chairman had countermanded the instruction and the letter had not been sent.¹²³

At this stage, the accommodation of the Auckland Regional Authority decision making into the previous local government structure was ascendant. Pearce asked for and got a unanimous vote in favour of Watt's scheme. Robinson had his reservations recorded, but the bulk of the membership were comfortable with the pallid government offer. Even supporters, like Brian Berg, voted for the proposal, arguing that after such a long time it was better to get some gain rather than hold out for more.¹²⁴ The effects of the leadership and the municipal councils in prolonging the rapid rail debate were clear then.

Finally, Pearce and Allsopp-Smith acted to prevent Robinson resurrecting his own version of rapid rail. They moved to have the Rapid Transit Committee disbanded.

123. In D.M. Robinson's "Notes for Opposing Recommendation One (Disbandment of the Rapid Transit Committee) Item 12 of the Policy and Finance Committee and Moving an Amendment in the Auckland Regional Authority meeting of August 20, 1973" p.4 in Robinson's 1973 Rapid Rail Reports File.

124. Interview with Brian Berg, December 22, 1986.

Allsopp-Smith's Transport Committee recommended to the Policy and Finance Committee that the Rapid Transit Committee be disbanded and the latter committee adopted the recommendation. Pearce then put the recommendation to a full Auckland Regional Authority meeting on August 20, 1973.¹²⁵

This was an obvious attempt to curtail Robinson's obstruction of the scheme, particularly when the intention was for Pearce to take over the negotiations on the Watt plans. Robinson made a final and unsuccessful effort to stop his Committee being disbanded.

What is the significance [he asked] of this unseemingly haste to disband a Committee which the Policy and Finance Committee admits has done such good work?¹²⁶

Especially when Robinson argued his Committee's terms of reference were to bring a rapid transit scheme to completion. The significance was clear. Finally, rapid rail could be made compatible with the role preferred by the Auckland Regional Authority leadership and a majority of its members. Robinson's Committee could potentially raise his version of rapid rail again and so it was to be silenced. In 1987, Flynn was asked did he feel there had been any sense of relief at all amongst the Chairman and the member-

125. Minutes for the meeting of the ARA Policy and Finance Committee August 20, 1973 (No.7/73) p.11, in ARA archives. See also, Minutes for the meeting of the ARA meeting August 20, 1973 p.3 in ARA archives.

126. In D.M. Robinson's "Notes for Opposing Recommendation One (Disbandment of the Rapid Transit Committee) Item 12 of the Policy and Finance Committee and Moving an Amendment in the Auckland Regional Authority meeting of August 20, 1973", p.5 in Robinson's 1973 Rapid Rail Reports File.

ship when the Rapid Transit Committee was disbanded? He smiled and said he "preferred not to comment on that".¹²⁷

Pearce's recommendation was accepted by the Auckland Regional Authority and the Rapid Transit Committee was disbanded. Only Robinson and his deputy chairman, Brian Berg, voted against the motion. Pearce assumed control of the negotiations for the Watt scheme. In the event, the government decided shortly before the 1975 election not to proceed with the Watt proposal either.¹²⁸

127. Interview with E.A. Flynn, December 22, 1986.

128. Interview with M. Lancaster, July 10, 1987.

CHAPTER 8ROBINSON AND THE ARA, 1975-1986

Robinson's involvement in the ARA declined after the rapid transit proposals were dropped in 1975. Although he was re-elected to the ARA in 1974 and 1977, Robinson was neither chairman nor deputy chairman of any ARA committee and another group of politicians assumed the political management of the ARA. Robinson's metropolitan role was reduced to suggestions he made about issues that he remained interested in, and these were generally ignored and sometimes greeted with ridicule.

In 1976 and 1977 for example, he opposed the ARA's plan to take water from the Waikato River and then purify it for Auckland use. The plant would cost an estimated \$120 million. Robinson advocated, instead, the recycling of water from the Manukau oxidation ponds, the water could then be used for irrigation and industrial use thereby releasing water from existing sources for domestic purposes. The chairman of the ARA Works Committee called the suggestion "distasteful" and maintained the cost of purifying sewage water would make it dearer than whiskey.¹ Robinson again suggested the solution the following year and was rebuffed once more.

In 1979 Robinson was again temporarily involved in urban transport issues. The National Government had promised the Auckland region \$30 million worth of rolling stock for

1. Sunday News, January 11, 1976.

its suburban railway lines. The government made a similar election promise to the Wellington region, but while this was honoured, the government reneged on its pledge to Auckland.² Robinson was angry and took the issue up with vigour. He advocated that the ARA respond to the government in the strongest terms and called for the ARA buses to be removed from the roads until the government made good its word, but a majority of the membership voted against the motion.³ Robinson was furious, and in his anger he called the Prime Minister "the stumbling block to a good railway system in Auckland"⁴ and "the greatest obstacle to sound central government and local government relations".⁵ He made the latter accusation at the 1979 Municipal Association Conference in Dunedin.

Members of the ARA, members of the Auckland City Council and the Auckland Local Bodies Association, all distanced themselves from the Robinson-Muldoon clashes. The latter passed a resolution that:

Members regret statements made by individuals which may prejudice those central government/local government relations and, in particular, as an association disassociates itself from personal attacks made recently on the Prime Minister and Ministers of the Crown.⁶

2. New Zealand Herald, March 11, 1979.

3. *ibid.*

4. Auckland Star, July 10, 1979.

5: *ibid.*, April 5, 1979.

6. In a copy of the minutes of the Auckland Local Bodies Association for the meeting of April 17, 1979 in Robinson's Mayoral Correspondence File, January-June, 1979.

The same year Robinson was ignored when he suggested that if sewage gas from Manukau was used to run the ARA buses a saving of \$1.75 million in fuel would be made, and again he was ignored when he advocated that the Railways build an overhead line to take suburban trains to the foot of Queen's Street. The Auckland Star however, lauded the former suggestion,⁷ and the New Zealand Herald remarked of the second that time would prove Robinson right.⁸ No ARA action was taken on either.

Robinson's participation in metropolitan decision making was reduced. His role seemed to take on the status of a sideline critic. As for the ARA decision making itself, the influence of the lower tier municipalities increased.

Potentially the tension between ARA Chairman Lambie (1965-68) and R.G. McElroy, Auckland City Mayor during the same period, and moreso the course and conclusion of the rapid rail issue, invited the municipalities to influence the ARA's decision making and make it further accountable to themselves. This did happen.

After Pearce died, L.I. Murdoch the Mayor of Papatoetoe during the establishment process, became chairman of the ARA. Murdoch advocated that the ARA establish a regional sporting facility, the Mount Smart Athletic Stadium, and assume responsibility for the Auckland Symphony Orchestra. These minor deviations from the Lambie/Pearce ARA role

7. Auckland Star, July 11, 1979.

8. New Zealand Herald, June 9, 1979.

helped to precipitate a campaign to confine the body to an even more limited role and indeed to strengthen the lower tier's influence on ARA decision making.

In 1983 a political group calling itself the "New Deal" entered the ARA elections and gained a majority of seats on the ARA. The "New Deal" was the first metropolitan ticket to gain a majority on the body. Its policy planks were reactionary in terms of Robinson's conception of the authority's brief. They stated that the ARA was:

To refrain from undertaking new functions and activities with substantial financial obligations unless there is

- (a) certainty the new function is desired and required by a majority of the people of the region;
- (b) majority support of at least 75%, by number and by population, of contributing local authorities....

To emphasize the importance of "value for money" so as to minimise the levies and the costs imposed on ratepayers, through their local councils....

To return to local councils any activities of the ARA which are more appropriately handled at the local level.⁹

The deputy leader of the ticket, the Mayor of Northcote, Jean Sampson, called the ticket very much a "league of mayors".¹⁰ It was effectively a coalition of local body politicians who held office in the lower tier municipalities, and who wanted to limit the ARA's political autonomy on the basis that "smaller unit of management can often be

9. Jolyon Firth, "New Deal Policy Manifesto", 1983, pp.1-2.

10. C. Wall "The ARA and the New Deal: One Year on: Success or Disaster?" in Metro, October 1984, p.114.


far better at administering public functions than 'big government'."¹¹ Even their election propaganda reflected the imagery associated with the old Auckland City Council when it suggested local bodies must agree to less autonomy and greater cost saving.

Although the New Deal members were initially united on policy they became involved in intra-mural factional arguments. There were philosophical differences primarily over the degree of retrenchment and the number of standing committees to be disbanded. More significantly, there were personality clashes of a particularly unseemly nature. The 'New Deal' became disaffected with both its chairman Fred Thomas, the anti-rapid rail campaigner and former mayor of Takapuna, and deputy chairman Jean Sampson. It managed to oust Sampson, but not Thomas.¹² Continued clashes between Thomas and the New Deal members overshadowed the remainder of the New Deal administration. During it, 21 mayors petitioned the Minister of Local Government to appoint a team of inquiry, which he did.

The ARA review team penetrated the morass of personality-based factionalism and in doing so comprehended how the regional body had failed to develop as the dominant metropolitan decision maker. The Review then suggested ways to reduce the municipal councils' influence on the body.

