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**The Application of Critical Discourse Theory: A Criterion-
Referenced Analysis of Reports Relating to Language
Revitalisation in Australia and New Zealand**

A thesis
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of the requirements for the degree
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Abstract

The discipline of language policy and planning (LPP) is often proposed as a viable tool for language revitalisation. However, the conventional paradigm upon which LPP is based is inadequate for such an inherently political, contentious and problematic area of social policy, and does not address the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourse that is at the very core of language revitalisation efforts. It is therefore argued here that LPP needs to be explicitly underpinned by critical discourse theory (CDT) if it is to be of genuine use to those involved in language revitalisation efforts, particularly to grass roots language activists. Following an introductory chapter which provides a background to the research and a rationale for it (*Chapter 1*), there is a critical review of selected literature on LPP and CDT, a review which ends by proposing a list of criteria which, it is argued, can be used to determine the extent to which discourse that is intended to be counter-hegemonic adheres to the principles of effective counter-hegemonic discourse as outlined in the literature on CDT (*Chapter 2*). In the following three chapters (*Chapters 3, 4 & 5*), these criteria are applied to the analysis of three recent reports that have a direct bearing on indigenous language revitalisation in Australia (*Our Land Our Languages*) and New Zealand (*Ko Aotearoa Tēnei* and *Te Reo Mauriora*). The first of these reports is found to adhere very closely to the criteria; the second less so; the third almost not at all. The different ways in which each of these reports has been received would tend to support the hypothesis that, other things being equal, the more closely a text of this type conforms to the criteria - that is, the more closely it is aligned to the fundamental principles of effective counter-hegemonic discourse as outlined in CDT - the more likely it is to be positively received and, therefore, to represent an effective challenge to the existing hegemony. The overall conclusion is that CDT can not only assist language activists by providing a basis for determining how successful counter-hegemonic discourse is likely to be in achieving its aims but has the potential to provide LPP with a secure theoretical foundation (*Chapter 6*).

Keywords:

te reo Māori, language revitalisation, indigenous language revitalisation, language policy and planning, critical discourse theory, counter-hegemonic discourse

He tuku

E tukuna atu nei ēnei tuhinga ki a Ngāti Pūehutore, ki a Ngāti Takihiku, ki a Ngāti Whakatere, ki te iwi whānui hoki o Raukawa, otirā, ki te hunga katoa puta noa i Aotearoa nāna i whakapau kaha ki te pupuru i tēnei reo rangatira.

He kupu whakawhetai

I te tīmatanga te Kupu

i te Atua te Kupu

ko te Atua anō te Kupu

I te Atua anō tēnei Kupu i te tīmatanga.

Nāna ngā mea katoa i hanga

Kia tau iho ngā manaakitanga a te Runga Rawa ki runga ki a kīngi Tūheitia me tana whānau anō hoki.

E te hunga mate, moe mai rā i te moengaroa tē whakaarahia, i te urunga tē taka.

Pupū ake ana te aroha mō koutou nāna ahau i tautoko ki te whakatutuki i te kaupapa nei. Tuatahi, kei taku kaiarahi matua, kei a te Amorangi Winifred Crombie, tēnā koe mō āu kupu whakamānawa mai me tāu whakamārama i te huarahi e tika ana kia taea te tihi o te maunga teitei nei. E mihi ana hoki ki a Tākuta Hemi Whaanga mō tō mātauranga ki ngā tini āhuatanga o te tuhi me te whakaputa i ngā tuhinga pēnei nei me ngā wā i whakawātea i a koe anō ki te āwhina i ahau.

Ka rere hoki aku mihi ki te Whare Wānanga o Waikato mō te homai i tētehi Waikato Doctoral Scholarship hei āwhina i ahau ki te whakaoti i tēnei mahi. Pikitū ake nei hoki te mihi ki ngā kaimahi o te Tari Karahipi, otirā ki a Gwenda Pennington mō te pai o tāna mahi whakahaere me tōna kaha ngākaunui ki ngā ākongā. I whakawhiwhia anō hoki ahau ki ētehi pūtea tautoko a te Pua Wānanga o te Ao. Nō reira, e te Pua Wānanga, me āna kaiako, me āna kaimahi, tēnā rā koutou katoa nāu ahau i āta poipoi mai o te tīmatanga o taku tohu paetahi i te tau 2001, ā, tae noa ki tēnei wā.

Ki aku hoa mahi, ki a Jillian Tīpene koutou ko Murray Peters, ko Joeliee Seed-Pihama, otirā ki a Tubby Barrett kōrua Riri Te Whara Ellis he nui ngā hua i riro i ahau i ā tātou wānangananga, i ngā whakawhiwhiti kōrero anō hoki. Mā te Atua koutou e manaaki.

Ka huri ake au ki taku tau whakaruruhau e tū kaha tonu nei ahakoa ngā āhuatanga i pākia mai i roto i ngā tau i mahue ake nei. E Wini, i te otinga o taku tohu paerua, i pēnei taku kupu whakamihi ki a koe: *nōku te waimārie ko koe tōku hoa. Nāu te pīkaunga taumaha i kawē kia wātea ai au ki te whakaoti i tēnei tuhinga.* Kei te tika tonu ēnei kupu mōu. Nō reira, kei te nui tonu te aroha. He taonga koe nā Ihowa.

Ki aku tamariki e arohatia nuitia nei, ki a Koha a te Atua, koutou ko Te Tuhikiterangi, ko Pirikiteariki, nei aku wawata mō koutou: kia piri koutou ki te Ariki, ki āna tikanga, me tōna aroha hoki.

Ngā whakamoemiti, ngā whakawhetai e Ihowa

Mō āu manaakitanga ki te iwi e tau nei

Ko koe te piringa, ka puta ki te oranga

E te Ariki

Paimārire

Contents

Abstract	i
He tuku	ii
He kupu whakawhetai	iii
Contents	v
List of Tables	ix
List of Figures	x
Chapter 1	1
Introduction to the research	1
1.1 General Introduction	1
1.2 The Māori language in New Zealand since colonisation: A brief historical overview	2
1.2.1 Introduction	2
1.2.2 First contact	2
1.2.3 Colonisation and control	4
1.2.4 Major causes of language loss	8
1.2.4.1 Education: The immersion of Māori children in English	9
1.2.4.2 Removal of Māori language from the public sphere	10
1.2.4.3 Fracturing the social institutions which supported the Māori language	10
1.2.4.4 Negative attitudes and ideologies	12
1.3 Rationale for this research	13
1.3.1 A personal perspective	13
1.3.2 A political perspective	15
1.3.2.1 The Waitangi Tribunal and the legal system	17
1.3.2.2 Grassroots revitalisation initiatives	21
1.3.2.3 <i>Aotearoa</i> : The national language policy experience	23
1.3.2.4 The <i>Māori Language Strategy</i> 2003	24
1.3.2.5 Conclusion: The central problematic in Māori language revitalisation	26

1.4	Introduction to the research question, research methods and thesis structure	29
Chapter 2		32
	A critical review of selected literature on language policy and planning and critical discourse theory	32
2.1	General Introduction	32
2.2	Language policy and planning (LPP)	32
2.2.1	The emergence of LPP as an applied discipline	32
2.2.2	Definition and scope of LPP	34
2.2.3	LPP: Selected frameworks	37
2.2.3.1	An integrated LPP framework (Baldauf, 2005)	37
2.2.3.2	An expanded language policy framework (Shohamy, 2006)	38
2.2.4	Key issues affecting language policy and planning	39
2.2.4.1	Global language endangerment	39
2.2.4.2	Language rights	43
2.2.4.3	Language economics	45
2.2.4.4	Behaviour change	49
2.2.4.5	Agency and intervention	52
2.2.4.6	Politics, power & ideology	56
2.2.5	LPP: Towards a critical discourse perspective	60
2.3	Critical discourse theory	61
2.3.1	Critical discourse theory: An introductory overview	61
2.3.2	The emergence of critical discourse theory	61
2.3.3	Critical discourse theory: Key concepts	65
2.3.4	Challenges to critical discourse theory	77
2.3.5	Deriving effectiveness criteria from critical discourse theory	84
Chapter 3		87
	A criterion-referenced analysis of <i>Our Land Our Languages</i>	87
3.1	Introduction	87
3.2	Background to the report	87
3.3	Criterion-referenced analysis of the report	91
3.3.1	Criterion A: Representation of an ‘in-group’	91

3.3.2	Criterion B: Representation of an ‘other’ identity _____	95
3.3.3	Criterion C: Group formation and fragmentation _____	100
3.3.4	Criterion D: Engagement with hegemonic interests/ key decision-makers _____	110
3.3.5	Criterion E: Dislocation and deconstruction _____	120
3.4	Responses to <i>Our Land Our Languages</i> _____	130
3.4.1	Non-government responses _____	130
3.4.1.1	Positive responses _____	130
3.4.1.2	Positive responses with reservations _____	137
3.4.1.3	Negative responses _____	138
3.4.2	Government responses _____	139
3.5	Some concluding comments _____	143
Chapter 4	_____	145
A criterion-referenced analysis of <i>Ko Aotearoa Tēnei</i>	_____	145
4.1	Introduction _____	145
4.2	Background to the report _____	145
4.3	Criterion-referenced analysis of the report _____	148
4.3.1	Criterion A: Representation of an ‘in-group’ _____	149
4.3.2	Criterion B: Representation of an ‘other’ identity _____	154
4.3.3	Criterion C: Group formation and fragmentation _____	160
4.3.4	Criterion D: Engagement with hegemonic interests / key decision-makers _____	169
4.3.5	Criterion E: Dislocation and deconstruction _____	176
4.4	Responses to <i>Ko Aotearoa Tēnei</i> _____	186
4.4.1	Responses to the early release of <i>Chapter 5</i> _____	186
4.4.2	Responses to the full report _____	188
Chapter 5	_____	197
A criterion-referenced analysis of <i>Te Reo Mauriora</i>	_____	197
5.1	Introduction _____	197
5.2	Background to the report _____	197
5.3	Criterion-referenced analysis of the report _____	206
5.3.1	Criterion A: Representation of an ‘in-group’ _____	206

5.3.2	Criterion B: Representation of an ‘other’ identity _____	209
5.3.3	Criterion C: Group formation and fragmentation _____	210
5.3.4	Criterion D: Engagement with hegemonic interests/ key decision-makers _____	220
5.3.5	Criterion E: Dislocation and deconstruction _____	228
5.4	Responses to <i>Te Reo Mauriora</i> _____	238
5.5	Some concluding remarks _____	245
Chapter 6	_____	247
Overview and conclusions	_____	247
6.1	Introduction _____	247
6.2	Overview and discussion of the main research findings _____	247
6.2.1	The literature review and the development of effectiveness criteria _____	247
6.2.2	Application of the effectiveness criteria to three reports concerned with indigenous language revitalisation _____	251
6.2.2.1	<i>Our Land Our Languages</i> _____	252
6.2.2.2	<i>Ko Aotearoa Tēnei</i> _____	254
6.2.2.3	<i>Te Reo Mauriora</i> _____	257
6.3	Research contribution _____	259
6.4	Limitations of the research _____	260
6.5	Recommendations for future research _____	261
6.6	A final comment _____	261
References	_____	262
	Books, journals and theses _____	262
	Newspaper, magazine, audiovisual and web based articles and comments _____	286
	Legislation, government policies, reports, speeches and material obtained under the <i>Official Information Act 1982</i> _____	297
Appendices	_____	306
	<i>Appendix 1: Language policy and planning: Overarching frameworks</i> _____	307
	<i>Appendix 2: Language vitality and revitalisation frameworks</i> _____	310
	<i>Appendix 3: Behaviour change and policy frameworks</i> _____	319

List of Tables

<i>Table A1: An evolving framework of language planning goals</i>	307
<i>Table A2: Graded intergenerational disruption scale (GIDS)</i>	312
<i>Table A3: UNESCO Factor 8: Community members' attitudes toward language</i>	315
<i>Table A4: NILS Report recommended language endangerment Indicator One— Intergenerational Language Transmission</i>	315
<i>Table A5: Expanded GIDS (Revitalisation specific)</i>	317
<i>Table A6: Behaviour change wheel: Definition of interventions and policies</i>	321

List of Figures

Figure A1: Expanded language policy (Shohamy, 2006, pp.52 & 58)	_____	308
Figure A2: The Catherine wheel (Strubell, 2001)	_____	314
Figure A3: MINDSPACE and policy-making (Dolan et al., 2010, p.9)	_____	320
Figure A4: Behaviour change wheel (Michie et al., 2011, n.p.)	_____	321

Chapter 1

Introduction to the research

1.1 General Introduction

The *Māori language* is a critical aspect of the identity of *New Zealand*.¹ In particular, it is a critical aspect of the identity of Māori in this country. Benton (1998, June/July, p.31) has referred to it as “our only unbroken link with the country’s human history”, adding that “[w]ithout it, we’re just bleached driftwood abandoned on the shore”. However, it is now, after approximately 200 years of colonisation, at its lowest ebb. In spite of a number of world renowned revitalisation initiatives, achieving the critical mass of speakers needed for widespread intergenerational transmission is a distant hope. The language has almost no public presence outside of the education and broadcasting sectors, the proportion of both adult and child speakers continues to decline and English is so pervasive that it is likely that all of the remaining Māori speakers are also proficient in English (Bell, 2010, p.5; Waitangi Tribunal, 2011a, pp.168-169; 2011d, pp.1-2). Indeed, Matamua (New Zealand Press Association, 2010, September 10) rejects as a misconception the belief that “te reo Maori is experiencing a resurgence”, predicting instead that it “could die out by 2050”.² Clearly, notwithstanding efforts to revitalise the language, we are still at a crisis point.

¹ The first time that a Māori term is used it will be italicised and an explanatory note provided. The Māori term for New Zealand is *Aotearoa* and can be used alongside or instead of the English term. Although the author has used New Zealand this thesis, *Aotearoa* is often used in excerpts from the documents that are analysed as well as in a number of cited sources. Similarly, although the author uses the term Māori language, the Māori terms, such as *te reo Māori*, *te reo Maori*, or ‘*te reo*’ are often used in the documents and cited sources (see footnote 2 for example).

² This is supported by the Waitangi Tribunal (2011a, p.169) which stated that “the notion that te reo is making forward progress is manifestly false.” Matamua (Massey University, 2007, August 24) was also reported as stating that “if we don’t use the language as a natural part of everyday life we are going to go past the tipping point in the next 10 or 20 years. That is, we will reach a point where there is not a critical mass [of Māori language speakers] and it is just going to die away.”

1.2 The Māori language in New Zealand since colonisation: A brief historical overview

1.2.1 Introduction

The aim of this section is to provide a brief overview of the fate of the Māori language from the beginning of European colonisation until the time when revitalisation efforts began. Readers who seek further information are advised to consult the following works (among others): Bell, 1991, 2010; Benton, 1981, 1987; 1991; de Bres, 2008a; Chrisp, 2005; Christiansen, 2001; Grin and Vaillancourt, 1998; Hohepa, 1999; Ka'ai, 2004; Ka'ai-Mahuta, 2011; Matamua, 2006; Nock, 2010; Ormsby-Teki, Timutimu, Palmer, Ellis, & Johnston, 2011; Parliamentary Library, 2009; Powick, 2002; Reedy, 2000; Smith, 1989; Spolsky, 2003, 2005; Waitangi Tribunal, 1986, 2010, 2011a, 2011c; and Winitana, 2011.³

1.2.2 First contact

Europeans arriving in New Zealand between 1790 and 1840 were faced with an autonomous race numbering between 100,000 and 150,000 people, affiliated to one or more of over forty tribes situated throughout the land (Belich, 1986, p.300; Crosby, 1999, p.17). These people had a complex culture with well-established social institutions, such as the *whare wānanga* through which philosophy, beliefs, traditions, and knowledge were transmitted (Nock, 2010, p.185). Their skill and thirst for warfare caused a more circumspect approach to colonisation than was evident in Australia.⁴

Prior to 1850, virtually all social and economic communication between Māori and *Pākehā* was through the Māori language (Spolsky, 2003, pp.555-556).⁵ Representatives of the Crown were Māori speaking (Waitangi Tribunal 2011c,

³ Government agencies including The Ministry of Māori Development (*Te Puni Kōkiri*), The Māori Language Commission (*Te Taura Whiri i te Reo Māori*), Ministry of Culture and Heritage, and The Ministry of Education have also produced a number of reports and information concerning Māori language decline and revitalisation.

⁴ Belich (1986, p.305) states that, "with all due respect to British humanitarianism, one reason the New Zealand settlers did not treat the Maoris as their Australian counterparts did the Aborigines was that, when they tried, they got killed."

⁵ *Pākehā* is the Māori name for New Zealanders of British/European ancestry, specifically a person of fair skin. Although the term is not generally applied to darker-skinned New Zealanders, such as, for example, people who have immigrated from Asia or Polynesia, it is sometimes applied more widely to non-Māori society or government in order to identify the non-Māori Other.

p.451). The *Treaty of Waitangi* (1840) (hereafter referred to as ‘the Treaty’) was translated into, and discussed in Māori.⁶ Furthermore, driven by Māori-medium mission schools and by grammars, biblical translations and dictionaries published by missionaries, Māori were, by 1850, proportionately more literate than settlers (Benton, 1987, p.64; Ka’ai-Mahuta, 2011, p.200; Nock, 2010, p.186). Such was the dominance of the Māori language that the possibility of the language becoming extinct would have been inconceivable. As Christiansen (2001, p.13) observes:

Initially there was no reason to think that a new language spoken by a relatively small number of explorers, traders, and settlers from Europe could pose any threat to the continued viability of the dialects of the Māori language that were the medium of communication, ceremony, trade and commerce, matters spiritual and political used in the valleys and districts of Māori settlement throughout Aotearoa. Indeed, the early European settlers and missionaries were quick to learn the language and to use it in their encounters with Māori.

Nevertheless, the unthinkable did occur. A mere 130 years after the signing of the Treaty the Māori language was in dire straits. The percentage of Māori children who spoke the language had plummeted from 90% in 1913, to 26% in 1953. By the 1970s, it was a mere 5% (including no more than 100 pre-school children) (Benton, 1981, 1991; Waitangi Tribunal, 1986, para.3.3.2; 2010, p.7). Most of the remaining approximately 64,000 fluent speakers were elderly. Māori had been displaced by English in most aspects of everyday family life and its role in the upbringing of children had become almost non-existent. It was clear that “if nature were left to take its course, Māori would be a language without native speakers with the passing of the present generation[s] of Māori speaking parents” (Benton, 1991, p.12). As Matamua (2006, p.71) has maintained, “[t]he complete eradication of the Māori

⁶ The *Treaty of Waitangi* was signed in 1840 by representatives of the British Crown and over 500 Māori chiefs from throughout New Zealand. It established a British Governor of New Zealand, recognised Māori ownership of their lands and other properties, and gave the Māori the rights of British subjects. The Māori version of the Treaty, which retains Māori autonomy over their own affairs, was by far the most signed, however the English version, which gives Britain sovereignty of New Zealand was preferred by the Crown. Despite the lack of consensus over its meaning it is generally accepted that the Treaty is the founding document of New Zealand as a nation.

language had nearly come to pass". It was at this point that a concerted effort towards revitalisation began.

1.2.3 Colonisation and control

The rapid decline of the Māori language can only be fully understood in the context of the colonisers' aim to achieve hegemony and assimilation. Three primary elements were critical to the paradigm of settlement colonisation: economic necessity, familiarity, and a sense of superiority.⁷ First, as with colonisation in general, settlement colonisation was primarily driven by an economic imperative: the desire not only to achieve a basic standard of living in the new country but, ultimately, a better standard than many settlers had in their European homelands. Second, colonisers aimed to re-create (to the extent possible) the way of life with which they were familiar. The third element was an internalised assumption, influenced partly by social Darwinism and the colonisers' more advanced technology, of innate superiority and the concomitant inferiority of Māori language and culture (see for example, Belich, 1986, pp.299-300; Salmon, 1991, pp.95-97, 113,116, 308, 352 & 427-9). This ideology of racial hierarchy produced widespread negative attitudes toward Māori and the Māori language. Many believed that the demise (or assimilation) of the Māori population and the decline of the language would be the inevitable result of natural selection (Belich, 1986, pp.299-301 & 323; Durie, 1998, p.31; Ka'ai-Mahuta, 2011, pp.204-205).⁸ This combination of elements is significant: not only did it underpin the gradual dispossession of Māori land and the increasing control over their lives and minds, it also justified it.

⁷ Mufwene (2002) has observed that language loss has been the most catastrophic in settlement colonies, such as New Zealand and Australia, rather than trade or exploitation colonies. This is because coloniser intentions in the latter two kinds of colonisation do not extend to cultural and linguistic domination, that is, they do not extend to what McGrath (1995, p.xxix) describes as "the establishment and maintenance of hegemony . . . over land, bodies and minds".

⁸ This perspective is most commonly linked to comments by Dr Isaac Featherston, Superintendent of Wellington Province in 1846, that, "A barbarous and coloured race must inevitably die out by mere contact with the civilized white; our business, therefore, and all we can do is to smooth the pillow of the dying Maori race" (Owens, 1972, p.419). A similar sentiment, again from the late 19th century, is cited by Durie (1998, pp.31-32), as "Just as the Norwegian rat has displaced the Māori rat, as introduced plants have displaced native plants, so the white man will replace the Māori". The notion of the inevitable extinction of Pacific islanders as a result of contact with Europeans was widely held over a long period of time with Howe (1977, p.140) suggesting that it "long predated evolutionary theories of Darwin and others in the second half of the nineteenth century."

The critical precursor to language decline is the establishment of economic and political control. Thus, as Spolsky (2003, p.554) observes, “[t]he question of success or failure of Māori language policy in New Zealand . . . cannot be restricted to linguistic issues alone”. Because colonising interests created an environment in which the Government and other institutions could directly affect the vitality of the Māori language, “non-linguistic factors were critical” (Spolsky, 2003, p.559). These factors include:

- the assumption by Pākehā of control over government (following the Treaty of Waitangi);
- an exponential increase in settler numbers and a serious reduction of the Māori population (as a result, largely, of warfare and European diseases);
- large-scale alienation from, and confiscation of, land (which undermined the ability of Māori to compete economically);
- use of British military forces to overcome Māori resistance (and increase Pākehā control);
- privileged access for Pākehā to public discourse (including English language popular media such as newspapers, and more recently, television, radio and the Internet).

The Treaty of Waitangi was interpreted by Pākehā as giving them the right to govern the country as a whole, an interpretation that was eventually extended to include the formation of policies and the introduction of laws that privileged ‘white’ institutions and pushed Māori and the Māori language into the background (Smith, 1989, pp.3-5; Weatherley, 2009, pp.1-2).⁹ As Matamua (2006, pp.67-68) observes, “the true enemy of the [Māori] language was the new institutionalism”, that is, the English language institutional infrastructure (including parliaments, schools, courts, laws, statutes, bills and religious institutions) which was imposed on the Māori world. English became the normal language in the public arena. Institutions and activities that supported

⁹ Cheyne, O’Brian and Belgrave (2008, p.21) state that “Once Pākehā society became dominant, for all legal purposes the Crown controlled the meaning of the Treaty. The Crown was even able to determine when the Treaty would be acknowledged and when it could be safely be ignored”. Given that power-relations in New Zealand remain essentially unchanged in 150 years, the political struggle for cultural and social equity is highly salient to Māori language revitalisation.

the Māori language were increasingly forced “behind closed doors” (Smith, 1989, p.4). As Smith (p.4) notes:

Highly visible Māori political or economic structures were either systematically destroyed or forced outside the mainstream public arena The definition of public practice became synonymous with dominant Pākehā structures and relations; conversely, private practice became associated with subordinate Maori structures and relations.

Accompanying the increasing control by Pākehā of institutional structures was an exponential increase in settler numbers and a serious reduction in the Māori population due, in large measure, to a combination of warfare and European diseases. Between 1840 and 1871, settler numbers went from 2,000 to 256,393, while the 45,470 Māori had become a minority in their own country (Christiansen, 2001, pp.15-16).¹⁰ Furthermore, as Māori did not see themselves as a single, monolithic nation but as independent tribal groups, their capacity to operate as a bloc was reduced.¹¹ This change in the population structure also impacted on the Māori language. As Christiansen (2001, p.16) observes: “There was now little motivation for European immigrants to learn Māori, as their survival no longer depended on their ability to communicate with Māori people”. Furthermore, the lack of density of Māori populations outside of Auckland, Waikato and the Bay of Plenty meant that language maintenance was very difficult (Spolsky, 2003, p.559).

Added to the change in the respective populations and the increasing Pākehā control of institutional structures was extensive alienation from, and confiscation of Māori land, something that was reinforced by the use of British military to overcome Māori resistance. During the 1860s, approximately 18,000 British troops were engaged in military operations against opposition forces that numbered no more

¹⁰ Mason Durie (1998, p.31) also notes that Fenton’s 1857-58 “headcount” estimated the Māori population at 56, 049 while the 1896 count recorded an all time low of 42, 113.

¹¹ The Māori king movement is the best known attempt to create a unified bloc that transcends tribal loyalties. However it was never universally accepted amongst Māori, with some tribes even fighting on behalf of the Government.

than 4,000 at any one time (Belich, 1986, p.132; Spolsky, 2003, p.55).¹² Taken together, these things seriously undermined the ability of Māori to compete in the economy. The socio-economic disadvantage that ensued inevitably lowered the perceived status of the Māori-speaking community which, in turn, impacted in a negative way on the perceived value of the Māori language (Benton 1991, p.15).¹³

Also impacting on the perceived value of the Māori language was Pākehā control over privileged access to public discourse (including English language popular media), such as newspapers and, more recently, television, radio and the Internet, something that was challenged only by a vibrant Māori newspaper sector that existed until the 1930s and, occasionally, by activists such as those involved in the newspaper campaign against the Taranaki war which arguably led to the recall of governor Gore Browne (Lethbridge, 1993, pp.188-200; Storey, n.d., p.11).¹⁴

Māori were not merely passive victims in the face of increasing Pākehā control. They were eager to acquire Pākehā knowledge and Western technology (Christiansen, 2001, p.18; Ka'ai-Mahuta, 2011, p.204). Even after the wars between Māori and Pākehā (1860 – 1872), wherever Māori were able to resist land sales, they were also able to retain a measure of autonomy, particularly in isolated rural communities. Where resistance was untenable, they often collaborated (Belich, 1986, pp.303-304). Spolsky (2003, p.555) conceptualises the colonisation process as one that involved “the continued effort of two groups of people sharing common space, each taking an active role in negotiating the way in which that sharing should be instantiated as regards language choice”. Thus, throughout the early part of the 19th century, many Māori leaders encouraged the learning of English (Matamua, 2006, p.70). For example, Sir Apirana Ngata is cited by Harrison (2002, p.49) as having argued that the priorities for Māori education should be “English, English,

¹² Belich (1986, p.132) states that “for the first two months of the war they were only outnumbered four to one. After this, the disparity mounted until it reached ten to one The most fundamental feature of the Waikato war was the vast British superiority in numbers.”

¹³ See also Chrystal (2000, p.133) who states that “an endangered language will progress if its speakers increase their legitimate power in the eyes of the dominant community.” Clearly, the inverse is also true, as seen in the case of the Māori language.

¹⁴ Anglican humanitarians, such as Archdeacon Octavius Hadfield, Bishop George Selwyn and William Martin, wrote letters and published pamphlets in Great Britain against the Taranaki war in an apparently successful bid to convince the Colonial Office and Parliament to stop Browne and his strident Māori policy.

English”.¹⁵ This did not, however, indicate that he was advocating the rejection of Māori culture and language but rather encouraging the attainment of the benefits of the Pākehā world only accessible through English in addition to the treasures of the Māori world only accessible through the Māori language, as seen in the following words of encouragement, penned by Ngata in 1949 to a young girl:¹⁶

E tipu e rea mō ngā rā o tō ao.

Grow tender shoot for the days of your world

Ko tō ringaringa ki ngā rākau a te Pākehā hei oranga mo tō tinana.

Turn your hands to the tools of the Pākehā for the well-being of your body

Ko tō ngākau ki ngā taonga o ō tīpuna Māori hei tikitiki mō tō māhunga.

Turn your heart to the treasures of your ancestors as a crown for your head

Ko tō wairua ki tō Atua, nāna nei ngā mea katoa

Give your soul to God, the author of all things.

Nevertheless, notwithstanding the ideal of two cultures living peacefully side by side envisaged by some Treaty signatories or as popularised by early historical narratives depicting colonial New Zealand, the reality was that Māori were almost always required to adapt to Pākehā, any accommodation by Pākehā being essentially ‘tokenistic’ (Christiansen, 2001, p.20) or representing a kind of ‘false generosity’ (Freire, 1984, pp.532-533).¹⁷ Although Spolsky (2003, p.571) has described the process of negotiation between Māori and non-Māori as ‘often painful’, it is clear that the pain has never been shared equally by both partners.

1.2.4 Major causes of language loss

The colonists’ vision of New Zealand could be realised only if they gained overall control of everything, language included. To do so, they needed to place the English language at the centre of public society. This involved:

¹⁵ Sir Apirana Tūrapa Ngata (1874-1950) was arguably the foremost Māori politician ever to have served in Parliament. He is also known for his promotion of Māori culture and language.

¹⁶ Words and translation obtained from Houia-Roberts (2003, p.4).

¹⁷ Freire (1984, p.533) stated that “in order to have the continued opportunity to express their ‘generosity’, the oppressors must perpetuate injustice as well. An unjust social order is the permanent fount of this ‘generosity’, which is nourished by death, despair and poverty. This is why dispensers of false generosity become desperate at the slightest threat to its cause.”

- immersing Māori children in English;
- removing Māori language from the public sphere;
- fracturing the institutions which supported the Māori language;
- supporting and reinforcing negative beliefs about, and attitudes towards the Māori language.

1.2.4.1 Education: The immersion of Māori children in English

The most powerful mechanism for assimilating minority children into mainstream cultures is schools (Houia-Roberts, 2003, p.5) and in the case of New Zealand, there was a “systematic attempt to engineer a linguistic and cultural shift to English” (Benton, 1996, p.66). In Spolsky’s (2003, p.556) words: “Gaining control of the new technique (literacy) came with a high price”. The initial success of Māori language mission schools was cut short in 1847 when subsidies were paid only to mission schools that taught through the medium of English. Further Government involvement in schooling, such as, in particular, *The Native Schools Acts of 1858 and 1867*, *The Native Schools Code in 1880* and its revision in *1897*, first reduced the role of the Māori language to a mere “bridge to their later acquisition of English” (Ormsby-teki et al., 2011) and then required that English be the sole medium of education (Benton, 1996, p.64; Kā’ai-Mahuta, 2011, pp.204-205; Smith, 1989, pp.4-5). By the turn of the century, “Māori was banished altogether from the classroom” (Benton, 1991, p.23).

Although some Māori leaders were concerned about the potential impact of English-medium instruction on the Māori language, many believed that that impact would be minimal in view of the fact that only a limited amount of time was spent at school and, at that time, the language was still strong in Māori homes and Māori children could switch with relative ease between Māori and English (Ormsby-Teki et al., 2011). Unfortunately, exposure to English, combined with the fact that children were punished for speaking the Māori language at school, had a powerful impact. Many children who grew up speaking Māori to their parents would not use the language when interacting with their own children for fear that they would be punished if they used the language at school (Benton, 1991, p.18; Edwards, 1990, pp.28-32).

1.2.4.2 Removal of Māori language from the public sphere

By the 1890s, virtually all high value functions (including schooling, legal and commercial transactions and government) were conducted through the medium of English (Parliamentary Library, 2000, p.1; Smith, 1989, p.5). Although this was, in part, a natural consequence of Pākehā control of these domains, policy and legislation also played a part.

With the exception of the vibrant Māori language newspaper sector, which communicated with Māori communities between the 1840s and 1930s, there were practically no public domains in which Māori was used for daily communication in those geographical areas dominated by Pākehā. Nevertheless, Māori language was still strong in those rural settlements where the majority of Māori lived (Nock, 2010, p.187). In these isolated settlements, the Māori language was more than just the language of home life and cultural and religious activities around marae. It was also used by *whānau* groups when engaging in agriculture-related employment activities (Benton, 1996, p.66; Te Puni Kōkiri, 2004, p.13).¹⁸ Thus, in spite of the increasing encroachment of English, there was a brief period between 1890 and 1940 during which English and Māori had complementary, albeit unequal functions (Benton, 1991, pp.14-15). The vast majority of Māori were native speakers, and used the Māori language extensively in community settings, leading Te Puni Kōkiri (2004, p.14) to suggest that during this period the Māori language was “relatively secure”. This would not last. The high incidence of bilingualism among the younger generations, combined with the loss of young Māori leaders in World War II and the massive social and economic changes following the war, contributed to a steep decline in the use of the Māori language.

1.2.4.3 Fracturing the social institutions which supported the Māori language

In 1945, 80% of Māori lived within their rural tribal boundaries. However, on-going loss of land, the difficulty of finding work in rural areas (and, sometimes, the dream of a better life in the towns) meant that, by 1966, 62% of Māori lived in urban areas (Te Puni Kōkiri, 1999, p.6). By 1996, only 14% of Māori remained in their traditional rural areas.

¹⁸ *Whānau* is a close knit extended family structure.

This rural exodus fractured the cohesive whānau units which had been a bastion of the self-generation of the language (Te Puni Kōkiri, 1999, p.6; 2004, pp.14-15). This social dislocation was compounded by integrative policies, such as *pepper potting*¹⁹ (which reduced opportunities for everyday conversations in Māori) and English-medium education which, taken together, meant that, outside of contexts such as the *marae*²⁰ or, sometimes, the church, there were no social institutions that supported the transmission of the Māori language to children (Benton, 1991, p.9; Christiansen, 2001, p.18; Smith, 1989, p.5). As has been noted by Te Puni Kōkiri (2004, p.14):

The linguistic result of the urban migration, and policies of state agencies, was that the Māori language was not used in the majority of urban domains despite the fact that, in the first decade of urban migration, virtually all Māori adults and many Māori children could speak Māori.

In contrast, the dominance of English in urban domains, especially in workplaces, and the influence of negative attitudes towards the Māori language, resulted in many Māori families making a conscious decision that it would be better to use English rather than Māori as the primary means of communication with their children (Benton, 1987, p.66; Te Puni Kōkiri & Te Taura Whiri i Te Reo Māori, 2003, p.11). Even so, as Benton (1998, June/July, p.31) observes, there was no evidence of any great leap forward in the school work of children as a result.

Other significant factors in the increasing use of English in households include the rise in the number of mixed marriages as well as the introduction of English

¹⁹ 'Pepper-potting' is the intentional intermingling, within a single area, of different classes of houses or social groups. The New Zealand pepper-potting policy dispersed Māori families among European dominated areas to prevent residential concentrations of Māori. This was in line with Hunn's (1961, p.14) recommendation that Māori urbanisation be actively nurtured as "the quickest and surest way of 'integrating' the two species of New Zealander. Hunn (1961, p.14) hoped to prevent a "colour problem from arising . . . as the Māori population expands" noting that "people understand and appreciate one another better and mutually adjust themselves easier if living as neighbours than if living apart in separate communities."

²⁰ Although the term *marae* technically refers to the open space in front of a meeting house, it can also refer to the whole complex, including the buildings and grounds. It is generally expected that oratory in formal ceremonies at the marae will be conducted in the Māori language. As such it is often considered as the last bastion of the Māori language.

television into family homes in the 1960s. For the first time ever, the intergenerational transmission of the language had been deeply ruptured and almost all Māori children were being raised primarily as speakers of English (Te Puni Kōkiri, 2004, p.15). The result was disastrous for the Māori language. An entire generation of children had no or little knowledge of their own language, a generation which would become, in the ensuing decades, a monolingual English “fifth column” to their Māori speaking relatives, thus completing “the anglicization of the New Zealand countryside” (Benton, 1991, p.22).²¹ As Hunn (1961, p.15) correctly noted in his much criticised report, “every Maori who can no longer speak the language, perform the *haka* or *poi*,²² or take his place on the marae, makes it just so much harder for these remnants of Maori culture to be perpetuated”.

1.2.4.4 Negative attitudes and ideologies

There was a widespread belief that the English language and the culture associated with it were superior to Māori language and culture. This belief was accompanied by the conviction that English was the key to future employment and success and that bilingualism impeded children’s development. These beliefs had a marked effect on Māori perceptions of their own language, something that was reinforced by English language popular media (Christiansen, 2001, p.18). Benton (1987, p.66) asserts that television had a powerful influence on children, explaining that it reinforced “the implicit message of the school that English was the only language of any importance in the wider world.”²³

Unfortunately, the promised “better future” that would result from ‘Pākehā knowledge’ was not equitably enjoyed by Māori people (Christiansen, 2001, p.18).

²¹ In his landmark representation of the Māori language crisis, Benton (1991, p.16) noted three transition points of decline that were experienced (at different times) by every part of the country, (1) Māori ceasing to be the first language understood by children; (2) Children unlikely to acquire fluency in Māori; (3) Children more likely to be monolingual English speakers.

²² *Haka* and *poi* are types of cultural dances that are closely associated with the Māori language.

²³ The emergence of bilingualism among minority language speakers is not only considered a step toward language death in a practical sense but it also is reflective of a transition in the attitudes toward both languages (Lewis, 2007, pp.8-9). For example, Te Puni Kōkiri (2004, pp.13-15) links the “pronounced ambivalence towards the Māori language” among Māori society around the 1900s-1940s (the period of the emergence of the first bilingual generations) to the speed with which Māori urban migrants in the 1950s discarded Māori names for their children in favour of English ones. In the face of “massive uncontrolled exposure to English in environments where the Māori community was no longer able to determine the linguistic norms” the earlier ambivalence led to a giving way of the desire to retain their language (Te Puni Kōkiri, 2004, p.15).

What emerged in the 1950s, and was apparent by the 1970s, was a ‘Māori under-class’, which, together with its concomitant social problems, further reinforced the low estimates and negative stereotypes of Māori and their language held by the wider population (Nock, 2010, p.187).²⁴ In addition, many Māori, especially younger Māori, were embarrassed about using their Māori language skills in public. Taken together, these attitudes and behaviours led ultimately to a situation in the 1970s which Christiansen (2001, pp.18-19) has described as follows:

Māori remained physically identifiable as Māori but a large majority had lost understandings of cultural beliefs and practices, had become removed from living arrangements which allowed extended families to operate as economic and social units, and had lost the language which enabled communication with the world as Māori.²⁵

The colonist agenda of control involved placing the English language at the centre of society and, at the same time, removing the Māori language to its margins and rupturing the intergenerational transmission. As a result, in less than 175 years, the Māori language declined from being the only language in these islands to being a critically endangered minority language.

1.3 Rationale for this research

1.3.1 A personal perspective

On a personal level, there have been a number of particularly influential events and experiences that have guided my decision to carry out the research reported here. One of these was my decision, at the age of twenty five, to learn the Māori language and the events and circumstances that surrounded that decision. Another reason was my marriage to a Māori woman and our decision that our children should be brought up to speak the Māori language and to be familiar with *te ao Māori* (Māori cultural life). Also of significance were experiences leading up to, and during the time when

²⁴ Nock (2010, p.187) writes that “[s]ub-standard housing, high unemployment and poor health, together with the loss of family support networks, created a breeding ground for the emergence of social problems”.

²⁵ Christiansen (2001, p.19) goes on to state that this type of cultural dispossession would, in later years, be identified as a major cause of mental ill health for Māori.

I was involved with others in developing a Māori language plan for Whakamārama marae (Lewis, 2007), my wife's home marae.

I was born into a New Zealand Pākehā family, my ancestors being of Welsh, English, Scottish, and Norwegian extraction. I was brought up and educated in a context in which I had limited exposure to Māori people, culture or language until, in 1990, at the age of 20, I began work at the Taumarunui branch of the Public Trust Office and experienced life in a small King Country town where many of the inhabitants were Māori. There I learned for the first time not only that Pākehā and Māori often thought about and did things in very different ways, but also that the ways in which Pākehā thought about and did things were by no means always appreciated by Māori. I also began to realise that, contrary to what I had been taught at school, Māori language and culture were neither dead nor irrelevant.

When, in 1992, my workplace was restructured and I lost my position, I decided, with the encouragement and support of a number of friends and acquaintances, to enrol for a Māori language course. Initially, I was seriously concerned about whether it was appropriate for me to enrol in such a course in view of the fact that so many Māori at that time had had no opportunity to learn the language. However, towards the end of my first year of study, I began to be convinced, partly as a result of advice I was given by a *kaumātua*²⁶ that it was acceptable for me to have a place on a Māori language course so long as I was fully responsive to the responsibilities associated with my learning of the language.

My awareness of these responsibilities was heightened as a result of my experiences at Whakamārama marae where, due to a serious lack of *kaumātua* to attend to the *paepae*,²⁷ I was sometimes called on to speak, most notably, and poignantly, on occasions when family members of a deceased relative were unable to deliver a eulogy in Māori. These experiences, combined with the fact that, at the time, Te Awamutu (where Whakamārama marae is located) had only one *kōhanga reo*²⁸ and

²⁶ *Kaumātua* are respected tribal elders.

²⁷ The *paepae* is the bench or front row of seats generally situated in front of the meeting house, where the main orators of a marae sit before they deliver their speeches.

²⁸ *Kōhanga Reo* (Literally - language nest) refers to the total immersion Māori language family programme for young children from birth to six years of age.

no *kura kaupapa Māori*,²⁹ convinced me of the need to work with others to develop a Māori language strategy for Whakamārama marae and look towards shaping the implementation activities.

It proved very difficult, however, during the development of that strategy, to locate people who had expertise in the area of language policy and planning. Indeed, although the funder of that project, *Mā Te Reo*,³⁰ stipulated that our planning meetings should be facilitated by an expert in that area, it was unable to identify anyone in the country with the appropriate expertise who could perform that role. By the time the strategy referred to above had been completed, there was a new focus within our *iwi* (tribe), *Raukawa*, on lifting the profile of the Māori language, particularly through language planning. I was fortunate to be invited to take up an *iwi*-level position as a member of a highly committed team whose task it was to undertake a range of further language-related activities. However, in spite of our best efforts, it proved impossible to attract sufficient government funding to retain key staff. It therefore seemed to me that there were important lessons that we still needed to learn, lessons that were likely to be of relevance to all of those who were committed to furthering the cause of Māori language revitalisation. It was at that point that I decided to conduct research in the area of language policy and planning, my overall aim being to determine whether some of the problems we faced could be resolved by exploring the approaches others involved in indigenous language revitalisation had adopted.

1.3.2 A political perspective

Language policy and planning activity relating to the revitalisation of the Māori language in New Zealand has, so far, been only moderately effective. In its recent review of over 30 years of revitalisation efforts, the *Waitangi Tribunal* (2010, p.x; 2011d, pp.1-2) observed that the Māori language is at a ‘crisis point’.³¹ Rather than moving towards a critical mass of speakers and widespread intergenerational

²⁹ *Kura kaupapa Māori* are Māori-language immersion schools (*kura*) which reflect Māori cultural values with the aim of revitalising Māori language, knowledge and culture.

³⁰ *Mā te Reo* is a Government funded programme established in 2001 to support projects, programmes and activities that contribute to local level Māori language regeneration. *Mā te Reo* is administered by Te Taura Whiri I te Reo Māori.

³¹ The Waitangi Tribunal (Māori: *Te Rōpū Whakamana i te Tiriti*) will be discussed in *Section 1.3.2.1*

transmission, things had gone backwards. The proportion of Māori who spoke the Māori language had continued to decline, with a significant decline in children aged under ten who were speakers of the language (Waitangi Tribunal, 2011d, p.2). There had been a large decrease in the number of children attending Māori language medium education, with *kōhanga reo* attendance having decreased from 14,514 in 1993 to 9,288 in 2009 (Waitangi Tribunal, 2011, July 2, p.2). The Waitangi Tribunal (2010, pp.x, 28-29) also noted that the language that is being taught is of a lower quality than previously, with teachers at all levels being more likely to be second-language learners rather than native speakers. Furthermore, the Māori language had - and has - almost no public presence outside of the education and broadcasting sectors, something reflected in Houia-Roberts' (2003, p.18) assertion that even though "children may learn Māori . . . there are very few domains in which they can actually use it". Indeed, the Waitangi Tribunal (2011d, p.2) accepts that the focus on education programmes is a strategy that is "no longer working".

Many believe that the answer may lie in co-ordinated, comprehensive, coherent and consistently implemented language policy and planning (see for example, Benton, 1996; Human Rights Commission, 2008; Kaplan & Baldauf, 2003; Peddie, 1991, 1993, 1997, 2003, 2005; The Royal Society of New Zealand, 2013, March). It is noted in the *Māori Language Strategy* (Te Puni Kōkiri & Te Taura Whiri i Te Reo Māori, 2003, p.3) that one of the key principles required for its successful implementation is "greater planning and co-ordination" in order to ensure "that we can do the right activities in the right ways and at the right times". Effective language planning is influenced by numerous factors and therefore encompasses far more than one or two key sectors (Cooper, 1989, p.182; Eggington, 2005, p.223; Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997, p.8; Lewis, 2007, pp.11-12). To be successful, it needs to penetrate and "pervade the entire society" (including all national and local government departments, the civil service, business, industry, and educational institutions) (Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997, p.187). It needs to be reflected in all areas of public activity (from road signs to currency) (Shohamy, 2006, p.53). It needs to involve all languages and it needs to be accompanied by adequate resources. The following discussion relates to four major projects aimed at achieving this type of language policy and planning. They are:

- The Waitangi Tribunal and the legal system;
- Grassroots revitalisation initiatives;
- The New Zealand national language policy experience;
- The *Māori Language Strategy* 2003.

1.3.2.1 The Waitangi Tribunal and the legal system

Following the realisation in the 1970s of the tremendous level of language decline, a Māori voice began to emerge as part of the wider movement calling on the Government to honour its Treaty promises. Indeed, the concomitant increase of public awareness of the Treaty, together with the establishment of the Waitangi Tribunal in 1975 and the subsequent integration of Treaty rights into the New Zealand legal system, has meant that the Treaty has arguably provided the greatest amount of political leverage for Māori. In this regard, it is not surprising that the greatest advances in government protection of the Māori language have arguably been due to the legal system upholding Treaty of Waitangi rights (Romaine, 2002, pp.205-206).

The Waitangi Tribunal, which has been central to this struggle, is a permanent, commission of inquiry (including Māori and non-Māori members) charged with investigating and making recommendations on claims brought by Māori relating to breaches by the Crown of the promises made in the Treaty of Waitangi.³² The Tribunal's recommendations are generally non-binding on the Government, and therefore the Tribunal aims to move parties closer to a settlement by "conducting a robust inquiry, identifying all parties and their representatives in a public and transparent process that clarifies key issues, resolves points of contention where possible" (Waitangi Tribunal, n.d.). A critical issue is that the framework for settling Treaty grievances is set in a context of Pākehā dominance, which effectively means the Crown determines the meaning of the Treaty, when it can be acknowledged and when it can safely be ignored (Cheyne, O'Brian & Belgrave, 2008, p.21).³³

³² See *Sections 1.2.2 and 1.2.3* for a brief context to the signing in 1840 as well as the role of the Treaty of Waitangi in New Zealand.

³³ Member of Parliament Tariana Turia (2013, May 15) believes that the [Treaty] settlement process is both unfair and unjust, asking "where in the world does the perpetrator of the crime - in this case the Crown - also get to be judge and jury? When is the perpetrator ever allowed to determine whether

Early claims heard by the Waitangi Tribunal related to tangible *taonga* (treasure) such as ‘lands and estates, forests, fisheries’ (as stated in Article two of the English version of the Treaty). However in 1984, Huirangi Waikerepuru and Ngā Kaiwhakapūmau i te Reo Māori Incorporated Society filed a claim with the Tribunal arguing that the Māori language is also a *taonga*, that the Crown’s Treaty promise to protect it had not been kept and that the Māori language should, therefore, be given official recognition and nurtured in government at all levels, especially in broadcasting, education and health (Matamua, 2006, p.52). In its WAI 11 *Te Reo Māori* report (Waitangi Tribunal, 1986) on this claim, the Tribunal accepted the claimants’ fundamental arguments and directed the Government to take steps to protect the language, with specific mention of broadcasting policy and Māori medium education. Nevertheless, the Tribunal, clearly aware of negative attitudes in relation to the claim, followed a pragmatic approach, rejecting the notion of compulsory Māori language in schools and mandatory bilingual documents for the Public Service and stating that “we think it more profitable to promote the language than to impose it” (Waitangi Tribunal, 1986, p.6).

A direct outcome of the WAI 11 inquiry was the *Maori Language Act 1987* (hereafter referred to as the ‘Māori Language Act’).³⁴ This Act of parliament provided an official status for the language and established the *Māori Language Commission* (later called *Te Taura Whiri i te Reo Māori*) as a central planning agency. Nevertheless, other than granting the right to speak Māori in certain legal settings (using registered translators), the *Māori Language Act* left this official status undefined, omitting key WAI 11 *Te Reo Māori* recommendations, such as the right to use the language in dealings with public bodies, Māori/ English bilingual positions in the State Services and Māori language protection in broadcasting policy. Consequently, not only was the Māori language *not* given the same status as English but, in stating in its provisions that the use of the Māori language could

a crime was committed or not-how bad the crime was-and what compensation will be paid - if any? Who has access to millions of dollars of funding to back their side of the story-to hire the best lawyers to put their case? Who has limited access to legal aid and research to tell their side of the story? How does that equate to a fair and just process for dealing with Treaty claims?”

³⁴ In an act that appears to be intended to stifle public debate on the contents of the WAI 11 report, the *Māori Language Act 1987* was presented to parliament on the same day as the report was released.

not “affect the right of any other linguistic community in New Zealand to use the language of that community”, the *Maori Language Act 1987* clearly signalled that the expectation was that Māori language would be effectively limited to very few domains.³⁵ In the event, Te Taura Whiri i te Reo Māori (hereafter referred to as Te Taura Whiri) was not provided with adequate resources to begin to alter this situation.

Other Māori language-related claims heard by the Waitangi tribunal include WAI 026/150, concerning the allocation of radio frequencies, and WAI 176 concerning Broadcasting. These claims began as result of the lack of provision for Māori radio and television in the *Māori Language Act 1987* however, gained momentum with Government’s proposal in 1989 to privatise frequency management licences and to transfer the assets of the public broadcasters to quasi-private sector entities (Bell, 2010, p.7; Matamua, 2006, p.47). The claimants argued that this move would undermine the Crown’s ability to protect the Māori language. This matter was played out in a series of court cases, eventually arriving at the Privy Council which, although it upheld the previous decisions in favour of the Government, did find that:

- the Māori language is in a serious state of decline;
- It is an official language of New Zealand, a highly prized treasure (taonga) for Māori and also part of the national cultural heritage;
- The Māori language is protected by the Treaty – the Crown has an obligation to protect and preserve the Māori language as part of taonga in return for being recognised as the legitimate Government of the whole nation by Māori;
- In practice, it is inevitable that the Crown would have to bear a substantial proportion of the costs of any Māori language broadcast

³⁵ It is arguable that, in the main, the *Māori Language Act 1987* benefitted the governing *élite*, in the same way that Cooper (1989, p.81) believes the anti-sexist language campaign “drained popular discontent . . . into harmless channels, without changing the fundamental social, economic, and political arrangements that promote . . . inequality.” Purcell (2009, p.152) asserts that *élite* group concern for weaker group wellbeing does not compromise their own welfare or hold on power. Consequently, the ultimate aim of language activists should be to change the fundamental social structures from which the inequality derives.

(Matamua, 2006, p.55; Waitangi Tribunal, 2011c, pp.401, 442 & 452-453).³⁶

The Government accepted this perspective and subsequently created *Te Māngai Pāhō* (also called *The Māori Broadcasting Funding Agency*) in 1993 to fund the Government's Māori broadcasting initiatives.³⁷ This was a significant milestone, with Matamua (2006, p.59) observing that “most Māori believed it was a step toward reclaiming some type of Māori self-determination”. It was these claims, together with a number of unfunded Māori initiatives, that created a momentum that produced a nationwide network of Māori radio stations and, permanently on air from 2004, a national Māori Television Service (Matamua, 2006, pp.47-50). This represents a crucial step forward for the prestige of the language in what Bell (2010, p.12) asserts is “arguably the most important public, institutional domain in society”. He (Bell, 2010, p.22) nevertheless warns that if a minimum level of mainstream and primetime television programming is not achieved, the Māori language “is in danger of being ghettoized on a minority channel and will not receive the profile which it needs in society at large to increase its prestige in the eyes of its speakers (Bell, 2010, p.14).

One of the most significant Waitangi Tribunal claims in recent times is the WAI 262 (Indigenous flora and fauna, cultural intellectual property) claim. This claim arose from concerns that *mātauranga Māori* (Māori knowledge and ways of knowing) in relation to Māori taonga - including Māori language dialects - was being lost, as were the taonga themselves, and that the control guaranteed to Māori in the Treaty was being denied to them as a result of legal or policy decisions. The Te reo Māori chapter of the inquiry report, *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei*, identified the health of the Māori language as “approaching a crisis point” (WT, 2011, July 2, p.1) and was unequivocal in identifying government policies and practices as the primary cause. Reference was made to a lack of imagination, ambition and commitment in relation to the Māori language on the part of government. The report noted that there was little evidence of true partnership, repeated policy failures, a lack of

³⁶ See *New Zealand Māori Council v Attorney-General* [1994] 1 NZLR 513.

³⁷ The Waitangi Tribunal noted that in 2006 *Te Māngai Pāhō* (Originally called as *Te Reo Whakapūaki Irirangi*) spent \$49.8 million on Māori broadcasting

commitment to the implementation of the 2003 *Māori Language Strategy* and inadequate resourcing. It also questioned why key WAI 11 recommendations had still not been implemented twenty five years after the 1986 report. The main recommendations of the inquiry report, entitled *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei*, include a strengthening of Te Taura Whiri. This report will be discussed in-depth in *Chapter 4*.

1.3.2.2 Grassroots revitalisation initiatives

The development of Māori education initiatives such as Te Ataarangi (in 1979), *Wānanga Māori*³⁸(1981), Te Kōhanga Reo (1982), and Kura Kaupapa Māori (1985) have made a significant contribution to language revitalisation (Waitangi Tribunal, 2011a, p.155). All of these projects began as a result of grassroots energy, were supported (after much lobbying) by the Government and then grew dramatically in the 1990s (Ormsby-teki et al., 2011, p.31). By 1993, for example, there were 809 kōhanga with 50% of all Māori in pre-school (14,000) attending. Despite the difficulty of gaining government approval, by 1999 there were 59 kura kaupapa and over 30,000 students being educated through the language (Waitangi Tribunal, 2011a, p.155). Similarly, following a Treaty settlement relating to tertiary wānanga, the number of students learning the Māori language at tertiary level peaked in 2003 at 36,000 (Ormsby-teki et al., 2011, p.32).³⁹ Unfortunately, inadequate education infrastructure resulted not only in the high demand not being capitalised on, but also in a consistent decline in numbers. By 2009, there were 350 fewer kōhanga attended by 5,200 fewer children (only 25% of Māori pre-school children). In a sombre concluding remark, the Waitangi Tribunal (2011a, p.165) notes that “[t]here is no suggestion yet that the bottom of this renewed decline in the fortunes of te reo has been reached.”

Within Māoridom, *iwi* (tribes) are robust and cohesive people groups made up of a number of *hapū* (sub-tribes) and *marae* and are, therefore, a critical locus of

³⁸ *Wānanga*: A place of (higher) learning. In recent times the term has been applied to universities and other tertiary level institutions. Hence, the ‘University of Waikato’ is also known as ‘Te Whare *Wānanga* o Waikato’.

³⁹ Other notable milestones include the establishment of tribal *wānanga*, the statutory recognition of the *Kura Kaupapa Māori* guiding philosophy in 1999, as well as the launch of the *Māori-medium Curriculum* and the *Māori Education Strategy* in 2008 (Waitangi Tribunal, 2011a, p.155).

revitalisation planning. The first such initiative, *Whakatupuranga Rua Mano*,⁴⁰ was a 25 year plan which began in 1975 and involved a confederation of three tribes (*Te Āti Awa, Ngāti Raukawa and Ngāti Toa*). It emerged from research which showed that practically no young speakers within those tribes possessed any significant knowledge of the Māori language. It included marae-based wānanga that eventually gave rise to the tertiary institution, Te Wānanga-o-Raukawa, described by (Ormsby-teki et al. (2011, p.32) as one of the most significant developments in Māori language revitalisation. A second well known iwi language revitalisation initiative is *Kotahi Mano Kāika*⁴¹ run by the *Kai Tahu* tribe, a tribe which arguably has the lowest number of speakers. The aim of *Kotahi Mano Kāika* is to have 1000 or more *Kai Tahu* families speaking the Māori language in their homes as the normal language of communication by 2025. The project involves weekly language lessons and immersion camps, kapa haka, and uses IT and professionally made resources in their dialect. At this stage there has been little robust evaluation of the impact that this project has made on *Kai Tahu* members. However, a review by Mere Skerrett notes the “general agreement that still there was only a small amount of whānau dedicated to the *kaupapa*”⁴² (2010, p.6) and concludes that despite a “groundswell of excitement and activity . . . the wider commitment was just not evident,” with tribal leadership “paying lip service to the idea . . . or letting the politics of distraction get in the way” (2010, p.11). Notwithstanding the fact that wealth creation is a revitalisation strategy, a key criticism within a number of tribes, particularly those who have already received Treaty claims settlements, is that key decision makers are prioritising wealth creation strategies at the expense of the development of comprehensive language revitalisation strategies (Te Paepae Motuhake, 2011, p.39). Furthermore, although a number of iwi have developed iwi-revitalisation strategies, at this stage most lack the resources to make any substantial impact, with *Raukawa* being an example here (see *Section 1.3.1*).

⁴⁰ Translation: ‘Generation Two Thousand’.

⁴¹ The full name is *Kotahi Mano Kāika, Kotahi Mano Wawata* (‘One thousand homes, one thousand hopes’).

⁴² *Kaupapa*: initiative or project

1.3.2.3 *Aotearoa*: The national language policy experience

Joseph Lo Bianco (1987, p.3), in the Australian *National Policy on Languages*, noted that the absence of an explicit and comprehensive policy does not mean significant decisions affecting language are not occurring, stating that “the primary purpose of Australia’s language policy was to make the choices about language issues in as rational, comprehensive, just and balanced a way as possible.” In New Zealand, however, the necessary coordination is absent. National language planning has been side-stepped and such language planning as there is continues to take place in a largely *ad hoc* way, with legislative measures that impact on language rights being largely divorced from any centralised language planning activity.⁴³

Following the launch of Australia’s *National Policy on Languages* in 1987, the New Zealand (Labour) government explored the possibility of developing its own national language policy. In August 1990, the then Minister of Education, Phil Goff (cited in Peddie, 2003, p.17) announced that an amount of \$100, 000 was budgeted for the purpose of formulating a policy, observing that:

Until now, issues associated with languages in New Zealand have been dealt with in an ad hoc way. . . . Without common goals and a co-ordinated framework around which policies can be developed and programmes implemented, it has been difficult for the government to respond comprehensively to language issues.

This process appeared to stall briefly during election year. However, it was continued by the incoming National Government. In 1992, the Minister of Education, Lockwood Smith, commissioned Dr. Jeffery Waite to prepare the groundwork for the design of a national language policy document. Waite consulted widely, finally recommending that bilingualism for all should be the general aim, with the strengthening of the Māori language at the top of a list of critical language

⁴³ As indicated by the large number of Acts that affect the Māori language in some way including, for example, the *Race Relations Act 1971*, the *Human Rights Commission Act 1977*, the *Māori Language Act 1987*, the *Broadcasting Act 1989*, the *Māori Television Service Act (Te Aratuku Whakaata Irirangi Māori) 2003*, and the *New Zealand Sign Language Act 2006*.

issues in need of urgent attention (Waite, 1992, p.18).⁴⁴ However, despite widespread acceptance of the general direction in which Waite's thinking was heading, the national languages policy project was abandoned. Peddie (2003, p.19) has noted that a combination of factors was responsible for the abandonment of the policy, including, in particular, the neo-liberal support for "weaker centralised direction" and hesitation related to the place of the Māori language in a national policy.⁴⁵ The underlying problem, however, was that the political will required to overcome the perception of high political risk was lacking. As East, Shackelford and Spence (2007, p.24) have concluded, "the positive opinions expressed by government at that time were an effective rhetorical device for hiding the fact that the government was doing virtually nothing".

1.3.2.4 The Māori Language Strategy 2003

Julia de Bres (2008c, p.11) links the beginnings of the Māori language strategy to a Māori language march to Parliament in 1994, where, "on the spot", the then Minister of Māori Affairs agreed to the development of a strategy for sustainable revitalisation. This agreement was made good in 2003 when Te Puni Kōkiri, in conjunction with Te Taura Whiri and other government organisations with areas of responsibility for the Māori language, published the *Māori Language Strategy*.⁴⁶ This strategy aimed to coordinate the sector in relation to the following objectives:

- To increase the number of those who know the Māori language;
- To improve proficiency levels in Māori;
- To increase the number of situations in which Māori can be used;

⁴⁴ Waite (1992, p.19) also believed that the "allocation of resources should favour Maori revitalisation programmes that are under Maori control, set in a context of Maori values, and based on the direct transmission of the language from native speakers to native speaker".

⁴⁵ Other factors listed by Peddie (2003) include the rapidly-changing demography of New Zealand, which made firm decisions over languages difficult; the relative lack of understanding by business of the advantage of international languages in trade; and economic uncertainties. Peddie (1997) also lists racist attitudes, the lack of a cohesive, concerted approach by language groups, as well as the difficulty in negotiating decentralised government policies, business and economic priorities. He also noted that although 20 Government departments were represented in the interdepartmental advisory group, there were very few of a senior level with the authority to make decisions. In any case, the project was most likely doomed to failure because so little consideration was given to the importance of gradual change accompanied by centralised educational campaigns.

⁴⁶ The development of the current Māori Language Strategy took nine years of policy work and research and involved the production of two documents: *Toitū Te Reo* (Te Taura Whiri, 1996) - a consultation document, and; *Te Tūāoma* (Te Puni Kōkiri, 1999) - an initial strategy (see de Bres (2008c) for an in-depth discussion on the development of the *Māori Language Strategy*).

- To ensure the Māori language can be used for the full range of modern activities; and
- To foster positive attitudes towards the language so that Māori-English bilingualism becomes a valued part of NZ society (Te Taura Whiri i Te Reo Māori & Te Puni Kōkiri, 2003).

