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**International Climate Change Governance:  
Issues of Democracy, Institutions and the Media**

A thesis  
submitted in fulfilment  
of the requirements for the degree  
of  
Doctor of Philosophy in Political Science and Public Policy  
at  
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by  
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## **Abstract**

The United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change was established in 1992 to stabilize greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere to prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system. The nation states of the world have attempted to arrest climate change through a state-centric large scale multilateral treaty making process. Yet, over a period of more than twenty years, little has been achieved toward that objective. The making of international climate change governance required to arrest climate change is falling short. Greenhouse gases, which scientists consider to be the main culprit of climate change, are increasing rapidly making every subsequent year's emissions concentration a new record.

Climate scientists say global temperatures rising above 2 degrees Celsius could be extremely dangerous. The 1992 Convention, 1997 Kyoto Protocol, 2009 Copenhagen Accord and subsequent agreements have failed to translate the goal and achieve the threshold target as no serious and viable policies are forthcoming. Instead, the United Nations' climate conferences have become a yearly chore for diplomats.

The complexities of climate change governance arise not only from the nature and uncertainty of its impact, but also from its embedded relationships with social, cultural, political, economic, historical and institutional dimensions. Appropriate responses to address the challenges of climate change are difficult in the absence of potential solutions in sight. The pre-requisite for any effective policy responses is that the decision making process be democratic, transparent, and inclusive so that the ultimate addressees can 'own' the problem and contribute to solutions.

A sizable literature focuses on the causes and reasons behind climate change and advocates radical actions to arrest it. Other research highlights economic implications, alternatives to fossil fuels, consumption and production, scientific uncertainty and challenges the perennial North-South politics in seeking to explain the lack of progress. There has been little research on why international climate change governance is making only incremental progress. This thesis takes as its starting point the paucity of attention to working out how and why progress

has not been made, drawing on insights from climate change negotiations, major climate agreements and analyses of data on media communications on the issues of international climate change negotiations for policy making.

The research recognizes the complexity of climate change and takes a comprehensive approach in considering *why has there been little progress in the making of an effective international climate change governance to prevent climate change*. The thesis takes three complementary approaches in addressing the central research question. The first develops from the concept of a democratic deficit and posits that the failure of progress can be attributed to a lack of the democratic processes in grappling with the issues. The second explores the state-centric framework of UNFCCC and posits that since the environmental issues are non-territorial, the challenges postulated by climate change cannot be resolved and progress made by solely relying on a state-centric approach. The third is to do with media communications and posits the role of the media in public education as central to develop the necessary public support for addressing the issues of climate change. The Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accord, and how they were achieved are central to this research as these are the two major climate change agreements achieved internationally so far.

This research concludes that the approaches we have adopted so far have been inadequate because of the lack of involvement of the main stakeholders in decision making processes. The common but differentiated and historical responsibilities, pertinent principles in 1992, no longer reflect current economic growth and greenhouse gas emission patterns. There is a need to review our state-centric institutional framework toward a more inclusive, participatory, and deliberative accountability whereby the public and businesses can ‘own’ the problem. The role of the media is paramount in this because it is the media that passes information from the scientists, experts and policy makers to the public. The research concludes that the media has a key role to play and needs to be more critical in advancing measures to address the problems of climate change.

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## **Abbreviations**

AFP	Agence France Presse
AOSIS	Alliance of Small Island States
AU	African Union
AWG-KP	Ad hoc Working Group on Kyoto Protocol
AWG-LCA	Ad hoc Working Group on Long Term Cooperative Action
BAP	Bali Action Plan
BASIC	Brazil, South Africa, India and China
BRICS	Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa
CAN	Climate Action Network
CBD	Convention on Biodiversity
CBDR	Common but Differentiated Responsibilities
CDM	Clean Development Mechanism
CERs	Certified Emissions Reductions
CFCs	Chlorofluorocarbons
CIFs	Climate Investment Funds
CITES	Convention on International Trade in Endangered Species of Wild Fauna and Flora
CO <sub>2</sub>	Carbon Dioxide
COP	Conferences of the Parties
CSD	Commission on Sustainable Development
CSO	Civil Society Organizations
DOE	Department of Energy
EC	European Commission
ECOSOC	United Nations Economic and Social Council
EEA	European Environment Agency
EIA	Environmental Impact Assessment
EIA	Energy Information Administration

EIG	Environmental Integrity Group
EITs	Economies in Transitions
EP	European Parliament
EPA	Environmental Protection Agency
ETS	Emission Trading Scheme
EU	European Union
FOE	Friends of the Earth
G-8	Group of 8
G-20	Group of 20
G-77	Group of 77 (Developing Countries)
GATT	General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade
GCF	Green Climate Fund
GDP	Gross Domestic Product
GEF	Global Environmental Facility
GHG	Greenhouse Gases
GMOs	Genetically Modified Organisms
GNI	Gross National Income
GUK	Guardian Newspaper United Kingdom
HDI	Human Development Index
HR	Historical Responsibility
IAEA	International Atomic Energy Agency
ICC	International Criminal Court
IDA	International Development Agency
IEA	International Energy Administration
IGO	Intergovernmental Organization
IIASA	International Institute for Applied System
ILO	International Labour Organization
IMF	International Monetary Fund
INC	International Negotiating Committee (for Climate Change)

INGOs	International Non-governmental Organizations
IO	International Organization
IPCC	International Panel on Climate Change
IR	International Relations
ITLOS	International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea
IUCN	International Union for the Conservation of Nature
JI	Joint Implementation
LDCs	Least Developed Countries
MDG	Millennium Development Goals
MEF	Major Economic Forum
MOFA	Ministry of Foreign Affairs
MOE	Ministry of Environment
MOP	Meeting of the Parties
MRV	Monitoring, Reporting and Verification
NAFTA	North American Free Trade Agreement
NAM	Non-Aligned Movement
NASA	National Aeronautics and Space Administration
NATO	North Atlantic Treaty Organization
NEAA	Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency
NGO	Non-governmental Organization
NIEO	New International Economic Order
NYT	New York Times
ODS	Ozone Depleting Substances
OECD	Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development
OPEC	Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries
POL	Protecting the Ozone Layer
PPP	Purchasing Power Parity
PPT	Parts Per Million

REDD+	Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and forest Degradation and Conservation, Sustainable Management of the Forest and Enhancement of the Forest Carbon Stocks
SBI	Subsidiary Body for Implementation
SBSTA	Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice
SIDS	Small Island Developing Countries
UG	Umbrella Group
UK	United Kingdom
UN	United Nations
UNAIDS	United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDs
UNCED	United Nations Conference on Environment and Development
UNCHE	United Nations Conference on Human Environment
UNCLOS	United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea
UNDP	United Nations Development Programme
UNEP	United Nations Environment Programme
UNESCO	United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organizations
UNFCCC	United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
US	United States of America
USCI	United States, China and India
WEC	World Energy Council
WMO	World Meteorological Organization
WSI	World Resource Institute
WSJ	Wall Street Journal
WSSD	World Summit on Sustainable Development
WTO	World Trade Organization
WWF	World Wildlife Fund





## **Chapter 1**

### **Introduction: Understanding the Causes of Slow Progress**

#### **1.1 A Preface**

Growing up in the western region of Nepal, the writer was aware of the way traditional farming practices were conducted to ensure harmony with nature. There was little awareness of, and concern about, environmental and climate change issues. Changes in farming practices, pastureland management, and surrounding areas became linked to weather patterns, particularly the arrival of the monsoons from the Bay of Bengal and its impact on the rain-fed farming system. Changing weather patterns brought reductions in the harvests of many types of crops with people becoming increasingly anxious about food security. To meet the demands of the increasing population, forests were cut down in favour of harvesting crops, houses and motorways were built, and other land-use practices resulted in reduced local water sources, more pollution and fewer carbon sinks. In the villages, there used to be abundant fresh water flowing from natural taps, but continued deforestation and concrete construction development<sup>1</sup> dried up many of the natural water sources. Increasingly, poverty forced more and more people to leave their farms to find employment in cities and abroad (providing cheap labour for the Gulf countries).

As a school boy, the writer heard about the pristine snow-clad top of the world, Mount Everest (Sagarmatha in Nepali). But as the climate changed, there were many reports that Everest was losing its sublime beauty. In 2009, the government of Nepal held a cabinet meeting in Kalapathar, the Base camp of Mount Everest, at an altitude of 5,242 meters to send the message to the governments participating in COP-15 (Conference of Parties-15) in Copenhagen that Mount Everest was losing its snow as global temperatures were rising. Also in 2009 in a similar effort to draw the attention of COP-15 and the world to the changing climate, the Maldives government held a cabinet meeting underwater to send the message of global temperature rise

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<sup>1</sup> Building cemented houses and poorly planned roads at and around the estuary of the natural water sources resulted in the water sources disappearing.

to motivate the governments of the world to take action against rising temperature.

In preparations for COP-15 there were aspirations that the concerns of Nepal and the Maldives, in common with many others, would be addressed by the governments of the world. This did not eventuate however, and the writer's interest in the lack of progress in the face of one of the greatest challenges of the 21<sup>st</sup> Century became more focused. It was evident that the discussion about climate change typically saw, as the core issue, the North-South divide and economic interests, particularly those of the United States (US). To reduce the argument to such a limited scope did not make sense in Nepal, situated as it is between two of the most powerful developing countries – China and India.

China is the world's most populous and third largest country in the area. Its economy is already huge and growing at an aggregate of 9 per cent per year, represented by its Gross Domestic Product (GDP purchasing power parity) of US \$12.61 trillion in 2012.<sup>2</sup> It is one of the members of BRICS (Brazil, Russia, India, China and South Africa) and BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China). China's environmental problems are among the most severe of any major country and have become major concerns for the Chinese people and government. China's large population, economy and size mean that its environmental problems will spill over to the rest of the world. After all, the planet, and its oceans and atmosphere, are shared.

India, the world's second most populous country, is 22 times bigger than Nepal. The Indian economy is currently growing at an average of 7 per cent per year, and its GDP purchasing power parity is US \$4.735 trillion compared to Nepal's US \$40.49 billion in 2012.<sup>3</sup> India's share in world GDP is about 5.46 per cent against Nepal's 0.049 per cent in 2013.<sup>4</sup> It is also a member of BRICS and BASIC, a group of major emerging economies. Its

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<sup>2</sup> See CIA Factbook, 'China', <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/ch.html>.

<sup>3</sup> See CIA Factbook, 'India', <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/in.html>.

<sup>4</sup> See CIA Factbook, 'Nepal', <https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/np.html>.

rapidly accelerating fossil-fuelled based economy is business-as-usual which carries environmental costs. Like China, India's environmental problems are enormous and global in magnitude.

In contrast, Nepal is among the poorest and the least developed countries in the world, with about one-quarter of its population living below the poverty line. There are many differences between these three countries, yet when it comes to climate change, all three are categorized under one umbrella term, 'Non-Annex I'.<sup>5</sup> Even South Korea and Mexico which have long been members of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), are still listed as Non-Annex I countries. These kinds of categorisations, which were meaningful some 20 years ago, are irrelevant today as the economic circumstances of some of the developing countries including China and India are changing. The problematic is that these categorisations are intricately connected with the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change's (UNFCCC) principles of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) and historic responsibility (HR), with the politics of and within North and South, and built on the foundation of state-centric negotiation frameworks. A deeper understanding of the UNFCCC's institutional framework and its CBDR/HR principles and the role of the media reveal why progress on international climate governance has not been made.

## **1.2 The Thesis**

The central thesis question of this research is: *Why has there been little progress in the making of an effective international climate change governance to prevent climate change?*<sup>6</sup> The efforts towards international climate change governance are falling short in addressing the challenges of climate change. While the

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<sup>5</sup> In climate change negotiations Non-Annex-I category includes all developing countries irrespective of their size, economy and changing status. All developed countries including economies in transition are included in Annex-I category. Annex II refers to developed countries excluding economies in transition.

<sup>6</sup> Although governance has been defined in different times and number of ways, international climate change governance refers to policies negotiated and approved at the UNFCCC—governance without (world) government. Climate change governance appeared as a term of its own during the creation of UNFCCC in 1992. The launching of the Kyoto Protocol at COP-3 supported the link between climate change governance and a global response in the hands of the United Nations institutions. The UNFCCC's climate governance making process is continuing.

governments of the world recognized the urgency, risks and opportunities of climate change by establishing the UNFCCC in 1992 little progress has been made in mitigating greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions since that time. Given the challenges arising from climate change, the question arises as to why the Conferences of the Parties (COPs) have not agreed upon actions to limit global temperatures.

Progress on developing climate change policy has also been slow. The pledges made at Kyoto 1997 were far from adequate.<sup>7</sup> The pledges made under the Copenhagen Accord 2009 to reduce the GHG emissions collectively fell far short of what was required to limit global temperature increases to 2 degrees Celsius (°C).<sup>8</sup> Helm and Hepburn have noted that international agreement toward a credible climate-change framework remains elusive, and while the process intensified in the run-up to the end of the first Kyoto Protocol (KP) period, emissions have continued to rise rapidly.<sup>9</sup> The concentration of CO<sub>2</sub> is rising at a rate of 3 parts per million (ppm) per year.<sup>10</sup> Given current policies and regulations, worldwide energy-related carbon dioxide emissions are projected to increase 46 per cent by 2040.<sup>11</sup>

Helm, Yamin and Depledge, Ghosh and Woods, Vogler and others agree that the outcomes of international climate change negotiations have made little progress despite negotiations continuing for quite some time.<sup>12</sup> Helm has argued that the international climate agreement failed because it did not deal with the issues of

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<sup>7</sup> See UNFCCC, 'GHG Data', [http://unfccc.int/ghg\\_data/ghg\\_data\\_unfccc/items/4146.php](http://unfccc.int/ghg_data/ghg_data_unfccc/items/4146.php).

<sup>8</sup> IEA, *World Energy Outlook 2010* (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2010), 53.

<sup>9</sup> Dieter Helm and Cameron Hepburn, eds., *The Economics and Politics of Climate Change* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 1.

<sup>10</sup> Will Steffen et al., *Global Change and Earth System: A Planet under Pressure* (Berlin: Springer Verlag, 2004). See also Dieter Helm, *The Carbon Crunch* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 2012).

<sup>11</sup> Energy Information Administration, *International Energy Outlook 2013* (Washington: EIA, 2013).

<sup>12</sup> Dieter Helm, 'Climate Changed Policy: Why Has So Little Been Achieved', in *The Economics and Politics of Climate Change*, eds., Dieter Helm and Cameron Hepburn, 9-35 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); John Volger, 'Environmental Issues', in *The Globalization of the World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, eds., John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, 348-62 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011); Arunabha Ghosh and Ngaire Woods, 'Governing Climate Change: Lessons from Other Governance Regimes', in *The Economics and Politics of Climate Change*, eds., Dieter Helm and Cameron Hepburn, 455-77 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); and Farhana Yamin and Joanna Depledge, 'The Global Climate Change Regime: A Defence', in *The Economics and Politics of Climate Change*, eds., Dieter Helm and Cameron Hepburn, 433-53 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

carbon consumption.<sup>13</sup> Volger has suggested that scientific uncertainty and the differential impact of global warming in different countries could be the reason for the slow progress.<sup>14</sup> Yamin and Depledge, and Ghosh and Woods have argued that North-South politics is the climate change regime's greatest weakness.<sup>15</sup> Divisions within the developed countries between the European Union (EU) and the US have also complicated the process. Bodansky argues the split between the US and EU at climate negotiations is more serious than the split between developed and developing countries.<sup>16</sup> "The lack of progress has been attributed to the problems evident in the international system, procedural problems of negotiations and characteristic problems of climate change".<sup>17</sup> There are a wide range of issues that influence the role of states in climate negotiations.<sup>18</sup> This thesis argues that the democratic deficit<sup>19</sup> surrounding the representation of states and stakeholders, coupled with the current state-centric framework of UNFCCC, and the uncritical behaviour of media accounts are central to the failure of progress toward international climate change governance.

Although recent scholarship has noted that the UNFCCC has not made much progress, there has been little research regarding why international climate change governance failed to make greater progress, particularly with reference to insights from climate change negotiations, major climate agreements and the data on media communications – from both the North and South – about international climate negotiations for policy making. The challenge is also to make sense of the wide range of different theories and interpretations including the main schools of thought in the field of international relations and global environmental politics.

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<sup>13</sup> Helm, 2009.

<sup>14</sup> Volger, 2011.

<sup>15</sup> Yamin and Depledge, 2009; and Ghosh and Woods, 2009.

<sup>16</sup> Dimitriv Bodansky, 'The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Postmortem', *American Society of International Law* 104, no. 2 (2010): 230-240.

<sup>17</sup> Chandra L. Pandey, 'International Climate Change Negotiations and the Media', in *The Refereed Proceedings of the 2012 Australian Political Science Conference*, eds., Richard Eccleston; Nicholas Sageman and Felicity Gray, 273-300 (Hobart: University of Tasmania, 2012b).

<sup>18</sup> See for details: David Victor, *Global Warming Gridlock* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press); David L. Downie, 'Global Environmental Policy: Governance through Regimes', in *The Global Environment: Institutions, Law and Policy*, eds., Regina Axelrod; Stacy Vandever and David Downie, 70-91 (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2011); and Pandey, 2012b.

<sup>19</sup> Here, democratic deficit means democratic representation and participation in deliberative and decision making processes with the standard practice of transparency and accountability. There is no attempt to translate state-model democracy to the international level but it is argued instead that the ultimate addressees (people and industries) should participate in policy deliberations for consensual debate and public accountability.

While much of the research on climate change has focused on particular climate negotiations, research on the media is mainly limited to Western countries and has focused on the representation of climate change through debates between sceptics and believers.<sup>20</sup> The communication of climate change knowledge from scientists to policy-makers and the public via the media is of major interest because of its implications for creating public understanding of global environmental issues.<sup>21</sup> However, to date, no study has assessed the continuing lack of progress of international climate change negotiations contextualizing and combining the major international climate agreements and the media articulations of major parties – India, China, the US and the United Kingdom (UK). The KP and the Copenhagen Accord have been the major features of international climate change negotiations so far following the establishment of the UNFCCC. This study explores these two major climate change agreements and assesses the contributions of media to the issues of climate change.

Over the two decades since the establishment of UNFCCC in 1992, the world has seen drastic changes in the social, political and economic circumstances of people. The US and the EU used to be the biggest GHG emitters in the twentieth century but now China has grown to be a major economic power and its emissions have consequently increased dramatically. Although the objective of ‘making poverty history’ is far from over, India, Brazil, and South Africa have become major global economic powers as well. In short, the economies of the South have become major GHG emitters, with China becoming the number one emitter in the world.<sup>22</sup> These changes in global politics and economic power raise questions about whether these shifts need to be reflected in the principles of the UNFCCC, which divides countries into two categories as Annex I (developed countries) and Non-Annex I (developing countries). Moreover, it is more useful to question whether the Annex 1/Non-Annex 1 distinction and state-centric institutional structures of climate negotiations are even helpful.

Indeed, the discussion of climate change policy making has become polarised, and this has contributed to the lack of progress. The

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<sup>20</sup> Simon Billett, ‘Dividing Climate Change: Global Warming in Indian Mass Media’, *Climate Change* 99, no. 1-2 (2010): 1-16

<sup>21</sup> Ibid.

<sup>22</sup> IEA, 2010, 47.

manifestations of North South, the EU and US and South, South divisions within a state-centric framework neglects the borderless landscapes of climate change, which affects people living in transboundary landscapes. It is a global problem and it does not matter where CO<sub>2</sub> is emitted because it ends up in the shared atmosphere. The sources of GHG emissions are deeply embedded in industrialized and industrializing societies but countries are devising no effective climate policy to arrest concentration of emissions in the atmosphere. For all the efforts of negotiators and urgency surrounding this issue, the UNFCCC's treaty making system has consistently failed to produce treaties and agreements that effectively address climate change.<sup>23</sup>

This thesis argues that there has been a failure to develop and adopt a workable framework based on the principles that identify and adapt to the changing realities of the world. The failure also comes from a cosmetic representation of the stakeholders founded on the state-centric framework of UNFCCC combined with the uncritical role of the media. To substantiate the arguments, this thesis examines three strongly connected themes, which have not received much consideration so far, to determine why international climate change governance has not made progress. First are arguments attributing the lack of progress to a democratic deficit existing around climate change negotiations. Second are arguments which attribute the lack of progress to the state-centric framework. Third are the arguments about the role of the media in public education, the agenda setting roles, and the potential paths forward on climate change and on the negotiations surrounding it. These issues will be further contextualized in 1.2.3 section of this chapter and explored in subsequent chapters.

### **1.2.1 Tracing the Beginning**

Although the environmental impact of CO<sub>2</sub> was proposed by the Swedish chemist Svante Arrhenius in 1906, and confirmed with more supporting evidence by the British engineer Guy Callendar in 1938, these analyses were not highlighted until

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<sup>23</sup> Matthew J. Hoffman, *Climate Change at the Crossroads: Experimenting with a Global Response after Kyoto* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).



recently.<sup>24</sup> General environmental issues such as pollution and environmental degradation were well reflected in Rachel Carson's book, *Silent Spring*, published in 1962, which generated a wave of environmental awareness. Since the 1970s many more environmental issues and challenges have emerged in support of these earlier claims. The first comprehensive high-level talks began with the United Nations Conference on the Human Environment (UNCHE), also known as the Stockholm Conference, convened in Stockholm in June 1972.

Formal recognition of the potential threat of climate change dates back to 1988, when the UN General Assembly established the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) to report on the state of scientific knowledge on global climate to inform policy responses. While there are uncertainties in our understanding of climate change and its impacts, scientists have refined their understanding and argued that emissions of GHGs must be limited to keep global temperature below 2°C relative to pre-industrial age, a temperature deemed necessary to avoid potential challenges.

Helm has noted that little progress has been made to reduce the build-up of emissions so far.<sup>25</sup> Global GHG emissions have continued to rise since the UNFCCC was established to stabilize "greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system".<sup>26</sup> Recognizing the inadequacy of voluntary emission reductions targets, parties to the UNFCCC moved beyond it to KP, a climate agreement that included binding commitments for a number of developed countries. Although Kyoto was a legally binding agreement and came up with flexible mechanisms such as emissions trading, clean development mechanism (CDM) and joint implementation (JI), it has not made any visible contribution to achieving the objective of emission reductions for stabilizing global temperature.

In 2007 the Fourth Assessment Report of the IPCC, and governments of the world through climate agreements, concluded that the increase in global temperatures

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<sup>24</sup> Andrew E. Dessler and Edward A. Parson, *The Science and Politics of Global Climate Change: A Guide to the Debate* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 8.

<sup>25</sup> Helm, 2009, 9-10; Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, *International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011), 497-501; Volger, 2011.

<sup>26</sup> UNFCCC, *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change* (Bonn: Climate Change Secretariat, 1992).

should be pegged to 2°C and that CO<sub>2</sub> concentration in the atmosphere must not exceed 450 ppm. According to National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA), average global levels of CO<sub>2</sub> were about 280 ppm before the Industrial Revolution and by 2011 they were 390.4 ppm<sup>27</sup> but recent research has demonstrated that CO<sub>2</sub> concentration in the atmosphere had already reached 400 ppm by May 2013.<sup>28</sup>

Negotiations have been continuing for a post-Kyoto climate change agreement since 2006. The Bali Roadmap set out for the COPs the steps to be taken to finalize an ambitious climate agreement in COP-15 in Copenhagen, only to see COPs failing to negotiate the necessary agreement in 2009. The Copenhagen Accord was developed by the US, Brazil, China, South Africa and India, only to have it blocked from being adopted at the final plenary session. The Durban Agreement of 2011 envisaged the adoption of a global climate treaty by the end of 2015 and its entry into force in 2020. It was expected to include reduction targets for countries that had previously blocked international climate protection agreements, such as India, China, and the US, and a 2°C limit on the global temperature increase.

The EU succeeded in pushing through a schedule for negotiations intended ultimately to produce a comprehensive and ambitious world climate agreement. But no concrete steps towards abating GHGs were developed in COP-18 in Doha except that it extended the KP for the second commitment period for countries that produce only 15 per cent of total global GHG emissions and envisioned to continue future negotiations.<sup>29</sup> It left a high level of uncertainty about the outcome of 2015 conference of the COPs but what is certain is the governments of the world would enjoy business-as-usual for at least another 8 years until 2020.

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<sup>27</sup> NOAA, 'Carbon Dioxide Levels Reach Milestone at Arctic Sites', <http://researchmatters.noaa.gov/news/Pages/arcticCO2.aspx>.

<sup>28</sup> See CO<sub>2</sub> Home, [co2now.org](http://co2now.org). This data was originally prepared by NOAA: National Climatic Data Centre, available at <http://www.ncdc.noaa.gov/sotc/global/>. Also see media report by Paul Brown, 'Carbon Dioxide Climb Speeds Up', *Climate News Network*, <http://tdcplone.dailyclimate.org/tdc-newsroom/2013/03/co2-climb>.

<sup>29</sup> UNFCCC, *Outcome of the Work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol* (Bonn: Climate Change Secretariat, 2012).

### 1.2.2 The Debates

Negotiations over climate change have been contested strongly between and within developed and developing countries. At COP-3, developed countries such as the US and Australia pressured developing countries to take on specific emission targets. They insisted that any emission reduction processes needed global participation particularly from key developing countries such as China, India and Brazil. What emerged from Kyoto were distinctions between states' interests, between the developed and developing, between great and middle powers, as well as the concerns of the small/island states. In Copenhagen in 2009, major emitting countries were unable to come to any substantive agreement on climate change mitigation or on structural changes to the respective economic models on the basis of national interest.

Areas of dissent included the rights of the developing world to industrialise and concerns by the North that long term global climate change was affecting all and that this would be accelerated by rapid business-as-usual development in the South.<sup>30</sup> There were debates on how industrialisation could lift millions out of poverty and create a widespread green consciousness. The response was that the current precarious environmental condition required new paradigms of green growth based on the view that the West had created this problem and was now using this point to stifle growth in a resurgent South.

There have been strategic splits between governments and splits within the Non-governmental Organization (NGO) community.<sup>31</sup> There were concerns from more radical viewpoints that collaborating NGOs would be 'bought off' and 'co-opted'. One of the slogans in Copenhagen from several civil society groups was "system change not climate change"<sup>32</sup> which suggested that climate change was the outcome of an ecologically destructive and profit based capitalism. There were also splits between Northern environmental NGOs and Southern environmental NGOs on the relationship between development and the environment. Some

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<sup>30</sup> IEA, *World Energy Outlook 2011* (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2011).

<sup>31</sup> Aynsley Kellow, 'Norms, Interests and Environmental NGOs: Limits of Cosmopolitanism', *Environmental Politics* 9, no.3 (2000): 1-22; Marc Williams and Lucy Ford, 'The WTO, Social Movements and Global Environmental Movements', *Environmental Politics* 8, no. 1(1999): 268-289.

<sup>32</sup> Climate Justice Action, 'Copenhagen: System Change, Not Climate Change!' <http://www.climate-justice-action.org>.

commentators argued that environmental NGOs should take a self-critical look at themselves and ask to what extent they actually contributed to the poor result of climate negotiations.<sup>33</sup>

Various arguments have been made about the impasse reached on climate change. First, for many in the South the climate change debate is a Western conspiracy to prevent the South from competing with the North.<sup>34</sup> On this account, the West has for centuries both plundered and exploited the South's resources whilst at the same time exported its industrial waste to the South aided by willing and corrupt Southern governments with weak environmental regulations. Second, others have argued that with faltering economic development and free market trade, an environmentally conscious middle-class will fail to emerge, as thoughts become focused on post-material issues. Many have argued that there are trade-offs between environment and economic growth.<sup>35</sup> Recent scholarship on the environment and development has argued that continued economic growth is only possible at the expense of the environment,<sup>36</sup> and that the poor are most directly affected by environmental changes. For their survival the poor are more likely to be environmentally conscious than the richer middle classes, but are less able to deal with the issue. There is a counter argument that a global environmental consciousness is not yet fully developed in the local and poorer communities.<sup>37</sup>

Third, the concerns over what is seen as a democratic deficit are highlighted in the literature on environmental governance.<sup>38</sup> The rules of procedure for the climate change negotiations are based on consensus among the COPs under the Convention, and the proviso that the COPs can agree to follow another approach.<sup>39</sup> There are a large number of parties and observers involved which

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<sup>33</sup> Heinrich Boll Stiftung, 'The Green Political Foundation', <http://www.boell.de/ecology/society/ecology-society-ngos-climate-crisis-12261.html>.

<sup>34</sup> Lorraine Elliott, *The Global Politics of Environment* (Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

<sup>35</sup> Tim Jackson, *Prosperity without Growth: Economics for a Finite Planet* (Sterling, VA and London: Earthscan, 2011). Iain Watson and Chandra L. Pandey, 'Environmental Security and New Middle Powers: The Case of South Korea,' *Asian Security* 10, no. 1 (2014): 70-95.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> United Nations Sustainable Development, 'United Nations Conference on Environment and Development, Agenda 21, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil 3-14 June 1992', <http://sustainabledevelopment.un.org/>

<sup>38</sup> See for details: Walter F. Baber and Robert V. Bartlett, *Global Democracy and Sustainable Jurisprudence: Deliberative Environmental Law* (Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press, 2009).

<sup>39</sup> See UNFCCC, *Kyoto Protocol* (Bonn: Climate Change Secretariat, 1998).

have also increased the complexities of policy making. Although all the states are legally equal at UNFCCC, and accredited NGOs can attend the meetings representing global civil society, parties and observers considered that the procedures of climate change negotiations were not democratic, resulting in the failure to adopt the Copenhagen Accord. Concerns raised are that the powerful and major emitters play dominant roles in line with their national interests<sup>40</sup> in climate change policy making, resulting in weak agreements which ignore the concerns of poor and vulnerable countries.

Volger has argued that the pursuit of power, status, and wealth is rarely absent from international environmental cooperation and even some of the more mundane deliberations clearly reflect the struggle for national interests.<sup>41</sup> Zurn has argued that climate change is a highly complex borderless issue which suffers from a democratic deficit and in order to successfully tackle this “highly complex behind the-border issues with societal actors as the ultimate addressees, these new kinds of international institutions require a more sophisticated institutional design”.<sup>42</sup> Nye concurred and argued that instead of merely rejecting the arguments, more access must be given to global civil society organizations such as NGOs.<sup>43</sup>

Fourth, recent scholarship has demonstrated that the lack of public education and public understanding about the knowledge of climate change and its potential risks and impacts is also resulting in slow progress because the media shapes public perception, leading to governmental actions.<sup>44</sup> The media provides information on climate science and informs the public about overall climate change issues, from the negotiations and processes, to the possible outcomes.<sup>45</sup>

The scholarship on climate change is extensive making it clear that the lack of progress on climate negotiations is not simply explained from North South

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<sup>40</sup> Volger, 2011.

<sup>41</sup> Ibid, 352.

<sup>42</sup> Michael Zurn, ‘Global Governance and Legitimacy Problem’, *Government and Opposition* 39, no. 2 (2004), 269.

<sup>43</sup> Joseph Nye, ‘Globalizations Democratic Deficits: How to Make International Organizations More Accountable’, *Foreign Affairs* 80, no. 4 (2001):2-26.

<sup>44</sup> A. Walberg and L. Sjoberg, ‘Risk Perception and the Media’, *Journal of Risk Research* 3, no. 1 (2000): 31-50

<sup>45</sup> Pandey, 2012b.

politics or from any other extrinsic competing perspectives. The responses of the COPs to the challenging issue of climate change reveal the difficulties in achieving agreement. Organizing international negotiations among more than 190 heterogeneous states on highly contentious issues to forge a mutually acceptable outcome is a difficult and intricate task.<sup>46</sup> In sum, climate change concerns are shaped by the many complicated interrelationships between economic, political, and social dynamics of domestic societies and institutions, as well as the credibility of scientific arguments that climate change is due to anthropogenic factors. Clearly, the UNFCCC's state-centric institutional framework, the role of media and the concerns of achieving a democratic decision making process in global climate change governance has further implications.

### 1.2.3 The Challenge

Although the dynamics of climate change are far reaching and hold overarching relationships with several issues, the scientific urgency for making a more adequate response is growing.<sup>47</sup> An OECD report in 2012 stated: "Delay in alleviating these environmental pressures will impose significant costs, undermine growth and development and run the risk of irreversible and potentially catastrophic changes in the future".<sup>48</sup> The World Bank report in 2012 stated that under current emission pledges and commitments, global temperatures would most likely result in 3.5 to 4°C and the 4°C scenarios are devastating.<sup>49</sup> An OECD environmental outlook reported that global GHG emissions continued to rise and in 2010 global GHG emissions reached an all-time high of 30.6 gigatonnes despite the recent economic crisis.<sup>50</sup> In 2011 the GHG emissions further increased

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<sup>46</sup> Joanna Depledge, *The Organizations of Global Negotiations: Constructing Climate Change Regime*, (London, Sterling, VA: Earthscan, 2005).

<sup>47</sup> IEA, 2011.

<sup>48</sup> Alex Morales, 'OECD Predicts 'Grim' Outlook for Global Environment by 2050', *Bloomberg*, March 15, 2012, <http://www.bloomberg.com/news/2012-03-15/oecd-predicts-grim-outlook-for-global-environment-by-2050.html>.

<sup>49</sup> World Bank, *Turn Down the Heat: Why a 4°C World Must Be Avoided* (Washington DC: World Bank, 2012),

<sup>50</sup> Virgine Marchal et al., *The OECD Environmental Outlook to 2050* (OECD, November 2011).

by 3 per cent.<sup>51</sup> In 2012, global GHG emissions hit another new record of 35.6 gigatonnes, a 2.6 per cent increase from 2011 and 58 per cent above 1990 levels.<sup>52</sup>

As noted above, data shows that global GHG emissions have been rapidly increasing ever since industrialization began. The IPCC has estimated that global warming of more than 2°C could be dangerous.<sup>53</sup> The EU adopted the 2°C threshold above pre-industrial level global temperature as a goal to limit anthropogenic warming,<sup>54</sup> and recent research and analysis from a number of think-tanks including NASA suggest that humanity must aim for even lower levels of GHGs emissions.<sup>55</sup> The governments of the world also agreed to limit global temperatures below 2°C by ratifying the UNFCCC and adopting subsequent negotiating documents. While governments around the world have reiterated the importance of limiting global temperature below 2°C, they have lagged behind in imposing the ambitious pledges and achieving their self-imposed goals.

The non-tangible results of KP and the limited outcomes of the COP-15 reflected that some of the major polluting states did not support any globally legally binding treaty. India's Environment and Forests Minister, Mr. Jairam Ramesh said, "China, South Africa, Brazil and India bonded very well together at Copenhagen. We are united in our desire not to have a binding agreement thrust upon us which will constrict our development options".<sup>56</sup> The chances that a global deal on carbon would ever be reached were always slim and it was affirmed by the collapse of the 2009 Copenhagen summit at which the US, Russia and Japan all said they would not agree to any new binding carbon pact while India and China were not included in the first place.<sup>57</sup> As Victor notes, few countries will do much to control emissions unless they are sure that their

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<sup>51</sup> Jos Oliver et al., *Trends in Global CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions: 2012 Report* (The Hague: PBL Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency, 2012).

<sup>52</sup> Mark Kinver, 'Carbon Emissions are Too High to Curb Climate Change', *BBC News*, December 2, 2012, <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/science-environment-20556703>.

<sup>53</sup> Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), *Climate Change 2007*, eds., Solomon S, Dahe Q, Manning M, et al. (Cambridge Univ Press: New York, 2007g) 996.

<sup>54</sup> European Council, *Climate Change: Medium and Longer Term Strategies*, no. 7242/05 (Brussels: EU, 11 March 2005).

<sup>55</sup> James Hansel et al., 'Target Atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub>: Where Should Humanity Aim?' *Open Atmospheric Science Journal* 2(2008): 217-231.

<sup>56</sup> Mary Kissel, 'Climate Change 'Quagmire'', *WSJ*, March 11, 2010, JA17.

<sup>57</sup> Editorial, 'The Post-Global Warming World', *WSJ*, October 25, 2011, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204618704576640730949448812.html>.

competitors will bear similar costs.<sup>58</sup> These backward steps exemplify the stances of major emitters regarding a globally binding climate change agreement.

The major emitters from the developed world have been unwilling to adhere to any binding targets unless developing countries also commit to binding targets whereas the major emitters from developing countries stick to the historical responsibility of the West and their right to development. Questions raised are whether the South should follow, be allowed to follow, or have the right to follow a Western model of development. Another issue is whether countries could leapfrog from the Western model to another paradigm of development through the use of low carbon or carbon neutral technologies. The rise in the GHG emissions in the South raises questions whether the earlier agreed UNFCCC's principles of the CBDR and HR and the continued adequacy of the framework, should remain immune from revision.

The principles of CBDR/HR, albeit important, are based on historical emissions and economic might in the past and no longer reflect the changing scenario of the world's political and economic realities. The UNFCCC, the institution to tackle the climate challenge, is mainly state-centric and the role entrusted to non-state actors and global civil society, is cosmetic and symbolic. Thus, in exploring the core research question of *why has there been little progress in the making of an effective international climate change governance to prevent climate change?*, this research examines three compatible and complementary approaches in seeking to account for the lack of progress on such a major issue for the whole world. These approaches, as mentioned earlier, are the arguments about the democratic deficit, the institutional state-centric framework used in seeking to address the issue, and the effect of the media in reporting these developments.

By examining the making of the KP and the Copenhagen Accord the many reasons for the slow progress are highlighted, including the unequal responsibility for emissions reductions, the divergent interests of parties and the articulations of power by the parties, the greater emphasis on continuing high economic growth

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<sup>58</sup> David Victor, *The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the Struggle to Slow Global Warming* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), viii. See also Kathryn Harrison and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom, eds., *American and Comparative Environmental Policy: Global Commons, Domestic Decisions : The Comparative Politics of Climate Change* (Cambridge: MIT Press, 2010).



rather than on environmental concerns, the concerns of democratic participation, including the unsubstantiated definition of UNFCCC's principles and the high dependence on the state-centric framework to address a non-territorial issue.<sup>59</sup> The findings from the case studies are compared and contrasted with media accounts concerning its role in the communications of climate change issues, the agenda setting and potential path forward for international climate governance by providing scientific and negotiation information.

While the print media<sup>60</sup> used for this study was found to be playing their role in educating the public and policy makers by passing the information on climate change debate and negotiations, they were also locked into the contrasting perspectives of 'sceptics and believers' in the name of balanced reporting. The selected newspapers – *New York Times (NYT)*, *Wall Street Journal (WSJ)*, *Guardian UK (GUK)*, *the Hindu*, *China Daily* – identified with issues of democratic deficits, North-South divisions, and problems of existing principles. They advocated the potential benefit of research and development of low carbon technology. *The Hindu*, *China Daily* and *the WSJ* took similar positions as those of their respective governments' at climate conferences. *The Hindu*, *China Daily*, *NYT* and the *GUK* were playing positive roles towards crafting a new agreement by identifying, to some extent, the fast changing political and economic realities of the countries of the world. However, these newspapers did not explore how climate change responses had become locked into the continued advocacy for a Kyoto style agreement and a state-centric approach rather than an approach which relied much more on the contribution of non-institutional actors for universally enforced cooperation.

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<sup>59</sup> Climate change is a non-territorial issue: first it is borderless. Second, greenhouse gases from one country affect other countries globally. Third, it is not an institution like the nation-state rather it is an emerging global challenge.

<sup>60</sup> Five newspapers as discussed in chapter 3 have been used as primary sources of data for this study. Other print and audio visual media, internet sources have also been used to follow the updates and developments of climate change negotiations but not treated as the primary sources. Therefore the research has some limitations since the five selected newspapers do not represent all media in the respective countries. However, the newspapers used here are the 'prestige press' of the respective countries and many other media sources gain major and important informations from these 'prestige press'. See: Maxwell T. Boykoff and Jules M. Boykoff, 'Balance as Bias: Global Warming and the US Prestige Press', *Global Environmental Change* 14 (2004): 125-36. Also see: chapter 3 for details.

### 1.3 Overview of the Following Chapters

This section outlines the main themes and concepts of the following eight chapters of this thesis. Chapter 2 reviews the literature on the arguments concerning a democratic deficit, the state-centric structure used to address the complex issues of climate change, and the role of the media in informing the public of the issues of climate change and the processes used in efforts to develop international climate governance. Chapter 3 sets out the methodology and the research design adopted in this study. Chapter 4 examines the Kyoto Climate Conference and the KP. Chapter 5 assesses the Copenhagen Climate change conference 2009 and the Copenhagen Accord.

The Copenhagen climate conference and Copenhagen Accord were significant elements in the post-Kyoto agreement process. COP-15 was expected to produce an ambitious climate agreement however, the two years of negotiations mandated by the Bali Roadmap in 2007 turned out to be a fragile Accord. Both these chapters analyse the primary documents – the KP and the Copenhagen Accord – in the light of what went on during the negotiations and explore the international climate change negotiations from various aspects by identifying the many significant issues and problems associated with them in accounting for the slow progress of climate change governance. These chapters suggest that the UN framework and principles of climate change negotiations were insufficient, and argue that they need to be reframed and redefined to meet the changes taking place in GHG emissions consistent with the transition occurring in the economic and political conditions of the developed and developing countries.

To assess the media's contribution in promoting public understanding of the issues and potential paths forward surrounding climate change and governance, editorials and other commentaries (articles) on climate change were analysed from five major daily international newspapers involved in the climate change issue – the *Wall Street Journal*, the *New York Times*, the *Guardian*, the *Hindu* and the *China Daily* – each of which covered the stories of the four main emitters in the global climate change debates – the US, the UK, China and India. Chapter 6 outlines and summarises the data derived from these newspapers.

Chapter 7 analyses the media data using Entman and the de Vreese framework of textual analysis of newspaper articles in terms of shaping the perceptions of climate change science, the identification of issues and the agenda for climate change negotiations and, finally, the evidence of a democratic deficit surrounding these negotiations.<sup>61</sup> The chapter also addresses the propositions developed from the relevant literature in chapter 2. The chapter concludes that the media's contribution has left the public confused mainly in the US.<sup>62</sup> Only the *Guardian* offered a few detailed analyses to break the confusion and shape sound public understanding of the climate change science and debate. On the role of setting the agenda and strategy, the media played an important role in identifying the issues and proposing ways forward for solutions but were also found to have been advocates of the national positions of their respective countries working within the domestic and international political system. Chapter 8 draws the thesis to a close with a summary of the chapters and the conclusions of the thesis. The final chapter concludes that the present efforts to gain support for and commitment to reducing emissions are far from being adequate. More engaged contributions of societies (local and global), a more critical media, more flexible and workable frameworks and principles consistent with longer term issues of technology developments which need to be incorporated in a fundamental way.

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<sup>61</sup> See chapter 3.

<sup>62</sup> See chapter 7 of this thesis; this argument is broadly supported by previous research. For example see: Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004.

## Chapter 2

### Literature Review

#### 2.1 Introduction

Climate scientists warned an increase in global temperatures of more than 2 degrees Celsius would have major and potentially negative, effects on ecosystems across the globe. It has already been one of the most important drivers of ecosystem changes.<sup>1</sup> The leaders of the world confronted climate change in the early 1990s by signing the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). Over these two plus decades, they have attended innumerable conferences and made countless speeches spending a great deal of energy and time to achieve a serious climate agreement, but the outcome is painstakingly poor with the concentrations of global greenhouse gases (GHGs) rising alarmingly in the atmosphere.

The UNFCCC process has failed to materialize its goal of stabilizing concentrations of GHGs in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, therefore, it is immensely important to figure out why the process has come to an impasse in moving from the negative to the positive. If the problem is to be solved, it is essential to focus on the nature of the underlying climate change problem: *Why has there been little progress in the making of an effective international climate change governance to prevent climate change?* This central question has been simplified for clarity by asking three subsets of questions that are tightly connected to the propositions of this thesis. They are: 1. *Is a democratic deficit slowing the progress of international climate governance?* 2. *Are state-centric institutions up to the challenge of addressing climate change?* 3. *Is there a disconnection between the issues of climate change and the role of the media?* Strongly connected to these questions, this chapter reviews the literature on democratic deficit and the United Nations' (UN) debate on global democracy, the state-centric framework of climate change negotiations, and the role of the media in communicating climate change issues, agenda setting and offering paths forward. From the literature, five

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<sup>1</sup> Office of United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, 'The Relationship between Climate Change and Human Rights', in *Green Planet Blues*, eds., Ken Konca and Geoffrey D. Dabelko 338-51 (Philadelphia: Westview Press, 2010).

propositions are derived to examine the core research question and the three subset research questions of this thesis.

Zurn has argued that the “international climate change regime regulates behind-the-doors issues,” and “the ultimate addressees of the regulations issued by international institutions are largely societal actors” whose roles have been diminished in the making of international climate change policies.<sup>2</sup> Dryzek has noted that environmental problem solving is delegated to experts, civil servants and bureaucrats who are believed to have information, insight, and knowledge to transform political will to action.<sup>3</sup> But “Political scientists have pointed out the flaws of administrative rationality and some points of criticism are that administrative rationality cannot deal with long term problems”.<sup>4</sup> Administrative rationality has limitations in solving environmental issues.<sup>5</sup> “A more recent trend in discussions on effective environmental governance is the call for increased participation and democratization of existing governance institutions and forms”.<sup>6</sup> It has been argued that the increased “participation, deliberation, accountability, communications and multiple actors’ involvement in problem solving and decision making will lead to more effective environmental governance”.<sup>7</sup>

Baber and Bartlett are direct in their view: “International environmental politics is plagued by a democratic deficit”.<sup>8</sup> For these reasons, this study will consider three main and complementary arguments seeking to account for the lack of progress on climate change governance. One concerns the argument that there has been a democratic deficit in the attempts to address the issues of climate change. A second area of argument is that the state-centric approach is poorly placed to

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<sup>2</sup> Michael Zurn, ‘Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems’, *Government and Opposition* 39, no. 2 (2004): 260-87, 268, 69.

<sup>3</sup> John Dryzek, *The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2005), 75. See also John Dryzek, *Discursive Democracy: Politics, Policy and Political Science* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990).

<sup>4</sup> Annica Kronsell and Karin Backstrand, ‘Rationalities and Forms of Governance: A Framework for Analyzing the Legitimacy of New Modes of Governance’, in *Environmental Politics and Deliberative Democracy: Examining the Promise of New Modes of Governance*, eds., Karin Backstrand, Annica J. Kronsell, Jamil Khan and Eva Lovbrand 28-46 (Cheltenham, Gloss: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010), 31, 32. See also Ibid.

<sup>5</sup> Neil Carter, *The Politics of Environment: Ideas, Activism, Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 182-90.

<sup>6</sup> Kronsell and Backstrand, 2010, 32, 33.

<sup>7</sup> Ibid, 33.

<sup>8</sup> Walter F. Baber and Robert V. Bartlett, *Global Democracy and Sustainable Jurisprudence: Deliberative Environmental Law* (Cambridge, MA, London: The MIT Press, 2009), 103.

tackle the complex issues which transcend states in space and time, particularly on climate change and its governance. The third considers the role of the media in identifying and discussing the issues surrounding climate change, and in its presentation of the negotiations of major conferences seeking agreement on climate change policies.

Regarding the second argument about the state-centric international framework, Dunne and Schmidt noted that: “Mearsheimer argued that the ultimate goal of all states is to achieve a hegemon position in the international system. States, according to this view, always desire more power and are willing, if opportunity arises, to alter the existing distribution for power”.<sup>9</sup> On environmental issues, Paterson argues realists have generated “a research agenda which focuses on the potential for global environmental change to produce interstate conflict”.<sup>10</sup> He claims that in climate change negotiations, states do not behave rationally in the sense understood by rational choice theorists.<sup>11</sup> States, he says, have simply not clearly articulated or consistently ordered preferences with regard to climate change.<sup>12</sup>

For some, states are seen to have been cooperating in addressing environmental issues such as climate change for many years, while others draw attention to the time spent by states on negotiating environmental issues, which are not ratified subsequently by the most important states. For example, DeSombre comments: “the Law of the Sea Convention took eight years to negotiate and ultimately was so politicized that it was not ratified by some of the most important states in the process of decades”.<sup>13</sup> Other examples of complex negotiations include the Biodiversity Convention and Kyoto Protocol.

Zurn argues that the climate change issue is a borderless problem; it is not an issue of inter-state relations, but an issue of intra-state relations.<sup>14</sup> Barber and

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<sup>9</sup> Tim Dunne and Brian C. Schmidt, ‘Realism’, in *The Globalization of the World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, eds., John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, 86-99 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 94.

<sup>10</sup> Matthew Paterson, *Understanding Global Environmental Politics: Domination, Accumulation, Resistance* (New York: Palgrave, 2001), 18.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid, 15.

<sup>12</sup> Ibid.

<sup>13</sup> Elizabeth R. DeSombre, *The Global Environment and World Politics* (London and New York: Continuum, 2007), 23.

<sup>14</sup> Zurn, 2004, 268- 69.

Bartlett, and Hurrell and Kingsbury acknowledge the inherent difficulties in seeking agreement on complex issues such as climate change and ask whether it is “really possible that an international environmental consensus, amounting to a collective determination to follow a shared course for reasons held in common, can emerge from our disjointed and competitive system of global governance?”<sup>15</sup> The climate change problem is borderless in character and has implications globally because of the “interconnectedness and interdependence” of the current world order, with the consequence that environmental problems cannot be resolved by individual states or regional organizations.<sup>16</sup>

The post-Kyoto international climate change negotiations show that only a few nation-states played a vital role in the policy building process. Poor and small states did play a minor role, but it was the major emitters which dominated proceedings and outcomes. Vogler, discussing environmental politics, argues:

The pursuit of power, status and wealth is rarely absent from international deliberations. This is often neglected in discussions of international environmental cooperation, even though many of the great international gatherings and even some of the more mundane ones clearly reflect struggles for national and organizational advantage.<sup>17</sup>

Thus, it could be argued that there has been lack of progress on climate change governance because there are not only the tensions between rich and poor, or the newly emerging paradigm of climate change shifting from a traditional approach of rich versus poor to strong/powerful versus weak, but also because of the tensions inherent in the state-centric approach. On this account, environmental concerns can be seen as secondary issues.

The third argument emerges from the perspective that media has long been an important aspect of peoples’ lives. Media informs, analyses and educates people on short and long term concerns, simplifying complex scientific and other issues. As one of the current significant issues, climate change has featured prominently

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<sup>15</sup> Baber and Bartlett, (2009), 3. See also Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury, *The International Politics of the Environment* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1992), 1.

<sup>16</sup> David Held, *Democracy and Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 35.

<sup>17</sup> John Vogler, ‘Environmental Issues’, in *The Globalization of the World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, eds., John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 352.

in the media. The general public does not have a great understanding of climate change science and relies on information provided by the media.<sup>18</sup> The scientific consensus on climate change science is gradually building up to the point where most climate scientists are agreed that climate change is real and happening.<sup>19</sup> Yet the public is confused by balanced but biased media on climate change science and unaware of the gravity of the overall impact of climate change.<sup>20</sup> Addressing climate change calls for global responses which can only be achieved if there is widespread support around the world to embrace the necessary measures for change. Scientific certainty plays a prominent role in pushing public and global leaders to take action against the huge challenge of climate change.<sup>21</sup> Any disconnection between scientific knowledge and public education concerning climate change science and issues, a role in which the media plays a major part, hinders progress on international climate change governance.

As noted earlier, the three issues outlined above, are closely interrelated in seeking to answer the central research question of this study. Calls for much greater democratic accountability are linked closely to the state-centric framework of international negotiations, and from the role of the media in informing the world's diverse populations of the issues of climate change and the processes related to its governance and management. Dryzek, Eckersley, Baber and Bartlett, and proponents of deliberative democrats, have argued that environmental problems are better solved if the policy process is inclusive and democratic.<sup>22</sup> Climate change is one of the most challenging inter-state and intra-state environmental problems involving states, societies and communities. The roles of individuals, businesses and other non-state actors are significant in determining the successes,

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<sup>18</sup> Maxwell T. Boykoff and Jules M. Boykoff, 'Balance as Bias: Global Warming and the US Prestige Press', *Global Environmental Change* 14 (2004): 125-36.

<sup>19</sup> Rajendra. K. Pachauri and A. Reisinger, eds., *Contribution of Working Groups I, II and III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change*, (Geneva: IPCC, 2007), [http://www.ipcc.ch/publications\\_and\\_data/ar4/syr/en/contents.html](http://www.ipcc.ch/publications_and_data/ar4/syr/en/contents.html). See also Chandra L. Pandey., 'The Impact of Climate Change on Agriculture and Adaptation in Nepal', *Agribusiness and Information Management* 4, no. 1 (2012a): 13-23.

<sup>20</sup> Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004.

<sup>21</sup> Carter, 2007.

<sup>22</sup> See John Dryzek, *Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2005); Robyn Eckersley, *The Green State: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2004); Walter Baber and Robert Bartlett, *Deliberative Environmental Politics: Democracy and Ecological Rationality* (Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 2005).



in the first instance, negotiating agreements and, in the second instance, their effective implementation.

Yet, the framework to respond to this challenge is state-centric that sidelines non-state actors from decision making processes. The state-centric framework of climate change negotiations shapes the arguments for greater democratic accountability for the progress in addressing climate change. Media is an important source through which information is constructed, disseminated and consumed.<sup>23</sup> Crow and Boykoff have argued:

And then there is the obvious point that most citizens around the world typically do not read peer-reviewed literature, nor do they read policy documents or negotiate international treaties. Instead, to learn about climate change and gain climate information, people in the public arena turn to media communications...to link formal science and policy with their everyday lives.<sup>24</sup>

The role of media in transferring science into policy is significant. The calls for an enlightened, active and critical media which provides authoritative and insightful analysis and commentary to the public on climate change issues by involving all parties rather than adopting and reinforcing the state-centric framework is closely connected with the concerns for more democracy and inclusive decision making processes.

In section 2.2 of this chapter the discourse on democratic deficit is examined, and section 2.3 focuses on the state-centric attempts to provide governance processes for global climate change. Finally, 2.4 examines the role of the media, and its contribution to informing and educating the world's populations about the issues of climate change and the processes toward climate change governance. The chapter ends with a conclusion.

## **2.2 Democratic Deficit**

The issue of democratic deficit is discussed from many different angles, but with particular reference to international organisations (international organizations (IOs) stands for intergovernmental organizations in this research) such as the UN and

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<sup>23</sup> Deserai A. Crow and Maxwell T. Boykoff, (eds.), *Culture, Politics and Climate Change: How Information Shapes Our Common Future* (London and New York: Earthscan, 2014).

<sup>24</sup> Ibid, 2.

the European Union (EU). This section covers the democratic deficit arguments of various writers commenting on the UN, the EU and the US.<sup>25</sup> Insights from cosmopolitan democrats, deliberative democrats and the discourse of the UN vision of the global democracy will be presented to identify the democratic deficits in building the processes of international climate change governance. In terms of global democracy, cosmopolitan democrats urge the creation of a transnational parliamentary institution at the global level where the parliamentarians are elected by transnational global citizens, and the parliamentarians remain accountable to their transnational electorates.

The deliberative democrats lay emphasis on talking rather than on voting to increase legitimacy, accountability and democracy in the process of policy making.<sup>26</sup> The UN vision of global democracy is slightly different and sees the UN promoting greater participation among various actors of world politics such as states, IOs, multi-national companies (MNCs), non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and civil society organizations (CSOs) to achieve governance without government. Although critics may question whether the ideas of cosmopolitan democracy and deliberative democracy are driven by normative considerations, the European Parliament is a 'really existing' example of cosmopolitan democracy. The literature on deliberative democracy argues that this form of democracy is more useful in solving environmental problems and the patterns of practices are gradually emerging.<sup>27</sup>

Although many authors have pointed out the increased role of non-state actors in international decision making, some commentators raise questions and argue that this does not necessarily enhance democracy.<sup>28</sup> This thesis recognizes that there are many issues associated with the idea of enhancing democracy at the international/global level in terms of choosing models and/or enhancing deliberation in policy making. Therefore, instead of arguing for exporting a particular model of democracy this thesis examines the concerns of democratic deficit in the making of international climate governance based on the framework

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<sup>25</sup> The reference to the US is just to let the reader know about the issues relating to democratic deficits within nation-states.

<sup>26</sup> See for details: Dryzek, 2005; Baber and Bartleet, 2005; 2009.

<sup>27</sup> Ibid.

<sup>28</sup> See Marina Ottaway, 'Corporatism Goes Global: International Organizations, Nongovernmental Organizations Networks, and Transnational Business', *Global Governance* 7, no. 3 (2001): 1-17.

of the UN vision of global democracy, a model of global environmental governance without government, which allows participation and deliberation of global actors in addressing climate change issues.<sup>29</sup>

International climate change policies have been negotiated and formulated under the UNFCCC. International negotiations, open to all participating states, are a popular means of tackling problems that transcend national boundaries,<sup>30</sup> including environmental, climate change issues and many others. Critics comment that international negotiations for global governance suffer from a democratic deficit in the policy processes, both input and output, and in the procedural fairness, with the result that they tend not to achieve the goals sought, and in their implementation they do not address or represent the ultimate addressees<sup>31</sup> who are the target groups of change.<sup>32</sup> Wallace argues that international politics and global governance suffer from a democratic deficit.<sup>33</sup>

For Moravcsik an emerging central question about global governance is the structure and democratic legitimacy of international organizations.<sup>34</sup> He acknowledges: “There is a consensus answer to this question, among scholars and commentators, politicians and general public, that international organizations are normatively suspect.”<sup>35</sup> He has cautiously noted that the global governance decision making process is democratically suspect.<sup>36</sup> Johnstone notes: “Critiques of decision-making in international organizations are often framed in terms of the democratic deficit”.<sup>37</sup> Habegger writes that these accusations are based chiefly on

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<sup>29</sup> A state model democracy is a political system that reflects the democratic institutions and practices of the state. Political parties, elections, governments etc. become pre-requisite.

<sup>30</sup> Joanna Depledge, *The Organization of the Global Negotiations: Constructing the Climate Regime* (London and Sterling, VA: Earthscan, 2005).

<sup>31</sup> According to Michael Zurn, the ultimate addressees are the people and businesses affected by the decisions.

<sup>32</sup> Zurn, 2004, 268.

<sup>33</sup> William Wallace, ‘Europe the Necessary Partner’, *Foreign Affairs* 80, no. 3 (2001): 16-34.

<sup>34</sup> Andrew Moravcsik, ‘Is there a Democratic Deficit in World Politics? A Framework for Analysis’, *Government and Opposition* 39, no. 2 (2004): 336-63.

<sup>35</sup> Ibid, 336.

<sup>36</sup> Ibid.

<sup>37</sup> Ian Johnstone, ‘Legislation and Adjudication in the UN Security Council: Bringing Down the Deliberative Deficit’, *The American Journal of International Law* 102, no. 2 (2008): 275-308.

the gap between their extended influence and the lack of effective controlling mechanisms to prevent abuses of power.<sup>38</sup>

Dahl, Held, Baber and Bartlett have challenged the ambivalent constitutions of IOs which provide membership only to states but make policies of global scope to be imposed upon global citizens through states.<sup>39</sup> Dahl notes that international organizations and processes are not democratic because they lack “a system of popular control over governmental policies and decisions and democracy as a system of fundamental rights”.<sup>40</sup> Held argues that substantial areas of human activity are progressively organized on a global level so the fate of democracy cannot be limited within the contours of nation-states.<sup>41</sup> States collectively create the rules, ratify them and so are bound by them but the question is whether citizens are also bound. In Mulligan’s view, “there is a significant problem in binding the citizen through the promise of her (sic) state, even in a limited issue-area, which is why we still need to talk about a democratic deficit”.<sup>42</sup>

Inoguchi, Newman and Keane note:

The increasing prominence of international organizations is the question of accountability and democracy within these organizations. Traditionally, the concept of democracy did not extend beyond the domestic arena and a different sort of norm governed international relationships.<sup>43</sup>

Archibugi comments: “The United Nations is the most complex and ambitious international organization that has ever existed with an ethos of democracy among nations. However, the organization itself is not democratic by any standard.”<sup>44</sup>

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<sup>38</sup> Beat Habegger, ‘Democratic Accountability of International Organization: Parliamentary Control within the Council of Europe and the OSCE and the Prospects for the United Nations’, *Cooperation and Conflict* 45, no. 186 (2010): 186-204.

<sup>39</sup> Robert A. Dahl, *On Democracy* (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1998); David Held, *Models of Democracy* (Cambridge: Polity Press 1996); Baber and Bartlett, 2009; John Keane, *The Life and Death of Democracy* (London and New York: Simon & Schuster, 2009).

<sup>40</sup> Robert Dahl, ‘Can International Organizations be Democratic,’ in *Democracy’s Edges*, eds., Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 20.

<sup>41</sup> Held, 21.

<sup>42</sup> Shane Mulligan, ‘Questioning (the Question of) Legitimacy in IR: A Reply to Steffek’, *European Journal of International Relations* 10, no. 3 (2004): 475-84.

<sup>43</sup> Takashi Inoguchi, Edward Newman, and John Keane, eds. *The Changing Nature of Democracy* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1998), 13.

<sup>44</sup> Daniele Archibugi, ‘Democracy at the United Nations’, in *The Changing Nature of Democracy*, eds., Takashi Inoguchi, Edward Newman, and John Keane (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1998a), 245.

Many international organizations, including the UN and its agencies, are accused of lacking democratic accountability. Critics such as Habegger focus on the composition of the UN General Assembly (UNGA), the main executive body, and the Security Council among other UN agencies. Critics consider the Security Council's composition is not representative of the global power constellation any more, and that more generally, democratic accountability seems to be missing throughout the UN system, including the UNGA.<sup>45</sup> The representational deficit in institutional structures was introduced to the UN from the date of its birth. Schorr comments:

Amid the ruins of World War II, victorious leaders imagined a global community. The wartime coalition had been named the United Nations; now it would be made permanent. The UN would rest on a consensus of two great powers, the U.S. and the Soviet Union; two no longer great powers, Britain and France; and China, hoping to be great.<sup>46</sup>

Archibugi, Held and Kohler argue that international organization and global governance must be democratized in order to reflect the recent reconfiguration of political forces and the dynamic of international organizations.<sup>47</sup> This posits an argument for the UN's institutional and structural reform. Archibugi notes that while 'the people' are invoked in the preamble to the Charter of the UN, they are still excluded from the organization's decision-making process;<sup>48</sup> they are not given any opportunities to participate in the UN system. This issue and its implication are considered further in sections 2.2.3 and 2.2.4.

### **2.2.1 Democratic Deficit – the European Union**

The EU has developed into a new type of international polity, and attracted the term 'democratic deficit' in its dealings to draw attention to the increased executive power in the EU, the weak European Parliament (EP), and an EU that is

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<sup>45</sup> Habegger, 2010, 187.

<sup>46</sup> Daniel Schorr, 'Imagining a Global Community', *Montana Business Quarterly* 32, no.4 (1994):12.

<sup>47</sup> Daniele Archibugi, David Held and Martin Kohler, *Re-imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy* (California: Stanford University Press, 1998). See also Archibugi, 1998a. See also Jean-Philippe Therien and Madeleine Belanger Dumontier, 'The United Nations and Global Democracy: From Discourse to Deeds', *Cooperation and Conflict* 44, no. 4 (2009): 355-77.

<sup>48</sup> Archibugi, 1998a, 251.

too distant from voters.<sup>49</sup> Most politicians, scholarly commentators and members of the European public appear to agree that the EU suffers from democratic deficit.<sup>50</sup> Only the European Parliament (EP), one of the main branches of EU legislature, is democratically elected. The European Commission (EC), although unelected, enjoys a powerful role as an agenda-setter and regulatory coordinator, and is widely perceived to be a technocracy.<sup>51</sup> The European Court of Justice (ECJ), the Supreme Court of the EU, is also a powerful institution and has been an architect of a united Europe. It has become increasingly visible to the public, with its rulings on issues such as the forced Sunday closing of retail stores.<sup>52</sup> Most powerful of all the EU bodies is the Council of Ministers, which brings together national ministers, diplomatic representatives, and administrative officials from member states, who often deliberate in secret.<sup>53</sup>

The EP is democratically elected, but all other branches of the EU are indirectly accountable to the European voters. The EU's mode of agenda setting and the distribution of power in setting the agenda and taking the decisions are too diplomatic and too technocratic to satisfy many observers, scholars and citizens.<sup>54</sup> The democratic deficit is seen in the way the EU is lacking adequate means of legitimation from the citizens of the Union.<sup>55</sup> Whether the EU's institutions are democratic in making collective decisions on behalf of all European citizens or whether these institutions are lacking democratic legitimacy is itself a research agenda to assess, but is beyond the scope of this research.

The main parameters of the democratic deficit arguments come from a range of issues: the lack of transparency in EU policy making; a weak parliament; unaccountable agencies with excessive power. For instance, in the EU, voting is more implicit than explicit and decisions are reached mainly by persuading

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<sup>49</sup> Andreas Follesdal, 'Why There is a Democratic Deficit in the EU: A Response to Majone and Moravcsik', *Journal of Common Market Studies* 44, no.3 (2006): 533-62.

<sup>50</sup> Moravcsik, 2004, 348.

<sup>51</sup> Ibid.

<sup>52</sup> Gregory A. Caldeira and James L. Gibson, 'Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union: The Court of Justice and Its Constituents', *International Social Science Journal* 49, no. 152 (1997): 209-24.

<sup>53</sup> Moravcsik, 2004, 349.

<sup>54</sup> Ibid, 349.

<sup>55</sup> Hüsametdin Inanc and Hayrettin Ozler, 'Democratic Deficit in EU: Is there an Institutional Solution to Over-institutionalization?' *Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations* 6 (2007): 114-38.

opponents to agree which is quite different from the Senate in the USA and the Ständerat in Sweden.<sup>56</sup> The EP, despite its growing powers, is too weak to compensate for the democratic deficit of other EU institutions.<sup>57</sup> The weak parliament is unable to check other key agencies of the EU. In short, the EC has been called a politicized bureaucracy.<sup>58</sup>

Nonetheless, there is no consensus among social scientists and European citizens on the issue of the EU's democratic deficit. The EP is responsible to voters at the international level of public policy and decision making but the power of the EP is still limited. The power of the EP is gradually increasing.<sup>59</sup> Constitutional checks and balances, indirect control via national governments and the increasing powers of the EP are sufficient to ensure that EU policy making is, in nearly all cases, clean, transparent, effective and politically responsive to the demands of European Citizens.<sup>60</sup> The question of what constitutes a democratic deficit is often contestable and reflects, at an abstract level, on the specific model of democracy one considers to be a yardstick of democracy itself.

Dahl states that as the size of the polity and the number of citizens' increase, the situation of democracy becomes more and more absurd, as citizens' participation becomes more distant and ineffective.<sup>61</sup> The representation of citizens can be an alternative in the IOs where the representatives should be able to exercise control over the international bureaucracy as in the democratic polity of the nation-states. In this sense, the EP is weak because it is unable to exercise control over other institutions within the EU. Held argues that cosmopolitan or regional democracy is required to meet the dilemmas of democracy beyond nation-states.<sup>62</sup> Citizens should be able to engage in policy making wherever they are located. The EP is based on the model of cosmopolitan democracy where the representatives are elected directly by the people, unlike other institutions of the EU. In one sense, it upholds the democracy but the controlling power of the EP is limited in policy

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<sup>56</sup> Ibid, 121.

<sup>57</sup> Thomas D. Zweifel, *Democratic Deficit?* (USA:Lexington Books, 2002), 26.

<sup>58</sup> Ibid, 26.

<sup>59</sup> Leonard F.M. Besselink and Brecht Van Mourick, 'The Roles of National Parliaments and European Parliaments in EU Decision Making: The Approval of Lisbon Treaty in Netherlands', *European Public Law* 15, no. 3 (2009): 307-18.

<sup>60</sup> Moravcsik, 2004, 349.

<sup>61</sup> Dahl, 1998, 107.

<sup>62</sup> David Held, 1996.

input and output systems. Citizens are represented through the EP and while it can be argued that it is representative, it is not directly participatory. The weak EP does not have the power for extensive deliberations among representatives for public control and public scrutiny over the agenda of the EU. In a democracy, it is intended that policy input and output should reflect the wishes of the public. The EU is a most unlikely case for observing policy responsiveness because of the lack of institutional mechanisms that directly links the European public and EU policy makers.<sup>63</sup>

Although there are some contestations about the level of democracy in the EU, the existence of an elected EP makes it pivotal in the practice of cosmopolitan democracy. The decisions made on any issue, including trade or environmental regulation, pass through the multi state legislative process of Commission, Council, Parliament and domestic implementing authorities thereby making them highly transparent, legitimate and democratic.<sup>64</sup> “Co-decision has increased the Parliament’s role in policy making, resulting in more transparent decision making and reducing so-called democratic deficit”.<sup>65</sup> Although scholars still debate whether the EU is an inter-state forum or a functional regime that represents common transnational interests and actors, it is increasingly regarded as a competent environmental actor functioning as a multilevel governance structure.<sup>66</sup> Climate change has arguably become the single most important global environmental issue on the EU’s agenda and efforts to address climate change have resulted in increasingly ambitious new policies and programs to put Europe at the forefront of global efforts to tackle climate change.<sup>67</sup> Although it is too early to argue that greater democratic governance has resulted in a better environmental performance, without question, the EU has made great strides toward environmental and climatic protection.

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<sup>63</sup> Dimiter Toshkov, ‘Public Opinion and Policy Output in the European Union: A Lost Relationship’, *European Union Politics* 12, no. 2 (2011): 169-91.

<sup>64</sup> Moravcsiv, 2004.

<sup>65</sup> Regina S. Axelrod, Miranda A. Schreurs and Norman Vig, ‘Environmental Policy Making in the European Union’, in *The Global Environment: Institutions, Law and Policy*, eds., Regina S. Axelrod, Stacy D. Vandeveer and David L. Downie 213-38 (Washington DC: C Q Press, 2011), 218.

<sup>66</sup> Ibid.

<sup>67</sup> Ibid.



### 2.2.2 Democratic Deficit – the United States

The notion of democratic deficit is contentious and can be comprehended further by considering the US democracy. Although the US is a successful model of Western democracy by many standards in the world, the quality of democracy is questionable. The yardstick of democracy postulated by Dahl, Held, Keane, Baber and Bartlett challenges the US claims to be a democracy given that not all men and women were allowed to vote and participate in governmental activities. From this perspective the US was a restricted democracy for most of its independent history.<sup>68</sup> The US lacked several basic democratic procedures such as free elections, free and fair participation, and contestation particularly of African Americans and civil rights protections until the passage of civil rights codes in 1964 and voting rights in 1965.<sup>69</sup> Scholars argue that the American constitution has implicit within its articles the very idea of democratic deficit.<sup>70</sup> The distribution of power for checks and balances among the President, Senate, Congress and the Supreme Court are on-going areas of the study related to democratic deficit. There is also conflict arising from the ratification debates between Federalists and Anti-Federalists. These different perspectives challenge the conventional opposition between concentrated power and democratic legitimacy and between popular participation and effective government.<sup>71</sup> The US did not provide equal rights to all its citizens, particularly women and African Americans, until the 1970s.

More recent scholarship of democratic deficit comes from the concept of disaffected citizenry. Durant wrote, “The democracy deficits in America comprises four interrelated and mutually reinforcing trends that show few signs of abating if left unattended”.<sup>72</sup> He wrote: the first is the “policy challenged, vocal and increasingly impatient citizenry has become energized in America. That

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<sup>68</sup> Goran Thorbon, ‘The Rule of Capital and Rise of Democracy’, *New Left Review* 103 (1977): 3-41.

<sup>69</sup> Francisco E. Gonzalez and Desmond King, ‘The State and Democratization: The United State in Comparative Perspective’, *British Journal of Political Science* 34 (2004): 193-210.

<sup>70</sup> Sanford Levinson, ‘The Democratic Deficit in America’, *Harvard Law and Policy Review* (2006), [http://www.hlpronline.com/2006/06/levinson\\_01.html](http://www.hlpronline.com/2006/06/levinson_01.html). and Craig T. Borowiak, ‘Accountability Debates: The Federalists, The Anti-Federalists, and Democratic Deficits’, *Journal of Politics* 29, no. 4 (2007): 998-1014.

<sup>71</sup> Borowiak, 2007, 998.

<sup>72</sup> Robert Durant, ‘Democratic Deficit in America’, *Political Science Quarterly* 110, no. 1 (1995), 26.

citizenry perceives government ineptitude”.<sup>73</sup> The citizenry wants to put government aside and effect rule by themselves. The second is the “manufactured truths” and “commercially truth” news reporting for contributing to “public disaffection with Congress”.<sup>74</sup> The third trend comprising democratic deficit involves lack of deliberative democracy. The fourth is about the plebiscitary reform agenda and a persistent quest for accountability.<sup>75</sup> Durant argues that “a truly deliberative democracy requires both dialogue and discussion. Presently, however, a pernicious and most debilitating imbalance exists, in our polity, an imbalance strongly favouring persuasion – licit or illicit – over illumination”.<sup>76</sup>

### **2.2.3 Debates on UN Democracy**

The discussion of the UN democratic deficit and the democratization of the UN present another aspect of the issue. The UN has become a very significant and unique IO since its creation. For an organization so unique and important, the UN has paid surprisingly little attention to recording and evaluating its own history.<sup>77</sup> “Although the UN continues to enjoy strong recognition for its role as a foremost international organization charged with the task of promoting international security and democracy, its performance in this respect has been the subject of intense debate among scholars and policy makers”.<sup>78</sup> Article two of Chapter I of the UN Charter maintains the principle of the sovereign equality of all member states and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.<sup>79</sup> The spirit of the Charter shows that it is an organization which is associated with both states and peoples.

The great majority of states are members of the UN and participate in addressing the challenges of peace, security, trade, development, environment, human rights, climate change and much more. At the domestic level public policies are increasingly developing to make global governance more prevalent and improving

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<sup>73</sup> Ibid, 27.

<sup>74</sup> Ibid, 27, 28.

<sup>75</sup> Ibid.

<sup>76</sup> Ibid, 43.

<sup>77</sup> Robert J. Berg, ‘The UN Intellectual History Project: Review of Literature’, *Global Governance* 12, no. 3 (2006): 325-41.

<sup>78</sup> Osita G Afoaku, and Okechukwu Ukaga, ‘United Nations Security Council Reform: A Critical Analysis of Enlargement Options’, *Journal of Third World Studies* 18, no. 2 (2001): 149-69.

<sup>79</sup> Charter of United Nations, 2001.

policy outcomes.<sup>80</sup> But the lack of input legitimacy and procedural fairness has led to a situation in which the agendas of the most powerful states dominate.<sup>81</sup> As more decisions in more policy areas are taken at the international level, more democratic dilemmas unfold.<sup>82</sup>

The concept of great power unanimity was an option in maintaining post World War II international security. The aim of the Security Council was consistent with its structure and the then great power unanimity and thinking about the traditional crisis management role of the Security Council where the need for prompt and effective action militated against extensive deliberation.<sup>83</sup> Hurd argues that by adopting the UN Charter, states legitimized the Security Council and reproduced the legitimacy of the Council by appealing to its authority and seeking access to the Security Council.<sup>84</sup> In contrast, critics contend that international decisions, even when they are aligned with the wishes of the people concerned, are almost always imposed from outside.<sup>85</sup> International decision making in international organizations is distant, elitist and technocratic, and therefore may undermine democracy, but multilateralism can also enhance domestic democracy.<sup>86</sup> The process of increased integration in IOs nurtures the problem of legitimacy in governance since the lack of a directly accountable set of institutions responsible to the public or constituent members creates a democratic deficit.<sup>87</sup> It reduces legitimacy on the input side as decisions are taken further away from deliberation even if it improves legitimacy by producing better outputs.<sup>88</sup>

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<sup>80</sup> Habegger, 2010, 186.

<sup>81</sup> John Glenn, 'Global Governance and the Democratic Deficit: Stifling the Voice of the South', *Third World Quarterly* 29, no. 2 (2008): 217-38.

<sup>82</sup> Christiane Kraft-Kasack, 'Transnational Parliamentary Assemblies: A Remedy for the Democratic Deficit of International Governance', *West European Politics* 31, no. 3 (2008): 534-57.

<sup>83</sup> Ian Johnstone, 'Legislation and Adjudication in the UN Security Council: Bringing Down the Deliberative Deficit', *American Journal of International Law* 102, no. 2 (2008): 275-308.

<sup>84</sup> Ian Hurd, *After Anarchy: Legitimacy and Power in the United Nations Security Council* (Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press, 2007), 19.

<sup>85</sup> David Harland, 'Legitimacy and Effectiveness in International Administration', *Global Governance* 10, no.1 (2004): 15-19.

<sup>86</sup> Robert O. Keohane, Stephen Macedo and Andrew Moravcsik, 'Democracy-Enhancing Multilateralism', *International Organization* 63 (2009): 1-31.

<sup>87</sup> David Ward, *The European Union Democratic Deficit and the Public Sphere: An Evaluation of EU Media Policy* (Amsterdam: IOS Press, 2002), 1.

<sup>88</sup> Kraft-Kasack, 2008.

The concept of democracy and legitimacy of IOs has posed itself as a significant issue in global governance,<sup>89</sup> with debate about what global democracy is, and to what extent its existence is likely or desirable.<sup>90</sup> Many authors argue that global democracy is not about achieving the precise kind of democracy at the global level that many societies practice at the domestic level involving, for example, elections and the separation of governmental power.<sup>91</sup> Global democracy for global governance is grounded on consensual debate and public accountability.<sup>92</sup> Kofi Annan, a former UN Secretary General, provides his vision of global democracy by claiming that the term global democracy is an interstate platform, the goal of which is to provide all states, whether large or small, the fullest opportunity to participate in global decision making, which is based on the constitutional principles of the UN Charter.<sup>93</sup> Whether the argument over UN democracy ends at this point or whether it broadens its scope from its conventional limited membership of states to the needs of peoples as emerging actors for participation in the formal system is under perusal.<sup>94</sup>

This perusal has been more relevant in the last two decades, when the role of the UN as an IO has extended significantly into various areas that includes, but is not limited to peacekeeping, humanitarian intervention, and environmental issues. To address the problem of democratic deficit Held, Archibugi and Kohler proposed a cosmopolitan model of democracy in which there would be a new global covenant, a reformed UN with a Second General Assembly of peoples that would represent the world's citizens rather than their governments.<sup>95</sup> Realists would not support such proposals for creating new structures because of questions over whether states would surrender their interests and sovereignty to a second UN Assembly for the people and whether these delegates represent the interests of the people or

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<sup>89</sup> Barry Holden, ed., *Global Democracy: Key Debates* (London: Routledge, 2000).

<sup>90</sup> Ibid.

<sup>91</sup> Rodger A. Payne and Nayef H. Samhat, *Democratizing Global Politics: Discourse, Norms, International Regimes and Political Community* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 2004), 3.

<sup>92</sup> Ibid, 3.

<sup>93</sup> Kofi A. Annan, 'Democracy as an International Issue', *Global Governance* 8 (2002): 135-42.

<sup>94</sup> Daniele Archibugi, 'Principles of Cosmopolitan Democracy', in *Re-imagining Political Community: Studies in Cosmopolitan Democracy*, eds., Daniele Archibugi, David Held and Martin Kohler (Stanford, California: Stanford University Press, 1998b), 198-228.

<sup>95</sup> Archibugi 1998b; Held, 1996; Archibugi, Held and Kohler 1998; and David Held, *Democracy and the Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).

states. Since it would be the people who represent states not the states themselves the question arises as to whether such an ambitious reconstruction of the global institutions is necessary.<sup>96</sup>

Dahl doubts that IOs can be made democratic yet he notes: “To say that international organizations are not and are not likely to be democratic is not to say that they are undesirable”.<sup>97</sup> The UN has played a leading role in most of the international concerns from deploying peacekeeping forces to making decisions on global public policies. IOs such as the UN are different from states and seeking to impose state models of democracy upon IOs is not desirable. Instead, an alternative path should be sought such as accommodating the emerging actors of international politics to make the policy making process more inclusive. The widespread and expanded roles of the UN have transformed the UN from being one UN to the concepts of ‘three United Nations’: the first UN as an intergovernmental forum; the second UN as an international civil service; and the third UN as the UN of NGOs and experts.<sup>98</sup>

#### **2.2.4 Democratization of the UN as Global Democracy and Global Governance**

According to Therein and Dumontier, global democracy is a highly contentious concept in world politics and the idea of global democracy has been a driving force in discourse on the UN and its policies for the past two decades.<sup>99</sup> Falk and Strauss note that global democracy is considered to entail either the implementation of a world state or the democratization of all state governments, or reforms and innovations within existing nation-states and IOs.<sup>100</sup> Holden states: “What global democracy is, and to what extent its existence is likely or desirable, are matters about which there is considerable controversy”.<sup>101</sup> While Bull dismisses the idea of world government, conceding it could not be an actual

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<sup>96</sup> Martin Wolf, ‘The Case for Optimism: A Response’, in *Debating Globalizations*, eds., Anthony Barnett, David Held and Caspar Henderson (Cambridge: Polity, 2005), 41.

<sup>97</sup> Dahl, 1999, 32.

<sup>98</sup> Richard Jolly, Louis Emmerij, Thomas G. Weiss, *UN Ideas that Changed the World*, (Bloomington, Indiana: Indiana University Press, 2009), 32-33

<sup>99</sup> Therein and Dumontier, 2009, 355.

<sup>100</sup> Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss, ‘On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assembly: Legitimacy and the Power of Popular Sovereignty’, *Stanford Journal of International Law* 36 (2000): 191–220.

<sup>101</sup> Holden, 2000, 1.

possibility noting that: “There is not the slightest evidence that sovereign states in this century will agree to subordinate themselves to a world government founded upon consent”.<sup>102</sup> In defining cosmopolitan democracy Archibugi noted that there were three related viewpoints on democracy: democracy within states, democracy among states, and democratic management of global problems.<sup>103</sup>

Democratization at the domestic level is based on the presupposition that political communities can, in principle, control their destinies and citizens could come to identify sufficiently with each other with a view of the common good.<sup>104</sup> Through the ballot box, citizen voters are able to hold decision makers to account and, as a result of electoral consent, decision makers are able to make and pursue law and policy legitimately for their constituents, ultimately the people, in a fixed, territorial based community.<sup>105</sup> The UN has states as its members, whose decision making mode is executive multilateralism.<sup>106</sup> Cosmopolitan democrats such as Zürn and Held argue that the decision making mode of executive multilateralism is no longer able to provide legitimacy for IOs.<sup>107</sup> Held notes that the centre of political authority and the contours of political communities are in the process of being transformed;<sup>108</sup> while Higgott and Ougaard concur the globalizing world is moving to a “new historical phase”<sup>109</sup> which Archibugi says reflects the emergence of democracy at the international level “as a powerful international ethos”.<sup>110</sup> Held et al. argue:

In a world where powerful states make decisions not just for their own peoples but for others as well, and where transnational actors and forces cut across the boundaries of national communities in diverse ways, the question of who should be accountable to whom, and on what grounds, do not easily resolve themselves. Overlapping spheres of influence, interference and interest create fundamental problems at

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<sup>102</sup> Hedley Bull, *The Anarchical Society: A Study of Order in World Politics* (London: Macmillan, 1977), 252.

<sup>103</sup> Archibugi, 1998b.

<sup>104</sup> Michael J. Sandel, *Democracy's Discontent* (Cambridge and MA: Harvard University Press, 1996).

<sup>105</sup> Held, 2000.

<sup>106</sup> Held, 1995, 1996 and Zürn, 2004, 260.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid, 280, 286.

<sup>108</sup> Held, 2000, 17.

<sup>109</sup> Richard Higgott and Morten Ougaard, ‘Introduction: Beyond System and Society—Towards a Global Polity?’ in *Towards a Global Polity*, eds., Morten Ougaard and Richard Higgott, (New York: Routledge, 2002), 10.

<sup>110</sup> Archibugi, 1998b, 246.

the centre of democratic thought, problems which ultimately concerns the very basis of democratic authority.<sup>111</sup>

Held also argues: “Political communities are in the process of being transformed. Human communities have come into increasing contact with each other; their collective fortunes have been intertwined”.<sup>112</sup> Held notes that a political alternative may be developed by deepening and extending democracy across borders, regions and global networks.<sup>113</sup> Cosmopolitan democracy advocates the creation of new political institutions which would co-exist with the system of states of activity where those activities have demonstrable transnational and international consequences.<sup>114</sup> Cosmopolitanism is an argument of reforms to existing international organizations by introducing new institutional structures.

Article one of Chapter 1 of the UN Charter notes that the UN was established to maintain international peace and security, to develop friendly relations among nations, to solve the economic, social, cultural, and humanitarian problems, and promote respect for human and universal rights<sup>115</sup> because “international organizations are functional entities established by states on the basis of agreements”.<sup>116</sup> Article two of Chapter 1 maintains the principle of the sovereign equality of all member states and the settlement of international disputes by peaceful means.<sup>117</sup> In the UN context, the term global democracy is referred to as an interstate project, the goal of which is to grant all states large or small, the fullest opportunity to participate in global decision making, based on the principles of the UN Charter.<sup>118</sup> The designers of the UN Charter could not have foreshadowed the debates of another century instead focusing on interstate project democracy which had been shown to be weak and inadequate. In order to make IOs more accountable and reduce globalization’s democratic deficit, Nye stated:

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<sup>111</sup> David Held et. al., *Global Transformation: Politics, Economics and Culture* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1999), 81.

<sup>112</sup> David Held, ‘The Changing Contours of Political Community: Rethinking Democracy in the Context of Globalization’, in *Global Democracy: Key Debates*, ed. Barry Holden, (London and New York: Routledge, 2000), 17.

<sup>113</sup> Held, 1996, 353.

<sup>114</sup> See Held, 1995, 1996.

<sup>115</sup> UN, *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice* (New York: United Nations, 2001).

<sup>116</sup> Tetsuo Sato, ‘The Legitimacy of Security Council Activities Under Chapter VII of the UN Charter Since the End of the Cold War’, in Jean-Marc Coicaud and Veijo Heiskanen, eds., *The Legitimacy of International Organizations*, (Japan: United Nations University Press, 2001), 310.

<sup>117</sup> UN, 2001.

<sup>118</sup> Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Development* (New York: United Nations, 1996a).

“Even so, in a world of transnational politics where democracy has become the touchstone of legitimacy, these arguments [anti-democratic deficits] probably will not be enough to protect any but the most technical organizations from attack”.<sup>119</sup>

Many problems currently on the global agenda cannot be dealt with by an individual state or a group of states alone. The UN has raised public awareness of environmental issues through a series of thematic conferences such as the 1992 Earth Summit in Rio, demonstrating that global problems cannot be solved by individual state and states alone.<sup>120</sup> Instead, global environmental problems amongst others need global responses from states and other actors because “the ultimate addressees of regulations issued by international organizations are largely societal actors”,<sup>121</sup> raising questions about the inter-state project as global democracy.

In the mid-1990s, Boutros Boutros-Ghali stated: “A few short years ago, no one ever spoke of making the United Nations system more democratic. Today, the question is on every agenda”.<sup>122</sup> Keonig-Archibugi observes: “The end of the Cold War brought a resurgence of thinking about global democracy, as well as a new barrage of criticisms. Critics can be found among specialists in International Relations (IR) as well as experts of democracy and democratization”.<sup>123</sup> In endorsing the principles of democratic legitimacy, Kofi Annan declared that the most important factor for UN decision making must be the will of the people because the states alone cannot do the job.<sup>124</sup> This approach was affirmed with the official declaration that democratization of the UN was “the central and overarching objective of the 2008 session of the General Assembly”.<sup>125</sup> The UN leaders including Boutros Boutros-Ghali and Kofi Annan argued that international democratization was a necessity and could be achieved through restructuring or even with the current design by providing new actors with agreed means of formal

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<sup>119</sup> Joseph S. Nye, ‘Globalization’s Democratic Deficit: How to Make International Institutions More Accountable’, *Foreign Affairs* 80, no. 4 (2001): 2-6.

<sup>120</sup> Daniele Archibugi, 1998a.

<sup>121</sup> Zurn, 2004, 268; Baber and Bartlett 2009.

<sup>122</sup> Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *Secretary General Tells European Parliament Globalization of Economy Must Go Hand-in-Hand with Globalization of Democracy* (New York: United Nations, 1995).