11. Jolyon Firth, "New Deal Policy Manifesto", 1983, p.2.

12. For an explanation of the New Deal disintegration and Jean Sampson's loss of the deputy chairmanship, see C. Wall, "The Stabbing of Sister Jean", in Metro, February 1985, pp.69-84.



Source: New Zealand Herald, October 6, 1983.

The Commissioners stated:

We consider that the Regional Authority members ought and perhaps in certain circumstances, might be required to make their own decisions unfettered by the combined effect of the territorial local authority attitudes and as judged by members on the basis of regional interest. They are then accountable to the electorate, namely the citizens - not the local authorities - for their actions.¹³

The team recommended that the authority's electoral wards should no longer be based on municipal boundaries. (A little rationalisation had occurred in 1983). It also recommended that the elections should take place outside of national and municipal election years. These recommendations were designed to encourage a new set of candidates onto the authority. The authority elections were not to be contested by people as adjuncts to their municipal electioneering, but by regionalists on regional issues. The Commissioners wrote:

So important do we regard the recognition of the Regional Authority as a distinctive and recognisable level of government in its own right that we advocate the holding of triennial elections in the year when neither central nor local government elections are held.¹⁴

There seems little likelihood of the Commission's recommendations succeeding in their intent. The most likely consequence of the separate election would be a low turn

13. Review by the Local Government Commission into the Auckland Regional Authority, 1985, p.53

14. ibid, p.83.

out and low interest. The authority's 'benign regionalism' that has endured despite rapid rail and Mount Smart, and the municipal councils' successful protection of their own geographical and political integrity, means the authority is, and probably will continue to be, seen as simply one of many local bodies rather than the paramount agency of metropolitan government. Aptly the Commissioners noted: "The authority has suffered from an incorrect public perception - that local authorities are directly represented on it."¹⁵

So long as the municipalities remain in the present numbers they are base for continued resistance to the ARA. Catherine Tizard, the mayor of Auckland (1983-) comments:

In a nutshell, nothing has changed. ...
Voltaire [sic] said it all, "they have nothing to lose but their chains". The situation on the Auckland isthmus is quite pathetically depressing as far as amalgamation goes. Auckland is crippled by its multiplicity of territorial local authorities who at the same time resist any extension of the ARA functions to fill the gap.¹⁶

Some municipal councils are even trying to reduce the ARA's geographical boundaries and will, if successful, set a precedent for the possible dismemberment of the body. The Franklin County Council and Waiuku, Pukekohe and Taukau Borough Councils, all outskirt southern councils, petitioned

15. Review by the Local Government Commission into the Auckland Regional Authority, 1985, p.45.

16. In a letter from Catherine Tizard to the author dated January 20, 1987.

the Local Government Commission to be allowed to leave the Auckland Regional Authority in 1985.¹⁷ Their case was unsuccessful, but they have indicated to the Commission that they are prepared to make further representations. They maintained that they were not fairly treated by the ARA and criticised it for being a metropolitan institution. Yet under the ARA Act the outer areas only have to pay for the airport (which does not require a levy because it is self financing), for water and for planning. Their planning levy is only 25 percent of the levy metropolitan areas pay. The ARA Review Team noted that of the

significant volume of [planning] work over the preceding three years directly related to the particular needs of the four southern [Auckland area] districts, [the General Manager] calculated that the value of this ... would have been more than three times the total planning levy received.¹⁸

Yet these outer areas wanted to revert to the proposals of Franklin County Chairman and ARA establishment critic, R. Bennett - a separate South Auckland Regional Authority that they would control. Bennett's dream has remained strong after twenty years.

The ARA remains vulnerable then to the lower tier local bodies' defence of their own political authority. The irony of Robinson's challenge to morphological fundamentalism is that the ARA's efficiency has probably

17. AJHR 1985, Vol.III G-9, p.5.

18. Review by the Local Government Commission into the Auckland Regional Authority, 1985, pp.74-75.

strengthened the local bodies' ability to protect their geographical identities, and has allowed them to remain an ongoing threat to the ARA's own political authority. The metropolis has an agency that can cope with metropolitan problems and as a consequence less attention has been focused on the inadequacies of the lower tier municipalities. Since the ARA's establishment there have been only three successful amalgamation schemes in Greater Auckland. The Borough of Manurewa joined Manukau County as Manukau City on September 1, 1965;¹⁹ Warkworth Town District joined Rodney County in 1976²⁰ and in 1986 Otahuhu and Mount Wellington joined as Tamaki City.²¹

Other Local Government Commission plans have been unsuccessful. When Waitemata County became a City in 1973, both the Glen Eden and New Lynn Borough Councils indicated that they were not prepared to amalgamate with the County into a large West Auckland City.²² In 1978, the scheme to amalgamate the Rodney and Great Barrier Island Counties did not proceed. The Commission cited "the strong opposition to it [that] was expressed by both Authorities and by residents."²³

Even the Newmarket Borough, the smallest in New Zealand, with a population of a mere 1300 residents and an area of 75 hectares which is completely encircled by

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19. In a copy of the Manukau City District Scheme, Pt3, pp3-5 in the Manukau City Council Library, No.4094.
 20. AJHR, 1977, Vol.III G-9, p.7.
 21. Interview with the Tamaki City Council Town Clerk, C.A. Cooke, January 19, 1987.
 22. AJHR, 1974, Vol.VII, G-9, p.9.
 23. AJHR, 1978, Vol.5 G-6, p.9.

the City of Auckland,²⁴ has successfully stalled a Local Government Commission plan that it amalgamate with the Auckland City Council.

The Local Government Commission's proposals for Newmarket were followed by the resurrection of the single city of Auckland concept. The Auckland City Council issued a plan for the amalgamation of itself with eight other municipalities on the isthmus into one city. The idea was swiftly rejected. Six of the eight boroughs were opposed to the concept and the remaining two were prepared to consider it.²⁵ The Mayor of Mount Eden, (1983-1986) Phillipa Cunningham, called the City Council's suggestion "a power game", while the Mayor of Ellerslie called it "absolutely wrong and terrible."²⁶ The Auckland City Council was disappointed by this response and Councillor Barnaby claimed he "couldn't understand why local body politicians ran round like rabbits They're just frightened of losing their own burrow on which to peddle on."²⁷

It was clear local bodies had not given up the defence of their geographical integrity. At the end of 1985, the Auckland Star conducted a survey on local body attitudes towards amalgamation, it revealed how little local bodies believed in this project themselves. Only a third of the 300 councillors polled actually replied. Of those who did, a majority favoured amalgamation, but this proved to be

24. New Zealand Herald, November 20, 1985.

25. Auckland Star, October 2, 1985.

26. *ibid.*

27. Auckland City Harbour News, October 2, 1985.

mere lip service. The four cities concept was rejected by 69.5 percent of those polled, and almost 75 percent said that they were unhappy with the Local Government Commission. Yet it was the only agency, other than the Auckland City Council, to suggest amalgamation. The Commission was accused amongst other things of trying to rush through changes and of trying to further Michael Bassett's (the Minister of Local Government since 1984) Labour Party politics.²⁸ The councillors were asked which area needed reorganisation most. Auckland Central led the way with 18.64 percent, and the other areas followed. The Auckland Star did not indicate whether politicians supporting reorganisation actually supported their own areas' amalgamation, but it noted that:

the biggest sector (21.9%) said specific amalgamations should be left up to ratepayers and that their views were badly overlooked by the Local Government Commission.²⁹

Future reformers in Auckland local government are left to address this problem. If they decide that an independent role for the ARA is desirable then the municipalities must be made more manageable in numbers. With such rationalisation may come the more positive attitudes towards the authority that mayors of larger Auckland municipalities like Catherine Tizard have. At the same time, reformers must make the ARA a directly rating body, ending the municipalities levying for it and ending the notion

28. Auckland Star, January 5, 1986.

29. *ibid.*

municipalities have that the levying arrangement makes the ARA accountable to them. Given both Auckland and Robinson's experience of morphological fundamentalism, the latter objective will doubtlessly be a lot more easier to achieve than bringing about municipal amalgamation.

CONCLUSION

Dove-Myer Robinson's lengthy political career had incorporated a number of significant successes and failures. When the ARA accepted the proposals that Hugh Watt made on rapid rail in 1973, and then disbanded the Rapid Transit Committee, Robinson suffered one of his worst defeats. But the demise of the rapid rail project was only one of a number of significant failures. His loss of office in 1965 was another. He courted further failure with his decision to stand for the mayoralty in 1980 at age 79, after pledging not to do so at the 1977 municipal election, and with his decision to stand again for the mayoralty in 1983, and for a seat in 1986. In 1983 his vote was reduced by 6000 and in 1986 his council vote was a dismal 1058. After this drubbing he finally conceded in 1986 that his third unsuccessful attempt to get back onto the Auckland City Council was his last. In a brief back page report the New Zealand Herald referred to Robinson's failure as "his last bow",² but this protracted and forced retirement from politics had lost him much popular support. This was a pitiful sequel to the career of a man who had enjoyed widespread public support in the halcyon days of his mayoralty.

In his latter years Robinson demonstrated an inability to know when to give up. However, his greatest failure was his inability to balance his political career with his private, personal life. Robinson's life became dominated

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1. See Auckland City Council election results. Appendix A pp. 300, 301.
 2. New Zealand Herald, October 13, 1986.

by political involvement and the satisfaction he gained from this. He needed political busyness to fill an enormous vacuum created by the failure of two of his marriages, and the erosion of his relationships with his children.

