Ungentlemanly Warfare:

The Impact of Irregular Warfare on Military Strategy in the New Zealand Wars

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Abstract

'Ungentlemanly Warfare' examines the impact of irregular warfare on strategic thinking in the New Zealand Wars (1845–1872). Britain entered the period as an eighteenth-century force reliant on European methods of war. In contrast, Māori were an experienced bushfighting force depleted on manpower but experiencing a period of military innovation. This interaction led to an important exchange of strategic ideology and methods.

This thesis tracks how Māori, British, and colonial forces developed and exchanged irregular warfare practices across three regions and time periods. The Northern War exposed the shortcomings of conventional military conduct. Māori leadership altered their strategic approach and pursued a strategy of elastic offence. In contrast, British leadership persisted with their ineffective conventional means of warfare. In the Waikato War, British strategy was influenced by the success of colonial irregulars. British strategic and operational methods changed with the inclusion of multi-echelon warfare and the indirect approach. Kīngitanga leadership improved their combat capacity through guerrilla warfare, decentralised command, and a grand strategy of elastic offence. The Taranaki and West Coast campaigns highlighted the relationship between use of irregular warfare and military success in New Zealand. Both sides experienced success and failure across numerous conflicts, the defining factor being active use of irregular warfare. These case studies reveal the significance of irregular warfare strategies and tactics to military success in

colonial New Zealand. They also reveal opportunities and challenges to military adaptation in Māori, British, and colonial martial cultures of the nineteenth century.

'Ungentlemanly Warfare' provides a unique approach to the examination of the New Zealand Wars conflict. It is an operational history that draws upon methods and aspects of the 'war and society' approach to military history, especially the use of Māori scholarship, evidence, and theory. The thesis' chapters consider strategic and tactical decision making across the numerous conflicts within the period. To do so, I provide close readings of primary evidence, including military communication and reports, early histories, and first-person accounts, to identify the roles of irregular warfare and strategic adaptions in the New Zealand Wars.

'Ungentlemanly Warfare' analyses the impact of irregular warfare on the strategic thinking of military leaders within the New Zealand Wars. I argue that irregular warfare strategies and tactics played a significantly larger role in the outcome of events than previously acknowledged. This study illustrates the importance of guerrilla warfare and the strategy of elastic offense to Māori strategy. In contrast, it highlights the evolution of British military thinking from conventional conservatism to a multi-echelon force lead by irregular warfare units and tactics. 'Ungentlemanly Warfare' argues that irregular warfare was central to military conflicts in nineteenth-century New Zealand.

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List of Figures

List of Tables

Contents

Introduction: Irregular Warfare and the New Zealand Wars

At 2 pm on February 14th, 1864, a party of British soldiers from the 40th and 50th regiments were ambushed whilst bathing in the Mangapiko River by an estimated 100 Kīngitanga partisans.[1] The Kingite partisans were fortified within an old pā site and fired upon the British regulars from a protected position within the thick native bush.[2] Lieutenant Colonel Havelock attempted to rally the under-fire contingent, but a significant fear of bushfighting against Māori toa had developed amongst British regulars, and they refused to engage the enemy.[3] Gustavus von Tempsky and the Forest Rangers, (an elite irregular warfare unit) reinforced Havelock's precarious position.[4] The Rangers were experienced in bushfighting and decentralized command. Von Tempsky's unit outflanked the Kingites' position by navigating thick bush and crossing the Mangapiko River, before fighting uphill against the entrenched Kingites in melee combat.[5] The Rangers routed the 100-strong taua before escorting the British regulars to relative safety at camp. Lt. Col. Havelock's report to British High Command spoke highly of the Rangers' 'discipline under fire, skillset within the bush, ability to locate and pursue hidden Kingites and their officer's coolness under pressure'.[6] British Officers did not appreciate their

[1] Neville Ritchie, *The Waikato War of 1863–64: A Guide to the Main Events and Sites* (Hamilton: Department of Conservation, 2007), p.22.
[2] R.C. Mainwaring to Colonial Secretary, 12 February 1864, *AJHR*, 1864, E-3, p.26.
[3] John Featon, *The Waikato War 1863-1864* (Christchurch: Kiwi Publishers, 1996), p.50.
[4] *New Zealand Gazette*, no.5, 15 February 1864, pp.51–53.
[5] Lieutenant-Colonel Havelock to Colonel Waddy, 12 February 1864, *AJHR*, 1864, E-3, p.24.
[6] Featon quotes Lt. Colonel Havelock's official report. Featon. p.51

disorderliness or lack of command chain, but their effectiveness in bush conflict was beyond doubt.

This anecdote records the strategic effectiveness of irregular warfare units in Aotearoa New Zealand's colonial setting. This thesis explores the development of irregular warfare in colonial New Zealand and its inclusion in strategy across two decades of conflict between Imperial Britain, colonial settlers, and Māori.

Figure 1: Gustavus Ferdinand Von Tempsky's famous painting of the Ranger's actions during the Ambush of Mangapiko highlights the rough and steep terrain his unit was so proficient within; Accessed from, Richard Stowers, 'Von Tempsky and the Forest Rangers', ***History of the Forest Rangers during the New Zealand Wars*** **(Richard Stowers, 2012), p.1.**

'Ungentlemanly Warfare' analyses irregular warfare in the New Zealand Wars with a specific focus on the evolution of strategic thinking in the colonial setting. It contributes to the field of military history, the sub-discipline of studies of irregular warfare, and the New Zealand Wars historiography. 'Ungentlemanly Warfare'

draws upon a variety of primary and secondary evidence including firsthand accounts and academic commentaries to identify instances of irregular warfare and consider their impact on military strategic thinking. Irregular warfare is any strategic response, tactic, unit, or idea that fits outside conventional military doctrine and is typically utilized in asymmetrical conflict.[7] This thesis emphasizes that the use of irregular warfare, its framework and relevant sub-terms, including but not limited to partisan warfare, and guerrilla warfare are referent to their nineteenth-century legal and theoretical definitions.[8] Modern irregular warfare theory is defined as politically motivated state on non-state conflict, a reflection of armed conflict in today's societies.[9]

The asymmetrical nature of colonial conflict in New Zealand required military leaders to be strategically innovative and open to change. In Aotearoa, the New Zealand Wars pitched a European power against a decentralised tribal Indigenous people. The significant disparities in numeric and technological strength

[7] Asymmetric Warfare is conflict which involves opposing forces whose relative military power, strategy, or tactics differ significantly; Martin Kitzen, 'Operations in Irregular Warfare', *Handbook of Military Sciences* (2020), 1-21 <https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-02866-4_81-1>; James A. Russell, 'Asymmetrical Warfare: Today's Challenge to U.S. Military Power', *Naval War College* 57.19 (2004); 'Conventional Warfare is commonly agreed to be state-on-state conflict between organized, uniformed, professional military forces using massed firepower in open space away from civilians with the aim of destroying each other to gain and hold ground.'; Sandor Fabian, 'Irregular versus Conventional Warfare: A Dichotomous Misconception', *Modern War Institute* (2021) <https://mwi.westpoint.edu/irregular-versus-conventional-warfare-a-dichotomous-misconception/> [accessed 30 July 2023].

[8] Mackey concluded that commentary on nineteenth-century irregular warfare has been inadequate due to a lack of analysis on the interactions between the regular army and irregular units, alongside twenty-first-century military concepts being applied without consideration for nineteenth-century military theory; Robert Mackey, *The Uncivil War: Irregular Warfare in the Upper South, 1861–1865* (Oklahoma: University of Oklahoma Press, 2014) p.5.

[9] Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, JP 1 (Washington, DC, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017) I-6; Kitzen, p.2; Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Counterterrorism*, JP 3-26 (Washington, DC; Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2009) I-2.

meant conflict could not be fought effectively through either side's conventional means.[10] This thesis examines the challenges of asymmetric colonial conflict and the resulting irregular warfare adaptations incorporated by military leaders during the New Zealand Wars. The thesis explores case studies from the Northern, Waikato, and Taranaki Wars. In this work, irregular warfare encompasses all aspects of military conflict which differ or diverge from an organisation's conventional military doctrine.[11] Its definitions of 'regular' or 'conventional' warfare consider British and Māori cultural terminology and values.

Both British and Māori strategists utilized military methods recognisable as irregular warfare, predating the major academic theories using this terminology in the twentieth century.[12] This thesis draws significantly upon military concepts espoused by European military theorists but does not suggest coloniser-centric conceptual knowledge is the sole or most adequate form of analysis within colonial

[10] Up until the engagement at Paterangi, major British wins through conventional methods were little more than Pyrrhic victories presented as decisive wins for political gain; James Belich, *New Zealand Wars and The Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2013), p. 82.
[11] Kitzen, 2020.
[12] Calum Swears in his master's Thesis 'The Waikato Invasion 1863-64: A Counter-insurgency Approach' argued that despite counterinsurgency not being a 'specific phrase or term explicitly used by either the British or Māori at the time… it is evident in the actions and strategies used by both to either suppress rebellion or resist invasion.' Calum Swears, 'The Waikato Invasion 1863-64: A Counter-insurgency Approach' (MA Thesis, University of Waikato, 2022), p.8.

conflict.[13] The application of non-indigenous concepts is a recognised limitation of the analysis.[14]

Military History Historiography

The academic field of irregular warfare is a sub-discipline of the expanding field of military history. Military history is the study of armed conflict throughout human history and its impact on societies, cultures, organisations, economies, and relationships.[15] The field focuses on the causes of war, societal and cultural backgrounds, military doctrines, leadership, strategy, innovations, tactics, logistics, and political goals, and how these change over time.[16] Military history has been the reflection of events in armed conflict dating back to the war between Sumer and Elam in 2700 BC, Homer's 'Iliad' of the Trojan Wars and the commentaries of Julius Caesar's campaigns 'Commentarii de Bello Gallico' (58BC-49BC).[17] Up until the twentieth century, military history was a political and militaristic tool. The dominant literature was commonly produced by the victors of conflict to justify their actions, glorify leaders, and provide internal propaganda.[18] Alongside highlighting the

[13] It is crucially important we acknowledge the need to view events of the past through both colonial and indigenous perspectives. Linda Tuhiwai Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples* (Dunedin, London and New York: University of Otago Press/Zed Books, 1999); Nēpia Mahuika, 'New Zealand History is Māori History: Tikanga as the Ethical Foundations of Historical Scholarship in Aotearoa New Zealand', *New Zealand Journal of History*, 49.1 (2015), pp. 9-10.

[14] Nēpia Mahuika and Māori scholars have highlighted the issues of New Zealand history being presented through one lens. Nēpia Mahuika 'Closing the Gaps: From Post-colonialism to Kūpapa Māori and Beyond', *New Zealand Journal of History*, 45.1 (2011), pp. 15-32.

[15] Stephen Morillo and Michael F. Pavkovic, *What Is Military History?* (Cambridge: Polity, 2006), pp.4-8.

[16] Jeremy Black, *Rethinking Military History*. (New York: Routledge, 2004), pp.6-8.

[17] Jonas Grethlein 'From "Imperishable Glory' to History: The *Iliad* and the Trojan War' *Epic and History,* 8 (2009), pp.122-144; William Hamblin, *Warfare in the ancient Near East to 1600 BC: Holy warriors at the dawn of history* (Utah: Routledge, 2006).

[18] Matthew Gabriele, and David M. Perry. *The Bright Ages* (New York: Harper Collins Books, 2021) pp. 1-5.

success, and neglecting the horrors of conflict, early military history was largely a reflection of events, rather than thoughtful analysis.[19]

Modern military history has developed into a significant discipline of history that finely examines conflict and considers the wider influences and consequences of warfare.[20] A turning point in this development was the Napoleonic Wars (1803-1815) and the emergence of two key military theorists, Carl von Clausewitz, and Baron Antoine Jomini. Clausewitz and Jomini were both veterans of the conflict and wrote extensively on the theory of war, merging military strategy and academia.[21] Clausewitz argued that war was directly tied to politics and policy and conceptualized the idea that war was the continuation of policy when non-violent means failed to achieve the desired outcome.[22] Specifically, Clausewitz wrote 'War is not merely a political act, but a real political instrument, a continuation of the political process, an application by other means.'[23] Clausewitz also developed the 'Purpose, Goals, and Means' approach to the academic consideration of war. This

[19] Particularly during the early medieval period, as seen in the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, and Chronicle of the Franks; Gabriele, and Perry, pp.75-77.
[20] Modern History has expanded to include consideration of non-combats, societal & cultural influences, combat goals, and the influence of politics; See Michael Drake, 'Problematics of Military Power' *Discipline, Government and the Subject of Violence, from Ancient Rome to Early Modernity* (London: Routledge, 2001).
[21] Carl von Clausewitz served a Major General in the Prussian and Russian Army's; Christopher Bassford, *Clausewitz in English: The Reception of Clausewitz in Britain and America* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994). Timothy McCranor, 'On the Pedagogical Intent of Clausewitz's On War' *MCU Journal* 9.1, (2018) pp.133-154; Antoine Jomini served as a Brigadier General in the Swiss, French, and Russian Army's. Jomini also won the Legion of Honor Cross serving in Napoleon's HQ company. Peter Parat, Gordon A. Craig, and Felix Gilbert *Makers of Modern Strategy: From Machiavelli to the Nuclear Age* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1986).
[22] Carl Von Clausewitz, *Carl von Clausewitz: On War,* Vol I. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007), pp.22-24; Azar Gat 'A History of Military Thought' *From the Enlightenment to the Cold War* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2001) p. 125.
[23] Clausewitz p.24.

method presumed the purpose of war to be the enforcement of a will or desire determined by politics. Clausewitz wrote that the goal of conflict is the sufficient defeat of the enemy to enforce the purpose, and the means of conflict is the method used in pursuit of the goal.[24] Clausewitz proposed that in any conflict, the side with the stronger emotional and political motivations was more likely to achieve their purpose, delving into the role of morale in combat.[25] His counterpart Jomini's work focused on the improvement of military leaders through strategic theory. Jomini examined warfare beyond policy and considered the broader aspects of a campaign including, logistics, sea power, and grand strategy.[26] His theories aimed to inform military leadership and proved useful to future historians examining nineteenth-century conflict.[27]

Military history experienced significant change throughout the twentieth century as multiple trends emerged in response to major global conflicts. Following the First World War and the Second World War (1914-1918; 1939-1945) military commentary was typically produced by servicemen or veterans.[28] 'The face of battle' approach, championed by John Keegan, prioritised narrative commentary of conventional tactics employed during combat and emphasized that non-military

[24] See, Jeremy Black, 'Revolutionary and Napoleonic Warfare', *European Warfare 1453–1815* (London: Macmillan Publishers, 1999) pp.224-228.
[25] Clausewitz, pp. 30-34.
[26] See, Baron de Jomini, *The Art of War,* trans. by GH Mendell and WP Craighill (Radford: Wilder Publications, 2008) (1862).
[27] Jomini's work was highly respected, and until the US Civil War, Jomini was the sole military theorist taught at West Point academy. John Whiteclay Chambers and Fred Anderson, *The Oxford Companion to American Military History* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1999), p. 720.
[28] See Jeremy Black, 2004, pp. 18-24.

personal had a 'lack of reality, a certain hollowness' to their commentary on military history.[29] 'The face of battle;' approach struggled to gain traction because it relied on a top-down methodology.[30] Jeremy Black critiqued this trend's tendency to determine an army's fighting quality solely by the ability of its commanders, highlighting the limitations of commentary produced within the military fold.[31]

Operational history evolved from the face of battle approach as the field became more academically inclined, and historians sought to examine the causes and effects of historic conflicts. Operational commentaries focused on entire wars or campaigns to examine the strategic and tactical means required to succeed and how decisions impacted armies over a period.[32] This focus broadened to include detailed commentaries ranging from the role of cavalry in conflict to proposed methodologies of success in war.[33]

Twenty-first-century military history has developed further through the influence of fields such as gender history, Indigenous history, social history, and political history.[34] This interdisciplinary approach has 'de-militarized' military

[29] John Keegan, *The Face of Battle: A Study of Agincourt, Waterloo, and the Somme* (Penguin Publishing, 1983); Other key examples of this approach include Ann Hyland, *The Horse in the Ancient World* (Michigan: Praeger, 2003), pp. 75–77; Gregory Daly. *Cannae: The Experience of Battle in the Second Punic War* (London: Routledge, 2002), pp. 203–204.
[30] Black, 2004, pp.18-20.
[31] Black. 2004, pp.21-23.
[32] Key examples include Jeremy Black*, Why Wars Happen* (Reaktion Books, 1998); Edward Luttwak, *The Grand Strategy of the Roman Empire from the First Century AD to the Third* (Baltimore: n.pub, 1976); John France, 'Recent writing on Medieval Warfare: From the Fall of Rome to c.1300'*, Journal of Military History*, 65, (2001).
[33] Stephen Morillo, 'The "age of cavalry" revisited', *The Circle of War in the Middle Ages: essays on medieval military and naval history,* (1999) pp.45-58; Basil, H. Liddell Hart, *The Way to Win Wars* (London: Faber, 1942).
[34] Jeremy Black suggests military history in its modern sense is as relevant to social history as it is to military history. Black, 2023, pp. 10-20; Jeremy Black, *Rethinking Military History* (Taylor & Francis Group, 2004). p.3.

history and expanded the scope of source material beyond empirical or Western narrative data.[35] This inter-disciplinary influence has led military commentary to include the role of military might in reflecting social constructs, the relationship between people and war (combatants and non-combatants), the environmental consequences of war, discipline and violence toward the body, and the extension of peacetime social activities into conflict.[36] This diversified approach to military history is commonly referred to as the study of 'war and society.'[37] Gender theory has contributed significantly to the field, the revisitation of evidence to identify whose perspectives are told and the incorporation of deconstruction theory has highlighted the roles of women in conflicts and provided a means of study for historians seeking the perspective of other unheard voices such as the rank and file members of the army.[38]

Studies of war and society have directed attention to Indigenous military histories. Indigenous histories were largely undervalued in Western military history

[35] Kurt Raaflaub and Natham Rosenstein, *War and Society in the Ancient and Medieval Worlds* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1999).
[36] Examples include David Bourke, 'An Intimate History of Killing' *Killing in Twentieth-Century Warfare* (New York: Basic Books, 1999); Rafe Blaufarb 'The French Army 1750–1820'. *Careers, Talents, Merit* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2002); Richard Cobb, *The Peoples' Armies* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1987); Michael Paris, 'Warrior Nation' *Images of War in British Popular Culture 1850-2000* (London: Reaktion Books, 2002); James Marten, *The Children's Civil War* (North Carolina: University of North Carolina Press, 1998); Robert Weinberg, 'Mutiny Amid Repression: Russian Soldiers in the Revolution of 1905–1906', J*ournal of Social History*, 20:3 (1987) pp.619–621.
[37] Black, 2023, pp. 10-20.
[38] Examples of gender specific military history include Linda Grant De Pauw, 'Battle Cries and Lullabies' *Women in War from Prehistory to the Present* (Norman: University of Oklahoma Press, 1998); George Hicks, 'The Comfort Women' *Japan's Brutal Regime of Enforced Prostitution in the Second World War* (New York: Norton and Co, 1994); See Anna Green and Kathleen Troup for the use of gender specific methodology in history; Anna Green, & Kathleen Troup, 'The Houses of History' *A critical reader in history and theory* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1999).

until the advancement of postcolonial and post-structuralist history in the late twentieth century.[39] New Zealand and Māori scholars established some of the first Indigenous military scholarship, and in the 1980s and 1990s, historians began to revisit Eurocentric narratives.[40] Military historians began to redress the positioning of Indigenous military groups in colonial conflicts and prioritise Indigenous perspectives.[41] This work highlighted that the breakdown of euro-centric narratives was insufficient. Instead, Indigenous scholarship produced by Indigenous people using Indigenous concepts offered fresh insights.[42] These developments contributed to a diverse and expansive Indigenous military historiography, particularly within Aotearoa.[43]

[39] Postcolonial historians rejected historical narratives deemed euro-centric such as the nation state, in favour of Indigenous frameworks when studying non-European historical events; Iain Chambers and Lidia Curti, *The Post-Colonial Question: Common Skies, Divided Horizons* (London: Routledge, 1996) pp.242-260; The term 'postcolonial' has since been problematized and critiqued as colonists haven't actually left the situation and it would be inappropriate to lump all indigenous efforts as a collective; Green and Troup,. pp. 321-324.

[40] Examples being James Cowan. 'The Māori's in the Great War' *A History of The New Zealand Native Contingent and Pioneer Battalion*. (Auckland: Whitcombe & Tombs Limited, 1926); Peter Selwyn O'Conner 'The Recruitment of Māori Soldiers, 1914-18', *Political Science* **19** (1967) pp.48– 83; Chris Pugsley, *Te Hokowhitu a Tu: The Māori Pioneer Battalion in the First World War*. (Auckland: Reed Books, 1995); Doris Atkinson Paul, *The Navajo Code Talkers*. (Philadelphia: Dorrance & Company, 1973); Margaret Bixler, 'Winds of Freedom' *The Story of the Navajo Code Talkers of World War II* (n.p. Noble House Publishers, 1992).

[41] James Belich *New Zealand Wars and The Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2013); Noah Riseman, 'The Rise of Indigenous Military History', *History Compass* 12, (2014) pp. 901– 911; Kenneth Grundy, 'Soldiers Without Politics' *Blacks in the South Africa Armed Forces* (Los Angeles: University of California Press, 1983).

[42] Indigenous history needs to be produced and presented through an Indigenous Lens; Linda Tuhiwai Smith, *Decolonizing Methodologies: Research and Indigenous Peoples* (Dunedin, London and New York: University of Otago Press/Zed Books, 1999); Nēpia Mahuika, 'New Zealand History is Māori History: Tikanga as the Ethical Foundations of Historical Scholarship in Aotearoa New Zealand', *New Zealand Journal of History*, 49:1, (2015), pp. 9-10; Nēpia Mahuika 'Closing the Gaps: From Post-colonialism to Kūpapa Māori and Beyond', *New Zealand Journal of History*, 45:1, (2011), pp. 15-32.

[43] Ranganui Walker, *Ka Whāwhai Tonu Mātou, Struggle Without End* (Auckland: Penguin Books, 1990); Danny Keenan, *Wars Without End: The Land Wars in Nineteenth-century New Zealand* (Auckland: Penguin, 2009); Angela Ballara, 'Taua' *"Musket Wars", "Land Wars" or Tikanga? : Warfare in Māori Society in the Early Nineteenth Century* (Auckland: Penguin Books, 2003); Buddy Mikaere, *Te Maiharoa and the Promised Land* (Penguin Books, 1997); Timothy Winegard, *Indigenous Peoples of the British Dominions and the First World War*. (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2012).

'Ungentlemanly Warfare' contributes to the field of military history, especially to the area of operational history, through its focus on the development of strategy and tactics throughout the New Zealand Wars. 'Ungentlemanly Warfare' reflects the 'war and society' approach of modern military history because it uses evidence from non-military sources, considers inter-disciplinary influences, and interacts with Mātauranga Māori language and concepts.

The New Zealand Wars.

The New Zealand Wars (1845-1872) were a series of conflicts fought across colonial New Zealand between Imperial Britain, Māori, and the colonial population.[44] Conflicting comprehension of Te Tiriti o Waitangi, signed in 1840, sparked a divide between British settlers and Māori. These differences were exacerbated by the massive influx of settlers from 1840 to 1860.[45] Desire for British sovereignty and Māori Rangatiratanga were immediate political problems and land sales and cultural disputes catalysed numerous conflicts throughout the tumultuous period in New Zealand's history.[46]

[44] The New Zealand Wars can also be referred to as the Native, Māori, or Land Wars. Danny Keenan, "The 'New Zealand Wars' or 'Land Wars'?: The Case of the War in Taranaki 1860-61", *Journal of New Zealand Studies*, 1, (2002), pp. 99-107; Belich, p.15.
[45] Cliff Simons, 'Soldiers, Scouts, and Spies' *A Military History of the New Zealand Wars 1845-1864* (Auckland: Massey University Press, 2019) p.246.
[46] O'Malley, p.10; Walker, p.10.