<sup>123</sup> Mathias Keonig-Archibugi, ‘Is Global Democracy Possible?’ *European Journal of International Relations* 17, no. 3 (2010): 519-42.

<sup>124</sup> Annan, (2002a), 135-42.

<sup>125</sup> Therien and Dumontier, 2009 and See also UN News service 2008.



participation, and developing a culture of democracy internationally through an enlarged international civil society, even if there is substantial difference between democratization at the international level and democratization at the domestic level.<sup>126</sup>

As Archibugi has noted: “Peace and federalist movements have for long advocated the creation of a Second UN Assembly that would represent world citizens rather than their governments. The European and Canadian Parliaments have officially supported this proposal”.<sup>127</sup> Therien and Dumontier identify four different emerging entities in the field of international relations, the end of Cold War, the third wave of democratization, globalization and the rise of international actors, which have seen the UN put global democracy on its agenda.<sup>128</sup> The cosmopolitan democrats and the UN leadership argue that international governance must be democratized in order to reflect the recent reconfiguration of political forces.<sup>129</sup> In the process of democratization, unlike the proposals of the cosmopolitan democrats, the UN took up a new mode of governance in which it made a point of involving non-state actors including NGOs in the system.

NGOs have been important participants in the UN system since 1945.<sup>130</sup> They have access to intergovernmental meetings, present written statements, make speeches, and lobby for specific texts to be adopted. For the first twenty five years of the UN economic social council (ECOSOC) establishment 400 NGOs were registered<sup>131</sup> with the UN, and at any particular meeting only a few of these were active, mainly behind the scenes. In 2004, the Report of Eminent Persons on United Nations–Civil Society Relations<sup>132</sup> noted that the UN should be more active in tackling democratic deficits in the 21<sup>st</sup> century. “The UN should accept a more explicit role in strengthening global governance and tackling the democratic deficits it is prone to, emphasizing participatory democracy and deeper

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<sup>126</sup> Boutros Boutros-Ghali, *An Agenda for Democratization* (New York: United Nations, 1996b).

<sup>127</sup> Archibugi, 1998a, 251 and See also Held, 1996.

<sup>128</sup> Therien and Dumontier 2009, 358.

<sup>129</sup> Ibid, 355.

<sup>130</sup> Peter Willetts, ‘The Cardoso Report on the UN and Civil Society: Functionalism, Global Corporatism, or Global Democracy’, *Global Governance* 12 (2006): 305-25.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid.

<sup>132</sup> UN, *Report of the Panel of Eminent Persons on United Nations-Civil Society Relations* (New York: United Nations, June 2004).

accountability of institutions to the global public”.<sup>133</sup> Better incorporation of civil society and strengthening of the role of parliamentarians in international deliberations would address a primary inconsistency in today’s political world – that the substance of politics is increasingly international, while the process of politics (how decisions are agreed upon) remains primarily national.<sup>134</sup> The Report demanded the UN be more democratic, noting:

Today’s big issues are very different from those the world faced when the United Nations was born. Nations are no longer as unified by the imperatives of preventing future world wars, rebuilding devastated States and making colonies independent. Now the challenges range from terrorism to unilateralism and wars, from pandemics and climate change to economic crisis and debt, from ethnic to sectarian tensions to international crime, and from universality of rights to respect for diverse cultures. Also, there are four times as many Governments defining global priorities through their membership in the United Nations. The intergovernmental world has thus become more complex and diverse.<sup>135</sup>

Hence, rather than merely rejecting the discourse and argument of representational deficit, the concept of global democracy has been broadened within the UN, making it more societal including non-state actors being able to enjoy the “means of participation in the formal system”.<sup>136</sup> The involvement of non-state actors has introduced a new dimension to the UN General Assembly. One major innovation has been the holding since 2005 of informal interactive hearings at special sessions of the General Assembly and making recommendations on a wide range of topics.<sup>137</sup> The involvement of civil society at the Security Council has also gone through major changes in the past few years and more generally Council members rely to a growing extent on the expertise of NGOs in their daily work.<sup>138</sup>

Kofi Annan defined the UN and non-state actors partnership as “voluntary and collaborative relationships between various parties, both state and non-state, in which participants agree to work together to achieve a common purpose or

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<sup>133</sup> Ibid, 9.

<sup>134</sup> Ibid.

<sup>135</sup> Ibid, 23.

<sup>136</sup> Ghali, 1996b, 25. See also Archibugi, 1998b.

<sup>137</sup> Therien and Dumontier, 2009, 365.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid.

undertake a specific task”.<sup>139</sup> UN special agencies such as United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), United Nations Programme on HIV/AIDS (UNAIDS) have been working in partnership with non-state actors. The Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) framework established a clear mandate to develop partnerships with the private sector, non-governmental organizations, and civil society in general.<sup>140</sup> The UN Millennium Project notes that indeed, from 2002 to 2005, the Project assembled 250 governmental and non-governmental experts whose task was to develop a concrete action plan for the world to achieve the MDGs.<sup>141</sup>

For the first time in the history of the UN when the special session took place in June 1997, NGOs were able to take part in the main plenary debate, and they have continued to do so, on a daily basis.<sup>142</sup> The evolution of NGOs in the UN from consultative status to partnership, with the consolidation of extensive participation rights, is evidence that the interstate system has been transformed since 1945, both politically and legally, into a multi-actor system.<sup>143</sup> The partnerships between NGOs in an intergovernmental decision making body with nation-states is a contribution to greater democracy in global governance. NGOs can be the voices of people of the countries where dictators, military juntas, autocrats, religious oligarchies do not allow the citizenry to speak or raise voices against their regime. NGOs can play vital roles in raising the voices of people from such undemocratic countries. NGOs can also be vehicles of creating awareness at the grass-root levels because NGOs and CSOs can communicate with societies better than government bureaucrats.

Yet there are concerns about NGOs which need further elaboration. NGOs should make themselves democratic because most of them are not democratic even if they work for the advocacy and welfare of the people. They should be more transparent and accountable so that the public can trust them as their voices. UNEP and UNFCCC have also accepted that the involvement of NGOs and CSOs

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<sup>139</sup> Kofi Annan, *Enhanced Cooperation Between the United Nations and All Relevant Partners in Particular the Private Sector*, Report of the Secretary General (New York: United Nations, 2003).

<sup>140</sup> Annan, 2001a, 42.

<sup>141</sup> See UN, Millennium Project, [www.unmillenniumproject.org](http://www.unmillenniumproject.org)

<sup>142</sup> Peter Willetts, 'From "Consultative Arrangements" to "Partnership": The Changing Status of NGOs in Diplomacy at the UN', *Global Governance* 6 (2000): 191-212.

<sup>143</sup> Ibid.

can make the policy processes more representative, transparent, accountable, legitimate and democratic. Almost 1100 NGOs attended the Rio Conference on the Environment in 1992 whereas only 134 NGOs had attended the Stockholm Conference on the Human Environment in 1972. The level of NGO participation in environmental conferences has been gradually increasing over the time, yet their attendance is limited to observers whereas governments attend as negotiators. NGOs participate to ensure that grass-root levels needs-based priorities are put on the agenda. The new global democracy encourages NGO and CSO participation in operations and deliberations to increase the level of input and output legitimacy thereby making the decision-making processes more democratic.<sup>144</sup>

Baber and Bartlett argue that democratic deficit is the most annoying and defeating feature of international environmental politics<sup>145</sup> because the relevant rule is not perceived as legitimate by those to whom it is addressed.<sup>146</sup> As noted above, Zurn argues that the real addressees of climate change governance are national societies and companies but when it comes to international climate change policy making the real addressees are not represented.<sup>147</sup>

Moravcsik acknowledges that there could be democratic deficit in international organizations but argues that any criticism of real-world democratic legitimacy, and proposals for its enhancement, must be philosophically coherent and pragmatically viable.<sup>148</sup> In his view the EU could be the model for global democracy. In the view of Nicholas Low, climate change is the greatest government failure ever seen<sup>149</sup> because the real power to act on climate change does not lie with consumers and markets since markets are not actors, but with governments. However, the proponents of global democracy concur that climate change is the greatest government failure but dismiss the argument that states are the only actors with real power to act.

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<sup>144</sup> See Carter, 2007.

<sup>145</sup> Baber and Bartlett, 2009, 103.

<sup>146</sup> Thomas M. Frank, *The Power of Legitimacy Among Nations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999).

<sup>147</sup> Zurn, 2004, 268, 69.

<sup>148</sup> Moravcsik, 2004, 338.

<sup>149</sup> Nicholas Low, 'Editorial: The (Wedge) Politics of Climate Change', *Urban Policy and Research* 25, no. 1 (2007): 1-4.

Clearly, the debate of democratic deficit in global governance has been informed from various viewpoints such as the cosmopolitan, deliberative democrats, the UN inter-states project and partnership between the IOs and NGOs. Although these perspectives on global democracy differ on prescriptive remedies for more democratization of global governance, none of them accept that the international decision making process should lack for democratic practice. Instead, they search for promising pathways for global democratic change which would create more space for inclusivity. Yet, the challenge is to make the decision making process more inclusive, participatory and deliberative in a way that seriously involves individuals, businesses and other non-state actors. In this age of information, global public opinion, reverberating globally via online and other digital communications, is emerging as a powerful force in shaping policies and priorities. This innovation holds promises for making international decision making process more deliberative, legitimate, participatory and inclusive. But in the interim, confirming Bull's observation that no governments in the world are willing to surrender their sovereignty in the foreseeable future, and the UN vision of global democracy that advocates greater participation of global actors at deliberations, the yardstick developed by Payne and Samhat could be more helpful to examine democracy at the global level. They note:

We are not concerned with achieving the precise kind of democracy at the global level that many societies practice at the domestic level involving, for example, elections and the separation of governmental power. In global politics, the challenge is to create open and representative procedures in specific institutional contexts. Our view of global democracy is thus grounded in principles of consensual debate and public accountability. Where decision making power is concentrated, as many different voices as possible should be heard and the result of their collective deliberations about the appropriate course of action should carry the day. Clearly then, the democratization of global politics represents an ideal – one that is quite difficult, if not impossible, to achieve in practice. Yet, we would argue that working towards such an ideal matters a great deal.<sup>150</sup>

As this study is focused on why international climate change governance has not made good progress, the emphasis is on “democratic management of global

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<sup>150</sup> Payne and Samhat, 2004, 2-3.

problems” considering that the main reason for the democratization of global environmental governance “secure (s) legitimacy for decisions by involving the broader public” as “the ultimate addressees of regulation issues by international organizations are largely societal actors”.<sup>151</sup> This research assesses the extent to which the current mode of UN vision of global democracy meets its promises through the processes of international climate change governance and whether it is compatible in terms of the participation of the voices of the actors included where both rich and poor nation-states as well as NGOs and CSOs participate as Mitrany notes: “It is not an unprincipled or an unwise compromise to err, if need be, on the side of working democracy (consensus) rather than voting democracy”.<sup>152</sup>

From the above discussion, and in response to the core question of this thesis mentioned above, the following proposition has been derived:

The institutional shortcomings of the UNFCCC, and also of the democratic processes of the UN and its environmental organizations, have resulted in the lack of progress towards international climate change governance.

The above discussion also gives rise to a second proposition:

The lack of open and representative processes, together with the lack of consensual debate and public accountability have resulted in the failure to achieve agreement on international climate change governance.

## **2.3 State-Centric Approach**

Despite the absence of world government, Buchanan notes there is now an expanding array of international organizations that function as international rule making bodies and the question of their legitimacy based on democratic principles is becoming more salient,<sup>153</sup> and that there are different conceptions of

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<sup>151</sup> See Keonig-Archibugi, 2010; Zurn, 2004, 268; John Dryzek, *The Politics of the Earth: Environmental Discourses* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1997), 86.

<sup>152</sup> David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System: An Argument for the Functional Development of International Organization* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1943), 132.

<sup>153</sup> Allen Buchanan, ‘Reciprocal Legitimation: Reframing International Legitimacy’, *Politics, Philosophy and Economics* 10, no. 1 (2011): 5-19,

international governance.<sup>154</sup> The process of developing international governance is gradual and, in the case of climate change, policy making has been very slow given the urgency of the challenge. The sections below consider the debates around realism and liberalism to explore their usefulness in understanding the challenges of climate change and whether these theories are too limited by their state-centric framework to tackle climate change. If these state-centric approaches are not up to the borderless challenges of climate change then a new approach is required.

### **2.3.1 The Environment and International Relations**

The protection of the environment has been illustrated with the metaphor of the ‘tragedy of commons’, a phrase first articulated by Garret Hardin.<sup>155</sup> Where there is unrestricted access to a resource for maximizing individual benefits overexploitation of the commons<sup>156</sup> occurs, depleting the common resources and creating parallel problems leading to a tragedy for all. According to Hardin, it is not logical for states to cooperate. Rather based on assumption underlying his theory about the “Tragedy of Commons” it is logical for every actor to maximize their own use of resource in question, leading inevitably to the destruction of the common resource.<sup>157</sup> In contrast, many scholars argued that it is logical for states to collaborate and cooperate to protect the commons on which mankind’s and the eco-system’s lifeline relies.<sup>158</sup> Towards this end, nation-states have created international organizations to regulate, monitor and replenish the commons. This strategy seems to be working as nation-states have sought to preserve the common resources of the issue areas for the benefit of all. Yet, the success and failure depends on the issue of the debate and cooperation. Two somewhat successful examples of such activity have been the UN Convention Law of the Sea and the Antarctic Treaty System. Two other examples of such activity are The Regimes of

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<sup>154</sup> Kelly-Kate Pease, *International Organizations: Perspectives on Governance in the Twenty-First Century* (New Jersey: Prentice Hall, 2003), 5.

<sup>155</sup> Hardin, 1968.

<sup>156</sup> Volger, 2011, 354.

<sup>157</sup> Hardin, 1968.

<sup>158</sup> Regina S. Axelrod, Stacy D. VanDeveer, and Norman Vig, ‘Introduction: Governing the International Environment’, in *The Global Environment: Institutions, Law and Policy*, eds., Regina S. Axelrod, Stacy D. VanDeveer and David L. Downie, 1-23 (Washington DC: C Q Press, 2011).

Whales and Whaling and The Regime for Northern Fur Seals. The first one is diverted whereas the second one has collapsed.<sup>159</sup>

Through the UN, states agreed to the establishment of the UNFCCC to develop effective strategies to combat climate change. The negotiations which have followed have made only slow progress and provided a weak international climate change policy. Meanwhile, GHG emissions have been gradually and steadily increasing, giving rise to major questions about the prospects of protecting the environment through such international cooperation. The lack of progress is clearly a self-defeating strategy for states which should be doing what they can to protect themselves and minimize environmental threats.<sup>160</sup>

Conventional approaches to international relations, particularly the realist and liberal approaches and their different traditions, have been based on state-centric assumptions. The source of the state-centric approach is the Peace of Westphalia of 1648 but, increasingly, questions are being asked about the appropriateness of the state-centric approach, particularly in light of the implications in dealing with the environmental issues which scientists and others have brought to the attention of the world. Environmental issues cut across state boundaries as non-territorial developments which affect all states and peoples. Attempting to negotiate an agreement which would be effective in limiting the production of GHG emissions, and would result in a reduction in them appears to be well beyond the capacity of a system based on a state-centric approach. The increasing role played by NGOs in attempting to develop an effective agreement for the global governance of the environment is one way to make progress in international governance on the environment.

### **2.3.1.1 The Realists**

Even when considering the role and contribution of NGOs in the development of international governance on a range of issues, realists emphasise the pre-eminence

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<sup>159</sup> Oran Young, *Institutional Dynamics: Emerging Patterns in International Environmental Governance* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2010).

<sup>160</sup> Pease, 2003, 210.



of the state in international negotiations, and refer to a power hierarchy of states.<sup>161</sup> Gilpin writes:

An international system is established for the same reasons that any political system is created; actors enter social relations and create social structures in order to advance particular sets of political, economic or other interests. Because the interests of some of the actors may conflict with those of other actors, the particular interests that are most favoured by the social arrangements tend to reflect the relative powers of the actors.<sup>162</sup>

Regarding IOs, Karn and Mingst have noted from a realist perspective that:

States create IGOs and determine what actions they can or cannot take; they create international law and norms and determine their compliance or failure to comply. Because the more than 190 states in the international system vary so dramatically, however, their relative importance in global governance will vary. A large, powerful hegemonic state is more likely to play a greater role in international politics than are smaller, less powerful states.<sup>163</sup>

On this analysis, the failure to develop effective international governance on climate change can be attributed to the failures of the powerful states to carry out their functions as suggested by the realists. There is no promise that the powerful states will be able to carry out their objectives and to date have ended up in a stalemate as the problems of climate change grow. For Gilpin, the operation of the system depends on the actions of “a single powerful state [which] controls and dominates lesser states in the system” of intergovernmental organizations.<sup>164</sup> And Pease reasons that IOs are neither great-power directorates nor relatively independent actors promoting the international public good; rather they are tools of the powerful states that undermine and exploit subordinate states.<sup>165</sup> Karn and Mingst argue that a large, powerful hegemonic state plays a greater role in international organizations than smaller, less powerful states.<sup>166</sup> For them,

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<sup>161</sup> Kelly-Kate S. Pease, *International Organizations: Perspectives on Governance in the Twenty-First Century*, (Pearson, Prentice Hall: Webster University-St. Louis, 2008), 47.

<sup>162</sup> Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981), 9.

<sup>163</sup> Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, *International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance* (London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2004), 16.

<sup>164</sup> Gilpin, 1981, 29.

<sup>165</sup> Pease, 2008, 6-7.

<sup>166</sup> Karn and Mingst, 2004, 46.

international organizations act as recommenders, and states, as unitary actors, consider most international organizations' actions as recommendations.<sup>167</sup>

The conditions suggested by Gilpin and by Karn and Mingst regarding the presence of a large, powerful state, or single powerful state, are relevant to climate change. Large and powerful states have certainly been present throughout the negotiations but been unable to come up with effective measures to address the issue. Instead, their participation in negotiations have been limited to their own particular interests regarding the measures needed to deal with rising GHG levels.

With states the main actors for the global governance decision making process, their effectiveness lies in their willingness to enter into and comply with commitments agreed to.<sup>168</sup> For Pease, the state is still a dominant and unitary actor of international politics,<sup>169</sup> and Cheever agrees that IOs have limited authority.<sup>170</sup> Realists believe the hegemon can only enforce decisions made by IOs therefore the potential of cooperation among states is quite limited.<sup>171</sup> They do not accord any great significance to NGOs. For realists, the state is the central unit of analysis in international relations, and so this approach carries through to attempts to address the issues of climate change and environmental degradation.

It could be said that the rich and powerful developed countries are neglecting the concerns of developing countries' economic growth and the agenda of development because climate change affects every country but it does so disproportionately.<sup>172</sup> Environmental NGOs blame the developed world for not taking leadership roles over climate change. Within the Copenhagen international climate change negotiations new developments have been encountered with major emitters from developing countries emerging as key players in climate change governance making. The ability of the US to reject the Kyoto and yet promote a document agreed to by major emitters during the COP-15 revealed that

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<sup>167</sup> Pease, 2008; Karns and Mingst 2004, 45-50.

<sup>168</sup> Karns and Mingst, 2004, 9.

<sup>169</sup> Pease, 2008, 6.

<sup>170</sup> Daniel S. Cheever, 'The Role of International Organization in Ocean Development', *International Organization* 22, no. 3 (1968): 629- 48.

<sup>171</sup> John Mearsheimer, 'The False Promise of International Institutions', *International Security* 19 (1995): 5-49.

<sup>172</sup> Pandey, 2012a: see IPCC, *Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report* (Geneva: IPCC Secretariat, 2007d).

international cooperation is “harder to achieve, more difficult to maintain, and more dependent on state power” to agree or disagree.<sup>173</sup>

Although the climate change conferences have not turned out to be a complete disaster, there has been an on-going, albeit slow, process which gives the sense that the states negotiating the climate change issues are still engaged but the outcomes are scanty. The long twenty year journey of negotiations demonstrates that states are cooperating over the climate change issue with new and changing roles of different states/actors in determining the negotiations, but that the state-centric framework underlying efforts to address emerging global issues such as climate change has been singularly incapable of producing desired outcomes compatible with the needs of climate science for new governance directions.

### **2.3.1.2 Liberalism**

Liberals, neo-liberals, liberal institutionalists and others have challenged the anarchic and national self-interested focus of the realists and given emphasis to a more positive and hopeful view of the possibilities for the world.<sup>174</sup> Contemporary liberalism argues that non-state international actors are important, not just states.

While most of these theorists concede that states are the primary actors at the international level, they argue that the traditional view of state sovereignty and unitary interest cannot explain the steady growth of international cooperation or the persistence of many specialized international institutions in the contemporary world.<sup>175</sup>

They argue that individuals as well as governments share many interests and can thus engage in collaborative and cooperative social action, domestically as well as internationally, which results in greater benefits for everybody at home and

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<sup>173</sup> David Baldwin, ‘Neoliberalism, Neorealism, and World Politics’, in *Neorealism and Neoliberalism: the Contemporary Debate*, ed., David Baldwin (New York: Columbia University Press, 1993), 5.

<sup>174</sup> Liberals take a positive view of human nature and believe that humans, having a rational intellect, have the ability to recognize problems and may solve them through international cooperation. Neo liberals primarily focus on economic policy counting on the rule of the market, public expenditure cuts for social services, deregulation and privatization. They believe that market mechanism will be able to resolve the emerging environmental problems. Liberal institutionalists agree that international institutions can make international cooperation easier. Although liberal thinkers do not agree with the realist view that international institutions are mere ‘scraps of paper’, they take states as the main unit of analysis.

<sup>175</sup> Regina S. Axelrod, Vandevier and Vig, 2011, 5.

abroad.<sup>176</sup> For Clark, liberalism is about maintaining a tradition of optimism.<sup>177</sup> While there are many strands of thinking most liberal theorists argue that states hold common interests on many issues and their interdependence leads them to cooperate because IOs serve not only common interests but they also provide many incentives for cooperation.<sup>178</sup> For liberals, international cooperation takes place in the international system within the context of multiple interactions. These occur with various actors learning from their interactions and expecting mutual interests to increase with greater interdependence, knowledge, communication, and the spread of democratic values.<sup>179</sup>

Keohane, Haas, Levy, and Held argue that the UN needs to be reformed in terms of making effective responses to address global threats using the means of international cooperation.<sup>180</sup> Johnson notes that IOs emerged to respond to the requirements of coordinating activities among states.<sup>181</sup> They emerged in an effort to improve the condition of humankind and to help solve problems for states in ways other than war.<sup>182</sup> For Levy, Keohane and Haas, interdependence restricts the ability of governments to attain their objectives unilaterally, and while it may be asserted that such interdependence threatens state sovereignty, it facilitates collective state-based problem solving.<sup>183</sup> To these scholars, interdependence and cooperation are the ways to address contemporary global problems.

Levy, Keohane and Haas emphasize international cooperation as a means to address global environmental issues. They make a distinction between 'operational sovereignty' and 'actual sovereignty'.<sup>184</sup> Operational sovereignty can be traded for any cross-border concerns whereas actual sovereignty remains with

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<sup>176</sup> Robert Jackson and Georg Sorenson, *Introduction to International Relations* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1999), 109.

<sup>177</sup> Ian Clark, *The Hierarchy of States: Reform and Resistance in the International Order* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1989).

<sup>178</sup> Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: World Politics in Transition* (Boston: Little Brown, 1977).

<sup>179</sup> Karns and Mingst, 2004, 37.

<sup>180</sup> Marc A. Levy, Robert O. Keohane, and Peter M. Haas, eds, 'Improving the Effectiveness of International Environmental Institutions', in *Institutions for the Earth* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993). See Held, 1996.

<sup>181</sup> Amber Lynn Johnson, 'Why Not to Expect a World State', *Cross Cultural Research* 38, no. 2 (2004): 119-32.

<sup>182</sup> Michael N. Barnett and Martha Finnemore, 'The Politics Power and Pathologies of International Organizations', *International Organization* 53 (1999): 699-732.

<sup>183</sup> Levy, Keohane and Haas 1993, 415.

<sup>184</sup> Ibid.

the state. They argue that the division of sovereignty gives new paths for international cooperation and preserves the Westphalian notion of state sovereignty. Kofi Annan has picked up this point and argued that if this operational sovereignty were to be given to the UN, it could make the UN the only global institution that derives legitimacy from universal membership, with a mandate that encompasses development, security, human rights as well as environmental issues. In this way the UN would be unique in world affairs.<sup>185</sup>

Anne-Marie Slaughter has argued that sovereignty can be disaggregated for participation and status which would empower government institutions around the world to engage with each other in networks that would strengthen and improve their ability to perform their designated government tasks individually and collectively.<sup>186</sup> When national government institutions participate and exercise sovereignty for global governance, the core characteristic of sovereignty would shift from concerns about external interference to the capacity to participate in trans-governmental networks of all types.<sup>187</sup> These scholars contend that IOs should play a more prominent role in the international system because of growing interdependence among states and rapidly changing roles of international organizations' on cross-border issues of health, terror, crime, security, environment and climate.<sup>188</sup> Many IOs have been created for international cooperation to combat the common concerns such as human rights, development and environment for collective good.

For the liberals, successful alliances of the nation-states reveal their significant strategic, economic and the social ties. Liberals are motivated by incentives in cooperation for dealing collectively with complex problems such as economic progress, environmental degradation and climatic challenges. Within the liberal school, there has been a lively debate regarding the need for substantial restructuring of environmental governance institutions. Biermann and Bauer believe that problems in global environmental governance such as a lack of

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<sup>185</sup> Kofi Annan, *We the Peoples: The Rise of the United Nations in the Twenty-first Century* (New York: United Nations, 2000), 68.

<sup>186</sup> Anne-Marie Slaughter, *A New World Order* (New Jersey, Oxfordshire: Princeton University Press, 2004). 34-35.

<sup>187</sup> Abram Chayes and Antonia H. Chayes, *The New Sovereignty: Compliance with International Regulatory Agreements* (Cambridge and MA: Harvard University Press, 1995), 107. See also Slaughter, 2004.

<sup>188</sup> Breitmeir, 1997, 87.

resources, poor coordination and ineffectiveness can be resolved by creating a new architecture.<sup>189</sup> Adil Najam takes a different view and notes:

It is not only that new organizational maneuvering is likely to be insufficient to revive the spirit of the Rio compact or to intergrate with civil society networks; it is also that any new organizational arrangement is likely to remain as stymied as the current arrangement until these other issues of global environmental governance are tackled first.<sup>190</sup>

Ken Conca opines that the hybridization concept – a bottom up approach – through which governance emerges, is seen where values and rules are contested and where non-state actors can take on substantive roles.<sup>191</sup> He notes that political struggles will deliver alternative governance mechanisms – mechanisms without pre-determined outcomes and which may even achieve democratic environmental governance.<sup>192</sup> Hass sees the UNEP:

as part of a broader decentralized network of environmental governance, where UNEP serves as a hub linking together spokes connecting to additional policy networks of scientists, NGOs, MNCs, IO secretariats and state actors. Reforms should focus on strengthening UNEP's ability to receive and transmit accurate environmental information to a multitude of recipients.<sup>193</sup>

The literature distinguishes between various environmental agreements although agreements and institutions may not have produced the environmental outcomes. Scholars point out that this should not be the only measure.<sup>194</sup> Building institutional effectiveness can be seen as a precursor and condition for environmental effectiveness, and an important side-effect of the process of institutional building and international negotiations may bring about both environmental learning and growing environmental awareness, creating a basis for more environmentally effective agreements in the future.

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<sup>189</sup> Frank Biermann and Steffen Bauer, eds., *A World Environment Organization: Solution or Threat for Effective International Environmental Governance?*, 1-26 (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005).

<sup>190</sup> Adil Najam, 'The Case Against a New International Environmental Organization', *Global Governance* 9 (2003): 367-84.

<sup>191</sup> Ken Conca, *Governing Water: Contentious Transnational Politics and Global Institution Building* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2006).

<sup>192</sup> Ibid.

<sup>193</sup> Peter Hass, 'Turning Up the Heat on Global Environmental Governance', *The Forum* 5, no. 2 (2007).

<sup>194</sup> Najam, 2003.

It could be argued that given both the nature of the international system and the complexity and extensive ramifications of climate change policy, building environmentally effective institutions and policies has been a long and slow process. Climate change negotiations are multilateral issues with states as the main decision makers, although the liberal approach recognizes there are other actors in international politics besides nation-states. Yet, the liberal theoretical perspective is problematic in understanding the international climate change negotiation processes. Liberalism advocates cooperation in responding to global threats but, on the climate change issue, there has not been a response to meet the issue of climate change despite the creation of the UNFCCC, the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accord, all of them negotiated by the representatives of the nation-states, ensuring the continuation of the state-centric framework which has failed to produce any significant progress on global GHG emissions and temperature rise. Thus, the failure to develop effective responses to address the issue of climate change challenges the so-called theoretical optimism of liberalism for international cooperation.

### **2.3.1.3 NGOs in International Governance**

In international relations theory, the main reaction toward NGOs is ‘NGOs exist but...’.<sup>195</sup> According to Kegley and Wittkopf the impact of NGOs on world politics should not be exaggerated since nation-states have a monopoly on the use of coercive force and retain an enormous capacity to shape global and state welfare.<sup>196</sup> They note that the nation-state “still molds the activities of non-state actors more than its behaviour is molded by them”.<sup>197</sup> Gordenker and Weiss believe that NGO activities in shaping international decisions are usually left distant or obscured.<sup>198</sup> Others argue that NGOs can influence international conferences, monitor the implementation of agreements by states and raise public awareness.<sup>199</sup> The access of NGOs as observers at UNFCCC conferences has been

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<sup>195</sup> Bob Reinalda, ‘Private in Form, Public in Purpose: NGOs in International Relations Theory’, in *Non-State Actors in International Relations* eds., Bas Arts, Math Noortmann and Bob Reinalda, 11-40 (Hants, UK: Ashgate, 2001).

<sup>196</sup> Charles. W. Kegely and Eugene R. Wittkopf, *World Politics: Trends and Transformation* (New York: St. Martin’s Press, 1995).

<sup>197</sup> Ibid, 196.

<sup>198</sup> Leon Gordenker, and Thomas G. Weiss, ‘Pluralising Global Governance: Analytical Approaches and Dimensions’, *Third World Quarterly* 16, no. 3 (1995): 357-387.

<sup>199</sup> Vogler, 2011, 360.

open and wide enabling non-state actors to play various significant roles at international climate change negotiations.<sup>200</sup> As observers, NGOs are not necessarily passive during the negotiation processes.

The climate change literature clearly demonstrates that NGOs have been influential and visible entities in international climate change negotiations.<sup>201</sup> In Elliot's view the extent to which NGOs or civil societies influence the policy making agenda is a matter of dispute but she recognizes that without the expertise of environmental NGOs and other civil society groups, multilateral environmental agreements would be fewer and weaker.<sup>202</sup> Chasek, Downie and Brown claim that NGOs influence international environmental conferences by providing scientific and technical information, and new arguments to delegations already sympathetic to their objectives.<sup>203</sup> NGO participation in environmental conferences has gradually increased over time yet their greater attendance has not reflected required policy outcome. Betsill and Corell argued that environmental NGOs were restricted to attend plenary sessions and the text of Kyoto Protocol did not reflect any influence of ENGOs.<sup>204</sup> Although the roles of NGOs are known to be increasing, their role is still limited to being participant-observers and given "the strong focus on self-interested nation-states as the primary units of international relations, hardly any room is left for autonomous NGO action", with the role of government representatives being that of negotiators.<sup>205</sup> The following section argues that these state-centric approaches alone are not sufficient to respond the challenges of climate change.

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<sup>200</sup> See Article 7.6 of UNFCCC, *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change* (Bonn: Climate Change Secretariat, 1992).

<sup>201</sup> Michele Betsill and Elisabeth Corell, 'Environmental NGOs and the Kyoto Protocol Negotiations: 1995 to 1997', in *NGO Diplomacy: The Influence of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Environmental Negotiations*, eds., Michele M. Betsill and Elisabeth Corell, 43-66 (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2008); and M. R. Auer, 'Who Participates in Global Environmental Governance? Partial Answers from International Relations Theory', *Policy Sciences* 33, no. 2 (2000): 155-180; Kate O'Neill, *The Environment and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

<sup>202</sup> Lorraine Eliot, *The Global Politics of Environment* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

<sup>203</sup> Pamela S. Chasek, David L. Downie and Janet W. Brown, *Global Environmental Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2010), 100.

<sup>204</sup> Michele Betsill and Elisabeth Corell, 'NGO Diplomacy: The Influence of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Environmental Negotiations', *Global Environmental Politics* 1, no. 4 (2001), 65-85.

<sup>205</sup> Reinalda, 2001, 15.



### 2.3.2 Contextualizing Slow Progress: Inadequacy of State-Centrism

Negotiating reductions to GHG emissions has been a highly challenging political process.<sup>206</sup> The discussion of realism above showed international negotiations as primarily self-seeking forums for nation-states, while liberalism looked to international cooperation in addressing the complex problems of climate control. Both approaches still highlight the central role of states. Both of these approaches have put state at the centre of analyses and tried to solve the emerging global problems. They argued for the continued adequacy of conventional state-centric problem solving mechanisms. Zurn argues that the model of representation and decision making is still “executive multilateralism”,<sup>207</sup> in which governments become the representatives of their states, and hold substantial informational and other advantages over other actors in shaping global policies.

Karns and Mingst have argued that governance by entities outside of the state is most contested when major economic interests are at stake and when the interests of the most powerful state are threatened.<sup>208</sup> Climate change policies are well insulated with economic interests. In the view of Chasek, Downie and Brown, stabilization of CO<sub>2</sub> in the atmosphere would require cutting current emissions by at least half, which would necessitate a switch from coal and oil to natural gas and renewable sources, all of which would affect the interests of the most important emitters of GHGs.<sup>209</sup> Hence, no comprehensive agreement has been developed so far which could have a substantial impact on GHG emissions reduction. The Copenhagen and post-Copenhagen negotiations suggest that the old division of North and South countries is simply irrelevant for progress on climate change in the face of a new pattern emerging in which the political and economic interests of major emitting countries have been the major hurdle to producing an effective and global legally binding agreement.

DeSombre has emphasized the disconnection between ecological systems (borderless issues) and political systems (territorial state-system) which makes

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<sup>206</sup> Pamela S. Chasek, *Earth Negotiations: Analysing Thirty Years of Environmental Diplomacy* (Tokyo: United Nations University, 2001).

<sup>207</sup> Zurn, 2004, 264.

<sup>208</sup> Karns and Mingst, 2004, 486.

<sup>209</sup> Chasek, Downie and Brown, 2010, 179.

addressing environmental issues at the global level difficult.<sup>210</sup> Uncertainty about climate change problems, the consequences and actual costs of mitigating it undoubtedly challenges the willingness of political leaders to address climate change. Cooperation in addressing the issues of climate change encounters similar issues to that of other environmental cooperation, “such as the role of powerful states and the difficulty of negotiations”.<sup>211</sup> The participating states’ various interests, power and wealth is hardly absent from environmental negotiations.<sup>212</sup> The Westphalian framework with its emphasis on state sovereignty has delivered and it will continue to deliver remains at the heart of international negotiations.<sup>213</sup> Although the state-centric pursuit of national advantage is frequently neglected in discussions of international environmental cooperation, they often feature prominently.<sup>214</sup>

The UN, the institution that comes closest to the idea of a global political body, has the Westphalian principle written into its Charter.<sup>215</sup> The UNFCCC 1992 reaffirms “the principle of sovereignty” and state-centrism in its Preamble for “international cooperation to address climate change”.<sup>216</sup> The Copenhagen Accord explicitly notes, “Non-Annex I Parties will communicate information on the implementation of their actions through National communications, with provisions for international consultations and analysis under clearly defined guidelines that will ensure that national sovereignty is respected”.<sup>217</sup> The RIO+20 reiterated, “We continue to be guided by the purposes and principles of the Charter of United Nations”.<sup>218</sup> It could be argued that the UN has been successful in achieving international peace and security by depending on the very notion of a state-centric framework, however, the continuous failure in achieving ambitious environmental and climate change agreements reveals starkly the inability of

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<sup>210</sup> Elizabeth R. DeSombre, *The Global Environment and World Politics* (London and New York: Continuum, 2007), 1.

<sup>211</sup> *Ibid.*, 3.

<sup>212</sup> Vogler, 2011, 352

<sup>213</sup> Zygmunt Bauman, *Reconstructing Europe*, *RSA Journal*, CL VIII, no. 5551 (2012): 24-29.

<sup>214</sup> Volger, 2011.

<sup>215</sup> Bauman, 2012.

<sup>216</sup> UNFCCC 1992.

<sup>217</sup> UNFCCC, *Report of the Conference of the Parties on its Fifteenth Session, Held in Copenhagen from 7 to 19 December 2009* (Bonn: Climate Change Secretariat, 2009c).

<sup>218</sup> UN, *RIO+20 UN Conference on Sustainable Development, Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, 20-22 June* (New York: United Nations, 2012).

state-centrism to deliver an outcome to address the borderless global challenges of climate change.

Baber and Bartlett question whether it is even possible to construct a legally binding ambitious environmental agreement at the global level. As mentioned earlier they argue:

No one doubts that treaties can be negotiated between nations to advance the cause of environmental protection. But is it really possible that an international environmental consensus, amounting to a collective determination to follow a shared course for reasons held in common, can emerge from our disjointed and competitive system of global governance?<sup>219</sup>

For Bauman the kind of ‘international’ or ‘multilateral’ thinking the UN practises, is limited to the state-centric framework, which is not a great step on the road towards a global politics, but a major barrier set across the road.<sup>220</sup> It is argued that policy innovations that increase the participation of and deliberation in decision making among citizens and societal actors will enhance public acceptance for policy decisions and strengthening the knowledge base for implementation.<sup>221</sup> Questions about whether NGOs influenced the decision making and shaped the outcomes of negotiations at Kyoto and Copenhagen are addressed in chapters 4 and 5 of this research. Although a group of nation-states and NGOs could have set the agenda for Copenhagen in trying to achieve their particular objectives, they did not succeed, not least because of the difficulties of trying to develop some sort of consensus among a large number of very different parties, but also because certain parties took over the agenda to the frustration of those who were seeking a different outcome.

Large numbers of environmental NGOs were pressuring governments for drastic emission reduction measures. Yet, the outcome showed that nation-states, particularly major emitters, were involved in developing and delivering the Protocol and Accord which introduced the status-quo positions of nation-states

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<sup>219</sup> Baber and Bartlett, 2009, 3.

<sup>220</sup> Bauman, 2012.

<sup>221</sup> Backstrand et al., ‘The Promise of New Modes of Environmental Governance’, in *Environmental Politics and Deliberative Democracy: Examining the Promise of new Modes of Governance*, eds., Karin Backstrand, Jamil Khan, Ammika Kronsell and Eva Lovbrand (Glos, UK and Masschusetts, USA: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited, 2010), 6.

from the establishment of the UNFCCC. This was clearly reflected in the development and production of the Copenhagen Accord which is discussed in chapter 5. Haas argues that all IOs are deliberately designed by their founders to solve problems but no collaboration is conceivable except on the basis of explicit articulated interests.<sup>222</sup> International cooperation is very necessary in responding to the challenges of climate change and states have created a forum to address it, based on a state-centric approach. However, some of the major emitters', also known as powerful states (the major emitters from both the developed and developing countries), were unwilling to move significantly to develop explicitly articulated interests for mitigating GHG emissions, affirming international climate change gatherings which reflect a struggle for national advantage.<sup>223</sup>

The RIO+20 underscored the broad public participation required for sustainable development and environmental conservation through meaningful involvement and active participation of all major groups including women, children, youth, indigenous peoples, NGOs, local authorities, workers, trade unions, business, industry, the scientific and technological community, and farmers as well as other stakeholders such as local communities, volunteer groups, migrants, older persons, and persons with disabilities.<sup>224</sup> Zurn also argues that international climate change governance cannot be successful by excluding largely societal actors such as individuals, businesses and communities.<sup>225</sup> In his view the state-centric approach of the UN has diminished the roles of major stakeholders in the making of international climate change policies.<sup>226</sup> The very notion of state-centrism and the division of world into sovereign states that articulates their national-interests has created a formidable barrier to the forging of effective international accords for the protection of the environment.<sup>227</sup>

According to Weiss “now that states visibly cannot address a growing number of transboundary threats” such as “climate change, migration and pandemics” and the “current feeble system of what many of us now call is ‘global governance’” is

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<sup>222</sup> Ernst Haas, *When Knowledge is Power* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1990), 2.

<sup>223</sup> Volger, 2011.

<sup>224</sup> UN, 2012, 7.

<sup>225</sup> Zurn, 2004, 268-269.

<sup>226</sup> Ibid.

<sup>227</sup> David Potter, ‘Environmental Problems in Their Political Context’, in *Environmental Policy in an International Context: Perspectives on Environmental Problems*, eds., Pieter Glasbergen and Andrew Blowers (London: Arnold, 1995), 106.

entirely inadequate for addressing these global common challenges. Therefore, we have a “desperate requirement for” new alternatives “that moves beyond the anarchy and overarching authority” of nation-states.<sup>228</sup> He notes that the UN is still fundamentally state-centric and that there is a:

fundamental disconnect between the growing number of global problems and the current inadequate structures of international problem solving...The usual explanation for this sorry state of affairs and institutional disarray is a lack of political will, great power politics or classic collective action problems but blame also should be appointed to us scholars for our lack of imagination beyond the state-centric framework.<sup>229</sup>

From the above discussion, it can be argued that the progress on international climate change governance is stymied by the state-centric framework of climate change negotiations. Two propositions will be derived from this consideration of the centrality of the state-centric approach in international relations for accounting the lack of progress in preventing climate change.

The first proposition derived from the above discussion is:

The competitive system of global governance negates efforts to achieve an international consensus on international climate change governance.

The second proposition is:

The state-centric framework of international negotiations on climate change governance prevent the prioritisation of saving the global commons.

### **2.3 Educating the Public - the Media**

Climate change did not attract much public and political attention during the 1960s and 1970s. Until 1988 arguments did little to bring climate change to the fore until Malta initiated the debate on climate change in the same year at the UN General Assembly. Global climate change came to the attention of world governments and policy makers after decades of scientific research.<sup>230</sup> Over the

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<sup>228</sup> Thomas Weiss, ‘What Happened to the Idea of World Government’, *International Studies Quarterly* 53 (2009), 253-71.

<sup>229</sup> Ibid, 254, 56.

<sup>230</sup> Andrew E. Dessler and Edward A. Parson, *The Science and Politics of Global Climate Change: A Guide to the Debate* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006).

decades, scientists have recognized the synthesis of research regarding current and projected threats that ecosystems face from anthropogenic global warming as well as threats to national security, public health, and economies.<sup>231</sup> As noted above, little has been achieved in these last two decades in respect to reducing global GHG emissions.<sup>232</sup> Cooper argued that without public trust of climate change science, policymaking in a democratic society cannot address the serious threats that we face today, and in this, the role of the media is significant in building public trust.<sup>233</sup> States would be better able to address the issue of climate change when the public seriously demands actions, but the public could not be expected to pressure governments if they were confused and not motivated to take action against climate change. Consequently, the role of media is critical in motivating people and building public trust by imparting accurate climate change scientific information because the scientific community plays an important role and science becomes a powerful political tool in environmental politics.<sup>234</sup>

The media is the fourth important organ of the nation-state.<sup>235</sup> Media sources fulfil a variety of roles from educating the public to enhancing pluralism. As an instrument the media is an important source for the public to gain information about what is happening around them and across the world. In 1956, Siebert and Schramm provided historical, philosophical and international perspectives on the press comprised of theories of the press such as authoritarian, totalitarian-communist, libertarian and social responsibility.<sup>236</sup> Almost a half-century later, the social responsibility model is said to be widely accepted by the media as an unwritten contract and the consequent social commitments toward society and

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<sup>231</sup> See IPCC, 2007a; and Camille Parmesan, 'Ecological and Evolutionary Responses to Recent Climate Change', *Annual Review of Ecology Evolution and Systematics* 37 (2006): 637-69.

<sup>232</sup> Helm and Hepburn, 2009; see also Cameron Hepburn and Nicholas Stern, 'The Global Deal on Climate Change', in *The Economics and Politics of Climate Change*, eds., Dieter Helm and Cameron Hepburn (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

<sup>233</sup> Caren B. Cooper, 'Media Literacy as a Key Strategy toward Improving Public Acceptance of Climate Change Science', *Bioscience* 61 (2011): 231-37.

<sup>234</sup> Haas, 1990. See also Ulrich Beck, *Ecological Politics in an Age of Risk* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995).

<sup>235</sup> New World Encyclopaedia, 'The Mass Culture', [http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Checks\\_and\\_balances](http://www.newworldencyclopedia.org/entry/Checks_and_balances).

<sup>236</sup> Peterson Siebert and Schramm, *Four Theories of the Press* (Urbana, IL: University of Illinois Press, 1956).

restrain themselves accordingly.<sup>237</sup> However, the practice of media particularly on climate change does not concur with social responsibility as will be discussed in chapters 6 and 7.

In the contemporary world media conglomerates and media organizations are accused of managing newspapers primarily as businesses and trying to please as big an audience as possible.<sup>238</sup> The financial benefits and market interests drive media roles in shaping societies. Media capitalism withholds democratic participation because of its profit orientation, narrowing the number of voices heard with the result that the media has neglected the important role of promoting democratic participation.<sup>239</sup> Media serves the interests of governments in areas such as terrorism and confidential matters because media does not have free flow access to these matters and reports only those things that governments want media to report. However, it does not mean that media does not leak any confidential reports. The US National Security Agency's classified document leak in 2013 is one of the recent examples of media's reporting against the national security interest of the US government. The role of the media depends on access to the populations, information, government interests and significantly the interests of media itself.

Herman and Chomsky's<sup>240</sup> propoganda model suggests three purposes of the media: 1) the mass media serve as a system for communicating messages and symbols to the general populace. 2) It is their function to amuse, entertain and inform and to include individuals with the values, beliefs and codes of behaviour that will integrate them into the institution structures of the large society. 3) Finally this role in a world of concentrated wealth and conflict of interest requires propoganda. This model argues that there are five classes of filters in society to determine 'what is news' or simply put, who gets and does not get printed in the

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<sup>237</sup> Itai Himelboim and Yehiel Limor, 'Media Institutions, News Organizations, and the Journalistic Social Role Worldwide: A Cross-National and Cross-Organizational Study of Codes of Ethics', *Mass Communication and Society* 14 (2011):71–92.

<sup>238</sup> Ben H. Bagdikian, *The New Media Monopoly* (Boston, MA: Beacon Press, 2004) and Robert W. McChesney, *The Problem of the Media: U.S. Communication Politics in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (New York: Monthly Review Press, 2004).

<sup>239</sup> Robert G. Picard, *The Press and the Decline of Democracy: The Democratic Socialist Response in Public Policy* (Westport, CT: Greenwood, 1985).

<sup>240</sup> Edward S. Herman and Noam Chomsky, *Manufacturing Consent: The Political Economy of the Mass Media* (New York: Pantheon Books, 1988).

newspapers or broadcast by radio and television. While big businesses and governments gain easy access to the public in order to convey their state-corporate messages, the dissenters from mainstream are given little voice.<sup>241</sup>

Bennett suggests that three normative orders affect individual journalists – political norms (provide political information to citizenry to enhance accountability), economic norms (efficiency and profitability) and journalistic norms (fairness, objectivity, accuracy and balance).<sup>242</sup> Although the media is seen as acting as intermediary vehicles that reflect public opinion, respond to public concerns and make the electorate cognizant of state policies, important events and view points as the fundamental principles of democracy depend on a reasonably informed electorate.<sup>243</sup> The propaganda model sees the mass media as instruments of power that “mobilize support for the special interests that dominate the state and private activity”.<sup>244</sup>

Scholars concur that the media can play an important role in the construction of environmental problems and issues since the general public gains most of its knowledge about science from media.<sup>245</sup> Although environmental and interest groups are good at perusing environmental data, as consumers the public does not generally peruse the peer reviewed work on the science of climate change but relies on the media which, Walberg and Sjoberg conjecture, plays a key role in the public understanding of risk.<sup>246</sup> Cooper argues that the press can play a significant role in the public education of climate change, and that there is a disparity between climate science and climate policy that points to the existence of an urgent problem of public education of climate science.<sup>247</sup>

Dessler and Parson view the press as often only a little help because controversy sells newspapers and argue that journalists do not understand scientific issues any

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<sup>241</sup> Ibid.

<sup>242</sup> W. L. Bennett, ‘An Introduction to Journalism Norms and Representations of Politics’, *Political Communication* 13 (1996): 373-84.

<sup>243</sup> Jeffery Klaehn, ‘A Critical Review and Assessment of Herman and Chomsky’s ‘Propaganda Model’, *European Journal of Communication* 17, no. 2 (2002): 147-82.

<sup>244</sup> Herman and Chomsky, 1988, xi.

<sup>245</sup> D. Nelkin, *Selling Science: How the Press Covers Science and Technology* (New York: W.H. Freeman, 1987); and see also: K. M. Wilson, ‘Mass Media as Sources of Global Warming Knowledge’, *Mass Communications Review* 22 (1995): 79-89.

<sup>246</sup> Anders A. Walberg and Lennart Sjoberg, ‘Risk Perception and the Media’, *Journal of Risk Research* 3, no. 1 (2000): 31-50.

<sup>247</sup> Cooper, 2011.



better than policy actors and following their professional norm of providing balance between opposing views, the press may give particular prominence not just to minority views but also to extreme views.<sup>248</sup> Boykoff and Boykoff find that balanced reporting is actually problematic in practice when discussing the human contribution to global warming and resulting calls for action to combat it.<sup>249</sup> Johnson and Covello note that “Considerable evidence exists that the media engage in selective and biased reporting that emphasizes drama, wrongdoing and conflict.”<sup>250</sup>

This study proceeds from the view that the media plays a significant role in shaping public opinion on climate change because it has open and free access to the information on climate change. The UNFCCC process recognized the media by giving it observer status as one of the important actors of climate change negotiations. They have easy access to negotiations, meetings and side events organized by NGOs. Fifty years ago in 1963 Bernard Cohen argued: “The press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.”<sup>251</sup> In their 1972 work, McCombs and Shaw argue: “The media are the major primary sources of national political information; for most, mass media provide the best – and only – easily available approximation of even changing political realities”.<sup>252</sup> “New research exploring the consequences of agenda setting and media framing suggest that the media not only tell us what to think about, but also how to think about it, and, consequently, what to think”.<sup>253</sup> Media can, by providing objective information instead of relying on their professional norms of presenting a balanced view,<sup>254</sup> make connections between scientific knowledge and

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<sup>248</sup> Dessler and Parson, 2006.

<sup>249</sup> Maxwell T. Boykoff and Jules M. Boykoff, ‘Balance as Bias: Global Warming and the US Prestige Press’, *Global Environmental Change* 14 (2004): 125-36.

<sup>250</sup> B.B. Johnson and V. T. Covello, ‘Agenda- setting, Group Conflict, and the Social Construction of Risk’, in *The Social and Cultural Construction of Risk*, B. B. Johnson and V. T. Covello eds., 179-81. (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing, 1987), 179.

<sup>251</sup> Bernard Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harcourt, 1963), 13.

<sup>252</sup> Maxwell E. McCombs and Donald L. Shaw, ‘The Agenda Setting Function of Mass Media’, *Public Opinion Quarterly* 36, no. 2 (1972): 176-87.

<sup>253</sup> Maxwell E. McCombs, ‘The Evolution of Agenda-Setting Research: Twenty-Five Years in the Marketplace of Ideas’, *Journal of Communication* 43, no. 2 (1993), 65.

<sup>254</sup> Media’s balanced view is very important when two or more groups have tie situations but in climate change issue it is not much helpful because IPCC consists of significant number of scientists to advise government of the worlds on the issue of climate change while the contrary voices against climate change comprise negligible number of scientists.

information dissemination through media as a function of public education to make people better understand the problem and to respond to the challenges of climate change.<sup>255</sup>

However, this has not happened so far. For example, the American Congress continue to be divided on the climate change issue and so are the public. Thus, this study notes that where the media is divided in its reporting of scientific knowledge and information dissemination then the public is confused and ill-informed. The divisions may be seen in recommendations for setting the agenda, in identifying the issues of international climate change, and over the negotiations.

From the discussion above on the media, and in response to the core research question for this thesis, the following proposition is derived for analysis:

The role of the media in building the trust of the public of the issues of climate change science and proposed policies is essential to the endeavours of political and policy leaders to come to agreement on climate change governance.

## **2.4 Conclusion**

Scholars present contrasting views in debates relating to the democratic deficit in international organizations. Cosmopolitan democrats argue for the establishment of a global parliament. Deliberative democrats put the emphasis on deliberations, making governance processes more talk-centred than vote-centred. In terms of the UN vision of global democracy, some argue that the inter-state system should be converted into a multi-actor system of states, together with other participating actors such as NGOs and CSOs. Concerning global governance and state participation, one group of scholars argues that international organizations are creations of states and so they can do little other than make recommendations.<sup>256</sup> This means they do not go beyond the will of states, particularly the will of the powerful states, and therefore there is a democratic deficit as international organizations can be used by powerful states to prevail in pursuit of their interests which, however, might not be true with all global issues. A second group of scholars argue that international organizations are mediums for international

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<sup>255</sup> Boykoff and Boykoff 2004. See also Pandey, 2012b.

<sup>256</sup> Karns and Mingst, 2011; Pease, 2003.

cooperation to address international concerns.<sup>257</sup> These scholars opine that the UN and its environmental organizations need to be restructured or reformed to produce competitively better outcomes.

The notion of democratic representation refers to the democratic credentials of the international organizations with regard to their member states' representation in the deliberative formulation of the policies that affect the states.<sup>258</sup> But in the globalized twenty-first century, Held has suggested that the concept of the sovereign state lies at the crossroads of a vast array of networks and organizations which have been established to regulate and manage diverse areas of cross-national issues.<sup>259</sup> The perceived democratic deficit is interlinked with two difficulties: the power imbalances among states as well as those between states and non-states actors as the representatives of civil society in the shaping and making the global public policy,<sup>260</sup> under the prevailing state-centric framework. Administrative rationality is increasingly recognized as full of flaws, ill-equipped and inadequate to solve environmental problems<sup>261</sup> whereas it is argued that deliberative rationality, with its call for greater participation, transparency, accountability, communication and multiple actors (all stakeholders) engagement in problem solving and decision making will lead to more effective and more democratic environmental governance,<sup>262</sup> improving implementation and producing effective environmental outcomes that stand up to scrutiny under evaluation.

Although Herman and Chomsky's Propaganda Model shows that power and the interests of industries calibrate the role of the media, many scholars believe that the media needs to play a significant role in the public education of climate change issues.<sup>263</sup> But the failure of international climate change negotiations and lack of public pressure on governments to act against climate change begs the

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<sup>257</sup> Levy, Keohane and Hass, 1993.

<sup>258</sup> Glenn, 2008.

<sup>259</sup> David Held, 'Democratic Accountability and Political Effectiveness from Cosmopolitan Perspective', *Government and Opposition* 39 no. 2 (2004): 364-91.

<sup>260</sup> Held, 2004.

<sup>261</sup> Dryzek, 2005, 75 and Carter, 2007, 181.

<sup>262</sup> Kronsell and Backstrand, 2010, 31. See also Caroline Kende-Robb and Warren A. Van Wicklin III, 'Giving the Most Vulnerable a Voice', in *Strategic Environmental Assessment for Policies*, eds. Kulsum Ahmed and Ernesto Sanchez-Triana, 95-126 (Washington DC: The World Bank, 2008).

<sup>263</sup> Cohen, 1963; Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004; Pandey, 2012b; Beck, 1995; Dessler and Parson, 2006.

question of whether evaluating the role of media in educating the public by explaining or describing issues has salience. The Kyoto Protocol and Copenhagen Accord were two significant agreements in the history of climate change negotiations. The primary objective of these agreements was to reduce global emissions yet they have not been effective in this. Critics cite them as significant steps, but not concrete steps, for minimizing the emissions.

In sum, this chapter has identified three main themes in the literature: the democratic deficit, the state-centric framework and the role of the media and the existing gaps in the literature to be contributed from these major themes in the field of international environmental politics, climate change politics and media studies. The issue of democratic deficit in international organizations is not a novel argument in itself but what this thesis contributes is to apply the notion of democratic deficit in international climate change governance through empirical analysis of negotiations and the media communications.

Addressing the issues of international security, peace and international trade through the medium of state-centric institutions has long been undertaken, but this thesis challenges this deep rooted practice by showing its inability to address the borderless problem of climate change, thereby showing how the state-centred approach has slowed progress in climate change governance. This thesis also makes a direct contribution to research on this issue in assessing the role of the Western and Non-western media in passing the information to the public on climate change science, particularly concerning the barriers to climate change governance and paths forward from the major emitters of the North and South. This thesis brings the strong combination of the three insights discussed above in understanding the limited progress made on climate change governance.

The chapters ahead will respond to the core research question – *Why has there been little progress in the making of an effective international climate change governance to prevent climate change?* To address the core research question and its three subset questions, the following chapters will put forward more perspectives contextualizing international climate change governance building on the arguments of democratic deficit, the state-centric framework and the role of the media in public education and policy orientations. This chapter and the

propositions generated at the end of each section conclude by revisiting the major themes developed in this chapter to assess and summarise the main arguments. The propositions are reiterated below in terms of consolidating the arguments which follow in the next chapters.

From the above discussion, and in response to the core question for this thesis as noted the preceding paragraph, the following propositions have been derived:

1. The institutional shortcomings of the UNFCCC, and also of the democratic processes of the UN and its environmental organizations, have resulted in the lack of progress towards international climate change governance.
2. The lack of open and representative processes, together with the lack of consensual debate and public accountability have resulted in the failure to achieve agreement on international climate change governance.
3. The competitive system of global governance negates efforts to achieve an international consensus on international climate change governance.
4. The state-centric framework of international negotiations on climate change governance prevent the prioritisation of saving the global commons.
5. The role of the media in building the trust of the public of the issues of climate change science and proposed policies is essential to the endeavours of political and policy leaders to come to agreement on climate change governance.

## Chapter 3

### Methodology

#### 3.1 Introduction

The distinction between quantitative and qualitative research is important in research. The data collected from each have different characteristics and require different techniques for analysis.<sup>1</sup> The outcomes of any research are primarily dependent on the stance of the researcher and the methodology employed. Quantitative research uses the syntax of mathematical operations to investigate the properties of data and is therefore considered to be more applicable to natural sciences.<sup>2</sup> With qualitative research the researcher becomes immersed in the data, searching out patterns, surprising phenomena and inconsistencies to generate new concepts, theory or uncover further instances of those already in existence.<sup>3</sup> Quantitative and qualitative research are said to be two diametrically opposed research approaches.<sup>4</sup> This research takes a predominantly qualitative case study approach in examining multilateral efforts to address the substantive issues of climate change as discussed in the proceedings leading to the Kyoto Protocol 1997, the Copenhagen Accord 2009, and in the selected media. However, in terms of data collection, and building the analysis and assembling arguments through figures and graphs, the research has also used a quantitative approach. It is this researcher's view that to answer the research question of this thesis, a mixed methodology is appropriate as Bryman and Burgess noted when appropriate, a mixture of quantitative and qualitative research is possible.<sup>5</sup>

#### 3.2 The Mixed Approach

This research takes a mixed approach in examining the working systems of international climate change governance and in seeking to understand the issues, strategies and outcomes. The decision to take a qualitative or quantitative approach needs to be based on the research question and the nature of the data

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<sup>1</sup> Nicholas Walliman, *Your Research Project: A Step-by-Step Guide for the First-Time Researcher* (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 2001), 227.

<sup>2</sup> Ibid, 252-53.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid, 259.

<sup>4</sup> Nicholas William, *Your Research Project: A Step by Step Guide for the First-Time Researcher* (London, Thousand Oaks, New Delhi: Sage Publication, 2005), 246.

<sup>5</sup> Alan Bryman and Bob Burgess, *Analysing Qualitative Data* (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 1994).

collection.<sup>6</sup> It also depends on the type of data and the method used to collect the data. The choice of a mixed method is based on diverse types of data used for this study and “to develop a better understanding of the phenomena being studied” because “the fundamental claim being made here is that a mix of methods will generate a better understanding than will a single method alone”.<sup>7</sup> The data used are in written form, such as legal documents of climate change agreements, articles from print media, experimental investigations or social survey investigations reports from databases and in record/visual form such as recorded webcast videos of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), and relevant television news/documentaries that are publically available.

Both qualitative and quantitative approaches were used in collecting data from databases such as Factiva, UNFCCC, Earth Negotiations Bulletin (ENB), International Energy Agency (IEA), Energy Information Administration (EIA), Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency (NEAA), National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration (NOAA) and analysing them. Bryman notes “quantitative research can be construed as a research strategy that emphasizes quantification in the collection and analysis of the data”.<sup>8</sup> It entails a deductive approach and incorporates positivism and embodies a view of social reality as an external, objective reality.<sup>9</sup> Graphs, figures, tables and numbers became part of the quantitative aspects of this research derived from databases noted above and others to build the arguments and analyses in this research and answer the central research question.

Bryman writes: “Qualitative research can be construed as a research strategy that usually emphasizes words rather than quantification in the collection and analysis of the data”.<sup>10</sup> It emphasizes an inductive approach and embodies a view of social reality as a constantly shifting emergent property of individuals’ creation.<sup>11</sup> Sandelowski writes, “Qualitative research is an umbrella term for an array of

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<sup>6</sup> Bob Matthews and Liz Ross, *Research Methods: A Practical Guide for the Social Sciences* (Harlow, Essex: Longman, Pearson Education Limited, 2010), 113.

<sup>7</sup> Jennifer C. Greene, *Mixed Methods in Social Inquiry* (San Francisco, CA: Willey, 2007), 98.

<sup>8</sup> Alan Bryman, *Social Research Methods* (New York: Oxford University Press, 2004), 19.

<sup>9</sup> Ibid.

<sup>10</sup> Ibid, 19-20.

<sup>11</sup> Ibid.

attitudes towards and strategies for conducting inquiry that are aimed at discovering how human beings understand, experience interpret, and produce social world” views.<sup>12</sup> Qualitative research is required here in assessing data such as the legal documents of UNFCCC, media accounts and quantitative data collected from databases critical to drilling down into the issues of international climate change governance and exploring the nuances in the written words and visuals to understand the issues, strategies and outcomes from a range of sources noted above and below. Qualitative research is essential for analyses in the case study and describing complex phenomena like climate change negotiation processes. The qualitative approach is also used in assessing what the newspapers (media) have reported, the assessment of the developments of the Kyoto Protocol and Copenhagen Accord, contextualizing what the countries’ positions were and what they meant in addressing climate change.

This study acknowledges the limitations of stand-alone qualitative and quantitative research methods with the researcher aiming to show the benefits from both of these approaches to gain a better understanding of the empirical enquiry relating to this research. “After all, the presence of the words in data collection and analysis is not distinctive to qualitative research: words are central to questionnaires, a common source of quantitative data; and there are generally more words than numbers in the analysis sections of the quantitative research reports”.<sup>13</sup> To one degree or another, this research has been shaped by ideas (qualitative) about the nature of social phenomena and how they can be understood from quantitative and qualitative data. However, this researcher acknowledges that the knowledge produced through this research might not be applicable to other issues of global governance and may remain unique to relatively few other cases. Ensuring personal biases and idiosyncrasies do not intrude in such a study and distort the findings is of particular importance in this research.

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<sup>12</sup> M. Sandelowski, ‘Qualitative Research’, in *The Sage Encyclopedia of Social Science Research Methods*, eds., M. Lewis-Beck, A. Bryman and T. Liao (Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2004).

<sup>13</sup> Martyn Hammersley, *What is Qualitative Research?* (London, New Delhi: Bloomsbury, 2013).



### 3.3 The Case Study

This research is based on a case study approach which is one of the ways of doing social science research.<sup>14</sup> Case studies are the preferred strategies when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being posed, where the researcher has little control over events and the focus is on contemporary phenomenon as in this study.<sup>15</sup> The question of this study begins with ‘why’ to explore the slow progress of climate change at international climate change negotiations, which is considered one of the most challenging contemporary issues of the 21<sup>st</sup> century. Yin writes, “A case study is an empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within its real life context, especially when boundaries between phenomenon and context are not clearly evident”.<sup>16</sup> Case studies “combine a qualitative investigation of a topic, using all appropriate techniques, with a link to wider themes in the study of politics”.<sup>17</sup> The unit of analysis of the case study may be a person, an organization, a social action in a particular setting or a country.<sup>18</sup> “Such studies combine a qualitative investigation of a topic, using all appropriate techniques, with a link to wider themes in the study of politics”.<sup>19</sup>

The primary strength of using a case study approach in research is the abundant variety of evidence that can be collected from multiple sources including newspapers, recorded videos and legal/official documents.<sup>20</sup> Case studies can analyse complex events and take into account numerous variables precisely because they do not require numerous cases or a limited number of variables.<sup>21</sup> A case study approach is a solid basis for building theory; it can be either a critical case, extreme case, representative case or a revelatory case.<sup>22</sup>

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<sup>14</sup> Robert K. Yin, *Case Study Research: Design and Methods* (Thousand Oaks and London: Sage Publications, 1994).

<sup>15</sup> Yin, 1994, 1.

<sup>16</sup> Yin, 13.

<sup>17</sup> Rod Hague and Martin Harrop, *Comparative Government and Politics: An Introduction* (Hampshire and New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010), 43.

<sup>18</sup> Bob Matthews and Liz Ross, *Research Methods: A Practical Guide for the Social Sciences*, (Harlow, Essex: Longman, Pearson Education Limited, 2010), 128.

<sup>19</sup> Hague and Harrop, 2010, 43.

<sup>20</sup> Yin, 1994.

<sup>21</sup> Alexander L. George and Andrew Bennett, *Case Studies and Theory Development in the Social Sciences* (Cambridge, Massachusetts: The MIT Press, 2005), 45.

<sup>22</sup> See David Evans and Paul Gruba, *How to Write a Better Thesis*, (Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 2002); and Yin, 1994.

The choice of case study does have some limitations for any research. It can be more subjective because it relies on personal interpretation of data and inferences can arise. "Investigators who do case studies are often regarded as having deviated from their academic disciplines and their investigations as having insufficient precision, objectivity and rigor".<sup>23</sup> Critics say a case study cannot be used in generalizations but this does not mean that it cannot enter into the collective process of knowledge accumulation in a given field or in a society. Yet, a purely descriptive and explanatory case study without any attempt to generalize can certainly be of value in this process and has often helped cut a path towards scientific innovation.<sup>24</sup> This study recognizes that every study has some sort of limitations but a case study approach, carefully carried out, is a major contributor to advancing knowledge and learning. It does not lack precision, objectivity or rigour, rather its "finding or conclusion...is likely to be much more convincing and accurate" because this study "is based on several different sources of information".<sup>25</sup>

There are four types of case study designs: (a) single-case (holistic) designs; (b) single-case (embedded) designs; (c) multiple-case (holistic) designs; and (d) multiple case (embedded) designs.<sup>26</sup> "Clearly there are different definitions of cases and case studies, and this has made systematic analyses of the value and purposes of technique difficult".<sup>27</sup> To be identified as a case study it is important to treat the total study population as one entity. The selected 'case (s)' becomes the basis of a thorough, holistic and in-depth exploration of the aspect(s) that the researcher wants to determine. It is an approach in which a particular instance or a few carefully selected cases are studied intensively. In a case study the focus of attention is the case in its idiosyncratic complexity, not on the whole population of cases.<sup>28</sup> 'The case' that forms the basis of the investigation is usually something that already exists. The case is a naturally occurring phenomenon. It exists prior to

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<sup>23</sup> Yin, 1994.

<sup>24</sup> Bent Flyvbjerg, 'Five Misunderstandings About Case Study Research', in *Qualitative Research Practice*, eds. Cleave Seale, Giampietro Gobo, Jaber F. Gubrium, and David Silverman, 420-434 (London and Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage, 2004), 424.

<sup>25</sup> Yin, 1994, 92.

<sup>26</sup> Ibid, 38.

<sup>27</sup> Juliet Kaarbo and Ryan K. Beasley, 'A Practical Guide to the Comparative Case Study Method in Political Psychology', *Political Psychology* 20, no. 2 (1999): 369-91.

<sup>28</sup> Ranjit Kumar, *Research Methodology: A Step-by-Step Guide for Beginners* (New Delhi: Sage, 2011), 126.

the research project and, it is hoped, continues to exist once the research has finished. There is no pressure on the researcher to impose controls or to change circumstances. The boundaries of the case can prove difficult to define in an absolute and clear-cut fashion.<sup>29</sup>

For the purpose of this research, the central case study question concerns the lack of progress in climate change negotiations. A case is defined as an instance or an episode such as the development of issues relating to the Kyoto Protocol and failure to adopt effective climate policies. Cases include climate change negotiation episodes which have occurred subsequently, media accounts on these episodes/events and legal documents detailing these cases, as will be discussed below. The case study will focus on two cases (the developments of the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accord and their failure to adopt strong measures to address climate change and media accounts to explain the positions and actions of the parties at the Kyoto and Copenhagen), which is a multiple-case design (two to three cases), through an empirical examination of real world phenomena (international climate change negotiations and their perennial failure) within its naturally occurring context and without directly manipulating either the phenomena or the context. Multiple cases research findings are considered more compelling and the overall study is therefore regarded as being more robust.<sup>30</sup>

Emphasis in the analyses is laid on providing a detailed analysis of a limited number of cases (two cases) on the same topic in order to find answers to the research question.<sup>31</sup> For more than 2 decades, international climate change governance has failed to produce desired outcomes in order to address climate change. Thus, the central question/case study of the research is about the failure of climate negotiations to achieve desired outcomes to mitigate greenhouse gases (GHGs). The outlines of the developments of the Kyoto Protocol and the developments of the Copenhagen Accord are central to this study and so is the use of the media accounts to explain the positions and actions of the parties and to examine what happened at Kyoto and Copenhagen, and how this was all understood and interpreted in the media communications the researcher has

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<sup>29</sup> Martyn Denscombe, *The Good Research Guide: For Small-Scale Social Research Projects* (England: Open University Press 2010), 54, 62, 63.

<sup>30</sup> Yin, 1994, 45.

<sup>31</sup> Matthews and Ross, 2010.

selected. There can be no answer to the core research question without considering what happened at Kyoto and Copenhagen, and why it happened as it did. The use of media provides a widely published and available account of what happened and why at the negotiations. The use of records (webcast) of and about Kyoto and Copenhagen is partly to ground the outline in 'official' reports and data, and to use these as a check on what the media reported.

In examining Kyoto and Copenhagen negotiations, the responses of the various parties to climate change, the major issues, strategies, outcomes and their overarching complex relationship with states, non-state actors and public representation in formulating strategies and policy proposals will be determined. Through a careful analysis of Kyoto and Copenhagen the global climate change negotiations and decision making processes are determined, particularly the issues, strategies and outcomes that took place at an inter-state setting by "empirical inquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon".<sup>32</sup> Negotiations over climate change have been continuing since the 1992 Earth Summit yet the responses of the COPs have not been able to settle on the level of emissions reduction reported and recommended by the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), a global intergovernmental scientific body. The Kyoto Protocol and Copenhagen Accord were certainly seeking to address the major issues associated with climate change, however, stalemates have given rise to the core question of this research.

### **3.4 Research Design**

In seeking to answer *why there has been little progress in the making of an effective international climate change governance to prevent climate change*, three subsets of questions are also examined: 1. Is the democratic deficit slowing the progress of international climate change governance? 2. Are state-centric institutions up to the challenge of addressing climate change? 3. Is there a disconnection between the concerns of climate change and the role of media? These questions are strongly linked to the propositions derived from the literature of democratic deficit, state-centric framework and the role of the media. These three themes are tightly connected with one another in this research as the state-

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<sup>32</sup> Yin, 1994, 23.

centric framework gives rise to the notion of a democratic deficit. To understand these issues in the policy making process and address the problem is an important role of the media since it is the media that disseminates information from science and government to the general public.<sup>33</sup> In order to explain and understand why the climate change policy making was conducted in the way it was rather than in another way which could have produced positive results the focus will be on content, context, processes, actors, and outcomes. Even after the IPCC produced four assessment reports and informed policy makers to take swift, fast and effective responses to stay within the limit of 2 degrees Celsius global temperature it did not happen as parties stuck to their national positions over two decades of the negotiations process. Emissions continued to skyrocket even after having bi-annual climate change conferences and many agreements including the Kyoto Protocol and Copenhagen Accord.

Evaluating parties positions and actions, and communications of newspapers articles in terms of what parties said and what newspapers wrote on the issues are central. While the negotiations and associated factors (actors, positions, processes, strategies) and the media reports to explain positions and actions of the parties are treated as independent variable, the Kyoto Protocol and Copenhagen Accord's and their outcomes are treated as dependent variables in this research. This process determines who said what, who wrote what, or signed what, and who is seen as being responsible for what was said, who the intended audience was and how participants responded to negotiations and discussions leading to the lowest common denominator agreements. The roles played by different negotiating groups and COPs are carefully scrutinized and analysed along with newspapers accounts from 1997 to March 2012 on international climate change negotiations. The research then examines the way the negotiating blocs and COPs performed during the climate negotiations to determine the (un)common interests the participating states held and what influences they were able to exert on the negotiation processes.

Earlier many researchers divided climate change negotiations into North-South politics but now there are several negotiating blocs at international climate change

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<sup>33</sup> See chapter 2 for details.

negotiations including the Umbrella Group (UG), the European Union (EU), Group of 77+ China (G-77+ China), African Group (AG), Least Developing Countries (LDC), Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), and the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG). From Copenhagen there evolved new climate change alliances such as BASIC (Brazil, South Africa, India and China), IBSA (India, Brazil and South Africa), and USCI (United States, China and India). Given the changing scenario of the countries of the world, this research contextualizes the alterations and examines whether the framework and principles of the UNFCCC process reflected these changes and what new roles these emerging alliances have been forming at negotiations and whether they are making a paradigm shift to address climate change issues. Understanding the stances and the interests of the COPs sheds light on the major priorities of the parties and their overarching links with climate change negotiations and their likely impacts on their domestic politics, economy, and social lives of national societies.

### 3.5 Data Sources

The study will analyse primary and secondary data in order to understand key aspects of the international climate change negotiations and policy making. The primary sources of data are video webcasts of the entire UNFCCC process, the texts of the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accord, and the media accounts and commentary of these meetings. The *Earth Negotiations Bulletin* [ENB in cooperation with International Institute of Sustainable Development (IISD)] database is a balanced, timely and independent reporting service that provides daily information in print and electronic formats on the multilateral negotiations on environment and development.<sup>34</sup>

Generally, in the UNFCCC process, negotiation texts were developed, analysed word for word, contested, redrafted and renegotiated by COPs along with technical support from the Secretariat until a consensus was reached. Information relating to the prescribed two-track approach, Ad hoc Working Group-Kyoto

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<sup>34</sup> Earth Negotiations Bulletin, 'A Reporting Service for Environment and Sustainable Development Negotiations', <http://www.iisd.ca/enbvol/enb-background.htm>; See also Florian Weiler, 'Determinants of Bargaining Success in the Climate Change Negotiations', *Climate Policy* 12, no. 5 (2012): 552-74.

Protocol (AWG-KP) and Ad hoc Working Group – Long Term Cooperative Action (AWG-LCA), under the Kyoto Protocol and the UNFCCC was posted on UNFCCC's official website ([www.unfccc.int](http://www.unfccc.int)) by the Secretariat for networks and the individuals interested in climate change negotiations, such as governments, civil society and business link-ups.

In these ways the research highlights insights from the climate agreements, webcast documentaries of the UNFCCC's formal meetings of COP plenary sessions, UNFCCC Secretariat Press briefings of the progress made, the UN Press Conference on the progress of negotiations, and the non-state actors press conferences organized within the venue of COP centre of COP 13, COP 15 and onwards available online via UNFCCC's official website. The webcast documentaries are official records recorded in videos as and when they happened throughout the negotiations process of two weeks to make them publicly available to all interested parties to comprehend how countries were positioning themselves on climate negotiations and present the formal statements made by the COPs, the opinions expressed, what happened and why it happened.

These videos provide a more accurate picture of how parties behaved than one can gain by attending the two weeks negotiations. Indeed, "The secretariat provides full audio and video recordings for all official open plenary meetings in audio format and webcast on the Internet", where negotiations were finalized and adopted.<sup>35</sup> These sources are treated as the primary source of information by UNFCCC and treated in this research as observations on the behaviours of the parties at climate negotiations. The question and answer sessions during press briefings provides the formal views of the UNFCCC Secretariat, UN, COPs and non-state actors. The webcast data was collated, compared, contrasted and analysed with the outcomes, the Kyoto Protocol and Copenhagen Accord along with the accounts of newspapers.

This research is based predominantly on official documents/recordings of the UNFCCC and media's accounts but has been supplemented with some interviews with a number of relevant people. Attempts were made to conduct a number of

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<sup>35</sup> UNFCCC, 'Use of Cameras and Audio/Video Recording Devices at UNFCCC Sessions', <http://unfccc.int/press/items/5022.php>.

interviews via Skype with interview requests submitted to the UNFCCC chief, the US, China and Indian climate change ministries. The Indian environment ministry made a brief response and while the US and UNFCCC promised interviews they never happened. Therefore, collecting the world leaders' opinions from direct quotations of the newspapers/media became an alternative source for interviews where necessary because their opinions were abundantly available in the media and press briefing on-demand webcast of UNFCCC.

The secondary sources of data include the related UN official documents, public documents, press releases, websites, and opinions given to newspapers by UN/climate deal officials, states' representatives at climate summits and observers, related journal articles and textbooks. This study focused on the fundamental data for the core research from the Kyoto Protocol and background to it, the Copenhagen Accord and background to it, and the behaviours of the selected media accounts.

The newsprint media is central to this study because of its critical role in disseminating information, helping to shape national and public opinions as a primary source of information around the world. While there is a sizable literature on climate change issues there is a clear gap in the literature about the nexus of the media and climate change negotiations. Moreover, there is no research that combines tripartite data (agreements, process and media) in analysing the climate process. Media accounts bring insights from the 663 articles on international climate change negotiations collected from 5 leading newspapers by using textual analysis of the news frames<sup>36</sup> in determining how the media has portrayed the issues of climate change and sought to influence the climate change negotiation processes.

This research draws on data from reliable and leading newspaper sources, particularly editorial and opinion articles from 1997 to 2012 of current developments both online and in-print on the climate change debate, including the international climate change negotiations and the politics inherent in reports.

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<sup>36</sup> For more on news framing see: Robert M. Entman, 'Framing: Towards clarification of a fractured paradigm', *Journal of Communication*, 43, no. 4(1993): 51-58; see also, C. H. de. Vreese, 'News framing: Theory and typology', *Information Design Journal + Document Design* 13, no.1 (2005): 51-62.



There has been a huge flow of information on the climate change issue but only articles that focus on the UNFCCC climate change negotiations and were related to COP-3, the Kyoto Protocol, and up to and including COP 17 and the Durban Summit were examined to see how the negotiations and the debate on climate change was moving ahead. The five newspapers selected enable an assessment to be made of the way in which the climate change debate developed and how the UN responses were reported by leading newspapers over the period covered in this research.

The newspapers selected are: 1) *Wall Street Journal*, a national ranking and leading newspaper in the US, widely recognized at home and abroad and cited by many research studies; it has the largest circulation in the US.<sup>37</sup> 2) The *New York Times* is another leading paper nationally and internationally with the largest circulation of its Sunday newspaper and online editions.<sup>38</sup> 3) The *Guardian United Kingdom* is another leading newspaper around the world with a long experience of covering environmental and climate issues in a highly reputable way. It has a separate section, 'Guardian Environment Network', that provides extensive coverage of many aspects of climate change negotiations. 4) The *Hindu* is one of the most prominent newspapers of India and has a strong tradition of opinion articles written by people of wide repute. It is one of the top two largest circulated English dailies in India.<sup>39</sup> The *Hindu* is widely acknowledged as the reading material of those in agenda setting positions in India.<sup>40</sup> 5) The *China Daily* is the leading English newspaper published in print and online in China. It is China's "flagship English language newspaper" and window into China with the largest circulation in China and abroad.<sup>41</sup>

The rationale behind the selection of these newspapers was not based on whether they were conservative or progressive, but their national and international

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<sup>37</sup> Audit Bureau of Circulation, 'The Top U.S. Newspapers for March 2012', *News Bulletin Connection*, <http://accessabc.wordpress.com/2012/05/01/the-top-u-s-newspapers-for-march-2012/>

<sup>38</sup> Ibid.

<sup>39</sup> Audit Bureau of Circulation, 'Circulation Figures of Member Publications for the Audit Period January-June 2012', <http://www.auditbureau.org/>

<sup>40</sup> IndiaStat, 'IndiaStat Online Media Database, 2007', <http://www.indiastat.com>; P. Sonwalkar, 'Murdochization' of the Indian Press: From By-line to Bottom line. *Media Culture and Society* 24, no. 6 (2002):821–834.

<sup>41</sup> Riva Gold, 'North Asia Sweats Heatwave', *WSJ*, August 12, 2013, A11. See also Wikipedia, The Free Encyclopaedia, 'China Daily,' Last Modified 22 August 2012, [http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China\\_Daily](http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/China_Daily)

reputation as being in the group of top newspapers widely read and constantly used by researchers.<sup>42</sup> These five newspapers have credibility, are widely recognized, are ranked highly and have been extensively used by other researchers and recognized as ‘prestige press’ of those countries.<sup>43</sup> Although limited, these papers also present views from both the English speaking world and the non-English speaking world, and from both Annex I (developed) and Non-Annex I (developing) countries bringing the understanding and perspectives of the many different categories of Conferences of Parties. Another rationale behind choosing these newspapers was to examine the roles of newspapers in major emitting countries. Copenhagen and post-Copenhagen negotiations saw gradual movement toward a paradigm shift, giving primary decision making roles to the US, China, India and the EU. For this reason, newspapers from the US, UK, China and India were included. By including the two US newspapers what was offered was very different stances from the US on climate change and what should be done about it. This will be discussed further in chapters 6 and 7.

It could be argued that at least one newspaper from each of the countries participating in the negotiations should have been included. But with around 192 countries involved in the climate change negotiations it was well beyond the resources and scope of this research to embark on such a large number of publications. The main objective of the research is to locate why there has been such little progress on international climate change negotiations and finding answers to these questions requires that major emitting countries such as China, India and the US gain the priority. It is one thing to include newspapers from all the countries of the world and quite another to set goals to understand the international climate governance in a limited time with limited resources.

The *Factiva* database, *Google* and individual website archives of the newspapers were used to extract the data. *Factiva* offers the world's most comprehensive collection of news.<sup>44</sup> The *Factiva* search produced several articles that were repetitions. The researcher had to check each of the articles to avoid repetition.

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<sup>42</sup> Maxwell T. Boykoff and Jules M. Boykoff, ‘Balanced as Bias: Global Warming and US Prestige Press’, *Global Environmental Change* 14 (2004): 125-36; see also: Maxwell T. Boykoff, ‘Flogging the Dead Norm? Newspaper Coverage of Anthropogenic Climate Change in the United States and United Kingdom’, *Area* 39, no. 4 (2007): 470-81.

<sup>43</sup> Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004.

<sup>44</sup> Dow Jones, ‘Factiva’, <http://www.dowjones.com/factiva/index.asp>.

The *Factiva* search could not produce enough related articles and therefore *Google* and individual website archives were used. Although very time consuming and frustrating, *Google* and the individual newspapers' website archives produced the most of the articles that were of major importance to this project. Search terms used were '(editorial or opinion) and (global warming or climate change) and (Kyoto Protocol or Copenhagen Accord) and (UN climate change negotiations)'. The focus was on the UN climate change negotiations. In addition to the five newspapers' editorials and opinion pieces, some materials were also obtained from the *CNN*, *BBC*, *CBC*, *All Jazeera* and *AFP*, as a way of updating knowledge on the global climate change debate and negotiations.

Newspapers have long played critical roles in shaping public opinion.<sup>45</sup> How the stories of climate change developed and how the perceptions of climate change were seen as affecting negotiations and processes of policy making are of particular interest to this study. How newspapers may be seen to shape public opinion on the issues and whether they had an impact on decision making on international climate change governance is one approach to understanding the role of the media on the climate change issue. How the leading newspapers expressed different views on the many aspects of climate change negotiations, and how they disseminated knowledge to make the politicians, world leaders and national societies aware of the issues is central to this research.

Therefore, as noted above, this study has used primarily 5 newspapers from around the world. In addition, some secondary data will also be drawn from other newspapers and Television news sources because the key strength of case study is to use multiple sources of data information<sup>46</sup> but these are used to develop understanding of climate change negotiation perceptions and are not treated as main sources of data for the study. The case study of this research will have insights from related academic literature as indicated, but in particular, the data for this study will be drawn from the following:

1. The Kyoto Protocol 1997 and further developments

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<sup>45</sup> Deserai A. Crow and Maxwell T. Boykoff, *Culture, Politics and Climate Change: How Information Shapes Our Future* (London and New York: Earthscan, 2014).

<sup>46</sup> Yin, 2003, 23.

2. The Copenhagen Accord 2009 and subsequent developments

3. Newspapers: *New York Times*, *Wall Street Journal*, *The Guardian*, UK, *The Hindu* and *China Daily*.

### 3.6 Frame Analysis of the Media

Five newspapers' articles available both in print and online are examined by textual analysis of frame covering a time period of 1997 to 2012. Studying the media is consistent with studying society and the issues of society. Editorials, opinions and news analysis are forms of public discourse, which reproduce existing opinions, values, ideologies, and power structures.<sup>47</sup> Media sources are not neutral and play an active role in shaping perspectives, which can trigger actions for future development. A good method for analysing editorials and opinions is through framing.<sup>48</sup> Frames are interpretive packages and at the core of the interpretive package is "a central organizing idea or frame of making sense of relevant events, suggesting what is at issue".<sup>49</sup>

Gitlin defined frames as persistent patterns of cognition, interpretation, and presentation of the selection, emphasis and exclusion by which symbol handlers routinely organize discourse.<sup>50</sup> Entman defined framing as selecting "some aspects of a perceived reality" and making them "more salient in a communicating text, in such a way as to promote a particular problem definition, casual interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described".<sup>51</sup> Frames should not be confused with agreement, disagreement and positions for or against some policy measure because frames are shared. They can be generic and issue specific. With the aim of examining the central question in this research, issue specific frames have been used as part of the media analyses.

When an issue or a conflict reaches a stalemate such as occurred in the climate change negotiations, neither side can impose its will on the other and each can veto whatever the other proposes, framing offers a way to assess whether or not

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<sup>47</sup> Teun A van Dijk ed., *Discourse and Communication* (Berlin: Walter De Gruyter, 1985a), 232.

<sup>48</sup> Teun A van Dijk, ed., *Handbook of Discourse Analysis* (London: Academic Press, 1985b).

<sup>49</sup> W. Gamson and A. Modigliani, 'Media Dicourse and Public Opinion on Nuclear Power: A Constructivist Approach', *American Journal of Sociology* 95, no. 1 (1989): 1-37.

<sup>50</sup> T. Gitlin, *The Whole World is Watching* (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1980).

<sup>51</sup> Entman, 1993, 52.

the debates are working.<sup>52</sup> Framing refers to the effects of presentation of judgment and choice.<sup>53</sup> The author selects and presents information in such a way that it first resonates with readers and then persuades them to reach specific opinions. Lakoff, the linguist, adds to the definition of framing, stating that they are cognitive structures that allow human beings to understand their reality.<sup>54</sup> Conceptual frames shape our thinking in a similar way. The concepts we use provide borders and modes of thought for drawing inferences beyond them. For example, using words such as “crimes against humanity” in America’s post-9/11 context will resonate with moral and political principles deep in the American readerships’ unconscious minds. These frames then shape how they experience political relationships to their own leaders and people in other countries.

