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LOCKED
INTO
LEGITIMACY:

A Study of the Place of
Values in Politics & Society

A THESIS PRESENTED FOR THE DEGREE OF

DOCTOR OF PHILOSOPHY

BY

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ABSTRACT

The object of this thesis is the analysis of the nature, extent and origins of political beliefs and their particular role in legitimising state authority in New Zealand. In the first part two general approaches to the problem of legitimacy are considered. The first, associated with Western 'social science', assumes that democracy is representative of all interest groups, and is characterised by shared norms and procedures termed the 'civic culture'. The author examines the evidence and shows that there are no valid empirical grounds in support of this assumption. The second approach, associated with Marxism, makes the reverse assumption, that the working-class in liberal democracies continues to be exploited, and that allegiance to the state in the working-class is less the consequence of 'free choice' than of system constraint.

In the second part the author attempts to develop a model of the causal influences which shaped the political beliefs of the working-class in New Zealand history. An assessment of the historical and contemporary evidence shows that the 'loyalty' of the majority of the working-class to the state was as much the product of physical, legal and symbolic constraints, as that of social mobility, rising living standards, and welfare provisions. The author concludes that the forces which shape political consciousness in New Zealand society have been centralised and consolidated by the state as a hegemonic culture pre-empting freedom of political choice.

Preface

This thesis has been taking shape over the last five years, in three universities, a number of courses and seminars, innumerable conversations, and subliminal impressions. The topic has gradually expanded from being a simple, timeless, descriptive survey, to encroach upon history, political psychology, philosophy. This is not unexpected since my intellectual stock-in-trade has undergone a rather profound transformation in the last three years, away from a narrow 'disciplinary' political sociology towards a Marxist general theory. If the end product is too vast, too ambitious, it is because I prefer to err on the side of grand theory rather than abstracted empiricism. More than this, I think the time is ripe for the construction of a general theory of New Zealand society, and this thesis is my own exploration of one facet of that society.

I would like to acknowledge certain key ideas and individuals who have had much influence on my work. I owe a lasting debt to my teachers at the University of Canterbury - Cora Vellekoop-Baldock, Fred Bauman and Walter Schwager - whose approaches to sociology produced intellectual antibodies against all manner of doctrinal positions. I owe to them and to people like Lynd and Mills, an early suspicion of specialisms and what I call the arrogance of oversight. My second debt is to my students, many of whom collected statistics for me as part of their training. The best of them have acted as deterrents against any temptation to relax standards and substitute cuisine.

To those most closely involved with the writing of this thesis, for their encouragement, support and tolerance in indulging my penchant for theoretical fanciwork, I have to thank Professor Theo Roy of the University of Waikato, and Mr. Roger Oppenheim of the University of Auckland. For their help in commenting upon and in deflating some of my main points, I thank Professor David Bettison of the University of Waikato, and my wife, Janet Lindsay Bedggood. And for his generous attitude and kind permission to use the 1963 Victoria Survey data I am indebted to Dr. Alan Robinson of Victoria University. Finally, I am grateful for the research Grant of some \$300 made by the University of Waikato for the purpose of keeping one solo sociologist afloat.

For New Zealand scholars, when it comes to acknowledging key ideas of those with whom one has had no personal contact, it is somewhat anti-climactic to refer only to books and articles. Nonetheless, I wish to give due recognition to the work of Brian Barry, Richard F. Hamilton, and W.G. Runciman, as being of great help in the writing of this thesis. Of the others too numerous to mention, their influence and wisdom, should, it is hoped, be reflected in my work. If not, that is my problem.

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PART ONE

A Critique of Political Culture

"When an opponent declares, " I will not come over to your side ", I calmly say, " your child belongs to us already.... What are you? You will pass on. Your descendants however, stand in a new camp. In a short time they will know nothing else but this new community."

Adolph Hitler

"Reason is, and ought only to be the slave of the passions, and can never pretend to any other office than to serve and obey them."

David Hume

"Functionalists are forever packing their bags for a voyage they never intend to take."

Barrington Moore.

ONE :

Introduction: Problems of Legitimacy

1. Main Argument and Procedure

The broad objective of this thesis is an examination of the question of state legitimacy in Anglo-American democracies, and in particular New Zealand. In my view the question of how a state comes to achieve a legitimate authority, though crucial to the existence and purpose of social science, has been left unanswered by contemporary social science. In general terms I argue that the prime condition of state legitimacy, the voluntary consent of subjects or citizens, has been taken for granted by social scientists who have either (a) made unproven (or false) assumptions about the existence of mass allegiance; (b) asserted that democratic stability and democratic legitimacy is the same thing; or (c) put (a) and (b) together in order to invoke a spurious explanation of the dependence of state legitimacy upon a prior value-consensus. In my view, the problems of legitimacy, resting upon empirical proof of "voluntary consent", have been amenable to empirical test for some time, yet social scientists have persisted in avoiding the test. This fact, it seems to me requires explanation.

The second stage of my argument is to adduce reasons, ideological and methodological, for this particular defect in order to clear the way for the development of a model of legitimation capable of producing an empirical test of the problems of legitimacy. The third stage, is to apply the legitimation model to the New Zealand case in order to

observe the historical conditions under which a national political culture emerged. The final outcome is a test of the theory as it has been developed, in order to show whether or not individuals are capable of voluntary and rational political choice under the 'welfare state' in New Zealand. The general argument can be summarised in the form of a proposition.

"If it can be shown that historically the function of social science has been to operate within a framework of "liberal-democratic" assumptions, and that one consequence is that contemporary "political sociology" avoids confronting the problems of state legitimacy by invoking unjustified assumptions, then, having recognised this, we can return to first premises concerning the conditions under which individuals learn and modify their political interests, values and beliefs, in order to demonstrate how far the modern welfare state in New Zealand is "locked into legitimacy".

It may be useful to outline the procedure I have adopted to present this argument before moving on to a definition of terms and a discussion of the underlying themes in the first part of the thesis. Part One is titled a "critique of political culture" to signify the limitations of contemporary consensus (or congruence) social science in approaching the problems of legitimacy. In Chapter Two I attempt to show how an empirical interest in political values and beliefs arose around two distinctive 'ideological' movements - Bourgeois and Marxist - the former in order to demonstrate the importance of political interests and values as the means by which state authority was legitimised, the latter in order to argue that values and interests were the product of the unequal social relations of capitalism and therefore not evidence of legitimacy but of domination. The controversy between Bourgeois and Marxist theorists concerning the origin and importance of values remains central in the succeeding chapters. The consensus

tradition, or political sociology is, it is argued, the heir to Nineteenth century bourgeois social theory. As Barry has put it:

"And just as sociology grew out of the previous wave, so the fullest manifestation of the new one was the rise of a new subject: political sociology. Here all the leading conceptions of an earlier period found a home, with new names, new forms of evidence, and a new framework almost as impressively complex as that of Hegel himself. The tendency of popular participation to lead to absolutism became the 'theory of mass society', and 'national character' re-emerged in the guise of 'political culture'. New evidence of irrationality was found in survey data. Parsons provided a framework within which the central question was the classical one, 'How can social order be maintained?' and in which much of the answer was said to lie in the existence of common values systems among the members of a society - precisely the factors, such as religion, by which the earlier conservatives had set so much store" (1970: 8-9).

In Chapters Three and Four, the contemporary manifestations of conservative political sociology as it approaches the question of democratic stability and legitimacy are considered. While much progress has been made in describing the nature and extent of political values, the assumption remains that consensual values are either necessary or sufficient (or both) conditions of democratic stability, and therefore by the form of logic employed, democratic legitimacy. However as is pointed out, no congruence theorist is able to demonstrate that support for any liberal democracy is either voluntary or widespread. According to the criteria laid down (in Section Two of this Introduction) concerning the manner in which the problems of legitimacy must be tested, the congruence approach to political culture, both analytic and empirical is found wanting.

But the examination of bias does not rest there, it must be shown that a critique of liberal democratic

theory can lead to some prospect of improvement. In Chapter Five, the alternative neo-Marxist approach is considered in order to see whether or not it offers a more valid explanation of the problems of legitimacy in liberal democracies. It is suggested that constraint theorists, in accepting the importance of values in legitimising state authority, have developed a model of political learning which competes favourable with the congruence assumption of 'voluntary consensus'. This is based upon the concept of state hegemony, through which means the conservative forces in a society are able to 'pre-empt' and shape political interests and values independently of the actual effectiveness or performance of the state in satisfying interests. Arising out of this approach associated with Mann, Parkin and Jessop, we have the possibility of a model of legitimacy which can generate empirical tests. The most important of these is the nature and origins of 'working-class' conservatism. As a crucial test of congruence and constraint approaches, it is particularly good, since the working-class is the majority of the electorate, and any absence of 'voluntary consent' in a significant minority is sufficient to undermine its potential majority power. I conclude Part One with an assessment of these issues and some indications of how one can attempt to test the legitimacy of state authority in New Zealand (Chapter Six).

Part Two of this thesis consists of the application of the ideas derived from the critique of political culture, to the New Zealand case. In Chapter Seven I examine some of the parallels between congruence and constraint approaches and the partial explanations advanced by historians and political scientists to account for the peaceful incorporation of the working-class in the British-settled colonies. These include the view that the elements of the original working-class in the colonies were "declassified" by radical political change, economic opportunity and by a growing

sense of national unity. Yet each of these consensual outcomes carries the reverse constraint implication, that the frontier was open only to a few, that mobility was selective, and that the sense of national unity served to pacify working-class discontent more effectively than did the realisation of material progress. In order to test these two explanations of the emergence of mass allegiance in New Zealand, in Chapter Eight I sketch out a model of political legitimization. This model specifies what I consider to be the key historical variables that have some impact upon the shaping of political culture. Then, in Chapter Nine an attempt is made to apply this model through an historical re-examination of forces which influence the fate of the New Zealand working-class between 1870 and 1920. By the end of this period the nature of the national political culture can be defined as a meritocratic mainstream comprising a core set of values of economic individualism and political equality. The question of how far the working-class was incorporated into this consensual culture as the result of free choice or physical and symbolic constraint is considered. Thus the three problems of legitimacy as they bear upon the rise of the nation state are subject to test. The nature of the emergent political culture with conservative and radical wings is described, and its distribution across the middle- and working-classes is considered in terms of an explanation of its origins derived from the legitimization model.

The remaining sections of the thesis are devoted to presentation and interpretation of empirical survey data on the nature, extent and origins of present-day political belief-systems. In Chapter Ten I review the empirical findings relating to the existence of belief-systems in Anglo-American systems. The term belief-system is used to describe empirical patterns of attitudes revealed by survey data, but which may not necessarily correspond directly with dimensions

of political culture. Nevertheless, it is suggested on the basis of New Zealand data that the prevailing belief-systems which refer to the political objects of system, self and input and output, in New Zealand, do in principle 'fit' the description of the meritocratic mainstream culture in broad terms. There appears then, to be evidence of the continuity of a political culture defined by both historical and survey methodologies.

In Chapter Eleven the problems of extent and origins are taken up again, this time in order to show whether or not the two main belief-systems, authoritarian and populist, are best explained by congruence or constraint approaches. The question of whether or not authoritarian (implying 'irrational') attitudes are the product of working-class experience is examined first. The evidence is presented leading to the conclusion that this belief-system originates in the social centre and is assimilated by members of the working-class only to the extent that they are exposed to centre institutions and lack the education and information to 'rationally' assess the quality of their political learning. In Chapter Twelve this procedure is repeated in order to explain the likely origins of the populist belief-system. The evidence points equally firmly to the conclusion that populism is a subordinate political culture with its roots in the social periphery and capable of modifying if not repudiating centre institutions. Both belief-systems and the manner in which they are disseminated provides further confirmation of the utility of the legitimization model. In the concluding chapter I attempt to draw together the findings of both parts of the thesis and discuss certain theoretical and practical implications.

2. Defining Legitimacy

It is now necessary to return to our point of

departure and by way of introduction discuss some implications of the themes found in Part One of the thesis. First, however, a definition of some key terms introduced in the above section is required. In defining legitimacy I follow the general convention in using the term to mean the exercise of "authoritative power" by the state. That is, the state is "authorised" to exercise power on behalf of its subjects, by their voluntary consent, or allegiance. This it might be supposed, is the proper concern of philosophers, or laymen, but not of empirical social science. Indeed the definition of legitimacy is a moral and ethical matter since it sanctions an arrangement by which scarce resources are unequally distributed. Similarly, the defining condition of legitimacy, mass allegiance, is also a matter of logic, since one can easily stipulate the conditions under which the legitimate or non-legitimate exercise of power occurs. But, while there is general agreement about what is meant by legitimacy and allegiance, the real problem, that of empirical proof is commonly overlooked. The question of whether or not a regime (an elected government as distinct from the state) is legitimate is answered by substituting unwarranted assumptions and inferences about the workings of democracy, in the place of empirical evidence. That is, the existence or non-existence of mass allegiance is not regarded as problematic, since it is commonly taken for granted that Liberal Democracies actually operate so as to guarantee the optimum satisfaction of all interest groups, and, that any breakdown in government performance or effectiveness, will necessarily lead to a withdrawal of specific support (based upon material rewards) and allegiance, and lead to protest, reform, and the restoration of democratic forms. Once this assumption is made any absence of widespread protest is taken as evidence of an allegiant consensus. Indeed the argument can be carried further; to the extent that a citizen does not participate, he

or she is acting in rational self-interest. This viewpoint is succinctly expressed by Bendix (1969: 24) "although citizenship allows for more active participation, there are few instances in which it requires positive action".

So far I have defined what I mean by legitimacy, and argued that contemporary social science has failed to subject the question to empirical test. This is not because the methods and techniques of investigating the existence of mass allegiance (or voluntary consent) have not been available. On the contrary, such methods have been in use, though usually directed at less contentious matters. The question then arises "how is it possible to define and measure the quality of consent?". I submit that the existence of allegiance cannot be inferred from actual political behaviour, since only a small minority of individuals act politically, and this action may spring from diverse motives. That is, both activity and non-activity may arise equally out of allegiance or alienation. Since the legitimacy of liberal democracy cannot be established by reference to the degree of active mass participation, this shifts the matter of empirical proof into the realm of values and beliefs. Without reference to beliefs and values (as they are expressed in political attitudes) it is not possible to say whether or not individuals are allegiant, compliant (involuntary consent) or alienated. These terms will be defined presently and need not concern us here. The point to establish is the logical nature of a test of legitimacy as requiring empirical evidence of allegiant beliefs and values. However, it is not sufficient to describe the nature and extent to which so-called allegiant values occur in a liberal democracy. It is also necessary to establish their origin. This means that some empirical method must be developed to allow us to differentiate between values which are freely con-

sensual or based upon voluntary consent, and those which are the product of a regime or states capacity to influence consent independently of its performance or effectiveness. How far we can in practice differentiate between conditions which allow voluntary consent (including the ability to rationally assess the regimes effectiveness; to be able to participate in political bargaining, legally and in practice; and to be able to participate equally in changing a regime if it is ineffective, or unjust in the long term), and those which manipulate consent (the growth and centralisation of state institutions in the socio-cultural system), remains to be seen.

Since one cannot test legitimate authority without reference to political values and beliefs, and since it is held that liberal democracy rests upon a value-consensus or "common interest" it is necessary to specify how "common" this interest is, and whether or not this interest is found in a majority of properly allegiant citizens. The critical test of legitimacy therefore is an empirical one, that of determining the nature, distribution and origin of political values and beliefs in the community. These questions of the nature, distribution and origins of political beliefs can be termed the three problems of legitimacy. Each has to be satisfactorily answered before any conclusive claims can be made about the legitimacy of specific regimes.