His political involvement in the Brown's Island controversy destroyed his third marriage with Bettine Robinson. During the controversy, she implored Robinson to give up the sewerage campaign, because "I was getting nowhere" while she was burdened by both the demands of their clothing business and raising the family. Robinson did not; "awful rows" ensued, and the marriage was lost.³ Robinson's decision to stand for a third time for the mayoralty cost him his fourth marriage, and a partner whom he later considered "too good for me".⁴ Happily the divorced partners have remained in amicable correspondence with one another, but this has been little solace in a lonely old age, compounded by his few friendships and the distant relationship between himself and his children;⁵ a result again of a man too involved in politics to give time to his children.

Robinson's most significant victories had probably been accomplished before he assumed the mayoralty. Personally he had survived a difficult, and at times, cruel childhood and though emotionally scarred, he had the courage to take up larger challenges during his adult life.

3. Interview with D.M. Robinson, August 16, 1982.

4. Interview with D.M. Robinson, October 6, 1982.

5. Interviews with B. Keam, August 17, 1982 and October 28, 1982. (On a 'Close Up' television programme made shortly after Robinson's 1980 defeat, two of his children informed the interviewer how inadequate they considered Robinson as a father).

Politically he had been instrumental in saving the Waitemata Harbour from sewage pollution and in allowing future generations to enjoy those beaches and that vista. As for the accusations that he had destroyed the Manukau Harbour, the Mangere oxidation plant placed additional stress on the Manukau ecosystem, but it is not the severest not most difficult of the problems that harbour faces. In fact, the harbour had been seriously polluted by industrial and refuse pollution before the plant was built. The plant's operation prompted the Auckland Harbour Board to make efforts to stem other sources of pollution whose effects might well have been even more damaging than they have been, had the oxidation plant not precipitated such action.⁶ Twenty-three years after the Brown's Island controversy, Robinson's contribution was still considered so significant that he was nominated for the U.N. Pahlavi Prize for the Environment, alongside figures like Thor Heyerdahl and Sir Peter Scott.⁷

His involvement in both the U.N. Conference on the Human Environment in Stockholm, in 1972, and the Habitat Conference in Vancouver, in 1976; his promotion of the Environmental Defence Society and of large scale recycling and composting of urban refuse, and his support for the Kirk Government's stand against the Mururoa nuclear testing, have probably given additional credibility to the environmental cause in New Zealand.

6. Interviews with F.W.O. Jones, May 27, 1982; R.C.F. Savory, April 23, 1983 and M.R. Lancaster, July 10, 1987.

7. Interview with D.M. Robinson, March 7, 1982. The prize was awarded to a person during his/her lifetime who has made a substantial contribution to the study or protection of some aspect of the world's environment, its wildlife or prehistory.

During his mayoralty there had been successes. He was instrumental of course, in establishing the ARA. He had developed a commanding charismatic style during his 18 year tenure of the office. This gave national recognition to the Auckland mayoralty. Jolyon Firth, the deputy mayor of Auckland City 1977-1980, commenting on this considered the mana and the mystique Robinson brought the Auckland City mayoralty his greatest achievement ... "he has set an unenviable precedent for others to emulate."⁸

As mayor, Robinson had also been involved in a host of local projects like establishing council welfare services and the Museum of Transport and Technology, as well as making a substantial contribution to the negotiations for the motorway system and airport construction in the early 1960s, and to accomplish all these he had been successful in mounting an independent political machine that assisted his mayoral victories. Robinson made good use of Professor John Roberts' comments on a T.V. documentary programme in his own 1983 election material:

There are four charismatic politicians in our history. There is Richard John Seddon, Michael Joseph Savage, Robert David Muldoon and Dove-Myer Robinson. And while the others had party structures behind them, and they built on the successes of other men, Robbie seems to me to owe nothing to anyone but himself, he's a unique phenomenon. Where he may stand as a mayor in perspective of history, no one can say, but as a political phenomenon he must stand among the first three or four in New Zealand's history.⁹

8. Interview with J.R. Firth, August 23, 1983. Firth was an Auckland City Councillor 1968-1983.

9. "Look inside for the answer to the \$64 Election Day question", in Robinson's Political Pamphlet Collection.

This analysis of Dove-Myer Robinson's career has attempted to assess how successful was his challenge to a reactionary protectionism, defined as morphological fundamentalism, amongst local bodies. The study has encompassed significant elements of success and failure within Robinson's long involvement in local body politics. It has also endeavoured to show whether Robinson's political methods and image facilitated his challenge. The likelihood of further structural change to Auckland local government, given the implications of his struggle, and the status of Robinson's political career after the demise of rapid rail were final considerations.

Robinson's challenge had been successful in a very significant way. Through the ARA reforms, the metropolis had gained an agency to plan and co-ordinate metropolitan development, deal with metropolitan problems, implement metropolitan projects and administer metropolitan functions. Where Myers had failed in his bid to amalgamate the Auckland municipalities into one council, where Bloodworth had failed to have a limited Board of Works established, and where Luxford had failed in equipping the metropolis with a Greater Auckland Authority, modelled on the Toronto Metro, Robinson had succeeded in his arduous task. It was the first act of major local government reform successfully undertaken in the Greater Auckland region since the origins of municipal government there.

Two recent commentators have endorsed the ARA's ability to carry out its functions effectively, Graham Bush,

Associate Professor of Political Studies at the University of Auckland, has written:

In the end, Auckland's money must be put on the Auckland Regional Authority. Despite being nobbled by legislative defects, political timidity and two-hatism, it has evolved far beyond what many of its begetters conceived or desired. Of necessity it has proceeded by empirical trial-and-error, and as Latham noted, the loyalty to the committees has worked to the detriment of integrated services.

But its accomplishments in incorporating related activities and managing functions like parks, water resources, the airport and public transport, cannot be gainsaid. Auckland without the ARA would rank much lower in habitability, congeniality and urbanity. It can look Auckland squarely in the face because it cares about the face of Auckland.¹⁰

In 1985, the Local Government Commission Review Team also endorsed the work and functions of the ARA. It proposed additional powers like tourist planning should be devolved from central government to the authority, and that an early amalgamation of the North Shore Drainage Board be made with the authority.¹¹ It also investigated ARA levies and found that, despite the common accusations that the body was a wasteful bureaucracy, it had performed its functions with considerable efficiency. "In real terms", the team noted, "the Auckland Regional Authority expenditure had reduced and levies have not escalated."¹²

10. Graham Bush, "Our Public Administrative Structures in the 1980s: Can They Cope? Local Government In Auckland the Notion of Adequacy in Local Government, 1980, p.12.

11. Review by the Local Government Commission into the Auckland Regional Authority, 1985, pp.42-43.

12. *ibid.* p.63.

Robinson's challenge to morphological fundamentalism, and the resultant birth of the ARA, is all the more creditable given the local body situation outside Auckland. No other New Zealand municipal figure has been associated so closely with such a campaign as was Robinson, and none has helped establish a stronger tier of metropolitan government. The reaction by the national local body community to the ARA's establishment was generally critical. Francis Kitts, the then Mayor of Wellington City opposed it.¹³ This unwillingness for even mayors of central cities to entertain ideas of a strong tier of regional government persists. The present Mayor of Christchurch City wrote in 1987:

I do not believe that any of the answers to our problems in Christchurch is to add further responsibilities to the regional body, i.e. the Canterbury United Council. I hold the view that a stronger metropolitan City Council incorporating not only the territorial units in the metropolitan area, but also the ad hoc authorities such as the Christchurch Transport Board and the Christchurch Drainage Board, will generally deal with many of the regional issues. There would be no need for a large regional body.¹⁴

The United Council, to which Hay refers, developed from the Local Government Act of 1974. As further testimony to the strength of Robinson's own challenge, it was the Local Government Commission and the then Minister of Local Government, Henry May, who were responsible for the regional

13. Evening Post, November 4, 1963.

14. In a letter from H. Hay to the author, dated February 25, 1987.

administration such as it exists outside Auckland.

Under the 1974 Act, passed 11 years after the ARA was formed, United and Regional Councils were established to co-ordinate metropolitan and county-wide functions.¹⁵ After representations to the Local Bills Committee, the local bodies were given the right to determine whether a United or a Regional Council would be established in their region.¹⁶ The United Council option was preferred - only one Regional Council was established in Wellington. It is elective and more autonomous than the United Councils but has fewer functions than the ARA. The twenty United Councils established in New Zealand have had considerable difficulty developing as independent political bodies.¹⁷ Their members are appointed by the 'lower' tier bodies, the membership being drawn from sitting local body councillors. The lower tier councils also determine the United Councils' functions and the size of the levy they may make. A critical commentator, Richard Welch, has suggested of them that "even the spectre of regional administration disappeared in New Zealand."¹⁸ The product of Robinson's reform campaign remains then an advance on regional government elsewhere in the country.

Despite the clear element of success in Robinson's challenge to Auckland morphological fundamentalism, his overall record is more mixed. Even though the metropolis had gained an instrument of planning and development it

15. New Zealand Statutes, 1974, vol.2, pp.1443-1576.

16. D. Boswell, Local Government, 1980, p.20.

17. Regional Government Conference, a discussion document, December 1985, pp.4-5. Northland United Council Files, 120/1/28.