To understand framing, Lakoff explains that using a word such as ‘war’, triggers fundamental moral and political principle frames that evoke an evil world in which we must look to an authoritarian President as commander-in-chief, whose orders we obey in order to protect our entire society from destruction by foreign enemies. With these frames dominating our thinking, we are more likely to tolerate giving up some of our civil liberties and dropping bombs that kill innocent civilians.<sup>55</sup> Framing is a central discursive strategy that occurs in virtually all genres of discourse and may be used as a very powerful method of persuasion, often having profound political, social or behavioural consequences.<sup>56</sup>

The concept of framing recognizes frames and framing strategies in a variety of discourse types, in framing analysis as a part of discourse analysis, and in using framing strategies themselves. Framing is about moral values, deep truths, and the policies that flow from them.<sup>57</sup> “Framing is about getting language that fits your

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<sup>52</sup> Daniel D. Perlmuter and Robert L. Rothstein, *The Challenge of Climate Change: Which Way Now?* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 196.

<sup>53</sup> Shanto Iyengar, ‘Framing Responsibility for Political Issues’, *Annals for the American Academy of Political Social Science* 546 (1996): 61.

<sup>54</sup> George Lakoff, *Whose Freedom? The Battle over America’s Most Important Idea* (New York: Picador, 2007).

<sup>55</sup> Ibid.

<sup>56</sup> Entman 1993; de Vreese 2005.

<sup>57</sup> George Lakoff and Elisabeth Wehling, ‘Obama vs. Romney: The Framing Matchup, Round One’, *Huntingtonpost*, July 18, 2012, [http://www.huffingtonpost.com/george-lakoff/obama-romney-slogan\\_b\\_1605212.html](http://www.huffingtonpost.com/george-lakoff/obama-romney-slogan_b_1605212.html)

world. It is not just language. The ideas are primary – and the language carries those ideas and evokes those ideas”.<sup>58</sup>

As the framing can follow a number of approaches, the critical discourse analyst van Dijk has defined three elements in his schematic for framing in newspaper editorial and opinion pieces. These include: definition, explanation, and moral/recommendation<sup>59</sup> or “moral evaluation” for the item described.<sup>60</sup> These three categories are more than just descriptive; they simultaneously equate to three functions. Editorials/articles not only express an opinion about a recent news event, but are also intended to persuade a reading public. As such, the text must contain argumentative structures. The three categories that van Dijk outlines collectively buttress the persuasive power of an article.

The first category, definition, summarizes an event. It answers the question ‘What happened?’, where the information focuses on the present or very recent past. In order to write an opinion article and evaluate an incident, it is sometimes necessary to review the events, select relevant dimensions of the story, and focus on specific actions or political actors. This summary encapsulates the definition. However, the definition is not necessarily a straightforward, objective element. Rather, reviewing, selecting, and focusing presuppose ideologically framed opinions which are part of the editor’s cognitive model, or worldview, of the situation.<sup>61</sup> Second, editorials and opinion articles contain explanations which seek to account for the causes of an event and to answer the question ‘Why did it happen?’ The argumentation scheme may use a variety of strategies such as facts and figures as data. The scheme can also explain a circumstance through the lens of history<sup>62</sup> evaluating why something happened.

The third element of an editorial or an opinion article is the recommendations or moral stance. These are the natural consequences or conclusions from argumentation positioned by definition and evaluation. This aspect of the articles

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<sup>58</sup> George Lakoff, *Don’t Think of an Elephant! Know Your Values and Frame the Debate* (Vermont, Canada: Chelsea Green Publishing, 2004), 4.

<sup>59</sup> Teun A van Dijk, ‘Race, Riots and the Press: An Analysis of Editorials in the British Press About 1985 Disorders’, *Gazette* 43, (1989): 229-253.

<sup>60</sup> Entman, 1993, 52.

<sup>61</sup> Ibid, 236.

<sup>62</sup> Ruth Wodak, ‘The Discourse Historical Approach’, in *Methods of Critical Discourse Analysis*, eds., R. Wodak and M. Mayers, 63-94 (London: Sage, 2001), 75.

makes predictions and answers the question ‘What will happen?’ or ‘What might happen?’ In addition, the recommendations/morals offer the most robust tone to answer the question ‘What should be done?’ The advice laid down in these sections is often targeted towards gaining an understanding of the ruling elites or concerned parties including policy makers. Together these categories form an argument, often through making the editorial or the opinion article’s locus credible and making other positions flawed.

Frames become invaluable tools for presenting relatively complex issues, such as stem cell research or climate change, efficiently and in a way that makes them accessible to lay audiences because they play to existing cognitive schemas.<sup>63</sup> McCombs argued that framing is simply a more refined version of agenda setting.<sup>64</sup> From that perspective, framing means making aspects of an issue more salient through different modes of presentation and therefore shifting people’s attitudes.<sup>65</sup> He labels this phenomenon ‘second-level agenda setting’. Framing does not focus on which topics or issues are selected for coverage by the news media, but instead on the particular ways those issues are presented.<sup>66</sup>

Entman, and de Vreese’s framework of textual analysis of frame is applied to this case study of this thesis as it is the most suitable for assessing mainly opinion articles in the newspaper to “promote a particular problem definition, casual interpretation, moral evaluation, and/or treatment recommendation for the item described”.<sup>67</sup> Articles/data have been processed by using textual analysis of issue specific frame to arrive at findings. Three issue specific frames/themes (Shaping Perception of Climate Change Science; Setting Issues and Agenda for Negotiations and Democracy Debate in the Media) are developed based on Entman and de Vreese’s framework in chapter 7 for finding responses on the propositions developed in chapter 2. The climate change values held by the newspapers, their understanding of democracy, the importance that they attach to

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<sup>63</sup> Dietram A. Scheufele and David Tewksbury, ‘Framing, Agenda Setting, and Priming: The Evolution of Three Media Effects Models’, *Journal of Communication* 57 (2007): 9-20.

<sup>64</sup> Maxwell E. McCombs, *Setting the Agenda: The Mass Media and Public Opinion* (Malden, MA: Blackwell, 2004).

<sup>65</sup> Scheufele and Tewksbury, 2007.

<sup>66</sup> V. Price, and D. Tewksbury, ‘News Values and Public Opinion: A Theoretical Account of Media Priming and Framing’, in *Progress in Communication Sciences: Advances in Persuasion*, eds., G. A. Barrett and F. J. Boster, 173–212 (Greenwich, CT: Ablex, 1997).

<sup>67</sup> Entman, 1993, 52.

solving problems through agenda setting and (non) adherence to governments' positions are also evaluated. This multidisciplinary approach helps answer the central research question and its three sub questions as noted above. The answers to these questions are then interpreted within the larger context of international climate change governance, taking into account the current negotiations and political situation along with historical information production and dissemination of print media.

### **3.7 Limitations of the Approach and Methodology**

This case study may not be generalized with other issues of global governance. Although the concerns of democratic deficit and state-centric framework may be generalized, the role of media will differ from one environmental issue to another. This research has not sought to examine the arguments concerning the origins of, and reasons for, climate change but focuses instead on the difficulties the international community has had in seeking to address major global issues. Moreover, the research seeks to explain the causes of slow progress in the making of an effective international climate change governance to prevent climate change in a holistic way but does not offer a prescription for a successful and effective climate agreement. Instead, it argues that various alternative models and approaches need to be used to reduce the existing level of democratic deficit, to be more inclusive in the state-centric framework and that a more socially responsible media be developed as pre-requisites in addressing climate change.

Expecting that a computer aided software program would reduce time and help in the process of data analysis, the researcher learnt to use Nvivo – a computer aided software program claimed to be useful for qualitative data analysis – and was supported in this by the university which purchased the software. However, the software proved to be rather limiting and disappointing. Nvivo was useful in finding specific words which led to the identification of relevant material, but in terms of understanding the context for textual analysis, necessary for this study, it was not very useful and its use was discontinued.



### 3.8 Conclusion

This chapter has shown that the methods of data collection, types of data collected and their analysis requires a mixed method to answer the core research question *why has there been little progress in the making of an effective international climate change governance to prevent climate change?* The case study section clarified how this research should proceed to highlight the lack of progress in climate change negotiations and policy making. Within climate change developments the Kyoto Protocol and the Copenhagen Accord along with media accounts of both of these events are key in responding to the case study analyses, the research questions and propositions generated in chapter 2. In the research design section, the independent and dependent variables and the strong connections between central research question, subset of research questions and propositions concerning a democratic deficit, state-centric framework and the role of media have been identified.

As the central goal of the thesis is to answer the propositions, three sub research questions and one main question, data has been drawn from wide range of sources: legal documents and webcast videos of UNFCCC, media accounts mainly from five newspapers (several other newspapers and TV commentaries have been used to observe the developments of climate change debate and negotiations), the use of databases such as ENB, IEA, EIA, NOAA and NEAA utilizing mixed method for the research. Editorial, opinion articles and news analysis are of the major interest of this research as they reproduce existing opinions, values, ideologies and power structures and this will also be contextualized in processing and analysing media data. For the analysis of the media data, Entman and de Vreese's frame analysis of opinionated articles will be applied in chapter 7 along with evaluation. Specific frame analysis has been used. Although the newspapers used many different frames in presenting the news, to answer the central research question the author, after sampling and coding the newspapers, developed three issue specific frames: 'Shaping perception of Climate Change Science', 'Setting Issues and Agendas for Negotiations', and 'Democracy Debate in the Media' to examine how the newspapers' contributed on the three topics of particular interest in chapter 7. The chapters ahead will put the methodology discussion of this chapter into context.

## **Chapter 4**

### **Kyoto Climate Conference and the Kyoto Protocol**

#### **4.1 Introduction**

As outlined in Chapter 1, international climate change negotiations under the United Nations (UN) platform commenced with the formal establishment of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992, and included the voluntary pledges of signatories. These voluntary pledges against climate change were considered to be inadequate and the Conference of the Parties (COPs) negotiated a new agreement at COP-3 on December 10, 1997 in Kyoto, Japan. The most significant achievement of COP-3 was the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol (KP), a far reaching international climate change agreement at the time in an effort to constrain global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions and to reduce the threat of anthropogenic global climate change.

In accordance with Article 24 of the KP it was open for signature from 16 March 1998 to 15 March 1999 at the UN Headquarters, New York. By that date the Protocol had received 84 signatures.<sup>68</sup> Finally, the KP came into force on February 16, 2005 when more than 55 countries incorporating industrialized countries responsible for at least 55 per cent of global carbon dioxide emissions had ratified it. The ratification process took almost 8 years to meet the threshold set by the Protocol. Two major industrialized countries, the United States (US) and Australia, did not ratify the Protocol when it was concluded. Australia ratified it in 2007 but the US has never ratified the Protocol.

The primary objective of the KP was to stabilize emissions below 5 per cent of 1990 levels and prevent further environmental deterioration and “limit dangerous human interference with the climate system”.<sup>69</sup> Some scholars and commentators have argued that the KP was a most significant document in developing the environmental regime whereas others viewed it as a document of compromise. The targets agreed at the KP, the result of compromise, bore little relationship to

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<sup>68</sup> See UNFCCC, ‘Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol’, [http://unfccc.int/kyoto\\_protocol/status\\_of\\_ratification/items/2613.php](http://unfccc.int/kyoto_protocol/status_of_ratification/items/2613.php).

<sup>69</sup> UN, ‘Climate Change: The Negotiations’, <http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/climatechange/pages/gateway/the-negotiations>.

what was required to make a serious impact on global warming.<sup>70</sup> The 5 per cent target of emission reductions was below the recommendation of the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC).<sup>71</sup> Recent data shows a rollercoaster increase in global GHG emissions raising serious questions about the significance of the KP. A few member states may be on track to meet their targets but most of the states were struggling and there has been little progress in reducing the emissions of GHG. In 2008-2010, the EU-15 as a whole was almost 2% below the target, an achievement that was facilitated to some extent by the recent economic crisis but in terms of the EU 27, Australia, Japan, and Russia, all failed to achieve their Kyoto targets.<sup>72</sup> China, India and the US remained major emitters.

So far, studies of climate change have focused mainly on the domestic groups lobbying for states to accept or reject ratification of the Protocol.<sup>73</sup> This chapter investigates the reasons for the slow progress in relation to a democratic deficit and state-centrism, as discussed in chapter 2, in the development of the Protocol.

The first section presents the background and context for the development of the KP before setting out the characteristics of the KP, with particular reference to the distinction between Annex I and Non-Annex I parties and the perennial problem this distinction created. Whether, and to what extent, the Kyoto decision making was in accord with the UN vision of global democracy is then assessed. The next section analyses whether the KP met environmental concerns or whether it was an agreement of compromise. The effectiveness of the Kyoto mechanism is analysed, including the emission trading scheme (ETS), Joint Implementation (JI) and Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) and concludes that Kyoto's flexible mechanisms have not played any significant role in the abatement of global GHG emissions. Next it explores the national interests of the major emitters and concludes that the major emitters had put economic interests over the environmental concerns. Section 4.7 explores why major emitters either ratified

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<sup>70</sup> Anthony Giddens, *The Politics of Climate Change* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 2009).

<sup>71</sup> IPCC, Working Group III: Mitigation of Climate Change, (Geneva: IPCC, 2007e).

<sup>72</sup> Corina Haita, 'The State of Compliance on the Kyoto Protocol: ICCG Reflection No. 12/2012', International Center for Climate Governance, [http://www.iccgov.org/FilePagineStatiche/Files/Publications/Reflections/12\\_Reflection\\_December\\_2012.pdf](http://www.iccgov.org/FilePagineStatiche/Files/Publications/Reflections/12_Reflection_December_2012.pdf).

<sup>73</sup> Aaron M. McCright and Riley D. Dunlap, 'Defeating Kyoto: The Conservative Movement's Impact on U.S. Climate Change Policy', *Social Problems* 50, no. 3 (2003): 348-73.

the Protocol or refused to ratify it followed by the conclusion.

## 4.2 Background and Context

Since the early 1980s, an international consensus on the reality and seriousness of climate change has been debated, including several comprehensive reports from the National Academy of Sciences and National Research Council 1983 and 2001, and from the IPCC in 1990, 1995, 2001, 2007 and the World Climate Program 1985.<sup>74</sup> Increasing scientific evidence of human interaction with the climate system, coupled with growing public concern over global environmental issues, began to push climate change onto the political agenda by the mid-1980s. Considering the seriousness of climate change the United Nations General Assembly (UNGA) took up the issue for the first time when it was proposed by the government of Malta and adopted resolution 43/53 for the “Protection of global climate change for present and future generations”.<sup>75</sup> According to the IPCC, emissions resulting from human activities were substantially increasing the atmospheric concentrations of the GHGs: carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>), methane, chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs) and nitrous oxide.<sup>76</sup> The IPCC confirmed that human-induced climate change was the most likely threat and called for a global climate change treaty to address the problem,<sup>77</sup> resulting in the establishment of UNFCCC.

The UNFCCC 1992 was the second major international legal instrument to address the problems of global environmental change<sup>78</sup> and came into force on March 21, 1994 with 189 Parties to the Convention (188 states and 1 European Community). Its membership in 2012 had reached 195.<sup>79</sup> It enjoys one of the highest rates of membership among Multilateral Environmental Agreements (MEAs). The first of its kind was the Vienna Convention for the Protection of Ozone Layer (POL) with its Montreal Protocol on Substances adopted on 16

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<sup>74</sup> Ibid.

<sup>75</sup> UNFCCC, ‘A Guide to the Climate Change Convention Process’, Bonn: *Climate Change Secretariat*, 2002.

<sup>76</sup> See IPCC, *First Assessment Report: Preface to the IPCC Overview* (Geneva: IPCC, 1990).

<sup>77</sup> See Ibid.

<sup>78</sup> Irving M. Mintzer and J. Amber Leonard, ‘Vision of a Changing World’, in *Negotiating Climate Change: The Inside Story of the Rio Convention*, eds. Chris Hope and Jim Skea, 3-44 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1994).

<sup>79</sup> UN, ‘Climate Change: The Negotiations’, <http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/climatechange/pages/gateway/the-negotiations>.

September 1987 for restoring the depleted ozone layer. After more than ten years of intense scientific research and nearly two years of intense diplomatic negotiations, UNFCCC moved forward with aspirations of measures to reduce the risks of rapid climate change.<sup>80</sup>

The UNFCCC stated in 1992 that the increases of GHG enhanced the natural greenhouse effect, and would result in warming of the Earth's surface and atmosphere to the point where such change may adversely affect natural ecosystems and humankind.<sup>81</sup> It recognized that the climate system was a shared resource whose stability could be affected by industrial and other emissions of CO<sub>2</sub> and other GHGs.<sup>82</sup> In support of the UNFCCC aims, and with agreement to a legally binding targets, the KP was adopted on December 11, 1997 in Kyoto, Japan, and came into effect in 2005 after the threshold was met following the ratification of the Russian Federation. The major distinction between the 1992 Convention and the KP is that the Convention only encouraged developed countries to stabilize GHG emissions whereas the Protocol committed industrialized countries to legally binding targets.

The KP developed four different commitments: 1) stabilizing GHGs; 2) binding targets for developed countries; 3) new tools for reducing emissions; 4) monitoring compliance.<sup>83</sup> Development of the mechanism for monitoring compliance was to support implementation of the three tools/mechanisms and compliance with the binding commitments of Annex I Parties. Table 4.1 provides the brief but significant issues of Protocol. It illustrates that the Protocol gave different targets to individual Annex I countries with an aggregate goal of reducing emissions by 5 per cent below the level of 1990. The principle common but differentiated responsibility (CBDR) and flexible mechanisms are important features of the Protocol to achieve the targets.

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<sup>80</sup> Mintzer and Leonard, 1994.

<sup>81</sup> See UNFCCC, *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change* (Bonn: Climate Change Secretariat, 1992).

<sup>82</sup> Ibid.

<sup>83</sup> Gateway to the UN System's Work on Climate Change, 'Commitments Under the Kyoto Protocol', <http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/climatechange/pages/gateway/the-negotiations/the-un-climate-change-convention-and-the-kyoto-protocol>.

**Table 4.1: Key Elements of the Kyoto Protocol 1997**

- General commitments from all parties.
- Specific individual emission targets from Annex I parties in general and Annex II parties in particular.
- Emission reduction target: 5 per cent below the level of 1990.
- Emission targets cover CO<sub>2</sub>, CH<sub>4</sub>, N<sub>2</sub>O, HFC<sub>s</sub>, PFC<sub>s</sub>, SF<sub>6</sub>.
- Flexibility Mechanisms: Joint Implementation (JI); Clean Development Mechanism (CDM); Emission Trading Scheme (ETS).
- Reporting and review procedures for Annex I parties.
- Compliance system.
- Regular reviews.
- Common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) among parties.
- Rules of Procedure: Consensual decision making among parties: for KP, 55 countries incorporating industrialized countries which are responsible for at least 55 per cent of global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, needed to ratify to be effective.

### **4.3 Characteristics of the Kyoto Protocol**

According to CBC News in 2007: “Depending on who you talk to, the KP was either a) an expensive, bureaucratic solution to fix a problem that may not even exist; or b) the last, best chance to save the world from the ‘time bomb’ of global warning”.<sup>84</sup> The scientific evidence of climate change was gradually mounting even if it was unclear how much human beings were contributing to it and the actual risks of climate change. Yet, it was relevant that solutions be sought, and made binding for industrialized countries. Under the KP Annex I parties were required to make demonstrable progress in achieving their commitments by 2005. It took account of economies in transition (EITs) by providing some flexibility within Annex I parties. It also required parties to initiate post-Kyoto commitment negotiations seven years before the expiry of the KP. The KP was built on the principles set by Article 3 of the 1992 UNFCCC which involved the continuation of the policies of the Convention. The policies introduced in Article 3 are:<sup>85</sup>

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<sup>84</sup> ‘In Depth Kyoto and Beyond’, *CBC News*, February 14, 2007, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/kyoto>.

<sup>85</sup> See Article 3 of UNFCCC 1992.

1) The parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities.

2) Developed countries should take the lead in combating climate change and adverse effects thereof. The specific needs and special circumstances of developing country parties, particularly vulnerable, should be given full consideration.

3) Parties should work towards sustainable development, sustainable economic growth and take appropriate mitigation measures which should be integrated with national development programmes.

#### **4.4 Annex I and Non-Annex I Classification**

All parties to the global climate change negotiations were categorized as either Annex I (industrialised/developed countries) or Non-Annex I (non-industrialised/developing countries). The KP makes a clear distinction between industrialized and developing countries' GHGs reduction requirements.<sup>86</sup> It was founded on the principles of CBDR and historical responsibility (HR) – the leadership role of Annex I or industrialized countries.<sup>87</sup> CBDR refers to the concept that while all countries had a common responsibility to address global climate change, the industrialized countries had a special responsibility for their greater historical contribution to climate change, greater per-capita emissions, and greater financial and technological resources.<sup>88</sup> The assumption was that the industrialized countries would take the lead role and gradually the developing countries would move to achieve that goal but the Protocol did not set any particular time-span for the graduation period of developing countries, unlike that of the ozone layer regime where “developing countries accepted binding controls

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<sup>86</sup> See Article 1.7 of the UNFCCC, *Kyoto Protocol* (Bonn: Climate Change Secretariat, 1998). The Kyoto Protocol requires Annex I signatories to limit – usually reduce – their greenhouse gases (overall by about 5 per cent). It places no limitations on developing countries. For a summary of climate change negotiations, see the summary reports at <http://www.iisd.ca/linkages/climate/reports.html>.

<sup>87</sup> See Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC 1992.

<sup>88</sup> Joanna Depledge, ‘Continuing Kyoto: Extending Absolute Emission Caps to Developing Countries’, in *Building in Kyoto Protocol: Options for Protecting Climate*, ed. Kevin B. Baumert et.al, 31-60 (Washington: World Resources Institute, 2002).

to reduce the use of ODS under the Montreal Protocol”.<sup>89</sup>

The Annex I and Non-Annex I division created a gulf between the industrialized and the developing countries. The developing countries first wanted to see the responses made by the industrialized countries, while the industrialized countries waited for the developing countries to share the responsibility. The different parties/groups looked at the climate change from different angles and the issue became politicized as these different parties presented conflicting propositions based on their interests. The difficulties arising from the principles of CBDR along with the categorization of Annex I (developed) and Non-Annex I (developing) countries will be further contextualized in the discussion of the making of the Copenhagen Accord in 5.2 section of Chapter 5.

Within Annex I is Annex II which refers to advanced industrialized countries whereas Annex I includes industrialized countries as well as EITs, countries in economic transition. The Annex I and Non-Annex I were further divided into different negotiating groups having different interest coalitions, some of which came from official UN listings, including Small Island Developing Countries (SIDS), the Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS), Least Developed Countries (LDCs), Group-77 (G-77), Umbrella Group (UG), Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC), European Union (EU) and the Environmental Integrity Group (EIG), which came to existence in 2000.

#### **4.5 Kyoto Decision Making: the UN Vision of Global Democracy**

Chapter 2 discussed the UN vision of global democracy noting that international organizations (IOs) have been accountable only to their member states and that their legitimacy was exclusively dependent on their member states. But, in practice, at a functional level, IOs have long had to work in conjunction with non-state entities and be accountable to them as well as to member states. For example, were the World Health Organisation (WHO) and Millennium Development Goals (MDGs) to propose actions which did not have the support and agreement of the relevant non-state entities then there would be no effective action as its authority and effectiveness would be challenged by non-state actors and transnational

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<sup>89</sup> Pamela S. Chasek, David L. Downie and Janet Welsh Brown, *Global Environmental Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2010), 202.



networks. In more recent concerns about the environment, non-state actors have been demanding more transparency from IOs and greater participation by relevant actors, state and non-state, in addressing the democratic deficit.<sup>90</sup> Several scholars have questioned the democratic deficit and accountability of global governance institutions such as the WTO, the IMF and others.<sup>91</sup> Although the WTO and IMF are not UN institutions, the degree of democratic deficit related to these institutions is significant. Decision making processes have given little access to wider societal groups and many member states, particularly the developing countries, argue that their voices often go unheard.<sup>92</sup>

Many UN reports in the 1990s concluded that the UN needed to be more democratic in its decision making processes. Global democracy is considered to be either the implementation of a world state or democratization of all world governments, or reforming existing states and international organizations for the democratic management of global problems.<sup>93</sup> The UN raised public awareness of environmental issues through a series of thematic conferences such as the Earth Summit 1992 in Rio with NGOs making a significant contribution, demonstrating that global problems cannot be solved in an exclusively intergovernmental realm.<sup>94</sup> These problems need global responses that include states and societal actors because “the ultimate addressees of regulations issued by international organizations are largely societal actors”.<sup>95</sup> The UN top officials showed deep interest in democratizing the UN and their analyses were affirmed when the democratization of the UN was officially declared “the central and overarching

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<sup>90</sup> Kate O'Neill, *The Environment and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

<sup>91</sup> Elizabeth Smythe and Peter J. Smith, *Legitimacy, Transparency and Information Technology: The World Trade Organization in an Era of Contentious Trade Politics*, Trans. Cynthia Schoch (New York: Palgrave, 2006); Jean-Marc Coicaud, ‘Reflections on International Organizations and International Legitimacy: Constraints, Pathologies and Possibilities’, *International Social Science Journal* 53, no. 170 (2001): 525-36; and Michael Zurn, ‘Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems’, *Government and Opposition* 39, no 2 (2004): 260-87.

<sup>92</sup> Jeffrey Atik, ‘Global Trade Issues in the New Millennium: Democratizing the WTO’, *George Washington International Law Review* 33 (2001): 451-72.

<sup>93</sup> Richard Falk and Andrew Strauss, ‘On the Creation of a Global Peoples Assembly: Legitimacy and the Power of Popular Sovereignty’, *Stanford Journal of International Law* 36 (2000): 191–220.

<sup>94</sup> Daniele Archibugi, ‘Democracy at the United Nations’, in *The Changing Nature of Democracy*, eds. Takashi Inoguchi, Edward Newman, and John Keane, 244-54 (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 1998b).

<sup>95</sup> Zurn, 2004, 268; and Neil Carter, *The Politics of Environment: Ideas, Activism, Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

objective of the 2008 session of the General Assembly”.<sup>96</sup> It opened the windows for NGOs to be participants in most of the international meetings that deal with the issues of public importance.

In the process of democratization, unlike that proposed by the cosmopolitan democrats, the UN looked to a new mode of governance system which involved consensual decision making process among states and involvement of the non-state actors to decentralize the roles of states through “politics above and below the state”.<sup>97</sup> NGOs have been important contributors in the UN system since 1945.<sup>98</sup> Although only 400 NGOs were registered until the 25<sup>th</sup> birthday of the UN, the UN boosted non-state involvement in international public policy making by embarking upon a series of major world conferences and summits through the 1990s and by launching the Global Compact<sup>99</sup> which asked companies to embrace universal principles and to partner with the UN. It has grown to become a critical platform for the UN to engage effectively with enlightened global business.<sup>100</sup> NGOs have access to intergovernmental meetings, present written statements, make speeches, and lobby for specific texts to be adopted. Thus, the UN vision of global democracy defined UN intergovernmental forum and non-state actors’ partnership as “voluntary and collaborative relationships between various parties, both state and non-state, in which participants agree to work together to achieve a common purpose or undertake a specific task”.<sup>101</sup>

Developing an agreement on global climate change negotiations involves a complex process of bargaining primarily among the states. As observers, NGOs

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<sup>96</sup> Jean-Philippe Thérin and Madeleine Bélanger Dumontier, ‘The United Nations and Global Democracy: From Discourse to Deeds’, *Cooperation and Conflict* 44, no. 4 (2009): 355-77; and See also UN News service 2008.

<sup>97</sup> Paul Wapner, *Environmental Activism and World Civic Politics* (Albany: State University of New York Press, 1996) and Paul Wapner, ‘The Normative Promise of Non-State Actors: A Theoretical Account of Global Civil Society’, in *Principled World Politics: The Challenge of Normative International Relations*, eds. Paul Wapner and Edwin J. Ruiz, 261-74 (Lanham ME: Rowman and Littlefield, 2000).

<sup>98</sup> Peter Willetts, ‘The Cardoso Report on the UN and Civil Society: Functionalism, Global Corporatism, or Global Democracy’, *Global Governance* 12 (2006): 305-25. The United Nations Global Compact is a strategic policy initiative for businesses that are committed to aligning their operations and strategies with ten universally accepted principles in the areas of human rights, labour, environment and anti-corruption.

<sup>99</sup> Shepard Forman and Derk Segaar, ‘New Coalitions for Global Governance: The Changing Dynamics of Multilateralism’, *Global Governance* 12 (2006): 205-25.

<sup>100</sup> Ban Ki-Moon, ‘What is Global Compact’, <http://www.unglobalcompact.org/>

<sup>101</sup> Kofi Annan, ‘Enhanced Cooperation between the United Nations and All Relevant Partners in Particular the Private Sector’, *Report of the Secretary General*. New York: United Nations, 2003.

play a critical role at the agenda setting stage because environmental NGOs have gained the greatest advantage from the relatively open nature of international environmental negotiations.<sup>102</sup> Article 7.6 of the UNFCCC opened the doors for participation of representatives of (I)NGOs as observers, an indication that the UN was trying to change itself as its dynamics were changing. The UN and UNFCCC have moved to include NGOs and IOs in the climate change negotiation process. “By promoting civil society’s greater involvement in world politics, the discourse and policies of the UN have indeed succeeded in advancing the idea of democracy without borders”.<sup>103</sup> In this way the UN has sought to make the process more democratic and legitimate creating more space within the state-centric framework of international system. But how far the making of the KP confirmed the UN vision of democracy and consensual politics of decision making among the states and active involvement of the NGOs will be explored in the following four sub-sections.

#### **4.5.1 The Rules of Procedure for Climate Change Negotiations**

The negotiation processes of climate change have become more complex with multiple actors, including states, IOs, NGOs, industry, expert groups and global environmental social movements. The number of parties and observers has increased rapidly. The climate change issues for negotiation have also multiplied. Parties are engaged in negotiations dealing with issues such as adjusting existing rules, creating new rules, implementing the rules agreed and reviewing the effectiveness of rules to the changing circumstances of scientific knowledge available on climate change. To manage these issues, the formal rules for conducting the climate change negotiations are established in Convention’s Rules of Procedure.<sup>104</sup>

UNFCCC Article 7.2 (k) notes that the Conference of the Parties is the supreme body of the Convention and they agree upon and adopt, by consensus, rules of procedure and financial rules for itself and for any subsidiary bodies.<sup>105</sup> Article 7.3 notes:

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<sup>102</sup> O’Neill, 2009.

<sup>103</sup> Therien and Dumontier, (2009), 355.

<sup>104</sup> See UNFCCC, *Organizational Matters: Adoption of the Rules of Procedure* (Bonn: Climate Change Secretariat 1996).

<sup>105</sup> UNFCCC, 1992.

The Conference of the Parties shall, at its first session, adopt its own rules of procedures as well as those of the subsidiary bodies established by the Convention, which shall include decision-making procedures for matters not already covered by decision-making procedures stipulated in the Convention. Such procedures may include specified majorities required for the adoption of particular decisions.<sup>106</sup>

Similar provisions were made for the rules of procedure in the KP. Article 13.5 of the KP notes:

The rules of procedure of the Conference of the Parties and financial procedures under the Convention shall be applied *mutatis mutandis* under this Protocol, except as may be otherwise decided by consensus by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol.<sup>107</sup>

There was no provision made for the KP to be adopted on the basis of majority voting. The KP was successfully adopted on the basis of consensus because, at the time it was adopted, all the parties, including the US, agreed to Article 25 of the KP:

This Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date on which not less than 55 Parties to the Convention, incorporating Parties included in Annex I which accounted in total for at least 55 per cent of the total carbon emissions for 1990 of the Parties included in Annex I, have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.<sup>108</sup>

The consensual decision making system among the Parties to the Convention has been practiced since the beginning of climate change negotiations in the UNFCCC, and the consensual decision of the COPs may seek other ways of decision making such as majority voting or the special threshold sought for the KP ratification to be effective. Yet, the continuous delay in the progress of negotiations let alone the goal of emissions reductions begs the question of whether the state-centric framework of consensual politics determines effective decision making. This debate will be further discussed in section 5.5 of chapter 5 where it is argued that although consensual decision making process (state-centric) is one of the important elements of the UN vision of (deliberative) democracy,

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<sup>106</sup> Ibid.

<sup>107</sup> UNFCCC, 1998.


<sup>108</sup> Article 25.1 of Ibid.

continuous gridlock at climate change negotiations among a large number of parties suggest that innovative ways need to be sought for better policy outcomes and effectiveness of climate change governance. States that are not parties to the Convention, the UN, special agencies of the UN, intergovernmental bodies and NGOs have observer status, enabling them to observe the negotiation process, make comments and suggestions but are barred from voting. Each party to the climate change negotiations has one vote<sup>109</sup> but observers have no voting rights. Figure 4.1 below shows the extensive participation of states and the non-state actors as observers of the COPs/MOPs<sup>110</sup> and their fragile impact on international climate change policy making. This will be discussed further in section 4.5.4.

#### 4.5.2 Climate Process Participation

The COP-1 began in Berlin in 1995 with the participation of almost 5000 people from interested parties, observer states, observers, and media. COP-2 in Geneva, Switzerland was attended by fewer than 2000 participants, while COP-3 attracted almost 10,000 participants in Kyoto, following the greater interest in environmental and climate issues by the media and environmental organizations, and by states.

**Figure 4.1: Participation of Parties, Observers and Media at COP 1, 2 and 3**



Source: Adapted from UNFCCC Participation Breakdown

The COP-1 held high hopes and concluded with the ‘Berlin Mandate’ that showed uncertainty about progress and agreed to a two year period for analysis and evaluation on how individual countries could combat GHGs.<sup>111</sup> Since COP-1,

<sup>109</sup> See Article 22.1 of Ibid.

<sup>110</sup> Meetings of the Parties to the Kyoto Protocol

<sup>111</sup> ‘COP-1 –COP-14’, *People’s Daily Online*, December 5, 2009, <http://english.peopledaily.com.cn/90002/98666/99044/99081/6833110.html> .

different countries started to back track from the negotiations and downplayed the need for a legally binding treaty. OPEC, Russia and Australia showed their objections through COP-1 and COP-2. The objections of the fossil-fuel exporters (OPEC) and of the US and Australia led to the breakdown in COP-2 which, although a small gathering, did set out some milestones for policies. It was established that countries would not seek a uniform solution but act according to their own situation while also expressing a wish for binding targets in the medium-term future.<sup>112</sup> The COP-3 garnered the greatest number of participants as many countries signed the KP, as shown above in figure 4.1. The numbers of media and observers were comparatively greater than the states, showing the salience of the issue for states, for media and for many observers.

#### **4.5.3 The Ratification Process**

192 states and 1 international regional organization (EU) were parties to the Protocol.<sup>113</sup> Of the 193 parties, only 84 had signed the Protocol by 15 March 1999, the official deadline set by the Convention to the KP. However, the rule for the KP was set up in such a way that it could be effective without having consensus for ratification that solely depended on the ratification of developed countries. Only 55 per cent of parties were required for ratification, provided those ratifying countries include 55 per cent of emitters' total global emissions. It meant that major industrialized emitting countries had to ratify the Protocol to bring it into force.

Only 5 countries ratified the Protocol in 1998. The EU favoured a high threshold (55 per cent) for ratification because it was unwilling to assume any obligations if the US did not ratify,<sup>114</sup> and the US favoured it because it gave the US a veto. Another 15 countries ratified the Protocol in 1999 and 10 countries in 2000. Many more countries ratified the Protocol in the following years. Out of 193 COPs, only the US, one of the major emitting countries, never ratified the Protocol despite having signed it on 12 November 1998. The reasons for this are outlined in section 4.7 of this chapter below.

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<sup>112</sup> Ibid.

<sup>113</sup> See UNFCCC, Status of Ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.

<sup>114</sup> Hermann E. Ott, 'The Kyoto Protocol', *Environment*, 40, no. 6 (1998):16-20 and 40-45.

2002 was an important year for the KP with most members of the EU, China and India ratifying the Protocol. The threshold was not met until 2004 when Russia ratified it and the debate shifted from ratification to implementation. There has not been much evidence of implementation and compliance in terms of effective environmental outcomes. Section 4.7 discusses the reasons for the Russian and other COPs' ratification.

#### **4.5.4 Inequality of Parties**

A large number of parties formed coalitions in climate change negotiations. The constitutions of international organizations are based on the equality of members, as Article 2.1 of the UN Charter states: "The Organization is based on the principle of the sovereign equality of all its Members".<sup>115</sup> However, in global intergovernmental negotiations inequality is pervasive, whatever the issue under negotiation.<sup>116</sup> Powerful states have more resources at their disposal and often affect the processes of negotiation and decision making. States with the military, economic and political resources are able to use them to exert influence in global negotiations.<sup>117</sup>

Despite inequality the KP was unanimously adopted. Initially, the US agreed to adoption and the unanimous adoption, from Realist perspective, may be because of inequality, as the existence of a hegemon can induce other states to subscribe to what is supported by the hegemon but later the US did not persist in its initial support for a strong climate change agreement and did not ratify the Kyoto. However, the unanimous adoption confirms that it was consensual. The three major issues of the KP negotiations were: 1) how much emissions should be reduced; 2) who should be responsible for reducing GHG emissions and the role of developing countries in reducing emissions; 3) what measures and mechanisms should be adopted to reduce emissions.<sup>118</sup> The KP required that emissions should

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<sup>115</sup> See UN, *Charter of the United Nations and Statute of the International Court of Justice* (New York: United Nations, 2001), Article 2.1.

<sup>116</sup> Joanna Depledge, *The Organizations of Global Negotiations: Constructing the Climate Change Regime* (London: Earthscan, 2005).

<sup>117</sup> Elisabeth Corell and Michele M. Betsill, 'Analytical Framework: Assessing the Influence of NGO Diplomats', in *NGO Diplomacy: The Influence of Nongovernmental Organizations in International Environmental Negotiations*, eds. Michele M. Betsill and Elisabeth Corell, 19-42 (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2008).

<sup>118</sup> Some of the threads on these three main issues are to be found in Chasek, Downie and Brown, 2010 and in the work of this writer, after going through the literature on climate change these

be reduced by 5 per cent from the levels of 1990, and that developed countries should take the lead role and finance developing countries projects of emissions mitigation and building the infrastructure of adaptation. The liabilities should be carried out based on the principles of CBDR and HR as indicated above.

The climate policy of the KP is the CBDR and is based on the concept that because the developed world was more responsible for anthropogenic climate change it should bear greater responsibilities, and that as the developing countries become developed they would take up their share of the burden. Thus, the KP's emission reductions covered only a small portion of emitters. The few developing countries, being emerging economies, were not able to tackle the challenges of climate change without the necessary financial and technological support for mitigation and adaptation. Developing countries are more vulnerable to climate change impacts and have less capacity to adapt to these impacts than developed countries.<sup>119</sup> The financial and technological supports were available through the industrialized countries, particularly the US, Japan and others. During the KP negotiations, the small and poor country coalitions such as AOSIS, SIDS and LDCs had moral authority but this did not count for much in the view of other states in the negotiations as the outcomes of the KP was the lowest common denominators.

Formally, states are the parties which participate at international negotiations. International environmental negotiations have welcomed the non-state actors as observers of the negotiation processes. They have not enjoyed the status of state participants but NGOs have been participating in international environmental negotiations in increasing numbers, particularly since the Earth Summit in 1992, begging the question of whether and how NGO participation affects the negotiation process.<sup>120</sup> Matthews noted that "National governments are not simply losing autonomy in a globalizing economy. They are sharing powers – including political, social, and security roles at the core of sovereignty – with businesses,

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themes emerged as the issues which have been the most contentious in each of the international climate change negotiations.

<sup>119</sup> UN, 'Climate Change: The Need for New Global Agreement', <http://www.un.org/wcm/content/site/climatechange/pages/gateway/the-negotiations/the-need-for-a-new-global-agreement>.

<sup>120</sup> Michele Betsill, 'Environmental NGOs Meet the Sovereign State: The Kyoto Protocol Negotiations on Global Climate Change', *Colorado Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy* 13, no. 1 (2002): 49-64.



with international organizations, and with a multitude of citizens groups”.<sup>121</sup> Litfin stated “(Once) States have acceded to non-binding principles or weak agreements, they usually find it difficult not to agree to increasingly robust commitments”.<sup>122</sup>

Non-state actors particularly the environmental NGOs were active participants at the KP. Greenpeace, World Wildlife Fund (WWF) and Friends of the Earth (FOE) had the largest delegations attending negotiating sessions but their roles were limited.<sup>123</sup> NGOs have been invited to observe international environmental negotiations but they have frequently been excluded from plenary and closed-door sessions – often known as ‘informal’ or ‘informal-informal’ – where many of the key decisions are made.<sup>124</sup> Betsill argues:

States have a further advantage in treaty making because they ultimately vote on whether to approve the text of an international agreement. States can use the threat to block negotiations as a source of leverage, a tool that is generally not available to NGOs.<sup>125</sup>

States address environmental problems in an international treaty making context which gives special leverage to states and the outcome of the treaty becomes moderate because states become mindful to take account of their domestic and international interests in adopting and ratifying the international environmental agreements.

Yet ENGOs were active during the KP negotiation processes. Many scholars agree that NGOs’ participation at global environmental negotiations do make a difference<sup>126</sup> but the extent of influence is contestable. COP-3 had more than 1000 ENGOs representatives but only one fourth of the ENGOs were from the less developed South which had sent only one or two representatives each.<sup>127</sup> ENGOs established a coalition called Climate Action Network (CAN) for their activities

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<sup>121</sup>Jessica T. Mathews, ‘Power Shift’, *Foreign Affairs* 76, no. 1 (1997), 50.

<sup>122</sup> Karen T. Litfin, ‘Sovereignty in World Ecopolitics’, *Mershon International Studies Review* 41, no.2 (1997): 167-204.

<sup>123</sup> See UNFCCC, ‘Participation Lists,’ available from the UNFCCC Secretariat in Bonn, [http://unfccc.int/files/parties\\_and\\_observers/ngo/application/pdf/participation\\_breakdown\\_cop1-17.pdf](http://unfccc.int/files/parties_and_observers/ngo/application/pdf/participation_breakdown_cop1-17.pdf).

<sup>124</sup> Kal Raustiala, ‘States, NGOs and International Environmental Institutions’, *International Studies Quarterly* 14 (1997):719-33.

<sup>125</sup> Betsill, 2002, 51.

<sup>126</sup> Pratap Chatterjee and Matthias Finger, *The Earth Brokers. Power, Politics and World Development* (London: Routledge, 1994); Wapner, 1996; and Raustiala, 2001.

<sup>127</sup> Betsill, 2002.

and lobbying during the KP negotiations. CAN was created in 1989 as a global network of almost 700 environmental NGOs working to curb human-induced climate change to ecologically sustainable levels.<sup>128</sup> “The major NGOs also have considerable independent international activities that take place outside the framework of CAN”.<sup>129</sup>

The ENGOs had four main objectives during the KP negotiations:<sup>130</sup> commitments from industrialized countries for twenty per cent GHG emissions reductions below 1990 levels by 2005, strong review and compliance mechanisms, objections to allow industrialized countries to meet commitments through emissions trading, and opposition to credit for emissions absorbed by sinks.<sup>131</sup> The outcomes of the KP were quite different from what the ENGOs had lobbied to influence and as Paterson has argued: “it is hard to conceive that their very high profile [during the UNFCCC negotiations], their persistent lobbying (in large numbers), and their links to the media both internationally and in their own countries, were without effect”.<sup>132</sup> For example, the KP’s target of GHG emissions was set at 5 per cent below the 1990 level instead of the 20 per cent proposed by the ENGOs, emission trading mechanisms became significant tools for flexibility for emissions reductions, and parties decided to use sinks as absorbers.

ENGO’s access to the plenary meetings was also very limited. Their participation at plenary sessions mostly depended on the Chairman’s discretion until KP. Betsill noted: “Throughout the ABGM process, NGOs were denied access to the floor during plenary sessions and by ABGM 6, delegates met primarily in closed door ‘non-group’ sessions from which NGOs were excluded altogether”.<sup>133</sup> The post-Kyoto negotiations saw a more open attitude on the part of the chairing officers and secretariat to participation by NGOs.<sup>134</sup> Although KP was a consensual outcome by the states, NGOs – the representatives of the global civil

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<sup>128</sup> Climate Action Network, ‘About CAN,’ <http://www.climatenetwork.org/about/about-can>

<sup>129</sup> Steinar Andresen and Lars H. Gulbrandsen, *The Role of Green NGOs in Promoting Climate Compliance* (Oslo: Fridtjof Nansen Institute, FNI Report 4/2003), <http://www.fni.no/doc&pdf/rapp0403.pdf>.

<sup>130</sup> Betsill, 2002, 53.

<sup>131</sup> Sinks refers to the absorptive capacity of the forests.

<sup>132</sup> Matthew Paterson, *Global Warming and Global Politics* (London: Routledge, 1996), 110.

<sup>133</sup> Betsill, 2002, 54.

<sup>134</sup> Depledge, 2005.

society – were mostly denied access to the plenary sessions and none of their goals were reflected in the Protocol. The limitations on the participation of NGOs and non-state actors in actual decision making has implications for what would constitute a ‘more democratic’ process.

#### **4.6 Kyoto Protocol: Environmental Protection or a Compromise**

Despite considerable controversy among parties over the climate change regime, the KP came into effect in 2005. It was designed to contain global emissions since any increase or reduction of GHG by any country would have global ramifications, unlike some other environmental problems such as surface water pollution and industrial waste. North America and Europe have had a long history of emitting high rates of GHGs since industrialization and the KP upheld the principles of CBDR and HR as a way of sharing the global warming burden between developed and developing countries. On the developing countries’ interpretation of the principle of CBDR the responsibility for remedies was placed on the developed countries. Under the KP they were to accept binding emissions targets, provide financial and technological support to the developing countries whereas developing countries could continue their development business-as-usual.

Among the industrialized countries, the emissions from the US were the greatest with the EU, Canada and Japan the other major emitters. The targets for emissions of these and other countries were assumed to reduce under the KP to a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system.<sup>135</sup> The EU agreed to the deepest cuts to reduce emissions and ratified the Protocol in 2002. It was proposed that such levels should be achieved within a time frame sufficient to allow ecosystems to adapt naturally to climate change, to ensure that food production was not threatened and to enable economic development to proceed in a sustainable manner.<sup>136</sup> However, the 5 per cent reduction targets of the KP was far removed from what the climate science was demanding. Table 4.2 shows the details of states’ GHG emissions targets.

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<sup>135</sup> The preamble of the Kyoto Protocol writes that Kyoto Protocol is adopted in pursuit of the ultimate objective of the Convention as stated in its Article 2 of the UNFCCC 1992.

<sup>136</sup> See UNFCCC, 1992.

**Table 4.2: Parties and Emission Targets by Percentage of Base Year**

Party	Quantified Emission Reduction Targets	Party	Quantified Emission Reduction Targets
Australia	108	Liechtenstein	92
Austria	92	Lithuania*	92
Belgium	92	Luxemburg	92
Bulgaria*	92	Monaco	92
Canada	94	Netherlands	92
Croatia*	95	New Zealand	100
Czech Republic*	92	Norway	101
Denmark	92	Poland*	94
Estonia*	92	Portugal	92
European Community	92	Romania*	92
Finland	92	Russian Federation*	100
France	92	Slovakia*	92
Germany	92	Slovenia*	92
Greece	92	Spain	92
Hungary*	92	Sweden	92
Iceland	110	Switzerland	92
Ireland	92	Ukraine*	100
Italy	92	United Kingdom of Great Britain & Northern Ireland	92
Japan	94	United States of America	93
Latvia*	92		


Source: Extracted from UNFCCC's Kyoto Protocol text. Asterisk\* has been used to denote Economy in Transition.

It soon became clear that: “The existing climate regime remains grossly inadequate when it comes to stabilizing greenhouse gas”.<sup>137</sup> The data in figure 4.2 shows that countries such as Australia, New Zealand and Iceland were the highest emitters per capita but they were allowed to continue GHG emissions and their way of life. Australia was allowed to accelerate its emissions by 8 per cent; Iceland was permitted to accelerate by 10 per cent whereas New Zealand, Russia and Ukraine were able to run their industries business-as-usual. The US was to reduce by 7 per cent (though it never ratified the agreement), Canada to reduce by

<sup>137</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, *The Global Climate Change Regime: Issue Brief* (New York and Washington D C: Council of Foreign Relations, 2012), 7.

6 (it also opted out after Durban Agreement 2011 because it widely failed to keep Kyoto targets), and Japan to reduce by 6.

**Figure 4.2: Greenhouse Gas Emissions Per Capita, 2009, CO<sub>2</sub>e Tonnes**



Note: Data excludes Land use, land-use change and forestry (LULUCF)

Source: United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (2011) National Inventory Submissions.


The KP did not give China and India any binding targets as developing countries. Recent data from the US Energy Information Administration (EIA) presented in figure 4.3 shows that China and India have become the world's number one and number three emitters and the trend of their emissions is rapidly increasing. According to International Energy Agency's (IEA) World Energy Outlook 2011 the US stands in the second position. China's total GHG emission by percentage is 25.4, the US total emission is 17.8 per cent and India's total emission is 5.3 per cent of the total global emissions which mean together they emit 48.5 per cent.<sup>138</sup> India's emissions rose 8.7 per cent, in 2011 moving it ahead of Russia to become the fourth largest emitter behind China, the US, and the EU.<sup>139</sup> The IEA anticipates that CO<sub>2</sub> emission trends in developing countries will continue to

<sup>138</sup> Carbon Dioxide Information Analysis Center, *Top 20 Emitting Countries by Total Fossil-Fuel CO<sub>2</sub> Emissions for 2008* (Oak Ridge, Tennessee:CDIAC, 2011), [http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/emis/tre\\_tp20.html](http://cdiac.ornl.gov/trends/emis/tre_tp20.html).

<sup>139</sup> IEA, *Global Carbon-dioxide Emissions Increase by 1.0 Gt in 2011 to Record High* (Paris, OECD/IEA, 2012b).

increase, through the growing consumption of fossil fuels in some of the larger countries.<sup>140</sup>

**Figure 4.3: 10 Major Emitters of Greenhouse Gases - 2009**



Source: Extracted from the US Energy Information Administration 2009. The figures shown are in million tonnes of greenhouse gas emissions.

The industrialized countries have been struggling to meet their KP requirements. In 2009 GHG emissions in developed countries slightly decreased but the IEA reasoned: “The trend of emissions in developed countries will rebound in 2010 and CO<sub>2</sub> emissions will likely be at a similar level to 2008, before the recent financial crisis and the slowdown in economic activity”.<sup>141</sup> The EU led the way in proposing emission limits but even its members are lagging behind and struggling to meet the target commitments. Japan’s GHG emissions increased by 2.4 per cent in 2012 as a result of a substantial increase in the use of fossil fuels in power generation post-Fukushima.<sup>142</sup> Canada's December 2011 decision to withdraw from the KP – based on domestic economic concerns, its inability to meet the Protocol’s commitments as well as its view that the world's top GHG emitters have refused to ratify the agreement – generated concerns that the KP itself may be in danger of collapse.<sup>143</sup> According to Climate Action Tracker, emissions calculations carried out recently among developed countries reveal that only Norway has achieved the Kyoto targets, that Iceland, Israel and Switzerland have

<sup>140</sup> IEA, *CO<sub>2</sub> Emission From Fuel Combustion Highlights* (Paris: IEA, 2011b), <http://www.iea.org/co2highlights/co2highlights.pdf>; See for detail, see IEA 2011a.

<sup>141</sup> IEA, 2011b, 7.

<sup>142</sup> IEA, 2012a.

<sup>143</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, 2012.

made some progress and the rest of the developed countries have achieved insufficient reductions to their targets.<sup>144</sup>

#### **4.6.1 Kyoto Protocol's Flexible Mechanisms**

The KP, as noted above, has developed mechanisms such as ETS,<sup>145</sup> JI and CDM. The ETS, as set out in the article 17 of the KP, provides opportunities for countries to sell their spare emission units. Industrialized countries needing more carbon-use than indicated by their cap-quota can buy from those which have unused emission credits. The ETS made carbon a commodity which can be bought and sold. Parties can buy emission credits and continue polluting.

The JI is a flexible mechanism established by the KP to support Annex I parties in order to maintain their emissions ceilings. The JI is explained in article 6 of the Protocol which notes:

For the purpose of meeting its commitments under Article 3, any Party included in Annex I may transfer to, or acquire from, any other such Party emission reduction units resulting from projects aimed at reducing anthropogenic emissions by sources or enhancing anthropogenic removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in any sector of economy.<sup>146</sup>

Under JI, industrialized countries may run low-carbon projects such as replacing a coal fired power plant by a more efficient combined heat and power plant in EITs where the costs of running such projects are cheaper. The countries or companies can use the earned credits known as emissions reduction units (ERUs) to meet their own quantified quotas given by the KP. The provision offers parties a cost-efficient and flexible means to fulfil their Kyoto commitments whereas the host party<sup>147</sup> benefits from technology transfer along with foreign investment. The projects under the JI mechanism did not start until 2008 and only a few projects are in operation.<sup>148</sup> Russia and the Ukraine are the host countries of most of the JI

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<sup>144</sup> Climate Action Tracker, 'Developed Countries', <http://climateactiontracker.org/countries/developed.html>.

<sup>145</sup> ETS refers to a mechanism through which Annex I countries can buy credits if they exceed the caps from other Annex I countries which have unused credits. For example the Annex B countries could buy credits from Russia and the Ukraine.

<sup>146</sup> UNFCCC, 1998.

<sup>147</sup> Any EIT Annex I country in which JI project is in operation.

<sup>148</sup> Carbon Trust, 'Global Carbon Mechanisms: Emerging lessons and implications (CTC748)', *Carbon Trust website*, 2009.

projects and the optimism about sharing costs and spreading benefits remains in theory.<sup>149</sup> The dwindling future of KP has also led to a significant fall in the number of JI projects.

The KP mechanism that has resulted in the greatest growth in the international carbon market is the CDM.<sup>150</sup> Article 12 of the KP notes:

The purpose of the clean development mechanism shall be to assist Parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention, and to assist Parties included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3.<sup>151</sup>

Under the CDM mechanism industrialized countries invest in clean energy projects in developing countries to meet their emissions targets through certified emissions reductions (CERs) in their home countries. CDM commenced comparatively earlier than JI. By the middle of the 2007, around 700 CDM projects had been approved to be funded mostly in the major developing country emitters such as China, India, Brazil and Mexico.<sup>152</sup> Figure 4.4 below shows the limited focus of CDM. The four different colours stand for four countries from bottom – ascending order: India, China, Brazil and Mexico. The figure shows that almost 80 per cent of CDM projects have been concentrated in these four countries. The largest portion of the figure is indicated in red which stands for China. The second largest portion, in light purple, represents India. Brazil, indicated by white, stands at the third position with Mexico, shown in dark purple, is the fourth.

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<sup>149</sup> Peter Newell and Matthew Paterson, *Climate Capitalism: Global Warming and the Transformation of the Global Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 96.


<sup>150</sup> Scott D. Deatherage, *Carbon Trading Law and Practice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 43.

<sup>151</sup> See Article 13 of UNFCCC 1998.

<sup>152</sup> Robert Henson, *The Rough Guide to Climate Change* (London: Rough Guides, 2008).



**Figure 4.4: CDM Projects in Operation in Developing Countries**



Source: United Nations Environmental Program, <http://cdmpipeline.org/cdm-projects-region.htm>.

By creating assets with a market value of CERs, the CDM is designed to help channel private sector investment towards climate friendly projects that otherwise might not have come into existence.<sup>153</sup> Yet there is doubt that CDM projects create win-win situations in reducing GHGs because “it allows developed countries to relax their own emissions reductions efforts”.<sup>154</sup> In addition, the “Lack of non-Annex I Parties’ quantified mitigation commitments in the CDM context creates incentives for those involved in CDM projects to inflate the amount of CERs claimed, through, for example, manipulation of counterfactual ‘base-line’ scenarios”.<sup>155</sup>

Whether developing countries are transforming the modes of energy production and consumption into renewable sources of energy through CDM is not yet clear. It is said that marginal projects dominate, such as containment of industrial gases by bolting on fixtures to already existing pipes and, according to Giddens, almost half the emission reduction claims are the results of accounting tricks and empty of content.<sup>156</sup> “And it has encouraged a lot of fraud”.<sup>157</sup>

Despite heavy criticism of the environmental integrity of coal projects, the CDM

<sup>153</sup> Farhana Yamin and Joanna Depledge, *The International Climate Change Regime: A Guide to Rules, Institutions and Procedures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

<sup>154</sup> Giddons, 2009, 190.

<sup>155</sup> For more detail refers to Yamin and Depledge, 2004, 160.

<sup>156</sup> Giddens, 2009.

<sup>157</sup> David Victor, *Global Warming Gridlock: Creating More Effective Strategies for Protecting the Planet* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), xxix.

executive board permitted two controversial mega projects: a new coal fired power plant and a hydro power plant in India which made headlines because of its non-additionality in reduction of emissions and the harm reportedly caused to the local population.<sup>158</sup> The transparencies of the CDM projects are rather limited because the processes of registration and granting CERs are not made public.

The US sought these emission trading mechanisms during the KP negotiations that would allow developed countries to achieve their emission targets either through emission-abatement projects or through emission trading, whereas the EU and developing countries argued that domestic actions were the main measures to achieving targets.<sup>159</sup> The EU's initial rejection of emissions trading made it impossible for America to stay in the treaty,<sup>160</sup> and while this debate ended up with flexible mechanisms, America stayed out of the Protocol. The introduction of these flexible mechanisms was intended to reduce GHG emissions but, as Victor noted, they carried "deep flaws that are hard to fix".<sup>161</sup> In fact they provided easy access to the investors to move to developing countries, where there were no quantified targets, from industrialized countries to pay and pollute there. Many rich countries have achieved some improvement of environmental performance, at least in part, by shifting some of the more resource intensive and polluting industries to developing countries and by increasing imports.<sup>162</sup> Thus, they provide relaxation to industrialized countries to meet their quantified Kyoto targets by offshoring domestic emissions elsewhere but making no serious contributions to global emissions reduction.

#### **4.7 Responses of Key Players to the Kyoto Protocol**

The varied differences and interests among the parties and negotiating groups over environmental protection made the climate change negotiations complex. As

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<sup>158</sup> 'UNFCCC Approves Controversial Coal and Hydro Projects in India', *CDM Watch, Sierra Club and International Rivers*, [http://www.cdmwatch.org/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2011/10/Press\\_Release\\_EBregistersIndiaProjects.pdf](http://www.cdmwatch.org/wordpress/wpcontent/uploads/2011/10/Press_Release_EBregistersIndiaProjects.pdf).

<sup>159</sup> Daniel Bodansky, 'The History of the Global Climate Change Regime', *Graduateinstitute*, (2010b): 23-40.

<sup>160</sup> 'Carry on Kyoto-Climate Change', *The Economist*, October 9, 2004.

<sup>161</sup> Victor, 2011, 97.

<sup>162</sup> Ton Buhrs, 'Climate Change Policy and New Zealand's 'National Interest': the Need for Embedding Climate Change Policy into a Sustainable Agenda', *Political Science* 60, no. 1, (2008): 61-72.

mentioned in chapter 2, Barber and Bartlett wrote:

Treaties can be negotiated between nations to advance the cause of environmental protection. But is it really possible that an international environmental consensus, amounting to a collective determination to follow a shared course for reasons held in common, can emerge from our disjointed and competitive system of global governance?<sup>163</sup>

The climate change problem, as a part of wider environmental problems, is borderless and intervenes globally because the “interconnectedness and interdependence” of the current world order means that environmental problems cannot be resolved by individual states or regional organizations.<sup>164</sup> Keohane and Nye argued that in the politics of interdependence, domestic and foreign policy become closely linked and interdependence in world politics refers to situations characterized by reciprocal effects among countries or among actors in different countries.<sup>165</sup>

The 8 years of wrangling between the parties left the KP with little optimism until, finally, with Russia on board, it was able to come into effect. Exploring the economic interests and political differences of parties provides a clear picture of the slow progress of the KP. This section examines why some high emitting industrialized countries ratified the Protocol, and whether they were actually concerned with environmental issues or with their national interests and strategies. The US Senate rejected the KP by 95 against 0 votes in 1997, yet this does not explain why Russia ratified the Protocol in 2004, or why the EU, Japan, Canada, China and India ratified the KP. The following section examines the extent to which economic issues determined the outcome of the KP.

Japan’s ratification of the KP in 2001 was crucial for the survival of the Protocol. The US withdrawal from the KP was a heavy blow for Japan because it could give the US industries an advantage to continue their businesses as usual, while Japanese industries would have to make heavy cuts to meet their KP targets of 6

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<sup>163</sup> Walter F. Baber and Robert V. Bartlett, *Global Democracy and Sustainable Jurisprudence: Deliberative Environmental Law* (Cambridge, MA, London: The MIT Press, 2009), 3. See also Walther f. Baber and Robert V. Bartlett, *Deliberative Environmental Politics: Democracy and Ecological Rationality* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2005).

<sup>164</sup> David Held, *Democracy and Global Order: From the Modern State to Cosmopolitan Governance* (Cambridge: Polity Press, 1995), 35.

<sup>165</sup> Robert O. Keohane and Joseph S. Nye, *Power and Interdependence: Word Politics in Transition* (Boston; Toronto: Little Brown and Company, 1977).

per cent. By ratifying the KP, Japan had a competitive disadvantage because the US had opted out of the Protocol and the emerging developing countries were exempt from any commitments. Japanese industries did not want the government to ratify the Protocol because of the possible effect on their economy whereas the Japanese public and NGOs were largely supportive of early ratification.<sup>166</sup> In addition, there was strong support for ratification from the Japanese Ministry of Environment (MOE), the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (MoFA) and some industries including pollution, nuclear and insurance.<sup>167</sup>

It is certainly not inconceivable that Japan would have sided with the US,<sup>168</sup> since Japan had strong trade relations with the US. An important concern for the Japanese government in ratifying the Protocol was the close association with Japanese national identity and the name of the Protocol – Kyoto. The embedded symbolism constrained the ability of anti-KP forces in Japan to get their concerns onto the political agenda and limited the freedom of action of political leaders in the wake of the US withdrawal.<sup>169</sup> In addition, Europe was also one of the most lucrative Japanese markets and Japan was aware that if Japan did not ratify the KP, Japanese products would possibly be boycotted by the European champions of environmental concerns. Thus, Japan's embedded symbolism coupled with its economic interests saw Japan ratify the Protocol.

The EU had established some of the strongest and most innovative environmental protection measures in the world and had increasingly taken the lead role on international environmental issues such as climate change.<sup>170</sup> The EU and its member countries were parties to both the UNFCCC and the KP. The 15 EU states who were then members in 1997 took on an 8 per cent emissions reduction target, and distributed the reduction among its members. The EU ratified the KP in 2002, thereby confirming the commitment of EU members to emission

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<sup>166</sup> 'Co-op', *JCCU*, February 16, 2005, accessed September 9, 2011, [http://www.jccu.coop/English\\_here/news/new\\_050221\\_01.html](http://www.jccu.coop/English_here/news/new_050221_01.html).

<sup>167</sup> Hironori Hamanaka, *The International Negotiations for the Kyoto Protocol* (Tokyo: Keio Gijuku Daigaku Shuppankai, 2006).

<sup>168</sup> Yves Tiberghien and Miranda A. Schreurs, 'High Noon in Japan: Embedded Symbolism and Post-2001 Kyoto Protocol Politics', *Global Environmental Politics* 7, no. 4 (2007): 70-91.

<sup>169</sup> Tiberghien and Schreurs, 2007.

<sup>170</sup> Regina S. Axelrod, Norman J. Vig and Miranda A. Schreurs, 'The European Union as an Environmental Governance System', in *The Global Environment: Institutions, Law and Policy*, eds., Regina S. Axelrod, David Leonard Downie and Norman J. Vig (Washington DC: CQ Press, 2005), 200.

reductions. There has been no major political drive identified for the EU's climate championship, but it did want to salvage itself from the wrongs that it had committed by destroying the environment as based on the principle of CBDR. It was also interested to save the environment given the EU was the most developed landmass of the earth, ensuring the maintenance of its central role in climate change politics. Most EU countries had already reached full development. The EU was also committed to the KP and its use and promotion of biofuels energy and common regional trade interest. Perhaps one of the reasons for the EU's willingness to tackle GHG emissions had also something to do with the need of EU countries to reduce their dependence on imports of oil and gas.

Scholars including Axelrod, Vig and Schreurs have noted the lead role of the EU:

Political will and public support have been keys to EU success in approaching the environment from an integrated perspective. First, the legal foundations have been firmly established so that the EU has an unchallenged right to protect the environment. Second, all states recognize that without common environmental policies, barriers to free trade develop. Third, political, economic, and geographic diversity have challenged policy makers to develop innovative strategies for overcoming differences and sharing burdens equitably.<sup>171</sup>

While the EU as a bloc ratified the KP, "the picture is patchy across the bloc" and "many member states are finding it tough to meet their individual targets as set under a burden sharing agreement".<sup>172</sup> Europe has generally talked a better climate-protection game than it has delivered. The EU deferred the target of 30 per cent emissions reductions announced in the build-up of COP-15, in part because of the economic strains of the global recession in 2008 but, by slowing the economic activity across Europe, the recession has made the target easier and cheaper to achieve.<sup>173</sup> An IEA press release reports that the challenge of improving and maintaining the quality of life for people in all countries, while limiting CO<sub>2</sub> emissions, had never been greater since the IEA estimated that 40% of global emissions came from OECD countries in 2010. These countries

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<sup>171</sup> Ibid, 200.

<sup>172</sup> 'US Attacked As EU Ratifies Kyoto', *CNN.com/World*, June 1, 2002, <http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/europe/06/01/kyoto.eu/index.html?related> .

<sup>173</sup> Editorial, 'A Tale of Two Targets', *NYT*, July 15, 2010, A 26.

accounted for 25% of emissions growth compared to 2009.<sup>174</sup> Many newly joined EU members accepted the targets because they could derive huge economic benefits from the ETS mechanism such as the JI.

Canada's ratification of the Protocol gave a somewhat different message. Canada calculated the US to be uncooperative in trying to impose its unilateralism. For example, Chretien's government sent a message to the US that its unilateral policy was unfair. Canada ratified the KP and, in 2005, Paul Martin and his Liberal government, made a pledge to spend \$10 billion on climate change.<sup>175</sup> However, when Stephen Harper's government presented the federal budget in 2006, there was no mention of the KP.<sup>176</sup> In 2006 the Canadian Conservative government said that the KP targets were unrealistic and unachievable. After the Durban Climate Conference in December 2011, Canada formally announced that it would withdraw its participation from the KP. There were two major consequences of the withdrawal: Canada was to pay \$14 billion for carbon credits because it lagged far behind the KP target and, second, the KP was ineffective for Canada because it exempted major emitters. This meant that even if the industrialized countries reduced their emissions, the concentration of emissions would rise because of the major developing economies.<sup>177</sup>

Canada and Australia had been actively involved in the UNFCCC climate negotiations from the outset. Australia had decided not to ratify the Protocol on 5 June, 2002 whereas Canada ratified the Protocol in December 2002. The Australian government announced that it had "decided not to ratify the Kyoto Protocol although it has agreed to limit its greenhouse gas emissions to 108 per cent of the level of 1990 emissions by 2008-12".<sup>178</sup> Australia is the world's worst per capita emitter of GHGs mainly due to its large exports of coal and gas and its low population.<sup>179</sup> The US decision on the KP was one of the major causes of

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<sup>174</sup> IEA, *Prospect of Limiting the Global Increase in Temperature to 2°C is Getting Bleaker* (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2011c).

<sup>175</sup> 'In Depth: Kyoto and Beyond', *CBC News*, February 14, 2007, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/background/kyoto/>.

<sup>176</sup> Ibid.

<sup>177</sup> Rob Gilles, 'Canada Pulls Out of the Kyoto Protocol', *The GUK*, December 13, 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9992409>.

<sup>178</sup> Australian Government. *State of Environment 2006* (Canberra: Department of Sustainability, Environment, Water, Population and Communities, 2006).

<sup>179</sup> Grant Holloway, 'Australia Isolated over Kyoto', *CNN.com/World*, September 4, 2002, <http://edition.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/auspac/09/04/australia.kyoto/index.html>.

Australian non-ratification. The political and economic relationships between the US, Canada and Australia were significant. The Australian Prime Minister Howard stated that if the Protocol was in the best interests of Australia, it would sign it, noting three areas of concern for Australia: first, Australia did not know what the obligations would be in the next two assessment periods; second, unlike most developed countries Australia was a net exporter of energy; third, there was the uncompetitive position of Australia with competitor countries such as China and India, which were not part of the binding KP.<sup>180</sup> These three issues revolved around the national interests of Australia. Yet, despite these earlier concerns, Kevin Rudd's government ratified the KP in 2007 after winning the government benches.<sup>181</sup>

The Russian Federation ratified the KP on November 5, 2004, which provided the lifeline to the Protocol by passing the threshold set. "Like a swamp creature in a bad horror movie, the Kyoto treaty on climate change has risen from the dead".<sup>182</sup> Three different factors lay behind the delayed Russian decision to ratify the KP: economic, political and environmental. Economically, the KP gave Russia a 0 per cent target which meant Russia was able to maintain its emissions at 1990 levels without making any major change.<sup>183</sup> The collapse of the Russian economy put global-warming emissions well below the limits set by the KP. Accepting the 0 emission limits would have profited Russia handsomely from selling unused emission credits to countries with booming economies.<sup>184</sup> In addition, Russia was given an extra incentive considering its vast forests which could work as carbon sinks. The JI was a lucrative mechanism for Russia to sell its carbon credits.

The economic gain from the sale of carbon credits would have led Russia to ratify the Protocol in 2002 along with other major industrialized countries. But when the US, the biggest market for Russia's carbon credits, withdrew from the Protocol,

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<sup>180</sup> Ibid.

<sup>181</sup> Friends of the Earth Australia, *Submission paper to the Independent Review of the Environment Protection and biodiversity conservation Act (1999)*, (Australia: Friends of the Earth Australia, 2009). <http://www.environment.gov.au/epbc/review/submissions/pubs/190-friends-of-the-earth.pdf>.

<sup>182</sup> 'Carry on Kyoto-Climate Change', *The Economist*, October 9, 2004, <http://www.economist.com/node/3262974>.

<sup>183</sup> Laura A. Henry and Lisa McIntosh Sundstrom, 'Russia and the Kyoto Protocol: Seeking an Alignment of Interests and Image', *Global Environmental Politics* 7, no. 4 (2007): 47-69.

<sup>184</sup> 'Kyoto Protocol in Peril', *NYT*, December 4, 2003, <http://www.nytimes.com/keyword/kyoto-protocol>.

Russia was in confusion. Russia's heavy reliance on the energy sector for revenue meant that Russia had to be certain that the KP would not detrimentally affect its energy industry.<sup>185</sup> Russia was in transition and unsure whether ratifying the KP was an advantage or whether it would be at a position of disadvantage. Russia needed some time to understand the economic consequences of ratification.

Climate science, for Vladimir Putin, was embryonic. Apparently there were a number of uncertainties about the impacts of climate change and the scale of damage. Putin was not convinced that climate change was anthropogenic. For example, in 2000 Putin curtailed the environmental committees of Russia to minimize the number of bureaucrats, and permitted an oil pipeline from Southern Siberia to China as a measure of economic development.<sup>186</sup> Putin had ambivalent attitudes towards environmental protection. The statement he produced after the ratification of the KP suggested that environmental protection was just rhetoric for Putin. He said:

The decision on ratification was passed taking into account the significance of the Protocol for the development of international cooperation and, likewise, taking into account the Protocol will take effect only under the condition of the Russian Federation's participation in it.<sup>187</sup>

Putin wanted to continue bargaining for political benefits and economic interests in addition to earning profits by selling carbon credits to European markets without the US. The US withdrawal positioned Russia at the centre of the KP because it was only Russian ratification that could have made the Protocol effective. Acknowledging its sound position on KP ratification, Putin pressurized the EU to offer favours for ratification. In particular, Russia wanted strong support from the EU on its bid to join World Trade Organization (WTO) as a favour for the KP ratification.<sup>188</sup> The Working Party on the Accession of the Russian

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<sup>185</sup> Jessica E. Tipton, 'Why did Russia Ratify the Kyoto Protocol? Why the Wait? An Analysis of the Environmental, Economic, and Political Debates', *Slovo* 20, no. 2 (2008): 67-96.

<sup>186</sup> See David Hoffman, 'Putin Abolishes Russian Environmental Committees Without Comment', *Washington Post*, May 22, 2000. See also for full text, V. Rea Oreanda, 'Putin Signs Decree Abolishing State Committee for Environmental Protection', (Goskomekologiya), *Forest.ru*, Moscow, May 19, 2000, <http://www.forest.ru/eng/problems/control/publication1.html>.

<sup>187</sup> Steven Lee Myers, 'Putin Ratifies Kyoto Protocol on Emissions', *NYT*, November 6, 2004, <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/11/06/international/europe/06kyoto.html>.

<sup>188</sup> 'QA: The Kyoto Protocol', *BBC News*, February 16, 2005. <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/4269921.stm>.



Federation was established on 16 June 1993, completing its mandate on 10 November 2011, under the chairmanship of Ambassador Stefán Jóhannesson (Iceland). The Eighth Ministerial Conference formally approved the Accession Package of the Russian Federation on 16 December 2011 and on 22 August 2012, the WTO welcomed the Russian Federation as its 156<sup>th</sup> member.<sup>189</sup>

An analysis of the history of climate change negotiations and a breakdown of the national (economic) interests that are potentially affected explains why opposition has, up to now, prevailed in the US.<sup>190</sup> The US economy has a heavy dependence on fossil fuels and accounted for 36.1 per cent of GHG emissions in 1990, making it the world's biggest polluter.<sup>191</sup> "With 4 per cent of the world's population, the US produces 25 per cent of its carbon-dioxide emissions".<sup>192</sup> There had been great concern that ratification of the KP would make the US economy suffer.<sup>193</sup> The US response to the KP was in line with its responses to other multilateral agreements, such as the International Criminal Court (ICC), and international arms control agencies and weapons inspectors which posed a profound challenge to the UN's founding principle of collective security.<sup>194</sup>

The Bush Administration preferred unilateralism, or at least US dominance instead of multilateralism, in terms of global policy making. The US did not trust the UN and offered no constructive roles on various issues of that time. Victor wrote: "The US, unlike nearly all other countries on the planet, can get things done without the UN, and that luxury allows many Americans to see the UN as a bothersome constraint on American freedom of action".<sup>195</sup> It appears the US sought UN support only to legitimize its unilateral actions such as waging war against Iraq and for seeking a coalition in the name of terrorism although it may not be the case for all issues.

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<sup>189</sup> World Trade Organization, 'Accession: Russian Federation', August 22, 2012, [http://www.wto.org/english/thewto\\_e/acc\\_e/a1\\_russie\\_e.htm](http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/acc_e/a1_russie_e.htm).

<sup>190</sup> Deborah S. Davenport, *Global Environmental Negotiations and U.S. Interests* (Gordonsville, VA: Palgrave Macmillan, 2006), 171.

<sup>191</sup> 'Japan Ratifies the Kyoto Pact', *The BBC News*, June 4, 2002, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/asia-pacific/2024265.stm>.

<sup>192</sup> Editorial, 'US Leadership Needed', *The Boston Globe*, November 30, 2000, <http://global.factiva.com.ezproxy.waikato.ac.nz/hp/printsavews.aspx>.

<sup>193</sup> Ronald Bailye, 'Shanghaied in Kyoto', *WSJ*, December 15, 1997, A.

<sup>194</sup> Editorial, 'A Wounded United Nations', *NYT*, January 2, 2004, <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/02/opinion/a-wounded-united-nations.html?ref=editorials&pagewanted=print>.

<sup>195</sup> Victor, 2011, 268.

In sharp contrast to climate change negotiations, the US provided strong leadership for protecting the ozone layer negotiations.

The United States, which at that time accounted for more than 40 per cent of worldwide CFC production, took a lead role in the negotiations in part because it had already banned CFC use in aerosol spray cans, which accounted for a large percentage of total use at that time, and wanted other states to follow suit.<sup>196</sup>

The Montreal Protocol did not threaten the US interest and economy but allowed it to export the US manufactured domestic law to the international level. “DuPont officials announced that substitutes could be available in five years if market conditions warranted the development effort”.<sup>197</sup> DuPont’s announcement was followed by other large chemical companies in the US and the Europe.<sup>198</sup> Indeed, the Montreal Protocol had limited contents (a few gases used mostly for refrigeration and readily available substitutes) on the table and found it cheaper to address them in comparison to the risk of skin cancer and huge expenses to fight against it. The ozone regime had ten years graduation period for developing countries but the stark difference with climate change regime is that there is no graduation period for developing countries.

Developing countries were required to make binding commitments and in return developed countries agreed to provide financial and technological support for phasing out the ozone depleting substances. It was based on national domestic abatement of ozone depleting substances whereas the KP’s flexible mechanisms offered external alternatives for emission caps. The scientific body to produce knowledge on ozone depleting substances was not intergovernmental and the process of producing knowledge was more efficient, faster and less bureaucratic. The US did not have sound climate change policies ready for implementation. If the US had had bold and effective policies at home it would have given the US a leadership role on international climate change negotiations and policy.

The US Congress had been very sceptical about UN actions regarding the

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<sup>196</sup> Chasek; Downie and Brown, 2010, 165.

<sup>197</sup> Edward A. Parson, ‘Protecting the Ozone Layer’, in *Institutions for Earth*, eds., Peter M Haas, Robert O. Keohane and Marc A. Levy (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993), 41.

<sup>198</sup> Chasek; Downie and Brown, 2010.

environment.<sup>199</sup> The frequent watering down of international climate agreements by the US Congress demonstrated that the Congressmen did not put scientific evidence of IPCC on their priority list over the US economy as noted in Byrd-Hagel resolution in 1997.<sup>200</sup> The polarized politics of climate change within the Senate and the House of Representatives between Democrats and Republicans further complicated the issue.<sup>201</sup>

According to two 1998 nationwide polls by the Program on International Policy Attitudes “an overwhelming majority of the U.S. public embraces the idea that global warming is a real problem that requires action” and “a strong majority of Americans favours Senate ratification of the Kyoto Treaty but Senate did not embrace the will of Americans.”<sup>202</sup> An editorial in *The New York Times* wrote: “The problem, when it comes to motivating politicians, is that the dangers from global warming – drought, famine, rising seas – appear to be decades off”.<sup>203</sup> In short, although opinions were fluid, many thought the effects of global warming were unlikely to occur for some decades and would most likely have severe consequences for others, i.e. the poor and distant.<sup>204</sup>

Under the Clinton administration, the US argued that the major emitters from developing countries should make quantified reduction commitments, but the developing countries were not ready to accept any binding commitments. Without the developing countries on board the US was not inclined to ratify the KP. Had the US ratified the Protocol the costs involved in ratification would have been significantly greater than the advantages of non-cooperation. “The cost to the US of fulfilling its obligations, for instance, could exceed 4% of its GDP and result in the loss of 4 million job opportunities”.<sup>205</sup> Elliot argued that the US did not ratify

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<sup>199</sup> Nigel Pervis, ‘The Perspective of the United States on Climate Change and the Kyoto Protocol’, *International Review for Environmental Strategies* 5, no. 1 (2004): 169-77.

<sup>200</sup> A resolution that articulated the US Senate’s conditions for the US to become a signatory and to ratify any international agreements dealing with the reduction of greenhouse gas emissions under UN and UNFCCC. The resolution was passed by 95-0 against ratifying the Kyoto Protocol.

<sup>201</sup> See for details: Daniel D. Perlmuter and Robert L. Rothstein, *The Challenge of Climate Change: Which Way Now?* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 211-18.

<sup>202</sup> McCright and Dunlan, 2003, 349.

<sup>203</sup> Editorial, ‘The Climate and National Security’, *NYT*, August 18, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/18/opinion/18tue1.html?>

<sup>204</sup> Marten Scheffer; Francis Westley and William Brock, ‘Slow Response of Societies to New Problems: Causes and Costs’, *Ecosystems* 6, no. 5 (2003): 493-502.

<sup>205</sup> Chen Gang, ‘The Kyoto Protocol and Logic of Collective Action’, *Chinese Journal of International Politics* 1 (2007): 529.

the KP for its vested interest in continuing the consumption of fossil fuels to upgrade the US economy and the fear that Kyoto was alien, so developing countries like China and India would benefit more than the US because if the US ratified the Protocol, as a developed country it had to follow the reduction targets and also pay a large sum of money for technology transfer and development of the developing countries.<sup>206</sup> Thus, the US opted out from the KP on the grounds of political interests, economic benefits and ‘business interest’.<sup>207</sup> The scientific confusion was also used as a reason for non-ratification.

*The New York Times* argued that once the US improved its domestic emission reductions, it would open the way for it to provide global leadership in climate change.<sup>208</sup> Apart from this, the US had to be more flexible towards the developing countries if it wished to provide global leadership. *The New York Times* noted in 2010 that: “industrialized nations agreed in Copenhagen to provide \$30 billion in aid between 2010 and 2012 and \$100 billion annually beginning in 2020” showed the remarkable resurgence of American interest in climate change leadership.<sup>209</sup> The US was usually the leading voice on most matters of international environmental policy twenty-five years ago but the US resurgence dwindled as, Victor noted, “...the US itself is stuck in political gridlock”.<sup>210</sup>

China, one of the biggest emitters of GHGs, ratified the KP in 2002 bringing it closer to implementation.<sup>211</sup> Chinese Premier, Zhu Ronnie, announced through a press release that China had approved the KP and that this showed China’s positive stance towards international environmental cooperation and sustainable development.<sup>212</sup> China was considered to be a developing country so it was not required to limit its emissions, leaving Chinese industries able to continue with the existing modes of energy consumption. China’s mission to reinforce ties and cooperation among developing countries was at the foundation of its foreign

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<sup>206</sup> Lorraine Elliott, *The Global Politics of the Environment* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004).

<sup>207</sup> Ibid, 92.

<sup>208</sup> Editorial, ‘From Copenhagen to Cancun’, *The New York Times*, December 2, 2010, <http://www.nytimes.com/2010/12/03/opinion/03fri3.html?>

<sup>209</sup> Ibid.

<sup>210</sup> Victor, 2011, 277.

<sup>211</sup> ‘China Ratifies Global Warming Treaty’, *CNN.com/World*, September 4, 2002, <http://archives.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/africa/09/03/kyoto.china.glb/index.html> .

<sup>212</sup> See ‘China’s Approves Kyoto Protocol’, *Los Angeles Chinese Learning Center*, September 3, 2002, <http://chinese-schol.netfirms.com/news-article-China -Kyoto-Protocol.html>.

policy.<sup>213</sup> The issue of climate change, therefore, presented to China unprecedented opportunities to enhance its prestige among developing countries.<sup>214</sup>

In addition, China would be able to earn from the emission trading schemes such as CDM. The developed countries had hoped that China would be brought into the binding commitments of the KP. It has not materialized yet except Chinese own initiatives to fight climate change. China announced its “green project”, a five year plan, in 2001 to bring about environmentally friendly products and sustainable development. In 2007 China issued a national plan to restructure its economy by promoting clean technologies and by improving energy efficiency. China is heavily dependent on fossil fuels for its economy and is putting various climate change policies into effect to fulfil its responsibilities.<sup>215</sup>

China’s 12<sup>th</sup> five year plan commissioned in 2012 sets binding targets to reduce energy consumption per unit of GDP by 16 per cent, aims to cut CO<sub>2</sub> emissions per unit of GDP by 17 per cent, and raise the proportion of non-fossil fuels in the overall primary energy mix to 11.4 per cent.<sup>216</sup> But the increasing numbers of private cars are emerging worries for Chinese constraints of emissions. Chinese light vehicle sales in 2009, at 13.6 million, exceeded the 10 million of the US and Chinese consumer spending was expected to rise rapidly.<sup>217</sup> Due to its deep economic interests for continuity for higher growth rate and large population, it has encountered uphill challenges in the fight against climate change.

With its population of 1.2 billion, India is close to China in the global ranks of population. India ratified the Protocol in 2002. T.R. Baalu, Minister for Environment and Forests of India, said: “India’s accession to the Kyoto Protocol is a reiteration of our commitment to addressing and resolving various issues of

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<sup>213</sup> Gang, 2007.

<sup>214</sup> Zhang Zhihong, ‘The Forces Behind China’s Climate Change Policy’, in *Global Warming and East Asia*, ed. Paul G. Harris, 66-85 (London: Routledge, 2003), 78.

<sup>215</sup> Gang, 2007.

<sup>216</sup> The National Development and Reform Commission, ‘China’s Policy and Actions for Addressing Climate Change 2012’, <http://www.ccchina.gov.cn/WebSite/CCChina/UpFile/File1324.pdf>.

<sup>217</sup> Deloitte, *Consumer 2020: Reading the Signs* (London: Deloitte Global Services Limited, 2011), 5.

global concern in a multilateral manner”.<sup>218</sup> India is another fast growing economy and, as a developing country, did not have to meet any specific target to curb emissions. It could also benefit from the emission trading scheme such as the CDM projects. Having gained these economic advantages, India had nothing to lose in political and environmental matters by ratifying the KP. To have its political role in international relations, India needed a multilateral forum and ratification of the KP would place India in a better bargaining position in the future.

In addition, COP-8 was scheduled to take place in India. In 2008 India released its first National Action Plan on Climate Change emphasizing the overriding priority of maintaining high economic growth rates to raise living standards. The plan identified measures that promoted Indian development objectives while also yielding co-benefits for addressing climate change effectively. It declared its national measures would be more successful with assistance from developed countries, and pledged that India’s per capita GHG emissions “will at no point exceed that of developed countries even as we pursue our development objectives”.<sup>219</sup>

In sum, the selection of 1990 as the base year of 5 per cent emissions reduction targets delivered some advantage to the Russian Federation and countries of the Eastern European bloc.<sup>220</sup> Developing countries ratified the KP to fulfil their economic and technological necessities for the mitigation of GHGs and adaptation to changing climate. For developing countries, having an international agreement signed was a means of ensuring the continuation of funding aid from the developed countries. The ratification of the KP did not constrain developing countries and made no significant contribution to the problems of climate change. The AOSIS were concerned with the possible submerging of their low lying island states and had the strongest voice for radical cuts but the national (economic and political) interests of the powerful states softened their voices.

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<sup>218</sup> See quotation in ‘India Ratifies Kyoto Protocol’, *Rediff*, August 28, 2002, <http://www.rediff.com/news/2002/aug/28earth1.htm>.

<sup>219</sup> Centre for Climate and Energy Solution, *Summary: India’s National Action Plan on Climate Change* (Arlington, VA: C2ES), <http://www.c2es.org/international/key-country-policies/india/climate-plan-summary>.

<sup>220</sup> Henry and Sundstrom, 2007.

The KP came into existence to reduce emissions below 5 per cent from 1990 levels. Several rounds of negotiations and bargaining among the major emitters resulted in the KP becoming a near universal document, but it had little to offer by way of reducing GHG emissions. States have been able to choose any base year and binding targets can vary from one state to another. The industrialized countries have different levels of targets for cutting GHG emissions. Only Europe had targets of 8 per cent but the major GHG emitters had low targets or were able to increase their emissions further. The targets and policies of the KP proposed insignificant targets to decrease emissions. The politics of climate change among the key actors turned the KP into a legally binding but a weak document that could offer very little to arrest climate change.

#### **4.8 Conclusion**

The KP was the first legally binding agreement on global climate change and aimed to reduce 5 per cent of GHG emissions below the level of 1990 which, however, proved not to be enough to address the potential impact of climate change predicted by climate scientists. The near-universal ratification indicated that policy making procedures at Kyoto reflected a consensual approach based on formal equality. Given the large number of parties to the international climate change negotiations, not all parties could equally participate in every stage of negotiations and decision making. NGOs, as representatives of global civil society, offered considerable expertise for drastic emissions cuts but the outcomes of the KP did not reflect that the presence of NGOs made any difference. They should have been given greater roles in policy making instead of being restricted in their participation at plenary sessions of the KP negotiations. Their presence could have encouraged parties to be more flexible in building the consensus because NGOs would report the positions of the parties back to their constituencies on the one hand and, on the other hand, their presence could have reduced the democratic deficit evident in the UN's processes of negotiation.