The vision was as follows:

By 2028, the Māori Language will be widely spoken by Māori. In particular, the Māori Language will be in common use within Māori whānau homes and communities. All New Zealanders will appreciate the value of the Māori language to New Zealand society (Te Taura Whiri i Te Reo Māori & Te Puni Kōkiri, 2003, p.5).

Although the *Māori Language Strategy* (2003), has not been quite so comprehensively buried as, for example, Waite's draft national language plan, the Waitangi Tribunal (2010, p.66) has described it in the following way,

[It is] a well-meaning but essentially standard and pre-consulted Crown policy that does nothing to motivate Māori at the grassroots [...] [It] is another failure of policy. It is too abstract and was constructed within the parameters of a bureaucratic comfort zone. It is less a Māori language strategy than a Crown Māori language strategy

What the Tribunal (2011c, p.462) found particularly disappointing, however, was that the wording of the published goals was “watered down” from the more “specific and adventurous” aims of earlier discussion documents. Furthermore, as de Bres (2008c, p.19) observes, the focus of the 2003 strategy is “more firmly on language use in whānau and community settings”, a contrast to an earlier focus on “what the government could do to support Māori language within its existing functions”.

With reference to its implementation, the Tribunal (2011c, p.463) noted that what we have is “a picture of lost opportunities due to poor communication and

coordination, unrealistic expectations, and de-prioritising within agencies”. As with Waite’s document, it appears that the critical underlying issue is not so much the lack of *actual* co-ordinated and cohesive planning as the lack of that genuine *commitment* to co-ordinated and cohesive planning (Hollings, 1991, pp.60-61; Office of the Auditor-General (OAG), 2007, pp.6, 8 & 18-19) which Dua (1991, pp.106 & 132) considers to be of fundamental importance.⁴⁷ As Nicholson (1987, p.5) has observed, commitment is essential if the nation is “truly serious about Māori language revival”. Without this commitment, New Zealand language policy and planning efforts have created “an impressive façade of progress masking a retrogressive reality” (Benton, 1991, p.30).

1.3.2.5 Conclusion: The central problematic in Māori language revitalisation

The central problematic in Māori language revitalisation (or the revitalisation of any language for that matter) is neither technical nor bureaucratic but rather political and ideological.⁴⁸ It is intrinsically related to the negative, sometimes openly hostile, attitudes of some (mainly English-speaking) New Zealanders towards the threat to English hegemony posed by any encroachment by Māori language on domains that are primary English-speaking (de Bres, 2008a, pp.21-22; 46-55; 2009, p.18; Harlow, 2005; Hollings, 1991, p.58; Lane, 2003).⁴⁹ At the core of this conflict is competition for political and economic control as well as control over the instrumental and identity-making functions of language; a continuation, therefore, of colonialist struggles (Bunwaree, Carroll and Carroll, 2005, pp.157-158; Cooper, 1989, p.80; Lo Bianco, 1990, p.74; Schmidt, 2006, p.98; Williams, 2000, p.2;

⁴⁷ Commitment from both *élites* and non-*élites* is fundamental to effective LPP - see Chrystal, 2002, p.154 and UNESCO, 2003, pp.13-14 (commitment to language revitalisation); Dua, 1991, pp.106, 121-122 (commitment to systematic / comprehensive evaluation, proper implementation) and Tollefson, 1991, p.211 (commitment to democracy).

⁴⁸ A belief that is common among monolinguals, English monolinguals in particular, is that ‘other’ (minority) languages either threaten the dominant language or undermine national unity. Thus, irrespective of whether the ‘*stated*’ rationale is based on equal opportunity, pedagogy, practicality or economics, the critical aspect is that bi/ multilingualism is constructed as a *problem*. See for example, Eggington (1997, p.44); McGroarty (1997, pp.76, 80); Macedo, Dendrinis, & Gournari (2003); Myers-Scotton (2006, pp.404-405); Schmidt (2006, pp.99-100) and; Shohamy (2006, pp.79-80).

⁴⁹ For example, 71% of non-Māori did not want their children to speak Māori (de Bres, 2008a, p.47). This includes the approximately 12% of ‘English only’ New Zealanders who tend to forcefully express their belief that English should be the only language used in New Zealand public life (de Bres, 2008a, pp.51-53). In connection with this, it is important to note that although there may be tacit agreement by many non-Māori to the principle of revitalising the Māori language, there is considerable resistance to specific initiatives (Nicholson & Garland, 1991, p.405).

Wright, 2004, pp.225-227). It is thus not surprising to find that policy and planning discourse is often largely controlled by those in whose interests it is to preserve the *status quo*. Indeed, central to the basic neo-Marxist and post-structuralist criticisms identified by Fishman (1994, p.91) is the fact that classical language planning is:

- is conducted by *élites* that are governed by self-interest;
- reproduces rather than overcomes socio-cultural and econotechnical inequalities;
- inhibits or counteracts multiculturalism;
- supports the globalisation of western ideals, which in turn would lead to new forms of colonialism.⁵⁰

The lack of macro-level support for dominated languages is not so much a reflection of resistance to bilingualism *per se*, rather, as Cooper (1989, pp.79-87, 109 & 183-185) and Macedo, Dendrinis, and Gournari (2003, p.9) maintain, it is a reflection of self interest, of the desire of the majority to retain control over the minority.⁵¹ As Houia-Roberts (2003, p.18) observes with reference to the Māori language, while the government has assumed that the future of the language should rest with the majority, “the majority has done little to assure its future”. At the core of this dilemma is the fundamental political conflict that is always present whenever hegemony is threatened by attempts to create, reproduce and transform social relations (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, pp.122-127 & 134-145; Purcell, 2009, p.151).

Notwithstanding the difficulties involved, Māori cannot wait any longer for the Government to intervene in an effective way: they must themselves lead and direct Māori language revitalise efforts. This certainly does not mean, however, that Māori should accept sole responsibility for the revitalisation of the language and, in particular, it does not mean that *Māori families* should accept sole responsibility the revitalisation of the language. This would be extremely dangerous, particularly in the context of what Lo Bianco (2006, November 11, p.6) has referred to as a type of ‘market fundamentalism’ that “places pluralism under very great pressure” by

⁵⁰ The fifth ‘criticism’ identified ethnographic research as the most appropriate methodology for avoiding the four issues named here.

⁵¹ Shohamy (2006, p.167) expresses it like this, "Controlling language is a way of controlling us."

ensuring that “cost is what ultimately determines the distribution of resources” and where “the whole idea of difference has been privatised . . . pushed back into the family and the home”. In this context, what taking the lead means is using whatever strategies are necessary in order to ensure that the Government adheres to its democratic responsibilities and creates an environment in which the Māori language becomes, in actuality, a truly national language for New Zealand.

In this context, it is relevant to note that Lewis (1962, February 13 - See <http://quixoticquisling.com/testun/saunders-lewis-fate-of-the-language.html> for G. Aled Williams’ English translation), in a BBC⁵² radio lecture that arguably triggered the Welsh language revival, highlighted the importance of insisting that government institutions at all levels act responsibly in relation to issues associated with language diversity and language rights. The following is an extract from the translation of that lecture:

The political tradition of the centuries and all present-day economic tendencies militate against the continued existence of Welsh. Nothing can change that except determination, will power, struggle, sacrifice and endeavour. May I call your attention to the story of Mr. and Mrs. Trefor Beasley? Mr. Beasley is a coal miner. In April 1952 he and his wife bought a cottage in Llangennech near Llanelli, a district where nine out of every ten of the population are Welsh-speaking. All the councillors on the rural council which controls Llangennech are Welsh-speaking: so too are the council officials. Therefore when a note demanding the local rates arrived from ‘*The Rural District Council of Llanelli*’ Mrs. Beasley wrote to ask for it in Welsh. It was refused. She refused to pay the rates until she got it. She and Mr. Beasley were summoned more than a dozen times to appear before the magistrates’ court. Mr. and Mrs. Beasley insisted that the court proceedings should be in Welsh. Three times did the bailiffs carry off furniture from their home, the furniture being worth much more than the rates which were demanded. This went on for eight years. In 1960 Mr. and Mrs. Beasley received a bilingual note demanding the local rates from

⁵² British Broadcasting Corporation

Cyngor Dosbarth Gwledig Llanelli, the Welsh on the bill being just as good as its English.

Lewis believed that “the example of Mr. and Mrs. Beasley shows how we should set about it [i.e. insisting on language rights]”. He concluded his speech by asserting that “nothing less than a revolution to restore the Welsh language in Wales” was needed, adding that success would only be possible “through revolutionary methods”.

To date, the concept of comprehensive, cohesive and co-ordinated national language planning has had no real impact on successive governments in New Zealand even though it has had a greater impact in a number of other countries including Wales and Australia, both of which are faced with issues relating to indigenous languages. Nor have either the *Maori Language Act 1987* or the *Māori Language Strategy (2003)* led to any genuine strengthening of the positioning of the Māori language in this country. Furthermore, in spite of the many and varied strategies aiming to revitalise the language that have been put in place by Māori themselves, the future of the Māori language remains very far from certain. In this context, a research project that aims to explore the issue of Māori language revitalisation in the context of language policy and planning seems to be overdue. My concern here is not only with language policy and planning. It is also with critical discourse theory. It was noted above that language revitalisation efforts inevitably involve that fundamental political conflict that results whenever hegemony is threatened by attempts to create, reproduce and transform social relations. This being the case, I believe that critical discourse theory (CDT), which explores issues relating to hegemony and counter-hegemony, has much to offer to minority language activists. Indeed, I believe that CDT should play a central role in language policy and planning (LPP) as an academic discipline, providing it with a theoretical base that it currently appears to lack.

1.4 Introduction to the research question, research methods and thesis structure

The overarching research question underpinning the research project reported here is:

With particular reference to policy and planning as it relates to the revitalisation of indigenous languages, can critical discourse theory contribute in a positive way by providing criteria (guidelines) for the production of reports that are designed to challenge the existing hegemony and secure maximum support for proposals and recommendations?

The question above is addressed initially through a critical review of selected literature in the areas of critical discourse theory (CDT) and language policy and planning (LPP). That review aims, in part, to identify effectiveness criteria derived from critical discourse theory that can be applied in the context of language revitalisation activities (*Chapter 2*).

The second stage in addressing the overarching research question outlined above is to apply the criteria derived from CDT to the contextualised analysis of official reports relating to indigenous language revitalisation. Accompanying the analysis of each report is an analysis of responses to it. The aim here is to determine whether there are any marked differences between responses to the proposals and recommendations made in those reports that meet the criteria (i.e. conform to the proposed guidelines) and those that do not.

The first of the reports analysed is *Our Land Our Languages: Language Learning in Indigenous Communities*, a report produced by the Australian House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs in September 2012 (see *Chapter 3*). This report, which includes thirty major recommendations and is already being described by many commentators as being of major significance in relation to indigenous language revitalisation in Australia.

Each of the next two reports analysed is concerned, in whole or in part, with the revitalisation of the Māori language in New Zealand. The first of these reports, *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei: A Report into Claims Concerning New Zealand Law and Policy Affecting Māori Culture and Identity*, was released by the Waitangi Tribunal in July 2011 (see *Chapter 4*). It recommends wide-ranging reform of laws and policies affecting Māori culture and identity and calls for the Crown-Māori relationship to

move beyond grievance to a new era based on partnership. *Chapter 5* of that report, on which the analysis centres, relates to the Māori language. The final report analysed is *Te Reo Mauriora*, a review of the Māori language sector and the *Māori Language Strategy* that was written by a panel of Māori language experts and released in April 2011 (see *Chapter 5*). These two reports, each of which is concerned, in part, with the *Māori Language Strategy (2003)*, are very different in terms of the organisational and rhetorical approaches adopted. They have also elicited very different types of response, largely positive in one case, and largely negative in the other.

The final chapter (*Chapter 6*) provides an overview of the research together with a discussion of its limitations and its potential contribution to language policy and planning as an academic discipline and, more specifically, to language revitalisation activities.

Chapter 2

A critical review of selected literature on language policy and planning and critical discourse theory

2.1 General Introduction

In this chapter, a critical review of selected literature in the areas of language policy and planning (LPP) (2.2) and critical discourse theory (CDT) (2.3) is undertaken in order, in particular, to assess the importance accorded to hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourse in LPP and to determine whether CDT has anything to offer in this area that may have implications for language revitalisation activities. The chapter ends by proposing a number of criteria which, it is argued, could be used to determine the extent to which discourse that is intended to be counter-hegemonic adheres to the principles of effective counter-hegemonic discourse as outlined in the literature on CDT (2.3.5).

2.2 Language policy and planning (LPP)

2.2.1 The emergence of LPP as an applied discipline

The deliberate shaping of the nature and function of languages has been practised since antiquity. Currently, 78 of the 125 polities with constitutional statements about the status or use of their language(s), name a single official or national language, with 32 of these 78 cases including statements relating to the protection of languages, particularly where minority and indigenous languages are concerned (Spolsky, 2004, pp.11-13). The deliberate shaping of languages has been referred to in a variety of different ways, such as, for example, *language engineering* (Miller, 1950), *language planning* (Haugen, 1961 [1972]), *language management* (Neustupný & Nekvapil, 2003) and *language policy* (Sibayan, 1974). The most commonly used terms throughout recent literature are ‘language policy’ and ‘language planning’.⁵³ Although these terms are sometimes used interchangeably,

⁵³ Wright (2004) refers to the discipline as “Language policy and Language planning” however others (such as Grin, 2003a, pp.27-28) do not always explicitly distinguish them. Although the predominant term used by Cooper (1989) was language planning which he called the “most popular” (p.29), he appears to treat “language policy-making” (p.31) as synonymous to language planning. See also Ricento (2000, p.23) who deliberately uses ‘language policy’ as a superordinate term which subsumes ‘language planning’ while Hornberger (2006, p.25) notes that some have subsumed policy into language planning. Shohamy (2006, pp.49-50) sees that language policy is less interventionist

they can be seen as a collocation that combines two distinct but complementary elements of a whole, the former (language policy) relating to formal or implicit statements, laws, initiatives, beliefs or decisions, including the authorisation of subsequent planning activity, the latter (language planning) to activity that shapes, promotes, implements and evaluates language policy in the attempt to modify or reinforce language behaviour.⁵⁴

Language policy and planning (LPP) is now recognised as a branch of applied linguistics. Ricento (2000, pp.10-20) has traced its development through three overlapping major epochs.⁵⁵ In the *first phase (1960s-1970s)*, LPP reflected Eurocentric conceptions and positivist social science paradigms, focusing largely on the importation of ‘developed’ Western languages to former colonial states in Africa and South-East Asia in order to secure unity and socio-economic development, but with little problematisation of its methodology, assumptions or interests (Lo Bianco, 2004, p.757; Ricento, 2000, pp.10-13).⁵⁶ By the beginning of the *second phase (early 1970s – late 1980s)*, a number of scholars had identified some of the limitations of LPP and had begun to acknowledge the socio-political effects of early LPP, such as marginalising local languages and effectively extending colonial power relations (Bamgbose, 1978, pp.62-63; 1987, pp.7-10; Cobarrubias, 1983, pp.40, 53 & 70-77; Tollefson, 1991).⁵⁷ During the second phase, increased globalisation led to increased language contact, and thus, in some cases, to language demise (Austin & Sallabank, 2011, pp.1-6 & 21; Grenoble, 2011, pp.27-35; Ricento, 2000, p.17). This phase also saw a greater tolerance of multilingualism, with some governments, such as those of Canada and Australia, beginning to see multilingualism as a potential resource rather than a threat (Wright,

than language planning, which, by specifying both the goal and the implementation of policies and laws “does not leave anything for the individual to decide” (p.49). However, Neustupný & Nekvapil (2003, p.187) and Spolsky (2004, pp.5-15; 2009, pp.4-5; 2012, pp.5) assert that language management is the most comprehensive term.

⁵⁴ See Baldauf, 2005, p.958; de Cillia & Busch, 2006, p.576; Hornberger, 2006, p.25; Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997, p.xi; Spolsky & Lambert, 2006, p.561. Note that Shohamy (2006, p.xvi) does not limit Language Policy “to formal limited or official policies but rather . . . powerful mechanisms that . . . impose, perpetuate and create ‘de-facto’ language policies and practices.”

⁵⁵ Jernudd and Nekvapil (2012) also provide a good survey of some landmark movements, models and frameworks in LPP.

⁵⁶ Haugen (1966, p.262) for example, still believed that the “inevitable conflicts and problems” could be solved by “intelligent, reasoned, understanding policies of language teaching”.

⁵⁷ LPP was acknowledged as not philosophically neutral, Eurocentric, and that greater attention needed to be paid to the ethical dimensions of language planning (Baldauf, 2005, p.958; Cobarrubias, 1983, pp.41, 58 & 70-77).

2004, p.10). In the *third phase (1990s onward)*, post-modern and critical approaches became more prominent. These approaches eschewed the simplistic understanding of the interlinking of LPP, government and society, focusing on how to develop more democratic policies, reduce inequalities and protect minority languages (Pennycook, 1994, 2006, Said, 1993; Tollefson, 1991, 1995, 2002, 2006). Within the context of LPP, terms such as *linguistic ecology* (Haugen, 1971 [1972], 2001; Skutnabb-Kangas & Phillipson, 1996), *linguistic imperialism* (Phillipson, 1992; 2006), *linguistic human rights* (Skutnabb-Kangas, 2006); *minority language rights* (May, 2000b, 2001, 2005, 2006), *language shift* or *endangerment* and *language revitalisation* (Fishman, 1964, 1991, 1994; 2001a, 2001b, 2001c; Grenoble & Whaley, 1998, 2006; Hinton & Hale, 2001) began to emerge.

As understanding of language and languages in society has broadened, the nature and scope of LPP has expanded. As recognition of the deeply political nature of language as a social organism has increased (Shohamy, 2006, pp.55-56; Tollefson, 1991, pp.201-204) and as the concept of language ecology (and ecolinguistic language planning in particular) has developed (Calvet, 2006; Grenoble, 2011, pp.30-31; Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997, p.297; Mühlhäusler, 1996), LPP has become more nuanced and more *ethnographic* in character (Canagarajah, 2006, pp.153-155) and as a consequence, has begun to draw from a much wider range of perspectives and disciplines.⁵⁸

2.2.2 Definition and scope of LPP

LPP has been defined by Cooper (1989, pp.29-45 & 98) as “deliberate efforts to influence the behaviour of others with respect to the acquisition, structure or functional allocation of their language codes”. In common with many other

⁵⁸ Perspectives and disciplines that include *discourse analysis* (Dorner, 2011; Lo Bianco, 2004; 2005; McEwan-Fujita, 2011; Wodak, 2006), *ethnography* (Hymes, 1974; Canagarajah, 2006; Hornberger & Johnson, 2007; Johnson, 2009; McCarty, 2011), *mathematics* (Wyburn & Hayward, 2008; Fernando, Goldstein & Valijarvi, 2010); *political theory* (Schmidt, 2006), *public policy* and *economics* (Grin, 2003a, 2003b, 2005; 2006; 2007; Hu & Alsagoff, 2010; Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997, pp.153-192), *psycho-sociology* (Baker, 2006) as well as *sociolinguistics*, *ethnic relations*, *education*, *geography* and *history* (Lo Bianco, 2004, p.738; Ricento, 2006a, p.x; Cartright, 2006).

attempts to define the discipline, this definition refers to *context*,⁵⁹ *intentions*⁶⁰, *means*,⁶¹ *participants*⁶² and *effect*⁶³. One further definition that is worth noting is that of Christ (cited by de Cillia & Busch, 2006, p.577; Wodak, 2006, p.170) which, in addition to the five elements referred to above, includes a political dimension:

[T]he sum total of all those political initiatives ‘from above’ and ‘from below,’ by means of which a particular language or languages are supported in their public currency, their functioning and their dissemination. Like all policies, it is subject to conflict, and must be permanently reordered through constant discussion and constant debate

Recognised types of language planning, all necessarily inter-related,⁶⁴ include *status planning*, *corpus planning*, *acquisition planning* (or *language-in-education planning*), *prestige planning*, *usage planning* and *discourse planning*.

⁵⁹ *Context* includes the events, history, demographics, cultural values, political regimes as well as the economic and sociolinguistic situation of the ecology (Cooper, 1989, pp.93-95). Cooper (1989, p.183) states that “[LPP] cannot be understood apart from its social context or apart from the history that produced that context.”

⁶⁰ Lo Bianco (2001, pp.222-225; 2008, p.167) observes that LPP goals have problems as a point of departure, problems that may themselves be problematic. These problems are inherently ideological and, while they may be articulated as linguistic, mostly correlate to political, economic or social ends. This means that, rather than focusing solely on language itself, the fundamental *intention* of LPP is to change behaviour through altering the social and political environment. Thus Shohamy (2006, p.45) refers to LPP as "the primary mechanism for organising, managing and manipulating language behaviours", Kaplan and Baldauf (1997, p.303) see LPP as being ultimately about "human resource development."

⁶¹ Formal *means* of LPP intervention may include laws, regulations, guidelines, policy statements, strategies, reports, and planning documents, which are then complemented by the allied allocation of human and material resources (Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997, p.3). In addition to these Shohamy (2006, pp.54-56) states that the real language policy is observed through a variety of overt and sub-surface mechanisms, which although they can be bottom up are more likely to be top-down (see *Appendix 1: Framework 2*).

⁶² *Participants*: It has been repeatedly observed that LPP is an activity in which people at every level of society should be involved (Herriman & Burnaby, 1996, p.11). Nonetheless, it is those with the greatest ability to "access sanctions, penalties, and rewards, including financial sources" who are most able to turn ideology into policy (Shohamy, 2006, p.54). Cooper (1989, p.183) warns that although "[LPP] may be initiated at any level of a social hierarchy . . . it is unlikely to succeed unless it is embraced and promoted by *élites* or counter-*élites*."

⁶³ *Effect*: Behaviour change (or "organis[ing] linguistic activity" (Bastardas-Boada, 1995, p.16) is the fundamental goal of LPP and any LPP that does not ultimately modify behaviour in the desired manner is of little use (Ager, 2005, pp.1039-1040). Accordingly, Eastman (1991, p.147) asserts that "state policies can have absolutely no effect on linguistic repertoires unless those state policies have, as their primary goal, social change."

⁶⁴ *Planning management*, which relates to the strategic frameworks that undergird and co-ordinate LPP efforts and includes areas such as agency structure, leadership and support roles, research and analysis, accounting, plan delivery, monitoring and evaluation is often omitted from LPP modelling although it is generally included in language plans (e.g. the National Policy Framework in *Iaith pawb* (National Assembly of Wales, 2003, pp.9-19) and ACALP in the *National Policy on Languages* (Lo Bianco, 1987, pp.185-188).

The first of these (*status planning*) relates to decisions about the allocation of functions, roles and domains within a language ecology and includes, for example, the officialisation of languages (Cooper, 1989, pp.99-121; Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997, pp.29-38; Myers-Scotton, 2006, pp.378-392).

The second (*corpus planning*) aims to record, modify and adapt languages in line with particular language-internal goals such as standardisation and modernisation (Cooper, 1989, pp.122-156; Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997, pp.29 & 39-49; Myers-Scotton, 2006, pp.392-395).

The third (*acquisition planning*) concerns the teaching and learning of languages and aims to increase the level of communicative competence in a particular language or particular languages (Baldauf, 2005, p.961; Cooper, 1989, pp.157-163; Lo Bianco, 2004, p.742; Myers-Scotton, 2006, pp.395-405).⁶⁵

The fourth (*prestige planning*) attempts to secure compliance with LPP goals in other areas by promoting the instrumentality and image of particular languages as well as the prestige of their speaking communities (Ager, 2005, pp.1035-1054; Baldauf, 2005, p.962; Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997, pp.50-51; Lo Bianco, 2004, pp.742-743).⁶⁶

The fifth (*usage planning*) aims to increase or modify language use in a range of communicative domains and networks (Lo Bianco, 2004, p.742; 2005, p.260; National Assembly of Wales, 2002, p.30).

Finally, *discourse planning*, of fundamental significance so far as this research project is concerned, relates to the discursive realm and is concerned largely with

⁶⁵ See also Baldauf, 2005, p.961; Lo Bianco, 2004, p.742; Wardhaugh, 2010, p.379 for definitions of status, corpus and acquisition planning.

⁶⁶ There are a number of closely related terms that can be subsumed under prestige planning, including: *esteem planning* (focusing on the subjective valuing of a language) (Lo Bianco, 2005, pp.260-261); *image planning* (creating an identity for the language and the speaking and non-speaking communities); *dignity planning* (a far less ambitious goal for endangered languages) (Lo Bianco, 2005, p.261); *language marketing* (derived from commercial marketing) and *tolerability planning* (aimed at changing the attitudes and behaviours of the dominant language group toward a minority language) (de Bres, 2008a; 2008b; 2009).

the rhetoric of persuasion (Lo Bianco, 2004, pp.743 & 756-757; 2005, pp.261-263). With reference to discourse planning, Kaplan and Baldauf (2007, p.117) claim that “the most effective way to change the structures that affect action in human affairs is to alter the discourse about those structures”. Paradoxically, those areas of language planning, including prestige planning and discourse planning, that may have the greatest impact on the desire for linguistic behaviour change in any language ecology are arguably the least well developed (Ager, 2005, p.1035).

2.2.3 LPP: Selected frameworks

Given the developing nature of LPP theory and practice, it is not surprising to find that a number of different frameworks have been proposed. Despite being inevitably prone to over-simplification, frameworks can help explain and strategically prioritise the complex network of inter-related factors involved in an integrated system (Baldauf, 2005, p.959). In this section, two of these frameworks are discussed from a discursively-oriented perspective.⁶⁷

2.2.3.1 An integrated LPP framework (Baldauf, 2005)

Baldauf’s (2005) LPP framework describes four areas of planning (*status, corpus, language-in-education* and *prestige*), associated with each of which are two types of planning goals (*policy planning goals* that focus on form, and *cultivation planning goals* that focus on function) (see *Appendix 1: Framework 1*). Thus, if a cultivation planning goal was *revitalisation* (included under the heading of status planning), it might be associated with a policy planning goal such as *officialisation*.

This model includes three general planning levels (*macro, meso* and *micro*), each of which may be associated with a different *level of awareness* (*overt* versus *covert*).

⁶⁷ Each of the frameworks discussed here is concerned with LPP in a general sense. See *Appendices 2 and 3* for other frameworks and models that relate to specific aspects of LPP, including: Haugen’s (2001) language ecology framework (which includes questions designed to help determine a language’s current status within a particular polity); the *Ethnolinguistic vitality framework* proposed by Giles, Bourhis and Taylor (1977), the *UNESCO sociolinguistic vitality framework* (2003) and the Lewis and Simons (2010) *Expanded GIDS* framework (each of which is designed to help determine the extent to which a language is at risk); Fishman’s (1991) *Graded intergenerational disruption scale* (GIDS) (which is designed to address the functional disruption of threatened languages in social space), Strubell’s (2001) *Catherine wheel* (which is designed to help explore the impact of a number of factors on language learning motivation), and Grin’s (2003b) COD policy analysis framework that points out that to succeed language revitalisation efforts must invest in all three components: *Capacity, Opportunity and Desire*. In addition, see Antia, 2000, pp.1-11 for an overview of a number of different frameworks.

There is no explicit reference in this framework to usage planning or discourse planning (although it is relevant to note here that Baldauf described this framework as an “evolving” one) (p.960) (see *Appendix 1: Language policy and planning: Overarching frameworks*).

2.3.3.2 An expanded language policy framework (Shohamy, 2006)

Shohamy (2006) places discourse (defined in the broadest sense as systems of relations, both linguistic and non-linguistic) at the very core of her expanded language policy framework. This framework (see *Appendix 1: Framework 2*) draws upon the language management framework proposed by Spolsky (2003, p.554; 2004, p.5; 2009, pp.4-5) in which ‘total language policy’ is seen as being constituted of a combination of *language beliefs* (ideologies and attitudes), *language practices* (observable choices and behaviour – what people actually do) and *language management* (efforts to modify behaviour and ideologies), with ‘real language policy’ being detectable in language practices rather than being confined to explicit policy documents (Shohamy, 2006, p.54).

In connection with this, Shohamy (2006, pp.53 & 56-58) observes that language behaviours, and the individual choices that underlie them, are strongly influenced by a multitude of non-neutral mechanisms and devices (including language tests, penalties, myths and propaganda) that are embedded within political, economic, ideological and social agendas.⁶⁸ Thus, for example, she notes that the use of a particular language for currency is an indicator of the fact that that language has an implicit *de facto* priority over others, irrespective of the explicitly stated priorities within formal policy document (pp.53 & 55). Although those with direct access to societal power structures, especially governments and large corporations, can influence language policy mechanisms more easily than others, all members of society can attempt to influence language policy, especially through language practice itself (pp.xvi-xvii & 56-57).

⁶⁸ Shohamy (2006, p.54) states that these mechanisms “lie at the heart of the battle between ideology and practice”

2.2.4 Key issues affecting language policy and planning

In this section six key issues affecting LPP are discussed – they are *global language endangerment* (2.2.4.1); *language rights* (2.2.4.2); *language economics* (2.2.4.3); *behaviour change* (2.2.4.4); *agency and intervention* (2.2.4.5); and *politics, power and ideology* (2.2.4.6).

2.2.4.1 Global language endangerment

Since Krauss (1992) estimated that half of the world's 6000-7000 languages would be extinct by the end of the 21st century, language endangerment has become a global issue (Grenoble & Whaley, 2006, p.1). The level of language loss is unprecedented – one fifth of the world's languages have disappeared between 1970 and 2005 with the current rate of loss estimated at one language every two to three weeks (Crystal, 2000, p.19).

With the loss of language, not only does the world lose “an immense edifice of human knowledge, painstakingly assembled over millennia by countless minds” (Harrison, 2007, p.3), it also faces a range of potentially negative community outcomes relating to health and to social, emotional, economic and cognitive wellbeing (Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Social Justice Commissioner, 2009, pp.60-65; Fillmore, 2000, pp.206-207; Hinton, 2001, p.5).⁶⁹ This is related to the fact that language endangerment occurs in contexts of economic, military, social, cultural or political dominance, contexts in which communities are marginalised and placed under immense pressure to abandon their heritage languages in favour of languages which have become dominant and are perceived as being of higher status (Grenoble, 2011, p.34; Harrison, pp.5).⁷⁰ Thus, Wyburn and Hayward (2008, p.268) note that the dominance of any language is not due to “any intrinsic

⁶⁹ Hale, Krauss, Watahomigie, Yamamoto, Craig, Jeanne, and England (1992, p.8) equate the impact of language loss to that of the extinction of animal species, stating that “any language is a supreme achievement of a uniquely human collective genius, as divine and endless a mystery as a living organism”.

⁷⁰ Elements of globalisation that have impacted on language loss include the repressive measures and ideologies that have been associated with colonisation, urbanisation, early childhood education, the spread of American pop culture via television and the Internet, the concept of national languages, and the encroachment of neoliberal political structures, multinationals and Western consumerism (Grenoble, 2011, pp.33-35; Grenoble & Whaley, 2006, pp.2-3; Hinton, 2001, pp.3-4 & Myer-Scotton, 2006, pp.406-408). Canagarajay (2005, pp.195-196) states that before the decolonisation project of non-Western nations (which entailed resisting English) was complete; it was subsumed by globalisation (which reasserted their need for English).

superiority of the one language over [another]” but to the “political, economical and/or social advantages enjoyed by its group”.

The extent of language endangerment can be appreciated when it is borne in mind that most of the world’s nations have a single national language and approximately ninety four percent of the world’s population are first language speakers of only 5.5% of the world’s remaining languages (SIL, n.d.). In such a context, speakers of other languages are constructed as ‘minorities’ and considered to be part of a problem (a multilingualism problem), with the natural response to such problems being to remove them (Lo Bianco, 2006, November 11, p.5). Thus, de Swaan (2001, pp.4-6) has compared the world language system to an inherently unequal galaxy of planets, with language shift, like gravitational pull, almost always towards languages that provide more opportunities and more upward socio-economic mobility.⁷¹

A language becomes *moribund* when it is no longer being reproduced through transmission to children and *extinct* when the last speaker has died and there are no archives to regenerate it (Crystal, 2000, pp.20-21; Grenoble, 2011, p.40).⁷² Language death can occur within a single generation once control of domains relating to socio-economic mobility are lost, bilingualism becomes widespread and the original language is no longer the primary one in which children are socialised (Fishman, 1991, pp.87-109; Harrison, 2007, p.8; Lewis, 2007, pp.7-9). Other factors that impact on the viability of languages include *user characteristics*,⁷³ the

⁷¹ Peripheral (local) languages are likened to moons that are grouped around planets (national or regional languages) which, in turn, form around a galaxy (supercentral languages such as Arabic, Spanish or Chinese) with English arguably the single hyper-central language (sun) (de Swaan, 2001, p.6).

⁷² Harrison (2007, pp.5-6) notes that recorded languages are sometimes called ‘sleeping’ and may be ‘awakened’ or ‘revived’ in “some hoped-for future”.

⁷³ *User characteristics* includes demographics (e.g. age, density of communicative networks, growth, size, religious fervour), perceived status of the language community, level of control of resources and the means of decision-making, solidarity, physical separation, cohesive group identity, family ties and marriage practices, critical awareness, level of affective attachment to the language, and monolingual and bilingual proficiency of the speaking population relative to the total ecology.

*extent of infrastructural support,*⁷⁴*the language education context,*⁷⁵ *the frequency of formal and informal, official and intimate interactions in the language,*⁷⁶ *the language's historical and socio-economic prestige, and a range of issues associated with the language itself*⁷⁷ (Crystal, 2000, pp.68-90; Federation of Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Languages (FATSIL) & Australian Institute of Aboriginal & Torres Strait Islander Studies (AIATSIS), 2005, pp.27-31; Fishman, 1991; Giles, Bourhis & Taylor, 1977; Grenoble, 2011, pp.33-35; Grenoble & Whaley, 2006, pp.3-13; Haugen, 2001, p.65; Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997, pp.271-274; Lewis & Simon, 2010; Strubell, 2001; UNESCO, 2003).

Nevertheless, even where languages are highly endangered, language death is not inevitable. When faced with language loss, many communities, often supported by linguists, seek to revitalise their languages (Crystal, 2000, pp.91 & 106-107; Grenoble & Whaley, 2006, pp.69-101; Hinton & Hale, 2001).⁷⁸ *Language revitalisation* is the strategic attempt to return an endangered language to a place where its role as a language of communication for its speaking community can be sustained indefinitely. In contexts of continuing linguistic domination, such as that faced by Māori, Steven Chrisp (1997) suggests that revitalisation efforts are best focused on achieving long-term agreed diglossia, that is, agreement as to how two or more languages can function a single integrated society.

Achieving this kind of social bilingualism involves “counter-balancing the forces which have caused or are causing the language shift” (Grenoble & Whaley, 2006, p.21). Given the generally powerful, complex and political nature of these forces,

⁷⁴ *Extent of infrastructural support* includes the number, status, and instrumentality of domains and functions, the geographical location where the language is used, the amount of multi-level governmental and community institutional language support through legislation, policies, strategies, research and funding.

⁷⁵ *Language education context* includes the extent to which the language is used as the medium of instruction, whether second/foreign language instruction pedagogy and techniques are relevant and effective, and the quality and amount of materials and resources.

⁷⁶ Whether interactions contribute to intergenerational transmission is a particularly important factor.

⁷⁷ This includes whether there is a standard (written or oral) form of the language and the extent and quality of its documentation and written traditions.

⁷⁸ Revitalisation can also be referred to as language ‘revival’, ‘restoration’, ‘regeneration’, ‘maintenance’ and ‘reversal of language shift’ (Hohepa, 1999, p.46; 2006, pp.294-295; Lewis, 2007, pp.6-7). Spolsky (2003, pp.554-555) prefers the term ‘regeneration’ for activities that increase the status and salience of a language, and reserves ‘revitalisation’ for the restoration of intergenerational transmission.

especially when compared to the resources available to the communities of endangered languages, a strategic approach is essential. As Fishman (1991, p.113) explains:

Stressing the wrong priorities is a very costly example of lacking a proper social theory or model of what RLS [Reversing Language Shift] entails. . . . The sociolinguistic landscape is littered with the relatively lifeless remains of societally marginalized and exhausted RLS movements that have engaged in struggles on the wrong front (or on all . . . fronts simultaneously), without real awareness of what they were doing or of the problems that faced them.

Because these factors that impact on revitalisation are all interconnected, LPP needs to address them in a cohesive, comprehensive and strategic way. On the one hand, ill-thought out or unnecessarily contentious tactics can provoke a dominant backlash that reduces the possibility of building public and political will for language revitalisation. On the other hand, over-conservative goals and strategies, such as those which focus solely on intergenerational transmission, diglossia or reversing language shift, can create a ‘master-slave’ relationship where the language revival programme both functions within and also supports the demands of the dominant language and culture (Eggington, 2001, p.242; Romaine, 2006, p.452).⁷⁹

With reference to Māori language revitalisation, Fishman (1991, p.245) observes:

Māori is still dying year by year and effective first aid and major surgery are needed urgently, rather than stressing such elective non-essentials as token mass media programs, the token use of Māori in government offices, signs and letterheads, wildly luxuriant corpus planning for ‘Māori in the modern sector’, literary prizes for writers, and Māori-speaking telephone operators and clerks at government agencies. All of the above are merely

⁷⁹ Furthermore, when challenged, hegemonic institutions although they may cede a limited amount of material gain, rights or power, still “ensure they control the process and keep some basic assumptions in place”, therefore not “posing any fundamental challenges to the hegemonic project itself” (Purcell, 2009, p.147).

symbolic flourishes, given the lack of substance with respect to the societal co-management which they imply, or even any substantially self-regulatory intergenerational Māori home-family-neighborhood life on which such efforts must be firmly based if they are to contribute to RLS per se (rather than merely to jobs for a few dozen disaffected intellectuals). What would be fine goals once stages 6 to 4 are nailed down would merely be hollow victories, masked defeats and hopeless distractions otherwise. Even were they to be granted . . . they would not stop the arterial bleeding of Māori any more than they have Irish or even of Basque.

It is, therefore, hardly surprising that ten years later Benton and Benton (2001, p.446) gave a negative rating to Māori language *Reversing Language Shift* (RLS), stating that “on almost any reading of the [GIDS] scale, Maori would still be in the zone of maximum disruption”.

2.2.4.2 Language rights

The concept of linguistic human rights (LHR) is a response to the suppression of minority languages (often due to the imposition of a unifying national language) and has established itself as a major driving force within LPP. It is a concept that has begun to receive widespread international acceptance, with several influential U.N. charters and documents having been signed off.⁸⁰ A second example of enacted rights is the *European Charter of regional and minority languages* which not only considers that the use of these languages in private and public life an unalienable right but that they also contribute to the maintenance of Europe’s wealth and traditions (Grin, 2003b, p.207).

In the case of language preservation, toleration or *laissez-faire* protection is inadequate – making it a matter simply of individual responsibility has proved to

⁸⁰ King and Haboud (2007, p.61) suggest that the United Nations has been the most powerful language planning agent in acknowledging linguistic diversity. Thus, for example, 1966 *United Nations Covenant on Civil and Political Rights* (Article 27); the *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious, or Linguistic Minorities* (1992); the *Universal Declaration of Linguistic Rights* (UDLR Follow-up Committee, 1998) while yet to be approved from UNESCO, was adopted at the conclusion of the World Conference on Linguistic Rights in 1996 in Barcelona, and is supported by many influential organisations and individuals. Article 13 of the *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples* states that indigenous peoples ‘have the right to revitalize, use, develop and transmit to future generations their . . . languages’, and that signatory states ‘shall take effective measures to ensure that this right is protected’.

be unsuccessful (Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997, p.212). What is required is proactive, collective responsibility, including the obligation that the state should intervene actively in language ecologies, promoting and planning for public and private spaces in which communities can exercise their linguistic rights (Skutnabb-Kangas, T., 2006, pp.283-284).⁸¹

This raises the issue of how overlapping language rights within the same ecology are to be reconciled. As de Swaan (2001, p.52) observes, the right of one individual to speak in the language of his/her choice does not impinge on the freedom of everyone else to ignore what they say. Consequently, the concept of universal equal rights is a practically unworkable concept, particularly as there must be a limit as to the number of languages that can co-exist simultaneously in the public domain (Pennycook, 2006, pp.68-69; Wright, 2004, pp.241-243). For this reason, agreements based on territorial division or diglossic arrangements must be considered, something which, according to Wright (2004, p.241) “depends entirely on dominant majorities being ready and willing to confer on the language of the weaker group the necessary prestige and utility”.

Rights-based language intervention is problematic from a number of perspectives. Intervention, even when based on rights, always has economic, social and political consequences, including the potential to create new losers as well as new winners (Grin, 2005, p.455; May, 2005, pp.1055-1056; Ridge, 1996, pp.20-21). Thus, for example, a rise in the status of a particular language may result in the rise to dominance of one of more dialects of that language and the withering of others, the same type of linguisticism which prompted appeal to language rights in the first instance. This is due to the fact that “[I]inguistic-imperialism and language-rights discourses . . . construct their critical frameworks from within the same paradigm

⁸¹ A right to use one’s language in public or even in private is not universally recognised, but should be (Sallabank, 2012, p.110). Tove Skutnabb-Kangas (2006, pp.283-284) identifies several pairs of rights “dichotomies” all of which he believes are necessary in protecting dominated languages. These include: negative rights (basic freedom of expression & right to an interpreter) versus positive rights (right to use and maintain their language); toleration-oriented rights (anti-discrimination) versus promotion-oriented rights; individual rights versus collective rights (for languages both are necessary); territorial rights (rights for a language and speaker community within its own territory) versus personal rights (for dispersed people outside a groups territory); rights in “hard law” (binding on the governing body) versus “soft law” (non-binding declarations, legal precedents). Hu and Alsogoff (2010, p.369) also differentiate between non-instrumental rights (the fundamental right to express and reproduce culture) and instrumental rights (the role of language in enjoying social and economic opportunities).

they wish to critique” (Pennycook, 2006, p.68). Accordingly, Hu and Alsagoff (2010, p.370) stress the need for a principled and transparent approach wherever these type of distributive inequalities occur, while Sayers (2009, p.213) calls for a holistic focus on language survival that is motivated more by “plight of people” than by “the decrease of the number of languages”.

Rationales based solely on language rights are considered to be the least persuasive to those who do not share the same moral convictions (Grin, 2003a, p.36; 2005; Hu & Alsagoff, 2010, pp.369-370). Where major economic forces militate against language shift, language rights-based arguments are unlikely by themselves to counteract them. As Grin (2003a, p.52) observes “the weak may avail themselves of a ‘right’ only to the extent that the strong have an interest in granting and upholding this right”. Certainly, there is a “discontinuity” between the “unrealistic discussions of ‘rights’ in political discourse” and the actual nature of rights that have a recognised legal status (King & Haboud, 2007, p.61).

Nevertheless, when used in conjunction with other rationales, such as technical or practical “feasibility” and “proper allocation of scarce resources”, they can be effective (Grin, 2005, p.451). Furthermore, legislation and rights provisions can support language survival by providing leverage in legal contexts (Romaine, 2002, p.194). In New Zealand, for example, the greatest advances in government protection of the Māori language have arguably been due to the court system’s having upheld Treaty of Waitangi rights (see *Section 1.3.2.1*). Furthermore, the concept of language rights has gained considerable traction on a world-wide basis, meaning that ignoring language rights issues can tarnish a nation’s reputation internationally.

2.2.4.3 Language economics

The impact of economic theory on LPP has extended beyond the widespread use of basic economic concepts, with the *economics of language* (also known as *language economics*) playing an increasingly important role within the practice of LPP, particularly in relation to minority languages (Grin, 2003a, p.1; 2006, pp.77-89; Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997, pp.154-155). The economics of language focuses on the complex interrelationships between economic factors and language, particularly in relation to the application of economic concepts, tools and paradigms to explain

language preference and choice and to justify and evaluate LPP (Grin, 2003a; 2003b; 2006).

Within the economics of language, language is considered to be a hyper- collective commodity that “displays external network effects” and can therefore be related to economic concepts such as networks, standards, production, consumption, cost, demand, supply, quantity and fluctuations in value (de Swaan, 2001, pp.27-33 & 178-179; Grin, 2003a, pp.21-22; Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997, pp.155-158).⁸² Thus, for example, LPP initiatives represent *supply*, which, when unrelated to linguistic *demand*, will fail (Wright, n.d., p.6).⁸³ Heterogeneous language ecologies can be conceived of as *competitive markets* in which dominant languages can threaten the survival of minority languages through competition for speakers, space and resources (Bourdieu, 1977, pp.651-653; Grin, 2003a, p.27).⁸⁴ The concept of *value* is seen in terms of the fluctuating appreciation of a language as reflected in the behaviour (use and take up) of social actors and is based on factors such as, for example, the instrumental and integrative usefulness of a language relative to other languages as well as the nature (mono/multilinguality, density) and perceived esteem (wealth, likeability etc.) of its speaking community relative to other communities in the market (ecology) (de Swaan, 2001, pp.21, 33-59 & 176-179; Grin, 2003a, pp.36-39).⁸⁵ The fact that the communal nature of language means that some of its benefits accrue to the community rather than to the individual is,

⁸² de Swaan (2001, pp.27-29) believes that the likening of a language to a collective asset such as a cell phone network is apt. The network (language) requires an initial investment (language learning), its value fluctuates in line with the number of users, and large networks enjoy economies of scale, with smaller ones being at an ever increasing economic disadvantage.

⁸³ Wright (n.d., p.6) notes that revitalisation efforts not anchored in proven community demand “could be judged fruitless and a waste of money - money which might have been used for other language planning purposes or (budgetary niceties aside) more fundamental social needs in that community, say housing and water supply.”

⁸⁴ Grin (2003a, pp.26-27) concedes that the metaphor of several competing currencies (languages) in a market is less problematic in an economic sense than a single currency analogy, which (given that a “market in the economic sense emerges from the existence of supply and demand functions”) is considered economically “unsound” with “little heuristic pertinence”.

⁸⁵ Grin, (2003a, p.36) notes that just because languages are valuable in an intrinsic sense or perhaps are likened to ‘treasure’ (such as the ‘Māori language as a *taonga*’ discourse) does not mean they are necessarily valuable in an economic sense, stating that “it is important to consider different forms of value”.

consequently, a “hard-nosed economic” justification for centralised intervention relating to the maintenance of linguistic diversity (Grin, 2003a, p.21).⁸⁶

Grin (2003a, p.24) has observed that economics is conceptually and perhaps methodologically “better equipped than other social sciences . . . to process decision-making problems” because it can draw on a robust and logically consistent conceptual framework in order to formulate, evaluate and compare advantages and drawbacks and subject popular rhetoric to close scrutiny (Grin, 2003a, pp.1, 24, 41 & 55; 2005). One of the most significant contributions that language economics has made to LPP is in relation to the analytically rigorous and transparent evaluation and comparison of policy options (Grin, 2003a, p.5; 2003b, p.143). Thus, for example, Grin (2003a, pp.39-40) uses benefit and cost curves to prove that neither zero diversity nor limitless diversity are socially optimal, a finding that challenges both the widely held belief that diversity is always negatively correlated with macro-economic welfare and also the belief that boundless diversity has no associated social costs. This type of provision of robust instrumental rationales is an important contribution to LPP given the inevitable competition for policy attention and resources. As Kaplan and Baldauf (1997, p.167) observe, “no language plan no matter how sound is likely to succeed unless the decision makers are convinced of its economic and political value”. As noted in the previous section (2.2.4.2), Grin (2003a, p.53) has observed that, “the weak may avail themselves of a ‘right’ only to the extent that the strong have an interest in granting and upholding this right”. It is important that this is borne in mind in view of the fact that the strongest justifications for many revitalisation programmes relate to rights and abuse, justifications which, while important, “[cut] no ice with those not already convinced of the legitimacy of those arguments” (Grin, 2005, p.457) and are therefore likely to “[fall] on deaf ears” (Eggington, 2001, p.243).⁸⁷ An example of an attempt to strike a balance is the evaluation by Hu and Alsagoff (2010, pp.369-371) of the provision of English as a medium of instruction in China in terms of both normative rights and instrumentally oriented considerations, such as practical

⁸⁶ Likewise, Grin (2006, pp.83-84) considers the erosion of linguistic diversity by the “free play of market forces” as *market failure*, a situation which, when it occurs, also justifies state intervention in the form of language policy.

⁸⁷ Furthermore, Grin (2005, p.457) asserts that “even among those who would be sympathetic to such rights on moral grounds, doubts may arise from a policy analysis standpoint.”

feasibility (availability of resources), allocative efficiency (aggregate benefits and costs) and distributive fairness (respective gains and losses).

Policy evaluation is a continuing process within the LPP cycle, allowing planners to regularly adjust goals, strategies and priorities with a view of using scarce resources more effectively (Grin, 2003a, pp.8 & 41-43; 2003b, pp.117-146; Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997, pp.90-99 & 167-168). In this area, language economics has much to contribute to considerations such as the relationship between expenditure on different policies and the net benefit to society. Any goal, even language revitalisation, can be achieved with enough resources invested in it. However, given the scarcity of resources, the real question from an economic standpoint, is “whether the outcome is worth the resources devoted to achieving it” (Grin, 2003a, p.52). Furthermore, within the context of language economics, the comparative cost of implementing and failing to implement language policies is a major consideration.⁸⁸

For example, the real financial cost of moving to a bilingual education system is the cost it entails over and above the cost involved in maintaining a monolingual system. Given the premise that children need to be schooled irrespective of whether a bilingual option is available, the financial cost of introducing bilingual education is likely to be a modest one when set against the probable increase in attendance and results. Indeed, such a move may be well worth its cost and, in the long term, may even pay for itself (Grin, 2003a, pp.53-54; 2006, pp.88-89).

In spite of the usefulness of language economics in terms of the recasting of language issues and the evaluation in relation to benefits and costs, it has limitations (Grin, 2003a, p.5). First, the many qualitative and sociological aspects of language are difficult to accommodate within the context of the fundamentally quantitative orientation that underpins economic cost-benefit analysis and modelling (Eggington and Baldauf, 1990, p.91; Grin, 2003a, p.55). Secondly, LPP decisions involve political processes and the economics of language is only one of a number approaches that input into the wider political debate (Grin, 2003a, p.5).

⁸⁸ A cost may be non-economic, such as the potential for inter-group tension that may arise if the language of a minority is denied recognition.

2.2.4.4 Behaviour change

The primary aim of LPP is to change behaviour. Thus, Cooper (1989, p.45) defines LPP as involving “deliberate efforts to influence the behaviour of others with respect to the acquisition, structure or functional allocation of their language codes”. Consequently, any LPP practice, irrespective of its quality and authoritative appearance, is effectively unsuccessful if it does not lead to behaviour modification. It is, however, one thing to accept that behaviour change is paramount and another to achieve it. Substantive, sustained behaviour change (rather than superficial behaviour change) is “very difficult to achieve” (Spillane, Reiser & Reimer, 2002, p.414).

An essential prerequisite of behaviour change is social acceptance at a number of levels. Ager (2005, p.1039) dismisses as pointless any planning “that is rejected by the target group . . . no matter how well researched or technically brilliant”. It is, after all, local practices and discourses that are the default policy or policies (Johnson, 2009, pp.154-155).⁸⁹ So, for example, Schiffman (2006, p.116) notes that an official Russian-only language policy was subverted by Polish teachers who reverted to Polish whenever authorities were not present.

LPP has not been marked by a high level of success. Indeed, Grenoble and Whaley (2006, p.ix) have argued that “an honest evaluation of most language revitalisation efforts to date will show that they have failed”. In particular, conventional LPP has not had much impact on behaviour change, suggesting that its frameworks, strategies, tools and levers are inadequate.⁹⁰

⁸⁹ In response to criticisms regarding the quality and type of the reformed language in modern Turkey, Myers-Scotton (2006, p.395) accepts that the paramount consideration is that “the target people . . . accept the end product”.

⁹⁰ Attitudes are an important indicator of language value and can affect minority language reproduction (Baker, 2006, pp.210-211) but this not the same as behaviour or practices (Cooper, 1989, pp.134-135). For example, Fishman (2001c, p.479) stated that (a) “*the discrepancies between attitudes and performance* are as noteworthy in conjunction with RLS as they are in conjunction with all areas of ‘moral behavior’ where ‘the spirit is willing but the flesh is weak’ [emphasis mine]” and (b) (p.480) that although “the general climate of opinion . . . has improved in an amorphous and largely still ineffectual sense . . . actual RLS prospects and attainments have improved very little, if at all . . . and [in some cases] seem even to have deteriorated”. In this regard, it is unrealistic to expect that we will always behave in accordance with our attitudes, however attitudes affect language behaviour more if the issue is central to our lives.

Schiffman (2006, p.114) notes that “implementation is almost always the weakest link in language policies”, something that Ricento (2000, p.23) attributes to the fact that the following questions remain largely unanswered: “Why do individuals opt to use (or cease to use) particular languages for specified functions in different domains, and how do those choices influence - and how are they influenced by - institutional language policy decision-making (local to national and supranational)?” Thus, more attention needs to be paid to those psychological, group-membership, cultural, behavioural and contextual variables that directly impinge on individual and group language choice and practice. What *is* known is that a deeper level of acceptance of change is more likely when new ideas are constructed in ways that allow for their incorporation into existing psychological frameworks (Spillane, Reiser & Reimer, 2002, pp.416-418). Haarmann (1990, p.104) asserts that “every planning effort . . . has to rely on a kind of psychological background which favours an effective implementation of planning goals and which, ultimately, is the most crucial variable for the long term success of planning”. Thus, linguistic culture can influence the outcomes of policy making just as emphatically and definitively as explicit, authoritative decisions (Schiffman, 2006, p.112).⁹¹ In the U.S., for example, until recently (due to the growth of Spanish), the need for explicit language policy has been negligible (so far as the dominant group is concerned) as the dominant linguistic culture has been able to support the use of English to the exclusion of almost all other languages (Schiffman, 1996, pp.14-15; 2006, p.121).

If LPP were to fully embrace behaviour change as its fundamental priority, it would need a more robust range of policy and planning tools drawn from a range of disciplines such as behavioural theory, social learning theory, ethnography, socio-cultural theory, and CDT (Ricento, 2006a, pp.x-xi). This could result in the integration of ‘hard’ compliance policy options (that compel certain types of behaviour) and ‘soft’ options that “go with the grain of human nature, rather than rubbing us up the wrong way” (Dolan, Hallsworth, Halpern, King, & Vlaev, 2010,

⁹¹ Schiffman sees language policy as *ultimately grounded* in (1996, p.5) and *inextricably connected* to (2006, p.112) linguistic culture (which he defines as the “sum totality of values, beliefs, attitudes, prejudices, myths, religious strictures and all other cultural baggage that speakers bring to their dealings with language from their culture” (Schiffman, 2006, p.112). Consequently, language policy, is defined by Schiffman (2006, p.112) as “not only the explicit, written, overt, de jure, official, and “top-down” decision-making about language, but also the implicit, unwritten, covert, *de facto*, grass-roots and unofficial ideas and assumptions”.

p.13; Smollan, 2006, p.145).⁹² Also required would be a system where the value of the policy is affirmed and new behaviour patterns are rehearsed and reinforced (Spillane, Reiser & Reimer, 2002, pp.417-418).

Dolan et al. (2010) recommend MINDSPACE as a potentially useful public policy implementation framework (see *Appendix 3: Framework 1*). MINDSPACE, predicated on the belief that sustainable changes in behaviour will come from the successful integration of cultural, regulatory and individual change, involves *enabling, encouraging, engaging, exemplifying, exploring* (before policies are implemented) and *evaluating* (following implementation).⁹³ Michie, van Straalen & West (2011) provide the Behavioural Change Wheel (BCW) as a comprehensive and coherent approach which links to an overarching model of behaviour (see *Appendix 3: Framework 2*). The model of behaviour, “motivation in context”, underpins the BCW’s prediction of “what aspects of the motivational system will need to be influenced in what ways to achieve a behavioural target” (Michie et al., 2011, p. 9). Consequently, at the hub of the BCW are three essential prerequisites for behaviour change to occur: *capability* (psychological and physical capacity to engage in the activity), *motivation* (all the brain processes (reflective and automatic) that energise and direct behaviour), and *opportunity* (all the physical and social factors that lie outside the individual that make the behaviour possible or prompt it).⁹⁴ The framework also provides a comprehensive range of known intervention activities (*education, persuasion, incentives, coercion, training, restriction, environmental restructuring, modelling, and enablement*) and policy categories (*communication/marketing, guidelines, fiscal, legislation, environmental / social planning, regulation, and service provision*) (p.7). The BCW goes further than simply providing these. In addition, it “forms the basis for a systematic analysis of

⁹² Thus, for example, drink driving initiatives that integrate stiff penalties with effective advertising aimed at shifting social norms and have resulted in significant behaviour change over the last decade (Dolan et al., 2010, p.14). Furthermore, small, incremental changes that do not disrupt normal patterns and are perceived to be fair are more likely to be successful over the long term (Smollan, 2006, p.149).

⁹³ For an outline, see *Appendix 3: Behaviour change and policy frameworks*

⁹⁴ These factors and the behaviour itself are all mutually influencing, for example, both capability and opportunity can influence motivation while enacting a behaviour can alter all three factors (Michie et al., 2011, p.5). This means that, first, the “target behaviour can in principle arise from combinations of any of the components of the behaviour system and second, a single intervention may have consequences on other parts of the system which may work for or against sustainable change” (Michie et al., 2011, p.10).

how to make the selection of the interventions and policies” (p.8) so that they match the behavioural target, the target population, and the context in which the intervention will be delivered (p.2).

2.2.4.5 Agency and intervention

The majority of macro-level LPP decisions are made by formal *élites*, influentials and authorities (Cooper, 1989, pp.88-89), that is, by those who have the authority and capability to make laws and distribute resources throughout a nation’s complex network of domains and institutions (Gruffudd, 2000, p.176; Williams, 2009, pp.78-79).⁹⁵ These *élite* groups are never devoid of interests and are therefore likely to allocate important linguistic roles and scarce resources in directions they deem desirable, with certain languages being favoured and others being perpetually marginalised (Myers-Scotton, 2006, p.379). Thus Spolsky (2009) stresses that it is important to “look behind policy statements to . . . see who is the active agent” (pp.225 & 226), noting that “any government agency can establish a *de facto* language management policy, which may or may not reflect official government policy” (p. 230).

Nevertheless, it does not follow from this that language planning is only ever a top-down process. On the contrary, social actors of all kinds can influence LPP in a range of ways. In particular, it is important to note that macro-level decisions require micro-level consent: language policies and plans can be re-interpreted, rejected or ignored at a micro-level (Myers-Scotton, 2006, pp.375-376).⁹⁶ To be successfully put into effect, Cooper (1989, p.185) has observed “that decisions taken at higher levels of authority require smaller-scale decisions at lower levels of authority” (that is, in workplaces, churches, and in families, by radio disc jockeys, teachers, sign makers and storekeepers) (Cooper, 1989, pp.160-161). Discourses conducted at lower levels can become ‘default policy’. In fact, different ‘grassroots’ interpretations of a *de jure* policy may actually become ‘multiple *de facto* policies’ (Cooper, 1989, pp.38; Johnson, 2009, pp.154-155). Thus, effective LPP addresses

⁹⁵ Representative governing bodies also have the potential to make policy that best fits the entire linguistic ecology rather than one or two interests within it (Lo Bianco, 1990, p.77).

⁹⁶ Hornberger (2009, p.199) has observed, for example, that, in some rural schools, the 1994 Bolivian National Education reform was ignored resulting in “untouched stacks of the Reform’s texts remain[ed] in locked cabinets in the director’s office and little effort has been made to implement [the reform]”.

both top-down and bottom-up influences and aims to combine authority, resourcing, and capability with local participation (Cooper, 1989, pp.183-185; Crystal, 2000, pp.117-119; Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997, pp.196-199). Even so, LPP frameworks continue, in general, to be technicist in orientation, often locating practitioners of the discipline on the side of those *élites* that hold power (Calvet, 1998, p.203).⁹⁷ Indeed, Williams (2009, p.56) considers language planning agencies to be “political rather than professional constructs” which, although providing tangible support, “are established, nurtured and operationalised within fairly limited confines that have as much to do with political expediency as they have with the long-term vitality of the target language”.

Recommending a critical approach to LPP does not necessarily resolve problems relating to the positioning of those involved in LPP as an applied discipline since all agents are necessarily ideologically motivated. Any assertion of neutral positioning is, therefore, naïve, having the effect of simply moving from overt / explicit to covert / implicit social, political and ideological positioning (Blommaert, 1999, pp.436-437; van Dijk, 2008, p.6). Similarly, positioning oneself in relation to what is presented as being ‘just’ or ‘right’ ignores the contingency of these essentialising positions and, furthermore, may simply invite others to interpret these essentially empty signifiers in ways consistent with their own agendas.

Given the difficulty of positioning LPP practitioners in terms of agency, it is imperative that the role is re-conceptualised in a way that avoids any assumption of neutrality and fully accommodates the value-laden, constructive and dynamic processes of political contestation between opposing policy agents (Calvet, 1998, pp.202-203; Dorner, 2011; Shohamy, 2006, p.xvii; Spolsky, 2009, pp.181-185). Such a reconceptualisation, though far from generally accepted, is not new. It is implicit in, for example, Lo Bianco’s (2004, p.751) assertion that the aim of any social agent involved in LPP is to “assert deliberative control”, generally with a view to disrupting or maintaining ‘natural’ shift processes.⁹⁸

⁹⁷ Lo Bianco (personal communication, August 2013) considers LPP practitioners to have an important role but not an exclusive one, describing LPP as “a real-world problem solving exercise in which experts, politicians and communities interact with each other.”

⁹⁸ This should not be new as in some sense intervention of social behaviour is universal to human experience (Dolan et al., 2010, p.13).

In connection with this, it is relevant to note that Combs and Penfield (2012) have called on language stakeholders to consider themselves as language activists, that is, as people engaged in “energetic action . . . in order to create, influence and change existing language policies . . . [and] who, through various means actively defend their right to venerate and freely use their languages in multiple, often public, domains” (p.462). Spolsky (2009) describes activists as being linguicentric groups or individuals “whose ideology is clearest in support . . . of a threatened target language” and, who, because they lack authority, depend on “acceptance of their ideology by those they try to influence” and by “supranational” and “supragovernmental” proponents of language rights (pp.204 & 205). Activism is fundamental to LPP activities such as those involving endangered language revitalisation, providing marginalised and grass-roots agents with a way of participating effectively in policy making (Combs & Penfield, 2012, pp.467-468). Thus, for example, Grin and Vaillancourt (1998, pp.93-94) note the crucial role grassroots individuals played in the drive for bilingual signs in Wales, signs that “were not put up as the result of a spontaneous choice by British authorities . . . [but] like most other positive measures or concessions in favour of the language . . . had to be wrested from the government.”