In conclusion, in the first part of this thesis my argument will be that explanations of political stability and legitimacy which focus upon the widespread existence of voluntary consent, are not based upon empirical evidence, but rather make use of demonstrably false assumptions about the nature of representation in Liberal Democracies. To overcome this defect it is necessary to subject these assumptions to test, to approach the problems of

legitimacy in empirical terms, and for this purpose to develop a model of the legitimation process. If under this model it can be shown that support for the state (or regime) is based upon the long-term effectiveness of its performance, then the conditions for voluntary consent are met and the state's authority can be considered legitimate. If on the other hand, the state is capable of producing its own support independently of its performance, by the exercise of monopoly power over cultural and social institutions, then the conditions for voluntary consent cannot be met, and the legitimacy of the state is in question.

;

TWO:

The Making of Political Culture

1. Political Culture in Defence of Private Property

My purpose in this chapter is to trace the emergence of the concept of 'political culture' from the Eighteenth century to the point at which it became a stock term in modern political analysis. By adopting the standpoint of the Sociology of Knowledge, I will try to show how the current 'scientific' use of the term reveals a significant shift, but at the same time remains firmly rooted in the ideological origins of Eighteenth century Bourgeois thought. Since I am concerned with tracing the origin of a concept, I shall not at this point define in detail what is meant or implied by the term. Various possible meanings will become evident as the analysis proceeds. It is sufficient to say that the term has been fairly consistently used to encompass those beliefs, values, or opinions which individuals have about political institutions, events, issues and objects (Pye, 1965: 3-25; Pye, 1972).

The significance of political culture in any political system is the mediating role it plays in articulating and expressing interests and values, and in providing support for, or allegiance to, political regimes. That these two important consequences of political culture are not the same remains a matter of controversy. This centres upon whether or not support is said to be allegiant, as distinct from compliant, and whether regimes can be regarded as legitimate or merely existent. Despite these differences all political theory has a dual purpose (Spragens, 1973: Chapter 7).

The first is empirical, and is concerned with a descriptive understanding of, among other things, political culture. The second is normative or prescriptive, and is concerned to define what, in the way of political regimes, 'ought' to be. Though the contamination of 'fact' and 'value' has long been decried, in the study of 'political culture' as it emerged in history, the two are clearly inseparable (Moodie and Studdert-Kennedy, 1970; Runciman, 1965: Chapter 8).

The systematic enquiry into the nature of political culture began in the early French Enlightenment. The problem in need of explanation was the importance of sentiment and values in determining the type of political regime. For clear historical reasons the problem could not be posed in this manner until the feudal order began to show signs of disintegration. Both defenders of the ancient regime and bourgeois apologists then found it necessary to devise a new theory of the state in transition. The concern with political culture then, was part of the general problem of state legitimacy, and the intellectual pre-occupation to replace supernatural and rationalist justifications of the state with the 'natural' law of civil society (Eisenstadt, 1971: 4). Since the purpose was to demonstrate the harmony between 'human nature' as embodied in civil society and the type of political regime that represented a balance between new and old interests, it was necessary to distinguish between civil society and the state.

The origins of empirical political inquiry were therefore to be found in the attempts of Eighteenth century philosophers to go beyond moral philosophy. Since it was no longer possible to contain change by moral exhortation, it came to be recognized that the maintenance of social order required a knowledge of the causes of social disorder (5). The existence of

a variety of political forms, the autonomy of civil society, and the changes men wrought upon the state, all demanded further knowledge which could only be provided by a comparative-historical science of society.

2. Montesquieu

According to Runciman (1968: 2) political sociology did not, could not by definition, emerge until statements about the connection between society and the state were framed as 'if...then' propositions. Clearly, such propositions had to be empirical and inductive as opposed to rationalist and deductive. Montesquieu is regarded, rightly, as being the first to attempt a systematic account of the social bases of the state in propositional terms (26; Althusser, 1972: Chapter 2; Eisenstadt, introduction). He set out methodically to investigate the relations between a number of environmental and ecological causes, and political consequences (Montesquieu, 1900: 7). The concept of principle or sentiment, however was an important factor intervening between such causes and different political types. The principle of Government is 'that by which it is made to act' (20). Montesquieu recognised the importance of the Principle in legitimising regimes and was aware that knowledge of its causes was vital in preventing the breakdown of a regime (Althusser: 46).

As Aron claims, Montesquieu's attitude towards explanation distinguishes him from his contemporaries, since in setting out to 'make history intelligible' he anticipated the problem to be later faced by Nineteenth century sociologists, namely how to make lawful generalisations about a complex social world (1968: 18).

Nevertheless, despite Althusser's claim that Montesquieu consistently refused to 'draw his princ-

iples from his "prejudices, but from the nature of things" (29), his overriding purpose was to make sense out of history in order to explain and justify the existence of the Monarchy in France. For only in the Monarchy was to be found the balance of social power - the condition of liberty (Aron: 34). To do this, he had to account for the causes and conditions which distinguished the Monarchy from both the Republic and the Despotism.

Montesquieu showed how the Monarchy was the outcome of a moderate evolutionary process of change leading from the conditions favourable for Republics to conditions favourable for Monarchies. The conditions for each political type were expressed somewhat loosely in 'if...then' terms. If the geographic size, and population of the State was small, if its soil was barren, if it had little trade or commerce, and a simple two-class social structure, then a Republic founded upon the Principle of virtue was likely (Bk. xviii-xx). But when because of a growth of commerce, population and inequality, these simple conditions had evolved into the 'rich luxurious States' of Europe, the principle of virtue would give way to a political culture based upon honour supporting a Monarchy (Bk. xx: 4-23).

While the Republican democracies flourished in small States sustained by patriotism, the sentiment of Monarchy - honour - derived from the ranking of individuals by status. In this way the 'vices of mankind conspire for the common good' (Aron, 1968: 27). Since the Monarchy can survive only by restraining ambition in its subjects and turning it to the common good, according to Montesquieu the mechanism of such restraint was the strategic role of the nobility and clergy in checking the absolute power of the Monarch (Althusser, 1972: 72). The nobility in turn would be supported by the 'law' which 'render the nobility hereditary' (Bk. v: 9). The Constitution would

guarantee Liberty which 'is a right of doing whatever the laws permit,' (Bk. xi: 3) by instituting a moderating balance between the legislative, executive and judicial powers of the State (6). The rule of law which serves the Manners, Customs and Character of a Nation, is the supreme repository of State Legitimacy.

Having seen the importance Montesquieu attaches to the Law, the Constitution and the Principle of the Monarchy, it is necessary to ask how far honour is capable of legitimising State authority. As distinct from virtue which is universal in democracies, honour is the 'passion of an estate...which may be contagious as examples always are, but which cannot be shared.' (Althusser, 1972: 73) It is clear that honour is the expression of the interests of the nobility against those of the Monarchy and the 'people'. For while the 'people are restrained by their laws'...'how are the nobility to be restrained?' (Bk. iii: 4).

Not only did honour legitimise continued inequality, it established a pact against popular revolutions and the spectre of Despotism. The conflicting interests of the Monarch, nobility, and rising bourgeoisie, were muted by the common interest they shared in presenting a united front to 'the People' (Althusser, 1972: 103). Honour, then was the code by which the feudal aristocracy buried their differences, maintaining the 'conditions for the permanent survival of a decadent class, whose ancient perogatives (were) being torn from it and disputed by history' (93).

Montesquieu having shown good reason why a Republic did not exist in Eighteenth century France, had also to show good cause why it should remain. This meant considering the possible future conditions which might lead to its 'downfall and bugbear' (75). That is, the Despotism. According to Aron, Montesquieu's

abhorrence of Despotism was 'not without political intent' (29). Clearly, he feared the tendency of Monarchy to absolutism. 'Despotism (was) a possible outcome of monarchies, once the latter (lost) respect for order, for nobility, for those intermediary bodies without which social structure collapses and the absolute and arbitrary power of a single individual triumphs over all moderation' (29). In denouncing Despotism, Montesquieu was defending the nobility from neither the bourgeoisie nor the people, but from the King. For it would be the absolute rule of the King, which breaking-down the honourable pact between privileged classes, that would open the way to the 'regime of the popular revolution' (Althusser: 85).

Montesquieu's prescriptions for a stable Monarchy are similar to those made by Harrington in defence of the 'equal commonwealth' (1924). Honour, for Harrington was deference to the 'agrarian law' which limited the value of landholdings, thereby opening the way for the bourgeoisie to penetrate the nobility. The conflict between established gentry and aspiring bourgeoisie would be contained by a balance of property and thus power. Though the inroads of the bourgeoisie had gone much further in England than in France, Harrington, like Montesquieu was concerned with a static form of government upon the principle of balance of power among the propertied classes. Neither foresaw the consequences of a regime established in opposition to the common people. They believed that once the alliance had been struck, it would prove a permanent bulwark against the threat from below (Macpherson, 1964: Chapter 4).

In terms of the sociology of knowledge, it seems clear that the apologists of the nobility, among them Montesquieu, were concerned with the ideological defence of a specific type of historical regime on the grounds that it was both necessary and just.

It was necessary as the only type of regime able to control the worst in 'human nature' for the benefit of the common good, forestalling both popular and royal despotisms. It was just since it supported the rule of law and the Principle of honour and liberty. While Montesquieu's political sociology spanned much of recorded history to the Eighteenth century, he saw no need of change beyond this hal-
lowed point (Macpherson: 190). This connection between aristocratic power and ideology is drawn by Marx:

"For instance, in an age and in a country where Royal power, aristocracy and bourgeoisie are contending for mastery, and where therefore, mastery is shared, the doctrine of the separation of powers proves to be the dominant ideas and is expressed as an eternal law" (1967: 438).

Thus the concept of 'political culture' as a legitimising force in Eighteenth century France and Britain, was a precipitate of power and privilege. Honour and deference were nothing but the recognition of mutual self-interest, advanced by cooperation and compromise.

My purpose in dwelling so long on Montesquieu is to illustrate the specific historical and valuational limits placed upon his empirical analysis. He clearly recognised that an understanding of the causes of the Monarchy and its possible downfall was vital in the interests of its persistence, being thus concerned to 'disentangle the causes and effects at work in civil society' only to the extent necessary to 'justify a prescriptive position' (Runciman: 26). Since this was so, a number of 'unproblematic' aspects of Legitimacy were left untouched. Montesquieu did not question the identification of honour with property since by blind convention the propertyless were excluded from civil society. And while he acknowledged that rulers might, by understanding society, alter it,

he could not consider whether or not it was power rather than Principle that legitimised the State. The fact that he was interested in the Principle rather than the Nature of government, meant that he simply took for granted the distribution of power in order to concentrate upon political culture (Keohane, 1972: 392). As a consequence the relationship between the two was not made clear.

3. Liberal and Conservative models of Legitimacy

Following the analytic advances of Montesquieu, there was an interregnum of nearly a century in the development of political sociology. The two normative models of political legitimacy which dominated the late Eighteenth and early Nineteenth centuries were rooted in conflicting metaphysical assumptions about Man and Society (Horowitz, 1972: Chapters 3 & 4). The Eighteenth century bourgeois theory of civil society defined political allegiance as a contract between individuals and the state. The purpose of the state was to protect property rights but refrain from intervention in life and liberty beyond this point. The doctrine of natural man upon which the middle-class view of the state rested was 'a historical model enlisted to bolster up a psychological model and an ethical theory implied by it' (Runciman, 1963: 26).

"The greatness of Seventeenth century liberalism was its assertion of the free rational individual as the criterion of the good society; its tragedy was that this very assertion was necessarily a denial of individualism to half the nation" (Macpherson, 1964: 262).

Obviously the idea of political obligation, reduced to a natural law, was sufficient reason for the legitimacy of the state. Status and honour were a worthy basis of political agreement since they preserved the freedom to own property and justified necessary inequality. Consequently political culture was but a reified

set of class interests universalised and fixed in time. By the late Eighteenth century there had emerged a static, legalistic and prescriptive definition of the causal links between civil society, human nature, political opinion, and the state (270).

A second 'theory' of legitimacy, which achieved prominence during the Nineteenth century, was that of the state as a spiritual or organic community. As a classic defence of the status quo it became the intellectual stock in trade of successive apologists for property and privilege in the face of each new wave of attacks on the bourgeois society. Its foremost advocates were Hegel, Burke and Tocqueville. In their view political authority was not vested in contracts or rights and obligations in the civil society, but the other way around. The higher authority of the state determined the nature of political obligation. Legitimacy was drawn from the 'heavens' and represented as custom, tradition, the idea or the community. For Hegel political sentiment, or patriotism, was the necessary and universal translation of private egoism into public pride in the civil society. But like his aristocratic forbears, patriotism was not a necessary condition for the legitimacy of the state, since the state (which for Hegel meant Prussia), was an embodiment of the metaphysical 'Idea' and therefore, its own justification (1953; Marcuse, 1955: 213-223).

Similarly, Burke's concept of legitimacy was derived from an ideal notion of consensus (1955: 57).

"Society is a partnership of men who accept their duties and receive their rights as these have been defined by those standards which have developed over time in the social system. To be born within a political culture is concomitant with having obligations to accept these opinions and to learn to apply them in social and political activities" (Graham, 1972: 33).

Burke, proceeding from the utilitarian assumption of conflicting interests, found that the origins of consensus presented no problems, since he was referring only to bourgeois interests. However, the maintenance of consensus, and therefore political order was related to certain problematic conditions. Allegiance was contingent upon four main factors (Graham: 41-45). First, the state must arbitrate between interest groups in such a way as to maximise the interests of all groups. Secondly, effective government is in turn a function of strong and experienced elites. Thirdly, the continuity of tradition must be unbroken keeping political demands contained within manageable limits. Fourthly, allegiance is facilitated by the socialisation of basic values and religious sentiments.

But while political opinion is an important source of political legitimacy it is not sufficient, since it presupposes a harmony of interests. As Burke showed in the events leading up to the American Revolution, when the balance of interests breaks down so does consensual political opinion (1960: 32). When interests and power prevail, political culture becomes significant only when a balance of power has been struck. More in the tradition of Montesquieu than Hegel, Burke realised that tradition could be maintained only by a knowledge of the conditions which threatened to disrupt it; in a word, 'prudence' (36).

If Hegel was the aristocratic apologist in the rearguard against the bourgeois revolution in Germany, and Burke the spokesman for the English Monarchy, the noble Tocqueville lived through several major political upheavals in France and was forced to come to terms with the demands for political equality arising from the mass populace (Aron, 1968: 85). As the bourgeois revolution developed at different rates and with varying degrees of success in European states, it

was Tocqueville who had first to face the intellectual problem of reconciling persistent demands for equality with aristocratic privilege. According to Aron, "Tocqueville himself regarded his theory of modern democratic societies as the expansion and revision of the theory of ancient Republics developed by Montesquieu" (201). But in order to do this, he first had to account for the changes in the 'ancient regime' at the hands of a successful bourgeois revolution (1966: Part 3).

The revolution in the name of liberty and equality was actually a demand to extend the privilege of property. Since "liberty meant the freedom of opportunity to become rich" (Mayer, 1961: 4). But the breaking of the ancient prerogative of privilege was marginal only, for it continued to rest upon the inequality of those without property. The subsequent political history of France reduces to the successive attempts by elites to retain their property rights in the face of increasing demands for political equality. And as the principle of equality became established with extended political representation 'freedom was therefore rendered more difficult of attainment' (56).

But these changes did not arise out of abstract principles alone. The bourgeois mentality was the product of changing socio-economic forces undermining the stability of the political order. Montesquieu's pact of honour among the privileged classes failed for the simple reason that:

"when the wealthy and enlightened elements of a population were no longer able to act in concert and take part in government, the country became, to all intents and purposes, incapable of administering itself" (Aron, 1968: 210).

It follows then that a necessary condition of

political stability is that elites must reach agreement about the rules governing their mutual interests. In France, unlike England, the ruling-classes resolutely refused to comprehend the nature of changing socio-economic forces, and allowed their strength in unity to lapse. In Montesquieu's terms, the sentiment of honour was abandoned in the movement towards democracy which then took on the characteristics of a Bonapartist Despotism (Tocqueville, 1966: 226).