There is extensive literature on the history of the New Zealand Wars. Most studies focus on conventional rather than irregular warfare. Early commentators on the conflicts were veterans, and their work provides valuable first-hand accounts and a range of primary evidence.[47] However, colonial authors' work is typically limited by their packaging within the euro-centric narrative of conquering imperial forces bringing civilization to 'noble savages'.[48] Māori accounts were typically narrative based and often presented competing evidence to their colonial counterparts, particularly details such as Māori casualty rates.[49] The two most useful pieces within the period are James Cowan's *New Zealand Wars* (1922) and Major General James Alexander's *Bush Fighting* (1873).[50] Cowan's commentary presents a vast array of first-hand accounts including Māori veterans. Cowan's work has been criticized for its romanticized view of the pioneering period and adherence to Anglocentric narratives. James Belich argues that the text is valuable once its slanted lens is recognised.[51] Alexander's commentary is the first to actively consider the conflicts beyond the major conventional endeavours. It provides accounts of British

[47] See T. Lindsay, Buick, *New Zealand's First War* (Wellington, Government Printer, 1926); Featon, John, *The Waikato War, 1863–64* (Auckland: J. H. Field, 1879); Hitiri Te Paerata, *Description of the Battle of Orakau* (Wellington: Government Printer, 1888).
[48] Thomas Gudegon titled his book 'Defenders of Old New Zealand' and positioned the British as honourable defenders in the conflict; Thomas Gudgeon, *The Defenders of Old New Zealand* (Auckland, H. Brett, 1886).
[49] Tuta Nihoniho, 'Narrative of the Fighting on the East Coast (Nga Pakanga ki Te Tai Rawhiti), 1865–71' *With a Monograph On Bush Fighting* (Me Ngā Korero Mo Uenuku) (Wellington: Government Printer, 1913).
[50] Major General James Alexander *Bush Fighting* (William Clowes and Sons, 1873); James Cowan. *The New Zealand Wars: a History of the Māori Campaigns and the Pioneering Period* (Wellington: Government Printer, 1922).
[51] O'Malley is critical of Cowan's use of heroism and bravery to reiterate myths and the Anglocentric narrative. O'Malley, 2019, p.32; 'To castigate him for a being a man of his era is a fruitless exercise.'; Belich, p.16; Gregory Wood, *Revisiting James Cowan: a reassessment of The New Zealand Wars (1922-23)* (MA thesis, Massey University, 2010), pp. 11-12.

and Māori soldiers who engaged in skirmishes and incidents Alexander deemed representative of 'Bush Fighting.'[52]

The New Zealand Wars historiography shifted with the rise of postcolonial and post-structuralist historical trends. Numerous commentators challenged the established narrative and began to present evidence of colonial land aggression and invasive British exertion of sovereignty.[53] Despite working toward redressing traditional narratives, commentaries before the publication of James Belich's *New Zealand Wars* prioritised conventional warfare and commonly presented British victory as inevitable because of Britain's superior manpower and technology.[54] Belich's 1986 study is the seminal work of the New Zealand Wars historiography.[55] Belich utilized a revisionist approach to undo and highlight the perpetuation of myths and racial assumptions within historiography.[56] Belich also critiqued historians' misrepresentation of sources produced by the British Army and promoted the martial ability and achievement of Iwi, highlighting the strategic use of the 'Modern Pa'.[57] However, Belich's work does not explore the relationship

[52] Major General James Alexander was a high-ranking officer within the British Army so this does hinder the usefulness of the evidence due to risk of bias and a sole lens on the activities.
[53] Examples include; Keith Sinclair, *The Origins of the Māori Wars* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2013); Alan Ward, 'The Origins of the Anglo-Māori Wars: A Reconsideration', *New Zealand Journal of History*, 1.2, (1967); Brian James Dalton, *War and Politics in New Zealand 1855–1870*, (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1967); Ian Wards, *The Shadow of the Land: A Study of British Policy and Racial Conflict in New Zealand, 1832–1852,* (Wellington: Government Printer, 1968).
[54] 'Māori resistance was, of course, hopeless, but it was very determined' Harold Miller, *The Invasion of Waikato* (Dunedin: John McIndoe, 1964), p.16; Keith Sinclair stressed Māori technology was no match for the Royal Artillery; Keith Sinclair, *A History of New Zealand* (Auckland, Pelican, 1980), p.132.
[55] O'Malley, p.34; Belich, 2013.
[56] Belich, p.15.
[57] O'Malley, p.35.

between irregular and regular military units and strategies.[58] A second key commentary within this period is Michael Barthorp's *To Face the Daring Māori*.[59] Barthorp's presentation of British soldier's journals and letters is invaluable to this thesis's examination of the Northern War.[60]

The prominence of 'war and society' scholarship within military history and the expansion of Indigenous history has contributed significantly to the historiography of the New Zealand Wars. The inclusion of social history became particularly relevant within New Zealand after the establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal and the Settlements Act of 1995.[61] Vincent O'Malley championed this movement, publishing two key texts, *The New Zealand Wars = Ngā Pakanga o Aotearoa* and *The Great War for New Zealand : Waikato 1800-2000*.[62] O'Malley placed greater emphasis on the use of Māori source material, Māori conceptual knowledge, and discussion of the long term socio-economic impact of the wars.[63] The Indigenous scholarship of the New Zealand Wars has worked to introduce Māori perspectives, language, tikanga and source material to the field.[64] Māori scholars including Ranganui Walker and Buddy Mikaere have furthered the social history movement

[58] For example, Belich covers the Kingite Guerrilla ambush at Martin's farm and identifies Māori strategy and the ramifications for British forces but does not discuss the strategic methods in play; Belich, p.134.
[59] Michael Barthorp *To Face the Daring Māori* (Hodder and Stoughton, 1979); Belich, 2013.
[60] Barthorp's work is also worthy of recognition for its criticism of British Command and fairer approach to Māori martial ability then his counterparts; Barthorp, 1979.
[61] Waikato Raupatu Claims Settlement Act 1995 (No.58, 3 November 1995)
[62]Vincent O'Malley, The New Zealand Wars = Ngā Pakanga o Aotearoa. (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2019); Vincent O'Malley, *The Great War For New Zealand Waikato 1800-2000* (Auckland: Bridget Williams Books, 2016).
[63] O'Malley, pp.13-14.
[64] Ballara, 2003; Pugsley, 1995.

through discussion of the long-term effects of sovereignty and land confiscation.[65] Danny Keenan's book *Wars Without End* provides a Māori lens on the strategic actions of British leadership and provides detailed discussion of Māori military methodology.[66]

Recent scholars have focused on conventional warfare, redressing Anglocentric narratives, Māori history, and social history. The history of irregular warfare remains a key gap in operational histories of the wars. There have been a few noteworthy pieces but no major considerations of irregular warfare in the New Zealand Wars. James Huston explored the development of colonial soldiers and highlights limitations of British commanders.[67] Richard Taylor highlighted the role of unique units such as the Royal Engineers and the postal units alongside stressing the importance of logistics in conflict.[68] Cliff Simons examines the use of military intelligence to great length but has faced significant criticism for favouring European perspectives.[69] Calum Swears' thesis suggests British strategy in the Waikato War is representative of modern day counter-insurgency strategy.[70]

This thesis examines the role of irregular warfare in the New Zealand Wars among British, colonial, and Māori forces. The wider aim of this thesis is a greater

[65] Walker, 1990; Buddy Mikaere, 1997.
[66] Danny Keenan, *Wars Without End: Ngā Pakanga Whenua o Mua: a Māori perspective* (Auckland: Penguin, 2021). Angela Ballara 'Taua' was also particularly useful in discussion of Rūnanga.
[67] Jamie Daniel Huston 'Colonial Force Effectiveness in Regional Conflicts: The Taranaki and Whanganui Theatres 1860-1869' (PhD Thesis, University of Waikato, 1998).
[68] Richard J. Taylor, 'British Logistics in the New Zealand Wars 1846-66' (PhD thesis, Massey University, 2004).
[69] Vincent O'Malley, 'Soldiers, Scouts and Spies: A Military History of the New Zealand Wars 1845-1864", *Journal of New Zealand Studies*, 29, (2019), pp. 102-104; Simons, 2020; Swears, 2022.
[70] Swears, p.1.

recognition of the role irregular warfare played in the New Zealand Wars, a defining period within our nation's history.

Irregular warfare

This study uses contemporary (nineteenth-century) definitions of Irregular warfare to examines strategic and tactical thinking of 'regular' and 'irregular' conflict during the New Zealand Wars.[71] In contrast, modern military thinking has conceptualised irregular warfare as state on non-state conflict since the 9/11 terrorist attacks, and rise to prominence of operational terrorism.[72] Since then, commentators have prioritised the analysis of insurgency and strategic terrorism.[73] Robert Mackey has highlighted the field's tendency to draw upon twenty-first concepts during analysis of colonial conflict and the limitations of this approach.[74] In modern terms, irregular warfare is asymmetrical conflict between politically motivated terror groups, and modern partisan units operating within a grey area between peace and war, to

[71] Irregular Warfare is any strategic responses, tactics, units, or ideas that fit outside the conventional military doctrine; Martin Kitzen, 'Operations in Irregular Warfare' *Handbook of Military Sciences* (2020); James Russell, 'Asymmetrical Warfare: Today's Challenge to U.S. Military Power', *Naval War College* 57.19, (2004); Irregular Warfare is therefore also a methodological tool of analysis to identify, analyse, and infer strategic innovation within the conflicts; Nancy Partner and Sarah Foot, 'Foundations: Theoretical Frameworks for Knowledge of the Past' *The Sage Handbook of Historical Theory* (London: Sage, 2013), pp. 1-8.
[72] Kitzen, p.1; Michael A. Sheehan, Erich Marquardt, and Liam Collins. *Routledge Handbook of U.S. Counterterrorism and Irregular Warfare Operations*. (London: Routledge, 2022) p.1; Joint Chiefs of Staff, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, JP 1 (Washington, DC, Joint Chiefs of Staff, 2017) I-6.
[73] Insurgency is 'A hybrid form of warfare that combines subversion, guerrilla, and terrorism in order to establish political control over (parts of) a country or region' Martin Kitzen, 'Western military culture and counterinsurgency: An ambiguous reality' *Scientia Militaria: South African Journal of Military Studies, 39*.2 (2012) pp. 1–24; Benjamin Fall, 'The theory and practice of insurgency and counterinsurgency' *Naval War College Review, 18*.3 (1965).
[74] Mackey, p.5.

actively prevent potential risk and influence populations.[75] This differs from colonial era understanding of military theory because warfare had differ goals and circumstances. This section defines aspects of irregular warfare relevant to the New Zealand Wars with consideration of nineteenth century military theory. The concepts relevant include guerrilla warfare, partisan warfare, multi-echelon warfare.

Guerrilla warfare within the nineteenth-century context is the avoidance of pitched conflict and active targeting of supply lines conducted by men not within the organised army system of pay or command.[76] Guerrilla comes from the Spanish term *Guerra* which was used to define the Spanish rebels who harass Napoleon's supply lines during the Peninsular War.[77] Nineteenth-century military theorist Carl von Clausewitz presented guerrilla warfare as the 'People's War' and referred to conflict conducted with the backing of the people in difficult terrain.[78] Guerrilla campaigns can be traced back to Roman 'Fabius Tactics' and have been employed throughout history by military groups seeking decisive victories without open conflict.[79]

[75] Anthony Cordesman, 'Stability operations in Syria: The need for a revolution in civil-military affairs' *Military Review* (2017) 2–21; Joseph Votel, Charles Cleveland, Charles Connett, and Will Irwin, 'Unconventional warfare in the Gray Zone.' *Joint Forces Quarterly 80* (2016) 101–109; Andrew Sike, *Routledge handbook of terrorism and counterterrorism* (London: Routledge, 2018).
[76] Francis Lieber, *Guerrilla parties considered with reference to the laws and usages of war* (1862) pp.18-19; Robert B. Asprey. *War in the Shadows: the Guerrilla in History*. (London: Macdonald and Jane's, 1976).
[77] Mackey, p.12; Asprey, pp.116-120.
[78] Carl von Clausewitz described guerrilla warfare as 'Peoples War' in Clausewitz *On War*, Vol I, Chapter II.
[79] Andrew Mumford and Bruno Reis, 'The Theory and Practice of Irregular Warfare' *Warrior-scholarship in counter-insurgency* (London: Routledge, 2013), p.53.

Partisan warfare in its most basic form is counter-guerrilla conduct.[80] Developed from the success of light calvary units in the Seven Years' War (1756–1763), conventional armies slowly developed elite conventional units into irregular forces capable of fighting guerrilla warfare with the operational backing of the regular army.[81] Partisan warfare is conducted by detachments of the regular army who are trained in and tasked with irregular warfare and operate beyond the capacity of the regular army. Antoine Jomini defined nineteenth-century partisans as detachments of the regular army tasked with 'compelling the enemy to retreat, intercepting an enemy's advance to protect the regulars, observe, raid and steal enemy provisions, distract fortifications, and destroy lines of communications.'[82]

Multi-echelon warfare is the conceptualisation of regular and irregular strategies and units working cohesively.[83] This strategy was developed extensively by Eastern military minds, Vietnamese General Võ Nguyên Giáp presented multi-echelon warfare as the use of irregular warfare alongside the regular army operations because the 'two combined stimulate each other, deplete, and annihilate enemy forces to bring victory'.[84] In the New Zealand Wars, both Iwi and British

[80] Lieber, p.11; Mackey, pp.11-12.
[81] Lieber defined Partisan soldiers as, soldiers whose 'Objective was to injure the enemy by action separate from that of his own main army; the partisan acts chiefly upon the lines of connection and communication, and outside or beyond the lines of operation of his own army, in the rear or flanks of the enemy'; Lieber, p.11; Daniel Baugh, 'The Global Seven Years War 1754-1763' *Britain and France in a Great Power Contest* (London: Routledge, 2011).
[82] Antoine Jomini, *Treatise On Grand Military Operations* (n.p. 1845) republished (D. Van Nostrand, 1865).
[83] Asprey, p.84.
[84] Giap's work is translated and quoted in Asprey, p.84; Mao Zedong wrote extensively on the effectiveness of the multi-echelon approach and drew upon the teachings of Sun Tzu, *The Art of War* (London: Harper Press, 2013).

forces would come to rely on the efforts of regular and irregular units operating in alignment to overarching strategic aims.

The indirect approach is an irregular warfare strategy and conceptual device for identifying and evaluating strategic decisions inclusive of irregular warfare.[85] In his book *Strategy* (1967), Captain Basil Liddell Hart argued that irregular warfare methods and the path least expected attained the greatest results in armed conflict.[86] The indirect approach is a military move which negatively impacts the enemy's capacity for war, or lures the enemy into a false move and creates a favourable combat situation.[87] At the strategic level, the indirect approach is defined as,

> A strategy of elastic defence, including a calculated retirement which lures the enemy into a position of strength for a tactical offensive. Or a strategy of offence that seeks to upset the enemy and entice a response against a strong tactical defence.[88]

Hart also theorised a strategy of limited aim, which stated that effective irregular warfare followed a grand strategy of attrition. If an organisation drained their enemy's resources disproportionately greater than their own, they conducted

[85] Basil Liddel Hart, *Strategy*, second revised edition, (London: Faber and Faber, 1967); Patrick Major, '"Our Friend Rommel: The Wehrmacht as 'Worthy Enemy" in Post-war British Popular Culture' *German History*. (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Alex Danchev, 'Liddell Hart and the Indirect Approach' *Journal of Military History* 63.2 (1999), pp. 313–337.
[86] *Strategy* examined the use of Irregular Warfare tactics throughout history, ranging from Fabian and Hannibal, Sun Tzu, the USA Civil War, and the SOE in WWII.; Liddell Hart.
[87] 'The Indirect approach often consists of a logistical military move directed against an economic target or source of supply for the opposing army, occasionally for psychological effect' Liddell Hart, pp.120-124.
[88] Liddell Hart, pp.123-125.

effective irregular warfare.[89] Hart's work has been drawn upon by numerous historical commentators and military organisations to great effect in the study of strategic thinking.[90] Throughout the New Zealand Wars, military leaders undertook campaigns, missions, and raids which were outside their normative military conduct and followed the indirect approach.

Key Source Material

This thesis presents close readings of the available primary evidence to show how irregular warfare impacted strategic thinking in the New Zealand Wars. It's key sources include military correspondence, official reports and soldiers' journals or letters. This study examined the possible material instances of irregular tactics or decisions that were unknowingly 'irregular warfare' but representative of the concept.

The key archives drawn upon during the study include the British Parliamentary Papers, the Appendix to the Journals of the House of Representatives Papers (AJHR), and the Cowan Papers. The British Parliamentary Papers contain most communication between British Army officers and Government officials, both within London and New Zealand. This thesis drew upon hard copies of the documents which were published by the Irish University Press in 1970 to be

[89] Liddell Hart, p.126.
[90] 'Design for Military Operations' *The British Military Doctrine* Army Code No 71451. D/CGS/50/8. (Chief of the General Staff. 1996); Alex Danchev, 'Alchemist of War' *The Life of Basil Liddell Hart* (London: Weidenfeld & Nicolson, 1998); Major, 2008; Alex Danchev, 1999, pp. 313–337.

distributed amongst educational settings across the commonwealth. The AJHR provided New Zealand Government specific reports of communication and official policy. The Cowan papers and Cowan's two-volume book *The New Zealand Wars* provided valuable firsthand accounts from soldiers and officers of the conflict.[91] This was extremely important because of the difficulty in accessing Māori perspectives of the wars. In compliment to the archival evidence, this thesis examined numerous unpublished sources including Gustavus von Tempsky's *Memoranda of the New Zealand Campaign In 1863 and 1864* and Major Cyprian Bridge *Journal of Events on Expedition to New Zealand commencing 4th April 1845*.[92] The insights within the first-hand accounts of these officers provided significant evidence for this examination of strategy and irregular warfare.

These primary sources were critically examined with the consideration of the 'indirect approach'. Basil Liddell Hart conceptualised 'the indirect approach' as both a methodological tool for identifying instances of irregular warfare and a strategy implementable by military leadership.[93] This thesis applied the concept to the decision making of military leaders within the primary evidence to identify and examine the impact of irregular warfare.

[91] James Cowan, 'The New Zealand Wars' *A History of the Māori Campaigns and the Pioneering Period Volume I* (Wellington: Government Printer, 1983).
[92] Gustavus von Tempsky, *Memoranda of the New Zealand Campaign In 1863 and 1864, 1865* (Waikato: Von Tempsky, 1864); Major Cyprian Bridge, *Journal of Events on Expedition to New Zealand commencing 4th April 1845* (Wellington: Alexander Turnbull Library).
[93] Basil Liddell Hart, *Strategy*, second revised edition, (London: Faber and Faber, 1967) pp.121-125.

This thesis recognised the importance of a Māori perspective within examination of Māori military history. As such, all conclusions established were considered against the work of Māori scholars such as Terrence Johanson whose work, *Ka Pu Ruha, Ka Hao Te Rangatahi; Changes in Māori Warfare Between The Period Prior to First European Contact and the End of the New Zealand Wars* was extremely beneficial to this thesis.[94]

Chapter Summary

To examine the impact of irregular warfare on strategic thinking within the New Zealand Wars, this thesis is divided into 5 chapters.

Chapter One provides a point of reference to the discussion of conventional warfare and the development of strategic thinking. It explores the military background of both Māori and Britain before their first engagement during the Northern War. It highlights the strategic thinking of military leaders before exposure to the New Zealand conflict and introduces the key scholarship relevant to each side's miliary theory.

Chapter Two is focused on the Northern War (1845-1846) and acts as a baseline for this study's consideration of strategic adaptation. Both sides commenced the conflict with their conventional approach to warfare. However, the asymmetric,

[94] Terence Johanson, 'Ka Pu Ruha, Ka Hao Te Rangatahi; Changes in Māori Warfare Between The Period Prior to First European Contact and the End of the New Zealand Wars' (MA thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2009).

colonial conflict quickly exposed the limitations of conventional conduct. Māori leadership adapt quickly, but British leadership failed to identify the need for change and accordingly lost the conflict.

Chapter Three explores the expansive use of irregular warfare strategies and tactics in the Waikato War, otherwise known as the Invasion of the Waikato. In the Waikato, Māori military leadership maximised the combat ability of their force through guerrilla warfare, decentralised command, and a grand strategy of elastic offence. In contrast, the development of colonial units well-versed in irregular warfare resulted in British leadership gradually adopting irregular warfare units and tactics. This adoption was solidified at Rangiaowhia where British Commander Lieutenant General Duncan Cameron used irregular units to avoid pitched conflict and raided the township of Rangiaowhia to defeat the Paterangi Line.

Chapter Four uses the unique situation on the West Coast to highlight the importance of irregular warfare in colonial conflict. There are three conflicts within the West Coast theatre, the first and second Taranaki wars and the West Coast or Wanganui campaign. Māori leadership achieved great success in the first conflict through expansive guerrilla warfare and dominating the terms of engagement with the strategy of elastic offence. In comparison, British and Colonial field leadership apply all their strategic development in the West Coast campaign. Irregular units led highly diversified multi-echelon columns against Māori resistance to great success. Irregular units and tactics were prioritised within British strategic thinking, and their

conduct on the West Coast was recognized as 'Distasteful Warfare' by the British War Office.

The conclusion examines the overall impact irregular warfare had on strategic thinking within the New Zealand Wars.

Chapter 1: Conventional Military Backgrounds

Māori Military Affairs

Polynesian explorers settled in Aotearoa at some point between the third and twelfth century and various Iwi developed across the country.[1] Whilst the collective term 'Māori' represents the society and culture these people developed the term was not used until the arrival of Europeans.[2] Māori were not a unified people like their British counterparts, split by Iwi, these tribal groupings were divided further by hapū and whānau.[3]

Within Māori society, Mana (prestige) and utu (revenge, reciprocal) were fundamental societal values.[4] Acts of crime, or slights against mana, or disregard for tapu (sacred customs / items) were considered a breach of the victim's spiritual relationship with their whakapapa and reciprocal action was a necessity.[5] War was not the sole method of attaining utu, but it was the most common. Armed conflict was considered the ultimate sanction, and a just course of action.[6] Māori warfare

[1] James Belich, *Making peoples: A history of the New Zealanders from Polynesian settlement to the end of the nineteenth century*. (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press, 1996) p.17.
[2] Belich, pp.15-20.
[3] Ranginui Walker, *Ka Whawhai Tonu Matou: Struggle Without End* (Auckland: Penguin Books, 2004), pp.64-65.
[4] Atholl Anderson, 'War is their principal profession: On the frequency and causes of Māori warfare and migration, 1250–1850 CE.' *Archaeological Perspectives on Conflict and Warfare in Australia and the Pacific* 54 (2022), p.43.
[5] 'Utu was a fundamental principle of all Māori interaction… a necessity, not an option for Māori political and social groups which had been attacked.' Angela Ballara, *Taua: "Musket Wars", "Land Wars" or Tikanga? : Warfare in Māori Society in the Early Nineteenth Century*. (Auckland: Penguin Books, 2003) p.26.
[6] Ballara, p.73.

differed significantly from Western conflict because the acquirement of territory was commonly a biproduct of an enemy not retaliating sufficiently rather than the goal of war.[7] Archaeological evidence suggests that beside utu, the attainment of food and agriculture was the driving force behind pre-European Māori Warfare.[8] This proposal is based upon roughly 90% of pā constructed within the North Island being within proximity of major kumara cultivations.[9] The relative frequency of war within Aotearoa prioritised martial ability within Māori society, and great military leadership correlated to great mana.[10]

The biggest influence on Māori warfare prior to the New Zealand Wars was the Musket Wars. The label 'Musket Wars' is problematic, and there is significant debate as to whether these campaigns are a standalone conflict or a continuation of pre-European patterns of war.[11] The introduction of the musket had a profound impact on Māori warfare. The Bay of Islands was the hub of European trade and settlement in the early 1800s. This region was home to Ngā Puhi.[12] Hongi Hika, a significant Ngā Puhi Rangatira developed reciprocal relationships with missionaries such as Samuel Marsden and Thomas Kendall.[13] Through this contact, Hika became

[7] Andrew Vayda, 'Māoris and Muskets in New Zealand: Disruption of a War System.' *Political science quarterly* 85.4 (1970), p.188.
[8] John Carman and Anthony Harding, *Ancient warfare: Archaeological Perspectives* (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1999), p.57.
[9] Anderson, p.43.
[10] Missionary sources suggest Hapū engaged in at least 2 major military forays a year by 1828; Ron Crosby *The Musket Wars : a History of Inter-Iwi Conflict, 1806-45*. (Auckland: Reed, 1999), pp.29-31.
[11] Ballara, p.234; Crosby, p.13; Sebastian Hepburn-Roper, 'Musket War and Musket trade: The New South Wales to New Zealand firearms trade 1829–1840.' *Asia-Pacific Economic History Review*, 63.1 (2023) 73– 93.
[12] Hepburn-Roper, pp.73-75.
[13] Urlich Cloher, 'The introduction and diffusion of firearms in New Zealand 1800-1840' *Journal of the Polynesian Society*, **79** (1970), p.403.

well-versed in European society, and learnt to read and write. His hapū became the dominant agriculture group in the North and the centre of trade with New South Wales.[14] Hika was appointed to the position of constable by the New South Wales Governor in 1815 to protect the lucrative trade network. Fortuitously, these events coincided with the conclusion of the Napoleonic Wars and the increase in available muskets on the open market.[15] Hika utilized his position and positive trade relations to acquire significant musketry for Ngā Puhi and his own hapū.[16]

In 1818, Hongi Hika led an 800-strong taua (war party), down the East Coast to Tolaga Bay. Armed with 50 muskets, Hika rampaged the coastline during an eleven-month campaign. Tom Brooking suggests up to 500 villages was burned, and 2000 prisoners were enslaved.[17] Despite the success, Hika sought greater firepower. This is because muskets were notoriously unreliable, and Hika recognised a disciplined assault with patu and taiaha could overwhelm a minor musketry presence.[18]

[14] Belich, 2001, pp. 154-160.
[15] Paul D'Arcy has argued the majority of muskets actually acquired were of poor quality and bound for Africa. Paul D'Arcy, 'Māori and muskets from a pan-Polynesian perspective.' *New Zealand Journal of History*, **34**, (2000) pp.117– 132.
[16] Belich, pp.156-158.
[17] Tom Brooking, *Milestones: Turning Points in New Zealand History*, (n.p. Dunmore Press, 1999) pp.40-45
[18] Patu and Taiaha were wooden melee weapons. Howe suggests the unreliability of muskets limited their effectiveness. Kerry Howe, *Where the waves fall: a new South Sea islands history from first settlement to colonial rule*. (Sydney: Allen and Unwin, 1984).



Figure 2: Map of Ngā Puhi Campaigns during the Musket Wars. This shows the expansion of Māori military campaigning during the early nineteenth century.

In 1821, Hongi Hika organised the shipment of roughly 500 muskets from Sydney.[19] This was the largest shipment to date, and it thrust Hika, and Ngāpuhi to the forefront of military might and inter-tribal mana.[20] Throughout the 1820s, the dominance of the musket meant there was a direct correlation between musket quantity and economic success. The capture of slaves, goods, and wealth through the musket meant hapū with significant musketry did exceedingly well in European

[19] Hepburn-Roper, pp.73-76.
[20] Crosby, pp.19-22.

trade. The success of Hika's campaign, and rapid acquirement of musketry led a major arms race between iwi and a decades long conflict across the country. By the end of the 1820's central North Island iwi, particularly Waikato Tainui inflicted significant defeats upon Ngāpuhi as musketry became widespread. [21]

Musket warfare significantly impacted Māori military strategy. Hilltop pa were replaced by gunfighter pā. Typically positioned on flat terrain, these defensive structures sought to provide the enemy with no cover.[22] An outer stockade halted any offensive charge, whilst the inner line provided secure firing positions.[23] These were the predecessors to the Modern Pā of the New Zealand Wars, and rangatira began to employ flanking angles to maximise firepower. The introduction of the potato, hardier than the kumara, meant long-range expeditions were viable. These country wide campaigns would prove to be valuable experience in the New Zealand Wars, as the capacity to live off the land meant iwi forces could wage expansive guerrilla warfare against Britain.

The musket had a profound impact on Māori society and military strategy, sources suggest that of the 100,000 Māori living in New Zealand around 1810, up to

[21] Ngāpuhi taua experienced significant defeats in 1825, 1826 and 1827, especially against Waikato Tainui; Crosby, 1999.
[22] Anderson, p.54.
[23] Walker, pp.82-84.

50,000 had been killed, enslaved, or forced to migrate by the late 1830s.[24] However, by the late 1830s, large-scale campaigns began to decline. Muskets had saturated the Aotearoa market and those hapū who were late to the arms race began to claim utu against their aggressors.[25] Ngā Puhi's dominance crumbled, and the significant casualties began to affect society.[26] Large scale campaigning became unviable for many hapū after any form of serious defeat. The period recognised as the Musket Wars came to a gradual end with the massive influx of European settlers, who with the help of the New Zealand Company began to purchase and settle land left unoccupied by campaigning hapū. Europeans also brought Christianity which began to pacify the intentions of Rangatira and European diseases ravaged Māori settlements.[27]

The military doctrine of Māori Warfare was majorly impacted by the introduction of musketry, but still followed a cohesive system of tikanga (customs). The performance of the haka and presentation of musketry typically initiated conflict as attempts to dissuade the enemy from resisting.[28] Hapū on the back foot or facing significantly greater enemies resorted to gunfighter pā which mitigated the numerical strength of opposing armies.