The principle of CBDR, agreed in the UNFCCC in 1992, albeit very relevant to most developing countries, was rendered less relevant to China, India and Brazil as they rapidly increased their economic growth. These countries are reluctant to share the burden that restricts their economic growth along with development and

political interests, as will be further discussed in chapter 5. The US as the biggest emitter did not ratify the Protocol, while India and China, two of the biggest emitters, were free-riders because they did not have to commit themselves to any legally binding emission targets. The Protocol came into force in 2005 but the evidence shows that, with very few exceptions, countries have not met their KP goals,<sup>221</sup> and that global GHG emissions have continued to rise.<sup>222</sup> The developed countries committed to GHG emissions reductions negotiated at the KP, in order to reduce the cost of meeting their commitments, depend on their access to cheaper reductions elsewhere.<sup>223</sup>

KP negotiations after its adoption in 1997 became more complex until it was given the final support by Russia. Studies conducted by the International Institute for Applied Systems (IIASA) and the World Energy Council (WEC) show that Russia and the Ukraine are likely to reach their KP targets even in the absence of any global warming policy so they could receive economic incentives by the Protocol.<sup>224</sup> Japanese confusion and the Canadian decision to withdraw from the Protocol confirmed their concerns for economic interests over climate change. Under the state-centric framework, states' economic and political interests were the first priority of the major emitters, as seen in the concerns of the US and Australia and others.

The KP became a compromised manifesto as political and economic interests of the parties predominated making it ineffective in the reduction of GHGs.<sup>225</sup> Nevertheless, the proponents of the KP could argue that it is a unique environmental agreement on at least four counts. First, it was an international legally binding agreement which many signatories were expected to observe.<sup>226</sup> Second, the COPs to the KP agreed to adopt different targets among industrialized countries for the period of 2008-2012 with the average range of emission

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<sup>221</sup> Elizabeth Malone, *Debating Climate Change: Pathways through Argument to Agreement* (London: Earthscan, 2009), 22.

<sup>222</sup> IEA, 2012.

<sup>223</sup> N. Duic, L.M. Alves, F. Chen, M. da Graca Carvalho, 'Potential of Kyoto Protocol Clean Development Mechanism in Transfer of Clean Energy Technologies to Small Island Developing States: Case Study of Cape Verde', *Renewable and Sustainable Energy Reviews* 7 (2003): 83–98.

<sup>224</sup> Quoted in Victor, 2001, 30.

<sup>225</sup> Ott, 1998.

<sup>226</sup> See UNEP, *The Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer* (Nairobi, Kenya: UNEP Ozone Secretariat, 1985/2012).



reductions 5 per cent below the 1990 levels.<sup>227</sup> Third, it developed flexible mechanisms, particularly the ETS, JI and CDM to support project-based cooperation with developed countries like Annex I and Annex II parties, and developed and developing countries like Annex I and Non-Annex I parties. For the ETS, a flexible mechanism such as JI assisted industrialized countries in meeting their binding targets, and there has been the CDM to assist developing countries through sustainable development. Fourth, the KP was able to disseminate the knowledge that for the stability of the concentration of GHGs in the atmosphere, the current mode of using fossil fuels and way of life had to be altered.

However, the Kyoto style agreement cannot be considered a pathfinder for future negotiations because significant contributions from each state are necessary to address rapid emissions concentrations in the atmosphere. The unequal distribution of wealth and resources among the states of the rich and poor and development agenda of the developing countries are to be addressed to combat climate change but they should not be done at the expense of environment. The developed countries have great responsibility to lead and shoulder the burden of addressing climate change and compensation is necessary because it can be effective in getting reluctant countries to participate in the international effort to slow global warming much more effectively.<sup>228</sup> But if emerging economies such as China and India become free-riders and continue their emissions as business as usual on the basis of the historic responsibility of the North, the global aim of GHGs abatement remains elusive.

Although HR is an important aspect of climate change negotiations, it is also one of the arguments made by some for their national interests. It is not a given and cannot be used to immune contemporary major emitters. Each party to the UNFCCC should acknowledge the fact that if climate change is a problem, it is global problem and it requires global actions to contain it. It is clear that any emissions reductions by only developed countries is far removed from limiting the global temperature to 2 degree Celsius relative to pre-industrial age, exempting major emitters from developing countries. The current debate centres on whether

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<sup>227</sup> See UNFCCC, 1998.

<sup>228</sup> Victor, 2001, 37.

the developing world should share the burden. For an appropriate and robust response to global climate change, all major emitters should be willing to shoulder the responsibility for drastic emissions cuts. Mechanisms such as compensation and differential commitments can help bind major developing countries into quantified commitments but such rules are complicated and difficult to design given the large number of states with vested state-centric interests are parties to the UNFCCC.<sup>229</sup>

This chapter has shown that the state-centric framework for the negotiations, in which non-state actors were only observers rather than participants, meant that the special national interests of the major emitters dominated the outcome leaving the KP unable to contribute significantly in reducing emissions and slow progress. Further, it needs to be noted that although NGOs' fuller participation might have made some difference, it is not clear that states would have had to come to terms with their environmental agenda through the current interstate forum of UNFCCC. A multi-actor partnership, including major stakeholder participation and extensive deliberation would make the decision making process more democratic, legitimate and the policies more effective in terms of policy making and implementation. An inclusive approach would help the public, the main addressees of the climate change, to understand, 'own' and respond to the problem.

This case study has displayed that states, particularly major emitters, can stay out of any environmental agreements irrespective of pressures created by other states. With reference to the first two sub questions and propositions related to these questions generated in chapter 2, it can be concluded that the lack of progress towards achieving the benefits of climate change is due to the institutional shortcomings of the UNFCCC and also those of the democratic processes of the UN and its environmental organizations and, second, that an international climate consensus is not possible because of the competitive system of global governance. These conclusions will be further contextualized in the concluding chapter of the thesis. The next chapter explores whether these cases affirm the procedures and processes of developments in the round of negotiations at COP-15 and the production of Copenhagen Accord.

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<sup>229</sup> Ibid, 43.

## Chapter 5

### The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference 2009

#### 5.1 Introduction

Chapter 4 established that the Kyoto Protocol (KP) was a compromised lowest common denominator document and short-term climate agreement for four years period (2008-2012). Under it, Conferences of the Parties (COPs) were to negotiate and agree to a substantial and long term climate agreement by 2009 for limiting the global temperature by 2 degree Celsius (2°C). Under the auspices of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the COPs organized the fifteenth meeting in Copenhagen, Denmark, with the hope of producing legal certainty and political guidance to the future of the international climate change regime after 2012 in accordance with the Bali Action Plan (BAP) adopted in 2007 which set the terms for long-term cooperative action for the post 2012 period.<sup>1</sup> The goal of COP-15 was to establish a serious international climate change agreement for implementation when the KP expired. Formal statements from negotiating blocs and parties at COP-15 illustrated their intention to conclude a rigorous post-Kyoto agreement in December 2009 with a globally legally binding effect. However, the outcomes of the conference were weak legally, environmentally and democratically since “no serious commitment to binding reductions was agreed upon”.<sup>2</sup>

Many countries called for a global and comprehensive agreement, with a robust and legally binding structure that would provide the necessary investment environment and the basis of trust between countries to reassure all that everybody was doing their fair share.<sup>3</sup> Although many anticipated a legally binding treaty from COP-15, which needed to include large emitters such as the

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<sup>1</sup> UNFCCC, ‘The Bali Roadmap, Closing Statement of Joint High-Level Segment by the President of the COP, Rachmat Witoelar,’ [http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop\\_13/application/pdf/close\\_stat\\_cop13\\_president.pdf](http://unfccc.int/files/meetings/cop_13/application/pdf/close_stat_cop13_president.pdf). According to BAP the areas to focus on at COP-15 were GHG emissions reduction goals for industrialized countries and, where applicable, for newly industrializing countries, and financial and technological support to developing countries for adaptation and mitigation.

<sup>2</sup> Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, *International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2011), 501.

<sup>3</sup> Joeri Rogeli, et al. ‘Copenhagen Accord Pledges are Paltry’, *Nature* 464, no. 7292 (2010): 1126-28.

United States (US), no legally binding agreement was forthcoming.<sup>4</sup> The expectations for an ‘agreed outcome’ of the Bali Action Plan were not met,<sup>5</sup> and a recurring question has been why parties made no progress even after having recognized the climate science. In addressing the core question of the lack of progress, chapter 4 analysed the state-centric interests of the parties and the (in)ability of the KP to reduce greenhouse gases (GHGs). The principle of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) was the major element in keeping the US, the number one emitter, out, thereby making the Protocol weak. Furthermore, although by the UNFCCC constitution all parties were equal, with non-governmental organizations (NGOs) having observer status, major emitters were influential in determining the outcomes of the KP, while NGOs were given access to the meetings only at the discretion of the Chair of the meetings. This chapter examines the COP-15 negotiations, the Copenhagen Accord and its relevance to the goals of the UNFCCC, and outlines the various interests of the largest emitting parties, their concern for the environment, the contributions of parties and observers to the deliberations, and the climate change negotiating framework and contents in assessing the main reasons for the inadequate outcomes of COP-15.

The first section of this chapter presents the background and context of the COP-15. Section 5.2 contextualizes the issues of the representation of actors and the equality of UNFCCC’s norms in theory and practice. Section 5.3 discusses the conflict between the emissions reductions goals of UNFCCC and the environmental concerns of participating governments, while section 5.4 analyses the consensual decision making practices of UNFCCC gauging its strengths and weaknesses. This analysis shows that the practice of consensual decision making was undemocratic, the outcomes which followed were often protracted, frustrating and of the lowest common denominator. There was also the risk of veto and stalled negotiations, as experienced in COP-15. The following sections outline and discuss major issues with COP-15, the Copenhagen Accord and the implications arising from COP-15. The last section discusses the interests of the different negotiating blocs and major emitters, followed by a conclusion.

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<sup>4</sup> Lauren M. Sandler and Reeva I. Schiffman Kymer, ‘Copenhagen Accord: Outcomes, Next Steps, and Business Implications’, *Environmental Claims Journal* 22, no. 2 (2010):144-49.

<sup>5</sup> UNFCCC, *Bali Action Plan* (Bonn: Climate Change Secretariat, 2007).

## 5.2 Background and Context

COP-15, held from 7 to 19 December 2009, was one of the largest gatherings of world leaders ever held outside UN headquarters. More than 40,000 people, representing governments, NGOs, intergovernmental organizations, faith-based organizations, media and UN agencies were accredited.<sup>6</sup> Also present were participants of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation (SBI) and the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice (SBSTA), the Ad hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the KP (AWG-KP), and the Ad hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention (AWG-LCA).<sup>7</sup>

Under the KP, an Ad hoc working group, AWG-KP, had been established to work towards future negotiations and commitments to uphold commitments from industrialized countries for a second commitment period of the KP. The US was not party to the AWG-KP, but did have observer status. To bring the US into the negotiation process the AWG-LCA was established at COP-13 in Bali, as a subsidiary body for the enhancement of the implementation of the Convention in accordance with the provisions of the Convention and commitments made.<sup>8</sup> They both developed a shared vision of long-term cooperative action, enhanced adaptation, mitigation,<sup>9</sup> finance and technology transfer. Apart from bringing the US into the negotiating process, the aim of establishing AWG-LCA was to launch a comprehensive process to enable the full, effective and sustained implementation of the Convention through a long-term cooperative action, up to and beyond 2012, in order to reach an agreed outcome and adopt decisions made at COP-15.<sup>10</sup> The two AWGs held their meetings in parallel, but there was little substantive cooperation and coordination between them.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>6</sup> UNFCCC, *Copenhagen Climate Change Conference - December 2009* (Bonn: Climate Change Secretariat, 2009b).

<sup>7</sup> Ibid.

<sup>8</sup> See UNFCCC, *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change* (Bonn: Climate Change Secretariat, 1992), Article 2.

<sup>9</sup> Mitigation refers to how to minimize the impacts of climate change.

<sup>10</sup> See UNFCCC, 2007.

<sup>11</sup> Kati Kulovesi and Maria Gutiérrez, 'Climate Change Negotiations Update: Process and Prospects for a Copenhagen Agreed Outcome in December 2009', *Review of European Community and International Environmental Law* 18, no. 3(2009): 229–43

The BAP was the most significant factor in preparing for COP-15 and followed two years of intense international climate change negotiations proposed by Bali conference 2007 for a new global climate agreement to come into effect by the end of 2012. There was hope that the inauguration of the Obama administration in the US would provide a strong leadership role on climate change and that the strengthening of the international standing of China would also show some leadership on climate change. Although it did not translate into reality, with each of the two major emitters seeking excuses for their lack of action by using the other's failure to act, a weak and limited document was produced. Nevertheless, by meeting at COP-15 states indicated that they accepted climate change as a significant challenge of the 21<sup>st</sup> century.<sup>12</sup> The world leaders accepted the projections of global warming by the international scientific community in Copenhagen 2009.<sup>13</sup>

### **5.3 Copenhagen Climate Conference Participation and Representation**

COP-15 was attended by 193 COPs and two observer states: the Holy See and Andorra,<sup>14</sup> indicating that the states were taking the climate issue seriously and wanted to deliver on it. The number of non-state actors' participation showed that the global civil society was also concerned about climate change and were lobbying the states to deliver. It was an unprecedented climate change conference because it was planned by many of the COPs to deliver on the goals set by the BAP "on long-term cooperation" for a post-Kyoto arrangement.<sup>15</sup> The conference attracted the attendance of world leaders.

Figure 5.1 below summarises participation by the three main groups at COP-2, 3 and 15. Parties include member states and observers representing a wide range of people. It shows that COP-15 had significantly more observers and parties than earlier meetings.

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
<sup>12</sup> See UNFCCC 1992, and UNFCCC, *Kyoto Protocol* (Bonn: Climate Change Secretariat, 1998).

<sup>13</sup> Reports by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). The reports are prepared by 2500 scientists from 130 countries and must be endorsed by all governments before being officially released.

<sup>14</sup> IISD Reporting Services, 'COP 15 Final', *Earth Negotiations Bulletin* 12, no. 459 (2009): 1-30.

<sup>15</sup> IISD Reporting Services, 'COP/MOP3 Final', *Earth Negotiations Bulletin* 12, no. 354 (2007): 1-22.

**Figure 5.1: Comparative data of COP-2, 3 and 15**



Source: Adapted from UNFCCC's Participation Breakdown, [http://unfccc.int/files/parties\\_and\\_observers/ngo/application/pdf/participation\\_breakdown\\_cop1-17.pdf](http://unfccc.int/files/parties_and_observers/ngo/application/pdf/participation_breakdown_cop1-17.pdf). 0 to 14000 shows the individuals attending the conference from each group.

The presence of non-state actors was a valuable source of increasing the accountability and transparency of the UNFCCC and its Conventions, Protocols and Accords and was compatible with the vision of global democracy the UN had adopted<sup>16</sup>, as discussed in chapter 2. The UN had emphasized the need to democratize global decision making processes which could only result from the more extensive engagement of non-state actors, especially non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and businesses.<sup>17</sup>

Backstrand noted that: "Multi-stakeholder partnerships are presented as win-win solutions that can increase the democratic credentials of global governance and simultaneously strengthen environmental performance and effectiveness".<sup>18</sup> Article 71 of the UN Charter provides the legal grounds for non-state actor involvement in policy making as observers. A very similar provision is found in Article 7.6 of the Convention and Article 13.8 of the KP which seeks to ensure climate change processes are legitimate, transparent and accountable by involving both states and non-states actors.<sup>19</sup>

<sup>16</sup> Jean-Philippe Therien and Madeleine Belanger Dumontier, 'The United Nations and Global Democracy; From Discourse to Deeds', *Cooperation and Conflict* 44, no. 355 (2009): 355-77.

<sup>17</sup> Ibid.

<sup>18</sup> Karin Backstrand, 'The Legitimacy of Global Public Private Partnership on Climate and Sustainable Development', in *Environmental Politics and Deliberative Democracy: Examining the Promise of New Modes of Governance*, ed., Karin Backstrand et al. 85-104 (Cheltenham, Gloss: Edward Elgar Publishing, 2010), 85.

<sup>19</sup> See Article 7.6 of UNFCCC, 1992.

Questions have been raised by critics of this approach to global democracy who comment that non-state actors suffer from low level accountability and representativeness.<sup>20</sup> Sen argues that the UN conception of global democracy may begin “from the middle”<sup>21</sup> rather than participation from grass-roots levels. Yet, as argued in chapter 2, this model of democracy can only be an alternative in the contemporary system of global governance unless both global political leaders and academics become more imaginative in responding to borderless challenges.<sup>22</sup> COP-15 was not an exception by including more than 16,000 representatives from non-state sectors that included NGOs, civil society organizations (CSOs) and the media in the conference, putting pressure on world leaders to ensure better agenda setting and delivery processes although these non-state actors were restrained from participation.

### **5.3.1 Decision Making Procedures**

The climate change negotiation process followed the consensual approach (see chapter 4 above) in reaching decisions and agreements as noted in the rules of procedure of climate change in the Convention of 1992.<sup>23</sup> At COP-15 the President, Hedegaard,<sup>24</sup> recalled the practice of applying the draft rules of procedure with the exception of draft rule 42 on voting. Papua New Guinea opposed this, stating that agreement by consensus based on “the lowest common denominator” was “gravely negligent” given the seriousness of climate-change impacts.<sup>25</sup> Amendments of the rules and regulations could be made provided that parties agreed and fulfilled the required procedures.<sup>26</sup> Papua New Guinea proposed changes to the decision making process, but this was refused at COP-15 on the majority voting system.

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<sup>20</sup> Michael Edwards and Simon Zadek, ‘Governing the Provision of Global Public Goods: The Role of Legitimacy of Non-state Actors’, in *Providing Global Public Goods: Managing Globalization*, eds. Inge Kaul, Pedro Conceicao, Katell Le Goulven and Ronald U. Mendoza 200-24 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2003) and Paul Wapner, ‘Introductory Essay: Paradise Lost? NGOs and Global Accountability’, *Chicago Journal of International Law* 3 (2002): 155-60.

<sup>21</sup> Jai Sen, ‘The Power of Civility’, *Development Dialogue* 49 (2007): 51-64.

<sup>22</sup> Thomas Weiss, ‘What Happened to the Idea of World Government’, *International Studies Quarterly* 53 (2009), 253-271.

<sup>23</sup> See Article 7.2 (k) and 7.3 of UNFCCC 1992.

<sup>24</sup> Connie Hedegaard, Denmark’s climate and energy minister, served as the president of COP-15 for the first week but she is replaced by Denmark’s Prime Minister Rasmussen as many heads of the governments arrived in Copenhagen for the COP-15.

<sup>25</sup> IISD, 2009.

<sup>26</sup> See UNFCCC, *Organizational Matters: Adoption of the Rules of Procedure* (Bonn: Climate Change Secretariat, 1996).



Majority voting was considered to be ineffective since some can escape the implementation of the policies because they could vote against the policy while the process relied on parties showing a willingness to cooperate. It is particularly difficult when the issues have multi-dimensional impacts on access to resources, and their distribution. Hardin argued:

When issues have differential effects, especially distributional effects, at the international level, we cannot simply vote by some kind of majority decision procedure and then expect every nation to follow through as virtually every US citizen might be expected to follow through on Environmental Protection Agency directives.<sup>27</sup>

Thus, the parties to the Convention and Protocol could not form a consensus on majority voting for adopting documents and, instead, resorted to a consensual decision making process at COP-15 where parties debated but could not produce a unanimous agreement, as discussed below. The COPs advised the UNFCCC, made policies and took decisions. The UNFCCC and the UN then acted on the advice of parties and were accountable to the parties.

### **5.3.2 COP-15 Input Processes and Implications**

Article 7.2 of the UNFCCC clarifies the procedures and input processes of the COP meetings:

The Conference of the Parties, as the supreme body of this Convention, shall keep under regular review the implementation of the Convention and any related legal instruments that the Conference of the Parties may adopt, and shall make, within its mandate, the decisions necessary to promote the effective implementation of the Convention.<sup>28</sup>

Decisions must be agreed and adopted by consensus. COPs can change the rules of procedure and financial rules for itself and its subsidiary bodies by consensual agreement and adoption.

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<sup>27</sup> Russell Hardin, 'Democracy and Collective Bads', in *Democracy's Edges*, eds. Ian Shapiro and Casiano Hacker-Cordon (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999), 81.

<sup>28</sup> See UNFCCC, 1992.

The webcast documentary<sup>29</sup> of COP-15 shows that the opening day ceremony commenced and concluded smoothly in the Bella Centre in Copenhagen. Delegates representing different negotiating groups spoke on behalf of each of their negotiating blocs as outlined in section 4.4 of chapter 4. The participation processes went smoothly for the first week, prior to the ministerial-level talks but access to non-state actors was significantly restricted during the second week of the negotiations.<sup>30</sup> The Bella centre could only accommodate 15,000 of the 40,000 representatives. Many countries were disenfranchised from the policy-making process at COP-15,<sup>31</sup> as will be discussed below.

This disenfranchisement affected representatives of both the countries and NGOs, particularly in the Copenhagen Accord with discussions over transparency and the involvement of observers and civil society representatives.<sup>32</sup> Many NGO representatives were angry, arguing that their exclusion from the negotiations at such a critical moment was not good for the outcome because they could not put pressure on the delegates.<sup>33</sup> Many of the parties were not represented in the select group.<sup>34</sup> The setting up of the select group and the difficulties arising from its establishment and operation, culminating in the Copenhagen Accord are outlined and discussed below in section 5.5.

The final plenary session of COP-15 debated the provisions about limiting the rise of global temperature to 2°C above preindustrial levels by 2050, and how this could be achieved. There was a proposal to reduce GHG emissions by 80 per cent by 2050 with the possibility of a mid-term goal by 2020.<sup>35</sup> In the final discussion process, a majority of parties from the select group supported 80 per cent

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<sup>29</sup> UNFCCC's Webcast documentary is a complete video recording of COP-15 from December 7 to 19, 2009 and is available on demand from UNFCCC website, <http://unfccc.int/press/multimedia/webcasts/items/5857.php>.

<sup>30</sup> Dana R. Fisher, 'The Limits of Civil Society's Participation and Influence at COP-15: A Comment on Disenfranchisement of Countries and Civil Society at COP-15 in Copenhagen by Ian McGregor', *Global Environmental Politics* 11, no.1 (2011): 8-11; and Matthew J. Hoffmann, *Climate Governance at the Crossroads* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 1.

<sup>31</sup> Ian McGregor, 'Disenfranchisement of Countries and Civil Society at COP-15 in Copenhagen', *Global Environmental Politics* 11, no.1 (2011): 1-7. And also see the comment by Dana R. Fisher on the same piece.

<sup>32</sup> IISD, 2009, 28.

<sup>33</sup> Ibid.

<sup>34</sup> McGregor, 2011, 4.

<sup>35</sup> Markus Becker, 'Failure in Copenhagen Gunning Full Throttle into the Greenhouse', *Spiegelonline*, December 19, 2009, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,668111,00.html>.

emissions reductions but the consensus of all states was required by the UNFCCC process, and this could not be reached even among the select group of 25. Meanwhile, the more than 100 other world leaders were waiting in the plenary chamber next door anticipating that the 25-member mini-summit would produce some sort of document.<sup>36</sup> It did not happen.

The conflict within the group of 25 turned into a major political theme that defined the conference – the tension between the UN principle of global democracy and the pragmatic need for problem-solving.<sup>37</sup> UNFCCC processes authenticated the sovereign equality of each state and provided a veto to each party, meaning that any country could block the negotiation process. It was particularly difficult to achieve consensus for such a complex issue involving so many different players with varying national interests.

Victor and Hass have questioned whether a global approach was the best approach to combat climate change.<sup>38</sup> The International Energy Agency (IEA) data showed that about twenty countries were responsible for more than 80 per cent of global GHG emissions. Some argued that forums like the Group of 20 (G-20) and the Major Economic Forum (MEF) countries were more likely to produce effective outcomes than the UN platform.<sup>39</sup> Victor advocated abandoning the UN climate change process in favour of alternative approaches.<sup>40</sup> Perlmutter and Rothstein noted that there were some encouraging signs that other negotiating arenas such as the Group of 8 (G-8), the Group of 16 (G-16) and G-20 were being explored.<sup>41</sup> Although it is more appropriate to ask if the institutional structure of international

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<sup>36</sup> McGregor, 2011 and see also Tobias Rapp, Christian Schwagerl, and Gerald Traufetter, 'How China and India Sabotaged the UN Climate Summit', *Spiegelonline*, December 19, 2009, <http://www.spiegel.de/international/world/0,1518,692861,00.html>.

<sup>37</sup> Radoslav S. Dimitrov, 'Inside UN Climate Change Negotiations: The Copenhagen Conference 2010', *Review of Policy Research* 27, no. 6 (2010): 795-821.

<sup>38</sup> David Victor, 'Towards Effective International Cooperation on Climate Change: Numbers, Interests and Institutions', *Global Environmental Politics* 6, no. 3 (2006): 90-103; Peter M. Hass, 'Climate Change Governance after Bali', *Global Environmental Politics* 8, no. 3 (2008): 73-79.

<sup>39</sup> See Chapter 7 and 8 for details: *Wall Street Journal*, *New York Times* and *Guardian*, UK are in favour of alternative approaches.

<sup>40</sup> David G. Victor, 'Fragmented Carbon Markets and Reluctant Nations: Implications for the Design of Effective Architectures', in *Architectures for Agreement: Addressing Global Climate Change in the Post-Kyoto World*, eds., J.E. Aldy and R.N. Stavins, 133-60 (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007).

<sup>41</sup> Daniel D. Perlmutter and Robert L. Rothstein, *The Challenge of Climate Change: Which Way Now?* (Oxford: Wiley-Blackwell, 2011), 192-93.

climate change negotiations was the problem,<sup>42</sup> it is also noteworthy that the progress has been slowed by the big emitters who were unwilling to commit to binding targets<sup>43</sup> not by the small emitters, raising the question as to whether these big emitters would agree to cut their fossil-fuel emissions drastically to realise the goal of maintaining 2°C. Then there is the question as to whether the big emitters would seriously consider the dire concerns of the most climate change vulnerable countries such as the Least Developed Countries (LDCs) and Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS).

Climate change is not the first major complex issue involving multiple parties. Protecting the Ozone Layer (POL) and the Law of the Sea were also very complex and difficult issues but the UN managed to deal with them although these issues were very different in terms of making responses. In POL the most important innovations and most contentious issues were the financial and technology transfer provisions,<sup>44</sup> with a fund being created to pay the incremental costs of developing country parties in meeting their control obligations. Industrial country parties contributed to the fund, according to the UN scale of assessment, and were in addition to other funding.

For technology transfer, parties pledged to ensure that the technology necessary to meet control obligations was available to developing country parties on “fair and most favourable terms” – a compromise with G-77 and, second, that the capacity of LDCs to fulfil the control obligations “will depend upon the effective implementation of the financial co-operation and transfer of technology”.<sup>45</sup> The UN was also successful in dealing with another complex issue on the Law of the Sea. By 2011, 163 countries had ratified the Convention. The US signed the 1994 Agreement on Implementation but objected to the deep seabed provisions to the Convention. The success and usefulness of the UN platform in tackling complex issues depends on the particular issue.

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<sup>42</sup> Hoffmann, 2011.

<sup>43</sup> Radoslav Dimitrov, ‘Inside Copenhagen: The State of Climate Governance’, *Global Environmental Politics* 10 no. 2 (2010): 18-24; and ‘Canada Tagged as ‘Fossil of the Year,’ *CBC News*, <http://www.cbc.ca/news/world/story/2009/12/18/climate-canada-award.html>.

<sup>44</sup> Edward A. Parson, ‘Protecting the Ozone Layer’, in *Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection*, eds., Peter M. Hass, Robert O. Keohane and Marc A. Levy, 28-73 (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993).

<sup>45</sup> Interview with national officials quoted in Ibid.

The climate change negotiating process is enormous, unwieldy and not transparent because the most important decisions “take place behind closed doors”.<sup>46</sup> Of the meeting in Copenhagen, Pears notes “The process at the COP was controversial, with ‘secret drafts’, repeated suspensions of formal processes, and progressively tougher exclusion of NGOs (including business) from the core processes”.<sup>47</sup> He also notes that in final discussions, a large majority of parties spoke in support, but the consensus required by the UN process could not be reached. O’Neill comments: “The construction of international environmental treaty regimes rests on a complex process of bargaining and negotiation among nation states”.<sup>48</sup>

Progress towards an agreement that could reduce emissions were stalled because negotiators, particularly from the US and major developing countries, were at a stand-off. The US President Obama worked to produce an agreement with the leaders of Brazil, South Africa, India and China (BASIC) but excluded the EU and other parties from the negotiation process of the select group because these were the current and future major emitters from developing countries.<sup>49</sup> A minimalist agreement with no reference to specific emission reduction targets was announced as China firmly stuck to its position, and India followed China in repeating that “developed countries had caused the problem, so they should act first and strongest to fix it”.<sup>50</sup> Obama argued that unless major emitters agreed to be on board, then the West would not be bound by any specific legally binding commitments. Like the Europeans, the US President was also intent on securing a commitment to protect the climate from the new economic superpowers, China and India.<sup>51</sup>

China and India, supported by two other members of the BASIC group were adamant on CBDR and the historical responsibility of the developed countries. The BASIC bloc was sure that any legally binding commitments from them would

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<sup>46</sup> Matthew J. Hoffmann, *Climate Governance at the Crossroad: Experimenting with a Global Response after Kyoto* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 4.

<sup>47</sup> Alan Pears, ‘COP 15: the Notes and the Verdict’, *The Fifthstate*, February 16, 2010, <http://www.thefifthstate.com.au/archives/9424>.

<sup>48</sup> Kate O’Neill, *The Environment and International Relations* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 81.

<sup>49</sup> McGregor, 2011 and see also Rapp, Schwagerl, and Traufetter, 2010.

<sup>50</sup> See Pears, 2010; and McGregor, 2010.

<sup>51</sup> See Rapp, Schwagerl, and Traufetter, 2010.

hamper their rapid economic growth and argued that the developed countries must commit to quantified legally binding commitments because their industrialization based on fossil fuels was solely responsible for the current status of GHG concentrations. The US remained adamant that unless the BASIC countries, particularly India and China, agreed to be committed to a legally binding agreement, the US was not interested in hampering its economy, which was already in deep recession. It was clear that the final deal was to come out from the US, China and India known as (USCI) group.

Obama had been an advocate of climate change during his election campaign and at the G-8 summit in L'Aquila recognised the scientific view on the requirement to keep global temperatures below 2°C in July, 2009.<sup>52</sup> The Norwegian Nobel Committee highlighted Obama's fight against climate change and the assurances that the US was not indifferent to global challenges.<sup>53</sup> Obama's assurances had created high hopes for a global and legally binding treaty which the US would support, unlike the KP. On Friday 18 December 2009, Obama announced that the US, China, India, Brazil and South Africa had concluded an "unprecedented breakthrough" and "agreed to set a mitigation target to limit warming to no more than 2°C and, importantly, to take action to meet this objective".<sup>54</sup> Yet the Copenhagen Accord turned out to be a modest agreement reflecting that national interests and major emitters can contain progress as Susskind observes: "In the final analysis, only agreements that are politically acceptable to national leaders will be approved".<sup>55</sup>

#### **5.4 The UNFCCC Principle and Environmental Concerns of Negotiating Blocs**

The negotiations included plenary sessions, working bodies, informal working groups, traditional general debate, roundtable discussions, and direct

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<sup>52</sup> G8 Leaders Declaration, 'Responsible Leadership for a Sustainable Future', G8 Summit, L'Aquila, [http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8\\_Allegato/G8\\_Declaration\\_08\\_07\\_09\\_final,0.pdf](http://www.g8italia2009.it/static/G8_Allegato/G8_Declaration_08_07_09_final,0.pdf).

<sup>53</sup> Thorbjorn Jagland, 'Award Ceremony Speech', Oslo, December 10, 2009, <http://www.nobelprize.org/>

<sup>54</sup> Quoted in Focus Report, 'COP Ends With Meaningful But Contentious Agreement', *Business and the Environment* xxi, no.1 (2010): 1-4.

<sup>55</sup> Lawrence Susskind, *Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating more Effective Global Agreements* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 12.

participation.<sup>56</sup> Countries with similar interests and viewpoints formed coalitions, registered themselves in the process of the UNFCCC, and tended to negotiate in groups, which saved negotiating time and enabled one country to speak on behalf of a wider coalition of countries. To assist negotiations groups, as noted in chapter 4, frequently tabled their official positions and items to be addressed at COP meetings.<sup>57</sup> Table 5.1 provides a synopsis of the positions taken by the negotiating blocs of COP-15.

**Table 5.1: Negotiating blocs and Their Positions for COP-15 Contents**

Negotiating Blocs	Temperature Limit	Legal Status as Binding	Burden Sharing	Agreement Track
Umbrella Group 10 Countries	2°C	All-inclusive	Developed and Developing as per individual capabilities	New global agreement
European Union 27 Countries	1.5°C to 2°C	All-inclusive	Developed and Developing as per individual capabilities	New global agreement or Kyoto 2
G-77 130 Countries	1.5°C to 2°C	Developed Countries	Historical Responsibility (HR) of Annex I	Kyoto 2
AOSIS 43 Countries	1.5°C	Developed Countries	HR of Annex I	Kyoto 2
LDC 49 Countries	1.5°C	Developed Countries	HR of Annex I	Kyoto 2
AU 50 Countries	1.5°C	Developed Countries	HR of Annex I	Kyoto 2
EIG 5 Countries	1.5°C or 2°C	Developed Countries	HR of Annex I	Kyoto 2

Source: Chandra Lal Pandey (figures drawn from IIED, 2009)<sup>58</sup>

At COP-15 Australia delivered the official statement on behalf of the Umbrella Group (UG), consisting of Australia, New Zealand, Norway Canada, Iceland, Japan, Kazakhstan, the Russian Federation, the Ukraine, and the United States, which sought to coordinate positions and deliver common statements. The UG made it clear that they recognized the magnitude of inaction over climate change.

<sup>56</sup> Farhana Yamin and Joanna Depledge, *The International Climate Change Regime: A Guide to Rules, Institutions and Procedures* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

<sup>57</sup> See UNFCCC, Part One: Proceedings, <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/cop15/eng/11.pdf>.

<sup>58</sup> Mike Shanahan, 'COP15 for Journalists: A Guide to the UN Climate Change Summit', London: International Institute for Environment and Development, 2009, <http://pubs.iied.org/pdfs/17074IIED.pdf>.

They stated that they were committed to action, with a strong outcome to meet the aspirations of the world's citizens who demanded a successful outcome to tackle climate change. They also made it clear that it was not only the responsibility of the industrialized and advanced world but also that legally binding commitments must include all major economies from both developed and developing countries.

Any global climate change agreement would be only partially complete if the US remained outside. In 2009 Obama showed a deep-interest in climate change, declaring:

The threat from climate change is serious, it is urgent, and it is growing. Our generation's response to this challenge will be judged by history, for if we fail to meet it – boldly, swiftly, and together – we risk consigning future generations to an irreversible catastrophe.<sup>59</sup>

The US and, specifically, President Obama, were represented widely in the Western media as having brokered the Copenhagen deal that rescued failing negotiations.<sup>60</sup> Obama's commitment to an international climate change agreement would be mere lip service unless it could muster a majority vote in the Senate for ratification to introduce stringent climate change policies at the domestic level. One of the main difficulties faced by the US Presidents Clinton and Bush over ratification of the KP was due to domestic political institutions such as the Senate.<sup>61</sup>

In 1997 Republican Senators Byrd-Hagel proposed the resolution, passed unanimously by the full house Senate by 95:0, with the clear message that the US Senate was not in favour of ratifying the KP, for two major reasons. First, the KP exempted developing country parties from any binding commitments where "greenhouse gas emissions of Developing Country Parties are rapidly increasing and are expected to surpass emissions of the United States and other OECD countries as early as 2015" so "the exemption for Developing Country Parties is inconsistent with the need for global action on climate change and is

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<sup>59</sup> Barak Obama's Speech at United Nations Summit on Climate Change, September 22, 2009, [http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/usa\\_nc5.pdf](http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/natc/usa_nc5.pdf).

<sup>60</sup> Peter Christoff, 'Cold Climate in Copenhagen: China and the United States at COP 15', *Environmental Politics* 19, no. 4 (2010): 637-56.

<sup>61</sup> Kathryn Harrison, 'The Road not Taken: Climate Change Policy in Canada and the United States', *Global Environmental Politics* 7, no.4 (2007): 92-117.



environmentally flawed”.<sup>62</sup> Second, the Senate was strongly of the view that the disparity of treatment between Annex I and Non-Annex I Countries and the level of required emission reductions, “could result in serious harm to the United States economy, including significant job loss, trade disadvantages, increased energy and consumer costs, or any combination thereof”.<sup>63</sup> It noted that it would not ratify any future agreement “unless the protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period”.<sup>64</sup> American Presidents have been bound by this resolution.

Russia, another member of the UG, highlighted its pledge to reduce emissions.<sup>65</sup> In September 2009, just before Copenhagen, Russia announced that it would reduce emissions between 20 to 25 per cent of the 1990 levels.<sup>66</sup> But in the COP-15 negotiations, Russia only pledged to make a 10 to 15 per cent reduction below 1990 levels by 2020 as part of a commitment to the KP, but said that it would reduce emissions by 20 to 25 per cent as part of an agreement on long-term cooperative action.<sup>67</sup> However, it refused to be a part of Kyoto 2. Instead, it advocated a voluntary bottom-up approach that would allow each country to determine so-called ‘no-lose’ targets whose achievement would bring rewards and noncompliance would bring no penalties. Russia went on to develop national emission reduction goals domestically.<sup>68</sup>

Japan, another member of the UG, unlike its earlier support for the KP, was firmly against any further extension of the KP as Kyoto-2. In September 2009, Yukio Hatoyama’s government announced 25% emission reductions by 2020 below the level of 1990. Several countries, including Japan, noted that their pledges to reduce emissions were contingent on a comprehensive global framework.<sup>69</sup> Japan declared that it would provide assistance to developing countries of about US\$15

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<sup>62</sup> National Centre for Public Policy Research, Byrd-Hagel Resolution (Washington DC: NCPPR, 1997).

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> Ibid.

<sup>65</sup> IISD, 2009.

<sup>66</sup> Charles Digges, ‘Russian Announces Higher Emissions Cuts in 11th Hour before Copenhagen’, *Bellona Foundation*, November 20, 2009, [http://www.bellona.org/articles/articles\\_2009/Medvedev\\_announces\\_larger\\_cuts](http://www.bellona.org/articles/articles_2009/Medvedev_announces_larger_cuts).

<sup>67</sup> UNFCCC, *Copenhagen Accord* (Bonn: Climate Change Secretariat, 2009a).

<sup>68</sup> Dimitrov, 2010.

<sup>69</sup> IISD, 2009.

billion in total up to 2012, including 11 billion towards the target of US\$30 billion to the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund (GCF).<sup>70</sup> These amounts were promised upon the establishment of a fair and effective international framework by all major economies and agreement on their ambitious targets. Rather than extending the KP, Japan wanted to see a single political document agreed by all major economies.

The EU, of 27 member states, had been a champion of climate change negotiation, and had adopted an effective energy and climate change policy.<sup>71</sup> The EU had been a party to the Convention since 1993 and to the KP since 2002. Under the KP the then EU-15<sup>72</sup> committed itself to reducing its GHG emissions by 8 per cent in relation to the 1990 level during the first commitment period from 2008 to 2012.<sup>73</sup> Member states of the EU transferred part of their sovereign powers to the EU including climate change.<sup>74</sup> The EU advocated the development of a strong legally binding agreement, in line with the proposed economy-wide emission abatement, strong financial support and robust compliance mechanisms. The EU committed to the KP and EU-27 emissions were 9% below the 1990 levels in 2007.

The EU showed its willingness to contribute 2 to 15 billion Euros by 2020 and proposed that all the countries should contribute to the global climate fund except the least developed countries. About the new climate agreement, the EU clearly set out its position on climate change, on finance and on the type of a new legally binding agreement. It sought to bridge the differences between AWG-KP and AWG-LCA mentioned above and move towards a new legally binding agreement which did not come solely from the KP, which exempted major developing countries from any commitments. It set the number at 2°C temperature limit and demanded that all countries contribute to commitments and finance except the LDCs.

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<sup>70</sup> UNFCCC's High Level Segment Japanese Statement on Webcast Documentary of COP 15 Final Plenary Session.

<sup>71</sup> UNFCCC, *Report of the Centralized In-depth Review of the Fourth Communication of the European Community* (Bonn: Climate Change Secretariat, 2009e), <http://unfccc.int/resource/docs/2009/idr/ec04.pdf>.

<sup>72</sup> The EU had only 15 member states at that time.

<sup>73</sup> The EC and its 15 member States, by a decision adopted on 25 April 2002, have agreed to fulfil their commitments under Article 3, paragraph 1, of the Kyoto Protocol, jointly and in accordance with Article 4 of the Kyoto Protocol.

<sup>74</sup> UNFCCC, 2009e.

The G-77/China group of 130 countries was a powerful block for climate change negotiations and were united in advocating Kyoto 2 with stringent binding targets for the North, voluntary targets, and substantial international financial and technological support for the South and no MRV<sup>75</sup> for policies that were not supported internationally.<sup>76</sup> They were against the proposal for a single globally legally binding agreement. For G77/China, Sudan expressed concern at the ‘insistence’ of developed countries on a single outcome in Copenhagen and urged parties to build on the Protocol’s success by establishing more ambitious targets for the second commitment period, as well as developing the means to address the potential consequences of Annex I parties’ policies and measures on developing countries.<sup>77</sup>

The G77 bloc included the major emitters of China and India, along with poor countries that were most vulnerable to climate change impacts but lacked the resources for mitigation and adaptation. Together, they remained adamant that rich nations must commit to emission cuts beyond 2012 under the KP since it was the only international legally binding instrument that they believed would curb carbon emissions and also that it contained functioning mechanisms for bringing development benefits to poor countries.<sup>78</sup> They argued that any new global treaty would violate the UNFCCC’s founding principle of CBDR and historical responsibility.<sup>79</sup>

In 2001, it was projected that emissions from the developing world would rise rapidly and within the next three decades, was likely to exceed those from the industrialized nations.<sup>80</sup> Since 1997 China and India have consistently continued their developments on their fossil footprints that seriously increased their GHG emissions. The increased emissions identify China as the world’s number one emitter and India the number 3 emitter, both of which were challenged to reduce their emissions along with Brazil and South Africa. Figure 5.2 shows that the

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<sup>75</sup> Monitoring, Reviewing and Verification process.

<sup>76</sup> Dimitrov, 2010.

<sup>77</sup> IISD, 2009.


<sup>78</sup> Richard Black, ‘Copenhagen Climate Summit Negotiations Suspended’, *BBC News*, December 14, 2009, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/8411898.stm>.

<sup>79</sup> See UNFCCC, 1992.

<sup>80</sup> David G. Victor, *The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the Struggle to Slow Global Warming* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001).

increasing GHG emission rate is gradually shifting from developed countries to developing countries.


**Figure 5.2: World Energy Consumption, 1990-2035**



Source: International Energy Outlook 2011, US Energy Information Administration,  
<http://www.eia.gov/forecasts/ieo/index.cfm>.

Figure 5.2 shows that the emissions were greater in developed countries from 1990 to 2000 but from 2008 onwards the emission rates of developing countries have increased rapidly and are projected to rise. Figure 5.3 below shows that global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions have been continuously growing. The share of the developed countries emissions has been either static or in decline whereas the share of developing countries has been in strong growth. Although a legally binding agreement, applauded by many environmentalists and G-77/China, the KP did not make any impact on the footprint of GHG emissions. Figure 5.3 shows that GHG emissions have risen significantly, confirming that any legally binding or voluntary agreements without firm and serious emission reduction commitments from major emitters would be a skeleton without flesh and blood in the fight of climate change.

**Figure 5.3: Global CO<sub>2</sub> Emission per Region from Fossil Fuel Use and Cement Production**



Source: EDGAR 4.2 (1970-2008); IEA 2011; USGS 2012; WSA 2012; NOAA 2012, <http://edgar.jrc.ec.europa.eu/CO2REPORT2012.pdf>.

However, the G-77 bloc and China made it clear that they were not going to commit to any binding agreements but on the evidence in figures 5.2 and 5.3, as major emitters, they would be committed to legally binding targets, and to reduce emission concentrations. During COP-15, and follow up climate conferenes the developed countries were hesitant to follow principles of CBDR and HR because they made sense of the message from the data in figures 5.2 and 5.3. Yet, developing countries were reluctant to support any regulations which restricted their agenda of development and economy whereas the developed world was wary of substantial funding to developing countries.

The AOSIS bloc, including the most vulnerable states, wanted swift and strong action to limit global temperature rise. They wanted to limit the temperature to 1.5°C above pre-industrialized levels because they believed that a 2°C rise was not safe for them. In 2009 they demanded higher reduction targets and kept a clearly defined stance of 45 per cent emission cuts for Annex I countries and the 1.5°C temperature limit. The bloc supported the statement made by Sudan on behalf of G-77/China and went further to note that “over a hundred countries have

committed to this” and concluded by emphasising that 1.5°C was necessary for them to stay alive.<sup>81</sup>

The AOSIS statement made its appeal on moral grounds because the survival of small low lying islands was conjectured to be threatened, yet the argument on how much GHG emissions should be reduced was political and misleading. It acknowledged that since 2008, developing countries had been surpassing the GHG emissions in global records. Unlike other negotiating blocs from developing countries, AOSIS demanded emission reductions from all major emitting countries, a new development breaking the solidarity of G-77/China.<sup>82</sup>

The LDCs group, including SIDs, openly supported the view expressed by G-77 and their position was also founded on the CBDR and historical responsibility. The LDCs’ statement that the quantified emission targets for Annex I parties was the only way to reduce emissions, raised serious concern over the negotiating behaviour of the group. While it apparently supported the arguments made by other negotiating groups such as G-77/China, and AOSIS, it did not support the main drive of reducing GHG emissions against climate change.

The IEA reported in 2008 that “Due to continuing strong economic growth, China and India account for just over half of the increase world primary energy demand between 2006 and 2030”<sup>83</sup> and it noted in 2011 that China, India and the US together emitted around 50 per cent of total global GHG emissions.<sup>84</sup> Graphs 5.2 and 5.3 above show that if these parties, together with other major emitting countries such as Brazil, and South Africa, were exempted, even if the remaining Annex I parties made 100 per cent reductions, GHGs would not be reduced. And on current trends, in a business-as-usual scenario, GHGs would rise inexorably pushing up average global temperature by as much as 6°C in the long term.<sup>85</sup>

The Environment Integrity Group (EIG), formed in 2000 and comprising South Korea, Mexico, Switzerland, Liechtenstein and Monaco put its formal position at

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<sup>81</sup> UNFCCC, Prime Minister Thomas’s speech and others from the Copenhagen conference can be viewed on the internet at <http://unfccc.int/press/multimedia/webcasts/items/2777.php>.

<sup>82</sup> Mike Shanahan, *A Journalist’s Guide to the Bali Climate Conference* (London: International Institute for Environment and Development, 2007).

<sup>83</sup> IEA, *World Energy Outlook 2008* (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2008), 38.

<sup>84</sup> IEA, *World Energy Outlook 2011* (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2011a).

<sup>85</sup> IEA, 2008, 37.

COP-15 and urged that the opportunity provided by COP-15 should not be missed. The group was committed to 30 per cent reduction of GHG emissions.

The participating parties recognised the threats and problems of climate change and the unacceptability of continuing under a business-as-usual scenario. They also recognized that the challenges of climate change needed quick and efficient actions. They identified that the most vulnerable parties were the LDCs, AOSIS and SIDS, and showed their seriousness towards the problems of climate change through their political statements. The statements of each negotiating bloc identified the ways of addressing climate change, although they differed over how to address climate change. This will be explored further below.

Coalition blocs such as the UG and EU aimed to work towards maintaining a 2°C limit in temperature rise whereas negotiating blocs such as G-77/China, AOSIS, and LDCs looked for a 1.5°C limit. The UG and EU groups aspired to sign a single new deal in which both developed and developing countries would adopt binding commitment targets for emissions reductions. The G-77/China, SIDS, LDCs and AOSIS groups considered that it was the responsibility of the developed countries to reduce GHG emissions and to make financial contributions and transfer technology. They argued that the developed countries should not attempt to avoid the burden of climate change because it was the historical responsibility of the developed countries. These positions made the process of negotiation more complex. The complexities of the negotiation process are often forgotten by negotiators and national governments often fail to consider the full range of negotiation complexities in their negotiation preparations.<sup>86</sup>

The principle of CBDR emerged in recognition of the special needs of developing countries and to encourage them to participate in global environmental agreements.<sup>87</sup> Article 3.1 of the UNFCCC states that the parties should protect the climate system for the benefit of present and future generations of humankind, “on the basis of equity and in accordance with their common but differentiated

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<sup>86</sup> Ariel Macaspac Penetrante, ‘Simulating Climate Change Negotiations: Lessons from Modelled Experience’, *Negotiation Journal* 28, no. 3 (2012): 279-314.

<sup>87</sup> Philippe Sands and Jacqueline Peel, ‘Environmental Protection in the Twenty-first Century: Sustainable Development and International Law’, in *The Global Environment: Institutions, Law and Policy* eds., Regina S. Axelrod, David Leonard Downie and Norman J. Vig 43-63 (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2005).

responsibilities and respective capabilities. Accordingly, the developed country parties should take the lead in combating climate change and the adverse effects thereof”.<sup>88</sup>

The Article had two important elements: “states have a common responsibility to protect certain environmental resources”, and “to take account of differing circumstances, particularly in relation to each state’s contribution to causing a particular environmental problem and its ability to respond to the threat”.<sup>89</sup> The Preamble of the UNFCCC demands the widest possible cooperation by all countries for their participation “in an effective and appropriate international response, in accordance with their common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities and their social and economic conditions”.<sup>90</sup>

Application of the CBDR principle had important consequences for climate change policy making and its relevance to the Brundtland commission report, *Our Common Future*, which recognized that poverty and underdevelopment in developing countries were major contributors to environmental degradation, and that environmental priorities could not be realized unless poverty in developing countries was reduced through sustainable economic growth and inequalities of consumption patterns between poor and rich countries were addressed.<sup>91</sup> The LDCs, many from AOSIS and SIDS, were the most vulnerable parties in negotiations and lacked financial, technological and other knowledge to combat climate change. They needed financial and technological support from the developed countries for adaptation and clear quantified emission reduction targets for developed and all major emitting countries as their social and economic conditions are gradually changing. Yet, chapter 4 showed that almost 80 per cent of climate funding through clean development mechanism (CDM) for mitigation and adaptation went to major emerging economies.

As noted above, the G-77/China group was comprised of more than 130 developing countries. South Korea and Mexico were still Non-Annex I (developing) countries even as part of the OECD. China and India still thought of

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<sup>88</sup> Article 3.1 of UNFCCC 1992.

<sup>89</sup> Sands and Peel, 2005, 55.

<sup>90</sup> See Preamble of UNFCCC 1992.

<sup>91</sup> World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).



themselves as LDCs. The various parties needed to clearly define the principle of CBDR so that a single new treaty could be developed under which all industrialized countries and major emitters of GHGs from developing countries would make binding commitments. It has been clear that the KP was not adequate and the emerging data from the IEA and EIA showed that GHG emissions were increasing at an alarming rate in the major economies of developing countries, while the middle class and the population of major developing countries were also rapidly increasing.<sup>92</sup> The IEA reported:

China consolidates its position as the world's largest energy consumer: in 2035 it consumes nearly 70% more energy than the United States, the second-largest consumer, even though, by then, per-capita energy consumption in China is still less than half the level in the United States. The rates of growth in energy consumption in India, Indonesia, Brazil and the Middle East are even faster than in China.<sup>93</sup>

The IPCC's Fourth Assessment Report emphasized that stabilizing GHGs at 450 ppm (parts per million) required a reduction of developed countries' CO<sub>2</sub> emissions by 25 to 40 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020.<sup>94</sup> The IPCC report also noted that developing countries needed to reduce their emissions as soon as possible even if developed countries made substantial reductions for limiting temperature by 2°C. Thus, for making serious and sustained responses against climate change both developed and major emitters from developing countries had to commit to them. This could only happen if the concerns raised earlier were resolved, or else emerging economies from developing countries would claim exemption from any binding targets that consequently did not support the goal of environmental concerns of the UNFCCC, and the abatement of global GHG emissions. Instead, it brought a deterioration of the international climate change negotiations as Canada resigned from the KP in a competitive system of global governance.<sup>95</sup> Russia, Japan and New Zealand had already declared that they

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<sup>92</sup> IEA, *CO<sub>2</sub> Emission from Fuel Combustion Highlights* (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2011b); See for detail, see IEA 2011a.

<sup>93</sup> IEA, 2011a, 40.

<sup>94</sup> IPCC, *Contribution of Working Group III to the Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007c), 776.

<sup>95</sup> 'Canada Pulls Out of the Kyoto Protocol,' *GUK*, December 13, 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/feedarticle/9992409>.

would not support the concept of KP-2<sup>96</sup> and even the EU could stop supporting the KP if major emitters from developing countries were not included.

The prospects of arresting GHG emissions are grim as current and future major emitters from developing countries have stuck to CBDR and historic responsibility, and the US Byrd-Hagel Resolution included the condition that “unless the Protocol or other agreement also mandates new specific scheduled commitments to limit or reduce greenhouse gas emissions for Developing Country Parties within the same compliance period” the US would not be a party to developing a new climate change agreement.<sup>97</sup> Thus, unless the discourse of CBDR and equity was resolved, emerging economies from developing countries would claim exemption from any binding targets and the developed world would not commit to any binding agreement.

### **5.5 Consensual Politics and COP-15 Final Plenary Session**

The Danish Prime Minister, host and President of last week of the COP-15, proposed a select group as ‘Friends of the Chair’ for good to unblock the negotiations when negotiations failed to reach agreement.

Differences emerged, inter alia, on whether work should be carried out in a smaller ‘Friends of the Chair’ format as well as on a proposal by the Danish COP Presidency to table two texts reflecting the work done by the AWGs. Many parties rejected this idea, urging that only texts developed in the AWGs by parties should be used.<sup>98</sup>

The EU, Japan, Columbia, Canada, Marshal Islands, Iceland, Guyana and many others supported the establishment of a ‘Friends of the Chair’ group.<sup>99</sup> Sudan, Bolivia and many others stressed the need for transparency and sought clarification on the establishment of the smaller group.<sup>100</sup> The select group consisted of 25 states: the US, the UK, Sweden, Spain, Saudi Arabia, the Russian Federation, Norway, Mexico, the Maldives, Lesotho, South Africa, Bangladesh, Algeria, Denmark, Germany, France, India, Ethiopia, Colombia, South Korea,

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<sup>96</sup> ‘Kyoto Protocol,’ *NYT*, Last Updated December 12, 2011, [http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/k/kyoto\\_protocol/index.html](http://topics.nytimes.com/topics/reference/timestopics/subjects/k/kyoto_protocol/index.html).

<sup>97</sup> The National Research Centre, *Byrd-Hagel Resolution: Senate Resolution 98* (Washington D.C.: National Research Centre, 1997).

<sup>98</sup> IISD, 2009, 1.

<sup>99</sup> Ibid.

<sup>100</sup> Ibid. Also only 23 states were named by parties on webcast documentary.

China, Brazil, and Grenada.<sup>101</sup> The main issues of contention were over whether there should be a 1.5°C or 2°C temperature limit; whether there should be voluntary commitments or a legally binding agreement; whether there should be an extension of the KP or a new global agreement. As the select group of 25 started to work to break the deadlock the rest of the more than 100 representatives sat and waited for further notices for plenary sessions. The meeting that took place ‘behind closed doors’ in Copenhagen lasted for 10 hours. Dissenting parties stood vigorously against the process employed but it was not clear what else could have been done in the face of opposition had not a small group of negotiators been formed.

The President of COP-15 oversaw the development of a draft text with all parties having participated in producing an Accord that was the product of “consensus from that group”.<sup>102</sup> He requested the parties to consult with other parties in considering the Accord consisting of 12 articles and two appendices to be completed when parties submitted their pledges by February 2010. Developed countries should also submit their quantified targets under appendix 1. Developing countries were to submit their plans for mitigation under appendix 2. The President gave one hour for consideration and consultation of the Copenhagen Accord to be adopted. Several parties demanded points of order to present their dissenting opinions on the process and its outcome, followed by parties who were in the favour of adopting the draft.

Tuvalu argued that the COPs’ work under the umbrella of the UN was based on an equal right to participate in the climate process whether a nation was large or small. Tuvalu had not been represented during the decision input processes of the Accord. It also noted that the Accord was short on substance.<sup>103</sup> Venezuela also showed its deeper concerns of being unrepresented in the process. It argued that they had been waiting to participate but the chair and select group did not give them a chance to participate and so the policy outcomes did not include their needs

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<sup>101</sup> See Webcast documentary of Final Plenary session of COP 15. Although it was said and reported that 25 states’ select group was created, only 23 states were categorically spelled at the plenary session.

<sup>102</sup> See UNFCCC’s Webcast of December 18 and 19 of Plenary Sessions Chairman of COP 9<sup>th</sup> meetings addressing the delegates on 19<sup>th</sup> December 2009, [http://cop15.meta-fusion.com/kongresse/cop15/templ/play.php?id\\_kongresssession=2753&theme=unfccc](http://cop15.meta-fusion.com/kongresse/cop15/templ/play.php?id_kongresssession=2753&theme=unfccc).

<sup>103</sup> Ibid.

and anticipations.<sup>104</sup> Bolivia also argued that the process of producing the policy text was extremely unsatisfactory and did not give them a chance to deliberate or be consulted. The outcome did not capture their needs or requirements.<sup>105</sup> Cuba considered the Accord lacked transparency and that it was dictatorial. It did not capture the policy essence of CBDR.<sup>106</sup>

Costa Rica noted that it was not consulted so the Accord could not be adopted at the meeting.<sup>107</sup> Nicaragua showed its grave concern over the shortness of time given to solve the climate change problems. It argued that the international democratic system of the UN was deteriorating because the production of the Accord lacked representation and legitimacy. Nicaragua initially proposed suspending the meeting but later withdrew the proposal.<sup>108</sup> Sudan compared the Copenhagen Accord to the Holocaust stating:

It is to ask Africa to sign a suicide pact to let continue the economic dominance of a few countries...No one, no Obama or you can threaten Africa. No African delegates are given a mandate to kill Africa. The promise of 100 billion will not bribe us to destroy the continent.<sup>109</sup>

Reacting to Sudan's statement and in support of the Copenhagen Accord, the Maldives stated:

We worked hard to maintain 1.5 but big emitting countries blatantly refused it. In my view, this document is not what we are looking and seeking for but it is amicable as beginning to continue talks. Please accept this document because it has many life lines.<sup>110</sup>

Ethiopia and Papua New Guinea also noted that they were not represented but that they wanted to adopt the document. Spain, Canada, France, Sweden, United Kingdom, USA, Norway, and Australia agreed with the Maldives statement and expressed their concerns about Sudan's comparison of the Holocaust.<sup>111</sup> Japan and Russia also wanted to adopt the document.<sup>112</sup>

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<sup>104</sup> Ibid.

<sup>105</sup> Ibid.

<sup>106</sup> Ibid.

<sup>107</sup> Ibid.

<sup>108</sup> Ibid.

<sup>109</sup> Ibid.

<sup>110</sup> Ibid.

<sup>111</sup> Ibid.

<sup>112</sup> Ibid.

Some 187 countries supported the Accord and 6 opposed it, blocking it from being adopted. The final plenary statements of parties pointed to the huge gap between agenda setting and progress made. Some member states seeking a rigorous and an ambitious agreement were frustrated by the Accord. The formal statements expressed through points of order during the final plenary session depicted the picture and revealed how disappointing the Copenhagen process and the Accord were.

This section has demonstrated the difficulties of international climate change negotiations and policy making with more than 193 parties as formal negotiators. It questions whether international climate change governance, in which so many parties are involved, possesses “the capacity to deliver the global collective environmental benefits they are asked to provide”.<sup>113</sup> Downie argues that solutions to international environmental problems often require the participation of a large number of state and private actors which decreases the possibility of effective environmental cooperation due to increased transaction costs, the increased likelihood of free riding, and difficulties in identifying and reaching consensus.<sup>114</sup>

Not only are there difficulties with such a large number of states but also there are the difficulties of the underlying North-South divisions<sup>115</sup> and divisions within North and South. COP-15 also had to confront the many different negotiating groups within the North and South groups. Soroos concluded that one of the reasons for the weak Copenhagen Accord was the “product of complex time consuming negotiations among disparate countries with conflicting interests that typically produce weak documents reflecting the lowest common denominator of perceived interests.”<sup>116</sup> The conflicting national interests of the states side-lined the role of non-state actors including global civil society. The consensual decision making process among states empirically showed that UNFCCC is not a multilateral institution rather a state-centric institution that by its very nature treats non-state actors as peripheral.

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<sup>113</sup> Marvin S. Soroos, ‘Global Institutions and the Environment: An Evolutionary Perspective’, in *The Global Environment: Institutions, Law and Policy*, eds. Regina S. Axelrod; David Leonard Downie and Norman J. Vig 21-42 (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2005), 39.


<sup>114</sup> David Leonard Downie, ‘Global Environmental Policy: Governance through Regimes’, in *The Global Environment: Institutions, Law and Policy*, eds. Regina S. Axelrod; David Leonard Downie and Norman J. Vig 64-82 (Washington D.C.: CQ Press, 2005)

<sup>115</sup> Ibid.

<sup>116</sup> Soroos, 2005, 39.

## 5.6 Issues for the Copenhagen Climate Conference 2009

**Figure 5.4: The Most Contested Issues at COP-15**



Source: Adapted from Climaticoanalysis.org,  
<http://www.climaticoanalysis.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/01/post-cop15-report52.pdf>.

Establishing how negotiations should proceed was a key issue for COP-15. Figure 5.4 shows the most contentious issues on the table at COP-15. AWG-KP and AWG-LCA could not resolve the issues of whether the KP track should be extended or whether a new global agreement should be produced, who should be involved in legally binding commitments for emission reductions, what actions should be taken to combat climate change, and what the threshold of temperature limit should be – whether 1.5°C or 2°C. It was intended that COP-15 would resolve these questions about the post-2012 climate regime – a view reflected in the unofficial slogan for the conference, “seal the deal”.<sup>117</sup> Conversely, the major actors upheld their positions strongly and delegates were unable to finalize the fundamental themes of the COP-15. Besides, the major themes of establishing procedures, the negotiation processes dealt with a wide range of technical issues<sup>118</sup> such as enhanced adaptation, mitigation, finance and technology

<sup>117</sup> Daniel Bodansky, ‘The Copenhagen Climate Change Conference: A Postmortem’, *The American Journal of International Law*, 104, no. 2 (2010): 230-40.

<sup>118</sup> Lavanya Rajamani, *The Copenhagen Agreed Outcome: Form, Shape and Influence* (New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research, 2009). And see Kulovesi and Gutierrez, 2009.

transfers. The comparison and contrast between the themes of the agenda, the statements of the negotiating blocs and the outcomes of COP-15 reveals the gaps between what was on the agenda and what happened.

### **5.7 The Copenhagen Accord 2009**

The Copenhagen Accord consisted of 12 articles. It was widely reported as being a political agreement among certain heads of state and was not the result of consultation with all the world leaders present in Copenhagen.<sup>119</sup> The Accord was a kind of ‘letter of intent’ declaration containing no concrete and actual plan. It recognized that climate change was one of the greatest challenges of our time and that it would be combated in accordance with the principle of CBDR and respective capabilities and on the basis of equity.<sup>120</sup>

Sandler and Kymer notes: “The Accord, however, has critical limitations that will lead to policy uncertainties. The most obvious is the lack of a deadline for a successor document to the Kyoto Protocol”.<sup>121</sup> Article 1 of the Accord provided greater political support and validity of the scientific view of the IPCC and maintained that temperatures should not rise more than 2°C. It provided no specific emission reductions and dates other than those chosen by states. The principles of CBDR and respective capabilities were reiterated but the status of emerging economies – whether developing countries, countries in transition or developed countries – was not made clear. This classification would have made it easier to continue with the CBDR principle. This will be discussed further below.

The Accord also recognized that social, economic development and poverty eradication were the first and overriding priorities of developing countries, and that a low-emission development strategy was indispensable to sustainable development which provided BASIC<sup>122</sup> countries, still regarded as developing countries, more space for saying ‘no’ to the binding commitments for GHG emissions. Article 3 of the Accord stated that enhanced action and international cooperation was urgently required for enabling and supporting the implementation

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<sup>119</sup> See UNFCCC, 2009a.

<sup>120</sup> Ibid.

<sup>121</sup> Sandler and Kymer, 2010, 145.

<sup>122</sup> BASIC refers to Brazil, South Africa, India and China which are emerging economies and major greenhouse gas emitters.

of adaptation actions aimed at reducing vulnerability and building resilience, especially in those countries that were vulnerable, such as the LDCs and SIDs and Africa.<sup>123</sup>

Article 8 of the Accord noted that the collective commitment by developed countries would provide around US\$30 billion for the period 2010-2012 with balanced allocations between adaptation and mitigation. In the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency of implementation, developed countries had a goal of mobilizing jointly US\$100 billion a year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries. It emphasized that the funding was to be sent to the most vulnerable and the neediest countries.<sup>124</sup> As the US special envoy for climate change, Todd Stern, stated, “I do not envision public funds, certainly not from the US going to China. We would intend to direct our public funds to the neediest countries”.<sup>125</sup> Article 8 noted that the sources of funding were to be public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance with the fund to be channelled through the Copenhagen GCF with a new effective and efficient governance structure providing equal representation to developed and developing countries. It set out the provisions of finance for short and long term climate policy. Some countries made voluntary pledges for the flow of the fast-start fund from 2010 to 2013. Table 5.2 provides a glimpse of the financial pledges made at COP-15.

**Table 5.2: Informal Pledges for Funding Contributions made at Copenhagen 2009**

Country	Pledges for 2010 to 2012 (US\$)
Japan	11 billion
EU	10.7 billion
Norway	1.5 billion
USA	3.7 billion
Russia	200 million

Source: Data taken from UNFCCC, COP-15 Webcast.

<sup>123</sup> See Article 3 of UNFCCC, 2009a.

<sup>124</sup> See Article 8 of Ibid.

<sup>125</sup> Quoted in Focus Report, ‘COP Ends With Meaningful But Contentious Agreement’, *Business and the Environment* xxi:1 (January 2010): 1-4.



The World Resource Institute (WRI) 2011 data on pledges of fast start funding shows how much countries have pledged and whether the funds pledged are independently fast-start or include the allocations of other similar titles of the past. Table 5.3 below provides the data for 2011 for fast start funding pledges.

**Table 5.3: Updated Summary of Developed Countries Fast-Start Climate Finance Pledges by November 23, 2011**

Country	Updated Pledges in US\$ Million
Australia	\$641
Belgium	\$214
Canada	\$409
Denmark	\$230
European Commission	\$214
European Union (*not included in pledge total, above)	\$10,283
Finland	\$157
France	\$1800
Germany	\$1800
Iceland	\$1
Ireland	\$143
Japan	\$15000
Liechtenstein	\$ 0
Luxemburg	\$13
Malta	\$1
Netherlands	\$443
New Zealand	\$74
Norway	\$1000
Portugal	\$51
Slovenia	\$11
Spain	\$536
Sweden	\$1143
Switzerland	\$162
United Kingdom	\$2471
United States	\$1704

Source: World Resource Institute, <http://www.wri.org/publication/summary-of-developed-country-fast-start-climate-finance-pledges>.

The WRI noted that the total pledges made amounted to US\$28.22 billion but the delivery of the pledges remained uncertain. It further noted:

‘New’ funding represents an increase relative to pledges or allocations from previous years. However, a number of pledges include

commitments already made in the past. For example, Japan's USD 15 billion fast start pledge announced in December 2009 as the Hatoyama initiative includes USD 10 billion announced previously in 2008, while the fast start pledges of the United Kingdom and the United States also include their 2008 commitments to the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs) of roughly USD 1.4 billion and USD 2 billion respectively.<sup>126</sup>

Many of these pledges related to funds that were supposed to have been delivered in 2008. There are doubts whether countries will deliver the pledges. The debate on the GCF nomination for representation delayed the board meeting and was scheduled to take place from August 23 to 25, 2012. The failure of the Durban climate conference to make solid progress on sources of finance and the global economic crisis left rich nations reluctant to commit cash, promoting fears the money may not emerge in time.<sup>127</sup>

Articles 10 and 11 noted that a Technology Mechanism was to be established to accelerate technology development and to transfer support for action on adaptation and mitigation which includes REDD+. <sup>128</sup> The Accord required that the Annex I countries submit their emission reduction pledges and Non-Annex I countries to submit the mitigation measures that they would adopt by February 2010. It also required that Non-Annex I countries report their progress through national communications every two years to ensure that national sovereignty is respected through national communications and international consultations. The weaker part of the Accord was that Non-Annex I countries did not have to undergo any verification process through MRV for the local projects. Chinese and Indian projects would remain free of any MRV process for state-centric political and economic reasons since it was agreed that the MRV would apply only to those projects that were internationally funded.<sup>129</sup> The liberty for developing countries not to undergo any verification process through MRV raises questions about the reliability of Non-Annex I parties' reporting.

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<sup>126</sup> World Resource Institute, *Summary of Developed Country 'Fast-Start' Climate Finance Pledges* (Washington DC: World Resource Institute, 2011).

<sup>127</sup> Nina Chestney, 'First UN Climate Fund Board Meeting Set for August 23', *Reuters*, August 2, 2012, <http://uk.reuters.com/article/2012/08/02/us-un-gcf-idUKBRE8710IH20120802>.

<sup>128</sup> Reduced Emissions from Deforestation and Deforestation is a mechanism to increase resilience to climate change. It requires the full engagement and rights of indigenous people and other forest dependent communities.

<sup>129</sup> Article 5 of UNFCCC, 2009.

The KP featured the difficulty of the consensus building process for climate change. It took a considerable amount of time for the major emitting Annex I parties to ratify it, and it was not universal. In contrast, the Copenhagen Accord was the first to include all major emitters. All the parties undertook to set some kind of commitments voluntarily because they were not legally binding. Yet the Accord became a fragile agreement in the sense that any party could volunteer emission pledges according to their choice that would not contribute to any emission reductions.

The focus of climate change moved from scientific consensus to political consensus because the focus of the parties was not about science but about the ways to tackle the climate problem. Non-binding, reporting through national communications, international consultations and the voluntary bottom-up nature of the agreement was important in making the agreement broadly inclusive which affirmed the principle of sovereignty – the adequacy of the Convention’s state-centric approach of the UN – but it did not necessarily strengthen the effectiveness of global climate change policies. The idea of boundary and political authority relates to the concept of sovereignty and suggests that states are free from any MRV process and penalty and were therefore unlikely to stick to their voluntary commitments.

### **5.8 Implications and Analysis of COP-15**

COP-15 was intended to produce a legally binding agreement. Faced with the prospect of failure, the UN General Secretary Ban Ki-moon requested the major parties to find a common ground, and they produced the draft Copenhagen Accord. Many parties were not satisfied with the draft because it did not address their demands, but they understood the constraints in making any further progress and supported the draft. The draft was sent to a plenary session where more than 100 delegates were waiting. The outcome of COP-15 was that the full plenary of all UN member states was unable to reach any fruitful results, and the group of 25 was also unable to produce any significant outcome.

The Accord faced several constraints. It did not specify how the industrialized countries were to lower emissions because it did not establish emission reduction targets for developed countries either short (2020) or long term (2050). It did not

specify any deadline for making the agreement binding, and did not indicate how the amounts of US\$30 billion and US\$100 billion would be made by individual contributors. Politically, it was a significant Accord because it brought influential leaders together in an effort to move forward, even if the Accord was only a 'letter of intent'. It introduced a new policy on REDD+ but it was not passed or adopted. Many parties and observers had expected the Accord to be fair, ambitious and binding but the Accord failed on all three counts: the poorest and neediest nations did not believe it to be fair; the EU, AOSIS, SIDS, LDCs, environmentalists and climate scientists did not see it as ambitious and the Accord did not become a binding agreement. The ingredients of the architecture might have responded to the long term challenges of climate change but not in precise legal terms because the Accord did not hold any legal standing in the UNFCCC process.<sup>130</sup>

Thompson states that the most important task was to launch the Copenhagen GCF as soon as possible since the poor in developing nations would suffer first and, most likely, suffer the most.<sup>131</sup> The funds to developing countries would start working on new projects of clean energy, green growth and climate resilience. The Accord argued that funds should be sent to the most climate vulnerable countries yet it did not specify how this was to happen and where they should be directed.

COP-15 and the Copenhagen Accord showed instances of good international cooperation, optimism and frustration based on state-centric institutional framework. The US was the chief advocate of the consensual climate change negotiations to ensure it, or other influential developed countries, could veto the agreement. However, at Copenhagen a few developing countries used the consensual veto to block the Accord from being adopted. In the three months to Copenhagen the hope of achieving a legally binding agreement had almost diminished, with officials believing that solid packages<sup>132</sup> would be set up in

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<sup>130</sup> COP-15 Press Conference, Copenhagen, Denmark, 19 December 2009, UNFCCC Executive Secretary Yvo de Boer available at [http://cop15.metafusion.com/kongresse/cop15/templ/play.php?id\\_kongresssession=2759&theme=unfccc](http://cop15.metafusion.com/kongresse/cop15/templ/play.php?id_kongresssession=2759&theme=unfccc)

<sup>131</sup> Allen Thomson, 'Development Ethics and the Copenhagen Accord: How Important Are the Global Poor?' *Ethics, Place and Environment* 13, no. 2 (2010): 191-96.

<sup>132</sup> This refers to issues of funding, reporting, monitoring, verification etc.

Copenhagen as contours to a legally binding agreement, but even that did not take place.<sup>133</sup>

The Copenhagen Accord suffered from a lack of trust and from representative deficits. Voices were raised for greater transparency, mature diplomacy, and to follow the UNFCCC procedures for policy making as written in Article 7.2. Most of the voices were from the small island and most vulnerable countries. Non-state actors could not make it into the negotiations halls. At the plenary sessions, none of the big and influential parties raised issues of transparency and procedure. The conflicts of interest between the major emitters and the small island and developing countries were not simply about environmental or climate change interests; rather they had broader and overarching implications which will be discussed below.

### **5.9 Interests of Major Emitters**

Much has been discussed about the responses of the key players to the Kyoto Protocol in section 4.7 of chapter 4. Section 4.7 also articulated the conflicting national self-interests of the major emitters and their negative impact on the Kyoto Protocol. This section explores the politics of resources or energy politics, interests of major emitters and their implications on international cooperation for effective climate governance. International cooperation on the climate change issue was made difficult because of the serious implications for countries' social, political, economic structures,<sup>134</sup> and their heavy reliance on fossil fuels. Although the small island and vulnerable countries were threatened by IPCC estimates of sea level rises, the major emitters, as their economies have been strongly embedded to fossil fuel growth, could not adopt any agreement against their national political interests.

The IPCC AR4 report stated that if global temperature was not limited to 1.5°C, climate change would bring unintended consequences for low lying island and most vulnerable countries.<sup>135</sup> Developed countries and major emitters from developing countries had a stake in the impact of climate change but they were not

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<sup>133</sup> See UNFCCC Press Conference Webcast, December 19, 2009.

<sup>134</sup> Matthew Paterson and Michael Grubb, 'The International Politics of Climate Change', *International Affairs* 68:2 (1992): 293-310.

<sup>135</sup> See IPCC, Climate Change 2007: Synthesis Report (Geneva: IPCC, 2007d).

able to pursue any serious responses against climate change because they had their bigger concerns of social, political and economic structures within their domestic constituencies. The responses required limiting and managing climate change which would affect the heart of a country's socio-political and economic-industrial structures,<sup>136</sup> and serious actions for preventing climate change have frequently been watered down.

Politicians are generally reluctant to take serious decisions that impinge on the way of life of the people in their respective countries because of the impact on economic growth and its economic values embedded in existing social-political structures. The economic growth imperative is inherent to the capitalist system, which imprisons governments and that is increasingly globally interdependent.<sup>137</sup> If the ecological and economic imperatives are deemed incompatible, this may well be the most fundamental obstacle to progress on climate change. Although there are different views on this question, making changes to the requirements of climate change can lead to a decline in the standard of life and can generate protest and opposition showing the linkage between social, political and economic issues.

The countries that have the greater stake at UN global climate change negotiations are important in terms of fossil fuel consumption and possession of reserves that are the backbone of their economy and mode of life. Some countries such as the US and China have major challenges in maintaining their supplies of fossil fuels and in developing other forms and alternative sources of energy.<sup>138</sup> Export dependent countries like Saudi Arabia and other OPEC members are worried about their dependence on oil revenues and the implications of any decline in the use of fossil fuels. These countries fear the economic consequences of emission limitations and oppose abatement measures strongly, even those taken by other countries.<sup>139</sup>

Among all negotiating blocs, the EU, LDCs and AOSIS looked for an ambitious and legally binding agreement, but none of them had significant carbon reserves.

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<sup>136</sup> Paterson and Grubb, 1992.

<sup>137</sup> Charles E. Lindblom, 'The Market as Prison', *The Journal of Politics* 44, no. 2 (1982): 324-36.

<sup>138</sup> Ibid. See for details on politics of resources: Chandra L. Pandey, 'Resources and the International Climate Change Policy Gridlock', *Chinese Journal of Population, Resources and Environment*, Forthcoming.

<sup>139</sup> Ibid and Pamela S. Chasek, *Earth Negotiations: Analysing Thirty Years of Environmental Diplomacy* (Tokyo: United Nations University Press, 2001).

The EU is highly dependent on energy imports and it is meaningful for it to reduce its energy dependence. Among the LDCs and AOSIS countries, consumption is very low with no major impacts on global emissions, whereas countries like the US, Canada, China, India, Russia and Saudi Arabia together account for between 60-70 per cent of the world's total potential fossil-fuel consumption.<sup>140</sup> Canada's departure from the KP was related to economic issues and linked with its tar sands.<sup>141</sup> Saudi Arabia has always stood against any legally binding agreement that would prevent it from exploiting its oil wells, which have long been the most important source of its national income.<sup>142</sup> The US, Russia and China are the leading producers and consumers of world energy.<sup>143</sup> India and China rely on coal as their primary source of commercial energy.<sup>144</sup>

These countries saw that there was a trade-off between possession and consumption of fossil fuel reserves and economic development, between economic development and standards of living as society benefits, and between fossil fuel modes of economic development and environmental degradation and sustainability. These countries have focused more on the first two trade-offs to maintain and upgrade the standards of living. China and India have taken measures to control population leaving the significant demands of existing populations to be met. For instance, Jai Ram Ramesh, India's former Environment and Forests Minister, stated: "To say that climate change is the defining issue, no, there are bread-and-butter environmental issues".<sup>145</sup> Governments in developing countries give greater emphasis to their development and to meeting basic human needs. They understand that climate change is a priority particularly for the developed countries. Their argument is well supported by the Brundtland Report that noted:

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<sup>140</sup> See reference given at 138 for details; RFF, *Global Energy Resources: An Overview* (Washington DC: Resources for Future, 2003).

<sup>141</sup> Barbara Lewis, David Ljunggren and Jeffrey Jones, 'Insight: Canada's Oil Sand Battle with Europe', *Reuter*, May 10, 2012, <http://www.reuters.com/article/2012/05/10/us-oil-sands-idUSBRE8490OL20120510>.

<sup>142</sup> IMF, *Saudi Arabia: Financial System Stability Assessment—Update*, IMF Country Report No. 12/92 (Washington: IMF, 2012).

<sup>143</sup> EIA, *International Energy Annual 1999* (Washington DC: US Energy Information Agency, 1999).

<sup>144</sup> See Hal Gluskoter, *Increased in Fossil Fuel Utilization in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century* (Reston, VA: US. Geological Survey, 1998) ; and see also White Paper on World Fossil Fuel Reserves and Projected Depletion, Prepared by The Colorado River Commission of Nevada, March 2002, <http://crc.nv.gov/docs/world%20fossil%20reserves.pdf> .

<sup>145</sup> Quoted in Mary Kissel, 'Climate Change Quagmire', *WSJ*, March 10, 2010, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703701004575113304086087516.html>.

“inequality is the planet’s main environmental problem” and “it is futile to attempt to deal with environmental problems without a broader perspective that encompasses the factors underlying world poverty and international inequality”.<sup>146</sup>

All countries possessing fossil fuels are not necessarily rich now. They came from different negotiating blocs to block the negotiation. Major emitters from developing countries such as China, India and Brazil saw climate change as a long term threat and wanted financial and technical assistance. Saudi Arabia and other fossil fuel exporting countries were concerned that efforts to cut GHG emissions would damage their economy<sup>147</sup> and are bargaining for compensation if an ambitious climate agreement takes place. China was determined to ensure that no agreement would threaten its on-going economic development and independence of action.<sup>148</sup> To ensure it was not bound, “China played a very tough game, including insulting the US president and other heads of state by sending their vice-foreign minister to the final negotiations with heads of state instead of their premier.”<sup>149</sup> India continued to insist that developed countries should act first and strongly to fix climate change and opposing this approach were the US, Canada, Russia, and Australia.<sup>150</sup>

Developed countries were “cautious about any institution which would require substantial funding” to support developing countries and remain in a disadvantaged position if major emitters from developing countries did not commit to quantified binding targets.<sup>151</sup> “Few nations or firms will do much to control emissions unless they are sure that their competitors will bear similar costs”.<sup>152</sup> Thus global climate change negotiations and policy making were not only a struggle between developed and developing (North and South) countries, but also a new mode in global climate governance where the long term standing, and the emerging, powers were not much help in coming to an agreement.

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<sup>146</sup> WCED, 1987, 3-6.

<sup>147</sup> Chasek, 2001, 127.

<sup>148</sup> Pears, 2010.

<sup>149</sup> Ibid, 4.

<sup>150</sup> Ibid, 2010.

<sup>151</sup> Elliot, 2004, 12.

<sup>152</sup> David G. Victor, *The Collapse of the Kyoto Protocol and the Struggle to Slow Global Warming* (Princeton and Oxford: Princeton University Press, 2001), viii; See Victor, 2011.



While many countries had been working hard to make their economies green, they insisted that a new legally binding treaty must be negotiated. The IPCC<sup>153</sup> also noted that the poor and vulnerable were going to suffer if the issue of climate change remained unaddressed, but no stringent agreement was forthcoming. In 2012, international climate change talks in Doha ended with agreement to extend the KP with the number of signatories greatly reduced to the EU and Australia. New Zealand, Japan, Russia, and Canada opted out from the Kyoto 2. The three major emitters the US, China and India, the free riders of the KP, refused to be included.

Table 5.4 shows the biggest emitters of the world by GHG per capita. China's CO<sub>2</sub> emission is 1.5 tonnes per capita and India's is 0.7 whereas New Zealand, Australia, Russia, Canada, the US and the Finland have per capita CO<sub>2</sub> emissions of 10, 9.6, 4.9, 4.7, 3.7 and 3.4 tonnes respectively. This suggests that China and India are on solid ground in arguing that they are still developing countries and do not want to take any binding commitments because they have to develop their country to reduce poverty and improve efficiency since "there is an urgent need for debate over the appropriate role of the climate regime in the broader fight for poverty reduction and development".<sup>154</sup> Connecting climate change with poverty reduction and development is a good approach but as the climate clock crosses 2°C, the questions are: Is this an appropriate measure? It is not the quantity of emissions which matters? The second question is more pertinent although the issues of poverty reduction and development in the South are equally important.

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<sup>153</sup> IPCC 2007, AR4 has projected that the poor and vulnerable countries and people are most likely to suffer because they do not possess the means to address the challenges and damages of climate change.

<sup>154</sup> Joanna Depledge and Farhana Yamin, 'The Global Climate-Change Regime', in *The Economic and Politics of Climate Change*, eds. Dieter Helm and Cameron Hepburn, 433-53 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009), 447.

**Table 5.4: Major Emitting Countries in the World and their Economies 2011.**

Country	GHGs Per Capita (tonnes of CO2 Equivalent)	GDP (nominal) Per Capita in US\$
Qatar	18.0	97,967
Brunei Darussalam	17.9	36,521
New Zealand	10.00	38,227
Australia	9.6	66,984
UAE	6.2	66,625
Norway	5.8	96,591
Russian Federation	4.9	13,236
Bolivia	4.9	2,246
Canada	4.7	51,147
USA	3.7	48,147
Finland	3.4	50,090
Iceland	3.3	43,226
Venezuela	3.0	10,409
Brazil	4.0	12,917
Saudi Arabia	2.5	19,890
South Africa	1.9	8,342
China	1.5	5,184
India	0.7	1,527

Sources: UNDP, Greenhouse gases per capita (tonnes of CO2 equivalent) and IMF, World Economic Outlook Database-September 2011.<sup>155</sup>

The principles of CBDR, historical responsibility, equity and GDP have been central to climate change negotiations since the establishment of the UNFCCC in 1992. This has served to highlight the “the persistent dysfunctional North-South politics”,<sup>156</sup> a broad division unlikely to disappear at any time soon but becoming more and more irrelevant now. Helm noted that the climate change governance principle should be based on consumption instead of production.<sup>157</sup> He wrote: “a serious weakness of Kyoto is that what matters for an international agreement is the consumption of carbon, not its geographic production”.<sup>158</sup>

Helm further noted that: “As China has pointed out, although it might produce high emissions, these are on behalf of consumers in developed countries, and

<sup>155</sup> See UNDP, International Human Development Indicators, Greenhouse Gases Per Capita (tonnes of CO2 equivalent), <http://hdr.undp.org>. See also International Monetary Fund, World Economic Outlook Database-September 2011, <http://www.imf.org/external/data.htm>

<sup>156</sup> Depledge and Yamin, 2009, 443.

<sup>157</sup> Helm, 2009.

<sup>158</sup> Ibid, 19.

therefore the consumers should pay for the relevant reductions”.<sup>159</sup> This line of reasoning also supports the argument that developed countries should pay more for GHG emission reductions based on their high consumption ratio. This argument may give reason for developing countries particularly major emitters to resist pressure on them to make the adjustments, but it fails to address the fundamental goal of emissions abatement and the issues surrounding the rising population and middle class in China, India, and Brazil and their greater consumption of commodities. Further, even if the Western countries were to pay for the GHG emissions on the basis of consumption it is not in accord with the UNFCCC aim which is to stabilize emission concentrations because this principle talks only about payment of money and not about the ways to mitigate the emissions.

There are several other issues of climate change deadlock apart from the superficial North-South division and the consumption and production issues. The framework and the principles of UNFCCC have been major obstacles as the conditions of the countries changing. The lack of progress can also be attributed to the problems evident in the international system, procedural problems of negotiations, and the characteristic problems of climate change.<sup>160</sup> The underlying theme is that even if “we are condemned to live with uncertainty” over the extent of the impacts of the climate change, we still have to find a way out.<sup>161</sup> The nature of climate change is complex with its causes, geographic scope and consequences along with uncertainties.

The core debate of the “environmental and climate change governance is to transform societies and individuals behaviour toward more sustainable and environmentally sound ways” that consequently reduce global GHG emissions.<sup>162</sup> The “environmental governance is about effecting societal change to lead to stronger environmental performance and effectiveness”.<sup>163</sup> Newell and Paterson

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<sup>159</sup> Ibid, 19 and Jiahua Pan, Jonathan Phillips and Ying Chen, ‘China’s Balance of Emissions Embodied in Trade: Approaches to Measurement and Allocating International Responsibility’, in *The Economics and Politics of Climate Change*, eds., Dieter Helm and Cameron Hepburn, 142-66 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

<sup>160</sup> Chandra Lal Pandey, ‘International Climate Change Negotiations and the Media’, in *The Refereed Proceedings of the 2012 Australian Political Studies Association Conference*, eds., Richard Eccleston, Nicholas Sageman and Felicity Gray 273-300 (Hobart, Australia: University of Tasmania, September 24-26, 2012b); and See also Downie, 2005.

<sup>161</sup> Helm, 2009, 9.

<sup>162</sup> Backstrand et al. 2010, 30.

<sup>163</sup> Ibid.

argue that collective human societies should embark on a project to radically transform the way their societies work, “seeking a dramatic transformation of the entire global economy”.<sup>164</sup> The global economy could be transformed into a low carbon economy through the use of climate market mechanisms such as CDM, JI and ETS introduced in the KP. However, Chapter 4 showed that these mechanisms were focused on very limited countries and have had little impact on GHG emission abatement so far.