If, according to Tocqueville, the breaking-down of tradition in France threatened political liberty, why then in the 'First new Nation', the United States, with no aristocratic heritage, should a stable synthesis between equality and liberty have been possible? What was the American alternative? Without Marx or Jesus? Certainly without Marx since Tocqueville believed that the prospects of revolution declined with the growth of popular sovereignty (1956: 263-274). To put it simply, too many people had too much to lose (Aron: 228). Though he found part of the answer in the conditions of frontier society which forestalled the emergence of classes based upon scarcity, Tocqueville put much more emphasis upon the manners, morals and beliefs that emerged in the new state (102-108). The Constitution established representative government, freeing the state from the tyranny of popular sentiments, and at the same time kept distinct powers of government separate from the legislature. It was assumed to provide a guarantee against a concentration or centralisation of power. In this sense, law and its observance became a fundamental value in the American political culture, replacing the traditional aristocratic defence of liberty (132 - 138).

But even more crucial to stable government was the existence of values and beliefs that supported

democratic institutions. While the creation of popular institutions which are seen to be effective tends to produce norms favourable to their existence, it is clear from Tocqueville's analysis that he regarded religious values to be the mainstay of the American political culture (34-38, 42-43). Religion provided the necessary consensual values of tolerance and civil rights which facilitated the acceptance of democratic norms within which conflicting individual and group interests could be contained (Lipset, 1964: 95-96). We shall see that this secularised world-view, sanctifying achievement and instrumental activism, was held by most later theorists to constitute the core values of the American belief-system. It had the effect of legitimising the modern democratic regime in the same way that virtue provided support for the ancient Republic. Thus-

"In America it is not virtue that is great, but temptation that is small, which comes to the same thing. It is not disinterestedness that is great, it is interest that is taken for granted, which again comes to the same thing" (Aron, 1968: 201).

Tocqueville's reformulation of the basis of political sentiment in the modern Republic suggests that America managed to evade the fate of popular tyranny, because the state met all the conditions required for a stable consensus. But Aron's claims notwithstanding, the legitimising political culture was not founded upon a sentiment which 'comes to the same thing' as virtue. Is it not the case, that honour has been imitated by the majority as Althusser suggests; that liberty, as the freedom to acquire property, remains the core value at the expense of equality? Does not this liberty remain conditional upon the fulfillment of individual ambition? If so, the virtue of American democracy is rather different from that of Montesquieu's Republic. Egoism, flattery and gain had no part in republican virtue, while the

principle of universal but justifiable self-interest fits Tocqueville's account of embourgeoisment in the United States well (Aron, 1968: 192).

It is clear that both Burke and Tocqueville stress the importance of two conditions of political allegiance. The first is a traditional core of values concerning formal religious or legal rights and obligations. The second is an effective government which can minimise conflict and maximise individual self-interest. Both however, acknowledge that a belief in equality must sustain those who are unequal. Thus the role of tradition and religion in legitimising the political order has a dominant place in conservative thought. The church, the law, the schools and membership of voluntary associations all contribute to a cultural consensus, or the 'spirit of the nation', and foster a democratic political culture safeguarding the liberty of the privileged against populist demands for extreme equality.

Anticipating a theme to be explored at length presently, it seems clear that the conservative theory of legitimacy from Montesquieu onwards provides ample historical justification for recent claims that a necessary and sufficient condition for the maintenance of political order is that political elites or decision-makers share a common political culture (Medding, 1969). In both views political culture is the outcome of a balance of power, though for contemporary theorists this balance pre-supposes a necessary 'meritocratic' inequality rather than a traditional 'natural' inequality. In contrast with the liberal version of universal man, the organic, consensual model of political culture has been based upon a realistic and sophisticated understanding of the social bases of political order and disorder. Nevertheless, like the utilitarians, the conservative

theorists were prescribing a model of the ideal state within which liberty, equality and fraternity remained ethical justifications of privilege opposed to equality. It is necessary then to consider how such universalist and consensual definitions of political culture first came to be exposed to critical scrutiny.

4. The "Causes" of Political Culture

The important aspects of the problem of political legitimacy which remained unproblematic, or taken as given, in liberal and conservative thought, could not become recognised as intellectual 'problems' until the links between society and the state as separate and autonomous institutions had been re-formulated (Runciman, 1965: 30). This meant getting rid of the assumption of universal political interest manifested in a common political culture. The possibility of admitting variations in political culture had to wait upon the discovery of 'social' man, the historical actor whose consciousness was the product of social, not merely sense experience. For bourgeois thought had universalised social experience into a uniform 'human nature', just as the concept of the 'political economy' embodied particular class interests.

With Marx's attack upon the 'total validity' of Hegel's all-embracing 'intellectual achievement' (Runciman, 1965: 31) the way to further progress in the understanding of the social 'causes' of political opinion was opened. His critique of bourgeois thought was based upon a materialist theory of knowledge which he put in the place of Hegel's idealist epistemology (1967: 414-415). Hegel's Idea contains two propositions, that which is ideal is real, and that which is ideal is necessary (1967b: 156-158).

But the idea of the state:

"merely reflected modern constitutional monarchy; as such it failed to live up to its theoretical standards. It contained contradictions and lacked any legitimacy except that of its own empirical existence inflated into a universal criterion of validity" (Avineri, 1968: 16).

That is, what exists is necessary and good. Upon such a critique of Hegel's thinly-veiled apology for Prussian aristocracy, Marx founded his theory of ideology (1967: 429-442). Its main proposition was that ideas about the state, its legitimacy, citizen rights and obligation, all sprang from the actual existence of historically specific social relations (413). Hegel's motive, according to Marx, was to remove the question of legitimacy from the historical and material realm of human experience into a realm of timeless universality. In this way the particular interests of the Prussian ruling-class were presented falsely, as being identical with the interests of all citizens (425).

On a more limited front Marx completed the unmasking of Hegel with his concept of 'social' man. For Hegel economic man was subordinate to political man, the citizen; allegiance to the state meant that 'man was able to overcome his egoism and strive for the common good' (Avineri: 18). But, for Marx, this subordination of society to the state was an idealist figment. The state and society were not in reality distinct, since it was the 'class' structure of civil society which shaped political interests and the state (1967: 425). Though the correspondence between class interests and political opinion was not always exact, in general political relations were derived from social relations. Class consciousness or something which takes its place, becomes the basis of the political culture (438-439).

But, while all political ideas are necessarily derived in the first instance from social relations, not all consciousness becomes politicised. On the contrary, political communications emanating from the ruling-class may establish a more readily acceptable set of political beliefs, in Marx's term, false-consciousness. Thus the political culture of Burke and Tocqueville (based upon traditional and religious values) was for Marx, a mythology which served to legitimise inequality and exploitation. Deference to authority, tradition and religious values, supported the 'liberty' of the bourgeoisie at the expense of the equality and freedom of the proletariat.

In considering the place of 'political culture' in Marx's thought, we are in fact elaborating relations between three sets of empirical phenomena. The proposition runs, if socio-economic interests are "X", then, political interests are "Y", and hence, the forms of political opinion and behaviour will be "Z". While many writers claim that Marx drew deterministic links between the economic sub-structure and the political super-structure (Nordlinger, 1970: 8-12), this was not in fact so (Goldmann, 1969: Part 3). Such links were not determinate, but conditional upon a number of variables which have only in recent years become subject to empirical test (Bottomore, 1973: 19-41). For example, Marx was led to apply ex post facto explanations of the apparent failure of class consciousness in the proletariat in terms of false consciousness. But recently it has been possible to empirically assess the differential influence of conflicting social and cultural pressures upon the formation of political opinions of the working-class (Jessop, 1971). As a result, some of the theoretical promise of the Marxist analysis of political culture is now being realised (Mann, 1970: 1973).

Apart from recent developments of this sort, it is also true that Marx's basic proposition concerning the material basis of social consciousness has become a commonplace assumption of contemporary social science. As Nordlinger states, political sociology since the time of Marx can be described as a "century-long dialogue with his ideas" (8). Indeed, much of the subsequent writing on political culture has been devoted to testing his assertions in the hope of rebutting them, or of finding them valid after all.

5. The Debate with Marx

According to Runciman (1963: 30) a full sociology of politics was not possible until Marx, because of the profound influence of Hegel's idealist theory of the state. As we have seen, Marx' upsetting of Hegel reduces to the proposition that if the state consists of a concentration of power exercised by or on behalf of the ruling-class in its own interests, then the political culture will consist of a set of universal myths about the 'general will' and so on - that is, the categories of 'false-consciousness'. The first important sociologist to take issue with this view of political culture and leave a lasting impression on social science was Max Weber. He was concerned to correct what he regarded as the overly deterministic view that ideas were epiphenomena (Giddens, 1972: 30-39). As has been shown since however, the methodological views of Marx and Weber differed in emphasis only. Neither took a vulgar mono-causal view of history - ideal or material - but each attempted to weigh causal factors according to his perception of historical reality (Weber, 1958: 183; Giddens, 1970).

Nevertheless, the point at which Weber took issue with Marx is central to the problem of political

culture (Marcuse, 1972: 201-226). He considered that the independent impact of economic ideas derived from an ethical world-view, were of first importance in the industrial transition in the West. Indeed the Protestant Ethic was a necessary condition of the emergence of capitalism in Europe (1958: 90-91; Aron, 1970: 202-210). In this sense, religious ideas gave rise to an economic rationality - the spirit of capitalism - by inculcating core values of austerity and self-discipline (1958: 40-53). Beyond this initial point however, the interplay of ideas and economic behaviour shifts, and the capitalist ethos succeeds religion as the justification of the economic order (Aron, 1970: 217-224).

"Once established, it is the capitalist regime, the milieu, which determines behaviour regardless of motivations, as is amply demonstrated by the spread of capitalist enterprise through all civilisations, whatever their religious systems" (224).

Because capitalism was founded upon the principle of economic rationality in maximising profit and investment, the criteria of economic efficiency began to spread into other social institutions, into science, bureaucracy and politics (1964: 123). This process of increasing rationalisation became expressed in political institutions in the form of rational-legal domination. That is, the rule of law and bureaucratic administration became institutionalised as a form of authority based upon rational-legal norms (324-328). According to Weber's ideal-type of this form of authority, the legitimacy of the state rested upon a rational calculation of self-interest on the part of subjects. In reality however, Weber allowed for mixed forms of authority appealing to different expressions of political interest. For in the transition from traditional to rational-legal states, legitimacy was based on mixture of interests, emotional, religious, as well as absolute values and

a presumed rationality of goals (382-384). In this way Weber was able to allow for the complexity and variety of political forms found in his contemporary Europe. For example, in his own Germany could be found an impure form of the traditional and rational-legal state together with a mixed political culture comprising religio-traditional 'honour' as well as bureaucratic norms (384-385; Giddens, 1972: Chapter 2). However, at the level of historical generalisation, the process of rationalisation was seen as irreversible, leading ultimately to the ideal-typical form of rational-legal domination (Zeitlin, 1968: 155; Giddens, 1972: Chapter 4).

Like Marx, Weber defined the state in terms of its monopoly of physical force (Runciman, 1963: 34-36). He did not however claim that there was a perfect correspondence between the exercise of state power and the class interests of the bourgeoisie. The state was not the pure instrument of the ruling-class, but had come to represent the general interest in a liberal democracy based upon the free market (Giddens, 1972: 20). Weber's attitude towards the state has been attributed to his own identification with the Prussian state (7-9). Not only did he put the Nation ahead of any other value, but the failure of the bourgeois revolution in Germany forced him to underestimate the importance of class relative to power and status.

But while Weber described political culture in liberal democracies as a consensual expression of rational-legal norms, he also profoundly regretted the process of disenchantment accompanying increasing rationalisation (Runciman: 55). In Aron's words (1970: 249)

"The more organised and rational society is,
the more each of us is condemned to what the

Marxists of today call alienation - condemned to feel that we are enslaved by a whole which is greater than we are, condemned only to realise a share of what might be, doomed to perform all our lives a limited function whose prime merit and nobility lies in the acceptance of these very limitations"

These sentiments aside, Weber's contribution to the understanding of political culture is mainly in the idea of Legitimacy; the conditions by which the state is able to persuade its subjects to submit and accept political authority (1964: 324-329). Regardless of the origins of political opinion it is their obedience which provides the necessary support for the state.

It is precisely the concept of Legitimacy which has become the focus of political sociology as it has shifted from the prescription of static, traditional and unequal political communities, to that which accounts for the support of democratic institutions. While Montesquieu saw the Monarchy as the only realistic form of government, in his time, it was clearly founded upon an elite political culture, the exclusive property of the propertied. Similarly, the theorists of the bourgeois ascendancy, Tocqueville and Weber, while approving of idea of equality, were fearful that in practice too much equality would bring about the eclipse of privilege. The fateful incorporation of the mass citizenry into the political community ran the double risk of mass tyranny and totalitarian centralisation.

Much more sanguine in his judgement of the perfectibility of the bourgeois order was Durkheim. He took to the extreme the view that the State was subordinate to civil society.

"Political power is implicitly assumed to be the outcome of a pre-established moral

ascendancy of the state: the more transcendent or "religious" the moral ascendancy of the state, the more absolute its power" (Giddens, 1971: 509).

Thus Durkheim proves an heir to Hegel at another time acting on behalf of another class. His idealism defines the state as being a consequence of organic solidarity. This means that the division-of-labour in civil society determines the form of the state. Underlying his rather opaque discussion of power can be found Durkheim's real intent - that of justifying the bourgeois nation state in the name of the cultural consensus. Thus, according to Giddens, Durkheim "allows no means of dealing with the tension between legitimation and power which is of crucial importance in all political systems: power and force, in other words, are frequently means for the creation of values by dominant strata.." (509).

Though the development of the concept of political culture was associated with the rise of empirical social science, it is evident that the primary concern of Eighteenth and Nineteenth century political analysis remained the justification of the bourgeois state as necessary and good. Marx was the exception in his time since his social philosophy required the transformation of bourgeois society into the classless society. We shall see that the subsequent development of political sociology, particularly the interest in political culture, shows that the ideological roots feeding social analysis remain as strong as ever. On the one side there is the temptation to account for the 'success' of democratic institutions in terms of a basic consensual political or 'civic' culture consisting of beliefs of equality, tolerance, freedom, and so on. This conception of the 'civic' culture is clearly a fusion of the two major elements of Nineteenth century political thought, the individualist and organic theories of the state. The passage of

time and the guise of modernity have done little to disguise this fact. On the other side, we have the contemporary neo-Marxist theories of political culture which equate the 'civic' culture with a utilitarian 'false-consciousness'. No less than in the past, in recent developments of the concept of political culture, the debate with Marx is still at the centre of the stage.

THREE :

The Congruence Approach

1. Analytical

1. Procedure

The analysis of recent contributions to the study of political culture can best proceed along the following lines. The focus on political culture has arisen out of growing interest in the links between social structure and political institutions. Much of this interest derives from the concern to determine the conditions of democratic 'stability', but nevertheless has found expression within the empirical tradition of modern social science. Within this tradition a number of 'models of governing' can be identified, specifying in part the different ways in which political culture enters into the political process (Rose, 1973: 467). These models can conveniently be reduced to two opposing conceptions of the causal significance of political culture. The congruence (or consensus) model is grounded in the assumption that political values originating in the political community provide the basis for the legitimacy of the political system. A useful shorthand term expressing this functional process is producer politics (Sartori, 1969: 90-94).

The opposing model, the constraint model, reverses the presumed causal direction of values from a 'bottom-up' to a 'top-down' process. According to this model, interests and values, and the manner in which they are expressed, are constrained by the existence of political and socio-cultural institutions. A shorthand term for this process is consumer politics. The congruence model has its

roots in Nineteenth century liberal thought, and has become characteristic of the discipline known as 'political sociology' (Barry, 1970: 7-9). The constraint model is identified with Marxist theory and in particular that which emphasises the crucial role of cultural 'hegemony' (Miliband, 1969: 180). Each model therefore is drawn from dissimilar intellectual roots and brings to the study of political culture rather different ideological predispositions.