18. Welch, p.23.

would not have had otherwise, the authority had not emerged as an autonomous political agency nor as the unchallenged origin of metropolitan policies that Robinson had envisaged.

Robinson's rapid rail campaign showed that the lower tier's morphological fundamentalism, in this case protection of its political autonomy, had seriously influenced ARA decision making. Lambie and then Pearce's leadership had facilitated this. They encouraged a bland "benign" regionalism that allowed the lower tier (and its sympathisers on the ARA) to view the authority as an instrument of their own policy rather than a threat to their political authority. Because rapid rail represented a deviation from this course, a number of municipal councils asserted themselves and called for their consultation and consent in the scheme. The ARA leadership and the bulk of the regional authority's membership acquiesced to this. Pearce then proposed that the ARA accept a compromise scheme that was compatible with the emphasis on non-controversial regionalist policies. Robinson's position was further compromised because the cautious relationship the old local body structure had had with central government was assumed by the authority. Central government, the dominant partner, then encouraged the morphological fundamentalism of the lower tier by insisting that the ARA and the territorial local bodies form a consensus on rapid rail.

The demise of rapid rail invited Auckland municipal councils to seek further influence in ARA decision making. The subsequent emergence of the New Deal, and its re-emergence in 1986 as the majority Regional Ratepayers group,

were outcomes of the municipalities' determination to defend their own political authority. These latter developments, the finding of the 1985 Review Commission and its proposals for ARA elections to be contested in separate election years by regionalist candidates on regional issues, all point to the mixed success that Robinson had ultimately had in his challenge to morphological fundamentalism. His vision of the ARA as an agency politically independent from and dominant of the other Auckland local bodies had not been realised. The outcome of his rapid rail campaign was an important step in the municipalities' efforts to preserve their own political authority and contain that of the ARA.

Given the difficulty of Robinson's challenge and its mixed results, what lessons do Robinson's political methods and style offer future challengers of local body morphological fundamentalism? It is evident that his own political style characterised his challenge. The strong preferences Robinson had for operating alone and the high personal involvement and profile that Robinson brought to his campaigns is clearly consistent with "the agent of change" whom Schon maintains has challenged conservative dynamism in the past and has worked for new courses of action and direction. Schon wrote:

At the root of most innovations significant enough to precipitate a change of state, there are individuals who display irrational commitment, extraordinary energy, a combativeness which enables them to battle established interests over a long period of time. ...¹⁹

19. Schon, p.84

Appropriately, Latham called Robinson's commitment to reforms and his passionate advocacy of them "evangelistic".²⁰ K.B. Cumberland, the mayor's long time friend, remarked that Robinson established the ARA because "he won by attrition, wearing down his opponents with his enthusiastic lobbying and power of persuasion".²¹

Robinson's enthusiastic promotion of local body reforms was crucial to the establishment of the ARA. Robinson continually sought an audience - voluntary or otherwise - of local body and parliamentary politicians and tried to press action on the 1961 and 1962 ARA Bills from figures like the Minister of Internal Affairs, the Local Bills Committee members, the Prime Minister and the Local Government Commissioners. He maintained this advocacy and lobbying despite the criticism and negative attitudes of many of his political associates.

Robinson's advocacy was aided by his knowledge of overseas reform models, especially the Toronto Metro. This reflected a pattern apparent in most of the mayor's political campaigns. During the sewerage controversy, he became familiar with overseas oxidation treatment and invited a panel of experts to Auckland to advocate its use there. With rapid rail, he inspected rapid transit systems in Northern Europe (1970), Japan (1971) and North America (1973). He also consulted with high ranking transportation officials in Washington and Ottawa to gain corroborative evidence for his own proposals. With metropolitan reform, he visited

20. Latham, p.7.

21. Interview with K.B. Cumberland, May 13, 1982.

and investigated reform models in Toronto, Winnipeg and Melbourne, and used these upon which to model the ARA. He also gathered information about overseas models to provide concrete evidence of the ARA's likely benefits, and used this in his advocacy of the reforms.

Robinson needed political strengths other than his evangelical advocacy to bring the reform process to its satisfactory conclusion. He had an ability to work effectively at the appropriate level in private consultations to gain or consolidate support for reform. In July 1963, he was able to get the ARA Bill released from the Local Bills Committee after a private meeting with Prime Minister Holyoake, to which Scott was summoned and reprimanded. On another occasion, Robinson wrote confidentially to Holyoake and indicated that he was prepared to compromise over the compulsory inclusion of special purpose bodies in the 1962 ARA Bill. This meant he retained Holyoake's support for the reforms, while undermining the special purpose bodies' efforts in mid-1962 to stop the Establishment Committee Bill.

This political manoeuvring was matched by his ability to openly exploit his opponents' tactics. When the special purpose bodies were released from the bill in late 1962, he was able to retain municipal support for the legislation, by using Scott and Allen's calls for municipal amalgamation to his advantage. The municipalities' attention turned from the profit making bodies excluded from the Bill to Robinson's public claims that Auckland was being made "a plaything of Wellington", and that M.P.s and Wellington officials were determined to amalgamate all of the Auckland

municipalities. He used Scott and Allen's threats then to rally municipal support for the reform proposals. With this consensus he then gained, in 1963, sympathetic hearings from a delegation of Auckland M.P.s and then from the Prime Minister, Keith Holyoake.

Robinson was also adept at quickly countering a setback and regaining the offensive. This had characterised his sewerage fight, but in 1961 he put the tactic to good use. After the withdrawal of the 1961 Bill, he dramatised this rebuff, calling his office "Heartbreak House", crying at the grave of Captain Hobson, Auckland's founder, because of the damage done to the City and demanding his critics be subpoenaed to explain their real reasons for opposing the reform bill. These theatrics put his critics sufficiently on the defensive for him to gain a twelve month extension of the Establishment Committee's life. This reprieve enabled him to work on a fuller, this time successful, ARA Bill. These political abilities were needed to promulgate the unpopular policies that he chose.

Yet Robinson's modus operandi was fraught with risk. While his own political resources were considerable, he relied exclusively on them. He discounted the advantages of working through a political machine to gain his metropolitan objectives, as for instance the New Deal would. This was the most obvious weakness in his political approach and there are salient implications for future challengers, should they operate alone as Robinson did.

During repeated conversations with the author, Robinson

has discussed this obsessive self-reliance. He has maintained that by working alone, if he failed he had only himself to blame, while if he succeeded he could claim full credit. The determination to prove himself was probably rooted in his childhood. He was determined to prove to his childhood detractors that even if he was Jewish, he was as good, if not better than them. He was equally determined to prove his father's faith, however perversely expressed, in his son's abilities, to be correct. At some point his political critics became fused with his past detractors and overcoming them - by himself - became a measure of his own success.

Yet the risks involved in political self-reliance are considerable. All the repercussions of advancing change are brought to bear on the reformer acting alone, rather than being dissipated over members of an association or group advocating reform. Donald Schon himself was unhappy with the risk and inefficiency involved in the individual as an agency of change. He wrote:

The agent of change, must engage an essentially alien culture and leave himself vulnerable to punishment for disrupting established power. All of these roles therefore make enormous demands on the person. They subject him to stress he is able to meet only through a missionary stance.²²

The outcome of the 1965 election by ARA members for the ARA chairmanship and committee chairmanships seem to prove this point. Robinson was "punished" for his reform

campaign and for the political reputation that he had gained during his struggles. When Robinson was exiled from influence an additional risk appeared - the vacuum that was left when the agent of change disappeared, even temporarily from the scene.

The 1965-1968 period showed how easy it was for politicians with different conceptions of the ARA's role, particularly Lambie, to move in and shape events when Robinson was personally prevented from doing so. The subsequent history of the ARA must have been different had Robinson in 1965 formed a political association to promote his conception of the ARA. He may have retained influence with the backing of a political machine. The weakness in his political individualism showed also with the fate of rapid transit after 1975. He was so intimately connected with the issue that one Rapid Transit Committee member writes:

Nobody really stopped its [rapid rail's] implementation. The idea seemed to languish and die with the passing of Sir Dove-Myer Robinson from the Authority. He was the guiding light of the proposition and probably still is.²³

While the attitudes of both municipal councils and the ARA leadership/membership did stop the scheme, it is true that without Robinson there was no rapid transit lobby left, and the idea lapsed. In 1986 it was the Railways Corporation, not the ARA, that suggested implementing

23. In a letter from R.G. Gallagher to the author dated 21 December, 1986.

rapid light rail as an alternative.²⁴

The other weakness inherent in Robinson's political modus operandi was that a particularly severe setback could jeopardise his political credibility and his own continuing influence. The 1965 election defeat nearly did so. In 1973 the demise of rapid rail, with which he was so intimately associated, terminated his metropolitan career. Politically outmanoeuvred by Pearce, his rapid rail proposals discarded, and his energy dissipated by a long struggle, Robinson failed to revitalise his rapid transit or any other lengthy metropolitan campaign thereafter.