Reports from many prominent global GHG monitoring institutions demonstrate that emissions are rapidly increasing every year with many key climate indicators moving beyond the natural variability within which contemporary society and economy have cultivated, and thrived. Despite more than twenty years of international efforts along with enormous amount of time and energy expended on the UNFCCC process, carbon emissions are now rising many times more than in 1990.

There is no reliable and meaningful solution in sight to date. Deep ecologists argued for ‘back to nature’ but said ‘no’ to a technological fix. They could be pointing in the right direction but the current level of ecological consciousness of mankind refuses to go back to nature as consumers show no sign of changing their spending habits on less environmentally intensive goods and services<sup>165</sup> so a technological fix, albeit for the short term, is a serious option as it is embedded in political economic systems, the profit based interests and values if the world is to remain around 2°C as the IPCC has demanded. A holistic approach of changing attitudes on the “social-cultural” dynamics seems aspirational at least for now and would take a long time for the public to ‘own’ the problem and run out of other options.<sup>166</sup>

The Copenhagen Accord did not place the core understanding of climate change governance – the transformation of human behaviour and the global economy – in

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<sup>164</sup> Peter Newell and Matthew Paterson, *Climate Capitalism: Global Warming and Transforming of the Global Economy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 1.

<sup>165</sup> European Environment Agency, *Environmental Pressures from European Consumption and Production. Insights from Environmental Accounts* (Copenhagen: European Environment Agency, 2007).

<sup>166</sup> Ton Buhrs, ‘Climate Change Policy and New Zealand’s ‘National Interest’: the Need for Embedding Climate Change Policy into Sustainable Agenda’, *Political Science* 60, no. 1 (2008), 72.

sustainable and environmentally sound ways. Addressing this issue reveals clearly that there is no future in being negative about the responses of various participants but there is a future in determining and understanding the situation in which each finds itself, and not just in general terms of being developed or developing or in being dependent on fossil fuels or some other category. The future is that each party should respond to the extent it can to materialize the complex goal of climate governance of transforming societies resulting into low-carbon world. Chapters 8 and 9 will discuss these issues further.

### **5.10 Conclusion**

COP-15's major achievement was the Copenhagen Accord, a three page document with 12 articles and two appendices. The main objective of the COP-15 was to adopt an ambitious agreement that would be effective after the expiry of the KP. To achieve an agreement the parties had to agree on the temperature increase limit, and on burden sharing in reducing and mitigating GHGs. However, the parties insisted on their long standing arguments on the position of climate change based on UNFCCC principles and state-centric institutional framework. The outdated UNFCCC division of Annex I and Non-Annex I blurred the climate change negotiations. For instance, Korea and Mexico – both of which, to their credit, participated creatively in the Copenhagen process – joined the OECD six months after Kyoto, but they have remained as Non-Annex I countries.<sup>167</sup> Russia and the Ukraine are not OECD members until now but they have been members of the Annex I category. Emerging economies such as China, India, Brazil, Korea, Mexico and South Africa had more in common on some key economic dimensions with some countries in the so-called developed world than they did with the poorest developing countries, such as those of sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.<sup>168</sup>

Yet the Copenhagen climate change conference took climate change concerns to the highest political level. Almost 115 of the world's leaders made it an historical conference in search of a multi-level environmental agreement. The active participation of the Obama administration was significant given the earlier stance

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<sup>167</sup> Robert N. Stavins and Robert C. Stowe, 'What Hath Copenhagen Wrought? A Preliminary Assessment', *Environment Magazine* 52, no. 3 (2010): 8-14.

<sup>168</sup> Ibid.

of the Clinton and Bush Administrations. Copenhagen brought a high level of participation from non-state actors, including various NGOs, academia, businesses and media. However, COP-15 did not allow most of the accredited non-state actors to enter the Bella centre.<sup>169</sup> Likewise many of the heads of state and negotiators were not allowed to participate in the negotiations.<sup>170</sup> Consequently, six countries – none of them major emitters – objected to the Accord which was noted by the conference, and not adopted.<sup>171</sup>

It was an international climate change agreement which brought both developed and developing countries together but the Accord did not say anything about moving emerging economies to the Annex I group or any new alternative group. The Accord made provisions for a fast-start fund of US\$30 billion for 2010-2012 and long term funding of US\$100 billion a year by 2020. It also focused on the issues of adaptation for the most vulnerable ones but it left the appendices empty for voluntary commitments for GHGs mitigation. As discussed earlier, the contents of the figures 5.2 and 5.3 above and the positions of a few major emitting countries from both so called developed and developing worlds weakened the Accord. Reflecting on COP-15, Chasek and Downie note:

The climate regime has developed at a slower pace, it does not yet include the rules that are required to mitigate climate change in the long-term, it does not yet have a binding regime to control emission reductions for all major emitters, therefore, only a few call it as a success.<sup>172</sup>

The Copenhagen Accord was a meaningful first step for President Obama, and many delegates from the EU, but many delegates from developing countries and the environmentalists described it as a failure. A successful agreement needed agreement on emission reduction targets to limit global temperature rises to below 2°C. It also needed a strong form of governance for funding and technology transfer for emission mitigation and adaptation, and it needed a solid framework for burden sharing by redefining the essence of developing and developed countries along with greater role of global civil society. If the Copenhagen Accord

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<sup>169</sup> Fisher, 2010.

<sup>170</sup> McGregor, 2010.

<sup>171</sup> Stavins and Stowe, 2010.

<sup>172</sup> Pamela S.Chasek and David L. Downie, *Global Environmental Politics* (Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 2005), 163.

is judged from these criteria, even if the Accord may provide many lifelines to future negotiations, it is safe to say that the Accord did not bring together major environmental concerns, and did not pay sufficient attention to the multilateral norms of sovereign equality as well as representation of non-state actors. It confirms that states were directed more according to state-centric interest than about environmental concerns.

Nevertheless COP-15 imparted a very important message for future negotiations. It confirmed that there was a general but perennial problem of conflicting interests among the large number of parties. Global issues such as climate change and bio diversity present the special problems of large numbers of states.<sup>173</sup> Creating consensus among these large numbers of parties with conflicting interests is more than a Herculean task vividly observed in many international negotiations including COP-15. The Accord was crafted by only 5 parties following negotiations which had ended in stalemate when all parties as well as the 25 in the special group had been included. It showed that the UN process of state-centric consensus approach for negotiations had become weaker and time consuming. Many COP-15 delegates argued that the: “UN process had become completely unworkable, making it impossible to forge consensus among disparate countries debating contentious fundamental requirements of a global climate change agreement”.<sup>174</sup> Except that the difficulties were more likely to be issue specific ones than suggesting a decline in the UN processes.

In sum, this chapter identified five perennial problems at COP-15 which were consistent with the KP, and which can be generalized with other UNFCCC conferences: 1) the problem of conflicting interests of the large number of parties who often prioritized state-centric national interests more than the so called cooperation for environmental concerns and who side-lined non-state actors; 2) the consensual decision making process among parties and use of the veto: all the parties intended to adopt the Copenhagen Accord, albeit imperfect, but six developing countries used their veto power to block it from being adopted; 3) politics within and between North-South, North-North and South-South: the North’s reluctance to deploy funding and low carbon technology to the South and

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<sup>173</sup> Downie, 2005.

<sup>174</sup> Climaticoanalysis, 2010, 25.

South's right to development (business-as-usual) combined with an unwillingness to take binding commitments by some Northern countries and major emitters from the South; 4) the understanding of the CBDR principle with no graduation date for major emitters from developing countries: the graduation clause with specific details for separating countries from developing to a new criteria where they could assume more responsibility than other developing countries would create the space to address an important challenge and invite countries to start considering whether or how they might take steps towards addressing climate change;<sup>175</sup> and 5) unsubstantiated understanding of historical responsibility: many developing countries were calling for the industrial world to clear its debts but it was inappropriate and misleading as they remain silent for countries like India and China, who were also benefiting by importing Western technologies for their continuous economic growth at the significant environmental costs.<sup>176</sup> These countries have also continued to be major emitters.

This chapter also argues that, in the short term, technological intervention is necessary to keep the world on the edge of a temperature limit of 2°C. The following chapter presents data and insights derived from selected newspapers as noted in chapter 3 from four major GHG emitters and central players in climate change policy making, to analyse whether the newspapers identified the problems of slow progress and what efforts were made to resolve these problems by passing accurate scientific information to educate the public and to enable governments to articulate pro-climate stands on climate change issues.

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<sup>175</sup> Michael Grubb, 'Durban: The Darkest Hour', *Climate Policy* 11 (2011): 1269-71.

<sup>176</sup> Felix Ekardt, Anne-Katrin Exner and Sibylle Albrecht, 'Climate Change Justice and Clean Development: A Review of the Copenhagen Negotiating Draft', *Carbon and Climate Law Review* 3, no. 3 (2009): 261-69.



## Chapter 6

### Media and Climate Change

#### 6.1 Introduction

Previous chapters on the Kyoto Protocol (KP) and the Copenhagen Climate Conference explored issues related to the slow progress in the development of the international climate change governance. This chapter sets out how the newspaper media covered international climate change negotiations and policy making. It presents the data from selected newspapers on the issues of climate change, and examines the role it played in its coverage of the international climate change negotiations and agreements, including coverage, the consistency, or lack of it, between data collection and making meaning of the data in this research.

This research is based on 667 articles from five major world newspapers selected for this research as noted in the methodology section in chapter 3. Editorials and opinion articles from each newspaper were of particular interest because editorials are semi-official writings, present the stance taken by the newspapers and opinion articles are generally included as pieces of significance in terms of public interest. Chapters 7 draws analyses from the data presented in this chapter. The articles<sup>1</sup> from the *Wall Street Journal* (WSJ) and the *New York Times* (NYT) cover the period from 1997 to early 2012. The *Guardian* (GUK) covers the period from 1998 to 2012 because archives were not available before 1998. The *Hindu* covers from 2000 to 2012 and the *China Daily* from 2001 to 2012, the latter, due to the limited material available online.

Articles published covered the period 1997, the year of KP adoption, to 2012, the year of the Doha Agreement. Prior to 2006, articles covered issues surrounding the KP. For 2007 there is coverage of the initiatives for post-Kyoto agreement which resulted in the Bali Action Plan. Between 2007 and 2009, the media

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<sup>1</sup> Articles are presented in the sequence of dates. Each section begins with first available article year to the latest one. Words like editorial, opinion piece, news analysis, editor, reported, commented and viewed are used to avoid monotonous reading and capture the interest of the readers. No words used in the presentation of the commentary are deliberately contextualized one from the other. Words like countries, nations, nation-states, developing world and developed world, North and South are used as they appear in the original texts (some attempts have been made to bring consistency by using countries and states instead of nations and nation-states) but they are treated in this study just as substitutes for one another. No attempts have been made to distinguish nations from nation-states or states according to classic definitions of political science.

coverage of climate change centred on various rounds of negotiations ultimately leading to the Copenhagen climate conference 2009 where the Conference of the Parties 15 (COP-15) was expected to deliver an ambitious climate treaty. In 2010 the media covered the Cancun climate conference. In 2011, there were high expectations that the meetings in Durban would decide the future path of climate change negotiations. In 2012, the media covered the concerns of Durban and COP-18 in Doha. The division of articles in table 6.1 sets out the years, place of the meetings and number of articles discussed during the climate change conferences.

**Table 6.1: Number of articles by period and issue 1997-2012**

Newspaper	<i>WSJ</i>	<i>NYT</i>	<i>GUK</i>	<i>Hindu</i>	<i>China Daily</i>
Period	1997-2012	1997-2012	1998-2012	2000-2012	2001-2012
<u>Topic</u> Kyoto (1997)	75 articles (1996-2006)	83 articles (1996-2006)	56 articles (1999-2006)	30 articles (2000-06)	19 articles (2001-06)
<u>Topic</u> Bali(2007)	8 articles	11 articles	16 articles	12 articles	13 articles
<u>Topic</u> Poznan(2008)	8 articles	8 articles	4 articles	10 articles	6 articles
<u>Topic</u> Copenhagen(2009)	36 articles	22 articles	25 articles	22 articles	19 articles
<u>Topic</u> Cancun(2010)	23 articles	13 articles	11 articles	22 articles	19 articles
<u>Topic</u> Durban(2011-12)	15 articles	25 articles	22 articles	7 articles	23 articles
	165 articles	162 articles	134 articles	103 articles	99 articles

Source: Chandra Lal Pandey

As noted in chapter 3 on methodology the search terms produced a total of 165 articles from the *WSJ*; 162 articles from the *NYT*; 134 articles from the *GUK*; 103 articles from *The Hindu*; and 99 articles from the *China Daily*. The researcher attempted to archive all the available relevant articles from the selected newspapers but acknowledges the limitations of the search with the possibility that some articles might have been missed. The *WSJ* published more articles on Copenhagen and Cancun than the other papers. It sought to highlight the Climategate events of 2009 and 2010. The *Hindu* had the least coverage after Cancun while the *China Daily* carried a number of articles in the period. From

Kyoto to Poznan, the *China Daily* published fewer articles than in the period Copenhagen to Durban. It had more coverage during and after Durban.

As mentioned in chapter 3, Factiva found no articles in the *China Daily* before 2007 and from that time there was a growing interest in the paper on climate change issues. The *NYT* had more articles concerning Kyoto than any other newspaper, but less coverage during Bali and Poznan than the other papers, and had more than others from Copenhagen (less than the *Hindu*), and Cancun. The *China Daily* had the least number of articles during the KP when the period is taken into consideration as noted earlier. The *GUK* had good coverage during the Kyoto period and Copenhagen and published the highest number of articles on Bali compared to other papers but over Poznan it had the least.

Each newspaper produced a few articles before, during or after the international climate change negotiation conferences. Editorials were from 650 to 900 words and opinion articles from 1000 to 1400 words, and more complex than the editorials. The following sections outline the original articles and summaries of the articles published. The first section of this chapter outlines the material from the *WSJ*, the second section from the *NYT*, the third, the fourth and the fifth from the *GUK*, the *Hindu* and *China Daily* respectively. The conclusion of this chapter presents summarized analysis of the newspapers and their main arguments being made.

## **6.2 The *WSJ* Eastern Editions and Online**

This study used 165 articles from the *WSJ* in total. An article dated December 15, 1997 expressed the view that the United States (US) should not accept the emissions targets as proposed by the KP of 7 per cent below the levels of 1990 by 2012 because of the damage it would do to the US economy and, in return for such steep reductions, the US would get nothing solid.<sup>2</sup> On November 17, 1998 the *WSJ* argued that the level of warming caused by human activity was very small and that the KP was an unnecessary policy to raise taxes.<sup>3</sup> In November 28, 2000, an article argued that news of global warming was not new news so drastic steps that would imperil the world economy made no sense especially when there

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<sup>2</sup> Ronald Bailye, 'Shanghaied in Kyoto', *WSJ*, December 15, 1997, A1.

<sup>3</sup> Editorial, 'Classic Political Effect', *WSJ*, November 17, 1998, A 1.

was so much doubt about global warming.<sup>4</sup> Prior to this, an editorial in September 2000 argued that the US reductions of carbon dioxide to meet the Kyoto targets would increase the prices of commodities.<sup>5</sup>

In 2001 a contributor wrote that the evidence against a warming trend was overwhelming, expressing concern that the Bush administration might support the KP and that would be rash, lopsided, and based on erroneous science. It argued that Bush's rejection of the KP was good science, good economics and good politics.<sup>6</sup> An editorial on May 31, 2001 argued that the European Union (EU) should not paint the Bush Administration as global villain for rejecting the KP when the US was facing energy shortages and the Senate had already rejected it.<sup>7</sup> An opinion article on July 16, 2001 wrote that the need of 55 per cent of the developed countries that emitted 55 per cent of the total emissions was the threshold for Kyoto's ratification and that Europe could not do it alone without the US or Russia and Japan.<sup>8</sup> It also approved the US rejection of the KP in giving the US companies an advantage over their foreign rivals but warned that in the long term the US companies would find themselves less energy efficient than their foreign competitors.<sup>9</sup>

On October 3, 2003 comments were made about the EU's battle for allocating their emission allowances arguing that US industry was watching the European battle closely.<sup>10</sup> The *WSJ* reported that Russia would not ratify the KP but when Russia subsequently ratified it, it said that it was bad news because Russian ratification would be enough to activate the ill-considered treaty. It doubted that, given the high price and meagre yield of the United Nations (UN) project, a good time frame for policy implementation would ever come.<sup>11</sup> Its editorial on June 6, 2004 noted that many were worrying over global warming which made it easy to forget that most of the world's poor and sick continued to deal with far more basic

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<sup>4</sup> James K. Glassman, 'Forget Kyoto', *WSJ*, November 28, 2000, A 26.

<sup>5</sup> Editorial, 'Gore's Emergency', *WSJ*, September 25, 2000, A 36.

<sup>6</sup> James K. Glassman, 'It's No Time to Go Wobbly on Kyoto', *WSJ*, May 11, 2001, A 14.

<sup>7</sup> Editorial, 'Who Speaks for Europe', *WSJ*, May 31, 2001, A 16.

<sup>8</sup> John J. Fialka and Geoff Winestock, 'Future of Kyoto Protocol minus the US is Uncertain', *WSJ*, July 16, 2001, A 2.

<sup>9</sup> 'Kyoto Spurned Is Mixed Bag for US Firms - Subsidiaries Abroad Will Have to Abide by New Emissions Rules', *WSJ*, July 25, 2001, A 2.

<sup>10</sup> 'Readies Worried Indus For Kyoto Caps', *WSJ*, October 3, 2003, A 12.

<sup>11</sup> Editorial, 'Quid Pro Kyoto', *WSJ*, May 5, 2004, A16.

problems associated with living conditions than the impacts of climate change and thus argued for the importance of a Copenhagen Consensus – a consensus to solve the world’s basic problems including hunger, poverty and housing rather than global warming.<sup>12</sup>

On February 16, 2005 in an opinion piece the *WSJ* wrote that while the US was a leading proponent of GEOSS,<sup>13</sup> it was not signing up for the KP, in part because the Bush administration argued that the data did not prove that global warming was as big a threat as Kyoto supporters contended.<sup>14</sup> In analysing climate change and other pressing issues, it suggested that there were other more effective ways to help the world’s poor by controlling HIV/AIDS, providing micronutrients, liberalizing trade, controlling malaria.<sup>15</sup> On June 25, 2005 an argument was made that most global warming alarms were based on computer simulations that were largely speculative and depended on a multitude of debatable assumptions, and since “the Byrd-Hagel vote eight years ago, the case of linking fossil fuels to global warming has, if anything, [become] even more doubtful.”<sup>16</sup> After Kyoto was ratified, it said that even if countries met their Kyoto targets, it would not do much for the atmosphere because the world’s biggest emitters did not have any commitments.<sup>17</sup> The US did not sign the KP because arbitrary emissions targets were both pointless and economically damaging and no proof existed that lowering emissions would reduce global warming.

The *WSJ* argued that the idea that human activity influenced climate change was far from proven, and that if the warming trend of recent decades continued then it might be a boon to humanity.<sup>18</sup> An editorial of December 4, 2006, noted that Exxon was being targeted by mainstream scientists and environmental activists because it was one of the few companies that still thought that some debate on climate change was valuable. By way of contrast the editorial argued that

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<sup>12</sup> Editorial, ‘Copenhagen on Kyoto’, *WSJ*, June 6, 2004, A8.

<sup>13</sup> Global Earth Observation System of Systems is being built by Group on Earth Observations on the basis of ten year implementation plan running from 2005 to 2015.

<sup>14</sup> Daniels Michaels, ‘Global Accord Set for Approval Will Unify Earth Watching Data’, *WSJ*, February 16, 2005, A 13.

<sup>15</sup> ‘Copenhagen Solution’, *WSJ*, June 8, 2005, A 14.

<sup>16</sup> Editorial, ‘Kyoto by Degree’, *WSJ*, June 25, 2005, A 16.

<sup>17</sup> Jeffry Ball, ‘Kyoto Questioned as U.S. Moves on Coal; Diplomats Consider Carrots To Draw Major Emitters Into Global-Warming Pact’, *WSJ*, December 6, 2005, A 2.

<sup>18</sup> Editorial, ‘Kyoto’s Big Con’, *WSJ*, January 19, 2006, A 14.

environmentalists had been wrong about the apocalyptic claims such as global famine, overpopulation, natural resource exhaustion, the evils of pesticides, and global warming.<sup>19</sup>

Criticizing the KP, an editorial of December 6, 2006, stated that recent data showed that placing artificial limits on emissions had not done much to reduce emissions and may even have been counterproductive. Therefore, the American approach was more promising than that of Europe – the key to reducing carbon emissions lay in unleashing the private sector, not capping it.<sup>20</sup> A letter published on 13 December 2006 carried a contrasting theme noting: “Science outranks senators. Galileo was a consensus of one”.<sup>21</sup> Another contributor saw the debate as shifting the focus from science to economics.<sup>22</sup> Its editorial of December 4, 2007, expressed concern over Australia’s new Prime Minister, Kevin Rudd, who vowed to tackle climate change and ratify the KP.<sup>23</sup>

An editorial on June 6, 2008, argued that the political consensus on global warming was exaggerated by the alleged scientific consensus.<sup>24</sup> Its editorial on June 7, 2008, quoted Bjorn Lomborg<sup>25</sup> and expressed the view that the costs of mitigating climate change would be much greater than the speculative benefits and that therefore the focus should be shifted to adaptation by seeking new technologies rather than to a cap-and-trade regime.<sup>26</sup>

On June 1, 2009, the editorial wrote that China was now the world’s number one carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>) emitter and criticised the idea of green investments because China wanted its economy to be more efficient while the West would be less competitive.<sup>27</sup> It argued that sceptics were swelling everywhere so there was no point in the US House of Representatives preparing to pass a climate-change bill.

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<sup>19</sup> Editorial, ‘Global Warming Gag Order’, *WSJ*, December 4, 2006, A 16.

<sup>20</sup> Editorial, ‘Europe versus America on CO<sub>2</sub>’, *WSJ*, December 6, 2006, A 16.

<sup>21</sup> Editorial Letter, ‘Senators Chill Out Letter to Exxon Creates a Heated Reaction’, *WSJ*, December 13, 2006, A 19.

<sup>22</sup> Jeffrey Ball, ‘Politics and Economics Climate Economics; Fight Over Who Pays for Emission Curbs’, *WSJ*, May 5, 2007, A 4.

<sup>23</sup> See Editorial, ‘Aussie Ouster’, *WSJ*, November 26, 2007, A 20; See also ‘Australia’s Rudd Approves Kyoto Protocol’, *WSJ*, December 4, 2007, A 6.

<sup>24</sup> Stephen Moore, ‘Climate Change Collapse’, *WSJ*, June 6, 2008, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB121269184525849383.html>.

<sup>25</sup> Bjorn Lomborg is Director of Copenhagen Consensus Centre, an OP-ED article writer and author of the *Skeptical Environmentalist* and *Cool It*.

<sup>26</sup> Editorial, ‘A Different Consensus’, *WSJ*, June 7, 2008, A 10.

<sup>27</sup> Editorial, ‘Pelosi’s Chinese Climate Change’, *WSJ*, June 1, 2009, A 18.

The Australian Parliament was preparing to kill its own country's carbon-emissions scheme and a growing number of Australian politicians, scientists and citizens once again doubted the science of human-caused global warming.<sup>28</sup> In an article on September 21, 2009, the paper wrote that President Obama had promised strong action on climate change since his first day of office but that he had several other pressing issues to address and there were differences between the US and Europe on fundamental issues such as how quickly rich countries should have to cut their emissions over the next decade. The EU targets were to be between 20 to 30 per cent below 1990 levels by 2020 whereas the most aggressive proposal in Congress to curb US emissions was for 4 per cent reduction below 1990 levels by 2020.<sup>29</sup>

The paper noted China's view that the stand of developed countries had made the deal more difficult.<sup>30</sup> Its editorial ridiculed Barack Obama's statement: "Now is the time to confront this challenge once and for all. Delay is no longer an option" but "it turns out that delay is an option".<sup>31</sup> It argued that the pointlessness of Copenhagen would become part of Obama's argument that the Senate should introduce a cap and tax on the US, as well as a justification for the Environment Protection Agency's (EPA) nondemocratic carbon crackdown via clean-air regulation. If Obama were to be lucky, however, the Senate would fail to act, the EPA would get tied up in court, and the economy would recover faster without the looming burden of higher energy taxes.<sup>32</sup>

In 2009 November and December, it published 5 articles critiquing the argument of mainstream climate science contextualizing Climategate. It argued this was not settled science but indicated it was a cracking empirical foundation with many billion-dollar edifices built on it which, sooner or later, were bound to crumble.<sup>33</sup>

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<sup>28</sup> Kimberley A. Strassel, 'The Climate Change Climate Change', *WSJ*, June 26, 2009, A 13.

<sup>29</sup> Stephen Power and Ian Talley, 'Climate Change to Take Centre Stage at UN Talks', *WSJ*, September 21, 2009, A 8.

<sup>30</sup> 'World News: Discussions On Climate Could Fail, Beijing Says', *WSJ*, October 22, 2009, A 7.

<sup>31</sup> Editorial, 'Copenhagen's Collapse', *WSJ*, November 17, 2009, A 24.

<sup>32</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>33</sup> See for more: Editorial, 'Global Warming With the Lid Off', *WSJ*, November 24, 2009, A 22; Editorial, 'Rigging a Climate Consensus', *WSJ*, November 28, 2009, A 14; Bret Stephens, 'Climategate: Follow the Money', *WSJ*, December 1, 2009, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703939404574566124250205490.html#printModule>; and see also Editorial, 'We Deserve Ethical Behaviour by Climate Scientists', *WSJ*, December 2, 2009, A 24; and Editorial, 'The Copenhagen Concoction', *WSJ*, December 8, 2009, A 20.

At the beginning of the Copenhagen climate conference in 2009, it wrote that officials from 192 countries would meet in Copenhagen to tackle global climate change, seeking a successor to the KP. Even if they could not negotiate a binding agreement because each country had its own particular priorities and concerns, many countries hoped at least to work out commitments to reduce their GHG emissions and provide assistance to poorer countries likely to be hardest hit by the effects of global warming.<sup>34</sup>

On December 10, 2009 an article discussed the issue raised by the US Chief climate change negotiator, Todd Stern, that the US did not plan to give money to China to subsidize its efforts to curb GHGs, and that developing countries could not get a pass from demands to burn less fossil fuels.<sup>35</sup> It compared Copenhagen 2009 with other conferences, and noted that what was proposed was a lot of financial dealings, a potential foreign aid bonanza, and a massive transfer of funds from West to Non-Annex I countries with little to show for it because the corruption, political oppression, government control of the economy and the absence of the rule of law would combine to keep poor countries poor. Recasting foreign aid as climate mitigation would not change any of that.<sup>36</sup>

Its editorial of December 17, 2009, wrote that the cap-and-trade policy would be counterproductive. It was a scheme that would impose heavy carbon taxes and allowances on US industries, which would provide an incentive to move offshore, or to sell those allowances to overseas' companies that could use them to become more competitive against US companies. American workers, it concluded, would be the big losers.<sup>37</sup>

On December 19, 2009, it was reported that the Copenhagen Accord left key questions unanswered and it was silent on how to achieve the goals set in the Accord claiming it would have little immediate impact on companies in the US and elsewhere. The negotiations also showed the shift in the balance of power between the US and China as a central dynamic of the fractiousness at

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<sup>34</sup> 'Environment: A Special Report: Who Wants What in Copenhagen', *WSJ*, December 7, 2009, R 6.

<sup>35</sup> Alessandro Torello, 'Envoy Says US Won't Pay China to Cut Emissions', *WSJ*, December 10, 2009, A 16.

<sup>36</sup> Editorial, 'The Copenhagen Shakedown', *WSJ*, December 16, 2009, A 26.

<sup>37</sup> Editorial, 'Cap and Trade in Practice', *WSJ*, December 17, 2009, A. 26.



Copenhagen.<sup>38</sup> The Accord provided the foundation for an eventual binding treaty but the same foundation had been laid many times before with scant success.<sup>39</sup> It wrote:

Honest carbon accounting would also impede programs like the corrupt clean development mechanism where European consumers end up paying Chinese companies for emissions reductions that either aren't real or would have happened anyway. At least Copenhagen's talk did less tangible harm.<sup>40</sup>

An opinion article on December, 2009, stated that Copenhagen climate talks 2009 focused on the leading climate culprit – carbon dioxide. But reversing global temperatures by reducing carbon emissions would take many decades if not centuries. Even if the largest CO<sub>2</sub> cuts were implemented, it would not reverse the melting ice already occurring in the most sensitive areas, including the rapid disappearance of glaciers in Tibet, the Arctic and Latin America implying that what we could do effectively to buffer global warming would be to make an all-out effort to reduce emissions of methane.<sup>41</sup>

In 2010 the *WSJ* editorials criticized the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) report and its climate chief Rajendra Pachauri's blistering rebuke to India's environment minister for casting doubt on the notion that global warming was causing the rapid melting of Himalayan glaciers. It argued that the Himalayan glaciers do seem to be retreating and the reasons for that are complex and still poorly understood.<sup>42</sup> At least three articles were written criticising the IPCC and mainstream climate science.<sup>43</sup> An editorial on February 16, 2010 wrote: "We think the science is still disputable".<sup>44</sup>

An opinion article on November 29, 2010 noted that the US had two key goals at the Cancun climate conference in 2010: to reinforce an international agreement on

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<sup>38</sup> Jeffrey Ball, Stephen Power, Elizabeth Williamson, 'Climate Pact Falls Short - Emission Curbs Are Weak; U.S. Calls Compromise With China, India a 'First Step'', *WSJ*, December 19, 2009, A 1.

<sup>39</sup> Editorial, 'Copenhagen's Lesson in Limits', *WSJ*, December 19, 2009, A 12.

<sup>40</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>41</sup> Robert Watson, Mohamed El-Ashry, 'A Fast, Cheap Way to Cool the Planet', *WSJ*, December 29, 2009, A 21.

<sup>42</sup> Editorial, 'A Glacier Meltdown', *WSJ*, January 23, 2010, A 14.

<sup>43</sup> See for more: Editorial, 'The Continuing Climate Meltdown', *WSJ*, February 16, 2010, A 18; Patrick J. Michaels, 'The Climategate Whitewash Continues', *WSJ*, July 12, 2010, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704075604575356611173414140.html>.

<sup>44</sup> *Ibid*

climate change that entailed comparable efforts from all major GHG emitters and avoid getting blamed if the talks were seen to fail.<sup>45</sup> An opinion article on December 7, 2010, expressed the view that few people would be surprised if the Cancun talks failed but the real surprise was that, for the previous two decades, people believed that there was a realistic prospect of securing broad international agreement to restrict CO<sub>2</sub> by all the major emitters. That did not happen so individual approaches to the problem should be sought.<sup>46</sup>

On December 10, 2010, it reported that the fate of the KP appeared uncertain at Cancun as diplomats struggled to finalize a package of agreements to address climate change, while a global treaty on the issue stalled amid a stalemate among the US, China, Japan and other nations.<sup>47</sup> It reported that, at Cancun, rich countries would voluntarily cut emissions as pledged in Copenhagen 2009 and developing countries were to come up with plans to make cuts to limit global warming to less than 2 degrees Celsius above pre-industrial levels. The agreement included a green fund of \$100 billion a year that wealthier countries would provide to help poor countries finance programs to cut emissions and cope with drought and other effects of global warming.<sup>48</sup>

On December 11, 2010 an editorial commented that when it came to global warming, there has always been more than a touch of the old-time religion. Unfortunately for the climateers, the rest of the Maya pantheon did not seem to be cooperating. A more realistic view came from the Japanese, who said they would not sign on to any successor to the 1997 KP, expiring in 2012.<sup>49</sup> It was also noted that the Cancun, Mexico, climate conference would not be the last of its kind in failing to gain a legally binding agreement.<sup>50</sup> It reported that world leaders at

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<sup>45</sup> 'The Key to Cancun: For the U.S. to get what it wants in climate talks, says Michael Levi, it must stop obsessing about China', *WSJ*, November 29, 2010, R 6.

<sup>46</sup> Rupert Darwall, 'A Mexican Stand Off in Cancun', *WSJ*, December 7, 2010, A 17.

<sup>47</sup> Cassandra Sweet, 'Climate Pact Stalls at Cancun Summit', *WSJ*, December 10, 2010a, [http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704457604576011860259922304.html?mod=WSJEUROPE\\_hpp\\_MIDDLETopNews](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748704457604576011860259922304.html?mod=WSJEUROPE_hpp_MIDDLETopNews).

<sup>48</sup> Cassandra Sweet, 'Nations Approve Cancun Climate Package', *WSJ*, December 11, 2010b, [http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703518604576012922254366218.html?mod=WSJ\\_topics\\_obama](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703518604576012922254366218.html?mod=WSJ_topics_obama)

<sup>49</sup> Editorial, 'The Cancun Crack-up', *WSJ*, December 11, 2010, A 14.

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

Cancun made it clear that addressing the climate issue would be all about money.<sup>51</sup>

The Australian Prime Minister Julia Gillard was attacked in an article on July 18, 2011 for her carbon tax by writing “Ms. Gillard vowed to press forward with cap and tax and said that her convictions are ‘very deeply held’. We’ll see if her government can survive them”. Continuing its stand on climate change, an editorial on October 25, 2011 commented:

The science on climate change and man’s influence on it is far from settled. The question today is whether it makes sense to combat a potential climate threat by imposing economically destructive regulations and sinking billions into failure-prone technologies that have their own environmental costs.<sup>52</sup>

It further cast doubt on any legally binding treaty in Durban 2011:

The chances that a global deal on carbon would ever be reached were always slim, a point brought home by the collapse of the 2009 Copenhagen summit. The US, Russia and Japan have all said they won’t agree to any new binding carbon pact, while India and China were never believers in the first place.<sup>53</sup>

In an opinion article on November 25, 2011, the view was expressed that the real peril of climate change was not the increasingly shaky theory of anthropogenic global warming, but the sweeping, eye-wateringly expensive, economically catastrophic policies being introduced on the basis of little more than junk science, so the anonymous leaker FOIA has done the causes of truth, rationalism and global justice an enormous favour.<sup>54</sup>

On December 6, 2011, an article reported on its research about China which wants to extend the KP, currently set to expire in 2012, \$30 billion annually by 2012 and follow through on a plan for \$100 billion by 2020 to mitigate the effects of climate change in poor nations, a system for rich countries to provide climate-

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<sup>51</sup> Jeffrey Ball and Cassandra Sweet, ‘World News: UN Climate Talks End—Rich Nations Agree to Help Poorer Ones but Put Off Figuring Out Who Will Pay’, *WSJ*, December 13, 2010, A 15.

<sup>52</sup> Editorial, ‘The Post Global Warming World’, *WSJ*, October 25, 2011, A 18.

<sup>53</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>54</sup> James Delingpole, ‘Yet Another Climate Change Scandal; The Real Peril Comes from the Economically Catastrophic Policies Being Pushed in its Name’, *WSJ*, November 25, 2011, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204630904577057631818466186.html>.

adaptation technology and best practices to poorer nations, a review of efforts to reduce emissions so far, and a policy of common but differentiated principles (CBDR) to mitigate climate change.<sup>55</sup> And if these demands were met, China might consider a legally binding arrangement, according to Xie Zhenhua, China's chief negotiator at Durban. It touched upon the issues and tussles among the US, China and India and the voices of environmental organizations such as 'kill Africa' and 'climate justice now'.<sup>56</sup> It also reported on the contentious issue of funding:

Wealthier nations were angling for control of donations that flow from their public coffers to the fund, while poorer nations that will be the beneficiaries of funds want the United Nations-led climate conference to be in charge of overseeing it.<sup>57</sup>

Referring to the Durban summit a *WSJ* opinion article stated:

The Durban agreement is being hailed as a diplomatic victory. Yet it essentially concedes defeat, leaving any hard decisions to the far end of the decade when other politicians will have to deal with it. For nearly 20 years, the international community has tried to negotiate commitments to carbon cuts, with almost nothing to show for it.<sup>58</sup>

Any carbon deal to replace Kyoto would have a negligible impact on climate in coming decades so the focus should be about adaptation.<sup>59</sup> On January 26, 2012, a letter was published signed by 16 scientists saying that there was no need to panic about global warming because there was no compelling scientific argument for drastic action to 'decarbonize' the world's economy even if one accepts the inflated climate forecasts of the IPCC, aggressive GHG control policies are not justified economically.<sup>60</sup> Interestingly, it published one letter signed by many climate

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<sup>55</sup> Patrick McGroarty, 'Chinese Overture Jolts Climate Talks', *WSJ*, December 6, 2011a, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204903804577080223812409562.html?mod>.

<sup>56</sup> Patrick McGroarty, 'As Climate Talks Wind Down a Final Standoff', *WSJ*, December 9, 2011b, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204319004577088412312709158.html>.

<sup>57</sup> Patrick McGroarty, 'Talks on Climate Change Fund Make Progress', *WSJ*, December 9, 2011c, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203501304577086502352895284.html>.

<sup>58</sup> Bjorn Lomborg, 'Global Warming and Adaptability', *WSJ*, December 12, 2011, [http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203413304577086361984880468.html?mod=WSJ\\_Opinion\\_carousel\\_3](http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970203413304577086361984880468.html?mod=WSJ_Opinion_carousel_3).

<sup>59</sup> Ibid.

<sup>60</sup> Editorial, 'No Need to Panic About Global Warming', *WSJ*, January 26, 2012, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204301404577171531838421366.html#printMode>.

scientists that clearly criticized the article “No Need to Panic About Global Warming”.<sup>61</sup> The letter reads:

You published ‘No Need to Panic About Global Warming’ (Op-Ed, Jan. 27) on climate change by the climate-science equivalent of dentists practicing cardiology. While accomplished in their own fields, most of these authors have no expertise in climate science. The few authors who have such expertise are known to have extreme views that are out of step with nearly every other climate expert. For example, there is a retrovirus expert who does not accept that HIV causes AIDS. And it is instructive to recall that a few scientists continued to state that smoking did not cause cancer, long after that was settled science.<sup>62</sup>

It went on to claim that:

Research shows that more than 97 per cent of scientists actively publishing in the field agree that climate change is real and human caused. It would be an act of recklessness for any political leader to disregard the weight of evidence and ignore the enormous risks that climate change clearly poses.<sup>63</sup>

With few exceptions, the *WSJ* consistently argued against climate change and also noted that old voters were more important for Senators and Congressmen because their turnout is greater than young ones who believe in climate change:

What is more, the age divide is not enough to change the dynamics in Congress, where lawmakers are well-aware that older voters turn out more frequently and broad action to address global warming is not on the immediate agenda.<sup>64</sup>

### **6.3 *NYT* Late Editions and Online**

This section of the study outlines a total of 162 articles from the *NYT*. It covers the period between 1997 and 2012. On December 6, 1997, the *NYT* reported that a possible agreement on cutting industrialized countries' emissions of heat-trapping waste gases had begun to emerge from intensive negotiations. This preceded the second key issue about the immediate role of developing countries in controlling

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<sup>61</sup> ‘Check with Climate Scientists for Views on Climate’, *WSJ*, February 2, 2012, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204740904577193270727472662.html#printMod>.

<sup>62</sup> Ibid.

<sup>63</sup> Ibid.

<sup>64</sup> Keith Johnson, ‘On Climate change, Some Arguments Shift’, *WSJ*, January 26, 2013, A 4.

the gases which continued to threaten the overall prospects for successful talks.<sup>65</sup> On December 11, 1997 the *NYT* reported that negotiators from around the world had agreed on a legally binding treaty obligating industrial countries to cut emissions of waste industrial gases that scientists argued were warming the earth's atmosphere. However, one contentious issue – the possible sale or trade of emissions permits between the countries – remained unsettled. It also noted that the US Senate had to ratify the Protocol for it to be implemented in the US, which the Republican Senator Chuck Hagel predicted was unlikely.<sup>66</sup>

On December 12, 1997 the *NYT* reported to its readers that despite the KP, CO<sub>2</sub> emissions would keep rising noting that the Protocol left developing countries out of any commitments.<sup>67</sup> On December 14, 1997 it was suggested that US President Clinton and Vice President Gore would have difficulty getting the KP ratified by the Senate because Republican Senators denounced the treaty. Furthermore, the White House said it would not seek ratification until developing countries agreed to participate, but developing countries insisted that they would not make commitments until the industrialized countries started cutting back.<sup>68</sup>

A November 11, 1998 editorial commented that nobody had successfully challenged the urgency of the climate mission, despite the well-financed efforts of some industry groups to minimize the warming threat. The scientific consensus – that the unchecked burning of fossil fuels could someday cause great damage to the environment – remains intact, but what is not intact, is the spirit of common purpose that produced the Kyoto agreement.<sup>69</sup> It opined two considerations which were necessary to make the Protocol work well: early action meaning that instead of waiting until 2008, nation-states should try to implement targets immediately; and that emission trading should commence involving buying pollution permits

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<sup>65</sup> William K. Stevens, 'Split over Poorer Countries Role Puts Cloud on Global Warming Talk', *NYT*, December 6, 1997a, <http://www.nytimes.com/1997/12/06/world/split-over-poorer-countries-role-puts-cloud-on-global-warming-talks.html>

<sup>66</sup> William K. Stevens, 'Meeting Reaches Accord To Reduce Greenhouse Gases', *NYT*, December 11, 1997b, <http://www.nytimes.com/1997/12/11/world/meeting-reaches-accord-to-reduce-greenhouse-gases.html>

<sup>67</sup> William K. Stevens, 'The Climate Accord: The Outlook; Despite Pact, Gases Will Keep Rising', *NYT*, December 12, 1997c, <http://www.nytimes.com/1997/12/12/world/the-climate-accord-the-outlook-despite-pact-gases-will-keep-rising.html>

<sup>68</sup> James Bennet, 'December 7-13; Global-Warming Deal? Wait: Things Are Just Heating Up', *NYT*, December 14, 1997, <http://www.nytimes.com/1997/12/14/weekinreview/december-7-13-global-warming-deal-wait-things-are-just-heating-up.html>

<sup>69</sup> Editorial, 'Remember Global Warming?' *NYT*, November 11, 1998, A 26.

from poorer countries.<sup>70</sup> On October 28, 2000 the editorial wrote: “The international panel of climate scientists, considered the most authoritative voice on global warming, has now concluded that mankind's contribution to the problem is greater than originally believed”.<sup>71</sup> It lamented that unfortunately, the US Congress refused to address the issue but progress could still be made by the private sector.<sup>72</sup>

On July 19, 2001 the Bush Administration was criticized in an editorial for renouncing the Protocol with the paper urging investment in new low-carbon technology.<sup>73</sup> An editorial on July 24, 2001, said Democrats and many corporate leaders agreed with ratification of the Kyoto and reminded Bush about his campaign pledge to impose mandatory controls on carbon dioxide. Bush was reminded about his father's commitments by saying that it was at Rio that his father first committed the US to a global effort to reduce GHGs and there was still time for his son to honour that commitment.<sup>74</sup>

By 16 February 2002 Bush's global warming strategy was accused in an editorial of having lost its impetus and that America's long-awaited substitute for Kyoto was a disappointment.<sup>75</sup> Another editorial also criticized the US approach to the KP claiming that Bush had no serious strategies for climate change. It provided two options for America: one was to rely on dated dirty modes of energy to increase pollution in cities and global warming, and the other was to redesign the energy system to reduce America's dependence on carbon based fuels and send a signal to the world that America was serious about climate change.<sup>76</sup> Another editorial on June 18, 2002 exposed the failures of Bush as he rejected the KP, dismayed the allies of America, reneged on his own campaign pledge, and dismissed a report written by his own experts that asserted “human activities are largely responsible for global warming and warns that the environmental

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<sup>70</sup> Ibid.

<sup>71</sup> Editorial, ‘A Sharper Warning on Warming’, *NYT*, October 28, 2000, A 14.

<sup>72</sup> Ibid.

<sup>73</sup> Editorial, ‘Clueless in Global Warming’, *NYT*, July 19, 2001, A 24.

<sup>74</sup> See for more: Editorial, ‘Isolated on Global Warming’, *NYT*, July 24, 2001, A 18; See also Editorial, ‘America on the Sidelines’, *NYT*, July 29, 2001, A 4.14.

<sup>75</sup> Editorial, ‘Backward on Global Warming’, *NYT*, February 16, 2002, A 18.

<sup>76</sup> Editorial, ‘Crossroads on Global Warming’, *NYT*, June 3, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/03/opinion/crossroads-on-global-warming.html?>

consequences could be severe”.<sup>77</sup> It also appreciated Japanese ratification of the Kyoto – a blow for the Bush Administration.<sup>78</sup>

On February 14, 2003 an editorial highlighted Bush’s policies of ‘carbon-intensity’ and voluntarism in the place of KP problems. The former only aimed to slowly increase the carbon and the latter did not motivate and squeeze companies to act.<sup>79</sup> By August 2003 an article claimed Bush was in denial and was asking for more research on already confirmed scientific evidence. The McCain-Lieberman climate bill, the author said, was not likely to pass by Bush or senior Republicans, but every senator would now be required to take a stand one way or the other on an issue of great public concern; an issue on which the world had spoken clearly but Congress remained irresponsibly silent for too long.<sup>80</sup> On December 4, 2003 the editorial noted that it was sad that Russia was not motivated to ratify the KP because the US, the major buyer of the carbon credits, had already refused to ratify, and it would not be easy for other countries which ratified the KP to invest in cleaner power plants while the US had a free ride.<sup>81</sup>

On January 25, 2004 an editorial discussed Bush’s election campaigns which had no mention of climate change and noted that Bush regarded a mandatory emissions cap in the KP as top-down regulatory management which was unacceptable to him. But Bush’s bottom-up voluntarism was going nowhere meaning the McCain-Lieberman climate bill needed another try.<sup>82</sup> On December 14, 2005 an editorial criticized America’s shameful foot-dragging at Montreal and praised the countries that care about global warming which did not allow the US to blow the whole conference to smithereens.

Given the steadily mounting evidence of the present and potential consequences of climate change – disappearing glaciers, melting polar ice caps, dying coral

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<sup>77</sup> Editorial, ‘Global Warming Follies’, *NYT*, June 8, 2002, <http://www.nytimes.com/2002/06/08/opinion/global-warming-follies.html?>

<sup>78</sup> Ibid.

<sup>79</sup> Editorial, ‘Weak Response to Global Warming’, *NYT*, February 14, 2003, <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/02/14/opinion/weak-response-on-global-warming.html?>

<sup>80</sup> Editorial, ‘Warming Trends’, *NYT*, August 3, 2003, <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/08/03/opinion/warming-trends.html?>

<sup>81</sup> Editorial, ‘Kyoto Protocol in Peril’, *NYT*, December 4, 2003, <http://www.nytimes.com/2003/12/04/opinion/kyoto-protocol-in-peril.html?>

<sup>82</sup> Editorial, ‘Warming Up’, *NYT*, January 25, 2004, <http://www.nytimes.com/2004/01/25/opinion/warming-up.html?>



reefs, threatened coastlines, increasingly violent hurricanes – one would surely have expected America's negotiators to arrive in Montreal willing to discuss alternatives but they did not.<sup>83</sup> It also asked “Why should India and China make major sacrifices while the United States, in effect, gets a free ride? The battle against global warming will never be won unless America joins it, urgently and enthusiastically. Our grandchildren will look back with anger and astonishment if we fail to do so”.<sup>84</sup> An editorial on November 26, 2006 commented on the inactivity of the EPA and the Bush administration for failing to address the challenges of global warming with 12 US federal states including New York and Massachusetts proceeding to sue the EPA in the Supreme Court the following day.<sup>85</sup>

Two factors, an editorial on April 16, 2007 claimed, were crucial to the success of any global system to reduce GHGs. One was American leadership and the other was China's full participation. Despite President Bush's diffidence, there had been mounting pressure from mayors, governors, some in Congress and, lately, even the Supreme Court, for the US to assume a more aggressive role. And now there were some modestly encouraging signs from China.<sup>86</sup> It opined that China was unlikely to take binding targets as long as the US did not do so as well. Just as Bush was using China to excuse his own lack of action, China was using America's lack of action to account for its inaction. A plea to the Democrats in Congress to help break the stalemate, and further encourage China to engage with the issue by establishing strong and credible emission limits for America was made.<sup>87</sup>

On September 29, 2007 an editorial noted: President Bush's global warming summit brought 17 countries together including G-8 and big emitting countries like China, India and Brazil. The summit suggested the change of Bush's perception on climate change from deep denial about existence of global warming or the fact that humans and fossil fuels are primarily responsible for it to a more open minded and somewhat chastened in legacy mode. Congress, it said, should

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<sup>83</sup> Editorial, ‘America's Shame in Montreal’, *NYT* December 13, 2005, A 32.

<sup>84</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>85</sup> Editorial, ‘Global Warming Goes to Court’, *NYT*, November 28, 2006, <http://www.nytimes.com/2006/11/28/opinion/28tue1.html>.

<sup>86</sup> Editorial, ‘China's Signal on Global Warming’, *NYT*, April 16, 2007, A 18.

<sup>87</sup> *Ibid.*

lead him because in terms of substance Bush was still isolated.<sup>88</sup> On November 20, 2007 the paper noted that the world's scientists had done their job. The IPCC, the most powerful, authoritative voice on global warming, consisting of 2500 world climate scientists, had produced a clear message about the need for an urgent response to the climate challenge saying it was time for world leaders, starting with Bush, to act.<sup>89</sup> An editorial on December 17, 2007 mentioned that the Bali climate change conference in 2007 ended in disappointment without any quantified commitments from the largest emitters.<sup>90</sup>

On November 9, 2008 an opinion article by Gore was published. In it Gore argued that American people elected Obama as their 44<sup>th</sup> President and so laid the foundation for fighting against climate challenges and that the US should put a price on carbon at home, and lead the world's efforts to replace the KP in 2009 in Copenhagen with a more effective treaty that would cap global CO<sub>2</sub> emissions and encourage countries to invest together in efficient ways to reduce global warming pollution quickly, including by sharply reducing deforestation. It also argued that the best way – indeed the only way – to secure a global agreement to safeguard our future was to re-establish the US as the country with the moral and political authority to lead the world toward a solution.<sup>91</sup> On November 28, 2008 an editorial compared and contrasted President Bush's and President-elect Obama's positions on climate change. It said Bush was in denial but Obama was arguing that the economic crisis was the best time to invest in clean energy technologies.<sup>92</sup> It further said: "Call it what you will: a climate policy wrapped inside an energy policy wrapped inside an economic policy. By any name, it is a radical shift from the defeatism and denial that marked President Bush's eight years in office".<sup>93</sup>

An editorial on January 27, 2009 reaffirmed Obama's stand on climate change citing his direction to the EPA to consider California's application to set its own

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<sup>88</sup> Editorial, 'Still Out in the Cold', *NYT*, September 29, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/29/opinion/29sat4.html?>

<sup>89</sup> Editorial, 'The Scientists Speak', *NYT*, November 20, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/11/20/opinion/20tue1.html?>

<sup>90</sup> Editorial, 'Disappointments on Climate', *NYT*, December 17, 2007, <http://www.nytimes.com/2007/12/17/opinion/17mon1.html?>

<sup>91</sup> Al Gore, 'The Climate for Change', *NYT*, November 9, 2008, WK 10.

<sup>92</sup> Editorial, 'Save the Economy, and the Planet', *NYT*, November 27, 2008, <http://www.nytimes.com/2008/11/27/opinion/27thu1.html?>

<sup>93</sup> *Ibid.*

rules on GHG emissions from cars and trucks, contrasting that with Bush's rejection of the application.<sup>94</sup> A February 26, 2009 editorial appreciated Obama's attempts to invest in clean energy technologies and said that Obama had to persuade everyone from Congress, the Senate, American taxpayers and China to follow. It also argued:

Merely acknowledging a problem is not the same as addressing it. It has been four decades since Richard Nixon urged Congress to free the nation from its dependence on foreign oil, and the country is more dependent than ever. It has been well over a decade since the world's industrialized nations agreed in Kyoto, Japan, to control global-warming emissions, and emissions continue to rise. Mr. Obama is challenging not just the country, but history.<sup>95</sup>

On June 29, 2009 an article applauded the House for passing the Waxman-Markey climate change bill<sup>96</sup> and questioned Bush's legacy:

Do you remember the days when Bush administration officials claimed that terrorism posed an 'existential threat' to America, a threat in whose face normal rules no longer applied? That was hyperbole – but the existential threat from climate change is all too real.<sup>97</sup>

On July 10, 2009 an editorial reported that Obama had learnt lessons on global warming and mentioned how divided the world was about taking responsibility when he attended the G-8 summit.<sup>98</sup> Two other editorials in July and August 2009 stated that climate science demanded radical actions to cut emissions but that the US had not been able to respond accordingly and saw the climate change bill passed by the House as not very robust first step.<sup>99</sup>

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<sup>94</sup> Editorial, 'New Day on Climate Change', *NYT*, January 27, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/01/27/opinion/27tue1.html?>

<sup>95</sup> Editorial, 'Mr. Obama's Energy Future', *NYT*, February 26, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/02/26/opinion/26thu1.html?>

<sup>96</sup> The U.S. House of Representatives passed the American Clean Energy and Security Act of 2009 (H.R. 2454 of the 111th Congress) on June 26, 2009, by a vote of 219 to 212. The (ACES, Waxman-Markey) Act is a comprehensive national climate and energy legislation that would establish an economy-wide, greenhouse gas cap-and-trade system and critical complementary measures to help address climate change and build a clean energy economy. The House Energy and Commerce Committee voted 33-25 to approve Waxman-Markey on May 21, 2009. Committee Chairman Henry Waxman (D-CA) and Rep. Edward Markey (D-MA), chairman of a key subcommittee, introduced the bill on May 15, after floating a discussion draft in March.

<sup>97</sup> Paul Krugman, 'Betraying the Planet', *NYT*, June 29, 2009, A. 21

<sup>98</sup> Editorial, 'A Lesson on Warming', *NYT*, July 10, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/10/opinion/10fri1.html?>

<sup>99</sup> For more: Editorial, 'The Climate and National Security', *NYT*, August 18, 2009,

On September 30, 2009 an editorial wrote that more than 100 leaders had gathered for the New York climate change summit 2009 sponsored by the UN and including President Obama and the Chinese President Jintao who were seen as important because together these countries produced more than 40 per cent of the total global emissions. They could lead the world or mess things up royally.<sup>100</sup> It was noted that both of these leaders failed to bridge the gap that China was no longer pretending that it was a backward country and that the US was acknowledging its responsibility to help poor and most vulnerable nations reduce emissions without sacrificing growth. The two leaders had a considerable distance to bridge.<sup>101</sup> An editorial on December 7, 2009 opined that nobody should expect a planet saving agreement from Copenhagen because it would be all about attitudes and aspirations.

Nonetheless, the US and China agreed to reduce emissions and their two leaders worked to produce an interim agreement which included Obama seeking Congress approval to deliver on his promise of 17 per cent emission reductions.<sup>102</sup> On December 21, 2009 it was noted that the international climate negotiations in Copenhagen had produced neither a grand success nor the complete meltdown despite two years of advance work. The meeting failed to convert a rare gathering of world leaders into an ambitious, legally binding action plan for reducing GHG emissions. It applauded Obama's role on climate change but said the UN climate talks had been chaotic and real progress will henceforth be made in small gatherings of big players. It noted that except on finance, the pledges of Copenhagen Accord were nowhere near enough to keep atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide from rising above dangerous levels.<sup>103</sup>

A February 22, 2010 editorial noted that Yvo de Boer, chief of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), had resigned because the UN climate change negotiation processes were tiring, cumbersome and slow. This resignation did not prove that that UN negotiation framework was of no value and

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<http://www.nytimes.com/2009/08/18/opinion/18tue1.html?> ; Editorial, 'Trade and Climate', *NYT*, July 19, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/07/19/opinion/19sun1.html?>

<sup>100</sup> Editorial, 'Mr Obama and Mr Hu on Warming', *NYT*, September 23, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/09/23/opinion/23wed1.html?>

<sup>101</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>102</sup> Editorial, 'Beyond Copenhagen', *NYT*, December 7, 2009, A 28.

<sup>103</sup> Editorial, 'Copenhagen and Beyond', *NYT*, December 21, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/21/opinion/21mon1.html?>

therefore should be abandoned.<sup>104</sup> On July 17, 2010 an editorial contrasted the US Senate's attempt to water down the House-passed energy bill with the British, German and French environmental ministers' attempts to approve stricter emissions targets. "Nobody expects the Senate to go as far as the European ministers' advocate. But there is no excuse for the Senate's backward march. We all live on the same planet, and it is getting warmer".<sup>105</sup> On October 18, 2010 an editorial asserted that Republicans were climate deniers.<sup>106</sup>

The paper on December 3, 2010 focused on the issues to be resolved insisting that Copenhagen's promises must be carried out by actions even if the differences between poor and rich countries, and the biggest emitters China and the US, were unresolved. It also asked the US delegates to work hard to honour Obama's pledges to reduce 17 per cent emissions at home and cautioned that the UN climate process itself was on probation and that climate change and the havoc it would cause was a global issue requiring a global forum to address it.<sup>107</sup> On December 17, 2010 an editorial commented that Cancun produced better results than Copenhagen in terms of transparency, helping poor countries to protect tropical forests, and adopt clean energy systems through the green fund while also keeping the UN climate process alive. However, it argued that keeping the UN process alive was not the same as saving the planet so big emitters must reduce their emissions as climate science demanded.<sup>108</sup>

On March 5, 2011 the paper's editor wrote: "Humans were inevitably going to be part of the fossil record. But the true meaning of the Anthropocene is that we have affected nearly every aspect of our environment – from a warming atmosphere to the bottom of an acidifying ocean".<sup>109</sup> Based on research published in *Science*, an editorial on September 27, 2011 reported that many species would die out. Some might adapt, however, Atlantic and Pacific populations of bowhead whales – long kept apart by the frozen Arctic – were now overlapping in the open waters of the Northwest Passage. "A rapid reduction in greenhouse gas emissions is tragically unlikely. We are holding the future of every species on this planet – including

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<sup>104</sup> Editorial, 'Climate Change', *NYT*, February 22, 2010, A 18.

<sup>105</sup> Editorial, 'A Tale of Two Targets', *NYT*, July 16, 2010, A 26.

<sup>106</sup> Editorial, 'In Climate Denial Again', *NYT*, October 18, 2010, A 34.

<sup>107</sup> Editorial, 'From Copenhagen to Cancun', *NYT*, December 3, 2010, A 30.

<sup>108</sup> Editorial, 'Small Steps on Global Warming', *NYT*, December 17, 2010, A 38.

<sup>109</sup> Editorial, 'The Anthropocene', *NYT*, March 5, 2011, A 20.

ourselves – hostage”.<sup>110</sup> An article on November 23, 2011 stated there was no doubt about climate change. Human activity affected the environment causing climate change and we have no idea about the magnitude of this effect but we need to do our best to preserve our environment and move to non-fossil fuels as sources of energy.<sup>111</sup> On November 27, 2011 an article stated:

The negotiating process itself is under fire from some quarters, including the poorest nations, who believe their needs are neglected in the fight among the major economic powers. Criticism is also coming from a relatively small but vocal band of climate change skeptics – many of them sitting members of the U.S. Congress – who doubt human influence on the climate and ridicule international efforts to address it.<sup>112</sup>

Following this on November 28, 2011 an article claimed that the fund of \$100 billion promised in Copenhagen was a fiasco because, from its inception, the fund had been hamstrung by a lack of practical details of where the money should come from, and by competing visions for how it should achieve its aims.<sup>113</sup>

An editorial on December 4, 2011 confirmed delegates from 194 countries would gather in Durban to negotiate controlling the GHGs aware that over the years there had been far more talk than action. The overall results had been dismal even by Kyoto’s modest standards, and the history of climate change control was not encouraging because GHGs rose between 1990 and 2009 by a whopping 38 per cent and the biggest obstacles for global progress had been countries like China, India and the US.<sup>114</sup> An opinion article on December 9, 2011 noted that American delegates faced sharp criticism from fellow envoys, environmental activists and demonstrators, as they had shifted their position in Durban on the European Roadmap saying: “We are strongly committed to promptly starting a process to

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<sup>110</sup> Editorials, ‘Climate Change and the Exodus of Species’, *NYT*, September 27, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/09/27/opinion/climate-change-and-the-exodus-of-species.html?>

<sup>111</sup> Andrew C. Revkin, ‘You are Driving a Bus Full of Kids With a Curve Ahead’, *NYT*, November 23, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com>

<sup>112</sup> John Broader, ‘Another Try for a Global Climate Effort’, *NYT*, November 27, 2011a, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/28/business/global/28iht-RBOG-CLIMATE28.html?>

<sup>113</sup> James Kanter, ‘A Pledge That Didn’t Meet Its Potential’, *NYT*, November 28, 2011, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/11/28/business/global/28iht-RBOG-COP28.html?>

<sup>114</sup> Robert B. Semple, ‘Remember Kyoto? Most Nations Don’t’, *NYT*, December 4, 2011, SR 10.

move forward on that.”<sup>115</sup> The statement was immediately qualified with the statement that any resulting agreement may or may not be legally binding.

On December 11, 2011 an opinion article asserted that the issues on the table were rather taller and broader than atmospheric carbon levels or forestry practices in seeking to devise a fund to compensate those affected but what was really at play were the politics concerning the relations among Europe, the US, Canada, Japan and three rapidly rising economic powers: China, India and Brazil. Those international relations, in turn, were driven by each country’s domestic politics and the strains the global financial crisis had put on all of them.<sup>116</sup>

By December 12, 2011 it was commented that the Durban agreement had dismantled a 20 year old tradition of UNFCCC by bringing all developed and developing countries on board but for now it remained a pledge to move forward with details to be negotiated. The conclusion of talks in Durban was marked by exhaustion and explosions of temper while the governments avoided a climate process disaster, the decisions adopted fell well short of what was needed.<sup>117</sup> American climate change delegates were reported satisfied by the Durban outcome because the Americans went to Durban with two goals: 1) to deepen the agreements reached in Cancun and in Copenhagen, 2) to replace the KP with a new all-inclusive agreement and America got both because in the real world of international negotiations on exceptionally difficult global commons problem such as climate change the Durban agreement looked like a success.<sup>118</sup>

Comments made on February 16, 2012 relating to climate change emails leaks offered a glimpse into the campaign against climate change with documents, from a non-profit organization in Chicago called the Heartland Institute, outlining plans to promote a curriculum that would cast doubt on the scientific findings that fossil

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<sup>115</sup> John Broader, ‘US Climate Envoy Seems to Shift Stance on Timetable for New Talks’, *NYT*, December 9, 2011b, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/09/science/earth/us-climate-envoy-seems-to-shift-position-on-timetable-for-new-international-talks.html>.

<sup>116</sup> John Broader, ‘Bigger Toolkit Needed to Manage Climate Change’, *NYT*, December 11, 2011c, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/11/science/earth/climate-change-expands-far-beyond-an-environmental-issue.html?>

<sup>117</sup> John Broder, ‘UN Climate Talks End With Deal for New Emissions Treaty’, *NYT*, December 12, 2011d, <http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/12/science/earth/countries-at-un-conference-agree-to-draft-new-emissions-treaty.html>.

<sup>118</sup> John Broder, ‘US Envoy Relieved by Climate Talks Outcome’, *NYT*, December 14, 2011e, [www.nytimes.com](http://www.nytimes.com).

fuel emissions endanger the long-term welfare of the planet.<sup>119</sup> On March 27, 2012 an article quoting the scientific community warned about increasing global emissions which had reached a record high in 2010. It cautioned that a concerted worldwide effort to reduce emissions might not begin particularly in the face of a global economic slowdown.<sup>120</sup>

The paper also noted that the UNFCCC meetings had ended in disillusionment with incremental political progress with little real impact on arresting climate change. The negotiation processes came under fire from the poorest countries and from a small but vocal band of climate change sceptics, many of them from the US Senate and House of Representatives, who doubted the existence of human influence on the climate and ridiculed international efforts to deal with it.<sup>121</sup> From the coverage outlined it is clear that *NYT* identified the lack of progress – it mentioned the issues of power politics between long standing power and emerging economies and the complex issues of technology and economy—yet did not set out to analyse in detail why there had not been progress and how the solutions be achieved.

#### **6.4 The *GUK* (Includes Observer and its editorial ‘Leader’)**

This section of the study examines a total 134 articles from the *GUK*. On April 9, 1999, an article criticized the US Department of Energy (DOE) for allowing the US domestic emissions to go on increasing, contrary to the intention of the 1997 KP and Vice-President Gore’s commitment that the US would cut emissions as stipulated in the KP.<sup>122</sup> On August 13, 2000 the leader noted that five of the hottest years of the last millennium took place in the 1990s. The twentieth-century’s 10 warmest years all occurred in its last 15 years. Snow-covers in the Northern Hemisphere and ice floes in the Arctic Ocean have decreased. Globally, the sea level rose between four and 10 inches over the past century.<sup>123</sup>

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<sup>119</sup> Justin Gillis and Leslie Kaufman, ‘Leak Offers Glimpse of Campaign against Climate Science’, *NYT*, February 16, 2012, A 23.

<sup>120</sup> ‘Global Warming & Climate Change’, *NYT*, March 27, 2012, <http://topics.nytimes.com/top/news/science/topics/globalwarming/index.html>.

<sup>121</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>122</sup> Paul Brown, ‘US to Exploit Soviet ‘Hot Air’’, *GUK*, April 9, 1999, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/1999/apr/09/10?INTCMP=SRCH>.

<sup>123</sup> Leader, ‘A Climate for Change’, *GUK*, August 13, 2000, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2000/aug/13/leaders.leaders?INTCMP=SRCH>.



The same article also stated that worldwide precipitation over land had increased by about 1 per cent. Furthermore, since the adoption of the KP in 1997 major countries had agreed to work toward reducing emissions but that US policy had been held hostage by special interest groups, particularly those in the US oil industry.<sup>124</sup> On November 17, 2000, the leader complained that ignorance was no longer an excuse for inaction because most climate scientists agreed that human activity was the main cause of global warming. Scientists argued that the 5 per cent target of Kyoto was inadequate and with 4 per cent of the world's population, the US was responsible for more than 20 per cent of emissions meaning its degree of irresponsibility to Kyoto would rise if the election went to Bush, a global warming denier.<sup>125</sup>

The leader on April 1, 2001 remarked that the Bush administration was in a state of right-wing delusion, considered global supremacy in the 21<sup>st</sup> Century as a tussle between China and America with Bush's views on climate change as a socialist plot designed to distort the scientific evidence to justify an assault on the American way of life to escape from the KP through a unilateral decision.<sup>126</sup> It further asserted that:

His dangerous distortion of reality results not only from the corruption of the conservative mind. Another cause is no less sinister. The Petroleum Club of Houston, Mr Bush's Texan oil backer, is now central in forging American energy and environmental policy.<sup>127</sup>

On May 3, 2001 an article evaluated Bush's first 100 days in office and stated that Bush carried the military-industrial complex character; he was immoral, he abandoned the KP, and instructed his treasury secretary to block IMF funds to bail out developing countries. All these actions abandoned faith and principle and came from arrogance, ignorance, and conscience-less conservatism.<sup>128</sup>

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<sup>124</sup> Ibid.

<sup>125</sup> Leader, 'High Noon at Hague', *GUK*, November 17, 2000, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2000/nov/17/guardianleaders.globalwarming?INTCMP=SRCH>.

<sup>126</sup> Leader, 'The US is Not Fit to Run the World', *GUK*, April 1, 2001, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2001/apr/01/leaders.leaders?INTCMP=SRCH>.

<sup>127</sup> Ibid.

<sup>128</sup> 'Mr Bush's Bad Dream', *GUK*, May 3, 2001, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/theguardian/2001/may/03/guardianweekly.guardianweekly11?INTCMP=SRCH>.

The leader on May 6, 2001 censured Exxon's support for Bush's abandonment of the KP and went on to urge a boycott of the petrol stations of Esso and Exxon's in the UK as an appropriate response to its pressure on Bush to ratify Kyoto.<sup>129</sup> On June 19, 2001 the leader stated that Mr. Bush's boastful refusal of the KP and demand for more research was an attempt to ignore others' persuasive assessments of the climate change problem. His love for missiles could easily make Europeans understand that Bush is an affable, inflexible front man for a right-wing business, political and military alliance intent on pursuing the logic of a solo superpower to its domineering conclusion.<sup>130</sup> It reported on June 30, 2001 that:

The original Kyoto agreement was to cut the developed world's emissions by 5.5% by 2010 from a 1990 baseline. This is more difficult than it sounds because emissions have risen dramatically since 1990, particularly in the US, and gives a clue to why Mr Bush finds it impossible to ratify the agreement.<sup>131</sup>

An article reported on July 24, 2001 that reaching an agreement on the KP was a roller coaster ride and one of the most arduous series of international negotiations ever recorded but it stated that the deal came into existence after 8 years and it was just a small step.<sup>132</sup> The leader remarked on the same date:

The 186 countries involved in the Bonn climate change negotiations are, with one exception, to be congratulated on their success in translating the 1997 Kyoto protocol into an international treaty. Particular praise is due to the European Union, which took the lead when others faltered.<sup>133</sup>

On August 22, 2002 an article opined about the disturbing gap between rich and poor countries with both sides agreeing that enriching the world must not be at the

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<sup>129</sup> Leader, 'Back this boycott', *GUK*, May 6, 2001, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/news/2001/may/06/leaders.leaders1?INTCMP=SRCH>.

<sup>130</sup> Leader, 'Bush's Offensive Charm', *GUK*, June 19, 2001, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2001/jun/19/usa.guardianleaders?INTCMP=SRCH>.

<sup>131</sup> Paul Brown, 'Key Countries Resolve to Honour Kyoto Without US', *GUK*, June 30, 2001, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2001/jun/30/globalwarming.climatechange?INTCMP=ILCNETTXT3487>.

<sup>132</sup> James Meek and Paul Brown, 'After Nine Years of Talks, A Deal at Last - But It's Just a Small Step for Mankind', *GUK*, July 24, 2001, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2001/jul/24/climatechange.physicalsciences?INTCMP=SRCH>.

<sup>133</sup> Leader, 'Global Achievement', *GUK*, July 24, 2001, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2001/jul/24/guardianleaders.globalwarming?INTCMP=SRCH>.

expense of the environment. It also stated that if there was one cause that the summit on sustainable development was synonymous with, it was climate change because Rio had laid the foundation for the KP where industrialized countries pledged to cut emissions, therefore the summit on sustainable development should go further to 'grow without grime' for considerable investment in renewable technology since development cannot see one planet split into two worlds.<sup>134</sup> The leader on August 25, 2002 stated that the KP must be brought into force and the world must go ahead without the US even if its emissions were 25 per cent of the global total.<sup>135</sup>

Close to a year later on August 6, 2003 the leader lamented that global warming was becoming part of the present, with the 1990s the hottest decade in the millennium. Bizarrely, the weight of the evidence required for policy makers around the world to act decisively was not enough for the world's greatest polluter, the US, but urgent policy changes such as more cash for alternative sources of energy, making polluters pay, cutting subsidies for dirty fuels were needed as first steps.<sup>136</sup> On December 5, 2003 the editorial argued that Russia would join the KP because it allowed nations to sell emissions rights to others that needed them, and the hard cash countries could invest in cleaner energy. It also said that other developed countries would invest in clean energy whereas the US, by turning its back on Kyoto, would rely only on dirty fuels.<sup>137</sup>

An opinion article on February 19, 2004 discussed the flaws of producing and understanding climate science, arguing that anti-environmental lobby groups, along with the US Senators, played hard to create distrust of climate change among people and even forced the editorial boards to publish papers in their interests.<sup>138</sup> On April 5, 2004 the leader was critical that Bush was trying to improve his image for his second election campaign of 2004 by altering his stand

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<sup>134</sup> Leader, "Global Division," *GUK*, August 22, 2002, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/politics/2002/aug/22/greenpolitics.environment?INTCMP=SRCH>.

<sup>135</sup> Leader, "A Good Time to Save the World," *GUK*, August 25, 2002, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2002/aug/25/worldsummit2002.leaders?INTCMP=SRCH>.

<sup>136</sup> Leader, "The Climate Must Change," *GUK*, August 6, 2003, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2003/aug/06/guardianleaders.weather?INTCMP=SRCH>.

<sup>137</sup> "Kyoto Protocol and Editorials," *GUK*, December 5, 2003, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2003/dec/05/russia.theeditorpressreview?INTCMP=SRCH>.

<sup>138</sup> Diana Liverman, 'Careful with that Planet Mr President', *GUK*, February 19, 2004, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/education/2004/feb/19/research.highereducation?INTCMP=SRCH>.

on unilateralism to gently reintegrate with the rest of the world by signing a low key maritime treaty. Bush was warned that before signing the convention, he must overcome the conservative fringe of the Republican Party. It also criticized the “*Wall Street Journal*, the house newspaper of the swivel-eyed right” editorial on the danger of a US subject to “the control of a highly politicised UN bureaucracy”, and argued that the Law of the Sea treaty set a terrible precedent.<sup>139</sup> On October 2, 2004 the leader applauded the Russian ratification of the KP and said that the US and Australian involvement in the Iraq war overshadowed other international issues including the KP. Consequently, the US and Australian non-ratification of Kyoto would make them unable to benefit from valuable economic resources created under the Protocol.<sup>140</sup>

The leader on July 29, 2005 questioned:

Why, after being so implacably opposed for so long to the Kyoto Protocol, did the US perform a U-turn yesterday? To the complete surprise of even its closest allies, it announced a new pact with five Asian-Pacific states to cut greenhouse gases.<sup>141</sup>

It noted belatedly, that even the US president, whose bread had been buttered by the fossil fuel industry, had acknowledged that global warming was a problem. This followed the 132 American city mayors and several state governors who voluntarily signed up to help meet the targets that Kyoto set for the US. This support was not confined to the Democratic Party but transmitted to leading Republican figures, such as Senator John McCain and California governor Arnold Schwarzenegger, who signalled their strong support for a ceiling on US carbon dioxide emissions.<sup>142</sup>

The leader on April 2, 2006 raised the issue of aviation industry noting that airlines that paid no fuel tax or duty were exempt from any climate change levy and this uncontrolled flight luxury was way beyond what the planet could afford. It implored governments to tax aviation industries unilaterally and if it cannot be

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<sup>139</sup> Leader, ‘US Diplomacy Blinded by the Right’, *GUK*, April 5, 2004, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/apr/05/usa.guardianleaders?INTCMP=SRCH>.

<sup>140</sup> Leader, ‘Voting for Kyoto’, *GUK*, October 3, 2004, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/world/2004/oct/02/russia.comment?INTCMP=SRCH>.

<sup>141</sup> Leader, ‘A New Environment’, *GUK*, July 29, 2005, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2005/jul/29/guardianleaders.usnews?INTCMP=SRCH>.

<sup>142</sup> *Ibid.*

done unilaterally it must be established through international agreement.<sup>143</sup> A contributor on November 4, 2006 wrote: “As an American, I am appalled, ashamed, and embarrassed by my country's lack of leadership in dealing with global warming”.<sup>144</sup> The Bush administration was not the only US problem but oil men and their buddies also did not want conservation being core conservatives on the matter. The former Clinton and Gore administrations had fared no better in taking any brave actions aimed at radically reducing emissions.<sup>145</sup>

On June 1, 2007 the leader expressed the view that Bush had a history of making visionary speeches which came to nothing. His G-8 partners did not listen to him at their meetings where Bush attempted to deviate from the UNFCCC negotiating process because the US wanted a deal on a fossil intensive approach that had no chance of reducing GHG emissions.<sup>146</sup> An opinion piece on June 2, 2007 set out the flaws of CDM<sup>147</sup> projects evident until 2006 under the KP. Companies like Ernst and Young that ran CDM projects in India manipulated the public opinion data and made huge profits. It also said that until 2006 the CDM board did not reject even one application and the causes could be that CDM was short of staff, experts and funding until the end of 2006 when it stood on its own feet.<sup>148</sup>

The paper's environmental editor commended the voices of influential scientists and government officials on the price increase from airline's flight to inefficient light bulbs to effectively tackle climate change. The editor wrote that although the IPCC did not recommend specific climate policies, an IPCC's draft obtained by the *Guardian* highlighted the introduction of an effective global carbon tax priced between \$20 and \$80 per tonne by 2030 to limit the temperature rise. The Bali 2007 climate conference would initiate how such a tax could be imposed

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<sup>143</sup> Leader, ‘Soon We Will Pay the True Price of Air Travel’, *GUK*, April 2, 2006, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/apr/02/leaders.comment?INTCMP=SRCH>.

<sup>144</sup> ‘America's Anti- Environmentalists’, *GUK*, November 4, 2006, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2006/nov/04/americasantienvironmentalists?INTCMP=SRCH>.

<sup>145</sup> Ibid.

<sup>146</sup> Leader, ‘Climate Change Stamping all over Kyoto’, *GUK*, June 1, 2007, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/jun/01/comment.usa?INTCMP=SRCH>.

<sup>147</sup> Clean Development Mechanism under Kyoto Protocol.

<sup>148</sup> Nick Davies, ‘Truth About Kyoto: Huge Profits, Little Carbon Saved’, *GUK*, June 2, 2007, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/jun/02/india.greenpolitics?INTCMP=SRCH>.

globally.<sup>149</sup> On December 3, 2007 the leader stated: “The science of climate change is clear. The politics of the world's response are still murky, as the Bali summit, which begins today, will show”. It speculated that Bali would fall short of the scientific expectations and that the US would not go for deep cuts and rapidly growing economies like China and India would not join hands for mandatory cuts.

The same article reported that the 10,000 officials from 190 countries would battle for their country's national advantage and concluded the Bali conference offered an option to talk.<sup>150</sup> On December 15, 2007 the leader declared that the Bali conference was not a failure but that US obstruction could still threaten a deal by 2009 impinging on its success. The US intransigence at the Bali conference had been all the more shameful the leader declared, because it was no longer accompanied by a denial of the basic science as the US now accepted that the world was facing catastrophe although it still refused to take its share of the pain needed to avert it – which was selfish behaviour on a global scale.<sup>151</sup> On December 16, 2007 an article explained that the US had finally joined the Bali agreement after the conference overran by a day however the US still maintained reservations and wanted the developing nations to adopt mandatory emissions targets. The Bali Roadmap opened the road for two years to seal a deal in Copenhagen in 2009.<sup>152</sup>

An article on February 2, 2008 cautioned:

The Climate Security Act going through Congress and the Bali negotiations bear witness to the resistance. The problem is that many Americans still dismiss the sustainability agenda as bad science, bad religion, bad for business and bad for America.<sup>153</sup>

Additionally,

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<sup>149</sup> David Adam, ‘UN Scientists Urge Carbon Tax to Fight Global Warming’, *GUK*, November 17, 2007, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/nov/17/climatechange.carbonemissions?INTCMP=SRCH>.

<sup>150</sup> Leader, ‘Hope and Fear in Bali’, *GUK*, December 3, 2007, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/dec/03/indonesia.comment?INTCMP=SRC>.

<sup>151</sup> Leader, ‘Bali Conference Waiting for America’, *GUK*, December 15, 2007, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2007/dec/15/comment.politics?INTCMP=SRCH>.

<sup>152</sup> Juliette Jowit, Caroline Davies and David Adam, ‘Late-night Drama Pushes US into Climate Deal’, *GUK*, December 16, 2007, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2007/dec/16/bali.climatechange?INTCMP=SRCH>.

<sup>153</sup> James Jones, ‘Face to Faith’, *GUK*, February 2, 2008, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/feb/02/uselections2008.religion?INTCMP=SRCH>.

Their fear is that if you factor in the environmental costs you'll price America out of the market and export their jobs and factories to India and China. Or that the environmental agenda will be the Trojan horse that will bring socialism to America and the country to its knees.<sup>154</sup>

On April 14, 2008 it was noted that the developing world was dismayed by the lack of climate negotiation leadership so a new deal to replace the KP was under threat. Approving of the comments of a top UN climate official it wrote that China, India and other developing countries were unwilling to sign a new climate pact to replace Kyoto because the rich countries failed to set a clear example on cutting carbon emissions.<sup>155</sup>

On October 15, 2008 two propositions were suggested for preventing climate change: cut emissions by at least 80 per cent and safeguard the forests by stopping deforestation and moving to afforestation.<sup>156</sup> On December 8, 2008 the paper, citing a UN document, claimed that the world seemed to be on the track to meet the Kyoto targets by cutting emissions. It said that 16 industrialized countries had met the targets but 20 industrialized countries were off the course and that the KP had been successful in setting up the framework but had failed to reduce GHG emissions.<sup>157</sup> An article on December 15, 2008 commented: "climate change negotiations taking place in Poland last week ended in disappointment for many hoping for a global agreement on greenhouse gas emissions. The Americans weren't helping".<sup>158</sup>

On March 14, 2009 an editorial argued that the science of climate change was clear. Scientists had clarified and done their bit in 2007 and later, so now the issue of climate change fell to politicians to pick up the agenda and devise a replacement for the KP and for an agreement of global scope. American political

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<sup>154</sup> Ibid.

<sup>155</sup> David Adam and John Vidal, 'Rich States Failing to Lead on Emissions, Says UN Climate Chief', *GUK*, April 14, 2008, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/apr/14/climatechange.carbonemissions?INTCMP=SRCH>.

<sup>156</sup> Editorial, 'Climate Change Seeing the Wood', *GUK*, October 15, 2008, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/oct/15/climate-change-deforestation?INTCMP=SRCH>.

<sup>157</sup> David Adam, 'Analysis: Has the Kyoto Protocol Worked?' *GUK*, December 8, 2008, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/dec/08/kyoto-poznan-environment-emissions-carbon?INTCMP=SRCH>.

<sup>158</sup> Tan Copsey, 'A Bleak Week in Poznan', *GUK*, December 15, 2008, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2008/dec/15/poznan-climate-change>.

leadership change is significant which is not only the replacement of a ‘denial man’ by a man who does not deny it and can put policies into practice unlike, the Clinton Administration that signed Kyoto but could not ratify it.<sup>159</sup> An editorial on June 2, 2009, cited the Netherlands Environmental Assessment Agency’s (NEAA) research that CO<sub>2</sub> emissions from the developing world accounted for more than half of the total global emissions for the first time so the developing world could be ignored in the 1990s but that could not be overlooked any longer.<sup>160</sup>

An editorial on September 20, 2009 explained the deadlock between the developed and developing countries:

There are various obstacles in the negotiations, but the main one is a global fault line between developed and developing worlds. Countries with massive industrial potential still unfulfilled – mainly China and India – will not take moral instruction in eco-austerity from countries that have already industrialised and left a legacy of carbon in the atmosphere as a result. The industrialised countries, meanwhile, are reluctant to bind themselves to targets that do not also restrain countries they see as competitors.<sup>161</sup>

An editorial on November 15, 2009 observed that without compliance from the major emitter, the US, there was less chance of negotiating a globally binding agreement. The US officials were waiting for China’s emissions cuts announcement of 40 to 45 per cent reductions relative to economic growth by 2020 before joining other key nations such as Brazil and Japan who had pledged more action than the US. It also argued that voluntary action was not enough to prevent the global average temperature from increasing by more than 2°C, in conjunction there would need to be a global cut in emissions within the next five years.<sup>162</sup>

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<sup>159</sup> Editorial, ‘From science to statesmanship’, *GUK*, March 14, 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/mar/14/climate-change-copenhagen-politics?INTCMP=SRCH>.

<sup>160</sup> Editorial, ‘Climate Change: the World Looks to Washington’, *GUK*, June 26, 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/jun/26/editorial-climate-change-washington?INTCMP=SRCH>.

<sup>161</sup> Editorial, ‘We Saved the Economy; Now for the World’, *GUK*, September 20, 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/sep/20/copenhagen-climate-change-environment-summit?INTCMP=SRCH>.

<sup>162</sup> Editorial, ‘Copenhagen Summit Change We Cannot Yet Believe in’, *GUK*, November 16, 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/nov/16/obama-copenhagen-climate-change?INTCMP=SRCH>.



On December 18, 2009 an article commented that the Copenhagen Accord was produced by the participation of very few countries. Developing countries were bitterly disappointed by the Accord and the process as most of them had not been invited to work on the draft, after huge pressure from the US.<sup>163</sup> An editorial on December 19, 2009 said that the Copenhagen climate change summit had three tickets on its agenda: emissions, financial aid and the process of moving ahead, and on each of these three counts the Accord, effectively hammered out was not by the whole conference but by BASIC<sup>164</sup> and the US, fell woefully short.<sup>165</sup> It further remarked that the Accord was a sad tribute to collective failure and that the all-important question at the end of Copenhagen is – what happens next?<sup>166</sup>

On December 21, 2009 an editorial commented that the Copenhagen climate change conference looked both adequate and inadequate: adequate because of the novel manner through which the ultimate failure of COP-15 was reached and inadequate, because a considered reading of the Accord, which was its only tangible output, reveals that it was not just inadequate but in fact utterly empty.<sup>167</sup> It concluded:

Failure to fix the climate in Copenhagen might have been forgiven had the delegates emerged with a credible timetable for getting the job done. Instead, progress made under the text's inaction plan is to be 'assessed' in 2015, with a view to considering whether to tighten the 2 degrees Celsius lid on temperature rises to 1.5 degrees Celsius. This may sound a noble idea, but the review is set to be futile, since the science says that rises above 1.5 degrees Celsius will probably be guaranteed by the middle of the new decade.<sup>168</sup>

On December 22, 2009 the paper published an interview with leading climate change experts asking for their assessment of the Copenhagen Accord. Fuqiang Yang, director of global climate solutions, World Wildlife Fund (WWF)

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<sup>163</sup> John Vidal, 'Analysis Copenhagen Draft Text', *GUK*, December 18, 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/18/copenhagen-draft-text-analysis?intcmp=239>

<sup>164</sup> Brazil, South Africa, India and China.

<sup>165</sup> Editorial, 'Copenhagen Climate Conference: The Grim Meaning of Meaningful', *GUK*, December 19, 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/dec/19/copenhagen-climate-change-conference-obama?INTCMP=SRCH>.

<sup>166</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>167</sup> Editorial, 'Beyond Copenhagen: Dialogue, no Diktat', *GUK*, December 21, 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/dec/21/copenhagen-climate-compromise?INTCMP=SRCH>.

<sup>168</sup> *Ibid.*

International, responded that Copenhagen ended without a fair, ambitious and legally binding treaty to reduce GHG emissions, yet what did emerge was an agreement that would at the very least cut emissions, set up an emissions verification system and reduce deforestation. John Prescott, climate change rapporteur for the Council of Europe, opined that Copenhagen failed to produce a legally binding global treaty and it was hard to get one, but Copenhagen produced a statement of principle which was the final admission that we cannot let temperatures rise above 2°C from pre-industrial levels.

Martin Rees, president of the Royal Society, stated that the outcomes from Copenhagen were less than many had hoped for but the involvement of China and India was crucial. The grandstanding by particular countries and insistence by some on an unreasonable target of 1.5°C was plainly unhelpful to the negotiations yet the Accord helped maintain long term concerns about climate change on the global agenda. Bryony Worthington, climate campaigner with sandbag.org, who helped draft the UK climate change bill, opined that the Accord was a spectacular failure on many levels such as the voluntary pledge and review later measures, the insultingly low level of funds, and the current poor arrangement of COP-15 where no consensus could be reached toward future policies.

Gavin Schmidt, climate scientist at NASA and co-founder of RealClimate.org, stated that COP-15 was not an event but a process with people now seeing the problems caused by climate change. Kumi Naidoo, executive director, Greenpeace International, posited that the outcome of COP-15 was unfair and that nation-states and climate polluting industries had put their self-interest before climate protection; the pledges were weak and could drive temperature to 4°C instead of 2. Global citizens, for their part, needed to elect more ambitious leaders who could embrace new, low carbon technologies. Vicky Pope, head of climate change advice at the Met Office, stated that the Accord was fairly weak and disappointing but it was good that everyone accepted the scientific reality that climate change was a problem and that we needed to limit warming to 2°C. Nicholas Stern, chair, Grantham Research Institute on climate change and the environment, stated that COP-15 was a disappointment but that the road to Copenhagen and the summit itself generated commitments on emissions reductions from many countries, including, for the first time, from the world's two

largest emitters, China and the US, and that the Accord did recognise that a rise in global average temperature should be limited to below 2°C.