In this and the next chapter, work which can be classified as falling within the congruence approach will be discussed. I have made a somewhat artificial distinction between work which is primarily analytic and that which places more importance upon empirical research. Clearly there is considerable overlap, but the justification is on both logical and historical grounds. The analytic work predates and is largely responsible for setting the conditions for more recent empirical studies.

Two main explanatory tasks can be discerned within the congruence school. The first is the largely analytic concern to establish a conceptual scheme of the cultural requisites of 'stable democracy'. It is assumed that values have a prominent place in maintaining stability, though opinion differs as to whether values are necessary and sufficient causes of stability. A second explanatory task extends the scope of inquiry considerably. The link between values and political institutions is cast into a historical framework, in an attempt to place values in a causal sequence. The analytic approach to both of these 'problems' is at a very high level of abstraction, spanning historical epochs as well as linkages between 'macro' and 'micro' politics.

In order to establish a set of criteria according

to which this work can be assessed, there are three conditions which must be met before a model of political culture can be regarded as anywhere near adequate. That is, since the central problem is that of specifying how far consensus about values is a condition of democratic stability, it is necessary to determine just how widespread this consensus must be. What is the nature of the values which are said to legitimise political authority? What particular groups must share such beliefs, and how are they produced in the first place? The critical test of these related questions must rest upon demonstrating first, the nature of congruent beliefs and values; second, the necessary extent of support; and most important, third, account for their origins in such a way as to determine whether they are truly allegiant or merely compliant (Partridge, 1971: 123-124). In other words, the crucial test of legitimacy must show that the political system is legitimised by the free consent of its subjects rather than by the capacity of the system to supply its own legitimacy. These questions of the nature, extent (or distribution) and origin of political values can be termed the three problems of legitimacy. They are all empirical questions, and each has to be satisfactorily answered before any conclusive claims about the existence of legitimate authority under any specific regimes, including liberal democracies, can be made.

2. The Parsonian Schema

Parsons' work has been particularly influential in establishing the congruence approach to the problems of the nature, extent and origin of values associated with Democracy. First we must consider the basic terms in Parsons' schema. They are the idea of system, within which political system and empirical regimes are located, and the idea of

stability. These two terms provide us with Parsons' definition of 'democratic stability'. Hence, a 'system' is defined as consisting of a set of shared values; an emphasis on system as a cultural 'entity' which goes back to Durkheim. For a system to persist (stability) 'it' must fulfil four functional requirements. It must attain goals; adapt to internal and external needs; integrate social behaviour around shared norms; and ensure that these norms are reproduced in successive generations (Parsons, 1966: 26). Political institutions are one of four institutional domains or sub-systems, which are largely concerned with goal-attainment, but which are also involved in regulating the economy, generating institutional support for the regime, and in political socialisation. The definition of 'stable democracy' is therefore subsumed under 'system stability' which in turn is defined as a process of moving equilibrium following an evolutionary path of increasing differentiation, adaptive upgrading, inclusion, and value generalisation (Parsons, 1971: 26-28).

The empirical content of these terms can be discerned in Parsons' judgement about the 'costs' and 'gains' of political modernisation. The gains have been universal suffrage, citizenship rights, and electoral participation, but the costs have been increasing bureaucratisation and centralisation of the 'polity' (Parsons, 1971: 104). Thus the practical dilemma of modern democracy is that of arriving at the optimum balance between centralisation (responsible, effective decision making) and decentralisation (representation and accountability to subjects). This problem of demarcation between the 'rights' of government and the citizenry, according to Parsons, is the most serious moral problem facing modern societies. There is clearly a risk of too much stability at the expense of democracy. This is even more likely when one considers the looseness of his 'conditions of

democracy'. They consist of universal suffrage; one citizen - one vote; a formal electoral procedure; and the secret ballot (1971: 82-89).

But like system stability which entails shared values, stable democracy entails formal constitutional requirements. It might therefore be thought that the relationship between values and the polity is tautological. However the values Parsons has in mind are much more extensive than the concept of 'citizenship', and such broad societal values are pre-requisites for the emergence of stable democracy (1971: 8-21). Parsons' concept of 'culture' is derived from Weber's idea of rationalisation. In accounting for the causes of rational-legal domination in terms of underlying socio-cultural changes, Weber founded the concept of a 'modern' political culture congruent with the existence of liberal democracy (Bendix, 1962: 431-457). Parsons took the concept of "zweckrationality" and broke it down into pattern-variables (Wiseman, 1966: 16-20). Taking the ascription/achievement and particularism/universalism variables as the two main dimensions of political culture, Parsons constructs a four-fold typology of cultures matched with 'typical' regimes (Mitchell, 1967: 156; Wiseman, 1966: 16-18).

Parsons is content to apply this schema loosely in his own case studies of Politics and Society (1969). There is no attempt to specify the extent to which these values are shared by the community, nor the manner in which they are learned. These issues are lost in the grand scale of the Parsonian evolutionary "story". In his essays on Power and Elections in America, he stresses the primacy of value-consensus based upon universalist-achievement values. Power and social inequality are justifiable as functional means of satisfying system needs for goal-attainment and adaptation (Mitchell, 1967: 129-139). Similarly, the Party-system and political socialisation work as

mechanisms of social integration and pattern-maintenance (Mitchell, 1967: 118-124, 136-142). His more recent work continues to stress the 'cultural imperative' of political values in legitimising political authority (Parsons, 1971: 15-17; 1970; 1972: 262).

In his 'explanation' of totalitarianism in Germany Parsons points to the failure of German culture to develop a fully modern set of universalist and achievement values (Mitchell, 1967: 153-156). From his evolutionary standpoint, the significant feature of post-war Germany was the conflict between industrial change on the one hand, and the traditional, ascriptive socio-cultural system on the other. The bourgeois revolution was so late, rapid and incomplete, that it failed to accomplish 'rationalisation' in the cultural sphere. Germany was therefore a special case of rapid modernisation which produced 'authoritarian' political solutions to the problem of integration and pattern-maintenance. Since the crucial value-component was missing, Germany was neither democratic nor stable. Parsons extends this mode of analysis to the problems of 'developing' nations struggling with 'all four problems' of system survival. His essay on Soviet Communism is a case in point (Mitchell, 1967: 161). He regarded the Soviet 'solution' to national integration as temporary, like that of Germany, since in his view further industrialisation would bring about the required cultural conditions of political democracy. Failing that, the alternative was 'destruction and breakdown' (Mitchell, 1967: 164).

Any evaluation of Parsons' approach to political culture must necessarily point first to the severe restrictions in his use of concepts. The general criticisms will be deferred for the present (Chapter Six, pp. 108-115). More particularly, Parsons' use of the basic concepts in his analytical schema of the link between value consensus and democratic stability

can be shown to be too loose for explanatory purposes. The definition of 'stable democracy' derived from system-requisites and formal citizenship rights and obligations is of no use in specifying degrees of stability or 'democracy' within a broad range of regimes. While it does allow a broad distinction between Anglo-American democracies and totalitarian states this distinction is purely formal, and is too crude to demonstrate whether or not political values are a necessary or sufficient condition of democratic stability. Too many other variables are left unaccounted for; in the case of Germany for example, the absence of a modern political culture is one of a number of possible factors associated with the rise of Facism, not the least of which was the 'Imperial' struggle with other powers, the war, and its aftermath.

Similarly, in the absence of any empirical specification of the extent of consensus within a particular culture, it is not possible to demonstrate the degree of support necessary or sufficient for democratic stability. Finally, without a systematic study of the conditions under which political values are learned, Parsons is unable to show whether values are allegiant or compliant (Pateman, 1971: 294-296). It follows that Parsons' analytical congruence model has a number of logical and empirical shortcomings (Barry, 1970: 85-86). One might justifiably suppose that his model begs all the important questions of legitimacy and does no more than confirm the expectation that 'democrats' live in 'democracies'. What we find instead is an historical sketching of 'universalist' evolutionary trends which works to justify the existing pattern of political values found in Anglo-American democracies (Kavanagh, 1972: 66; Kothari, 1968). However, though these restrictions are severe, judged against Parsons' own requirement that a conceptual schema be heuristic if nothing else, it can be shown

that his analytic model has stimulated a number of empirical studies of political culture.

Nevertheless, though the adoption of the concept of 'political culture' in the work of Almond (1956), Beer (1958) and Macridis (1961) marked its growing acceptance within comparative political studies, until the early sixties, the concept remained a loose analytical abstraction. Its causal significance was taken for granted rather than put to empirical test (Kim, 1964: 334). It was assumed that shared political values played a crucial role in maintaining political stability, but the nature of the values, their extent, and the causal mechanisms involved were not specified. The tendency towards a sociological reductionism in which the political system remained an epiphenomenon was the dominant characteristic of this trend. In the mid-sixties however, David Easton offered a more balanced model of the place of political culture in the process of politics (Easton, 1965a; 1965b).

3. Easton's Systems Theory

Easton's model represents a significant advance over Parsons' analytical schema as it gives prominent place to the capacity of the political system to react upon and transform the social structure. Parsons' model describes a series of stages whereby the political system adapts to structural and value changes. But the most recent rational-legal form of 'domination', corresponding to 'liberal democracy', is conceived as a relatively stable (non-changing) institution. By comparison, Easton regards any political system as a dynamic institution which persists by constant adaptive interaction with its social environment (Easton, 1965a: 19-21). In order to persist (remain stable) the system requires a balance of demands and supports from society. If demands become too

heavy and/or supports too light, the efficiency of the system to both operate effectively (in allocating values) and to maintain legitimacy is threatened. There are two forms of support. Specific support which is the consequence of 'rewarding' system outputs, and diffuse support which is the consequence of either the socialisation of allegiant values, or the ability of the system to induce support by propaganda or coercion, or both of these. The contribution of political culture is important in-so-far as it inculcates 'a sense of attachment to or loyalty for authorities, regime or political community, that is more or less independent of specific benefits' (Miller, 1971: 201). Thus by either means, socialisation into allegiance, or by propaganda, a reservoir of 'goodwill' for the regime may be established independently of its capacity to provide rewards.

It seems then, that the learning of supportive values is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for the persistence of the system since the authorities have recourse to constraints. It may be however, that a freely allegiant culture is a necessary condition for the persistence of democratic regimes, since the definition of democracy rules out the possibility of coercion or constraint. Unfortunately, Easton in his concern to avoid any involvement with 'normative' theory which takes the 'perpetuation of democracy as a preferred type of political system', fails to provide criteria which differentiates democratic from other regimes. Not only does he not specify system change short of 'complete breakdown and evaporation of a political system', he is unable to provide a definition of democracy other than that people believe it to be so. 'We see that a political community would persist, by Easton's definition, even under the most complete tyranny' (Miller, 1971: 232).

For these reasons, Easton's model does not allow

an adequate treatment of the role political culture plays in stabilising democracy. Yet it remains a potentially fruitful approach, provided its terms can be specified in a form capable of test. In the first place it would be necessary to identify the characteristics of democracies as opposed to non-democracies, to allow for measurement of variations in stability. One defining condition would clearly be the nature of support - allegiant or compliant. Then, the conditions under which the withdrawal of diffuse or specific support might endanger the stability of the system would need to be worked out.

If the various sources of support, and the ways in which they become established, could be shown, then the three problems of legitimacy - that of the nature, extent and origins of political values - might be squarely faced. Some progress in this respect is evident (Muller, 1970; Fraser, 1970; 1974; Weissberg, 1972) and Easton himself seems aware of the need to move in this direction (Easton, 1968). In his attempt to develop a general approach to political socialisation, Easton points to the somewhat exclusive concentration upon the processes by which, and extent to which, diffuse support is important for political stability (Easton, 1968; Jaros, 1973: 140-141; Connell, 1972). But 'what' is it that diffuse support is supposed to maintain? In the absence of a definition of 'what' is maintained under 'what' conditions, most political socialisation research substitutes the existing regime. But since the regime is capable of generating its own support, it is clear that the great emphasis upon childhood socialisation as a condition of stability overlooks the 'output' and 'feedback' side of Easton's model (Connell, 1972: 181-187; Marsh, 1973).

4. Eckstein's concept of Congruence

I shall not consider Eckstein's work at any

length since it is limited by its restricted application as well as its logical shortcomings. It is very doubtful whether his theory of Stable Democracy (1966) constitutes any advance over either Parsons' or Easton's model of political culture. However, he does at least approach the problem of explanation more cautiously, requiring a definition of 'stable democracy', and some specification of the links between values and polity. In defining democratic stability he raises an issue which Parsons takes for granted and Easton deliberately avoids. It must meet three conditions. It must be durable, effective and authentic. But the first two conditions are trivial since they reduce to propositions concerning the long-term survival of the polity. The third, authenticity, requires that 'elections in such systems must decide in some basic way, the outcome of the competition for power and policies' (1966: 229). As Barry claims, this condition is the same as that adopted by Lipset, that democracy be defined as 'a competitive struggle for the people's vote' (1970: 52-63). However, it is one thing to identify democracy with formal elections and quite another to demonstrate the manner in which elites genuinely compete to represent the interests of the electorate. The crucial question of representation is begged from the outset so that for Eckstein 'support' becomes the same thing as 'consent' or 'allegiance'.

Having at least pinned down his dependent variable, however crudely, Eckstein moves on to discuss the conditions which account for its 'stability'. He suggests two main conditions - solidarity and congruence. Briefly, solidarity is equivalent to the more general term 'consensus' referring to a general agreement on the 'rules of the game' and the legitimacy of the regime, while congruence implies a degree of 'harmony' between political institutions and social institutions such as the family structure and the school system

(1966: 236-237). It is certainly plausible to assert that:

"a government will tend to be stable if its authority pattern is congruent with the other authority patterns of the society of which it is a part" (234).

But this assertion approaches an explanation only to the extent that the degree of solidarity or congruence can be shown to be a necessary or sufficient condition of stability under certain specified conditions. Eckstein's application of his model falls far short of doing this (Barry, 1970: 52-63). First, we have little but a vague statement of an unknown degree of association between an analytic construct 'congruence' and an equally vague measure of stability in one nation - Norway. Eckstein needs more than one case to demonstrate a relationship. Second, he is unable to show whether congruence or solidarity is a cause or a consequence of stability. Or for that matter whether both values and polity share a common cause. The most plausible alternative, as Barry suggests, is that familiarity with democratic institutions breeds an acceptance of them (1970: 63). Thus, while proposing a 'theory' of the link between values and stable democracy, Eckstein ends up with a series of circular statements reminiscent of Parsons' schematic propositions. For, if political values can not be shown to be independent of political institutions, then there is no possibility of demonstrating a causal relationship. A rigorous logical reduction of his terms and his evidence leaves Eckstein's theory as little more than the statement that 'democrats live in and tend to like democracies'.

We have seen that the analytic models of Parsons, Easton and Eckstein fail in various ways to translate the presumption that shared values are causally important in maintaining democratic stability into

empirically testable propositions. In Easton's case this is only for want of trying. We shall now turn to the influential work of Lipset, which, while overcoming some of these defects also falls short of an adequate model of the causal significance of political culture. Nevertheless, Lipset's work goes a long way in extending the usefulness of the congruence model.