[24] Walker, 2004, pp.82-84; 'Suggests 20,000 killed alone'; Crosby, pp.5-10.
[25] Hepburn-Roper, p.92.
[26] Crosby, pp.25-27.
[27] The major clash between Ngā Tahu and Ngati Toa was averted by a measles outbreak in 1837; Crosby, p.26.
[28] Hapū with Rangatira of great Mana often projected their strength to avoid bloodshed and attain utu through other means; Anderson p.55; Ballara, pp.26-30.

Heading into the New Zealand Wars, Māori military systems were well-versed in musket warfare and strategic thinking was prioritized amongst hapū leadership. The competitive nature of Māori society and the desire to further both individual and hapū mana created an environment that pushed for military innovation to edge out rivals.[29] The period recognised as the Musket Wars had normalised the gunfighter pā, musket skills, and organised musket conflict. Importantly, the wars 'ended' either side of 1840, only five years before the Northern conflict, and 20 years before the Taranaki and Waikato conflicts. A significant portion of the fighting age men available were battle hardened and experienced in colonial musket warfare entering the New Zealand Wars.

British Military Affairs

A season of old man's glory reflected from battles long ago, never was professional conservatism more rigid nor opposition to new-fangled ideas more unyielding. Christopher Lloyd.[30]

Before the New Zealand Wars, the British Army was a military organisation rooted in traditional beliefs and outdated systems, commonly described as an eighteenth-century institution.[31] British Army leadership was resistant to the significant military

[29] O'Malley, p.19.
[30] Michael Barthorp quotes Historian Christopher Lloyd in *To Face the Daring Māori* (Hodder and Stoughton, 1979), pp.62-63.
[31] Azar Gat, *The development of military thought: the nineteenth century* (n.p.: Oxford University Press, 1992), p.4.

innovations developed by revolutionary France, and this staunch traditionalism was solidified by the events of Waterloo (18 June 1815).[32] The Duke of Wellington led British forces against Napoleon at Waterloo. The Duke was a recognised defensive commander and stalwart of traditional means.[33] He insisted on engaging Napoleon from a defensive position and was reliant on eighteenth-century tactical methods.[34] Wellington largely rejected the importance of mobility in warfare which Napoleon had championed, electing to rely upon overwhelming infantry instead of effective calvary.[35] Napoleon was defeated at Waterloo, but it was not the efforts of Wellington. Poor weather allowed the Prussian Army to engage Napoleon's force and their heavy calvary forced Napoleon's retreat.[36] Nether the less, the Duke of Wellington had 'defeated' Napoleon and his success would entrench his outdated approach to warfare within British strategic thinking.

In the aftermath of the Napoleonic Wars, European nations experienced a boom of military theory, championed by Carl von Clausewitz and Antonie Jomini, except for Britain.[37] French and Prussian military leaders discredited eighteenth-century strategic literature, and the continental armies moved to embody the highly

[32] See Gwyn Harries-Jenkins, *The Army in Victorian Society* (London: Routledge, 1977). George Robert Gleig. *Story of the Battle of Waterloo*. (New York: Harper & Brothers, 1875).
[33] Jac Weller suggests that Wellington's reliance on square formation eighteenth century tactics can be attributed to the success he achieved at Maida against the French in 1806; Jac Weller *Wellington at Waterloo*. (New York: Crowell, 1967) p.24; Gleig, p.27.
[34] Weller, pp.24-26.
[35] Weller, p.26.
[36] Gleig, pp.70-80.
[37] Azar Gat, *The Origins of Military Thought from the Enlightenment Period to Clausewitz* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989).

mobile methods of Napoleonic warfare.[38] Britain underwent significant political changes and disputes between politicians and military leaders led to significant neglect of the army.[39] Whilst Britain did produce Sir William Napier, a student of Jomini, military theory and innovation suffered post the Napoleonic period.[40] Between 1826-46, taking the Queen's shilling was a lifetime enlistment however after 15 years of service it was a free discharge.[41] Officer positions within the army were almost exclusively attained through purchase, whilst the rank and file was limited to the lowest classes of society.[42] One of the few reforms during this period removed the ban on Irish Catholics and by 1830, 42% of non-commission officers (NCOs) and soldiers were Irish.[43] The negligence of the armed forces saw the British Army become notorious for the brutal conditions foot soldiers experienced. Alcoholism was near guaranteed, unlike livable quarters.[44] The recruitment of low socio-economic men and privileged men in officer positions created a force reliant on

[38] Napoleonic Warfare emphasized Speed, rapid manoeuvring, and splitting armies into smaller factions to crush resistance; Gat 1992, p.2.
[39] Edward M. Spiers, *The Army and Society 1815-1914* (London: Longman, 1980).
[40] Harry Bruce, *Life of Sir William Napier* (London: Murray, 1864); Hew Strachan, *Wellington's Legacy: The Reform of the British Army* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1984).
[41] Prior to 15 years' service, Men could purchase their discharge for 20 pounds; Ian Knight, *Go to your God like a solider* (London: Greenhill Books, 1966).
[42] In 1846, soldiers' prior lifestyles were recorded; 67% of men were labourers, 13% considered soldiering an easier life 8% were criminals, 7% were restless in life, 5% came from respectable backgrounds. James MacMullen, *Camp and Barrack Room; or the British Army as it is, by a late Staff Sergeant of the 13th Light Infantry* (n.p. Chapman and Hall, 1846) p.115.
[43] By 1860, 30% of the entire army was Catholic and Irish; Peter Karsten, 'Irish Soldiers in the British Army, 1792–1922: Suborned or Subordinate?', *Journal of Social History*, 17.1 (1983), p.36; New Zealand Herald, 6 July 1865.
[44] David Chandler, *The Oxford Illustrated History of the British Army* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994) pp.160–99.

absolute discipline, and centralized command. A soldier's worth, like a unit's worth, was determined by their ability to respond to orders as a choreographed whole.

Despite the flaws within the British Army, Victorian Britain was an Imperial powerhouse stretching 8 million square miles with a population of 170 million, roughly 25% of the world.[45] Britain's position as a global superpower was maintained not through its 200,000-strong Army but through the dominance of Her Majesty's Royal Navy.[46] With 240 ships, and 40,000 sailors, Britian was the premier maritime force, largely due to their expansive colonial interests across the world. [47]

However, the continued lack-lustre military investment came to a head in the Crimean War (1853-56). Despite Britain's position as a victor, alongside the French and Ottoman empires, against Russia, the conflict highlighted major flaws and public pressure to reform the British Army became widespread. The British Army had experienced a logistical nightmare, struggling to supply its regiments. The 'Amateurishness' of the British Army was exposed in comparison to the professionalism of the French army.[48] During the period of the continental military

[45] Peter Marshall, *The Cambridge Illustrated History of the British Empire* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.24.
[46] Marshall, p.27; Laurie Barber, *Sergeant, Sinner, Saint, and Spy: The Taranaki war diary of Sergeant William Marjoram* (Auckland: Random Century, 1990), p.1.
[47] Barthorp, p.62.
[48] Heather Streets, *Martial Races: The Military, Race and Masculinity in British Imperial Culture* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2004), pp. 23–24; Richard Glover, *Peninsular Preparation* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1963), p. 27.

boom, the French Army had established itself as the leading military power in terms of logistics, officer training and medical services. The Prussians and Austrians were widely agreed to have the best Infantry and Calvary units respectively.[49] Napoleon III invested heavily in the French *Intendance militaire* before the Crimean engagement, and this detailed approach to logistics doubled the manpower required.[50] But it massively improved the combat effectiveness of the French Army.[51] Britain's position as a continental power came under question, and despite the emergence of Florence Nightingale, the Crimean War had been a series of failures. Britain's maritime strength was unquestioned, but its ability to succeed in land operations came under pressure. In response, the British Army received significant investment in the Royal Military Colleges, Commissariat system, and the Woolwich Royal Arsenal.[52]

The reforms to the British Army after Crimea would impact the Taranaki and Waikato conflicts, but not the Northern War. In 1845, at the start of the New Zealand Wars, the British Army had 26 regiments of Calvary, six of which were posted

[49] Miles Hudson and John Stainer, *War and the Media* (Stroud: Sutton Publishing, 1999), pp. 1–21; 'The French and German Armies at the Commencement of the Revolution War and at the Present Moment' *United Service Journal and Naval and Military Magazine* 3 (1832), 435–41; 'Sketch of the Military and Statistical Position of Prussia' *United Service Journal and Naval and Military Magazine for 1832* 3 (1832), 442–48; 'Sketches of the Austrian Cavalry Service by a çi-devant Huszar Officer', *United Service Magazine and Naval and Military Journal* 1 (1842), 495–508.

[50] The *intendance* was responsible was the entire French support system, including Medical Service, Veterinary Service, Military Justice, and Supply trains; Lieutenant-Colonel Victor Belhomme, *Histoire de l'infanterie en France* (Paris: Lavauzelle, 1892).

[51] Belhomme, p.324.

[52] John Sweetman, *War and Administration: The Significance of the Crimean War for the British Army* (Edinburgh: Scottish Academic Press, 1984); John Batchelor and Ian V. Hogg, *Artillery* (Macdonald, London, 1972), p.10; Knight, pp. 155-156.

overseas in South Africa and India, seven Battalions of Foot Guard and 112 Battalions of Infantry, only 29 of which were in the United Kingdom region.[53] These Infantry Regiments or Regiments of Foot were made up of 1118 men divided into 10 companies and led with absolute discipline by commanding officers. Among the 10 companies, Number 1 would be the 'Grenadiers' or right flank, and Number 10 the 'Light' company or left flank. The remaining 8 'line' companies make up the center when engaging in conflict.[54] The two flanking companies were specialized 'skirmishing' units, trained to protect the flanks or push the advance, brutally effective on the open fields of Europe.[55] The line companies were expected to act as a cohesive unit, individual autonomy was discouraged in favour of large-scale choreographed action.[56] Line infantry relied upon discipline, uniformity, and pitched conflict.[57] This eighteenth-century strategic thinking would come undone in the rugged and wild topographical nature of the New Zealand North Island.[58]

British leadership approached colonial conflict seeking decisive victory through line infantry. Traditionalism within the British officer class led to an expectation of formality.[59] However, Indigenous populations could not match the numbers or technology of European powers and therefore relied on expert

[53] Barthorp, Michael, p.359.
[54] Richard J. Taylor, *Tribe of the War God* (Napier, Cosmos, 1996), p.12; Knight, p.128.
[55] Knight, p.159.
[56] Taylor, pp.12-14.
[57] Taylor, p.12.
[58] Knight, pp.158-161.
[59] Richard Preston, *Men in Arms: A History of Warfare and Its Interrelationships with Western Society*. Ed. (Michigan: Praeger Publishers, 1970), pp.129-142.

knowledge of the terrain. The post-Crimea reforms had drastically improved the British infantry, with updated strategic drill manuals and the development of the Enfield rifle.[60] However, colonial New Zealand was sparsely urbanized, and the native bush forced close-quarter conflict. These combat scenarios did not favour overwhelming numbers or the slow re-load time of organized musketry.[61] Britain had learnt this lesson during the Seven Years War and the American Revolutionary War (1775-1783).[62] General Edward Braddock's defeat in 1755 had proved colonial frontiers did not favour formalized maneuvers and instead, mobile decentralized irregulars were highly effective.[63] In fact, before the New Zealand Wars, British leaders had access to literature referent to frontier light infantry tactics, and the British Army was engaged in numerous colonial engagements.[64] These commentators did not recognize the strategic thinking as irregular warfare but later historians have identified the methods employed.[65] British resistance to strategic change is a testament to deep-rooted traditionalism and neglect within the British Army Institution. That is why, the significant strategic adaptions and active inclusion of irregular warfare was so significant during the New Zealand Wars.

[60] The Enfield Rifle had an effective range of 300 meters which significantly outmatched traditional musketry. Simons, p. 13; Knight, pp. 155-156.
[61] Taylor, pp.6-7.
[62] Julian Stafford Corbett, *England in the Seven years' War: a study in combined strategy* (Longmans, Green, 1907).
[63] Peter E. Russell. 'Redcoats in the Wilderness: British Officers and Irregular Warfare in Europe and America, 1740 to 1760', *The William and Mary Quarterly* 35.4 (1978) p.1.
[64] 'Essay on Regular and Irregular Forces' *Gentleman's Magazine and Historical Chronicle*, XVI (1746); Colonel John Fuller, *British Light Infantry in the Eighteenth Century* (London: Hutchinson & Co, 1925) pp.106-107; Roy Kaushik, *The Army in British India: From Colonial Warfare to Total War 1857-1947* (London: Bloomsbury Publishing, 2014)
[65] Russell, 1978. p.2.

In summary, the British Army was an eighteenth-century institution, notorious for its absolute discipline, traditionalism, and resistance to change.[66] British Leadership approached the New Zealand Wars with line infantry, centralized command, and absolute discipline the staples of strategic thinking. Roughly 14,000 British soldiers from 14 regiments would serve in the New Zealand Wars, armed with Enfield rifles, Armstrong cannons, and a belief no Indigenous population could stand against the might of the British Empire.[67] In conventional army terms, the British armed forces held significant advantages over their Indigenous counterparts. Rifles verse muskets, boats verse waka, and the Royal Artillery against a handful of old ship's cannons. At the start of the Northern War, British and Colonial leaders expected a quick decisive victory; however, this would not be the case. Not only would Britain arguably lose the Northern War, but Māori forces would also find great success across two decades of colonial conflict.

[66] Gat, 1992, p.2.
[67] O'Malley, p.13.

Chapter 2: The Northern War – Downright Madness

'At 6 o'clock 3rd of May, we mustered for the war
the 58th and 69th likewise some gallant tars
To face the bold Honi Heke – that dareing Māori Chiefe
And likewise, bold Kowitta that came to his relief
We fought on the 8th of May. Although we were not beat
At 5 o'clock that evening we were forced to retreat'
Alexander Whisker.[1]

The Diary of Corporal Alexander Whisker (58th Regiment of Foot) during his service in the New Zealand Wars is an important source in this thesis's discussion of conflicts in the North. Alexander's detailed notes are insightful and provide a British soldier's viewpoint on events and the decisions of leadership. Whisker wrote the above poem in the aftermath of the disaster of Ohaeawai. The language utilized is important, despite losing 100 men in seven minutes, Whisker insists they were not beat only retreating. Alexander's thoughts reflect the communal attitude British and Colonial leadership held toward the Ngā Puhi hapū which opposed them.

[1] Corporal Alexander Whisker, *Diary Entry*, June 1845 in Michael Barthorp, *To Face the Daring Māoris: Soldiers' Impressions of the First Māori War, 1845-47*. (London: Hodder and Stoughton, 1979), p.85.

The Inception of Colonial Conflict

The Northern War emerged from the hostilities developed between the two different understandings of the 1840 Te Tiriti o Waitangi. Te Tiriti sought to bring structure, law, and co-existence to the colony, however, the British Crown and Māori Rangatira had different interpretations of how this would be implemented.[2] Māori leadership expected to retain chiefly authority and tribal autonomy, whilst British leadership expected iwi to recognise British sovereignty, and the two conflicting ideologies clashed throughout the nineteenth century.[3] Customs taxes, market restrictions, and the establishment of a new Capital at Auckland negatively impacted the Northern tribes' economic system.[4] This interference directly opposed Māori authority and autonomy. British law began to interfere with tribal law as local magistrates' involvement in Māori legal matters stressed the growing divide.[5]

An important difference between the Northern War and the later Waikato and Taranaki conflicts was both sides' approach to non-combatants. Mutual respect for non-military parties was commonly observed, largely because both Ngā Puhi and the colonial government wanted to maintain Anglo-Māori economic and social relationships.[6] For example, the felling of the Union Jack was a symbolised objection

[2] Rangatira meaning Hereditary Leader or Chief; Vincent O'Malley, *The New Zealand Wars = Ngā Pakanga o Aotearoa*. (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2019) p.44.
[3] James Belich, *New Zealand Wars and The Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2013) p.30.
[4] O'Malley, p.44.
[5] Alan Ward *Show of Justice* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 1995) pp.53-55.
[6] Southern Cross, 22 March 1845; Heke to Fitzroy, 21 May 1845, C.O. 209/35, pp.87-91; Thomas Lindsay Buick, *New Zealand's First War, or, The Rebellion of Hone Heke*. (Christchurch: Capper Press, 1976) p.91

to British Sovereignty without impacting trade in the region. Heke's defiant act was the spark that ignited conflict in the region because of its symbolic significance to Governor Robert Fitzroy.[7]

The Northern War began on 11 March 1845 when Hone Heke led a combined Ngā Puhi taua against the town of Kororareka (Russell) to fell the Union Jack for a fourth time.[8] This raid resulted in the ransacking of Russell.[9] In response, British and Colonial forces would undertake three expeditions into Ngā Puhi territory that resulted in major conflicts at Puketutu (May), Ohaeawai (July), and Ruapekapeka (December). The British were profoundly beaten at Ohaeawai and unable to secure a decisive victory at any point during these expeditions. The Ngā Puhi factions engaged in conflict at Te Ahuahu in early June. The war ended in the aftermath of Ruapekapeka with neither side willing to expend further resources. An uneasy peace followed.

[7] Robert Fitzroy, *Remarks On New Zealand in February 1846* (London: W. and H. White, 1846)
[8] O'Malley, p.46.
[9] Belich, p.37.

British Steel and Troublesome Pā

The Northern War pitched the colonial powerhouse Britain against the Indigenous Māori in an asymmetrical conflict within a colonial theatre of war.[10] The Northern War was the first conflict in a two-decade period of violence within New Zealand during the nineteenth century. This conflict highlighted both organizations' military limitations in an asymmetrical conflict and initiated their adoption of irregular warfare strategic approaches.

The British Army struggled to achieve military success during the Northern War because their command group relied on conventional military strategies that were outdated Eurocentric ideas.[11] These themes of underestimating Māori stem from a cultural sense of superiority ingrained in not only British but European thinking.[12] Furthermore, as discussed in the chapter one, the British Army was an eighteenth-century institution reliant on military methods obsolete even in European conflict.[13]

The presumption of British superiority was reflected within the colonial government's approach to Hone Heke's endeavours in Kororareka. After the third attempt on the flagpole, Governor Fitzroy concentrated the minimal force at his

[10] Victorian Britain was an Imperial powerhouse stretching 8 million square miles with a population of 170 million, roughly 25% of the world; Peter J. Marshall, *The Cambridge Illustrated History of the British Empire* (Cambridge University Press, 1996), p.24.
[11] Richard J. Taylor, *Tribe of the War God* (Napier, Cosmos, 1996), p.12; Ian Knight, *Go to your God like a solider* (London: Greenhill Books, 1966), p.128.
[12] O'Malley 2019, p.13; James Whitman, *The Verdict of Battle: The Law of Victory and the Making of Modern War* (Cambridge, London: Harvard University Press, 2012), pp.20-21.
[13] Azar Gat. *The development of military thought: the nineteenth century* (Oxford University Press, 1992) p.4

disposal on the defence of the Union Jack at Kororareka. [14]This 140-strong garrison included a detachment of the 96th regiment, the naval brigade of HMS Hazard and was further supported by 200 lightly armed townsfolk.[15] Despite the limited numbers, Governor Fitzroy, Magistrate Beckham and colonial officials were undeterred by the threat Heke posed, believing that 'Māori resistance was no match for British steel'.[16] This presumption proved costly. Heke and his allies hit Kororareka in a three-pronged assault, defeating the garrison, felling the Union Jack, taking the town, and destroying 50,000 pounds worth of property and goods.[17]

The failure of British Regulars to defend Kororareka did not impact British leadership's strategic planning in their initial military response to Heke's rebellion. In April 1845, Lieutenant Colonel Hulme and his second Major Cyprian Bridge set out on the first expedition of the Northern War, tasked with retaking Kororareka, and then advancing into Ngā Puhi territory.[18] Hulme's force landed at Onewhero Bay, supported by the Royal Marines and a Ngā Puhi Rangatira Tamati Wake Nene, whose hapū sought to maintain peaceful relations with Britain through accompanying their military expeditions.[19] Hulme planned to engage Heke and

[14] Belich, p.36.
[15] These townsfolk had the occasion musket, old shotgun, or weaponised farm tools; Eyewitness account' *The Times*, 6 September 1845.
[16] Thomas Lindsay Buick, *New Zealand's First War, or, The Rebellion of Hone Heke* (Christchurch: Capper Press, 1976), pp.91-93; *The Times*, 6 Sept. 1845; Fitzroy to Lord Stanley 9 April. 1845, C.O. 209/34.
[17] Belich, p.37.
[18] Hulme led 300 British Regulars, the majority of with having recently arrived from Australia. This force was supplemented by 120 Naval Marines, and a handful of volunteers; Belich, p. 37; Barthorp, p.34.
[19] Belich, pp.34-35.

Kawiti at Puketutu, where the two Ngā Puhi hapū had entrenched themselves. This would require Hulme's column to march two days through New Zealand bush in the month before winter.

Colonel Hulme's conventional army expedition was unprepared for the conditions they would face in northern New Zealand. Hulme and colonial officers presumed the endeavour would be quickly dealt with because 'one British soldier was equal to any half dozen savages.'[20] Fortified with this belief, 'Hulme set out into unknown country against an enemy of unknown strength'.[21] The lack of reconnaissance and experience in traversing Aotearoa's frontier meant the field force was not provided with any camp equipment, form of shelter, artillery support, transport, or sufficient rations because it was believed the foray into the bush would be a quick success.[22] The first evening, the column settled in a valley and endured a night of torrential rain. Major Bridge described night in his journal, 'Never passed so miserably a night, we had to get up and stand around the fire. We were in a pretty plight in the morning, Officers, and men all wet through, Arms, Ammunition, everything'.[23] With their munitions and morale low, Hulme's column marched to Puketutu through harsh, dense terrain.

[20] James Cowan, *The New Zealand Wars: Volume I* (Wellington: Government Printer, 1983). p.37.
[21] Cowan, 1983, pp. 37-38.
[22] Major Cyprian Bridge, *Journal of Events on Expedition to New Zealand commencing 4th April 1845* (Wellington: Alexander Turnbull Library); Cowan, pp.36-37.
[23] Major Cyprian Bridge, *Journal of Events* 1845.

The British strategic approach at Puketutu was buttressed by the belief that unwavering discipline and coordinated line infantry would win the field**.** [24]This conventional army approach was brutally effective in the fields of Europe but would come undone in the dense terrain of northern Aotearoa.[25] Colonel Hulme and Major Bridge undertook light reconnaissance identifying the danger presented by the left and front sides of the fortification, with musket-proof flax work and protruding angles to create enfilading fire on attackers.[26] Hulme decided against further reconnaissance because a Māori informant believed the right side to be less formidable. Bridge, however, noted the right side to be three lines thick of stone and wooden palisades.[27] Hulme failed to properly map out the battlefield and did not utilize Waka Nene's men, who had been effectively raiding the region and could have easily scouted the Pā. Heke and Kawiti had specifically positioned Puketutu in terrain suited to mobile decentralised conflict. James Cowan described the land immediately before Puketutu as 'ideal for tribal warfare, rife with bush and fern, swamps and creeks'.[28] Cowan's use of the language, 'tribal warfare' displayed military and scholarly resistance to unconventional military methods, which were labelled as Indigenous tactics only. Hulme's conventional force was unable to force a pitched field conflict in this terrain, and their inexperience would be exposed by

[24] Taylor, pp.12-14.
[25] Knight, pp.158-161.
[26] Cowan, p.37; Barthorp, p.38.
[27] Major Bridge, 1845.
[28] Cowan, p.39.

Kawiti who outflanked and inflicted significant British casualties in the conflict to come.

The battle of Puketutu highlighted the challenges that Hulme and British leadership would face utilizing a conventional warfare approach in colonial Aotearoa. Hulme's force engaged Puketutu Pā on the 8 May 1845, with the expectation Māori resistance would be futile against the dominant British Army.[29] Hulme drew upon his conventional warfare education and treated Puketutu Pā like a European siege scenario; artillery was to be fired against the walls before a direct assault with overwhelming numbers. Nine handheld rockets were fired upon the outer palisade of Puketutu. However, little structural damage was inflicted.[30] Despite this failure, Hulme order a frontal assault, advancing three sections of men toward the right-hand side of the Pā, the section Hulme had not mapped.[31] During the charge, Hulme's rank and file soldiers were required to navigate ravines, and engage an outer party of Ngā Puhi defenders.[32] The broken terrain did not favour line infantry.[33] Whilst the Ngā Puhi contingent was dispatched the British advance was stifled and the center column entrenched on a breastwork to trade volleys with the Pa's garrison.[34] The failure to breech the walls, and the difficult terrain presented a serious problem for the British regulars who were now pinned within firing range

[29] Belich discusses British sense of superiority, p.151.
[30] O'Malley, p.48.
[31] Belich, p.41; Major Bridge, 7th May 1845.
[32] 'They had to cross a ravine between the lake and the left face of the Pā under a heavy fire.'; Bridge, 8th May 1845.
[33] Line Infantry requires discipline, uniformity, and pitched conflict; Knight, p.158-161.
[34] Bridge, 8th May 1845.

of the heavily fortified right flank of the Pā. Ngā Puhi Rangatira Kawiti was a superb military commander and had hidden a significant taua in the flanking treeline.[35] Hulme's center column had overreached, Kawiti identified this potential combat opportunity and approached the field discretely, using the rolling terrain to cover his advance.[36]

Kawiti's flanking manoeuvrer helped win the day, but British discipline under fire avoided a decisive British loss. Kawiti ambushed the entrenched British contingent inflicting significant casualties.[37] Fortuitously for Hulme, Kawiti had engaged the light company of the 65th regiment, the best troops available, trained in conventional skirmishing combat.[38] Kawiti's ambush placed the company on the back foot, but the disciplined unit quickly recovered and charged into Kawiti's force.[39] This is the first major combat situation between the two organisations, and in the savage melee conflict Ngā Puhi soldiers stood tall but could not sustain the same volume of casualties, and the British army's ability to engage despite taking losses becomes the deciding factor.[40] A 60-strong taua launched from the Pā to draw attention from Kawiti, however in this pitched conflict the Ngā Puhi effort faltered under significant loss of life and withdrew to the safety of the Pā.[41] Hulme had

[35] O'Malley, p.48.
[36] Barthorp, pp.39-40.
[37] O'Malley, p.48.
[38] The Light Company and the Grenadier Companies consisted of the best troops in the regiment; Knight, p.159.
[39] British Infantry were renowned across the world for the discipline and uniformity under fire; Cliff Simons, *Soldiers, Scouts and Spies: A Military History Of The New Zealand Wars 1845-1864* (Auckland: Massey University Press, 2019), p.13; Bridge, 11 May 1845.
[40] Hulme's Report (9 May 1845), W.O. 1/433, pp.561-70.
[41] Belich, p.42.

beaten the Ngā Puhi contingent in open combat, but lost 25 percent of his force and was unable to breech the Pā.[42] The presumption of British martial supremacy, and a European conventional approach to the conflict, resulted in an unprepared, and unsuited strategic approach to colonial conflict. The rigidity of the British strategic thinking hindered British officer's ability to react to combat scenarios and deviate the approach when situations required change.