Dr Myles Allen, head of the climate dynamics group in the atmosphere, argued that the COP-15 outcome was good on one level because it recognized the 2°C temperature limit and that China and the US came on the board. But it was depressing that governments wanted to spend years on a legally binding agreement instead of implementing what had already been agreed upon. Bernarditas de Castro Muller, former lead negotiator for the G-77 plus the China group of developing countries, stated that the outcome of COP-15 was inadequate and there were other problems arising from the process of producing documents: the main one was that the process resulted in an agreement that completely undermined the cardinal rule of multilateralism, transparency and inclusiveness. Rajendra Pachauri, chairman of the IPCC, said that Copenhagen 2009 produced three major achievements: the agreement of 2°C temperature limit that guaranteed that climate science was settled, that BASIC and the US were on board the agreement, and that there was \$30 billion funding for 2010-2012.<sup>169</sup>

On February 23, 2010 an opinion article criticized the Climategate email hackers for their malicious attempt to stall Copenhagen but it wrote that Climategate did not erode the interests of people in climate change instead it made people more concerned about climate change.<sup>170</sup> An editorial on July 8, 2010 reaffirmed the Climategate opinion:

There was no attempt to hoax the world into believing that climate change exists, just excessive secrecy. There was no panicky cover-up to hide rigged data, for no data was rigged. There was no cabal of scientists cooking up fake evidence of catastrophe. There is, however, a real crisis of the most extreme nature: evidence suggests that climate change is real, urgent and increasing. Nothing about the so-called Climategate affair challenges that fact.<sup>171</sup>

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<sup>169</sup> Adam Vaughan and David Adam, 'Copenhagen Climate Deal Spectacular Failure or A Few Important Steps?' *GUK*, December 22, 2009,

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/22/copenhagen-climate-deal-expert-view> .

<sup>170</sup> David Adam, 'Climate Wars Damage the Scientists But We All Stand to Lose in the Battle', *GUK*, February 23, 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/cif-green/2010/feb/23/climate-scepticism-hacked-emails?INTCMP=SRCH>.

<sup>171</sup> Editorial, 'Climate Change: The Science Stands', *GUK*, July 8, 2010,

Investors support was sought on November 17, 2010 in an article that implored policy makers and leading investors like Allianz and HSBC as well as investment groups from developing countries and pension funds from across Europe and North America to tackle global climate change at Cancun's UN climate summit or risk economic disturbance.<sup>172</sup>

On December 12, 2010 an editorial noted that the Cancun agreement left too many issues unresolved but enough was agreed by the delegates in Mexico to raise hopes that climatic disaster could be avoided in the long term with its proposals for a mechanism to prevent deforestation in the developing countries, disbursement of \$100 billion a year by 2020 to protect poor nations against climate impacts and make a move to low carbon development, set up for technology transfer for low carbon economy.<sup>173</sup> On December 13, 2010 an editorial presented how Britain's weather patterns were changing and how people were suffering in Pakistan and many other places because of the impacts of climate change and argued that though Cancun may look fine for now it is actually more like another opportunity missed in the process of climate negotiations.<sup>174</sup>

An editorial presented new figures released on May 30, 2011 showed we were continuing to hurtle towards dangerous climate change at a time when policy makers were running out of ideas. It noted that over the past half-decade, three global warming orthodoxies had endured: the diplomatic one which saw the UN forum as the best place to negotiate; the economic one in which the great recession would automatically lower the emissions; and the industrial one where the rich countries would wean themselves off the fossil fuels and move to a mix of

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<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/jul/08/climate-change-climategate-emails-editorial>.

<sup>172</sup> Michelle Ward, 'Investors Call for Global Climate Change Deal at Cancun', *GUK*, November 17, 2010,

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/sustainable-business/investors-cancun-climate-change-business?INTCMP=SRCH>.

<sup>173</sup> Editorial, 'A Muted Cheer for the Cancun Agreement', *GUK*, December 12, 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/dec/12/leader-climate-change-cancun>.

<sup>174</sup> Editorial, 'Cancun Climate Summit: Yet Another Opportunity Lost', *GUK*, December 13, 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2010/dec/13/cancun-climate-summit-leader-editorial>.

nuclear and renewable. All of these were seemingly utopian for their inability to make any progress to cut emissions.<sup>175</sup>

An environmental editor on June 6, 2011 wrote that developing nations were questioning funding commitments from developed countries, citing World Research Institute data that showing the world's 21 developed countries and the European Commission had publicly announced pledges of \$28 billion in fast track after commitment made in Copenhagen in 2009. While this was close to the \$30 billion promised for the 2010-2012 period, only around \$12 billion had actually been budgeted for by countries and as little as 30 per cent had been delivered in some cases.<sup>176</sup> On July 15, 2011 an article quoted Sir David King, chief scientific adviser to the United Kingdom (UK) government, saying that the world should abandon the KP on climate change and find a way forward through alternative approaches with emissions quotas based on population by mid-century.<sup>177</sup> But on October 12, 2011 it published an article arguing that if the Kyoto process died in Durban, the politics of climate change negotiations would be more difficult, and that allowing Kyoto to lapse would be a disaster.<sup>178</sup> On November 24, 2011 claims were made that vulnerable countries were considering occupying Durban talks until substantial progress was made.<sup>179</sup>

On November 25, 2011 an article conceded that although legally binding targets were the only way to tackle climate change, the powerful, high emitting nations would be stubborn and the titanic clash over climate change negotiations would continue particularly among the big emitters. It urged a step forward from India,

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<sup>175</sup> Editorial, 'Global Warming Bleaker and Bleaker', *GUK*, May 30, 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/may/30/editorial-climate-change-iea-birol>.

<sup>176</sup> John Vidal, 'Bonn Climate Talks: Developing Nations Question Funding Commitment', *GUK*, June 6, 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/jun/06/leon-climate-funding-commitment>.

<sup>177</sup> Fiona Harvey, 'Sir David King: World Should Abandon Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change', *GUK*, July 15, 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/jul/15/david-king-abandon-kyoto-protocol/print>.

<sup>178</sup> Kelly Rigg, 'If Kyoto Dies in Durban, It Will be a Death Knell for the Climate Fight', *GUK*, October 15, 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/oct/12/kyoto-durban-climate-change>.

<sup>179</sup> John Vidal, 'Climate Change: Vulnerable Countries Consider Occupying Durban Talks', *GUK*, November 24, 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/nov/24/climate-change-occupy-durban-talks>.

the US, China, Japan and Canada on the negotiation process.<sup>180</sup> On the same day, November 25, an editorial remarked that global emissions needed to start to fall within the next five years or so, and that each delay made failure costlier and harder to avoid.

The will to act on climate change was out of political energy, running on empty. The problem was (relatively) distant, complex and intractable, and the solution was costly, immediate, and the gains uncertain. It was the kind of slow-burn crisis that democratic politicians only tackle under sustained popular pressure and at the time of writing Western voters had other things on their minds such as looming economic turmoil. The government that promised to be the greenest ever was allowing emission-cutting policies to appear an indulgent hangover from a more prosperous age. As a consequence, when the 17<sup>th</sup> climate change conference opened in Durban, Africa had the opportunity to remind the parties why inaction was not an option.<sup>181</sup>

On December 9, 2011 yearly climate conference was described as a pantomime and doubt was cast on the US behaviour. For President Obama, facing an election campaign amid the worst recession for 80 years, the political reality was that a Durban deal would be used as ammunition by his opponents, most of whom dismissed climate change as a conspiracy to defraud Americans. Finding the real villain, one should look behind Obama to the Republican Party.<sup>182</sup> On December 12, 2011 an article noted how climate scientists and environmental groups reacted to opening the door for a globally legally binding agreement. In their view it was a positive sign but, not enough unless ambitious and rapid emission cuts could be implemented nothing would minimize temperature rise and there would be an increase in global emissions.<sup>183</sup>

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<sup>180</sup> Mark Lynas, 'A Meaningful Durban Treaty Would be a Triumph of Weak over Strong', *GUK*, November 25, 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/nov/25/meaningful-durban-treaty-weak-strong>.

<sup>181</sup> Editorial, 'Climate Change Summit Aim for the Top', *GUK*, November 25, 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/nov/25/durban-climate-change-summit-editorial>.

<sup>182</sup> Fiona Harvey, 'An Insider's View of the Durban Climate Change Conference', *GUK*, December 9, 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/dec/09/insider-view-durban-climate-conference?newsfeed=true>.

<sup>183</sup> Fiona Harvey and John Vidal, 'Durban Deal will not Avert Catastrophic Climate Change Say Scientists', *GUK*, December 11, 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/dec/11/durban-climate-change-deal>.

On the same day an editorial lamented that the Durban agreement was almost a complete failure because trying to get agreement became instead a plan about a plan. Conflicts of interest centred on arguments between developed and developing economies over who pays for the past, and how to pay for the future without the heaviest burden falling on those most vulnerable to climate change – the least developed countries and small island states. The phrase ‘legal force’ used in the Durban text was undefined, and no plan was made for sustainable income, no certainty of a Kyoto extension for 4 or 5 years, and at least 8 years more of ongoing pollution and emissions.<sup>184</sup> On April 1, 2012 an editorial pointing to the problem of climate change in the Arctic region issued a warning: “There is a dangerous lack of urgency among politicians in their reactions to the vast changes that are sweeping our planet”.<sup>185</sup>

## 6.5 The Hindu

A total of 103 articles from *the Hindu* were examined. On October 4, 2000 the actions of developed countries were criticised in editorial noting it was unfair for the industrialised countries to impose their agenda of interests on the developing countries. The paper criticized the role of major global financial institutions including the UN and argued that they needed to change their attitudes towards developing countries.<sup>186</sup> An article on November 26, 2000 confirmed that the UNFCCC summit on global warming in the Hague brought more businessmen than environmentalists to the table given the emerging global emissions market was worth billions of dollars. It went on to note that most scientists were convinced that global warming was happening but that some experts argued that the science of climate change was still in its infancy. The *Hindu* posited that the common perception based on evidence was that global warming was happening and a real phenomenon.<sup>187</sup>

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<sup>184</sup> Editorial, ‘Climate Change: Ambition Gap’, *GUK*, December 12, 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2011/dec/12/durban-climate-change-conference-2011-climate-change>.

<sup>185</sup> Editorial, ‘Climate Change: the Arctic is Too Precious to Be Left Unprotected’, *GUK*, April 1, 2012, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2012/apr/01/observer-editorial-arctic-climate-environment>.

<sup>186</sup> Editorial, ‘Disquiet after Seattle’, *The Hindu*, October 4, 2000, <http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/2000/10/04/stories/05042512.htm>.

<sup>187</sup> Batuk Gathani, ‘Climate Changes Warm Businessmen Hearts’, *The Hindu*, October 25, 2000, <http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/2000/11/25/stories/03250006.htm>.

On November 26, 2000 a republished *Agence France Presse (AFP)* article reported that the UN climate talks collapsed at the 11th hour after the EU and the US failed to settle a bitter row over ways to stop global warming and over how to cut emissions of GHGs – the by-product of burning oil, gas and coal held responsible for the earth's warming.<sup>188</sup> An editorial criticized the US stand on April 7, 2001 and noted: “It is true that the industrialised countries bear the main responsibility for the build-up of GHGs in the atmosphere and it is therefore they and not the developing countries which should take action to halt the process”.<sup>189</sup> The then Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee on October 30, 2002 rejected suggestions from several developed countries that India and other developing countries increase their commitments to reduce the emission of GHGs to address the problem of climate change, opining that it was the developed world which had contributed much more to the problem. Vajpayee argued that the ethos of democracy could not support any norm other than equal per capita rights to global environmental resources and urged that the UNFCCC Convention pay more attention to the aspect of vulnerability and adaptation of developing countries.<sup>190</sup>

The COP-8 negotiations in New Delhi received many warnings but made little commitment to arrest global warming. *The Hindu's* editor remarked on November 1, 2002 that with the passing of each year, the signs of changes in the weather – global warming leading to alteration of rainfall and temperature patterns – were becoming more and more apparent. There could now no longer be any doubt that the world was in the midst of climate change. Since it would take decades to reverse the process, there was a need for immediate action but the UNFCCC process to climate action was very slow. Further, COP-8 was convened in India and as a developing country India should have worked harder to produce better and more meaningful outcomes whereas the draft prepared by India and adopted, made no mention of the KP and its implementation and thus India tarnished its

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<sup>188</sup> ‘EU US Differences Wreck Global Climate Talks’, *The Hindu*, November 26, 2000, <http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/2000/11/26/stories/03260005.htm>.

<sup>189</sup> Editorial, ‘Insensitive Decision’, *The Hindu*, April 7, 2001, <http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/2001/04/07/stories/05072512.htm>.

<sup>190</sup> P. Sunderarajan, ‘Why Should We Do More to Cut Greenhouse Gases? PM’, *The Hindu*, October 31, 2002, <http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/2002/10/31/stories/2002103106700100.htm>.



image. The only two countries that appreciated the draft were the US, an opponent of the KP and Saudi Arabia, a major exporter of crude oil.<sup>191</sup>

An editorial on December 15, 2004 claimed the ratification of the KP by Russia was significant in reducing GHG emissions through the international framework and that, equally, the recently released eight-nation Arctic Climate Impact Assessment report published by the University of Cambridge, reinforced its vital importance through its projections about the likely consequences of unchecked global warming.<sup>192</sup> An article on December 19, 2004 commented on the UNFCCC meeting held in Buenos Aires, where the EU and the US worked out a modest deal to inch ahead in the international efforts to put a cap on global warming, although the Americans avoided any commitment to negotiate any mandatory emissions reductions.<sup>193</sup>

On December 12, 2005 it was reported that India and China had sent a signal to the rest of the world that they would take action against climate change although the US declined to ratify the KP despite the private and deep worries of many Americans about global warming.<sup>194</sup> An editorial on December 16, 2005 applauded the efforts made at COP-11 in Montreal that brought an improvement in the international campaign to reduce the dangers of global warming along with the CDM mechanism. The Montreal conference had two major achievements: one was in firming up a plan to start talks on further commitments on targeted emission reductions beyond 2012 by those developed countries which had already undertaken such commitments in the first phase of the Protocol, and the second was in trying to bring the US and other dissident members of the UNFCCC into the international climate change agenda by initiating what was called a 'dialogue process', due to take place in the following two years.<sup>195</sup>

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<sup>191</sup> Editorial, 'COP Out in New Delhi', *The Hindu*, November 1, 2002, [www.hindu.com/thehindu/2002/11/01/editorial](http://www.hindu.com/thehindu/2002/11/01/editorial).

<sup>192</sup> Editorial, 'Ethics and Shortcuts', *The Hindu*, December 15, 2004, <http://www.thehindu.com/2004/12/15/stories/2004121501851200.htm>.

<sup>193</sup> 'Deal Reached on Global Warming', *The Hindu*, December 19, 2004, <http://www.thehindu.com/2004/12/19/stories/2004121903961200.htm>.

<sup>194</sup> Robin McKie, 'The World Can Breathe Again', *The Hindu*, December 12, 2005, <http://www.thehindu.com/2005/12/12/stories/2005121205501100.htm>.

<sup>195</sup> Editorial, 'Improved Climate for Kyoto Agenda', *The Hindu*, December 16, 2005, <http://www.thehindu.com/2005/12/16/stories/2005121603591200.htm>.

Citing the International Energy Agency (IEA), the *Hindu* wrote that global emissions would accelerate dramatically because of the increased reliance on coal for electricity production, and that without the policies in place to increase the use of alternative and renewable sources of energy as well as government intervention, global emissions would rise significantly as developing economies continued to rely on fossil fuels.<sup>196</sup> An opinion piece published on November 9, 2006 noted that the consensus on climate change was already clear and incontrovertible while the UN data showed that emissions continued to rise in industrialized countries as the scientists had warned. The former chief economist of the World Bank, Nicholas Stern, called climate change the greatest and widest market failure ever.<sup>197</sup>

An editorial on November 14, 2006 wrote approving of the Stern report that not doing anything to reduce global warming was no longer a valid choice and argued that the uncertainty surrounding the long-term impacts of GHG emissions on climate warranted stronger, not weaker, goals to limit them before they would cause permanent and dangerous climate change. It commented that attention had turned to China, India and the US and the decisions of these countries would be crucial to the success of UNFCCC climate change negotiations.<sup>198</sup>

Changes in land use and wood burning from deforestation were responsible for 18 per cent of global GHG emissions each year so the world must protect tropical rainforests from further destruction to combat climate change.<sup>199</sup> The CDM projects were actually not protecting the forests or the poor and vulnerable people. Instead, they were new ways of exploiting the forests, vulnerable and indigenous people in the name of emission trading.<sup>200</sup> Given the climate challenges were building up, more than 180 countries agreed to review the KP but there was no deal adopted on a deadline for setting a global limit on GHGs that could be

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<sup>196</sup> Oliver Morgan and Richard Wachman, 'Emissions Forecast: More Bad News', *The Hindu*, November 6, 2006, <http://www.thehindu.com/2006/11/06/stories/2006110602031100.htm>.

<sup>197</sup> Kofi Annan, 'As the Climate Changes, Can We?' *The Hindu*, November 9, 2006, <http://www.thehindu.com/2006/11/09/stories/2006110904161100.htm>.

<sup>198</sup> Editorial, 'The Economics of Climate Change', *The Hindu*, November 14, 2006, <http://www.thehindu.com/2006/11/13/stories/2006111301960800.htm>.

<sup>199</sup> Ian Sample and David Adam, 'Protect Forests to Soak Up Emissions', *The Hindu*, November 13, 2006, <http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/protect-forests-to-soak-up-emissions/article3047202.ece>.

<sup>200</sup> Terry Slavin, 'A New Way to Exploit the Developing World?' *The Hindu*, November 17, 2006, <http://www.thehindu.com/2006/11/17/stories/2006111702841100.htm>.

applied after 2012 when the KP would expire.<sup>201</sup> The *Hindu* noted that there were no signs that the US and Australia, which had rejected the Protocol, would consider signing a successor agreement, or that industrialising countries such as China and India would agree to cut their carbon emissions.<sup>202</sup>

A December 3, 2007 article remarked that a consensus had developed for a drastic reduction of GHG emissions, although there were differing views of countries on how much and how soon. India, with one sixth of the world's population, had its job cut out at Bali because it could no longer afford to maintain its present laid-back attitude on deteriorating climate system.<sup>203</sup> Further, it reported that world leaders had launched marathon negotiations on how to fight global warming which, if left unchecked, could cause devastating sea level rises, send millions further into poverty and lead to the mass extinction of plants and animals.<sup>204</sup> On December 6 the *Hindu* wrote:

The real issues in Bali are not technical or economic. The crisis we face demands a profound philosophical discussion, a reappraisal of who we are and what progress means. Debating these matters makes us neither saints nor communists; it shows only that we have understood the science.<sup>205</sup>

The paper on December 8, 2007 highlighted that while the Bali roadmap has been touted as the starting point for a fresh set of negotiations for a post-2012 agreement when the Kyoto Protocol lapses, developing countries — particularly the G77 group — has been pushing for honouring the existing commitments first. It wrote “sources claim that the developed world is insisting that the developing world purchase the technology in the open market”.<sup>206</sup>

On December 14, it was commented that the US had worsened the deadlock in the on-going global climate change talks at Bali, by putting forward a proposal that

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<sup>201</sup> ‘Little Progress at Nairobi’, *The Hindu*, November 19, 2006, <http://www.thehindu.com/2006/11/19/stories/2006111902441200.htm>.

<sup>202</sup> *Ibid.*

<sup>203</sup> C.E. Karunakaran, ‘Climate Change: Should India Change?’ *The Hindu*, December 3, 2007, <http://www.thehindu.com/2007/12/03/stories/2007120354921100.htm>.

<sup>204</sup> ‘World Leaders to Discuss Steps to Save Planet’, *The Hindu*, December 3, 2007, <http://www.thehindu.com/2007/12/03/stories/200712035531600.htm>.

<sup>205</sup> George Monbiot, ‘Climate Change: Action or Despair’, *The Hindu*, December 6, 2007, <http://www.thehindu.com/2007/12/06/stories/2007120652441100.htm>.

<sup>206</sup> Aman Sethi, ‘Pressure on Developing Nations to Adopt Emission Limits’, *The Hindu*, December 8, 2007, <http://www.thehindu.com/2007/12/08/stories/2007120861071800.htm>.

seemed to completely discard the international UN framework, in favour of separate national-level efforts to reduce GHG emissions without any binding international commitment.<sup>207</sup> However, on December 17, the paper commended that the Bali conference overcame considerable wrangling and produced the Bali Action Plan, a basic but promising Road Map to 2009, when major economies had to decide on new actions to reduce GHG emissions. The Bali resolution accepted the scientific evidence and emphasised the urgency of combating climate change. Developed countries must, as per the Bali Action Plan, adopt measurable, reportable and verifiable emission limits and reductions while developing countries could emphasise adaptation rather than emissions reduction.

The Bali Action Plan provided opportunities for China and India to reduce their carbon footprint through technology and to strive for mitigation without compromising economic growth.<sup>208</sup> An article on December 18, 2007 approved that India's responsibility for global warming remained at rock bottom however it did not mean that India needed to do nothing except negotiating smart.<sup>209</sup>

On December 3, 2008 an article discussed the threatening situation of climate change particularly for the Pacific Islands and stated that increasing coastal inundation, salinization and erosion, as a consequence of rising sea-levels and human activities, were contaminating and reducing the size of productive agricultural lands, thus threatening household and local food security.<sup>210</sup> The fragile Himalayan region had to be protected because the Himalayas have a deep association with glaciers, biodiversity, forests, ecology, environment and climate change risks.<sup>211</sup>

The participants of the 2008 Poznan, Poland, climate conference were not serious in the negotiations as they failed to produce a roadmap for a revised mode of

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<sup>207</sup> Priscilla Jebaraj, 'Climate Change US Proposal Discards UN Framework', *The Hindu*, December 14, 2007,

<http://www.thehindu.com/2007/12/14/stories/2007121461161700.htm>.

<sup>208</sup> Editorial, 'Saving the Climate at Bali', *The Hindu*, December 17, 2007,

<http://www.thehindu.com/2007/12/17/stories/2007121754731000.htm>.

<sup>209</sup> Promode Kant, 'Global Warming & India's Responsibility', *The Hindu*, December 18, 2007,

<http://www.thehindu.com/2007/12/18/stories/2007121855200800.htm>.

<sup>210</sup> 'Climate Change Threatens Food Security, Says FAO', *The Hindu*, December 3, 2008,

<http://www.thehindu.com/2008/12/03/stories/2008120355010900.htm>.

<sup>211</sup> Editorial, 'Funding a Green Vision', *The Hindu*, December 5, 2008,

<http://www.thehindu.com/2008/12/05/stories/2008120555921000.htm>.

negotiation and new UNFCCC climate agreement. The *Hindu* stated that ambitious targets must be at the heart of the agreement based on a new institutional architecture for cooperation between rich and poor countries because while countries can recover from financial crises, there was no antidote or rewind button for global warming.<sup>212</sup> An article published on December 9, 2008 wrote that global emissions were on track to meet the Kyoto targets but the drop in emissions had actually nothing to do with climate policies, but were parts of political upheaval of the Soviet Union and the subsequent economic decline in the Eastern Europe as the causes of the drop in emissions.<sup>213</sup>

The next day the paper commented that the Poznan climate change negotiations were not progressing fast enough to produce a “fully elaborate and comprehensive” treaty by the time delegates meet again in Copenhagen in December. An article reported the Indian stance on climate change negotiation quoting the chief Indian climate change delegate, Vijay Sharma, saying:

If any party wants to tinker with the established principles, such as the principle of common but differentiated responsibility, which mandates emission cuts only for developed nations, then of course this would handicap the negotiations and detract from the efficiency, and lose unnecessary time.<sup>214</sup>

However, two days later the Poznan climate change conference was reported as significant because it had paved the way for sealing a deal at the Copenhagen climate conference in 2009. Recalling the proverb ‘prevention is better than cure’, the paper argued for prevention through mitigation and adaptation. The issue of climate justice and human rights in the development perspective are to be addressed and the industrialized countries must take strong and immediate steps to increase assistance to the least developed countries for adaptation.<sup>215</sup>

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<sup>212</sup> Kevin Watkins, ‘Global Warming Demands Urgent Action’, *The Hindu*, December 8, 2008, <http://www.thehindu.com/2008/12/08/stories/2008120855690900.htm>.

<sup>213</sup> David Adam, ‘Has the Kyoto protocol worked?’ *The Hindu*, December 9, 2008, <http://www.thehindu.com/2008/12/09/stories/2008120955720900.htm>.

<sup>214</sup> Priscilla Jebaraj, ‘Climate Change Talks not Fast Enough for Treaty UN Convention Secretary’, *The Hindu*, December 10, 2008a, <http://www.thehindu.com/2008/12/10/stories/2008121060991300.htm>.

<sup>215</sup> Mary Robinson, Margot Wallström, and Gro Harlem Brundtland, ‘A New Climate Deal Based on Human Progress and Justice’, *The Hindu*, December 12, 2008, <http://www.thehindu.com/2008/12/12/stories/2008121255020900.htm>.

On December 13 the comment was made that Poznan had been mildly successful in operationalizing the adaptation fund with the slow progress attributed partly to the US Presidential transition, and the uncertainty of the EU's internal climate negotiations which ended with huge concessions for European industry.<sup>216</sup> By December 20, 2008 an editorial reviewed climate change as a side-line issue in a period of economic meltdown however there was consensus that the earth would continue to grow warmer due to accumulated atmospheric carbon dioxide and that the level of the long-lived gas had risen to 385 parts per million today from 280 ppm before the industrial revolution. At Poznan a great deal of attention had been devoted to implementing a much-needed adaptation fund for vulnerable countries which needed strengthening. The *Hindu* noted:

At the recent UN Climate Change Conference in Poland a great deal of attention was devoted to implementing a much-needed adaptation fund for vulnerable countries. That effort must be strengthened. What is more, its emissions trading scheme does not appear to be functioning optimally – preliminary data for 2007 show a surplus of permits rather than the intended shortage that would make emissions costly.<sup>217</sup>

One commentator quoted the Environment Minister of India, Jairam Ramesh, on November 23, 2009 saying that India was not a deal breaker but a deal maker and that the present crisis on climate change was the 'inability' of the US to put on the table credible emissions reduction targets for 2020.<sup>218</sup> Chinese President Jintao was quoted at the UN climate change conference in New York in September 2009, as saying "Global climate change has a profound impact on the existence and development of mankind and is a major challenge facing all countries". Jintao further noted that China was endeavouring to cut CO<sub>2</sub> emissions per unit of growth domestic product (GDP) by a notable margin by 2020 from the 2005 level; to vigorously develop renewable energy and nuclear energy; to energetically increase a forest carbon sink; endeavour to increase forest coverage by 40 million hectares and forest stock volume by 1.3 billion cubic meters by 2020 from the

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<sup>216</sup> Priscilla Jebaraj, 'Frustration at Climate Change Summit', *The Hindu*, December 13, 2008b, <http://www.thehindu.com/2008/12/13/stories/2008121360681800.htm>.

<sup>217</sup> Editorials, 'Looking Beyond Kyoto', *The Hindu*, December 20, 2008, <http://www.thehindu.com/2008/12/20/stories/2008122052541000.htm>.

<sup>218</sup> 'Climate Talks Wrong to Blame India for Deadlock', *The Hindu*, September 23, 2009, <http://www.thehindu.com/2009/09/23/stories/2009092360891000.htm>.

2005 levels; to step up efforts to develop the green economy, the low-carbon economy and circular economy; and to enhance research, development and the dissemination of climate-friendly technologies.<sup>219</sup>

The next day an editorial praised Obama's efforts aimed at bringing major emitting developing countries forward in their commitments to mitigate climate change. India too, it implored, must step forward because the official stance that the country's per capita emissions would always be lower than those of the developed countries could not form the basis for serious climate talks, considering the goal was to reduce the rate at which GHGs were being added to the Earth's atmosphere. It applauded Chinese President Jintao's clear and specific goals and efforts to reduce emissions, and also stated that technology must be developed for at source carbon sequestration.<sup>220</sup> China, India, Japan and private sector contribution just prior to the Copenhagen climate conference in 2009 was applauded but the *Hindu* cautioned that there were huge challenges ahead to make negotiations successful at international and domestic levels for developing appropriate climate policies and implementing them. Real vision, leadership, creativity, as well as a mutual understanding of the difficulties of making and implementing climate policies are required through a global effort to forge a path towards a more prosperous and sustainable future for us, our children, and generations to follow.<sup>221</sup> In sum, the developed world must take the leadership and that:

Developing countries should also sharply reduce their emissions, but they must be supported, financially and through technology sharing with the rich industrialised countries. Without commitments to such support, the negotiations ahead will prove very difficult.<sup>222</sup>

An article on December 2, 2009 analysed the Chinese pledge of a voluntary reduction in the intensity of its carbon dioxide emissions per unit of GDP by 40-45 per cent of 2005 levels by 2020. This extended experts' views that China would have to do little to match its new pledges as it had only pledged to reduce

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<sup>219</sup> 'Hu Pledges Climate Support', *The Hindu*, September 23, 2009, <http://www.thehindu.com/2009/09/23/stories/2009092356551500.htm>.

<sup>220</sup> Editorials, 'Break the Climate Deadlock', *The Hindu*, September 24, 2009, <http://www.thehindu.com/2009/09/24/stories/2009092455280800.htm>.

<sup>221</sup> Nicholas Stern, 'China India Show the Way', *The Hindu*, September 25, 2009, <http://www.thehindu.com/2009/09/25/stories/2009092555820900.htm>.

<sup>222</sup> Ibid.

the intensity of its emissions not its net emissions. Nonetheless, China had finally put its pledges on paper as fixed targets, even if it had already committed those targets in its domestic plans.<sup>223</sup> In terms of Copenhagen, China was not considered a game-changer, but it had laid down a marker by pledging 40 to 45 per cent GHGs reductions.<sup>224</sup>

On December 6, 2009 an editorial commented:

Today 56 newspapers in 45 countries take the unprecedented step of speaking with one voice through a common editorial. We do so because humanity faces a profound emergency. Unless we combine to take decisive action, climate change will ravage our planet, and with it our prosperity and security.<sup>225</sup>

It further noted that Copenhagen should not be a venue for blaming each other or a fighting place between rich and poor because climate change is a global problem, and its science is clear.

The 56 editorials called on all the representatives to seize the opportunity for progress or face the greatest modern failure of politics. Climate change was a matter of social justice which demanded that the industrialised world dig deep into its pockets and pledge cash to help poorer countries adapt introducing clean technologies to enable them to grow economically without raising emissions. Fairness required that the burden placed on individual developed countries take into account their ability to bear costs. For instance, newer EU members, often much poorer than ‘old Europe’, must not suffer more than their richer partners.

The aim of the Copenhagen climate conference was after all to reset the goal to produce an ‘operationally binding political agreement’ on how and under what terms actions were needed to prevent dangerous global warming and how it could be distributed globally, across 192 countries. The editorial wrote that the signs and indications from the first few days of Copenhagen had not been auspicious, and argued that the key should be the convention’s principle CBDR that major developing countries should seek to meet the concerns of developed countries.

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<sup>223</sup> Ananth Krishnan, ‘Chinas Emission Reduction Target Stirs Debate’, *The Hindu*, December 2, 2009,

<http://www.thehindu.com/2009/12/02/stories/2009120255431400.htm>.

<sup>224</sup> Ibid.

<sup>225</sup> ‘Copenhagen: Seize the Chance’, *The Hindu*, December 6, 2009, <http://www.hindu.com/2009/12/07/stories/2009120755960100.htm>.



There were also indications that the developed nations, instead of reaching across the trust divide, were contemplating political arm-twisting to safeguard their key interests while overriding developing countries' concerns. Smaller nations do and could influence the course of the negotiations but a great deal would depend on the kind of role the US, the EU, China, and India ended up playing in the negotiations and the high-level political parleys.<sup>226</sup>

An article on December 18, 2009 claimed that measurable, reportable and verifiable (MRV) pledges became the defining battle ground of the Copenhagen climate conference because major developing countries, including India, remained firm that their voluntary mitigation actions were not open to international scrutiny but a common ground was being sought.<sup>227</sup> Two days later the editor wrote that on any reasonable reckoning, the outcome of the Copenhagen climate summit fell far short of what the nations of the world, particularly the industrialised countries, needed to do to combat global warming. The Copenhagen Accord was seen as a personal negotiation among the political leaders of the US, China, India, Brazil and South Africa and by postponing any global quantitative commitment to climate mitigation, particularly any commitment to drastic emissions reduction by the developed nations, they paid a disproportionate amount of attention to the responsibilities of developing countries. The most serious import of these concessions was evident from the UNFCCC assessment that the current global mitigation efforts allowed for a significant probability that global temperature rise would reach 3°C.

One observer declared that the contribution to mitigation commitments of developing countries was greater than that of the developed countries and the cry of many small developing countries, led by the Island nation of Tuvalu, which had been promised \$100 billion in annual climate finance by 2020 amounted to asking them to trade their future “for thirty pieces of silver today,” was a call to moral responsibility that must not be ignored. The observer further argued that the political challenge before the BASIC countries, especially India and China, was to redefine the task of drastic emissions reduction globally, led by the developed

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<sup>226</sup> Editorials, ‘Copenhagen’s Indifferent Start’, *The Hindu*, December 15, 2009, <http://www.thehindu.com/2009/12/15/stories/2009121557400800.htm>.

<sup>227</sup> Priscilla Jebaraj, ‘Compromise in Sight on International Scrutiny’, *The Hindu*, December 18, 2009, <http://www.thehindu.com/2009/12/18/stories/2009121860881300.htm>.

countries, in a manner that refused to counter pose the global public good to the development imperative. Climate laggards in the developed as well as the developing world needed to be pushed aside in a dialogue which had both the scientific case and the ethical imperative and demanded a stronger display of political will that went beyond firm negotiating stances and forces all major players in mitigation action to do their due share for humanity.<sup>228</sup>

On December 22, 2009 an opinion article wrote that the COP-15 was undemocratic. It further noted that no one could have imagined that the Copenhagen climate conference's final plenary session would be suspended for the US President Obama for a meeting where only he and a selected group of guests, would have the exclusive right to speak.<sup>229</sup> An article published on December 24, 2009 claimed the reasons of the failure of the Copenhagen climate conference was the arrangement that the big players preferred "an informal setting, where each country says what it is prepared to do --where nothing is negotiated and nothing is legally binding".<sup>230</sup>

Two days later an opinion article commented that the principle of CBDR impact of 2°C change in mean temperature was essential for prioritising climate victims because India's food and water security systems would be the worst victims of a rise in mean temperature. Therefore, building defences against potential climate change pre-empted calamities by mainstreaming climate resilience in all developmental programmes should be the priority task.<sup>231</sup> An editorial on the same day pointed to the likely plight of climate change refugees affected by famine and natural disasters and the problem of the UN treaty, the Convention and Protocol Relating to the Status of Refugees of 1951, which did not grant climate refugees the status of refugees.<sup>232</sup>

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<sup>228</sup> Editorials, 'Far From Inspiring', *The Hindu*, December 21, 2009, <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/article67768.ece?>

<sup>229</sup> Fidel Castro Ruz, 'The Truth of What Happened at Copenhagen', *The Hindu*, December 22, 2009, <http://www.thehindu.com/2009/12/22/stories/2009122255360800.htm>.

<sup>230</sup> Richard Black, 'Why did Copenhagen Fail to Deliver a Climate Deal?' *The Hindu*, December 23, 2009, <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/op-ed/article69690.ece>.

<sup>231</sup> M.S. Swaminathan, 'Copenhagen and Tsunami and Hunger', *The Hindu*, December 26, 2009, <http://www.hindu.com/2009/12/26/stories/2009122655310800.htm>.

<sup>232</sup> Editorials, 'Factor in Climate Refugees', *The Hindu*, December 26, 2009, <http://www.thehindu.com/2009/12/26/stories/2009122655180800.htm>.

A month later a joint statement was issued at the conclusion of the Second Meeting of Ministers of the BASIC countries on climate change in New Delhi which was notable for its sober message sent to the developed world and the UN, that progress on climate talks would depend on a reassertion of the central principle of CBDR outlined by the UNFCCC.<sup>233</sup> The BASIC Four affirmed their intention to submit voluntary national mitigation actions to the UNFCCC by January 31, 2010 and the onus was now on the developed world to do its part. It also noted that future negotiations should be inclusive and transparent noting that the absence of such transparency at Copenhagen resulted in a highly visible crisis of credibility for the entire process.<sup>234</sup>

An editorial published on April 3, 2010 commented that the World's People Conference on Climate Change, which drew around 30,000 people, deserved credit for drawing attention to contentious issues. It demanded the rich and affluent nations bear responsibility for the accumulation of GHGs and prepare to pay out massive compensation for those most at risk from climate-linked environmental destructions. The conference asserted the deep sense of injustice nursed by the nations of the developing world who wanted a climate tribunal established along the lines of the International Court of Justice where developed countries could be tried for not fulfilling their Kyoto commitments. It also highlighted the conflict faced by the indigenous peoples' traditional rights and the UN carbon credits for forest protection.<sup>235</sup>

Financial assistance from developed countries for projects to combat climate change in the developing world emerged over 2010 as a key sticking point. At the climate meet in Tianjin, China, which was the last round of negotiations before the year-end Cancun conference, negotiators from India, China and other developing nations called on the West to step up to its commitments with promises. Differences also surfaced over developed countries repackaging earlier development aid as climate-related funding.<sup>236</sup> An editorial on October 10, 2010

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<sup>233</sup> Editorials, 'Strengthening Kyoto', *The Hindu*, January 26, 2010, <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/article94824.ece?>

<sup>234</sup> Ibid.

<sup>235</sup> Editorials, 'People for Climate', *The Hindu*, April 30, 2010, <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/article418740.ece?>

<sup>236</sup> Ananth Krishnan, 'Climate Finance Key Issue', *The Hindu*, October 7, 2010, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article816622.ece>.

wrote that the Tianjin talks witnessed some progress on the issue of financing the mitigation efforts of climate change and adaptation, but there was a significant gap between the level of funding required and what had been committed. The public dispute between China and the US also weakened the levels of emissions cuts. China argued the developed world must take mandatory commitments for emissions cuts whereas China and India sought to engage through voluntary emissions cuts, a stance approved by editorial comments. It also said that REDD+<sup>237</sup> was to be formalized at Cancun for post 2012 implementation.<sup>238</sup>

An editorial on December 5, 2010 implored India to make a strong case in Cancun for substantial international funding for carbon mitigation. It opined that the fast track \$30 billion finance for 2010-2012 had not been fully contributed and channelled, and suggested that India be careful in its urban development because housing infrastructure and transport were the main sources of emissions meaning India should go for a green infrastructure.<sup>239</sup> Japan for its part stood firm that it would not extend the KP for a second commitment period.<sup>240</sup> And on December 10, 2010 an article noted that the race was on for a UN climate summit deal but that there were deep differences on how to cooperate on cutting global GHG emissions. In the interim, some progress had been made on a new mechanism to support poor countries deal with global warming.<sup>241</sup>

No grand compact mandating deep cuts in global warming gases was brokered in Cancun, instead the two-week session focused on a proliferation of secondary issues – a ‘Green Fund’ to help poor nations, deforestation, technology sales and other matters to produce a modest deal.<sup>242</sup> An article on December 17, 2010 stated that Cancun addressed the issue of transparency, adaptation, a green climate fund, technology transfer, forestry and capacity-building, which included long-awaited

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<sup>237</sup> Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation “plus” Conservation is a sustainable management of forest.

<sup>238</sup> Editorial, ‘Funding the Climate Clean-Up’, *The Hindu*, October 10, 2010, <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/article823706.ece?>

<sup>239</sup> Editorials, ‘Green Infrastructure’, *The Hindu*, December 5, 2010, <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/article933913.ece>.

<sup>240</sup> Meena Menon, ‘Kyoto Protocol in Jeopardy’, *The Hindu*, December 9, 2010a, <http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/energy-and-environment/article941366.ece>.

<sup>241</sup> ‘Race is on at U.N. Climate Summit to Close Deal’, *The Hindu*, December 10, <http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/energy-and-environment/article943546.ece>.

<sup>242</sup> ‘Nations Struggle at Cancun to Make Even Modest Deals’, *The Hindu*, December 11, 2010, <http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/energy-and-environment/article945616.ece?>

decisions but the world could not just wait and hope that commitments and targets by individual countries would be enough to reduce GHG emissions and that was the failure of the Cancun agreements.<sup>243</sup>

On July 21, 2011 an article stated that India had discussions on climate change in the Security Council which was a welcome step, but it argued that the 15-member body did not have mandate to deal with climate change. For India peacekeeping missions, the use of force and sanctions which the UN Security Council can authorise, did not fit with the problems of climate change so it needed to stay in the realm of UN General Assembly or the UNFCCC, yet the Indian stand was modest because China and Russia were absolutely against the Security Council dealing with climate change.<sup>244</sup> On October 7, 2011 an editorial focused on rapid urbanization, economic growth and the repercussions of climate change given that cities contribute 75 per cent of human-induced GHGs.<sup>245</sup> Following on the central theme of Durban 2011 what was needed was to redefine rich and poor countries saying it was time to move beyond traditional distinctions between developed and developing countries and move China and other growing economies to accept legally binding curbs on GHGs.<sup>246</sup>

An editorial on November 28, 2011 wrote that any attempt at the Durban climate change conference in 2011 to transfer the onus of emission cuts from the rich countries to India and China should be resisted. It also claimed that there appeared to be public indifference to the UNFCCC meeting as Europe, the epicentre of the whole discourse on climate change, was coming apart because the continent had its economic crisis to deal with. Copenhagen started this insidious process and Durban could take it further so it must be resisted. Copenhagen undermined the basic principle of the KP and sought to alter it by placing both advanced and emerging economies on the same plane despite India and China having obvious differences on per capita income compared to the industrialized world. It also wrote that the post-Fukushima world's prospects looked bleak, Germany was

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<sup>243</sup> Meena Menon, 'Cancun: Held Together by Optimism', *The Hindu*, December 17, 2010b, <http://www.thehindu.com/2010/12/17/stories/2010121762971300.htm>.

<sup>244</sup> 'Climate Change Debate in UNSC Welcome Step: India', *The Hindu*, July 21, 2011, <http://www.thehindu.com/news/international/article2279157.ece>.

<sup>245</sup> Editorials, 'Cities and Climate Change', *The Hindu*, October 7, 2011, <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/editorial/article2518565.ece>.

<sup>246</sup> 'In Climate Talks West Would Redefine Rich and Poor', *The Hindu*, November 26, 2011, <http://www.thehindu.com/sci-tech/energy-and-environment/article2662031.ece?>

turning away from nuclear energy and there was no reliable renewable energy attainment yet which meant that the world was back to coal and oil which was not best thing. The only way to delink fossil fuel emissions from the ups and downs of the world economy was to develop a robust alternative to carbon markets, more investment in renewable energies and to ensure that nuclear power became a credible option.<sup>247</sup>

By December 13, 2011 it was argued that India had lost the climate change plot at Durban because in any reasonable reckoning the outcome of UNFCCC 17<sup>th</sup> meeting at Durban was a triumph for European climate diplomacy. At Durban, the EU succeeded in putting together a substantial coalition, including the small island states, the least developed and some other developing countries, and the emerging economies of Brazil and South Africa, behind a climate agenda that was, in scientific terms, unambitious in its mitigation goals and clearly aimed at passing the climate burden on to the large developing countries. It further outlined that India was not well prepared for Durban and that the delegation had no positive mandate. A strategic mishandling was evident because after two weeks of opposition, India finally agreed to everything without making any note of the principles of the Convention such as equity. The next UNFCCC meeting (COP-18) would impel India to recognize that the interests of the 1.2 billion people that it so frequently invokes at climate negotiations lies as much in an early climate agreement as in adequate access to global atmospheric space.<sup>248</sup> An opinion article in 2012 viewed that Indian climate negotiators should strongly follow conservative country position of the Kyoto style agreement.<sup>249</sup>

## 6.6 China Daily

This section reviews 99 articles from the *China Daily*. An opinion article on April 21, 2001 depicted the Bush administration's attitude to the KP as ruining years of arduous work on environmental protection by the international community. Alarming scientific evidence was accumulating and if climate change remained

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<sup>247</sup> Editorials, 'The Climate at Durban', *The Hindu*, November 28, 2011, <http://www.thehindubusinessline.com/opinion/editorial/article2668676.ece>.

<sup>248</sup> Editorials, 'India Lost Plot at Durban', *The Hindu*, December 13, 2011, <http://www.thehindu.com/todays-paper/tp-opinion/article2710277.ece>.

<sup>249</sup> Sandeep Sengupta, 'Lessons from Durban Conference', *The Hindu*, February 14, 2012, <http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/lessons-from-the-durban-conference/article2890130.ece>.

unchecked, the world would see climatic disasters, so the KP needed to come into effect at the earliest opportunity.<sup>250</sup> The US former Vice-President Dick Cheney reportedly doubted the existence of global warming reaffirming the stance that the KP was ill-conceived because it did not put any pressure on China, the number 2 emitter and India, the number 5 emitter at that time.<sup>251</sup> An article on November 11, 2001 claimed “In a rare and bold move that will keep the United States isolated, Tokyo is preparing to ratify the Kyoto global warming pact even without the world's biggest economy and polluter”. At the domestic level, Japanese businesses had warned the government not to ratify but Japan ratified the KP on the considerable external pressure from the EU with its concern that if Japan did not ratify the Protocol, Japanese products could be boycotted in the European market.<sup>252</sup>

On September 2, 2002 *China Daily* reported that China approved ratification of the KP with a view to taking an active part in multilateral environmental protection.<sup>253</sup> One month later the *Daily* wrote that Chinese ratification of the KP was highly appreciated by the UNFCCC and if Russia also ratified Kyoto, China and Russia could put pressure on the US for ratification.<sup>254</sup> On December 3, 2003 the *Daily* wrote:

Attention focused on Russia after the Bush administration announced it would not ratify Kyoto in what it called a flawed pact that would unfairly harm the US economy. The US was responsible for one-fourth of the world's man-made carbon dioxide emissions, and its March 2001 decision angered environmentalists.<sup>255</sup>

A week later it wrote: “Climate change is not a prognosis; it is a reality... Developed countries have a responsibility to reduce their emissions, but also have a responsibility to help developing countries adapt to the impacts of global

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<sup>250</sup> Guo Yali, ‘Kyoto Protocol Should be Fixed Without Delay’, *China Daily*, April 21, 2001, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2001-04/21/content\\_51928.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2001-04/21/content_51928.htm).

<sup>251</sup> ‘Vice President Cheney Still Doubts Global Warming Theory’, *China Daily* June 14, 2001, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2001-06/14/content\\_63739.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2001-06/14/content_63739.htm).

<sup>252</sup> ‘Japan Set to Ratify Kyoto Climate Pact without US’, *China Daily*, November 11, 2001, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2001-11/04/content\\_92007.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2001-11/04/content_92007.htm).

<sup>253</sup> Shao Zongwei, ‘Nation Approves Kyoto Protocol’, *China Daily*, September 4, 2002, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2002-09/04/content\\_134822.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2002-09/04/content_134822.htm).

<sup>254</sup> ‘Approval of Protocol Hailed’, *China Daily*, October 17, 2002, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2002-10/17/content\\_140030.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2002-10/17/content_140030.htm).

<sup>255</sup> ‘Russia Rules out Accepting Kyoto Protocol’, *China Daily*, December 3, 2003, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-12/03/content\\_286904.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-12/03/content_286904.htm).

warming”.<sup>256</sup> A year later in 2004 it wrote after Russian ratification of the KP China became the first country to work under the CDM stipulated by the Protocol.<sup>257</sup>

In 2005 an article wrote, after 7 years, the Kyoto finally came into existence but still the US and Australia had not ratified it. Now officials were pondering a ‘carbon tax’ to punish polluters – a move opposed by business – while others favoured expansion of nuclear power and promotion of energy-saving technologies.<sup>258</sup> An article on November 12, 2005 commented that the UN climate conference in 2005 ended with a watershed agreement by more than 150 countries, as well as an unwilling US, to open talks on mandatory post-2012 reductions in GHGs. It remarked that continued warming was melting glaciers worldwide, shrinking the Arctic ice cap and heating up the oceans, raising sea levels. Climate scientists predicted major climate disruptions in coming decades.<sup>259</sup> On November 25, 2005 the *Daily* wrote:

The Kyoto Protocol is merely a first step. During the 12-day conference in Montreal, which begins on November 28, parties to the Kyoto Protocol will discuss climate control steps to be taken from 2013 on. A negotiating mandate or actual treaty such as the Kyoto Protocol is not expected for another several years, however.<sup>260</sup>

On December 3, 2005 an opinion article heralded the on-going global climate change conference in Montreal, Canada as an opportunity for residents in the world community to discuss self-restraints amounting from excessive damages to the global climate while pursuing material development. The aim was to put concrete steps for a new Kyoto-style agreement as a successor to the KP given that no state could stay blind to the negative impacts of accelerated industrialization on global climate change.<sup>261</sup> On December 9, 2005, Australia

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<sup>256</sup> ‘Climate Change Cost \$60 Billion in 2003’, *China Daily*, December 12, 2003, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-12/12/content\\_289545.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-12/12/content_289545.htm).

<sup>257</sup> Xu Binlan, ‘First Greenhouse Emission Deal Inked’, *China Daily*, December 2, 2004, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-12/02/content\\_396978.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2004-12/02/content_396978.htm).

<sup>258</sup> ‘Kyoto Global Warming Pact Takes Effect’, *China Daily*, February 16, 2005, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-02/16/content\\_416936.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-02/16/content_416936.htm).

<sup>259</sup> ‘UN Climate Talks End With Pivotal Deal’, *China Daily*, November 12, 2005, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-12/11/content\\_502428\\_3.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-12/11/content_502428_3.htm).

<sup>260</sup> ‘Climate Protection From Rio to Montreal’, *China Daily*, November 25, 2005, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-11/25/content\\_497719.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-11/25/content_497719.htm).

<sup>261</sup> Fang Zhou, ‘Global Village Needs to Reduce Greenhouse Gases’, *China Daily*, December 3, 2005, [www.chinadaily.com.cn](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn).



was reported as saying: forget the KP and its timetable because short-term targets and tight time-tables were not solutions to fighting climate change. The *Daily* criticised Australia's role in global climate change negotiations.<sup>262</sup>

On March 29, 2006 it claimed that failing to address the climate issue would be handing on an irresponsible legacy to future generations.<sup>263</sup> On November 6, 2006 the paper wrote that the Nairobi climate conference would aim to work towards making a new global climate treaty with the focus on technical matters, such as organizing the Adaptation Fund, intended to help poorer countries grapple with climate change. Examples include financing the building of walls against rising seas or switching to drought-resistant crops. Despite this, not much progress was expected unless the Bush administration was out of power in the US.<sup>264</sup> An article on November 17, 2006 noted the avant-garde views of scientists on climate change when the COP was taking place in Nairobi. It reported scientists saying that pollution may be helpful to cool the planet especially by the use of sulphur dioxide although scientists put this perspective into context considering that global climate change negotiations were not making any pace even after strong evidence of climate change occurring.<sup>265</sup>

On February 6, 2007 an article stated that China would not cry for oil but for water in the future because the UNFCCC process in its 16 years had produced very little to halt climate change. The groups stymieing progress were the lobbyists from Exxon, the Organization of the Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and the world's coal groups who had spent a lot of money on confusing the public with their rhetoric. These groups, however, could not persuade the scientists to soften their language, although they tried very hard. It compared climate change to national security issues and argued that if climate change was military security then we would be basing our policy response on the worst-case analysis, not the best-guess consensus. For many years, the *Daily* argued, climate

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<sup>262</sup> 'Forget Climate Targets, Timetables, Australia Says', *China Daily*, December 9, 2005, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-12/09/content\\_502042.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-12/09/content_502042.htm).

<sup>263</sup> 'Climate Change Deal to Fail without US, China India: Blair', *China Daily*, March 29, 2006, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-03/29/content\\_555624.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2006-03/29/content_555624.htm).

<sup>264</sup> 'Climate conference convenes in Kenya', *China Daily*, November 6, 2006, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2006-11/06/content\\_726107\\_2.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2006-11/06/content_726107_2.htm).

<sup>265</sup> 'Pollution May be Helpful, Scientists Claim', *China Daily*, November 17, 2006, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2006-11/17/content\\_735921.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2006-11/17/content_735921.htm).

change was dismissed as scaremongering by contrary voices and fossil-fuel industries but today the reality is different as it is invading us.<sup>266</sup>

On May 5, 2007 delegates were reported to have approved the world's first roadmap for stemming mounting GHG emissions, laying out an arsenal of anti-warming measures that would have to be rushed into place to avert a disastrous spike in global temperatures. The report, a summary of a more than 1,000-page study by a UN network of 2,000 scientists, showed the world had to make significant cuts in gas emissions through increasing the energy efficiency of buildings and vehicles, shifting from fossil to renewable fuels and reforming both the forestry and farming sectors.<sup>267</sup>

On June 8, 2007 Chinese President Jintao was quoted as saying:

Considering both historical responsibility and current capability, developed countries should take the lead in reducing carbon emissions and help developing countries ease and adapt to climate change. For developing countries, achieving economic growth and improving the lives of our people are top priorities. At the same time, we also need to make every effort to pursue sustainable development in accordance with our national conditions.<sup>268</sup>

A new perspective to the climate change debate was presented on June 25 as it wrote "Asian business and government leaders accused rich countries of hypocrisy, saying they run polluting industries with cheap labour in China and then blame the country for worsening global warming and climate change".<sup>269</sup> The Western approach to impose binding emissions targets over China was green imperialism. When the Nobel Prize was given to the IPCC, the *Daily* commented that the prize showed the significance of the IPCC's scientific evidence about climate change arguing that the science was clear.<sup>270</sup>

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<sup>266</sup> Jeremy Leggett, 'Time for the All Out War on Climate Change', *China Daily*, February 6, 2007, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2007-02/06/content\\_801998.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2007-02/06/content_801998.htm).

<sup>267</sup> 'Anti-warming Roadmap Unveiled', *China Daily*, May 7, 2007, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2007-05/05/content\\_865677.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2007-05/05/content_865677.htm).

<sup>268</sup> 'Hu Urges Common But Differentiated Responsibilities', *China Daily*, June 8, 2007, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-06/08/content\\_889664.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2007-06/08/content_889664.htm).

<sup>269</sup> 'Rich nations blamed of green imperialism', *China Daily*, June 25, 2007, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2007-06/25/content\\_901823.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2007-06/25/content_901823.htm).

<sup>270</sup> The Asahi Shimbun, 'Scientific Message Triggers Big Political Change', *China Daily*, October 17, 2007, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2007-10/17/content\\_6181880.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2007-10/17/content_6181880.htm).

Negotiators left Bali (2007) speaking of an historic breakthrough and promising urgent action to fight climate change credited with floods, droughts, storms, heat waves and rising seas. It also concluded an agreement to work out a long-term climate treaty involving all nations by late 2009. Among incentives for poor nations, Bali laid out schemes to slow deforestation, share 'clean' technologies and established a new fund to help vulnerable people adapt to droughts or rising seas.<sup>271</sup> On December 17, 2007 doubt was cast on the Bali roadmap believing it was a compromise although there was growing enthusiasm for participation. The paper noted: "After all, it would be unthinkable to advance a major common effort, such as the one defined by the Bali roadmap, without a common fund. And it is always a good thing if the common effort can be made 'measurable, reportable and verifiable' at the market level."<sup>272</sup>

Two days later the Bali conference was reported as not a rich versus poor countries' war, but a common cause war against climate change because the concentrations of global emissions had reached a point of no return. To fight against climate change the Bali negotiators focused on a climate change deal for the post-2012 period. The article defended China saying that China was working to develop a low-carbon economy as nearly 40 per cent of global carbon trading involved China.<sup>273</sup> An editorial on December 21, 2007 reviewed Bali saying world leaders had debated the future of our planet but nothing concrete emerged. It noted:

It's time we reconsidered the existing paradigm of development. The world has been talking about sustainable development. But as one of India's leading ecologists, Debal Deb, says: It is common understanding among natural scientists that if development means unlimited growth in production and consumption of materials, sustainable development is an oxymoron. That's because unending growth of anything in the universe is impossible – except perhaps the universe itself.<sup>274</sup>

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<sup>271</sup> 'Hard Part Arriving after Praise for Bali Deal', *China Daily*, December 17, 2007, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2007-12/17/content\\_6324983.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2007-12/17/content_6324983.htm).

<sup>272</sup> You Nuo, 'Transparent Action on Climate Deal', *China Daily*, December 17, 2007, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2007-12/17/content\\_6324878.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/cndy/2007-12/17/content_6324878.htm).

<sup>273</sup> Lau Nai-keung, 'It Takes a World To Fight Climate Change', *China Daily*, December 19, 2007, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2007-12/19/content\\_6332009.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2007-12/19/content_6332009.htm).

<sup>274</sup> Editorial, 'Time We Changed Our Development Paradigm', *China Daily*, December 21, 2007, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2007-12/21/content\\_6338536.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2007-12/21/content_6338536.htm).

An opinion article on April 9, 2008 claimed there were different ways to fight climate change under the KP such as technological reduction and market reduction. The EU has focused on a market reduction approach whereas Japan has been focusing on technological reduction. The problem was that the indigenous manufacturing industries in China and other emerging markets still lagged far behind developed countries and the high standard of emission reduction quotas would surely perpetuate the gap between the two worlds and even expand it. The US, Japan and the EU were all focused on their own interests in carbon rights game theory that would ultimately establish their leading positions in industry and cement the 'retention of relative advantage' by ensuring a productivity gap remained in the future. The late comers in manufacturing would thus be kept at a strategic disadvantage by the major players in this 'power game' and again denied a crucial means for economic development. The article argued that there needed to be careful thought about the direction of China's environmental protection and a set of market standards specifically suited to its environment needed to be worked out.<sup>275</sup>

Bush was quoted as saying: "Today, I am announcing a new national goal: to stop the growth of US greenhouse gas emissions by 2025," adding that power plant emissions should be slowed so they peak over the next 10 to 15 years and decline thereafter. Bush, it reported, did not give any specific mandatory cap on US emissions and fell far short compared to the Europeans.<sup>276</sup> On December 12, 2008 an article quoted the Chinese climate change minister, Xie Zhenhua, saying that only by sticking to the principles of the 1992 Convention and its KP, working toward their full, effective and sustained implementation could it be expected to reach a fair and effective agreed outcome in Copenhagen. Any attempt to deviate from, breach or re-define the Convention, or to deny the KP, or to merge the Convention process with the KP process, would be detrimental, and ultimately lead to a fruitless Copenhagen Conference.<sup>277</sup>

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<sup>275</sup> Liu Junhong, 'Carbon Rights a Power Game', *China Daily*, April 9, 2008, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2008-04/09/content\\_6602256.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2008-04/09/content_6602256.htm).

<sup>276</sup> 'Bush Proposes Halt of US CO2 Emissions Growth by 2025', *China Daily*, April 17, 2008, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2008-04/17/content\\_6622528.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2008-04/17/content_6622528.htm).

<sup>277</sup> 'Comply with Framework to Fight Climate Change Minister', *China Daily*, December 12, 2008, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2008-12/12/content\\_7298622.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2008-12/12/content_7298622.htm).

An opinion article on April 13, 2009 said that a tough climate change policy would benefit China over various sectors – national security, the promotion of sustainable economic development and as a full partner in one of the most important global efforts of our era. Little time should be wasted on debates over carbon that is ‘embedded’ in China's exports and the responsibility lay with developed countries for the majority of the historical global emissions. The aggressive pursuit of a truly low carbon economy could help establish an era of unparalleled innovation and economic prosperity. Action on climate change was also an important sign of membership in the international community.<sup>278</sup>

Two weeks later an opinion article claimed that the global community would continue to follow the principle of CBDR, under which all countries contributed to tackling climate change as per their capabilities. Chinese leaders had recently stressed that China, being a responsible member of the global community, would contribute its fair share in battling climate change so there was clearly ground for optimism. It argued that while there was tremendous potential to cut energy use and emissions by using technology that already existed in China, or could be transferred from developed countries, it was clear that concerted efforts were also needed on research, development and demonstration, low-carbon technologies, especially renewable energy sources, carbon capture and storage.<sup>279</sup>

On August 26, 2009, Chinese government was cited for its resolutions on climate change policy directions to speed up research, develop and promote key technologies for energy efficiency, and aim at renewable energy, clean energy and low-carbon energy. It also called for specific plans and policies to develop a green economy and a low-carbon economy, including increasing green investment, and advocating green consumption and green growth.<sup>280</sup> On September 4, 2009 an opinion article discussed how China and India could work together on global issues such as climate change. It reported that GHG emissions were increasing sharply in fast developing countries such as China and India but counted in per

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<sup>278</sup> Scott Moore and Julian Wong, ‘Tough Climate Change Policy Would Benefit China’, *China Daily*, April 13, 2009, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009-04/13/content\\_7670256.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2009-04/13/content_7670256.htm).

<sup>279</sup> Serge Abou, ‘Climate Change: EU, China Have Work to Do’, *China Daily*, April 28, 2009, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2009-04/28/content\\_7723170.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2009-04/28/content_7723170.htm).

<sup>280</sup> ‘Climate Change Law to Bring Teeth to Emissions Mandates’, *China Daily*, August 26, 2009, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-08/26/content\\_8818449.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009-08/26/content_8818449.htm).

capita terms, their emissions remained very low compared to that of the developed countries.

China and India with more than a billion people each, and high emission levels, which the developed world alleges was aggravating the climate crisis, did not take into account that the developed world itself had failed to meet the Kyoto targets.<sup>281</sup> The fear that the developed world would try to impose another one-sided agreement that suited its interests remained a strong driver to encourage China and India to work jointly. The globalization of a few powers' vested interests was nothing new for China and India and explained why they needed to strengthen their coordination, and draw other marginalized stakeholders to their table. The rise of China and India and the admission of their historic responsibility held great hope for a fruitful bilateral relationship that could influence the climate change course of the world.<sup>282</sup>

The developing world, victimized by GHG releases in the West, not only suffered from extreme vagaries of weather that brought havoc but was forced to yield ground on development making it an imperative to ease the transfer of technology between nations in order to save the world from the looming climate crisis that knows no borders given that holding off would be more costly. The political will of advanced nations in facilitating the South in technology transfers would benefit all mankind.<sup>283</sup>

An opinion article on November 17, 2009 said that China was waiting for the American commitment on climate change, noting that on November 5, House Democrats passed through committee the Kerry-Boxer climate change bill that would mandate cuts in GHG emissions by 20 per cent from 2005 levels over the next decade. The American Clean Energy and Security Act, approved by the House in June 2009, would reduce emissions 17 per cent by 2020. While both would cut emissions, it noted that the chances of Congress passing any legislation before Copenhagen were slight.<sup>284</sup> Further, the US wanted a new agreement

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<sup>281</sup> Srawan Singh, 'China India Can Change Political Climate', *China Daily*, September 4, 2009, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2009-09/04/content\\_8654749.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2009-09/04/content_8654749.htm).

<sup>282</sup> Ibid.

<sup>283</sup> Wen Jia, 'Changing to Meet Climate Change', *China Daily*, September 22, 2009, P 5.

<sup>284</sup> Nancy Fowler Larson, 'China Awaits US Climate Pledge', *China daily*, November 17, 2009, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/obamavisitchina/2009-11/17/content\\_8982097.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/obamavisitchina/2009-11/17/content_8982097.htm).

different from Kyoto whereas the developing countries wanted Kyoto II, making Copenhagen a complex negotiation to achieve a viable agreement.<sup>285</sup>

By December 5, 2009, it was reported that world governments were seeking to agree to a successor to the Kyoto Protocol. It cited Ban Ki-moon saying: "From all corners of the globe, we now see unprecedented momentum for governments to act quickly and decisively. I am optimistic Copenhagen can be a success".<sup>286</sup> Another article writing on the UNFCCC CBDR principle, argued that the industrialized countries with abundant financial resources and advanced technologies should shoulder their responsibilities and make tangible moves to deal with their high per capita CO<sub>2</sub> emissions noting that the US had been reluctant and some other developed countries had also shown dissatisfaction with the principle. It stated that developing countries should also make contributions but on a voluntary basis whereas the developed world should adopt binding targets.<sup>287</sup>

On December 12, 2009, developing countries were reported to have slammed the Copenhagen Accord claiming that the deal was hammered out by the US and four major emitters from the developing world, which revealed conflict between developed and developing countries and their differing perspectives.<sup>288</sup> One opinion article expressed appreciation for the Copenhagen Accord which recognized CBDR and respective capabilities upholding long term emissions reductions of less than 2°C, providing funding and technology support for developing countries, and increasing transparency on mitigation activities. It argued that the issue of CO<sub>2</sub> emission reduction was an issue of the development right of developing countries and, therefore, it could not be solved without changing the unbalanced global economy which was something missing at Copenhagen.<sup>289</sup>

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<sup>285</sup> Ibid.

<sup>286</sup> 'UN Sees Signs of Optimism for Copenhagen Summit', *China Daily*, December 5, 2009, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2009-12/05/content\\_9125450.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2009-12/05/content_9125450.htm).

<sup>287</sup> 'UNFCCC: Common but Differentiated Responsibilities', *China Daily*, December 5, 2009, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009copenhagenclimate/2009-12/05/content\\_9126005\\_2.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009copenhagenclimate/2009-12/05/content_9126005_2.htm).

<sup>288</sup> 'Developing Nations Slam US Led Climate Deal', *China Daily*, December 19, 2009, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009copenhagenclimate/2009-12/19/content\\_9203277.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009copenhagenclimate/2009-12/19/content_9203277.htm).

<sup>289</sup> Yang Hongliang, 'Copenhagen Accord and Beyond', *China Daily*, December 23, 2009, P 8.

On May 7, 2010 the paper wrote that China was trying to improve its image of public diplomacy for a single voice with developing countries not only to be heard at the negotiation table but also to show its sincerity over emissions reductions.<sup>290</sup> On October 11, 2010 an opinion article reported on the UN climate change meeting in Tianjin, which advanced cornerstones for the creation of a global climate fund at Cancun, Mexico in 2010. Securing climate financing and technology transfer was seen as 'a must' to assist the millions of vulnerable, poverty-stricken people in poor countries.

China's lead role in South-South cooperation was recognized, and urged by China, all developing countries were encouraged to hold onto the principles agreed by the 194 countries under the UNFCCC to stop rich countries from backtracking on their previous promises. China, it claimed, must also go all-out to commit itself to tough targets to reduce its emissions, and make the results transparent for the good of China as well as the world. Above all, developing countries should not allow the rich countries to limit the space and scope of the developing countries' future economic growth and shrink their historical and present responsibilities for reducing GHG emissions thus helping mitigate the impact of climate change.<sup>291</sup>

On December 5, 2010 the paper noted that the Kyoto II debate was heating up in Cancun, Mexico but Japan's announcement that it would not bind itself to the second commitment period with Kyoto II at any cost surprised the developing countries with criticism being directed at Japan. China and other negotiators said they would not work through any secret text for negotiations.<sup>292</sup> On December 11, 2010 it was reported that overruling Bolivia's objection against the adoption of the Cancun agreement text, the conference had finally adopted a deal that included detailed financing plans although no plans for binding emission cuts to fight global warming had been settled.<sup>293</sup>

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<sup>290</sup> Fu Jing, 'Climate Forum Paves Way to Cancun Meet', *China Daily*, May, 7, 2010, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2010-05/07/content\\_9819385.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2010-05/07/content_9819385.htm).

<sup>291</sup> Editorial, 'Climate Change Talks', *China Daily*, October 11, 2010, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-10/11/content\\_11392447.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2010-10/11/content_11392447.htm).

<sup>292</sup> 'Wrestling Over Kyoto Protocol Heats up at Cancun', *China Daily*, December 5, 2010, [http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2010-12/05/content\\_11834826.htm](http://europe.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2010-12/05/content_11834826.htm).

<sup>293</sup> 'Final Accord Reached at Cancun Despite Bolivia's Objection', *China Daily*, December 11, 2010,



The Mexican Foreign Minister Patricia Espinosa was quoted while responding to Bolivia's objection: "I take note of your [Bolivian] opinion, but if there are no other objections, this text is approved".<sup>294</sup> She further stated, "Consensus does not mean that one nation can choose to apply a veto on a process that other nations have been working on for years. I cannot ignore the opinion of another 193 states that are parties".<sup>295</sup> On December 13, 2010 an article reported that Cancun was a big step toward achieving the desired values and strengthening confidence in multilateralism given it laid a foundation for talks in Durban in 2011. Delegates said that the process was transparent and inclusive and agreed to set up a Green Climate Fund that would be steered by 24 board members chosen equally from developed and developing countries to assist poor, small, island and least developed countries.<sup>296</sup>

However, an editor on December 17, 2010 wrote although the fragile deal reached in Cancun, Mexico saved the UN negotiating process from collapsing, it could not take proper measures to keep the earth from boiling.<sup>297</sup> The year 2010 was one of the hottest years on record. Although many perceived the Cancun agreement as a Christmas gift for it maintained the 2°C target, included a package of \$100 billion and countries affirmed what they had agreed in Copenhagen with the exception of Bolivia, it did not solve everything, with the reduction commitments insufficient to keep the temperature increase below 2°C. There were other outstanding issues too, such as the legal form of the agreement and how to provide the long-term finance, but Cancun proved that the multilateral process could deliver results and without such an agreement the UN process would have been in imminent danger.<sup>298</sup>

On February 2, 2011 an editorial presented the Chinese domestic scenario of climate change policy writing that a paper mill company was taken to court for not following environmental regulations, to set an example, yet it said it was hard

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[http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/2010-12/11/content\\_11687830.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/2010-12/11/content_11687830.htm).

<sup>294</sup> Quoted in *ibid*.

<sup>295</sup> *Ibid*.

<sup>296</sup> Li Xing, Li Jing and Lan Lan, 'Cancun Lays Foundation', *China Daily*, December 13, 2010, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/china/2010-12/13/content\\_11692779.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/china/2010-12/13/content_11692779.htm).

<sup>297</sup> OP Rana, 'Capital Game in Climate Deal', *China Daily*, December 17, 2010, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/2010-12/17/content\\_11718290.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/2010-12/17/content_11718290.htm).

<sup>298</sup> Connie Hedegaard, 'Cancun Climate Deal Holds out Hope', *China Daily*, December 22, 2010, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/2010-12/22/content\\_11739670.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/2010-12/22/content_11739670.htm).

to sue every time because of the various actors involvement in such lawsuits. Nevertheless, the case was a step in the right direction.<sup>299</sup> An editorial on March 26, 2011 chronicled mounting public support in China in combating climate change with people switching their lights off for one hour in response to the WWF asking for support toward a low carbon economy.

China's leadership had joined the fight against climate change in its own way. In 2009, the State Council, China's Cabinet, pledged to reduce carbon emissions for every unit of GDP by 40-45 per cent by 2020 from the 2005 level. In the previous year, the National Development and Reform Commission, the country's top planning body, had said a pilot program to test the impact of an emission cap on growth would be started in one sector or city before expanding it to other sectors and cities. Addressing the National People's Congress on March 5, 2011 Premier Jiabao vowed to improve energy efficiency and curb pollution and carbon emissions.<sup>300</sup> On March 31, 2011 an editorial noted that China as the world's second largest economy was expected to become more efficient in its use of energy. "To this end, Chinese enterprises should redouble their efforts to go green. They need to reap more energy efficiency gains through innovation rather than closing outdated facilities".<sup>301</sup>

On June 23, 2011, the *Daily* wrote that global climate change negotiations revealed a discrepancy growing between rich and poor countries because developing countries had put a high priority on the continuation of the Protocol, while some industrialized countries, such as Japan, Russia and Canada, voiced a clear intention to walk away and build a new framework for agreement.<sup>302</sup> Later in the year an editorial reported that the world's population was expected to reach seven billion the following month. Sustainable development, it argued, had become an ever more urgent issue, and one that was intertwined with the challenges of water scarcity, energy shortages, global health issues, food security, and environmental degradation.

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<sup>299</sup> Editorials, 'Environmental Battle', *China Daily*, February 1, 2011, P. 8.

<sup>300</sup> Editorials, 'An Hour for Our Earth', *China Daily*, March 26, 2011, [http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-03/26/content\\_12230967.htm](http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2011-03/26/content_12230967.htm).

<sup>301</sup> Editorials, 'Realistic Green Targets', *China Daily*, March 31, 2011, P. 8.

<sup>302</sup> Lan Lan and Li Jing, 'Problems for Phase Two of Kyoto Protocol', *China Daily*, June 23, 2011, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/business/2011-06/23/content\\_12762034.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/business/2011-06/23/content_12762034.htm).

It was deemed essential for governments at all levels to calculate the real cost of environmental damage paid for by robust growth with such costs seemingly bearable at the beginning, but overtaken by the accumulation of environmental debts which could not be sustained indefinitely.<sup>303</sup> On September 29, 2011 an editorial said that international efforts to avoid double digit recession needed a contribution from China as the second largest economy, and that China needed to rapidly transform its model to pursue greener and more sustainable growth to enhance energy security in an attempt to help the world deal with climate change.<sup>304</sup>

The BASIC countries' environment ministers met in Beijing to make their common stand on climate change negotiations. In their view all industrialized countries should support a second round of the KP, agreeing that the conference should decide to initiate the operation of the Green Climate Fund, thereby ensuring adequate financial support for developing countries, while urging the developed countries to capitalize the fund from their public resources.<sup>305</sup> An editorial on November 23, 2011 considered the Chinese government's national climate change policy to be effective, saying that the Chinese government never assumed that mitigating climate change was beyond their ability noting also that whatever the outcome of the UNFCCC in Durban, South Africa, China would spare no effort in fulfilling its plan to reduce GHG emissions.<sup>306</sup>

On the same day, an article cited the US chief climate change envoy, Todd Stern, for UNFCCC as saying:

Kyoto is not on the table for the US but the US won't see the Kyoto being a logjam. The US isn't one of the two tracks; it's up to Kyoto parties to say what they want to do about Kyoto. The other track is the track that involves all parties. That's the one we are in, that's the one we are the most focused on. I think whether in the future ... whether we will have two tracks is an open question. We will wait and see.<sup>307</sup>

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<sup>303</sup> Editorials, 'Environmental Debts', *China Daily*, September 15, 2011, P. 9.

<sup>304</sup> Editorials, 'Green Growth is the Key', *China Daily*, September 29, 2011, P.8.

<sup>305</sup> Lan Lan, 'BASIC Countries Reach Kyoto Consensus', *China Daily*, November 2, 2011, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/business/2011-11/02/content\\_14020586.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/business/2011-11/02/content_14020586.htm).

<sup>306</sup> Editorials, 'Addressing Climate Change', *China Daily*, November 23, 2011, P. 8.

<sup>307</sup> 'US says Kyoto Protocol Not on Its Durban Agenda', *China Daily*, November 23, 2011, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/world/2011-11/23/content\\_14148802.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/world/2011-11/23/content_14148802.htm).

On November 25, 2011 an opinion article argued although China was still a developing country in terms of global standards of classification such as the human development index (HDI), per capita GDP, gross national income (GNI), and purchasing power parity (PPP). Obama's contention that China had 'grown up' and therefore should commit to climate change without hesitation as industrialized countries, was growing respect for, rather than fear of, China because it was growing so fast and had become so big and powerful that it had the potential to 'swallow' the Western world in a decade or two. However, in terms of classification the data showed that China was still a developing country with the article asking why China should commit to being seen as an industrialized country.<sup>308</sup>

An editorial opinion piece on December 14, 2011 noted how in Durban the parties agreed to disagree. After the failure of the Copenhagen and Cancun climate conferences, it was probably an optimistic few who expected Durban to achieve a real climate deal, making the outcome not unexpected. What was surprising was that many countries walked out of the conference cheering that Durban was a successful conference although it did nothing to mitigate global warming.<sup>309</sup> Developed nations including the US and the EU were happy that the new agreement would bind developing countries as well but it did not absolve the developed world from its historic responsibility. More urgent action was needed, the *Daily* claimed, to save the planet, however, the negotiators in Durban did not agree to any new pledges and, in spite of all their backslapping and self-congratulations, they failed to produce anything that would prevent world temperatures from rising by more than 2°C, which scientists reiterated would be catastrophic for the planet.<sup>310</sup>

An opinion article on January 11, 2012 reviewed Durban as dressing up failure as victory which had been integral to climate-change negotiations since they started 20 years ago. The latest round of talks in South Africa had been no exception. It wrote that if the countries wanted to act to mitigate emissions, they should end the

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<sup>308</sup> Martin Khor, 'China Still a Developing Country', *China Daily*, November 25, 2011, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2011-11/25/content\\_14162563.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/bizchina/2011-11/25/content_14162563.htm).

<sup>309</sup> Op Rana, 'Durban Ends with a Whimper as Expected', *China Daily*, December 14, 2011, [http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2011-12/14/content\\_14265691.htm](http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/business/2011-12/14/content_14265691.htm).

<sup>310</sup> Ibid.

collective suspension of disbelief when it came to climate change negotiations and see through the hype and self-serving political spin.<sup>311</sup> An opinion article on March 12, 2012 stated that the environmental treaties of the last 20 years had not been able to develop a global consensus on patterns of natural resource use. New values and norms were required to ensure the transformation from a consumerist society based on freedom of choice to a more constrained societal model that provided rewards to encourage conservation and discourage waste.<sup>312</sup>

## 6.7 Conclusion

This chapter has shown how the five leading newspapers portrayed and reported climate change debates, talks, conferences and agreements from 1997 to the beginning of 2012. In using news from a range of sources including individuals such as influential diplomats and political leaders, editorials, reports and the statements of interviews, each of these newspapers presented many similar and many different stories on global climate change negotiations and policy making. Except the *WSJ*, the media applauded the KP and its principles. They encouraged countries to join the Kyoto and start reducing their emissions foot-prints. Bali 2007 was also applauded by the media for its ability to forge consensus to move ahead and get an agreement by 2009. The media agreed that Copenhagen 2009 failed to achieve the climate momentum. It was criticized for poor outcomes, non-transparency and failures to ensure democratic participation. The media cautiously applauded the Cancun 2010 for legalizing and operationalizing many of agreed issues of the Copenhagen Accord. They seemed to have put a lot of faith in Durban, therefore, they criticized that Durban deal 2011 was unable to stabilize GHGs.

The newspapers, for different arguments, touched on ideas over leadership, over the carbon market, over technology, over the shifts in negotiating power, over existing agreements, over national interest and development, and over proposals for success and it is interesting to see how they gradually emerge over time. The *NYT* and *GUK* wrestled with the concerns of contrary voices about climate

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<sup>311</sup> Bjorn Lomborg, 'The Emperor's New Climate-Change Agreement', *China Daily*, January 11, 2012, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/project/2012-01/11/content\\_14424458.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/project/2012-01/11/content_14424458.htm).

<sup>312</sup> Mukul Sanwal, 'New Rules for Global Governance Needed', *China Daily*, March 12, 2012, [http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2012-03/12/content\\_14809707.htm](http://usa.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2012-03/12/content_14809707.htm).

science and events like Climategate. From the outset to 2005, the papers were putting perspectives into the development and ratification of the KP. They were debating whether their respective governments ratify or abandon the Protocol. All newspapers, with an exception of *WSJ*, commented that the US should ratify Kyoto and develop domestic climate policies to contribute to reducing emissions. The papers also contextualized Japanese ratification of Kyoto with embedded symbolism and economic interest as articulated in chapters 4 and 5. When the US abandoned the Protocol, it gave a veto power opportunity to Russia for favourable bargaining as a reward of ratification. The papers commented that the Europeans weakened the Protocol for Russian ratification in the face of rejection from the US and Australia.

After Kyoto, the four out of five newspapers sought to set out a clearer path for future negotiations. An important admission came from the Indian and Chinese newspapers which recognized that climate change was a global problem and needed a global response. A few of their articles viewed that although the principle of CBDR and historical responsibility were always important, China and India needed to step up toward finding innovative ways of fighting climate change instead of sticking to the argument that it is a Western problem. In the beginning, the *GUK* newspaper unconditionally supported the views of developing countries urging the developed world to take leadership to combat climate change. Over time, it moved beyond its previous position proposing that climate change was a global problem needing a global response. However, its global response was still mainly dependent on the Kyoto style agreement.

The *NYT* consistently urged the US government to take global leadership in climate change negotiations and policy making. It warned if the US did not embrace low carbon economy, it would have to bear a huge economic loss in the future. Although the *WSJ* dismissed the salience of climate change agreements declaring that they were the channels of transferring funds to many corrupted third world countries, it urged the US to take up leadership in the development of technology saying that the availability of sophisticated technology would be part of economic growth. These emerging positions of papers reflected the growing global response to climate change, one of the biggest challenges facing the world, which clearly needed a globally sustained and cooperative approach to move to

achieving effective governance of climate change. The papers also identified that the West was having a difficult time because of the economic recessions; however, the *NYT*, *GUK*, *China Daily* and *the Hindu* argued that an economic recession could be overcome in a few years whereas climate change caused by greenhouse gases trapped in the atmosphere would need 100 of years to dissipate and a long period of time through concerted and globally cooperated action.

However, in arguing for a global response along a further Kyoto-style agreement, the papers continued with the distinctions between ‘Annex I and Non-Annex I’ and ‘development and environmentalism’ and these distinctions arguably have been obstacles to climate change governance. However, they did not suggest new categories or potential framework to incorporate the emerging economies so that they could take greater responsibility for addressing climate change. By Copenhagen in 2009, the focus of climate change negotiations and agreements, which had been based on developing a Kyoto style treaty, that focuses on the responsibility of the developed countries was little relevant as GHG emissions were rapidly rising in the major emerging economies in the South. Negotiations for international climate change policy needed a different approach than the Kyoto style one that the newspapers had been advocating for long. The following chapter will bring more insights and present detailed analyses of what all these newspapers reporting and impartation of the news meant to global climate change negotiations and policy making and their contribution to slow progress of the climate change in the contexts of previous chapters.

## **Chapter 7**

### **Analysis of the Media**

#### **7.1 Introduction**

The fundamentals of international climate change governance and decision making through the case studies of the Kyoto Protocol (KP) in chapter 4 and the Copenhagen Accord in chapter 5 have been established. Chapter 4 demonstrated that the eight years of wrangling was very time consuming with many nation-states unwilling to commit to the Protocol. As established, Australia finally ratified in 2007 while the United States (US) has never ratified, raising economic and policy concerns about a Protocol that exempted major developing countries including China and India. Since then many of the countries that ratified the Protocol have failed to meet their commitments with Canada renouncing the KP in 2011, pointing out that there had been little success in making it legally binding.

According to Article 3.9 of the KP, parties started to negotiate for an agreement that would be effective on its expiry in 2012. The Bali Action Plan set out the path for an agreement that was expected to be sealed in Copenhagen 2009, but the Copenhagen Accord which resulted was not promising. The mission of reducing GHGs had been elusive because of the problem of the climate change framework and the common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) principle. The state-centric framework and the diverse national interests of the parties resulted in various interpretations of the CBDR principle which made climate change governance making even more complicated.

The climate change conferences in Cancun in 2010, Durban in 2011 and Doha in 2012 made modest promises for a new agreement but these have not been achieved to date. Parties have agreed to hold negotiations on a global agreement which does not mean that parties have agreed to ratify, commit and implement governance procedure to meet the targets required by climate science to limit temperature to 2°C. The shape and essence of any future agreement is still unclear and unknown. Any legally binding agreement will not come into existence until major emitters from developing economies are included. Whether China, India and the US will support a future agreement remains unanswered. Kyoto has expired and COP-18 at Doha did not achieve an agreement other than 15 per cent



of the global emitters making commitments for a second round of the KP beginning on January 1, 2013 and ending on December 30, 2020.<sup>1</sup>

The newspapers' overall arguments over the issues of climate change and international climate change negotiations have been presented in chapter 6. The chapter also outlined the media's coverage in terms of the contribution made to advancing a wider understanding of climate change and the measures necessary to address concerns. This chapter assesses how the media contributed to the debate on global climate change governance, international climate negotiations and decision making. The first section discusses the newspapers' framing of climate change science and assesses their contribution to educating the public on climate change issues. The second section examines the framing of setting the issues and agenda for climate change negotiations, and the third section assesses the newspapers' framing of the democracy debate in terms of the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) negotiations, climate governance and decision making procedures. These three themes were derived from the literature discussed in chapter 2 in seeking to explain why there has been a lack of progress in addressing or preventing climate change issues.

In the first section, this chapter examines the proposition that the disconnection between the concerns of climate change and the role of media stymied the progress of international climate change governance and so the public and policymaking in a democratic society cannot address the serious threats facing states today. The media's role in building public trust of climate change for sound policy making is examined. Diamond argues that only when public pressure results in the passing of laws demanding different and stringent actions to address climate change, will there be the necessary change.<sup>2</sup>

In the second section on setting the issues and agenda for climate change negotiations, the media's contribution focused on national interests and state-centric power politics as identified in chapters 4 and 5, reflecting the prevailing UNFCCC structure in which the state is the unit of analysis and the central

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<sup>1</sup> See Page 2 of UNFCCC, *Outcome of the work of the Ad Hoc Working Group on Further Commitments for Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol* (Bonn: Climate Change Secretariat, 2012b).

<sup>2</sup> Jared Diamond, *Collapse: How Societies Choose To Fail or Succeed* (New York: Viking, Penguin, 2005), 38.

principle for dealing with climate change is common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR). Here, the media were aware of changing power structures, shifting alliances and the differing positions of states which from time to time, questioned the validity of the principle of CBDR given the increase in global emissions from emerging economies. Four out of five newspapers played an important role in setting the agenda for a successful transformation from a fossil-fuelled world to a low-carbon world through technology, with each offering proposals for a solution. The *New York Times* (NYT), *Guardian*, UK (GUK), *The Hindu* and *China Daily* highlighted the continued adequacy of a Kyoto style agreement based on the state-centric approach for the future which will be contextualized in section 7.3 below.

In the third section, a response is made to the concerns of democratic deficit. With the international politics of climate change shaped by the inter-state system, the question arises as to whether this system was a major obstacle in achieving the appropriate responses to climate change or facilitated change. The newspapers focused on inter-state procedural democratic participation and reported that 100 leaders were not able to participate in the negotiations which produced the Copenhagen Accord. The media did not shed light on the limited participation of non-state actors. These issues will be further discussed below.

## **7.2 Shaping Perceptions of Climate Change Science**

The debate on climate change negotiations was intense in each of the newspapers with each raising a range of issues within the debate over climate change. The newspapers framed climate change news as either being supportive of mainstream science or being sceptical of it. The *Wall Street Journal* (WSJ) consistently challenged the International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) arguments on the nature of climate change and its anthropogenic causes.<sup>3</sup> It argued that the level of warming caused by human activity was very small and that the Kyoto Protocol (KP) was an unnecessary policy to raise tax from taxpayers.<sup>4</sup> It highlighted the climate denials and Climategate email leaks and argued that the knowledge of mainstream science was exaggerated. Most of its writings revolved around the

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<sup>3</sup> All articles of the Wall Street Journal consistently challenged this view from 1997.

<sup>4</sup> Editorial, 'Classic Political Effect', WSJ, November 17, 1998, A 1.

uncertainty of science and thus cautioned against negotiations for the prevention of climate change, funding flows and climate justice. In 2009, contextualizing Climategate it argued climate science was not settled science but that its empirical foundation, with many billion-dollar edifices built on it, was cracking and, sooner or later, was bound to crumble.<sup>5</sup>

The *WSJ* challenged the claims of climate scientists and their arguments that human activity was causing climate change. The *WSJ*'s scepticism related to the production of new knowledge which could be important in reducing climate uncertainty. The questioning of the validity of climate science by the *WSJ* could open the door for new knowledge to be pursued. But it reported in 2012 that "Research shows that more than 97 per cent of scientists actively publishing in the field agree that climate change is real and human caused".<sup>6</sup> Rajendra Pachauri, the chief of the IPCC, at the Cancun climate conference 2010 noted that there were 3750 experts involved in the production of knowledge<sup>7</sup> who worked on a voluntary basis.