5. The First New Nation

Lipset's sociology of politics is concerned with the 'problems posed by Tocqueville: the social requisites and consequences of Democracy' (Lipset, 1963: 41). Two historical factors have been associated with the rise of democratic institutions - industrialisation and mass political allegiance. Both were necessary but neither in itself was a sufficient condition of democratic stability. Lipset reproduces the familiar Weber-Parsons scenario of the evolutionary development of the West. The transition to industrialisation was accompanied by the rise of bourgeois values of achievement and equality, universalised by spreading literacy and popular education. Along with wealth and rising expectations went continuous mass protest and demands for political incorporation together with the formal trappings of citizenship. In the 'older' democracies such as Britain and some Scandinavian nations, these modern values became diffused into the working-classes, thereby broadening the basis of political support and forestalling the emergence of major political cleavages. Such a moderate gradualism in national development gave rise to a secular political culture legitimising the constitutional basis for democratic institutions.

A broad definition of both democracy and political culture, as well as the crucial causal connection between them, is given by Lipset:

'Essentially I have urged the view that realistically the distinctive and most valuable element of democracy in complex societies, is the formation of a political elite in the competitive struggle for the votes of a mainly passive electorate..... but the political elite can be leaders and representatives only if there are mechanisms within the culture which foster the kinds of personal motivations that lead men to perceive and strongly support their interests within a political system with relatively well-defined rules' (1964: 208-209).

An 'authentic' or 'legitimate' democracy therefore by definition requires a strongly allegiant and participant political culture. But, just as democracy must be responsive to the genuine interests of the electorate, so must it be responsible and effective. The second major function of political culture is to:

"sustain the separation of the political system from the excesses inherent in the populist assumptions of democracy - the belief that the majority will always prevail" (1964: 208-209).

For Lipset then, the role of political culture is crucial in maintaining a proper balance between popular influence and popular restraint. This is a familiar theme by now. Without sufficient popular influence we lack democracy; without sufficient restraint we lack effectiveness. And without both, we lack democratic stability. Just as familiar, however, is the lack of empirical specification of the precise nature of this 'balance' - that is, how much of each is stabilising, and how much of each is non-stabilising?

After making a broad definition of democratic stability and the causal role of political culture, Lipset moves on to define the nature of the values which are associated with democratic institutions. Like Parsons, he attempts to construct an analytical typology of political cultures based upon three value

dimensions. He adopts both of Parsons' pattern-variables, particularism/universalism and ascription/achievement, and adds a third, corresponding to Parsons' treatment of citizenship - elitism/equalitarianism (1964: 211). This latter value is justified by the fact that some modern systems are characterised by both achievement and universalism and yet remain somewhat elitist. In the chapter on Values and Democratic Stability we get an ideal-typical comparison of the United States, Britain, France and Germany. The United States scores 'modern' on all three values; Britain, the 'open aristocracy' combines a modern political system (democracy) with a still dominantly traditional social system (ascriptive, particularist and elitist). France and Germany too, display characteristic mixes of traditional and modern values.

Thus far Lipset seems to be duplicating Parsons' conceptual schema based upon the traditional-modernity process of modernisation. He argues that, depending upon the rate and degree of industrialisation different political systems require different mixes of political culture. When the modernisation process takes place two alternative strategies are apparent. First, the most common pattern is of gradualistic change which moves in stages towards social equality and a universalistic opportunity structure stabilised by the existence of traditional values which underly and interpenetrate the emergence of modern values. Rose expounds this theme with reference to British political culture (1965: 83-129).

Second, there is the case of rapid 'revolutionary' development which accomplishes the modernisation of society and the polity in a relatively brief period. Lipset shows how this was possible in the United States. The legitimacy crisis of the First new Nation was solved by the effective 'routinisation' of Washington's charisma in the constitution, the party-system and the democratic

'rules of the game'. The revolutionary elite was able to demonstrate that a strong national government was in the interests of all powerful groups because it was effective in mobilising developmental resources. Supportive modern values rapidly sprang up and took on an independent effect in maintaining the legitimacy of the regime in the post-revolutionary period of consolidation (1964: 45). Following Parsons, Lipset is able to draw a broad historical sketch of the reasons why France and Germany failed to adopt either of these successful modernisation strategies (1964: 224-227).

However, two objections to this sketch can be found in his use of terms. First both the degree of stability and the extent of value consensus remains unspecified. No systematic relationship between consensus and stability can be determined since neither explanatory nor dependent variables are variables. Second, Lipset is unable to show whether or not values act independently of both socio-economic factors and the political system in bringing about democratic stability. He acknowledges these limitations (though he did not take account of the reciprocal influence of political factors until much later) and sets about remedying them. The first step is to control the possible effects of socio-economic factors which may render political culture a spurious cause of democratic stability. This is accomplished by selecting a sample of 'stable' English-speaking democracies; the United States, Canada, Australia and Britain, all of which Lipset considers to have reached a broadly comparable level of socio-economic development. The problem then becomes that of specifying the unique differences, in basically similar political cultures, which 'account for important differences among the stable and highly developed democracies' (1964: 249).

But this approach also presents a number of

logical and empirical difficulties. The most serious is the failure to adequately differentiate cultural causes from political effects. Thus the 'differences' in the way these political systems function, are defined as variations in the rules of the game, tolerance of opposition and non-conformity, and 'respect shown for the due process of law' (1964: 268). But these would appear to be value differences in the same way as Parsons' pattern-variables are value differences. A second difficulty has to do with the method Lipset uses to specify variations in the explanatory variable - political culture. According to the pattern-variable typology, Britain is the most ascriptive-elitist; Canada and Australia (while showing unique patterns of equalitarian-universalism) are mid-way; while the United States is the most universalist-achievement culture. Lipset's method is to select empirical indicators of these values which are reliable, valid and comparable. In order to ensure that the same values are being tapped in each culture, comparable statistical indices are used to represent each value. For example, equalitarianism is estimated by a combination of indicators supposedly revealing the extent to which persons are 'given respect simply because they are human beings' (Truman, 1971: 497). They are first, a relatively high rate of tertiary education, representing the value placed upon higher education as a means of promoting equality of opportunity. Second, the extent or frequency of mass political witchhunts, which expresses the egalitarian ideal to reduce deviants or dissidents to the common level. Third, a high degree of 'lawlessness', showing a disrespect for authority and the law (1964: 259-273). Putting aside the question of the validity of these indicators for the moment, how reliable and comparable are they?

Challenging Lipset's claim that the Australian political culture is less universalistic but more

equalitarian than that of Canada, Truman shows that his measures of equality alone are incorrect (Truman, 1971: 499-500). In fact Australia lags behind Canada in both the proportion of students and finance spent on higher education. Not only are Lipset's statistics faulty, they do not take account of the dispersion of inequality within the system. Truman concludes that Australia is educationally less mobile than Canada (500). Lipset is wrong on the facts of anti-communist witchhunts too. If anything, popular attitudes towards the Communist party and civil liberties have been more liberal in Australia than in Canada. On the third count, lawlessness, it is more difficult to get comparable figures. Yet the best available show Australians to be more law-abiding than Canadians. At best then, Lipset's data on equalitarianism is inconclusive, at worst wrong.

But, even if it could be shown conclusively that Australians were better educated, more intolerant of communists and less law-abiding than Canadians, what does this have to do with equalitarian values? Lipset's leaping inferences from indicators to concepts are highly dubious. His theory states that all three characteristics of egalitarianism were laid down during the nation-building experience, and that the unique patterns within each nation cannot be attributed to value diffusion between nations (1964: 268). Yet this unidirectional causal connection may be spurious. Education policy may be a matter for Governments and have little to do with an unfolding national culture. It may be a deliberate response to the skill requirements of economic development, in which case, values are squeezed out between economic change and public policy.

Similarly, mass witchhunts are more plausibly connected with xenophobia and the volatile nature of public opinion in a mass society than being symptoms

of a cultural imperative to reduce every exceptional person to the level of mediocrity. Again as Truman points out, crime is not only a matter of breaking laws for its own sake, but is causally related to inequality both nationally and internationally (1971: 506). If crime involves a rejection of law and authority, it is as much a reaction to inequality as the desire to be equal. Truman concludes:

"If Lipset is correct in assuming this causal relationship, then the data indicates that he has ranked the four countries wrongly on the equalitarian-elitist dimension. But the evidence could just as well be interpreted to show that equalitarian values are either, not the cause of educational mobility, anti-communism or lawlessness; are an insufficient cause of these effects; or again have some causal relationship to one or other but not the rest. Much more rigorous methods would have to be used to determine which of these alternatives is correct" (509-510).

But any of these alternatives is a direct threat to Lipset's interpretation of the crucial role of political culture. For, if it could be shown that these so-called political differences were not necessarily related to variations in pattern-variables, then it might be that variations in culture have no causal impact on political outcomes. In order to test this possibility it is logically necessary to control not only for socio-economic factors more carefully, but to take into account the reciprocating influence of political institutions upon cultural values. The 'differences' Lipset attempts to explain in terms of values may be more parsimoniously explained by other factors. In fact it is true to say that the main weakness of the analytical congruence model as developed by Lipset lies in the use of values as explanations.

6. Assessing Lipset

The most severe difficulties with Lipset's

explanation of democratic stability are logical. We have seen that he shares with other analytic congruence theorists the definition of stable democracy as requiring two conditions - effectiveness and legitimacy. Effectiveness means the satisfaction of political demands and the generation of specific support in Easton's terms. Legitimacy is of two sorts. That which arises out of the effectiveness of a regime, and that which is relatively independent of its performance. The two concepts are therefore entailed but not quite the same thing, since as Barry claims 'ascriptive' legitimacy which originates somewhat independently of system performance may survive for some time after a system ceases to be effective (Barry, 1970: 69). Ascriptive legitimacy may still contribute to the stability of the system in the absence of its effectiveness. Therefore, Lipset's use of the term legitimacy is misleading. If one form of support cannot survive unless the system is effective, then it is the same as effectiveness. If, on the other hand, support continues despite the systems ineffectiveness, then it cannot be considered a form of legitimacy without abandoning Lipset's precondition of effectiveness, and therefore with it, democracy. In Barry's words:

"Legitimacy, in the sense in which it can be said to be a basis of support independent of efficiency, has now become 'ascriptive' legitimacy; and it comes about by only one means, namely the survival of the regime (or some salient features of it) for a long time" (71).

Lipset's solution to this problem is to argue that the long-term effectiveness of democracy presupposes continued stability, and that a traditional or ascriptive faith in the system will pay off with long-term benefits. Which is to say that since all regimes experience crises in performance, the most critical form of support - diffuse support - is a consequence of the systems past effectiveness.

According to Barry, this means:

"precisely that the regime can rest on its laurels: its achievements in the past will enable it to ride out with relatively undiminished support failure to achieve in the present" (1970: 71).

This argument would be justifiable provided the costs and benefits of stable government in the long-term were equally spread across the political community. But if these two forms of support are differentiated along an elite-mass line so that the systems ineffectiveness has consequences only for the mass, then clearly it is the existence of diffuse support in the mass citizenry which is important for political stability. For example, all the Anglo-American democracies, according to Lipset, fulfil the conditions of stability, but some are more reliant upon traditional, diffuse support than others. Thus the United States regime is supported more for its effectiveness in implementing and realising the values of equality, universalism and achievement. This is particularly so, since in his view, the American political culture lacks a traditional dimension and is characterised by a strong populist distrust of law and authority. Conversely in Britain, popular support is based on the 'dualist' appeals of effectiveness combined with a diffuse trust and deference to traditional authority (cf. Sharpe, 1973).

In this respect the British and Commonwealth political systems are able to rely on a stock of goodwill to carry them over hard times and to justify greater levels of inequality. Moreover, the collectivity-orientations rather than self-orientations characteristic of these political cultures is conducive to 'socialistic and welfare-state concepts' which put the value of the 'general interests' before individual liberty (1964: 270). Necessary inequality

(or the lack of effectiveness for the majority) becomes more readily justifiable in the name of the nation or community than in the United States, where as Sharpe has noted, self-interest and anti-elitism does not sit well with notions of the collective good (1973b).

In other words, Lipset appears to be allowing for the failure of democratic effectiveness in solving conflicts of interest and promoting social justice, provided there is sufficient traditional 'diffuse' support to stabilise the system in the short-term. His 'stable democracy' can tolerate a degree of 'inequality' in-so-far as the political culture can offer compensatory appeals to allegiance. He demonstrates clearly that it is a function of political culture to justify inequality among the unequal (cf. Sharpe, 1973: 13-14). Like Burke, he places a great deal of emphasis upon the 'symbolic' or 'transvaluational' equality that reconciles 'low status individuals to their position and thus contributes to the stability and legitimacy of the larger system' (1964: 271-272).

These symbolic equalities - "booby-prizes" - may take the form of religious other-worldliness, status-mobility or consumption, or chiliastic and utopian social or political movements. Thus in the economically advanced United States we find that while the general effectiveness of the system has minimised economic frustration among low status groups, nevertheless, those who are denied the rewards of equality, achievement and universalism, are attracted to authoritarian political movements, racism, chauvinism and other 'extremist' tendencies.

While these tendencies may be part of the cost of long-term democratic effectiveness, Lipset seems aware of the ethical problems involved in his position.

He recognises that political stability based upon deference has negative consequences as it may lead to 'non-democratic' tendencies in the political system. Clearly there is considerable 'imprecision' in Lipset's use of the term democracy since he does not specify 'how much' ineffectiveness is necessary and whom it must effect before the system becomes non-democratic. This whole problem, central to the analytic school, is dealt with by Lipset in an epilogue entitled 'Some personal views on Equality, Inequality, and comparative social science' (1964: 318-348). Here he expresses his concern about the dangers which exist in liberal democracies, in particular their inability to fulfil the expectations of equality and social justice in all groups. "For the American class system will not stand still, nor will it automatically continue to become more equalitarian" (1964: 338).

To counter these dangers, it will be necessary for men to apply the core values of the American tradition to prevent any breakdown of democratic ideals. For indeed, the emergence of a truly rational-legal political authority, legitimised by the genuine consent of the majority, can arise only out of successful economic development, universal literacy and full political citizenship for all citizens. Meanwhile, however, in the transition to modernity, it is vital that the groups which are most severely disadvantaged by change maintain their symbolic commitment to political authority. True, there is a danger that stability as a means will displace democracy as an end (1964: 321) but this is only a minor flaw in the 'liberal heaven'.

In conclusion, it seems clear that Lipset, like the other analytic congruence theorists, fails to comprehend the extent to which certain 'liberal' presumptions enter into his definitions, and his assessment of the costs and benefits of democracy as it exists in

modern industrial societies. His analytic schema functions as a form of political ideology, putting aside immediate costs in the name of a set of supposed long-term gains. To this extent he becomes the victim of his own dictum that 'when existing data are confirmatory, most of us are not motivated to look further' (1969: 26). More important he does not even raise the question of whether or not these 'facts' should be allowed to speak for themselves (Runciman, 1965: 178). When the problems of legitimacy are dealt with on an analytic level, then those of the extent and origins of political values are pre-empted. The gaps in the loose explanatory 'sketch' of the link between values and stability are readily filled by the liberal presumptions underscoring the congruence model (Stretton, 1972: 286-299).

FOUR :

The Congruence Approach

11. Empirical

1. The Empirical Challenge

Despite the obvious limitations of the analytical congruence model, whose practitioners to paraphrase Barrington Moore 'are forever packing bags for a trip they never intend to take' (La Palombara, 1970: 128), the acceptance of political culture as an important concept in comparative political studies 'represents a considerable advance on previous global descriptions of such phenomena as a nation's "political character"' (Kavanagh, 1972: 11). By the early sixties the state of comparative studies had reached the point of embarking upon an interdisciplinary study of political systems.

"The situation thus call(ed) for concepts and approaches equally sensitive to both the universal and the unique in both the individual personality and in the ordering of human society. Questions about the limits of variety and the consequences of differences in the attitudes and sentiments that shape politics (could) be answered only by an approach which combines individual psychology and collective sociology" (Pye, 1965: 6).