The last point however that must be made here, was that after his challenge to morphological fundamentalism declined, Robinson was not left a ruined political figure. As his political horizons contracted, he focused his considerable talents on the mayor's civic duties and on projects within Auckland City. He had performed admirably in these areas throughout his mayoralty, and this continued until his defeat in 1980. He was closely involved in establishing council welfare services, and council help for the unemployed, establishing youth drop-in centres, protecting a number of historic buildings like the Customs House, finding alternative funding for the Auckland Museum, and promoting car park, mall, library extension and Centennial Hall projects. He could always be relied upon to contribute exuberantly to countless Auckland events, and by 1980, he was lending his name and usually his active

24. Interview with Brian Berg, December 22, 1986.

support to 250 organisations in Auckland.²⁵ His presence became an automatic part of the events that made up the Auckland social calendar, while some of his eccentricities like his topless walk to work and his interview - bare-chested - with Alan Whicker on the internationally broadcast "Whicker's World" gave him special status.

By the time Robinson lost the mayoralty in 1980, it is fair to say that he had become a city institution. The former Mayor of Wellington, Sir Michael Fowler, maintained that "New Zealanders understood the conglomerate of villages that make up Auckland through Robbie."²⁶ Jolyon Firth asked, "is there anyone quite like him? By any test he is a phenomenon",²⁷ while the editor of the Sunday Times lamented in 1980 "Auckland without Robbie would be like Christmas without Santa Claus."²⁸ Even a foe like Muldoon confirmed Robinson's charismatic status in his remark - intended to be disparaging - that the mayor was "a pet" kept on by an indulgent public and council.²⁹

It may be that Robinson's showmanship and celebrity status will overshadow the other aspects of his local body career - his unwise decisions to stand for election in the 1980s, his substantial successes, and his challenge to morphological fundamentalism. The last years of


25. New Zealand Herald, June 11, 1980. "Mayor's Patron File", 1980.

26. Sunday News, June 6, 1976.

27. J. Firth, "Guide to the Electors of the City of Auckland", 1977, p.3.

28. Sunday Times, June 8, 1980.


29. Sunday News, October 10, 1976.



The trade mark walk to work. This photograph was taken on June 15, 1979 - Robinson's 78th birthday. (With an acknowledgement to The New Zealand Herald)

Robinson won a wager with this post card that he sent to himself from London. Addressed "Robbie, New Zealand", it arrived at the Auckland Civic Administration Building as he had predicted.

(With an acknowledgement to The New Zealand Herald)




Robinson, who had had the second of his hip replacement operations in 1976, demonstrated his agility to visiting orthopedic surgeon, John Charnley.

(With an acknowledgement to The New Zealand Herald)



Robinson invited a chapter of the Stormtroopers, an urban gang, to mayoral afternoon tea. He wished to thank them for their contribution to the 1978 TVNZ fundraiser, Telethon.

(With an acknowledgement to The New Zealand Herald)





"Eros". Robinson pictured in 1979, offering possible subject material to Auckland sculptors.

(With an acknowledgement to The New Zealand Herald)

Robinson's career were not dissimilar to those of Fiorello La Guardia, the Mayor of New York City from 1934 to 1945 whom Robinson shared so much with on a superficial level - poor immigrant beginnings, small stature, penetrating voice, populism, showmanship, national recognition and waning political influence. Like La Guardia, Robinson's "flamboyances may well be remembered long after his more solid accomplishments have been forgotten."³⁰

30. A. Hecksner and P. Robinson, When La Guardia Was Mayor: New York's Legendary Years, 1978, p.403.

APPENDICES and BIBLIOGRAPHY

APPENDIX A

Auckland City Council Membership and Voting Returns

Councillors 1952-1956 (Listed in order of the number of votes each councillor gained)

1952

Apr. By-election

Robinson D.M.

1953

Oct. Ambler F.N. (C&R)
 Roche Barbara (C&R)
 Robinson D.M. (UI)
 Dreaver Mrs M.M. (L)
 Butler W. (L)
 Postlethwaite A.P. (C&R)
 Barnett B.W. (UI)
 Dodd Mrs A.H. (L)
 Buttle K.N. (C&R)
 Whittaker J.M. (C&R)
 Armishaw E.C. (UI)
 Bloodworth T. (C&R)
 Savory R.C.F. (C&R)
 Curran P.T. (L)
 Bailey C. (C&R)
 Cumberland K.B. (UI)
 Dreaver A.J.R. (L)
 Forsyth G.F.H. (L)
 Dyson E.J.V. (UI)
 Hunter S.H. (C&R)
 Bradley J.N. (L)

1956 (Continued)

Kingston B.H. (C&R)
 Tongue W.M. (C&R)
 Cumberland K.B. (UI)
 Curran P.T. (L)
 Myers G.E. (C&R)
 Glasse A.O. (C&R)

1958

Oct. By-election (Hunter dcd.)

Passmore C.S. (C&R)

1956

Nov. Buttle K.N. (C&R)
 Dreaver Mr M.M. (L)
 Bloodworth T. (C&R)
 Ambler F.N. (C&R)
 Delugar Miss W. (C&R)
 Whittaker J.M. (C&R)
 Dreaver A.J.R. (L)
 Savory R.C.F. (C&R)
 Bailey A.E. (C&R)
 Hunter S.H. (C&R)
 Bradley J.N. (L)
 Forsyth G.F.H. (L)
 Robinson D.M. (UI)
 Carpenter J.W.M. (C&R)
 Armishaw E.C. (UI)

KEY

C&R	Citizens' and Ratepayers' Association
Civ Ref	Civic Reform
L	Labour Party
UI	United Independent

Appendix A - Continuation

Councillors 1959-1968

1959

Nov: Armishaw E.C. (Civ.Ref)
 Cumberland K.B. (Civ.Ref)
 Shone A.P.H. (Civ.Ref)
 Bloodworth T. (C&R)
 Deluger Miss W. (C&R)
 Tongue W.M. (C&R)
 Savory R.C.F. (C&R)
 Ambler F.N. (C&R)
 Dreaver Mrs M.M. (Civ.Ref)
 Dreaver A.J.R. (Civ.Ref)
 Beechey H.G. (C&R)
 Dale J.H. (C&R)
 Myers G.E. (C&R)
 Forsyth G.F.H. (Civ.Ref)
 Glass A.O. (C&R)
 Pasmore C.S. (C&R)
 Bradley J.N. (Civ.Ref)
 Tutt G.R. (C&R)
 Watts H.E. (C&R)
 de Malmanche F.H.T. (C&R)
 Parkinson H.W. (C&R)

1961

Feb: By-Election (Bradley decd)
 Chapman Prof. V.J. (C&R)
 Aug: By-election (Mrs M. Dreaver
 decd)
 Jeffreys H.H. (L)

1962

Oct: Bloodworth T. (C&R)
 Tongue W.M. (C&R)
 Deluger Miss W. (C&R)
 Park Sir Keith (C&R)
 Watts H.E. (C&R)
 Dale J.H. (C&R)
 Horton Mrs W.M. (C&R)
 Ambler F.N. (C&R)
 Glasse A.O. (C&R)
 de Malmanche F.H.T. (C&R)
 Armishaw E.C. (Civ.Ref)
 Beechey H.G.St.V. (C&R)
 Tutt G.R. (C&R)
 Dreaver A.J.R. (L)
 Bailey A.E. (C&R)
 Speer N.. (C&R)
 Passmore C.S. (C&R)
 Awatere A. Civ.Ref)
 Pearce T.H. (C&R)
 Forsyth G.F.H. (L)
 Shone A.P.H. (C&R)

1963

Apr: By-election
 (Pearce disqualified
 de Malmanche resigned)
 Pearce T.H. (C&R)
 Grant-Mackie W.C. (Civ.Ref)

1965

Oct: Awatere A. (C&R)
 Park Sir Keith (C&R)
 Pearce T.H. (C&R)
 Glasse A.O. (C&R)
 Bloodworth T. (C&R)
 Beechey H.G. St.V. (C&R)
 Dale J.H. (C&R)
 Horton Mrs W.M. (C&R)
 Watts H.E. (C&R)
 Delugar Miss W. (C&R)
 Tongue W.M. (C&R)
 Littlejohn R.S. (C&R)
 Tutt G.R. (C&R)
 Tronson M.L. (C&R)
 Ambler F.N. (C&R)
 McKinnon I.W. (C&R)
 Armishaw E.C. (Civ.Ref)
 Sussex T.R. (C&R)
 Forsyth G.F.H. (L)
 Dreaver A.J.R. (L)
 Clark W.J.H. (C&R)

1968

Oct: Armishaw E.C. (C&R)
 Awatere A. (C&R)
 Park Sir Keith (C&R)
 Laidlaw A.L. (C&R)
 Deluger Miss W. (C&R)
 Glasse A.O. (C&R)
 Tongue W.M. (C&R)
 Dale J.H. (C&R)
 Holland Mrs W.M. (C&R)
 Watts H.. (C&R)
 McKinnon J.W. (C&R)
 Tronson M.L. (C&R)
 Salmon E.P. (C&R)
 Ambler F.N. (C&R)
 Tutt G.R. (C&R)
 Ferguson R.H.L. (C&R)
 Firth J.R. (C&R)
 Alcorn J.A. (C&R)
 Clark W.J.H. (C&R)
 Dreaver A.J.R. (L)
 Sussex T.R. (C&R)

KEY: C&R Citizens' and Ratepayers' Association
 Civ Ref Civic Reform
 L Labour Party
 UI United Independent