Being an “active agent of social and policy change”, however, is a “challenging role” (Sharp & Richardson, 2001, p.197), and although some LPP practitioners and researchers may identify as language activists in particular contexts they may not necessarily do so in all contexts. Nevertheless, there are precedents in other areas. For example, sociologist (and later “public intellectual”) Pierre Bourdieu (Swartz, 2003), and liberation-psychologist Ignacio Martín-Baró (1994a, 1994b, 1994c)⁹⁹ are both academics who have cast off the pretence of neutrality and objectivity, actively resisting unjust social arrangements, power abuse or oppression (Fine,

⁹⁹Martín-Baró stated the psychologists must (a) help uncover the “collective lie” – the serious problems in society that have been systematically hidden from view (Martín-Baró, 1994a, p.188); (b) “rethink their image of themselves as professionals”; help people grasp a new practical understanding of themselves and a “more autonomous determination of their future” (Martín-Baró, 1994c, p.46) noting that this change in individual consciousness and empowerment should lead to more a just and humane societies (Martín-Baró, 1994b, p.30). Martín-Baró was assassinated by Government soldiers in 1989 in a response related to his “steadfast affirmation of fundamental human rights” (Mishler, 1994, p.vii).

2006, pp.83, 89). Furthermore, van Dijk (2008, p.6) has argued that, within critical discourse studies, underlying commitment “to engagement in favour of dominated groups” is no less a political choice than *not* committing oneself politically.

For those who do adopt the position of language activist, however, a central issue will be the rationale for this positioning, with rationales such as the achievement of language equality or a better future being highly contestable. An acceptable starting point, perhaps, an ecological one, one that is based on the desire to maintain an ecological stability. For some, the emphasis is on ethical practices, that is, practices that do not aim to silence or negatively label any opposition, disguise intentions, or frame information in a way that restricts individual choice or reproduce inequalities (Shohamy, 2006, pp.131-132; van Dijk, 2008, pp.212-218). Equally important may be the recognition that LPP activity has consequences for the entire language ecology, an increase of the status of one language in a particular community having the potential to produce a corresponding change or reduction in the status of another (Herriman & Burnaby, 1996, p.13; Lo Bianco, 2004, pp.751-752; May, 2005, pp.1055-1056; Ridge, 1996, pp.20-21). Thus, May (2005, p.1064) notes that the goal of LPP activity in the case of threatened languages is not about “replacing a majority language with a minority language” but about “questioning and contesting why the promotion of a majority (national) language should be necessarily *at the expense* of all the others” (emphasis in original).¹⁰⁰ Thus, those LPP practitioners who position themselves as language activists need to proceed strategically and with caution as the consequences of disadvantaging any group may impact in a negative way on the overall long term success of an LPP project (Shohamy, 2006, p.40). Notwithstanding the use of strategy in sensitive situations, it is clear that awareness of the multitude of covert mechanisms that constitute *de facto* language policy for dominating languages, makes “activism and resistance” inevitable (Shohamy, 2006, p.xv). As Calvet (1998, p.203) states: “Once pacifist illusions are disposed of, it only remains for the linguist, in the course of carrying out his [sic] trade, to behave as a citizen and keep a democratic watch on language policy at all times”.

¹⁰⁰ Thus, May (2000a, p.123) notes that in the case of Wales, where the English remains dominant in all language domains, the requirement to be bilingual in English and Welsh does not threaten anyone’s right to use English within Wales concluding that, “The unwillingness to learn Welsh must thus be predicated on the long-standing derogation and vitiation of minority languages.”

2.2.4.6 Politics, power & ideology

LPP is one of the most contentious and problematic areas of social policy in multilingual societies.¹⁰¹ This is due to the fundamental connection between language and the deeply embedded contestation of identities, power, representation, voice and ideology that constitutes the political (Herriman & Burnaby, 1996, pp.10 & 13; Shohamy, 2006, pp.xv-xviii & 22-24).¹⁰² As Shohamy (2006, p.167) observes, “Controlling language is a way of controlling us.” For people, though, the power of language is also the power to reshape, to protest, to denounce oppression and resist its domination”.

From this perspective, LPP can be considered as “a civil war of languages” (Calvet, 1998, p.203), “a battleground of contending discourses, ideologies and interpretations” (Williams, 2000, p.2) involving *élites* and counter-*élites*.¹⁰³ The former typically manipulate the power mechanisms of society for their own self-interest, while the latter typically attempt to reduce or overcome the perceived inequalities that result from the *status quo* (Cooper, 1989, pp.80-87; Kaplan & Baldauf, 1997, pp.80 & 195-196). As a result, LPP problems are never objective and LPP outcomes are rarely, if ever, the result of rational, scientific endeavour. Rather, both are generally forged through political disputation, negotiation and compromise (Lo Bianco, 1990, pp.74 & 77; 2001, p.225; Ricento, 2000, p.7). As Brock (2001, p.48) notes, initiating policy in a democracy can be a “messy business” which involves negotiating complex webs of competing interests and issues. Thus:

¹⁰¹ Notwithstanding the existence of LPP activities that are more technical and less contested in nature (such as for example, orthographic reform in Sweden) in this section I assert that political contestation is a central characteristic of most LPP activities and of all language revitalisation efforts.

¹⁰² Language policy outcomes are incredibly salient to society for a number of reasons including: it is intrinsic to identity; it is personally experienced by the population; it is a source of high social and economic capital; and it reproduces particular values in society (See Chrystal, 2000, pp.36-40; Trappes-Lomax, 2004, p.140; Wardhaugh, 2010, p.7). Lo Bianco (1990, pp.73-74) notes that language is fundamental to political interests because “it has powerful symbolic importance and group identity functions that go beyond its more obvious communicative functions and that, as a consequence, the contested, disputed interests of different social groups are inextricably bound up with language issues.” Chrystal (2000, p.66) states that “language is the most valuable single possession of the human race.”

¹⁰³ Even a simple public sign, for example, sends a politically embedded message as to which language community is in power and whose language has priority (Shohamy, 2006, pp.xv & 110).

[Even a] brilliant, carefully crafted policy proposal could get amended, gutted, re-written, shelved or even abandoned at any stage of the process of review by [an] immediate superior, by the chief executive officer, by staff in the minister's office, within the cabinet room, or eventually within the prime minister's or premier's office.

The conventional paradigm upon which LPP is based is inadequate for such an inherently political discipline, notwithstanding the post-modern critical turn within the discipline (Kaplan & Baldauf, 2007, pp.124-125; McGroarty, 1997, pp.71 & 85-86; Ó Riagáin, 1997, p.143; Pennycook, 2006, p.71). In fact, Cross (2009, p.23) believes that, despite the critiques since the 1990s, LPP practice has “remained a largely technocratic exercise”, while Luke, McHoul and Mey (1990, p.27) note that LPP has “[failed] to tackle . . . hidden agendas . . . [and has] tended to avoid directly addressing larger social and political matters within which language change, use and development, and indeed language planning itself, are embedded”.¹⁰⁴ It is not surprising, therefore, that one of the ironies of LPP, as noted by Carol Myers-Scotton (2006, pp.375-376), is that politicians rather than LPP experts plan language. Thus language professionals are rarely invited to participate in policy dialogues and consequently have minimal impact in language matters, a fact which represents a tremendous challenge to the discipline (Kaplan & Baldauf, 2007, p.113; Lo Bianco, 2005, p.255).

Conventional LPP theory provides little assistance for those who wish to engage with the political and to successfully navigate decision-making processes. This is particularly the case in relation to policy implementation, which Schiffman (2006, p.119) describes as “the weakest link in language policies”. Lo Bianco's (2004, p.749) rhetorical question is relevant here: “How many times does it occur that in electoral debate concessions are made to publically demanded principles only to be denied in practice?” In seeking to address this issue, Kaplan and Baldauf (2007, p.110) recommend broadening the focus of LPP by combining existing technical

¹⁰⁴ Ricento (2006b, p.15) notes a branching in responses to language shift and language death: First, a technician sociolinguistic analysis of its causes, nature and outcomes intended to guide revitalisation, and second; a critical analysis of the asymmetrical power relations that exist in the structures and ideologies of society.

and critical approaches with strategies, disciplines and activism directed at the political context. Three areas that have been identified in the literature on LPP as having the potential to offer a great deal here are: (a) the navigation of contested political processes, (b) the creation of constituencies, and (c) the implementation of a range of discourse strategies.

Disciplines such as political science and public policy have the potential to offer something of importance to LPP in relation to the *navigation of contested political processes* (e.g. elections and policy cycles).¹⁰⁵ There is however, already some practical guidance relating to this area within existing LPP literature. Thus, for example, Kaplan and Baldauf (2007) argue that LPP is more likely to be successful if it:¹⁰⁶

- uses long-term strategies that allow for political processes (p.123);¹⁰⁷
- involves the totality of a linguistic ecosystem (pp.124-125);¹⁰⁸
- is effective in a range of demographic and political settings and economic situations and in the context of a range of other legislation (pp.111, 122-123);
- fits the economic situation and attends to cost benefit ratios (p.123);¹⁰⁹
- is aware of the bias of the key players (pp.124-125);
- is sufficiently funded and empowered for impact and benefits to be visible within the timeframe of a budget cycle (pp.123 & 125);¹¹⁰
- is explicit since, in the long term, maintaining hidden agendas and illegitimate manipulation of the public have the potential to rebound (pp.124-125).¹¹¹

Understanding *the creation of constituencies* is also important. Thus, for example, Barnaby (1996, pp.217-218) has identified voter strength as one of four key factors

¹⁰⁵ Thus, for example, Kaplan and Baldauf (2007, pp.118-119) claim the U.S. *English Only* movement was significantly more successful than the *English Plus* movement because its proponents were more organised, more unified and more aware of the initiatives necessary to secure political action.

¹⁰⁶ All the references in this list derive from Kaplan and Baldauf (2007) and therefore only the page numbers are shown.

¹⁰⁷ See also Lo Bianco (2006, November 11, pp.10-11); Shohamy (2006, pp.xvi-xvii).

¹⁰⁸ See also Grenoble (2011, p.31); Spolsky (2004, pp.7-8).

¹⁰⁹ See also Grin (2005, pp.450-451); Kaplan & Baldauf (1997, p.167).

¹¹⁰ See also Johnson (2009, p.142).

¹¹¹ See also Lo Bianco (1987, p.5).

influencing the kind and amount of attention paid to various languages in Canada, and Lo Bianco (2006, November 11, p.3) has observed that the best and most successful policies are those that accommodate differences and involve working together to produce a shared vision. He has noted the power of this type of unified alliance in the case of Australian language groups working together to progress the 1987 *National Policy on Languages*:

[W]hen our government realised how powerful we were in a unified way it was very clear that those forces within the government didn't want us to have a single voice and started to try and buy off some sectors (and ultimately with some success) to divide us because fundamentally our interests are not all identical and we have to concede space if we're going to progress the activity of a general language policy (Lo Bianco, 2006, November 11, p.3).¹¹²

Given their small size, minority language groups need to form (and then sustain) alliances with similar groups in the context of a common purpose in order to increase their combined political power (Lo Bianco, 1990, pp.67-73; 2006, November 11, p.10). Support and consensus may be created by political processes, such as the establishment of bi-partisan advisory councils and committees or extensive consultation processes (Herriman, 1996, pp.46, 50 & 61; Lo Bianco, 1990, p.77). In this area, social movement theory may have much to offer since effective counter-hegemonic struggle involves "collective challenges by people with common purposes and solidarity in sustained interaction with *élites*, opponents and authorities" (Spicer & Böhm, 2007, p.1673).

Public policy making involves, at its core, a discursive struggle (Jernudd, 1993, p.134; Lo Bianco, 2001, p.225; 2004, pp.749-751; 2008, pp.157, 164 & 167-168). As Kaplan and Baldauf (2007, p.117) note, discourse is fundamental to the constitution and transformation of society and so altering the discourse about society is the most effective way of changing society. Discourse constructs

¹¹² See also Lo Bianco's (1990, pp.67-69) description of the process of these groups becoming conscious of a single group identity. Another example is the successful 1998 'English for the Children' campaign (Kaplan & Baldauf, 2007, pp.10-11; McGroarty, 1997, p.76).

language problems and then determines “which will be elevated for policy attention and which will be relegated to the margins” (Lo Bianco, 2005, p.256). Thus, the ability to use *discourse strategies* of various types plays a critical role in the effectiveness of LPP, particularly bearing in mind the need to communicate in ways that are persuasive to both key decision makers and the wider public (Ager 2005, pp.1038-1042; Kaplan & Baldauf, 2007, p.117). At the very least, therefore, LPP practitioners need to be able to communicate in ways that go beyond those which are appropriate in the case of readers of academic journals if they are to engage effectively in public discourse. Discourse that attracts policy attention is likely to be positive, inclusive (Pyles, 2008, pp.448 & 454-456; Spillane, Reiser & Reimer, 2002, p.418), well-researched (Ricento, 2006b, p.19; Rybecki & Rybecki, 2000, p.80) and aligned to prevailing policy paradigms (Cheyne, O’Brian & Belgrave, 2008, p.149; Durie, 2003, p.3; McEwan-Fujita, 2011, p.59; McGroarty, 1997, pp.85-86). It is also likely to stress economic and inclusive national interest justifications and to combine them with “judiciously placed stories that . . . are grounded in the personal experiences of people that [politicians] can identify with” (Lo Bianco, 2006, November 11, pp.1-2 & 9).

2.2.5 LPP: Towards a critical discourse perspective

Much of the literature on LPP points to the need for a wider perspective, one that accommodates a critical discourse perspective. However, Kaplan and Baldauf (1997, p.206) have stated that although post-structuralist critiques “can be powerful tools for understanding language planning problems or how language planning itself may go wrong”, they are “not helpful for those who actually have to do language planning” as opposed to simply providing “armchair comments on it”. It may be partly because of the prevalence of views of this type that there has been little motivation to, as Fishman (1994, p.98) puts it, “go beyond . . . critique”. My primary aim in exploring the literature on CDT (*Section 2.3* below) is to attempt to determine whether it does, in fact, have the potential to offer more to LPP than armchair commentary.

2.3 Critical discourse theory

2.3.1 Critical discourse theory: An introductory overview

Critical discourse theory (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985) is based on the following premise: *the social world is constructed through articulatory practice* rather than being anchored in some deeper objective reality.¹¹³ Meanings and identities, discursively constructed on an ongoing basis, are *radically contingent, antagonistic forces attempting to fix, disrupt and reconfigure them* in order to achieve hegemony (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p.38). Thus critical discourse theory (CDT) highlights the relationship between discourse and social movements, “the multifaceted nature of human antagonisms and identities, and the penetration of ideology (the symbolic) into all social relations” and, hence, the possibility of contesting and transforming the political world (Townshend, 2004, p.286).¹¹⁴ In that it has the potential to unmask, contest and transform the existing structures of society, CDT is of direct relevance to those involved in political struggles, such as the revitalisation of minority languages.

2.3.2 The emergence of critical discourse theory

CDT emerged at a time when many of the traditional, stable or totalising foundations of society were no longer taken for granted (Critchley & Marchant, 2004, p.1). During the late 20th century, a number of dislocatory events led to a deep theoretical and political dissatisfaction with orthodox Marxism which was seen as being “unable to develop a plausible account of ideology” because it underestimated (a) the extent to which all social relations were ideologically constituted and (b) the diversity and strength of non-class-based political identities, from populism to the new social movements (Townshend, 2004, p.270).¹¹⁵ In this context, CDT emerged as a reformulation of philosophical thought that drew on a number of sources including Marxism, post-structuralism and psychoanalysis. It

¹¹³ Carpentier and Spinoy (2008, p.5) state that the theoretical starting point of CDT is the . . . proposition that all social phenomena and objects obtain meaning(s) through discourse.”

¹¹⁴ By removing the essentialist aprioristic conviction that “the social is sutured at some point, from which it is possible to fix the meaning of any event independent of any articulatory practice”, CDT is able “to succeed in founding a political practice fully located in the field of democratic revolution” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.177).

¹¹⁵ The dislocatory events include the proliferation of new social groups and alliances in ‘68 student revolt, the 1970s crisis of welfare state capitalism, the 1980s working class support for Thatcher’s new right government, the end of the totalising ideologies that sustained Cold War; and the overdetermined nature of Latin American politics.

combines *anti-essentialist* ontology, *anti-foundationalist* epistemology, *contextualised linguistic analysis*, and a *relationalist* and *contextualist* view of identity formation (Torfing, 2005b, pp.13-14). This combination is packaged into a consistent and robust critically oriented theory that asserts the primacy of politics over the social in determining meaning and identity (Torfing, 2005a, pp.1, 2 & 5). As Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p.120) assert, “political practice does not recognise class interests and then represent them: it constitutes the interests it represents.”

Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p.4) insist that their theory is both ‘*post-Marxist*’ and ‘*post-Marxist*’, their point being that while it takes Marxism as an important starting point, it discards Marxism’s limiting essentialist orientations, focusing on the plurality of social agents engaged in the struggle for hegemony (Barrett, 1994, pp.244-246; Torfing, 2005a, p.5). They radicalise Gramsci’s (1971) concept of *hegemony*, discarding its economic determinism and class reductionism (Barrett, 1994, pp.244-247; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, pp.65-88; Torfing, 1999, pp.36-45).¹¹⁶ Thus, Torfing (2005a, p.6) notes that although CDT retains the Marxist concept of hegemonic struggle, it is *post-Marxist*, in that it deprivileges any one group or struggle and can therefore apply to all spheres of society.¹¹⁷ As Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000, pp.5-6) observe:

[D]iscourse theory conceives of society as a symbolic order in which social antagonisms and structural crises cannot be reduced to essential class cores determined by economic processes and relations. It also implies that all ideological elements in a discursive field are contingent, rather than fixed by a class essence, and that there is no fundamental social agency or political project that determines processes of historical change in an *a priori* fashion.

Like Marxism, Saussurean semiotic structuralism (de Saussure, 1916) provides one of the starting points for CDT in the sense that it conceptualises meaning and identity as being determined by differential relations with other meanings and

¹¹⁶ CDT combines the historical materialism categories of base (material conditions, the economy and ownership of the means of production) and super structure (the state, judicial system, the church, mass media and schools and the entire production of meaning that goes on in society) into one field produced by the same discursive process (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p.32).

¹¹⁷ See also Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p.4).

identities. However, CDT discards the Saussurean notion of language as a stable, unchanging and totalising system, asserting instead that the relationships among signs are continually shifting, with the result that meaning, identity and structure can only ever be partially fixed.¹¹⁸

Critical discourse theory has also drawn on the decentring of classical Western understanding of the individual as an autonomous subject that is particularly associated with Foucault (1972; 1980), Althusser (1971) and Lacan (1977; 1993). Identities are seen as being ideologically constructed in ways that have associated expectations in terms of behaviour and thought (Althusser, 1971, p.174). However, CDT radicalises the concept of the constructed identity, holding that there is no 'true' or 'pre-determined' identity but, instead, that conflicting discourses strive to organise the same social space in such a way that the individual is *fragmented* and *overdetermined* (e.g. 'mother', 'volunteer', 'business person'), with each identity construction being associated with different sets of actions (Carpentier & Spinoy, 2008, p.6; Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp.41-43; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, pp.97-105). There is, within CDT, a distinction between *subject positions* (the positioning of subjects within a discursive structure each position having its own expectations, characteristics and discourse (e.g. white, mother, middle class, guest)) and *political subjectivities* (the ways in which subjects act or live out their identities which emerge from the lack in subject positions) (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p.12; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.115). Political subjectivities stabilise into subject positions (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p.13). In times of structural crisis, individuals choose to identify with political projects that seem most capable of suturing the rift in a symbolic order, despite the fact that the final *suture* is something which "never arrives" (Laclau & Mouffe (1985, p.86)).¹¹⁹

There are many theoretical affinities between CDT, the psychoanalytic theory of Jacques Lacan (1993) and Žižek's (1989; 1990) psychoanalytic conception of the

¹¹⁸ For example, Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, pp.11-12 & 25) discard the static Saussurean *fishing net* metaphor, preferring instead the *inter-net* which better explains the issue of *change*.

¹¹⁹ *Suture*, a term derived from Lacanian psychoanalysis, refers to the attempt in hegemonic practices to cohere or fill-in the original lack. Nevertheless, given the "ultimately unfixed character of every signifier", a totally sutured society is impossible (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.88, note 1). Barrett (1994, p.249) also notes that *deconstruction* works in opposition to *suturing* in that it paradoxically aims to uncover the buried traces of old, sedimentary practices from what the new hegemonic practices are trying to exclude.

subject. Thus, for example, concepts such as ‘fantasy’, ‘desire’, ‘*objet petit à*’ and ‘*jouissance*’ that derive from psychoanalysis, reverberate in CDT. The concept of *jouissance*, which has, in French, overtones of sexual fulfilment as well as a surfeit of enjoyment more generally, was presented by Lacan (1993) in his 1959-1960 seminars, as ultimately unattainable. Thus the objects (causes) of fantasies (*objets petit à*) are perpetually absent.¹²⁰ They stimulate desire with the promise of recreating that fullness - that *jouissance* - which separation from the womb renders unattainable.¹²¹ Nevertheless, for Žižek (1989, pp.125-128), once it is acknowledged that fantasies mask the fissures in society, it follows that they provide a route by which the failure of ideologies may be anticipated. The relevance of these concepts becomes clear as soon as it is recognised that the absence of completeness is at the very core of CDT. Thus, the promise of *jouissance* is at the core of political articulations and symbolic identifications. The belief that our *jouissance* can be achieved through political action is as unsustainable as the belief that it is blocked by some *Other* who has unjustly obtained that desired *jouissance* (Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2004, p.211). Hegemony, like *jouissance*, is ultimately unattainable. Thus, as Žižek (1997, p.48) observes, “the crucial pre-condition for breaking the chains of servitude is . . . to ‘traverse the fantasy’ . . . that keeps us attached to the Master [and] makes us accept the framework of the social relationship of domination”.¹²²

Many of the words and phrases used by Laclau are transliterations of those used by Lacan (e.g. ‘suture’, ‘identity’, ‘identification’, ‘subject-as-lack’ and ‘floating signifiers’) or echo, in terms of their use, words and phrases used by Lacan. Thus,

¹²⁰ Žižek (1997, p.39) states that the *objet petit à* is “not what we desire, not what we are after but rather, that which sets our desire in motion” It is the treasure that is sought *within* the object / Other (or that which we hope to receive as a result of possessing it) which causes desire. Nevertheless, although the *objet petit à* promises to fill the lack it can never do so.

¹²¹ Stavrakakis (2007, p.83) notes Laclau’s insistence that *jouissance* is “very much present in [his work] . . . although, admittedly, sometimes in a sketchy and inchoate way.”

¹²² In Lacan’s discourse of the master (based on Hegel), a slave’s deferral of his/her own desire (in preparing objects of desire for the master’s consumption) not only increases the value of that desire (beyond demand) but allows them to govern their desire, to gradually overcome the fear of death that lead them to capitulate in battle with the master and thus to move beyond their master/slave binary designation. On the other hand, Žižek (1997, p.46) asserts that a slave’s (fool) inadequate subversion of the existing order in snatching a small piece of *jouissance* from the master (knave), “actually serves as its supplement”. An example is where non-*élites* accept from *élites* the ‘fulfillment’ of joy (money, respect, safety) in exchange for behaviour that supports the status quo of domination” (Žižek, 1997, p.48).

for example, Laclau and Mouffe (1985) use the terms ‘nodal point’, ‘empty signifier’, ‘the radically excluded’ and ‘an outside that is constitutive of the inside’ in ways that echo Lacan’s (1977) use of the terms ‘*point-de-capiton*’, ‘master signifier’, ‘*objet petit à*’ and ‘extimacy’ (Glynos & Stavrakakis, 2004, p.201).¹²³ For Lacan (1977), master signifiers, which are empty of content, structure identity; for Laclau and Mouffe (1985) ‘nodal points’, which are linked together through ‘floating signifiers’, structure discourse. In *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p.125) described antagonism as the blocking of identity by the ‘Other’, something which highlights susceptibility to destabilisation and the continuing possibility of antagonism. However, in response to Žižek’s (1990, pp.249-254) claim that full identity is always impossible, not because it is blocked by social antagonisms but because self is always fundamentally split,¹²⁴ they shifted focus, observing that the subject is an empty space or lack, emerging only as *subjectivity* through acts of identification and when dislocating events disrupt the existing discursive structure of society (Torfing, 2005b, pp.16-17; Worsham & Olsen, 1999, p.137). In exploring the concept of antagonism as outlined by Laclau and Mouffe, Žižek, (1990, p.249) observes that it constitutes a reinvention of the Lacanian real as a traumatic impossible in a way that makes it “useful as a tool for social and ideological analysis”.

2.3.3 Critical discourse theory: Key concepts

Critical discourse theory rejects the separation between *the discursive* and *the non-discursive* in favour of a perspective that sees an “interweaving of the semantic aspects of language and the pragmatic aspects of action” (Torfing, 2005a, p.7). In other words, “whatever we say, or think, or do is conditioned by a more or less sedimented discourse which is constantly modified and transformed by what we are saying, thinking, and doing” (Torfing, 2005b, p.14). In the absence of a transcendental centre or origin, it is through discourse that we fix (partially) meanings and identities, create coherent social realities, coordinate social relations,

¹²³ *Points de capiton* are 'quilting points', that is occasional points where the otherwise perpetual movement of signification stops to produce an illusion of a stable meaning.

¹²⁴ This is because the negation invoked by an antagonistic force is always the negation of a negation (Torfing, 1999, p.52). See Townshend, 2004, pp.275-279 for a discussion on the debates between Laclau and Žižek.

establish our beliefs and ultimately shape our behaviour (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p.35; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.112; Mishak & Grant, 2008, p.35).¹²⁵

This is by no means meant to suggest that there is no physical reality:

[T]he fact that every object is constituted as an object of discourse has *nothing to do* with whether there is a world external to thought, or with that realism/idealism opposition. An earthquake or the falling of a brick is an event that certainly exists in the sense that it occurs here and now, independently of my will. But whether their specificity as objects is constructed in terms of ‘natural phenomena’ or ‘expressions of the wrath of God’, depends upon the structuring of a discursive field. What is denied is not that such objects exist externally to thought, but the rather different assertion that they could constitute themselves as objects outside any discursive conditions of emergence (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.108).

Within the context of CDT, *articulation* is “any practice establishing a relation among elements such that their identity is modified as a result of articulatory practice”, and discourse is “[t]he structured totality resulting from . . . articulatory practice” (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.105). Thus, CDT is concerned with much more than texts (written and spoken). It is concerned with the whole process of making meaning, where all social phenomena are seen as acquiring meanings through their differences, meanings being constantly rearticulated through social practice (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, pp.111-113). Articulation involves every dimension of social practice, including, for example, unconscious practices, rituals, and customs, that form and position identities (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, pp.12-13), that link signs in the search for coherence (pp.7-8), the overall goal being to arrest the flow of differences and achieve hegemony (pp.14-15).

All of this relates in a fundamental way to the notion of *deconstruction*, a philosophical theory initially propounded by Heidegger (1927) and applied by

¹²⁵ Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p.112) repeat Derrida’s (1967, p.280) statement that, “this was the moment when language invaded the universal problematic, the moment when, in the absence of a center or origin, everything became discourse”.

Derrida (1967) to critical analysis. Deconstruction, which can be seen as representing a perpetual challenge to hegemony, aims, through re-examination and reinterpretation, to reveal the undecidability of hegemonic interpretations by interrogating dominant meanings in ways that identify excluded or repressed elements (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p.13; Torfing, 1999, pp.65-67). Andersen (2003, pp.57-58) states that “deconstruction is about showing how differences are contingent . . . by showing that they are not differences at all.” In this way, the [hierarchical] relationship is usually reversed and what presents initially as a norm is recognised as “a game of dominance” (Andersen, 2003, p.58). With reference to this process, Laclau and Mouffe (1985, pp.167 & 192-193) observe that the absorption of different perspectives is fundamental to radical democracy.¹²⁶

The *radical contingency* of everything social, the irreducible gap between signified and signifier, is both the philosophical starting point and the analytical motor of CDT (Bridgman, 2007, p.481; Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, pp.5-7; Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p.38; Purcell, 2009, p.150; Torfing, 1999, p.50).¹²⁷ Identity and meaning are seen as being wholly dependent on relationships which are constantly in the process of reconfiguration and, therefore, “always temporary and partial fixations . . . in a fundamentally undecidable terrain” (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p.39). This ‘undecidability’ is such that signs are ‘overdetermined’, being subject to an infinite range of alternative possibilities in each semantic area or ‘field of discursivity’ (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.111).¹²⁸ Through these excluded possibilities not only can the social consequences of particular discursive constructions be pinpointed, but they also create the possibility for the articulation of alternative discourses (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p.9).

Thus, in the words of Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p.177):

¹²⁶ In fact, Howarth (2000, p.271) claims that without these type of “democratic practices being built into the [radical democratic] project itself; . . . the project runs the risk of internal incoherence.”

¹²⁷ Radical contingency is based on the understanding that there is “no final, absolute ground, foundation or essence to identity, *except* for contingency itself” (Dahlberg and Phelan, 2011, p.16). The implication in terms of democratic revolution is that *everything* is able to be contested.

¹²⁸ Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, pp.55-57) state that it is unclear whether the ‘field of discursivity’ refers to any meaning whatsoever outside the specific discourses, or if it could be narrowed to any related, that is, *potentially competing* discourses in the same sphere. They propose therefore, the addition of an ‘order of discourse’ concept defined as “a social space in which different discourses *partly cover* the same terrain which they compete to fill with meaning, each in their own particular way”.

[The] fundamental obstacle to founding a political practice fully located in the practice of democratic revolution is essentialist apriorism, that is, the fixation of meaning of any event independent of any articulatory practice.

The paradox inherent in contingency is that it is the condition of both the possibility and the impossibility of any identity, that is, it creates the compelling necessity of attempting to re-structure dislocated elements towards a complete identity (hegemony) whilst also creating the impossibility of ever achieving this completely (Laclau, 2005b, p.70; Torfing, 1999, p.51).

Nevertheless, although absolute fixity is impossible, so also is “absolute non-fixity”, a situation which Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p.112) believe “implies there have to be partial fixations”. In this regard, notwithstanding their radical contingency, most social practices seem so natural, so uncontested and so firmly established that there *appears* to be no alternative. Sedimented discourses, discourses that have been validated so often that their politically constructed origins have been forgotten or repressed (Torfing, 1999, p.305), are often referred to as ‘objective discourses’. They reflect (a) the human preference for continuity and structure, a preference which limits the possibilities of change and ties potential re-articulations to existing discourse, and (b) the fact that social fields, while being radically contingent *in principle*, are relatively inflexible in specific situations, being subject to localised rules and expectations of any social field (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p.38). Not all possibilities are equally likely. Some meanings are more probable than others and the ability of any one group to successfully re-articulate the political is limited (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp.6 & 56).¹²⁹ Accordingly, while it needs to be acknowledged that there is an ever-present possibility of sedimented entities being problematised, contested and transformed, it also needs to be acknowledged that continuity creates the inverse possibility of political discourses becoming naturalised (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp.36-37).

130

¹²⁹ For example, social relationships where the power relations are rigid such as patient-doctor, expert-non-expert, powerful-dominated.

¹³⁰ It is extremely difficult to always question everything and generally therefore it is usual for large parts of social practice to be taken for granted.

Within the context of CDT, *the political* refers to the primary terrain in which hegemonic discourses are contested (Torfing, 1999, p.304). For Gramsci (1971), *hegemony* involves a process in which the values, interests and assumptions of one class (the proletariat) are, through consent or coercion, conceptualised as being equivalent to the values, interests and assumptions of society generally.¹³¹ Within the context of CDT, however, the concept of hegemony is not linked to a class-based analysis. Instead, it is conceived of as the expression of a collective will and/or national and popular character that transcends particular identities or interests. Just as the creation of a single discourse involves the articulatory fixation of as many floating elements as possible to a nodal point, thus creating a ‘chain of signification’, hegemonic inventions achieve a similar fixation across discourses or identities within society, the equivalential chain being a response to a discursively constructed enemy (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp.44-45 & 48; Laclau, 2005a, p.39; Torfing, 2005a, p.10). In this process, the nodal point or master signifier of each discourse or identity, in order to be linked with a wider range of elements than was previously possible, becomes more and more detached from its original meaning and is, therefore, emptied of significance, becoming a signifier of the absent content (Laclau, 1996, p.44; 2005a, p.42; 2005b, p.71; Townshend, 2004, p.271).¹³² Thus, Torfing (1999, p.101) defines hegemony within the context of CDT as follows:

[Hegemony involves] the expansion of a discourse, or set of discourses, into a dominant horizon of social orientation and action by means of articulating unfixed elements into partially fixed moments in a context criss-crossed by antagonistic forces.

¹³¹ Hegemony is best described as the organisation of consent (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p.32). However, Barrett (1994, p.239) suggests that Gramsci’s emphasis on consent is partly due to the difficulties of getting coercion related arguments through the prison censor.

¹³² Torfing (1999, pp.111-112) differentiates between transformism and expansive hegemony. The former is a passive, defensive absorption and co-optation of the active elements of both allies and antagonistic groups into the hegemonic force. Clinton’s centre-drifting administration is an example here. The latter, expansive hegemonies (such as for example Thatcherism’s dismantling of the Welfare state by mobilising a whole series of resistances against the bureaucratic nature of the state) involve metonymical sliding that displaced existing or traditional meanings, functions and identities and taking on expanded ones.

Successful articulation, according to Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p.189), involves establishing a set of viable, yet different, nodal points by which society can be reconstructed. In this regard, they assert that hegemonic projects must consist of “a set of proposals for the *positive organisation of the social*” (emphasis mine) and not just negative or subversive demands.

The fundamental contingency of the social field, that is, “the vast area of floating elements and the possibility of their articulation to opposite camps”, ensures that hegemonic articulations are impermanent and unstable and therefore creates the possibility for both *hegemonic* and *counter-hegemonic* articulations (Carpentier & Spinoy, 2008, p.9; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.136).¹³³ Thus, Purcell (2009, pp.143-144) observes:

[Neoliberalism] is one in a long line of hegemonies that successfully (but temporarily) establish a particular interest as a universal one [I]t is hegemonic, but it is not invincible. It is merely hegemonic now. Counter-projects are possible; indeed they are inevitable.

Hegemonic articulations receive different degrees of social consent. Torfing (1999, pp.114-115) notes that they may have the status of *myths* or, where they become dominant, as in the case of the European Enlightenment, they may transcend that status, becoming *social imaginaries*. A social imaginary is “a horizon in the sense that it is not one object among other objects, but rather the condition of possibility for the emergence of any object” (Torfing, 1999, p.115). It thus dominates the empirical events it inscribes and appears to be natural, routine, ordained, fully-fixed and absolute (Mumby & Clair, 1997, p.184; Torfing, 2005a, p.8), with the closed identity of utopian ideals making it less readily susceptible to exposure and contestation (Jeffares, 2007, p.48).¹³⁴

¹³³ In *Emancipation* (1996), Laclau inverted the *universal* from its status as the ultimate ground of the social, and emptied it of any concrete content. Critchley and Marchant (2004, p.7) state that the universal was, thus, reformulated as “the empty horizon of the social . . . which can never be filled up by a given *particularism* even though *particular* forces and actors will strive to incarnate it.” As a result *hegemony* was reformulated as the relation between the particular and the universal.

¹³⁴ Collective social imaginaries, such as the “Enlightenment” or “Positivism’s perception of progress” are defined as an unlimited horizon or absolute limit that structures the field of intelligibility and therefore can incorporate any number of social demands (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, pp.15-16).

Fundamental to the formation of hegemonies and counter-hegemonies are *social antagonisms* and *dislocations*. No discourse can ever be fully fixed but is always in conflict with other discourses that define reality differently (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p.47). Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000, p.9) state that, “social antagonisms introduce an irreconcilable negativity into social relations . . . because they reveal the limit points in society in which social meaning is contested and cannot be stabilised.” In *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, Laclau and Mouffe (1985, pp.124-125) represented antagonism as being dislocation *per se* (responsible for the impossibility of full constitution of identities); later, they represented it as being a *discursive response* to dislocation. With reference to this, Laclau (in an interview with Worsham & Olsen 1999, p.137) makes the following observation:

When Chantal Mouffe and I wrote *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, we were still arguing that the moment of the dislocation of the social relations, the moment which constitutes the limit of the objectivity of social relations, is given by antagonism. Later on I came to think that this was not enough because constructing a social dislocation – an antagonism – is already a discursive response. You contrast the Other who dislocates your identity as an enemy, but there are other alternative forms. For instance, people can say this is the expression of the wrath of God, that this is an expression of our sins and that we have to prepare for the day of atonement. So, there is already a discursive organisation in constructing somebody as an enemy which involves a whole technology of power in the mobilisation of the oppressed. That is why in *New Reflections* I have insisted on the primary character of dislocation rather than antagonism.¹³⁵

Social antagonisms are the result of the innate contestability of the social and are situated at the contested points where discourses collide. They involve those who are excluded from hegemonic discourses and therefore pose a threat to them (Böhm,

¹³⁵ Thus, in Lacanian terms, antagonisms are already discursive articulations and therefore fall on the symbolic/imaginary order of reality. Dislocations, however, in that they show the impossibility of the symbolic representing the real, fall on the side of the real order (Glynos & Stavrakakis (2004, p.206). Glynos and Stavrakakis (2004, p.206) go on to state that dislocation [is] . . . the index of the negative dimension of the real as limit of discourse.”

Dellagnelo & Mendonça, 2010, p.4; Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp.47 & 56; Torfing, 2005a, p.8). Likewise, a hegemonic antagonism provides the constitutive “outside” that stabilises the counter-hegemonic identity, and creating a chain of equivalence among different elements, which can, temporarily at least, transform into a single entity in light of their common opposition to the hegemonic force (Carpentier & Spinoy, 2008, p.10). For Laclau and Mouffe (1985, p.154) categories such as ‘serf’, ‘slave’ and so on “do not designate in themselves antagonistic positions”. They are designated in this way only by virtue of “a different discursive formation, such as ‘the rights inherent in every human being’”, in relation to which “the differential positivity of the categories can be subverted and the subordination constructed as oppression”. Thus, one of the aims of CDT is to make the antagonistic frontiers visible, thus facilitating discursive challenge, re-negotiation and subversion.

Symbolic orders are normally able to cover or suture a wide range of rifts in society. They are, however, disrupted when crises arise which cannot be domesticated, integrated, or explained by the existing system (Torfing 2005a, p.8). Such crises are represented as *dislocations*, that is, destabilising events that uncover the undecidable nature of hegemonic social orders. Dislocations result in a proliferation of floating signifiers, that is, terms which assume different meanings depending on whether they are ‘articulated’ in, for example, liberal or socialist discourse (Torfing 2005a, p.8). They open up a terrain for new hegemonic articulations to heal the structural rift that is left (Dahlberg & Phelan, 2011, pp.25-26). Thus, for example, the joint occurrence of rising unemployment and rising inflation in the stagflation crisis of the 1970s contributed to the end of Keynesianism as the dominant economic paradigm and the subsequent rise of neo-liberalism.

Politics, constructed in and through hegemonic struggles, is the discourses, institutions and decision-making practices that seek to *constitute* (and *subvert*) society and is therefore conceived of as necessarily having primacy over the social sphere (Carpentier & Spinoy, 2008, p.15; Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p.36; Torfing, 1999, pp.69-70).¹³⁶ Since politics involves contestation among hegemonic

¹³⁶ *Politics* in CDT is more than ‘party politics’. It is the manner in which we constantly organise and constitute the social in ways that exclude other possible ways (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p.36).

discourses, *power*, conceived of in line with Foucault's (1977) conceptualisation as being both productive and constraining, is fundamental to politics.¹³⁷

Also fundamental to politics is *representation*, that is, the presentation, within a context where they are not already present, of the interests, wants or opinions of a group. Such presentation, involving "the process through which the unachieved particular identities are inscribed within a universal context" (Torfing, 1999, p.183), is necessarily representational given the practical impossibility of every person in a group presenting in universalising platforms, such as media or in parliament. Representation cannot be transparent. It is necessarily hybrid in that it involves the reconstruction and re-articulation of interests. It is also subject to the type of distortion associated with sell out or betrayal. All of this is of major significance in post-modern democracies where people identify themselves as having the legitimate authority to represent the interests of others by virtue of signifiers (e.g. 'democratic' or 'constitutional') that are empty of content. The only possible response, according to Laclau (1993, p.289), is to attempt to ensure that participation in representation is as high as possible.

The notion of *social antagonism* is central to political pluralism, which Torfing (1999, p.254) defines as conflict "between different hegemonic forces that are fighting over the 'correct' interpretation of the empty signifiers of freedom and equality". Thus, Mouffe (1996, p.8) observes that *plural democracy*¹³⁸ is intrinsically divisive, as indicated in the significant social antagonisms that have characterised the 21st century. It follows, therefore, that two extremes must be avoided – (a) the Utopian ideal of perfect unity without conflict (Carpentier & Spinoy, 2008, p.11; Mouffe, 2000, p.121), and (b) antagonism, which involves the absence of any symbolic common ground, and which characterises actors, such as terrorists or fundamentalists, who recognise neither the legitimacy nor the principles of pluralist democracy, as enemies rather than adversaries (Álvarez, 2010,

¹³⁷ Politics and power are two sides of the same coin, where power refers to the production of objects such as 'society' and 'identity', politics refers to the always present contingency of these objects (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p.38)

¹³⁸ Torfing (1999, p.303) defines plural democracy as "a democratic sentiment that carries a profound respect for plurality and difference. It is the situation where individuals are able to organise their lives as they wish, a situation which inevitably leads to conflict and antagonisms (Torfing, 1999, p.252).

para. 29). Mouffe argues, however, that a deliberative framework (*deliberative democracy*), involving rational argument aimed at mutual understanding, is not only inadequate but can be dangerous in that the elimination or relegation of dissenting passions may involve the loss of opportunity to give them a democratic outlet and, thus, mobilise them to dislocate society (Álvarez, 2010, para.6-7). What is needed, according to Mouffe (2000, p.126), is the domestication of *antagonistic* disputes between enemies (that we aim to destroy) into *agonistic* ones between adversaries (that we disagree with). This requires that opponents recognise the contingency of their own beliefs and acknowledge the legitimacy and rights of the 'Other' (Álvarez, 2010, para.16-18) while, at the same time, being willing to engage in agonistic articulatory practice with the firm intention of transforming power relations and creating hegemony (Alvarez, 2010, para. 16-18 & 25). It is important to note here that although supporters of deliberative democracy argue that Mouffe's conception of agonism is no different from deliberative democracy in that argument requires a consensus at a basic level (Erman, 2009; Knops, 2007), a thesis with which Mouffe (2000, p.126) agrees, the consensus is still bound to be a "conflictual consensus."

Within CDT, *elements* are signs whose differences are not yet discursively articulated, leaving them with multiple, potential meanings in periods of social crisis. These elements are referred to as *floating or empty signifiers* where they are particularly open to different ascriptions of meaning (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp.28-29; Laclau, 2005b, pp.69-71; Worsham & Olson, 1999, pp.129-130). A discourse attempts to turn elements into *moments* by temporarily stopping the fluctuations of meaning, thus presenting the illusion of a unified and meaningful system aligned to a *nodal point* (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp.26-29; Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.105), that is, to a privileged sign or reference point around which other elements are ordered. Thus:

The practice of articulation . . . consists in the construction of nodal points which partially fix meaning; and the partial character of the fixation proceeds from the openness of the social, a result, in its turn, of the constant overflowing of every discourse to the infinitude of the field of discursivity (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.113).

Nodal points are empty and/or floating signifiers representing universally accepted ideals such as ‘freedom’ or ‘democracy’ which redefine the differential identity of terms within that discourse (Torfing, 2005a, p.7; Žižek, 1999, pp.19-20). Articulation reflects the distinctive interests of social agents and always involves a battle to gain hegemony over the definition of nodal points (Böhm, Dellagnelo & Mendonça, 2010, p.4), with hegemonic success occurring when discourses are able to crystallise as many floating signifiers as possible into a *chain of equivalence* around a nodal point which stops their sliding and fixes their meaning (Torfing, 1999, p.303; Žižek, 1989, p.87).¹³⁹ A *chain of equivalence* or *chain of signification* is thus made up of a cluster of moments (with the exclusion of all other elements) which are linked to a nodal point:

The articulation of a political discourse can only take place around an empty signifier that functions as a nodal point. In other words, emptiness is now revealed as an essential quality of the nodal point, as an important condition of possibility for its hegemonic success (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p.9).

The processes involved in building chains of equivalences are fundamental to CDT since *group formation*, the establishment of common identities, involves the establishment of chains of equivalences. Group formation involves “splitting a system of differences and instituting a political frontier between two opposed camps”, thus creating a sharp antagonistic frontier in society (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, p.11). In the context of a common antagonistic force, a common identity is articulated and internal differences weakened until the only thing the constituent parts have in common is the common enemy (Torfing, 2005a, p.8). Thus:

Despite the different content of the particular demands, they will all be united in their opposition to the system What unites the particular groups is the construction of a chain of equivalence that emphasizes a universalizing sameness of the negated demands (Torfing, 2005a, p.10).

¹³⁹ Žižek (1989, p.87) states that the nodal point ‘quilts’ the floating signifiers into a pattern of meaning.

A master signifier, such as 'feminist', may be constituted as a group through shared opposition to 'unequal gender relations', 'patriarchy' or 'male oppression', the threat providing a broadly accepted negative focal point from which a common project stabilises its identity. Thus, by positing a common enemy, feminism obscures internal differences (e.g. coloured versus white feminists) which threaten to weaken 'feminist' mobilisation.

The *logic of difference* is opposite to the logic of equivalence. If oppression decreases, the equivalential relations dissolve back into an array of differences (Critchley & Marchart, 2004, p.4). This expands the differential space so that the former antagonistic division is relegated the margins of society. In post-World War II Britain, for example, the defeat of the 'Nazis' gave rise to a proliferation of different political interests (Torfing, 1999, p.126).

The importance of groups forming alliances of popular resistance to a common opposition is highlighted in CDT.¹⁴⁰ Such alliances do not simply advance related *demands* in a particular field; they hegemonise these demands. Torfing (2005a, p.10) therefore asserts that "we should not deny the particularity of political identities, but insist on the possibility of articulating broad popular frontiers based on a hegemonic universality." For Laclau (2005a, p.35), *demands*, the manifestation of a grievance resulting from an unfulfilled request, are the basic unit of analysis:

If, for instance, the group of people in that area who have been frustrated in their request for better transportation find that their neighbours are equally unsatisfied in their claims at the levels of security, water supply, housing, schooling, and so on, some kind of solidarity will arise between them all: all will share the fact that their demands remain unsatisfied. That is, the demands share a negative dimension beyond their positive differential nature (Laclau 2005a, p.37).

¹⁴⁰ Barrett (1994, pp.254-255) observes that "we have moved from a social order in which subjects are differentially, but fatefully, positioned, to a social order in which the democratic project can articulate itself in a political discourse which takes those differential positionings as an object of struggle".

When a series of demands from different discursive origins is articulated as equivalent, new discourses (or chains of equivalence) come about. Thus, “[w]hat unites the particular groups is the construction of a chain of equivalence that emphasizes a universalizing sameness of the negated demands” (Torfing, 2005a, p.10).

2.3.4 Challenges to critical discourse theory

An exhaustive discussion of the challenges to CDT is outside the scope of this thesis. Nevertheless, it is important to address the main arguments.

2.3.4.1 Idealism

It has been claimed that CDT is idealist, that is, that it denies the independent existence of material. Geras’ (1987, p.65) accusation of ‘shamefaced idealism’ is not, however, sustainable. The social constructivist claim that matter can be known only as a discursive construct (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, p.108) is by no means the same as a claim that there is no such thing as matter outside of discourse (see quotation on *Pages 65-66*). Nevertheless, Eagleton (2007, p.219) argues that Laclau and Mouffe’s materialist position goes too far in eliding the distinction between the non-discursive and the discursive. In particular, he argues that in claiming not simply that politico-ideological interests are not always tied to class situations but that there is “no logical connection whatsoever” between politico-ideological interests and class situations (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985, pp.84-85), they go too far. He insists (Eagleton, 2007, p.220), for example, that post-Marxist theory itself, being historically grounded in a particular phase of capitalism, is “living testimony in its very existence to that ‘necessary’ relation between forms of consciousness and social reality which it so vehemently denies”. This results, he argues, in the opening up of a space of resistance that is so broadly-based as to become irrelevant, impotent, and directionless in relation to the current historical context in which, he believes, class struggle is (as he also claims it was in the past) the fundamental social antagonism (Eagleton, 1981 p.485). In his view, deconstructionism is “simply too weak and theoreticist a basis on which to mobilize one’s political forces” (Eagleton, 2007, p.xix). Although arguments such as this may be seen as going some way towards undermining what Townshend (2004, p.283) refers to as ‘thick’ versions of CDT, that is, versions that deny the importance of external socio-

economic factors in shaping the discursive field, they have limited impact in terms of what he refers to as ‘thin’ versions (pp.283-284), that is, versions that accommodate socio-economic factors and interests and that, therefore, while asserting the primacy of the political over the social, nevertheless allow for a level of influence in the opposite direction.

2.3.4.2 Ant(agonistic) and deliberative democracy

Antagonism plays a central role in CDT as articulated in *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* (Laclau & Mouffe, 1985) where it is seen as being fundamental to the construction of those alliances upon which resistance depends. Therefore, dislocation and antagonism are treated as two sides of the same coin, antagonism being a characteristic of dislocation. Later, however, Laclau (2004, p.319) argues that dislocation need not necessarily involve antagonism.

As stated earlier, Mouffe observes (Álvarez, 2010, para.7) that *deliberative democracy* can be dangerous in that reliance on achieving mutual understanding may involve the loss of opportunity to give dissenting passions a democratic outlet and, thus, to be mobilised in a way that dislocates society. The solution, *agonistic democracy* (or *plural democracy/ radical democracy*) is fundamentally different from deliberative democracy in that it is *not* based on the belief that the inequalities inherent in discourse can be overcome. Rather, it is based on the belief that it is possible to build democracy around difference and dissent rather than consensus. This presupposes that it is possible “to turn ‘enemies’ into ‘adversaries’ who agree on the basic rules of plural democracy, while disagreeing on their interpretation and their implications for how to organize society” (Torfing, 2005a, p.6). Thus, Mouffe (Álvarez, 2010, para. 14–18) asserts that agonism begins, first, by recognising that “there are conflicting points of view”, and second, by acknowledging “your opponent’s legitimacy.”

Although Knops (2007, p.118) believes that rational consensus is not ‘conceptually impossible’ but rather a ‘very difficult’ but useful goal to aim at, Purcell (2009, pp.150-153) argues that viewing politics as a search for inter-subjective understanding and agreement instead of a hegemonic struggle will inevitably be unsuccessful. Furthermore, it could be argued that because “dominant classes, genders, races, and sexualities begin with greater epistemological authority before

they even open their mouth” (Purcell, 2009, p.155), deliberative processes may actually reinforce and legitimise existing power relations, preventing disempowered groups from using their most promising political tool - conflict - to achieve political momentum and mobilise a social movement (Purcell, 2009, pp.153 & 155).¹⁴¹

In this context, it is important to note that the aim of agonistic democracy is very different from that of deliberative democracy. As Erman (2009, p.1047) observes, Laclau and Mouffe’s concept of agonistic democracy is based not on the Habermasian ¹⁴² ideal of rational consensus through mutual understanding but rather on *shared understandings of what is at stake*. CDT recognises that conflict and the human will to power are always present in the political. Therefore, rather than attempting to achieve the impossible - a benevolent power-neutral decision-making environment – it instead challenges existing hegemonies, articulating a credible alternative. It is only in this context that the concept of *agonism* can be fully understood.

2.3.4.3 Relativism and the role of the analyst

For critical discourse theorists, there is no extra-discursive truth, morality or ethics. It is, therefore, not surprising to find that they have been accused of *relativism*, that is, of presenting all perspectives as being equally valid. The only possible response to this criticism is to stress the importance of the interaction between decision-making and cultural and historical positioning. Political decisions are taken within the sedimented practices that constitute the normative framework of a certain society (Butler, Laclau, & Žižek, 2000, p.82). Thus, we always find ourselves placed within a particular discourse that provides us with a set of historically contingent criteria for determining what is true, right and good (Torfing, 2005a, p.9).¹⁴³ This has particular implications for the role of discourse theorists who can

¹⁴¹ Thus, while dominant groups may incorporate the concerns of weaker groups into their plans, they are unlikely to compromise anything essential to their own welfare (Purcell, 2009, p.157).

¹⁴² Jürgen Habermas is a world renowned German sociologist and philosopher perhaps best known for his theories on communicative rationality and the structural transformation of the public sphere. His communication framework rests on the assumption that mutual understanding is the goal of all speech acts, and that human beings possess the communicative competence to bring about such understanding.

¹⁴³ As Torfing (2005a, p.9) states “only God is capable of transcending all discursivity; we mortals are stuck within particular discursive frameworks that define our criteria for judging something to be true, right, or good.”

never be neutral spectators who interpret and evaluate society (Howarth & Stavrakakis, 2000, pp.6-7); they must necessarily bring their own discursivity into play, implicating themselves in power struggles and therefore not only affecting the results but also the discourses that are being researched (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p.22).

Although Fairclough (1992, p.91) insists on the possibility of producing texts that are less invested with ideology than others, Teun van Dijk (2008, p.6) urges critical discourse analysts to “commit themselves to an engagement in favour of dominated groups in society”. Anderson (2003, p.xvii) observes that, according to CDT, ‘emancipator’ must be rejected as a neutral domicile of the critic since “there is no freedom without power”, and Jørgensen & Phillips (2002, p.22) note that nobody is “sufficiently liberated from the discursive construction of the world” to make a distinction between ideological and non-ideological texts. As Eagleton (2007, p.205) notes:

[T]he thesis that objects are constructed entirely internal to the discourses which constitute them raises the thorny question of how we could ever judge that a discourse had constructed its object validly. How can anyone, on this theory, ever be wrong?

In response to these issues, Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, p.203) conceptualise constructivist critique as “a positioned opening for discussion”. Thus:

[C]ritical research should explicitly position itself and distance itself from alternative representation of reality on the grounds that it strives to do something specific for specific reasons...[it] should make it clear that [it] is just one among other possible representations, thus inviting further discussion (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, p.205).

Since “truth is always local and mobile” (Torring, 2005a, p.2), there is *in principle* no objective meta-language, methodology or privileged criteria that can verify the truth of propositional statements. It follows, therefore, that critical analysts must rely on intellectual honesty, theoretical consistency, transparency of the research

steps, replicability, historical consistency of argumentation, the systematic adherence to a set of explicit rules, and the offering of empirical support (Jørgensen & Phillips, 2002, pp.206-208). However, such criteria are subject to “constant renegotiation as there is no way of protecting them from the politico-discursive interventions of competing truth regimes” (Torfing, 2005a, p.2).

2.3.4.4 Critical discourse theory, critical discourse analysis and analytical methodology

It was noted in the previous section that critical discourse analysts should adhere systematically to a set of explicit guidelines. This implies an overall methodology. How, then, should such a methodology be established? Laclau and Mouffe’s focus is theoretical rather than methodological. In an early work Laclau (1979, pp.60-61) asserts that the only way forward from a genuine theoretical problem is to supersede the existing theoretical system with a new one. The reason is that if an empirical resolution can be achieved within the framework of the existing theory, the problem is not, in fact, a theoretical one. Rather, the difficulties encountered relate to application of the theory. At first sight, it would appear that any problems associated with the application of CDT, that is, with the development of appropriate methodologies, has already been solved. After all, what is often referred to as ‘critical discourse analysis’ is a field that is well established. On closer examination, however, critical discourse analysis is generally not directly related to critical discourse theory as outlined here although it does share many of its tenets.

Critical discourse analysis, which, according to Flowerdew (2008, p.195), grew out of the critical linguistics of Fowler, Hodge, Kress, and Trew (1979), focuses on the complex inter-relationships between language use and society (Blommaert & Bulcaen, 2000, p.454; Wodak & Meyer, 2009, p.27). It has a strong orientation towards the analysis of texts in context. It is often primarily associated with the writings of Fairclough (1989; 1992; 1995), Wodak (1995; 2001), and van Dijk (1997, 2008).¹⁴⁴ It is multi-disciplinary in nature, drawing upon theories, approaches, methodologies and strategies associated with a range of academic disciplines. Its adherents refer to the social theorizing of many of those whose

¹⁴⁴ Other approaches are outlined by Blommaert and Bulcaen (2000, pp.451-452), Kendall (2007, May, p.4), Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, p.92) and Wodak and Meyer (2009, pp.11-27).

influence is evident in the formulation of CDT as articulated by Laclau and Mouffe (including Foucault, Bourdieu, Habermas, Gramsci and Giddens) and also, sometimes, to the critical discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe itself. However, it also refers to and makes use of theories, approaches, methodologies and strategies associated with other areas of intellectual activity.

At the very heart of critical discourse analysis is the view that discourse and the social world are mutually constitutive, that discourse shapes and constructs ideas, social identities and relations rather than simply reflecting them (Jørgensen, & Phillips, 2002, pp.5, 9, 62 & 67). Critical discourse analysts attempt to make transparent the ways in which discourses may embody and reinforce the misuse of power and the reinforcement of discrimination and social inequality (Wodak & Meyer, 2009, pp.3 & 10-12). They may also engage in emancipatory resistance, attempting to contribute to radical social change by turning discourse back on those in power (Flowerdew, 2008).

There are many different approaches to critical discourse analysis. Among those whose approaches are particularly influential are Fairclough (who focuses on dialectal relations), Van Dijk (whose work is socio-cognitive in orientation) and Wodak (whose focus is discourse-historical).

Fairclough (1992) proposes a three-dimensional model which is based on the principle that texts can never be understood in isolation from webs of other texts and the social context. It therefore combines analysis of texts (e.g. how linguistic features such as metaphors construct meaning and identities) with analysis of discursive practices (e.g. the rules and processes of discourse production) and of the wider social context that impinges upon the text (Fairclough, 1992, pp.71-73).

Van Dijk (2008, p.213) focuses on the interaction between society, cognition and discourse on the basis that, “[m]anipulation is always between social actors, is always exercised through discourse, and always centers on the mind”. For him, a primary aim of critical discourse analysis is to deconstruct the two overarching goals of mental manipulation, that is (a) the ‘mental models’ of specific social structures or events, and (b) the social representations of groups of people

(pp.viii,16, 63 & 66). While he believes that both influence attitudes, ideologies and social practices, he considers the latter to be particularly important in view of the fact that acceptance of the social representations of dominant groups can eventually serve as a permanent basis for inequality (pp.222 – 226 & 230).

Ruth Wodak (2001), adopting a discourse-historical approach, attempts to understand the multifaceted social phenomena under investigation through triangulating data and integrating various perspectives. This triangulatory approach involves four levels of context: (a) the immediate text (coherence/cohesion); (b) interdiscursive and intertextual relationships among related current or historical utterances, texts, genres, and discourses; (c) the extralinguistic sociological variables and institutional frames of a specific ‘context of situation’ (for example, a party election leaflet), and finally (d) the broader sociopolitical and historical contexts within which the discursive practices are embedded. In collaboration with Reisigl (Reisigl & Wodak, 2009, pp.93-94), she elaborates five discursive strategies:

- *Nomination* (how the persons, objects, phenomena/events, processes and actions are named and referred to linguistically);
- *Predication* (what characteristics, qualities and features are attributed to social actors, objects, phenomena/events and processes);
- *Argumentation* (what arguments and justifications are used in the discourse);
- *Perspectivisation/framing* (from what perspective nominations, attributions and arguments are expressed);
- *Intensification/mitigation* (whether the utterances are articulated overtly and whether they are intensified or mitigate).

The focus of different critical discourse analysts and different schools of critical discourse analysis varies, as does their approach to the analysis of texts in context. It is, therefore, not possible to relate critical discourse analysis *in any direct way* to the critical discourse theory of Laclau and Mouffe. Consequently, neither is it possible, where the aim is to put CDT into practice, to select any one of the analytical approaches adopted by critical discourse analysts. However, as Jørgensen

and Phillips (2002, pp.8, 49 & 63) observe, there are no specific methodological guidelines and illustrative examples of analysis associated directly with CDT as articulated by Laclau and Mouffe. Howarth and Stavrakakis (2000, p.5) claim that this is due, in part, to (a) a post-positivist disdain for the need for ‘empirical’ facts in the analysis of theoretical statements, and (b) the rigid application of pre-existing theory, which tends to preclude innovation and to pre-determine the outcomes. However, as Torfing (1999, p.292) observes, the critical issue here is the fact that although CDT is not content to remain merely theoretical, its analysts avoid developing any “all purpose technique” or “totalising master methodology,” preferring instead methodological *bricolage*, whereby the methods used are determined in relation to the particular concrete setting. Thus, it has been argued that CDT can be viewed as an open and flexible toolbox that can be applied to a variety of research areas and theories, including materialist and qualitative forms of analysis (Carpentier & Spinoy, 2008, p.21; Howarth and Stavrakakis, 2000, p.5; Townshend, 2004, p.286). Even so, Jørgensen and Phillips (2002, pp.154-155) insist that successful combination requires an explicit and careful integration of these research frameworks.

2.3.5 Deriving effectiveness criteria from critical discourse theory

I have argued that the achievement of hegemony, something that is central to CDT, is also central to the successful negotiation of language policy and language planning and that, therefore, language policy and planning as a discipline needs to be firmly located within the context of CDT. One of the advantages of doing so is that it provides us with the possibility of developing criteria based on CDT (referred to here as ‘effectiveness criteria’) that will assist those involved in language policy and planning to make decisions about the content and organisation of discourse that have the express purpose of improving LPP efforts to address language revitalisation.

Based on the review of literature on CDT here, I have developed a range of effectiveness criteria that are intended to be useful in determining the extent to which texts that come within the general domain of LPP are likely to be effective in developing hegemony and, therefore, in achieving the policy and planning goals

of their authors. These effectiveness criteria are outlined below under five main headings:

Representation of an ‘in-group’

1. Is the construction/ representation of any ‘in-group’ identity consistent with the overall purpose of the text within its discourse context?
2. Is the representation of any ‘in-group’ likely to be perceived as sufficiently inclusive and genuinely representative by the target membership of that group and to resonate positively with them?