The concept of political culture provided the link between the micro and macro study of politics:

"The concept of political culture assumes that each individual must in his own historical context, learn and incorporate into his own personality the knowledge and feelings about the politics of his people and his community... For the individual the political culture provides controlling guidelines for effective political behaviour, and for the collectivity

it gives a systematic structure of values and rational considerations which ensures coherence in the performance of institutions and organisations" (Pye, 1965: 7).

Pye's programmatic statement indicates the early promise of political culture in empirical political research, leading to the application of the congruence model to both Developed and Developing nations (Verba, 1965).

The most widely recognised development of the Weber-Parsons congruence approach to political culture has been the work of Almond and Verba (1965). In an early paper Almond adapted Parsons' schema for his own use (Almond, 1956). He did not wholly accept the definition of political values in terms of pattern-variables for two reasons. First, he found them over-analytic, too much of ideal types to fit the empirical complexity of political cultures. Second, they tended to equate values with political regimes. Almond was at the outset wary of exaggerating the existence of an ideal-typical political culture in a community characterised by individual and group differences. Nevertheless despite these reservations, the Parsonian emphasis upon values as 'explanations' was adopted. In particular the definition of the social system as consisting of patterns of role expectations. Almond defined political culture as a "pattern of orientations to political action" (1956: 396).

The problem was defined as that of demonstrating the significance of political culture as an explanation of variations in political systems, and the method was deliberately empirical. According to Almond:

"The actual test of the usefulness of this analytical scheme can only come from a more detailed application of it in developing the special properties of the classes of political systems" (1956: 397).

Hence the problem became defined as:

"what kinds of orientations are held by which people towards which political objects"
(Kavanagh, 1970: 11).

At this stage Almond was interested in the cultural correlates of four main types of political systems; Anglo-American, Continental European, Pre-Industrial and Totalitarian. However his interest (with Verba) moved in the direction of the comparative analysis of nations of the Anglo-American type. Though this category included nations sharing a political culture which was relatively "homogeneous and secular", the pattern-variable approach allowed their distinctive characteristics to be described. For example, in Britain and the United States traditional values - diffuse, affective, particularistic and ascriptive - were to different degrees incorporated into the dominant secular culture. 'The political system is saturated with the atmosphere of the market' (Almond & Verba, 1965: 398).

2. The Civic Culture

In their five-nation comparative study, Almond and Verba (1965) define their approach to political culture as an attempt to answer a major problem facing political development in the modern world. That is to say; how is it possible to diffuse the Anglo-American form of political culture, which is taken to be a necessary condition of democratic stability, to the New States? The first step was to specify the nature, content and extent of this 'civic culture'. Its historical archetype was the British political culture:

"What emerged was a third culture, neither traditional nor modern but partaking of both: a pluralistic culture based upon communication and persuasion, a culture of consensus and diversity, a culture that permitted change

but moderated it. This was the 'civic' culture" (1965: 8).

With the original civic culture outlined in such hyperbolic terms it was necessary to specify:

'the content of what has to be diffused, to develop appropriate measures for it, to discover its quantitative incidence and demographic distribution in countries with a wide range of experience with democracy' (1965: 9-10).

Armed with this factual information it would be possible to speculate intelligently about:

'How much of what must be present in a country before democratic institutions take root in congruent attitudes and expectations' (1965: 9-10).

Here we have a statement that a certain degree of 'civic culture' must be present in a political culture before stable democratic institutions can emerge. The approach is therefore clearly not explanatory, but rather prescriptive-descriptive. The causal link between certain values and stability has already been prescribed. It is stated in the form of an existing law rather than as a hypothesis to be tested. To the extent that other possible explanations of democratic stability (socio-economic interests, the passage of time, system effectiveness or system propaganda) are excluded from their analysis, Almond and Verba succumb to the particular defects of the analytical model discussed in the last chapter. Briefly, they fail to establish that 'values' are the cause of anything.

But while it is true that in this sense Almond and Verba cease to ask the important questions about legitimacy in order to subject their prescriptive concerns to a comparative empirical analysis, it is also true that adequate description must precede explanation. Within the limitations of their design,

their method does improve upon previous attempts at specifying the values associated with democracy. It avoids the shortcomings of analytical constructs of ideal-type values, both of the historical type (pattern-variables) and psychological or psycho-analytical type (national character). Their design therefore is an attempt to measure the nature and extent of values associated with degrees of democratic stability. This clearly requires the specification of both values and democratic outcomes as variables.

The first step in the procedure was to specify the nature of political beliefs so that they could be observed and measured. Beliefs (or orientations) were classified according to their objects in the political system. The objects were:

(1) The political system; by which is meant the nation, regime or polity.

(2) Inputs; specific institutions, incumbents and organisations involved in the "flow of demands from the society into the polity" (1965: 14-15). In other words, the institutions and activities involved in 'producer politics'.

(3) Outputs; the institutions, incumbents and organisations associated with "that process by which authoritative policies are applied or enforced", i.e. "consumer politics".

(4) Self-orientation; that is, the beliefs concerning the political role of the citizen (1965: 14-15).

The classification of these four dimensions of political objects is derived from the axiomatic schema of Parsons' model of political modernisation. These are interpreted by Almond and Verba as follows:

(1) That the process of social differentiation associated with industrialisation will generate and increasingly specialised political culture with specific orientations to the four dimensions of the total political system. The stages in this process are classified as; (a) Parochial (where political orientations are undifferentiated from general cultural orientations), (b) Subject (where orientations have developed to the general political system and its outputs only) and (c) Participant (with orientations towards all four categories of objects).

(2) That the process of political development will entail a 'combination, fusion and meshing' of prior political orientations into some form of mixed political culture. Hence the possibility that mixed cultures in which Parochial, Subject and Participant orientations have been combined, will account for some of the: 'most significant differences in the five democracies included in our study' (1965: 19). There are however, two processes by which mixing can occur. The first entails the 'persistence' of prior beliefs, either Parochial or Subject, within a dominantly participant culture. The second form of mixing involves the co-existence of Parochial, Subject and Participant attitudes within the individual. As we shall see the explanations offered for these two forms of mixtures in the modern political culture invoke reference to both the history of political development and the process of political socialisation.

(3) That as political systems change (modernise, develop, etc.) there is the possibility that under certain conditions the political culture will cease to be congruent with the political system. Congruence is high when political orientations are generally positive (allegiant), and low when orientations approach indifference or zero (apathy). Incongruence exists when orientations move toward the negative

pole (alienated).

In simpler terms Almond and Verba are saying that 'good citizenship' in stable democracies is a function of two conditions:

(1) An optimum balance of active (participant) and passive (subject) attitudes towards politics, and:

(2) An optimum balance of positive (allegiant) and negative or neutral (alienative or apathy) support for the regime.

The task then is to specify empirically by a comparison of the five democracies the minimum level of civic attitudes necessary for democratic stability.

The key differences among Britain, the United States, Germany, Italy and Mexico have to do with the problem of incorporating Parochial and Subject cultures into a Participant culture without generating apathy, alienation and political instability. We recognise this as the focus of research on political opinion from Montesquieu to the present day: how to reconcile demands for equality with the persistent fact of continuing inequality. For Almond and Verba the particular form this problem took in each of the five nations could be revealed by the empirical study of the 'living history of the political cultures of people' (1965: 39). The descriptive study of each culture would allow a stratigraphy of the stage each nation had reached along the evolutionary path towards modernity. What was important in this process was the extent to which individuals became sensitive and aware of the role of the state in shaping their lives. Under traditional forms of domination, Parochials are defined as being unaware of politics as distinct from other areas of social existence. As the centralised state is formed orientations become focused upon the system, and its

consequences for the subject. By the time the state becomes more responsive to broadly-based demands (or inputs), activist orientations develop towards the system, inputs, and the role of the citizen. To what extent do the five nations represent different points in this process?

In the first place all five nations have developed differentiated and centralised state apparatus. This means that the objective conditions for fully developed political orientations exist. It may be though, that sections of the public remain unaware of the 'system' and its consequences for them, but the data provided by Almond and Verba provides no conclusive evidence of this. For example, though the question on "national pride" was met with a 19% non-response in the Italian sample, this is more likely to be an artifact of the survey method than evidence of Parochialism (1965: 70; La Palombara, 1965: 287). Similarly, non-responses to questions about 'output' do not provide conclusive proof that subjects are unaware of the policies affecting them. The Italian and Mexican 'parochial' sub-cultures identified by Almond and Verba may therefore be less a consequence of political ignorance, than of an ignorance of, or resistance to, the survey research technique. Certainly, survey researchers in the more developed Anglo-American democracies assume for good reason, that all respondents have formed some opinion about the nation and the role of citizen (Delameter et.al., 1971: 321).

While it is possible to argue that this assumption may create attitudes where in fact none exist, socialisation research data suggests that this is unlikely. For example, Easton and his associates claim that, in the United States, children become socialised into a diffuse support of the system at a very early age (Easton & Dennis, 1969: 358 passim). The child learns the 'primordial sentiments' of loyalty and patriotism first; it then becomes familiar with the constitutional

rules of the game, dissent, opposition, and the workings of the regime. In the United States and Britain at least, learning orientations towards the system and its outputs appears to be merely a matter of time. Though this process may be more rapid for some than others (Greenberg, 1970a; 1970b; Dennis et.al., 1971) it seems fair to say that young children are the only significant group of parochials in Anglo-American political cultures (Jahoda, 1963; Davies, 1968). Thus in the five nations, parochial orientations have not been shown to contribute to variations in democratic stability. Thus the consequences of political culture for political systems must be located in the varying degrees of mix of Subject and Participant orientations.

For Almond and Verba, Subjects cannot develop activist orientations towards the input structure until electoral institutions are established. But in all five nations these institutions exist and the mixed cultures are characterised by:

"a substantial part of the population (which) has acquired specialised input orientations and an activist set of self-orientations, while most of the remainder continue to be orientated towards an authoritarian government structure and have relatively passive sets of self-orientations" (1965: 25).

In other words a large section of the citizenry fails to align itself with the input structures not because they are unavailable, but because it remains trapped in pre-democratic or traditional interest-groups, or has not been adequately socialised into the modern political culture.

According to Almond and Verba there are two main reasons why individuals remain Subjects in liberal democracies. The first is cultural lag, and the second, inadequate socialisation. The failure of

individuals to develop participant citizen orientations to inputs is seen as a hangover of historical sub-cultures whereby:

(1) Prolonged periods of authoritarian rule prevented the universalist expression of political demands which therefore remain fixed within traditional reference groups. Nevertheless:

(2) Such traditional groups were forced to compete with mobilising citizen groups during the process of democratisation and became aware of the existence of centralised input and output structures. However:

(3) Where such competition between traditional and modern interest groups has served to reinforce subject values - particularist, affective, and ascriptive - subject groups are likely to be driven into defensive infrastructures which remain resistant to the dominant culture. Thus we can expect to find persistent enclaves of subject sub-cultures based upon religion, region, class or ethnicity, contained within the most modern of democratic political cultures.

Almond and Verba's historical 'explanation' is almost identical to the process outlined by Lipset and Rokkan (1967: 1-64) which places great emphasis upon the rate and sequence of major interest-confrontations during the modernisation process. The most significant case of political culture being out of alignment with the polity is where the social structure still retains strongly traditional interest groups while the polity has become modern (Lipset, 1964: 239-247). So, the problem is conceived by congruence theorists as a matter of traditional groups failing to learn to articulate their interests in a form that makes the modern input system accessible to them. Yet this theory remains vague for two reasons. Firstly, it

is not clear how Almond and Verba conceive the relationship between subject orientation and evaluation; and thus support or rejection of the system (See Inkeles, 1969). Secondly, it is possible that Subject orientations are the product of political experience (See page 78 below). It may be simply that Subjects are passive because the political system is ineffective in meeting their demands.

Plainly these two problems are connected, but are not adequately resolved by Almond and Verba, who fail to specify any interaction between political culture and the polity. They do admit that subject groups unable to articulate their interests into the input structure do have a choice in their responses, but account for this either in terms of cultural hangover or in 'imperfections in the processes of political socialisation, personal preferences, and limitations in intelligence or opportunities to learn' (1965: 19) not as a possible consequence of system performance:

"where the 'primary' structures remain outside the polity or are passive objects of the polity rather than active participants within it, then the individual has only three choices: to fully involve himself in politics, withdraw from it, or become the passive object of it" (1965: 105).

In other words the flow of affect into the system is blocked, and individuals may 'withdraw emotionally', 'displace or project' their feelings into extremist movements, or become involved in partisan or total politics outside the electoral system (cf. Palma & McClosky, 1970). Since one of the prime conditions of democratic stability for Almond and Verba is:

"a form of partisanship that avoid(s) intense antagonism at one extreme and political indifference at the other" (1965: 113)

this blockage in the 'flow of affect' has major consequences for their theory. If significant groups are alienated or passively withdrawn from the system they offer neither sufficient support for, nor acceptance of the rules of the democratic game. And they remain prey to anti-democratic appeals such as that of Communism (106). However, the explanation of such hostility (negative affect) may be that it is a consequence of the political system (Barry, 1970: 51). The direction of causality must therefore be considered more as an interaction than a one-way flow.

Further, if one is to account for the differential response of Subjects to the input or party system, some attempt must be made to distinguish orientations and feelings in terms of degree of actual participation in the input structure (Jaros et.al., 1968; Portes, 1971; Aderbach & Walker, 1970; Form & Huber, 1971). This is particularly the case in Britain and the United States. It can be argued plausibly that in Italy, Mexico and to some extent Germany, large numbers of subjects reject the electoral system because it cannot respond to and reconcile major interest cleavages (cf. La Palombara, 1965; Scott, 1965; Verba, 1965b; Baker, 1970; 1973). Using involvement in elections as a measure, Almond and Verba's data shows that the proportions who reject the electoral system or remain apathetic to it are, in Italy, 80%; Mexico, 60%; Germany, 60%; while for Britain the figure is 40% and the United States, 18%. But in Britain and the United States it is just as likely that alienation and apathy are the product of the party-system, as the failure of certain traditional-groups to integrate themselves into the polity (Dennis, 1970; cf. Muller, 1970; Hanson, 1973; Western & Wilson, 1973).

The same difficulty arises when Almond and Verba consider self-orientations. They put great stress on the existence of a belief that individuals can influence

Government, as a basis of diffuse support for the system. In Britain and the United States - the two systems which approximate the 'civic culture' - it is assumed that the system is sufficiently effective to adequately represent all political interests and to create the conditions for values of trust and co-operation which support feelings of citizen competence. Thus while subjects may not feel bound to get actively involved in the input structure, they do at least see:

"themselves as able to appeal to a set of regular and orderly rules in the dealings with administrative officials" (1965: 171).

Hence the feeling of competence, that one will be treated fairly by government administration, takes the form of a passive deference to outputs. But for Almond and Verba the nature of deference in the civic culture is defined as allegiant, by the prior assumption that the political system is effective. Hence passivity can be equated with contentment, and alienation where it exists, attributed to the defects of individuals or groups rather than the system. Thus Almond and Verba by pre-judging the nature of subject passivity in the 'civic culture' beg the crucial issue of origins, and of legitimacy. The civic culture then becomes an a priori model of the ideal democratic culture which represents an optimum balance of allegiant activism and allegiant passivity.

As Almond and Verba's main concern is to establish within the 'civic culture' the main conditions of democratic stability, they are clearly more concerned with the degree and nature of support than with the problem of origins. Since they have already excluded the possibility of the political system interacting with political culture in establishing the conditions of support, the problem of origins becomes relegated to the ad hoc application of the evolutionary "story".

However, unless it is clear what causal processes are involved in producing the mixed or dualistic 'civic culture', then it cannot be stated that political culture is an independent causal factor in maintaining political stability. Indeed the evolutionary model of the origins of modern political values tends to become self-confirming. The five nations are seen as representing various stages in the industrial transition, reflecting the problems associated with the mobilisation of peripheral groups into the mainstream culture, and generating the conditions for allegiant citizen values.