AUCKLAND CITY MAYORAL ELECTIONS 1950 - 19561950

Allum J.A.C. (Ind)	20021
Stewart J.S. (L)	13064
Coakley J.L. (C&R)	6411
Wilcox V. (Com)	541

1953

Luxford J.H.	20201
Allum J.A.C.	18633

1956

Ashby T.W.M.	12017
(Died Sept, 1957)	
Luxford J.H. (C&R)	11274
Stewart J.S. (L)	10333

1957 (Nov)

By-election (Vice T.W.M. Ashby, deceased)

Buttle K.N.	17298
Stewart J.S.	7573
Kirk H..	4906
Curran P.T.	1038
Innes T.S.	97

AUCKLAND CITY MAYORAL ELECTIONS 1959 - 1983

	<u>1959</u>	<u>1962</u>	<u>1965</u>	<u>1968</u>	<u>1971</u>	<u>1974</u>	<u>1977</u>	<u>1980</u>	<u>1983</u>
Robinson	18,980	18,316	15,998	18,484	26,882	19,762	17,773	10,610	3,998
C & R - Buttle	17,941	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
- McElroy	-	-	17,132	12,512	-	-	-	-	-
- Tronson	-	-	-	-	-	-	4,266	-	-
- Horrocks	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	7,717
Labour - Forsyth	-	-	3,373	-	-	-	-	-	-
- Anderton	-	-	-	-	-	12,717	12,140	-	-
- Tizard	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	10,470	11,924
Independents	-	-	-	-	2,696	-	140	248	151
- Faber	-	17,215	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
- Forsyth	-	-	-	1,132	-	-	-	-	-
- Sims	-	-	-	-	-	6,241	-	-	-
- Kay	-	-	-	-	-	-	7,340	12,151	8,935
- Hart	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	-	2,556
<u>TOTAL VALID VOTES</u>	36,921	35,531	36,503	36,128	29,578	38,720	41,659	33,479	35,281

AUCKLAND CITY COUNCIL ELECTIONS - 1986

Robinson contested Remuera Ward.*

Remuera (2 Seats) Results:

J. Stevens	(C&R)	3004
Elizabeth Currey	(C&R)	2792
Marie Quinn		1959
D.M. Robinson		1058
Luke Van Ryn		949

* A ward system was introduced by parliamentary act in 1985

Polling Booth Results for 1959 Mayoral Election

City:	Buttle	Robin-		
Town Hall ..	389	381	Parnell-Epsom:	
Drainage Bd ..	30	82	R.S.C. Rooms ..	131 218
St Andrew's ..	205	155	Library ..	302 247
Hospital ..	45	39	District School ..	358 188
Holy Sepulchre ..	215	199	Blind Institute ..	30 48
Masonic Hall ..	64	121	Grammar ..	89 43
Epiphany Hall, Gun-			Normal School ..	270 191
dry St ..	180	264	St Andrew's ..	403 107
Pitt St Methodist ..	112	160	Convent Hall ..	170 77
St James', Wgtn St ..	73	137	Baptist Hall ..	291 80
Trades Hall ..	74	90	Girls' Grammar ..	266 134
St Thomas', Union St	71	161		
			Remuera:	
Ponsonby-Herne Bay:			St Mark's ..	254 143
School, Curran St ..	30	35	St Luke's ..	317 107
St Stephen's, Jervols Rd	375	382	Innes' Garage ..	159 88
Leys Institute ..	375	615	District School ..	217 60
O'Neill St Hall ..	78	177	Library ..	1093 393
R.S.C. Rooms ..	159	250	Int. School ..	214 170
Richmond Rd School ..	187	312	Somervell Hall ..	878 203
Grotto Hall, Kelmarna			Scout Hall ..	175 104
Ave ..	62	105	Baptist Hall ..	426 233
Bayfield School ..	402	315	St Chad's ..	336 198
			Community Hall ..	49 127
Westmere-Grey Lynn:			Congregational Hall ..	351 193
Tennis Club, West End	63	62	Blomfield's Garage ..	88 64
Dunnottar Memorial				
Hall ..	297	401	Eastern Suburbs:	
Westmere School ..	98	187	Orakel School ..	322 238
R.S.C. Hall ..	192	429	Wm Lange Hall ..	296 317
Baptist Hall ..	76	103	King's Garage ..	21 34
School ..	187	260	Methodist Hall ..	178 70
Library ..	258	383	Tennis Pavilion ..	177 125
Snowden's Garage ..	43	51	Plunket Rooms ..	177 159
Fire Brigade Bandroom	127	222	Kohl School ..	421 136
Cox Art School ..	77	134	St Thomas' Hall ..	249 163
			St Ignatius' Convent ..	208 150
Pt Chevalier:			Collinson's Garage ..	115 98
Methodist Hall, West			St Helliers School ..	324 263
Springs ..	125	133	Presbyterian Hall, St	
R.S.A. ..	262	585	Heliars ..	185 114
Methodist Hall, Moa Rd-	50	88	Tamaki Memorial Hall	262 268
Armstrong's Hall ..	85	130	Redemptionist Library	107 183
School ..	221	289	Claridge's Garage ..	33 86
Baptist Hall ..	163	313	Glendowie School ..	143 278
Gladstone School ..	81	100	Davis' Garage ..	64 130
			Glen Taylor School ..	73 107
Avondale-Blockhouse Bay:			Sacred Heart Hall ..	50 87
Baptist Hall, New			Glen Brae School ..	78 152
North Rd ..	74	81	Youth Centre ..	73 183
Mack's Garage ..	48	75	Pt England School ..	81 194
New Windsor School ..	87	175	Ruapotaka School ..	67 114
Sunset Home ..	25	36	Presbyterian Hall, Pt	
B'hae Bay School ..	43	140	England ..	80 164
Improvement Hall ..	183	623	Glen Innes School ..	72 202
Glenavon School ..	84	294	Hedlund's Garage ..	44 60
St Ninian's Hall ..	134	287		
Avondale School ..	110	234		
Victoria Hall ..	159	185		
Avondale College ..	53	157		
Methodist Hall, Fir St	145	323		
Community Hall ..	66	191		

Source: A.C.C. Returning Officer/New Zealand Herald.

Polling Booth Results for 1962 Mayoral Election

City	Robin- son	Faber					
Town Hall	467	387	Cox Art School	103	53	Innes' Garage	88 182
Drainage Bd	43	35	Pt Chevalier			Blomfield's Garage	86 74
St Andrew's	143	162	Methodist Hall,			Immanuel Hall	310 493
Hospital	52	59	Western Springs	114	71	District School	95 197
St David's	217	181	RSA Rooms	479	272	Library	560 1096
Epiphany Hall,			Methodist Hall,			Int. School	192 185
Gundry St	188	111	Moa Rd	118	42	Somervell Hall	243 516
Pitt St Methodist	189	133	Armstrong's Hall	161	81	Scout Hall	243 516
St James', Wgtn St	123	80	School	311	201	Baptist Hall	253 454
ATB office, Welles-			Baptist Hall	241	148	St Chad's	241 422
ley St	66	34	Gladstone School	95	60	Community Hall	124 55
St Thomas', Union			Avondale-Blockhouse			Orakei-Mission Bay	
St	125	56	Anderson's Garage,			Orakei School	267 304
Ponsonby-Herne Bay			Methuen Rd	109	62	Wm Lange Hall	492 359
St Stephen's, Jer-			N. Windsor School	194	140	Methodist Hall	124 170
vois Rd	378	335	Sunset Home	54	28	Tennis Pavilion	186 103
Leys Institute	610	344	B'hse Bay School	329	262	Presbyterian Hall,	
O'Neill St Hall	135	65	Baptist Hall	225	168	Kohl. Rd	206 178
RSC Rooms	175	96	Intermed. School	54	28	Kohl. School	177 228
Church of Christ			Glenavon School	338	154	St Thomas' School	220 317
Hall	82	37	St Ninian's Hall	257	156	St Hellers-Glendowie	
Richmond Rd			Avondale School	251	159	St Ignatius Convent	160 182
School	287	142	Victoria Hall	181	79	Lonsdale - Cooper's	
Grotto Hall, Kel-			Avondale College	106	74	Garage	88 146
marna Ave	108	31	Methodist Hall, Fir			St Hellers School	291 380
Bayfield School	382	378	St	217	190	Presbyterian Hall	97 146
Westmere-Grey Lynn			Community Hall	251	61	Tamaki Mem. Hall	221 346
Tennis Club, West			Paraei-Epsom			Redemptionist Lib.	184 172
End	66	76	RSC Rooms	205	113	Brown's Garage	86 101
Dunottar Mem-			Library	218	299	Glendowie School	225 189
orial Hall	398	271	District School	220	377	Glendowie College	127 85
Westmere School	195	85	Blind Institute	49	44	Tamaki	
RSC Hall	374	203	Grammar	71	162	Glen Taylor School	320 152
Baptist Hall	59	74	Normal School	198	285	Riechelmann's Gar.	81 89
School	224	136	St Andrew's	170	381	Glen Brae School	158 40
Library	400	257	Convent Hall	117	131	Youth Centre	157 84
Wilkinson's Hall,			Baptist Hall	104	187	Pt England School	166 57
Crummer Rd	88	38	Girls' Grammar	118	255	Ruapotaka School	92 31
Geo. Boyce & Son,			Remuera			Presbyterian Hall	148 67
Ltd. Showroom	168	92	St Mark's	156	236	Glen Innes School	176 77
			St Luke's	150	293	Hedlund's Garage	68 66