Representation of an ‘other’ identity

3. Is the construction/ representation of any ‘other’ identity group consistent with the overall purpose of the text within its discourse context?
4. Is the representation of any ‘other’ identity group likely to be perceived as inaccurate, disrespectful or offensive by the target membership of that group?

Group formation and fragmentation: The logics of equivalence and difference

5. Does the text identify a common adversary in such a way as to increase the potential for the extension of an existing coalition of support for its aims?
6. Does the text provide evidence of an existing coalition of support for its aims?
7. Does the text employ strategies whose aim is to avoid the creation of an opposition coalition?
8. Does the text move beyond personal interests, weakening differences by articulating a broad inclusive agenda which has the potential to create a coalition of different interests?

Engagement with hegemonic interests / key decision makers¹⁴⁵

9. Are hegemonic interests / key decision makers positioned in a way that is likely to gain their approval and is there evidence of agonistic engagement with them?

¹⁴⁵ In the local context of the texts discussed in *Chapters 3, 4 and 5*, hegemonic interests have been interpreted as key decision makers.

10. Are the arguments provided likely to convince hegemonic interests / key decision makers?

Dislocation and deconstruction

11. Does the text contest the nodal points of the status quo hegemony and expose and undermine its aims (underlying objects of desire and promised fantasies), drawing attention to significant dislocating events and exposing/revealing the inherent contingency of its positioning, its rhetorical manipulations, the negative implications of its articulations as implemented policy, the inconsistency of its rhetoric over time and/or the discrepancies between its promises and achievements?

12. Are the key signifiers redefined (through chains of signification) in a way that is counter to the purposes of adversaries and likely to resonate positively with the primary target audience and the wider readership?

These criteria are applied to the analysis of a number of texts that relate directly to indigenous language revitalisation in Australia (*Chapter 3*) and New Zealand (*Chapters 4 & 5*), the findings of the analyses being discussed in relation to the ways in which each of these texts was received.

Chapter 3

A criterion-referenced analysis of *Our Land Our Languages*

3.1 Introduction

In this chapter, *Our Land Our Languages*, a report written by the Australian House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Affairs (HRSCATSI), is analysed in terms of the criteria outlined in *Chapter 2* (3.3).¹⁴⁶ The analysis is preceded by some relevant background to the report (3.2) and followed by a discussion of responses to it (3.4) and some concluding remarks (3.5).

An electronic copy of this report is available from the Parliament of Australia: www.aph.gov.au/Parliamentary_Business/Committees/House_of_Representatives_Committees?url=atsia/languages2/report.htm

3.2 Background to the report

Indigenous Australian languages are among the most endangered in the world. Of the 250 distinct languages that existed prior to colonisation, only a handful are expected to survive without substantial and urgent language intervention (Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders Social Justice Commissioner (ATSISJC), 2009, pp.57-58; HRSCATSI, 2012, pp.33-34). Nevertheless, despite a growing willingness in much of Australian society to support progressive policies for indigenous people, the presence of residual colonist ideologies and attitudes within contemporary political and societal institutions, as well as the relative powerlessness of indigenous people themselves, have prevented real progress from being made (Luker, 2006, pp.48-50 & 285; Moreton-Robinson, 2003, pp.24-26; Mühlhäusler & Damania, 2004, p.1).

¹⁴⁶ The full title is *Our Land Our Languages: Language learning in indigenous communities*. The HRSCATSI is one of 9 general purpose standing committees within the Australian Parliament which hold inquiries into various matters relating to government policy, administration or performance. At the time of the inquiry the Committee consisted of 7 members of parliament: four from the governing Labor Party (including Chair Shayne Neumann, Sharon Grierson, Ed Husic and Graham Perrett) and 3 non-Government Members (including Natasha Griggs (Country Liberal), Dr Sharman Stone (Liberal) and Barry Haase (Liberal)). Although no member of this committee is indigenous, there is, within the committee, a degree of goodwill towards Indigenous Australians as indicated by the references to Aboriginal people and traditional custodians in the majority of this group's maiden speeches in parliament (with Stone and Haase being the exceptions).

In this context, the HRSCATSI Committee (hereafter referred to as ‘the Committee’) approached appropriate Ministers for terms of reference for an inquiry into indigenous languages, having stressed in an earlier inquiry relating to youth justice that language is “an important component of cultural connection and community building” (Neumann, 2011, August 22).¹⁴⁷ On 5 July 2011, the Minister for Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs and the Minister for the Arts jointly initiated the inquiry (Information about the inquiry, n.d.).

The Terms of Reference were as follows:¹⁴⁸

The Committee will inquire into and report on Indigenous languages in Australia, with a particular focus on:

- The benefits of giving attention and recognition to Indigenous languages;
- The contribution of Indigenous languages to Closing the Gap and strengthening Indigenous identity and culture;¹⁴⁹
- The potential benefits of including Indigenous languages in early education;
- Measures to improve education outcomes in those Indigenous communities where English is a second Language;
- The educational and vocational benefits of ensuring English language competency amongst Indigenous communities;
- Measures to improve Indigenous language interpreting and translating services;

¹⁴⁷ The inquiry report referred to earlier is *Doing time—time for doing*. It considered indigenous youth in the criminal justice system. Neumann (2011, August 22) noted that “[m]any people referred to language as playing a significant role in the wellbeing of Indigenous people. Aboriginal elders reiterated time and time again that their Indigenous languages keep culture alive”.

¹⁴⁸ The Terms of Reference for this type of review are significant because they provide the scope and ethos of the review and therefore tend to prefigure the findings.

¹⁴⁹ *Closing The Gap On Indigenous Disadvantage* (CTG) is a comprehensive, integrated, long term, equality based policy that invests just under A\$5 billion per year in basic health, education, employment and other services in order to increase life opportunities for ATS people. It derived from the Council of Australian Governments (COAG) under the Rudd government in 2008 and involves formal agreements between national and state governments as well as partnerships with corporate and community sectors.

- The effectiveness of current maintenance and revitalisation programs for Indigenous languages;
- The effectiveness of the Commonwealth Government Indigenous languages policy in delivering its objectives and relevant policies of other Australian governments (HRSCATSI, 2012, p.xi).

The inquiry lasted twelve months. There were one hundred and fifty four (154) submissions and twenty three (23) consultation hearings throughout the country. Its two hundred and fifty six (256) page, seven (7) chapter report, entitled *Our Land Our Languages*, was tabled in Parliament on the 17th of September 2012.

In a speech supporting the tabling of the report in Parliament, the deputy-chair of the Committee, Dr. Sharman Stone (2012, September 17), summarised the overall intent of the inquiry as follows:

To identify whether it is important to recognise and help to preserve traditional languages and, if so, to identify exactly what traditional language learning gives to its speakers. We also looked at how the continued preservation and use of one's home language - in this case, traditional Indigenous language - impacts on other learning by the children, in particular their learning of standard Australian English.

In the report, the Committee not only stressed the importance of indigenous languages to their speaking communities in terms of cultural connection and self-identity, but also found that “the use of languages, including Indigenous languages and Standard Australian English, can assist in improving education, vocational and economic outcomes for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people” (HRSCATSI, 2012, p.2). Dr. Stone (2012, September 17) made the following observation:

We found overwhelming evidence that there was an enormous benefit when the people of any human society, including our Indigenous Australians, are able to speak, preserve and indeed restore their native languages.

The Committee made thirty (30) recommendations, a number of which focused on the need for Government action in relation to recommendations made in previous reports. The report's key recommendations include:

- recognition of indigenous languages in the *Closing the Gap* framework and in the Constitution;
- Parliamentary leadership in the recognition and acknowledgement of Indigenous languages;
- expansion of the Indigenous Languages Support (ILS) program and prioritisation of the development of language nests;
- updating of the National Indigenous Languages Policy action plan with clear goals, accountability and reporting requirements;¹⁵⁰
- enhancement of the capacity of Indigenous language projects to maintain and revive languages through greater access to resources, including Deductible Gift Recipient eligibility and enabling Torres Strait Islander applications for ILS funding;
- implementation and review of relevant international human rights instruments;¹⁵¹
- resourcing of bilingual education and provision of alternative reporting methods for literacy development where children speak an Indigenous language as a first language;
- increased level of cultural awareness among all teaching staff as well as compulsory English as an Additional Language or Dialect (EAL/D) training for teachers;

¹⁵⁰ In 2009, in response to the NILS report 2005, which found that the situation of Australia's Indigenous languages was grave and required urgent action, the Commonwealth Government announced a national Indigenous languages policy: *Indigenous Languages – A National Approach*. The objectives include (a) increasing national attention and appreciation of ATS languages; (b) supporting the restoration and maintenance of ATS languages; (c) Government recognition and investment in interpreting and translating services; (d) strengthening cultural and language esteem through language revival; and (e) supporting ATS language programmes in schools. A discussion of this policy is found in *Our Land Our Languages* (pp.50-53).

¹⁵¹ In 2009, the Australian Government became a signatory of the UN *Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples* (UNDRIP)(2007), a declaration which reaffirms the right of Indigenous peoples to have access to an education provided in their own culture and language (Purdie, Frigo, Ozolins, Noblett, Thieberger, & Sharp, 2008, p.ix).

- first language assessments of Indigenous children entering early childhood education, and alternative NAPLAN methods and reporting for students whose first language is not English;¹⁵²
- establishment of a national Indigenous interpreting service and immediate development and implementation of measures to ensure competent interpreting services in the health and justice sectors;
- development of careers for Indigenous language interpreters and translators through improved access to training and accreditation, and protocols to ensure that interpreters are used when required;
- development of strategies for training Indigenous language teachers;
- creation of a dedicated language archive at AIATSIS and increased community access to those materials.¹⁵³

3.3 Criterion-referenced analysis of the report

Although there is, inevitably, considerable overlap among categories, each of the criteria (and each of the questions relating to each of the criteria), is discussed separately in the analysis below. In order to add emphasis, *italic print* is used in sections of some of the extracts from the report cited below.¹⁵⁴

3.3.1 Criterion A: Representation of an ‘in-group’

Question 1: Is the construction/ representation of any ‘in-group’ identity consistent with the overall purpose of the text within its discourse context?

Question 2: Is the representation of any ‘in-group’ likely to be perceived as sufficiently inclusive and genuinely representative by the target membership of that group and to resonate positively with them?

¹⁵² In 2008, the National Assessment Program – Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN) commenced in Australian schools. It is a national testing program for all Australian students in Years 3, 5, 7 and 9 in reading, writing, language conventions and numeracy. The tests are in English, leading to criticism that it gives an inaccurate assessment of the abilities of students with first languages other than English as proficiency in English for these students increases dramatically only in the final years of primary school.

¹⁵³ AIATSIS refers to the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies.

¹⁵⁴ In this section, the in-text citation of excerpts from the *Our Land Our Languages* report will show only the page number. For example, instead of ‘(HRSCATSI, 2012, p.56)’ it will show ‘(p.56)’.

The report aims to shift perspectives by re-articulating the strongly held national ‘Australian’ identity in a way that makes it more inclusive.¹⁵⁵

It begins by representing the report writers as members of an all-Australian ‘in-group’, using the first person plural inclusive pronoun (*we*) and possessive adjective (*our*), reinforced by the inclusive adjective (*all*), and thereby ameliorating the impact of the moral imperative associated with the choice of auxiliary verb (*should*):¹⁵⁶

We should all have an interest in and where possible learn about and incorporate local Indigenous languages into *our* workplaces, *our* communities and *our* everyday lives (p.33).

Those who submitted views - views that are included in extracts - are also represented as members of this ‘in-group’. Thus, for example, in the extract below, we again see the inclusive use of ‘we’ and ‘all’, this time supplemented by reference to ‘the broader Australian society’. It is relevant to note that this extract is attributed to Dr. Nick Thieberger, the use of the short form of the first name (Nick), which gives a sense of intimacy and immediacy, contrasting with the use of the title (Dr), which imbues the views expressed with a sense of knowledge and authority – which, by association, are shared by those who adopt a similar stance. On this occasion, the emphasis is on future benefits for this broadly inclusive ‘in-group’, benefits that will involve the re-specification of the in-group itself (the broader Australian society) as one that is characterised by the ability to ‘appreciate’ and ‘understand’:

The value for the *broader Australian society* is that *we will all* be able to *appreciate* Indigenous societies in greater depth if *we* are able to *understand* more of their languages (p.19).

¹⁵⁵ The term ‘Australia(ns)’ is sometimes used in this section as a short form for both ‘Australia’ (nation) & ‘Australians’ (people).

¹⁵⁶ It is acknowledged that the predominant term of self-reference in the report is the formal ‘the Committee’. This will be discussed later.

In their attempt to strengthen the sense of a common identity shared by this (idealised) in-group (Australians), the report writers universalise widespread characteristics of Australian society (Australian dialect and culture), referring to them as ‘unique’ markers of group identity and therefore, by implication, associating them with other unique characteristics of broader Australian society, that is, the languages and cultures of the indigenous peoples. Reference to the sense of otherness experienced by Australians when travelling overseas provides readers with an opportunity to identify with that sense of otherness that Indigenous Australians may experience at home, a sense of otherness that can nevertheless be accommodated within the over-arching in-group Australian identity. Once again, the report writers signal their solidarity with an idealised in-group (all Australians) by using an inclusive pronoun (*we*) and possessive adjective (*our*):

As Australians we are aware of the particularities of our language and culture when we travel to places where language and culture differs from our own. Even when we might understand the language, for example, when travelling to England, America or New Zealand, differences in accents, phrasing and colloquial terms can reaffirm our sense of identity as Australians through the use of unique elements of Australian English and Australian culture. Often we recognise another Australian by the style of English language that is used (p.7).

It is important to note that the reference here to an overseas ‘out-group’ provides an ‘Other’ identity in relation to which the Australian ‘in-group’ can be constructed. The effect of this is to strengthen the over-arching Australian in-group identity and, in doing so, to reduce any potential focus on internal differences within that identity. The important role that indigenous languages play in creating this sense of shared identity is repeatedly reinforced:

The chapter discusses the value of promoting Indigenous languages as a vital part of Australia’s living cultural heritage (p.4).

Building the recognition and appreciation of [Indigenous] languages will also contribute to the national pride of all Australians (p.16).

Greater understanding and *shared ownership of [indigenous] languages . . . will contribute to the Australian identity of all students, schools and communities . . .* (p.18).

The Committee encourages all Australians to take pride in the Indigenous languages that surround us and *to value our rich heritage . . .* Each and every one of us has a role to play in progressing us along the path of reconciliation *and in defining what it means to be Australian* (p.33).

The indigenous languages of Australia are presented as being valuable to all Australians (as part of in-group identity), a source of pride and benefit¹⁵⁷ whose loss would “would disadvantage all Australians” (p.27), and, therefore, as being worthy of maintenance and revitalisation:

Although it was understood that Indigenous languages are valuable to those who are descendants of a particular language group, *the benefits of maintaining and revitalising Indigenous languages to all Australians was a recurrent issue throughout the inquiry* (p.15).

Implicit in this conceptualisation of an all-Australian identity is the right of both Indigenous and non-Indigenous people to claim a shared sense of national identity. This is a fundamental message of the report as indicated in its presence in the report’s title itself (*Our Land Our Languages*) as well as in the foreword and concluding comments:

To *all Australians* I say: take pride in the Indigenous languages of our nation. *Indigenous languages bring with them rich cultural heritage, knowledge and a spiritual connection to the land* (v.iii).

¹⁵⁷ The benefits provided to Australians by Indigenous language are referred to at the following points in the report: improved educational and social outcomes (p.2); ecological knowledge (p.27); historical and cultural knowledge (p.67); heritage and living value (p.72); academic benefit and cultural, spiritual connection to the land (p.viii).

For *all Australians*, Indigenous languages are about *who we are as a nation*, about *the place we call home, the country we live in, and the land we call Australia* (p.213).

The answer to the questions that headed this section is affirmative in both cases. An inclusive, all-Australia ‘in-group’ is established and implicitly represented as being knowledgeable, authoritative, contemporary and enlightened, with Indigenous languages articulated as a core and valuable part of the whole. This identity clearly serves the overall purpose of the text, that is, to shift perspectives in order to reduce opposition and gain as much support as possible for its recommendations.

3.3.2 Criterion B: Representation of an ‘other’ identity

Question 3: Is the construction/ representation of any ‘other’ identity group consistent with the overall purpose of the text within its discourse context?

Question 4: Is the representation of any ‘other’ identity group likely to be perceived as inaccurate, disrespectful or offensive by the target membership of that group?

The report writers use nomenclature as one way of signalling that those who might otherwise be regarded as ‘Other’ must be included in membership of the overarching in-group. The default designator used to refer to Aboriginal peoples is *Indigenous Australians* (used 43 times in the report), the word *Aboriginal* occurring only in the context of quotation from, or reference to submissions to the Committee or as part of the group designation *Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders*.¹⁵⁸ This re-articulation of ‘Aboriginal Other’ as part of an ‘Australian Us’ makes the Aboriginal people and their perspective more difficult to ignore, particularly for politicians who have a specific responsibility to represent the Australian constituency as a whole.

¹⁵⁸ The term *Australia’s Indigenous peoples* is also used 2 times in the report.

The grounds given for this 'Other as In-group' claim, as well as the associated assertion that Indigenous languages are central to this identity, include Indigenous Australians' authentic connection to Australia, through land occupation and ownership. For example:

This report builds on [the Mabo decision] and recognises and celebrates the languages of *Australia's Indigenous peoples who have lived in this land for over tens of thousands of years* (pp.vii-viii).¹⁵⁹

This report recognises and *celebrates* the languages of *Australia's Indigenous peoples who were the original owners of this land for tens of thousands of years* (p.1).

The deep connection that the languages have to Australia is also highlighted:

[I]t is equally *important for all Australians to recognise the several hundred unique Indigenous languages that were spoken for tens of thousands of years in Australia* (p.8).

There is a potential danger in the stratagem of including indigenous peoples in an overarching in-group identity (rather than presenting them as being the Other). The danger is that this will lead to the suppression of their unique voices and concerns and appropriation of their languages and cultures. Thus, for example:

The *NILS report 2005* emphasised the urgency of *the problem facing all Australians* to keep many of the endangered Indigenous languages alive (p.40).

This danger is offset by the inclusion of a large volume of direct quotation from submissions by indigenous people themselves. These quotations provide a humanising insight into Indigenous perspectives and values ("what *their* languages mean to *them*" (p.4)), as well as reasserting *a parallel sense* of separate (and

¹⁵⁹ The Mabo decision recognised that 'terra nullius', the concept that Australia was unoccupied at the time of colonisation, is a fiction" (p.1). See pages 103-104 for more information on this decision.

included) identity. Here, inclusive pronouns are used with more restricted reference, as in the examples below:

[O]ur language helps us with our identity and our culture, and helps us work out where we fit in society, for example who we are related to (pp.9-10).

With our language we know where we belong, we know the names from our country (p.11).

You heard the old people talk about what language means to us. Once the language is taken away then our country and our culture are taken away. We will be nobody (p.15).

The report establishes an overall set (an ‘in-group’ made up of all Australians) and a particular sub-set (part of that ‘in-group’) whose members also identify as belonging to an ‘other group’ made up of Indigenous Australians. This has the effect of recognising and respecting their right to assert their essential indigenous otherness *at the same time* as recognising and respecting their right to membership of the overarching insider group. This way of constructing the identity of Indigenous Australian is wholly consistent with the purpose of the text and is, in addition, unlikely to be perceived as inaccurate, disrespectful or offensive, particularly in view of the following extract from the beginning of the report:

Throughout this report the use of the word ‘Indigenous’ respectfully refers to Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people of Australia (p.2).

Furthermore, on those few occasions when indigenous people are referred to by the authors as ‘Other’ (‘they’, ‘them’ and ‘their/s’), there is a clear intention to redress the usual imbalanced representation, the standard fare negative portrayal being replaced by a positive portrayal:

Sadly, it is these tragic outcomes that dominate many media stories. However there are positive stories that are not being heard – and many of these stories are about language and about communities working together

to preserve, revitalise and sustain their Indigenous languages. These communities are raising their children strong in first language and able to speak SAE and make choices for their future (p.64).

Another *excellent example of achievement* is the 2012 Senior Australian of the Year Laurie Baymarrwangga, who was recognised for ‘almost singlehandedly nurturing the inter-generational transmission of local ecological knowledge through a lifelong commitment to caring for kin, culture and country’ (p.20).

Another *excellent example* of an organisation working within a region to support a range of communities to preserve their languages was the Papulu Apparr-Kari Aboriginal Corporation based in Tenant Creek (p.191).¹⁶⁰

The inclusive all Australia in-group is so strongly formulated that the only out-group detectable, with one important exception (which is discussed below), is that group which is made up of non-Australians, that is, those who do not share in that heritage of which indigenous language and culture constitute a major part. As indicated in *Section 3.3.1*, this group includes those from “places where language and culture differs from our own . . . for example . . . England, America or New Zealand, [where] differences in accents, phrasing and colloquial terms *can reaffirm our sense of identity as Australians* (p.7).

The exception referred to above is the group whose members are associated with a ‘monolingual mindset’, representing dissent from the Committee’s aims (a common adversary/ other identity). However, the existence of such a group is generally inferential and often historical and depersonalised (e.g. *Government policies of the past*) rather than the subject of direct reference, as in the following extracts:

¹⁶⁰ This corporation is also commended earlier in the document: “The Papulu Apparr-kari Language centre produces *excellent* children’s books” (p.60).

Chapter 3 examines the policy context for Indigenous languages in Australia, including *the limited support those languages have received from Australian governments in the past* (p.4).

These languages *have not always received due recognition in the past* (p.8).

Past policies of Australian governments have contributed to the loss of language and culture in many Indigenous communities. . . . The Committee believes successive governments have failed to prevent the continued decline of Indigenous languages (p.30).

The implementation of a bilingual education program in the Northern Territory has received *varying levels of Northern Territory Government support* through to the present day (p.46).

Limited recognition of Indigenous languages occurred *in the 1960s . . . The implementation of a bilingual education program in the Northern Territory has received varying levels of Northern Territory Government support through to the present day* (p.46).

In addition, where the monolingual mindset *is* directly associated with particular people, amelioration is generally provided and the report's authors are careful not to identify these people as belonging to an 'out-group':

However, *many non Indigenous Australians may not have considered* the critical importance of language to a persons' identity, sense of belonging and cultural connection (p.9).

The fact that *many Australians are unaware of the rich diversity of Indigenous languages* that have existed in Australia is an area that should be improved (p.31).

The report identifies Indigenous people as an integral and valued part of the Australian in-group without undermining their sense of uniqueness. The only real

‘out-group’ detectable (other than non-Australians) is those with a ‘monolingual mindset’. However, the abstract way in which this is presented, together with the fact that none of these people is identified (named and shamed), means that offence is unlikely to be taken. The answer to the questions with which this section began is therefore in the affirmative in both cases.

3.3.3 Criterion C: Group formation and fragmentation

There are four questions under this heading. Each is considered separately below.

Question 5: Does the text identify a common adversary in such a way as to increase the potential for the extension of an existing coalition of support for its aims?

A central aim of *Our land Our Languages* is to challenge the notion that “Australia is a monolingual nation”, one in which “only standard Australian English can benefit a person” (p.1). Synonymous with this notion is what is referred to by Greg Dickson (2012, September 17) and Lisa Waller (2012, September 26) as a ‘monolingual mindset’, that is, the ideological source of opposition to policies that encourage the maintenance or revitalisation of languages other than the dominant one. It is this mindset that is identified as the common adversary in the report.¹⁶¹

As indicated in *Section 3.3.2*, while a common adversary/ out-group is identified, the writers are careful not to cause offence. Thus, the adversary is represented in terms of a particular mindset, one which is located largely in the past and associated with institutional decision-making rather than with individuals. The writers avoid any direct reference to Australians who do not support positive intervention. They also, wherever possible, avoid direct attribution of blame. Rather, the preference is to omit any statement of agency by using (a) non-agentive passive constructions (e.g. *These languages have not always received due recognition in the past*) or (b) nouns that have negative senses or connotations in association with particles that signal forward movement (e.g. *changing attitudes, healing scars*). Potential negatives are de-centered, the emphasis being placed on implied ameliorative

¹⁶¹ It is indicative of the overall positive tone and purposes of the report that the Committee do not refer to this mindset as *xenophobia*.

reasons (e.g. . . . many Australians *are unaware of* the rich diversity of Indigenous languages).

The difficulty for members of the Committee, however, is that they would be remiss if they did not identify the cause of the poor state of indigenous languages, and although blaming Government would provide a common adversary in opposition to which further support might be rallied, to do so would have had the potential to alienate those best positioned to give effect to the report's recommendations. The Committee finds the perfect culprit – past governments (small 'g' and plural number):

Chapter 3 examines the policy context for Indigenous languages in Australia, including the limited support those languages have received from *Australian governments in the past* (p.4).

Twenty years later, this Committee is appalled that it is faced with making the same recommendations to government and trusts it will not be met with *the inaction that has characterised successive governments* (p.184).

Past policies of Australian governments have contributed to the loss of language and culture in many Indigenous communities The Committee believes *successive governments* have failed to prevent the continued decline of Indigenous languages (p.30).

Thus, although there is evidence of a common adversary - a combination of a monolingual mindset and past governments - against which the views of Committee members and, by implication, those of 'broader Australian society' can be offset, depersonalisation and historical distancing function to reduce or remove any sense of personal opprobrium which would be likely to result in the hardening of opposition. In this way, a space is created in which adversaries have an opportunity to rethink their positioning without loss of face and, in doing so, associate themselves with views that are presented as being contemporary, enlightened, knowledgeable and authoritative.

Question 6: Does the text provide evidence of an existing coalition of support for its aims?

The report makes reference to twenty three (23) public hearings and receipt of over one hundred and fifty four (154) submissions, recording thanks to “those people who put much time into their excellent contributions to submissions and during hearings” (p.viii) and quoting extensively from these contributions and submissions. It uses the names of submitting organisations and the titles of submitters (e.g. Doctor; Professor) along with the evidence they provided in a way that gives credibility by association to the recommendations of the Committee. The writers of the report comment favourably on the activities of several individuals and groups, including governments, as exemplified in the extracts below:

The Committee *praises the work of all organisations, communities and individuals* who are striving, often with very limited resources, to preserve Indigenous languages for future generations (p.198).

The Committee *commends ALATSIS . . . commends the staff . . . and the researchers* who have been responsible for generating much of the material held in the AVA (p.209).

There has been *considerable funding and effort by all governments and community groups* in assisting with the Closing the Gap strategy (p.30).

The Committee *commends* the New South Wales government’s ongoing commitment to supporting Indigenous languages (p.58).

The *Committee commends the Western Australian government* for the development of the limited authority to teach qualification being offered to Indigenous language teachers (p.135).

As well as emphasising the variety of institutions and individuals within the coalition of support, the report emphasises the geographical breadth of that support:

In Adelaide the Committee heard from an ex-principal, Alitya Rigney, of the Kurna Plains School (p.14).

In Darwin, Maratja Dhamarrandji commented on the importance of language as a tool for good education (p.14).

Across Australia, there has been a groundswell of activity in the area of language maintenance and revitalisation (p.2).

The Committee thanks those that provided examples of the many language resources being developed *around Australia* (p.4).

The Committee held public hearings in various locations *throughout Australia* . . . and received evidence from *many Indigenous people* (p.9).

In addition, the report draws heavily on decisions, reports, surveys, and policies by influential bodies in a way that suggests that its own findings and recommendations are merely a reiteration of those of others. One of the most important references is to the 1992 Mabo decision of the High Court of Australia which is positioned as foundational to the report, thereby making the judiciary a powerful ally for its aims.¹⁶²

This report builds on the Mabo decision of the *High Court of Australia* in 1992 which recognised the occupancy of the Indigenous peoples and their on-going connection to the land. That decision was a vital step in redressing past wrongs and it acknowledged the richness of Indigenous heritage and its place as a living culture However, twenty years on from that decision and we have failed to close the gap on Indigenous disadvantage It is

¹⁶² The 1992 Mabo Decision was a highly controversial landmark decision that recognised, for the first time, that native title rights survived colonial settlement (albeit subject to the sovereignty of the Crown), thus rejecting the doctrine that pre-colonisation Australia was 'terra nullius' (a land belonging to no one). Although the decision caused widespread concern among non-aboriginal Australians at the time – a fear that they might lose their houses, for example - the impact on them has been minimal. By linking this report with the Mabo judgement, the Committee is suggesting that the recognition of Indigenous languages is both as equally justified and as equally nonthreatening.

the desire of this Committee that in 2012, twenty years since the Mabo land decision, the next vital decision is made by governments and by all Australians to recognise and value Indigenous languages. Through land and language we can close the gap (p.212).¹⁶³

A prominent supporter of the Committee's work is the Minister of the Arts, one of those who supported the call for an inquiry:

These issues [deductible gift recipient eligibility] were examined in the 2011 Review of Private Sector Support for the Arts, which was undertaken by Mr Harold Mitchell AC and *commissioned by the Minister for the Arts* [T]he Committee strongly supports the changes to the ROCO as recommended by the Mitchell review (p.72).

Some other examples of an influential coalition of support for the Committee's positioning are included below:

The *Australian Bureau of Statistics* released research highlighting the benefits of maintaining Indigenous languages to enhance young peoples' wellbeing (p.26).

In 2012, *the United Nations* held a forum on 'The Study on the role of languages and culture in the promotion and protection of the rights and identity of indigenous peoples'. The importance of language is summed up in the following quote . . . (p.8).

The *Commonwealth Ombudsman* reported in its March 2011 report *Talking in Language: Indigenous Language Interpreters and Government Communication* that. . . (pp.164-165).

¹⁶³ Also worthy of note is the use of the full name, High Court of *Australia*, which although a convention for these reports, resonates with the report's focus on representing Australia as supportive to its aims.

A report published by *the World Bank* in 2006 supported the need to teach in first language . . . (p.113).

The very fact that the Committee includes members of opposing political parties is itself a significant signal of a widespread coalition of support, something that is reinforced near the end of the *foreword* of the report when the Committee's chairperson (Labor party MP, Shayne Neumann) thanks the deputy chairperson (Liberal party MP, Dr. Sharman Stone).

Our *Land Our Languages* provides quotations from a large number of credible submissions and witnesses as well as influential national and international identities that support its aims. Indeed, its recommendations sometimes echo those of these influential groups. Individuals and groups within this coalition are not only referred to respectfully but often in highly positive ways, and are therefore likely to form a coalition of support for the aims of the report.

Question 7: Does the text employ strategies whose aim is to avoid the creation of an opposition coalition?

This report employs a wide range of strategies which would appear to be calculated to avoid the creation and/ or reinforcement of an opposing coalition. These include, as indicated above, the positive representation of Australians as knowledgeable, authoritative, contemporary and enlightened and the efforts not to cause offence by associating the ideological adversary with any contemporary individuals. Indeed, that the writers are at pains to avoid alienating any potential opposition coalition is clearly evidenced in their determination to avoid causing offence to those most likely to form one, such as the supporters of the much maligned Northern Territory *Compulsory English Teaching in English in the First Four Hours of Each School Day* policy (hereafter referred to as the 'English in the First Four Hours' policy). It was noted in one submission that "[the] policy has been criticised widely by politicians, educators, Indigenous leaders, Indigenous language speakers, linguists and human rights advocates" (p.116). Nevertheless, in referring to it, the report writers focus on what they choose to represent as laudable intentions:

After reviewing the evidence and speaking with the Northern Territory Government representatives in Darwin, *the Committee believes the Northern Territory Government had the best of intentions in 2008 when it announced the Compulsory Teaching in English for the first four hours*, in order to improve English competency and NAPLAN results. However the Committee believes this policy was not successful in achieving its aims of improving educational outcomes for Indigenous students in the Northern Territory (p.119).

In a further example, the authors avoid direct criticism indicating their acceptance of the fact that not all responses were necessarily negative. See below

The implementation of a bilingual education program in the Northern Territory has received *varying levels of . . . support* through to the present day (p.46).

Another stratagem aimed at avoiding the creation of an opposition coalition of support is the provision of reassurance to those concerned about the potential impact of the Committee's recommendations on the majority language:

The importance of learning and speaking English competently for all Australians is not disputed (p.8).

Central to the idea of giving attention and recognition to Indigenous languages is that it will strengthen Indigenous culture and identity which *will lead to improvements in Standard Australian English competency* and socio-economic factors including improved measurements of wellbeing (p.13).

Furthermore, the provision of incentives (including, for politicians, the possibility of improved image and, hence, greater support) are likely to reduce opposition to the recommendations:

The Committee considers that *Parliamentarians are in unique positions to demonstrate leadership* in promoting the benefits of strengthening and recognising the languages and culture local to their electorate, and therefore build on the reconciliation path between Indigenous Australians and non Indigenous Australians (p.32).

The Committee recommends the Minister for Education work through the Standing Council on School Education and Early Childhood *to develop incentives for teacher training institutions to offer Indigenous language teacher training*, such as a limited authority qualification to teach . . . [and] to develop strategies for training Indigenous language teachers *to improve access to qualifications, full accreditation and career pathways* as well as providing school support and mentorship where required (pp.xx,136 & 142).

The Committee recommends the Commonwealth Government . . . *allocate resourcing to provide Indigenous interpreters with accessible training* . . . (pp.xxi & 187).

The Committee recommends the Commonwealth Government *consult with the Australian Institute of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Studies to determine an appropriate and sustainable funding model* in order for it to recommence its research grants program in the 2013-14 Budget (pp.xxii & 210).

One further stratagem is to place emphasis not only on the value of indigenous languages in and of themselves, but on the many indirect advantages (social, cognitive, economic, educational, occupational, health) associated with their acquisition and retention, indirect advantages that are likely to have considerable appeal for some of those for whom arguments relating to language rights and social justice may be less convincing. Thus, for example:

The maintenance and use of Indigenous languages has positive implications for capacity building in Indigenous communities, particularly through

community involvement and *employment in resource management, art and tourism, broadcasting and interpreting* (p.26).

The Committee recognises *the significant role that languages play in assisting to improve health, education, employment and general wellbeing indicators* within Indigenous communities (p.43).

There is a wealth of evidence that supports *the positive associations of health, education and employment outcomes as well as general wellbeing with language and culture* (pp.7-8).

Professor Mühlhäusler et al, in the 2004 *Economic Costs and Benefits of Australian Indigenous Languages* report highlighted a range of economic and social benefits for Australia from the enhanced knowledge of complex phenomena gained from Indigenous languages (pp.27-28).

The Indigenous tourism industry offers Aboriginal language speakers significant opportunities for employment. An increase in tourist numbers may reflect a heightened interest among overseas tourists in Aboriginal culture. *Any increase in tourism benefits the whole community* (p.28).

Raising the profile of Indigenous languages through the use of interpreters for government interaction in sectors such as health, legal and education *can be beneficial for Indigenous and non Indigenous Australians* (p.18).

In addition to their generally positive tone and effort to avoid direct criticism, the authors have attempted to avoid the creation of an opposition coalition by (a) providing incentives to encourage acceptance of their recommendations, (b) providing reassurance in connection with their potential impact, and (c) emphasising the indirect benefits associated with retaining indigenous languages.

Question 8: Does the text move beyond personal interests, weakening differences by articulating a broad inclusive agenda which has the potential to create a coalition of different interests?

Almost everything that has been discussed thus far points to considerable effort on the part of the report writers to articulate a broad inclusive agenda which has the potential to create a coalition of interests, including, for example, indigenous groups, health professionals, social workers, educationalists, politicians and, indeed, all of those Australians who wish to associate themselves with views that are presented as being contemporary, enlightened and endorsed by those who are both knowledgeable and authoritative. Furthermore, expanding the Australian in-group identity not only lifts the status of Indigenous people and languages, it also affirms the non-indigenous sense of belonging to the land. In connection with this, it is important to note that persistent themes throughout the report are reconciliation and cultural heritage, themes that are likely to have widespread appeal:

The Committee sees the benefits of greater recognition of Indigenous languages as having a positive impact on slowing the rapid decline of Indigenous languages, improving self-esteem and identity for Indigenous Australians, assisting in all areas of Closing the Gap on Indigenous disadvantage and *improving reconciliation outcomes for all Australians* (p.2).

Each and every one of us has a role to play in *progressing us along the path of reconciliation* and *in defining what it means to be Australian* (p.33).

In targeting the ideology associated with the ‘monolingual mindset’ referred to earlier, the report writers also create an opportunity to gather support from the large number of Australians who have strong linguistic and cultural ties with languages other than English. This was reinforced in an article in the *Sydney Morning Herald* (Hall, 2012, September 18) in which Dr Sharman Stone, the Committee’s chairperson, was reported as making the following point:

Whatever home language you bring to that school in the first instance, or that preschool, you should be taught in that language. And I include other language speakers in that as well, if you speak Sudanese or Congolese, but you work from there, so the child has the best chance.

There is evidence of considerable efforts to articulate a broad inclusive agenda, allied to the all-Australian identity they have articulated, an agenda that offers a number of benefits for all, having, therefore, the potential to create a coalition of different interests.

The report writers have used a range of strategies to avoid the creation of an opposition coalition. This is achieved primarily through the creation of positive identities and the avoidance of any discourse with the potential to offend. Also relevant are strategies that include providing reassurance to potential adversaries regarding the potential impact of the recommendations, the respectful and positive positioning of a wide range of groups, the careful identification of a (depersonalised) common adversary, and the use of influential evidence sources. Above all the broad inclusive agenda that is presented as having potential benefits for all creates the sense of a large coalition of support for the report. The answer for each of the questions included in this section is - yes.

3.3.4 Criterion D: Engagement with hegemonic interests/ key decision-makers

Question 9: Are hegemonic interests/ key decision makers positioned in a way that is likely to gain their approval and is there evidence of agonistic engagement with them?

As indicated and exemplified earlier, the agonistic tone of report has the effect of positioning groups, including key decisions makers, in a way that is least likely to lead them to adopt an oppositional stance in relation to the report's recommendations. Wherever possible, the report writers include praise for positive and effective government initiatives. Where negative evaluation of government policies is unavoidable, it is presented in a way that is as matter-of-fact and as distanced from current decision-makers as possible, as in the case of the Northern Territory's policy regarding the teaching in English in the first four hours of each school day, a policy which is described simply as being "unsuccessful in achieving [its] aims".

In line with their attempts to adopt an approach that appears as objective and agonistic as possible (as noted above), where Committee members record negative judgments or dire warnings about the dangers it perceives as being inherent in the neglect of indigenous languages and cultures and/or attempts to suppress them, these judgments are generally attributed to others, the report writers either simply reiterating them or (as indicated in the second example – below) adding their own judgment to those of others.

The Committee *received a lot of evidence that described the negative impact of NAPLAN testing for children who learn English as an Additional Language (p.123).*

The *NILS report 2005 concluded that the situation of Australia's languages is grave and requires urgent action. Without intervention the language knowledge will cease to exist in the next 10 to 30 years (p.35).*

There are a few occasions when judgments and experiences of committee members are presented without direct reference to the judgments and experiences of submitters. In such cases, as in the extract below, a negative evaluation may be accompanied by a statement that ensures that no blame is attached to a particular office or individual – in this case, the Office of the Arts and its Minister who is a key decision maker and potential supporter:

As the lead agency responsible for administering the National Indigenous Languages Policy and the ILS program, *the Office for the Arts is oversubscribed and inadequately funded and levels of funding have been static since 2005-06 This equates to a slow death by neglect for many Indigenous languages (p.67).*

Similarly, in the following extract, the report, while noting government's overall failure to 'close the gap', nevertheless recognise the efforts made by government representatives. In doing so, they identify with them (*we*) and appear to echo the frustration that many government representatives have expressed in the past. In the context of the report as a whole, which holds out the prospect of greater success if

its recommendations are followed, this appearance of empathy is likely to resonate positively with key decision makers:

However, twenty years on from that decision and *we have failed to close the gap on Indigenous disadvantage*. Over these two decades *billions have been spent providing various services, assistance and programs to improve outcomes for Indigenous peoples. We are making progress, but progress is slow* (p.212).

The report writers' self-positioning is critical in relation to the positioning of key decision-makers. Throughout the report, personal pronouns referring to committee members is eschewed, reference to the writers being through exclusive use of the formal designator 'the Committee'. In this way, emphasis is placed not on the opinions of individual members of the Committee but on their fulfilment of the role assigned to the group by virtue of government appointment. This not only enhances the aura of objectivity that permeates the report but also reinforces the fact that decision-making power (including the power to call for the inquiry) rests elsewhere:

The Committee Chair *approached appropriate Ministers for terms of reference* for an inquiry into Indigenous languages. On 5 July 2011 *the Minister for Families, Housing, Community Services and Indigenous Affairs and the Minister for the Arts jointly referred the inquiry* (p.2).

Fundamental indications of the Committee's appropriate positioning in relation key decision makers include the thorough and systematic treatment of the eight tasks set them in the Terms of Reference¹⁶⁴ and the provision of evidence that is highly salient and influential to key decision makers (this will be discussed in relation to *Question 10* below). The report writers have taken care not to appear to over-step their authority, as indicated in the selection of main verbs such as 'encourage' and 'urge' rather than modals expressing obligation or necessity (e.g. 'must'; 'should'; 'ought to'):

¹⁶⁴ The report addresses these tasks in a slightly different order to that of the Terms of Reference. The impact of this will be discussed in *Section 3.3.5*

The Committee *encourages the states and territories* to work with the Commonwealth to improve language learning in Indigenous communities across all portfolio areas (p.58).

The Committee *encourages the Commonwealth Government* to develop an implementation plan to give effect to its endorsement of the Declaration (p.76).

The Committee *urges state and territory governments* to continue to support strategies that focus on building Indigenous community partnerships with schools and recognise the importance of Indigenous languages within these partnerships (p.86).

These are critical recommendations and the Committee *urges the Commonwealth Government* to act quickly to announce their implementation (p.212).

On the one occasion when members of the Committee make a comment on something that is beyond their remit, they make it clear that they are aware of this and use an indirect form of recommendation:

The Committee notes that *the Commonwealth Government's ratification of the Convention for Safeguarding of the Intangible Cultural Heritage extends beyond the terms of reference for the present inquiry*. However, *the Committee sees merit in a review being conducted* (p.77).

The sense of objectivity that is associated with use of 'the Committee' is reinforced by the inclusion on several occasions of differing perspectives, different scenarios or both sides of an argument. This increases the overall sense of agonistic debate as opposed to antagonistic accusation:

The National Congress of Australia's First Peoples . . . expressed its 'disappointment that . . . a National Indigenous Languages Centre has not been acted upon by the Australian Government'. . . . *Conversely*, Ms Sally

Basser from the Office for the Arts did not see a need for a new national centre, and said that: ‘our view would be that there is an existing body called AIATSIS which . . . could perform that role in the future. There is an organisation that we have. We do not need a new one’ (p.196).

In New South Wales Aboriginal teachers are able to apply for sponsorship from the Aboriginal Education and Training Directorate for HECS contributions and relief payments to attend study blocks in order to complete the postgraduate Master of Indigenous Language Education program. *In contrast*, the Committee received some evidence that teachers are unable to be released from their workplaces to take further study in teaching Indigenous languages (p.139).

While the weight of evidence supported constitutional recognition of Indigenous languages, the Tasmanian Aboriginal Centre (TAC) urged for legislative changes and increased funding *instead*. They did not support constitutional recognition, and said that it: would not provide any effective mechanism for strengthening languages and would be purely tokenistic (p.74).

With respect to *Question 9*, in addition to the agonistic positioning of key decision makers, including, in particular, the restrained and objective self-positioning of the Committee in relation to the tasks it was set, makes it more likely that the report will gain the approval of key decision makers.

Question 10: Are the arguments provided likely to convince hegemonic interests/ key decision makers?

The writers have ensured that evidence-based arguments are central to the report:

In view of the evidence received during the present inquiry, it is clear that the need for a national Indigenous interpreter service cuts across all government jurisdictions (pp.184-185).

The research demonstrates that educational outcomes for students are higher when the mother tongue or first language is incorporated into early education (p.118).

The *overwhelming evidence* was that children learning in a bilingual environment can grow and prosper in a bilingual or multilingual way and have improved Standard Australian English outcomes (p.211).

The Committee *received a lot of evidence* that described the negative impact of NAPLAN (p.123)

The sources of evidence selected by the report writers are frequently of a kind that is likely to be convincing so far as key decision makers as concerned. In particular, research that is either commissioned by government bodies or funded from government sources is repeatedly referenced. Not only is this likely to be persuasive, it also (see previous question) positions key decision makers in a positive way - see excerpts below:

Professor Mühlhäusler et al, in the *2004 Economic Costs and Benefits of Australian Indigenous Languages* report highlighted a range of economic and social benefits for Australia from the enhanced knowledge of complex phenomena gained from Indigenous languages (pp.27-28).

In 2005, the National Indigenous Languages Survey (NILS) report recommended increasing translating and interpreting services in regional centres with large numbers of Indigenous people who do not speak English well (p.173).

In 1992 the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs tabled the report *Language and Culture – A Matter of Survival* (p.47).

The *Social Justice Report 2009* supported the use of language nests and made the following comment about resourcing them effectively (p.101).

Where the findings of local research are consistent with or reinforce international research findings, they are likely to be even more persuasive. Thus, the report frequently balances national and international research findings, as in the following examples:

The research undertaken in this area within Australia and internationally clearly states the dual benefits of first language learning in schools (p.119).

The Committee received convincing evidence for bilingual education. This evidence is supported nationally and internationally by numerous studies . . . (p.118).

Since governments have a vested interest in being able to produce statistics that indicate that they are doing well in terms of comparative measures of health, education, employment, welfare and social stability, arguments that indicate that indigenous language maintenance and/or revitalisation has a positive impact in all of these areas are likely to appeal to key decision makers who are government representatives. Hence the emphasis in the report on all of these areas including the existing *Closing the Gap* initiative (see examples below):

The Committee views the link between Indigenous languages and improvements to overall wellbeing as an essential element that will continue to help meet governments' targets of Closing the Gap (pp.30-31).

[T]here needs to be dramatic progress in regard to training Indigenous language interpreters for working in technically difficult specialist areas, such as justice and health. With health targets a large factor in Closing the Gap, interpreting and translating is of urgent importance. (pp.186-187).

Knowledge of Indigenous languages provides opportunities for Indigenous people to be employed as translators and interpreters (p.29).

Health advantages including mental and physical health have been linked to learning and retaining one's own language (p.25).

There are *strong potential employment outcomes* for Aboriginal communities through language acquisition (p.27).

The maintenance and use of Indigenous languages has *positive implications for capacity building in Indigenous communities*, particularly through community involvement and employment in resource management, art and tourism, broadcasting and interpreting (p.26).

As an additional trigger for gaining support from key decision makers, the report writers repeatedly stress the potential dangers of continuing neglect of indigenous languages, dangers that are presented, often simply through juxtaposition, in a way that represents an implicit threat to the success of the *Closing The Gap* policy:

And over these two decades we have seen *the decline of many Indigenous languages just as we have seen the rise of Indigenous youth disconnected from their culture, failing at schooling, lacking a sense of identity or future, and ending up in the criminal justice system* (p.212).

The Committee was disturbed to realise the dramatic decline in Indigenous languages that is continuing within each generation. The Committee recognises the significant role that languages play in assisting to improve health, education, employment and general wellbeing indicators within Indigenous communities (p.43).

The important role that Indigenous languages play in terms of a connection to culture, kinship, land and family was highlighted during the Committee's inquiry, *as was the devastation to communities that results when language is lost* (p.vii).

One further policy trigger for key decision makers relates to the use of economic rationales and effectiveness indicators. The report includes both, as seen in the following excerpts:

The Committee views a 'top down' hierarchical arrangement between a new national centre and the pre-existing, grass-roots network as inherently complicated, potentially wasteful in terms of the limited resources dedicated to Indigenous languages, and potentially damaging for programs that currently are working well. The Committee believes that effort should be focused on enhancing existing networks and organisations to improve their capacity to conduct language preservation and revitalisation work (p.198).

The Committee agrees . . . that *there is no evidence of an effective action plan* for the implementation of the objectives of the National Indigenous Languages Policy (p.57).

While Indigenous languages policy is an integral issue in education, as Dr William Fogarty told the Committee, it is also fundamental 'for Indigenous identity, cultural reproduction and the aspirations for Indigenous *economic and social development*' (p.45).

The Committee has presented a set of recommendations that chart a future for Indigenous languages and assist our Indigenous youth to grow strong in culture and in heritage and *with the skills and opportunities to participate fully in the Australian society and economy* (p.211).

Given that there is less political risk for key decision makers in agreeing to/ extending what has already been agreed and in gaining part of the funding required from non-government sources, the report aligns its recommendations with existing government policies, with on-going policies implemented by previous governments and with existing structural arrangements. In this way, it avoids giving the appearance of requesting expensive, complicated and politically risky changes. At the same time, it includes praise for government wherever possible:

The Committee has recommended an increase in funding However *it is not governments' responsibility wholly to fund language centres* recommendations in this report work towards opening up market

opportunities for language centres through increasing the use of interpreting services, *opening opportunities for philanthropic and private sector contributions*, creating demand for the production of resources and collaboration with schools (pp.199-200).

The Mabo decision of the High Court of Australia in 1992 recognised the occupancy of the Indigenous peoples and their on-going connection to the land. This report builds on this connection to land and recognises and celebrates the languages of Australia's Indigenous peoples who have lived in this land for over tens of thousands of years (pp.vii-viii).

The Committee observes that the Commonwealth Government formally endorsed the Declaration of the Rights of Indigenous Peoples in 2009. The Committee encourages the Commonwealth Government to develop an implementation plan to give effect to its endorsement of the Declaration (p.76).

The Committee strongly supports the development of the [Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Languages] Framework and its inclusion in the Australian Curriculum. Given the importance placed on these initiatives by Indigenous communities, the Committee considers there would be value in specifying dates for the proposed implementation of the Framework . . . on its website (p.97).

The Committee recommends that the Commonwealth Government review make publically available by March 2013 *an updated action plan with clear goals, accountability and reporting requirements to implement its National Indigenous Languages Policy*. The Committee further recommends that relevant Commonwealth Government agencies are required to report annually on outcomes of the action plan (p.xviii).

The Committee *recommends the Commonwealth Government include in the National Indigenous Languages Policy 2009 a commitment to support and*

progress signage of place names and landmarks in local Indigenous languages (p.xvii).

The Committee recommends that the Minister for Education *work through the Standing Council on School Education and Early Childhood to develop a National Assessment Program – Literacy and Numeracy (NAPLAN) alternative assessment tool* for all students learning English as an Additional Language/Dialect.

The report is heavily evidence-based, referring repeatedly to influential sources of evidence. In addition, it includes policy triggers and rationales that are highly salient so far as key decision makers are concerned. This, combined with the minimalisation of political risk associated with the alignment of the report's recommendations with existing policy, is likely to be convincing so far as key decision makers are concerned. The answer to both of the questions included in this section is therefore, yes.

3.3.5 Criterion E: Dislocation and deconstruction

Question 11: Does the text contest the nodal points of the status quo hegemony and expose and undermine its aims (underlying objects of desire and promised fantasies), drawing attention to significant dislocating events and exposing/revealing the inherent contingency of its positioning, its rhetorical manipulations, the negative implications of its articulations as implemented policy, the inconsistency of its rhetoric over time and/or the discrepancies between its promises and achievements?

Question 12: Are the key signifiers redefined (through chains of signification) in a way that is counter to the purposes of adversaries and likely to resonate positively with the primary target audience and the wider readership?

The key signifiers that are contested and redefined in *Our Land Our Languages* are 'Australia' and 'Australians'. The *status quo* hegemonic discourse associated with

these signifiers links them to an English-language-based cultural paradigm. A corollary of this is that Aboriginal people are an 'Other' whose culture and languages have little or no value to Australia and are, in a sense, foreign to it. Within the context of this hegemonic discourse, which is referred to above as involving a 'monolingual mindset', the report's recommendations could represent a threat to the possession of the *objet petit à*, that is, the total hegemony of English (which necessarily involves the removal of Aboriginal languages from Australian public life). This discourse is, therefore, the primary barrier to the report's achieving its purposes.

Contesting the key signifiers of this monolingual and monocultural mythology involves exposing its contingency, something that is achieved through reference to the Mabo decision:

The Mabo decision recognised that 'terra nullius', the concept that Australia was unoccupied at the time of colonisation, is a fiction. Similarly, the notion *that Australia is a monolingual nation and that only Standard Australian English can benefit a person is a fiction* (p.1).

This is reinforced by the repeated provision of counter-evidence, as in the following examples:

In present day Australia there are children from a vast array of cultures and first languages or dialects. This is the rich tapestry of culture prevalent in today's society and is not confined to remote areas or to areas of high Indigenous populations (p.156).

It is important to emphasise that Australia is not a monolingual society. Since British settlement English has been the main language in Australia. The importance of learning and speaking English competently for all Australians is not disputed. However it is equally important for all Australians to recognise the several hundred unique Indigenous languages that were spoken for tens of thousands of years in Australia (p.8).

In the following extract, it initially appears that the report writers endorse the *status quo* discourse that the English language alone is important in Australia. However, as the last three sentences indicate, what we actually have here is a type of partial acceptance of the *status quo* which effectively exposes the racist ideology that underpins it, therefore undermining the entire discourse:

Abilities to read and write in English¹⁶⁵ and to be numerate are critical if young people are to complete their schooling successfully in Australia, exercise choice about what they do in life beyond school and participate fully in the economic and social development of their local communities and the broader Australian society. All students in Australia have the right to be taught to communicate effectively in Standard Australian English, to understand how the English language works, to think and learn in and through English, and to be given access to the cultural understandings it carries. *But Standard Australian English learning should not be at the expense of Indigenous languages and cultural learning. Neither should Indigenous languages and cultural learning be to the detriment of English language learning. Both should act as bridges to succeed in the other rather than creating barriers* (p.120).

The report exposes the unbalanced representation of Indigenous Australians by noting the focus on ‘tragic outcomes that dominate many media stories’ while there are “positive stories that are not being heard . . . about language and about communities working together to preserve, revitalise and sustain their Indigenous languages” (p.64).

Not only do the writers of the report expose the contingency of these hegemonic conceptions of the key signifiers ‘Australian’ and ‘Australia’, they redefine them, including Indigenous people and their languages as an essential and beneficial part of ‘Australia(ns)’. Thus, for example, the writers consistently use the term ‘Indigenous Australians’ to contest the idea of ‘Aboriginal Other’ (see 3.3.1 and 3.3.2 above). Indeed, the report sets out to demonstrate the exemplary ways in

¹⁶⁵ The use of ‘English’ (instead of SAE) here shows that this statement is expected to be true in a global sense.

which many Indigenous Australians and their languages have contributed/ are contributing to Australian society, culture and economy as indicated in the long extract below (pp.19-20):

Greg Dickson provided the Committee with the following examples to demonstrate *social, cultural and economic benefits* that are gained from recognising and valuing Indigenous languages. These benefits are evidenced at local community levels, regionally, nationally and internationally. The examples provide a window into what is possible when the potential of Indigenous languages is harnessed:

- Australian of the Year recipients who speak an Aboriginal language as a first language: Galarrwuy Yunupingu (1978), Mandawuy Yunupingu (1992)
- National TV shows in Indigenous languages e.g. Bush Mechanics (Warlpiri, ABC TV 2001), Women of the Sun (Yolngu Matha/English, ABC/SBS 1981)
- Top-selling, award-winning recording artists who speak and sing in Indigenous language/s (e.g. Yothu Yindi, Geoffrey Gurrumul Yunupingu)
- Indigenous language-speaking AFL stars: e.g. Liam Jurrah, Liam Patrick (both Warlpiri)
- Award-winning feature film Ten Canoes (2006 – Ganalbingu and other languages)
- Theatre productions, e.g. Ngapartji Ngapartji (Big hART, 2007 - Pitjantjatjara language)
- National advertising campaign (Qantas 2009 – Kala Lagaw Ya language)
- Award-winning journalism (Sydney Morning Herald, 2009 ‘Language is Power – Let us have ours’, in English and Gumbaynggirr, received UN Media Peace award, 2010)
- Tertiary education courses e.g. Graduate Certificate in Yolngu Studies (Charles Darwin University), Certificate 1, 2 and 3 in

Aboriginal Languages e.g. Gamilaraay, Gumbaynggirr (TAFE NSW)

- Academic writing in Indigenous languages, e.g. Bani, E. (1987), 'Garka a ipika: masculine and feminine grammatical gender in Kala Lagaw Ya', *Australian Journal of Linguistics* 7(2):189-201.31.

Another excellent example of achievement is the 2012 Senior Australian of the Year Laurie Baymarrwangga, who was recognised for 'almost singlehandedly nurturing the inter-generational transmission of local ecological knowledge through a lifelong commitment to caring for kin, culture and country' in the Crocodile Islands of the Northern Territory.

Ms Baymarrwangga initiated the Yan-nhangu Dictionary project in 1994, and continues to pass on her language and culture through the Crocodile Islands Initiative, which includes a ranger program, a language nest and a web-based ecological knowledge base for schools.

Evident in *Our Land Our Languages* is a progressive undermining of the linguistic *status quo*. Indigenous languages are re-articulated as 'Australian' and promoted as being beneficial to all Australians (see discussion earlier). Likewise, references to 'Standard Australian English' (SAE) serve not only to reinforce the all-Australia identity represented but also to remind readers of Anglo-Saxon heritage that they are themselves in some senses 'Other':

But *Standard Australian English* learning should not be at the expense of Indigenous languages and cultural learning (p.120).

[T]he notion that Australia is a monolingual nation and that only *Standard Australian English* can benefit a person is a fiction (p.1).

In addition, the report's recommendation that there should be bilingual place names involves the de-centring of English in Australia's linguistic landscape, something that would be likely to have much more than merely symbolic impact:

While dual naming or Indigenous naming may be viewed by some as merely symbolic the Committee is convinced of *the value and place of symbolism in changing attitudes, healing scars and forging new futures* (p.32).

Related to the deconstructing and redefining of the key signifiers ‘Australia’ and ‘Australian’ is the re-articulation of the concept of *value*. It is widely believed by governments and individuals, in Australia and elsewhere, that indigenous languages have little or no value, even for indigenous peoples, value being conceptualised largely in economic terms. Although the Committee’s Terms of Reference include inquiry into the role of indigenous languages in ‘strengthening Indigenous identity and culture’, there is an underlying assumption that this, and other potential benefits (educational and vocational), must be driven by a value for money equation. In reorganising the Terms of Reference, the report writers effectively reconceptualise them. Thus, for example, ‘strengthening Indigenous identity and culture’ (the second part of the second Term of Reference) is elevated into initial position. It is the first item dealt with in the report (*Chapter 2*) and it is articulated initially through the evidence provided by Indigenous Australians themselves (“what their languages mean to them”), indicating that:

- (a) issues of partnership and self-determination are to be treated as more than rhetorical concessions; and
- (b) the strengthening of culture and identity that is associated with indigenous language revitalisation is fundamental, with all of the other benefits (educational, vocational, social and economic) flowing from it and clustering around it.

The report writers associate Indigenous Australian languages, and bilingualism generally, not only with a wealth of benefits for Indigenous Australians, *including economic ones*, but with benefits for all Australians, in particular, those benefits that relate to cultural identity and reconciliation (the latter being referred to 31 times throughout the report):

[The] *benefits of maintaining and revitalising Indigenous languages to all Australians* was a recurrent issue throughout the inquiry (p.15).

The Committee considers that Parliamentarians are in unique positions to demonstrate leadership in promoting the benefits of strengthening and recognising the languages and culture local to their electorate, and therefore build on the *reconciliation path* between Indigenous Australians and non-Indigenous Australians” (p.32).

The *value of languages* was discussed from the perspective of *reconciliation* numerous times throughout the inquiry (p.15).

The Committee sees *the benefits* of greater recognition of Indigenous languages as having a positive impact on slowing the rapid decline of Indigenous languages, improving self-esteem and identity *for Indigenous Australians*, assisting in all areas of *Closing the Gap on Indigenous disadvantage* and *improving reconciliation outcomes for all Australians*” (p.2).

The Committee is of the view that *constitutional recognition of Indigenous Australians, and their unique cultures, languages and heritage is an important step forward for the nation as a whole* (p.74).

The Committee has presented a set of recommendations that chart a future for Indigenous languages and assist our Indigenous youth to grow strong in culture and in heritage and with *the skills and opportunities to participate fully in the Australian society and economy* (p.211).

International research has demonstrated that *bilingualism also has cognitive and developmental benefits*. Internationally, there has been recognition of *the value of bilingualism in preserving and valuing traditions, enriching individuals, and in creating modern flexible and tolerant societies* (p.19).

The overwhelming evidence was that children learning in a bilingual environment can grow and prosper in a bilingual or multilingual way and have improved *Standard Australian English outcomes* (p.211).

One further barrier to the implementation of the report's recommendations is the assumption that government policies, practices and funding have been adequate, and that there is, therefore, no need to change the *status quo*. This perspective is revealed, in part, in the following excerpt:

The Committee cannot reconcile the statement made by the [National Indigenous Languages Policy] under its 'actions' that greater attention and support is being provided for Indigenous languages, when funding for language projects has declined effectively in real terms (p.67).

The report identifies a number of dislocatory events, particularly highly criticised policies, where evidence of their ineffectiveness is conclusive. For example:

The Committee experienced first-hand difficulties with the supply and service of Indigenous interpreters during the inquiry (p.168).

[T]he Committee believes this policy [English in the First Four Hours] was not successful in achieving its aims of improving educational outcomes for Indigenous students in the Northern Territory (p.119).

The Committee received a lot of evidence that described the negative impact of NAPLAN testing for children who learn English as an additional Language (p.123).

The government's assumptions regarding its own effectiveness are further undermined through the highlighting of discrepancies between promises and achievements:

In 2009 the Commonwealth Government announced a national Indigenous languages policy: Indigenous Languages – A National Approach. The policy was a response to the NILS Report 2005, which found that the situation of Australia's Indigenous languages was grave and required urgent action. . . . In the policy announcement, the Government stated that it was

committed to addressing the serious problem of language loss in Indigenous communities The Committee received substantial evidence about the National Indigenous Languages Policy. A common theme was that while stakeholders welcomed the announcement of the policy, there was little evidence that it was being fully implemented (p.11).

Other responses highlighted that few concrete or newly funded activities have resulted from the policy. For example, the AEU asserted that ‘there appears to be a significant disjuncture between policy statements and actual practice’ (p.54).

The report writers also draw attention to repeated failure on the part of governments to accept and implement recommendations of bodies they themselves established. Extracts such as the following one highlight the primarily rhetorical nature of responses to some of these recommendations by previous governments:

In 1992 the House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs recommended the establishment ‘of a national interpreter service for Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander languages to ensure that people have reliable access to trained interpreters and translators’. Twenty years later, this Committee is appalled that it is faced with making the same recommendations to government and trusts it will not be met with the inaction that has characterised successive governments (p.185).