British and colonial leadership did not recognise the limitations of conventional warfare in the aftermath of Puketutu. This was exemplified by the appointment of Colonel Henry Despard as commander of British forces in New Zealand. Colonel Despard assumed command on July 1st, 1845, and immediately sought to nullify Heke's rebellion with a second campaign into Ngā Puhi territory.[43] Colonel Despard could not have been more unsuited to the Northern War situation and pointed to the key issues within the British Army organisation.[44] Despard did not acquire leadership of the 99th Regiment through merit. He purchased the commission and had not seen active service in 30 years.[45] Despard operated his regiment through absolute centralised command, even his ranking officers were segregated from tactical and strategic decision making.[46] To further solidify his

[42] British Casualties 14 Dead, 38 Wounded; Māori 28 Killed Wounded unknown; Cowan, p.43.
[43] Belich, p.45; Fitzroy to Hulme, 31 May 1845, W.O. 1/433, p.123; Belich, p.45; Cowan p.46
[44] Azar Gat, *The development of military thought: the nineteenth century* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), p.4.
[45] Neville Kenrick, *The Story of The Wiltshire Regiment* (n.p. Gale & Polden, 1963) p.255.
[46] Barthorp, pp.83-85.

ineptness, Despard was not well versed in the current army manuals therefore he forced his newly acquired regiment to learn and operate within the drill manual of 1799.[47] Despard had effectively turned one of the best regiments in the British Army, into an eighteenth-century force, solely reliant on the decision-making capacity of 60-year-old man inexperienced in conventional conflict let alone the irregular conflict methods of Ngā Puhi leadership.

Colonel Despard made two critical mistakes in his preparation for the Ohaeawai Campaign, operating in winter and the dismissal of loyalist Māori allies. Despard led a 570-strong expeditionary force into Ngā Puhi territory in the second week of June, the middle of winter. Both Colonel Hulme, and Major Bridge had spoken against campaigning in winter, but Despard refused to entertain ideas from his subordinates.[48] Despard's conventional force struggled to cross the tough terrain, and their slow pace mitigated any chance of catching Kawiti unaware. Tamati Waka Nene offered to guide the column through the harsh terrain and begin long range raids against Kawiti's fortification. Colonel Despard dismissed Waka Nene's offer because he did not require the services of 'Savages'.[49] Despard's attitude toward Waka Nene is reflective of the British sense of superiority and scepticism toward military methods beyond the conventional doctrine. Despard's decision to exclude

[47] The drill manuals Despard learnt as young man in India; Buick, p.149.
[48] Historically, military campaigns cease, or hold over winter because in the colder month's supply lines struggle, and cold-hungry soldiers are not effective, and more susceptible to desertion.
[49] 'When he required the assistance of savages, he would ask for it.' Buick, p. 149.

Waka Nene is notably important, Waka Nene had actually defeated Hone Heke at Te Ahuahu in May and could have been invaluable in Despard's campaign.[50] At Ohaeawai, the poor preparation led to severely low rations and poor morale within the British contingent. The consistently wet winter evenings became a constant challenge for the expeditionary force because adequate tenting equipment had not been supplied.[51]

Regiment	**Manpower**	**Troop Type**	**Commanding Officer**
58th	270	Grenadier / Light Company	Major Cyprian Bridge
99th	180	Rank n File	Major McPherson
96th	70	Rank n File	Colonel Hulme
Naval Bridge	30-40	Sailors & Marines	Captain Johnson
Royal Artillery	10	Engineers & Artilleryman	Lieutenant Wilmot

Table 1: Colonel Henry Despard's force at Ohaeawai based on troop numbers given in Barthorp pp.87-88. This table shows the heavy reliance on conventional warfare troops.

Colonel Despard sought a decisive victory at Ohaeawai through artillery bombardment and a direct assault against the pā. This approach assumed overwhelming numbers would best the Ngā Puhi defensive fortification. Despard initiated his assault against Ohaeawai with 8 days of inconsistent artillery

[50] On the 12th of June Waka Nene outnumbered 4-1 defeated Heke's forces at Te Ahuahu in pitched conflict after Heke insulted Nene's Mana at peace talks; Robert Burrows, *Extracts from a Diary Kept by the Rev. R. Burrows During Heke's War in the North, in 1845*, (Auckland: Upton & Co. 1886), p.36; Belich, p.35.
[51] Private Robert Hattaway Account in Barthorp, pp.90-91.

bombardment.[52] This proved futile because Despard limited this artillery fire to 30-minute intervals, rendering the firepower useless as the defenders simply evacuated or bunkered down every 30 minutes and then repaired the damage.[53] Despard's limited strategic repertoire presented two options, besiege the garrison or storm the walls.[54] The conventional British force lacked the mobility to navigate the dense bush surrounding the Pā and therefore could not implement an effective siege. It was however the efforts of Ngā Puhi surprise raid which initiated Despard's decision to charge Ohaeawai Pā.[55] Colonel Despard committed a significant portion of his force to an all-out assault on the northeast section of the Pā, opposite to the section targeted by his artillery.[56] The raid had embarrassed the pretentious Despard and by all accounts, he lost any sense of reason and rushed his assault against the wishes of his officers.[57] Lieutenant Phillpots was so violently opposed to the rash loss of lives that he parted ways with his entire military attire in defiance whilst Waka Nene bluntly told Despard he was a 'Very Stupid Person'.[58]

Despard's plan included a 20-man strong forlorn hope tasked with providing covering fire, and two assaulting columns directed to either side of the North-eastern

[52] Private Robert Hattaway, 'Reminiscences of the Northern War' *New Zealand Herald*, 13 May 1899, <https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/NZH18990513.2.69.7> {accessed 20 May 2023}, pp.5-10.
[53] Barthorp, pp.91-94.
[54] Hattaway, pp.5-10.
[55] 'Kawiti launches a surprise raid against Despard's encampment and capture a British officer. This insult enrages Despard who acts without reason and orders the attack'; Bridge, July 1845.
[56] O'Malley, pp.50-51.
[57] Belich, p.47.
[58] John Webster, *Reminiscences of an Old Settler in Australia and New Zealand*, (Christchurch: Whitcombe & Tombs, 1908) p.288.

corner of the pā.[59] Critical to Despard's attack was a detachment of non-military pioneers and seamen who were equipped with axes and ropes to bring down the defensive palisade. There was no secrecy to the assault, Despard believed the Māori no match for British steel, and at 3pm a bugle sang out, and the rank and file charged uphill at the heavily fortified pā. Despard's conventional approach to colonial conflict presumed overwhelming numbers would win the day.

The 58th Grenadiers led the charge. Operating within the conventional drill manual, the attacking columns were tightly packed with 'elbows touching… four ranks deep and only the regulation 23 inches between each rank'.[60] Upon the sounding of the bugle, the two columns charged up hill toward the Pā, the 'first two ranks at the charge with the bayonet… the 3rd and 4th ran with muskets.'[61] The garrison waited until the charge was within 5 yards of the palisade, Corporal John Mitchell described that point blank volley as 'the opening of the doors of a monster furnace'.[62] 'Only one ladder made it to the breeching party' because the pioneers having witnessed the onslaught refused to advance and 'lay down in the fern'.[63] Within seven minutes, Despard's assault had lost 100 of the finest soldiers in the 58th regiment.[64] The palisade had proven too strong for hatchets, the ropes and ladders

[59] Cowan, p.64; Belich, p.52.
[60] *Account of Corporal William Free 58th Grenadiers* in Cowan, p.66.
[61] Free, p.66.
[62] *Account of Corporal John Mitchell* in Barthorp, p.95.
[63] Bridge. 1st July 1845.
[64] At 3 o'clock that evening 200 of our men, the 58th the 98th the sailors and marines, they all like men did muster upon that fatal day, to fight for Queen and country and show them British Play, But men been few and the Pah was strong we could not rightly stand, For in 7 and a half minutes we had lost one hundred men; *Private Alexander Whisker Poem* in Barthorp, p.96.

never reached the walls, the Māori garrison were difficult to dislodge as they fired from underneath the palisade wall.[65] Numeric superiority did not win the day, Kawiti had inflicted one the worst defeats in the British Army's history.



Figure 3: View of the Left Angle of Heke's pā at Ohaeawai That Was Stormed on the 1st July, 1845. Cyprian Bridge, Alexander Turnbull Library, A-079-005.

The defeat at Ohaeawai highlighted the limitations of Colonel Despard's centralised command structure. The combat situation at Ohaeawai mitigated the advantages British regulars held in coordinated pitched conflict.[66] The first volley from the Ngā Puhi garrison killed 20 soldiers, a further 20 were killed and 60 were

[65] 'Not a single Māori could we see. They were all safely hidden in their trenches and pits, poking the muzzles of their guns under the foot of the palisade… We tore at the fence… trying to pull it down but it was hopeless business.'; Free in Cowan, p.61.
[66] Knight, pp.158-161.

wounded in the ensuing chaos as the enfilading fire devasted the British assault.[67] British infantry were drilled to act as an orchestrated whole, reliant on the direction of their commanding officers. [68]At Ohaeawai, British officers were targeted, and the dependent regulars were unable to act autonomously within the combat situation.[69] The lack of able decision-makers can also be attributed to Colonel Despard's insistence that all decisions were run through him via a battlefield runner.[70] Had British officers and soldiers a greater degree of autonomy the pioneer contingent could have been rallied, or their equipment commandeered. This is not to suggest decentralised command would have changed the overall outcome, but a more coordinated approach and retreat might have reduced the severity of the defeat. Likewise, the inclusion of Colonel Hulme, Major Bridge and Rangatira Waka Nene in the strategic planning of Ohaeawai could have altered Despard's approach. Their experience in fighting within the colonial theatre should have been drawn upon, instead Despard segregated his experienced officers and based his strategic approach entirely upon his own belief in the might of the British Army. James Belich has stressed the importance of noting Kawiti's superb efforts at Ohaeawai, and not discrediting the defender's success by blaming Despard for defeat.[71] The outcome at Ohaeawai was decided by the excellent strategic thinking of Kawiti and his

[67] Cowan, p.68.
[68] Companies were expected to act as a cohesive unit, individual autonomy was discouraged in favour of large-scale choreographed action; Taylor, pp.12-14.
[69] Taylor, p.14.
[70] Whisker, July 1845.
[71] Belich, 1986, pp. 48-53.

Rangatira. However, Despard's reliance upon conventional conflict drastically increased the severity of the British defeat.

Despite the catastrophic outcome, British leadership failed to identify the shortcoming of conventional warfare in the colonial setting**.** In his report to Governor Fitzroy, Despard attributed failure solely to the pioneers for running away with the axes during the onslaught. The Duke of Wellington upon reading the battle reports stated, 'service has been well conducted by Colonel Despard', similarly Despard's immediate superior General O'Conner backed his decision making.[72] Despard received full support from British officials in the aftermath of a defeat which historians have labelled as 'downright madness', highlighting British resistance to strategic change.[73] The defeat had little impact on Despard's strategic thinking. During his inspection of Ohaeawai Pā he declared Kawiti could not have constructed such a position without European help. He remained ignorant of Māori martial capacity and refused to adapt to circumstance.[74]

Colonel Despard's actions at Ruapekapeka Pa portray no strategic adaption or recognition of conventional shortcomings after the Ohaeawai disaster. Despard led a

[72] Fitzroy expressed continued 'great confidence in his zeal and experience as well as in his prudence; FitzRoy to the Governor of NSW, 8 July 1845. W.O.1/433, pp.682; Duke of Wellington, *Memo*, 27 June 1846, W.O.J/527, pp.383-5.
[73] Barthorp, pp.100-111.
[74] Belich, p.49.

1300-strong second expedition against Hone Heke and Kawiti at Ruapekapeka pā.[75] Ruapekapeka Pa was a formidable fortification built on the northern edge of Tapuaeharuru Ridge. The region had no roads nor trail routes, and it required parties to navigate steep bush terrain.[76] Despite Despard's last experience traversing through the rough Northern terrain, he maintained his stance against the use of Waka Nene's direct help. The column took three weeks to march the 18-mile route to Ruapekapeka.[77] Upon arrival, Despard utilized a significant artillery presence and bombarded Ruapekapeka for two weeks.[78] Ruapekapeka endured significant bombardment and on January 10th, multiple breeches appeared. Despard rushed to organise another frontal assault. However newly appointed Governor George Grey overrules Despard after heeding the advice of Waka Nene, Mohi Tawhai, and Major Bridge who warned that a direct assault would be foolhardy against such a defensively sound position.[79] The following day, Kawiti abandoned Ruapekapeka pā and positioned a significant taua of soldiers within the rising bush. British regulars were sent to pursue Kawiti. However, they stumbled into an ambush and endured heavy casualties.[80] Despard's actions at Ruapekapeka reflect British resistance to strategic change. His march to Ruapekapeka was just as ineffective, and failed to

[75] 5 December 1845 Grey ordered Despard to attack and 'crush' Kawiti's new pā at Ruapekapeka.; O'Malley, p.53

[76] Force included the 65th Regt, 99th Regt, 400 plus Loyalist Māori, 400 Naval Marines and 80 Artillery men form the East Indian Trading Company.; O'Malley, p.53.

[77] Belich, p.59.

[78] Three 32 pounder's, one 18 pounder, two 12 pounders and 4 mortars; O'Malley, p.54; Artillery fire began on the 31st of December; Despard to Grey, 12 Dec. 1845, W.O. l/433, pp.1193-97.

[79] Belich, p.60.

[80] O'Malley, pp.55-56.

utilize the experienced Waka Nene, two of the key mistakes from Ohaeawai. His rush to assault the Pā following small breeches on January 10th suggests that Despard still considered overwhelming numbers the key factor in success against Māori pā and colonial warfare.

The sole instance of strategic adaption by British leadership in the Northern War and the first notion of success in New Zealand was a skirmish led by Major Cyprian Bridge. During Despard's march to Ohaeawai Pā, Major Bridge led his 58th Grenadier company in the advance guard and was able to act with a degree of autonomy. Bridge utilized this time to drill his Grenadier company in combat methods learnt from Waka Nene and observing Kawiti.[81] The Grenadier company was made up of the best soldiers in the regiment, typically the biggest and most physical men of the regiment.[82] These skilled soldiers quickly adapted to a skirmisher like approach to combat, utilizing terrain and incorporating decentralised command.[83] This practice proved fruitful as Bridge won multiple engagements against Heke's advance guard and forward defences during the approach to Ohaeawai Pā. Bridge's success is the first instance of British leadership utilizing irregular warfare to adapt to colonial conflict.[84]

[81] Bridge, June 1845.
[82] Richard J. Taylor, *Tribe of the War God* (Napier, Cosmos, 1996), p.12.
[83] Belich, p.47.
[84] Bridge June 1845; Belich, p.48.

Figure 4: Colonel Cyprian Bridge 'From a Portrait about 1860'. Bridge was promoted after the Northern War; Cowan, p.63.

Home Turf and the Indirect Approach

The Ngā Puhi faction of resistance against the British Crown achieved great military success during the Northern War, particularly because they were able to dictate the theatre of war. Hone Heke sought greater autonomy for his Iwi and his rebellion against the sovereignty of the Crown achieved greater success the longer it was maintained. Therefore, military success was not always the defeat of the enemy, it included moral and psychological victory or avoiding unfavorable decisive battles. These requirements began the incorporation of the indirect approach, the grand strategy which would be drawn upon in some form by most Māori leaders during

the New Zealand Wars. The indirect approach is an irregular strategic and tactical methodology that utilizes methods and approaches to combat which avoid direct contact and either lure the enemy into a position of strength or negatively impact their ability to wage war.[85] Basil Liddell Hart conceptualised this strategic approach in the 1920s but its implementation can be dated back to the second Punic War.[86] The attack on Kororareka highlights this, by felling the Union Jack and killing British soldiers, Heke both achieved a moral victory and made an aggressive play to lure his enemy into Ngā Puhi controlled Territory.[87] The defeat at Kororareka forced Governor Fitzroy to respond and pursue Heke to stifle his resistance and threat to the colony.[88]

Figure 5: Sketch of Hone Heke, Leader of Ngā Puhi resistance; Ministry for Culture and Heritage.

[85] The indirect approach has consisted of a logistical military move directed against an economic target, source of supply for the opposing army, to lure the enemy into a position of strength or occasionally for psychological effect; Basil Liddell Hart, *Strategy, second revised edition, (London: Faber and Faber, 1967)*, p.123.
[86] Liddell Hart, p.122.
[87] Fitzroy to Lord Stanley 9 April. 1845, C.O. 209/34; Kemp to Fitzroy, 13 March. 1845, C.O. 209/34.
[88] Buick, pp.91-93; Colonial officials expressed serious doubts in the Governor's ability, how could he protect Auckland if he could protect the Union Jack; *The Times*, 6 Sept. 1845.

The Ngā Puhi alliance was an experienced and highly capable fighting force, led by experienced rangatira Hone Heke and Kawiti**.** Ngati Hine rangatira Kawiti shared Heke's opposition to British sovereignty and was quick to align with Heke's uprising.[89] Kawiti was a Rangatira of great mana, and a highly respected military commander. Between them Kawiti and Heke mustered a significant portion of Ngā Puhi's available soldiers, but they did not represent the interests of the entire iwi. Several chiefs headed by Tamati Waka Nene opposed Heke's goals and opted to support British endeavours in the North.[90] The Ngā Puhi iwi were a dominant force during the Musket Wars period, and that experience proved vital against the conventional British Army.

Māori soldiers' mobility through the native bush and capacity to live off the land was a major advantage over the British conventional army. The superior ability of Māori to operate in the New Zealand bush was best displayed by Waka Nene's hapū. Nene fought for the Crown initiative because he sought to maintain peaceful and prosperous trade relations. In Hulme's, and later Despard's marches to Puketutu and Ohaeawai respectively, the British Army struggled to navigate the terrain and were unable to set up steady supply lines.[91] This meant British soldiers were loaded with five days of supply in their packs, making travel slow and

[89] Ngāti Hine Rangatira Kawiti dubbed Te Ruki 'The Duke' on account of his military prowess; O'Malley, p.46.
[90] Belich, p.29.
[91] Bridge, 4th April 1845.

precarious through the unsteady terrain.[92] During these marches, key supplies were lost and every major obstacle including impassable bush, thick foliage, deep stream, and steep inclines, required a company of pioneers to construct conditions more suited to the conventional army (fording streams, rope bridges, cutting tracks).[93] In comparison, Waka Nene and his men travelled light, living off the resources of the land, and supplied by friendly tribes. Their ample knowledge of the land made shelter easily accessible, and Waka Nene could navigate the region quickly, making his long-range raids against Puketutu highly effective and an exemplar of irregular warfare.[94]

Likewise, Kawiti and Heke's superior knowledge of the terrain and highly mobile force allowed the Ngā Puhi contingent to consistently and effectively out-maneuver the British army in the colonial theatre. At Puketutu, Kawiti ambushed the 65th Light Company by navigating the dense bush on the outskirts of the conflict and using the natural rise in the land to cover his advance.[95] Similarly, Kawiti's defensive positions at Ohaeawai and Ruapekapeka are astutely positioned in terrain that offsets any combat advantage the British hold and the irregular nature of their garrison meant defenders were not tethered to the fortification.[96]

[92] The British soldiers were loaded with munitions, rations, and water for five days, their Māori counterparts were said to have marvelled at their capacity to move under such burden. Barthorp, p.35.
[93] Corporal John Mitchell, *Journal Letter 19th March 1848* (Museum of The Northamptonshire Regiment).
[94] Cowan, pp.38-39.
[95] Barthorp, pp.39-40.
[96] Belich, p.50.

Strategic adaptations

The battle of Puketutu was the first major conflict between the two foreign military powers of Britain and Ngā Puhi, this asymmetrical clash no clear victor but highlighted the need for strategic adaptation from both sides. Kawiti identified the need to adapt to the asymmetrical circumstances and became the catalyst for Māori military leadership's use of irregular warfare methods. After the pitched battle outside the palisade of Puketutu Pā, Kawiti reflected on the conflict and noted that despite the element of surprise, high morale, and superior mobility, the Ngā Puhi taua gave ground and could not match the high breaking point of the British regulars.[97] With the exception of Te Ahuahu, a pitched battle between Heke and Waka Nene where there was no British presence and a more symmetrical conflict, the Ngā Puhi resistance would embrace and utilize the indirect approach.[98] Following Puketutu, Kawiti and Heke operate through a strategy of offensive, small offensive plays to entice a response against a strong defensive position which mitigates the advantages Britian held.

Under this strategic basis, Kawiti constructed Ohaeawai Pā, considered to be the first modern Pā. The design of Ohaeawai moved away from the traditional gunfighters Pā and endeavoured to provide ample offensive opportunities whilst

[97] Belich, p.44.

[98] On the 12th of June Waka Nene outnumbered 4-1 defeated Heke's forces at Te Ahuahu in pitched conflict after Heke insulted Nene's Mana at peace talks; Robert Burrows, *Extracts from a Diary Kept by the Rev. R. Burrows During Heke's War in the North, in 1845* (Auckland: Upton & Co., 1886) p.36; O'Malley, pp. 48-49; Belich, p.35.

protecting its garrison from British artillery.[99] Ohaeawai was positioned on rising ground, with ravines and native bush creating a funnel effect forcing attackers to engage one section of the Pā.[100] The palisade consisted of a wooden outer wall and a deep inner trench, the trench had built-in firing positions so the garrison could fire from under the wooden palisade and remain protected.[101] As a result, Colonel Despard bombarded the Pā without success for a week. The fortification held strong, but Kawiti needed the British force to commit to an assault against the defensive position.

As per the strategy of offence, Kawiti sent a taua of his Ngā Puhi partisans to raid the British position. Utilizing their superior mobility through the native bush, the taua ambushed Waka Nene's forces, captured a British officer and stole Waka Nene's flag. Subsequently, the officer was dressed in Māori clothing and the defenders paraded the flag above Ohaeawai Pā.[102] This tactical offensive successfully enraged Colonel Despard who committed most of his force into a frontal assault. He had been successfully lured into attacking the strong defensive position.[103] This created a combat situation heavily slanted in the defenders' favour.[104] The British regulars were ordered to charge uphill toward the fortified position and chop down the palisade, Kawiti's men simply waited till the British soldiers reached the outer

[99] Belich, p.49
[100] Ibid
[101] Account of W. H. Free, in Cowan, p.61.
[102] Cowan, p.60
[103] Cowan, p.64; Belich, p.52.
[104] Liddell Hart, pp.123-125.

wall and fired from the ground level gun pits at point blank range.[105] The devastating volley killed 40, and wounded a further 60. This created chaos amongst the attacking columns as officers were killed and the regulars reliant on structured decision-making were unable to act on the situation presented.[106] The first volley not only wiped the front line of the attack, but it also discouraged the pioneers tasked with breaching the palisade who threw down their axes and fled the engagement.[107] A veteran of Kawiti's garrison described the scene to James Cowan as 'They fell right and left… like so many sticks throw down.'[108] The retreat was sounded and Despard's columns were routed in a chaotic fight from the engagement. One hundred Ngā Puhi soldiers had soundly trounced the mighty British Army, with innovative designs, irregular methods, and superb martial prowess.

[105] Barthorp, pp.102-104.
[106] Taylor, pp.12-16.
[107] Cowan, p.68; Cowan, p.61; Bridge, July 1845.
[108] *Account of Rihara Kou* in Cowan, p.64.



Figure 6: Ruapekapeka Pā was a formidable and innovative defensive position.

'Sketch of Kawiti's Pah at Ruapekapeka' by William Marlow, Lieut. Leeds and J.P. du Moulin, 1846, Alexander Turnbull Library, MapColl-832.11hkm/1846.

Kawiti's adaptation of Māori strategy to include irregular warfare and the indirect approach was further refined at Ruapekapeka. Kawiti positioned and constructed Ruapekapeka to negate any combat advantages British leadership had. The Pā was built on the northern edge of Tapuaeharuru ridge, deep within the native bush. The region had no roads nor trail routes, and it required parties to navigate steep bush terrain.[109] Despard's 1300-strong column struggled with the 18-mile march to Ruapekapeka and the requirements of a conventional army ground

[109] Belich, p.59, p.53.

the column to a dawdle, eventually reaching the outskirts of Kawiti's 3 weeks after setting off.[110] Soldiers had been required to chop a path through the bush and pull the artillery up steep embankments by hand. Kawiti's strategic positioning of the pā had begun to demoralise his enemy before the conflict initiated.[111] Despard persisted with his artillery bombardment, and Kawiti was unable to entice Despard into another frontal assault. Kawiti utilized the indirect approach once more and abandoned the pā.[112] British troops discovered the abandoned pā, and several Māori positioned within the tree line. The British force pursued Kawiti's men. They were again lured into a position of defensive strength, the British company were ambushed deep within the Native bush and encircled taking heavy casualties until Kawiti withdrew from the field.[113]

[110] Belich, p.59.
[111] O'Malley, pp.54-55.
[112] Despard did ordered an assault, but the newly appointed Governor George Grey dismissed this idea; Belich, p.60.
[113] O'Malley, pp.55-56.

Figure 7: Watercolour by John Williams 58th Regiment portrays the British assault on Ruapekapeka; Hocken Pictorial Collections, University of Otago, 12544 a13278.

Conclusions

The Northern War ended in an uneasy and inconclusive peace on January 21st 1846. Whilst Governor Grey reported a 'severe defeat' of the rebellion, Hone Heke and Kawiti emerged the better off in the peace deal.[114] Heke's rebellion sought to improve chiefly authority and his iwi's autonomy. The peace deal set up by Heke, ended colonial plans for military expansion into the Bay of Islands and saw Grey issue

[114] Grey to Lord Stanley, 22 January 1846, 'Papers relating to the recent disturbances in New Zealand (1861)' *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970), pp.14–15.

pardons for those supporting Heke's rebellion.[115] Furthermore, Grey refused to re-establish the Union Jack at Maiki hill and no iwi land was confiscated.[116] Based upon these outcomes, Heke and Kawiti had achieved success through the use of irregular warfare, the avoidance of pitched battles, and a war of attrition. Kawiti's development of Ngā Puhi strategy following Puketutu to embody the indirect approach and set the terms of engagement proved fruitful and would inspire later Māori leaders such as Rewi Maniapoto and Wiremu Kingi. Kawiti developed the modern Pā system based upon on these strategic circumstances. He built fortified defensive positions capable of inflicting offense and providing shelter from the Royal Artillery. The Ngā Puhi contingent were successful in the Northern War because they were quick to adapt to the asymmetrical circumstances of this colonial conflict. Their traditional pitched conflicts were an inefficient strategic approach against a technologically and numerically superior enemy. Therefore, utilization of their mobility, home terrain, and strong defensive positions became necessary and effective strategic adaptations.