Each of the IPCC's four reports claimed that the evidence was consolidating the conclusion that human activities were the main cause of temperature rise in the 19<sup>th</sup>, 20<sup>th</sup> and 21<sup>st</sup> centuries. Richard Muller, a climate sceptic, also conducted independent research funded by the Heartland Institute, a climate denial funding institution, and his findings were consistent with mainstream science that climate change was happening.<sup>8</sup> The *WSJ*'s denial of climate change and its support for very small group of scientific sceptics did not make any contribution to sound knowledge but contributed to confusion and policy delays. The *WSJ* highlighted on 'unsettled climate science', 'climategate events' 'climate change as natural'

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<sup>5</sup> See for more: Editorial, 'Global Warming With the Lid Off', *WSJ*, November 24, 2009, A 22; Editorial, 'Rigging a Climate Consensus', *WSJ*, November 28, 2009, A 14; Bret Stephens, 'Climategate: Follow the Money', *WSJ*, December 1, 2009, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052748703939404574566124250205490.html#printMod>; and Editorial, 'We Deserve Ethical Behavior by Climate Scientists', *WSJ*, December 2, 2009, A 24; Editorial, 'The Copenhagen Concoction', *WSJ*, December 8, 2009, A 20.

<sup>6</sup> 'Check With Climate Scientists for Views on Climate', *WSJ*, February 2, 2012, <http://online.wsj.com/article/SB10001424052970204740904577193270727472662.html#printMod>.

<sup>7</sup> Rajendra Pachauri speaking at 'Cancun Climate Conference 2010, COP 16/CMP6', November 29, 2010, Mexico, [http://unfccc.int/resource/webcast/player/app/play.php?id\\_episode=3023](http://unfccc.int/resource/webcast/player/app/play.php?id_episode=3023).

<sup>8</sup> Leo Hickman, 'Climate Change Study Forces Sceptical Scientists to Change Minds', *GUK*, July 29, 2012, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/science/2012/jul/29/climate-change-sceptics-change-mind>.

‘anthropogenic climate change as hoax’, ‘climate scepticism’, to frame its news articles and convey information on climate change science.

The *NYT* framed and disseminated the information from mainstream science on climate change insisting that there was a real need to combat global warming. A *NYT* editorial on anthropogenic global warming, published in 2000, stated that the IPCC, “considered the most authoritative voice on global warming, has now concluded that mankind's contribution to the problem is greater than originally believed”.<sup>9</sup> In noting the views of the minority opposition, an editorial, published in 2007 observed that most scientists concurred that the long-term costs of doing nothing against climate change would be more flooding, famine, and drought.<sup>10</sup> An article in 2012 suggested that the leaks of climate change emails provided a preview of the campaign against climate change and the attempts to cast doubt on the scientific finding that fossil fuel emissions endanger the long-term welfare of the planet.<sup>11</sup> Explanations about the causes of climate change provided the substance of the *NYT*'s articles focusing on human aspects of global warming. ‘Anthropogenic climate change’, ‘Western responsibility’ and ‘scepticism as rhetorics’ were the main frames used by the *NYT* to inform the public on climate change science.

The *GUK* framed climate change as antropogenic and stated that humans have contrived many more ways of destroying nature's delicate checks and balances. The anthropocentric ill-considered economic development resulted into deforestation, soil erosion, uncontrollable flooding and other forms of environmental degradations. The *GUK* argued that most climate scientists including IPCC by producing several scientific reports agreed that human activity is the main cause of global warming and climate change; therefore, inaction cannot be an excuse.<sup>12</sup> The *GUK* referred to Climategate and to sceptics, and argued that the evidence showed that the fight against climate change had been reinforced as the investigating committees found nothing wrong with the scientific

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<sup>9</sup> Editorial, ‘A Sharper Warning on Warming’, *NYT*, October 28, 2000, pg. A. 14.

<sup>10</sup> Editorial, ‘Global Warming and Your Wallet’, *NYT*, July 6, 2007, pg. A.14.

<sup>11</sup> Justin Gillis and Leslie Kaufman, ‘Leak Offers Glimpse of Campaign Against Climate Science’, *NYT*, February 16, 2012, A 23.

<sup>12</sup> Leader, ‘High Noon at Hague’, *GUK*, November 17, 2000, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2000/nov/17/guardianleaders.globalwarming?INTCMP=S RCH>.

evidence.<sup>13</sup> ‘Anthropogenic climate change’ ‘Western created problem’ ‘climategate as sceptics conspiracy’ were the major frames articulated by the *GUK* in producing its news to convey climate change messages to the public.

*The Hindu* framed its news of climate change based on IPCC’s reports. The *Hindu* wrote that the denial industry was working to destroy the canon of climate science because it was not interested in establishing the truth as it was going to harm their interests.<sup>14</sup> The articles from the *Hindu* maintained that the IPCC was the mainstream science of climate change and it was clear from IPCC’s scientific reports that anthropogenic climate change was happening. The *Hindu* argued that climate change as a problem caused by the West. It explained that climate change was an immediate threat to all living beings including humans and the natural environment so significant responses must be taken to prevent it from developing further. The main frames it used were ‘anthropogenic climate change’, ‘Western created problem’, ‘no space for scepticism’.

On the issue of framing climate change science, the *China Daily* followed the reports of the IPCC, which it regarded as the mainstream body of climate change science. Climate change, it said, was not a projection and it would gradually bring human misery and economic adversity.<sup>15</sup> It argued that there was not any doubt about anthropogenic climate change. It explained that the industrial development of the West was the central cause of rising temperature and emerging climate challenges. It noted that the planet was also facing growing challenges posed by environmental degradations and rising temperatures making it essential for governments at all levels to calculate the real cost of the damage. States paid for robust growth but costs which seem bearable today are accumulating as environmental debts which cannot be sustained indefinitely.<sup>16</sup> ‘Anthropogenic climate change’, ‘Western created problem’, and ‘climate scepticism unnecessary’ were the main frames developed and used by the *China Daily*.

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<sup>13</sup> David Adam, ‘Climate Wars Damage the Scientists but We All Stand to Lose in the Battle’, *GUK*, February 23, 2010, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/cif-green/2010/feb/23/climate-scepticism-hacked-emails?INTCMP=SRCH>.

<sup>14</sup> George Monbiot, ‘The Climate Denial Industry Seeks to Dupe the Public. It’s Working’, *The Hindu*, December 9, 2009, <http://www.thehindu.com/2009/12/09/stories/2009120954960900.htm>.

<sup>15</sup> ‘Climate Change Cost \$60 Billion in 2003’, *China Daily*, December 12, 2003, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-12/12/content\\_289545.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/en/doc/2003-12/12/content_289545.htm).

<sup>16</sup> Editorials, ‘Environmental Debts’, *China Daily*, September 15, 2011, P. 9.

The *NYT*, *GUK*, *Hindu* and *China Daily* did not question the validity and reliability of the IPCC's Assessment Reports (ARs). Although sceptics had raised some valid concerns such as the use made of the World Wildlife Fund's (WWF) data on retreating glaciers in the IPCC AR4 report and the IPCC's use of a Greenpeace campaigner in one of its key reports which critics said presented misleading claims about renewable energy, these newspapers viewed events like these including Climategate as conspiracies of sceptics.<sup>17</sup> The framing of argument in these four newspapers was clear that anthropogenic climate change was happening although it may seem a bit more one sided on the issue of climate science as they did not provide sufficient discussion to inform and educate the public. However, as argued in chapter 2, being balanced on climate change science is being selective and biased.<sup>18</sup>

Yet, the *GUK* was more investigative in seeking to reveal the secret stories of the contrary voices than other newspapers. Only the *WSJ* embraced the anti-climate science stance, while the others embraced the IPCC's stand. But the *WSJ* was locked in the debate of believers versus sceptics, leading the public to live in confusion as Helm reasoned, we are "condemned to live with uncertainty"<sup>19</sup> because we do not know the impacts of climate change. Johnson and Covello went further to argue that we were also doomed to live with confusion because the newspapers in the name of balanced reporting did not impart unbiased information.<sup>20</sup> A more detailed and investigative but also critical reporting of contrary voices dissecting their lies or weaknesses, if any, by the *NYT* could have given primarily the US public a better understanding of the issues of climate change.

The global population understands little about the science, and the causes and consequences of global warming and climate change. Bord's research has shown that much of the American population misunderstands climate change and global

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<sup>17</sup> 'Greenpeace Influence Seen in Climate Report', *NZherald.co.nz*, June 17, 2011, [http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c\\_id=2&objectid=10732704](http://www.nzherald.co.nz/world/news/article.cfm?c_id=2&objectid=10732704).

<sup>18</sup> See 2.3 of chapter 2.

<sup>19</sup> Dieter Helm, 'Climate Changed Policy: Why Has So Little Been Achieved', in *The Economics and Politics of Climate Change*, eds., Dieter Helm and Cameron Hepburn (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

<sup>20</sup> B.B. Johnson and V. T. Covello, 'Agenda- Setting, Group Conflict, and the Social Construction of Risk', in *The Social and Cultural Construction of Risk*, eds., B.B. Johnson and V. T. Covello, 179-81 (Dordrecht: D. Reidel Publishing, 1987).

warming.<sup>21</sup> Boykoff and Boykoff argued that media conglomerates and reporters distort reality by making scientific errors, by rigid adherence to balanced coverage and by presenting human-interest stories rather than scientific content.<sup>22</sup> They argue that the fundamental problem with media outlets is the way they misframe the climate change debate with images such as falling ice in Antarctica or storm pictures. Entman<sup>23</sup> wrote, “Balance aims for neutrality” in the media. According to Dunwoody and Peters the balance coverage of science in the media is “surrogate to validity checks” because “the typical journalist, even one trained as science writer, has neither the time nor the expertise to check the validity of the claims herself (sic).”<sup>24</sup> But many scholars argue that balance coverage does not always mean accurate coverage. “In fact when it comes to the coverage of global warming, balanced report can actually be informational bias.”<sup>25</sup>

The media presents dangerous and scary images of environmental degradation and demands action for preventing such degradation. Framing news with images is great in drawing the attention of the people to the short term, but complex problems like climate change need long term solutions. It is hard for public to grasp the actual scope of climate change problem. Ordinary people are busy with their day to day challenges of making a living, sending their children to schools and securing healthcare. The media needs to focus on helping the public understand the invisible GHGs produced in addition to simply showing the images. As people understand the impacts of these invisible GHGs, they will be more motivated to change their life style to contribute to reductions in GHGs. Indeed, understanding the daily weather is different from understanding climate change since weather is a daily feature whereas climate is about long term changes in weather and temperature patterns.

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<sup>21</sup> Richard J. Bord et al., ‘Public Perceptions of Global Warming: United States and International Perspectives’, *Climate Research* 11 (1998): 75-84.

<sup>22</sup> Maxwell T. Boykoff and Jules M. Boykoff, ‘Balance as Bias: Global Warming and the US Prestige Press’, *Global Environmental Change* 14 (2004): 125-36.

<sup>23</sup> R. Entman, *Democracy Without Citizens: Media and the Decay of American Politics* (New York and Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1989), 30.

<sup>24</sup> S. Dunwoody, H. P. Peters, Mass Media Coverage of Technological and Environmental Risks. *Public Understanding of Science* 1, no. 2 (1992): 199-230.

<sup>25</sup> Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004, 126.

Schoenfeld et al argued that the media plays a critical role in the construction of environmental issues and problems.<sup>26</sup> Media coverage of climate change science is much more than a collection of news articles made ready for passing balanced information, it is also about presenting accurate information for the public and establishing the link between the public, messages conveyed and problems to be solved. However, the newspapers, particularly the *WSJ*, in this research framed the climate change issue around the contrast between believers and sceptics for their balanced coverage.

The *WSJ* did not acknowledge the US fuel industry lobby against climate change as against ozone protection regulation because, as DuPont argued, “the science was too speculative and uncertain to justify”.<sup>27</sup> This has not resulted in a positive contribution in solving the complex problem of climate change. Similarly, former US Vice President, Al Gore and the chair of the IPCC, Rajendra Pachauri, have shown their preferred images and claimed that there was no room for doubt on the science of climate change. Leading sceptics like Lord Monckton and Christopher Brooker framed it in the opposite way. The debate on climate change has further obfuscated an already complex issue: it has been more about politics than about science. Critics have rightly noted: “The unfortunate result of the rough meeting of science and politics is an exaggerated and misleading appearance of scientific controversy and conflict played out in policy debates and in the press”.<sup>28</sup>

In *Designs on Nature* (2005), Jasanoff examines how 'scientific authority' is constructed in different political settings. By comparing the US, UK and Germany, she argues that those who have the authority (power) to speak for science in those contexts differ and it is important when considering who is referenced (particularly in the media) and who is considered authoritative in public science debates that concern policy making. In addition, “Science and technology have been regarded for centuries as instruments of social progress and personal

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<sup>26</sup> A. Clay Schoenfeld, Robert F. Meier and Robert J. Griffin, ‘Constructing a Social Problem: the Press and the Environment’, *Social Problems* 27, no. 1 (1979): 38–61.

<sup>27</sup> Edward A. Parson, ‘Protecting the Ozone Layer’, in *Institutions for the Earth: Sources of Effective International Environmental Protection*, eds., Peter M. Hass, Robert O. Keohane and Marc A. Levy (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 1993), 34.

<sup>28</sup> Andrew E. Dessler and Edward A. Parson, *The Science and Politics of Global Climate Change: A Guide to the Debate* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), 41.



liberation”<sup>29</sup> but when scientific knowledge is associated with gaining economic and political might “we can reasonably wonder whether science will lose its ability to serve either state or society as a source of impartial critical authority”.<sup>30</sup> In fact, the Gore-Monckton debate on climate change is more political and less scientific presenting personal interest and the self-righteousness either for political or economic gains with the media appropriating it to its interest of balanced reporting or biased reporting. As Breslow wrote: “Australia’s bruising fight over cap-and-trade stands as a reminder that despite broad scientific consensus on global warming, an unsettled political debate over the issue is not unique to the US”.<sup>31</sup>

Instead of focusing on the questions of ‘do you believe in climate change or are you a skeptic?’ the *WSJ* needs to reframe the debate to focus on the serious question of ‘is climate change a problem worth worrying about?’ The media is obligated to pass correct information about the scientific details onto the public rather than relying on images of melting polar caps and similar events. The use of dramatic pictures of the weather is a compelling way to frame the debate, but it can also distort public perceptions with uncertainty of weather patterns used to counter the points. From their study of national opinion polls between 1990 and 2010, Donner and McDaniels found that people tend to ‘blow hot and cold’ according to the short term evidence around them.<sup>32</sup> They showed that a cold snap may lead to skepticism over climate change whereas a particularly hot spell may increase climate concerns.<sup>33</sup> The media has to enable the public to distinguish daily or weekly weather changes from long term alternations in temperature, and how this might affect all the related policy issues.

The crude presentation of climate change in terms of ‘for or against’ reduced the debate to a political campaign, with the adoption of a party line and attacks on the other’s campaign, whereas the disagreement at negotiations arose for different

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<sup>29</sup> Sheila Jasanoff, *Designs on Nature: Science and Democracy in Europe and the United States* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2005), 5.

<sup>30</sup> *Ibid.*, 6.

<sup>31</sup> Jason M. Breslow, ‘Beyond U.S., Climate Politics Stir Parallel Battles’, *Frontline*, October 23, 2012, <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/environment/climate-of-doubt/beyond-u-s-climate-politics-stir-parallel-battles>.

<sup>32</sup> Simon Donner and Jeremy McDaniels, ‘Blowing Hot and Cold: US Belief in Climate Change Shifts with Weather (New York and Heidelberg: Climate Change, Springer, 2013), 1-14.

<sup>33</sup> *Ibid.*

reasons. Such issues were finally picked by the media and disseminated more widely. In playing the game of accusing and developing stories of ‘for’ and ‘against’, the media, as particularly conveyed by *WSJ* in this research, sent confusing messages to the general public, rather than providing a considered assessment of the issues and failing to educate the public intelligently.

The *NYT*, *GUK*, *the Hindua* and *China Daily* should have been more investigative and shown people what was going on behind the scenes, highlighting the sources of information of both the mainstream scientists and the sceptics, as George Monbiot<sup>34</sup> has done. Instead, the *WSJ* was saying that nothing was happening and that climate change was a hoax, while other newspapers were highlighting the gloomy days ahead if climate change was not addressed in time. The ramifications of this division did not robustly boost climate change policy making because public concerns were smeared in confusion.<sup>35</sup>

The research points to considerable evidence that the “media engages in selective and biased reporting” that emphasizes drama and conflict.<sup>36</sup> It was clear from this research that the media, as pointed out earlier, particularly *WSJ*, did not do well in meeting the climate change challenge by providing more investigative analysis, preferring to highlight the shallow contrasting arguments of believers and sceptics rather than highlighting the issue of the invisible carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>) as a heat trap that causes long-term temperature rises. The role of media in building public trust<sup>37</sup> on climate change is important as Cooper argued that without public trust of climate change science, policymaking in a democratic society cannot address the serious threats that we face today.<sup>38</sup> However, chapter 6 and assessment above in this section illustrated that there is disconnection between climate change science and its dissemination by the media.

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<sup>34</sup> See Chapter 2 of George Monbiot, *Heat: How Can We Stop the Planet Burning* (London: Penguin, 2007).

<sup>35</sup> Chandra L. Pandey, ‘International Climate Change Negotiations and the Media’, in *The Refereed Proceedings of the 2012 Australian Political Studies Association Conference*, eds., Richard Eccleston, Nicholas Sageman and Felicity Gray, 273-300 (Hobart, Australia: University of Tasmania, 2012b), 293.

<sup>36</sup> Johnson and Covello 1987, 179.

<sup>37</sup> The division among media to pass two completely contradictory pictures of same issue created confusion among people. The real problem is although *GUK* tried best to convince people, *WSJ* crumbled *GUK*’s attempt.

<sup>38</sup> Caren B. Cooper, ‘Media Literacy as a Key Strategy toward Improving Public Acceptance of Climate Change Science’, *Bioscience* 61 (2011): 231-37.

### 7.3 Setting Issues and Agendas for Negotiation

In their attempt to develop an ambitious and successful climate change agreement, the newspapers, although to different levels and contexts, made contributions by framing their news on the value of technology, finance and possible new proposals, as discussed in chapter 6. The *WSJ* framed its news putting the US economic growth and the American life-style at the top of its agenda setting, postulating that CO<sub>2</sub> concentrations and warmer temperatures could be a boon to humanity. It did not want the US to ratify the KP. The *WSJ* explicitly made the point that any US commitments for GHG emissions would have a significant impact on the US consumerist society and economy.

The *WSJ* argued that if developing countries would not adopt binding targets, the US products would be expensive and unaffordable. Although the *WJS* kept denying the anthropogenic climate change and its negative impacts, it argued for individual state and alternative approaches to make serious responses given that the UNFCCC framework and CBDR principle had failed to produce a realistic prospect of securing broad international agreement to restrict CO<sub>2</sub> by all major emitters.<sup>39</sup> Arguing against channelling fund from developed countries to developing countries it wrote the developing world needed better governance, not funding assistance.<sup>40</sup> It also noted that the balance of climate change negotiations power was shifting and that China and the developing countries should take commitments if the US is also to take them – a Kyoto style agreement would make no difference even if fossil fuels were the cause of climate change.<sup>41</sup> The frames used for agenda setting were mainly focused on ‘US economy’, ‘unleash private sector’, ‘no cap-and-trade’, ‘no investment in renewables’, ‘salience of Copenhagen consensus’.

The *NYT* framed the debate depicting the US (Bush) administration as a villain in the climate change negotiations because it did not ratify the KP and walked away from attempts to agree to legally binding commitments. It appreciated the other developed countries for ratifying the Kyoto and working hard towards sealing another deal. It maintained that China, India and other developing countries had a

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<sup>39</sup> Rupert Darwall, ‘A Mexican Stand Off in Cancun’, *WSJ*, December 7, 2010, A17.

<sup>40</sup> Editorial, ‘The Copenhagen Solution’, *WSJ*, June 8, 2005, A14.

<sup>41</sup> Editorial, ‘Kyoto by Degree’, *WSJ*, June 21, 2005, A 16.

right to develop and they should not be asked to take any binding commitments but noted that without the participation of the Chinese and other major emitters the objective of emissions reductions would not be achieved. It emphasized resolving political, economic and technological issues. It argued that the UN climate talks had been chaotic and for real progress small gatherings of big players would be necessary because the climate change politics was revolving around the EU, the US, Canada, Japan and three rapidly emerging economic powers: China, India and Brazil.<sup>42</sup> It framed its news on ‘capping the GHG emissions’, ‘investment in low carbon technology’, ‘American leadership’, ‘Chinese full participation’, and more ‘public education’.

The *GUK* framed its news positioning close to the *NYT* but argued that no development should be carried out at the expense of the environment. It put significant emphasis on low carbon technologies; it sought American leadership<sup>43</sup> and urged India, China, Japan and Canada to step forward in the negotiation process.<sup>44</sup> It argued that the KP was weak and inadequate because the US opted out of it. It proposed a framework in which the developed world must take leadership in funding and technology and in return the developing world would reciprocate and accept significant emissions targets.<sup>45</sup> The *NYT* and the *GUK* also tied the issue of combating climate change to economic development and patterns of consumption. The *GUK* news frames were ‘investment in renewable technology’, ‘sustainable development’, ‘emission free technologies’, ‘energy efficiency’. The *GUK* and *NYT* newspapers favoured development of a global legally binding agreement, while giving importance to individual responses as well.

The *Hindu* and *China Daily* framed their news arguing that climate change was a problem of historical exploitation through industrialization in the developed

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<sup>42</sup> John M. Broader, ‘In Glare of Climate Talks, Taking On Too Great a Task’, *NYT*, December 11, 2011, A 14.

<sup>43</sup> Editorial, ‘From Science to Statesmanship’, *GUK*, March 14, 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/mar/14/climate-change-copenhagen-politics>

<sup>44</sup> Mark Lynas, ‘A Meaningful Durban Treaty Would be a Triumph of Weak over Strong’, *GUK*, November 25, 2011, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/nov/25/meaningful-durban-treaty-weak-strong>.

<sup>45</sup> Editorial, ‘We Saved the Economy: Now for the World’, *GUK*, September 20, 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/sep/20/copenhagen-climate-change-environment-summit?INTCMP=SRCH>.

countries. They informed their readers that the North was already developed; it was time for the South suggesting if the developed countries attempted to block the economic development of the developing countries by imposing binding commitments, such attempts must be resisted. They argued that rich countries were hypocrites because they ran their industries in China and India for cheap labour but blamed them for worsening global warming and climate change. Polluting companies in China were owned by Americans, Europeans, Japanese and others.<sup>46</sup> But there was no suggestion at all that such operations should be closed down or relocated back to their countries of origin. Instead, this issue was used as a tool of the politics of negotiation.

While the relocation of manufacturing companies from the developed countries to developing countries has increased the amount of GHG emissions, these companies have created jobs and promoted economic growth in developing countries. China handsomely benefits from its exports, and there is no intrinsic reason that responsibility for the emissions should not belong to China. Likewise, if the CO<sub>2</sub> emissions of international imports and exports are taken into account, developing country per capita emissions would decline further whereas the developed countries per capita emissions would increase but this notion is challenged as the Chinese and Indian middle class populations increase. A similar case can be made with other developing countries. However, it should be noted that consumers, also, benefit nicely from the ‘externalization’ of many of the environmental and social costs associated with the production of goods, and for which many people in China pay the price.

The *Hindu* and the *Daily* noted that a great deal for a successful climate agreement would depend on the kind of role the US, the EU, China, and India articulated in the negotiations and high-level political parleys<sup>47</sup> so India and China needed to step up efforts to play critical roles at negotiations and focus on developing the green economy through climate friendly technologies. On the CBDR principle, only one article from the *Hindu* noted that it required reconsideration as the plight of many developing countries were changing in

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<sup>46</sup> ‘Rich nations blamed of green imperialism’, *China Daily*, June 25, 2007, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2007-06/25/content\\_901823.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2007-06/25/content_901823.htm).

<sup>47</sup> Editorial, December 15, 2009.

terms of their economies.<sup>48</sup> However, their editorials argued that the UNFCCC framework was the only suitable framework and the principle of CBDR was the best measure to address global climate change challenges. The *Hindu* framed its news on 'CBDR and HR responsibility', 'financial and technological support', 'no compromise for development', 'investment in low carbon technology and their deployment to developing countries'. The *China Daily* framed its news using frames such as 'Western responsibility to fix climate change', 'technology transfer', 'significance of the US and BASIC countries in climate policy', 'voluntary contributions from developing countries', 'consumption and production', and 'transformation of society from consuming to preserving'.

The arguments of these newspapers covered a wide range of issues and were significant in the conduct of climate negotiations as they had diagnosed significant changes which had taken place over the previous twenty years for the lack of progress towards international climate change governance. They touched almost every issue of climate change and the items on the agenda for negotiation such as significance of technology, finance, and the possible roles of major emitters, which are critical in the debate of climate change burden sharing and the need for all inclusive ambitious agreement. They identified the shifting balance of power taking place from COP-15 onwards and the national interests of parties as they articulated openly over areas of agreements and disagreements. They also noted the importance of strong leadership for the success of climate change policy making.

The newspapers' framing also focused on the developed versus the developing countries' bargaining issue and getting the Kyoto and Kyoto-2 either ratified or rejected. Chapters 4 and 5 have shown that there were many complex issues attached to climate change negotiations which resulted from the protracted bargaining between the developed and developed countries (the US and the EU), the developed and developing countries, between developed and major emitters from developing countries, and the shifting balance of power (GHG emissions) particularly on the issue of making binding commitments. The global climate change agreements made clear that developed countries recognized their role in

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<sup>48</sup> Kalpana Sharma, 'Should We Care About Global Warming?' *The Hindu*, November 28, 2006.

climate change and that developing countries were also serious about it. Despite this, there has not been speedy progress because there was no appropriate and globally accepted framework and principles to work with. With negotiations frequently locked in problems arising from the lack of a workable current framework and the principles, this overlooked the potential capacity for global societies and technology to contribute to a solution. Lacking were appropriate mechanisms, shared visions (locking out of current framework and principles) and communication for collective action.

Instead of attaching blame to countries, the newspapers should have focused more on how to solve the problem by looking into what alterations, checks and balances were emerging. Economic growth with little harm to the environment is important, but there is no point singling out one country when we know that climate change is a global problem. In responding to climate change challenges, the environment needed to be protected in ways which do not have a damaging impact on the economy and ecosystem. On this, the newspapers' framing advocated more investment on innovation of low-carbon technology and technology transfers. A challenging dimension emerged in focusing on the subsequent statistics of the International Energy Agency (IEA) by country rather than the total average.

The individual country emission data demonstrates a picture which is linked with the carbon intensity of production. The statistics from IEA, Energy Information Administration (EIA) and Netherlands Environment Assessment Agency (NEAA) show that the developed world's emissions and carbon per capita are falling since there is high technological progress and carbon offsetting in Europe and the rest of the developed countries.<sup>49</sup> In contrast, the emissions and carbon per capita have been rising sharply in developing countries.<sup>50</sup> The issue is one of making quick progress technologically while, at the same time, deploying the technological innovations of the developed world in the developing one. The challenge is the use of a shared vision to address climate change to agree on the tools to deploy the available technological innovations.

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<sup>49</sup> IEA, *World Energy Outlook 2011* (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2011a); NEAA, *Trends in Global CO2 Emissions: 2012 Report* (The Hague/Bilthoven: PBL Publications, 2012); EIA, *International Energy Outlook 2011* (Washington DC, EIA, 2011).

<sup>50</sup> Ibid.

Although there is a huge literature that argues that environmental protection and cornucopian development is not possible,<sup>51</sup> there is also a burgeoning literature that argues that environmental protection and economic growth are both possible as people understand that climate change matters greatly for present and future generations.<sup>52</sup> Even the authors of *Limits to Growth* concurred: “Impressive – and even sufficient – technological advance is conceivable, but only as a consequence of determined societal decisions and willingness to follow up such decisions with action and money”.<sup>53</sup> Furthermore, greater shared understanding will promote a change in the way of life of the people and also answer the problem of overconsumption and waste. Using appropriate low carbon technology in the energy hungry developing countries will reduce the reliance on carbon in the production of goods and services. The search for and development of new carbon-neutral technology offers a future when people are no longer reliant on carbon energy sources and so limit the amount of the GHG emissions in the atmosphere. All the newspapers mentioned the positive aspects of technology but they could have pursued the issue strongly to balance growth and environmental protection.

The UNFCCC and KP framework established flexible mechanisms such as the emissions trading scheme (ETS), joint implementation (JI), and clean development mechanism (CDM) as well as advocating quantified emission targets for developed countries.<sup>54</sup> The newspapers under study were doubtful about the CDM mechanism as a win-win for emission cuts. Chapter 4 discussed why the Kyoto mechanisms were ineffective. Newell and Paterson argue that climate capitalism “can find ways of doing new business in a way which brings on board those that will be doing less business in a low-carbon economy, or at least to provide enough growth overall for policymakers to be able to override their resistance”.<sup>55</sup>

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<sup>51</sup> Tim Jackson, *Prosperity without Growth: Economics for a Finite Planet* (London & Sterling, VA: Earthscan, 2009). See also: Lester R. Brown, *Plan B 2.0: Rescuing a Planet under Stress and a Civilization in Trouble* (Washington DC: Earth Policy Institute, 2006).

<sup>52</sup> Iain Watson and Chandra L. Pandey, ‘Environmental Security and New Middle Powers: The Case of South Korea,’ *Asian Security* 10, no. 1 (2014): 70-95. See also: World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1987).

<sup>53</sup> Donella Meadows, Jorgen Randers and Dennis Meadows, *Limits to Growth: The 30-Year Update* (Vermont: Chelsea Green Publishing, 2004), 204.

<sup>54</sup> For details see chapter 4

<sup>55</sup> Peter Newell and Matthew Paterson, *Climate Capitalism: Global Warming and the Transformation of the Global Economy* (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2010), 10.



Clearly, any project to decarbonise the world needs an altogether different model of growth, which does not depend on cheap and abundant use of fossil-fuels but contributes to the abatement of GHGs. One of the least explored solutions, apart from renewable energy available for the current scenario of more than 80 per cent use of fossil-fuel energy, is carbon capture and storage (CCS). Lord Hunt, former Director-General of the UK Met office and Terry Townshend, the Global Legislators Organization for a Balanced Environment, has argued that Gulf countries could lead the development and funding of CCS technology to capture and store the GHGs exhausts from the combustion of fossil fuels and prevent their emissions into the atmosphere.<sup>56</sup> The CCS may offer a credible scenario under which emissions can be sufficiently reduced over the next 30 years to limit global average temperature rise below 3°C by 2100, well above the agreed UN goal of 2°C if the pilot projects of CCS perform well.<sup>57</sup> Nuclear fusion, different from nuclear fission which is in current use, is also another potential area to produce zero carbon energy as the Sun produces the heat.<sup>58</sup>

The major concern of climate change is the emission of GHGs. Previously it was the developed countries which were the major emitters, but it is now major economies from developing countries which, as demonstrated in chapter 5.4, have emitted far more than the developed world as they pull their poor population out of poverty. The IEA's *World Energy Outlook 2011* projects that the dynamics of energy markets are increasingly determined by countries outside the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD). Non-OECD countries account for 90% of population growth, 70% of the increase in economic output and 90% of energy demand growth over the period from 2010 to 2035.<sup>59</sup> In the same vein, EIA's *International Energy Outlook 2011* projected:

Much of the growth in energy consumption occurs in countries outside the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (non-OECD nations), where demand is driven by strong long-term economic growth. Energy use in non-OECD nations increases by 85

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<sup>56</sup> Julian Hunt and Terry Townshend, 'Qatar can Provide the 'Game Changer' at Climate Summit', *New Zealand Herald*, November 27, 2012, [http://www.nzherald.co.nz/opinion/news/article.cfm?c\\_id=466&objectid=10850128](http://www.nzherald.co.nz/opinion/news/article.cfm?c_id=466&objectid=10850128).

<sup>57</sup> Ibid; Also see Victor, 2011.

<sup>58</sup> David Goodstein and Michael Intriligator, *Climate Change and the Energy Problem: Physical Science and Economics Perspective* (New Jersey: World Scientific, 2013).

<sup>59</sup> IEA, 2011a, 1-2.

per cent in the Reference case, as compared with an increase of 18 per cent for the OECD economies.<sup>60</sup>

The data demonstrates that the majority of current and future GHGs are being and will continue to be produced by developing states. Thus, the UNFCCC approach of the KP with its firm commitments only from developed countries will not make much difference in the mission of stabilizing the global GHG emissions. Major emitters from developing countries cannot be exempted in the name of development as Karl Hood, Chairman of Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) noted during Durban negotiation in 2011: “Must we accept our annihilation? While they develop, we die. Why should we accept this?”<sup>61</sup> A core question arises about how the developing countries can continue their economic agenda without making huge CO<sub>2</sub> emissions. The answer is technology for, at least, mid-term solutions.

Newell and Paterson have written on the salience of technology in the fight against climate change.<sup>62</sup> Development of innovative low carbon technologies in the developing countries is, for now, beyond their capacity. To meet their incapacity to reduce carbon foot-prints developing countries are in dire need to receive technologies from the developed world. In exchange for the redistribution of green technology from rich to poor, the developing countries would accept significant emissions targets.<sup>63</sup> Details need to be worked out because the issue is not only about whether there can be progress technologically but also about whether we can deploy the technological innovations of the developed world in the developing world. It is immensely important to deploy the available low-carbon technologies to the developing countries to reduce carbon intensity per GDP along with the search of carbon-neutral technology. The IEA 2012 reports, “No more than one-third of proven reserves of fossil fuels can be consumed prior

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<sup>60</sup> Ibid, 1.

<sup>61</sup> See GCI, ‘COP-17-A Comment on the Outcome and the Perception on it’, <http://www.gci.org.uk/COP-17.html>.

<sup>62</sup> Newell and Paterson, 2010.

<sup>63</sup> Editorial, ‘We Saved the Economy: Now for the World’, *GUK*, September 20, 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/sep/20/copenhagen-climate-change-environment-summit?INTCMP=SRCH>.

to 2050 if the world is to achieve the 2°C goal, unless carbon capture and storage (CCS) technology is widely deployed”.<sup>64</sup>

Another important issue concerning the approach taken by the newspapers for solving the complex climate change problem was the continued adequacy of the UNFCCC framework. Some papers adopted the argument of their respective governments in discussing climate change, such as the *WSJ*, the *Hindu* and the *China Daily*. The approach taken by the *WSJ* resembled the argument of the US Senate and Bush administration. For example the Byrd-Hegel Resolution and the Bush administration put more emphasis on the US economy and undermined the scientific necessity, as was the case of the *WSJ* as mentioned above.<sup>65</sup> The *Hindu* and *China Daily* editorials consistently argued for sustaining the CBDR principle and resistance to Western attempts to transfer the burden to developing countries as their governments position them in the climate negotiations.<sup>66</sup> The *Hindu* and *China Daily* favoured the UNFCCC framework, whereas the newspapers from developed countries proposed suitable alternative approaches for the possible benefits in fostering actions. On the CBDR principle, all concurred on its continued salience except for the *WSJ*.

The CBDR principle is applicable to the inter-state system because it is founded on states’-quotas. However, the principle of CBDR does not provide a clear definition and parties interpret it according to their preferences and needs. When negotiated in 1992 the GHG emissions and economic conditions of states were very different from the current situation and the argument of CBDR had strong validity, but today it needs to be re-examined as economic circumstances of some powerful developing countries are changing.<sup>67</sup> For instance, the US was the largest emitter in the 1990s but now some developing countries have overtaken the US. The CBDR principle does not say anything about changes to developing countries or whether major emitters from developing countries can still hold their right to development at the environmental costs and not take any specific targets for GHG emission reductions.

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<sup>64</sup> IEA, *World Energy Outlook 2012* (Paris: OECD/IEA, 2012a), 3.

<sup>65</sup> See Chapter 4 for Byrd-Hegel and Bush Administration’s argument and Chapter 5 for continuity even at Obama administration.

<sup>66</sup> See chapter 4 and Chapter 5 for details.

<sup>67</sup> Sharma, 2006.

Chapter 5 demonstrated that on a basis of per capita income, developing countries lag far behind developed countries and, by population per capita, their emissions are well below those of the developed countries so they do not want any obstacles to their economic growth and development in moving the millions of their populations out of poverty. Moving millions of the poor out of poverty is one of the goals of MDGs and is very important for developing countries, but successive IEA reports “have shown that the climate goal of limiting warming to 2°C is becoming more difficult and more costly with each year that passes”.<sup>68</sup>

Another principle for tackling climate change was Contraction and Convergence (C&C). This idea was developed by the Global Commons Institute, led by concert violinist and engaging orator Aubrey Meyer, under which the individual unit of analysis is about the maximum atmospheric CO<sub>2</sub> concentration to prevent severe climate change.<sup>69</sup> It divides the total emissions concentration by the world population to give an equal share of emissions for every person. “Contraction and Convergence secures survival by correcting fatal poverty and fatal climate change”.<sup>70</sup> On this model, the right to emit CO<sub>2</sub> is treated as a human right and allocated on an equal basis to all of humankind.<sup>71</sup> On a positive note, the C&C proposal provides equal emissions quotas to the people across the world. This system could reduce the climate injustice as the rich have to buy emission quotas from the poor, the ones who have not used their assigned quotas. It could be argued that it is more democratic in the sense of equal distribution of quotas as it gives equal quota to individuals across the world irrespective of their natural and man-made social circumstances.

Yet, critics may raise questions about whether a state may try to increase its power to build a monopoly for CO<sub>2</sub> allowances, or whether the global census information can be reliably recorded, and questions about who will make the decisions and how it will be done ethically. There are also difficulties over the differing requirements for keeping warm in cold climates, and keeping cool in warm climates. On the assumption that the unit of analysis in this proposal is the

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<sup>68</sup> IEA, 2012a, 3.

<sup>69</sup> Newell and Paterson, 2010, 97.

<sup>70</sup> Aubrey Meyer, ‘The Fair Choice for Climate Change’, *BBC News*, May 18, 2006, <http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/science/nature/4994296.stm>.

<sup>71</sup> Ibid.

individual, it moves the focus away from the state-centric approach to developing an individual-centric structure. Whether this idea would be supported is still unclear.

C&C could help solve the climate problem from a climate justice perspective (as will be discussed below) but it begs the question as to why it has not been practiced so far and whether it would be ever practiced in the future. While C&C is based on the logic of global equal rights and the calculated amount of carbon provides the quantum from which an inclusive, global, equal rights per capita entitlement of carbon is derived and bestowed to each adult, it is suggested here that having so many good qualities in it, contemporary societies of states will be the least interested in it. For example, if states were to accept C&C, most of the quotas would go to China and India as they have much larger populations.

Power games and national self-interest have featured throughout the climate change negotiations. The pursuit of power, status and wealth is never absent from international climate change negotiations and cooperation.<sup>72</sup> Observing their positions at climate negotiations, it is hard to imagine that the US and the other rich and powerful states would be interested to buy emission quotas from China, India and the rest of developing countries. No action can be taken against such states as international law holds contradictory provisions of states having the right to self-defence and states having the right of actions within its jurisdiction based on sovereignty. The C&C proposal is interesting, but as it is, it proffers an experiment likely to fail under the present state centric institutional structures within the international system. Future research is needed to further clarify the proposal, taking geography and specific locations into consideration based on their basic need of energy to divide the quotas.

The CBDR principle has been in practice for more than 20 years but very little has been achieved. The newspapers' arguments for seeking alternative approaches is a useful contribution, yet the unit of analysis of their argument was the state and according to the *WSJ*, *NYT* and *GUK* what they were suggesting were negotiations

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<sup>72</sup> John Volger, 'Environmental Issues', in *The Globalization of the World Politics: An Introduction to International Relations*, eds., John Baylis, Steve Smith and Patricia Owens, 348-62 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2011), 352.

between or among a small number of countries such as the Group of 7/8, the Group of Twenty (G-20) and Major Economies Forums (MEF).<sup>73</sup>

The MEF was launched in March 2009 as a successor to the Bush administration's Major Economies Meeting (MEM) for addressing climate change. Under the MEF the 17 major economies are intended to facilitate a candid dialogue among major developed and developing economies, help generate the political leadership necessary to achieve a successful outcome at the annual UN climate negotiations and advance the exploration of concrete initiatives and joint ventures that increase the supply of clean energy while cutting GHG emissions.<sup>74</sup> These MEF members are responsible for approximately 80 per cent of global emissions, and have provided an arena for major emitting countries to confront tricky issues and hammer out viable strategies without entering the labyrinth of UN diplomacy.<sup>75</sup>

In February 2012, a six-state coalition was established to tackle climate and public health risks, posed by short-lived pollutants including methane, hydro fluorocarbons, and black carbon (soot). Even these niche fora, however, have achieved little and are not immune to political rancour over legally binding emissions cuts<sup>76</sup> because the responses required to limit and manage climate change could go to the heart of countries' political and industrial structures.<sup>77</sup> Various international actors work alongside bilateral agencies on climate adaptation and mitigation projects in developing countries. Environmental NGOs are also fighting the climate cause. The proliferation of actors seeking to address climate change reflects the inherent complexity of it, which has substantive connections to many issue areas including development, finance, public health, energy and security.<sup>78</sup>

The newspapers have identified the shifting focus of climate negotiations: the developments after Copenhagen 2009 have seen the emergence of small groups of

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<sup>73</sup> Editorial, 'Small Steps on Global Warming', *NYT*, December 17, 2010, 38.

<sup>74</sup> Major Economic Forum on Energy and Climate, <http://www.majoreconomiesforum.org/>

<sup>75</sup> Council on Foreign Relations, *The Global Climate Change Regime* (New York and Washington: Council of Foreign Relations, 5 July 2012), 1-29.

<sup>76</sup> *Ibid*, 5.

<sup>77</sup> Matthew Paterson and Michael Grubb, 'The International Politics of Climate Change', *International Affairs* 68, no. 2 (1992): 293-310.

<sup>78</sup> *Ibid*, 6.

negotiating countries such as BASIC and the US becoming more significant as they have turned out to be the major players of energy consumptions and GHG emissions. The EU's role has diminished as its contribution to global emissions has been gradually shrinking. Many countries and a large number of environmental non-state actors are pressurizing the major players to take action but such voices have not been consequential so far.<sup>79</sup>

The US has flatly rejected the KP and has not improved its domestic climate change policy. China has put in place some effective domestic policies but its refusal to international MRV casts doubt on Chinese commitments. India has put in place a voluntary national action plan to fight climate change. BASIC is looking to the principles of equity, the CBDR and historic responsibility; whereas many developed countries, including the US, reject shouldering any burden unless all major emitters are on board. If parties remain firm on their stance then any proposed alternative approach will do nothing but buy more time for emitting more GHGs and producing the lowest common denominator as the outcome.<sup>80</sup> Although these alternative approaches could be significant in achieving the climate change goals, more serious efforts to reduce emissions must be made by the involved parties.

The KP established targets to cut emissions from developed countries but it did not include the US and provided no meaningful consequences of noncompliance.<sup>81</sup> It did not give any firm commitments to major developing countries as a result, and it has come under unprecedented strain as Canada officially withdrew from the Protocol in December 2011. Canada argued that it could only be a part of a binding agreement that included all major emitters as parties with quantified targets. Even if the KP was in effect, in 2012 the IEA noted:

Global energy demand grows by more than one-third over the period to 2035 in the New Policies Scenario (our central scenario), with China, India and the Middle East accounting for 60% of the increase.

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<sup>79</sup> Pratap Chatterjee and Matthias Finger, *The Earth Brokers* (London and New York: Routledge, 1994).

<sup>80</sup> Joanna Depledge and Farhana Yamin, 'The Global Climate Change Regime: A Defence', in *The Economics and Politics of Climate Change*, eds., Dieter Helm and Cameron Hepburn (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

<sup>81</sup> See UNFCCC, *Kyoto Protocol* (Bonn: Climate Change Secretariat, 1998).

Energy demand barely rises in OECD countries, although there is a pronounced shift away from oil, coal (and, in some countries, nuclear) towards natural gas and renewables. Despite the growth in low carbon sources of energy, fossil fuels remain dominant in the global energy mix, supported by subsidies that amounted to \$523 billion in 2011, up almost 30% on 2010 and six times more than subsidies to renewables. The cost of fossil-fuel subsidies has been driven up by higher oil prices; they remain most prevalent in the Middle East and North Africa, where momentum towards their reform appears to have been lost. Emissions in the New Policies Scenario correspond to a long-term average global temperature increase of 3.6 °C.<sup>82</sup>

In 2010 the IEA noted:

The commitments that countries have announced under the Copenhagen Accord to reduce their greenhouse-gas emissions collectively fall short of what would be required to put the world onto a path to achieving the Accord's goal of limiting the global temperature increase to 2°C.

COP-15 failed to overcome entrenched differences among the major parties and did not deliver targeted GHG cuts. COP-16 in Cancun made some strides toward effective multilateral action but fell short of promoting needed action to effect positive change, including commitments to a post-Kyoto framework.<sup>83</sup> In 2011 COP-17 in Durban showed the depth of the tension between and within developed and developing countries over how to interpret the fundamental underpinnings of the UNFCCC and KP's framework – namely, the principle of CBDR among and within Annex I and Non-Annex I countries over establishing and achieving meaningful quantified and firm mitigation targets.

In Durban some parties agreed to extend the KP but others such as India, China and the US refused to accept legally binding targets. Countries disagreed over the issues of financing stipulations and MRV in the KP and other potentially legally binding Accords. The Durban Agreement, in an attempt to broaden participation, did not mention the CBDR principle.<sup>84</sup> Many thought that parties were moving to a breakthrough but to their surprise the Doha Climate Gateway, COP-18, in 2012

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<sup>82</sup> IEA, 2012a, 1.

<sup>83</sup> Ibid, 4.

<sup>84</sup> See UNFCCC, *Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action* (Bonn: Climate Change Secretariat, 2011).



reiterated the central importance of the Convention and its principles.<sup>85</sup> The failure to define the principles of the Convention clearly, as discussed in chapters 4 and 5, raised concerns in future negotiations for making progress from the UNFCCC platform. Victor noted that: “Few countries will adopt costly national policies aimed at solving global problems unless they are confident that their biggest economic competitors are enduring similar obligations”.<sup>86</sup>

Climate frameworks struggle to monitor GHG outputs effectively, especially in developing countries, many of which lack the domestic capacity to audit their total emissions, even if they are able to monitor national levels. Some developing countries fear that MRV would encourage international pressure to cap their GHG emissions. Article 5 of Copenhagen Accord notes:

Non-Annex I Parties will communicate information on the implementation of their actions through National Communications, with provisions for international consultations and analysis under clearly defined guidelines that will ensure that national sovereignty is respected.<sup>87</sup>

Lakoff has pointed out:

Others, like China, argue that an international monitoring system represents an infringement on national sovereignty and that developing states should be afforded some leniency in emissions as they are currently in critical stages of economic development.<sup>88</sup>

It indicates the dominance of state-centric politics during these negotiations and newspapers clearly identified this. The primacy of state sovereignty is one of the significant points on which governments have focused since Stockholm 1972.<sup>89</sup> The state-centric politics led several states including Canada, Russia, and Japan to make it clear that they would not sign the second round of the KP’s commitments. New Zealand’s climate change Minister Tim Groser said:

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<sup>85</sup> See UNFCCC, *Report of the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action* (Bonn: Climate Change Secretariat, 2012a).

<sup>86</sup> David Victor, *The Global Warming Gridlock: Creating More Effective Strategies for Protecting the Planet* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011), xxx.

<sup>87</sup> See UNFCCC, *Copenhagen Accord* (Bonn: Climate Change Secretariat, 2009a).

<sup>88</sup> Ibid.

<sup>89</sup> Conca and Dabelko, eds., 2010, 57.

There is no question of withdrawing, the issue was always different: where would we take our next commitment – under the Kyoto Protocol or under the Convention, with the large majorities of economies? We have decided that it is in New Zealand's best interests to do the latter.<sup>90</sup>

As noted in chapter 6, Todd Stern, the special climate envoy of Obama said, “Kyoto is not on the table for the US...The other track is the track that involves all parties ... That's the one we are in, that's the one we are the most focused on”.<sup>91</sup> Maintaining consistent economic growth has been the major interest of major emitters from developing countries. On November 15, 2012, incumbent Chinese President Jinping stressed the need for Chinese economic growth.<sup>92</sup> India and other emerging economies were on this same approach which was articulated right through COP-15 to COP-18. The issue of sovereignty which has been referred in almost every document of UNFCCC<sup>93</sup> is often highlighted as significant, to the point where it almost caused the collapse of the UN process during COP-15.<sup>94</sup>

The politics of climate change has been predominantly state-centric<sup>95</sup> with the international climate change negotiations and policy making caught up in the traditional system of power politics of the inter-state system which originated at Westphalia in 1648. Climate change is a functional issue requiring a functionally based response as articulated by Mitrany who argued it was: “not how to keep nations peacefully apart but how to bring them actively together”,<sup>96</sup> and proposed: “a spreading web of international activities and agencies, in which and through which the interests and life of all nations would be gradually integrated”.<sup>97</sup>

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<sup>90</sup> ‘NZ Won’t Sign Up to Kyoto 2- Groser’, *3News*, November 9, 2012, <http://www.3news.co.nz/NZ-wont-sign-up-to-Kyoto-2---Groser/tabid/1160/articleID/276101/Default.aspx>.

<sup>91</sup> ‘US says Kyoto Protocol Not on Its Durban Agenda,’ *China Daily*, November 23, 2011, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/world/2011-11/23/content\\_14148802.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/usa/world/2011-11/23/content_14148802.htm).

<sup>92</sup> ‘China’s New Leadership Revealed’, *CNN News*, November 15, 2012, <http://edition.cnn.com/SPECIALS/asia/china>.

<sup>93</sup> See UNFCCC, *United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change* (Bonn: Climate Change Secretariat, 1992); UNFCCC 1998; UNFCCC, 2009.

<sup>94</sup> Editorial, ‘Beyond Copenhagen: Dialogue, not Diktat’, *GUK*, December 21, 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2009/dec/21/copenhagen-climate-compromise?INTCMP=SRCH>.

<sup>95</sup> Ibid. See also: Hoffman, 2011.

<sup>96</sup> David Mitrany, *A Working Peace System* (London: Royal Institute of Foreign Affairs, 1946), 7.

<sup>97</sup> Ibid, 14.

Functionalists<sup>98</sup> argue that it is possible to bypass the political rivalries of states by building habits of cooperation in non-political economic and social spheres by addressing problems requiring international cooperation.<sup>99</sup> But this functional approach has not made its way through climate change as we are caught in the continued state-centric framework of the UN system and Westphalia. As Hurrell and Kingsbury ask: “Can a fragmented and often highly conflictual political system made up of over 170 sovereign states ... achieve the high (and historically unprecedented) levels of cooperation and policy coordination needed to manage environmental problems on global scope?”<sup>100</sup>

We still live in the post-Westphalian order of state-centric international politics thinking that the idea of state sovereignty has delivered, and will continue to deliver, solutions to emerging global problems from security to finance to environmental threats such as climate change. Ecological, environmental and climate change issues are borderless and do not respect the psychological borders of nation-states. Each individual, corporation, institution at local, national and international levels are integral stakeholders of climate change and environmental issues. The politics of the UN is narrow and not about working towards a solution to global problems like climate change.<sup>101</sup>

Many see the international climate change negotiations platform as multilateral in which various actors, such as NGOs and IOs, also participate. Yet, the participation of NGOs and IOs has been limited to the role of observers.<sup>102</sup> Newspapers in this study did not discuss any significant role for non-institutional processes or the participatory roles of NGOs, but concentrated on states locked in a power-game and upholding national interests.<sup>103</sup> It is only the states’ representatives that hold authority to negotiate for consensus. The arguments

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<sup>98</sup> Functionalists believe that society is held together by social consensus, in which members (states) of the society (world) agree upon, and work together to achieve, what is best for society (world) as a whole.

<sup>99</sup> Margaret P. Karns and Karen A. Mingst, *International Organizations: The Politics and Processes of Global Governance* (Boulder and London: Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2010), 40.

<sup>100</sup> Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury, ‘The International Politics of Environment: An Introduction’, in *The International Politics of Environment*, eds., Andrew Hurrell and Benedict Kingsbury, 1-47 (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992), 1 & 4.

<sup>101</sup> Zygmunt Bauman, ‘Reconstructing Europe’, *RSA Journal*, CLVIII, no. 5551 (Autumn 2012), 24-29.

<sup>102</sup> See chapters 2, 4 and 5 for details.

<sup>103</sup> Lui Junhong, ‘Carbon Rights a Power Game’, *China Daily*, April 9, 2008, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2008-04/09/contnt\\_6602256.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/opinion/2008-04/09/contnt_6602256.htm).

presented by the newspapers indicated that the CBDR might need to be redefined but how was not made clear. Instead, we have been locked into the power games of the interstate system with different states holding to their positions and interests during these negotiations.

During negotiations, the powerful states or major emitters were locked into national interest defined by power politics.<sup>104</sup> The case studies of Kyoto and Copenhagen established that both the principles and the framework were inadequate. The negotiation structures used for the last two decades are inadequate and “has stuck in gridlock”.<sup>105</sup> These structures come from experience in managing earlier international problems of security and peace, which have little in common with the non-institutional nature of climate change. Although the case of ozone negotiations was very successful and global in scope (it dealt with a few chemicals, a few producers/companies and solutions were cheaper and easily available), using the same model for the highly complicated issues surrounding climate change is unrealistic.

The problem of climate change is that it does not respect national borders with tensions between the ecological challenge such as climate change and sovereignty due to the fact that the boundaries of states and boundaries of ecosystems do not seamlessly coincide.<sup>106</sup> There is not only a trade-off between the availability of green technologies and the incapacity of the developing countries but also the actions of every single human activity. Unless there is concerted and unprecedented effort by all states without exclusion of states and non-states actors and by taking into account the doctrine of national sovereignty because there is no international authority or world government to enforce every country to agree, then climate change targets are a pipe-dream. Progress in climate change governance will be contingent on finding innovative ways to deal with a variety of cognitive, economic, political and institutional hurdles.

Cutting GHGs drastically without reliable alternative sources of energy available and without a broadly shared global vision is almost impossible. The long-

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<sup>104</sup> See Chapters 4 and 5 above.

<sup>105</sup> Victor, 2011, 3.

<sup>106</sup> Ken Conca and Geoffrey D. Dabelko, eds., *Green Planet Blues: Four Decades of Global Environmental Politics* (Boulder: Westview Press, 2010), 57.

established state centric, top-down approach in tackling emerging global issues will continue because any other framework would be suboptimal under the Westphalian system. Hence, we need to develop complementary alternative approaches that include global, international, regional, national and local communities. Being locked up, as occurred during the Kyoto and Copenhagen climate conferences with parties basing their response on state-centric interests will not deliver the necessary outcome.<sup>107</sup> Further negotiations on this basis will not result in progress. A shared vision for our common future and posterity is required and it can only be achieved by adopting multiple approaches that are global, regional, and local, and calling on the development and deployment of carbon neutral/low carbon technology.

Diamond has set out how societies choose to fail or succeed.<sup>108</sup> He suggests that more than a single global approach and much greater reliance should be placed on small groups of actors such as the US and China, the G-7 or G-20 who are the major emitters, and including non-state actors who have a major interest in addressing the issues of climate change. As the case studies of Kyoto and Copenhagen have shown, only a few member-states played a critical role in developing the text.<sup>109</sup> Without the support of the major emitters neither Kyoto nor Copenhagen could have achieved more. For any ambitious policy to be successful requires response from the main stakeholders because states may sign treaties but it is the stakeholders who are able to change the behaviours to arrest the policy goals.<sup>110</sup>

Hence, a multiple approach must be embraced to reach out to all stakeholders. The UN inter-state system relies on states' role which cannot solely accomplish the goals of stabilization of GHGs.<sup>111</sup> Multiple approaches offer the prospect of success in achieving goals as they are inclusive and are able to reach out to the people who are the primary stakeholders of climate change. This would solve the problem of democratic decision making on the one hand and make the unit of

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<sup>107</sup> Editorial, 'Copenhagen's Lesson in Limits,' *WSJ*, December 19, 2009, A 12.

<sup>108</sup> Diamond, *Collapse*, 2005.

<sup>109</sup> See chapters 4 and 5 above.

<sup>110</sup> Conca and Dabelko, 2010, 62-63; and Michael Zurn, 'Global Governance and Legitimacy Problems', *Government and Opposition* 39, no. 2 (2004): 260-87.

<sup>111</sup> See UNFCCC, 1992.

analysis more responsible to bring the change to others because climate change amounts to a collective action problem.

Arguing in favour of a bottom up approach for democratic decision making, Ostrom wrote: “Many analysts – especially in academia, special interest groups, governments and the press – still presume that common-pool problems are dilemmas in which participants themselves cannot avoid producing suboptimal results”.<sup>112</sup> She concluded that complex collective problems could be solved when communication is free, vision is shared, trust is high and communities are mobilized from the bottom up rather than top down.<sup>113</sup> This is not an ideological position rather it is an empirical one, borne out by case studies originating in places ranging from remote fisheries in Turkey, forests in Japan, irrigation systems in Spain and the Philippines to fragile ecosystems in the Swiss Alps. This perspective challenges the conventional wisdom about prospects for a climate friendly world. It injects modesty into singular, universal notions about progress and places faith in people, with their ears to the ground, coming up with the best answers.

Knight, in applauding but misinterpreting Ostrom, stated that the Copenhagen Accord was a success because it devolved power to states and laid down how the temperature limit of 2°C was to be achieved which was then left to domestic legislatures to decide how to legislate for it.<sup>114</sup> Thinking ambitious climate actions would be forthcoming through the voluntary bottom-up approach of nation-states through the UNFCCC was another mistake. Such ideas have been presented for the last 20 years mainly through UNFCCC 1992, the Kyoto and Copenhagen which is where Knight’s analysis is inadequate. Ostrom<sup>115</sup> rightly reasoned that local projects are more compatible with democracy and are achievable because people at the local level are immersed in their milieu, they are serious about their problem and know how to solve it. Yet, it should be noted that Ostrom’s idea that a ‘bottom up approach’ to address the ‘tragedy of the commons’ and collective action problems was/is realistic only in very small scale communities, which

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<sup>112</sup> Elinor Ostrom, *Governing the Commons: The Evolutions of Institutions for Collective Actions* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990), 24.

<sup>113</sup> Ibid.

<sup>114</sup> Eric Knight, *Reframe* (Victoria, Australia: Black Inc., 2012), 197-198.

<sup>115</sup> Ostrom, 1990.

limits its applicability to global issues like climate change. For instance, how can numerous local initiatives (assuming they do get off the ground everywhere) address the big technological changes, the changes in production systems and ultimately, the allocation of burden sharing across the world?

The world is not comprised of average global citizens with the poor in the South and the rich in the North, responding differently to the global challenge of climate change. Incapacity, limited resources and knowledge of the local initiatives present hindrances to local candidates where in both rich and poor states electoral challenges emerge from populist opponents, and the withdrawal of business funding campaigns can occur.<sup>116</sup> For example, in 2005, the mayor of London set up an agency with partnership in the private sector to mitigate emissions of the city and in return there was an electoral overturn.<sup>117</sup> As the unpredictable impact of climate change events becomes more frequent, it is clear that the preparations and responses of individuals and local communities especially in the developing world cannot suffice by themselves alone.<sup>118</sup>

The top-down approach of the KP with legally binding firm targets for developed countries have only produced imperceptible results with many of the developed countries failing to meet their targets.<sup>119</sup> Canada renounced the KP in 2011 because it was not on track to meet Kyoto targets and major emitters were not part of Kyoto. The Canadian Environment Minister Peter Kent said, “Canada was invoking the legal right to withdraw and would be saving the country \$14 billion in penalties for not achieving its Kyoto targets”.<sup>120</sup> Thus, the issue concerning the appropriate responses to climate change should be initiated at every level: local, provincial, state, national, transnational, international, multi-national and multi-lateral by avoiding ‘free ride’ to act and reduce reluctance.<sup>121</sup> The most significant issue is that any “multilateralism or minilateralism”<sup>122</sup> must be inclusive to

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<sup>116</sup> Lever-Tracy, 2011, 92.

<sup>117</sup> Ibid.

<sup>118</sup> Ibid.

<sup>119</sup> See subsequent reports of IEA, 2010, 2011; 2012.

<sup>120</sup> Quoted in Wil Longbottom, ‘The Global Warming Dividend: Canada Abandons Kyoto Protocol to Protect its Lucrative Oil Reserves’, *Mail Online*, December 13, 2011, <http://www.dailymail.co.uk/news/article-2073520/Canada-abandons-Kyoto-Protocol-save-14bn-penalties-missing-greenhouse-gas-targets.html>.

<sup>121</sup> Andrew Dobson, *Green Political Thought* (Oxon and New York: Routledge, 2007), 104.

<sup>122</sup> Eckersley reasons that inclusive minilateralism, which includes the most affected ones and the biggest emitters is the right approach to make progress in climate change issue. Eckersley’s

involve all the major emitters and the representatives of real stakeholders. The actors involved should be serious about taking action rather than only attending negotiations, smiling and being agreeable with empty words on paper. States, particularly the advanced developed countries, have to underscore the significance of the deployment of technology in the required parts of the world and an incessant search for carbon-neutral technology. This can break the false choice of either development or climate change which “means decoupling emissions growth from economic growth”.<sup>123</sup>

The climate change debate is no longer about developed versus developing, or rich versus poor, but about making successful climate change responses for common prosperity. The polarization of the climate issue based on North-South politics is no longer relevant. As Carter has noted: “It is important to note that the simple North-South dichotomy does not capture the complexity of climate change politics”.<sup>124</sup> The relevant capacities and positions of the parties are gradually altering in terms of economic might, energy consumption, and emissions production. This raises a question about the continued adequacy of the CBDR as “there has been bitter disagreement over what this means in practice”.<sup>125</sup> Discussions should now focus on how the complex principles associated with the CBDR can be unknotted for future negotiations to move forward collectively.<sup>126</sup>

More research and development on all available technologies would be an integral aspect for any major initiatives in technological innovation aimed at reducing GHGs. The issue of technology transfers must be pursued in which the industrialized countries should relax the concerns of intellectual property rights by challenging corporate ownership and control of it to achieve greater compliance by reducing incapacity of developing countries. Although it may seem

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argument is sound, as inclusive minilateralism is complementary to UNFCCC, but it is doubtful that the group of major emitters would make smooth progress in decision making going by the record of the major emitters, which have shown to be the actual obstacles in the UNFCCC process. Therefore, we should use multiple approaches and the inclusive should not mean only states but the real stakeholders. See for details: Robyn Eckersley, ‘Moving Forward in the Climate Negotiations: Multilateralism or Minilateralism?’ *Global Environmental Politics* 12 no. 2 (2012): 24-42.

<sup>123</sup> Newell and Paterson, 2010, 10.

<sup>124</sup> Neil Carter, *The Politics of Environment: Ideas, Activism and Policy* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2007), 255.

<sup>125</sup> Ibid.

<sup>126</sup> Chandra L. Pandey, ‘The Limits of Climate Change Agreement: From Past to Present’, *International Journal of Climate Change Strategies and Management* (Forthcoming).



aspirational, it has been long due that we should try to determine non-institutional approaches to combat global problems such as climate change. Such non-institutional approaches are bottom up, societies to societies, and inclusive to put foundations for Eckersley's notion of 'ecological democracy'.<sup>127</sup> For this to happen the debate needs to be reframed.

According to Lakoff:

Reframing is telling the truth as we see it – telling it forcefully, straightforwardly and articulately, with moral conviction and without hesitation. The language must fit the conceptual reframing, a reframing from the perspective of progressive values. It is not just a matter of words, though the right ones are needed to evoke progressive frames.<sup>128</sup>

For reframed communication to be successful media sources can play a key role as has been emerging over time by focusing on strong American, Chinese and Indian leadership with the full participation of both developed and the developing major emitters. The newspapers' framing to present climate change issues to public and policy makers needs to be delinked from environmental degradation and economic growth to stay focused on potential socio-economic transformations along with technological innovation, as the media has identified, as key drivers in moving from a high carbon world to a carbon-neutral world and from consuming society to conserving society.

#### **7.4 Democracy Debate in the Media**

The framing of news about issues of democracy in the media on negotiations of international climate change governance is mostly about inter-state participation and deliberation. The news frames of democracy and transparency featured prominently during COP-15, with newspapers declaring that the Copenhagen Accord procedures were undemocratic,<sup>129</sup> because it was negotiated by the personal consultations between the US and the BASIC countries. "The climate

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<sup>127</sup> I have used the term ecological democracy here to refer that the participation or representation of the stakeholders in the decision making process of environmental issues. See for details: Daniel Faber ed., *The Struggle for Ecological Democracy: Environmental Justice Movements in the United States* (New York: The Guilford Press, 1998); and Robyn Eckersley, *The Green States: Rethinking Democracy and Sovereignty* (Cambridge: The MIT Press, 2004), 2.

<sup>128</sup> George Lakoff, 'Framing the Dems', *The American Prospect* 14, no. 8 (Sep 2003): 32-35

<sup>129</sup> For more: see chapter 5

summit was far from being a democratic exercise. But the struggle to prevent the terrible consequences of climate change must continue”.<sup>130</sup> As Ruz observed:

From the evening of the 17th and the early morning hours of the 18th, the Prime Minister of Denmark and senior representatives of the United States had been meeting with the Chairman of the European Commission and the leaders of 27 nations to introduce to them – on behalf of Mr. Obama – a draft agreement in whose elaboration none of the other leaders of the rest of the world had taken part. It was an anti-democratic and practically clandestine initiative that disregarded the thousands of representatives of social movements, scientific and religious institutions, and other participants in the Summit.<sup>131</sup>

The *NYT* noted that despite two years of advanced work, COP-15 failed to convert a rare gathering of world leaders into an ambitious, legally binding action plan for reducing GHG emissions even if Obama forged an agreement, as the time was running out, with the help of China, India, Brazil and South Africa – that all but a handful of the 193 nations present accepted.<sup>132</sup> The *GUK* wrote that developing countries were bitterly disappointed with the Accord and quoted one observer saying, “It will be almost impossible for the leaders of small countries to stand up and be the one to reject it”.<sup>133</sup> The *WSJ* wrote:

Leaders of the US, China and other major economies said late Friday that they had tentatively reached a new climate accord, though they said the pact wasn’t aggressive enough to meaningfully curb greenhouse-gas emissions and merely set up a future round of negotiations to hash out the details.<sup>134</sup>

Several developing countries rejected the Accord arguing that it would not become a UN blueprint for fighting global warming.<sup>135</sup>

The newspapers’ frames focused on democratic participation in terms of deliberations of the equal rights of states in consensual decision making, and also

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<sup>130</sup> Fidel Castro Ruz, ‘The Truth of What Happened at Copenhagen’, *The Hindu*, December 22, 2009, <http://www.thehindu.com/2009/12/22/stories/2009122255360800.htm>.

<sup>131</sup> Ibid.

<sup>132</sup> Editorial, ‘Copenhagen and Beyond’, *NYT*, December 21, 2009, <http://www.nytimes.com/2009/12/21/opinion/21mon1.html?>

<sup>133</sup> John Vidal, ‘Analysis Copenhagen Draft Text’, *GUK*, December 18, 2009, <http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2009/dec/18/copenhagen-draft-text-analysis?intcmp=239>.

<sup>134</sup> Jeffrey Ball, Stephen Power, Elizabeth Williamson, ‘Climate Pact Falls Short Emission Curbs Are Weak; U.S. Calls Compromise With China, India a ‘First Step’, *WSJ*, December 19, 2009, A.1.

<sup>135</sup> China Daily, ‘Developing Nations Slam US Led Climate Deal’, *China Daily*, December 19, 2009, [www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009copenhagenclimate/200912/19/content\\_9203277.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009copenhagenclimate/200912/19/content_9203277.htm).

on ideas around climate justice. The former is related to the power politics of powerful and strong states<sup>136</sup> whereas climate justice is a fluid concept which has recurring themes. Climate justice was first used in the UN World Summit on Sustainable Development in 2002.<sup>137</sup> The principles of climate justice prioritized ecological debt which means the Northern states and corporations “owe the rest of the world as a result of their appropriation of the planet’s capacity to absorb greenhouse gases” and confirmed “principles of democratic accountability, ecological sustainability and social justice”.<sup>138</sup> Its recent critical position is “we will not be able to stop climate change if we do not change the neo-liberal and corporate based economy which stops us from achieving sustainable development”.<sup>139</sup>

According to the IPCC:

As a form of environmental justice, climate justice is the fair treatment of all people and freedom from discrimination with the creation of policies and projects that address climate change and the systems that create climate change and perpetuate discrimination.<sup>140</sup>

It argues that with rising temperatures affects human lives, particularly for people of colour, low-income earners, and indigenous communities, who are compromised in terms of health, financial burdens, and social and cultural disruptions. Poor and vulnerable communities are the first to experience the negative impacts of climate change.<sup>141</sup> Climate justice treats climate change as an issue of human rights and environmental justice.<sup>142</sup> From a climate justice perspective the media noted that it was not justifiable if the above mentioned groups of people suffered from consequences they had not created. This argument is linked with the rights of poor people to development and economic growth, the eradication of poverty and the improvement of living standards. Although these

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<sup>136</sup> For more: see chapter 4 and 5

<sup>137</sup> India Resources Centre, *Bali Principles of Climate Justice* (Denpasar: International Climate Justice Network, 2002).

<sup>138</sup> Ibid.

<sup>139</sup> Climate Justice Now! *Radical New Agenda Needed To Achieve Climate Justice* (Poznan: CJN, 2008).

<sup>140</sup> Act for Climate Justice, ‘Mobilization for Climate Justice, What is Climate Justice’, <http://www.actforclimatejustice.org/about/what-is-climate-justice>.

<sup>141</sup> IPCC, 2007, 8-20.

<sup>142</sup> Ibid.

issues were important, they complicated the negotiations as “opinions divided”<sup>143</sup> over causality and an inability to grapple with the more practical and immediate challenges illustrated above.<sup>144</sup>

The newspapers strongly criticized the Accord for not setting firm, legally binding limits on future carbon emissions for developed countries and not spelling out the mechanism for providing financing support for developing countries. The media identified, in the debate at Copenhagen, the issue of the economic gap between developed and developing countries since most of the developing countries were striving to get themselves industrialized and urbanized. The *China Daily* quoted Brazilian President Luiz Inacio Lula Da Silva saying: “People in the developed world all have three meals a day, but for people in many African, Latin American and Asian countries, three meals a day is still something in the future”.<sup>145</sup> The media associated the issue of democracy with climate justice and the unbalanced global economy while criticizing the Accord and the roles of major emitters and economic powers which agreed not to cut emissions drastically.

The media’s view was that the rich nations should stop running the planet and to give way to global democratic solutions.<sup>146</sup> “Global democracy is [however] meaningless unless ultimate power resides in a directly elected assembly”<sup>147</sup> which connects citizens to the decisions that affect them and ensures public accountability for those decisions.<sup>148</sup> The media, to their credit, pointed to the issues of a democratic deficit in climate change governance as raised by Dahl, Held, Zürn and others as discussed in detail in Chapter 2. Although it is becoming more important to develop a democratic institutional framework for climate governance to reduce the democratic deficit, there are not feasible alternatives other than to include the non-governmental organizations and other non-state actors that represent the more than 7 billion people on the planet.

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<sup>143</sup> Zhu Qiwen, ‘Let Copenhagen’s Story of Hope Continue’, *China Daily*, October 19, 2009, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2009-10/19/content\\_8808073.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/world/2009-10/19/content_8808073.htm).

<sup>144</sup> Victor, 2011, 20.

<sup>145</sup> Yang Hongliang, ‘Copenhagen Accord and Beyond’, *China Daily*, December 23, 2009, [http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009copenhagencclimate/2009-12/23/content\\_9217288.htm](http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/china/2009copenhagencclimate/2009-12/23/content_9217288.htm).

<sup>146</sup> George Monbiot, ‘How to Rule the World’, *GUK*, July 17, 2001, 15.

<sup>147</sup> Ibid.

<sup>148</sup> UN, *Strengthening of the United Nations System, doc., A/58/817* (New York: United Nations, 11 June 2004).

Incongruously, the media was generally unconcerned about the role of non-state actors and NGOs. However, the role of formal delegates of states negotiating the future of global climate change policies and programmes was highly publicised in the media to argue the case that climate change decision making processes were undemocratic. Similarly, the attendance and demonstrations by a large contingent of NGO groups and concerned citizens from all over the globe was less publicized.<sup>149</sup> As observed in chapters 4 and 5, NGOs were not able to access good information and had difficulty in accessing negotiators to influence their positions.<sup>150</sup>

The media was critical of the decision making procedures of COP-15 and it was important for the media to raise concerns. Nonetheless, the media failed to recognize why the parties and NGOs including non-state actors were restricted at the final plenary sessions and second week of the conference respectively. It would have been a very democratic process of decision making to have included them, but practically, it can be argued that current UNFCCC negotiations would continue to be exclusive, cumbersome, painstakingly slow and would probably not deliver an agreement within the narrow window of time left to prevent dangerous climate change.<sup>151</sup>

Of course, the scale of enterprise is truly impressive with more than 193 nation-states and thousands of NGOs involved in the climate change negotiation process. Yet, such negotiations had difficulty delivering any agreement or producing bargaining that included the lowest common denominator. The media recognized the overt use of national self-interest but they failed to recognize the circumstances and complexities of climate change negotiations including COP-15. It can also be argued that if the five major players had not taken last minute political decisions breaking the stand-off, and overrunning the prescribed time, the UNFCCC would have collapsed in Copenhagen 2009. But the substantive question is whether the Accord founded on state-centric framework achieved anything that actually reduces GHG emissions to keep the world below the 2°C

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<sup>149</sup> Katherine Austin-Evelyn, Civil Society at UN Climate Change Conference (Durban: CJN, 2011), <http://www.climate-justice-now.org>.

<sup>150</sup> Alan Pears, COP-15: The Notes and the Verdict, *the Fifthstate*, <http://www.thefifthstate.com.au/archives/9424>.

<sup>151</sup> Robyn Eckersley, 'Moving Forward in the Climate Negotiations: Multilateralism or Minilateralism?' *Global Environmental Politics* 12 no. 2 (2012): 24-42.

relative to pre-industrial age. Databases that monitor CO<sub>2</sub> in every subsequent research outputs have been reporting the incremental rise in the GHG emissions concentration<sup>152</sup> which provides the basis for the argument that:

For all efforts of negotiators and urgency surrounding this issue, multilateral [inter-state] treaty-making has consistently failed to produce treaties and agreements that effectively address climate change. It may be time to concede that there is a mismatch between this type of treaty-making and the problem of climate change, that global treaty making, as attempted in the last two decades.<sup>153</sup>

As the state-centric and undemocratic process has been making scanty progress to catalyse the societal and economic transformation needed to avoid the potential threats of climate change, this should be materialized as an opportunity for thinking differently by framing news differently for making the process inclusive, participatory and deliberative. Research findings show that it is more likely that the ultimate stakeholders, through growing awareness, training and engagement would change their behaviour on the need to arrest climate change.<sup>154</sup>

## **7.5 Conclusion**

The five newspapers framed their news for building an understanding of the issues of technology transfers, funding for innovation, and the shape of a possible climate agreement by providing information on climate change issues, the role of developed countries and developing countries. From the analysis above, it has been obvious that the politics of sceptics, or supportive of, mainstream science can be found in developed countries, some Western media (in this study *WSJ*) and their political leadership. These disparate and rival media groups played a vital role in disseminating the information of climate change science however their particular stand, (scepticism of *WSJ* and doom day prediction of the rest), on the climate change information did not provide their readership with objective knowledge, but with confusion. Measuring the media's contribution in terms of the hypothesis on the role of the media it is clear that the *WSJ* failed to move

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<sup>152</sup> See CDIAC, Monthly Carbon Dioxide Concentration, <http://cdiac.ornl.gov/>. See also IEA, 2012a.

<sup>153</sup> Matthew J. Hoffmann, *Climate Governance at the Crossroads* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011), 17.

<sup>154</sup> Martin Patchen, *Public Attitudes and Behaviour About Climate Change: What Shapes Them and How to Influence Them* (West Lafayette: Purdue Climate Change Research Centre, 2006).

beyond the debate between sceptics and believers abrogating its public role and failing to translate words into actions against climate change. Results may have been forthcoming better from the US had the *WSJ* not become locked into the debate between climate deniers or believers.

Instead of focusing on the substantive issues relating to setting agendas, the papers became fixated in a ‘blame game’. The *WSJ* pointed to China and India in accounting for the failure of global climate change negotiations, but did not raise objections to American economic and political interests. The *NYT*, *GUK*, the *Hindu* and *China Daily*, in general, saw the US as the obstacle. The papers commented on the obstacles of climate change such as scientific complexity, distant threats, and the unmanageable number of negotiating parties, national interests, and power games. They provided perspectives on climate change and its characteristic problems that have intricate links and implications concerning the national economic interests of states.

The papers (except the *WJS* on very different grounds concerning junk science) did not identify the primary deficiencies of the KP including the inflexible and counterproductive dichotomy between Annex I and Non-Annex I countries and the interpretation of the UNFCCC principle of CBDR. Any Kyoto style agreement would include the industrialized countries in their quantified emission reductions while exempting the large emerging economies from Non-Annex I countries. Although the papers understood the problem created by CBDR and HR principles, they agreed that both Annex I and Non-Annex I countries should participate in a globally binding agreement, but that the CBDR should be the guiding principle of any agreement. The papers largely failed to recognize climate change as a global common problem needing full participation, particularly from all major emitters for binding emissions-reductions to stick. The data showed that the major emitters of the past – the Annex I countries – would not be the largest emitters of the future instead the large emerging economies from the Non-annex I countries will be the major emitters of the future.<sup>155</sup>

The papers from the US and the UK recognized the salience of alternative approaches but they failed to critique the unanimously consensual (all 195

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<sup>155</sup> IEA 2010; 2011a; 2012a; see chapter 5.4.

members voting in favour in decision making) framework of UNFCCC. Copenhagen failed to produce consensus and the Accord was to be ‘taken note of’ instead of being adopted. At Cancun 2011, when Bolivia used its veto it was the Mexican climate summit Chair, who gavelled the final meeting taking note of the Bolivian objection. Notably, negotiations at the meetings kept exceeding the prescribed time span because the parties could not agree to the proposed agreements, leaving the outcome as the lowest common denominator.

Another substantive issue that the media could have critiqued on was the UNFCCC’s culture of polarizing the climate debate into Annex I versus Non-annex I. Polarizing every climate change issue into developed (Annex I) and developing (Non-Annex I) countries is not part of the solution. The world is more diverse than the binary distinction of Annex I versus Non-Annex I. The substantive part for any agreement is to generate certain criteria for transferring Non-Annex I countries into Annex I as they transition their economies and develop diversity. The binary distinctions had become dysfunctional and outdated.

However, the media rightly suggested that although smaller states could influence the course of negotiations, a great deal depended on major actors’ roles,<sup>156</sup> ‘political parleys’<sup>157</sup> and the ‘power game’.<sup>158</sup> On the changing scenario of global GHG emissions, the media recognized that an ambitious climate change agreement should include developed and major emitters from developing countries – a change in the media’s stand over time – and in return developed countries should rapidly deploy energy-efficient low carbon technology to limit the temperature increases below 2°C.<sup>159</sup> It was the recognition of incapacity of the developing countries in terms of technologies but it was also vague because the media’s argument (with the exception of the *WSJ*) was still in line with the KP model, following the climate stand of respective governments in the case of the *WSJ*, *the Hindu* and *China Daily*. It has become clear that the KP did not work and will not work.<sup>160</sup> Instead, many (Canada, Russia, Japan, New Zealand) major

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<sup>156</sup> Broader, December 11, 2011.

<sup>157</sup> Editorial, September 24, 2009.

<sup>158</sup> Liu Junhong, ‘Carbon Rights A Power Game’, *China Daily*, April 9, 2008.

<sup>159</sup> IEA, 2010.

<sup>160</sup> See chapter 4 for details.



emitters from the developed world have opted out from it weakening the KP II still further.

In terms of democratic participation the media's frames emphasized the consensual decision making system surrounding climate change, climate justice and global democracy. Combining climate justice issues with poverty and the historical responsibility of the rich, the media aimed at putting more burdens on richer societies to help support the poor through a redistribution of global wealth to balance global economy. Climate justice is very important to arguments seeking equality in terms of energy rights, redistributing wealth and alleviating poverty while responding to climate change.

Although many argue that the principle of C&C and climate justice are important and a necessary condition for getting anywhere in climate change governance, they have also become obstacles for achieving the ambitious emissions reductions. While the media's focus was on the state-centric framework, little had been discussed about the UN's vision of global democracy (multilateralism) in which NGOs could play the role of representatives of global citizenry. Their limited focus on the roles of NGOs could possibly be either that NGOs are just there, which, as Carter has noted, NGOs have exerted a growing but rarely decisive influence in environmental diplomacy,<sup>161</sup> or that the NGOs themselves are locked into the state-centric framework.

This chapter has shown that the media framed the causes for slow progress by raising the concerns of democratic participation, national interest, power imbalances, the framework and the principles of climate change negotiations. Firstly, the media noted that climate change negotiations suffered from a democratic deficit, but it was not difficult to conclude that an ambitious agreement would not have come through the consensual deliberative process within the prevailing state-centric framework. However, the greater participation from non-state actors and global civil society could have pressured states for a more ambitious agreement.

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<sup>161</sup> Carter, 2007, 260.

Secondly, the media were right to point out the causes of slow progress as national self-interest and the CBDR principles, but their suggestions and proposals for future negotiations were peripheral, as they (except *WSJ*) were still informed by the Kyoto agreement: seeking participation from all but binding for industrialized countries and voluntary for developing countries which no longer met the emissions reductions required by climate science. Also the media did not explicitly emphasize the changing world's economic situation and the need to break the binary distinction of Annex I and Non-Annex I which directly connected to the principles of CBDR and HR.

Thirdly, the media would have been wiser to have framed many things related to climate change negotiations but the *WSJ* failed to unlock contrasting arguments in the interests of 'balanced' reporting. Accordingly, it can safely be said that the media, to some extent, failed to carry out its responsibilities due to the newspapers like *WSJ*. The substantial problem of international climate change negotiations lies in the fact that climate change is a genuinely immediate global problem based on the causes of warming and its impact. It is also a problem of 'common goods' in which the responses of individual states cannot meet global targets; therefore, it makes little sense for individual states to reduce their fossil fuel activities by imposing higher energy costs on industry when they are incapable of preventing climate change on their own and their fellow states are enjoying a disproportionate advantage. Based on the argument that the advanced countries were responsible for causing climate change, many observers have emphasized the responsibility of the advanced countries to lead the actions against climate change, which is a positive step from a climate justice perspective. The record of achievement, however, is very poor.

Under the CBDR and HR the KP determined binding targets for advanced countries whereas it exempted developing countries from any emissions reductions which created problems, particularly the decision of the US to opt out and, subsequently, that action being adopted by many other major emitters from advanced countries. These principles are key problems and do not address the emerging challenges now – with developed countries wanting major emitters to be included but major emitters making arguments that they are still developing countries – in the interim emissions have been increasing steadily and

significantly. This chapter concludes by noting that the main reasons for the slow progress are, first, the inability of the media to educate the public in the interest of climate friendly policy, secondly, the (ir) relevance of the perennial dichotomy of Annex I and Non-Annex I, leading to differentiated and preferred interpretation of CBDR and HR principles related to the power games of major players in the state-centric framework, and, third, little representation of real stakeholders or cognizant of their behaviour change. In the next chapter an over-all summary of this research will be presented followed by the conclusion.

## Chapter 8

### Conclusion

#### 8.1 Introduction

Little progress has been made in mitigating greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions since the world recognised the urgency, risks and opportunities of climate change by establishing the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) in 1992. Chapter 7 noted how international climate change negotiations have become the yearly chore of diplomats with the climate change policy failing to make much progress. States have long developed strategies in response to the challenges of security, in its various forms, seeking to bring order and stability to the many challenging issues affecting the world, yet in response to the major challenge of climate change states have been singularly unsuccessful to date. This thesis has taken as its starting point the paucity of holistic attention paid to working out how and why the UNFCCC climate talks have not made progress by drawing insights on the reasons for this from international climate change negotiations, major climate agreements and the behaviour of media sources and their framing strategies.

While much of the previous research on climate change has focused on particular climate change negotiations, research on the media has been mainly limited to Western countries and has been overshadowed by the debate between sceptics and believers over climate change. Yet, the communication of climate change knowledge, from scientists to policy-makers, and then to the public via the media is of immense interest because of its importance in creating public understanding about global environmental issues.<sup>1</sup> Thus, this thesis assesses behaviour of the media communications through newspapers' articles on the issues of climate change and the development of major climate agreements such as the Kyoto Protocol (KP) and Copenhagen Accord.

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<sup>1</sup> See section 2.3 of Chapter 2. See also: Maxwell T. Boykoff and J. Timmons Roberts, 'Media Coverage of Climate Change: Current Trends, Strengths and Weaknesses', *United Nations Development Programme Human Development Report, 2007/2008*, [http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/boykoff\\_maxwell\\_and\\_roberts\\_j.\\_timmons.pdf](http://hdr.undp.org/sites/default/files/boykoff_maxwell_and_roberts_j._timmons.pdf).

The KP and the Copenhagen Accord, major features of international climate change negotiations, held out much hope as processes to make substantive progress. Yet these hopes have been unfulfilled, with considerable recrimination and anger over the processes used and the outcomes which followed. Instead of progress on the issue, scientific evidence reports that there is a continuing failure to limit emissions, let alone achieving agreement on how to tackle the issue in the future. As discussed earlier (see chapters 1 and 2), scholars have noted that international agreement toward a credible climate-change framework has remained elusive, and in the meantime, emissions and the concentrations of CO<sub>2</sub> in the atmosphere have continued to rise.

Various propositions have been advanced to explain the lack of progress, including the argument that the climate agreements have failed because they did not deal with the issues of consumption of carbon, characteristic problems of climate change and procedural issues of climate talks. The continuing scientific uncertainties surrounding climate change, the differential impact of global warming in different countries, and the divisions between North-South politics blocking agreement over what needs to be done, have been other explanations. There are also uncertainties about the impact and magnitude of climate change although there is also a broad scientific consensus that rising temperatures, increasing emissions levels and higher concentration of the GHGs and their combined impact could potentially lead to the breakdown in the ecosystem.

There have also been major changes in the social, political and economic circumstances of peoples over the two decades since the establishment of UNFCCC in 1992. The United States (US) and the European Union (EU) used to be the largest emitters in the twentieth century but China's economic might has seen it increase its carbon-footprint exponentially becoming the number one emitter. India, Brazil, and South Africa have made huge progress towards becoming major economic world powers. Emerging economies of the South have become major GHGs emitters in the world. Such changes in global politics and economy have raised questions about whether these changes need to be reflected in the principles of the UNFCCC and its categorisation of countries into Annex I (developed countries) and Non-Annex I (developing countries). Yet, the positions of the parties on UNFCCC talks have not changed ever since its establishment.

Indeed, the discussion of climate change policy making has become polarised and politicised which has contributed to the lack of progress. This research has not sought to examine the arguments concerning the origins of, and reasons for, climate change but focuses instead on the difficulties the international community has had in seeking to address major global issues.

This concluding chapter brings together the major themes discussed in this thesis to account for the slow progress of international climate change policy making. It examines the reasons advanced to explain why there has been sluggish progress for developing a robust system of governance for addressing climate change, and considers the future path of climate change policy making. This study has focused on three core and interrelated issues fundamental to the slow progress on climate change agreement: democratic deficit, inappropriate institutional frameworks and principles based on state-centrism, and the role of media in the communications of climate change issues.

Democratic participation and deliberation is very significant in all areas of policy making but it is more important when the real addressees have to change their behaviour to bring about the change required. A number of issues influence climate change policy making including its scientific certainty, its disproportionate causes and impacts, and its costs and benefits in space and over time. Economic, social, political, and cultural issues are embedded within climate decision making.

International climate change governance, albeit weak, has so far proposed regulation and market based initiatives in response to climate challenges. To ameliorate some of the climate change effects through regulatory approaches, taxes have been introduced in one form or another to those who have been sidelined in the climate policy making process. Under competitive market based initiatives it is envisaged that the market would take a lead role in making climate friendly products and climate neutral technology, but businesses are not included in the decision making process because, so far, although by name UNFCCC is multilateral but by action it is an inter-state, inter-ministerial and state-centric platform in which decisions are to be made by governments, not by other actors.