In a similar example, Committee members not only draw attention to repeated failures to follow recommendations but also to the negative (or in this case discriminatory) implications of such failure:

The Committee reiterates its recommendations from its 1992 and 2011 reports that a national Indigenous interpreting service is established to ensure Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders are allowed the same access to interpreting services as other Australians (p.185).

In addition to exposing the government's inaccurate perception of its own effectiveness, the Committee also redefines the concept of 'effective language revitalisation', a concept that is, within the context of the hegemonic discourse, assumed to be 'top-down'. Critical success indicators become *partnership, community ownership of language revitalisation* and *appropriately supported self-determination*:

Indigenous Languages policy writers will need to work closely with Aboriginal communities and educational institutions to ensure engagement in decision making for the provision of effective outcomes in this arena (p.96).

The Committee sees the inclusion of Indigenous languages in the Closing the Gap targets as an essential acknowledgement of *the collaborative approach that must take place between governments and Indigenous communities*. The role of governments is to assist Indigenous communities to achieve the same opportunities and wellbeing outcomes as non-Indigenous Australians. *Indigenous Australians must continue to demonstrate a commitment to develop partnerships with governments to preserve and maintain languages within communities (p.31).*

The Committee believes that *community ownership of Indigenous language programs is essential for the successful maintenance and revival of Australia's Indigenous languages (p.67).*

The Committee believes that the term 'bilingual education' in the past has received negative connotations due to the fact that *bilingual programs have lacked thorough community consultation . . . Careful consideration should be given to the process of delivering bilingual programs and most importantly real local community consultation is required to successfully implement bilingual programs (p.120).*

The Committee does not see it as the role of the government to teach a child their culture or their first language. *However, there is a role for governments*

to assist communities to take on this responsibility when a history of social problems has diminished the current capacity of a community to be able to do so for itself (p.30).

The Committee's long term vision is for *community owned and operated language centres*, which respond to the increased demand for Indigenous languages services and for these services to be valued nationwide (p.200).

We see that valuing and supporting the use of Indigenous languages . . . has enormous impacts on . . . *and a sense of empowerment to control their own future* (p.22).

While retaining their general agonistic tone,¹⁶⁶ the report writers provide a wealth of counter-evidence and argument in order to subtly expose and undermine some of the critical ideological barriers to accepting the report's recommendations. They also discursively re-create key signifiers, such as Australia(ns), value, benefits, community ownership, self-determination and effectiveness, in ways that both counter the purposes of potential adversaries and improve the likelihood of acceptance of the report's recommendations. The answer to *Questions 11 and 12* is, therefore, yes.

3.4 Responses to *Our Land Our Languages*

3.4.1 Non-government responses

3.4.1.1 Positive responses

Following its release on September 17th 2012, *Our land Our Languages* was met with very positive media coverage and the unanimous support of insider organisations. On the day of its release, Amnesty International Australia (2012, September 17) and the National Congress of Australia's First Peoples (2012, September 17) released media statements welcoming the findings, while Greg Dickson, an academic at the Australian National University (2012, September 17) described it as "a thorough, measured, yet still ambitious document". Charis Palmer

¹⁶⁶ Even so, these reformulations do have the potential to represent a significant threat to those of a monolingual and monocultural mindset.

(2012, September 17), news editor of *The Conversation*, observed that the report has been welcomed by “language and Indigenous experts”, and Emma Murphy (2012, September 20), of *Green Left*, noted the positive response of “bilingual education advocates.” One week after its release, Lisa Waller (2012, September 26), writing for *Inside Story*, was in a position to assert that the “recommendations have met with overwhelmingly positive news coverage and public discussion in social media”. Furthermore, several respondents commented favourably on the bipartisan nature of Committee membership (ABC News, 2012, September 17; Amnesty International Australia, 2012, September 17; Karvelas, 2012, September 18), with ‘Frank Baarda’¹⁶⁷ (2012, September 17) describing the report as being “intelligent[ly] bi-partisan”.¹⁶⁸

Particularly noteworthy were responses that referred to the report as being truly different and/or of major significance. Thus, Lisa Waller (2012, September 26), noted that it “proposes a *major shift* in the way the nation understands and recognises Indigenous languages”, with “constructive recommendations” which “signal an encouraging shift in attitudes”. Rosa McKenna, former principal at the *Yolŋu* school in North-East Arnhem Land, who had found herself out of a job after commenting on the negative impact the *English in the First Four Hours* policy in a Four Corners programme, commented on the report’s negative response to that policy, adding: *Isn’t it interesting that with the flow-on from one positive report the whole discourse changes* (Waller, 2012, September 26). The extract below is from an entry by Professor Claire Bowern (2012, September 18) of Yale University on the language blog Fully (sic):

We’re all in a tizz at Fully [sic] over the new report *Our land our languages*. We’re usually pretty mellow when it comes to government releases *but this one is worth taking up some pixel space over It is not often that the opportunity comes along to make a real difference, but a new report into Indigenous languages in Australia has the potential to do just that. . . . We*

¹⁶⁷ The author names provided in online comments that are cited in this thesis are assumed to be pseudonyms. They will be identified with single quotation marks and referenced accordingly.

¹⁶⁸ This importance of bipartisan support is seen in a comment by Andrew Lynch and Jennifer Goh (2012, September 21) that it was “the lack of bipartisan support” that had caused the proposal for constitutional recognition of Indigenous people to drift.

have seen many reports on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islanders and their lives *This report is different.*

There are a number of reasons for such positive insider and media responses. One is the fact that, as several commentators noted, the report fully reflects the submissions made to the Committee. Thus, for example, a National Congress of Australia's First Peoples (2012, September 17) response stressed that "[the] Committee has listened" and noted that "almost every point in the Congress submission is included in the Committee's recommendations". Similar sentiments were expressed by Bill Fogarty (Palmer, 2012, September 17), research associate at the Australia National University, who observed that "it was nice to see the Committee taking on board evidence provided", adding that "[in] Indigenous affairs it sometimes feels like submissions are ignored for policy and political expedience purposes".

Another reason for the positive nature of most insider responses to the report is the fact that it was seen as being oriented towards indigenous self-determination. Thus, for example, Bower (2012, September 18) wrote that it is unlike other Government responses to Indigenous disadvantage in that solutions are found within Indigenous communities rather than being imposed upon them:

Rather than treating Aboriginal people as a problem to be solved, or adding yet another layer of bureaucracy onto already micro-managed lives, *this report is about finding solutions within communities. Many previous reports have exposed a shameful history of abuse and neglect. This time, we see case after case of people doing the best they can under extraordinarily difficult circumstances.* The findings should not be another opportunity for white Australia to spend a week of soul searching and brow beating before forgetting yet again about our vow that *this time we'll be different.* It's a chance to see what local communities have been doing and to support those efforts. . . .

Much of the commentary stressed the thorough, measured, ambitious and research-based nature of the report's recommendations. Thus, 'wamut' (2012, September

17), a contributor to Greg Dickson's article in the Crikey blog, commented that "[the] report is the product of a lot of research and investigation" and that "[they] know what they are talking about" As Professor Bower (2012, September 18) observes:

These recommendations are not shots in the dark; they are not guesses at a solution. They are the outcomes of a year of interviews and sifting of research which shows what communities have done to help their languages survive. The committee has documented what can be achieved on a shoestring and in the face of national apathy and often unhelpful or hostile policies.

In a further response, Bower (2012, September 21) asserted that the reason why the report is so important is that its writers understand what is fundamentally required to save a language. She notes that its thirty recommendations "*cover a very broad range of activities . . . a great example of 'thinking big'*", a point also made by Bianca Hall (2012, September 18), who referred to the "*wide-ranging' nature of the report*".

The committee also received praise for its strategic approach. Thus, for example, Greg Dickson (2012, September 17) made the following observation:

*Perhaps in the report's favour is that many recommendations target education and will bypass Indigenous Affairs Minister Jenny Macklin. Instead, Peter Garrett and state education ministers are being asked to look carefully at how schools handle indigenous languages.*¹⁶⁹

A wide range of organisations and individuals appear to have found in the report ample evidence of attention to those things that particularly concerned them. Thus,

¹⁶⁹ Dickson (personal communication, 2012, March 3) explains that "Jenny Macklin has a reputation . . . for not being terribly sympathetic to the plight of Indigenous people" and cites her hard line in pushing through the recent intervention-like *Stronger Futures* legislation as an example. *Stronger Futures* is considered by many as a continuation of the Northern Territory's *Intervention*. Dickson also states that "Peter Garrett has a history of being more sympathetic to Indigenous issues" although he notes that most of that reputation stems from his pre-politics career in music and environmental activism.

for example, Amnesty International Australia (2012, September 17) picked out six recommendations (9, 14, 21-23 & 25) of direct relevance to their own stance. Tim Gartrell, Director of You Me Unity, the campaign for constitutional recognition of Indigenous Australians, was reported (in Karvelas, 2012, August, 18) as expressing strong support for the recommendation relating to recognition of indigenous languages in the Constitution; and academics Bill Fogarty and Claire Bower (Palmer, 2012, September 17) stressed their support for the recommendations relating to language archiving.

Overall, the recommendations that received the most frequent positive comments were those relating to Indigenous and bilingual school programmes and the provision of an alternative assessment tool for students learning English as an additional language or dialect.¹⁷⁰ Support was often unequivocal, as in the case of endorsement of the Committee's position on the use of children's first language in the early years of schooling by, for example, Aidan Wilson (2012, September 18), Nikki Hatfield (in Adcock and Whop, 2012, September 18), Gregoriana Parker (Australian Associated Press, 2012, September 17), Warren Mundine (Karvelas, 2012, September 18), 'Catherine.Cox@sa.gov.au' (2012, September 18) and 'wamut' (2012, September 17).¹⁷¹

Many of the respondents called on the Government to act on the recommendations or, at least, expressed the hope that they would do so. Professor Gillian Wigglesworth, Director of the University of Melbourne's Indigenous Language Research Unit, expressed "hopeful optimism that the report would have an impact" and noted that "various governments will see that the weight of evidence supports measures" (University of Melbourne, 2012, September 26). She concluded:

¹⁷⁰ Other recommendations that received particular support include: (a) language to be considered part of identity and well-being and therefore as critical to *Closing the Gap* (see Mick Dodson quoted in Karvelas, 2012, September 18; and National Congress of Australia's First Peoples, 2012, September 17); (b) that Indigenous languages are endangered through Government neglect (see Jody Broun quoted in ABC News, 2012, September 17); (c) that Australian multilingualism is a positive ('Frank Baarda', 2012, September 17; 'Jon Altman', 2012, September 28; and 'Secomb Michael', 2012, September 18).

¹⁷¹ Nikki Hatfield is an Aboriginal elder and teacher; Gregoriana Parker is a Tiwi Islander; Warren Mundine is a former Labor Party president.

We have a real chance of improving the lives of the tens of thousands of Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander people . . . *But for that to happen, we need the governments to get behind the committee's findings and act immediately.*

Kerry McCallum (Waller, 2012, September 26), lead researcher on an Australian News Media and Indigenous Policymaking 1988–2008 project at the University of Melbourne, referred to the overwhelmingly positive response to the report, asking: *Can the rhetoric be translated into political action?* She added:

Governments will only bring about positive change in Indigenous affairs by leading public opinion, not following it . . . Governments are the most powerful players in society . . . If they want positive change in Indigenous affairs they have to drive it by deliberately framing the debate in positive ways and working to bring the community along with them.

Media releases from organisations were most direct in urging the government to act. Amnesty International Australia (2012, September 17) called on the government *“to accept and implement the recommendations”*; the National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples (2012, September 17) noted that it awaited *“the Government’s response as to how it intends to implement the recommendations from the report, and urge[d] them to significantly increase language resourcing accordingly”*.

Related to calls for action was the sober reflection in a number of articles that recommendations such as those included in the report have been made before and not acted on, something that was often presented as an additional reason why there should be an immediate and positive Government response in this case.¹⁷² One of

¹⁷² Lisa Waller (2012, September 26) for example, wrote that “history and contemporary politics suggest that transforming them [the recommendations] into statutory recognition and policy action will be a challenge”. Professor Claire Bower was quoted by Palmer (2012, September 17) as stating that “we’ve been here before” in the context of identifying recommendations going back to the Royal Commission into Aboriginal Deaths in Custody in the late 1980s and the *‘Ampe Akelyernemane Meke Mekarle’* (Little Children are Sacred) report. Bill Fogarty (also in Palmer, 2012, September 17) agreed with Bower that the recommendations could be found in a string of other reports on Indigenous communities. In Bower’s own article a day later (Bower, 2012, September 18), she recalled former Prime Minister Paul Keating’s statement in his 1992 landmark Redfern speech that

the most recent of these previous reports is the Gonski review of school funding (Department of Education, Employment and Workplace Relations, 2011, p.xi). In his report on that review David Gonski insisted that differences in educational outcomes should not be the result of differences in wealth, income, power or possessions and, therefore, that reducing educational disadvantage, which severely affects children from Indigenous backgrounds, should be a high priority in a new funding model. It is not surprising then that Fogarty (Palmer, 2012, September 17) noted that the recommendations included in *Our Land Our Languages* were “well-timed given the Federal Government’s response to the Gonski review of school funding”.

Our Land Our Languages leaves us in no doubt that it had a constituency of support, something that is borne out by, for example, the following excerpt from an article by the *National Congress of Australia’s First Peoples* (2012, September 17):

Congress worked hard to ensure *our members and member organisations who are experts in these areas were instrumental in developing a strong, evidence based report to the committee.*

There is evidence in several of the responses to the report of a direct attempt to extend and act upon this constituency of support, as indicated in the following extract from an article by Green Left’s Emma Murphy (2012, September 20):

The task now for Aboriginal communities and defenders of bilingual education will be to make sure governments start putting funding and resource commitments on the table We must ensure governments don’t adopt the easier, more symbolic recommendations and let the actual hard work fall by the wayside

the treatment of Australia’s Indigenous people was “the test which so far we have always failed”. She added: “Twenty years later, we are still failing. But now is an incredible opportunity to do better. Let’s not waste it.”

Thus, the report appears to have been a catalyst for renewed efforts from supporters. Also appearing to act as a catalyst are comments, relating to one another and to the report, by members of the Committee itself.¹⁷³

3.4.1.2 Positive responses with reservations

A number of responses to the report, while being largely positive, expressed reservations about certain aspects of it, particularly in terms of practicality. Thus, for example, Adcock and Whop (2012, September 18) reported that the principal of Cherbourg State School had stated that although attempting to accommodate different languages “is a good initiative . . . it may not be practical in some schools”, noting that the local Wakka Wakka language had very few speakers and that over 40 different languages were represented in that particular school alone. Similarly, Wilson (2012, September 18) reported that one commentator had observed that “finding teachers able to teach in indigenous languages will be fearsomely difficult and likely to lead to language proficiency trumping any real aptitude to teach”. ‘Singer Ruth’ (2012, September 18), while supportive of bilingual education, noted that the number of distinct languages and the ‘high mobility’ of communities would be problems, and ‘janis price’ (2012, October 27) observed that “[m]ost . . . ‘Grow your Own’ indigenous teachers have great difficulty with the jargon of curriculum and assessment”. For Waller (2012, September 26), an important issue was the report’s failure to identify a role for the news media which “have a key role to play in fostering a more positive national conversation about Indigenous language

¹⁷³ Shane Neumann (see Neumann, 2012, September 17; ABC News, 2012, September 17; and Karvelas, 2012, September 17) made positive reference to “the deputy chair, the Hon. Dr Sharman Stone [a liberal Party MP], and the cooperation all committee members on *both sides of politics* for this bipartisan report”. In a speech to Parliament, Stone (2012, September 17) endorsed Neumann’s assertion that the inquiry was “a most important [one]”. Labor MP Graham Perrett (2012, September 17) exclaimed in a speech in parliament (in the Federation Chamber) that “[this] was a unanimous report - a unanimous report”, adding that “[d]espite the range of political views in that committee, we were able to come up with a report in which we all agreed that this was an important thing to do”. The following day Sharon Grierson (2012, September 18), referring to what she called “a wonderful report”, commented, before going on to acknowledge the work the other members of the Committee, that it was “a great privilege - a real personal privilege - to be a member of the committee and a member of the inquiry that led to this report”. This sense of internal coalition is reinforced by the fact that the Committee’s media statements following the release of the report, all align with each other and the report’s recommendations. It is also reinforced in statements by the Committee urging the Government to act on the recommendations. Graham Perrett (2012, September 17), for example, insisted that recognising and preserving indigenous language “is the right thing to do and we should do it”. Similarly, in concluding his speech tabling the report, Shane Neumann made the following statement: *[I]f we want to celebrate and recognise our Indigenous languages, we must take action and we must take action now. For too long we have failed. It is tragic. It is dire. Action is required. I urge the government to take that action and I am pleased to support this report.*

policies”. For Nicolas Biddle (2012, October 3), the report did not resolve the fundamental dilemma of “how to improve the health, education and employment prospects of Indigenous Australians without sacrificing the enduring differences in language and culture valued by Indigenous Australians and the majority of the rest of the population”.

3.4.1.3 Negative responses

There were, as one would expect, some detractors. Thus, for example, Karvelas (2012, September 17), writing for *The Australian* (a centre right publication), described the Committee as being ‘Labor-dominated’, and right wing commentator Andrew Bolt (2012, September 24), in an article critical of the report, described it as being “teary-eyed”. Bolt’s primary complaint, notwithstanding the report’s endorsement of the universal need for English language competency, was that the report’s recommendations would lead to a lowering of English language competence among ‘Aboriginal children’ and consign young indigenous people to the status of “exhibits in a cultural museum”. Interestingly, despite the evidence presented in the report, he refers to certain aspects of the recommendations as being ‘pure guesswork’ and ‘against common sense’ and to the support that the report had had from opposing sides of the political arena as ‘tragic’.

Those aspects of the report that received most negative criticism were: (a) its assertion that indigenous languages are valuable in the contemporary world, (see, for example, ‘Linus Bowden’ (2012, September); Peter Gerard (2012, September))¹⁷⁴, (b) its insistence that teaching through home languages in the initial years of schooling can have a positive impact on educational achievement generally and on English language proficiency in particular (see, for example, Scott (2012, September 17) and ‘Warren Joffe’ (2012, September), and (c) the assertion that there are benefits for non-Indigenous Australians in indigenous language revitalisation (see, for example, ‘John Coochey’ (2012, September) and ‘Steve Hindle’ (2012, September). Finally, ‘Arthur Bell’ (2012, September 18), who

¹⁷⁴ The type of assertion underpinned all six comments to Karvelas (2012, September 18) as well the sole comment to Altman (2013, April 19). A typical example is the comment by ‘Botswana O’Hooligan’ (2012, September 18) that “Aboriginal people must realise . . . it’s fine to speak your mother tongue at home but if you want to get ahead at anything in Australia you must be fluent in English and able to communicate in English, not some esoteric Aboriginal language or any other language, but English.”

described himself as being “of obvious Aboriginal heritage”, referred to the report’s association of indigenous languages with identity as being “sickening and More Humbug and Waffle!”

3.4.2 Government responses

The value of the report appears to have been endorsed by the main ‘right’ and ‘left’ wings of Australian politics. Even the negative article by Andrew Bolt (2012, September 24) despaired that both sides were “tragically . . . backing” the report.

Emma Murphy (2012, September 20) reported that “Labor and the Coalition were quick to welcome the report”, adding, however, that agreement was ‘in principle’. Committee member Graham Perrett (2012, September 17) stated that both Education Minister Peter Garrett and the Minister of the Arts had ‘embraced’ the report and shown “a willingness . . . to further [it]”, although he noted that embracing it does not constitute a “formal governmental response”. Patricia Karvelas (2012, September 18) of *The Australian*, reported that (a) Education Minister Peter Garrett’s spokeswoman had stated that the government “welcomes this report and recognises the importance of preserving indigenous languages”, and (b) Garrett himself had “declared he [would] talk to state governments about adopting bilingual education for indigenous children” and had begun work on a new Indigenous languages framework for the new curriculum. She also reported (Karvelas, 2012, September 18) that Nigel Scullion, opposition indigenous affairs spokesperson (representing the Liberal coalition), had welcomed the report, making some supportive comments about transitional bilingual education.

The first positive Government response was in March 2013, with the formal agreement by the speaker of the House of Representatives (Parliament of Australia, 2013, March) to recommendation 3, that is, the recommendation that the Commonwealth Parliament demonstrate leadership in recognising and valuing Indigenous languages within its building and operations and encourage Members of Parliament to do the same in their electorates (pp.xvii & 32). In particular, the speaker agreed to ensure that signs or documents that accompany Indigenous artefacts or references in Parliament house would be expressed in the relevant Indigenous language(s) in addition to English. This recommendation was referred

to the *Standing Committee on Procedure* to consider how best to further respond to all aspects of the recommendation.

A further positive response to some of the recommendations was included in a National cultural policy, entitled *Creative Australia*, which was released on 13th March 2013. This comprehensive policy ties Australian creativity to job creation, prosperity and national identity and provides A\$235 million in new funding to a wide range of arts and cultural areas, including a small number of areas that clearly derive from *Our Land Our Languages*.¹⁷⁵ For example, it is noted that the A\$13.983 million new funding extension for community-driven language resources and activities under the ILS programme “responds to key findings of the *Our Land Our Languages* report” (Australian Government, 2013, p.19). This funding has been generally welcomed by indigenous language supporters (see, for example, Arnost, 2013, March 15). However, Greg Dickson (2013, March 13) notes that this level of funding is unlikely to go far in relation to the revitalisation of more than 250 indigenous languages:

While I’m loathe to look a gift horse in the mouth, I’m not sure that this increase in funding is significant enough to tackle the attrition of Aboriginal languages in Australia or bring about significant community development outcomes, employment or other measures that will contribute to the Closing The Gap framework.

Other elements of *Creative Australia* that link to recommendations made in *Our Land Our Languages* include (a) the goal of updating the National Indigenous Language Policy, (b) the A\$12.8 million (albeit over two years – see Altman, 2013, April 19) of additional funding provided to the AIATSIS for “further digital preservation of collections at risk of permanent loss, and, (c) the promise to “consider amendments to the definition of a cultural organisation under the Register of Cultural Organisations (ROCO) program so as to include Aboriginal and Torres

¹⁷⁵ *Creative Australia* was influenced by a number of sources including its own consultation process. Other sources that are referenced include an independent review of the Australian Council of the Arts, the Review of Private Sector National Arts and Disability Strategy, the Industry and Innovation Statement and the Australia in the Asian Century white paper (Meyrick, 2013, March 20).

Strait Islander languages” (Australian Government, 2013, pp.3, 78, 85, 93 & 146).¹⁷⁶

The Australian Government’s formal and comprehensive response to the *Our Land Our Languages* report was tabled in the *House of Representatives* on the 6th of June 2013. In this response the Government acknowledges “the *importance of the committee’s research*” and the “*value of its findings*” and agrees with the following assertions made in the report: (a) that indigenous languages are intrinsically connected to “educational, vocational and economic outcomes . . . improving self-esteem and identity of Indigenous Australians . . . assisting in all areas of closing the gap on Indigenous disadvantage and improving reconciliation outcomes”, and (b) that the Government “has an important ongoing role in supporting Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander communities” (Australian Government, 2013, June 6, p.2).

Of the 30 recommendations, six (6) were *agreed to*, twelve (12) were agreed to *in-principle*, two were agreed to *in-part* (2); and nine (9) were *noted*, with the only recommendation that was rejected outright being the recommendation that an alternative testing tool for NAPLAN be developed. In addition to Parliamentary recognition of Indigenous languages (recommendation #3) and the proposals which form a part of the *Creative Australia* cultural policy (recommendations #4, 5, 7 & 28) (which had already been announced),¹⁷⁷ the Government agrees to acknowledge Indigenous languages as a fundamental part of the *Closing the Gap* framework (recommendation #1), to support and progress bilingual signage of place names and landmarks (recommendation #2) and to support Torres Strait Islanders’ languages

¹⁷⁶ There was some concern that the sacking of Arts Minister Simon Crean (for a failed leadership *coup* that occurred shortly after the announcement of this policy) may affect the implementation of this policy (Brandle, 2013, March 22; Eltham, 2013, March 22). However, the new Minister for the Arts, Tony Burke was reported (Westwood, 2013, March 26) as stating that “those commitments are government policy ... and I am getting ahead with implementing them.”

¹⁷⁷ The formal response also provides additional information in relation to the update of the National Indigenous Languages Policy and Action Plan (recommendation #4), which was part of the *Creative Australia* announcement. This information includes the fact that (a) the Policy and Action Plan will be completed by the end of 2013 and (b) the recommendations made in the *Our Land Our Languages* report will be taken into account in its development (Australian Government, 2013, June 6, p.4).

activities through the Indigenous Languages Support Program (recommendation #6).¹⁷⁸

Where recommendations have been *agreed in-principle* or *noted*, the Government generally identifies existing or pending frameworks, policies or strategies which either already align to the recommendations or will be impacted by the recommendations. For example, the responses to recommendations 23, 24, 25, 26 and 27 (relating to the development of Indigenous interpreting and translating) refer to a “*national framework* for the effective supply and use of Indigenous language Interpreters . . . [that] is expected to be completed in 2013.” In a similar way, the development of the *Framework for Aboriginal languages and Torres Strait Islander languages* (also due in 2013) is expected to meet the requirements of recommendations 11 and 20 (which relate to teaching resources and the curriculum). Furthermore, it is explained that a number of the action points (or initiatives that have resulted from them) that are a part of the *Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Education Action Plan 2010-2014* closely correlate with a number of recommendations included in *Our Land Our Languages* that relate to Indigenous education and Indigenous teacher training (#16, 17, 19, 21 & 22). Other examples of explanations of the ways in which recommendations included on *Our Land Our Languages* will be/are accommodated within the context of other Government initiatives are outlined below:

- Recommendation #16 relating to limited authority qualifications to teach will be drawn to the attention of the organisations that are considering the development of a *National Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Educator Workforce Strategy* (Australian government, 2013, June 6, p.10)
- Recommendations #18 and 19 relating to training and career pathways for indigenous language teachers are being addressed through systemic reforms that are driven by *Smarter Schools – Improving Teacher Quality National Partnership* as well as the *More Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Teachers Initiative* (Australian government, 2013, June 6, p.11).

¹⁷⁸ The commitment to bilingual signage will be included in the update of the National Indigenous Languages Policy action plan (Australian Government, 2013, June 6), p.4).

- Recommendation #22 relating to in-service EAL/D and cultural awareness training is achieved by *The Australian Professional Standards for Teachers* (to be implemented nationally from 2013), the *Teach Remote* initiative and the *Senior Officers National Network of Indigenous Education* (Australian government, 2013, June 6, p.13).

It is worth noting the Government is careful not to agree to implement recommendations or parts of recommendations that could transgress the jurisdiction of another Governing body or could be seen as ‘one-size fits all’ solution for communities. Thus for example,

States and territories are primarily responsible for the provision of teacher professional development in schools (Australian government, 2013, June 6, p.11).

State and territory governments are responsible for key elements of the health and justice systems Recognising the need for a coordinated approach, the Australian Government is currently seeking support of jurisdictions to develop a National Framework for the supply and use of Indigenous language interpreters (Australian Government, 2013, June 6, p.11).

Language Nest activities may not be the best approach . . . in every language situation in Australia. The Australian Government will continue to work with communities to assist them to make informed decisions about the *methods . . . most suited to their language situation* and to support capacity building in communities to enable them to deliver strong and effective language activities, including Language Nests (Australian Government, 2013, June 6, p.8).

3.5 Some concluding comments

In terms of all of the criteria derived from CDT that are applied here, *Our Land Our Languages* would be difficult to improve on. All of the questions posed can be

answered with a resounding *yes*. In the next two chapters, two New Zealand-based reports are analysed in terms of the same criteria. One of these (*Ko Aotearoa Tēnei*) is a Waitangi Tribunal report relating to indigenous flora and fauna and including a chapter dealing with the Māori language; the other (*Te Reo Mauriora*) is a government sponsored report on the *Review of the Māori language sector and the Māori Language Strategy*.

Chapter 4

A criterion-referenced analysis of *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei*

4.1 Introduction

In this chapter, *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei: A report into claims concerning New Zealand law and policy affecting Māori culture and identity*, released by the Waitangi Tribunal in 2011 is analysed in terms of the criteria outlined in *Chapter 2*. The chapter begins with the provision of some background information (4.2) before going on to the analysis itself (4.3) and discussion of the report's reception (4.4).

An electronic copy of this report is available from the Waitangi Tribunal website: www.waitangi-tribunal.govt.nz/reports/downloadpdf.asp?reportid={BF981901-5B55-441C-A93E-8E84B67B76E9}.pdf

4.2 Background to the report

The WAI 262 claim (*Indigenous flora and fauna, cultural intellectual property*) was lodged with the Waitangi Tribunal on the 9th of October 1991 by 6 claimants on behalf of themselves and their *iwi*.¹⁷⁹ The other party to the claim, the Crown, is both defendant and eventual arbiter of the report.¹⁸⁰

The claim arose from concerns that *mātauranga Māori* (Māori knowledge and ways of knowing) in relation to Māori *taonga* - including indigenous flora and fauna as well as Māori dialects - was being lost, as were the *taonga* themselves, and that the control guaranteed to Māori in the Treaty was being denied to them as a result of legal or policy decisions (Waitangi Tribunal (WT), 2011a, pp.17, 19). The overall direction of the claim is outlined in the preface to the report:

[T]he Wai 262 claim is really a claim about *mātauranga Māori* – that is, the unique Māori way of viewing the world, encompassing both traditional

¹⁷⁹ The claimants included Haana Murray (*Ngāti Kurī*), Hema Nui a Tawhaki Witana (*Te Rarawa*), Te Witi McMath (*Ngāti Wai*), Tama Poata (*Ngāti Porou*), Kataraina Rimene (*Ngāti Kahungunu*), and John Hippolite (*Ngāti Koata*).

¹⁸⁰ See *Section 1.3.2.1* for a background on the Waitangi Tribunal. The panel for the WAI 262 Inquiry was Justice Joe Williams (presiding officer from 2006), Keita Walker, Pamela Ringwood and Roger Maaka. The first presiding officer, Judge Richard Kearney, died in 2005.

knowledge and culture. The claimants, in other words, are seeking to preserve their culture and identity, and the relationships that culture and identity derive from (WT, 2011a, p.xxiii).

Given the centrality of the Māori language to Māori culture, identity and knowledge (WT, 2011a, p.154), as well as its already accepted status as a *taonga* (see below), it was also included in the scope of the claim. The initial focus was on tribal dialects and inappropriate or offensive uses. However, this was quickly discarded in favour of a focus on the protection of the language as a whole.¹⁸¹

There are a number of precedents to the WAI 262 claim, most of which are discussed in *Section 1.3.2.1*, that are referenced throughout the report and therefore are worth noting briefly here. They include, for example, the 1986 WAI 11 *Te Reo Māori* report (WT, 1986) which found that the Māori language was a *taonga* and therefore that the Government had an obligation to protect it, and the resulting *Māori Language Act 1987* which, although providing official (if vague) status for the language and establishing what is now called Te Taura Whiri i te Reo Māori (Te Taura Whiri), omitted key *WAI 11 Te Reo Māori* recommendations. Another precedent that is referenced is the 1994 Privy Council decision that the Government should take steps to protect Māori interests in the broadcasting spectrum.¹⁸² The findings and recommendations of the 2007 report of the Office of the Auditor General on progress towards the implementation of the *Māori Language Strategy* is also discussed in Te reo Māori chapter of the WAI 262 report, and appears to have had an influence on some of its recommendations.¹⁸³ Finally, the *United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples (UNDRIP)*, endorsed by

¹⁸¹ It was discarded as it was seen that the protection of the dialects cannot be divorced from protection of the whole (WT, 2011a, p.154).

¹⁸² The Privy Council decision is referenced in the Reo Māori chapter to support the report's assertions regarding its vulnerable state of the language (WT, 2011c, p.401 & 452); the Crown's obligation to preserve the language (2011c, p.442); the importance of Māori participation in decision making (WT, 2011c, p.453); the ability of shareholding ministers (in TVNZ) to accept a lower financial return (WT, 2011c, p.457).

¹⁸³ In re-positioning the Te Taura Whiri as lead sector agency the Tribunal states that "This will address the problems . . . identified by the OAG" (WT, 2011c, p.471). The Taumata II (V2) version includes a 2 page discussion on the Office of the Auditor-General findings (WT, 2011c, pp.462-464). This section also features a picture of the OAG report with the comment "The report paints a picture of lost opportunities due to poor communication and coordination, unrealistic expectations, and deprioritising within agencies."

New Zealand in 2010, is expected to have a large, albeit as yet unspecified, future influence on Crown/Māori relationships.¹⁸⁴

The WAI 262 claim report was released on the 2nd of July 2011. Its title - *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei* (KAT) - meaning ‘This is ‘*Aotearoa*’ or ‘This is New Zealand’ - is intended to be a reminder that *Aotearoa* and New Zealand must be able to co-exist in the same space. The report was published in two versions: a two volume, in-depth 884 page version (Taumata II), and an abridged 322 page version (Taumata I) which aims to be accessible to a general readership. Both are organised into 8 thematic chapters, the fifth of which has the following title: *Te reo Māori*.¹⁸⁵

Both versions of the report were accompanied by two page summary sheets for each chapter, one page press releases, and FAQ sheets available on the Tribunal website.¹⁸⁶

Although historical grievances are considered, the WAI 262 findings and recommendations for each chapter focus on the contemporary relationship between the Crown and Māori. Thus, recommendations include, for example, infrastructural changes, such as the establishment of new partnership bodies and funding agents as well as expanded roles for other bodies, improved support for some areas, and amendments to laws covering a wide range of issues.

¹⁸⁴ Although John Key emphasised the non-binding and aspirational nature of the *UNDRIP*, and New Zealand’s 2010 statement of acceptance was limited, its affirmation of the central role of the Treaty (and principles) has led political commentators such as Chen (2010, April 28); Sir Eddie Durie (2010, April 22); and Mutu (2011) and the Government (Sharples, 2010, April 20) to accept that *UNDRIP* will influence future policy. Moreover, a key Government briefing paper to the Attorney General regarding the *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei* report (Te Puni Kōkiri, 2010, October 6, p.4) expressed the view that *UNDRIP* would “form an important component in the development of the Government response to the WAI 262 report.” Finally, the Waitangi Tribunal has referenced the *UNDRIP* throughout this report, including the Te reo Māori chapter (see for example, the quotation of Article 13 in WT, 2011c, p.442). The Tribunal states that it views *UNDRIP* as a “significant development . . . that as a universal human rights instrument it binds all UN member states morally and politically to comply fully with its contents . . . [and] can become customary international law over time” (WT, 2011c, p.674).

¹⁸⁵ A prepublication version of this chapter was released in October 2010 in order to make their analysis available to the *Review of the Māori language sector and Māori Language Strategy*, which had commenced in July that year. There was very little difference between the draft and final versions. The final version was not updated to 2011 and any changes were minor only, relating to matters of report-wide consistency and cross-referencing (WT, 2011a, p.153).

¹⁸⁶ FAQ = frequently asked questions

The final version of the Te reo Māori chapter found that “the notion is that te reo is making steady forward progress, particularly amongst the young, is manifestly false” (WT, 2011c, p.467), that the health of the Māori language was “approaching a crisis point” (WT, 2011, July 2, p.1) and was unequivocal in identifying Government policies and practices as the primary cause. Reference was made to a lack of imagination, ambition and commitment in relation to the Māori language on the part of government. The report noted that there was little evidence of true partnership and that there had been repeated policy failures, a lack of commitment to the implementation of the 2003 Māori Language strategy, and inadequate resourcing. It also questioned why key WAI 11 recommendations had still not been implemented twenty five years after the 1986 report. The report’s main recommendations are intended to lead to a strengthening of Te Taura Whiri, which, it is claimed, “has largely been relegated to the role of a stable of language Technicians”.

[Te Taura Whiri i te Reo Māori should become] the lead Māori language sector agency . . . function as a Crown–Māori partnership with equal numbers of Crown and Māori appointees on its board . . . have greater powers, including the authority to require Māori language plans of . . . public agencies and authorities . . . and the authority to approve [Māori language] curricula . . . and set targets for the training of Māori language and Māori medium teachers (WT, 2011c, pp.477-478).

The report also recommended that authorities and agencies in districts that meet a specified Māori speaker number threshold, as well as schools that have a specified number/ percentage of Māori pupils, consult with local iwi in the formulation of their [Māori language] plans (WT, 2011c, p.478).

4.3 Criterion-referenced analysis of the report

Where italic print is used in extracts from the report, this is intended to draw attention to particular sections.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸⁷ In this section, the in-text citation of excerpts from the report will show only the year and page number. For example, instead of ‘(WT, 2011a, p.56)’ it will show ‘(2011a, p.56)’.

4.3.1 Criterion A: Representation of an ‘in-group’

Question 1: Is the construction/ representation of any ‘in-group’ identity consistent with the overall purpose of the text within its discourse context?

Question 2: Is the representation of any ‘in-group’ likely to be perceived as sufficiently inclusive and genuinely representative by the target membership of that group and to resonate positively with them?

The report constructs a future, inclusive ‘all New Zealand in-group’, which involves identifying New Zealand as an equal partnership between two founding cultures, which began with the *Treaty of Waitangi* in 1840.¹⁸⁸ The partners within the ‘New Zealander’ in-group (consisting of Māori New Zealanders (also referred to as *tangata whenua*) and non-Māori New Zealanders (including Pākehā and others)) are represented by the Crown / government.¹⁸⁹ Thus:

Will it be possible to normalise Crown–Māori relations as the architects of the Treaty settlement process intended? (2011a, p.16).

[T]he promise that was made when the *Crown and tangata whenua* entered their partnership at Waitangi (2011c, p.715).

Māori (and Māori language and culture) are an integral part of the partnership and are, therefore, central to the culture and identity of the country as a whole and their interests as well as the interests of others, are acknowledged:

Most non-Māori New Zealanders like the fact that Māori identity and culture is now a vital aspect of New Zealand identity and culture (2011a,

¹⁸⁸ This equal partnership paradigm is developed in the report by a creating mirror image migration myth for both Kupe’s people (Hawaikians who became Māori) and Cook’s people (British who became Pākehā) and then by positing the Treaty as the formal agreement to begin the partnership (2011a, p.14).

¹⁸⁹ *Tangata whenua* means person of the land, that is, a native or indigenous person. *Non-Māori New Zealanders* are also called *tangata tiriti*, ‘treaty person’, that is someone who belongs to New Zealand by virtue of the Treaty (see 2011b, p.495). The term *Pākehā* generally refers to fair-skinned non-Māori New Zealanders: See footnotes in *Section 1.2.2* for more information.

p.15).

New Zealanders are unconsciously and organically building a new and unique national identity. It will, we suggest, come to be based on two things: the extraordinary natural beauty and wealth of these islands, and *the partnership between our two founding cultures* (2011a, p.16).

Such a commitment will not only fulfil – at last – the promise that was made when the *Crown and tangata whenua entered their partnership* at Waitangi . . . (2011c, p.715).

The Māori language is important for Māori and *is also an important part of New Zealand's culture and identity* (2011, July 2, p.1).

As New Zealand becomes more ethnically diverse, it is likely that *our indigenous culture can help unify us and define our national identity*. Te reo Māori will be a critical aspect of this (2011a, p.177).

[Māori interests have] to be . . . *balanced against* any valid interests of other New Zealanders and of the nation as a whole, if those interests are in tension. As we have said elsewhere, conflict between Māori and New Zealand interests is not to be assumed (2011a, p.237).

This partnership to date is seen as having been characterised by disharmony, a situation that, “continue[s] to test our collective comfort zones” (2011a, p.14). In that Māori are presented as having “largely met their obligations” (2011c, p.470), it is the lack of non-Māori commitment to partnership that is seen as having created this disharmony. So far as the report writers are concerned, the pathway to national harmony is one that involves acceptance of and, more importantly, commitment to a restructured national identity based on the equal partnership:

[S]uch a commitment will not only fulfil – at last – the promise that was made when the Crown and tangata whenua entered their partnership at Waitangi. *It will also pave the way for a new approach to the Treaty*

relationship: as a relationship of equals, each looking not to the grievances of the past but with optimism to a shared future. (2011c, p.715).

Over the next decade or so, the Crown–Māori relationship, still currently fixed on Māori grievances, must shift to a less negative and more future focused relationship at all levels (2011a, p.16)

This restructuring of the (*future*) national identity necessarily involves the creation of *potential* new identities for each ‘partner’. Thus Pākehā are presented as ‘native’ New Zealanders who are different from the colonial Other in that their identity is created, in part, with reference to Māori. At the same time, Māori indigeneity, while still asserted, is now framed within partnership terms:

It is clear that slowly the British became Pākehā, native sons and daughters of these soils in their own right – a distinct people (2011a, p.14).

In this way, we reject the old colonial label of little Britain in the south Pacific and express our unique heritage (2011a, p.15).

Although this all-Aotearoa/ New Zealand partnership configuration has the potential to undermine the widely accepted discourse of Māori as the sole indigenous people, it does not do so. Indeed, the unique indigenous character of Māori is placed at the very core of this new sense of genuine partnership identity:

. . . Māori culture is our national culture – it helps give all New Zealanders a sense of who they are (2011a, p.245).

[T]he Treaty principle of partnership between the Crown and Māori. . . . reminds us . . . that *Kupe’s people are at the core of New Zealand’s unique identity as a nation (2011a, p.24).*

Bicultural fusion gives our vibrant multicultural reality a solid core with enough gravity to pull later immigrant cultures into orbit around its vision, values, and expectations. A nation cannot sustain itself without that solid

core (2011a, p.16).

. . . the Treaty of course also grants the Māori interest a greater status than simply that of a minority group within society (2011c, p.442).

A further strand of this national partnership discourse is the re-identification of the Government as being *potentially* thoroughly representative and reflective of Māori, even to the point of aiming to be Māori speaking:

On the Crown's part there needs to be a *mind-shift away from the pervasive assumption that the Crown is Pākehā, English-speaking and distinct from Māori* (2011a, p.167).

The Government itself has failed to become more Māori speaking *and thus reflect the aspirations of a growing number of the citizens it represents* (2011c, p.470).

. . . *there is no reason why the Crown must be monolingual in English*. In referring to the relationship between 'the Crown and Māori', it is important not to overlook the fact that *the Crown represents Māori too* – it is not a Pākehā institution, even if that has been its character for much of the past (2011c, p.457).¹⁹⁰

In drawing on the hegemonic 'New Zealand as state' identity to make its point, the Tribunal appears to implicitly acknowledge a fundamental contest over the key signifier 'New Zealand', one that relates to the overdetermined Crown being identified both as 'equal partner' and final arbiter (of the Tribunal's recommendations). Central to this contest is the fact that the 'New Zealand as state' identity is considered, by the Crown, to be more representative and inclusive than is the 'New Zealand as an equal partnership' identity:

¹⁹⁰ Furthermore, the assumption that the Crown is Pākehā' is linked to a lack of support for the Māori language movement (WT, 2011c, pp.407, 469-470 & 477).

The core of the Crown's position was that protecting what the claimants seek is impractical, and has consequences for *New Zealand and New Zealanders* that must be considered (2011b, p.71)

In light of this, an implicit characteristic of the New Zealand partnership-based in-group proposed in the report is that it is self-selected. That is, New Zealanders are metaphorically offered the choice of belonging to this partnership-based in-group (or not):

New Zealand sits *poised at a crossroads* both in race relations and on our long quest for a mature sense of national identity (2011a, p.xvii).

. . . this country began in consensus as two peoples, and . . . now, as many peoples, *must continue* on that path (2011a, p.24).

Given that some New Zealanders, may “feel a sense of unease about these ideas [equal partnership]” (2011c, p.715), not to mention “the corresponding claim [by Māori] to resources, both fiscal and otherwise” (2011c, p.442), this partnership-based identity may be rejected. The Tribunal is aware of this possibility and forwards a number of arguments in favour of its acceptance, not least of which is the fact that:

Altered demographics mean we must do this in any event. In the life of the nation Māori are now much more to the fore and there is no turning back from that. So, while the Treaty makes it a constitutional responsibility to adjust the Crown–Māori relationship, *even without the Treaty the country would have a social and political responsibility to do so.* The number of Māori is predicted to rise to over 800,000 by 2026, which suggests that the total will nudge one million by mid-century.

Tribunal members have attempted to discursively create a new ‘in-group’ identity, one that is rooted in genuine equal partnership. In doing so, they grant to Pākehā a ‘native’ status while reinforcing Māori as the sole indigenous group. This is combined with the articulation of Government as potentially thoroughly

representative of Māori. However, as the extracts above indicate, in-group identity as represented in *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei* is largely *potential* rather than actual.¹⁹¹ This in-group is made up of those people, including representatives of government, who are committed to securing genuine partnership. The report writers are implicitly represented as already having opted for membership of this group. Otherwise, membership is open to both Māori and non-Māori in a process of self-selection. Thus, although it is potentially a fully inclusive group, it differs from the all-Australia ‘in-group’ presented in *Our Land Our Languages* in a fundamental way: the presupposition there is that Australians have already, in general, committed to membership.

Thus, although the construction/ representation of an ‘all New Zealand in-group’ is consistent with the overall purpose of the text within its discourse context, and although it is certainly inclusive, it is presented as being potential rather than actual. It is not only predicated on a major attitudinal shift, but on one that represents a clear threat to hegemonic ‘statehood’ discourse. This remains the case irrespective of the ways in which the report writers present the negative consequences of failure to commit to this inclusive identity. Those New Zealanders who fear the loss of control that would be associated with genuine partnership (including government representatives) are unlikely to endorse the report’s recommendations. Those Māori who remain unconvinced that any major repositioning by the Crown is likely in the foreseeable future and may, therefore, feel that acceptance of the report’s recommendations could lead to a lessening of Māori resistance, are equally unlikely to endorse them. The answer to the two questions with which this section began must be, for the present at least, no. *Nevertheless, the vision of a future based on genuine partnership rather than ongoing dispute is one that is likely to have considerable appeal for many and may, in time, gain more widespread acceptance.*

4.3.2 Criterion B: Representation of an ‘other’ identity

Question 3: Is the construction/ representation of any ‘other’ identity group consistent with the overall purpose of the text within its discourse context?

¹⁹¹ One extract that does signal a little more than potentiality is: *New Zealanders are unconsciously and organically building a new and unique national identity* (WT, 2011a, p.16).

Question 4: Is the representation of any 'other' identity group likely to be perceived as inaccurate, disrespectful or offensive by the target membership of that group?

As part of the attempt to create a New Zealand in-group, the report writers seek to dissociate Pākehā New Zealanders from both colonial and British identities:

But Cook's people did not stay British. They succumbed to the whenua's slow seduction just as surely as Kupe's people had. The transplanted British institutions and ideas took root in the soil, but the soil changed them (2011a, p.12)

Certainly their rejection of Europe's stifling social stratification did. Whatever the multiple causes, it is clear that slowly the British became Pākehā, native sons and daughters of these soils in their own right – a distinct people. And though comfortingly familiar, the British, their ideas, and their institutions eventually became 'other'.

In this way, we reject the old colonial label of little Britain in the south Pacific and express our unique heritage (2011a, p.15)

[I]t is changing from the familiar late-twentieth century partnership built on the notion that the perpetrator's successor must pay the victim's successor for the original colonial sin (2011a, p.15).

Tribunal members attempt to avoid representation of any New Zealanders as an 'out-group', the aim being to strengthen the potential coalition of support. Every New Zealander is presented as having the potential to be involved in a positive way in the creation of a better future, one that will benefit everyone. In fact, wherever possible, the Tribunal makes positive comments about Crown agencies, for example:

First and foremost, we note that *every one of the agencies we reviewed is doing something for mātauranga Māori*. Some may not be doing enough, some may not be doing it very well; *but at least they are doing something*. *This, in itself, is a considerable advance from the situation 20 years ago* (2011c, p.582).

We do not mean to diminish the Crown's now significant commitment to Māori language broadcasting . . . (2011a, p.155).

Where critical comments are made, they are often ameliorated, as in the case of the inclusion of 'benign neglect' and 'belated move' as possible alternatives in the first two extracts below, and the acknowledgement of good intentions in the third:

After decades of active suppression *or, at best, 'benign neglect'*, te reo Māori had reached a perilous state by the 1970s (2011c, p.407).

There has been a profound failure (*or, at best, a belated move*) to develop policy that will assist in the revival of te reo and the safeguarding of dialect (2011c, p.470).

It was a standard piece of pre-consulted Crown policy for the good of Māori, *admittedly promulgated by officials committed to the survival and growth of te reo, but sitting in sharp contrast to the grassroots momentum of the kōhanga reo . . .* (2011a, p.455).

Where there is attribution of blame, it is sometimes detached from current Ministers or takes the form of characteristics (expressed through nominalisation) rather than being attached directly to individuals or groups:¹⁹²

¹⁹²This is not always the case as is indicated in the following extracts: "By late 2007, however, Te Puni Kōkiri had still not undertaken [the MLS] evaluation according to the terms set out in its own draft implementation plan"(WT, 2011c, p.463); "Indeed, it is already clearly *failing to maintain the 2006 levels* – or its own strategy follows the *lack of ambition* in the MLS" (WT, 2011a, p.166); "*Inadequate priority* accorded to reo in resourcing as a result of this policy failure (WT, 2011a, p.169).

We conclude that a *failure of imagination and planning in the education sector* led to the major gulf between Māori-medium education supply and demand (2011a, p.165).

[B]ureaucracy's efforts to put in place measures to deal with . . . Māori language renaissance were decidedly leaden-footed. . . . pedestrian . . . (2011c, p.458).

On other occasions, Tribunal members attempt to avoid making direct criticism themselves by reiterating a criticism from another source:

ERO reviews in the 1990s showed that the quality of teaching and even the use of te reo at many kohanga was distinctly lacking. Similarly, concerns about child safety and financial mismanagement at various kohanga have commanded a good deal of media attention (2011c, p.458).

The 2006 Te Puni Kōkiri-commissioned Māori language survey showed much more positive results than the 2006 census, but it has been *strongly criticised by a leading scholar* for its lack of reliability (2011c, p.440).¹⁹³

Māori language revivalists must also be open-minded about what kind of Māori language education is appropriate. However, we have seen some adopting a relatively purist position, and contending that immersion is the only remedy. Writing in 1988, for example, former Māori language Commissioner Timoti Karetu and his colleague Jeffrey Waite argued that the establishment of 'exclusively Māori-medium schools' was 'the only way' for the language to be retained. . . . *Others, however, are not so sure that this is the right approach. . . .* (2011c, p.468).

In spite of all of this, there remains a considerable amount of explicit and implicit criticism – criticism of government, of organisations and of individuals (including Māori organisations and individuals) - criticism that effectively characterises them

¹⁹³ Te Puni Kōkiri is also referred to as The Ministry of Māori Development

as ‘out-groups’. Thus, for example:

The Crown has clearly not yet *adequately* responded to the Tribunal’s recommendation about the use of te reo by Government departments and public bodies (2011c, p.455).

In 2001 *only 18 out of around 100 Crown agencies claimed to have completed Māori language plans. Of these, only four were provided to Te Puni Kōkiri and only two were of a sufficient standard.* Although we were told that *Te Puni Kōkiri* intended to publish an update, its 2006 inventory of Māori language services (released in April 2008) was silent on the matter. *Te Puni Kōkiri* has since confirmed it is unable to provide any update of the 2001 situation (2011c, p.456).

Te Taura Whiri and *Te Puni Kōkiri* have *joint responsibility* under the MLS for the provision of public services in Māori. In November 2007, the Office of the Auditor General noted in its report on Implementing the Māori Language Strategy . . . *that both agencies had deprioritised this activity:* . . . (2011c, p.456).

Looking back, *the bureaucracy’s efforts* to put in place measures to deal with and encourage the Māori language renaissance were *decidedly leaden-footed* the reaction was *pedestrian* (2011c, p.458).

Within the context of *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei*, those who are not committed to genuine partnership represent, by implication, an ‘other’ identity. Most notable among them are government representatives since it is the actions and failures to act of government that are most severely criticised throughout the report. Criticism for lack of commitment to genuine partnership is seen clearly in the following excerpt:

[W]e saw repeated failures of policy. The most profound was the failure to train enough teachers to meet the predictable demand for Māori-medium education The Government’s 2003 Māori language strategy has been another failure. It is too abstract and has been constructed within a

bureaucratic comfort zone. There have been genuine problems with its implementation *due to a lack of leadership and commitment amongst the responsible Crown agencies. It is also an example of the lack of true partnership* between Māori and the Crown in language policy: it is a well-meaning but essentially standard and pre-consulted Crown policy that does nothing to motivate Māori at the grassroots (2011a, p.708).

It is, furthermore, government representatives who are most often associated with the type of mindset that is presented as being more consistent with an adversarial past than a (hypothetical) future characterised by genuine partnership:

. . . what we believe is needed more than anything is a *change in mindset* – a shift from the ‘*old*’ *approach* that valued only one founding culture to one in which the other is equally supported and promoted and the advantage New Zealand would hold by its embrace of both . . . is widely recognised (2011c, p.699).

Our point relates to the *mindset* the Crown brings to the discussion The *correct mindset*, in our view, is that every reasonable effort will be made to reach agreement, and that resort to the right to govern will occur only when all other reasonable options have been explored. The purpose of the partnership model is to provide a platform in which agreement is expected and encouraged. *It requires a readiness to compromise from the outset. Too often this readiness is absent* (2011c, p.581)

The *Crown’s defensive mindset* must shift (2011c, p.657)

Within the context of *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei*, those who are not committed to genuine partnership represent, by implication, an ‘other’ identity. Notwithstanding some attempt to be both inclusive and positive, Tribunal members make it clear that the Crown has provided little or no evidence of being committed to equal partnership and that, therefore, *should the mindset of its present and future representatives fail to change*, they would be perceived being part of an ‘other’ (together with past representatives of the Crown). Even so, a number of positive and ameliorating

observations signal that current and future government representatives are only *potentially* assigned to an ‘other’ identity group. While this does not seem to be wholly consistent with the overall purpose of the text, that is, to persuade key decision-makers (largely government representatives) to accept, and act upon the report’s recommendations, it is not wholly inconsistent with it. In addition, the frequent attribution of negative judgments to others, combined with the inclusion of evidence and careful argument (evidence and argument that are nevertheless sometimes open to a different interpretation from the one provided) mean that it would be difficult to interpret these judgments as being disrespectful or offensive. Thus, the answer to both questions that began this section is a qualified – yes.

4.3.3 Criterion C: Group formation and fragmentation

There are four relevant questions here. Each is considered separately below.

Question 5: Does the text identify a common adversary in such a way as to increase the potential for the extension of an existing coalition of support for its aims?

As indicated in the previous section, where there is negative criticism in the report, it is largely targeted at government agencies and government representatives. To identify these agencies and representatives as a common adversary would, however, as indicated above, be difficult for a number of reasons. Some attempt, therefore, appears to have been made to establish as a common adversary, that is, a particular mindset/ those who continue to subscribe to it: [W]hat we believe is needed more than anything is a *change in mindset* (2011c, p.699). As noted in the previous section, that mindset is associated with a lack of genuine commitment to equal partnership. The problem here, however, is that the authors of this report, unlike the authors of *Our Land Our Languages*, clearly associate that mindset, in part, with the Crown and it is therefore very difficult to separate it from Crown representatives:

Fundamentally, there is a need for a *mindset shift* away from the pervasive assumption that the Crown is Pākehā, English-speaking, and distinct from Māori rather than representative of them (2011c, p.451).

[T]he Government must *shift its mindset* so it comes to see Māori not as external to itself but as part of its very own make-up (2011c, p.457).

As a result, although *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei* identifies an abstraction (a particular mindset) as a common adversary, the fact that it is closely associated with the Crown does not greatly increase the potential for the extension of an existing coalition of support for the report's aims to government officials/ representatives.

Question 6: Does the text provide evidence of an existing coalition of support for its aims?

Tribunal members make considerable effort to create a wide support base for their recommendations through positive, well-argued and inclusive discourse, something that is particularly important given the non-binding nature of its recommendations and the dual roles of Government as both defendant and final arbiter.

Current Government representatives, including current Ministers (particularly where they are Māori) are often presented in a neutral or positive light. Thus, for example, the writers make a point of acknowledging the statutory roles of the Minister of Māori Affairs (2011a, pp.154-155) and also of linking the current Minister of Māori Affairs (and co-leader of the Māori party), Peter Sharples,¹⁹⁴ to the revitalisation movement, twice including a photograph of him speaking at the opening of New Zealand's first kura kaupapa Māori (2011a, pp.156 & 172).¹⁹⁵ They also make a point of complimenting him:

¹⁹⁴ Dr. Peter (Pita) Sharples is the Member of Parliament for Tamaki Makaurau (the Auckland Māori electorate). He is the co-leader of the Māori Party with Tariana Turia. In the National-led minority Government, Sharples holds the portfolio of the *Minister of Māori Affairs* as well as the Associate Minister for both *Education* and *Corrections* (all outside of cabinet). He is a fluent speaker of the Māori language and has participated widely in Māori cultural and language events.

¹⁹⁵ This reduces the potentially negative impact of a reference to the "apparent *ministerial* satisfaction with a Māori language Act that is clearly failing to stimulate the Government's own efforts to speak te reo" (WT, 2011c, p.470). There are also two pictures, in chapter 8, of Peter Sharples at the Permanent United Nations forum on Indigenous Peoples in relation to the *UNDRIP* (see WT, 2011a, p.232; WT, 2011c, pp.672-673). In addition, the covering letter of this report is addressed first to Peter Sharples, then to Prime Minister John Key and then to the other Ministers of the Crown (WT, 2011a, p.xvii).

In announcing the Tamati Reedy-led review of the MLS, Minister Sharples said on 29 July 2010 that a ‘more coordinated approach’ was needed *We are glad that the Minister has identified what had become quite apparent to us, and we trust this report will be of benefit to his review* (2011c, p.469).

Related to this is the way that the Tribunal acknowledges difficulties and constraints experienced by the Crown (albeit without accepting these as an excuse):

There was certainly no surplus of Māori-speaking teachers in the 1980s that could have been tapped into. But that made it a genuine challenge, not an insurmountable obstacle. (2011a, 164).

We acknowledge that a balance must be struck between investing in public services in te reo Māori and other vital activities, such as training Māori-medium teachers, and we know the Crown cannot do everything. But we do believe the Crown can and should do more about the use of te reo by its own agencies (2011c, p.457).

Also evident is an attempt to highlight the fact that there is an existing coalition of support for the Tribunal’s recommendations by using extensive referencing of authoritative sources, as in the following example:

This view is backed up by well-regarded international research. Stephen Cornell, writing for the influential Harvard Project on American Indian economic Development, has commented that . . . (2011c, p.454).

As the *Privy Council* said in the Broadcasting Assets case, where a taonga is in a vulnerable state, the Crown may well be required ‘to take especially vigorous action for its protection’ (2011c, p.452).

As the *Privy Council* has said in the context of te reo Māori, where a Government has previously acted to suppress, its obligation now to protect is all the greater. (2011c, p.568).

As indicated earlier, however, the amount of explicit and implicit criticism of existing and potential allies, including Māori organisations, serves to undermine the efforts made to build a coalition of support:¹⁹⁶

Dogmatic approaches that risk *alienating even fellow Māori must be kept in check*. It seems likely to us that a flexible stance will sometimes be required, in the interests of the language (2011c, p.452).

In the running of kohanga and kura, *Māori must also strive to get along with each other* (2011c, p.452).

With respect to Te Taura Whiri's work on standardising te reo . . . we are *unclear as to whether Te Taura Whiri has been acting in accordance with Māori wishes or contrary to them* (2011c, p.465).

So far as indicating an existing coalition of support for its aims is concerned, the inclusion of records of hearings and submissions (as appendices) serves this purpose to some extent, as does referencing of authoritative sources. However, although the report quotes from a number of sources that appear to be broadly supportive of its general direction, there is little evidence in the report of an existing coalition of support for its more specific recommendations. Indeed, while it recommends increased powers for Te Taura Whiri, it also criticises Te Puni Kōkiri. Overall, there is an absence of that overwhelming sense of support for the report's aims that is evident in *Our Land Our Languages*.

Question 7: Does the text employ strategies whose aim is to avoid the creation of an opposition coalition?

The Tribunal's decision to significantly broaden the scope of the original claim in responding to it had the potential to create opposition from all the parties involved. Tribunal members may have been attempting to avoid this potential pitfall when

¹⁹⁶ This is in contrast to *Our Land Our Languages*, which made a point of praising indigenous organisations.

they (a) declared that their recommendations should be regarded as provisional in view of the negative impact that the inclusion of the Māori language as a whole (rather than dialects only), combined with the brief submission period, may have had on the breadth of evidence and quality of insights, and (b) indicated at the beginning of the relevant chapter that, in broadening the scope of the report, the authors were, in fact, in accord with both the approach of the Crown and the evidence presented by the Crown. However, in that it is likely that Crown witnesses will resent having their own words used against them, the second of these strategies had the potential to backfire:

In recognition . . . that a brief period for submissions did and could not constitute a full inquiry into the reo issues we covered, our *findings and recommendations should rightly continue to be regarded as provisional* (2011c, p.387).

We also declared *our findings and recommendations to be provisional only*. We did so mainly because the chapter addressed matters that went beyond the narrow set of reo issues agreed to earlier . . . (2011c, p.387).

The Crown gave evidence about its entire range of reo initiatives Some claimant groups took a similarly expansive approach. *We were somewhat surprised by this*, given the agreed narrowing of the issues. . . . *Our concern* resolved itself when . . . the Crown's leading Māori-language policy witness . . . replied, 'I think there's a clear relationship between . . . Te Reo Māori [and the dialect of Ngāti Koata] . . . *This exchange confirmed for us* that the agreed restriction to tribal dialect was unworkable. *The Crown witness was right*: loss in one would affect the other, and vice versa (2011a, p.154).

The authors of *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei* appear to attempt to minimise the number of potential adversaries by maintaining, for some of the time at least, a positive stance towards the Crown as well as to non-Māori and by including ameliorating comments where criticisms are made.