Since allegiance is then seen as a direct consequence of economic development, the prescription for stability consists first of helping 'developing' nations achieve industrialisation, and second, laying down criteria for the diffusion of the 'civic culture'. The reduction of the political system itself to a more epiphenomenon of this developmental process is clear. The causes of support and alienation are not located in the performance of the system but in the particular mixture of traditional and modern attitudes in the culture. The strong liberal presumption remains, that, since the political system provides the freedom of choice to allow participation, then the explanation of the failure of most citizens to exercise this choice must be located elsewhere.

The real test however, is whether individuals are allegiant or deferential to authority because they are contented, or whether they are merely compliant because the political system itself renders them powerless. If the first interpretation is correct, it needs to be demonstrated by reference to a government's effectiveness in representing the interests of its subjects and in providing "just"

and "reasonable" rewards. If the second interpretation is correct, it must likewise be shown that the effectiveness of government does not reside in its capacity to induce support independently of its performance in satisfying demands.

Thus there are three major defects in Almond and Verba's work. First, the logical defect in the assumption that allegiant or supportive values are a sufficient cause of democratic stability. Second, their failure to consider the connection between allegiant support and system legitimacy. Both of these deficiencies arise from the sociological assumption that the political system itself is of no consequence in the maintenance of its own stability. A third defect, already noted with reference to Parsons and Lipset, is the failure to define what is meant by 'democratic stability' in terms which are capable of empirical test. This last issue at least is tackled seriously by Nordlinger.

3. Nordlinger's 'Stable Democracy'

Nordlinger (1967) takes Eckstein's definition of democratic stability, effectiveness and authenticity as his starting point. However he expounds on the two imperative activities of democratic systems in more detail. Democratic stability in the long-run is a compromise between effective elite rule and responsiveness to public opinion. Both are defined as necessary conditions of stable democracy. Without effectiveness stability ceases; without responsiveness democracy ceases. Authenticity then is translated into the degree to which the legislature represents and reflects changes in voters' opinions. We have then a reasonable specific operational definition of democratic stability and it remains to 'logically infer the conditions under which these two imperative activities of democratic systems are fulfilled' (213).

The dependent variable is stable democracy and the explanatory variable is attitudes towards political authority.

Following Almond and Verba closely, Nordlinger states that "stable democracy is thought to require a non-elite political culture characterised by a dualistic orientation towards political authority" (213). The dualistic orientation is that defined in the "civic culture" as the mixed citizen and subject orientation. Responsive government requires that sufficient numbers of individuals are active or directive in making political demands, while responsible government requires that sufficient numbers are acquiescent in accepting authority.

Having defined the nature of supportive beliefs, Nordlinger goes on to specify the degree to which such beliefs should be distributed in the non-elite. This is his specific contribution to the congruence model. He follows Almond and Verba by accepting that each individual will have both subject and citizen orientations. That is, the dualistic orientation is found within the concept of the political actor. More important however, in order to ensure that interests are represented equally, there must be a balance of citizens and subjects (directive and acquiescent attitudes) within all primary political conflict groups. Here we have a simple recommendation that in a pluralist political system all interest groups must be adequately represented. However, just in case existing inequalities of education, income and status give certain groups an unfair advantage, Nordlinger offers Inkeles' observation that political style, and hence activity or acquiescence, is related to personality rather than social class (216).

After demonstrating the bare outline of his

theory of congruence, Nordlinger goes on to show how the concept of the 'dualistic orientation' can be stated in the form of a necessary condition of stable democracy. He first shows how Almond and Verba's four conditions of stability can be reduced to his own single condition. Since he does not question the validity of Almond and Verba's four 'necessary' conditions of stability, it is clear that Nordlinger is applying rather loose criteria of causal explanation. Nevertheless the four correlates of stability - a balance of activity and passivity; balance between instrumental and affective involvement; consensus on the procedural norms of democracy; diffuse social trust and cooperation - are, but for the last, all present within his 'dualistic orientation'. Nordlinger then claims that:

'whatever validity attaches to the Almond and Verba formulation, and there is good reason for believing that it is eminently valid, also attaches to the present theory..' (225).

It follows that Nordlinger stands or falls with Almond and Verba, up to this point. But we have seen that Nordlinger specifies a balance distribution of the dualistic orientation across interest-groups as well as within political roles. This makes the assumption that the governing elite represents conflicting interests to be found in the non-elite. Under the pluralist model elites reputedly do not advance their own interests but represent those of groups in the electorate. Hence, if elites must respond to non-elite interests, sufficient non-elites must be active in making their demands heard. Similarly, certain proportions of each major interest group must acquiesce in the obligation to let government get on with the job and accept the responsibility of party leaders and government to govern (227). In trying to test this proposition by comparing British

and French working-class political cultures, Nordlinger falls foul of a number of difficulties.

In the British case he defines the major interest cleavage along party lines and takes working-class support of Conservative and Labour parties to represent class interests. Since party-support is the indicator of interests, his working-class sample does not include the whole non-elite group. But within the working-class he finds the dualistic orientation evenly balanced between Conservative and Labour supporters. There are about the same proportions of active and passive Conservative supporters as there are active and passive Labour supporters (226-231). On the basis of other observations he concludes that the same is true of the middle-class (232-233). What we then get is the statement that the British two-party system represents all interest groups across class lines authentically and at the same time is legitimised by popular deference to elite-rule (250-252).

There are two major objections to Nordlinger's view. The first has to do with the validity of his proposition. The second has to do with the adequacy of his evidence as a test of his proposition. At this point it is sufficient to note that Nordlinger has failed to show that a dualistic orientation is a necessary and sufficient condition of political stability. And, since he equates 'authenticity' or representation with the pluralist model of interest-groups and fails to come to terms with the problem of the origins of interests or political values, it is clear that he takes political stability for legitimacy. This question will be further discussed when comparing congruence and constraint approaches to working-class conservatism (Chapter 5).

In recent years a second line of research has

concerned itself with the extent to which political values intervene between socio-economic variables and political outcomes. Clearly, the analytic assumptions of Parsons and his school, that values are an independent source of political stability can not be demonstrated without at least controlling for socio-economic factors such as education, ethnicity, occupation, religion and so on. What emerges from this line of research is a causal explication of the presumed analytic links between socio-economic development and 'modern' values. In this context we shall consider the contributions of Inkeles (1969), Nie et.al. (1969) and Lipset and Rokkan (1967).

4. Inkeles on the causes of "Participant Citizenship"

Following Weber, Marshall, and Almond and Verba; Inkeles arrives at his concept of modern political culture. He identifies a set of related value-traits which he terms participant citizenship. This set includes:

"freedom from traditional authority, or stated positively, indentification with and allegiance to leaders and organisations transcending the parochial and primordial; interest in public affairs validated by keeping informed and expressed through participation in civic action; and an orientation toward political and governmental processes which recognises and accepts the necessity and desirability of a rational structure of rules and regulations. This syndrome is one any modern man might be expected to manifest, just as any modern polity is likely to desire, perhaps even require that he possess it" (1122-1123).

For two reasons Inkeles does not assume any necessary congruence between active citizenship and democratic systems. In the first place he argues that such a set of modern values is just as likely to be found in non-democratic as in democratic polities

(1123-1124). Secondly, the definition of the nature of political culture is an empirical matter which should go beyond description in an effort to explain the origin of both democratic and non-democratic values. Since citizenship as such may have nothing to do with democracy, it is other factors concerning the citizens' evaluation of the system's performance as satisfying on the one hand or alienating on the other, which are crucial in determining whether modern attitudes are likely to be supportive of democracy or not. In other words, Inkeles is not prepared to state a priori that democratic stability requires a certain balance of active and passive orientations. His approach to political culture is not based upon a prescriptive interest in the values which any political system may or may not require, but in the explanation of the causes of attitudes and values which exist (1124).

Briefly, Inkeles' procedure was to specify and measure the values which comprise the citizenship set to see whether or not they formed a general pattern of attitudes in six developing nations - Argentina, Chile, East Pakistan, India, Nigeria and Israel. He found that the five values (allegiance, interest, information, participation, and rationality) did form a consistent pattern of modern values across all six nations. The next stage was to locate the significant socio-economic causes of 'good citizenship'. Several factors emerged, suggesting to Inkeles that 'good citizenship' was a kind of luxury which could be 'afforded' only by those who had secured a standard of living above the minimum required for mere survival (1124). Further analysis revealed that the most significant experience which facilitated the learning of modern attitudes was that of education and work. Factory work emerged as second only to formal education as a 'school of citizenship'. Inkeles concludes therefore that certain

socio-economic changes involving education and work experience are necessary conditions for the development of citizenship attitudes.


However, not all 'good citizens' are 'happy, approving or satisfied with the political system' (1131). The citizenship set was not consistently related to positive judgements of the system either between or within the six nations. Inkeles concludes that the 'causes' of positive or negative evaluations have little to do with the causes of citizenship attitudes. Rather, they are a complex function of social position, personality and political performance. The feelings citizens have for the political system can not therefore be explained away as evidence of cultural lags, or of political immaturity on the part of alienated groups. Thus the crucial dimension of political culture, that which might be expected to have consequences for system stability, cannot be attributed to factors independent of the political system itself. In this respect it seems that Inkeles is moving towards a causal model similar to that offered by Easton in which the evaluative dimension of supportive values is seen as a function of both structural input and system feedback.

What we have then is a distinction between two components of values. One consists of citizenship rights and obligations, which seem to have their origin in the experience of modernisation, but which are common to most modern societies. The other consists of evaluative judgements of the effectiveness of the system, and has its origins in a causal interaction between the informed citizen and political performance. As soon as we admit the possibility however, that evaluations may be contingent upon system performance, the essential question of the manner in which judgements are formed arises. To this extent, it is clear that Inkeles' approach to political

culture moves beyond the narrow restrictions of the congruence model in the direction of a model which can handle the possibility of system constraint. In this way it seems clear that improvements on the congruence model follow advancements in explanation which move increasingly towards enabling us to address the three problems of legitimacy listed in Chapter One. The work of Nie et.al. is an example of such an advance (1969).

5. Nie et.al. on intervening values

The authors pursue a similar line of inquiry to Inkeles, drawing upon a secondary analysis of the Almond and Verba survey data. Their purpose is also that of causal explanation, and not primarily concerned with the prescription or description of factors contributing to democratic stability. They are interested in showing the 'relationships between socio-economic attributes, intervening attitudinal characteristics, and rates of political participation' (362). This requires that they develop empirical indicators of three broad socio-economic processes: First, social stratification, organised economic and secondary associations; Second, the links these variables have with the attitudinal measures used by Almond and Verba; and third, a measure of rates of participation, thus:



They find that indeed:

"Economic development alters the social class structure and the organisation intrastructure of society. One consequence of these alterations is the greater proportions of citizens who have social attributes - education, stable incomes, white-collar jobs, organisational memberships, - which, as already shown, relate to political participation" (372-373).

They then turn to the problems of showing whether or not changing attitude patterns intervene between socio-economic change and participation. There are three possibilities to be tested. First, the extent to which values are independent of socio-economic factors in causing increased participation. Second, the existence of different possible structural causes, e.g. status or membership organisations, which produce the same participant attitudes. Third, variations in these structural-attitude links across the five nations. It should be made clear however that the five attitudinal measures adopted from Almond and Verba are by definition non-interactive. That is; political information, citizen duty, political efficacy, attentiveness and perceived governmental impact, are assumed to operate in one direction only, towards shaping political behaviour. The possibility of reciprocity between political performance and attitudes in shaping attitudes is ruled out by the Survey methodology.

Two causal paths going from socio-economic factors to participation are distinguished, one which involves political attitudes and one which does not. The most important causal path involving attitudes is:

'from status and involvement in organisation to citizen duty and particularly information, which then act on efficacy and attentiveness, which in turn affect probability to participate'.

This finding enables the authors to account for variations between nations in terms of the:

'proportions of citizens in the middle and upper classes, and according to the density and complexity of organisation life' (819).

Clearly, then this path to participation involves a high component of independent attitudinal causation, over and above structural factors. 'In these ways

the class structure and the organisational structure of societies determine both the overall rate of participation and the relative amount of participation coming from various social groups' (819).

However, a distinct set of causes, relatively independent of both social status and attitudes, and deriving from organisational membership, has a direct effect on participation. The authors consider two possible reasons for the existence of this direct link from organisational activity to participation. First, organisation can provide conditions conducive to participation without the necessity for supportive attitudes. Second, some personality factor may be associated with and precede both organisational involvement and political participation. While the latter possibility may be true, the first is more plausible and supports Inkeles' finding that work experience (particularly in factory organisations) has a strong influence in generating modern attitudes.

Having outlined these two relatively independent causal paths to political participation, the authors discuss the implications of each for political mobilisation. They consider that mobilisation, which requires middle-class status as a pre-requisite of political participation, is a much more complex, long-term and costly procedure than the direct manipulation of organisational life. For example, this path will consistently under-represent low-status persons until such time as a society has achieved a high degree of modernisation, re-distribution of wealth, education and so on. However, while the organisational path towards participation may bring more numbers of low-status persons into the political system, there are other costs associated with this alternative. In particular, there is the relative lack of modern values which support or sustain political activity in times of crisis. There is therefore the risk that

rapid mobilisation of low-status persons will overload the demand or input structure of government without balancing the authoritative output side. When governments fail to meet strong particularistic demands, it is likely that a withdrawal of such specific support will threaten the stability of government, unless backed up by learned diffuse support of authority.

We see here, reproduced in 'scientific' terms the familiar problems faced by Tocqueville and other theorists of the Nineteenth century - how to balance political effectiveness with the rule of the majority.

"Whereas our findings suggest a potential for participatory democracy which is in optimistic contrast to most modern empirical studies of mass participation, these same findings raise again the specter of mass 'irrationality' and 'ignorant' involvement which has haunted democratic theorists since the Greeks" (827).

Though Nie et.al. tend to identify the status-attitudinal path with tolerant and diffusely supportive attitudes, they recognise as does Inkeles, that the connection is by no means necessary. Just as Inkeles demonstrates that the crucial evaluative dimension of political attitudes may be more due to the performance of the system than to the failure to adopt democratic attitudes, Nie et.al. acknowledge that, 'the relationship between basic attitudes, such as information and attentiveness, and the specific affective and normative content of opinions, has not been established' (827). This is particularly the case in societies where the political system has difficulty in meeting the demands of hostile interest groups (cf. Lal Goel, 1971a; 1971b). The fact remains then, that crucial questions of legitimacy and support cannot be settled by a causal model which does not take into account the reciprocal relations between citizens and the state. We shall now consider a major attempt to construct a model of the

reciprocal causal relationships between socio-economic development, democratic attitudes, and the performance of the polity, designed to show the extent to which legitimacy is the product of complex historical interaction of forces.

6. Cleavages, Parties and Voters

As Sartori has claimed, much political sociology treats politics as a 'projection' of socio-economic change (1969: 88). As we have seen the analytic approach to political culture takes values as independent causal agents of political institutions. It is assumed that political interests and beliefs become translated into political institutions as 'a matter of course'. However, an adequate explanation of the significance of values requires a model which can account for interactions between social, cultural and political institutions over historical periods. An outline of such a model has been offered by Lipset and Rokkan (1967: Introduction). While the sociological emphasis remains firmly upon the development of social 'cleavages', or conflicting interest groups within a society, the manner in which interests are translated into politics becomes partly the function of political factors. As Sartori states,

'As long as we take for granted that cleavages are reflected in, not produced by, the political system itself, we necessarily neglect to ask to what extent conflicts and cleavages may either be channeled deflected, and repressed, or vice versa, activated reinforced, precisely by the operations and operators of the political system' (1969: 8a).

Excessive sociologism which posits a one-way causal influence is based upon the objectivist 'illusion', and since it treats politics as an epiphenomenon of the total social process, cannot reach a full explanatory status. This is because the rules of decision-making,

electoral law and constitutions which govern political behaviour, shape, as much as are shaped by interests and values. In particular the conditions which govern the 'expression of protest and the representation of interests in each society' involve four sets of rules concerning the formation, expression and representation of political interests in the mass electorate (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 26).