The British Army entered the Northern War expecting a quick foray into the bush to subdue some overly ambitious rebels. Instead, they were effectively beaten in a yearlong campaign during which they maintained numerical and technologic

[115] O'Malley, p.53
[116] Proclamation, 23 January 1846, 'Papers relating to the recent disturbances in New Zealand (1861)' *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970), p.16.

supremacy. British army leadership struggled to recognise the need to adapt in this asymmetrical colonial conflict and this is portrayed by their continued reliance on conventional army operations and strategies, even after the disastrous outcome at Ohaeawai Pā. The comprehensive loss of life at Ohaeawai should have catalysed a different strategic approach. However, Colonel Despard maintained the status quo at Ruapekapeka which nearly resulted in a second massacre had one British officer not had the sense to retreat from Kawiti's ambush.[117] Similarly, the logistical challenges experienced by Colonel Hulme in his expedition to Puketutu should have informed British officials of the hazards of travelling through difficult terrain in winter as a conventional army. Only Major Bridge drew upon the guidance of Waka Nene to train his Grenadiers in Māori warfare and found battlefield success at a minor level. Bridge's efforts were the first instance of the British Army implementing partisan warfare to adapt to colonial conflict. The Northern War put the British War office on notice, and proved the Māori people could defeat the British War machine. This success would lead to significant military investment into the colony, and a greater British presence in the Taranaki and Waikato conflicts.

[117] O'Malley, p.57.

Chapter 3: The Invasion of the Waikato
12 July 1863 – April 1864

The Great War for New Zealand – Vincent O'Malley.[1]

On the 9th of July 1863 Governor George Grey issued a proclamation stating all Māori living north of the Waikato frontier must swear fealty to Queen Victoria or be forcefully ejected.[2] Three days later Lieutenant General Duncan Cameron led British forces across the Mangatawhiri stream intending to destroy the Kīngitanga movement and quell all Māori resistance to British sovereignty.[3]

The Kīngitanga was established in 1858 when Pōtatau Te Wherowhero was crowned as the first Māori King by Wiremu Tamihana the 'Kingmaker'.[4] The Kīngitanga did not unite the entirety of Māoridom, but it did forge a strong alliance between Waikato and Taranaki iwi, alongside a blanket opposition to land sales.[5] The

[1] Vincent O'Malley, *The Great War for New Zealand: Waikato 1800–2000* (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2016).

[2] Notice, 9 July 1863, 'The Affairs of New Zealand 1862-1864' *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970), p.36.

[3] Governor Grey to the Duke of Newcastle, 28 July 1863, 'The Affairs of New Zealand 1862-1864' *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970), p.38; Notice to Chiefs of Waikato, 11 July 1863, *New Zealand Gazette*, no.29, 15 July 1863, pp.277–78; Lt. Gen Cameron to Gov. Grey July 28, 1863 'The Affairs of New Zealand 1862-1864' *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970) p.386

[4] Robert Aldrich and Cindy McCreery, *Crowns and Colonies: European Monarchies and Overseas Empires* (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 2016), p.165.

[5] H.T. Clarke, Extract from Journal, 14 January 1861, (1862) 'The Affairs of New Zealand 1862-1864' British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13 (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970), p.20 '*Tamihana also confirmed that earlier proposals to seize the so-called 'waste lands' had seriously dented Māori confidence. He told Clarke that a European had told him of the plan, which 'confirmed us in our determination to form a land league … to assist each other in resisting any attempt to take forcible possession of our lands*'; 'Story of the King Movement, Told by a Māori Chief', *New Zealand Herald*, 18 February 1882

Kīngitanga land league generated significant issues within the colony. The settler population increased significantly during the 1850s (Figure 8) and the formation of a representative government in New Zealand (1852-56) cemented a colonial policy of land acquisition and expansion.[6] The competing aspirations of the two populations generated significant mistrust. The colonist's desired the fertile agricultural lands of the Waikato whilst the Kīngitanga opposed continued colonial military investment.[7]



Figure 8: Māori and European Population numbers across 1838–1901; NZHistory Images and Media.

[6] Cliff Simons, 'Soldiers, Scouts, and Spies' *A Military History of the New Zealand Wars 1845-1864* (2020) p.246.
[7] James Belich, *Replenishing the Earth: The Settler Revolution and the Rise of the Anglo-World, 1783–1939* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2009) p.361. 'Europeans in Auckland province could only watch on enviously, denied access to the Waikato lands that were key to their economy'; John Gorst, *The Māori King* (London, Macmillan, 1863), p.324; Harold Miller, *The Invasion of the Waikato* (Dunedin, John McIndoe, 1964), pp.195-217 'Tamihana believed the construction of the Great South Road, Telegraph lines, and Naval Flotilla *could have no other purpose than to bring soldiers and great guns upon the Waikato River'.*

Governor George Grey utilized these tensions to fuel rumors of an imminent invasion of Auckland to gain support for an armed endeavor into the Waikato.[8] In reality, Grey declared war upon the Waikato Iwi in July 1863 to seize the fertile farming lands of the Waikato and destroy the Kīngitanga which stood in opposition to the sovereignty of the Crown.[9]



Figure 9: Wiremu Tamihana 'Kingmaker'; Alexander Turnbull Library, ½-053942.

[8] Simons, pp.260-262: Gorst, p.383.
[9] J.E. Gorst, *The Māori King, or The Story of Our Quarrel with the Natives of New Zealand*, (Macmillan & Co., London, 1864) p.377.

Defending the Waikato

In the defense of the Waikato, the Kīngitanga implemented the indirect approach and a strategy of limited aim.[10] Kīngitanga leadership maximized the superior mobility of their army through guerrilla warfare and encouraged British forces to assault strong defensive Pā. This approach fits Basil Liddell Hart's concept of the indirect approach, specifically, a strategy of elastic offense. The Kīngitanga expanded Kawiti's strategic thinking in the North.[11]

The Kīngitanga recognized the asymmetric nature of the conflict and actively maximized any combat advantages possible during the Waikato War.[12] On the 12th of July 1863, Lieutenant General Duncan Cameron and close to 700 British rank and file crossed the Mangatawhiri Stream commencing the invasion of the Waikato.[13] A further 10,000 British troops and a few thousand Colonial troops would be committed to the Waikato War effort against the Kīngitanga whose available manpower rarely peaked above 2000.[14] The Kīngitanga and their allies drew upon

[10] A strategy of limited aim is an Irregular Warfare method fought with the intention of achieving victory through attrition; Basil Liddel Hart, *Strategy*, second revised edition, (London: Faber and Faber, 1967), p.126.
[11] The indirect approach consists of A strategy of elastic defence is a calculated retirement which lures the enemy into a position of strength for a tactical offensive. Or a strategy of elastic offence that seeks to upset the enemy and entice a response against a strong tactical defence; Liddell Hart, p.123.
[12] Vincent O'Malley, *Voices from the New Zealand Wars: He Reo Nō Ngā Pakanga o Aotearoa* (Wellington, Bridget Williams Books, 2021), p. 156.
[13] Lt. Gen Cameron to Gov. Grey July 28, 1863 'The Affairs of New Zealand 1862-1864' *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970) p.386.
[14]'The Waikato Campaign of 1863–64', *Press*, 18 May 1864: James Belich, 'The New Zealand Wars, 1845–1870: An Analysis of Their History and Interpretation' (PhD thesis, Oxford University, 1982) p.174; James Belich, *The New Zealand Wars and the Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict*, (Auckland University Press, Auckland, 2013) p.125.

roughly 4000 potential soldiers, however, these individuals were also required to maintain iwi agricultural interests and so the Kīngitanga army never engaged Britain at peak strength.[15] Māori military resources were limited to muskets pre-dating 1820, three derelict naval cannons, and no organized cavalry.[16] These major numerical and technological differences set the scene for an asymmetrical conflict that would require significant innovation for success.[17] The Kīngitanga maximized their combat advantages through the superiority of toā in the New Zealand bush, and the decentralized command structure of Rūnanga which allowed for flexibility in combat.[18] These advantages were utilized through the indirect approach, specifically a strategy of offence. This required the Kīngitanga to wage guerrilla warfare against General Cameron's forces to reduce his manpower and lure Cameron into assaulting a heavily fortified Pā, a methodology Kawiti had utilized to great success.

Initial military engagements from the Kīngitanga aimed to slow down Cameron's advance through Northern Waikato. At Koheroa, the first major engagement of the Waikato War, a Kīngitanga taua fired upon and successfully lured Lieutenant Colonel Austin's 14th Regiment and later Cameron into pursuing the taua

[15] Belich, p.129.
[16] The outdated muskets had significantly less range than British Enfield Rifles; Simons, p.36.
[17] Vincent O'Malley. *The Great War for New Zealand: Waikato 1800-2000*. (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2016) p.277.
[18] Johanson argued the tradition Māori decentralised command structure was highly suited to Irregular Warfare; Terence Johanson, 'Ka Pu Ruha, Ka Hao Te Rangatahi; Changes in Māori Warfare Between The Period Prior to First European Contact and the End of the New Zealand Wars' (MA thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2009) p.9; Vincent O'Malley, 'Reinventing Tribal Mechanisms of Governance: The Emergence of Māori Rūnanga and Komiti in New Zealand Before 1900', *Ethnohistory*, 56.1 (2009), 69–89.

deep into the hills toward Maramarua. The British force charged head-on into tight, rolling terrain, with pre-established firing positions. For five miles the Māori taua engaged the British force from strong defensive positions before retreating to the next. General Cameron noted that the Kingites; 'were making a stand on every favourable position' and 'defended with great obstinacy.'[19] At Koheroa, the Kingite force endeavoured to inflict casualties and impair Cameron's advance, this was achieved by luring British forces into terrain the regulars were unsuited to, and avoiding combat situations which favoured the British.[20] Cameron's pursuit ended with a sustained firefight that forced the Kingites to retreat across the Maramarua stream. Cameron and Grey claimed Koheroa as the first victory in New Zealand without artillery, but it was a Pyrrhic victory at best. Cameron lost roughly 13 men, and the Kingitanga strategy of offence had found great success against the British regulars who struggled within the colonial terrain.[21] This brash endeavour into unknown territory epitomised the racist presumption of superiority Belich identifies within British Army thinking.[22]

[19] Lieutenant General Cameron to Governor Grey, July 18, 1863, 'The Affairs of New Zealand 1862-1864' British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13 (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970), p.390.
[20] Major General James Alexander, *Bush Fighting: Illustrated by Remarkable Actions and Incidents of the Māori War in New Zealand* (London: Low and Searle, 1873), p.49.
[21] Alexander, p.49; **Pyrrhic Victory**, 'a victory that is not worth winning because so much is lost to achieve it'; Tamehana to Rewiti, July 1863, *AJHR* 1865, E-11, p.15; 'Quoting 'Native Account' *Southern Cross*, 28 July 1863.
[22] Belich, p. 156.

Guerrilla Warfare

Kīngitanga leadership utilized guerrilla warfare to maximise their military strengths and counter the asymmetric nature of the conflict.[23] The Kīngitanga force was supplemented by various hapū, each with their own desires or intentions for supporting the cause.[24] Combined efforts proved detrimental to combat effectiveness, therefore Kīngitanga leadership created a decentralised parallel command structure.[25] This meant individual hapū could operate independently but in alignment with an overarching grand strategy.[26] Kīngitanga military leaders were veterans of the musket wars period. Individuals such as Rewi Maniapoto were vastly experienced and recognised the asymmetric conditions of the invasion.[27] These conditions, stimulated by Cameron's ineffective engagement at Koheroa led to the development of a guerrilla warfare campaign. Kīngitanga forces operated in individual hapū and targeted supply or psychological targets representative of both British and Colonial interests.[28] These endeavours avoided major pitched conflict and armed combat was limited to ambuscades or traps, combat scenarios which heavily favoured the Kingites.[29] This strategic approach was a significant adaption from pre-European warfare. Irregular tactics of military deception was not a brand-

[23] Cowan, p. 265.
[24] Johanson, p. 19.
[25] Johanson, pp.9-19.
[26] Johanson, p.9.
[27] Johanson, p.26.
[28] Richard Taylor, 'Logistical Operations in the Waikato War 1863-64', *New Zealand Army Military Studies Institute Occasional Papers Series*, 9 (2005), p.12.
[29] Māori forces operated in small units lead by a single commander and employed tactics such as 'the ambush or takiri (mock retreat). Johanson, p.25.

new innovation, but its widespread use, and the decentralised small unit approach differed significantly from the large-scale blood parties of the musket war era.[30]

This guerrilla warfare campaign began on the 17th of July at Martin's farm when a taua of Ngati Pāoa partisans ambushed a supply convoy escorted by Captain James Ring and the 19th Royal Irish.[31] The Ngati Pāoa partisans took up firing positions on either side of an isolated stretch of the Great South Road and fired upon the middle section of the convoy, neutralising the middle cart and engulfing the escort in enfilading fire.[32] Captain Ring withdrew and organized a tightly formed bayonet charge in response to the Ngati Pāoa partisans whose attempt to inflict further casualties had drawn them past the safety of the tree line.[33] Despite their numeric supremacy, the Kingites identified the element of surprise had worn off and they retired beyond the treeline. To protect against further endeavours, Captain Ring fortified his company within the homestead at Martin's farm.[34]

[30] 'Even if the Kīngitanga army did not march under a centralised command structure, the nature of the force had evolved significantly from the large taua of the pre-treaty era.' O'Malley, p.225; Angela Ballara, *Taua: "Musket Wars", "Land Wars" or Tikanga?: Warfare in Māori Society in the Early Nineteenth Century* (Auckland, N.Z: Penguin Books, 2003), p.73.
[31] Alexander, p.52.
[32] James Cowan, *The New Zealand Wars: A History of the Māori Campaigns and the Pioneering Period*. (Wellington, New Zealand Government Printer, 1983). p.250.
[33] Belich, p.134; Captain Ring to Lt. General Cameron, 16 July 1863, 'The Affairs of New Zealand 1862-1864' *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970), p.388.
[34] Alexander, p.52.

Figure 10: The scene of the attack upon the escort on July 17. 'Views in New Zealand' ***Illustrated London News*** **(London, 1863); Alexander Turnbull Library, Wellington, New Zealand. http://natlib.govt.nz/records/22325734**

The Kīngitanga raids, ambushes, and long-range assaults were conducted by Māori toa who can be considered partisan soldiers.[35] These toa were experienced soldiers, operating under the strategic guidance of their immediate rangatira, and rangatira of the greater Kīngitanga organisation.[36] In reference to Lieber's legal definition of nineteenth-century warfare, these toa were soldiers within the organisation's regular army and intended to injure British forces through means

[35] Lieber, p.11; Jomini, 1845.
[36] Johanson, p.19.

outside of conventional Māori conflict.[37] Whilst this thesis recognizes the Kīngitanga differs significantly from the professional armies of the Western world, the principle remains relevant. This is important because it further solidifies the role irregular warfare had within the strategic thinking of the Kīngitanga rangatira.

The Kingite soldiers' superior capacity for conflict within Aotearoa New Zealand's topography directly checked Cameron's invasion of the Waikato. Kīngitanga soldiers were highly skilled in bushcraft, and this ability to live off the land meant raiding taua could operate deep behind British lines.[38] This created an extensive front line Cameron had to defend against and the Kīngitanga could operate without the need for supply lines.[39] The guerrilla warfare campaign proved costly and time-consuming for Cameron and the Imperial army, with raids, ambushes, and looting becoming a constant presence along the Great South Road. General Greaves summarised the situation in his memoirs:

> 'From this day (17 July) the enemy set to work in characteristic fashion. They attacked all weakly defended posts, and the convoys on the road, murdered isolated settlers and infested the bush like so many wild animals. Calls for military assistance came from all parts.'[40]

[37] Lieber, p. 11.
[38] Max Boot, *Invisible Armies: An Epic History Of Guerrilla Warfare From Ancient Times To The Present* (New York: Liveright Publishing, 2013), p. 24; Michaela Moura-Kocoglu, 'From Noble Savage to Brave New Warrior? - Constructions of a Māori Tradition of Warfare', *Cross/ Cultures,* 145 (2012), p. 371.
[39] Lawrence refers to this as operating like a vapor, frequent assaults across a wide front line. Trevor Lawrence, 'T.E. Lawrence on guerrilla warfare', *Encyclopaedia Britannica* (November 6, 2014) <https://www.britannica.com/topic/T-E-Lawrence-on-guerrilla-warfare-1984900>.
[40] *Memoirs of General Sir George Richard Greaves,* (London, 1924), pp.95-96.

Greaves's use of the phrase 'infested the bush like so many wild animals' and Cameron's description of Māori presence as an infestation (below quote) highlights the racial prejudice which underlined British strategic thinking.

By the 30th of July, the Kingite guerrilla warfare campaign had become so effective that the entire belt of bush along the Hunua and Pokeno ranges became too hostile for British supply and civilian interests. Homesteads and civilian commerce became key targets of the Kingites who sought to demoralise and further stretch British resources. Civilian deaths were frequent with numerous homesteads pillaged such as Henderson's farm, and Hay's House and a particularly brutal attack on the Kennedy farm on the 24th of October which saw two unarmed 8-year-old boys murdered.[41] This success forced the establishment of five significant redoubts and numerous forts along the Great South Road.[42] These garrisons sapped 510 men and further reduced Britain's tactical capacity to respond to further incursions from Māori Irregulars.[43] Cameron in his communication to Governor Grey wrote,

> 'The bush is so infested with Natives that I have been obliged to establish strong posts along our lines of communication, which absorbs so large a portion of the force that until I receive reinforcements it is impossible for me to advance further up the Waikato' [44]

[41] Gov. Grey to Duke of Newcastle, Oct 25th, 1863, 'The Affairs of New Zealand 1862-1864' *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970), p.428.
[42] Belich, p.134.
[43] Featon, p.38; DQMG Journals, p.48.
[44] Cameron to W.O., 30 July 1863, W.O.33/12, p.567.

This ability to engage the British force behind the conventional front line without restriction is a clear indictor of irregular warfare.[45] The Kīngitanga strategic approach created an environment which became increasing hostile the further Cameron advanced. This vulnerability was highlighted by Cameron's significant investment into the commissariat force and defensive redoubts. This strategic approach is recognised within modern military strategy as an effective method for limiting the ability of an enemy to take the initiative.[46] The strategic adaption of Māori strategy to operate through guerrilla warfare maximised the strengths of the Kīngitanga's military force. It promoted the decentralised nature of Māori tribal structure and supplemented the Kingite partisan's superior mobility.[47] As recognised by Gorst, success during the initial invasion was achieved not by the 1000 soldiers gathered at Meremere, but by the small 30-man strong taua that operated within the Hunua ranges.[48]

The Kīngitanga's guerrilla warfare campaign had a lasting and crucial impact on the British Army's striking power throughout the Waikato War. Before the engagements at Meremere and Rangiriri, Cameron considered it necessary to send military expeditions to Raglan and Thames to ensure the Kingites could not outflank

[45] Boot, p. 24.
[46] Warfare Development, *British Army Field Manual Volume 1 Part 10: Counterinsurgency* (London: Ministry of Defence, 2009), p. 104; Boot, p. 24.
[47] Johanson, p. 9.
[48] Gorst, p. 403.

and hit his supply lines.[49] James Belich suggests historians have not considered the wider impacts of this strategic approach he labelled as a 'character of guerrilla warfare'.[50] The following year, Cameron crawled his 7000-strong force in a three month long march from Ngaruawahia to Paterangi because he wanted 'Every precaution taken… to secure the advance up the Waikato Country, and to prevent the supplies being intercepted.'[51] Cameron invested more than half his available manpower into protecting his supply lines, securing footholds, escorting communications, and guarding his advance, leaving just 3000 men available to strike Paterangi Pā.[52] This expansive effort to protect against Kīngitanga irregulars shows the lasting impact the Kingite guerrilla warfare campaign had and importance of irregular warfare in the colonial setting.

[49] Imperial Armies were typically reliant on having a secure logistical system before launching campaigns or endeavours into hostile territory; Taylor, p. 17.
[50] Belich, 1986. pp.140-141.
[51] Alexander, p.123.
[52] Belich, p.162.



Figure 11: Map of the conflicts during Cameron's advance through southern Auckland / Northern Waikato; O'Malley. 2016 p.232.

The Indirect Approach

The highly effective guerrilla warfare campaign supplemented a larger grand strategy at play. Victory for the Kīngitanga would be the protection of iwi land, commercial interests, and spiritual places. The asymmetric conditions of the Waikato War meant traditional decisive victory was ill-equipped to bring about success. Instead, the Kīngitanga needed to hold a position of power and force a peace settlement. This could be achieved through a war of attrition. With these conditions,

the Kīngitanga command group constructed significant defensive positions and launched offensive plays through the guerrilla warfare campaign.[53] This strategy of elastic offense drained British resources, and encouraged the British into false moves which negatively impacted their capacity for war.[54] The Kīngitanga guerrilla campaign aimed to drain British resources, reduce available manpower, and lure British commanders into attacking heavily fortified positions.[55] The significant pā at Meremere, Rangiriri, and Paterangi were designed to dictate the terms of engagement, and minimise British combat advantages.[56] Furthermore, they also staggered Cameron's advance, in the hope the guerrilla campaigns could force a peace settlement.

To further the success of the guerrilla warfare campaign, the Kīngitanga Rūnanga invested significant manpower into partisan warfare. The September / October phase of the Waikato invasion saw an intensification of the guerrilla campaign beyond British lines with continued assaults on convoys, communication lines, and lightly defended patrols.[57] The dominance of Māori taua in bush fighting presented an opportunity to further adapt conventional Māori strategy and

[53] Johanson, p. 10.
[54] The Indirect approach is a military move which negatively impacts the enemy's capacity for war, or lures the enemy into a false move and creates a favourable combat situation; Liddel Hart, pp.123-125.
[55] Liddell Hart, p.123
[56] Upwards of 50 British soldiers were killed, and many wounded during this period of raiding; Belich, p.138; Michael Belgrave, *Dancing With The King: The Rise and Fall of the King Country, 1864-1885* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2017), p. 12.
[57] Cowan, p. 265; Taylor, p. 13.

significantly impact Britain's capacity for war.[58] Alongside the guerrilla campaign, significantly larger taua began launching long-distant strikes against key logistical positions.[59] This continued avoidance of pitched conflict to achieve victory further solidifies the role of the indirect approach.[60] These larger-scale assaults differ from tradition taua campaigns because they actively avoided pitched conflict, and instead aimed for logistical targets.[61] These raids did not seek prestigious victory, purely the decline of British combat capacity.[62]

The sacking of Camerontown highlights the effectiveness of Kīngitanga partisans during 1863. Camerontown was a key depot along the British supply line from Onehunga to Queens redoubt, and on September 7th in an organised long-range raid, a 100-strong taua of Ngāti Maniapoto soldiers surprised and defeated the Camerontown garrison.[63] The taua remained hidden from sight during their approach and struck the depot whilst supply ships arrived and the soldiers and sailors were preoccupied.[64] With the element of surprise, the Ngati-Maniapoto taua easily defeated the garrison, and sacked the depot, destroying 40 tons of

[58] James Alexander defined conflict within the bush and steep terrain as 'Bush Fighting' during his service in New Zealand; Alexander, p.9; Liddell Hart, 1967, pp.120-124.
[59] Cowan, pp.259–60.
[60] 'The Indirect approach often consists of a logistical military move directed against an economic target or source of supply for the opposing army, occasionally for psychological effect'; Liddell Hart, 1967, pp.120-124.
[61] Ron Crosby *The Musket Wars: a History of Inter-Iwi Conflict, 1806-45*. (Auckland: Reed, 1999), pp.40-50.
[62] Pre-contact Māori warfare was typically an extension of societal disputes over Mana or Utu. This meant war aimed to impose prestige or inflict suitable revenge; Angela Ballara, *Taua: "Musket Wars", "Land Wars" or Tikanga?: Warfare in Māori Society in the Early Nineteenth Century*. (Auckland: Penguin Books, 2003) p.26.
[63] Early reports suggest number could have been as many as 200 Ngāti Maniapoto soldiers. Alexander, Bushfighting, p.70; Lt. General Cameron to Governor Grey, 9 Aug. 1863 AJHR 1863, E-5, p.15.
[64] Lt. General Cameron to Governor Grey September 9th, 1863 'The Affairs of New Zealand 1862-1864' *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970), p.412.

commissariat stores.[65] Captain Swift the commanding officer at Tuakau redoubt 7 miles along the river had observed the attack on Camerontown and promptly led 50 rank and file soldiers out to support the garrison. After an 8-mile march across rough dense terrain, Swift's column encountered the Maniapoto unit who appeared to be 'Laughing and Chattering'.[66] Swift deemed the party drunk on stolen wine and ordered a direct bayonet charge. However, the Maniapoto partisans had cunningly deceived their counterparts, luring the British regulars into an ambush.[67] The British charge was stifled as 'The whole bush was lighted up with a terrific volley', the Ngati-Maniapoto ambush disintegrated the British front and left flanks, mortally wounding Captain Swift.[68] Lieutenant Butler rallied a second charge only to be checked just as effectively with Butler receiving a severe musket wound to the abdomen.[69] Swift's column would escape the onslaught in the early hours of the following day under the guidance of Colour Sergeant Mckenna, however the column suffered heavy casualties.[70] This long-range military move against an economic target not only hindered British supply but struck a psychological blow by destroying the redoubt named after General Cameron.[71] James Belich highlights the importance of the Camerontown raid as a 'surgical severance of a major British supply route' that was 'easily the most important single action of the first phase of

[65] Featon, 1879, p.63; Lt. General Cameron to W.O. 5 Oct. 1863, S.D., pp 53-54.
[66] Gamble, 3 October 1863, Journals of the Deputy Quartermaster General, p.57, WO 33/16, ATL.
[67] O'Malley, 2016 p. 240.
[68] Colour Sergeant Edward McKenna, 65th Regiment, to W. Hutchins, Lieutenant-Colonel, Assistant Military Secretary, 8 September 1863, AJHR, 1863, E-5, p.27.
[69] Alexander, p.72.
[70] Featon, p.47.
[71] Liddell Hart, p.123.

the war'.[72] The use of lure and ambush during the engagement is testament to the success of the indirect approach at the tactical level and value of irregular warfare during 1863.