Although there are proposals that have the potential to alienate some, such as the proposed revamping of Te Taura Whiri, strategies are employed to ensure that everyone involved is given a voice, albeit not to the same extent as is the case in *Our Land Our Languages*.¹⁹⁷ Thus, for example, included in the report are records of hearings (2011c, pp.717-732) and submissions (WT, 2011c, pp.733-742); as well as summaries of the main arguments of each party (2011c, see pp.389-392).¹⁹⁸ Furthermore, the opinions and fears of those with differing views are acknowledged throughout the document.¹⁹⁹ For example:

Pākehā, and now other New Zealanders, *fear that* Māori will acquire undeserved privileges at their expense. . . . Māori New Zealanders, on the other hand, are *fearful that* their unique place as first people will not be respected by other New Zealanders. They *fear that* the majority would prefer Māori were simply assimilated into an imagined utopian ‘mainstream’. Some Māori (though again, by no means all) argue for an entirely separate Māori future in which the non-Māori majority no longer has a veto over their aspirations (2011a, p.15).

Consistent with the qualification of its findings as provisional, the Tribunal is careful to acknowledge the parameters of its own role and authority and to explicitly pull back from transgressing the role and authority of other groups:²⁰⁰

It is not our place to dictate which should take priority – hip replacements

¹⁹⁷ Any loss of funding or functions is likely to be unpopular with these agencies irrespective of the strength of the argument. Nevertheless, the aim of the recommendations seems to provide Te Taura Whiri with more capacity to keep other agencies accountable for aligning their work with an overall Māori language strategy rather than taking over their functions, particularly setting the curriculum or teacher targets. Although Taumata I does not elaborate, Taumata II shows that the setting of teacher targets, for example, is to be done “after consultation with the secretary for education” (WT, 2011c, p.476).

¹⁹⁸ The report (WT, 2011c, p.xxvi) also states that a full copy of the record of inquiry is available on request from the Waitangi Tribunal.

¹⁹⁹ This is the case even where these opinions are rejected. Thus, for example: “The Crown attached a lengthy statement, written by Te Puni Kōkiri, which set out ‘factual points’ that the Tribunal should address. *Ngāti Koata* and *Ngāti Porou* both supported the Tribunal’s findings but disagreed with its recommendations . . . After due consideration, we were not convinced by these submissions that the chapter needed to be amended” (WT, 2011c, p.387).

²⁰⁰ Justice Joseph Williams (2005, p.237), the presiding officer of WAI 262, stated that although the Tribunal members aim to “influence a larger political game to produce a result”, [t]hey are not decisive players in it.”

or reo teachers (2011a, p.166).

[I]t would have been an abdication of responsibility to fail to offer our view In the end, though, *these are recommendations, not orders or directions* (2011c, p.701).

The Reedy review may itself come to similar conclusions *it is open to them to take account of our position as they formulate their own report* (2011c, p.470).

We also make a *tentative suggestion* to address the strong desire in certain communities for local control. . . . This is of course a matter for Māori rather than the Crown, but we raise it nonetheless (2011c, p.478).

As in the case of *Our Land Our Languages*, the authors of *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei* attempt to avoid creating an opposition coalition by (a) drawing upon an inclusive sense of national identity and (b) emphasising the fact that there are advantages for all citizens in adopting their recommendations. As already indicated, the first strategy seems less successful than in the case of *Our Land Our Languages* because the all inclusive identity called upon is presented as being potential rather than actual. So far as the second strategy is concerned, it appears, once again, to be applied less successfully than it was in the case of *Our Land our Languages*. This is because references to the advantages for the country as a whole are not only less pervasive but also more tentative/ speculative or set in the distant future:

Māori educational achievements remain poor, but more teaching of te reo and in the medium of te reo *may* encourage Māori students to perform better, as the Ministry of education suggested in its annual report on Māori education for 2006–07 (2011c, p.443).

There is also evidence that Māori in immersion and bilingual schools . . . are significantly less likely to be stood down, suspended, unjustifiably absent or truant than Māori in decile 1–4 mainstream schools. . . . [But] low truancy rates may show that Māori-medium schools are performing their

custodial functions well, *but do not necessarily mean that the quality of learning is high*. However, and despite these cautions, such results give some cause for optimism. This is because, as the relatively youthful Māori ethnic group becomes a larger share of the overall population, *such improvements are clearly in the national interest* (2011c, p.443).

It is also well accepted by scholars that being bilingual is beneficial for a child's cognitive development and communicative ability. . . . learning Māori *can also help* deliver developmental benefits (2011c, p.443).

Ko Aotearoa Tēnei does appear to employ strategies whose aim is to avoid the creation of an opposition coalition. These include repeated acknowledgment of the limitations of their own role/ function and the fact that certain Crown actions may have been well intended, inclusion of points of view that differ from their own, and drawing upon an inclusive representation of national identity while stressing that there are advantages for all New Zealanders in adopting the course of action they recommend. However, these attempts are counter-balanced by other aspects of the report, including using the evidence of Crown witnesses to justify extending its scope and including negative evaluation of many Crown actions (and lack of action) and of a number of organisations (including Māori organisations). Above all, the vision of a future based on genuine partnership is one that is likely to be perceived as representing a significant threat to those in power. Overall, therefore, while strategies whose aim is to avoid creating an opposition coalition do appear to be employed, these do not appear to be sufficient to the achievement of their aim.

Question 8: Does the text move beyond personal interests, weakening differences by articulating a broad inclusive agenda which has the potential to create a coalition of different interests?

In seeking to articulate a broad inclusive agenda, the report writers emphasise the advantages for all New Zealanders of a new partnership orientation and presents the government as being in a position to secure these advantages:

There is a growing community realisation that *New Zealand wins when*

Māori culture is strong (2011c, p.715)

Can it evolve from one based on past grievance to one that is *forward-looking and based on mutual benefit?* (2011b, p.19)

The survival of te reo Māori is no longer just of deep interest to Māori people – it is a matter of national pride and identity *for all New Zealanders. Everybody wins* when the Māori language thrives (2011a, p.161).

There are signs it is changing from the familiar late-twentieth century partnership built on the notion that the perpetrator's successor must pay the victim's successor for the original colonial sin, into *a twenty first century relationship of mutual advantage in which, through joint and agreed action, both sides end up better off than they were before they started.* This is the Treaty of Waitangi beyond grievance (2011a, p.17).

In taking such steps the Government would be fulfilling its Treaty duties while also *acting in the best interests of all* (2011c, p.699).

In attempting to signal the possibility of achieving the type of genuine partnership they recommend. Tribunal members stress the fact that there is already evidence of respect and goodwill between Māori and Pākehā relating, in particular, to Treaty settlements over the past few years:

Such a large area of common ground can only have arisen from a solid basis of mutual respect This respect between Māori and Pākehā made possible the watershed Treaty settlements process of the last 25 years (2011a, p.15).

There is a *deep reservoir of goodwill* between our cultures, and much commonality (2011c, p.715).

We sometimes forget that between these two poles there is in fact a much *greater degree of goodwill than New Zealanders* give themselves credit for

(2011a, p.15).

Ko Aotearoa Tēnei does move beyond personal interests and weaken differences by articulating a broad inclusive agenda which has the potential to create a coalition of different interests. Certainly, it attempts to do so. However, repeated criticism of Government actions (and inaction), the hypothetical nature of the all-inclusive New Zealand identity formulation and the tentative way in which the benefits for the country as a whole are often presented, considerably reduce the impact of that attempt.

4.3.4 Criterion D: Engagement with hegemonic interests / key decision-makers

The first question relating to this criterion is:

Question 9: Are hegemonic interests/ key decision makers positioned in a way that is likely to gain their approval and is there evidence of agonistic engagement with them?

Despite criticising a number of government agencies, there are clear attempts in *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei* to engage with key decision makers in an agonistic way. Fears are acknowledged, possible ameliorating reasons for some actions and lack of action are provided, and key decision makers (rather than the report writers) are presented as those who have the power to move the country towards the new, positive partnership agenda proposed and, in doing so, benefit all New Zealanders. Thus, critical comments are frequently softened (e.g. ‘benign neglect’ – 2011c, p.407), individuals are sometimes praised (e.g. Peter Sharples is complimented on his acknowledgement of the need for better co-ordination – 2011c, p.469), and the competition for resources faced by successive governments is recognised (2011a, p.166).

The report writers acknowledge the Crown’s treaty-derived right to govern, positioning it *both* as an equal partner *and* as a representative of Māori, (although still asserting and defining the obligations that are inherent in these positions). Key decision makers, along with the people of the country as a whole, are positioned as

being on a metaphorical journey, one which began with the Treaty and has arrived at a crossroads, the most positive of the routes forward resting with key decision makers to secure. For example:

New Zealand sits poised at a crossroads both in race relations and on our long quest for a mature sense of national identity (2011a, p.xvii).

A crossroads in history offers choices. The Wai 262 claimants really asked which of the many possible paths into the future New Zealand should now choose, and in this report we provide an answer based on the principles of the Treaty of Waitangi (2011a, p.xxiv).

A crossroads? So where do we go from here? (2011a, p.14).

[T]his country began in consensus as two peoples, and . . . now, as many peoples, must continue on that path (2011a, p.24).

[I]t would have been an abdication of responsibility to fail to offer our view of the many pathways forward in each of the claimed categories (2011c, p.701).

This journey/cross-roads metaphor is combined with the presentation of normalised equal partnership (a permanent solution) as the best and most reasonable way of ‘moving forward’ to a better and more peaceful future. The consequences of not having done so in the past - in particular, the consequences of having ignored earlier recommendations and having failed to implement some agreed policies adequately - are spelt out throughout the report. So, too, are the probable consequences of failing to do so in the future. The *status quo* is presented as a dystopia, and any failure to act in a positive way as a journey *backwards* towards ‘inter-racial rancour’, ‘conflict,’ ‘discontentment for all’, ‘squandering [of] Māori potential’ and ‘a seemingly endless stream of [non-productive] taxpayer-funded programmes’ (2011a, p.xviii).

However, while there is some evidence of agonistic engagement with key decision makers, there is little evidence that they are positioned in a way that is likely to gain their approval although there are some clear attempts to do so. Thus, for example, it is acknowledged that there are differing interests and perspectives (2011c, pp.389-393) that must be acknowledged:

Where relevant, we have . . . considered what other interests might be at play and how those interests might be fairly and transparently balanced alongside the Treaty-protected interests (2011b, pp.23-24).

Opponents of the teaching of mātauranga Māori within the state system might contend that there are worthier recipients of the limited education dollar These sorts of opinions are often to be heard in public debates. . . . *We do not simply dismiss such ideas, for there is something to them if one sets aside the various prejudices at work.* Affordability, for example, is certainly an issue that invites scrutiny of any spending (2011c, p.557).

Furthermore, frequent use of the obligative auxiliaries ('must' and 'have to') tends to undermine the potentially positive impact (so far as key decision makers are concerned) of the report's insistence that it is government rather than the Tribunal that has the final say. Thus, for example:

This weight of obligation, coupled with the Crown's duty to act in favour of te reo as a simultaneous matter of national interest, *must* be met with commensurate action – the development of a modern, Treaty-compliant regime to ensure the survival of the Māori language (2011c, p.443).

[T]he Crown *must* transfer enough control to enable a Māori sense of ownership of the vision, while at the same time ensuring that its own expertise and resources remain central to the effort (2011c, p.450).

The Government *must* accept the idea that it should not be an English speaking monolith (2011c, p.450).

If the Crown is serious about preserving and promoting the language it *must* also endeavour to speak te reo itself (2011c, p.451).

The Crown *must* commit to working with Māori in ways that go beyond, say, a few consultation *hui* and a reference group (2011c, p.451).²⁰¹

[T]he Crown *must* also spend money better, through better coordination and greater motivation within the Government Māori language sector. *The [Office of the Auditor General] report makes this clear* (2011c, p.464).

This *has to change* (2011c, p.469).

Although criticism of government is not accompanied by the explicit identification of specific Ministers, it is sometimes clear who they are:

We have also seen *apparent ministerial satisfaction* with a Māori language Act that is *clearly failing* to stimulate the Government's own efforts to speak te reo; *endless teaching scholarship plans* that may be linked to perceived demand issues but are not necessarily linked to long-term goals about language health and vitality; and *a survey* that may not be giving the most accurate information but has nevertheless provided opportunities for *positive media statements* (2011c, p.470).

The turning of Crown evidence against the Crown referred to earlier with reference to the extension of the Tribunal's remit, is also in evidence elsewhere:

. . . looking through the record of the last 20 years, it is difficult to find many affirmations that the Māori language revival effort is well funded – *unless of course they come from the Government itself*. . . . *Even Crown witnesses also made frequent reference to the limited resources available to them*. *Mr Chrisp of Te Puni Kōkiri, for example, explained that 'One of the dilemmas that we face is there is a finite pool of resources'*. . . . Ms Sewell said that

²⁰¹ Hui is a gathering or meeting.

the amount of support the Ministry of Education could provide for Māori language initiatives was impacted upon by factors including ‘the allocation of finite resources’. . . . Alexander Turnbull Library chief librarian Margaret Calder explained, with respect to Māori language materials held by the National library, ‘The decisions about where resources go of course is made at a library-wide level, given that there never are enough resources. . . . *[The] Crown’s own witnesses did not seem to be convinced that the funds they had to work with were enough – even for what strikes us as an inadequate agenda* (2011c, pp.465-466).

While some attempt appears to have been made in *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei* to position key decision makers in a way that is likely to gain their approval, overall, the ways in which they are presented appears unlikely to do so.

Question 10: Are the arguments provided likely to convince hegemonic interests/ key decision makers?

The Tribunal’s approach to the provision of evidence and its appeal to enlightened government are likely to be appreciated by key decision-makers. So far as the first of these is concerned, it is relevant to note that the Te reo Māori chapter (Taumata II version) has 276 references and explanatory notes, 2 maps, 13 statistical tables, and 17 graphs or diagrams. Of particular relevance is the fact that the tribunal also quotes (and aligns itself with) statements or findings from government agencies and Crown witnesses, a source of evidence that decision makers are likely to find difficult to refute. Even so, the fact remains that criticism is often severe and, as noted above, the writers turn Crown evidence against the Crown:

More teaching of te reo and in the medium of te reo may encourage Māori students to perform better, as *the Ministry of Education suggested* in its annual report on Māori education for 2006–07 (2011c, p.443).

Even *Crown witnesses* also made frequent reference to the limited resources available to them. Mr Chrisp of Te Puni Kōkiri, for example, explained that ‘One of the dilemmas that we face is there is a finite pool of resources’.

Likewise, Alexander Turnbull library chief librarian Margaret Calder explained, with respect to Māori language materials held by the National library, ‘The decisions about where resources go of course is made at a library-wide level, given that there never are enough resources (2011c, p.466).

[T]he Crown must also spend money better, through better coordination and greater motivation within the Government Māori language sector. *The [Office of the Auditor General] report makes this clear* (2011c, p.464).

Unfavourable positioning of New Zealand in relation to some other polities might have the effect of encouraging some key decision makers to accept the need for change. The danger is, however, that it could lead to retrenchment of existing attitudes:

These provisional recommendations . . . would only bring New Zealand into line with regimes applied in comparable countries overseas (2011c, p.476).

Members of the Tribunal are also clearly aware of the fundamental importance to decision makers of an economic rationale:

This calculation becomes more difficult when there are (and there always are) *competing priorities* for the same dollar (2011a, p.166).

There is acknowledgment of the fact that there are currently some major issues that government must address:

We acknowledge that there will be some unavoidable cost in our proposals for new bodies and regulatory frameworks. We accept that *the Government’s coffers are not full after the combined effects of worldwide recession and a devastating earthquake*. . . . We would . . . be neglecting our duty to issue a report that called for a lesser standard of compliance with Treaty obligations given the straitened financial conditions (2011a, p.246).

Nevertheless, it is important that they clarify the position on some aspects of government expenditure:

A vast amount of money – nearly \$12 billion per annum – is expended on the education system, and every dollar has to be carefully allocated. *But the cost of 'kaupapa Māori' education is not a burden on the budget. That is because the expenditure on providing kaupapa Māori students with an education would have occurred anyway, regardless of their choice of school* (2011a, p.199).

The state's resourcing of te reo Māori was estimated at . . . \$226.8 million. *It has been defined as resourcing both for 'services and programmes that [contribute] more or less directly to supporting the health of the Māori language' and for 'activities that are being undertaken by . . . government agencies to support the growth and development of the Māori language'* (2011c, p.407).

There will always be issues around affordability and cost. Potentially, though, *it may be unaffordable not to continue* supporting the growth in knowledge and use of te reo (2011c, pp.442-443).

The terms of the Treaty clearly set out that the Crown's right to make laws carries a reciprocal obligation to accord the Māori interest an appropriate priority In the context of te reo, the Crown must therefore recognise that the Māori interest in the language is not the same as the interest of any minority group in New Zealand society in its own language. *Accordingly, in decision-making about resource allocation, te reo Māori is entitled to a 'reasonable degree of preference and must receive a level of funding that accords with this status* (2011c, p.452).

. . . the provision of options that promote mātauranga does not necessarily take resources away from mainstream education, because *the cost of educating a child is relatively similar no matter which school they attend* (2011c, p558).

The expenditure required for the revitalisation of the Māori language is not specified. Instead, an association is made with ‘wise policy’, something that, in association with repeated references to inadequate expenditure in the past, involves the implication that policy has not been based on wisdom in the past:

Of course, this priority should be reflected, in the first instance, in the formulation of *wise policy*. In theory, the required level of funding should simply flow from that – that is, the funding allocated should be whatever is sufficient to implement the policy (2011c, p.452).

Some of the arguments forwarded in *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei* are likely to be convincing so far as hegemonic interests/ key decision makers are concerned, particularly where they are based on statements or findings from government agencies and Crown witnesses and/or include some recognition of the salience of economic considerations. Even so, the appeal to wise policy and, associated with it, the assertion that the expenditure required to revitalise *te reo Māori* should be determined in full collaboration with Māori and should take precedence over other types of expenditure seems unlikely to gain the approval/ support of key decision makers.

4.3.5 Criterion E: Dislocation and deconstruction

The following are the two questions relating to the criterion of dislocation and deconstruction:

Question 11: Does the text contest the nodal points of the status quo hegemony and expose and undermine its aims (underlying objects of desire and promised fantasies), drawing attention to significant dislocating events and exposing/revealing the inherent contingency of its positioning, its rhetorical manipulations, the negative implications of its articulations as implemented policy, the inconsistency of its rhetoric over time and/or the discrepancies between its promises and achievements?

Question 12: Are the key signifiers redefined (through chains of signification) in a way that is counter to the purposes of adversaries and likely to resonate positively with the primary target audience and the wider

readership?

In the Te reo Māori chapter of *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei*, the Tribunal, after establishing that there is in fact a significant Treaty obligation on the Crown to protect the Māori language, identifies four ‘self-evident’ obligations (partnership, wise policy, appropriate resourcing, and a Māori speaking government) that form the basis of “a genuinely Treaty-compliant modern Māori language regime” (2011c, p.441). It is these principles that provide the report with its overall structuring. They are used to interrogate government actions and as a basis for recommendations.

The introductory section of Chapter 5 deals with: (a) submissions to the panel; (b) the findings of WAI 11; and (c) identification of the issues. The main part of the chapter has four sections:

- a brief account of historical decline and post 1986 revival;
- a summary of health of reo in 2010;
- an analysis of Treaty interest in reo and obligations; and
- an assessment of Crown’s current reo policy

Arising out of the introduction and the four main sections are the four key principles, each representing a critical government obligation and each contesting a nodal point in Crown discourse. They are:

- genuine partnership (contesting the Crown’s claim to engage with and represent Māori)
- wise policy (contesting the Crown’s claim to have implemented effective strategies, policies and procedures)
- adequate resourcing (contesting the Crown’s assertion that it has been diligent in ensuring, within the context of financial constraints, that the Māori language revival movement is adequately resourced)
- a Māori speaking government (contesting the Crown’s claim to fully represent Māori)

It is these four critical requirements that provide the central chains of signification

on which the chapter's coherence relies. In each case, statistical evidence indicating a failure on the part of the Crown is provided. This evidence leads to conclusions that clearly undermine the Crown's "rhetoric about forward progress", highlighting the fact that even the Crown's key witness "conceded that there was a need for 'life support'" (WT, 2011a, p.168).

In relation to the issue of genuine commitment to the Treaty relationship (partnership), it is observed that even in the area of the Māori language regeneration, which is of fundamental concern to Māori, the Crown has failed to do more than pay lip service to consultation. This lack of 'genuine' partnership, that is, partnership in which "Māori . . . play a leading role in setting and owning the agenda, and share in the decision-making about Māori language goals and policies" (2011c, p.453), is considered a primary cause of the continued decline of the language. It is noted that this must be addressed as "*[i]t is only through a joint effort by two partners in a quality relationship that te reo stands any chance at all*" (2011c, p.450).²⁰²

A particularly telling dislocatory event to which attention is drawn is the development of the 2003 Māori Language Strategy:

Again, the problem is an absence of Māori ownership, which is crucial to success since Māori themselves are the key actors in the revival process. . . . [Their] effort was not honoured in the process by which the MLS was formulated – *a quick round of consultation hui, then the development of goals whose wording appears to reflect Crown rather than Māori preferences* (2011c, p.454).

In examining the Crown's performance we have found *a fundamental problem with the MLS 2003. It is not a partnership document. . . .* No doubt the contribution made by these individuals and groups was valuable. But consultation with them does not represent a partnership with the Māori

²⁰² The Tribunal states that "There is in our view no area of Crown–Māori relations more appropriate for [the application of partnership] than the future of the Māori language. That future cannot be made secure by Māori efforts alone or Crown efforts alone. It will depend on the ability of both sides to co-operate, participate, and contribute" (WT, 2011a, p.161).

community *The fact that the MLS was not developed through this kind of genuine partnership makes it a strategy by bureaucrats for Māori, and in our experience that never works* (2011a, p.163).

[The MLS] was a standard piece of *pre-consulted Crown policy* for the good of Māori (2011c, p.455).

Another dislocatory event that is highlighted is the lack of response to the 1995 *Hui Taumata Reo* call to government for “a wholehearted commitment by words and deeds to work in partnership with Māori for the protection and promotion of Māori language”, and “an end to inaction and unilateral decision-making” (2011c, p.455).

The report draws attention to the length of time that has passed since 1995 in order to emphasise the fact that government has ignored the call:

Fifteen years later, that criticism will resonate with many Māori arguing for a greater role in setting the policy agenda for their language (2011c, p.455).

One further symptom of the absence of genuine partnership is rhetorical manipulation. The Tribunal provides several examples of this in the excerpt below:

The received wisdom is that the revival of te reo over the last 25 years is nothing short of a miracle. There is an element of truth in that. But the notion that te reo is making steady forward progress, particularly amongst the young, is manifestly false. *The government bears significant responsibility for this misconception*. In its report on the Health of the Māori Language in 2008, Te Puni Kōkiri concluded that ‘it is apparent that the health of the Māori language in relation to all three language variables analysed (status; knowledge and acquisition; and use) has improved markedly since 2001’. While this claim was accompanied by the usual rejoinder about the need to maintain vigilance and effort, *the key message was that the Government’s efforts had been a success*. In fact, the very next sentence suggested that credit was due to Government initiatives to support language revitalisation since 2001. *Even Te Taura Whiri* – whose chair was scathing of government

efforts to revitalise te reo during the 2009 Māori language week – *has been susceptible to this kind of embellishment*. In its brief to the incoming Minister in 2008 it wrote of reaching ‘a turning point in this journey, and the corner is one of anticipation as the 150,000 Māori and 30, 000 non-Māori who now use the Māori language in some way, continue moving forward’. A change in government initially brought no break in *the official line*: in July 2009 the Minister of Māori Affairs announced that it was ‘great to be able to say that the Māori language is in a healthier state than it was five years earlier’. A year later, however, the mood had changed. In announcing the Tamati Reedy-led review of the MLS, Minister Sharples said on 29 July 2010 that a ‘more coordinated approach’ was needed that ensured ‘the programmes and expenditure across the whole of government are responsive to Iwi/Māori aspirations’. Expanding on his motivation for the review in a speech the same day, he remarked that ‘We have a Māori language strategy that is not up-to-date and has largely not been implemented (2011c, p.469).

According to the Tribunal, wise policy for the revitalisation of the Māori language will derive from engagement and consultation with Māori. That this type of wise policy has not guided actions in the past is indicated in a number of places – see examples below:

The fact is, if the MLS does not capture the imagination of grassroots Māori communities, and of Crown agencies, what is its point? It is after all a leadership document, and those who would follow it need to be inspired by it. We are not even satisfied that they know about it (2011a, p.163).

The Crown has clearly not yet adequately responded to the Tribunal’s recommendation about the use of te reo by Government departments and public bodies (2011c, p.455).

The report further exposes the separation between rhetoric and reality, locating inadequate policy aims and ineffective administration as factors that have contributed to the continuing decline of the Māori language:

The Ministry of education wishes to increase Māori participation rates in early childhood education, *but would appear content* for this increase to be in centres that are typically English medium (2011c, p.441).

The draft of the MLS sent out for consultation in early 2003 set a goal to double Māori language use in national and local government (including hospitals) by 2008. However, this wording was absent from the version of the MLS endorsed by Cabinet in July of that year and the final document does not set a definite target for increased reo use in Government agencies (2011c, p.456).

Officials needed to have taken proper and rigorous steps in the early 1980s to estimate kōhanga demand. Had they done so, it seems likely that they could have foreseen the massive up-take of kōhanga reo through the 1980s and into the next decade . . . (2011a, p.165).

The teacher supply issue remained a perennial problem; the 2001 census showed a marked decline in speakers aged zero to nine; and Māori-medium school numbers had dropped. Instead, the 2003 MLS was intentionally high level, and *so lacking in ambition* that its goals were *either easily achievable or so vague as to be meaningless*. For example, it proposed that the majority of Māori should be able to speak Māori ‘to some extent’ by 2028. This goal will be measured by Te Puni Kōkiri’s five-yearly language survey, the majority of whose respondents – by Te Puni Kōkiri’s own definition – already reach that level. Its aim for tribal dialects was simply that they be ‘supported’ by 2028. (2011a, p.165).

Looking back, the bureaucracy’s efforts to put in place measures to deal with and encourage the Māori language renaissance were decidedly *leaden-footed the reaction was pedestrian . . .* (2011c, p.458).

It was the *failure of Government supply* that accounted for the eventual decline in student numbers and not the failure of the language movement (2011c, p.458).

There has been a *profound failure* (or, at best, a belated move) to develop policy that will assist in the revival of te reo and the safeguarding of dialect (2011c, p.470).

. . . [L]ooking through the record of the last 20 years, it is difficult to find many affirmations that the Māori language revival effort is well funded – unless of course they come from the government itself. . . . even Crown witnesses . . . made frequent references to the limited resources available to them (2011c, p.465).

Given the *policy failure*, the priority accorded te reo in resourcing has also been inadequate (2011c, p.470).

The case for a *Māori speaking government* is underpinned by re-definition of the key signifier ‘government’ - not only as a body that represents Māori citizens but as one that includes Māori citizen representation. The report notes the fact that for much of its past, and currently, the Crown has been a monolingual English speaking, Pākehā institution: “[t]he Crown has clearly not yet adequately responded to the Tribunal’s recommendation about the use of te reo by Government departments and public bodies” (2011c, p.455). This view is reiterated in the following extract:

If the Crown is serious about preserving and promoting the language it must also endeavour to speak te reo itself. This not only leads by example but provides symbolic as well as tangible support to keeping the language alive. Māori should be able to use their own language, given its official status, in as many of their dealings with the New Zealand state as practicable – particularly since the public face of the Crown will often be a Māori one (2011c, p.451).

This re-identification of ‘New Zealand’ as a partnership ‘of equals’ (2011a, p.248) has an impact on the entire report. It is the overarching conception that redefines the four key government obligations (above). In emerging as a nodal point of the

report's discourse, partnership subsumes other important Treaty principles such as *kāwanatanga* (the Crown's right to govern) and *tino rangatiratanga* (the autonomy or self-government of iwi and hapū), thus creating an inclusive framework for the report's argumentation and counter-hegemonic positioning.²⁰³ The Tribunal discards alternative conceptions of what partnership entails such as, for example, partnership as consultation or the Crown-as-senior-partner, instead elevating the status of Māori to that of decision-maker.²⁰⁴ For example:

Throughout this report, the essential questions that arise are about the nature of that partnership, and about where the power lies within it. . . . The conceptual framework within which these issues are to be resolved is the Treaty principle of partnership between the Crown and Māori. It is in this partnership frame that the Treaty's essential message of hope is to be found – a message whose time, we believe, has well and truly arrived. It reminds us that this country began in consensus as two peoples, and that now, as many peoples, must continue on that path (2011a, pp.23-24).

*The principles of the Treaty, and the exchange of rights and obligations those principles enshrine, are woven together through the overarching principle of partnership. That, as we have said, is the framework for the Treaty relationship. In our consideration of the issues raised in this claim, we therefore must consider what partnership means for the relationship between Māori and the Crown, and for the place of New Zealand's two founding cultures in this land (2011b, p.24).*²⁰⁵

Partnership itself can mean many things The starting point should be shared decision-making (2011b, p.341).

²⁰³ The principles of the Treaty of Waitangi are inter-related to the Treaty document itself and have been developed from various Tribunal reports, legal interpretations, court decisions and government statements. Besides *kāwanatanga* and *tino rangatiratanga*, other principles include good faith; the need to compromise; and the duty to consult (see Department of Conservation, n.d; Hayward, 1997; Waitangi Tribunal, 2011b, pp.15-19).

²⁰⁴ See Humpage (2002, pp.278, 284) for discussion of how government have treated Māori like a junior partner in the development of the Labour-Alliance 2000 Closing the Gaps' policy.

²⁰⁵ The use of the weaving metaphor is reminiscent of the master signifier in Žižek's quilt which determines the pattern and shape of the whole (in this case *kete*).

As a result of the structuring provided by the concept of equal partnership, the Tribunal is able to propose a reconfiguration of the Māori language sector in a way that they believe better reflects the Treaty relationship and therefore will be more likely to achieve the revitalisation of the language. For example:

Te Taura Whiri should function as a Crown–Māori partnership through the equal appointment of Crown and Māori appointees to its board. *This reflects our concern that te reo revival will not work if responsibility for setting the direction is not shared with Māori* (2011c, p.471).

Thus, through their re-definition of partnership in a way that supersedes ideologies such as *assimilation* and *Māori separation* (expressed as *tino rangatiratanga*), the writers attempt to create a pathway to the *objet petit à*, that is, to a utopian existence for New Zealand society. Readers are promised that the ‘normalisation’ of this partnership will allow New Zealand to leave behind ‘grievance’ (2011a, p.xviii), the “burden of a troubled past” (2011a, p.xix), the “squandering [of] Māori potential” and “a seemingly endless stream of tax-payer [funding]” (2011b, p.xxiv) and move forward to a place where “conflict between the Crown and Māori is not a given” (2011a, p.xviii) and “mutual respect for each other’s mana . . . will *last forever*” (2011a, pp.xviii-xix). For example:

Māori New Zealanders fear that the majority would prefer Māori were simply *assimilated into an imagined utopian ‘mainstream’*. Some Māori (though again, by no means all) argue for an *entirely separate Māori future* in which the non-Māori majority no longer has a veto over their aspirations (2011a, p.15).

[The partnership framework] is changing from the familiar late-twentieth century partnership built on the notion that the perpetrator’s successor must pay the victim’s successor for *the original colonial sin, into a twenty first century relationship of mutual advantage* in which, through joint and agreed action, both sides end up better off than they were before they started. This is the Treaty of Waitangi beyond grievance (2011c, p.17).

[To] do-more-of-the-same choice is simply untenable. It still risks bequeathing to our collective future an uncomfortably large, poor, and underproductive cohort of working age Māori. In this *dystopia* the Treaty of Waitangi will remain, stubbornly, *a locus for Māori anger and non-Māori resentment* – a site of discontent for all. In this report, we say it needn't be this way. We pose, perhaps for the first time, the possibility of a Treaty relationship after grievance. A normalised, fully functional relationship *where conflict between the Crown and Māori is not a given* (2011a, p.xxiv).

In *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei* the Crown identity is overdetermined, subject to contestation by two opposing discourses. In the partnership discourse that structures the report, Government represents the non-Māori partner, while in the hegemonic 'New Zealand as a state democracy' discourse, which is seen in the call for the Crown to be Māori speaking, it represents all New Zealand citizens (including Māori). Hence:

The core of the Crown's position was that protecting what the claimants seek is impractical, and has consequences for *New Zealand and New Zealanders* that must be considered. (2011b, p.71)

The report exposes the fact that the government has not truly represented Māori. It does not, however, successfully redefine the *status quo* key signifier - New Zealand government. Instead, it attempts to replace it with a Treaty-based partnership discourse that, because it implies a major shift in power and control, seems very unlikely to gain widespread acceptance:

We have the opportunity now to take this a stage further through genuine commitment to the principles of the Treaty. This implies . . . a genuine infusion of the core motivating principles of mātauranga Māori . . . *into all aspects of our national life* (2011c, p.715).

The Crown's duties are *partnership, wise policy, appropriate resources to achieve policy goals, and a Māori-speaking government* (2011a, p.161).

Current widespread acceptance of New Zealand statehood means that this discourse would appear to represent a fundamental barrier to the full emergence of the future ‘New Zealand as equal partnership’ identity.

In this section, I have attempted to demonstrate that *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei* effectively contests the nodal points of the *status quo* hegemony and draws attention to significant dislocating events, exposing the inherent contingency and rhetorical manipulations in much of the Crown’s discourse. However, while the key signifiers are redefined in a way that is likely to resonate positively with those who already believe in the possibility of achieving an ideology of genuine partnership (which may include many Māori), it seems unlikely that their redefinition will resonate positively with many others. The concept of genuine partnership (the pathway to the *objet petit à* of national harmony), like that of an all-Aotearoa/ New Zealand identity, is likely, from the perspective of the repeated failures outlined in the report, to appear to many to be little more than a utopian fantasy, one which would, in addition, involve a considerable loss of control so far as key decision makers are concerned.

4.4 Responses to *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei*

4.4.1 Responses to the early release of *Chapter 5*

Media articles and reports following the release of the pre-publication version of the Te reo Māori chapter of *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei* (October 2010) picked up on themes relating to the poor state of health of the Māori language and the government’s role in the declining fortunes of the language. The Television New Zealand (hereafter TVNZ) Māori news programme Te Karere (TVNZ, 2010, October 20), for example, highlighted the report’s assertions regarding the lack of true partnership, repeated policy failures (particularly the *Māori Language Strategy*) and the inadequate level of resourcing for the language. Similarly, New Zealand Herald’s Yvonne Tahana (2010, October 21) emphasised the key message of language in crisis, clearly accepting the principle of equal partnership:

The dry signs were all around us. . . . But somehow we were all at the oasis feeling good, bedazzled by important initiatives such as Māori Television

and the once-a-year feel good Māori Language Week *We are in a crisis. The language renaissance has faltered.* However, for all its dire warnings the provisional report should be taken as intended: as a kick to get things moving again. It's a generational and timely reminder that this business of language retention is difficult, but *it's a case where both Māori and the Crown have equal responsibilities.*

In an early response to the Te reo Māori chapter, Mamari Stephens (2010, p.64, 65 & 81-82), a lecturer in the School of Law at Victoria University of Wellington, asserted that until an effective and coherent framework of protection and promotion for the use of the language in the public realm is put in place, “Māori is unlikely to be used as a language of civic importance, let alone as a normal language of the Crown”. In addition, Stephens noted with surprise the lack of a proposal to amend the outdated *Māori Language Act 1987* (apart from a recommendation that the role of the Te Taura Whiri be enhanced). Opposition Māori politician, Shane Jones (TVNZ, 2010, October 20) challenged the Minister of Māori Affairs to act. However, given the draft nature of the chapter, the government was able to defer making any official response. Pita Sharples (2010, October 20), while noting that he preferred not “to pre-empt the findings of the independent review panel”, did observe that the Tribunal had identified “many of the same concerns that led [him] to establish the independent review”.²⁰⁶ He also noted the report’s references to the need for Māori ownership, community participation and government support if the *Māori Language Strategy* were to have any hope of success. The actual nature of the primary Government response is, however, perhaps best summed up in an email to the CEO of Te Taura Whiri from Te Puni Kōkiri official, Tipene (Steven) Chrisp (2010, October 19):

[T]he whole-of-government communication strategy is: thank the tribunal, mihi to the claimants, and note that we cannot make any comment about this chapter of the WAI 262 report until we have had an opportunity to consider the whole report.²⁰⁷

²⁰⁶ Sharples was referring to the *Review of the Maori Language Strategy and Māori Language Sector* that was under way.

²⁰⁷ A *mihi* is a formal Māori greeting: in this case a respectful acknowledgment of the claimants.

Notwithstanding the early release of the Te reo Māori chapter, the Tribunal expressed the belief that “the real value of the Wai 262 report [would] come [only] when it [could] be considered as a whole” (WT, 2010, p.ix).

The press release and media theme for the launch of the full *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei* report, released on the 2nd of July 2011, focused on partnership beyond grievance: *Time to move beyond grievance in Treaty relationship . . .* (Waitangi Tribunal, 2011, July 2). This emphasis is reflected in other media articles such as, for example, the article by Yvonne Tahana (2011, July 6) in the *New Zealand Herald*, entitled ‘Bold bid for common path for Crown, Māori’.

4.4.2 Responses to the full report

Most of the responses to the report as a whole related to the full range of issues covered rather than to the Te reo Māori chapter alone. An exception was a Dominion Post editorial (Editorial, 2011, July 7) in which it was claimed that while some of the report’s recommendations were “challenging and potentially divisive”, the recommendations “urging action to preserve the Māori language” were relatively uncontroversial”.

Māori opinion on the report was mixed. Aroha Mead (2011, October 27) and Moana Jackson (1Matariki, 2011, July 1a), specialists in legal studies, expressed disappointment that the report had, in their view, avoided the important issues of rights and racism, asserting that Māori rights issues had lost ground, particularly in comparison with the advances made by other indigenous peoples overseas. Aroha Mead (2011, October 27) also expressed disappointment that the report created “no clear winners and no clear losers” and relied on the ability of the parties involved to swallow their pride and make changes. Also concerned by the conciliatory tone were bloggers Morgan Godfery and Anthony Marsh. Godfery referred to the report as “pedestrian” (2011, July 26), claiming that the Tribunal had worked “*unimaginably within existing norms*” and would “*fizzle out*” (2011, July 3). In connection with the statement that Māori interests would not be ‘*inappropriately*’ elevated above those of others but “*fairly and transparently balanced alongside [them]*”, Marsh (2011, July 3) made the following observation:

I just don't understand this language – ‘inappropriately’ WTF are they writing this with Don Brash in mind or what. I'll goddam ‘transparently balance’ some other interests all right cos at least I'll be at the table. I thought the Waitangi Tribunal had more grunt than this pacifying stuff – just be quiet or you'll upset people.

There was also a high level of scepticism from Māori regarding the implementation of the recommendations. Green Party co-leader Metiria Turei (Radio New Zealand, 2011, July 25) noted that she believed that there would be little if any “genuine Government engagement in response to the report”, such government response as there was being likely to be “fairly weak”. Lawyer and academic Moana Jackson (1Matariki, 2011, July 1b) stated that he believed that the report was unlikely to improve the Government's rate of accepting Waitangi Tribunal recommendations for funding or reparation, which he assessed at less than 3% of the amount recommended. Similarly, Auckland University academic Peter Keegan (2011, April 27), although agreeing with the findings in relation to the declining Māori medium enrolments and the problematic relationship between Te Puni Kōkiri and Te Taura Whiri, noted that he did not believe that Te Taura Whiri would receive enhanced funding or be subjected to any major changes in role as a result of the report. In fact, he questioned whether any major changes in role were really needed. ‘Simon Lambert’ (2011, July 3), in responding to a blog by Anthony Marsh (mars 2 earth), noted that he believed that the size of the document would mean that its impact would be dissipated “to the disadvantage of Māori”, ending with “just a big long 'hmmmmmm' from me at this stage”.

Not all Māori opinion was negative. Aroha Mead (2011, October 27), despite her criticism (above), did see some positives in the report, including the Tribunal's assertion that the Crown “[has] to stop seeing [itself] as Pākehā and English speaking and Māori as the other”, adding “you represent Māori”. Haami Piripi (1Matariki, 2011, June 30), *Te Rarawa* iwi leader and former CEO of the Te Taura Whiri, supported the inclusive approach of the Tribunal:

[There] is nothing in this report that the Crown ought to be able to shun,

everything in this report is about status quo . . . balance . . . moving on together . . . being New Zealanders together so it would be very difficult in my view for the Crown to say this report is no good for us, it's not going to be good for the country, it's not going to be good for anybody but actually I think what the report shows in revealing its recommendations is that it is good for everybody, it's good for New Zealanders as well as good for us as Māori and as kaitiaki and that's got to be good so there's plenty there to work with.

Carwyn Jones (2012, January 31), Victoria University of Wellington law lecturer and blogger, claimed that irrespective of the official response to the “political pressure currently being exerted”, the report would:

[R]emain a hugely significant document because it articulates a conceptually coherent vision of a state founded in the worldviews of two distinct cultures. Importantly, it goes beyond simply articulating a vision, but suggests a range of practical law and policy mechanisms by which that vision might be realized.

One non-Māori response to the report, that of right-wing former ACT Party leader Don Brash (who believes that the Treaty and the settlement process give Māori special treatment) interpreted co-governance between the government and iwi as “a recipe for disaster” (O’Brien, 2011, July 2).²⁰⁸ Similarly, former ACT party MP Muriel Newman (2011, July 3, p.1) described all of the Tribunal recommendations, including the requirement to provide Māori language plans, as “race-based lust for power and control.”²⁰⁹ She warns her readers:

While the tribunal is careful to avoid suggesting that Māori should have ownership rights to native plants and animals, something that would evoke a strong public backlash they have proposed a series of wide-ranging and

²⁰⁸ Brash is also quoted as saying that “Most New Zealanders interpret the Treaty of Waitangi as saying all New Zealanders have equal rights under the law” (O’Brien, 2011, July 2) However, note that the reference in the 1840 Treaty of Waitangi to the people of New Zealand (ngā tāngata katoa o Nu Tīreni) is to the original inhabitants, that is, Māori.

²⁰⁹ Dr. Muriel Newman is also the founder and director of the New Zealand Centre for Political Research (NZCPR), a far right “web based public policy think tank”.

powerful rights that taken together effectively result in ownership by the back door (Newman, 2011, July 3, p.1).

Kennedy Warne, co-founder and former editor of the *New Zealand Geographic* magazine and a regular commentator on Radio New Zealand, was supportive of the report. Warne (2011, July, 4) was particularly impressed with the covering letter to cabinet, referring to it as a “superb, superb document I think everyone should read”. His assessment of the document as a whole was just as positive: “[The report is] built on the desire for relationship and reconciliation”, providing “a new sense of strength and a new sense of optimism”. It is, he asserts, “a bit of a road map . . . identifying specifically Māori understandings, but we all can buy into these, and celebrate them I think, and incorporate them”.²¹⁰ Public policy law expert Mai Chen (2011, July 7), while believing that there would be “no big bang as not all of the recommendations [would] be adopted and implemented”, nevertheless believed that, as a result of the report, “society [would] change”.

Initially, the government simply acknowledged a number of aspects of the report, deferring any substantive policy response until the report had been read, understood and fully worked through. However, Treaty Claims minister, Chris Finlayson (2011, July 1), issued a press release that was clearly aimed at addressing the likely concerns of core National supporters:

The Tribunal’s report does not identify any specific breaches of the Treaty . . . It also acknowledges the excellent work this Government has done in order to recognise the role of Māori as Treaty partners. . . . The report covers a wide range of areas . . . [some] very novel *and any response should not be rushed* . . . in issues like intellectual property . . . *rights are never absolute* . . . *There are public and private interests to consider, as well as other factors like the fiscal situation. That is always a balancing issue for Government, in order to find solutions that are right for New Zealand.*

²¹⁰ Warne (2011, July 4) also stated that “I am very impressed how the Tribunal has addressed that issue and is trying to transcend it and the words are really strong unless we allow Māori into the core of decision making . . . Māori will continue to be perceived and know they are perceived as an alien minority.”

Meanwhile, the Cabinet's Domestic Policy Committee (2010, June 30, p.2) had assembled a Ministerial Group to coordinate and manage a consistent whole-government response, particularly as it related to issues that impact on a cross-section of portfolios and agencies. The aim was to provide a substantive response between 2012 and 2014.²¹¹ The initial goal was:

. . . to develop an overarching framework that considers the Treaty partnership generally, in the first instance, followed by the development of specific responses to particular issues that are informed by the overarching framework globally across the whole of government (Te Puni Kōkiri, 2011, July 26)

In a briefing paper to this ministerial Group,²¹² Te Puni Kōkiri (2011, July 29, p.1) made the following statement:

[O]n the whole, agencies find the Tribunal's report to be reasonable, balanced and constructive. Current law, policy and practice meet or exceed the Tribunal's recommendations, while other recommendations provide a sound basis for improvements.

Te Puni Kōkiri (TPK) had, potentially, the most to lose from the Te reo Māori chapter's recommendation that Te Taura Whiri should be strengthened. Erima Henare (2010, October, 19), chair of Te Taura Whiri, noted to his Board that "as you can imagine, TPK are reluctant for us to talk to the media as the Tribunal's report has not been kind to them." Nevertheless, attached to an affidavit by Crown Law (2010, November 25, p.2), there *was* a lengthy negative response to the pre-publication report which made reference to "factual matters that . . . stand out as points that the Tribunal should address". The concerns of Te Puni Kōkiri centred on (a) the Tribunal's reliance on the Office of the Auditor General report on the

²¹¹ Ministerial Group comprises the Attorney General (Chair); Ministers of Economic Development; Energy and Resources; Justice; Commerce; Environment; Agriculture; Biosecurity; Forestry; Foreign Affairs; Trade; Māori Affairs; the associate Ministers of Māori Affairs and Conservation as well as Tariana Turia (Te Puni Kōkiri, 2011, July 26)

²¹² The briefing paper (released under the Official Information Act 1982) outlines the next steps and high level principles which will underpin any whole of government responses. Unfortunately, the detail of what these steps were blanked out as they were still under consideration.

implementation of the *Māori Language Strategy (2003)* and (b) Bauer's (2008) claims regarding the inaccuracies of the 2006 *Health of the Māori language Survey*. These concerns were expressed in spite of the fact that Te Puni Kōkiri had received an independent report from Statistics Research Associates Limited (Gray, 2010, November 18) that essentially agreed with Bauer's thesis. It stated that the survey had "a poorly thought out design" and "should be seen as unreliable." In the event, "[a]fter due consideration", the Tribunal's members "were not convinced by these submissions that the chapter needed to be amended" (WT, 2011c, p.387).

The following year, Te Puni Kōkiri aired their concerns in the Ministerial group's briefing paper:

In general, we support the need to strengthen the role of Māori in Māori language revitalisation and to enhance the Māori Language Strategy. However, we have previously identified some concerns about the analysis undertaken by the Waitangi Tribunal (in particular, there are some gaps in the evidence that it has relied on which have impacted on its analysis) (Te Puni Kōkiri, 2011, July 26).

Te Puni Kōkiri may also have played a role in persuading the Māori Affairs Committee to make the following statement:

Te Reo Māori: The committee did not completely agree with the finding of the Waitangi Tribunal on the WAI 262 claim that "te reo Māori is approaching a crisis point". It commended the work of TPK and others in revitalising te reo Māori. It was eager to monitor the Government's response to the Māori Language Strategy Review report, *Te Reo Mauriora*, released in April 2011 (Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives, 2012, February 13, p.3).

Other Crown entities, however, were more supportive of the report. The Crown Law Office was reported as seeing no immediate legal risks arising from the report, noting that although some of the claims were novel, the Tribunal's analysis and response was in line with existing trends in jurisprudence (Te Puni Kōkiri, 2011, July, 29, p.5). They also advised that the Tribunal did not generally use the language

of 'Treaty Breach' in its report, but rather focused on opportunities to improve the Treaty partnership going forward.

The response from Te Taura Whiri was also mildly positive, a stance which, given the Tribunal's recommendation that its powers and position as lead agency in Māori language revitalisation should be increased, was not altogether unexpected. For example, in a private email to board members, Erima Henare (2010, October, 19) stated that:

You can see, that although we have had no input into the Tribunals (sic) process their findings are almost identical to those that we have spoken about over the last three years . . . However, it would be prudent that we reflect what the Minister is thinking on the issue.

Nevertheless, the following year Henare (2011, July 7) highlighted the fact that both *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei* and *Te Reo Mauriora* had claimed that the lack of prioritised support by the government had undermined the language's stability. Even so, he indicated that he believed that the present "far-ranging" powers and functions of Te Taura Whiri were sufficient and, therefore, that the major issue was adequate resourcing to enable it to fulfil its functions.

The nearest thing to an all-government response to WAI 262's recommendations was a number of proposals by Māori Party MP Te Ururoa Flavell (2011, October 10) which included:

- *Te Puni Kōkiri* and the *Ministry of Culture and Heritage* should take leadership in improving the co-ordination among agencies that look after Mātauranga Māori;
- *Te Taura Whiri* should become a *Crown-Māori partnership*, with increased powers to approve the development of Māori language plans in central and local Government, state-funded schools and broadcasting as well as to provide input into educational curricula and teacher training;

- *Local iwi should become reo Māori authorities in their rohe*, with their planning and decision-making becoming part of central agency planning;
- Crown-Māori partnership entities should be established in educational agencies.

Although these proposals appeared to relate directly to the *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei* report, Mai Chen (2011, October 11) responded by claiming that, in effect, “the Māori Party was helping the National-led Government’s policy of reducing the number of Crown entities”. She argued that if Te Taura Whiri became a *Crown-Māori Partnership* instead of an *Autonomous Crown Entity*, it could lose its policy making role, have less say over funding and, overall, be reduced to a status similar to that of a regional office of the Ministry of Education. She also argued that the increased status of local iwi could result in their reporting directly to Te Puni Kōkiri “thereby by-passing TTWh.”²¹³

It is clear that a significant amount of on-going hegemonic contestation surrounds the recommendations of *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei*.²¹⁴ The presiding officer of the WAI 262 enquiry, Judge Joe Williams (2011, July 7), has acknowledged this:

The tribunal's proposals are the beginning of a conversation There may be some who disagree with it for one reason, there may be some who disagree with it for other reasons, there may some who agree with it. Ultimately, what happens to it is going to be a matter for the parties, for the Crown, for the Claimants, and the private sector groups who might be involved in any discussions. This is our investigation and analysis of the problems and some solutions that are put up as recommendations. It will be

²¹³ The initials TTWH (or TTWh) refer to Te Taura Whiri.

²¹⁴ For example, Leo Watson (1Matariki, 2011, July 1c), lawyer for the claimants, stated that “a lot of assistance has come through those [1200] pages . . . but over the next few months whānau and hapū have to have the opportunity to . . . make sure that a lot of that detail can be brought back to the table with the Crown, and not have the Crown run away with a set of solutions for themselves. . . it’s for Māori to determine a pathway forward in engagement with the Crown, and to take some of the examples the Tribunal have provided, but not see that as the panacea for all the solutions in front of us.” Morgan Godfery (2011, July 26) noted that the Government’s response will depend on the level of influence on National by the ‘redneck right’, the ‘resurgent left’ and the Māori party. Political analyst Colin James conceived of the report as “one more big step in a long, winding journey” toward greater Māori influence (2011, July 5) noting that, “we’ve been gradually moving in this direction anyway. . . co-governance of the Waikato river for instance, no one would have thought of that five years ago” (James, 2011, July 2).

for others to decide what to do with it - our work is done.

Chapter 5

A criterion-referenced analysis of *Te Reo Mauriora*

5.1 Introduction

This chapter focuses on the second report that relates to the Māori language in New Zealand - *Te Reo Mauriora: Review of the Māori language sector and the Māori Language Strategy* - once again providing background information (5.2), followed by the analysis itself (5.3) and discussion of the report's reception (5.4). The chapter ends with some overall conclusions (5.5).

An electronic copy of this report is available from the Te Puni Kōkiri website: www.tpk.govt.nz/documents/te-reo-mauriora.pdf

5.2 Background to the report

In 2007, the Office of the Auditor-General released a performance report that identified major areas of concern in relation to the implementation of the *Māori Language Strategy* (OAG, 2007).²¹⁵ It concluded that the commitment to planning, resourcing and communication by all lead agencies had been far from adequate, a conclusion which quickly became the subject of political debate (OAG, 2007, pp.7-10).²¹⁶ A second development in 2007 was the *Hui Taumata Mō Te Reo Māori* which drew many Māori language leaders from across the nation. One of the key recommendations of this gathering was that the *Māori Language Act 1987* be reviewed and updated (Te Taura Whiri, 2008, November, p.3; 2008, pp.6-7; 2010,

²¹⁵ Reference was made to the Māori Language Strategy 2003 in *Section 1.3.2.4*

²¹⁶ For example, in question time in Parliament MP Te Ururoa Flavell (2008, July 22) drew on the Office of the Auditor-General findings to challenge the then Minister of Māori Affairs, Parekura Horomia, regarding commitment to the Treaty as well as to the implementation and evaluation of the Māori Language Strategy. His questions were: (a) "Does he [Horomia] agree that the Treaty obligation of the Crown to guarantee to Māori the undisturbed possession of their taonga includes their language; and what can he conclude about the status of the Treaty *when no agency, including Te Puni Kōkiri, had completed and finalised a plan that fully met the requirements of the Māori Language Strategy by the 30 June 2004 deadline set by Cabinet?*" (b) "What has the 2008 review concluded about the effectiveness of the implementation of the Māori Language Strategy to date, and what confidence can New Zealanders have in this review, knowing that the Auditor General identified, and I quote: *"the activities carried out so far by TPK do not constitute systematic evaluations of the effectiveness of the Māori language activities carried out by the government agencies?"*

July 29, p.4).²¹⁷ Towards the end of 2007, the Te Taura Whiri and Te Puni Kōkiri (TPK) began a joint internal review of the *Māori Language Strategy*, the findings of which were not made public (Flavell, 2008, July 22; Te Taura Whiri, 2008, p.7).²¹⁸

Following the 2008 and 2011 elections, Peter Sharples and the Māori Party entered into a coalition agreement with the John Key led National Government.²²⁰ Within the context of this agreement, although the Minister of Māori Affairs (Sharples) “[would] continue to lead the revitalisation strategy for *te reo rangatira*” (New Zealand National Party and Māori Party, 2011, December 11), there was, crucially, no promise from National to support the Māori Language Strategy or Māori language sector reform recommendations.²²¹ Any policy advances relating to the Māori language would therefore depend upon the Māori Party’s ability to use whatever leverage it had to persuade the National Government to act.²²²

At the end of 2008, the year in which the National-led Government took office, the New Zealand economy was in trouble, with substantial overseas-funded private sector debt and a high current account deficit. This situation was exacerbated by a global financial crisis (2008), the collapse and bailout of South Canterbury Finance

²¹⁷ In addition, Te Taura Whiri (2010, July 29, p.4) stated that it would be “short sighted from any review of the 1987 Act to merely consider an aspect of the Act when in fact “the role of TTWh within the Act itself is critical”.

²¹⁸ This report (Te Puni Kōkiri and Te Taura Whiri, 2009, p.28) proposed that the long-term vision of the 2003 strategy be retained but that its management be changed to make it “more effective.” Suggestions include adding outcome-oriented short-term goals for each health indicator, streamlining the organisation of functions and sectors, inviting more agencies to be involved and creating an overall action plan.

²²⁰ It is important to note that National was not dependent on any one party to govern, thus placing all its minority coalition partners in a weak position from which to negotiate credible policy gains. This is why political commentator Gordon Campbell (Campbell, 2011, December 12) labelled the Māori Party’s confidence and supply agreement with National (the others were with United Future and ACT) “the sorriest” of three “shabby” agreements in that “it concedes a lot but gains very little.”

²²¹ The revitalisation and promotion of the Māori language is a major theme in the Māori Party principles (See Māori Party, n.d., p.4).

²²² The Māori Party have consistently justified their support of National by stating that to be “at the table” that is, in Government (see Cheng, 2012, January 25; Levy, 2012, July 19; Young, 2009, December 11) is “the greatest opportunity Māori have ever had to benefit from political influence” and certainly better than “disappearing into the crowded wasteland of the opposition” (Turia, 2012, July 23).

(2010-2011)²²³ and the devastating Canterbury earthquakes (2010-2011).²²⁴ Consequently, in line with its neo-liberal orientation²²⁵ and public management model,²²⁶ the Government adopted an austerity-based approach in order to attempt to bring debt down to what it considered to be prudent levels. This policy, commonly referred to as the ‘zero budget’, involved prohibiting new Government spending and looking for cost reductions (English, 2012, May 24; Hartevelt, 2012, May 23).²²⁷ This explains both the Terms of Reference instruction that the review “must be *undertaken with the context of a tight fiscal environment*” (Te Paepae Motuhake, 2011, p.71) as well as Finance Minister Bill English’s post-review assertions that he was “expecting them to make any changes *within* the current budget”, and that “there would be *no new* provisions in the budget for developing Māori language” (New Zealand Press Association, 2011, April 13).

Consequently, the major justification of the review of the Māori Language Strategy (launched in July, 2010) was to ensure that Government investment in the Māori language was justified in terms of value for money. Thus, for example, Sharples (2010, July 29a, July 29b) observed that the aim of the review was to determine

²²³ *South Canterbury Finance* was New Zealand's largest locally owned finance company when it collapsed in August 2010. It had 35,000 investors and owned almost \$NZ2 billion in assets. It was placed in receivership in 2010 triggering a \$1.6 billion bailout of investors’ deposits by the New Zealand Government which was guaranteed under its Retail Deposit Guarantee Scheme.

²²⁴ *The Canterbury earthquakes* consisted of two major earthquake events as well as a long series of large aftershocks. The earthquakes, particularly the second in 2011 which killed 185 people, caused massive infrastructural and building damage, produced thousands of tonnes of silt, and disrupted the region’s economy, employment, and tourism. The total net cost to the Crown was estimated at \$13.5 billion, with the rebuild estimated to rise to \$30 billion or 10 percent of GDP, which will have a huge long term effect of the economy (the Japan tsunami was only 3 to 4% of its annual GDP) (Parliamentary Library, 2011, December 20).

²²⁵ *Neoliberalism* is an ideology that has influenced mainstream economics since the 1980s. It aims to use market competition to lift the performance of the state. Thus, in neo-liberalism, citizens become consumers or resource units, while it emphasises the personal freedom from state coercion and regulation and therefore advocates economic liberalisations, free trade, and deregulation of markets, the privatisation of state-owned enterprises, and the promotion of the private sector's role in society.

²²⁶ *New Public Management* has been a significant, albeit evolving, model of public administration since the 1980s. It combines neoliberal ideals with a distinctly proactive managerialist approach that aims to constantly improve performance, outcomes, efficiency and cost-effectiveness (Sayers, 2009, pp.226-228). It is now less stringently applied than the 80s radical market-led structural reforms, including wider concerns for collaboration and social outcomes (Duncan & Chapman, 2010). Nevertheless, the quest for cost-efficiency drives a reduction in back-office services through digitalisation, sharing and standardisation of systems as well as a focus on outcomes (rather than outputs) and evidence-based policy (James, 2011, September 30).

²²⁷ Rotherham (2011, May 10) noted that the International Monetary Fund “recommended monetary policy would need to be tightened to contain inflationary pressure and a return to fiscal surpluses by 2014/15”. The National Government ‘zero-budget’ policy appears to closely follow the IMF recommendation.

how government investment (estimated at approximately NZ\$226 million *per annum*) could be ‘refocused’ on “encouraging active use of te reo in daily life” (Klein-Nixon, 2010, March 4). Securing ‘maximum’ or ‘enhanced’ value for Government investment in the sector was a major focus of the Terms of Reference (Te Paepae Motuhake, 2011, pp.71, 77 & 79).²²⁸ The other related major themes iterated by Government, in public discourse and internal reviews, were (a) the need for the cohesiveness of the sector, (b) Government accountability for, and commitment to implementing the strategy, and (c) greater iwi involvement and control (see, for example, Flavell, 2009, October 15; Māori Affairs Committee, 2009, May 26, p.5; Sharples, 2010, July 29a; July 29b; September 1; Tahana, 2009, August 4; Māori Affairs Committee, 2009, May 26, p.5; Flavell, 2009, October 15; Sharples, 2010, July 29a; July 29b; September 1).²²⁹

As discussed in *Chapter 1*, there are widespread negative attitudes towards Māori language use among the approximately 85.4% of the New Zealand population who are non-Māori (de Bres, 2008a, pp.46-54).²³⁰ In connection with this, it is important to note that although there may be tacit agreement by many non-Māori with the principle of revitalising the Māori language, there is considerable resistance to specific initiatives (Nicholson and Garland, 1991, p.405).²³¹ However, as indicated in the 2003 *Māori Language Strategy* (Te Puni Kōkiri & Te Taura Whiri, 2003,

²²⁸ The original Terms of Reference (Te Puni Kōkiri, n.d., pp.6-7) suggest that all the research (including the literature review, data collection, stocktake and analysis of programmes and services, assessment of expenditure) are intended to “*provide the basis for the value for money assessment.*” This sentence is missing in the version of the Terms of Reference that is provided in the Appendices of the *Te Reo Mauriora* report.

²²⁹ The cohesiveness issues have existed for some years. In the 2000 Annual Report of Te Taura Whiri (2000, p.1) for example, Commissioner Patu Hohepa stated that “Burning issues continue to bedevil our work. Such an issue is the taking of some Māori language services and products from the Commission into your Ministry. They were better left to the Commission. Even though this Commission was created as the guardian and the activist for language promotion and maintenance, how could these be done if control over important aspects such as research and audit as well as possible funding have been moved to your Ministry? . . . That the Commission has continued to be at the mercy of non-Māori speaking analysts, linguists and decision-makers in your Ministry continue to cause repercussions in the Commission.”

²³⁰ For example, 71% of non-Māori did not want their children to speak Māori (de Bres, 2008a, p.47). This includes the approximately 12% of ‘English only’ New Zealanders who tend to forcefully express their belief that English should be the only language used in New Zealand public life (pp.51-53).

²³¹ For example, approximately 80% of non-Māori were not in favour of bilingual public services, bilingual public signs and Māori language television programmes; 60% were not in favour of Māori people speaking Māori in public places or at work; 79% of non-Māori did not agree to Māori as a compulsory school subject for Māori children; and 75% stated that they would not be willing to make a personal effort to ensure the survival of the Māori language (de Bres, 2008a, pp.46-50).

p.27), “to revitalise the language it is necessary for wider New Zealand society to value the language and support a positive linguistic environment.”