Source: A.C.C. Returning Officer/New Zealand Herald

Polling Booth Results for 1965 Mayoral Election

City	McElroy	Robinson	Forayth	Int. Sch.		
Town Hall	286	359	80	Bolton St	84	41 4
Drainage Div.				Chaucer School	52	36 18
Quay St	19	31	13	Baptist Hall	132	177 33
St Andrew's	129	117	24	Glenavon School	159	258 49
Hospital	51	23	8	St Ninian's	132	214 50
St David's	143	150	50	Avondale School	141	204 49
Pitt St Meth.	73	100	45	Avondale College	85	121 22
Beresford School	32	30	39	Victoria Hall	124	140 30
Union St	39	81	29	McGuiness	29	25 2
Transport Div.	15	41	8	Methodist Hall	109	184 60
Ponsonby-Herne Bay				Waterview Sch.	84	172 55
Leys Institute	284	470	134	Farnell-Epsom		
Jervois Rd	263	280	58	R.S.C., P'nell Rd	74	123 46
Ponsonby Hall	31	53	22	Library	294	178 35
R.S.C. Rooms	89	144	48	Parnell School	340	215 27
Ch. Christ Hall	32	70	13	Blind Foundation	38	33 13
Richmond School	124	232	77	Auck. Grammar	151	49 4
Grotto Hall	57	84	29	Epsom School	289	237 31
Bayfield School	339	351	48	St Andrew's	332	184 14
Westmere-Grey Lynn-Arch Hill				Convent Hall	108	103 7
W. End Tennis	53	69	15	Baptist Hall	184	106 2
Dunnottar Hall	279	335	82	Girls' Grammar	217	123 9
Westmere School	78	137	46	Remuera		
R.S.C. Hall	157	229	84	St Mark's	185	114 14
Baptist Hall	82	84	31	St Luke's	212	110 19
Grey Lynn Sch.	126	143	55	Innes Garage	176	65 15
Library	219	335	107	Bloomfield's	78	63 21
Maney's Garage	35	69	16	Immanuel Hall	802	272 24
Testing Station	72	102	30	Remuera School	180	67 11
Western-Springs-Pt Chevallier				Library	969	486 59
Methodist Hall				Int. School	179	139 36
West. Springs	104	84	25	Somervell	439	222 18
R.S.C. Club	227	403	113	Scout Hall	253	134 14
Moa Rd Hall	45	93	41	North Mem. Hall	414	265 20
Rugby League	108	132	35	St Chad's	428	269 19
Pt Chev. School	173	227	73	Meadowb'k Kind.	78	77 30
Baptist Hall				Orakei-Mission Bay-Kohimarama		
Formby Av.	125	269	64	Orakei School	328	246 44
Gladstone School	69	94	15	St James'	260	322 68
Avondale-Blockhouse Ray				Methodist Hall	149	127 18
Anderson Garage	106	116	21	Tennis Club	163	127 19
James Garage	37	47	6	Presbyterian Hall,		
N. Windsor Sch.	259	298	53	Kohl'ma Rd	204	152 10
Soccer Pavilion				Kohl'ma School	244	183 7
Whitney St	38	42	13	St Thomas Sch.	338	212 22
Sunset Home	36	66	4	St Thom. Hall	281	188 11
R'house Bay Sch.	221	310	61	St Hellera-Glendowie		
				St Ignatius	177	169 23
				St Hellera Sch.	403	303 30
				Pres. Hall	240	111 11
				Tamaki Hall	839	264 19
				Redemptorist		
				Library	133	174 28
				Brown's Garage	57	50 8
				Glendowie Sch.	218	166 15
				Glendowie Col.	100	104 14
				Tamaki		
				Glen Taylor Sch.	310	207 42
				Riechelmann's	92	116 19
				Glen Brae Sch.	42	113 36
				Tamaki College	54	57 39
				Pt England Sch.	55	97 39
				Ruapotaka Sch.	44	54 17
				Pres Hall	65	124 44
				Glen Innes Sch.	83	138 45
				Hedlund's Garage	57	51 16

Source: A.C.C. Returning Officer/New Zealand Herald.

Polling Booth Results for 1968 Mayoral Election

City	McElroy	Robinson	Forsyth			
Parnell - Epsom						
RSC, Parnell Rd	52	137	7			
Library	229	204	6			
Parnell Sch.	246	244	11			
Blind Fndtn	38	50	2			
Auck. Grammar	102	71	6			
Epsom Sch.	283	289	9			
St Andrew's	294	203	4			
Convent Hall	55	76	—			
Baptist Hall	137	93	2			
Girls' Gram.	187	105	4			
Remuera						
St Mark's	104	120	9			
St Luke's	159	103	9			
Innes Garage	135	108	7			
Blomfield's	69	113	14			
B'Nai B'Rith	415	348	13			
King's School	201	154	6			
Remuera School	128	111	10			
Library	20	584	41			
Rem. Int. sch.	116	170	9			
Somervell Hall	314	264	10			
Scout Hall	158	170	2			
Nth Mem. Hall	366	322	14			
St Chad's	375	328	22			
M'bank Kind.	59	115	4			
Orakei-mission Bay - Kohi-						
marama						
Orakei School	235	313	18			
St James'	186	327	15			
Meth. Hall	146	127	4			
Tea's Club	78	112	3			
Kohi. School	229	215	10			
St Thomas' Sch.	380	366	16			
St Thomas' Hall	164	206	10			
St Heliers-Glendowie						
St Ignatius	140	148	17			
St Heliers Sch.	384	445	20			
Pres. Hall	136	133	5			
Tamaki Hall	234	354	13			
Redem'ist Lib.	126	217	10			
Brown's Garage	39	38	3			
Glendowie Sch.	216	291	10			
Glendowie Col.	65	127	10			
Tamaki						
Glen. T. Sch.	181	330	34			
Parker's Gar.	43	76	2			
Glen Brae Sch.	30	125	10			
Tamaki Col.	33	102	7			
Pt Eng. Sch.	45	162	15			
Ruapotaka Sch.	31	81	9			
Pres. Hall	66	133	11			
Glen Brae Sch.	30	125	10			
Hedlund's Gar.	40	40	2			
City						
Admin. Building	175	298	17			
St Andrew's	95	94	7			
Hospital	9	14	1			
St David's	59	121	19			
Pitt St Meth.	47	95	5			
Beresford Sch.	19	80	10			
Napier St Sch.	16	57	2			
Regional House	14	36	4			
Ponsonby - Herne Bay						
Leys Inst.	184	502	48			
Jervois Rd	178	226	13			
Ponsonby Hall	11	53	2			
RSC Rooms	67	166	11			
Ch. Christ Hall	18	44	3			
Richmond Sch.	71	211	20			
Grotto Hall	23	67	4			
Bayfield Sch.	286	401	25			
Westmere - Grey Lynn -						
Arch Hill						
W. End Tennis	25	48	2			
Dunnotar Hall	210	446	24			
Westmere Sch	41	154	12			
RSC Hall	103	310	28			
Baptist Hall	41	60	10			
G. Lynn Sch.	82	192	18			
Library	118	382	45			
Maney's Gar.	11	56	5			
Test. Stn	19	71	6			
Western Springs, Pt Chevallier						
Meth. Hl. W. Spgs	52	99	8			
RSC Club	142	480	30			
Mea Rd Hall	18	92	10			
Rugby League	74	151	1			
Pt Chev. Sch.	148	274	11			
Bapt. Hall						
Formby Ave	102	252	14			
Gladstone Sch.	36	89	6			
Avondale - Blackhouse Bay						
Moorcroft's, New						
Windsor Rd	81	206	4			
James Garage	33	33	3			
N. Windsor Sch.	81	470	25			
Soccer Pav.						
Whitney St	72	79	4			
Sunset Home	60	47	5			
B'house B. Sch.	162	425	31			
Int. Sch.						
Bolton St	42	55	1			
Chaucer Sch.	29	85	4			
Baptist Hall	89	178	12			
Glenavon Sch.	41	333	22			
St Ninian's	94	181	16			
Avondale Sch	99	305	14			
Avondale Coli	53	158	11			
Victoria Hall	81	204	14			
Kenley Pl. G'ge	33	65	10			
Meth. Hall	112	273	20			
Waterview Sch.	51	181	12			

Source: A.C.C. Returning Officer/New Zealand Herald.

APPENDIX B

ARA Membership and Voting Returns

<u>Local Authority Wards</u>	<u>Estimated Population</u> (1.4.63)
Auckland City	146,200
Birkenhead Borough	8,630
Devonport Borough	10,950
Ellerslie Borough	4,430
East Coast Bays Borough	10,400
Franklin County	18,500
Glen Eden Borough	5,620
Helensville Borough	1,240
Henderson Borough	4,580
Howick Borough	7,390
Manukau County	36,000
Manurewa Borough	13,550
Mount Albert Borough	26,100
Mount Eden Borough	18,300
Mount Roskill Borough	32,200
Mount Wellington Borough	17,250
New Lynn Borough	9,280
Newmarket Borough	1,780
Northcote Borough	6,280
One Tree Hill Borough	12,900
Onehunga Borough	16,350
Otahuhu Borough	8,810
Papakura Borough	9,490
Papatoetoe Borough	19,400
Pukekohe Borough	6,300
Rodney County	6,920
Takapuna City	21,400
Tuakau Borough	1,600
Waiheke Road Board	2,060
Waitemata County	62,600
Warkworth Town	1,060
Waiuku Borough	1,650
	<hr/>
	549,220

Source: Government Statistician
Population Figures as at the time of the
ARA establishment.