The Kīngitanga Rūnanga had effectively utilized irregular warfare to hinder Cameron's invasion of the Waikato and reduced his capacity for conflict. However, the British adoption of counter-guerrilla warfare and the breakout from Paparata Pā, and therefore the Hunua ranges, altered the campaign conditions. Kīngitanga strategy now relied upon luring British forces into direct assaults against the formidable modern Pā.[73] This 'Pā Warfare', is still recognisable as the indirect approach. On a notably smaller scale, Kingite guerrillas still harassed Cameron's advance, and the formidable Pā fortifications provide the Kīngitanga an efficient method to combat British conventional supremacy. This approach was developed throughout the August to November period of 1863. The successful guerrilla warfare campaign operated out of three strong defensive positions, Meremere, Pukekawa, and Paparata Pā.[74] These positions allowed the Kingite taua to operate deep behind British lines and create an environment so hostile that soldiers garrisoning Queen's Redoubt slept in their uniform for fear of Māori attack.[75] The strategic positioning of this line of Pā fortification forced Cameron to engage Rewi Maniapoto's defence at

[72] Belich, 1986, p.137.
[73] Belgrave, p.12.
[74] The line provided secure bases for the raiding campaign, the raiding campaign prevented the concentration of a large force against the line… This strategy was enough to stop an 8000 strong army… whilst never exceeding 1500 men; O'Malley, p.238.
[75] anon., Diary of a British Soldier, Queen's Redoubt, 30 August 1863, Micro-MS-0445, ATL.

Meremere. However, the arrival of the British river flotilla mitigated Meremere's advantages because Cameron could outflank the Meremere garrison and engage the Pā from the rear. This meant Meremere no longer improved the Kingite combat advantage and was accordingly abandoned.[76] The Paterangi line, 25 miles south of Ngaruawahia, was purpose built to halt the British advance and protect the vital agriculture region of Rangiaowhia.[77] Consisting of four major Pā across five miles, all positioned to provide mutual support, the line posed a significant threat to Cameron's war effort.[78] Rewi Maniapoto again utilized the highly mobile partisan soldiers at his disposal to harass Cameron's forces and attack supply lines. However, the importance of protecting Rangiaowhia did impact Rewi's strategy, and the defensive garrison was prioritised over partisan warfare.[79] Minor partisan parties skirmished with Cameron's advance to reduce his striking power and encourage a frontal assault against Paterangi.[80] However, Cameron adopted the indirect approach and drew upon the expertise of the Forest Rangers to outflank the Paterangi line.

[76] Belich, 1986, p.138; Gamble, 5 November 1863, Journals of the Deputy Quartermaster General, p.66, WO 33/16, ANZ; *Sydney Morning Herald*, 13 November 1863.
[77] J.E. Ghorst, 'Observations on the Native Inhabitants of Rangiaowhia and Kihikihi', 21 May 1864 Gorst suggests all land lost prior to Paterangi was of 'slight value compared to the fertile territory the possession of which they now disputing.'
[78] Belich, 1986, p.160; *Daily Southern Cross*, 27 January 1864; Chris Pugsley, 'Walking the Waikato Wars: Bypassing the Māori Maginot Line at Paterangi', *New Zealand Defence Quarterly*, 16 (1997), p.32; Featon, p.110.
[79] Rangiaowhia was vital to the Kīngitanga's economy and the defense of Paterangi was prioritised. Belich, p.160.
[80] O'Malley, p.288; Cowan, p.347; *New Zealand Gazette*, no.5, 15 February 1864, pp.51–53 (various reports); Featon, *Waikato War*, pp.73–74.

A clear pattern can be identified in the Kīngitanga's defence of the Waikato that consisted of strong defensive positions capable of inflicting offensive success, supplemented by guerrilla warfare to drain British resources and encourage conflict against Pā. Together, these approaches produced combat situations beneficial to Māori strengths and effectively held back the British advance until 1865.

The Forest Rangers

'The most celebrated and perhaps notorious was the forest rangers, an elite corps of bush roving scouts. The eyes of the army'.[81] - Robert Stowers

By October 1863, the Kingite guerrilla warfare campaign had found so much success that British and Colonial officials were desperate for an effective response. Cameron had invested in 5 major redoubts along the Great South Road after the Martin's farm incident. However, these had proved ineffective and costly.[82] Similarly, investment into the commissariat transport corps had failed to prevent all civilian trade halting in the region.[83] Further failed endeavours included the clearing of 10 miles of bush along the Great South Road to negate the effectiveness of Māori ambushes and open trade within the region again.[84]

[81] Richard Stowers, 'Von Tempsky and the Forest Rangers', *History of the Forest Rangers during the New Zealand Wars* (Richard Stowers, 2012).
[82] Taylor, p. 12.
[83] DQMG Journals, p.48.
[84] Belich, p.104; *Daily Southern Cross*, 25th July 1863 (In the 7 weeks throughout September and October, 1000 acres of forest along the GSR was cleared by British Regulars and contractors alike; Gov. Grey to Duke of

The success of the volunteer settlers in bushfighting catalyzed the British command group's first major strategic adaptation in response to colonial conflict, the commission of the irregular warfare unit 'The Forest Rangers'. [85] The widespread guerrilla campaign had stretched British resources and manpower too thin. This exposed frontier homesteads and towns to raids from the Kīngitanga partisans. These hostilities toward civilians led to the formation of localized militia who proved highly capable at protecting civilian interests.[86] These localized corps of militia had no affiliation to the conventional army, they took up arms when homesteads and farms were threatened by Māori partisans and upon resolving the threat, resumed normal life.[87] The settlers proved effective. Their experience in bushcraft, frontier life, and a decentralised approach to combat found greater success in bush-fighting than their imperial counterparts.[88] Militia success led to the formation of colonial volunteer units who became counter-guerrilla operatives. They conducted long-range mounted cavalry patrols and raids throughout the Hunua

Newcastle, Oct 25th, 1863, 'The Affairs of New Zealand 1862-1864' *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970), p.428.

[85] Lt. Gen. Cameron to Gov. Grey, Oct 28th, 'The Affairs of New Zealand 1862-1864' *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970), p.442 'Cameron discusses the success of Lieutenant Lusk and the Mauku Militia against a significant Kīngitanga force'.

[86] Lt. Gen. Cameron to Gov. Grey, Oct 28th, BPP, p.442 'Cameron highlights the success of Lieutenant Lusk and the Mauku Militia.'

[87] Because of their self-organisation, and separation from the conventional army both organisationally and strategically, these volunteers can be classified as Guerrilla soldiers under Lieber's legal definition; Francis Lieber, *Guerrilla parties considered with reference to the laws and usages of war* (Washington; n.pub, 1862) pp.18-19.

[88] 'The force which this officer had at his disposal was too small to attack so large a body of natives, advantageously posted in the bush, with any prospect of success, but the gallantry which Lt. Lusk and the detachment…. Displayed in extricating themselves from a very critical position is deserving of the highest praise.'; Gov. Grey to Duke of Newcastle, Oct 25th, 1863, BPP, p.428; Mr Russell, Minister for Colonial Defence put together a memorandum of the colonial military presence in New Zealand; Distribution of the Militia and Volunteers in the Province of Auckland, 27 July 1863, AJHR, 1863, A-6A, p.3; Belich, New Zealand Wars, p.126.

Ranges, engaging the Kingites in topography the British regulars could not reach.[89] Later, the militia would reinforce the Waikato regiments, and the Rifle Volunteers became active units at Cameron's disposal. Colonial leadership recognised the potential in an organised colonial response to guerilla warfare and this led to the commission of the Forest Rangers.[90]

Colonist Military Presence	
Troop type	**Number of Men**
Militia	1639
Volunteer Cavalry	188
Rifle Volunteers	352
Naval Volunteers	150
Local Corps	847

Table 2: Distribution of the Militia and Volunteers in the Province of Auckland, 27 July 1863, AJHR, 1863, A-6A, p.3

[89] Lieutenant General Cameron to Governor Grey, Oct 23rd, 1863, The Affairs of New Zealand 1862-1864' *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970), p.429.
[90] Daily Southern Cross, *Notice* July 31, 1863.



NOTICE

TO MILITIAMEN AND OTHERS

ACTIVE YOUNG MEN, having some experience of New Zealand forests, may now confer a benefit upon the Colony, and also ensure a comparatively free and exciting life for themselves, by JOINING a CORPS of FOREST VOLUNTEERS now being enrolled in this Province, to act as the Taranaki Volunteers have acted, in striking terror into the marauding natives, by operations not in the power of ordinary troops.

By joining this Corps, the routine of Militia life may be got rid of, and a body of active and pleasant comrades ensured.

Only men of good character wanted.

For further information, apply to the office of the DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS, O'Connell Street, Auckland, between the hours of 2 and 3 o'clock, and 8 and 9 p.m.

July 31, 1863.

Figure 12: Daily Southern Cross Article calling for Volunteers. Note the emphasis on the New Zealand landscape. During this time most British troops were committed to the Waikato War. Taranaki militia engaged with hostile Taranaki iwi and formed the Taranaki Volunteers who acted similarly to the Forest Rangers; *Daily Southern Cross* July 31, 1863.

The Forest Rangers were an elite partisan unit that waged counter-guerrilla warfare against Kingite forces and proved the effectiveness of irregular warfare. Tasked to 'Strike terror into the marauding natives, by operations not in the power of ordinary troops.'[91] The Forest Rangers operated within the conventional army's organisation, shared a strategic end goal and system of pay.[92] However, they conducted affairs beyond the realm of the conventional army and operated within the Hunua Ranges for long periods, not reliant on supply lines or communication.[93] Forest Rangers were 'picked' men (best available), experienced in bushcraft and

[91] Daily Southern Cross, 31 July 1863.

[92] Lieber defined Partisan soldiers as, soldiers whose 'Objective was to injure the enemy by action separate from that of his own main army; the partisan acts chiefly upon the lines of connection and communication, and outside or beyond the lines of operation of his own army, in the rear or flanks of the enemy'. Lieber 1862, p.11.

[93] Antoine Jomini, *Treatise On Grand Military Operations* (n.p. 1845) republished (D. Van Nostrand, 1865)

frontier conflict.[94] Commanding officers Captain William Jackson & Major Gustavus Ferdinand von Tempsky emphasized marksmanship, decentralised command, bushfighting, and individual autonomy in their training of the unit.[95] Within the Hunua Ranges, the Forest Rangers actively sought out and eliminated Kīngitanga taua through ambush and pursuit.[96] Traps would be laid for travelling parties and potential raiding parties were tracked and pursued.[97] Beyond neutralising the threat of Kingite guerrillas, the rangers acted as the 'eyes of the army' working as long-range scouts, and escorted convoys through high-risk regions.[98] At Paparata Pā, Von Tempsky, and his officer Thomas McDonnell undertook a night-time expedition that required them to navigate six miles of densely vegetated ravines and avoid patrols.[99] The two successfully breached the pa's palisades, studied the defences, and escaped. Kingite defenders later discovered evidence of the ranger's stay, and fearing for the security of the fortification, it was quickly evacuated, freeing up Cameron's advance through the Waikato.[100]

[94] G.F.V.T to Hon. Thomas Russell, 12 August 1863; G.F.V.T to Defence Office, 30 June 1866.
[95] Von Tempsky describes ideal candidates for the Ranger Corps 'Experienced in bush life, had previous contact with Māori, general hardiness, Intelligence, Spirited, and knowledgeable in bush remedies'… men with skill and experience in the terrain of New Zealand could be trained in the art of guerrilla warfare and decentralized command.'; Von Tempsky, Gustavus, *Memoranda of the New Zealand Campaign In 1863 and 1864, 1865* (Waikato: Von Tempsky, 1864).
[96] Governor Grey to Duke of Newcastle, October 23, 1863, 'The Affairs of New Zealand 1862-1864' *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970), pp.427 – 429.
[97] G.F.V.T to Defence Office, 30 June 1866.
[98] Governor Grey to Duke of Newcastle October 23, 1863, BPP, pp.427 – 429.
[99] Manuscript of Lt-Col. Thomas McDonnell, N.Z.C APL; William T. Parham, *Von Tempsky Adventurer* (Hodder & Stoughton, London, 1969), p. 83; Parham, p.116; Gustavus Ferdinand Von Tempsky, *'Memoranda of the New Zealand Campaign in 1863 and 1864'* ATL.
[100] Cowan, p.267.

The ranger's success at Paparata, and their effective counter-guerrilla efforts in the Hunua Ranges set in motion Cameron's gradual adoption of multi-echelon warfare. The rangers' long-range reconnaissance capabilities became invaluable to Cameron's advance.[101] After Paparata, Cameron personally thanked and promoted von Tempsky and Thomas McDonnell.[102] The rangers actively included the indirect approach in their tactical decision making, frequently luring Kingite parties into ambuscades or avoiding conflict to create better combat situations later.[103] Their success promoted the potential of irregular warfare methods to Cameron. Cameron would go on to value the Rangers so highly that he commissioned a party of Rangers to his personal guard.[104] This was a major shift from the common position of senior officials of the British Army who considered irregular warfare 'Distasteful and Ungentlemanly'.[105]

Inclusion of Irregular Warfare

Conventional warfare efforts had slowly progressed Cameron's invasion of the Waikato region but bought victory no closer than when he first began. After the breakout at Paparata, instigated by the Forest Rangers, Cameron marched upon

[101] Stowers, p.61; Simons, p.113.
[102] Parham, p.116; Von Tempsky, *Memoranda.*
[103] Manuscript of Lt-Col. Thomas McDonnell, N.Z.C APL; Parham, p. 83
[104] Stowers, p.60.
[105] Senior British Military officials such as the Duke of Wellington believed warfare fought outside the bounds of traditional formality were distasteful and ungentlemanly; Simons, p.375, p.383; Stowers, p.60.

Meremere Pā the Kīngitanga's first line of defence.[106] The British Army had commissioned a specialist river flotilla for the invasion and Cameron used British naval dominance to engage Meremere on two fronts.[107] The garrison evacuated the Pā before conflict commenced.[108] On November 20th, Cameron led 1200 men against Rangiriri Pā, during which the Kingite garrison successfully repelled three assaults and inflicted significant casualties against Cameron's conventional force.[109] In a repeat of the Northern War, Cameron's leadership group had neglected to undertake any reconnaissance of the Pā and assumed British dominance.[110] The conventional approach relied upon the success of artillery bombardment, and overwhelming, unfazed direct charges. However, the Modern Pā was prepared to withstand artillery fire and engage British regulars.[111] In a rushed decision, Cameron split his force into 3 columns, the 65th engaged the right flank, whilst the 12th and 14th regiments engaged the left and center flanks of the Pā.[112] The 65th were checked under heavy fire and nearly broke, only breaching the walls after the 12th and 14th regiments bore an immense onslaught of Kīngitanga firepower.[113] The center column had been

[106] Lieutenant General Cameron to Governor Grey, Nov 4. 1863, 'The Affairs of New Zealand 1862-1864' *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970), p.443.
[107] Grant Middlemiss, *The Waikato River Gunboats: New Zealand's First Navy* (Cambridge: Grant Middlemiss, 2014), p. 13.
[108] Lieutenant General. Cameron to Governor Grey, Nov 4. 1863, 'The Affairs of New Zealand 1862-1864' *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970), p.443.
[109] Lieutenant General Cameron to Governor Grey, Nov 24, 1863. 'The Affairs of New Zealand 1862-1864' *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970), p.500.
[110] Belich, 1986, p.158.
[111] O'Malley, 2016, p.191.
[112] 'Cameron was weary of the fading light, and despite the ineffectiveness of the artillery and the failure of the amphibious party to land, he pressed on with his assault.'; Belich, 1986, pp.148–49.
[113] William G Mair, 'Battle of Rangiriri' *W.G. Mair 1832-1912: Notebook* (Wellington: Alexander Turnball Library).

tasked with breaching the Pa's defences via rope and ladder, however, these resources had been cut too short. The Kingite garrison targeted British officers, leaving the officer-reliant regulars floundering at the walls of Rangiriri.[114] The 40th and 65th regiments eventually breached the outer walls, but Cameron's forces failed to take the formidable central redoubt, and by nightfall, 47 British regulars had died upon the walls of Rangiriri.[115]

Figure 13: This pen sketch of the assault on Rangiriri by Charles Heaphy shows the formidable walls British soldiers faced during the assault; Alexander Turnbull Library, A-145-004.

[114] O'Malley, p.253.
[115] Lt. General Cameron to Governor Grey, 24 November 1863, *New Zealand Gazette*, no.62, 30 November 1863, p.514; *Daily Southern Cross*, 25 November 1863; Edward Arthur Howard Webb, *History of the 12th (The Suffolk) Regiment, 1685–1913*, (London; Spottiswoode & Co, 1914), p.291.

The conventional army had yet again failed to defeat the modern Pā system and victory was only achieved the following day when the Kingite garrison misunderstood the meaning behind the use of a white flag.[116] Rangiriri was claimed as a great victory and resulted in the capture of 150 Waikato Tainui soldiers, and access to Southern Waikato.[117] However, the conflict itself highlighted again the flaws of conventional warfare.[118] The illustrious 65th Regiment was checked under fire and nearly retreated under the pressure.[119] Similarly, the 12th and 14th regiments floundered against the strong defensive walls, and the loss of their commanding officers during the assault proved devastating.[120] This highlights the major limitation of centralised command structures, particularly against an irregular force happy to target officers.[121]

The military effectiveness of the Forest Rangers directly impacted Cameron's strategic thinking at Paterangi. During Cameron's approach to Paterangi, the Forest Rangers further solidified their importance to the war effort at Mangapiko River.[122] The Ranger's skillset in bushfighting and success against Kingite partisans had impressed British command and the Rangers were tasked with partisan combat.[123]

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[116] Lieutenant General Cameron to Governor Grey, Nov 24, 1863, 'The Affairs of New Zealand 1862-1864' *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970), p.501; O'Malley p.255; The Government Account of Rangiriri', *Press*, 9 December 1863.
[117] Cowan, p.334.
[118] Lieutenant General Cameron to Governor Grey, 24 November 1863, *New Zealand Gazette*, no.62, 30 November 1863, p.514.
[119] *Daily Southern Cross*, 25 November 1863.
[120] Webb p.291.
[121] See Allan R. Millett, Williamson Murray, and Kenneth H. Watman. 'The effectiveness of military organizations.' *International Security* 11.1 (1986) 37-71.
[122] See Featon, Waikato War p.50 or anecdote of Lt Havelock's report at beginning of thesis.
[123] Von Tempsky 'Memoranda', p.79.

This included ambushing Māori foraging groups, defeating garrison's scouting parties, and raiding the outer defences of Paterangi Pā to establish a panoramic report of the line's defences.[124] Von Tempsky and the rangers declared Paterangi Pā a 'fearful place to storm', and could 'scarcely believe that a savage race without any education in military tactics could have designed and so thoroughly carried out the details of such a complete system of defence.'[125] Cameron concluded that the Paterangi line could not be taken by *coup de main* and drew upon the experience of Von Tempsky and the knowledge of kūpapa Māori guides to construct an indirect strategic blow to Kingite resistance.[126] This moment signalled a significant shift in Cameron's, and the British army strategic thinking.[127] The flaws of traditional European strategic thinking in the colonial setting were beginning to be realised. Partisan warfare provided Cameron a more efficient means of engaging the Kīngitanga without major loss of life.

[124] Stowers, p.61; Simons, p.113.
[125] Von Tempsky, 'Memoranda', p.80.
[126] Stowers, 'Forest Rangers' p.60*; New-Zealander*, 25 Feb. 1864; Belich p.161.
[127] Simons p.375.



Figure 14: This undated lithographed plan of Paterangi Pā drawn by Captain E Brooks of the Royal Engineers shows the immense scale of the Paterangi line; Alexander Turnbull Library, PAM 1869 P 684.

Cameron's success at Paterangi and Rangiaowhia can be attributed to the adoption of partisan warfare within his strategic thinking. Cameron's plan of attack is representative of the indirect approach. The indirect approach being an unexpected military move to create a situation that does not favour the enemy's combat ability.[128] Cameron, with the support of von Tempsky, utilized the Forest Rangers, and Kūpapa Māori to avoid a direct assault on Paterangi, and instead hit Rangiaowhia, the agriculture hub of the region and main supply source for the

[128] Liddell Hart, p.123.

Paterangi line.[129] A 1230-strong multi-echelon force of Forest Rangers, Kūpapa Māori, British regulars, and mounted colonial militia was stripped of all non-essentials and tasked with a large-scale raiding mission against Rangiaowhia.[130] This operation required the Rangers and kūpapa scouts to guide the column under the cover of darkness through a section of the Paterangi line naturally protected by steep topography and dense native bush.[131] Once clear of the ridge line and past the major defences undetected, the calvary contingent charged ahead with the grounded troops in pursuit. The British force brutally ransacked Rangiaowhia.

This engagement was highly successful because the decimation of Rangiaowhia cut off the Paterangi line from supply, severely reduced the Kīngitanga's economic production, and dealt a serious psychological blow as the defending garrison was unable to protect the civilian population.[132] Whilst Kīngitanga forces had consistently engaged colonial civilians, Rangiaowhia is the first major instance of Cameron engaging Māori civilians. This escalation of conflict is further evidence of Cameron's shift away from conventional British conflict.[133] Wiremu Tamihana led a significant party from the Paterangi garrison in an attempt to save Rangiaowhia but was quickly routed by the colonial calvary.[134] Cameron's

[129] DQMG Journals, pp.95-97; Cameron to W.O. 1864.
[130] New-Zealander, 25 Feb. 1864; Von Tempsky, 'Memoranda', pp. 108-111.
[131] New-Zealander, 25 Feb. 1864; Belich p.161.
[132] Belich p.161.
[133] Some sources suggest Cameron had previously agreed that Rangiaowhia was a safe haven for Māori civilians; Statement of Whitiora Te Kumete' in John Caselnerg, *Māori is my Name: Māori Historical Writings in Translation*, (Dunedin, 1975) p.106; This would further the argument, but it seems highly unlikely Cameron would have ever agreed to not engage a war target.
[134] Von Tempsky, 'Memoranda', pp. 108-111; DQMG Journals, pp.95-97.

divergence from the conventional military strategy through the use of partisan warfare and irregular units had defeated the Paterangi line more efficiently and effectively than any other British effort. This adaption of strategic thinking points to irregular warfare becoming increasingly relevant in the colonial theatre of war.

Orakau Pā was the Kīngitanga's last line of defence in the Waikato and critical to the protection of their southern lands. However, the Kingite command group set themselves up for failure against the improved British strategic approach. Rewi Maniapoto, rangatira of Ngāti Maniapoto and a key member of the Kīngitanga Rūnanga, called upon all the Kīngitanga allies to gather and fortify at Orakau, a valley south of Rangiaowhia, between the Pūniu River and Manga-o-hoi stream.[135] A significant number of the Urewera iwi answered Rewi's call. However, these soldiers were religious fanatics, and their fervours beliefs dominated the Rūnanga.[136] This led to Orakau Pa's construction on open terrain, without food or water supply.[137] The Urewera faithful believed Britain would be beaten in open combat.[138] Positioned within a groove of peach trees and rolling terrain, the Pā utilized natural fortifications. However, unlike all previous Pā, Orakau had no accessible retreat

[135] Cowan, p.365.
[136] The poor cohesion between various Iwi was exposed as a weakness in more convention aspects of conflict, Johanson, p.76.
[137] Rewi argued this would leave Orakau too exposed, but his voice was outvoted. This scenario highlights one of the downfalls to the Kīngitanga's highly fractured force organisation; Johanson, pp.77-79.
[138] Cowan, p.366; The Urewera Taua were experienced veterans from the Taranaki conflicts who had yet to witness the full strength of the British Army. Their Prophet Penewhio declared British would be defeated at Orakau if an offensive stance was taken. Therefore, Rewi Maniapoto's skill in Pā building and strategy was ignored.

routes. Roughly 300 Kingite soldiers garrisoned the fortification. The diverse range of hapū resulted in a disconnected system of defence.[139] Ngati-Maniapoto defended the southeast angle, the Urewera coalition the south-west angle, and Ngati-Raukawa, and Ngati-te-Kohera the North-West angle.[140] Despite several respected war leaders present, the fractured garrison failed to communicate effectively, and each hapū operated independently in the defence of Orakau.[141]



Figure 15: Sketch of Orakau Pā and its position in comparison to Paterangi & Rangiaowhia; National Library of New Zealand, 2006.

The British Command group's initial success at Orakau can be attributed to the effectiveness of irregular warfare units in colonial conflict, and the strategic error in

[139] Johanson, p.19.
[140] Cowan, p.372-374.
[141] Cowan, p.376 'Te Winitana Tupotahi, Te Waru Tamatea, Piripi te Heuheu. Hapurona Kohi, Te Whenuanui'; Johanson, p.79.

Kīngitanga planning. British forces were better prepared for the engagement at Orakau than their previous endeavours against the modern Pā of Meremere, Rangiriri, and Paterangi. The Forest Rangers had been tasked with long-range reconnaissance and raids since January 1864, and in late February had ransacked the Orakau township and destroyed a raised fortified position.[142] Therefore, on the 30th of March, when Lt Colonel Haultin at Kihikihi redoubt discovered Rewi Maniapoto's force at Orakau, the British command group entered the conflict with significant knowledge of the region for the first time.[143] Brigadier General Carey led the offensive column against Orakau, constructing a three-pronged assault that utilized both conventional and irregular troops. A detachment of 250 Forest Rangers, Waikato militia, and the flank companies of the 19th Royal Irish took a 'circuitous route through somewhat difficult country, crossing and re-crossing the Punia River.'[144]

> 'At midnight, Major Blyth, 40th regiment, marched with 250 men, as enumerated in the margin with directions to take the road to· the right, to cross and recross the Punia River, and to gain the rear of the enemy's position before daylight, halting there until he should hear my attack, and then to… cut off the retreat of the enemy.'[145]

[142] Cowan, pp.366-367
[143] Brigadier General Carey to Lt. General Cameron, 3rd April 1864, 'The Affairs of New Zealand 1862-1864' *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970).
[144] Lt. General Cameron to Governor Grey, 7th April 1864, 'The Affairs of New Zealand 1862-1864' *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970).
[145] Brigadier General Carey to Lt. General Cameron, 3rd April 1864, 'The Affairs of New Zealand 1862-1864' *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970).

This route, whilst difficult, was plausible because of the nature of troops at Carey's disposal. The Rangers had continuously proved their elite capabilities within the native bush and could efficiently lead the party, likewise, the militiamen were comprised of settlers with bush experience and a general hardiness. These irregular units increased Carey's strategic effectiveness and ability to engage the enemy on multiple fronts.