The review of the Māori language sector and the *Māori Language Strategy* was officially launched on the 29th of July 2010, in Māori Language Week. The press release by Peter Sharples (2010, July 29a) which accompanied the launch provides a particularly clear window into the drive for a more co-ordinated approach that involves greater Iwi/Māori control based on the Treaty paradigm of partnership:

‘The strategy and infrastructure of the Māori Language sector is to be completely reviewed, to ensure the programmes and expenditure across the whole of government *are responsive to Iwi/Māori aspirations*’, Māori Affairs Minister Dr Pita Sharples has announced.

‘Government spends around \$226 million every year to revitalise Māori language, in schools, through broadcasting, in programmes supported by Te Taura Whiri i te Reo Māori and so on,’ said the Minister. ‘Most of the funding is managed by Government departments to fulfil their policies and plans. Other funding is allocated to Iwi, hapu, whanau and communities to support their projects and priorities’.

However, we need a *more coordinated approach*. We also need a strategy that will *empower Iwi/Māori to take control of the Māori Language*.²³² I am asking the review group to consider whether responsibilities, programmes, services and expenditure are coordinated and whether or not they are located with the right agencies or Māori stakeholders. By restructuring and consolidating the sector we can only achieve better results.

²³² Despite the benefits of speaking community control, there is also a danger that it doesn’t also involve neo-liberal governments disinvesting themselves from their legal and moral responsibilities for language revitalisation. Personal or individual responsibility can masquerade as empowerment or ‘freedom’ from state intervention when it results in less empowerment (Cabau, 2009). Writing about the deterioration of pluralism, Lo Bianco (2006, November 11, p.6) noted “that the whole idea of difference has been privatised. It’s been pushed back to the family and to the home”. This issue (as it relates to the report) is discussed again in *Section 5.3.5*.

‘A revised Māori Language Strategy will bring together all our efforts to promote and revitalise our language - a strategy that will be *based on partnership between the Crown and Iwi/Māori*’, said Dr Sharples.

The review panel, which was called Te Paepae Motuhake (The Independent Panel) consisted of seven members, each representing a Māori dialectal region, and each chosen because of his/her expertise and experience in Māori language and Māori language revitalisation activities.²³³

The terms of reference for this review begin with some background comments regarding the past and present status of the Māori language as well as the range of current government investment (Te Paepae Motuhake, 2011, pp.69-72). The rationale for the review is that “there is still room for significant improvement”, particularly in terms of sector cohesion, value for money and strategic language outcomes (pp.69-72). The seven issues to be addressed within the review are summarised below, with the three priority issues first:

Principles: Develop some guiding principles (including Treaty principles) that would underpin investment in Māori Language revitalisation.

Outcomes: Develop a strategic framework and intervention logic for government that is informed by the current state of the Māori language and desired outcomes reflected in iwi language plans and the consultation process.

Roles and responsibility of Government: Survey and prioritise the present roles and responsibilities within the Māori language sector. Consider the relationship between Māori / Iwi and Government and identify opportunities for partnerships as well as any other roles that should be undertaken by government.

²³³ Members of Te Paepae Motuhake included Emeritus Professor Sir Tāmami Reedy (chair), Raheera Shortland, Toni Waho, Pānia Papa, Hana O'Regan, Cathy Dewes, Pem Bird (July-November 2010) and Te Kahautū Maxwell (who replaced Pem Bird in Nov 2010).

Key initiatives: Gather evidence regarding Māori satisfaction and the impact of current initiatives delivered by government agencies and identify other programmes sought by Iwi/Māori

Co-ordination and infrastructure of the Māori Language Sector: Review the infrastructure; identify whether responsibilities, programmes, expenditure and services are located with the right stakeholders; identify opportunities for enhanced co-ordination and inter-agency engagement; compare the functions and powers of Te Taura Whiri i te Reo Māori with similar bodies domestically and internationally.

Expenditure: identify the expenditure, outputs and outcomes of all Māori language programmes and services.

Value: assess the value for money of the expenditure in light of a tight fiscal environment (also exploring other dimensions of ‘value’, including the effectiveness and efficiency of delivery, the level of support for cultural identity, Māori wellbeing and community relationships, and finally, the status of the Māori language as a *taonga* in the context of the Treaty of Waitangi).

The review period of eight months, with a further four months to develop a strategy, was timed to coincide with budget planning for the 2011/12 financial year (Te Paepae Motuhake, 2011, pp.76-77).²³⁴ It was expected that, subject to the Cabinet Strategy Committee confirming the framework for a whole-of-government response and a new strategy being developed, the Minister of Māori Affairs would be able to announce the new initiatives during Māori language week in early July 2011 (Te Puni Kōkiri, 2011, March 22, p.2). Given the amount of work required to complete the review, this was a particularly tight timeframe. Nevertheless, 2011 was an election year and may have been the last opportunity the Māori party would have to influence a process such as this as a part of Government. Thus, it was very

²³⁴ The official tabling of the Government budget was due on the 19th of May 2011

important that the review be delivered in a timely manner. The review phases are outlined below:

- | | | | |
|---------------------------|----------|--------------------------------|------------|
| 1. Establishment of Panel | TPK | Provide background information | |
| | Panel | Confirm timeframe | Jul. 2010 |
| 2. First Order Issues | Panel | Review state of Māori language | |
| | Panel | Review Iwi/Māori aspirations | Sept. 2010 |
| 3. Second Order Issues | Panel | Survey Māori language sector | |
| | Panel | Review expenditure & impact | Dec. 2010 |
| 4. Report | a. Panel | Assess information | |
| | b. Panel | Complete report | Mar. 2011 |
| 5. New Strategy | MMA | Assess recommendations | |
| | MMA | Develop strategy; consult | |
| | MMA | Prepare cabinet paper | Jun. 2011 |
| 6. Strategy complete | MMA | Endorse and announce | Jul. 2011 |

On completion of tasks 1-4a, panel members were expected to detail their findings and recommendations concerning a new Māori Language Strategy in a report to be presented to the Minister of Māori Affairs (Te Paepae Motuhake, 2011, p.71). That report was intended to form the basis of the strategy.²³⁵ The critical components of this new strategy are listed below in order to indicate how the information gathered in the seven areas of consideration was intended to be integrated into the strategy:

- a. Set out the guiding principles for the revitalisation of the Māori language;
- b. Focus on the desired outcomes for the revitalisation of the Māori language;
- c. Provide clarity about the most effective programmes and services to support the outcomes;
- d. Confirm the roles of government and those of Iwi and Māori and how they will be integrated to achieve the outcomes;
- e. Set out the priorities, location and quantum of funding given to the roles within agencies;

²³⁵ The steps required to gain cabinet approval for the new strategy were also outlined.

- f. Provide options for enhancement of relevant legislation (for example, the Māori Language Act 1987);
- g. Provide an implementation plan to achieve the aims.

An internal briefing paper produced at the beginning of the review shows that the Te Taura Whiri was concerned that the review would impact on their status, role and function (Te Taura Whiri, 2010, July 29, p.4). It was noted in that paper that they were the only agency to be reviewed on both their inputs and outputs and it was asserted that the functions, powers and outputs of all agencies should be reviewed (Te Taura Whiri, 2010, July 29, p.4). It was also noted in the paper that these concerns had been ignored by Te Puni Kōkiri in the drafting of the Terms of Reference and that, therefore, it was important that the Commission should “feed into the panel’s framework” in terms of “how this consideration happens” (Te Taura Whiri, 2010, July 29, p.4).

The review ended on the 13th of April 2011 with the release of a bilingual report entitled *Te Reo Mauriora*. Higgins (n.d., p.9) notes that “the report reads in the way it was constructed through an amalgamation of separately written and researched components that is typical of many review reports.” This perspective is reinforced by evidence of different dialects in the Māori versions of the sections.

The principal recommendation of *Te Reo Mauriora* was that the re-establishment of Māori language usage in homes be prioritised. It also recommended that the entire Māori language sector budget (which it estimated at approximately NZ\$600 million) be placed under the control of a Minister of Māori Language and a separate Board, *Te Mātāwai*, whose members would answer to him or her. *Te Mātāwai* would be made up of language experts representing nine regions. The panel also recommended the creation of nine *Rūnanga ā-Reo* which, through delegated authority from *Te Mātāwai*, would effectively control all of the Māori language sector programmes and services within their regions.

5.3 Criterion-referenced analysis of the report

In line with the practice so far where italic print is used in extracts from the report, this is intended to draw attention to particular sections.²³⁶

5.3.1 Criterion A: Representation of an ‘in-group’

Question 1: Is the construction/ representation of any ‘in-group’ identity consistent with the overall purpose of the text within its discourse context?

Question 2: Is the representation of any ‘in-group’ likely to be perceived as sufficiently inclusive and genuinely representative by the target membership of that group and to resonate positively with them?

The key in-group identified in the report appears, at first sight, to be all Māori, as indicated by the use possessive pronouns in the extract below,

It is naive to have a false sense of security about *our* recent gains in Māori language and cultural revitalisation initiatives. *We* have made significant progress in the last 25 years As a minority language, *we* are still very much in the critical stage. *Ours* will not simply become one of the surviving 1000 languages . . . by chance. But left to chance, and by apathy, *ours* could certainly easily become one of the 5000 — and quickly so.

The signifier for this group may also include the people or Iwi:

Return control to *the people* (p.15).

The *iwi* have to make sure the design of their respective houses are fit for purpose, and perhaps most importantly — they need to be committed to living in it (p.43).

²³⁶ In this section, the in-text citation of excerpts from the *Te Reo Mauriora* report will show only the page number. Thus, instead of ‘(Te Paepae Motuhake, 2011, p.56)’ it will show ‘(p.56)’. Furthermore, given that the English version would be the only one read by the majority of hegemonic interests/ key decision makers, it will be the focus of the analysis.

In spite of initial appearances, this in-group does not include all Māori. It explicitly includes iwi organisations, Māori language activists (particularly those active in the 1960s and 1970s), groups, such as *Te Ataarangi*, that have made a commitment to the Māori language and some of those who attended the consultation hui.²³⁷

Māori Language Homes — priority funding to be given to programmes that work with families and communities *that have made a commitment to te reo Māori*, such as: *Te Kōhanga Reo, Puna Reo, te Kura Kaupapa Māori, Wharekura, Kura a-iwi, Te Ataarangi, Wānanga Māori, marae, health services and businesses* (p.44).

The above summary captures the spirit and earnest voice of *the people who attended the hui throughout*. (p.24).

[C]oncern was expressed by *the people* [who attended the consultation hui] (p.57).

[government efforts have been made] largely as a response to political pressures that gained momentum in the *late 1960s and early 1970s to recognise the rightful place of te reo Māori in New Zealand Society. These protests* resulted in the establishment of the Māori Language Act 1987 whereby Māori was declared to be an official language of New Zealand (p.32).

Many Māori, by virtue of the negative nature of references made to them (negative references that are, however, often mitigated), appear to be excluded from this in-group:

The current reality is that 23% of the Māori population identify themselves as being able to speak te reo to some degree. *Not all of that 23% are*

²³⁷ That Te Ataarangi is a part of the ‘in-group’ is also indicated by the photographs (pp.44 & 45) of two well-known Te Ataarangi teachers speaking at the consultation meetings as well as the use of a quotation from the principle founder of Te Ataarangi, Katerina Te Heikōkō Mataira, to reiterate key principles in the Principles section (p.21). Review panel member Rāhera Shortland is also a member of the Te Ataarangi governing body.

committed to speaking te reo in the homes and use it as the language of communication with their children (p.27).

Māori have also had a role to play in the loss of language as it may be argued that choices were still made around intergenerational transmission by those who had access to quality te reo, irrespective of the external pressures they were experiencing. *Whatever the reason*, there remains a number of Māori who have been able to or are currently able to nurture te reo Māori in their homes, whānau and community, who choose not to do so. *Although one may empathise with the rationale or justifications for their respective choices*, the responsibility nevertheless still lies with *those people* to impart the language to the next generation of their whānau if they have the ability to do so (p.37).

Many iwi continue to prioritise other issues over te reo Māori and its revitalization . . . (p.3).

The perception was strong, *that tribal governance* tended to prioritise issues around Treaty Settlements, the Foreshore and Seabed Act, forestry and tribal economy over te reo . . . (p.39).

Māori expressed grave concern that more needs to be done by both the Government and Māori . . . (p.47).

The fractured nature of language constructions being passed on is an insidious problem. Here, teachers of Māori language *come under a huge barrage of criticism*. *Unfairly or not* they are seen as providers of te reo and are 'paid to do it' while the home environment and parents often escape *this carping criticism* (p.47).

There is *also concern* about the new language teachers are using in kōhanga reo and kura - a mixed up language with repeated errors (p.47).

The ‘in-group’ identified in this report appears to include only those Māori who are seen as being committed to revitalisation of the Māori language. This is fundamentally different from the inclusive national in-group representations articulated in *Our Land Our Languages* and *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei*. In fact, as indicated in the next section, the New Zealander signifier is used in *Te Reo Mauriora* with reference to an ‘out-group’. The answer to the two questions with which this section began must therefore be negative.

5.3.2 Criterion B: Representation of an ‘other’ identity

Question 3: Is the construction/ representation of any ‘other’ identity group consistent with the overall purpose of the text within its discourse context?

Question 4: Is the representation of any ‘other’ identity group likely to be perceived as inaccurate, disrespectful or offensive by the target membership of that group?

It was noted in the previous section that the ‘in-group’ in *Te Reo Mauriora* is made up of a relatively narrow section of Māori who are committed to Māori language use and revitalisation. In spite of the acknowledgement that attitudes towards Māori and the Māori language are more positive than they were in the past (“*but today a more positive change in attitudes and race relations is apparent*” (p.63)), almost every other group is presented, directly or implicitly, in negative terms. This includes a number of existing or potential political allies, including government representatives, non-Māori New Zealanders (with the exception of the Governor General and those involved in the governance and management of King’s College) and those Māori who have not demonstrated their commitment to the revitalisation of the language. All of these groups are treated as the ‘Other’ in this report:

*Some New Zealanders may say that the loss of Māori language is unimportant (p.14).*²³⁸

²³⁸ This is part of a quotation from the *Waitangi Tribunal WAI 11 Report*.

Raise critical awareness amongst Māori, *other New Zealanders*, and the global community to believe in the value of the Māori language. (p.23)

[G]enerations of *New Zealanders* . . . saw little value in our Country's indigenous language . . . actively degraded it and in many cases resented its presence (p.31).

Many informants of the review expressed that *the low status and lack of respect for the language is a relic of our colonial history* . . . (p.63).

The construction/ representation of an 'other' identity group in this report seems unlikely to be received in a positive way and appears, therefore, not to be consistent with the report's overall purpose. Indeed, the largely antagonistic stance of the writers seems likely to impact in a negative way on the potential for support for the report's recommendations.

5.3.3 Criterion C: Group formation and fragmentation

Question 5: Does the text identify a common adversary in such a way as to increase the potential for the extension of an existing coalition of support for its aims?

Although the stance adopted in *Te Reo Mauriora* towards number of identities is frequently a negative one, it is government that is identified as a common adversary. Thus, for example, the government is represented as a being *demolisher/ destroyer of te reo* (pp.29 & 41); *destroyer of Māori speaking communities* (pp.31 & 37); *unwilling to support te reo* (pp.29, 33); *devious* (p.29); *a liar* (p.31); and *unprofessional and disjointed* (pp.31, 33, 41 & 43). Much of the report is dedicated to rehearsing past and present failures of the Crown in relation to the Māori language. A few examples are provided below:

Although there are many factors that both directly and indirectly contributed to the decline of te reo in the 20th Century, there were perhaps no more damaging and long lasting than those forwarded by *the Crown* (p.29).

[T]he *Crown and its agents* led, resourced and supported the various campaigns that eroded the position of te reo in this country (p.31).

Whether one focuses on *the Crown's* failure to perform its duties in terms of protecting Te Reo as a taonga under the Treaty, and/or its failure to adequately promote and resource its development to ensure its continuation and survival — the end result was the same . . . (p.31).

The State's collective responses [to the Māori Language Strategy] have . . . remained largely isolated and disparate with significant questions being raised around accountabilities, confusion of roles, duplication of activities and waste (p.33).

The word 'responsibility' in the Terms of Reference is used with direct reference to the provision of support for Māori language revitalisation. The report writers, however, use it extensively with reference to government culpability (see, for example, pp.29-30), a clear example of the antagonistic stance adopted. Indeed, where there *are* statements relating to the Crown that could be interpreted in a positive, or at least relatively positive way, they are immediately undermined (see sections in italics below):

[T]he Government has continued to *slowly grow* the investment in te reo and its development across many spheres of public life. *By and large, this investment however, has been made in an ad-hoc fashion and in the absence of a comprehensive strategic plan for te reo Māori* (p.33).

In the New Zealand situation, the Government has made efforts to give effect to those expectations around te reo Māori, *largely as a response to political pressures* . . . (p.33).

Given that there has been an increase in the proficiency level of Māori from the early 1970s to 23% in 2006, it is reasonable to assume that government spending, especially from the Ministry of Education, has contributed to that

growth. *However the Ministry acknowledges its own results as 'patchy', indicating the need for better and sharper evaluation methods (p.61).*

The identification of Government as a common adversary may be something to which many of the report's in-group respond in a positive way. It is, however, an identification that is unlikely to increase the potential for the extension of an existing coalition of support for the report's aims. The answer to the question with which this section began must therefore be - no.

Question 6: Does the text provide evidence of an existing coalition of support for its aims?

The task with which review group members were entrusted was essentially to determine whether government Māori language expenditure was being directed in the best possible way to secure positive outcomes and, if not, to make recommendations in relation to the redirection of some of it. This being the case, whilst acknowledging that there are serious problems associated with government approaches to the Māori language (past and present) and with the *Māori Language Strategy* and its implementation, gaining support for recommendations made by the review group (establishing an 'in-group') appears, at first sight, to have been relatively unproblematic. *There were many potential allies.* In fact, the report's Terms of Reference provide evidence of an existing coalition of support for the overall aims of the review:

[T]he *Government* considers that there is still room for significant improvement in terms of the outcomes that are sought, the value for money and the infrastructure of this sector (p.69).

Māori language experts have identified the need to continue to increase the population of highly proficient speakers, to strengthen Māori language use in a variety of settings . . . (p.69).

Te Puni Kōkiri have . . . highlighted the importance of support for Iwi dialects. . . . Te Puni Kōkiri will convene and chair an inter-agency working

group, including the *Ministry of Education* and *Te Taura Whiri*, to support the Review (p.71).

Other sectors: *Ministry for Culture and Heritage; Department of Internal Affairs; Ministry of Economic Development; Ministry of Research, Science and Technology; National Library and related agencies; courts and Tribunals and, other agencies* as required (p.73).

The Minister of Māori Affairs will be responsible for this Review (p.73).

Iwi/Māori communities: *Iwi . . . Iwi* radio stations; *wānanga, Independent Tertiary Providers, Kura Kaupapa, Kōhanga Reo* and *Te Ataarangi. Hapū and Marae Whānau* (p.73).

In addition, there were a number of potential supporters who, while not included in the Terms of Reference, were known to the agencies involved. Thus, for example, a communication strategy sent by Peter Sharples (2011, April 12) lists key stakeholders, including interested Ministers and agencies as well as national Māori language organisations and advocates such as *Te Kōhanga Reo National Trust; Te Rūnanganui o Ngā Kura Kaupapa Māori; Te Tauihu o Ngā Waka; Te Ataarangi; Te Whakaruruhau o Ngā Reo Irirangi* and *Ngā Aho Whakaari*.

In spite of an existing coalition of support for the aims of the review, the authors of the report appear to have fractured its potential support base. As indicated in earlier sections, the panel adopted what appears to be a largely antagonistic stance toward many of these groups. However, what appears to have alienated its most influential supporters is the fact that the reviewers chose not to perform some of the tasks outlined in the Terms of Reference. Indeed, one particularly unexpected aspect of this report, given its purpose and discourse context, is the fact that members of the review panel appear to have interpreted their role, in part at least, as being not merely to assert tino rangatiratanga (sovereignty) by Māori over the process of Māori language revitalisation but also to assert their own authority by bypassing the Terms of Reference in relation to which they were appointed. This involved an attempted identity shift – from servant to master. This attempted shift in identity is

seen in the repeated use of modal auxiliaries (e.g. *must; should; shall; need to*) to indicate that, irrespective of the use, in places, of the word 'recommendation', what were being forwarded were requirements rather than recommendations. In the examples below, emphasis has been added:

[T]he future implementation of the revitalisation strategy *will be led by iwi* (p.7).

All initiatives *will be geared to support the principal goal* which is to create significant numbers of Māori language speaking homes (p.45).

The programme called He Kāinga Kōrerorero carried out by Te Ataarangi . . . *should be expanded* For example homes of a kōhanga reo or kura kaupapa Māori *will be supported by Te Ataarangi* so that the children and parents learn the reo . . . (p.47).

The Minister *will appoint an interim five person Board of Trustees*. The term of this interim Board *shall not exceed one year* (p.49).

The Minister *will have over-riding authority* for Māori language revitalisation *and will control* the Government's budget for Māori language (p.49).

Te Mātāwai *will be elected* by Māori (p.49).

All agencies *will be required* to participate... (p.51).

Te Mātāwai *will be authorised* to distribute te reo Māori funds... (p.51).

The connection between the examples above and the assertion of *tino rangatiratanga* is an obvious one. They are all anchored in a situation in which the present Crown / Māori power relations are reversed. Thus Māori will have over-riding authority (p.49), will control the budget (p.49), will elect Board members (p.49), will require Government participation (p.51) and will distribute funds (p.51).

Members of the review panel also call for a number of tasks to be completed by others that were, in fact, assigned to them as part of the Terms of Reference. Notwithstanding this, they express concern that these tasks have not been undertaken (see use of modal auxiliaries once again):

[There have been] no evaluations on the state of the language in programmes funded by Government. This research *must be carried out* (p.25).

[T]hese kinds of results [achievement of Māori medium schools] *need to be further analysed . . . which should guide . . . funding prioritisation* (p.61).

The spend on Māori initiatives from now on *needs to be tracked, monitored and evaluated for value for money* (p.61).

[The] economic value of the language against the GDP *should be measured* (p.63).

In connection with this, it is relevant to note that some of the tasks assigned to the proposed body, Te Mātāwai, are also tasks with which members of the review panel were themselves charged:

Te Paepae Motuhake envisages that Te Mātāwai *will carry out a detailed environment scan and develop a contract mapping analysis* (p.51);

Te Mātāwai will provide a forum *to correct the current lack of co-ordination, co-operation and inter-agency engagement* (p.51).

One of the tasks assigned to review panel members was to “identify current Māori language expenditure across Votes and agencies” (p.74). In the event, panel members noted that “[t]here was difficulty in extracting an exact figure on all government expenditure for Māori language”, with totals “rang[ing] between \$225 million and \$600 million” (p.57). Notwithstanding the lack of clarity, panel

members not only recommended that a figure of \$600 million be “the base funding for te reo Māori for the 2011-2012 financial year” (p.55) but also that “all current government funding allocated for te reo Māori be re-dedicated to Vote: Reo Māori under the authority of the [to be appointed] Minister for Te Reo Māori” (p.55).²³⁹ In simply accepting the higher figure,²⁴⁰ panel members ran the risk of alienating some potential supporters (not to mention the government departments from whose budget the \$600m would be derived) who may have been surprised at what might have appeared to them to be substantial expenditure. Furthermore, review panel members, in quoting from a Ministry of Education submission, note that the sum of \$502.2 million allocated to Māori Language from Vote: Education equates to only approximately 4.3% of Vote: Education funding. In concluding that this signals a significant imbalance, they ignore the fact that the sum of \$502.2 million is not the total sum spent on the education of Māori children and, in doing so, leave themselves open to a charge of financial misrepresentation or, at best, financial nativity. The risk here is loss of support from those Ministry of Education representatives who were initially on side with the aims of the review.

Overall, the text not only fails to provide evidence of an existing coalition of support for its aims but appears, as a result of the ways in which many identities are treated, to fracture such potential support as is evidenced in the Terms of Reference and elsewhere.

Question 7: Does the text employ strategies whose aim is to avoid the creation of an opposition coalition?

There is no evidence in *Te Reo Mauriora* of strategies whose aim is to avoid the creation of an opposition coalition. For example, the voices of those involved directly with the formulation and implementation of the *Māori Language Strategy* are largely absent from the report. No details of submissions or of meetings with government departments and agencies that took place during the review process are

²³⁹ It is difficult to see how such a proposal could operate in practice.

²⁴⁰ Much of the supposed expenditure on reo Māori is not, in fact, genuinely expenditure on te reo Māori at all. Thus, for example, money spent on *Kōhanga Reo* would be spent on pre-school education even if there were no *Kōhanga Reo*. In fact, government expenditure on *Kōhanga Reo* is less per capita than is its expenditure on other forms of pre-school education.

provided (in contrast to *Our Land Our Languages* where there are Internet links to submissions and transcripts of consultation meetings). The views of those who attended meetings or made submissions are largely unrepresented. Although the report *does* provide (p.15) some key responses from regional consultation meetings, it is impossible to determine who provided these responses. It is also impossible to determine whether these responses have been edited. Finally, it is noted that “there were many more solutions offered by attendees at both national and regional hui (p.15) but readers are left in ignorance of what these were.

Representation of government as adversary seems likely to have the effect of creating rather than avoiding the creation of an opposition coalition. So too do some of the report’s recommendations which would appear to have the potential to alienate some individuals and groups with authority in the area of Māori language, such as the Minister for Māori Affairs and members of Te Taura Whiri and Te Puni Kōkiri (The Ministry of Māori Development).²⁴¹ These include recommending the appointment of a Minister with responsibility for Māori language (with over-riding authority for Māori revitalisation) along with an interim five person Board of Trustees, and, later, the establishment of Te Mātāwai (a body made up of nine Māori language revitalisation experts who would co-ordinate all revitalisation efforts). In connection with this, it is relevant to note that Te Mātāwai would also assume responsibility for budget management and research and evaluation, something that would inevitably impact on government at all levels.

Question 8: Does the text move beyond personal interests, weakening differences by articulating a broad inclusive agenda which has the potential to create a coalition of different interests?

It is clear from the establishment of a very narrow ‘in-group’ and the largely negative representation of a number of groups that this report does not move beyond Māori interests by articulating a broad inclusive agenda that non-Māori could

²⁴¹ Te Taura Whiri expressed concern that they had “little-to-no involvement in what should have been our primary work” (Te Taura Whiri, 2010, July 29, p.4). Te Māngai Pāho were concerned enough to commission a report by independent academic Dr. Rāwinia Higgins (Higgins, n.d.) to consider the potential implications of the recommendations on them.

support. Instead, the *Te Reo Mauriora* report spends much of its time highlighting themes such as government culpability (as noted earlier) and Māori sovereignty (*tino rangatiratanga*), the latter being a major focus as is evidenced by its inclusion in the principles:

Sovereignty: The sovereignty of the Māori language belongs to Māori. Te Paepae has heard a resounding call from Māori, for Māori to take charge of revitalisation initiatives (p.11).

A further focus of the report is the assertion of Treaty, indigenous and linguistic human rights. 'Rights' is the first of the report's seven stated principles:

Rights: The recognition of the Treaty of Waitangi and supportive legislation such as the Declaration of Human Rights and the United Nations Declaration of Rights of Indigenous Peoples (p.11).

Key elements of this discourse include reiteration of the importance of a language to its speaking community and the legal obligations of governments to protect the language:

[T]he Waitangi Tribunal states that: the now *undisputed status of te reo Māori as a taonga... attracts the protections guaranteed in Article Two of the Treaty of Waitangi*. (p.18).

The *obligation to protect the language* is also encompassed in Article 13 of the United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, endorsed by the Crown in 2010 (p.18).

There are two areas of rights one must consider when discussing the *Crown's responsibilities for te reo Māori* (p.30).

The United Nations Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, Adopted by General Assembly Resolution 61/295 on 13 September 2007,

clearly articulates *the rights of an indigenous people to their language*.
(p.30).

It is important here to draw attention to the fact that there are aspects of this report which could, irrespective of the actual intentions of the reviewers, result in the perception that personal interests are in play. There appears, for example, to be a possible relationship between the review members themselves (Te Paepae Motuhake) and the membership of the proposed new Board (Te Mātāwai). The review panel had seven members, each a Māori language revitalisation expert representing a Māori dialect region. It was proposed that Te Mātāwai should also be made up of seven Māori language revitalisation experts representing different dialect regions (with the addition of two members representing the large urban centres of Auckland and Wellington). In the executive summary, panel members noted that their recommendations were “founded on . . . hearings and *the expert knowledge of the Independent Panel members about language revitalisation*” (emphasis added), a description that matches the criteria for the selection of Mātāwai board members (pg.49). The issue here is not whether review panel members intended to suggest an extended role for themselves, it is probable that they had no such intention, but the fact that this was a possible interpretation, one that could be seen as representing a significant threat to those who already had established roles in relation to Māori language revitalisation, roles that were, in some cases, challenged (sometimes implicitly) in the report.

In relation to those questions that jointly constitute the third criterion, it is important to note that although the report was commissioned by government and although government representatives made up the largest potential coalition of support for the report’s findings and recommendations, past and present representatives of the Crown are represented throughout in a way that effectively identifies them as a common adversary. This, combined with the fact that panel members not only failed to complete the tasks outlined in the Terms of Reference, but also effectively subverted them, making recommendations that (a) did not accommodate a ‘tight fiscal environment’, (b) would have been extremely difficult to implement and (c) represented a potential threat to a number of individuals and organisations, almost certainly had the effect of reducing rather than extending the potential coalition of

support for the report's recommendations. There is no evidence in the text of strategies whose aim is to avoid the creation of an opposition coalition. Nor is there any evidence of a broad inclusive agenda which has the potential to create a coalition of different interests. Furthermore, as indicated above, the parallel between membership of the review panel and the proposed membership of Te Mātāwai is such as to suggest the possibility that personal interests were involved. Nothing was done to dispel that possible interpretation.

5.3.4 Criterion D: Engagement with hegemonic interests/ key decision-makers

The first question relating to this criterion (engagement with key decision makers) is:

Question 9: Are hegemonic interests/ key decision makers positioned in a way that is likely to gain their approval and is there evidence of agonistic engagement with them?

In an important sense, everything in the previous sections impacts on the way in which key decision makers have been positioned in this report. In adopting what appears to be an antagonistic stance, review panel members position key decision makers in a way that is unlikely to gain their approval. In addition to devoting much of the report to rehearsing Crown failures and obligations (with the few positive statements being immediately undermined), omitting key voices and suggesting the replacement of key players (whose funding is recommended for re-allocation) in their proposed revised structure, panel members redefine the focus of the entire review, reinterpreting their role (from fulfiller of tasks to delegator of some of those same tasks). The new identity that this entails is considerably more authoritative than the identity associated with the Terms of Reference, effectively positioning panel members as the central 'in-group' with whom only a few others (including language activists of the 1960s and 1970s and some of those Māori who attended consultation hui and made comments and/or recommendations consistent with those of the review group) can be readily associated. All others, including the majority of key decision makers, appear to be consigned to 'out-group' membership.

That panel members appear not to have completed the tasks assigned them is something that is unlikely to have been well received by key decision makers. Furthermore, although extensive consultation meetings were held with Māori/Iwi and Government, the fact that the minutes of none of these were included with the submission means that those involved were effectively out-positioned. This is something that signals a lack of agonistic engagement and, once again, is something that is unlikely to gain the approval of key decision makers.

Question 10: Are the arguments provided likely to convince hegemonic interests/ key decision makers?

The review report makes very few references to relevant literature, the total number of references in the reference list being seventeen. The main focus of the report is on the paramount importance of intergenerational transmission. However, although reference is made, in relation to this, to Fishman (1991, p.245), there is no indication in *Te Reo Mauriora* that Fishman himself actually stressed the importance of a co-ordinated multiple focus (see, for example, 1991, pp.305-306), with opportunities for inter-generational transmission being reliant on the success of other activities.²⁴² In addition, although it is noted that “[m]other needs to know te reo Māori too” (p.25), there is no engagement with research-based literature that discusses what types of usage and levels of proficiency are required to successfully sustain transmission between generations.²⁴³ Nor is there any examination of the impact of current Māori in homes programmes, especially those run by *Ngāi Te Rangi* (Ormsby-Teki, et al, 2011), *Ngāi Tahu* (Skerrett, 2010) and *Te Ataarangi* (Te Puna Wānanga, 2010). Furthermore, while including the WAI 262 pre-publication draft (2010) in its reference list, panel members did not include in their report any

²⁴² Successful revitalisation involves a range of factors and is located in both public and private domains (See Baldauf, 2005, p.959; de Bres, 2008a, p.28; Fernando, Goldstein and Valijärvi, 2010, pp.68-72; Shohamy, 2006, p.68; Strubell 2001, pp.279-280; Williams, 2000, p.14). *Te Reo Mauriora* (see p.17) draws on both the sections of Lewis and Simon (2010) and UNESCO (2003) to support its focus on Intergenerational transmission despite the fact that a key intention of both the EGIDS (Extended GIDS) framework in Lewis and Simon as well as the UNESCO framework was to utilise a wide range of endangerment/revitalisation factors. Although there is one specific reference to improving the *status* of te reo Māori in *Te Reo Mauriora*, it relates to a requirement that diplomatic staff should be fluent in the language (p.65) and therefore is incoherent with the overall emphasis on returning the language in Māori homes.

²⁴³ Successfully re-starting intergenerational language transmission involves understanding wide range of theories (See Te Taura Whiri, 2011, April 14, p.3).

reference to its discussion of the Māori Language sector and strategy although that discussion was the most up-to-date and in-depth review available at that time. This overall lack of a research-based rationale is reflected in the fact that (a) the report recommends, without indicating how this is to be achieved, that “by 2050, 80% of Māori will speak Māori on a daily basis”, and (b) the following observations are made in the report without any indication that the authors have any reservations about accepting their validity as a solid basis for planning:

The most succinct answer was given at the Hui-ā-rohe in Wellington with the reply ‘*Me kōrero!*’ (We must speak it!) (p.13).

Feedback from a workshop group at the Hui ā-motu indicated that *the language would be deemed to be safe if 50% of Māori spoke Māori* (p.19). All hui were adamant that *speaking Māori at all times and everywhere is the solution to sustainability* (p.23).

The following extract is particularly revealing:

Clearly, te reo Māori stakeholders and advocates representing their various communities who attended consultation hui have a grasp of what’s required in order for sustainability to be achieved (p.15).

The overall purpose of the review was to supply information and recommendations that could inform a revised *Māori Language Strategy*. There is in the report no analysis of the existing strategy although paradoxically, it bemoans the absence of a “*coherent strategy and direction*” (p.41). Panel members were asked for a breakdown of the strategies, programmes and services provided by agencies and Māori / Iwi organisations, together with details and analysis of the associated cost.²⁴⁴ This was not supplied although the following observations were made:

²⁴⁴ This was to allow an assessment of their impact and efficiency in delivering the outcomes, as well as cross agency co-ordination. Also note that in its internal analysis of the report *Te Taura Whiri* asserted that the report “does not critique a single Government policy, practise or initiative – rather it summarises the role of Government as one that has “over the past 40 years been varied and disjointed” (Te Taura Whiri, 2011, April 14, p.7). Furthermore, in its conclusion as to whether the report achieved what it promised *Te Taura Whiri* (2011, April 14, p.2) answered, “No – the report fails short of delivering sound advice, analysis and information about whether the outcomes sought

[T]here are no evaluations on the state of the language in the many programmes funded by the Government. This research must be carried out (p.25).

[O]ver 86% [of Vote: Māori Affairs] is spent on the singular heavyweight expenditure item of Broadcasting, whose value for money in terms of te reo remains unknown (p.59).

The economic value of the language against the GDP should be measured (p.62).

The lives of all New Zealanders are enriched by the Māori language in many ways. We have yet to fully understand and articulate that enrichment (p.62).

Panel members not only failed to determine the value for money of government expenditure in terms of outcomes and desired outcomes, but also complained that this is a task that had not been done (p.25), needed to be done (pp.33, 61 & 63), and was difficult (p.57).²⁴⁵ They admitted, furthermore, that they were unsure of current expenditure overall, but nevertheless selected the higher of two possible figures without analysis (p.57). In spite of all of this, there is no acknowledgment in the report that there has been a departure from the terms of reference and, consequently, no justification in terms, for example, of the short timeframe and high workload.²⁴⁶ Nor is there any evidence of an attempt to work within the context of a “*tight fiscal environment*” (p.70). Rather, the report writers indicate that the overall cost of what is proposed will be higher than the existing budget (although there is no analysis of how much higher) (pp.35, 37, 47 & 55).²⁴⁷ Furthermore, many of the

for the language are being achieved within a VFM framework – i.e. – is the language deriving any kind of real benefit from current policy, programmes and practice?”

²⁴⁵ Given the fact that the lack of agreed outcomes is the major criticism of the 2003 *Māori Language Strategy* and the panel was specifically asked to develop outcomes, the Te Taura Whiri were justified in describing this aspect of the report as ‘hugely disappointing’ (Te Taura Whiri, 2011, April 14, p.2).

²⁴⁶ This may explain why the *Terms of Reference* is placed in the back instead of the front of the document.

²⁴⁷ A good example of allaying fears regarding budget blowouts is the *ECE Taskforce* report (Early Childhood Education Taskforce, 2011, p.4) which stated “we acknowledge the New Zealand Government is facing *severe fiscal constraints*. We also appreciate that – because of the size of the

recommendations are clearly neither practical nor viable. Quite apart from the extreme improbability of existing agencies agreeing to transfer NZ\$600 million *per annum* to another (new) agency, recommendations relating to the creation of a new infrastructure would (a) be expensive to implement, and (b) necessarily involve the transfer of some funding from revitalisation activities to the support of a newly created level of bureaucracy (Rūnanga ā-reo) without any evidence that this would lead to any improvement in outcomes.²⁴⁸ There was no attempt to comparatively reference the figure of \$600 million selected by panel members to the amount of \$226.8 million identified in *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei* as “state resourcing of te reo Māori . . . [in] 2006” and no reference to the subsequent definition of what this resourcing entailed (Waitangi Tribunal, 2011c, p.407).²⁴⁹ There was also no recognition of the fact that some of the expenditure that the government attributed to Māori language revitalisation would have had to be spent on education irrespective of the language (and therefore is not really a Māori language expense). In addition, there is no discussion of the capacity of iwi to handle financial allocations relating to revitalisation effectively. Finally, there is no reference to recently completed reviews concerning the progress of Iwi language revitalisation strategies.²⁵⁰ Indeed, the issue of accountability in relation to the proposed new structure was not raised; something not helped by the lack of quantifiable outcomes.²⁵¹ *None of this is indicative of positive engagement with key decision-makers.*

Government’s debt – fiscal pressures will continue for at least the next decade, no matter who occupies the Treasury benches in Parliament We contend that the subsidies from Government needed to advance the early childhood education sector *could be funded from within current fiscal resources. We are confident that much can be done with what Government already spends.* But, longer term, we invite you and your colleagues to reprioritise current allocations of government spending to this important area, and not only within the budget for education.”

²⁴⁸ In contrast, Te Taura Whiri (2011, February, p.3) considered any major restructuring “*too slow. . . too expensive*” suggesting instead that Māori language impact statements for all new crown policy and legislation would be “*simple, cost effective and highly effective change to cabinet regulations*”.

²⁴⁹ A definition of what Government resourcing for the Māori language entails is identified in *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei* as being “services and programmes that [contribute] more or less directly to supporting the health of the Māori language and for activities that are being undertaken by . . . government agencies to support the growth and development of the Māori language” (Waitangi Tribunal, 2011c, p.407).

²⁵⁰ See for example, *Ngāi Tahu* (Skerrett, 2010); *Taranaki* (Edwards and Ratima, 2010); *Te Arawa* (Raureti and Hohepa-Watene, 2010) as well as *Tūhoe* communities (Matamua, 2010a; 2010b).

²⁵¹ Related to this is the way the type of ‘support’ required from Government is not clearly identified and defined. It is a term used specifically for the relationship envisaged between the Government (auxiliary-subordinate supporter) and Māori / iwi (supported / leader) (See p.35) however, can include *clearing path - removing obstacles* (p.35), *extensive financial support* (p.35), *legislative support* (p.35), *all reasonable steps* (p.37), *broad-reaching support, agreement-acceptance* (p.41).

A characteristic of effective policy is that it is accompanied by effectiveness indicators. However, there is little evidence of awareness of this in the report which asserts that:

[B]y 2050, 80% of Māori will speak Māori on a daily basis (p.18).

All initiatives will be geared to support the principal goal which is to create significant numbers of Māori language speaking homes, with the goal that by 2050, 80% of Māori will be speaking te reo (p.45).

2050 — 80% of Māori homes are Māori language homes (p.23).

There is no indication in the report of why these figures have been selected or how they are to be achieved.²⁵² Nor is there any discussion of what constitutes a *Māori home* or a *Māori language home*.²⁵³ These are by no means the only statements in the report that lack any evidential basis. One of many possible examples is: *[by] giving the role to Te Mātāwai to co-ordinate revitalisation efforts, the essential link between the current programmes and homes will be made* (p.46).²⁵⁴

In connection with this, the report uses extended metaphors which appear to function not as illustrations but as substitutes for evidence-based arguments. The first extended metaphor (p.35) states that:

If the iwi fail to gain appropriate support from the Crown, then they are left having to cut back the scrub and foliage in order to move forward.

²⁵² In contrast, the Te Māngai Pāho (2010, p.24) forecast of incremental increases of Māori speakers show an increase of only 2-4% every three years, an increase that would fall short of the 80% referred in *Te Reo Mauriora*.

²⁵³ For example, does a Māori home have one or more non-Māori parent/guardian? Alternatively how many parents/guardians/children are required to speak with what fluency and how often for a home to be considered a Māori language home? It also ignores the key issues of motivation, as Keegan (2011, April 27) explains, “the majority of Māori aren't really that interested in investing the time required to learn the language to a high degree of proficiency needed to sustain household interactions in Māori.”

²⁵⁴ Other examples include the “grave concern at the rate of language change occurring” (p.25) and also a desire to retain authentic tribal dialects (p.25) where there is no analysis of what is required to achieve a quality language production in educational settings nor is there a consideration of the impact and viability of a dialectal focus on education/ broadcasting.

Inquisitive readers might wonder what this ‘scrub and foliage’ actually constitutes, what cutting it back might involve, who will do it, how costly the exercise will be and how progress will be evaluated.²⁵⁵

Within the context of a further metaphor – one that refers to ‘building the language house’ (pp.41-43) - the following points are made:

Departments can be likened to the different trades-people working in isolation There was evidence provided when we interviewed the State and the agencies of the Crown. . . . they are not working to a shared idea of an end goal.

The iwi have to determine the look of the house — they need to be the architects and have these key messages effectively communicated back to the trades team.

In terms of fiscal implications for the Government, the greatest cost will be in the rebuild. Once established and furnished however, the costs will reduce to a level of maintenance. There will always be work to do, as with any house, but if well resourced and nurtured, these costs can be manageable over the long term. If the house is left however to decay and fall down, then the rebuild will again consume greater levels of investment.

Within the context of this metaphor, Government co-ordination is identified as the problem and Government funding of iwi the solution. There are, however, several difficulties here. First, reference to Māori as architects and government as project managers is difficult to reconcile with the proposed structure which places Māori in both roles. Secondly, there is no clear indication of what blueprint the “trades-people” referred to are failing to work to. If it is the existing Māori Language Strategy, then the implication is that the only problem is in its implementation –

²⁵⁵ For example, based on an earlier budget figure of \$1.5 m for 140 whānau (Te Puna Wānanga, 2010, p.3), the economic implications of expanding the Kāinga Kōrerorero programme to 80% of (the 180,000) Māori homes could be as much as \$1 – 1.5 billion per annum.

something with which the remainder of the report appears to be out of line. There is no evidence provided for the assertion that interviews indicated that “the State and the agencies of the Crown . . . are not working to a shared idea of an end goal” (p.41). Nor is there any evidence to support the implication that the financial cost of language maintenance is lower than that of language revitalisation.

The review report is contradictory in places. Thus, for example, although it is asserted that revitalisation strategies “*will be led by iwi*” (p.61), elsewhere it is noted that “a Minister for the Māori language [should] be established with powers to determine all matters pertaining to the Māori language” (p.7).²⁵⁶ The following observations are also made in the report, the first two appearing to contradict the third:

Many Iwi continue to prioritise other issues over te reo Māori and its revitalisation (p.39).

[N]ot all Iwi are at same level in terms of articulating their needs and aspirations for te reo and in committing to language revitalisation (p.39).

[I]wi Māori expressed their readiness and willingness to assume leadership for revitalising Māori language (p.51).

This dissonance between current practice and stated desire has the potential to undermine confidence in a key recommendation of the report, that is, that revitalisation strategy and its funding should be placed in the hands of Iwi (pp.7, 23, & 49).

There have been, in addition, contradictions between the content of the report and comments made about it. The recommendations and diagrammatic structure within the report (pp.52-53) indicate that the intention was that agencies such as Te Taura

²⁵⁶ Sir Tamati Reedy (as secretary of the Māori Affairs Department) agreed with WAI 11 claimants that similar powers, then held by the Minister of Māori Affairs under s77A (2) of the Māori Affairs Act 1953, were ineffective (Waitangi Tribunal, 1986: 8.1.2). Thus the recommendation to give the Crown direct responsibility for the language turns the clock back 58 years without providing any justification that it is an improvement on the ‘arms-length from Government’ Māori Language Commissioner or that it derives from comments from the consultation hui.

Whiri and Te Māngai Pāho should be replaced.²⁵⁷ In post-launch interviews, however, Sir Tāmati Reedy (personal communication, WAI 262 symposium. Waikato University, Thursday 27 October 2011) insisted that the proposed new structure would not disestablish Te Taura Whiri.²⁵⁸ Indeed, he asserted that he saw the recommendations as merely expanding Te Taura Whiri's functions - giving it a new image with a new name.

In view of the discussion above, the answer to both of the questions with which this section is concerned must be in the negative.

5.3.5 Criterion E: Dislocation and deconstruction

Question 11: Does the text contest the nodal points of the status quo hegemony and expose and undermine its aims (underlying objects of desire and promised fantasies), drawing attention to significant dislocating events and exposing/revealing the inherent contingency of its positioning, its rhetorical manipulations, the negative implications of its articulations as implemented policy, the inconsistency of its rhetoric over time and/or the discrepancies between its promises and achievements?

Question 12: Are the key signifiers redefined (through chains of signification) in a way that is counter to the purposes of adversaries and likely to resonate positively with the primary target audience and the wider readership?

Central to the Terms of Reference is securing maximum value for money:

[S]till room for significant improvement in terms of . . . *the value for money* . . . (p.69).

²⁵⁷ This is in spite of the fact that no research on the “functions and powers of the Māori Language Commission” was conducted (as requested in the Terms of Reference (p.75).

²⁵⁸ With this, Rāhera Shortland agreed, asserting that Te Matāwai has been designed to “work *with* them so that the voices of the people will be heard . . . not to cut anyone off” (TVNZ, 2012, January 1).

This work must be undertaken with the context of a *tight fiscal environment*, with the aim of securing *maximum value from investments* in this sector (p.71).

[T]o identify and support opportunities for *enhanced . . . value for money* (p.71).

The terms of reference identify the issues that will be considered within the Review, including a *value for money* focus (p.71).

[T]his will include consideration of 'value' in terms of . . . effectiveness and efficiency of delivery (including unit price analysis and an impact survey) (p.77).

It is, however, also signalled in the Terms of Reference that 'other dimensions of value', including cultural identity, social well-being and positive Treaty relationships (p.77) should be considered. There was, therefore an opportunity to challenge the neo-liberal philosophy, the application of free market rationality to endangered languages, that underpins the *status quo* hegemony and to redefine cost-effectiveness in ways that exposed its contingency. This opportunity was overlooked even though it could have been pointed out that actual expenditure by government on Māori language is considerably less than NZ\$226 million identified in *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei*, let alone the NZ\$600 million sometimes claimed (and endorsed in this report). Thus, for example, it makes no sense to argue that all of the expenditure on Māori immersion education is expenditure on Māori language since, irrespective of the language of instruction, children must be educated. This had already been noted in a New Zealand Treasury policy paper in relation to language education planning of the Basque language (*Euskera*) (Grin and Vaillancourt, 1998, pp.134-135):

It is important not to confuse the cost of education with the marginal cost of operating an *Euskaldun* education system. The reason for this is a simple one: *children have to be schooled anyway*, and what matters here is the additional expenditure resulting from teaching in *Euskera* and through

Euskera, instead of operating the system in Spanish only. *If teacher-pupil ratios are identical in the various models, and if teachers of Euskera or through Euskera command the same wage rate, then expenditure per student is not part of the cost of the policy.*

Similarly, Dana Peterson of the Parliamentary Library (2000, p.8) observed that “children need to be educated and teachers trained and supported regardless of the subject matter, and only expenditure over and above what would be spent for any other special subject (e.g. science) or medium of instruction should be counted”. On this basis, she estimated that the Māori language component of the annual Education budget (1998/99) was a mere \$22 million (rather than the \$177.713 million claimed) and the total annual Māori language funding by Government in all areas was NZ\$53.846 million, that is, a mere 0.1% of the total appropriations for 1999/2000.²⁵⁹

The varying estimates of Māori language funding are referred to only briefly in the TRM report:

The Minister of Māori Affairs established an Independent Panel on 15 July 2010 to inquire into the state of the Māori Language, given the view that a sum of *at least \$225 million* was currently being spent on the language (p.5).

[F]urther clarification of the Government spend is needed. It ranges *between \$225 million* (See Appendix One) *and \$600 million* (MOE Submission and TPK Summary, Jan 2011) (?).

Te Puni Kōkiri undertook an Inventory of Māori Language Services in 2006. At that time, it estimated that *approximately \$225m per annum* was spent in the Māori Language Sector. This expenditure was concentrated in Vote: Education (\$145m) and Vote: Māori Affairs (\$75m) (p.55).

²⁵⁹ The *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei* report (2011c, p.558) also noted that “*the cost of educating a child is relatively similar no matter which school they attend*” and therefore “the cost of ‘kaupapa Māori’ education is not a burden on the budget.

The totals ranged between \$225 million and \$600 million (p.57).

In spite of all of this, the figure of NZ\$600 million was accepted without any further detailed financial analysis:

The Panel recommends \$600 million as base funding for te reo Māori for the financial year 2011-2012 (p.55).

Review panel members could have contested the government's figure of NZ\$600 million, thereby exposing and undermining one of its aims, that is, to appear to be spending much more on Māori language revitalisation than is actually the case (a discrepancy between a promise and an achievement). In doing so, they could have gone a long way towards convincing both Māori and non-Māori that they were fully justified in requiring that the report's recommendations should not be fiscally neutral. In the event, many of the responses to the report (see *Section 5.4* below) clearly indicate that the government succeeded in this aim. Furthermore, it was, in fact, the writers of the report rather than government who were often represented as being self-serving.

Another focus of the Terms of Reference is the need for improved infrastructure and greater co-ordination. Although the review panel did recommend a new type of infrastructure which they maintained would lead to better co-ordination, they did not take the opportunity to point out that the government's insistence on value for money actually did nothing more than highlight its own deficiencies in this area. After all, it could be argued that it was the bureaucratic inefficiencies of the government itself that had led to the failure to maximise outcomes and that, therefore, the government had failed in its duty to be fully accountable to Māori and other tax payers and must accept responsibility for this rather than attempting to suggest that Māori were somehow themselves responsible for it.

A third opportunity to contest the nodal points of the status quo hegemony concerns the responsibilities of government and Māori for Māori language revitalisation. Joseph Lo Bianco (2006, November 11, p.6) has pointed out the ways in which human capital economic theory places pluralism under pressure, noting in particular

the dangers involved in privatising “the whole idea of difference” in such a way that it has been “pushed back to the family and to the home”.²⁶⁰ Panel members did not contest the simplistic concept of responsibility as outlined in the Terms of Reference and, therefore, seek to expose and undermine one of the government’s aims – that is, to shift the main burden of responsibility for the revitalisation of Māori from the agency responsible for the decline of the language (the Crown) to the victims (Māori). Instead, they asserted that, although the Government has an obligation to support Māori (p.37), the major responsibility for revitalisation rested with Māori, thus placing Māori in a position where they could be held responsible in the future for any perceived failure in this area:

It is this panel’s position that *the responsibility of te reo rests with Māori* and the government’s role is to act responsibly under its obligations under the Treaty. Māori revitalise the language. Government supports (p.35).

Although *the task itself of revitalising the language rests with iwi Māori themselves*, there remains an obligation and responsibility on the Crown to support iwi Māori to achieve this (p.37).

The *objet petit à* of *Te Reo Mauriora* appears to be control of financial resources - which involves assertion of sovereignty over Māori language. It is noted in the report that tax sourced funding will be *extensive* (p.35), that it will be at least, \$600 million for the first year (p.55) and will increase over time (p.45).

It would have been perfectly possible to assert Māori sovereignty over Māori language without creating a situation in which Māori could be blamed for any perceived failure in the area of revitalisation in the future. This was not done. Instead, it was accepted by panel members that commitment by many Iwi/Māori had been and was currently lacking (pp.27 & 37) and that the “Government’s obligation to support the Māori language [was] neither absolute nor fiscally

²⁶⁰ Lo Bianco (2006, November 11, p.4) also recounts “how an Australian policy of allowing schools greater autonomy resulted in the powerful groups prevailing and “minority group’s voices being lost.” As noted earlier, individual responsibility masquerading as empowerment can, in fact, result in less empowerment (Cabau, 2009). Accordingly, a balanced approach of community control and state intervention is important in indigenous language revitalisation.

unlimited” (p.37). It was, furthermore, implied that in taking control of the (supposed) existing budget for Māori language revitalisation, Māori would also assume responsibility for any perceived failure in the area of revitalisation in the future notwithstanding the fact that (a) the responsibility for the precarious situation in which the language is placed rests with the Crown, and (b) the Crown continues not to commit fully to its future.²⁶¹ Thus for example:

The iwi have to make sure the design of their respective houses are fit for purpose, and perhaps most importantly — they need to be committed to living in it (p.43).

The responsibility to upkeep the whare and live in it - belongs to Māori (p.43).

Also missed were opportunities to draw attention to dislocating events, such as (a) the government’s repeated failure to ensure that the official status accorded to the Māori language was matched by support for its use in all official domains, and (b) the existence of documents that undermined government claims in relation to its contribution to Māori language revitalisation, and in particular, the (lack of) progress towards the twenty five year vision outlined in the Māori Language Strategy 2003, which states that:

By 2028, the Māori language will be widely spoken by Māori. In particular, the Māori language will be in common use within Māori whānau, homes and communities. All New Zealanders will appreciate the value of the Māori language to New Zealand society (Te Taura Whiri & Te Puni Kōkiri, 2003, p.5).

Opportunities for dislocation included, for example, potential references to (a) Bauer’s (2008) critique of the 2006 Māori language survey and its findings, (b) the

²⁶¹ All of this in spite of the fact that in the report revitalisation efforts are described as “under resourced” (p.27), with government investment “made in an *ad-hoc* fashion”, “largely *isolated* and *disparate* with significant *questions being raised around accountabilities, confusion* of roles, *duplication* of activities and *waste*” (p.33) and something which has had “*patchy*” results (p.61).

performance audit on the implementation of the Māori Language Strategy conducted by the Office of the Auditor General (OAG, 2007), and (c) the Māori language chapter of the 2010 WAI 262 pre-publication draft report, which described government efforts as “a picture of lost opportunities due to poor communication and coordination, unrealistic expectations, and de-prioritising within agencies” (WT, 2010, p.63). Taking these opportunities, particularly if it had been done with an emphasis on logic rather than accusation, could have been effective in not only securing greater awareness of the realities of the current situation, but also in highlighting the fact that the desired cost-effectiveness would require a much greater level of government commitment and co-ordination than has hitherto been the case. In addition, if panel members had explicitly framed their recommendations within the existing policy parameters and legislative statements, they would have had a far greater chance of acceptance.²⁶²

The overall structure of *Te Reo Mauriora* is unclear. A number of strands appear to compete with one another for the reader’s attention rather than complementing one another.

A potential macro-structure for the report was provided in the Terms of Reference, that is: *Principles; Outcomes; Roles and responsibilities of government and Māori*²⁶³; *Key initiatives; Co-ordination and infrastructure; Māori language expenditure; and Value*. The intention, one that is clearly indicated in the Terms of Reference, was that these should form a coherent chain of signification, with the final link in the chain (value) focusing on “securing maximum value from

²⁶² For example, the *Office of the Auditor-General* (2007) states that “The Government acknowledges that it is responsible, under the Treaty of Waitangi, for helping to revitalise the Māori language”; (b) the *New Zealand Education Curriculum* “acknowledges the principles of the Treaty . . . the bicultural foundations of *Aotearoa* New Zealand. All students have the opportunity to acquire knowledge of te reo Māori me ōna tikanga.” (Ministry of Education, 2007, p.9); (c) the vision statement of *Te Taura Whiri* is that “The human landscape of *Aotearoa* will resonate with its indigenous language”; (d) the vision statement of *Te Māngai Pāho* is “The Māori language – everyday, everyway, everywhere; (e) finally, an extract from *The Māori Television Service Act 2003* - “in its Te Reo Māori Report (WAI 11), the Waitangi Tribunal found that “. . . the Māori language is an essential part of Māori culture and must be regarded as a taonga, a valued possession [and] . . . questioned whether the principles and broad objectives of the Treaty of Waitangi could be achieved without a recognised place for the Māori language. The Tribunal found that the Crown is obliged by the Treaty to take active steps to protect the Māori language. The Crown accepted these findings.”

²⁶³ The section dealing with roles and responsibilities focuses on injustices (often historical injustices) and rights but does not provide any insights into opportunities for Government-Iwi/Māori partnerships.

investments in this sector”. From this perspective, the *principles* would have had an over-arching role, determining both the approach adopted and the desired *outcomes*.²⁶⁴ These desired outcomes would then be achieved through clarification of *the roles and responsibilities of government and Māori*. This, in turn, would lead to the specification of *key initiatives* and an outline of improved *co-ordination and infrastructure*, the *expenditure* and the resulting *value* being then specified. Thus, the headings would have signalled the nodal points (the floating signifiers that represent ideals such as agreed principles, shared responsibilities and value for money) around each of which a number of floating elements (e.g. current revitalisation strategies; Māori aspirations) could have been clustered in such a way as to lead to a redefinition (contextually derived specification) of each of the nodal points in terms of the overall aims of the review, thus creating a shared vision for Māori language revitalisation. Each of the nodal points (made up of a cluster of elements) would, therefore, have represented a chain of signification and each of these chains would have combined into a single chain leading to the master signifier (value).

In the event, although the authors of *Te Reo Mauriora* retained the overall macrostructure, with headings as specified in the Terms of Reference, these headings do not signal the nodal points of the report’s discourse: they do not act as focal points for the clustering of elements in such a way as to create new contextually derived specifications or combine into a single chain leading to a key signifier (value).²⁶⁵ Instead, the report appears to have two main themes – *government culpability and responsibility* on the one hand and *Māori sovereignty* on the other. It is these themes rather than “securing maximum value from investments in this sector” that appear to underpin the report’s recommendations. However, neither of these themes emerges with any real clarity of (re)definition/ (re)specification and there are points at which they operate in a way that seems to run counter to the overall aim of the report’s authors (which appears to be to insist on the responsibility of government to provide funding and the responsibility of Māori to decide how that funding will be spent).

²⁶⁴ It is relevant to note here that there are no measurable outcomes in the report.

²⁶⁵ There is no attempt to redefine ‘value’ in a way that could counter the government’s primary financial emphasis.

One of the reasons why these themes fail to operate effectively as nodal points is that they are undercut by the overall structuring of the report itself (which means that instead of operating as coherent wholes they are scattered throughout, appearing and reappearing in a range of different ways in almost every section of the report). Thus, for example, the theme of *government culpability and responsibility* appears under the heading of **Principles** (e.g. *The Māori language is a treasure (taonga), guaranteed Crown protection under the Treaty of Waitangi and imposes certain obligations of the Crown to ensure its preservation* (pp.10-11), **Outcomes** (e.g. *Apart from the big picture surveys conducted by the Ministry of Māori Development, there are no evaluations on the state of the language in the many programmes funded by the Government* (pp.22-25), **Roles and responsibilities of government and Māori** (e.g. *Although there are many factors that both directly and indirectly contributed to the decline of te reo in the 20th Century, there were perhaps no more damaging and long lasting than those forwarded by the Crown* (pp.27-33); **Key initiatives** (e.g. *Māori expressed grave concern that more needs to be done by . . . the Government . . . to revitalise the Māori language* (p.47); **Co-ordination and infrastructure** (e.g. *Te Mātāwai will provide a forum to correct the current lack of co-ordination, cooperation and inter-agency engagement* (pp.50-52); **Expenditure** (e.g. *In terms of education, concern was expressed by the people with specific regard to the lack of evaluation of the quality and growth of te reo in the sector . . .* (p.57); and **Value** (e.g. . . . *the Ministry acknowledges its own results as 'patchy'* (p.61).

Some of the other reasons why the two overall themes of the report fail to operate effectively as nodal points are outlined below.

The *major theme of government culpability and responsibility* is combined with repeated references to Māori culpability and responsibility which, though accompanied by concessions, nevertheless undercuts the major theme. A few examples are provided:

The fractured nature of language constructions being passed on is *an insidious problem*. Here, *teachers of Māori language come under a huge barrage of criticism* (p.25).

The current reality is that 23% of the Māori population identify themselves as being able to speak te reo to some degree. *Not all of that 23% are committed to speaking te reo in the homes and use it as the language of communication with their children* (p.27).

. . . Māori have also had a role to play in the loss of language as it may be argued that choices were still made around intergenerational transmission by those who had access to quality te reo, irrespective of the external pressures they were experiencing (p.37).

Many iwi continue to *prioritise other issues over te reo Māori and its revitalization . . .* (p.39).

The *major theme of Māori sovereignty* and, therefore, the right of Māori to determine how Māori language expenditure will be directed, is undercut by (a) the fact that the issue of how much is *actually* spent on Māori language revitalisation is not addressed, the strategy of accepting the highest figure (to be controlled in future by Māori) being open to a number of possible representations that seem unlikely to gain widespread support for the recommendations contained in the report, and (b) the failure of the authors to consider the likely impact on some existing programmes designed to support Māori language revitalisation of the proposal to redirect funding (e.g. from Vote: Education).