MEMBERS OF THE AUCKLAND REGIONAL AUTHORITY ESTABLISHMENT COMMITTEEOCTOBER 1960 - OCTOBER 1962

<u>NAME</u>	<u>REPRESENTING</u>
ROBINSON D.M.	Auckland City Council
BEAUMONT H.	Manurewa Borough Council
BENNETT R.W.	Franklin County Council
BLOODWORTH Hon. T.	Auckland Metropolitan Drainage Board
CHILDS S.C.	Pukekohe Borough Council
CROCOMBE A.C.	Birkenhead Borough Council
CUMBERLAND K.B.	Auckland Regional Planning Authority from July 1961
DICKINSON P.G.	Mount Eden Borough Council
ELSMORE L.	Ellerslie Borough Council
GREVILLE R.H.	East Coast Bays Borough Council
HAY K.W.	Mount Roskill Borough Council
HENDERSON W.H.	Takapuna City Council
HOLDAWAY E.A.	Auckland Regional Planning Authority until March 1961
HUTCHINSON T.P.	Taukau Borough Council Died May 1961.
JENKINS T.O.L.	Rodney County Council
LAMBIE H.D.	Manukau County Council
LOCKYER A.H.	Tuakau Borough Council from July 1961
MACK I.G.	Papakura Borough Council
MANNING L.A.	Onehunga Borough Council
MCCULLOCH R.M.	Mount Wellington Borough Council
MILNE F.W.L.	One Tree Hill Borough Council
MURDOCH J.D.	Otahuhu Borough Council
MURDOCH L.I.	Papatoetoe Borough Council
NOALL S.R.	New Lynn Borough Council
PORTER J.F.	Glen Eden Borough Council
POTTER J.F.	Northcote Borough Council
SPENCER N.B.	Auckland Transport Board
STEVENS A.J.	Waitemata County Council
STEVENS F.S.	Devonport Borough Council
STEVENSON W.A.	Howick Borough Council
TURNER F.G.	Mt. Albert Borough Council

<u>NAME</u>	<u>REPRESENTING</u>
WATERS A.F.	Warkworth Town Council
WEST A.B.	Helensville Borough Council
WHITE F.	Newmarket Borough Council
WHITESIDE R.S.	Waiuku Borough Council
WILSHER F.G.	Henderson Borough Council
WOODALL C.F.	North Shore Drainage Board
WOTTON L.M.T.	Helensville Borough Council until March 1961.

NEW MEMBERS FROM NOVEMBER 1962 - NOVEMBER 1963

ASHBY R.G.	Otahuhu Borough Council vice J.D. Murdoch
BELL A.T.	Ellerslie Borough Council vice L. Elsmore
GLASSE A.O.	Auckland Regional Planning Authority vice K.B. Cumberland
HADDRELL W.H.	Howick Borough Council vice W.A. Stevenson
HOLDAWAY E.A.	Northcote Borough Council vice J.F. Potter
LAWRIE C.W.J.	Pukekohe Borough Council vice S.C. Childs
McGUIRE G.A.	Tuakau Borough Council vice A.H. Lockyer
STREDWICK W.S.	East Coast Bays Borough Council vice R.H. Greville
TURNER E.W.	Mt Eden Borough Council vice P.G. Dickinson

ARA MEMBERSHIP 1965 - 1968

AUCKLAND CITY AND WAIHEKE

Allsopp-Smith J.	(C&R)
Johns A.C.	(C&R)
McKinnon I.W.	(C&R)
Pearce T.H.	(C&R)
* Robinson D.M.	(I)
Turner A.R.	(C&R)

MANUKAU CITY

* Beaumont H.
Lambie H.D.

WAITEMATA COUNTY AND HELENSVILLE

Gardiner N.F.
Souter W.B.

BIRKENHEAD

* Crocombe A.C.

DEVONPORT

* Stevens F.S.

EAST COAST BAYS

* Stredwick W.S.

ELLERSLIE

* Bell A.T.D.

FRANKLIN COUNTY, WAIUKU AND TUAKAU BOROUGHES

* Bennett R.W.

GLEN EDEN

Berg B.G.

HENDERSON

Keeling R.A.

HOWICK

McDonald G.S.R.

MOUNT ALBERT

* Turner F.G.

MOUNT EDEN

Mills R.C.

* Denotes a member of the ARA Establishment Committee.
21 members of the ARA November 1963-1965 who sought re-election were successful.

ARA Membership 1965-1968 Continued.

MOUNT ROSKILL

Pinches E.

MOUNT WELLINGTON

* McCullough R.M.

NEW LYNN

* Noall S.R.

NEWMARKET

* White W.

NORTHCOTE

* Holdaway E.A.

ONEHUNGA

* Manning L.A.

ONE TREE HILL

Andrews L.E.A.

OTAHUHU

Beddingfield A.T.

PAPAKURA

Cox H.

PAPATOETOE

* Murdoch L.I.

PUKEKOHE

* Lawrie C.W.J.

RODNEY COUNTY AND WARKWORTH TOWN

Jackson A.M.

TAKAPUNA

Wilcox R.H.D.

* Denotes a member of the ARA Establishment Committee.
 21 members of the ARA November 1963-1965 who sought
 re-election were successful.

1983 ARA ELECTIONS

AUCKLAND, WAIHEKE, MOUNT EDEN, NEWMARKET

Ferguson R.H.L.	CRND
Kay C.M.	IND
Firth J.R.	CRND
Collinge J.G.	CRND
Wilson L.	L
Rogers T.V.	CRND

MANAKAU, PAPAURA, HOWICK

Elsmore Sir L.	ND
Curtis B.J.	RR
Cooper M.T.	ND
Lewis N.	RR
Malcolm F.	ND
Barber F.C.	RR

MOUNT ROSKILL, MOUNT ALBERT

Hay K.W.	RCAND
Magness R.J.	IND

MOUNT WELLINGTON, ELLERSLIE

Shaw I.A.	L
-----------	---

NORTHCOTE, BIRKENHEAD

Stott G.E.	ND
------------	----

ONEHUNGA, ONE TREE HILL

Beeson T.V.G.	UIND
---------------	------

PAPATOETOE, OTAHUHU

Brewster A.W.	ND
---------------	----

PUKEKOHE, FRANKLIN, TUAKAU, WAIUKU

Short M.R.	I
Olson D.E.	ND

RODNEY, HELENSVILLE

Clapham P.	I
Lonquet-Higgins T.	I

TAKAPUNA, EAST COAST BAYS, DEVONPORT

Sampson J.	NSCRND
Thomas A..	NSCRND
Durbin B.	NSCRND
McCulloch A.M.	NSCRND

WAITEMATA, GELN EDEN, HENDERSON, NEW LYNN

Shadbolt T.R.
Covic A.
Berg B.K.

KEY

CRND	Citizens' and Ratepayers' and New Deal
I	Independent
IND	Independent and New Deal
ND	New Deal
NSCRND	North Shore Combined Ratepayers' and New Deal
RCAND	Roskill Community Association and New Deal
RR	Residents and Ratepayers
UIND	United Independents and New Deal

1986 ARA ELECTIONS

AUCKLAND CENTRAL		
Tauroa H.		RR
BIRKENHEAD		
Sampson J.		RR
EDEN		
Bullock I.		RR
EAST COAST BAYS		
Cholmondeley-Smith D.		RR
FRANKLIN		
Olsen D.		RR
GLENFIELD		
Creighton N.		TT
MANGERE		
Pettit J.		RR
MANUREWA		
Walsh N.		RR
MOUNT ALBERT		
Magness R.		RR
NEW LYNN		
McCorquindale J.		I
NORTHERN MAORI		
Norman W.		
NORTH SHORE		
Bradley I		UI
(Unsuccessful: Thomas F. RR)		
ONEHUNGA		
Henderson L		RR
OTARA		
Hieatt J.		RR
PAKURANGA		
Lewis N.		R & R

KEY: I Independent
 RR Regional Ratepayers
 R&R Residents and Ratepayers

1986 ARA Elections - Continued

PANMURE		
Shaw I.		L
PAPAKURA		
Hawkins D.P.		(unopposed)
PAPATOETOE		
Brewster A.		RR
REMUERA		
Ferguson L.		UI
RODNEY		
Clapham P.		I
ROSKILL		
Hay K.		UI
TAMAKI		
Kay C.		RR
TE ATATU		
Shadbolt T.		TT
WAITAKERE		
Berg B.		(unopposed)
WEST AUCKLAND		
Taylor G.		TT
WESTERN MAORI		
Minhinnick N.		(unopposed)

KEY:

I	Independent
L	Labour
RR	Regional Ratepayers
TT	Tim's Team
UI	United Independents

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