The British Army's multi-echelon strategy maximised their combat effectiveness in colonial conflict at Orakau Pā. Simultaneously to Major Blyth's flanking column, Carey sent Captain Blewitt and the 65th regiment to the left flank stretching the defending garrison's firepower, whilst Brigadier General Carey himself led a significant central column.[146] The Forest Rangers, and Royal Irish vanguard of Carey's column were better equipped for the difficult advance to Orakau and reached the Pā before dawn, significantly earlier than the main body. Captain Ring of the 19th Royal Irish led the vanguard in a surprise attack on the Pā but lacked the numbers to hold any territorial gain.[147] Blyth's column successfully outflanked the Kingite garrison and entrenched immediately behind the pā, whilst Blewitt held the left flank. Carey identified the futility of a direct assault against Orakau, instead opting to utilize his irregular troops to maintain an effective siege,

[146] Brigadier General Carey to Lt. General Cameron, 3rd April 1864, 'The Affairs of New Zealand 1862-1864' *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970).
[147] Ibid.

whilst his conventional army constructed a sap to breech Orakau pā.[148] For two days members of the Royal Artillery and British regulars constructed and pushed the sap forward, whilst the Forest Rangers and Waikato militia kept constant pressure on the garrison pinning the Kingites within their under-supplied pā.[149] On April 2nd, the Royal Artillery breached the outer palisade, and the Kīngitanga garrison attempted to push back Carey's central column but was quickly overwhelmed. The Urewera-Maniapoto force undertook an offensive retreat breaching the southern flank of the siege. The Forest Rangers pushed the Kingite force beyond the Punia River. Later, prisoners of war reported the Forest Rangers dominated this engagement and inflicted massive casualties before the Kingites made it south of the river.[150]

The adoption of a multi-echelon strategy maximised British combat effectiveness in colonial conflict. Whilst the use of a sap and siege work is within the conventional doctrine of war, the use of partisan and militia units was critical to the tactic's success. The Ranger's and flank companies' capacity for partisan warfare improved the mobility of Carey's force which is reflected in the surprise attacks on the Kingite garrison. The use of the indirect approach pinned Rewi Maniapoto's force within a fortification that did not improve their capacity for conflict.

[148] Every possible precaution taken, by the proper disposition of the force, to prevent the escape of the enemy; Lt. General Cameron to Governor Grey, 7th April 1864, 'The Affairs of New Zealand 1862-1864' *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970).
[149] Brigadier General Carey to Lt. General Cameron, July 12, 1864, 'The Affairs of New Zealand 1862-1864' *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970).
[150] Brigadier General Carey to Lt. General Cameron, July 12, 1864, 'The Affairs of New Zealand 1862-1864' *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970)

Conclusions

The Kīngitanga adapt their traditional conventional methods using irregular warfare to maximise their strengths in the asymmetric conflict. The Kīngitanga's military conduct reflected a change in approach to victory. Decisive pitched battle was not pursued, instead a war of attrition was fought. This approach aimed to make the invasion so costly and ineffective that peace would become a more suitable option and Kīngitanga leadership could negotiate from a position of strength if they retained enough territory and economic regions. The effectiveness of guerrilla tactics against the conventional British army altered traditional Māori force composition. Taua were no longer large blood parties seeking battle, instead taua became small parties of lightly equipped soldiers who engaged the enemy through surprise and entrapment. The grand strategy of the Kīngitanga Runanga displayed the indirect approach, specifically a strategy of elastic offense. The Kīngitanga established multiple heavily fortified positions which mitigated British conventional advantages and could be utilized for defensive offence. Kingites supplemented these positions with extensive guerrilla warfare. The guerrilla campaign, conducted by partisan soldiers, was highly effective and placed immense strain on the British War effort. However, as Cameron's invasion progressed through continued use of irregular warfare units, the limited manpower availability hindered Kīngitanga strategy.[151] The completion of strong defensive positions to protect agricultural hubs reduced

[151] Belich, p. 122.

the guerrilla campaigns, and led to a reliance upon Cameron engaging the Pā. This step back toward conventional warfare methods would prove costly, particularly at Orakau where the fractured force composition resulted in poor preparation.

Irregular warfare methods, especially decentralised partisan combat, maximised the strengths of the Kīngitanga organisation. It promoted their mobility, and skill within bush conflict. Furthermore, the indirect approach provided a genuine means of effectively defending against the invasion. However, the limited resources and manpower available contributed to the Kīngitanga's withdrawal into the King Country. Taranaki iwi would draw upon the Kīngitanga's highly effective guerrilla campaigns in the 'second Taranaki war' but in an interesting turn of events, Taranaki leadership regressed in their strategic approach to colonial conflict.

The British conventional army struggled to achieve success during the initial phase of the Waikato War. It was not until the commission of the Forest Rangers and the extended use of the colonial militia that Cameron's advance progressed beyond the Hunua Ranges. The conventional strategic approach to war proved ineffective against the highly mobile, decentralised Kīngitanga guerrilla force. Despite numeric supremacy, conventional units failed to succeed in the New Zealand bush. Its tight theatres of operation did not favour line infantry, nor choreographed tactics. The topography broke down these methods. Therefore, Cameron was unable to respond to the Kingite taua which ravaged British supply lines and colonial interests.

Operationally, he did not possess a diverse enough range of units to exploit the terrain, and strategically he could not pitch his strengths against Kingite weaknesses.

The success of the Forest Ranger's partisan warfare methods had a vital impact on British strategic thinking. Their achievements and effectiveness within the ranges, at Paparata, Mangapiko, Paterangi and Orakau directly contributed to British success and promoted irregular warfare to British Command. Cameron's employment of Forest Rangers to his personal guard, and frequent use of von Tempsky's advice revealed his developing respect for irregular warfare which was uncommon amongst British Officers. The multi-echelon composition of Cameron and Carey's forces after Rangiriri highlights the importance of irregular warfare in the colonial setting. Initial offensive columns at Meremere, and Rangiriri employed very few colonial or kūpapa irregular units. In comparison, the engagements at Paterangi, Rangiaowhia, and Orakau were led by irregular vanguards and actively incorporated partisan warfare.

Cameron's decision to avoid direct contact at Paterangi, and instead employ the indirect approach, showed the impact of irregular warfare on strategic thinking in the New Zealand Wars. Cameron's 3000-strong conventional force, consisting of famed regiments of foot, opted against meeting the Kīngitanga in pitched conflict and instead conducted a partisan raid. British forces had consistently operated within European methods of war since Colonel Hulme's first endeavour against Hone Heke in 1845. This conventional approach was supplemented by the racist

mentality that Māori could not match the superior British army. Cameron decided to diverge from normal practice within the traditional and conservative nineteenth-century British military. His decision was due to the efforts of the colonial irregulars, the effectiveness of Māori guerrilla campaigns, and the asymmetric nature of colonial conflict.

The lessons Cameron and British Leadership learnt throughout the Waikato campaign filtered into the strategic thinking of British officials in the Taranaki and West Coast campaigns. The major and lasting impacts of irregular warfare on British thinking post the Waikato War and into the West Coast campaigns would be multi-echelon force composition and frequent use of colonial volunteers and kūpapa Māori.

Chapter 4: Taranaki and West Coast Campaigns; 'Civilized Warfare'

During Major General Chute's counter-guerrilla campaign on the West Coast from 1865-1866 the British War Office wrote to Governor Grey and expressed hope that military conduct in New Zealand remained conventional and civilized.[1] However, the realities of asymmetric colonial conflict had drastically altered British and Iwi's approach to armed conflict.

The West Coast conflicts of the New Zealand Wars (1860-1861, 1863-1864, & 1865-1866) further stimulate the discussion of irregular warfare and its adoption by military leaders in Aotearoa New Zealand. Initial conflict underlined the ineffectiveness of conventional units and strategic approaches in combating guerrilla warfare in the colonial theatre. The resumption of conflict in response to the Pai Mārire faith showed the importance of settler units such as the mounted volunteers and the Taranaki Rangers. Post Waikato War conflict sees the continued development of multi-echelon warfare, and the movement toward a settler partisan-led strategic approach to conflict in New Zealand.

[1] Civilized conduct included organized starts to conflict and no targeting of officers, the gentlemen; Edward Cardwell to Governor Grey, 26 March 1866, *AJHR*, 1867, A-1B, p.1.

Martial Law

Conflict on the West Coast began in New Plymouth, in 1860 when martial law was declared in response to hostilities between Government land developers and Te Ātiawa rangatira Wiremu Kingi.[2] The formation of the Kīngitanga land league had drastically slowed down expansion for the growing settler population and colonial developers resorted to fraudulent deals to meet the demand.[3] At Waitara, a minor Te Ātiawa chief, Te Teira desired utu against Wiremu Kingi and offered to sell the Waitara block to hinder Kingi. However, Waitara was owned by Wiremu Kingi, and many other Te Ātiawa leaders (figure 16). Despite the disputed ownership, Governor Browne declared the sale legal and Wiremu Kingi's chiefly opposition as defiance against British sovereignty.[4] Colonial surveyors, escorted by Colonel Charles Gold and 400 men, were met by Wiremu Kingi and several key Taranaki chiefs.[5] Kingi refused to recognise the legitimacy of the sale, nor back down. Gold fired upon their defensive position and the Taranaki War began. [6]

[2] Keith Sinclair, *The Origins of the Māori Wars* (Auckland, Oxford University Press, 1957), p.123.
[3] James Belich, *New Zealand Wars and The Victorian Interpretation of Racial Conflict* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2013), p.79.
[4] Vincent O'Malley, *The New Zealand Wars = Ngā Pakanga o Aotearoa*. (Wellington: Bridget Williams Books, 2019), p.81.
[5] Governor Browne to Colonel Gold, 3 March 1860, 'Papers relating to the recent disturbances in New Zealand.' (1861) *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970), p.13.
[6] James Cowan, *The New Zealand Wars: Volume I* (Wellington: Government Printer, 1983) p.159.



Figure 16: 1860 Map of Ownership at Waitara, unknown author. ATL, MapColl-832.2gbbd/1860/Acc.5966.

Colonial military units were highly prepared for bushfighting combat scenarios and the adoption of irregular warfare strategies.[7] The population of New Plymouth in 1860 was roughly 2500 with 500-600 fighting-age men experienced in bushcraft and frontier life. James Cowan highlighted the capabilities of the key frontier families who were schooled in the rough work of settlement, trained to act upon initiative and could quickly adapt to the 'special conditions of Māori warfare in a country admirably fitted for Guerrilla Warfare.'[8] When martial law was declared to

[7] Major-General Sir James Alexander, *Bush Fighting: Illustrated by Remarkable Actions and Incidents of the Māori War in New Zealand* (London: Low and Searle, 1873).
[8] Cowan, p.161.

protect colonial interests at New Plymouth, both the militia and volunteer units were mobilized to support the Imperial Army.[9] The Taranaki Volunteer Rifle Corps was established in 1850 and led by Captain Wyatt and Captain Atkinson. This partisan unit would prove instrumental in bush fighting against the Wiremu Kingi, because of their mobility, quick response, decentralised command structure and bushcraft knowledge.[10]

The colonial military force used irregular warfare to great success at Waireka and proved more effective than the conventional Imperial force. A united iwi force of between 200 and 500 soldiers from the Taranaki, Ngāti Ruanui, and Ngā Rauru iwi, which had declared support for Wiremu Kingi, gathered at Kaipopo pā and was led by a principal rangatira, Te Hanataua.[11] These soldiers were armed with traditional melee weapons such as the taiaha and ranged weapons limited to sawn-off shotguns and the odd musket.[12] In response, Lieutenant Colonel Murray led an expedition of 275 men to meet Te Hanataua in the field. Murray split his force, with Captain Atkinson leading the Taranaki Rifle Volunteers and the militia down the coastline, whilst Murray led the Imperial force down the main road with orders to conclude affairs by nightfall.[13] During the approach the settler contingent was ambushed, Captain Atkinson and Captain Stapp acted swiftly, splitting the force, and

[9] O'Malley, p.82.
[10] 'Bush Fighting is a comprehensive term for warfare conducted in forests, in broken ground, and on the hill side.'; Alexander, p.2; Cowan, p.164.
[11] Belich suggests early accounts exaggerate Māori presence; Belich, p.82; Benjamin Wells, *The History of Taranaki* (New Plymouth: Edmundson & Avery, 1878), pp. 195-6; Harry Atkinson, *Diary*, 24 Mar 1860.
[12] Cowan, p.171.
[13] Cowan, p.174.

withdrawing to a position of strength. The colonials utilized the terrain advantages provided with Atkinson entrenched on the cliff overlooking the Waireka River, and Stapp's company spread across the riverbank. The colonials were vastly outnumbered but held out until nightfall and the iwi forces withdrew from the field.

British Expedition Force	
Unit	Numbers
65th Regt.	88
HMS Marines	28
TRV	103
Militia	56

Table 3: Lieutenant Colonel Murray's expedition force constructed from the force composition numbers in Cowan, New Zealand Wars, p.174. Note the significantly different make up compared to British troops in the Northern War (Table 1).

This engagement exposed the limitations of conventional military operations in colonial combat. Murray's force required the main road due to the inability to navigate rough topography. This staggered the expedition's advance because the highly mobile settler units were capable of the more direct route along the coastline.[14] When Murray heard the civilian contingent under heavy fire, he deemed the dense topography inaccessible and opted to secure the main road and fire rocketry at the general vicinity.[15] Captain Atkinson and Captain Stapp identified the potential combat advantages of defending from the steep cliffs and utilized these

[14] O'Malley, p.84.
[15] Cowan, pp.174-175.

possibilities to defend against a numerically superior enemy.[16] Murray did send a 65th detachment led by Lieutenant Urquhart to support the colonials, and Urquhart strengthened a counterattack by the militia under Captain Brown which pinned the iwi north flank between enfilading fire.[17] However, as dusk approached Murray was eager to return home by dark, and recalled Urquhart from the field, abandoning the settler units.[18] Murray's haste to conclude the day's conflict is reflective of the British traditionalist approach to war, an expectation of structured combat and a continued disregard of the threat their enemy posed.[19]

Victory at Waireka was achieved through the indirect approach and partisan warfare. Captain Peter Cracroft, Commander of HMS Niger, was first posted North of New Plymouth to protect against a pincer movement from the Waikato / Taranaki alliance.[20] Cracroft identified no northern threat and moved his 60-strong naval marines to join the fighting at Waireka.[21] Cracroft opted to employ several members of the Taranaki Rifle Volunteers to lead a flanking manoeuvre against Kaipopo Pā to catch Wiremu Kingi unawares.[22] The marines were lightly equipped and stormed the

[16] Use of terrain has an even greater impact on the outcome of combat in the colonial setting; Judy Ehlen, and Robert J. Abrahart, 'Effective use of terrain in the American Civil War: The Battle of Fredericksburg, December 1862.', *Fields of Battle: Terrain in Military History*, (2002), p.63.
[17] Belich, p.84.
[18] Murray, oblivious to everything but the duty of obeying his superior officer's orders to be back in new Plymouth by dark, marched his force along the main road homeward, and left the hard pressed settlers to extricate themselves In the best way they could; Cowan, p.176.
[19] Richard A. Preston Men in Arms: A History of Warfare and Its Interrelationships with Western Society. Ed. (New York, 1962) pp.129-142; Azar Gat, *The development of military thought: the nineteenth century* (n.p.: Oxford University Press, 1992), p.4.
[20] O'Malley, p.85.
[21] Belich, p.84.
[22] Cowan, p.176.

Pā at pace, firing rocketry concurrently to pin the defenders down. The marines overran Kaipopo, inflicting 100 Māori casualties, to their own 4 wounded.[23] Cracroft attributed his victory to the rapidity of his lightly armed men, and the use of surprise and the cover of darkness.[24] The Naval Marines operated separately from the conventional force, beyond the capabilities of the main force and outflanked the enemy through mobility and the element of surprise.[25] Therefore, they can be considered partisan soldiers in reference to Lieber's legal nineteenth-century definition and Robert Mackey's colonial partisan definition.[26]

Despite Cracroft's success, British leadership relied upon conventional military means in their early campaigns against hostile iwi on the West Coast. At Puketakauere, a dual fortification Pā was protected on three flanks by two swampy water courses which joined at the Waitara River north of the Pā.[27] There was a sole approach to Puketakauere, and it was defended by 20-foot trenches, heavily fortified rifle pits, and reinforced by the arrival of Rewi Maniapoto, a rangatira of great martial prowess.[28] Despite this, British leadership neglected to scout the terrain or fortification, and like their counterparts in the Northern conflict, assumed British

[23] The number of casualties fluctuates between reports and historical commentaries, Cracroft claimed to have laid out 100 of the dead garrison defenders; Belich, p.84.
[24] Cowan, p.176 'Cracroft offered 10 pounds to any sailor who chopped down Kaipopo's flags.'
[25] These actions are representative of Jomini's definition of partisans in *Treatise on Grand Military Operations* (n.p. 1845) republished (D. Van Nostrand, 1865).
[26] Francis Lieber, *Guerrilla parties considered with reference to the laws and usages of war* (1862), p.11; Robert Mackey, *The Uncivil War* (University of Oklahoma Press, 2014), pp.11-12.
[27] Belich, p.92 'Nelson dismissed the second fortification because it was an ancient Pā site.'
[28] Cowan, p.183.

martial supremacy.[29] On June 27th, after a gruelling march through dense topography, Major Nelson's exhausted 350-strong column reached Puketakauere. At 7 am, two howitzers bombarded the Pā to little effect before Nelson ordered a three-pronged assault.[30] Without any accurate reconnaissance, the British center marched directly against the towering trenches.[31] The rolling terrain hid Māori rifle positions and the British regulars were lured into a trap, upon reaching the outer palisade the British regulars were blindsided with point-blank shotgun volleys that decimated their lines.[32] British officers attempted to force further melee charges against the pā, but the Māori garrison dispatched all attempts. Nelson's flank force, consisting of the 40th Grenadiers the elite company of the regiment struggled to navigate the native bush and splintered into small groups. Ngāti Maniapoto partisans identified the floundering grenadiers and utilized their mobility through the bush to outflank the British contingent.[33] The Maniapoto partisans surrounded the 40th Grenadiers creating a kill box, the grenadiers sustained significant casualties before they were routed.[34] The retreating British force was pushed deep into the swamp where the British regulars overloaded with gear struggled to move, the Maniapoto & Te Atiawa force in an executionary style annihilated the floundering British troops.[35] Belich

[29] Nelson believed the Pā on Onukukaitara hill to be 'easily approachable even by heavy guns' through the mouth of the V formed by the gullies and was 'apparently without entrenchments'; Sydney Morning Herald, 21 Sept. 1860.
[30] A.S. Atkinson, Diary, 25 June 1860 p.598; Alexander, p.157.
[31] Sydney Morning Herald, 11 July 1860
[32] Atkinson, Diary, 29 June 1860 p.589; Belich, p.94.
[33] Cowan papers, 41b.
[34] Alexander, p.161.
[35]Cowan, p.188 'Māori executed British soldiers stuck in waist deep mud.' 'British casualties 33 killed, 34 wounded.'; Taranaki Herald, 30 June 1860; Diary of George Jupp, 27 June 1860.

described the battle of Puketakauere as the 'Most clear-cut and disastrous defeat suffered by imperial troops in New Zealand.'[36]

General Pratt replaced Colonel Gold after Puketakauere but failed to progress the British strategic approach beyond the conventional military doctrine. The defeat at Puketakauere had left New Plymouth vulnerable, and Taranaki iwi took full advantage, waging a brutal raiding campaign; destroying property, stealing livestock, and killing innocents.[37] Initially, Pratt took a proactive stance, leading a 1400-strong flying column against Kairau and Hurangi, burning villages and looting livestock.[38] This proactive strategic approach did not last, in response to the construction of four major pā south of the Waitara River, General Pratt decided upon a conservative sapping approach to conserve the loss of British lives.[39] Pratt's 1000-strong force dug protected, angling trenches to approach the numerous pā. Pratt believed this war of attrition would provoke Wiremu Kingi and his supporters into seeking peace. However, the Te Atiawa force simply abandoned the pā and took advantage of Pratt's force tied up in sapping operations to intensify the campaign against New Plymouth.[40] Pratt's reliance on conventional methods proved totally ineffective. Sapping requires the defending garrison to be pinned within the

[36] Belich, NZ Wars, p.92.
[37] Cowan, p.190.
[38] A flying column is a a self-sustained, combined arms force that was able to operate independently of fixed lines of communication for predetermined periods of time; James Castle, 'The Flying Column: A Concept for Tactical Nonlinear Sustainment', *School of Advanced Military Studies*, (US Army Command and General Staff College, 1991), p.1.
[39] O'Malley, p.90.
[40] O'Malley, p.93.

fortification. At Kihikihi the pā held no value nor were the defenders besieged. In 4 months, Pratt inflicted as little as 30 Māori casualties compared to 70 British casualties.[41]

Figure 17: Water colour of Pratt's sapping operation, note the highly fortified trenches approaching the pā; O'Malley, p.91, 2019.

The Te Atiawa and Taranaki iwi promoted their combat advantages through irregular warfare. From early June 1860, New Plymouth endured a brutal siege, all its inhabitants were pinned within the walls as Māori partisans maintained constant hit-and-run engagements. Mobile taua ransacked property, murdered civilians, and easily escaped British pursuit. This guerrilla warfare campaign escalated during Pratt's sapping operations. With all the imperial troops tied up in earthworks, the

[41] Belich, p.111.

Māori partisans ran rampant through New Plymouth 'murdering every soul who is fool enough to go half a mile outside the ramparts.'[42] The townsfolk suffered immensely with 51 people dying from starvation and disease.[43] Wiremu Kingi, Rewi Maniapoto, and the other key rangatira of the united iwi effort utilized the Indirect approach to great effect. They avoided pitched conflict with the imperial forces, hammered colonial sources of supply, and inflicted significant psychological blows.[44] Pratt's sapping operations brought victory no closer and had directly led to worse conditions in New Plymouth. By October, 200 settler farms were destroyed, $200,000 worth of damage was inflicted, and key settler leaders had lost faith in the British war effort.[45] The discontent between imperial and colonial leadership was furthered due to the imperial troop's inability to respond to the Māori partisans.[46] The conventional troops were forced to march in significant numbers due to the hostile environment and were ineffective in their pursuit of small lightly armed bands of Māori partisans.[47] Iwi rangatira continued to lure British columns into strong defensive positions, inflict casualties, and retreat.[48] This indirect strategy of partisan

[42] Belich, p.99; New Zealander, 15 Aug. 1860
[43] William Swainson, New Zealand and the War (London, 1862)
[44] Liddell Hart, Strategy. P.223; Belich, 1986, p.99 The raids forced New Plymouth to rely on external supply, a biproduct of these raids was Ngati Ruanui used the settlers thoroughbred livestock to generate a pastoral boom.
[45] 'Colonists ridiculed sapping strategy, 'totally useless' Lazy style of playing war'; *Southern Cross*, 25 Jan. 1861; 'The war can hardly be more unsatisfactory than now... General Pratt and his sappy procedure would absorb 10000 men at Waitara and look for more', 'If that old muff does not soon alter his tactics we shall be in a Jolly mess this winter'; Harry Atkinson to A.S. Atkinson, 27 Feb. 1860, R.A.P., I pp.688-692.
[46] Belich, pp.79-81.
[47] These conventional endeavours were also ineffective because they could not be sustained for long periods of time beyond the lines of supply; Moshe Kress, *Operational Logistics: The Art and Science of Sustaining Military Operations*, (London: Springer International Publishing, 2016), pp. 129-131.
[48] Māori leadership found great success employing 'tactics that were best executed by small forces under the control of a single commander such as the ambush or *takiri*, a mock retreat.'; Terence Johanson 'Ka Pu Ruha,

warfare was possible because of the Māori toa's mobility through the bush, and the decentralised command structure of Māori warfare, leaders acted toward the war goal whilst retaining autonomy.[49] Two notable instances include a patrol near Hurangi and a pā inspection in late September. In both instances, the imperial columns were numerically superior, but small Māori units routed the columns by luring them to attack strong defensive positions and utilizing the effect of surprise: a strategy of elastic defence.[50]

Pai Mārire and the Settler Soldiers

After the defeat, or at least suppression of the Kīngitanga movement, war in New Zealand moved to the West Coast and greater Taranaki region (1864-1866). The colonial government had identified the Pai Mārire faith as the next threat to British Sovereignty.[51] The Pai Mārire (Hauhau) religion was founded in 1862 by Te Ua Haumene a self-declared prophet who declared the British were prophesied to succumb to defeat if all Māori believed in the true faith.[52] Grey identified the Hauhau as militaristic fanatics, and the possibility of future land confiscation drove the imperial war effort on.

Ka Hao Te Rangatahi; Changes in Māori Warfare Between The Period Prior to First European Contact and the End of the New Zealand Wars' (MA thesis, U.S. Army Command and General Staff College, 2009), p.25.

[49] A parallel command structure was best suited because it allowed the various Rangatira to operate independently and proved highly effective in the guerrilla campaigns.; Johanson, p.12, p.76.

[50] At Hurangi, 1500 British Regulars led by General Pratt were routed by 41 Māori toa, On September 29th, 500 British regulars were routed leaving an old Pā site; DMQG Journals, p.137.

[51] O'Malley, p.153.

[52] 'Haumene likened Māori to the Jews, destined to return to their homelands'; O'Malley, p.153.

British Leadership during the 1864-66 conflict built upon the multi-echelon approach developed during the Waikato War to effectively engage the Hauhau resistance. Colonel Warre, commanding officer of British troops in 1864 was notably different from his predecessors. Warre actively drew upon the capabilities of the colonial units to great success. Following an ambush at Te Ahuahu, Warre assembled a multi-echelon force consisting of the 57th Regt, the Taranaki Mounted Rifles, and the Taranaki militia.[53] Warre expertly splits his force, leading the conventional troops with the local militia down the coastline, whilst his partisan force, the mounted volunteers, set off through the ranges.[54] Warre, unlike his predecessors, recognised the martial ability of both Māori and colonial forces. During his expeditions into the ranges, Warre constantly drew upon his mounted colonial units to scout ahead and flush out would-be ambushes or storm rifle positions at pace.[55]

Major General W.C.T. Chute's flying column campaign against the South Taranaki iwi holdings between the Waitōtara River and Mt Egmont is another key example of British leadership utilizing the multi-echelon warfare approach.[56] Chute's

[53] Colonel Warre reported 6 killed & 12 wounded; Colonel Warre to Governor Grey, April 1864. 'Further papers relating to the military operations in New Zealand' *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970); Governor Grey to Duke of Newcastle. April 25th, 1864. 'Further papers relating to the military operations in New Zealand' *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970).
[54] Mounted Partisans had become highly successful in bushfighting, Alexander writes extensively on their success in bush conflict; Alexander, pp. 7-10.
[55] 'Mounted Riflemen were superb combat tools in bushfighting, a lesson learnt from the American colonists in 1776, a lesson we should not have forgotten.'; Alexander, pp.8-11.
[56] O'Malley, p.163.

columns consisted of British regulars, colonial partisans, militia, and kūpapa Māori.[57] Operating at pace, Chute's approach utilized the firepower of conventional units and long-range mobility of the irregular units. This approach destroyed Māori villages, and poorly defended traditional pā. Chute's first significant column in December 1865 & January 1866, successfully took three key Pai Mārire strongholds within the Waitōtara region, inflicting severe casualties and taking minimal prisoners.[58] In February, the multi-echelon strategic approach allowed Major General Chute to lead a flying column east of Mt. Taranaki, a route never traversed by pākehā.[59] Unfortunately, weather conditions forced Chute to abandon the route five days in because the regular army contingent was still reliant on supply and Chute's organisation skill left much to be desired.[60] James Belich is critical of Chute's efforts, arguing that Chute's methods would have fallen short against a strong defensive pā.[61] This conclusion highlights the lack of consideration for irregular warfare within the field. The British strategic approach in 1865 had consistently avoided frontal assaults in favour of the indirect route, it is just as likely Chute would have outflanked a major pā like his predecessor Cameron did at Paterangi. Regardless,

[57] Kūpapa was the term given to Iwi and Hapū who fought alongside Imperial forces. The term Kūpapa is problematic because it implies and has been used by historians to describe loyalty to the crown. However, these Hapū were typically acting in their own interest rather than loyalty to Britain; Monty Soutar, 'Kupapa: A Shift in Meaning', *He Pukenga Korero,* Ngahuru, 6:2, (2001), p. 36; Ron Crosby, *Kūpapa: The Bitter Legacy of Māori Alliances with The Crown* (Auckland: Penguin Random House, 2015), p. 196.
[58] O'Malley, p.162; 'Chute's column took Ōtapawa, Okutuku and Te Pūtahi Pā.'; Colonel Weare to Rev. T.W. Weare, 13 January 1866, AJHR, 1867, A-1B, p.4. 'Weare provides insight into Chute's brutal approach to conflict in his personal communication, highlighting Chute's orders that no Māori should be taken alive.'
[59] O'Malley, p.166.
[60] Alexander, pp.199-200.
[61] Belich, p.208.