A further barrier to the two major themes of the report functioning as nodal points is the fact that the major guiding principles outlined in the report (*rights; identity;*

sustainability;²⁶⁶ *treasure; sovereignty; covenant*;²⁶⁷ and *status*) seem to compete with the two major themes (*government culpability and responsibility* and *Māori sovereignty*) and the section headings (*Principles; Outcomes; Roles and responsibilities of government and Māori; Key initiatives; Co-ordination and infrastructure; Māori language expenditure; and Value*) for the status of focal points.

In summary, review panel members missed several opportunities to (a) draw attention to the discrepancy between claim and reality, and (b) contest the nodal points of the *status quo* hegemony (particularly in relation to value for money), exposing their inherent contingency and redefining them in a way that was likely to serve the intended aims of the report. Instead, they appear simply to have accepted and reinforced some existing stereotypes / perspectives in attempting to establish government culpability and Māori sovereignty as key signifiers. They also effectively treated many of those who were likely to have constituted the report's primary readership (including its sponsors) as adversaries and made recommendations that are inconsistent with the Terms of Reference. There is, furthermore, little evidence of any attempt to provide support for the recommendations in the form of carefully constructed arguments that are intended to cohere around that weakening of internal differences and that establishment of a common identity that are "an important condition of possibility for . . . hegemonic success" (Howarth and Stavarakakis, 2000, p.9). Consequently, little in the report is likely to resonate positively with the primary target audience and the wider readership.

5.4 Responses to *Te Reo Mauriora*

Following the release of *Te Reo Mauriora*, members of the review panel expressed the belief that there was considerable support for the findings (see, for example,

²⁶⁶ Sustainability is associated in the report largely with intergenerational transmission. However, successful and sustained intergenerational transmission results from a co-ordinated approach involving many different avenues and it could be argued that the narrow focus on private domains in the report acts counter to the notion of effective sustainability. Furthermore, the important link between sustainability and cost-effectiveness is not discussed. For example, cost-effectiveness can only be determined with a clear perspective of what it takes to reach an overall goal.

²⁶⁷ Alongside 'covenant' is the following text: *Added to the Government's obligation to sustain te reo, is the responsibility to support the health and development of te reo in homes, and assist in raising its status publicly* (p.11).

interviews involving Sir Tāmami Reedy (TVNZ, 2011, April 17) and Rahera Shortland (TVNZ, 2012, January 1). An initial Māori Party press release relating to *Te Reo Mauriora* (Māori Party, 2011, April 13) was upbeat, welcoming “the fresh ideas and bold new approach”. Even so, it was noted that “there [would] be questions regarding the practical effect the recommendations . . . might have on various bureaucracies”.

Reservations about the report’s findings, however, increased rapidly. One day after its release, in an article in the New Zealand Herald (New Zealand Press Association, 2011, April 13), Peter Sharples observed that there could be difficulties associated with the establishment of a Minister for Māori Language, adding that he was “not confident about the Government support the plan would receive”.²⁶⁸ In a speech in Parliament in May 2011, Peter Sharples (2011, May 19) noted that expenditure on community-driven revitalisation projects had been increased by NZ\$2 million,²⁶⁹ a sum that had come from the Māori Affairs budget, adding, however, that “Te Paepae Motuhake . . . were quite clear that whānau themselves must take the primary responsibility for speaking Māori at home”, the role of the government being “to support”. In February 2012, he noted that recommendations were “at an interesting stage of development” (Sharples, 2012, February 8). In March 2012, it was reported that the Māori Affairs Select Committee had rejected the recommendation to create a Minister of Māori Language (Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives, 2012, March 26, p.3).²⁷⁰

The initial internal response to the report of Te Taura Whiri (TTWh) appears to have been one of shock. In an email written to Board members on the afternoon of the release, Glenis Philip-Barbara, the CEO, wrote:

As a result of this report I am now dealing with a group of staff who are wondering if this means that TTWh will be disestablished. The

²⁶⁸ The article also cited Finance minister Bill English as stating (as did Sharples) that any changes would need to be made within the current budget levels.

²⁶⁹ This is the only impact *Te Reo Mauriora* had on the 2011/12 budget.

²⁷⁰ In the view of this Committee, “iwi should retain mana for te reo Māori and that giving it to the Crown or Crown agency, as the review recommended, could be detrimental to the language” (Office of the Clerk of the House of Representatives, 2012, March 26, p.3).

uncertainty . . . will have a dire impact on the productivity of this tari and on the well-being of the people employed here. . . . I am disappointed . . . that no thought entered the minds of the Paepae Motuhake for Te Taura Whiri, even at the very least to give us a warning about what the report contained (Philip-Barbara, 2011, April 13b).

She added that “Te Mātāwai is whimsical at best” and observed that lawyer Mai Chen had advised that “it [would] be a mammoth and expensive task to disestablish TTWh and then to re-establish another entity”. It was also claimed in an internal analysis by Te Taura Whiri (2011, April 14, p.3) that it had had “little to no-involvement in what should have been our primary work” and that the report had fallen ‘significantly short’ of delivering what it was supposed to deliver (p.2).²⁷¹ Draft media statements that were never released (procured under the Official Information Act) show that Te Taura Whiri were prepared to publicly reject the recommendations as being “largely ill considered” and “contradictory” and to state that the independent voice of Te Taura Whiri had been subjugated and “its roles usurped” (Te Taura Whiri, 2011, April 13a; 2011, April 13b).²⁷²

Te Taura Whiri clearly found itself in an extremely difficult position. Philip-Barbara (2011, April 13a) noted that if “we go hard out against the report we risk the future of TTWh and not having any say in what happens next”. Alternatively, “if we say nothing we risk our reputation and appear weak to all stakeholders and our community”. In a later email (Philip-Barbara, 2011, September 23), she noted that in the opinion of Erima Henare, Te Taura Whiri chairman, “*Te Reo Mauriora* was politically naïve” but asked “how do we say this in so many words”.

²⁷¹ Te Taura Whiri (2011, p.2) concluded that not only had the report failed to fulfil significant aspects of its terms of reference but that it also had “create[d] a new agenda without informing the Māori language sector”.

²⁷² There are two versions of this unpublished media statement (2011, April, 13a & 13b). Both argue strongly against the report’s recommendations (in relation to practicality and effectiveness). One notes that the report was “a complete surprise”, the other that “a head’s up about the report and its contents would not have been inappropriate or problematic”. In an email to key staff, Philip-Barbara (2011, April 13a) stated that these press releases were focused on three points: “that a Minister for te reo is not cool, that the expense involved in the proposed new entity is foolhardy and that it is at odds with WAI 262.”

Recognising the degree of disquiet in Te Taura Whiri concerning the report, Peter Sharples (2011, April 12), before the actual launch of the report, wrote to the Te Taura Whiri Chairman, Erima Henare, stating that he (Sharples) would be the sole Government spokesperson in relation to the release of the review report in order “to ensure consistent messages were provided to media and other stakeholders”. In an article published in the New Zealand Herald (Tahana, 2011, April 15), it was claimed that Peter Sharples had “effectively gagged the commission”.

In private meetings with the Minister, representatives of Te Taura Whiri strenuously argued their case (Te Taura Whiri, 2011, April 18; 2011, September 16). In public, they remained largely diplomatic (see Henare, 2011, July 7; Human Rights Commission, 2011, May 17; Tahana, 2011, April 15; Te Taura Whiri, 2011, December, p.6). However, the Chairman, Erima Henare, did observe in a TVNZ interview (TVNZ, 2011, May 3) that he had doubts about whether the key recommendations of *Te Reo Mauriora* would be accepted. Furthermore, in the annual report of Te Taura Whiri for the year ended 30 June 2011 (Te Taura Whiri, 2011, p.4), Erima Henare noted that “[as] lead agency and a key advisor to Government on all matters pertaining to the Māori language, I have found it interesting in the extreme that others might assume this role for themselves thus creating . . . confusion”. Nevertheless, Te Taura Whiri later made a point of acknowledging some of the report’s findings, including “the need for improved leadership and coordination of Māori language revitalisation work” and “language development in the home” (Te Taura Whiri, 2011, September 16, p.6). Indeed, in December 2011, in Te Taura Whiri’s *Briefing for the incoming Minister of Māori Affairs* (Te Taura Whiri, 2011, December, p.2), it was stated that it had “deliberately aligned [its] priorities with the outcomes of the *Māori Language Strategy* and sector review”.

Another organisation concerned about the recommendations included in *Te Reo Mauriora* was Te Māngai Pāho.²⁷³ Indeed, so concerned were representatives of Te Māngai Pāho that they commissioned an independent report (by academic Dr.

²⁷³ It was noted in *Section 1.3.2.1* that Te Māngai Pāho (also called The Māori Broadcasting Funding Agency) was established with the primary goal of promoting Māori language and culture by making funds available for broadcasting and e-broadcasting (on-demand).

Rāwinia Higgins) to consider the potential implications for their organisation of the recommendations. That report (Higgins, n.d.), which was presented to Parliament on the 21st of March 2012, criticises the authors of *Te Reo Mauriora* on the grounds that their research was insufficient, the proposed iwi-led structure was potentially problematic,²⁷⁴ and the proposed creation of a *Minister for Māori Language* simply mirrored the current structure while nevertheless representing a threat to current agencies and, ultimately, the language itself.²⁷⁵ Despite these criticisms, the author is cautious, observing that “if the proposed infrastructure was to take effect then Te Māngai Pāho would be a leading agency in demonstrating what would be good policies and best practice models for targeted language and cultural revitalisation” (Higgins, n.d., p.14).²⁷⁶ Reporting to the Auditor General (OAG, 2012, p.7), Te Māngai Pāho observed that although it was aware of the possibility of a significant change in the administrative landscape should the recommendations included in *Te Reo Mauriora* be fully implemented, nevertheless “in the short term it [was] continuing to operate and plan for ‘business as usual’”.

The response from the wider public to media releases concerning *Te Reo Mauriora* appears to have been largely negative. Although this is not, perhaps, surprising, what *is* surprising is the fact that the focus is often on something that could have been contested in the report, that is, the reported annual spend on Māori language revitalisation - NZ\$600 million. This focus was frequently combined with on-going

²⁷⁴ Issues identified in the Higgins’ (n.d.) report include the fact that (a) both iwi and whānau do not currently prioritise language revitalisation when faced with other issues (p.13); (b) Not all “regions” (p.13) or “iwi organisations” (p.16) within the regional groupings are resourced or equipped to drive a co-ordinated iwi/community led approach to language revitalisation” (let alone a Māori Language broadcasting strategy) (c) “the devolution of resources targeted to the Māori Language Strategy out to regions and iwi will become problematic in “ensuring accountability for money”, it will “cost more money”; cause inequalities between regions; and may negatively affect current Iwi radio stations in some areas (p.17).

²⁷⁵ Issues here include (a) The proposed Mātāwai structure *only mirrors* the current structure with a new name (Higgins, n.d., p.8), (b) In rendering current agencies redundant (p.10) (see diagram in Te Paepae Motuhake, 2011, pp.52-53) it ignores the fact that they are critical to Māori language revitalisation, and (c) there is no substantial research to support the proposed new structure or consider its effects should it be implemented (Higgins, n.d., p.15), meaning that by separating language from other domains may be counter-active, *Te Reo Mauriora* may well be “ghettoising” it from the wider aspects of the Māori world (Higgins, n.d., pp.8 & 18).

²⁷⁶ It is important to note that it would be difficult to characterise the efforts of *Te Māngai Pāho* as being either isolated or disjointed. Its strategic framework links directly to the 2003 Māori Language Strategy and its five goals include strengthening Māori language *skills, use, education opportunities, community leadership, and recognition*.

resentment about Treaty claims. Thus, for example, typical of many responses was one by 'rouppe' (2011, April 14) and another by 'Sofia' (2011, April 14):

It is up to Māori to save te reo, not me. I already resent being forced to pay the fine (aka Treaty Claim) for a crime I neither perpetrated nor perpetuated and to now have some self-aggrandising panel say another \$600 million (and given it is from ministry spend I imagine they are talking that amount per annum) has to be diverted to save what they should be perfectly capable to saving themselves is just taking the * * * That \$600m per annum can be better spent on education, health and infrastructure – for the benefit of everyone, not the few (rouppe, 2011, April 14).

Reports from yesterday said \$225m to \$600m a year is being spent to preserve the use of Te Reo. \$616,438 to \$1.64 million a day.... It is a * * * travesty that the figure ranges \$225m to 266% times that amount with no real indication as to what it is spent on, but now it is of course the upper figure that is being talked of transferring to other attempts to save Māori language. Shouldn't we know what has failed so far before flushing more taxes down te wharepaku (Sofia, 2011, April 14)?

An email sent to Prime Minister John Key (*More Maori handouts*, 2011, April 29) described expenditure on the Māori language as an "obscene amount of money," and asked "Why are all New Zealanders expected to give, give, give their hard earned money, when the people the money is supposedly benefitting seem unable to get out of their own way to help themselves. . . . As taxpayers, and National party voters we totally disagree with giving Māori anymore handouts".

Even those who were broadly supportive of the report frequently expressed concern about the figure of NZ\$600 million. Representative of the online responses included in the Chelsey forum were those of 'harksgal'(n.d), who called the sum 'rediculas' (sic) and, in light of the Christchurch earthquake, 'just greed', 'Lols'(n.d.), who expressed bewilderment "at such a huge amount of money", and 'KH' (n.d.), who wanted to know "how they arrived at this sum".

An article by Matthews (n.d.) which appeared on the Kai Tahu tribal Māori language website, *Kotahi Mano Kāika Kotahi Mano Wawata* (www.kmk.maori.nz), while supportive of the report's recommendations, notes that more than a year after the report's release there is no evidence of action on it. Quinton Hita, a member of the council of *Ngā Aho Whakaari* (Māori in screen production) and former member of Te Taura Whiri noted that the omission of broadcast agencies from the report would be a "cause of great discussion" (TVNZ, 2011, April 13), adding that the report did not provide a solution to the problem of revitalisation (TVNZ, 2011, April 13). In relation to the recommendation relating to the use of Māori in homes, Peter Keegan (2011, April 27) made the following comment:

[I am] not convinced that many iwi authorities are currently in a position to assist. Clearly some are and active in this area (e.g. Ngāti Raukawa AND Ngāti Kahungunu), others lack the organisation or resources, others again, e.g., Waikato-Tainui certainly have the resources but currently don't seem to see supporting Māori language in homes as being very important. Too often it is forgotten that the majority of Māori no longer live in their traditional iwi regions, and too many urbanized Māori have very little meaningful contact with iwi organisations.

The initial intention was to release a statement on the report's recommendations during Māori Language Week (4-10 July, 2011) and then to devote the following week to developing a new Māori Language Strategy for confirmation early in 2012. It is noted in the Terms of Reference that the review "is timed to coincide with the planning cycle for the 2011/12 financial year, with key deliverables scheduled for November 2010, so that decisions can be implemented through planning and budget processes". The only proposal relating to Māori language sector reform that emerged in 2011, from Māori Party M.P. Te Ururoa Flavell, (2011, October 10) was that Te Taura Whiri should function as a Crown-Māori partnership and should be the lead language sector agency, something that relates primarily to the WAI 262 report but something that lawyer Mai Chen (2011, October 11) warned could have "serious detrimental implications for TTW", including the loss of its policy making role and reduction of its say on funding.

The 2013 budget provided some new and increased funding for Te Taura Whiri (a WAI 262 report recommendation), funding which was intended to lay the foundation for a new Māori Language Strategy due later in the year (Sharples, 2013, May 16). This included \$8 million for a new Māori Language Research and Development Fund “to strengthen the evidence base for effective Māori language policies and programmes”, \$16.7 million to attract, train and retain Māori language teachers, and an increase to \$2.5 million annually of community funding.²⁷⁷ It is noted in a budget statement that is linked explicitly to *Te Reo Mauriora* that “the Government is *considering* an additional \$15.2 million in funding to Te Taura Whiri i Te Reo to fund Māori communities’ engagement in learning Te Reo Māori in homes and on marae”.²⁷⁸ While *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei* and *Te Reo Mauriora* both appear to have influenced these budget items, it is likely that they were more directly linked to pressure on government brought to bear by Peter Sharples who has observed: “What I did get was a whole lot of Te Reo Māori initiatives. Because *we’re* trying to re-establish a permanent Te Reo Maori strategy amongst the community” (Newstalk ZB Staff, 2013, May 16). Notwithstanding, some relatively small 2013 budget concessions, it would seem that the negative impact of *Te Reo Mauriora* far outweighs any positive impact it may have had.

5.5 Some concluding remarks

The analysis of *Our Land Our Languages* in terms of criteria derived from CDT revealed that its writers had, in almost all respects, succeeded in creating a text that was likely to be effective in developing hegemony and, therefore, in securing support for its recommendations. An important aspect of this is its successful representation of an inclusive all-Australian in-group identity in relation to which nodal points could be redefined in a way that was likely to have broad appeal. The largely positive response it received is consistent with this.

In the case of *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei*, the analysis revealed a rather different dynamic at work. Here, although the authors appear to have attempted to represent an

²⁷⁷ In addition, the Government stated that it was also *considering* transferring the Ministry of Education’s \$2.3 million *Community Based Language Initiatives* fund to *Te Taura Whiri i Te Reo*.

²⁷⁸ It is not known why this amount was included in the budget statement when it was still under consideration. One possible scenario is that it is actually intended to form part of the 2014 budget (an election year) subject to the Government getting its books in order.

inclusive all-New Zealand in-group identity based on genuine partnership, that identity, when set against repeated indicators of past failure, is never fully believable and could not therefore serve as an effective key signifier in relation to which the report's nodal points could be effectively redefined. Overall, *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei* appears to have been more successful in highlighting problems associated with the *status quo* hegemony and the negative implications of opposition articulations as implemented policy than it was in presenting a believable counter hegemonic agenda. The nature of the mixed response it received appears to bear this out. While some commentators admired its breadth of vision, few indicated that they believed that it would have a major impact on policy and practice.

The early release of Chapter 5 of *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei* presented the writers of *Te Reo Mauriora* with an opportunity. The *Māori Language Strategy 2003* had already been analysed and found wanting, some of the strategies used by government to give the appearance of progress and of providing adequate funding had been laid bare. Even so, this opportunity was largely missed. *Te Reo Mauriora*, as witnessed by the almost wholly negative response it received, appears to have confused and alienated many, including some who could be expected to have represented a natural constituency of support, and to have strengthened rather than undermined the *status quo* hegemony.

Chapter 6

Overview and conclusions

6.1 Introduction

My aim in this chapter is to summarise and comment on the research reported in this thesis (6.2) and to give some consideration to its contribution (6.3), its limitations (6.4) and possible directions for future research (6.5). The chapter ends with a final comment (6.6).

6.2 Overview and discussion of the main research findings

The research question underpinning this research project was:

With particular reference to policy and planning as it relates to the revitalisation of indigenous languages, can critical discourse theory contribute in a positive way by providing criteria (guidelines) for the production of reports that are designed to challenge the existing hegemony and secure maximum support for proposals and recommendations? (Section 1.4)

This research question was addressed initially through a critical review of selected literature on language policy and planning (2.2) and critical discourse theory (2.3). That review indicated that CDT had not hitherto played a central role in language policy and planning, demonstrated its potential to do so, and led to the establishment of effectiveness criteria in the form of a series of questions that were then applied to the analysis of three recent documents concerned with language revitalisation.

6.2.1 The literature review and the development of effectiveness criteria

As indicated in the literature review, language policy and planning (LPP) is a branch of applied linguistics which is fundamentally concerned with changing linguistic behaviour. Its key considerations are *context, participants, intentions, means* and *effect*. The core areas of LPP activity include *status planning, corpus planning, acquisition planning* (or language-in-education planning), *prestige planning* and *usage planning*. It has been argued that it should also include *discourse planning*.

The following five closely related conclusions emerged from the review of literature on LPP:

- (1) The conventional paradigm upon which LPP is based is inadequate for such a contentious and problematic area of social policy, providing little guidance for engaging with political decision-making processes.
- (2) Much LPP practice has remained a largely technocratic exercise.
- (3) LPP practitioners are often ignored in decision-making processes or located on the side of those *élites* that hold power.
- (4) There is an important role for language activists in influencing LPP processes.
- (5) Participation in public policy making processes involves, at its core, a discursive struggle.

It was argued that notwithstanding the post-modern and critical turn within the discipline, the conventional paradigm upon which LPP is based is inadequate for such an inherently political, contentious and problematic area of social policy, providing little assistance for practitioners to engage successfully with political decision-making processes (*conclusion 1*). It was also noted that this inadequacy is symptomatic of the largely technocratic tendencies that underpin much conventional LPP practice, tendencies which lead to avoidance of, rather than engagement with, those critical social and political factors that directly impact on patterns of behaviour (*conclusion 2*). Thus, for example, so far as language revitalisation is concerned, there appears to be a separation between technicist sociolinguistic analysis of its causes, nature and outcomes, and critical analysis of the asymmetrical power relations that impact on social structures and ideologies. As a result, LPP practitioners are generally either ignored in decision-making processes or located at the periphery of power-holding *élites* (*conclusion 3*). That it is generally politicians rather than LPP experts who plan language represents a significant challenge for the discipline. Nevertheless, language policy and planning is not just a top-down exercise. As indicated in the literature, social actors at any level can influence LPP processes, particularly in relation to the implementation of decisions that come directly within their domain of influence. There is, therefore, an important role for language activists in LPP processes (*conclusion 4*). Given,

however, the fact that language activists lack the authority of *élites*, they depend heavily on persuading others, particularly those who are, or have the power to influence decision makers. Consequently, any participation in public policy making processes, whether it involves top-down action by *élites* or grass-roots activism, involves, at its core, a discursive struggle (*conclusion 5*).

Drawing on a range of disciplines, such as Marxism, post-structuralism and psychoanalysis, Laclau and Mouffe, in formulating a critical theory of discourse (CDT), argue that meanings and identities are radically contingent, being continually constructed and re-constructed through a plurality of opposing forces which attempt to fix, disrupt and reconfigure them in order to achieve hegemony. Although the political arena is conceptualised in terms of a plurality of antagonisms, Laclau and Mouffe promote agonistic engagement in disputes, which involves acknowledging both the contingency of one's own beliefs and the legitimacy of the opposing 'Other'. Those involved in counter-hegemonic discourse should therefore attempt to unmask, contest and transform the existing hegemony in a way that provides evidence of an existing coalition of support, reinforcing and extending it, while avoiding the creation of an opposition coalition. This, it is argued in the review, has important implications for those involved in language revitalisation initiatives and, more generally, for the discipline of language policy and planning, having the potential to provide it with a secure theoretical base.

Since society is constructed and transformed through discourse, the most effective way of changing society is to change social discourse. This is especially true of those issues with which LPP engages because they are never wholly subject to rational, scientific enquiry. This brings us to a central argument of this thesis and the sixth conclusion emerging from the literature review:

- (6) LPP as an academic discipline has little to say about the hegemonic and counter-hegemonic discourse that lies at the very core of language revitalisation efforts and needs to take on a critical discourse perspective if it is to achieve its fundamental aims.

In view of the need to communicate in ways that are persuasive both to hegemonic interests/ key decision makers and the wider public, the use of appropriate *discourse strategies* is critical to the effectiveness of LPP. Lo Bianco has argued that discourse planning should become a core area of LPP. It is argued here that all LPP should be underpinned by CDT, with discourse planning becoming the very core of LPP. One of the problems identified in the literature on CDT is, however, that there is currently little guidance for those who are concerned with its application to real world problems. Thus, in order to determine the extent to which counter-hegemonic texts conform to the principles of CDT, a number of criteria (referred to as ‘effectiveness criteria’) were developed on the basis of a review of the key concepts and principles of CDT. These criteria, formulated as questions were grouped under topic areas as follows.

A Representation of an ‘in-group’

1. *Is the construction/ representation of any ‘in-group’ identity consistent with the overall purpose of the text within its discourse context?*
2. *Is the representation of any ‘in-group’ likely to be perceived as sufficiently inclusive and genuinely representative by the target membership of that group and to resonate positively with them?*

B Representation of an ‘other’ identity

3. *Is the construction/ representation of any ‘other’ identity group consistent with the overall purpose of the text within its discourse context?*
4. *Is the representation of any ‘other’ identity group likely to be perceived as inaccurate, disrespectful or offensive by the target membership of that group?*

C Group formation and fragmentation: The logics of equivalence and difference

5. *Does the text identify a common adversary in such a way as to increase the potential for the extension of an existing coalition of support for its aims?*

6. *Does the text provide evidence of an existing coalition of support for its aims?*
7. *Does the text employ strategies whose aim is to avoid the creation of an opposition coalition?*
8. *Does the text move beyond personal interests, weakening differences by articulating a broad inclusive agenda which has the potential to create a coalition of different interests?*

D. Engagement with key decision-makers

9. *Are hegemonic interests/ key decision makers positioned in a way that is likely to gain their approval and is there evidence of agonistic engagement with them?*
10. *Are the arguments provided likely to convince hegemonic interests/ key decision makers?*

E. Dislocation and deconstruction

11. *Does the text contest the nodal points of the status quo hegemony and expose and undermine its aims (underlying objects of desire and promised fantasies), drawing attention to significant dislocating events and exposing/revealing the inherent contingency of its positioning, its rhetorical manipulations, the negative implications of its articulations as implemented policy, the inconsistency of its rhetoric over time and/or the discrepancies between its promises and achievements?*
12. *Are the key signifiers redefined (through chains of signification) in a way that is counter to the purposes of adversaries and likely to resonate positively with the primary target audience and the wider readership?*

6.2.2 Application of the effectiveness criteria to three reports concerned with indigenous language revitalisation

The criteria listed in the previous section provided the basis for the analysis of three counter-hegemonic reports concerned with indigenous language revitalisation (*Chapters 3, 4 & 5*). These were:

- *Our Land Our Languages: Language Learning in Indigenous Communities*, a report produced in September 2012 by the Australian House of Representatives Standing Committee on Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Affairs;
- *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei: A Report into Claims Concerning New Zealand Law and Policy Affecting Māori Culture and Identity* prepared by the Waitangi Tribunal which was released in July 2011 (with a pre-publication draft chapter on the Māori language being released earlier – in October 2010).
- *Te Reo Mauriora*, a report of a review of the Māori language sector and Māori Language Strategy that was released in April 2011.

6.2.2.1 *Our Land Our Languages*

In relation to **questions 1 - 4**, *Our Land Our Languages* was found to perform exceptionally well. It articulates a positive all-Australian identity (knowledgeable, authoritative, contemporary and enlightened) which is presented as being dependent on a uniqueness derived, in part, from its ‘Indigenous Australian’ heritage and the languages and cultures associated with that heritage, from whose protection and celebration a range of benefits for all are seen as flowing. The report writers avoid the potential danger inherent in repositioning the ‘Aboriginal Other’ as an integral part of the ‘Australian Us’ (‘Indigenous Australians’), that is, the danger of effectively suppressing the right of the indigenous people to assert their indigenous Otherness, by ensuring that their voices and perspectives permeate the report and are presented in a positive light. The only out-group detectable, with one exception, is that group which is made up of non-Australians. The exception is that group whose members dissent from the Committee’s aims (a common adversary / other identity). However, the existence of such a group is generally inferential and often historical and depersonalised (e.g. *Government policies of the past*) rather than the subject of direct comment and criticism. In relation to **questions five and six**, the report also fares well. Wherever possible, the report writers include praise for positive and effective government initiatives and align their recommendations as closely as possible with existing structural arrangements and existing government policies.

In relation to **questions 7 - 10**, *Our Land Our Languages* was also found to perform well. Avoiding direct reference to Australians who do not support positive intervention, the report writers identify as a common adversary a particular mindset, one that is located largely in the past and associated with institutional decision-making rather than with particular individuals or administrations. They provide evidence of an existing coalition of support in the form of extensive quotations from public hearings and submissions and from a range of reports and surveys by influential bodies, creating the impression that their own findings and recommendations are merely a reiteration of those of others. In addition, they employ a wide range of strategies which would appear to be calculated to avoid the creation and/ or reinforcement of an opposing coalition. These include the provision of incentives for supporting their recommendations, including, in addition to references to language rights and social justice, a range of benefits relating, for example, to education, health and employment. Finally, almost everything in the report points to considerable efforts on the part of the writers to articulate a broad inclusive agenda which has the potential to create a coalition of interests, including, for example, health professionals, social workers, educationalists, politicians and, indeed, all of those Australians who wish to be associated with views that are presented as being contemporary, enlightened and endorsed by those who are both knowledgeable and authoritative.

Carefully, agonistically and often largely implicitly, the writers of *Our Land Our Languages* expose the inherent contingency of the *status quo* hegemony, referring to some significant dislocating events and uncovering discrepancies between what policy has promised and what it has delivered. In doing so, they do not imbue the entire report with a sense of negativity. The overarching tone is a positive one, one that reflects the positive re-articulation of the key signifiers 'Australian' and 'Australia'. This re-articulation is central to the report, providing the nodal points around which the discourse clusters and creating chains of equivalence that are likely to resonate positively with indigenous and non-Indigenous Australian readers. Thus, in terms of **questions 11 and 12**, this report once again performs well.

In view of the fact that the analysis of *Our Land Our Languages* reveals that it performs well in relation to each of the effectiveness criteria, it is not surprising to find that it has been extremely well received, with very positive media coverage and the unanimous support of insider organisations. Perhaps most significantly, it has been endorsed by the main ‘right’ and ‘left’ wings of Australian politics.

6.2.2.2 *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei*

The ‘in-group’ identity represented in *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei* is *potentially* an inclusive one. However, membership of that group depends on commitment to a new national identity based on genuine partnership, as does acceptance of the report’s recommendations. Notwithstanding this, the evidence presented in the report itself, including evidence relating to a consistent lack of national commitment to genuine partnership, strongly suggests that only a minority of New Zealanders can claim current membership of this group. It also indicates that any extension of group membership would require a major repositioning. In this respect, *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei* differs fundamentally from *Our Land Our Languages*, where the presupposition is that Australians have already, in general, committed to membership of an all-Australia ‘in-group’. Overall, therefore, in relation to *questions 1 and 2*, *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei* does not perform well. Within the context of *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei*, those who are not committed to genuine partnership represent, by implication, an ‘other’ identity. Included in this group are government representatives, whose activities and lack of activity are both criticised (sometimes severely) and who are represented as having, on occasion, behaved in a way that is not only counter-productive but also intentionally misleading. Nevertheless, negative judgments are generally supported by evidence and careful argument, and negative criticism is generally couched in moderate language. Thus, although the report makes for uncomfortable reading for many, and although not all of the conclusions reached would appear to be beyond dispute, it is neither disrespectful nor offensive. In fact, there is considerable evidence of an attempt to engage agonistically in (a) the softening of some critical comments, (b) the praising of some individuals and groups, and (c) the acknowledgment of the interests, perspectives and even fears of different groups. Even so, its representation of an ‘other’ identity does not seem to be wholly consistent with the overall purpose of the text, that is,

to persuade key decision-makers (largely government representatives) to accept and act upon the report's recommendations. In relation, therefore, to **questions 3** and **4**, *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei* does not fare particularly well.

Some attempt appears to have been made in *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei* to establish as a common adversary a particular mindset. However, whereas the mindset that represents a common adversary is generally inferential and often historical and depersonalised in *Our Land Our Languages*, this is not the case in *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei*. Instead, that mindset is associated with all of those who do not currently share the writers' belief in equal partnership, particularly government representatives. Thus, precisely because it is a mindset that they are likely to share, it is not one against which many readers who are not already committed to the report's aims are likely to position themselves. The report does not therefore perform well in relation to **question 5**. However, in that much of the report is dedicated to highlighting the negative implications of opposition articulations as implemented policy, it does fare considerably better in relation to providing evidence of an existing coalition of support (**question 6**). The problem here, however, is that the effectiveness of this strategy depends on the existence and/or creation of a group of key decision-makers who are likely to support the report's recommendations. Although the report cites a range of sources that appear to be broadly supportive of its general direction, it provides little evidence of an existing coalition of support for its more specific recommendations (and therefore does not fare well in relation to this question).

In attempting to prevent the creation of an opposition coalition (**question 7**) as well as articulating an inclusive agenda (**question 8**), the report writers make repeated reference to an inclusive sense of national identity and emphasise the fact that there are, for all New Zealanders, potential advantages in adopting their recommendations. However, as indicated above, the first of these strategies fails to gain any significant traction because the inclusive sense of national identity presented is readily perceived to be largely mythical. Furthermore, although the second strategy seems to be more effective, references to the advantages for the country as a whole are not only less pervasive but also more tentative and speculative than is the case in *Our Land our Languages*.

There are clear attempts in *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei* to engage with key decision makers in an agonistic way. Moreover, the Tribunal's approach to the provision of evidence, its appeal to enlightened government and its placing of recommendations in the context of economic recession are likely to be appreciated by key decision-makers. Nevertheless, this is counter-balanced by severe criticism of a number of government agencies and therefore, overall, this report appears to be only moderately successful when judged against **questions 9** and **10**. However, there can be no doubt that *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei* effectively exposes the contingency of the *status quo* hegemony, drawing attention to significant dislocating events, and revealing the rhetorical manipulations inherent in much of the Crown's discourse. It is, therefore, clearly effective when judged in relation to **question 11**.

The readily identifiable chains of signification in the *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei* redefine nodal points (genuine partnership, wise policy; adequate resourcing; and a Māori speaking government) and the key signifier (partnership) in a way that is counter to the purposes of adversaries and forms the basis of the report's recommendations. However, although this redefinition is likely to resonate positively with those who believe that the vision of genuine partnership promoted throughout the report is one that is achievable within the foreseeable future, it seems unlikely that this group will be a large one. Indeed, the concept of genuine partnership (the pathway to the *objet petit à* of national harmony), like that of an all-Aotearoa identity, is revealed as little more than a utopian fantasy when considered in light of the repeated failures outlined in the report and its emphasis on the fact that government has the final say on its recommendations (indicating the strength of hegemonic New Zealand-as-a-state-democracy discourse). What this indicates is that the report is not successful when judged against **question 12**.

Analysis of *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei* in terms of the twelve criteria produced a mixed result. Its success, or partial success, in relation to questions **6**, **9** and **11** is undermined by weaknesses in relation to questions **1-5**, **7**, **8** and **12**. It is not, perhaps, surprising therefore to find that the reception of *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei* was mixed. Although there were some who applauded its emphasis on genuine partnership, there were others who found it to be inappropriately idealistic. The

initial responses of government representatives have tended to confirm the view of Green Party leader Metiria Turei that it is unlikely to lead to any significant change in government policy and practice. Nonetheless, should future demographic, economic and geo-political changes in New Zealand favour Māori (as Tribunal members are convinced it will), the report's New Zealand-as-an-equal-partnership discourse is likely to become much more widely accepted. *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei* may, therefore, in time, prove to be a report that represents an important landmark in the ideological landscape of Aotearoa.

6.2.2.3 *Te Reo Mauriora*

In the case of *Te Reo Mauriora*, review panel members departed substantially from the Terms of Reference that were intended to guide their deliberations, delegating some of the tasks with which they were charged to those involved in a proposed future organisational structure (one that would be very different from the existing one), often framing their conclusions as requirements rather than recommendations, and adopting a largely antagonistic stance towards key individuals and organisations. In doing so, they position/ represent themselves as *the* authoritative 'in-group', appearing to consign most others (including non-Māori New Zealanders, Crown representatives and some Māori) to outsider status. Bearing in mind the fact that the overall aim of the report is to secure support for recommendations that are capable of implementation, these strategies appear to be inconsistent with a positive response to *questions 1 – 4*.

The task with which the review group was entrusted was essentially to determine whether government spend on the Māori language was being directed in the best possible way to secure positive outcomes and, if not, to make recommendations in relation to the redirection of some of it. This being the case, whilst acknowledging that there are serious problems associated with government approaches to the Māori language (past and present) and with the *Māori Language Strategy* and its implementation, gaining support for recommendations made by the review group would appear to have been relatively unproblematic. There were many potential allies. However, in addition to consigning to outsider status many of those who might, under other circumstances, have provided a natural coalition of support, the writers actually include, by implication, those who commissioned the report in their

representation of a common adversary. There is no evidence of strategies whose aim is to avoid the creation of an opposition coalition. Nor is there any evidence of a broad inclusive agenda which has the potential to create a coalition of different interests. Furthermore, key decision-makers are clearly not positioned in a way that is likely to gain their approval. Thus, the report can be seen not to perform well in relation to *questions 5 – 9*.

At first sight, the report appears to perform well in relation to *questions 10 and 11*. Certainly, there is a considerable volume of criticism of existing policy and practice. However, this criticism is largely antagonistic in tone and is seriously undermined by a lack of coherent evidence-based discussion. Thus, for example, there is no evidence of genuine engagement with relevant literature, no record of the content of consultation meetings, inconsistencies between some parts of the report and others, and inadequate and potentially misleading financial analysis. Furthermore, the writers missed several opportunities to contest the nodal points of the *status quo* hegemony. Thus, for example, they overlooked the opportunity (provided in the wide definition of value in the Terms of Reference) to undermine the neo-liberal philosophy that underpins the *status quo* hegemony and to redefine cost-effectiveness in ways that exposed its contingency. By accepting, without analysis, the government's estimate of annual Māori language funding (\$600 million), they missed the opportunity of presenting a more realistic estimate and exposing the reasons for the government's inflated figure. Also missed were opportunities to draw attention to dislocating events, including, in particular, those relating to the inadequacies of the existing *Māori Language Strategy* and the lack of progress in relation to its implementation. The final conclusion, therefore, is that this report did not perform well in relation to *questions 10 and 11*.

In *Te Reo Mauriora*, there are no readily identifiable chains of signification and, therefore, no coherent and consistent redefinition of nodal points and key signifiers. Thus, for example, what appear to be two of the major themes of the report – *government culpability/ responsibility* and *Māori sovereignty* – never fully cohere into key signifiers that represent an effective challenge to the *status quo*. Certainly, they are unlikely to resonate positively with the primary target audience, an audience which includes those key decision-makers who will determine whether

the report has any impact on government policy and practice. In relation to *question 12*, therefore, this report was judged to be unsuccessful.

Almost immediately following the release of *Te Reo Mauriora*, government reservations about its findings and recommendations began to surface, as did a considerable amount of negative criticism in the public domain. While many of those who felt most threatened by the report, including those closely associated with *Te Taura Whiri*, maintained a largely diplomatic stance in public, their intra-institutional responses were often considerably less temperate.

6.2.2.4 Revisiting the research question

The analysis of these three reports – *Our Land Our Languages*, *Ko Aotearoa Tēnei* and *Te Reo Mauriora* – in terms of criteria derived from critical discourse theory revealed some major similarities and differences among them and served to highlight some of those features of the reports that appear to have played a major role in the ways in which they have been received. There would appear, therefore, to be much that future writers of reports of this type, and, indeed, of other types of documentation relating to indigenous language revitalisation and language policy and planning more generally, could gain from this sort of analysis. From this perspective, the research reported here yields a positive response to the research question that underpinned it (see below):

With particular reference to policy and planning as it relates to the revitalisation of indigenous languages, can critical discourse theory contribute in a positive way by providing criteria (guidelines) for the production of reports that are designed to challenge the existing hegemony and secure maximum support for proposals and recommendations?

6.3 Research contribution

So far as I have been able to determine, this is the first study to focus on potential links between CDT and language revitalisation. I believe that it contributes to language policy and planning discourse by demonstrating:

a) that CDT can provide the basis for the development of criteria that can be used to help to determine how successful texts designed to challenge the existing hegemony and secure maximum support for proposals and recommendations, (including reports relating to indigenous language revitalisation) are likely to be in achieving their aims;

b) that CDT can provide the basis for the development of guidelines/ success indicators that can be used to assist those involved in LPP (including grassroots activists) to prepare texts (written or spoken) that are intended to represent a challenge the existing hegemony and secure maximum support for counter-hegemonic proposals and recommendations; and, by extension

c) that CDT has the potential to provide LPP with a secure theoretical foundation.

I believe that this research project also contributes to discourse about critical discourse theory by demonstrating that it is possible to develop, on the basis of CDT, a methodology that can usefully be applied to the analysis of counter-hegemonic texts in order to determine how successful they are in conforming to the central principles of CDT. It should be borne in mind, however, that there are many factors that contribute to whether a counter-hegemonic text achieves its objectives, some of which may be available for scrutiny only by a select few (e.g. Cabinet members). It follows that a text that fares well in terms of the effectiveness criteria outlined here will not necessarily be successful in achieving the objectives of its author/s.

6.4 Limitations of the research

This research project reported here has several limitations of which I am aware.

The three texts analysed here were selected because they had a number of characteristics in common. They were recent publications of a similar type (reports) which had a similar purpose (to contribute towards indigenous language revitalisation). Had it been possible in the time available, it would have been useful to have included further analysed texts – either those of a similar type (e. g. older reports or reports from other parts of the world dealing with indigenous language

revitalisation) or texts of a different type but still coming within the domain of LPP. This would have provided more substantial support for the overall conclusions reached, particularly in cases where discourse relating to the documents analysed was extensive.

6.5 Recommendations for future research

There is likely to be a need of further refinement of the criteria developed within the context of this research project and there is certainly a need for the development of a context-related criterion hierarchy. Each of these tasks would require a considerable amount of text-based analysis, including the analysis of a range of text-types that come within the general domain of LPP.

6.6 A final comment

Although the research project reported here has implications for language policy and planning in a general sense, my particular hope is that it will make some contribution to Māori language revitalisation. Furthermore, counter-hegemonic strategies, such as those discussed here, could usefully be included in the education curriculum, providing young Māori, who are, by definition, immersed in counter-hegemonic struggle, with a useful, and potentially life-enhancing understanding of some of the ways in which they could contribute to a more just and equal society.

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Appendices

Appendix 1: Language policy and planning: Overarching frameworks


Framework 1: An Evolving Framework for Language Planning Goals by Levels and Awareness (Baldauf, 2005)

Table A1: An evolving framework of language planning goals

		<i>Levels Planning Processes and Goals</i>					
		<i>Macro</i>		<i>Meso</i>		<i>Micro</i>	
		<i>Awareness of goals</i>					
<i>Approaches to goals</i>	<i>Policy Planning (on form)</i>	<i>Cultivation Planning (on function)</i>		<i>Overt</i>	<i>Covert</i>	<i>Overt</i>	<i>Covert</i>
<i>Productive Goals Status Planning</i> (about society)	Goals Status standardization <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Officialization ● Nationalization ● Proscription 	Goals <i>Status planning</i> Revival <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Restoration ● Revitalization ● Reversal Maintenance Interlingual communication <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● International ● Intranational Spread					
Corpus Planning (about language)	<i>Standardization</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Graphization ● Grammitication ● Lexication Auxiliary Code <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Graphization ● Grammitication ● Lexication 	<i>Corpus Elaboration</i> Lexical modernization Stylistic modernization Renovation <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Purification ● Reform ● Stylistic simplification ● Terminological unification Internationalization					
Language-in-Education Planning (about learning)	<i>Policy Development</i> Access policy Personnel policy Curriculum policy Methods and materials policy Resourcing policy Community policy Evaluation policy	<i>Acquisition Planning</i> Reacquisition Maintenance Foreign / Second language Shift					
<i>Receptive Goals Prestige Planning</i> (about image)	<i>Language promotion</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Official / Government ● Institutional ● Pressure group ● Individual 	<i>Intellectualization</i> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> ● Language of science ● Language of professions ● Language of high culture 					

Framework 2: *Expanded language policy* (Shohamy, 2006)

Figure A1: *Expanded language policy* (Shohamy, 2006, pp.52 & 58)



Framework 3: *Language management* (Neustupný & Nekvapil, 2003, pp.187-189)

Language management aims to systematically address the wide range of communicative problems within a community by focusing on the following strategies.

- *participant strategies* (strategies to determine participants and networks in communication processes).
- *variety strategies* (govern what variety of languages are spoken and what problems affect these languages and their individual rules).
- *situational strategies* (examines the problems in situations (recurring sets of the use of language) such as, for example, domains).
- *function strategies* (examines problems relating to functions (communicative, symbolic, social etc.)
- *setting strategies* (determine when and where a language or type of language can be used).
- *content strategies* (the selection of the content of communication).

- *Frame/message form strategies* (determines the form of communication and form and order of its components).
- *channel strategies* (govern the various channels – electronic media for instance - through which communication forms are turned into surface structures).

Appendix 2: Language vitality and revitalisation frameworks

Language vitality and language revitalisation are intrinsically linked, with the former foundational for the latter.²⁷⁹ Nevertheless, the underlying motivation behind vitality is evaluative, while revitalisation is more interventionist (Grenoble & Whaley, 2006, p.3; Obiero, 2010, p.202).²⁸⁰

Framework 1: Language ecology (Haugen, 1971, 2001)

Einar Haugen (2001, p.57) sees the ecology of language relating to the “interaction between any given language and its environment.” Thus, this model emphasises the sociological, natural and psychological impact of a society where a language is used, learnt, transmitted on the language, and in particular how changes in some affect other areas (2001, p.63). Haugen asked 10 questions (2001, p. 65):

1. What is its *classification* in relation to other languages?
2. Who are its *users* (demographics)?
3. What are its *domains* of use?
4. What *concurrent languages* are employed by its users (level of bilingualism)?
5. What *internal varieties* does the language show?
6. What is the nature of its *written traditions*?
7. To what degree has the written form been *standardised*?
8. What kind of *institutional support* has it won (education, government, private, language planning)
9. What are the *attitudes* of its users towards the languages?
10. Sum up its status in a *typology of ecological classification* (where does it stand where is it going in comparison to other languages in the world).

Framework 2: Ethnolinguistic vitality (Giles, Bourhis & Taylor, 1977)

This social psychological framework assesses the health of a language in light of its importance to its community as well as wider society (Giles et al. 1977, p.309). It initially included three variables but was expanded to include a fourth variable related to socio-psychological factors.

²⁷⁹ Grenoble and Whaley (2006, p.3) state that “the degree of language vitality is the basic indicator used in determining the appropriate type of language revitalization program.”

²⁸⁰ Other frameworks/lists of factors that were considered but not included are Chrystal (2000) (Stages of language death; and Factors that may progress a language); Cooper (1989) (An accounting scheme for the study of language planning); Grenoble and Whaley (2006) (creating a language program); Hinton and Hale (2001) (Steps toward language revitalisation); Kaplan and Baldauf (1997) (Factors of language survival); Lewis (2007) (Language revitalisation, perception, choice and practices) and; Yamamoto (1998) (Key factors in Language Maintenance).

- (a) *Status*: historical and socio-economic standing and prestige of a language,
- (b) *Demographics*: the number, growth, distribution and concentration of speakers within the total population,
- (c) *Institutional support*: formal and informal domains
- (d) *Subjective perception*: connection to language and perception of speaking community of its status in society

The fourth factor acknowledges that the emotive connection to the language and the perception of themselves in relation to other groups are significant factors of language health. Myer-Scotton (2006, pp.74-75) notes that subjective perceptions are related to the composition and language of an individual's social networks. Alternatively Sallabank (2011, p.500) sees a greater focus, in this framework, on economic and institutional opportunities provided by a language than social value and community support.

Framework 3: Graded intergenerational disruption scale (GIDS) (Fishman, 1991)

The GIDS evaluative framework is a theoretical and empirical approach to address the functional disruption of threatened languages in social space (Fishman, 1991).²⁸¹ It both diagnoses vitality (where to start) and prioritises certain actions (what to aim at) in order to “focus the meager resources that are available in as judicious a way as possible” (Fishman, 1990, p.18).²⁸² The 8 inter-linked stages constitute a step-by-step descriptive framework that aims to first achieve diglossia (stages 1-4) and second to increase power sharing with the intention of transcending diglossia (stages 5-8).²⁸³ The areas of focus in GIDS are language domains (stages 1-3); literacy (stages 4-5) and intergenerational transmission (stages 6-8). It depends on the level of disruption as to where a speaking community begins. The fulcrum of the GIDS, and the most important factor of language survival is the recommencement of intergenerational transmission (stage 6).²⁸⁴ In this regard,

²⁸¹ It is based on large scale examples of language expansion, including, in particular, the revival of Hebrew (Hinton, 2001, p.6).

²⁸² Fishman (1991, p.113) observed that a number of RLS movements had failed because they had “engaged in struggles on the wrong front (or on all . . . fronts simultaneously), without real awareness of what they were doing or of the problems that faced them”.

²⁸³ Similar to the Richter scale, stage 8 indicates immanent extinction and stage 1 relative safety.

²⁸⁴ The RLS consists of two phases. The first phase, ideological clarification aims to create consensus among advocates that (a) much of RLS can be implemented without compulsion (b)

Fishman (1991, p.86) claimed that “success in intergenerationally unimportant functions is merely camouflaged failure.”

Nevertheless, the GIDS stages are all linked, with the closest to stage 6 having the most direct and certain linkage or influence to intergenerational transmission. Fishman (2001c, p.467) asserts that stage 6 must be the primary priority and the linkages between it and the other 7 stages must be a constant focus. Thus, for example, early schooling or higher status function initiatives are helpful if they support informal intergenerational interactions. Likewise given that language must be used for the purposes of active communication, Fishman (2001c, p.471) asserted that, “Xish [requires] a society in which it can function, *before* school begins, *outside* of school during the years of schooling and afterwards, when formal schooling is over and done with.”

Table A2: Graded intergenerational disruption scale (GIDS)

STAGES OF REVERSING LANGUAGE SHIFT SEVERITY OF INTERGENERATIONAL DISLOCATION
<i>(read from the bottom up)</i>
1. Education, work sphere, mass media and governmental operations at higher and nationwide levels
2. Local/regional mass media and governmental services
3. The local/regional (i.e. non-neighbourhood) work sphere, both among Xmen and among Ymen
4b. Public schools for Xish children, offering some instruction via Xish. but substantially under Yish curricular and staffing control
4a. Schools in lieu of compulsory education and substantially under Xish curricular and staffing control
<i>II. RLS to transcend diglossia, subsequent to its attainment</i>
5. Schools for literacy acquisition, for the old and for the young, and not in lieu of compulsory education
6. The intergenerational and demographically concentrated home-family-neighbourhood: the basis of mother tongue transmission
7. Cultural interaction in Xish primarily involving the community-based older generation
8. Reconstructing Xish and adult acquisition of XSL.
<i>I. RLS to attain diglossia (assuming prior ideological clarification)</i>

Framework 4: The Catherine Wheel (Strubell, 2001)

minority rights need not interfere with majority rights (c) bilingualism is a benefit for all and (d) RLS measures are context dependant. The second phase, the research phase is the groundwork which creates the RLS plan. Both the programme working plan and the research interact with the GIDS.


In contrast to the more static GIDS, Strubell's (2001, pp.279-280) Catherine Wheel (Table 2.7) places the individual at the centre of a dynamic and perpetual process of change which are wrought through the interrelationships between (a) language competence (b) the social use of language, (c) the demand for products and services in and through the language, and (d) the motivation to learn and use that language.

The idea is that positive outcomes in any factor will turn the wheel in turn influencing the next factor on the wheel and so on. Strubell (2001, p.280) notes that as all six steps are subject to blockage "it is the task of the language planner to overcome the causes of blockage with specific measures when required", although paradoxically admitting that many of the blockages are not directly linguistic in nature and cannot be adopted by language planners on their own. A further problem of the Catherine Wheel, acknowledged by Strubell, is that its idealised theoretical presentation inadequately conceptualises the inherent interdependencies between the factors.

Thus, Darquennes (2007, p.73) suggests its use with ecological methods, such as the social profile method, that take into account the cognitive, social and affective dimensions of the situation.²⁸⁵ Nevertheless, despite this issue the Catherine Wheel is a "comprehensive, multidisciplinary conceived and multi-dimensionally oriented total concept that is intertwined with social reality as a prerequisite for successful language revitalisation" (Darquennes, 2007, p.73).

²⁸⁵ The version of the Catherine Wheel in Darquennes (2007, p.70) differs slightly to the one represented in *Figure A2* (which derives from Strubell, 2001, p.280). In Darquennes' version the steps relating to the consumption and supply of good are combined, and a step relating to "more informal use of the language" is added.

Figure A2: The Catherine wheel (Strubell, 2001)



Framework 5: The UNESCO Language Vitality and Endangerment Framework (UNESCO Ad Hoc Expert Group on Endangered Languages, 2003)

This framework identifies nine inherently inter-related factors. The UNESCO group asserts that although the factors are intended to be used together some factors are more important and should be assigned greater weighting.

- Factor 1. Intergenerational Language Transmission
- Factor 2. Absolute Number of Speakers
- Factor 3. Proportion of Speakers within the Total Population
- Factor 4. Trends in Existing Language Domains
- Factor 5. Response to New Domains and Media
- Factor 6. Materials for Language Education and Literacy
- Factor 7. Governmental and Institutional Language Attitudes and Policies, Including Official Status and Use
- Factor 8. Community Members' Attitudes toward Their Own Language
- Factor 9. Amount and Quality of Documentation

Each factor is graded on a 0-5 scale. For example, the scale for factor 8 is seen in *Table A3*:

Table A3: UNESCO Factor 8: Community members' attitudes toward language

Grade	Factor 8: Community Members' Attitudes toward Language
5	All members value their language and wish to see it promoted.
4	Most members support language maintenance.
3	Many members support language maintenance; others are indifferent or may even support language loss.
2	Some members support language maintenance; others are indifferent or may even support language loss.
1	Only a few members support language maintenance; others are indifferent or may even support language loss.
0	No one cares if the language is lost; all prefer to use a dominant language.

The UNESCO framework was modified slightly in Australia's National Indigenous Language Survey (NILS) (FATSIL AND AIATSIS, 2005). They added 'language programs' as a tenth indicator and included an age group column in the intergeneration transmission indicator (FATSIL AND AIATSIS, 2005, p.31). Thus, indicator one for example, looked like this:

Table A4: NILS Report recommended language endangerment Indicator One—Intergenerational Language Transmission

Degree of endangerment	Grade	Speaker population	Age groups
Strong or safe	5	The language is used by all age groups, including children.	All
Unsafe	4	The language is used by some children in all domains; it is used by all children in limited domains.	Used by between 30% & 70% of <20 age group
Definitely endangered	3	The language is used mostly by the parental generation and upwards.	Used only by > 20 years old
Severely endangered	2	The language is used mostly by the grandparental generation and upwards.	>40 years old
Critically endangered	1	The language is known to very few speakers, of great-grandparental generation.	>60 years old
No longer fully spoken	0	There is no speaker left.	None

Framework 6: Expanded GIDS (Lewis & Simons, 2010)

Paul Lewis and Gary Simons from SIL have combined the GIDS, UNESCO as well the Ethnologue's 5-level scale of language vitality to produce a 13-level scale called EGIDS. From the scale, a language can be evaluated by answering the following 5 questions:

1. What is the current identity function of the language?²⁸⁶
2. What is the level of official use?²⁸⁷
3. Are all parents transmitting the language to their children?²⁸⁸
4. What is the literacy status?²⁸⁹
5. What is the youngest generation of proficient speakers?²⁹⁰

While EGIDS focus on assessing downward trending languages, Lewis and Simons (2010, p.117) also provide an alternative set of labels for levels 6a – 9 for languages that being revitalised (See *Table A5*).

²⁸⁶ Answers include (a) historical (no speakers or community), (b) heritage (no L1 speakers only L2 speakers); (c) home (increasing/decreasing daily oral communication) and (d) vehicular (used by others as L2 in addition to L1 community).

²⁸⁷ Levels of official use relate to EGIDS levels (0) international, (1) national, (2) regional and (3) trade (important instrumentive functions beyond local group – although language is unofficial)

²⁸⁸ The answer 'no' means that the language is being disrupted.

²⁸⁹ Levels of literacy learning include (a) institutional, (b) incipient or (c) none.

²⁹⁰ The term vehicular refers to the extent to which a language is used to facilitate communication among those who speak different first languages (Lewis & Simons, 2010, p.115).

Table A5: Expanded GIDS (Revitalisation specific)

Expanded Graded Intergenerational Disruption Scale (adapted from Fishman 1991)*			
LEVEL	LABEL	DESCRIPTION	UNESCO
0	International	The language is used internationally for a broad range of functions	Safe
1	National	The language is used in education, work, mass media, government at the nationwide level	Safe
2	Regional	The language is used for local and regional mass media and governmental services	Safe
3	Trade	The language is used for local and regional work by both insiders and outsiders	Safe
4	Educational	Literacy in the language is being transmitted through a system of public education	Safe
5	Written	The language is used orally by all generations and is effectively used in written form in parts of the community	Safe
6a	Vigorous	The language is used orally by all generations and is being learned by children as their first language	Safe
6b	Re-established	Some members of a third generation of children are acquiring the language in the home with the result that an unbroken chain of intergenerational transmission has been re-established among all living generations.	Vulnerable
7	Revitalized	A second generation of children are acquiring the language from their parents who also acquired the language in the home. Language transmission takes place in home and community.	Definitely Endangered
8a	Reawakened	Children are acquiring the language in community and some home settings and are increasingly able to use the language orally for some day-to-day communicative needs.	Severely Endangered
8b	Reintroduced	Adults of the parent generation are reconstructing and reintroducing their language for everyday social interaction.	Critically Endangered
9	Rediscovered	Adults are rediscovering their language for symbolic and identification purposes	Extinct
10	Extinct	No one retains a sense of ethnic identity associated with the language, even for symbolic purposes	Extinct

Framework 7: Capacity, Opportunity and Desire (COD) (Grin, 2003b) Francois Grin (2003b, p.43) argues that the fundamental outcome of language policy for regional and minority languages is continuing vitality, that is, that people use them. He believes that the achievement of this fundamental outcome depends heavily on social behaviour and thus identifies three factors, in particular, which impact on behaviour and therefore should be accounted for in policy measures. The three measures are: *capacity* to use given languages at a competent level, *opportunities* to use them, and *desire* to use them.

Lo Bianco (2013, p.i) describes *capacity* development as the development of personal language proficiency and language use, through both formal teaching and informal transmission; *opportunity* creation as the development of real and active circumstances and domains in which the use of the language is genuine, natural, welcome and expected, a condition which implies a crucial role for the state to play through its language policies; and *desire* enhancement as the creation of motivation to choose to learn and use the language, because proficiency in it brings certain rewards.

The COD model is based on the idea that all three components must be simultaneously present for language revitalisation activity to be successful. Many language revitalisation efforts have focused on teaching and learning (capacity) alone and while capacity is an absolute necessity to foster language use in language revitalisation contexts, on its own it is insufficient, to do so (Lo Bianco, 2013, p.ii). Rather all three components taken together constitute a necessary and sufficient set of conditions for language use.


Appendix 3: Behaviour change and policy frameworks

Framework 1: The Mindspace Framework (Dolan et al., 2010).

Name	Explanation
Messenger	We are more influenced by credible, likeable, peers with a convincing message
Incentives	Predictable human responses to incentives include: losses loom larger than gains, reference points matter; small probabilities are overweighted, immediate rewards.
Norms	We are strongly influenced by what others do and expect
Defaults	It is easier to accept rather than change the pre-set option
Saliency	Our attention is drawn to what is novel, accessible, and simple and also what is relevant to us
Priming	Our acts are often influenced by sub-conscious cues
Affect	Our emotional associations to words, images and events can powerfully shape our actions for even big decisions
Commitments	We seek to be consistent with our public promises, and feel the need to reciprocate acts.
Ego	We act in ways that supports the impression of a positive and consistent self-image in order to feel better about ourselves

Dolan et al (2010, p.9) also outline how MINDSPACE should be used in a policy process (see Figure A3). The process builds on existing methods of policy making and includes the four actions that should underpin government attempts to change behaviour, that is, enable, encourage, engage and exemplify. MINDSPACE also requires two supporting actions: Explore, which takes place before policies are implemented, and Evaluate.

Figure A3: MINDSPACE and policy-making (Dolan et al., 2010, p.9)



Framework 2: The behaviour change wheel (Michie et al., 2011).

This derives from an evaluation of nineteen existing behaviour change frameworks in relation to the criteria of (a) comprehensiveness (did it cover the full range of intervention functions or policies?), (b) coherence (were its categories consistent?) and (c) links to an overarching model of behaviour (were intervention mechanisms linked to potential behavioural targets?). Michie et al. (2011) found that none of the existing frameworks were adequate. Even MINDSPACE did not meet these criteria with Michie et al (2011, p .2) stating that it “does not appear to encompass all the important intervention types”, it “lacks coherence” as it involves a mixture of modes of delivery, and it focuses on automatic influences more than reflective ones and “does not attempt to link influences on behaviour with these two.”

The behaviour change wheel (Figure A4) and the definitions of interventions and policies (Table A6) are provided below:

Figure A4: Behaviour change wheel (Michie et al., 2011, n.p.)




Table A6: Behaviour change wheel: Definition of interventions and policies (Michie et al., 2011, p.7).

Interventions	Definition	Examples
Education	Increasing knowledge or understanding	Providing information to promote healthy eating
Persuasion	Using communication to induce positive or negative feelings or stimulate action	Using imagery to motivate increases in physical activity
Incentivisation	Creating expectation of reward	Using prize draws to induce attempts to stop smoking
Coercion	Creating expectation of punishment or cost	Raising the financial cost to reduce excessive alcohol consumption
Training	Imparting skills	Advanced driver training to increase safe driving
Restriction	Using rules to reduce the opportunity to engage in the target behaviour (or to increase the target behaviour by reducing the opportunity to engage in competing behaviours)	Prohibiting sales of solvents to people under 18 to reduce use for intoxication
Environmental restructuring	Changing the physical or social context	Providing on-screen prompts for GPs to ask about smoking behaviour
Modelling	Providing an example for people to aspire to or imitate	Using TV drama scenes involving safe-sex practices to increase condom use
Enablement	Increasing means/reducing barriers to increase capability or opportunity ¹	Behavioural support for smoking cessation, medication for cognitive deficits, surgery to reduce obesity, prostheses to promote physical activity
Policies		
Communication/marketing	Using print, electronic, telephonic or broadcast media	Conducting mass media campaigns
Guidelines	Creating documents that recommend or mandate practice. This includes all changes to service provision	Producing and disseminating treatment protocols
Fiscal	Using the tax system to reduce or increase the financial cost	Increasing duty or increasing anti-smuggling activities
Regulation	Establishing rules or principles of behaviour or practice	Establishing voluntary agreements on advertising
Legislation	Making or changing laws	Prohibiting sale or use
Environmental/social planning	Designing and/or controlling the physical or social environment	Using town planning
Service provision	Delivering a service	Establishing support services in workplaces, communities etc.

¹Capability beyond education and training; opportunity beyond environmental restructuring