In seeking to account for the lack of progress in climate change management, much criticism has been directed at the failure of states to agree to, and implement, policies to limit GHG emissions within their jurisdictions. As noted in chapters 4 to 7 the developed countries have been identified as giving rise to the problem through their practices of industrialisation and, particularly, their heavy reliance on fossil fuels to maintain their economic growth. The recently industrialising states are now the main producers of GHGs as the industrialised societies have stabilised or reduced their emissions. Developed countries have declined taking concerted action without similar commitments from emerging developing countries. For their part the developing countries have accused the rich countries of inaction and refused to take action. While such an approach may well have been relevant and important in dealing with territorial issues, it has not been effective in dealing with non-territorial issues such as climate change, bio diversity loss, environmental degradation and related issues.

The effects of climate change are a non-institutional issue which are borderless by nature and do not respect boundaries such as geographical borders, statehood and sovereignty, yet the major approach to tackle the challenges of climate change is based on institutions which are mainly state-centric, where nation-states prioritize their vested interests rather than implementing the responses required under the challenges of global climate conditions. The failure of conventional diplomacy to achieve any tangible outcome over the twenty years since the establishment of the UNFCCC reveals its diminishing capacity to handle global problems such as climate change.

The media has long been an important aspect of peoples' lives in helping to form opinions.<sup>2</sup> Media sources inform, analyse and educate people on short and long term concerns, simplifying complex scientific issues into simpler communications.<sup>3</sup> As one of the current significant issues, climate change has featured prominently in the media. The general public does not have a great understanding of climate science and relies on the information provided by the media. The scientific consensus on climate change is gradually building up to the

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<sup>2</sup> See section 2.3 of Chapter 2. See also Boykoff and Roberts 2008.

<sup>3</sup> Ibid.

point where most climate scientists are agreed that climate change is real and happening based on patterns of events and other geographical data.

Yet the public is not generally unaware of the gravity of the impact of climate change.<sup>4</sup> The newspapers commented that nobody had successfully challenged the urgency of the climate mission, despite the well-financed efforts of some industry groups to minimize the warming threat.<sup>5</sup> These interest groups have spent much on their rhetoric of scepticism. A significant proportion of Americans still dismiss the climate change and sustainability agenda as bad science, bad religion, bad for business and bad for America.<sup>6</sup> Addressing climate change calls for global responses not only from states but also from businesses and individuals from around the world to embrace the necessary measures. Any disconnection between scientific knowledge and public understanding of climate science, a role in which the media can play a major part, hinders progress on international climate change governance.

From these issues, outlined and examined in chapter 2, propositions were developed from the literature for assessing in this thesis. The central research question of this study asks: *Why has there been little progress in the making of an effective international climate change governance to prevent climate change?* This research has set out to assess five propositions to explain this lack of progress and account for why, when confronted with such a significant issue, we have been unable to agree on what needs to be done and how to effect significant change. The following propositions<sup>7</sup> were developed from the literature to answer the central research question.

1. The institutional shortcomings of the UNFCCC, and also of the democratic processes of the UN and its environmental organizations, have resulted in the lack of progress towards international climate change governance.

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<sup>4</sup> See section 2.3 of Chapter 2. See also: Boykoff and Boykoff, 2004.

<sup>5</sup> Editorial, 'Remember Global Warming?' *NYT*, November 11, 1998, A 26.

<sup>6</sup> James Jones, 'Face to Faith', *GUK*, February 2, 2008,

<http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/2008/feb/02/uselections2008.religion?INTCMP=SRCH>.

<sup>7</sup> See chapter 2 for details.



2. The lack of open and representative processes, together with the lack of consensual debate and public accountability have resulted in the failure to achieve agreement on international climate change governance.
3. The competitive system of global governance negates efforts to achieve an international consensus on international climate change governance.
4. The state-centric framework of international negotiations on climate change governance prevent the prioritisation of saving the global commons.
5. The role of the media in building the trust of the public of the issues of climate change science and proposed policies is essential to the endeavours of political and policy leaders to come to agreement on climate change governance.

#### **8.1.1 Propositions 1 and 2**

Two propositions were derived from the literature discussed in chapter 2 to assess the arguments which focus on the democratic and institutional shortcomings of the UN systems. The first proposition is that the institutional shortcomings of the UNFCCC, and also of the democratic processes of the UN and its environmental organizations, have resulted in the lack of progress towards international climate change governance. The second proposition is that the lack of open and representative processes, together with the lack of consensual debate and public accountability have resulted in the failure to achieve agreement on international climate change governance.

Research in chapters 4, 5 and 7 showed that there were serious issues of democratic deficit in the making of climate change agreements. At Kyoto, observers were barred from attending meetings or plenary sessions on the discretion of the chair of the sessions. The outcome of Kyoto did not reflect any goals of environmental non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and other non-state actors which were excluded from effective participation, deliberation and decision making. During Copenhagen many observers were barred from entering the Hall particularly in the second week of negotiations. And the final negotiations barred more than 100 representatives of the nation-states, leaving the

US, Brazil, South Africa, India and China (BASIC) to make the final decisions. COP-15 showed that not only were observers such as NGOs denied access but also the main negotiators (states) could not deliberate to produce the agreement – violating the right of equality and consensual politics provided by the rules of procedures of the UNFCCC and the state-centric Charter of the UN. Democratic deliberation, representation, participatory decision making, accountability and transparency were noticeably absent.

As discussed in Chapter 2, Dahl noted that international decision making processes are not democratic because the governance process is technocratic and people are not represented. Held noted that there are representational and institutional shortcomings in the UN and proposed a General Assembly of the People as the path to making the UN more democratic. Additionally, Baber and Bartlett noted that international environmental governance is plagued by a democratic deficit because the process is not inclusive and deliberative. Zurn stated that climate change governance suffers from democratic and legitimacy deficits because the real addressees (people and businesses) are side-lined in the process. Attempting to meet these sorts of criticisms, the UN developed its own vision of democracy in which it encouraged a partnership among the states, international (governmental) organizations (IOs) and non-state actors including NGOs, but the states remained the central actors and the rest were observers.<sup>8</sup> At Kyoto and Copenhagen international climate change governance negotiations were restricted to a select few states with non-state actors unable to make any effective contributions.

The research identified concerns about democratic deliberations, institutional frameworks, representation, accountability and transparency supporting the conclusion that the causes of slow progress were the institutional shortcomings of the UNFCCC and also the democratic processes of the UN and its environmental organizations.<sup>9</sup> The UN and environmental organizations are required to make further changes in institutional structures and representation, to ensure there is a more inclusive and more deliberative approach which encompasses all

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<sup>8</sup> See chapter 2.

<sup>9</sup> See chapters 4 and 5 for details.

stakeholders in a more democratic, legitimate, accountable and transparent process.

Copenhagen 2009 could be considered an unmanageable conference because each of the parties was sticking to their positions until the last day, and even the NGOs were split on their own role in the climate negotiation process. The number of participants was enormous (more than 40,000) and the Bella centre could accommodate only 15,000 participants. Opinions were diverse and the available time was limited. Thus, one can question whether there would be a viable agreement outcome had all non-state actors and all other parties deliberated until the end of the conference. In the case of Copenhagen one could say ‘no’ to the outcome, but actual progress could have been made had the non-state actors been allowed to participate until the last day. Without the protesting and pressuring of the many NGOs and other groups, the Copenhagen Accord as it was formulated could have not been produced. Those groups reminded the major emitters that the world was watching.

It is apparent that collective decision making processes are less hierarchical and more collaborative and can bring about more effective policy outcomes given they are the levers of change. In addition to more inclusive top-down approach, the bottom-up approaches from NGOs, local governments, and the actual stakeholders – people and businesses – need to be encouraged to act collectively for climate change policy to be successful at the grass-roots level.<sup>10</sup> One of the most important features in making climate change policy is to support and give effect to the individual consumer/citizen’s role because that is essential in seeking to introduce policies carrying sensitive responses.<sup>11</sup> Thus, on the issue of democratic deficit, the research concludes that the practice of state-centric multilateralism side-lined the actual addressees with the result that the challenges of the climate change impasse cannot be met.

This research analysis affirms the first proposition that the lack of progress towards achieving the benefits of climate change was due to the institutional and representational shortcomings of the UNFCCC. The UN embraces some

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<sup>10</sup> See Mathew J. Hoffman, *Climate Governance at the Crossroads* (Oxford and New York: Oxford, 2011).

<sup>11</sup> See chapters 2 and 8.

democratic notions and values, but the extent to which it carries these out depends on its strong state-centric structure and assumptions about internal and external sovereignty. This will be considered under proposition 3 below.

This research analysis supports the second proposition, that the principles of consensual debate and public accountability are required for there to be open and representative procedures in developing a process of global governance on matters of climate change. The research reveals considerable short-comings over open and representative procedures providing serious implications for democratic practices, legitimacy and public accountability of the policy making processes. As with proposition 1, this conclusion is not limited to the issue of climate change agreements. It is a feature of the present structure and processes of the UN, which leads to the conclusion that the UN has failed to be an adequate instrument for attempting climate change governance. Progress in climate change governance will depend on finding ways to deal with existing obstacles of democratic participation, representation, and deliberation at decision making process. Future research can focus on the models or processes of compatible democracy to effectively address democratic deficit of climate change governance.

#### **8.1.2 Propositions 3 and 4**

Two propositions were derived from the literature in chapter 2 to examine the arguments which focus on the institutional and state-centric approaches to tackling global issues, with particular reference to climate change governance. The third proposition is that the competitive system of global governance negates efforts to achieve an international consensus on international climate change governance. The fourth proposition is that the state-centric framework of international negotiations on climate change governance prevent the prioritisation of saving the global commons.

The second theme of the research concerned the prevalence of the state-centric framework in promoting and conducting the negotiations. This framework for the consideration of climate change was instituted early in efforts to address the issue with the establishment of the UNFCCC. It was assumed that climate change was an issue for states to deal with under the state-centric framework. Yet, it is argued here, that there is a clear need to critically re-examine the framework used in

seeking to come to an agreement able to deliver an effective climate change governance to prevent climate change.

Climate change is a complex issue and while state interests and power considerations are important in addressing the matter, they are critical to facilitating agreed measures rather than determining what those measures should be. The evidence of chapters 4, 5, 6, and 7 clearly shows that states were the driving actors of the negotiations and the decision making which resulted, and that the agreements made were founded on the state-centric framework. The Kyoto and Copenhagen processes simply side-lined the actual addressees. Chapter 4 outlined how the influential members of the COPs manifested their interests in ratifying or rejecting the agreements developed at Kyoto. It showed the confines of the state-centric approach by restricting the admission of non-state actors in the plenary sessions which resulted in the lowest common denominator manifested as an outcome.

Chapter 5 showed that the Copenhagen conference was a clear example of the use of the state-centric approach leading to a deadlock in negotiations as each participating state sought to promote its own interests, and major emitters refused to accept the required, if ambitious, binding targets. The non-state actors were denied access throughout the second week of the conference and finally the decision making process was hijacked by the big five emitters in producing an agreement of their choice.<sup>12</sup> National economic interests, issues of sovereignty and power structure played vital roles, affirming that progress on international climate change governance was determined by the salience given by participating states to environmental concerns. Earlier chapters also showed that the current principles of common but differentiated responsibilities (CBDR) and historical responsibility (HR) were at the core of the negotiations and that nation-states were articulating their national-interests as they used the advantages of the state-centric framework in pursuit of their particular concerns.

Non-state actors, including NGOs, were seeking to make their own contribution to the discussions and negotiations, but they were effectively side-lined by those who were following a state-centric approach. Hence, the core question is how we

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<sup>12</sup> See chapter 5. 5 and 5.9.

can revise principles to make them acceptable for all working through a situation where most participants are operating within their state-centric assumptions and leading to a lack of progress. In other words, states were functioning in a self-defeating framework and its principles. Creating and developing a framework, and its principles, which step outside this self-defeating state-centric approach, is the task confronting efforts to generate an international climate consensus. Such a framework and principles would seek to identify and include the main and several issues of climate change (such as economic and development implications) and also the core parties involved – whether state or non-state – and promote outcomes which enjoyed widespread support for an effective agreement among the negotiating parties and across the world at large, and about which there was acceptance of the proposed changes.

Within the current framework, the lack of appropriate observation of the rules of procedures, consensual deliberations and decision making rights of peer-member-states gave rise to concerns over accountability and democracy.<sup>13</sup> It also showed the difficulties in achieving consensual decision making practices within and through the UNFCCC. The chapters on the media revealed that although states had sovereign equality at the negotiations, the power structure often undermined the consensual decision making process. For example, Kyoto was not ratified by the US and it failed to engage Australia and others seriously. The Copenhagen Accord was blocked by 6 small countries but it succeeded at a functional level through the Cancun agreement. One small state (Bolivia) objected to the Cancun agreement but it still made its way through the UNFCCC process.

The language of North-South politics, the developmental rights of the South, and the environmental concerns of the North provided sharp contrasts and diverse perspectives. The countries of the South declared their intention to continue their economic growth at any cost. From the Kyoto to Doha, China, India and other emerging economies repeatedly made it clear that they considered the North was responsible for the environmental mess and that it should lead by example by reducing emissions, whereas emerging economies should be able to continue their development initiatives without being required to make emission reductions. The

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<sup>13</sup> See chapter 5.3 and chapter 8.4.

Europeans, and the US were intent on securing a commitment to protect the climate from the new economic superpowers, China and India but the new economic powers bonded together to argue that they were still developing countries.

Developing countries have not been willing to slow their economic growth even given the environmental costs, creating a fear of losing competitiveness with the developed world, while developed countries have been reluctant to make substantial funding available in the face of losing competitiveness. Developed countries wanted to allocate emissions targets to big emitters based on current emissions rates whereas major emitters from developing countries intended to overturn this status-quo and others of the least developing countries wanted to maintain the status-quo.

The issues of burden sharing have not been able to balance the conflicting interests of the major emitters from developed and developing countries. Now, as it is identified that the key to managing climate change and temperature limits lies in the economic drivers of a country, countries have been understandably unwilling to risk their economies in the name of climate change unless others do the same. The state-centric framework is manifestly stronger in the name of 'national interest' and sovereignty.<sup>14</sup> Few nation-states will adopt any measures to reduce GHG emissions unless they are convinced that their peers are also doing so. Nonetheless, the scientists have been urging greater efforts for reductions in the face of ever rapidly rising emissions. Climate scientists have claimed that the climate impacts being seen around the world should compel us to reduce emissions and plan for a 'changing future'.

This research examined the principles of CBDR and HR and concluded that they are static, lack clarity, and subject to multiple arbitrary interpretations. Countries have been changing their interpretations when it suits them politically to do so because these principles lack clarity in terms of changing plights of the countries.<sup>15</sup> These principles need revision and clarity on the issues of contention such as taking responsibility, burden sharing, graduation and leadership to avoid

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<sup>14</sup> See chapters 4, 5 and 8.

<sup>15</sup> See chapters 4 to 8.

arbitrary interpretations. The fundamental task of climate change governance is to establish clarity on norms and procedures. So far, the negotiation processes dealt with a wide range of technical issues<sup>16</sup> such as enhanced adaptation, mitigation, finance and technology transfers but the clarity on norms about who should be involved in legally binding commitments for emission reductions and what actions should be taken to combat climate change have been perennially postponed.

As climate change is a global problem which needs a global solution, it does not matter where GHGs are emitted because they have equal effect on changing climate irrespective of their origin locations. They end up in the shared atmosphere. Although the choices are difficult, in stopping the potentially irreversible and dangerous impacts of climate change, profound responses from every country and everyone according to their ability are required. Burden sharing is related to the costs of mitigation and also the costs of adaptation. Making appropriate responses to climate change needs the necessary resources such as funding for innovations, and knowledge and technology transfers. These resources are easily and abundantly available in the rich countries but most poor countries lack some or all of these resources, therefore it becomes the burden sharing responsibility of the rich countries to transfer required funding, knowledge and technology to those lacking the indispensable resources. In return for the support of their incapacity, poor countries would move deliberately towards a low-carbon life-style as their green industries grow and levels of environmental awareness proliferate.

However, there are questions around how a poor country can become a rich and prosperous country in 10 to 20 years' time and how the transition from a poor to rich country can be materialized in terms of taking climate change responsibility. South Korea, China and India provide examples of the strong growth of developing economies. These economies are fundamentally dependent on fossil-fuels and would not be a model of development for other developing countries. The challenge lies how to affect a rapid transition in the economy while maintaining our quality of life. Fostering innovative technologies and cutting edge

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<sup>16</sup> Lavanya Rajamani, *The Copenhagen Agreed Outcome: Form, Shape and Influence* (New Delhi: Centre for Policy Research, 2009). And see Kulovesi and Gutierrez, 2009.



research is a clear option for the North to further stabilize emissions and for the South to embrace a new model of green economic development. Complementary to it, is encouraging people to live climate friendly life-styles and to invest in low carbon services and industries.

A number of countries are now major emitters through their production processes and through consumption as identified in 5.9 section of chapter 5. The US, China, India, Russia, Canada, the EU and Australia are currently the major actors and so play role in making serious reductions in their emissions. But their domestic reality of continuous economic growth heavily relies on fossil fuels—the carbon—the major culprit of climate change. To make progress, emitters such as China and India must be supported by the advanced developed countries with technology transfers to meet their incapacity and the ambitious targets set down. Nonetheless, these emerging economies can still contribute to the mitigation of climate change because they are often in better positions than many other developing countries in Africa and Asia. Given that states are at differing developmental stages, the categories of Non-Annex I countries and Annex I countries used extensively in the climate negotiations, need to be reviewed, revised to create more room that recognizes the changing status of countries since they no longer capture key issues of climate change.

The principle of CBDR is an important element in addressing climate change but it is vague now as noted above. It clearly notes that climate change is common problem and countries have differentiated responsibilities but it does not clearly stipulate the correlation of countries' economic growth and development with their burden sharing responsibilities. In general understanding, for the developed world, it means that significant contributions are required in addressing climate change which has arisen from industrialization processes. For the developing world, it means there needs to be development proposals to lift millions of people out of poverty. Lifting the lives of the poor in the South out of poverty was articulated strongly in the Brundtland Commission's 1987 report as well as being one of the central goals of MDGs.<sup>17</sup> Emerging countries whose economies heavily depend on older and more polluting technologies argue that they have a right to

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<sup>17</sup> See chapter 5 for details.

development to grow their economies to escape poverty and achieve prosperity. They expect a right to the lion's share of future emissions because CBDR does not clarify when a country needs to shoulder the burden of tackling climate change. But the poorest and most vulnerable countries do not share the views of emerging economies. Karl Hood, Chairman of Alliance of Small Island States (AOSIS) noted during Durban negotiation in 2011: "Must we accept our annihilation? While they [emerging economies] develop, we die. Why should we accept this?"<sup>18</sup>

As outlined in chapter 5 and 7, poverty and the environment are not substitutes for each other, rather they are enemies. Addressing the serious issues of widespread poverty does not mean that the developing world should follow the same path of development as that had been followed in the developed countries. This research argues that rather than repeating the mistakes of the industrialised countries and continuing with business-as-usual, developing countries need to adopt and embrace economic development which is appropriate to the current climate for climate-friendly world. It means relying increasingly on developing new technologies which are not reliant on fossil fuels and climate-friendly production and consumption in order to decrease emissions.

The dominant and current model of development being practised in the South is that of reliance on fossil-fuelled technologies. As discussed in chapters 4, 5 and 7, recent data reports that despite ever-present climate change concerns, coal fired power generation is expanding faster than ever with capacity additions experiencing record levels in China and India. Here, the role of technology transfers, knowledge transfers and funding transfers is paramount to any success. Unless technology like carbon capture and storage and other low-carbon technologies are transferred to the developing world, no GHG emissions will be abated. The countries of the South generally do not possess many of the high technologies available in the North and the North has been unwilling to transfer their existing low carbon technology to the South. It is important, as the media consistently argued, that there should be a continuing search for zero-carbon technology and that the available technology should be transferred to developing countries in order to change their carbon footprint based development.

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<sup>18</sup> See chapter 8 for details.

As discussed in chapter 2 above, the competitive system of state-centric global governance makes an international climate consensus beyond the reach of current negotiations. Future agreements will require that the world develops an all-inclusive and binding climate change agreement to contain the global temperature increase at 2°C. This would mean a top down approach which can come only with widespread agreement, particularly of major emitters and consumers. But other multiple approaches, including bottom-up, are needed which extend beyond state-centrism to embrace the active participation and deliberation of the main stakeholders. There can be no lasting agreement unless the stakeholders (the levers of change) are agreed on the measures to be taken and are willing to implement relevant policies at the domestic level.

The failure of the KP to achieve the lowest denominator targets of 5 per cent demonstrated the outcomes which follow when there is only limited cooperation between the parties. This research established that a Kyoto-style agreement would not be able to achieve the UNFCCC's objective of stabilizing GHGs, unless major emitters from the South are included for binding targets, since the emissions in the developed countries were declining while increasing rapidly in non-OECD countries. The chapters on media perspectives also demonstrated that without the full participation of the US and China, along with other emerging economies, emission reductions cannot be established. Four out of the five media sources considered the KP to be a milestone, yet it was not able to achieve the objective for which it had been established.<sup>19</sup> Under the current state-centric framework, without the participation of major emitters from the both developed and developing countries, emissions can neither be reduced nor climate temperatures limited.<sup>20</sup>

GHG emissions have risen significantly, confirming that any legally binding or voluntary agreements without firm and serious emission reduction commitments from major emitters would be a skeleton without flesh and blood in the fight of climate change. The only way to delink fossil fuel emissions from the ups and downs of the world economy is to develop a robust alternative to carbon markets, more investment in renewable energies and to ensure that alternative power

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<sup>19</sup> See chapters 6, 7 and 8.

<sup>20</sup> See chapter 5.4 and chapter 8.3.

became a credible option. The construction of international climate treaty rests on a complex, state-centric process of political bargaining and negotiation among nation- states and progress towards an agreement that could reduce emissions were stalled because negotiators, particularly from the US and major developing countries, were at a stand-off. If major emitting countries such as China, India, Brazil, and South Africa, were exempted, even if the remaining Annex I parties made 100 per cent reductions, GHG emissions would not be reduced.

In light of these findings, this research concludes that the reliance on the state-centric framework and existing principles of the CBDR and HR means that these institutions, on which the climate change negotiations have depended, together with their norms, are not able to address the challenge of climate change. Progress in developing an international climate consensus can only come as the international system moves beyond the state-centric framework to the priority of saving the global commons and fixing the existing problems of UNFCCC's principles. New institutional designs and norm-setting procedures particularly of CBDR and HR need to be established at the international level to incorporate all the main international actors and the main stakeholders to address the transnational challenge of climate change, together with the development of technologies to significantly reduce the reliance on fossil fuels in economic planning.

Indeed, new and creative institutional designs are required to take the climate change negotiations process away from a state-centric approach to one in which all key actors are part of negotiations designed to reduce emissions and the one that can confluence the interests of major emitters as well. Climate policies can be negotiated, implemented and enforced by states in the absence of ultimate addressees but the levels of compliance and effectiveness remain far beyond the goals unless the levers-of-change agree to comply. States are but one of the international actors, and certainly important actors given their importance in implementing legislation and policies at the domestic level. Yet, states need to work closely with societies, communities and businesses in arriving at strategies for emission reductions. The societal focus is necessary to ensure local communities understand the climatic and environmental dynamics and problems at the local level and their impact at all levels. This inclusive participatory

deliberative process at the multi-actors negotiation forum, inclusive of states and non-state actors, along with enlightened understanding of the issues help cut the climate impasse.

This research shows strong support for the third proposition, that an international climate consensus is not possible because of the competitive system of global governance. The competitive nature of the international system, operating in a state-centric framework, lies at the heart of the failure to make progress on climate change governance. The fourth proposition, that progress in developing an international climate consensus can only come as the international system moves beyond the state-centric framework to the priority of saving the global commons, presents the alternative to the present system of international negotiation. But it does so with particular emphasis on developing a much more inclusive approach, which limits the capacity of veto power on the part of limited and particular interests to slow the progress of an effective climate governance.

This research did not seek to develop and test models on a new framework of governance which is beyond the scope of this study but suggests further areas for significant research. Instead it emphasises the values of identifying and including the major parties – state and non-state – in determining clearly the many complex issues associated with climate change, and the implications for economic, social and political change. Progress in climate change governance will depend on finding the ways to re-invent an international system that focuses more on solutions to global common problems than the narrow state-centric national interest and power politics.

### **8.1.3 Proposition 5**

The final proposition was derived from the literature in chapter 2 to examine the arguments concerning the role of the media in facilitating and promoting public understanding of the issues and negotiations surrounding climate change. The last proposition is that the role of the media in building the trust of the public of the issues of climate change science and proposed policies is essential to the endeavours of political and policy leaders to come to agreement on climate change governance.

This research examined the framing of arguments of the selected media or newspapers, which has a very important role in educating the public and passing information about climate change and negotiations onto the public if there is to be progress on climate change management. Chapters 6 and 7 determined that the selected media had done their job in informing people about the developments around climate change negotiations. The newspapers, with an exception of *WSJ*, while framing its coverage of the issues of climate change included many of the important concerns surrounding climate change, including accounts of international climate change negotiations, proposed possible climate deals, such as the US leadership and Chinese participation.

They consistently urged the development of appropriate technology to reduce emissions, and advocated the transfer of technology to the developing countries as a means of reducing emissions. They also noted the political and economic unwillingness of the US, Japan and the EU for technology transfers to keep the late comers developing countries at strategic disadvantage for the North's interest of power games and economic development. They touched upon the issues of state-centric national interest, undemocratic negotiations processes, climate justice, potential roles of major emitters and except the *WSJ*, the selected newspapers warned for the catastrophic impacts of climate change if timely actions were not taken.

Yet as discussed in chapter 2, the *WSJ*'s balanced but biased reporting failed to guide the public out of the confusion of the debate between sceptics and believers particularly in the US. The *WSJ* created confusion by highlighting the contrary voices on climate change science rather than assessing what the options were and what needed to be done. The *NYT*, *GUK*, *the Hindu* and *China Daily* attached their news stories of climate change to prospects for a scary future without showing how the nontangible and invisible GHGs would impact on peoples' lives and what they could do to change themselves, their values, practices and social norms. The selected newspapers, with an exception of the *WSJ*, reported the IPCC's projections of global warming, now accepted by the global political elites and the international scientific community, of the threats to economic growth, long-term prosperity, and the physical survival of human populations.

The analysis of *WSJ* and *NYT* made it clear that there were really two different stances in the US on climate change. The *NYT* stance was pro-environmentalist and consistently sought for better and more effective climate change policies. The *WSJ* stance was stridently anti-climate change policy and represented only part of contemporary American thinking on the issue. Analysis in chapters 6 and 7 note that the *WSJ* stance reflects its anti-regulation, anti-climate views, which lead it to an anti-environmentalist stance. Events like climategate may have provided politicians and policy makers with the opportunity to delay the agreement and leave the public in confusion. Together, these issues have had serious implications on the role of media and provide a strong argument for greater public awareness and education.

As discussed in chapter 7, the public in today's world do not have the time and access to read peer-reviewed papers; they are busy to make their livings; taking care of their jobs and family. The characteristic problem of climate change is its invisibility both in terms of the level of emissions and temperature rise, which is difficult to understand even for experts. A portion of the global media, such as the *WSJ*, has confused people and policy makers. Polarization is clearly seen in the developed world such as the US and Australia. The lack of know-how to adapt to climate change is seen in the developing world. The fundamental climate solutions lie in societal, economic and energy transformations making public education of paramount importance in preparing people to adopt climate friendly lifestyles and policies. If people do not understand the nuts and bolts of climate change, they are unlikely to work towards a climate friendly world.

Although the *WSJ* argued for innovative technological development for economic interests, the *NYT*, *GUK*, *the Hindu* and *China Daily* argued that low carbon or zero carbon technology must be incessantly sought and available 'know-how' be deployed to the developing countries. This thesis has highlighted the concerns of energy politics and the politics of resources in chapters 4, 5 and 7. The positions on climate change taken by governments, to an extent, depend on their domestic political systems and the 'range and balance' of powerful economic interests and their reliance on fossil fuels. This is most apparent in the case of the US and it also has implications for China and India. The climate change challenge is a highly political issue because of the impact on the many interests.

At Copenhagen, there was hope that with the inauguration of Obama the US would provide a strong leadership role on climate change, and that China's strengthened standing would also show some leadership on climate change. It did not translate into reality, with each of the two major emitters seeking excuses for their lack of action by using the other's failure to act, with a weak and limited document produced confirming that in the final analysis, only agreements that are politically acceptable to national leaders will be approved.<sup>21</sup> As the newspapers noted, both of these leaders failed to bridge the gap. China was no longer presenting as a backward country, and the US was not acknowledging its responsibility to help the poor and most vulnerable nations to reduce emissions without sacrificing growth.

Section 4.7 of chapter 4 and 5.9 of chapter 5 articulated the conflicting national and political self-interests of the major emitters and their negative impact on international climate governance. As China pointed out, although it might produce high emissions, these are on behalf of consumers in developed countries, and therefore the consumers should pay for the relevant reductions.<sup>22</sup> On this line of argument it follows that developed countries should pay more for GHG emission reductions based on their high consumption ratio. However, it fails to address the fundamental goal of emissions abatement and the issues surrounding the rising population and middle class in China, India, and Brazil and their greatly increasingly consumption of commodities. In fact, Korea and Mexico joined the OECD six months after the adoption of the Kyoto Protocol, but they have still remained as Non-Annex I countries. Emerging economies such as China, India, Brazil, Korea, Mexico and South Africa had more in common on some key economic dimensions with some countries in the so-called developed world than they did with the poorest developing countries, such as those of sub-Saharan Africa and Asia.<sup>23</sup> Smaller nations do and could influence the course of the negotiations but a great deal would depend on the kind of role the US, the EU,

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<sup>21</sup> Lawrence Susskind, *Environmental Diplomacy: Negotiating more Effective Global Agreements* (New York: Oxford University Press, 1994), 12.

<sup>22</sup> Ibid, 19 and Jiahua Pan, Jonathan Phillips and Ying Chen, 'China's Balance of Emissions Embodied in Trade: Approaches to Measurement and Allocating International Responsibility', in *The Economics and Politics of Climate Change*, eds., Dieter Helm and Cameron Hepburn, 142-66 (New York: Oxford University Press, 2009).

<sup>23</sup> Ibid.



China, and India ended up playing in the negotiations and the high-level political parleys.<sup>24</sup>

Each government positions itself with its own national/political/economic/energy interests and the UNFCCC's state-centric framework allows them to articulate their interests based on their domestic political system and necessity. Newspapers operate within these political systems and play an active role in them, from their own economic and political-ideological positions. The *WSJ*, *China Daily* and *the Hindu* played active roles consistent with their respective countries' political systems and national interests. The *WSJ* aligned its stance with the fossil fuelled-industries, the Byrd-Hegel Resolution and Bush Administration. The *Hindu* and *China Daily* aligned with the principles of Convention 1992 and the Kyoto Protocol and resisted Western attempts to transfer the burden of climate change to China and India. These interests are inseparably attached to the state-centric framework that sidelines the common interests of addressing climate change.

The newspapers also acknowledged that there were no ambitious actions against climate change at the global and local levels and some of the newspapers concluded that the UNFCCC was not able to deliver the required outcomes. The *WSJ*, *NYT* and *GUK* sought for alternative approaches but the alternative approaches they suggested were the forums like the Group of 7/8 (G-7/8) and major economic forums (MEF) that were basically centred on an inter-state structure, and which had themselves failed to produce any substantive changes. *The Hindu* and *China Daily* argued that the UNFCCC must be the central institution to address climate change and alternative approaches need to be supplementary to UNFCCC. The newspapers did not move away from an adherence to a state-centric approach and did not question the extent to which it was a self-defeating approach. The newspapers offered little analysis about how to effectively solve borderless problems of climate change and other emerging non-territorial challenges of 21<sup>st</sup> century.

The newspapers framing of Kyoto as a model of climate agreement, the continued adequacy of the state-centrism and institutional frameworks and principles of

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<sup>24</sup> Editorials, 'Copenhagen's Indifferent Start', *The Hindu*, December 15, 2009, <http://www.thehindu.com/2009/12/15/stories/2009121557400800.htm>.

UNFCCC are important, but over the last twenty years little has been achieved in addressing climate change based on these frameworks and principles. Revisions need to address the changing circumstances of states and the ratios of GHG emissions so that all major emitters are taking responsibility. The Kyoto style agreement has not helped to reduce GHGs, and the exclusive state-centric framework has failed to produce agreement among the main parties in working towards a system of an effective climate governance.

In sum, although the newspapers played their roles by touching upon various issues mentioned earlier, the balanced yet selective and biased reporting of the *WSJ*, the dominance of the state-centric framework, and their role as mouthpieces of their respective governments (particularly in the case of the *WSJ*, *the Hindu* and *China Daily*) did not contribute much to an effective and viable international climate change governance. In terms of the role of these three newspapers on climate change issues, the respective governments appeared to be writing the curriculum instead of climate science and its projections and determining required solutions. The newspapers were divided on the causes of climate change, issues of agenda setting and in identifying recommendations. Thus, it has important implications for the arguments about the role of the media as offering an independent voice and commentator on major matters. The role of the media needs to fulfil its social responsibility as noted in section 2.3 of chapter 2 by being more critical and more investigative to enable the addressees to ‘own’ the problem and work towards sustainable solutions.

This research concludes that the media needs to reframe their frames of arguments and structures and to be more critical and investigative in order to provide states, societies and businesses with the background and understanding to enable appropriate action to be taken. The media is essential in educating the global public concerning the debate of – between and within – North-South politics, the right to development, and historical responsibility. The KP was but a step along the way. By using news frames that emphasize that addressing the climate change problem, together with the significant positive policy ramifications for the whole world which would follow in addressing climate change, the arguments for the transformation of fossil fuelled based dependent societies into a more independent

and self-sufficient communities that rely on new modes of energy to by-pass the effects of fossil fuel consumption would be strengthened.

The media needs to educate societies and businesses about the necessity to ‘own’ the problem, to show differences in daily weather changes and long term climate patterns and to encourage ecologically conscious citizens who are willing to change social norms from a ‘consumer society’ to a ‘conserving society’. And as individuals and businesses are convinced to prevent climate change as well as convincing alternatives become evident, they would be encouraged to reduce their GHG footprints and to put pressure on their governments for climate friendly policies.

## **8.2 Summary**

This research demonstrates that climate change is an increasingly complex issue that demands a comprehensive approach to solve problems which has become insulated around political, economic and social demands along with uncertainties of governance implications for humanity. The UNFCCC talks have been on-going for over 20 years but they have yet to effect any change thus far. The five propositions analysed through this research elucidated that the process of international climate change governance is locked in a non-inclusive, flawed institutional framework and principles where not only the primary addressees have been excluded from the decision making processes but also states perennially debate about taking climate change responsibilities. The institutional framework needs to be more inclusive instead of exclusive and the principles of CBDR and HR needs to be revisited to accommodate different categories of states’ economic growth and development, and their baggage of political/national interests’s that is attached with their positions at international climate change negotiations. The divisions among the newspapers as to whether to become either environmentalists or anti-environmentalists news outlets did not help break the impasse, but rather left the public confused by the dichotomies.

To effect any substantive change for arresting climate change requires changes not only in attitudes of consumers (public) and producers (industries) but also of states and the state-centric institutional framework of the UNFCCC that side-lines the consumers and producers from the process of negotiations and policy making.

The state-centric framework does not engender ownership of the problem or work towards positive solutions. The parties have approached CBDR and respective capacity differently and have not been able to come to consensus on the best way to share GHG emission reductions. Until today, differentiation between the parties is fundamentally based on the binary distinction of Annex I (developed countries) and Non-Annex I (developing countries) but developed countries have challenged this binary distinction and current political and economic realities render this approach irrelevant. However, inequalities still remain and must be taken into consideration while charting future principles of UNFCCC. It is significantly important that climate change policy making be more inclusive, participatory, and deliberative especially focused on the ones most at risk and the ones that need to change their behaviour. Although the aim of this research is limited to identifying the causes of slow progress, it has also opened avenues for further research on how international climate change policy making can be made exclusively more inclusive and democratic.

Although newspapers follow the norms of balanced reporting, they need to be more thoughtful in communicating climate change because the ‘so called’ balanced reporting in terms of climate change becomes biased reporting. This research has demonstrated that these newspapers did not operate outside the domestic and international political systems; rather, they played active role within these political systems to articulate their own economic and political-ideological positions. The *WSJ* simply disparaged the KP and any other climate agreement and the other newspapers argued for continued relevance of CBDR and HR based in this context.

As argued earlier, while they are important elements of international climate change governance, it is inevitable to critically assess how such principles are appropriately and effectively used. The newspapers can, indeed, play an important role to help assess the existing frameworks, and principles critically. As noted in chapter 2, fifty years ago in 1963 Bernard Cohen argued: “The press may not be successful much of the time in telling people what to think, but it is stunningly successful in telling its readers what to think about.”<sup>25</sup> Thus, the newspapers need

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<sup>25</sup> Bernard Cohen, *The Press and Foreign Policy* (New York: Harcourt, 1963), 13.

to be more critical and more investigative to enable the addressees (states, societies, individuals and businesses) to think about climate change, 'own' the problem and to make international climate change governance successful.

## **Postscript**

More recent climate negotiations have shifted from the debate of the United States (US) and European Union (EU), and the developed and developing countries, to the US and Brazil, South Africa, India and China (BASIC countries). Together in 2012, the US, China and India were responsible for more than 51% of total global emissions. Since Copenhagen 2009 the BASIC countries have cooperated on international climate change governance to present a counterproposal for more obligations on rich countries to cut emissions. Three factors explain why these four BASIC countries are cooperating together. The first is their G-77 membership where they have played key roles and formed a common identity. The second is their increasing political and economic rise, triggering concerted efforts by developed countries to impose an obligation for quantified greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions targets on emerging economies. The third is the cooperation on climate change negotiations given their high dependence on fossil fuels' energy and their specific national economic interests.

Although the BASIC countries are working together on the issue of climate change, they are four separate entities with different national interests and policy priorities, which lead them to be agreement partners on some issues but not on others. They have differing views on the understanding of 'equity'. For India, which has a much lower per capita than the other three, 'equity' is framed in per capita terms, combined with the principles of historical responsibility and the capacity to pay. For Brazil and China, which have higher per capita emissions than India, the emphasis is on historical responsibility for GHG emissions as the key underlying principle. Another important difference is whether all major emitters should be subject to legally binding emissions reductions in a future climate agreement. In Cancun, South Africa and Brazil hinted that they would be open to legally binding targets for major developing countries. India hinted at the possibility of accepting legally binding commitments but China remained unwilling to discuss the prospect of mandatory reductions.

The lack of a single policy proposal suggests that it is difficult for them to reach a single climate negotiating position yet BASIC countries argued that extending Kyoto was a legal obligation, not a bargaining tool to pull further concessions

from developing countries. BASIC's fifteenth Ministerial meeting held from 26 to 28 June 2013 in South Africa reaffirmed that:

The Durban Platform is by no means a process to negotiate a new regime, nor to renegotiate, rewrite or reinterpret the Convention, and that future agreement will be built on institutions and mechanisms, including the work carried out by Parties under the Bali Road Map in accordance with its principles and provisions.<sup>1</sup>

The US and other members of the Umbrella Group such as Canada, New Zealand, Japan and Russia have indicated that any new legally binding instrument, if and when it becomes necessary, must incorporate symmetrical climate mitigation commitments, at least in form, for all significant emitters. The climate positions of the BASIC countries will find such equilibrium unpalatable. Copenhagen could be a timely reminder for Bonn 2015 as China, India and Brazil did not reciprocate any compromise but asserted their freedom of development regardless of environmental impacts on the one hand and, on the other hand, the major emitters from the Umbrella Group who clarified that they would not make any commitments unless emerging economies bind themselves to any forthcoming agreements. In contrast, releasing one of its three reports from assessment report 5 in September 2013, International Panel on Climate Change (IPCC) notes that human influence on the climate system is crystal clear; sea levels are rising, glaciers are melting and temperatures are increasing.

Recently, Grubb<sup>2</sup> argued that there needs to be a vision around solutions to the problems. Currently there is a state-centric impasse with the developing countries calling for a reduction of 45% by 2020 for industrialized countries, but they and the G-77, headed by China, refuse to accept long term reduction obligations. By contrast, industrialized countries are asking for reduction obligations from the newly emerging economies. The feature of climate governance reflects the determination of member states to pay more attention to promoting their sovereign rights and self-interests.

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<sup>1</sup> Department of Environmental Affairs, South Africa, *Joint statement issued at the conclusion of the 15th Basic Ministerial Meeting on Climate Change* (Cape Town: DEA, South Africa, 2013), [https://www.environment.gov.za/jointstatement\\_15thbasicministerialmeeting](https://www.environment.gov.za/jointstatement_15thbasicministerialmeeting).

<sup>2</sup> Michael Grubb, 'Durban: The Darkest Hour', *Climate Policy* 11, no. 6 (2011): 1269-71.

The bitter reality is the Kyoto Protocol, the Copenhagen Accord and the Kyoto II emphasized putting caps on greenhouse gas emissions in advanced industrialized countries where emissions are stabilizing exempting the countries where emissions are rapidly growing. If this reality is not taken into consideration and no flexibility is shown by the parties, there will be another gridlock. To arrest the increase in global temperature requires flexibility and serious commitments from all countries in climate change negotiations and governance. Real vision, creativity, leadership as well as mutual understanding of the difficulties of making and implementing climate policy are required to lead the world towards a more prosperous, sustainable and energy secured future for present and future generations.

Obama's recent speech on domestic climate policy and the huge domestic greening efforts of China are welcomed, but without serious commitments, any agreement could result in false promises, or be overtaken by economic and developmental interests, such as have been seen in the rapid increase in carbon emissions from many advanced and emerging economies. Achieving the UFCCC's ultimate objective of stabilizing the GHG concentrations in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system needs the participation of both the industrialized countries as well as the major emitters from developing countries. Interests articulated by the major players particularly the US and the emerging economies at the negotiations determine the future of climate governance for top-down approach although other member states do have stakes.

But other actors such as non-governmental organizations (NGOs), businesses and global civil society must be included in the process in order to let them 'own' the problem and start addressing issues collectively by making necessary changes in their socio-cultural and politico-economic styles through a bottom-up approach. As mentioned earlier states play a vital role in signing international agreements, implementing and enforcing them in national boundaries but for the compliance and effectiveness the ultimate addressees ought to be willing to change. By now it is clear that the principles of CBDR and historical responsibility, the little inclusive interstate framework and the uncritical role of media, as they are, do not



contribute much to the pragmatic measures necessary to mitigate emissions by breaking the current gridlock.

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## **Appendix**

**KYOTO PROTOCOL TO THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK  
CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE**



UNITED NATIONS

1998



# KYOTO PROTOCOL TO THE UNITED NATIONS FRAMEWORK CONVENTION ON CLIMATE CHANGE

*The Parties to this Protocol,*

*Being Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change,*  
hereinafter referred to as “the Convention”,

*In pursuit of the ultimate objective of the Convention as stated in its Article 2,*

*Recalling the provisions of the Convention,*

*Being guided by Article 3 of the Convention,*

*Pursuant to the Berlin Mandate adopted by decision 1/CP.1 of the Conference of the Parties to the Convention at its first session,*

Have agreed as follows:

## Article 1

For the purposes of this Protocol, the definitions contained in Article 1 of the Convention shall apply. In addition:

1. “Conference of the Parties” means the Conference of the Parties to the Convention.
2. “Convention” means the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change, adopted in New York on 9 May 1992.
3. “Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change” means the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change established in 1988 jointly by the World Meteorological Organization and the United Nations Environment Programme.
4. “Montreal Protocol” means the Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Layer, adopted in Montreal on 16 September 1987 and as subsequently adjusted and amended.
5. “Parties present and voting” means Parties present and casting an affirmative or negative vote.
6. “Party” means, unless the context otherwise indicates, a Party to this Protocol.
7. “Party included in Annex I” means a Party included in Annex I to the Convention, as may be amended, or a Party which has made a notification under Article 4, paragraph 2 (g), of the Convention.

## Article 2

1. Each Party included in Annex I, in achieving its quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3, in order to promote sustainable development, shall:

(a) Implement and/or further elaborate policies and measures in accordance with its national circumstances, such as:

- (i) Enhancement of energy efficiency in relevant sectors of the national economy;
- (ii) Protection and enhancement of sinks and reservoirs of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, taking into account its commitments under relevant international environmental agreements; promotion of sustainable forest management practices, afforestation and reforestation;
- (iii) Promotion of sustainable forms of agriculture in light of climate change considerations;
- (iv) Research on, and promotion, development and increased use of, new and renewable forms of energy, of carbon dioxide sequestration technologies and of advanced and innovative environmentally sound technologies;
- (v) Progressive reduction or phasing out of market imperfections, fiscal incentives, tax and duty exemptions and subsidies in all greenhouse gas emitting sectors that run counter to the objective of the Convention and application of market instruments;
- (vi) Encouragement of appropriate reforms in relevant sectors aimed at promoting policies and measures which limit or reduce emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol;
- (vii) Measures to limit and/or reduce emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol in the transport sector;
- (viii) Limitation and/or reduction of methane emissions through recovery and use in waste management, as well as in the production, transport and distribution of energy;

(b) Cooperate with other such Parties to enhance the individual and combined effectiveness of their policies and measures adopted under this Article, pursuant to Article 4, paragraph 2 (e) (i), of the Convention. To this end, these Parties shall take steps to share their experience and exchange information on such policies and measures, including developing ways of improving their comparability, transparency and effectiveness. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first session or as soon as practicable thereafter, consider ways to facilitate such cooperation, taking into account all relevant information.

2. The Parties included in Annex I shall pursue limitation or reduction of emissions of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol from aviation and marine bunker fuels, working through the International Civil Aviation Organization and the International Maritime Organization, respectively.

3. The Parties included in Annex I shall strive to implement policies and measures under this Article in such a way as to minimize adverse effects, including the adverse effects of climate change, effects on international trade, and social, environmental and economic impacts on other Parties, especially developing country Parties and in particular those identified in Article 4, paragraphs 8 and 9, of the Convention, taking into account Article 3 of the Convention. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol may take further action, as appropriate, to promote the implementation of the provisions of this paragraph.

4. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, if it decides that it would be beneficial to coordinate any of the policies and measures in paragraph 1 (a) above, taking into account different national circumstances and potential effects, shall consider ways and means to elaborate the coordination of such policies and measures.

### Article 3

1. The Parties included in Annex I shall, individually or jointly, ensure that their aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned amounts, calculated pursuant to their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B and in accordance with the provisions of this Article, with a view to reducing their overall emissions of such gases by at least 5 per cent below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012.

2. Each Party included in Annex I shall, by 2005, have made demonstrable progress in achieving its commitments under this Protocol.

3. The net changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks resulting from direct human-induced land-use change and forestry activities, limited to afforestation, reforestation and deforestation since 1990, measured as verifiable changes in carbon stocks in each commitment period, shall be used to meet the commitments under this Article of each Party included in Annex I. The greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks associated with those activities shall be reported in a transparent and verifiable manner and reviewed in accordance with Articles 7 and 8.

4. Prior to the first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, each Party included in Annex I shall provide, for consideration by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, data to establish its level of carbon stocks in 1990 and to enable an estimate to be made of its changes in carbon stocks in subsequent years. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first session or as soon as practicable thereafter, decide upon modalities, rules and guidelines as to how, and which, additional human-induced activities related to changes in greenhouse gas emissions by sources and removals by sinks in the agricultural soils and the land-use change and forestry categories shall be added to, or subtracted from, the assigned amounts for Parties included in Annex I, taking into account uncertainties, transparency in reporting, verifiability, the methodological work of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the advice provided by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice in accordance with Article 5 and the decisions of the Conference of the Parties. Such a decision shall apply in the second and subsequent commitment periods. A Party may choose to apply such a decision on these additional human-induced activities for its first commitment period, provided that these activities have taken place since 1990.

5. The Parties included in Annex I undergoing the process of transition to a market economy whose base year or period was established pursuant to decision 9/CP.2 of the Conference of the Parties at its second session shall use that base year or period for the implementation of their commitments under this Article. Any other Party included in Annex I undergoing the process of transition to a market economy which has not yet submitted its first national communication under Article 12 of the Convention may also notify the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol that it intends to use an historical base year or period other than 1990 for the implementation of its commitments under this Article. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall decide on the acceptance of such notification.
6. Taking into account Article 4, paragraph 6, of the Convention, in the implementation of their commitments under this Protocol other than those under this Article, a certain degree of flexibility shall be allowed by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol to the Parties included in Annex I undergoing the process of transition to a market economy.
7. In the first quantified emission limitation and reduction commitment period, from 2008 to 2012, the assigned amount for each Party included in Annex I shall be equal to the percentage inscribed for it in Annex B of its aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A in 1990, or the base year or period determined in accordance with paragraph 5 above, multiplied by five. Those Parties included in Annex I for whom land-use change and forestry constituted a net source of greenhouse gas emissions in 1990 shall include in their 1990 emissions base year or period the aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions by sources minus removals by sinks in 1990 from land-use change for the purposes of calculating their assigned amount.
8. Any Party included in Annex I may use 1995 as its base year for hydrofluorocarbons, perfluorocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride, for the purposes of the calculation referred to in paragraph 7 above.
9. Commitments for subsequent periods for Parties included in Annex I shall be established in amendments to Annex B to this Protocol, which shall be adopted in accordance with the provisions of Article 21, paragraph 7. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall initiate the consideration of such commitments at least seven years before the end of the first commitment period referred to in paragraph 1 above.
10. Any emission reduction units, or any part of an assigned amount, which a Party acquires from another Party in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 or of Article 17 shall be added to the assigned amount for the acquiring Party.
11. Any emission reduction units, or any part of an assigned amount, which a Party transfers to another Party in accordance with the provisions of Article 6 or of Article 17 shall be subtracted from the assigned amount for the transferring Party.
12. Any certified emission reductions which a Party acquires from another Party in accordance with the provisions of Article 12 shall be added to the assigned amount for the acquiring Party.

13. If the emissions of a Party included in Annex I in a commitment period are less than its assigned amount under this Article, this difference shall, on request of that Party, be added to the assigned amount for that Party for subsequent commitment periods.

14. Each Party included in Annex I shall strive to implement the commitments mentioned in paragraph 1 above in such a way as to minimize adverse social, environmental and economic impacts on developing country Parties, particularly those identified in Article 4, paragraphs 8 and 9, of the Convention. In line with relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties on the implementation of those paragraphs, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first session, consider what actions are necessary to minimize the adverse effects of climate change and/or the impacts of response measures on Parties referred to in those paragraphs. Among the issues to be considered shall be the establishment of funding, insurance and transfer of technology.

#### **Article 4**

1. Any Parties included in Annex I that have reached an agreement to fulfil their commitments under Article 3 jointly, shall be deemed to have met those commitments provided that their total combined aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent emissions of the greenhouse gases listed in Annex A do not exceed their assigned amounts calculated pursuant to their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments inscribed in Annex B and in accordance with the provisions of Article 3. The respective emission level allocated to each of the Parties to the agreement shall be set out in that agreement.

2. The Parties to any such agreement shall notify the secretariat of the terms of the agreement on the date of deposit of their instruments of ratification, acceptance or approval of this Protocol, or accession thereto. The secretariat shall in turn inform the Parties and signatories to the Convention of the terms of the agreement.

3. Any such agreement shall remain in operation for the duration of the commitment period specified in Article 3, paragraph 7.

4. If Parties acting jointly do so in the framework of, and together with, a regional economic integration organization, any alteration in the composition of the organization after adoption of this Protocol shall not affect existing commitments under this Protocol. Any alteration in the composition of the organization shall only apply for the purposes of those commitments under Article 3 that are adopted subsequent to that alteration.

5. In the event of failure by the Parties to such an agreement to achieve their total combined level of emission reductions, each Party to that agreement shall be responsible for its own level of emissions set out in the agreement.

6. If Parties acting jointly do so in the framework of, and together with, a regional economic integration organization which is itself a Party to this Protocol, each member State of that regional economic integration organization individually, and together with the regional economic integration organization acting in accordance with Article 24, shall, in the event of failure to achieve the total combined level of emission reductions, be responsible for its level of emissions as notified in accordance with this Article.

## Article 5

1. Each Party included in Annex I shall have in place, no later than one year prior to the start of the first commitment period, a national system for the estimation of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol. Guidelines for such national systems, which shall incorporate the methodologies specified in paragraph 2 below, shall be decided upon by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol at its first session.
2. Methodologies for estimating anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol shall be those accepted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties at its third session. Where such methodologies are not used, appropriate adjustments shall be applied according to methodologies agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol at its first session. Based on the work of, *inter alia*, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and advice provided by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall regularly review and, as appropriate, revise such methodologies and adjustments, taking fully into account any relevant decisions by the Conference of the Parties. Any revision to methodologies or adjustments shall be used only for the purposes of ascertaining compliance with commitments under Article 3 in respect of any commitment period adopted subsequent to that revision.
3. The global warming potentials used to calculate the carbon dioxide equivalence of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases listed in Annex A shall be those accepted by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties at its third session. Based on the work of, *inter alia*, the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change and advice provided by the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall regularly review and, as appropriate, revise the global warming potential of each such greenhouse gas, taking fully into account any relevant decisions by the Conference of the Parties. Any revision to a global warming potential shall apply only to commitments under Article 3 in respect of any commitment period adopted subsequent to that revision.

## Article 6

1. For the purpose of meeting its commitments under Article 3, any Party included in Annex I may transfer to, or acquire from, any other such Party emission reduction units resulting from projects aimed at reducing anthropogenic emissions by sources or enhancing anthropogenic removals by sinks of greenhouse gases in any sector of the economy, provided that:
  - (a) Any such project has the approval of the Parties involved;
  - (b) Any such project provides a reduction in emissions by sources, or an enhancement of removals by sinks, that is additional to any that would otherwise occur;

(c) It does not acquire any emission reduction units if it is not in compliance with its obligations under Articles 5 and 7; and

(d) The acquisition of emission reduction units shall be supplemental to domestic actions for the purposes of meeting commitments under Article 3.

2. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol may, at its first session or as soon as practicable thereafter, further elaborate guidelines for the implementation of this Article, including for verification and reporting.

3. A Party included in Annex I may authorize legal entities to participate, under its responsibility, in actions leading to the generation, transfer or acquisition under this Article of emission reduction units.

4. If a question of implementation by a Party included in Annex I of the requirements referred to in this Article is identified in accordance with the relevant provisions of Article 8, transfers and acquisitions of emission reduction units may continue to be made after the question has been identified, provided that any such units may not be used by a Party to meet its commitments under Article 3 until any issue of compliance is resolved.

## **Article 7**

1. Each Party included in Annex I shall incorporate in its annual inventory of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, submitted in accordance with the relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties, the necessary supplementary information for the purposes of ensuring compliance with Article 3, to be determined in accordance with paragraph 4 below.

2. Each Party included in Annex I shall incorporate in its national communication, submitted under Article 12 of the Convention, the supplementary information necessary to demonstrate compliance with its commitments under this Protocol, to be determined in accordance with paragraph 4 below.

3. Each Party included in Annex I shall submit the information required under paragraph 1 above annually, beginning with the first inventory due under the Convention for the first year of the commitment period after this Protocol has entered into force for that Party. Each such Party shall submit the information required under paragraph 2 above as part of the first national communication due under the Convention after this Protocol has entered into force for it and after the adoption of guidelines as provided for in paragraph 4 below. The frequency of subsequent submission of information required under this Article shall be determined by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, taking into account any timetable for the submission of national communications decided upon by the Conference of the Parties.

4. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall adopt at its first session, and review periodically thereafter, guidelines for the preparation of the information required under this Article, taking into account guidelines for the preparation of

national communications by Parties included in Annex I adopted by the Conference of the Parties. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall also, prior to the first commitment period, decide upon modalities for the accounting of assigned amounts.

## **Article 8**

1. The information submitted under Article 7 by each Party included in Annex I shall be reviewed by expert review teams pursuant to the relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties and in accordance with guidelines adopted for this purpose by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol under paragraph 4 below. The information submitted under Article 7, paragraph 1, by each Party included in Annex I shall be reviewed as part of the annual compilation and accounting of emissions inventories and assigned amounts. Additionally, the information submitted under Article 7, paragraph 2, by each Party included in Annex I shall be reviewed as part of the review of communications.

2. Expert review teams shall be coordinated by the secretariat and shall be composed of experts selected from those nominated by Parties to the Convention and, as appropriate, by intergovernmental organizations, in accordance with guidance provided for this purpose by the Conference of the Parties.

3. The review process shall provide a thorough and comprehensive technical assessment of all aspects of the implementation by a Party of this Protocol. The expert review teams shall prepare a report to the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, assessing the implementation of the commitments of the Party and identifying any potential problems in, and factors influencing, the fulfilment of commitments. Such reports shall be circulated by the secretariat to all Parties to the Convention. The secretariat shall list those questions of implementation indicated in such reports for further consideration by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol.

4. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall adopt at its first session, and review periodically thereafter, guidelines for the review of implementation of this Protocol by expert review teams taking into account the relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties.

5. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, with the assistance of the Subsidiary Body for Implementation and, as appropriate, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice, consider:

(a) The information submitted by Parties under Article 7 and the reports of the expert reviews thereon conducted under this Article; and

(b) Those questions of implementation listed by the secretariat under paragraph 3 above, as well as any questions raised by Parties.

6. Pursuant to its consideration of the information referred to in paragraph 5 above, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall take decisions on any matter required for the implementation of this Protocol.



## Article 9

1. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall periodically review this Protocol in the light of the best available scientific information and assessments on climate change and its impacts, as well as relevant technical, social and economic information. Such reviews shall be coordinated with pertinent reviews under the Convention, in particular those required by Article 4, paragraph 2 (d), and Article 7, paragraph 2 (a), of the Convention. Based on these reviews, the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall take appropriate action.
2. The first review shall take place at the second session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. Further reviews shall take place at regular intervals and in a timely manner.

## Article 10

All Parties, taking into account their common but differentiated responsibilities and their specific national and regional development priorities, objectives and circumstances, without introducing any new commitments for Parties not included in Annex I, but reaffirming existing commitments under Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention, and continuing to advance the implementation of these commitments in order to achieve sustainable development, taking into account Article 4, paragraphs 3, 5 and 7, of the Convention, shall:

- (a) Formulate, where relevant and to the extent possible, cost-effective national and, where appropriate, regional programmes to improve the quality of local emission factors, activity data and/or models which reflect the socio-economic conditions of each Party for the preparation and periodic updating of national inventories of anthropogenic emissions by sources and removals by sinks of all greenhouse gases not controlled by the Montreal Protocol, using comparable methodologies to be agreed upon by the Conference of the Parties, and consistent with the guidelines for the preparation of national communications adopted by the Conference of the Parties;
- (b) Formulate, implement, publish and regularly update national and, where appropriate, regional programmes containing measures to mitigate climate change and measures to facilitate adequate adaptation to climate change:
  - (i) Such programmes would, *inter alia*, concern the energy, transport and industry sectors as well as agriculture, forestry and waste management. Furthermore, adaptation technologies and methods for improving spatial planning would improve adaptation to climate change; and
  - (ii) Parties included in Annex I shall submit information on action under this Protocol, including national programmes, in accordance with Article 7; and other Parties shall seek to include in their national communications, as appropriate, information on programmes which contain measures that the Party believes contribute to addressing climate change and its adverse impacts, including the abatement of increases in greenhouse gas emissions, and enhancement of and removals by sinks, capacity building and adaptation measures;

(c) Cooperate in the promotion of effective modalities for the development, application and diffusion of, and take all practicable steps to promote, facilitate and finance, as appropriate, the transfer of, or access to, environmentally sound technologies, know-how, practices and processes pertinent to climate change, in particular to developing countries, including the formulation of policies and programmes for the effective transfer of environmentally sound technologies that are publicly owned or in the public domain and the creation of an enabling environment for the private sector, to promote and enhance the transfer of, and access to, environmentally sound technologies;

(d) Cooperate in scientific and technical research and promote the maintenance and the development of systematic observation systems and development of data archives to reduce uncertainties related to the climate system, the adverse impacts of climate change and the economic and social consequences of various response strategies, and promote the development and strengthening of endogenous capacities and capabilities to participate in international and intergovernmental efforts, programmes and networks on research and systematic observation, taking into account Article 5 of the Convention;

(e) Cooperate in and promote at the international level, and, where appropriate, using existing bodies, the development and implementation of education and training programmes, including the strengthening of national capacity building, in particular human and institutional capacities and the exchange or secondment of personnel to train experts in this field, in particular for developing countries, and facilitate at the national level public awareness of, and public access to information on, climate change. Suitable modalities should be developed to implement these activities through the relevant bodies of the Convention, taking into account Article 6 of the Convention;

(f) Include in their national communications information on programmes and activities undertaken pursuant to this Article in accordance with relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties; and

(g) Give full consideration, in implementing the commitments under this Article, to Article 4, paragraph 8, of the Convention.

## **Article 11**

1. In the implementation of Article 10, Parties shall take into account the provisions of Article 4, paragraphs 4, 5, 7, 8 and 9, of the Convention.

2. In the context of the implementation of Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention, in accordance with the provisions of Article 4, paragraph 3, and Article 11 of the Convention, and through the entity or entities entrusted with the operation of the financial mechanism of the Convention, the developed country Parties and other developed Parties included in Annex II to the Convention shall:

(a) Provide new and additional financial resources to meet the agreed full costs incurred by developing country Parties in advancing the implementation of existing commitments under Article 4, paragraph 1 (a), of the Convention that are covered in Article 10, subparagraph (a); and

(b) Also provide such financial resources, including for the transfer of technology, needed by the developing country Parties to meet the agreed full incremental costs of advancing the implementation of existing commitments under Article 4, paragraph 1, of the Convention that are covered by Article 10 and that are agreed between a developing country Party and the international entity or entities referred to in Article 11 of the Convention, in accordance with that Article.

The implementation of these existing commitments shall take into account the need for adequacy and predictability in the flow of funds and the importance of appropriate burden sharing among developed country Parties. The guidance to the entity or entities entrusted with the operation of the financial mechanism of the Convention in relevant decisions of the Conference of the Parties, including those agreed before the adoption of this Protocol, shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to the provisions of this paragraph.

3. The developed country Parties and other developed Parties in Annex II to the Convention may also provide, and developing country Parties avail themselves of, financial resources for the implementation of Article 10, through bilateral, regional and other multilateral channels.

## **Article 12**

1. A clean development mechanism is hereby defined.

2. The purpose of the clean development mechanism shall be to assist Parties not included in Annex I in achieving sustainable development and in contributing to the ultimate objective of the Convention, and to assist Parties included in Annex I in achieving compliance with their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3.

3. Under the clean development mechanism:

(a) Parties not included in Annex I will benefit from project activities resulting in certified emission reductions; and

(b) Parties included in Annex I may use the certified emission reductions accruing from such project activities to contribute to compliance with part of their quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under Article 3, as determined by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol.

4. The clean development mechanism shall be subject to the authority and guidance of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol and be supervised by an executive board of the clean development mechanism.

5. Emission reductions resulting from each project activity shall be certified by operational entities to be designated by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, on the basis of:

(a) Voluntary participation approved by each Party involved;

- (b) Real, measurable, and long-term benefits related to the mitigation of climate change; and
  - (c) Reductions in emissions that are additional to any that would occur in the absence of the certified project activity.
6. The clean development mechanism shall assist in arranging funding of certified project activities as necessary.
7. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first session, elaborate modalities and procedures with the objective of ensuring transparency, efficiency and accountability through independent auditing and verification of project activities.
8. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall ensure that a share of the proceeds from certified project activities is used to cover administrative expenses as well as to assist developing country Parties that are particularly vulnerable to the adverse effects of climate change to meet the costs of adaptation.
9. Participation under the clean development mechanism, including in activities mentioned in paragraph 3 (a) above and in the acquisition of certified emission reductions, may involve private and/or public entities, and is to be subject to whatever guidance may be provided by the executive board of the clean development mechanism.
10. Certified emission reductions obtained during the period from the year 2000 up to the beginning of the first commitment period can be used to assist in achieving compliance in the first commitment period.

### **Article 13**

1. The Conference of the Parties, the supreme body of the Convention, shall serve as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol.
2. Parties to the Convention that are not Parties to this Protocol may participate as observers in the proceedings of any session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. When the Conference of the Parties serves as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, decisions under this Protocol shall be taken only by those that are Parties to this Protocol.
3. When the Conference of the Parties serves as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, any member of the Bureau of the Conference of the Parties representing a Party to the Convention but, at that time, not a Party to this Protocol, shall be replaced by an additional member to be elected by and from amongst the Parties to this Protocol.
4. The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall keep under regular review the implementation of this Protocol and shall make, within its mandate, the decisions necessary to promote its effective implementation. It shall perform the functions assigned to it by this Protocol and shall:

(a) Assess, on the basis of all information made available to it in accordance with the provisions of this Protocol, the implementation of this Protocol by the Parties, the overall effects of the measures taken pursuant to this Protocol, in particular environmental, economic and social effects as well as their cumulative impacts and the extent to which progress towards the objective of the Convention is being achieved;

(b) Periodically examine the obligations of the Parties under this Protocol, giving due consideration to any reviews required by Article 4, paragraph 2 (d), and Article 7, paragraph 2, of the Convention, in the light of the objective of the Convention, the experience gained in its implementation and the evolution of scientific and technological knowledge, and in this respect consider and adopt regular reports on the implementation of this Protocol;

(c) Promote and facilitate the exchange of information on measures adopted by the Parties to address climate change and its effects, taking into account the differing circumstances, responsibilities and capabilities of the Parties and their respective commitments under this Protocol;

(d) Facilitate, at the request of two or more Parties, the coordination of measures adopted by them to address climate change and its effects, taking into account the differing circumstances, responsibilities and capabilities of the Parties and their respective commitments under this Protocol;

(e) Promote and guide, in accordance with the objective of the Convention and the provisions of this Protocol, and taking fully into account the relevant decisions by the Conference of the Parties, the development and periodic refinement of comparable methodologies for the effective implementation of this Protocol, to be agreed on by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol;

(f) Make recommendations on any matters necessary for the implementation of this Protocol;

(g) Seek to mobilize additional financial resources in accordance with Article 11, paragraph 2;

(h) Establish such subsidiary bodies as are deemed necessary for the implementation of this Protocol;

(i) Seek and utilize, where appropriate, the services and cooperation of, and information provided by, competent international organizations and intergovernmental and non-governmental bodies; and

(j) Exercise such other functions as may be required for the implementation of this Protocol, and consider any assignment resulting from a decision by the Conference of the Parties.

5. The rules of procedure of the Conference of the Parties and financial procedures applied under the Convention shall be applied *mutatis mutandis* under this Protocol, except as may be otherwise decided by consensus by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol.

6. The first session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall be convened by the secretariat in conjunction with the first session of the Conference of the Parties that is scheduled after the date of the entry into force of this Protocol. Subsequent ordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall be held every year and in conjunction with ordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties, unless otherwise decided by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol.

7. Extraordinary sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall be held at such other times as may be deemed necessary by the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol, or at the written request of any Party, provided that, within six months of the request being communicated to the Parties by the secretariat, it is supported by at least one third of the Parties.

8. The United Nations, its specialized agencies and the International Atomic Energy Agency, as well as any State member thereof or observers thereto not party to the Convention, may be represented at sessions of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol as observers. Any body or agency, whether national or international, governmental or non-governmental, which is qualified in matters covered by this Protocol and which has informed the secretariat of its wish to be represented at a session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol as an observer, may be so admitted unless at least one third of the Parties present object. The admission and participation of observers shall be subject to the rules of procedure, as referred to in paragraph 5 above.

#### **Article 14**

1. The secretariat established by Article 8 of the Convention shall serve as the secretariat of this Protocol.

2. Article 8, paragraph 2, of the Convention on the functions of the secretariat, and Article 8, paragraph 3, of the Convention on arrangements made for the functioning of the secretariat, shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to this Protocol. The secretariat shall, in addition, exercise the functions assigned to it under this Protocol.

#### **Article 15**

1. The Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation established by Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention shall serve as, respectively, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation of this Protocol. The provisions relating to the functioning of these two bodies under the Convention shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to this Protocol. Sessions of the meetings of the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation of this Protocol shall be held in conjunction with the meetings of, respectively, the Subsidiary Body for Scientific and Technological Advice and the Subsidiary Body for Implementation of the Convention.

2. Parties to the Convention that are not Parties to this Protocol may participate as observers in the proceedings of any session of the subsidiary bodies. When the subsidiary bodies serve as the subsidiary bodies of this Protocol, decisions under this Protocol shall be taken only by those that are Parties to this Protocol.

3. When the subsidiary bodies established by Articles 9 and 10 of the Convention exercise their functions with regard to matters concerning this Protocol, any member of the Bureaux of those subsidiary bodies representing a Party to the Convention but, at that time, not a party to this Protocol, shall be replaced by an additional member to be elected by and from amongst the Parties to this Protocol.

#### **Article 16**

The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, as soon as practicable, consider the application to this Protocol of, and modify as appropriate, the multilateral consultative process referred to in Article 13 of the Convention, in the light of any relevant decisions that may be taken by the Conference of the Parties. Any multilateral consultative process that may be applied to this Protocol shall operate without prejudice to the procedures and mechanisms established in accordance with Article 18.

#### **Article 17**

The Conference of the Parties shall define the relevant principles, modalities, rules and guidelines, in particular for verification, reporting and accountability for emissions trading. The Parties included in Annex B may participate in emissions trading for the purposes of fulfilling their commitments under Article 3. Any such trading shall be supplemental to domestic actions for the purpose of meeting quantified emission limitation and reduction commitments under that Article.

#### **Article 18**

The Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol shall, at its first session, approve appropriate and effective procedures and mechanisms to determine and to address cases of non-compliance with the provisions of this Protocol, including through the development of an indicative list of consequences, taking into account the cause, type, degree and frequency of non-compliance. Any procedures and mechanisms under this Article entailing binding consequences shall be adopted by means of an amendment to this Protocol.

#### **Article 19**

The provisions of Article 14 of the Convention on settlement of disputes shall apply *mutatis mutandis* to this Protocol.

#### **Article 20**

1. Any Party may propose amendments to this Protocol.
2. Amendments to this Protocol shall be adopted at an ordinary session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. The text of any proposed amendment to this Protocol shall be communicated to the Parties by the secretariat at least

six months before the meeting at which it is proposed for adoption. The secretariat shall also communicate the text of any proposed amendments to the Parties and signatories to the Convention and, for information, to the Depositary.

3. The Parties shall make every effort to reach agreement on any proposed amendment to this Protocol by consensus. If all efforts at consensus have been exhausted, and no agreement reached, the amendment shall as a last resort be adopted by a three-fourths majority vote of the Parties present and voting at the meeting. The adopted amendment shall be communicated by the secretariat to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all Parties for their acceptance.

4. Instruments of acceptance in respect of an amendment shall be deposited with the Depositary. An amendment adopted in accordance with paragraph 3 above shall enter into force for those Parties having accepted it on the ninetieth day after the date of receipt by the Depositary of an instrument of acceptance by at least three fourths of the Parties to this Protocol.

5. The amendment shall enter into force for any other Party on the ninetieth day after the date on which that Party deposits with the Depositary its instrument of acceptance of the said amendment.

## **Article 21**

1. Annexes to this Protocol shall form an integral part thereof and, unless otherwise expressly provided, a reference to this Protocol constitutes at the same time a reference to any annexes thereto. Any annexes adopted after the entry into force of this Protocol shall be restricted to lists, forms and any other material of a descriptive nature that is of a scientific, technical, procedural or administrative character.

2. Any Party may make proposals for an annex to this Protocol and may propose amendments to annexes to this Protocol.

3. Annexes to this Protocol and amendments to annexes to this Protocol shall be adopted at an ordinary session of the Conference of the Parties serving as the meeting of the Parties to this Protocol. The text of any proposed annex or amendment to an annex shall be communicated to the Parties by the secretariat at least six months before the meeting at which it is proposed for adoption. The secretariat shall also communicate the text of any proposed annex or amendment to an annex to the Parties and signatories to the Convention and, for information, to the Depositary.

4. The Parties shall make every effort to reach agreement on any proposed annex or amendment to an annex by consensus. If all efforts at consensus have been exhausted, and no agreement reached, the annex or amendment to an annex shall as a last resort be adopted by a three-fourths majority vote of the Parties present and voting at the meeting. The adopted annex or amendment to an annex shall be communicated by the secretariat to the Depositary, who shall circulate it to all Parties for their acceptance.

5. An annex, or amendment to an annex other than Annex A or B, that has been adopted in accordance with paragraphs 3 and 4 above shall enter into force for all Parties to this Protocol six months after the date of the communication by the Depositary to such Parties of the adoption of the annex or adoption of the amendment to the annex, except for those Parties that have



notified the Depositary, in writing, within that period of their non-acceptance of the annex or amendment to the annex. The annex or amendment to an annex shall enter into force for Parties which withdraw their notification of non-acceptance on the ninetieth day after the date on which withdrawal of such notification has been received by the Depositary.

6. If the adoption of an annex or an amendment to an annex involves an amendment to this Protocol, that annex or amendment to an annex shall not enter into force until such time as the amendment to this Protocol enters into force.

7. Amendments to Annexes A and B to this Protocol shall be adopted and enter into force in accordance with the procedure set out in Article 20, provided that any amendment to Annex B shall be adopted only with the written consent of the Party concerned.

## **Article 22**

1. Each Party shall have one vote, except as provided for in paragraph 2 below.

2. Regional economic integration organizations, in matters within their competence, shall exercise their right to vote with a number of votes equal to the number of their member States that are Parties to this Protocol. Such an organization shall not exercise its right to vote if any of its member States exercises its right, and vice versa.

## **Article 23**

The Secretary-General of the United Nations shall be the Depositary of this Protocol.

## **Article 24**

1. This Protocol shall be open for signature and subject to ratification, acceptance or approval by States and regional economic integration organizations which are Parties to the Convention. It shall be open for signature at United Nations Headquarters in New York from 16 March 1998 to 15 March 1999. This Protocol shall be open for accession from the day after the date on which it is closed for signature. Instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.

2. Any regional economic integration organization which becomes a Party to this Protocol without any of its member States being a Party shall be bound by all the obligations under this Protocol. In the case of such organizations, one or more of whose member States is a Party to this Protocol, the organization and its member States shall decide on their respective responsibilities for the performance of their obligations under this Protocol. In such cases, the organization and the member States shall not be entitled to exercise rights under this Protocol concurrently.

3. In their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession, regional economic integration organizations shall declare the extent of their competence with respect to the matters governed by this Protocol. These organizations shall also inform the Depositary, who shall in turn inform the Parties, of any substantial modification in the extent of their competence.

## **Article 25**

1. This Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day after the date on which not less than 55 Parties to the Convention, incorporating Parties included in Annex I which accounted in total for at least 55 per cent of the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 of the Parties included in Annex I, have deposited their instruments of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
2. For the purposes of this Article, “the total carbon dioxide emissions for 1990 of the Parties included in Annex I” means the amount communicated on or before the date of adoption of this Protocol by the Parties included in Annex I in their first national communications submitted in accordance with Article 12 of the Convention.
3. For each State or regional economic integration organization that ratifies, accepts or approves this Protocol or accedes thereto after the conditions set out in paragraph 1 above for entry into force have been fulfilled, this Protocol shall enter into force on the ninetieth day following the date of deposit of its instrument of ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.
4. For the purposes of this Article, any instrument deposited by a regional economic integration organization shall not be counted as additional to those deposited by States members of the organization.

## **Article 26**

No reservations may be made to this Protocol.

## **Article 27**

1. At any time after three years from the date on which this Protocol has entered into force for a Party, that Party may withdraw from this Protocol by giving written notification to the Depositary.
2. Any such withdrawal shall take effect upon expiry of one year from the date of receipt by the Depositary of the notification of withdrawal, or on such later date as may be specified in the notification of withdrawal.
3. Any Party that withdraws from the Convention shall be considered as also having withdrawn from this Protocol.

## **Article 28**

The original of this Protocol, of which the Arabic, Chinese, English, French, Russian and Spanish texts are equally authentic, shall be deposited with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.

**DONE** at Kyoto this eleventh day of December one thousand nine hundred and ninety-seven.

**IN WITNESS WHEREOF** the undersigned, being duly authorized to that effect, have affixed their signatures to this Protocol on the dates indicated.

## **Annex A**

### **Greenhouse gases**

Carbon dioxide (CO<sub>2</sub>)  
Methane (CH<sub>4</sub>)  
Nitrous oxide (N<sub>2</sub>O)  
Hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs)  
Perfluorocarbons (PFCs)  
Sulphur hexafluoride (SF<sub>6</sub>)

### **Sectors/source categories**

#### **Energy**

- Fuel combustion
  - Energy industries
  - Manufacturing industries and construction
  - Transport
  - Other sectors
  - Other
- Fugitive emissions from fuels
  - Solid fuels
  - Oil and natural gas
  - Other

#### **Industrial processes**

- Mineral products
- Chemical industry
- Metal production
- Other production
- Production of halocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride
- Consumption of halocarbons and sulphur hexafluoride
- Other

#### **Solvent and other product use**

#### **Agriculture**

- Enteric fermentation
- Manure management
- Rice cultivation
- Agricultural soils
- Prescribed burning of savannas
- Field burning of agricultural residues
- Other

#### **Waste**

- Solid waste disposal on land
- Wastewater handling
- Waste incineration
- Other

## Annex B

Party	Quantified emission limitation or reduction commitment (percentage of base year or period)
Australia	108
Austria	92
Belgium	92
Bulgaria*	92
Canada	94
Croatia*	95
Czech Republic*	92
Denmark	92
Estonia*	92
European Community	92
Finland	92
France	92
Germany	92
Greece	92
Hungary*	94
Iceland	110
Ireland	92
Italy	92
Japan	94
Latvia*	92
Liechtenstein	92
Lithuania*	92
Luxembourg	92
Monaco	92
Netherlands	92
New Zealand	100
Norway	101
Poland*	94
Portugal	92
Romania*	92
Russian Federation*	100
Slovakia*	92
Slovenia*	92
Spain	92
Sweden	92
Switzerland	92
Ukraine*	100
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland	92
United States of America	93

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\* Countries that are undergoing the process of transition to a market economy.

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**UNITED  
NATIONS**



**Framework Convention  
on Climate Change**

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**CONFERENCE OF THE PARTIES  
Fifteenth session  
Copenhagen, 7–18 December 2009**

**Agenda item 9  
High-level segment**

**Draft decision -/CP.15**

**Proposal by the President**

**Copenhagen Accord**

**The Heads of State, Heads of Government, Ministers, and other heads of delegation present at the United Nations Climate Change Conference 2009 in Copenhagen,**

*In pursuit* of the ultimate objective of the Convention as stated in its Article 2,

*Being guided* by the principles and provisions of the Convention,

*Noting* the results of work done by the two Ad hoc Working Groups,

*Endorsing* decision x/CP.15 on the Ad hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action and decision x/CMP.5 that requests the Ad hoc Working Group on Further Commitments of Annex I Parties under the Kyoto Protocol to continue its work,

*Have agreed* on this Copenhagen Accord which is operational immediately.

1. We underline that climate change is one of the greatest challenges of our time. We emphasise our strong political will to urgently combat climate change in accordance with the principle of common but differentiated responsibilities and respective capabilities. To achieve the ultimate objective of the Convention to stabilize greenhouse gas concentration in the atmosphere at a level that would prevent dangerous anthropogenic interference with the climate system, we shall, recognizing the scientific view that the increase in global temperature should be below 2 degrees Celsius, on the basis of equity and in the context of sustainable development, enhance our long-term cooperative action to combat climate change. We recognize the critical impacts of climate change and the potential impacts of response measures on countries particularly vulnerable to its adverse effects and stress the need to establish a comprehensive adaptation programme including international support.

2. We agree that deep cuts in global emissions are required according to science, and as documented by the IPCC Fourth Assessment Report with a view to reduce global emissions so as to hold the increase in global temperature below 2 degrees Celsius, and take action to meet this objective consistent with science and on the basis of equity. We should cooperate in achieving the peaking of global and national emissions as soon as possible, recognizing that the time frame for peaking will be longer in developing countries and bearing in mind that social and economic development and poverty eradication are the first and overriding priorities of developing countries and that a low-emission development strategy is indispensable to sustainable development.

3. Adaptation to the adverse effects of climate change and the potential impacts of response measures is a challenge faced by all countries. Enhanced action and international cooperation on adaptation is urgently required to ensure the implementation of the Convention by enabling and supporting the implementation of adaptation actions aimed at reducing vulnerability and building resilience in developing countries, especially in those that are particularly vulnerable, especially least developed countries, small island developing States and Africa. We agree that developed countries shall provide adequate, predictable and sustainable financial resources, technology and capacity-building to support the implementation of adaptation action in developing countries.

4. Annex I Parties commit to implement individually or jointly the quantified economy-wide emissions targets for 2020, to be submitted in the format given in Appendix I by Annex I Parties to the secretariat by 31 January 2010 for compilation in an INF document. Annex I Parties that are Party to the Kyoto Protocol will thereby further strengthen the emissions reductions initiated by the Kyoto Protocol. Delivery of reductions and financing by developed countries will be measured, reported and verified in accordance with existing and any further guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties, and will ensure that accounting of such targets and finance is rigorous, robust and transparent.

5. Non-Annex I Parties to the Convention will implement mitigation actions, including those to be submitted to the secretariat by non-Annex I Parties in the format given in Appendix II by 31 January 2010, for compilation in an INF document, consistent with Article 4.1 and Article 4.7 and in the context of sustainable development. Least developed countries and small island developing States may undertake actions voluntarily and on the basis of support. Mitigation actions subsequently taken and envisaged by Non-Annex I Parties, including national inventory reports, shall be communicated through national communications consistent with Article 12.1(b) every two years on the basis of guidelines to be adopted by the Conference of the Parties. Those mitigation actions in national communications or otherwise communicated to the Secretariat will be added to the list in appendix II. Mitigation actions taken by Non-Annex I Parties will be subject to their domestic measurement, reporting and verification the result of which will be reported through their national communications every two years. Non-Annex I Parties will communicate information on the implementation of their actions through National Communications, with provisions for international consultations and analysis under clearly defined guidelines that will ensure that national sovereignty is respected. Nationally appropriate mitigation actions seeking international support will be recorded in a registry along with relevant technology, finance and capacity building support. Those actions supported will be added to the list in appendix II. These supported nationally appropriate mitigation actions will be subject to international measurement, reporting and verification in accordance with guidelines adopted by the Conference of the Parties.

6. We recognize the crucial role of reducing emission from deforestation and forest degradation and the need to enhance removals of greenhouse gas emission by forests and agree on the need to provide positive incentives to such actions through the immediate establishment of a mechanism including REDD-plus, to enable the mobilization of financial resources from developed countries.

7. We decide to pursue various approaches, including opportunities to use markets, to enhance the cost-effectiveness of, and to promote mitigation actions. Developing countries, especially

those with low emitting economies should be provided incentives to continue to develop on a low emission pathway.

8. Scaled up, new and additional, predictable and adequate funding as well as improved access shall be provided to developing countries, in accordance with the relevant provisions of the Convention, to enable and support enhanced action on mitigation, including substantial finance to reduce emissions from deforestation and forest degradation (REDD-plus), adaptation, technology development and transfer and capacity-building, for enhanced implementation of the Convention. The collective commitment by developed countries is to provide new and additional resources, including forestry and investments through international institutions, approaching USD 30 billion for the period 2010 – 2012 with balanced allocation between adaptation and mitigation. Funding for adaptation will be prioritized for the most vulnerable developing countries, such as the least developed countries, small island developing States and Africa. In the context of meaningful mitigation actions and transparency on implementation, developed countries commit to a goal of mobilizing jointly USD 100 billion dollars a year by 2020 to address the needs of developing countries. This funding will come from a wide variety of sources, public and private, bilateral and multilateral, including alternative sources of finance. New multilateral funding for adaptation will be delivered through effective and efficient fund arrangements, with a governance structure providing for equal representation of developed and developing countries. A significant portion of such funding should flow through the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund.

9. To this end, a High Level Panel will be established under the guidance of and accountable to the Conference of the Parties to study the contribution of the potential sources of revenue, including alternative sources of finance, towards meeting this goal.

10. We decide that the Copenhagen Green Climate Fund shall be established as an operating entity of the financial mechanism of the Convention to support projects, programme, policies and other activities in developing countries related to mitigation including REDD-plus, adaptation, capacity-building, technology development and transfer.

11. In order to enhance action on development and transfer of technology we decide to establish a Technology Mechanism to accelerate technology development and transfer in support of action on adaptation and mitigation that will be guided by a country-driven approach and be based on national circumstances and priorities.

12. We call for an assessment of the implementation of this Accord to be completed by 2015, including in light of the Convention's ultimate objective. This would include consideration of strengthening the long-term goal referencing various matters presented by the science, including in relation to temperature rises of 1.5 degrees Celsius.

## Quantified economy-wide emissions targets for 2020

[illegible]



## APPENDIX II

## Nationally appropriate mitigation actions of developing country Parties

[illegible]

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## Framework Convention on Climate Change

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### Conference of the Parties

Seventeenth session

Durban, 28 November to 9 December 2011

Agenda item 15

High-level segment

### Establishment of an Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action

#### Proposal by the President

#### Draft decision -/CP.17

*The Conference of the Parties,*

*Recognizing that climate change represents an urgent and potentially irreversible threat to human societies and the planet and thus requires to be urgently addressed by all Parties,* and acknowledging that the global nature of climate change calls for the widest possible cooperation by all countries and their participation in an effective and appropriate international response, with a view to accelerating the reduction of global greenhouse gas emissions,

*Noting with grave concern the significant gap between the aggregate effect of Parties' mitigation pledges in terms of global annual emissions of greenhouse gases by 2020 and aggregate emission pathways consistent with having a likely chance of holding the increase in global average temperature below 2 °C or 1.5 °C above pre-industrial levels,*

*Recognizing that fulfilling the ultimate objective of the Convention will require strengthening the multilateral, rules-based regime under the Convention,*

*Noting decision X/CMP.7 [Title],*

*Also noting decision X/CP.17 [Title],*

1. *Decides to extend the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention for one year in order for it to continue its work and reach the agreed outcome pursuant to decision 1/CP.13 (Bali Action Plan) through decisions adopted by the sixteenth, seventeenth and eighteenth sessions of the Conference of the Parties, at which time the Ad Hoc Working Group on Long-term Cooperative Action under the Convention shall be terminated;*

2. *Also decides* to launch a process to develop a protocol, another legal instrument or a legal outcome under the Convention applicable to all Parties, through a subsidiary body under the Convention hereby established and to be known as the **Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action**;
3. *Further decides* that the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action shall start its work as a matter of urgency in the first half of 2012 and shall report to future sessions of the Conference of the Parties on the progress of its work;
4. *Decides* that the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action shall complete its work as early as possible but no later than 2015 in order to adopt this protocol, legal instrument or legal outcome at the twenty-first session of the Conference of the Parties and for it to come into effect and be implemented from 2020;
5. *Also decides* that the Ad Hoc Working Group on the Durban Platform for Enhanced Action shall plan its work in the first half of 2012, including, inter alia, on mitigation, adaptation, finance, technology development and transfer, transparency of action, and support and capacity-building, drawing upon submissions from Parties and relevant technical, social and economic information and expertise;
6. *Further decides* that the process shall raise the level of ambition and shall be informed, inter alia, by the Fifth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, the outcomes of the 2013–2015 review and the work of the subsidiary bodies;
7. *Decides* to launch a workplan on enhancing mitigation ambition to identify and to explore options for a range of actions that can close the ambition gap with a view to ensuring the highest possible mitigation efforts by all Parties;
8. *Requests* Parties and observer organizations to submit by 28 February 2012 their views on options and ways for further increasing the level of ambition and decides to hold an in-session workshop at the first negotiating session in 2012 to consider options and ways for increasing ambition and possible further actions.

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