Chute portrays the continued impact of irregular warfare on imperial strategic thinking. His multi-echelon columns actively targeted civilians, supplies, and unprotected villages to achieve victory, a far cry from the 'gentlemanly warfare' prioritised by London.[62] This use of the indirect approach resulted in the destruction of 8 pā, and 20 villages. It inflicted an untold number of Māori casualties in 5 weeks and significantly reduced Pai Mārire resistance in the New Plymouth / Mount Taranaki region.

Figure 18: Major General Trevor Chute championed the use of flying columns throughout the West Coast; Museum of New Zealand Te Papa Tongarewa, O.012369/02.

[62] Edward Cardwell to Grey, 26 March 1866, AJHR, 1867, A-1B, p.1. 'The British War Office wanted assurance that military operations were being conducted in accordance with humane usages of civilised warfare.'

Beyond Chute's flying columns, most field forces in 1866 consisted of British regulars, elite colonial partisans (Patea Rangers, Taranaki Mounted Volunteers, Taranaki Bush Rangers), settler volunteers, colonial militia, naval marines, and kūpapa Māori. British leadership also began to incorporate colonial officers into operational leadership roles. In November 1866 Major Rocke commander of the imperial field force led an expedition against a taua of Ngatiruanui at Popoia.[63] His force consisted of the 18th Royal Irish, Taranaki military settlers, Patea Rangers, native militia and the Wanganui Calvary. Rocke's vanguard force of calvary, T.M.S, and the 18th flank company was led by kūpapa and Ranger guides.[64] This field force operated highly effectively, negating enemy ambushes, storming fortifications, and capably navigating rough terrain. Afterwards Rocke thanked Captain Newland of the Patea Rangers for his command work and recommended the remnants of the Ngatiruanui taua should be pursued by a Kūpapa and Patea Ranger force because 'the position is too remote and difficult… for Imperial troops.'[65]

In 1863, whilst most British forces were committed to the invasion of the Waikato, the colonial volunteer units conducted military operations on the West Coast. Warre highlighted Captain Atkinson and his unit's military effectiveness as

[63] Major J.H. Rocke to Major-General T. Chute, Nov 2nd, 1866. 'Further papers relative to the affairs of New Zealand 1867', *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970).
[64] Governor Grey to Earl of Carnarvon, Nov 10, 1866, 'Further papers relative to the affairs of New Zealand 1867', *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970) p.23
[65] Major J.H. Rocke to The Deputy Quartermaster-General. Nov 2nd, 1866. 'Further papers relative to the affairs of New Zealand 1867', *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970) p.24.

long-range patrols and as offensive responses to Māori incursions during his communication with Lieutenant General Cameron.[66] Warre stresses their ability to combat Māori guerrillas in the bush and exceed expectations and states 'I am much indebted to their exertions, their endurance of fatigue and their willing cheerfulness in the performance of the arduous duties'.[67] Captain Atkinson and the TMV operated during the night, deep within South Taranaki iwi territory to set up ambushes. In October 1863, Atkinson reported routing two separate 30-strong taua by firing from the tree lines and escaping through the bush, ironically similar to the Kīngitanga tactics in the Hunua Ranges at this time.[68]

Upon conflict shifting back toward New Plymouth, Warre made colonial units and a multi-echelon approach central to his defence strategy. Atkinson's mounted riflemen were more effective in their pursuit of Māori partisans, and quicker to mobilize in emergencies.[69] Therefore, Warre strengthened the various outposts with British regulars and drew 'entirely on the Militia and Volunteers for the defence of the town.'[70] By 1866, most field forces consisted of colonial units and British officers drew on their capacity for partisan warfare to maximise potential combat advantages, and actively reduce the hostility of regions.[71] Colonial units became so

[66] Colonel C.B. Warre to Lt General Cameron. Oct 6, 1863. 'The Affairs of New Zealand 1862-1864' *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970).
[67] Ibid.
[68] Atkinson Report in Colonel Warre to Lt. General Duncan Cameron, Oct 6th, 1863. 'The Affairs of New Zealand 1862-1864' *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970).
[69] Alexander, pp.8-11.
[70] Governor Grey to Duke of Newcastle. April 25th, 1864. 'The Affairs of New Zealand 1862-1864' *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970).
[71] 'The field forces at Popoia, Te Maru-o-te-Whenna, Pungarehu, and Tiro Tiro Moana had significant Colonial and Kūpapa contingents who undertook the majority of operations.' Major J.H. Rocke to Major-General T.

versed in bush conflict that militia often operated alongside kūpapa units and waged 'Māori Warfare' against iwi who had taken up arms against the Crown.[72] This guerrilla warfare strategic approach saw kūpapa and militia units ambush travelling hapū, and raid Māori villages, destroying supplies and fortifications. The West Coast theatre of war became as hostile for Iwi as it had been for British regulars in 1860.[73]

British regiments were rotated out of New Zealand in 1865/1866 because the settler units continued to prove effective in waging irregular warfare within the colonial setting.[74] Chute's march across Mt Taranaki would be the last major British operation in New Zealand and in June 1866 Major Thomas McDonnell was appointed field commander of the colonial army and undertook a final campaign on the West Coast in the Patea region.[75] Major Thomas McDonnell was a veteran of the legendary irregular warfare unit the Forest Rangers and an understudy to Gustavus Ferdinand von Tempsky. McDonnell's irregular warfare martial education showed in his command. McDonnell was tasked with squashing resistance to the confiscation of land between the Waitōtara and Waingongoro rivers. He could not force an open conflict and had significantly fewer troops than his predecessor Chute.

Chute Nov 9, 1866 'Further papers relative to the affairs of New Zealand 1867', *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970); Governor Grey to Earl of Carnarvon, Nov 10, 1866, 'Further papers relative to the affairs of New Zealand 1867', *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970).

[72] Captain Kepa Native Militia to Major McDonnell November 8th, 1866. Further papers relative to the affairs of New Zealand 1867', *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970).

[73] Governor Grey to Earl of Carnarvon, Nov 10, 1866, 'Further papers relative to the affairs of New Zealand 1867', *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970).

[74] Not the sole reason but a significant reason. British Army Leadership disputes with the colonial government played a big role too.

[75] O'Malley, p.168.

Therefore, McDonnell maximised the advantages of his colonial units by hitting hard-to-reach unprotected settlements, burning critical resources, and waging a psychological war of terror.[76] A later parliamentary inquiry would find McDonnell's actions 'Improper and Unjust', truly representative of the strategic adaptations required to succeed in colonial conflict.[77] Whilst brutal, McDonnell's campaign highlights the requirements of successful colonial conflict: highly mobile troops who were able to operate without supply lines, at long range, and with a degree of autonomy. McDonnell would go on to be appointed commander of the New Zealand Armed Constabulary in 1868. James Belich described him as 'Able and Ruthless' for his success in intimidating Māori into an uneasy peace on the West Coast. [78]

The adoption of irregular warfare methods and the promotion of colonial efforts can also be attributed to the British conventional army's struggle against guerrilla warfare in the Northern and Waikato Wars. The colonial government and Governor Grey tasked Cameron with ending Māori independence amongst the south Taranaki iwi, where the Pai Mārire faith still burnt strong.[79] Cameron had refused to pursue Waikato iwi further and was reluctant to undergo the Wanganui campaign because he believed further conflict in the colony was unrequired and its

[76] McDonnell's Report, 4 Oct. 1866, AJHR 1867, A-1A, pp.16-18.
[77] Graham to Governor Bowen, 22 July 1868, AJHR, 1868, A-3, p.26.
[78] Belich, p.208; McDonnell's Report, 4 Oct. 1866, AJHR 1867, A-1A, pp.16-18.
[79] Belich, p.206.

continuation was fuelled by the greediness of settlers for land.[80] Grey pushed for a direct assault against Weraroa pā, a formidable fortification constructed by the Southern Taranaki Iwi. Cameron however, had a greater respect for Māori martial ability and the failures of the Waikato campaign still haunted him.[81] In their communication, Cameron informed Grey that it would not be desirable to assault Weraroa but if necessary would require 6000 Imperial troops, committing up to 1,500 men alone to secure supply lines and communication with Wanganui.[82] The conventional army's reliance on supply lines and the limitations of the conventional unit's mobility were major weaknesses in the colonial theatre of war, particularly against the superb guerrilla strategies of Māori rangatira. Based on what 'experience had shown him', Cameron chose an alternative strategic approach, he adopted the indirect approach.[83]

Indirect Approach on the West Coast

British Army officer's increased utilization of the indirect approach during the second half of the West Coast conflict shows the progression of strategic military thinking in a colonial setting. Cameron's last major conduct in New Zealand before

[80] Lt-General Sir D. Cameron to Governor Grey. 29th Jan, 1865 AJHR Papers 1865 p.7; Lt-General Sir D. Cameron to Colonel C. Warre, 30th Jan 1865 AJHR Papers 1865 p.7; Belich, 1986, p.206 'Cameron disliked the Wanganui campaign, and decided to conduct it very cautiously well before it began.'
[81] Brian James Dalton, *War and Politics in New Zealand, 1855-1870* (Sydney: Sydney University Press, 1967), pp.222-34.
[82] Lieutenant General Sir D. Cameron to Governor Grey. 28th Jan 1865 *AJHR Papers* 1865 p.6.
[83] Lieutenant General Cameron to Governor Grey, 26 May 1865. 'Further papers relative to the affairs of New Zealand 1867', *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970).

his resignation was the Wanganui Campaign and Weraroa Pā. James Belich has highlighted that early historical commentators criticised Cameron for his cautious approach to Weraroa and colonial officials questioned his martial capabilities.[84] However, Weraroa is a testament to Cameron's astute military intellect. He adapted to circumstance and was able to think beyond the conventional military doctrine. Cameron recognised the futility of attacking Weraroa, it would be again playing into the hands of South Taranaki Rangatira.[85] Instead, Cameron pinned the Weraroa garrison, outflanked the Pā and proceeded North, destroying Māori supply lines, and forcing a 200-strong Ngati Ruanui taua to face him in a pitched battle. The British conventional troops dominated the outnumbered Ngati Ruanui soldiers and Cameron secured territory to the Waingongoro River.[86] This strategic approach is revolutionary in comparison to the direct assault against Rangiriri Pā based entirely on an assumption of British strength, just two years previous.[87]

British and colonial success can be attributed to the use of the indirect approach as a strategic or tactical means to conflict. At Waireka, Captain Atkinson and Lieutenant Urquhart avoided pitched conflict and utilized the terrain to outflank and surprise their attackers with flanking fire.[88] Captain Cracroft took Kaipopo pā by avoiding the entire frontline and attacking the pā from the rear at dusk, by taking the

[84] Belich 1986, p.206; DQMG Journals, p.137
[85] Māori resistance had continuously relied upon Pā to set the terms of engagement. Cameron was well aware of this tactic by now; Michael Belgrave, *Dancing With The King: The Rise and Fall of the King Country, 1864-1885* (Auckland: Auckland University Press, 2017), p. 12; Johanson, p.10.
[86] Dalton, pp.226-234
[87] Belich, p.156.
[88] Cowan, pp.170-176.

road least expected and utilizing the element of surprise, 40 naval marines overran an entire garrison. General Pratt, whilst forever known for his futile sapping campaign, found success at Hurangi by targeting Māori supply villages and forcing Iwi soldiers to leave strong defensive positions. Colonel Warre and Major Rocke both became highly effective with their multi-echelon field forces. Through the implementation of partisan warfare, pitched conflict was avoided and the fight was taken to iwi forces in the bush, flipping a consistent narrative of Māori dominance in bush fighting.[89]

The impact of irregular warfare can be seen within the junior officer's decision-making. At Sentry Hill in April 1864, Captain Short routed a significantly larger Māori taua through a strategy of elastic offence, Short positioned his detachment in silence, and the seemingly unoccupied fortification encouraged a direct assault from the Māori party. Short had lured his enemy into attacking a position of strength and hit the attacking force with point-blank volleys and 4-inch cannon fire decimating their party.[90] It was a carbon copy of losses inflicted upon conventional British troops in previous campaigns.

British success on the West Coast can also be attributed to the degradation of Māori strategic thinking and the rise of the Pai Mārire faith. Up until 1863, the South

[89] Colonel Warre to Governor Grey, April 1864. 'Further papers relating to the military operations in New Zealand' *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970).
[90] 'Colonel Warre Report', Governor Grey to the Duke of Newcastle. May 4th, 1864 'Further papers relating to the military operations in New Zealand' *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970); Alexander 1873; Major J.H. Rocke to Major-General T. Chute, Nov 2nd 1866. 'Further papers relative to the affairs of New Zealand 1867', *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970).

Taranaki iwi was a dominant military force against the imperial army, dominant in the sense they controlled most of the territory and set the terms of engagement. As discussed previously, Te Atiawa led by Wiremu Kingi and supported by Rewi Maniapoto achieved multiple key victories through a strategy of elastic defence and expansive guerrilla warfare campaigns. These strategic approaches maximised iwi combat strengths and defeated the imperial Army at Te Kohia, Puketakauere and the Waitara River pā system.[91] At the same time, the combined forces inflicted a brutal siege against New Plymouth and nearly forced colonial interests out of the West Coast.[92] This success came undone with the rise of the Pai Mārire faith. The religious fervour and belief in a prophecy inhibits Iwi leadership just like British cultural ideas of supremacy inhibited effective strategic planning in the Northern War. At Sentry Hill, 300 Taranaki and Whanganui Pai Mārire soldiers charged a British redoubt in broad daylight over open terrain whilst chanting a karakia. Reportedly they had faith their belief would block British bullets and their victory was inevitable.[93] Just as zealotry had led to Rewi's downfall at Orakau, it resulted in a massacre at Sentry Hill. The attack was polar opposite of the indirect strategic approach which had achieved so much success previously.[94] A further 300 Pai Mārire were defeated at Wanganui by kūpapa Māori in a frontal assault. These endeavours were led by

[91] O'Malley, p.83; Sydney Morning Herald, 21 Sept. 1860 A.S. Atkinson Diary, 25 June 1860 p.598; Alexander, p.157.
[92] Cowan p.190; Belich, 1986, p.99.
[93] O'Malley, p.155.
[94] Warre, Historical Records of the 57th, pp.184-187.

prophets and reduced Iwi manpower in the region.[95] The Hauhau faithful endured but found limited success in comparison to their predecessors. Even into 1866 the Urewera iwi believed Napier could be taken through faith in their prophet.[96] Resistance in the Whanganui region did begin to re-incorporate the indirect approach, with strategic planning aiming to hit the commissariat stores and ammunition supply of the colonials.[97] Unfortunately, after Chute's scorched earth campaign, and the failures of the Pai Mārire, South Taranaki forces lacked the manpower and resources to compete with an enemy which had now adopted the indirect approach and maximised their combat power in the colonial setting.

Conclusions

The Taranaki and West Coast campaigns reveal the impact colonial conflict has on strategic thinking. Initial British campaigns were ineffective, lacked mobility, and relied on a conventional military doctrine centred upon European-style conflict. The success of colonial units experienced in bushcraft and Māori warfare, alongside experience from previous theatres in New Zealand, expanded British thinking to adopt irregular warfare. The move away from direct frontal assaults was a major turning point. Māori rangatira found great success by dictating the terms of engagement because British leadership sought decisive victories and would attack heavily fortified pā. The avoidance of direct conflict, and use of the long-range

[95] Cowan Papers, 41C.
[96] Interviews with Prisoners. G.S. Cooper to Native Secretary. Oct 29th, 1866, 'Further papers relative to the affairs of New Zealand 1867', *British Parliamentary Papers Colonies 13* (Dublin: Irish University Press, 1970).
[97] Ibid.

colonial partisans, highlights this shift in thinking. Military officials were seeking alternative means of victory. The West Coast campaigns became a war of attrition and limited aim.[98] By actively targeting supply and civilian targets, British strategy moved away from the gentlemanly conduct London so greatly prioritised and into the 'distasteful' aspects of conflict.[99]

The inclusion of irregular warfare units such as the Patea Rangers and kūpapa militia is another key aspect of strategic change. Colonial units such as the Patea Rangers, Taranaki Mounted Volunteers, and the Forest Rangers were partisan soldiers. They operated outside of the conventional army, conducted guerrilla warfare, lived off the land, operated without a centralised British command structure, and would become critical to the imperial war effort. Their success in bush conflict saw British regulars rotated out of New Zealand, and the establishment of the New Zealand Armed Constabulary in 1868 which would go on to fight the East Coast campaigns without imperial army support. Similarly, the greater role of kūpapa Māori in the imperial strategic approach revealed a further change in approach. Only a decade earlier, British leaders such as Colonel Despard absolutely despised the thought of operating alongside 'savages.'

[98] Liddell Hart, p.124.
[99] Simons, p.275.

The religious fervour of the Pai Mārire faith did no favours to the Taranaki iwi war effort, but it was not the sole factor in their eventual subdual. Conflict between Taranaki iwi and imperial forces lasted nearly a decade and the continued fighting severely depleted their manpower. Similar to the Kīngitanga, Taranaki iwi achieved success through expansive guerrilla warfare campaigns and a strategy of elastic offence which lured British forces into engaging formidable modern pā. The inclusion of irregular warfare within the strategic thinking of British and colonial leadership reduced the effectiveness of this approach. The success Taranaki iwi did achieve highlighted how effective small bands of resistance can be in asymmetric conflict.

British adoption of irregular warfare within their strategic thinking significantly contributed to their success on the West Coast. In comparison, Taranaki iwi achieved victory in the first Taranaki War but were unable to match the resources of the multi-echelon British organisation on the West Coast.

Conclusion.

Irregular warfare had a significant impact on military strategy in the New Zealand Wars. This thesis examined the implementation, success, and resulting consequences of irregular warfare strategies and units. A clear and identifiable trend emerged within the study; military success in colonial New Zealand was dependent on the use of irregular warfare. This was reflected in the outcome of events, and the strategic adaptations military leaders made across the conflicts.

In the Northern conflict, British conservatism was beaten by Māori innovation. In 1845, the British Army was an eighteenth-century institution largely neglected by parliament and led by stalwarts of tradition. In contrast, the Ngā Puhi alliance was fresh off significant military activity during the 'Musket Wars' era. Whilst depleted in manpower, the military-aged men were experienced in musketry and military innovation. The battle of Puketutu pā saw both sides meet in pitched conflict and operate through their conventional methods. Ngā Puhi suffered significant casualties, but British forces failed to take the pā. An important piece of evidence expanded upon in chapter two is Kawiti's discussion of implementing strategic change. Ngā Puhi leadership quickly identified their conventional pitched conflict methods would be unsustainable against the well-resourced British regulars. This resulted in the establishment of two heavily fortified pā at Ohaeawai and Ruapekapeka. These fortifications were designed to dictate the combat scenarios and formed a wider strategy identifiable as a strategy of offence. Small offensive

maneuverers were conducted to lure and entice British leadership to engage the pā. This would become a staple of Māori strategy throughout Aotearoa. In contrast, British leadership employed Colonel Despard to lead British forces after Puketutu. Despard's two campaigns into Ngā Puhi territory were famously poor and highlighted the flaws of conducting conventional warfare in colonial theatres of war. British expeditions were reliant on supply, unable to navigate the terrain and tactically hindered by centralised command. At Ohaeawai, the British suffered one of their worst military defeats of all time. The pā was not reconnoitred and Despard assaulted Ohaeawai in a frontal assault. The Māori garrison decimated British lines, and surviving soldiers floundered without direction from their officers. To surmise, conventional warfare was not an effective method of war in this asymmetric colonial conflict.

In the Invasion of the Waikato, irregular warfare significantly impacted strategic thinking, and its implementation contributed to military success. Kīngitanga rangatira made considerable adaptions to their conventional military strategy through irregular warfare methods to counter the asymmetric conditions of the invasion. At the strategic level, conventional Māori warfare pursued decisive victory and exertion of mana over their enemy, these conditions encouraged pitched conflict. This approach was unsustainable against imperial Britain therefore Kīngitanga leadership pursued a war of attrition. To protect Iwi interests, and hinder the British war effort, the Kīngitanga implemented a strategy of elastic offence.

Strong defensive fortifications capable of inflicting offence were constructed to mitigate British advantages and expansive guerrilla warfare was conducted to sap the British Army's capacity for war. Guerrilla warfare maximised the combat effectiveness of Kīngitanga forces.

The highly diversified coalition of hapū within the Kīngitanga resulted in numerous leaders of equal status. The decentralised command structure of guerrilla warfare allowed hapū to maintain their social hierarchies whilst working toward an overarching goal. The effectiveness of guerrilla warfare in the Hunua Ranges impacted the organisation of conventional Māori units. Long-range raids were traditionally conducted by large blood parties, 'taua'; however, guerrilla operations encouraged mobility and speed. This significantly altered the composition of the taua. The once large war bands became small units of 30 toa who drew upon their superior bushcraft skills to out manoeuvrer and defeat the British regulars. At the tactical level, irregular warfare impacted the way Māori conducted conflict. Traditional conflict often commenced with a show of force through the performance of the haka and presentation of firepower. In the Waikato War, Kīngitanga soldiers operated through surprise and entrapment. Pitched conflict was avoided in favour of combat scenarios that heavily favoured Māori interests, such as the ambush.

In contrast, the British Army commenced the Invasion of the Waikato still reliant upon conventional warfare. However, they would end the conflict with a multi-echelon force that drew heavily upon irregular warfare. Initial British strategy

presumed overwhelming numbers would defeat Kīngitanga resistance. However, the Kīngitanga's avoidance of pitched conflict did not allow for a decisive victory. The highly effective guerrilla warfare campaign left Lieutenant General Cameron's campaign operationally ineffective because the conventional army could not progress without its supply lines.

The efforts of the colonial militia catalysed the inclusion of irregular warfare in British strategy. British regulars were ill-equipped to respond to Māori raids. This resulted in the formation of a colonial militia, these men were experienced in bushcraft and in some cases knowledgeable in Māori conflict. The success of the colonial militia saw the establishment of the Forest Rangers, a partisan warfare unit. Militia and the Rangers successfully mitigated the lethality of the Kīngitanga guerrillas, and Ranger leadership helped the British break out of the Hunau's at Paparata Pā.

The success achieved by the colonial partisans and the failures of the conventional army at Rangiriri directly contributed to British leadership's adoption of irregular warfare. The most important evidence of irregular warfare's impact on strategic thinking is Cameron's decision to avoid pitched conflict at Paterangi and undertake the indirect approach to destroy Rangiaowhia. The British army was a very traditionalist institution, notorious for its resistance to change, and Cameron completely altered its strategic approach. The prominence of irregular units, the use of the indirect approach, and the specific targeting of a civilian settlement to achieve

military success highlights the evolution in British strategic thinking. Proper conventional conduct made way for ungentlemanly warfare, considered distasteful by London but highly effective in Aotearoa.

At the operational level, irregular warfare significantly altered the force composition of the British Army. At Koheroa, Cameron engaged Kingite forces with the line companies of the 14th regiment. In comparison the force at Orakau mostly consisted of flank companies engaging in partisan warfare, and colonial partisan units. Following the Ranger's success at Mangapiko River, all British endeavours drew heavily upon colonial partisans and began to incorporate kūpapa units. This diverged significantly from the British columns of the Northern Wars who famously dismissed Māori and colonial help. Irregular warfare transformed the British army from a conventional force reliant on eighteenth-century line infantry to a diversified multi-echelon force capable of waging partisan warfare and conducting in-direct operations.

In the West Coast / Taranaki Campaigns, the use of irregular warfare methods was central to British strategic thinking. Māori endeavours displayed the shortcomings of conventional conduct coloured by religious fervour. British forces initially struggled as their conventional methods were ineffective in responding to guerrilla warfare. Conventional approaches such as the sapping campaign proved highly ineffective and costly. The success of colonial units in the Taranaki and the

Waikato wars revolutionised the British approach. The force composition of expeditions altered with significant colonial and Kūpapa contingents. British leadership shifted their strategic aims from decisive victory to full-blown suppression of resistance. The indirect approach became prevalent as highly mobile multi-echelon flying columns were used to destroy the Māori force's capacity to resist. This shift in thinking toward irregular warfare is highlighted by the British War Office expressing major concern over the flying column operations because they were 'ungentlemanly and improper'. The impact of strategic thinking was further underlined by the phasing out of British regulars in favour of colonial partisans whose irregular conduct continued to prove more effective in the colonial topography.

Māori leadership on the West Coast reverted to conventional approaches and accordingly achieved less success than their predecessors. Early Māori conduct incorporated an expansive guerrilla warfare campaign that forced a reasonably favourable peace deal after the first Taranaki conflict. However, the rise of the Pai Mārire faith massively impacted the effectiveness of Māori strategy. Religious fanatics assumed control of military strategy, and based their strategic thinking upon the belief their prophecy would come true. A key example was the Hauhau contingent that stormed Sentry Hill head-on because they believed their prayer would stop the bullets. The Taranaki and West Coast campaigns proved the importance of irregular warfare in Māori strategy. With its incorporation, Māori

military organisations were highly capable of matching the British. Without the consideration of irregular warfare, Māori did not have the resources or manpower to match the British Empire.

To build upon this thesis, an interesting point of study would be the East Coast campaigns and the New Zealand's government's reliance on kūpapa units. This thesis hopes to promote and encourage a greater consideration of the role of irregular warfare in future examinations of the New Zealand Wars.

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