These four conditions - called thresholds of legitimation, incorporation, representation and majority power - consist of successive barriers set-up by existing ruling-groups, against the demands of aspiring interest-groups. The fact that they were progressively lowered in most industrialising states, as both the national and industrial revolutions got under way, suggests that they fell to successive demands for representation. Each new electoral barrier was lowered to specific political interests, until in the modern period we get a number of alternative, but 'democratic', outcomes (29). Once the thresholds of legitimation and incorporation have been dropped, establishing universal suffrage and equal rights of citizenship, there emerges the beginnings of a consensual political culture legitimatising democratic institutions. However, since interests and not values were obviously responsible for political change at each phase of political modernisation, it seems likely that interests as such are likewise the cause of political stability. This suggests that a political culture consisting of supportive attitudes pre-supposes the existence of a coalition of interests among those powerful enough to effect political change (Barry, 1970: 67). If this is the case, then the Lipset-Rokkan model reduces the causal significance of political culture to the status of neither necessary nor sufficient cause of political stability. That it is not necessary is clear from the prior commitment to the electoral rules of the game on the basis of 'mutual

interests'. That it is not sufficient can be demonstrated by its past failure to maintain conditions of stability without support from potentially powerful interest groups.

What remains then, with respect to modern democratic political cultures, is that a political culture consisting of a diffuse support of democratic institutions may provide a critical source of stability during periods when the system fails to meet the interests of potentially powerful groups, e.g. workers: Or alternatively, that political culture, managed by elites, may falsify both political interests and the manner of their representation in the electoral system. The first explanation assumes of course, that the pluralist model of interest-formation exists and that constituents are capable of realising and acting upon their interests (cf. Sharpe, 1973a: 19). The second explanation stressed by constraint theorists, entails the assumption that elites manage as much as respond to the demands of the electorate (cf. Budge, 1973; Barry, 1970: 68). Indeed, Sartori in commenting upon the Lipset-Rokkan model, suggests that the possibility of constraint has yet to be recognised in political sociology.

"In the Lipset-Rokkan model, the politics enters basically via the historical reconstruction. But politics should enter from another door as well. The final step on our future agenda is the full recognition of the programming of the managers.... In principle the producer's market does not matter less than the consumer's market. Hence in the perspective of political sociology, a party-system is not only a response to consumer's demands, but is equally a feed-back of producer's options. In practice, moreover, the political entrepreneur exerts a greater persuasive influence on the voter than does the economic entrepreneur on the buyer" (1969: 90).

This is the impasse of analytic functionalism

once again. Every major political change up to the present is explained in terms of conflicting political interests, however, once the 'pluralist' democratic state has been reached, it tends to be assumed that representation satisfies all existing political interests. Conflicts of interest fade away into the realm of managed political bargaining, and are replaced by supportive values as the main mechanism of democratic stability. Though both the Parsonian and Eastonian models of the political process are capable of incorporating the possibility of elite constraint, neither has been developed to pursue this line of enquiry. The possibility of the state generating diffuse support by coercion or propaganda; or the significance of the reverse 'interchanges' between Polity and the integrative and pattern-maintenance sub-systems (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967: 7) have not yet become problematic for congruence theorists (e.g. Nordlinger, 1967: 49-51).

7. Summary assessment

At this point we can briefly assess the claim of the congruence school to have developed a model of political culture. The basic premise in the congruence model is that of the evolutionary ideal. Parsons' system of pattern-variables become the universal prime-cause in the evolutionary process. This accounts for the emphasis put upon the causal place of values; the case of the superstructure wagging the structure. As Kavanagh points out there seems no good reason to take values as being independent of political performance, since values and structure will likely be 'mutually reinforcing over time' (1972: 66). Barry, makes the same point, when he reduces the congruence model to the statement that democrats support democracy because it is there (1970: 89-92).

But having staked a claim to values as causal agents, how far do the congruence theorists take it. The analytical approach employing loose historical and anecdotal methods (Parsons, early Lipset, and Eckstein) does not define values or political performance empirically, and fails even to put its limited propositions into a testable form. The empirical approach to values as causes (Almond and Verba, Nordlinger) does not show that particular quantities or mixtures of certain attitudes (balanced active-passive) are either necessary, sufficient, or in fact any sort of cause of democratic stability. The basic requirements of the experiment are totally lacking. In part this is because the feat is methodologically impossible, since we cannot take away all but the 'civic culture' in order to see what remains, nor take away the 'civic culture' itself to see what happens to democratic stability.

Similarly, the structural explanations advanced by Inkeles, Nie et.al. and Lipset and Rokkan, as either static models of the present, or dynamic models of the past, leave the possibility that values may be the results of political experience or elite management distinctly present, but outside the scope of their inquiry. Thus, Inkeles' data suggests strongly that evaluations of regimes may be a consequence of the performance of that regime. And Nie et.al. employing a non-interactive methodology, cannot say for sure that values are necessary causes of participation, (since mobilisation is possible without 'democratic' values) or that values precede rather than follow participation. Lipset and Rokkan too, show that though values at certain historical points are a stabilising influence, they are continually displaced by re-alignments of interests. For them, values become a consequence of a balance of interests and hence power. It follows that since a balance of interests is sufficient to stabilise a regime, we are left with the

rather weak assertion that values provide a reservoir of good faith in the system, tiding over the 'bad times', and maintaining political stability as a means towards the realisation of long-term benefits.

But as I have claimed already, this interpretation holds only in-so-far as it can be shown that the political system distributes its rewards equitably. If the assumptions of the congruence model - of equal representation, the meritocratic recruitment of leaders, adequate political information, and so on - are shown to be false to some degree, then it cannot be claimed that a congruent or supportive political culture confers legitimacy upon the system. On the contrary, passive allegiance becomes more the consequence of under-representation, apathy, alienation or induced compliance. The problems of legitimacy then can only be settled by asking the crucial question about the origins of political values. It is not sufficient to adopt accounts of historical development, or the adequacy of political socialisation, to address the problem of cause. Especially since this treatment of 'origins' rests so obviously upon liberal-democratic normative assumptions.

We have seen that if the political system is taken to be representative, effective and legitimate at the outset, then the empirical questions of nature, extent and origins are pre-conceived. Selected concepts are developed, particular methods are devised, and isolated aspects of the political process are abstracted. Such a procedure allows for selective interpretations of political culture which 'fit' the initial assumptions about the nature of liberal democracy. Other aspects of political life which have an important bearing on the issue of legitimacy - namely political stratification and the self-legitimising capacity of the state - are ignored or minimised. By contrast, the constraint model seeks to expose and test

some of these assumptions, in particular, whether or not the passive majority is under- or unrepresented; and if so, why it is that such a high proportion remains allegiant or compliant to the system.

FIVE :

The Constraint Approach

1. Assumptions & Tests

Just as the congruence model is derived from traditional elitist concepts of political culture, the constraint model (or conflict model) is derived from Nineteenth century Marxism. Though asserting rather contrary assumptions about the nature of man and the political order, at certain points the two models of political culture converge. In particular, both stress the importance of values in maintaining political "order". While earlier developments of Marxism regarded the 'ruling ideas' (or political culture) to be of secondary importance to social relations in determining political interests, more recently constraint theorists, in accounting for the 'failure' of revolution in the West, have placed much more importance upon hegemonic ideas as an independent force shaping the interests of the working-class (Jessop, 1972: 31-33). Under the influence of Gramsci (e.g. Merrington, 1968) and the Frankfurt School of Critical Theory (e.g. Schroyer, 1970), modern neo-Marxist theory places the process of legitimation at the head of a list of conditions which impede the emergence of working-class consciousness (Miliband, 1969; Nairn, 1972; Anderson, 1968; McQueen, 1970; Mueller, 1970; 1973).

Both models assume, because of the numerical superiority of the working-class, that it holds the actual or potential key to the balance of power in advanced industrial societies. Thus both congruence theorists (e.g. Nordlinger, 1967: 213) and constraint theorists (e.g. Parkin, 1972: 48) are concerned to explain the attitudes of the working-class towards

political authority. As we have seen the 'pluralist' assumption of equal representation, concentrates on 'producer' politics. That is to say, the 'system' responds to political demands rather than create them. If the system has shaped the manner or form in which interests are expressed, this influence is historical rather than immediately present (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). And since political interests have always forced modifications in the legitimising or 'hegemonic' values in the past, the fact that there appears to be little evidence of value-conflict in industrial societies is taken as evidence of the absence of class-conflict.

Not surprisingly, the constraint model, though in agreement about the stabilising, or in its terms counter-revolutionary, force of political culture, reverses the assumption that working-class interests are represented by democratic institutions. Instead it is held that the working-class is in fact under- or mis-represented in electoral politics for a number of reasons (Miliband, 1969; Offe, 1972). I shall not dwell upon the 'pre-theoretical' debates between neo-Marxist and 'liberal' social science here, except to say that the constraint model makes the socio-political context of explanation a central part of the problematic, thus revealing the extent to which ideological and utopian presumptions condition the subject-matter of both congruence and constraint models of political culture. That is, since liberal social scientists believe formal citizenship rights to be operative, for them the assumption of equal representation is not problematic. However, since constraint theorists believe that formal citizenship rights are quite ineffective in checking and controlling elite institutions, the question of representation is problematic. In order to put the constraint argument, it is convenient to refer again to Sartori's concept of 'producer' and 'consumer' politics.

Producer politics in the pluralist conception allows for the competitive representation of "freely developing" interests in the mass electorate. It justifies indirect democracy on the grounds that elites compete with each other to represent mass interests. Propaganda and coercion have a minimal place in shaping interests, though it is recognised that modern states are capable of generating their own support (Easton, 1965a: 267-340) and that the party-system and the mass media act to reinforce and consolidate the rules of the regime (e.g. Rose and Mossawir, 1967).

Constraint theorists on the other hand have attacked the assumptions of the congruence model at every point. A key issue has been whether or not elites were competitive and did represent the interests of the mass electorate, no matter how indirectly. The long debate between elitists and pluralists in the sixties seems to have been settled largely in favour of 'elitists' (Mankoff, 1970; Domhoff, 1969). Producer politics was in reality 'stage-managed' by a 'ruling-class' whose exercise of the hidden face of power was not genuinely responsive nor responsible to mass political interests. The power vested in the legislature by the electorate had been pre-empted by a 'ruling-class', reducing both Governments of 'left' and 'right' to the will of Corporate Capitalism (Miliband, 1969: 68-118).

Though there are variants of the critique of the pluralist model, all claim that Liberal Democracies fail to represent the interests of the majority. This therefore requires a second-stage in the constraint argument. Since the mis-represented masses, the potential fulcrum in the struggle for power, remain apathetic under these conditions, neo-Marxist theory was forced to adopt a new attitude towards political values as a critical force in maintaining false-consciousness (Miller, 1972). Values, instead of

being but a gloss over a prior identity of interests, now took on an independent causal role in shaping interests and legitimising authority (Mueller, 1973).

Mann in a recent review of the state of working-class consciousness and action in the West concluded that, while there was sufficient empirical evidence of alienation in the lives of workers, the experience of alienation was not sufficient to produce class-consciousness (1973). Where industrial unrest has occurred it has lacked both a class identity and solidarity, or any conception of an alternative society. It failed to go beyond an expressive 'explosion' which could not be sustained. Where it had produced critiques and plans of action, they were moderate proposals for participation in the control (but not the ownership) of the means of production. Mann concludes that the necessary condition for radical consciousness in industrial societies is now the existence of counter-institutions which offset the 'anaesthetic' effects of the dominant value-system which allows the patient to "see but not feel" the wound (1973: 27).

2. Concept of Hegemony

The emphasis upon the hegemonic power of the dominant culture has directed attention at the self-legitimising capacity of the state (Gramsci, 1971: 55-56f). Thus the state is seen to extend far beyond the conventional institutional definition, to include all forms of processes and institutions which effect political consciousness. The impact of the state then, in pre-structuring political interests is referred to as 'consumer' politics. It will be remembered that Sartori's analogy with economics claimed that political managers had potentially greater power to influence consumer choices than did industrial managers. The full appreciation of its

extent was first dramatised by Marcuse's (1966) critique of 'one-dimensional' society, and documented in some detail by Miliband (1969: 179-264).

The exercise of cultural power in the conditioning of uncritical political values is termed the process of legitimation (Miliband, 1969: 173-264; Parkin, 1972: 79-102; Jessop, 1972: 68-70). Jessop defines cultural power as: "control over the means of value-creation, interpretation and maintenance" (68). Such a definition clearly includes the structure of language, role-expectations, "vocabularies of motive", as well as more specific political values concerning the state and citizenship. To the extent that the state incorporates the cultural apparatus in shaping language, core beliefs and values, then 'consumer' politics becomes co-extensive with the whole institutionalisation process (Mueller, 1973). Berger and Luckmann (1966) do in fact adopt the term 'legitimation' for their own use in describing the processes by which individuals internalise the moral and social order.

However, while the legitimisation process has become central to the constraint model there is less agreement about what is legitimised, by what values, under what conditions, and how (Mann, 1970). That is, both congruence and constraint sociologists have tended to take for granted the existence of a widespread value-consensus across social classes (425). Mann sets out to test this assumption by a review of a large number of empirical studies of political and related attitudes in Britain and the United States. To begin, he asks what are the presumed values about which there is supposed consensus? They may be ultimate values such as equality or achievement; social norms governing the 'rules of the democratic game': or beliefs "about how society is actually organised", for example, social harmony or social trust (424). It is then a matter of empirical enquiry to see to what extent the:

"various classes in society internalize norms, values and beliefs which legitimate the social order. And, do such norms, values and beliefs constitute 'true' or 'false' consciousness" (425).

In order to specify the degree of consensus on these values, beliefs and so on, Mann reviews a number of surveys which provide data on occupational or class attitudes towards the social stratification system, achievement, equality of opportunity, images of society, political efficacy and trustfulness. Values are classified as dominant if they are supportive of present social structures, and deviant if antagonistic to existing society. He finds that on most abstract issues, for example achievement, a dominant consensus exists for both middle- and working-class groups. On more practical issues however, such as welfare, distribution of wealth and images of class and power, there is dissensus for large minorities. The working-class though, is divided, for except for two issues - 'the rich get all the profits' and 'the laws favour the rich' - no deviant consensus emerges. However, it can be argued that these deviant attitudes can be regarded as evidence of working-class realism in adjusting to the dominant culture, rather than evidence of radicalism (429). Mann concludes his survey of attitudes by pointing to four trends:

(1) value consensus does not exist to any significant extent:

(2) there is a greater degree of consensus among the middle-class than among the working-class:

(3) the working-class is more likely to support deviant values if those values relate either to concrete everyday life or to vague populist concepts than if they relate to an abstract political philosophy:

(4) working-class individuals also exhibit less internal consistency in their values than middle-class people.

Since there is obviously a lack of value-consensus on all but the most abstract and vague values, Mann asks 'why some measure of consensus is considered necessary for social cohesion' (432). He points out that the common sociological assumption that procedural norms and role expectations are the basis of social structure, need not entail general agreement on basic values. Most non-elite members of society are bound by "specific role behaviour" at the level of everyday life, thus the:

"compliance of (the lower classes) might be more convincingly explained by their pragmatic acceptance of specific roles than by any positive normative commitment to society" (435).

It is only those 'actually sharing societal power (who) need develop consistent societal values'. While the subordinate class is subject to several sets of conflicting and confusing sets of values, this prevents the emergence of a coherent radical sub-culture. Hence:

"It is not value-consensus which keeps the working-class compliant, but rather a lack of consensus in a critical area where concrete experiences and vague populism may be translated into radical politics" (436).

It therefore remains to be shown whether or not such norms, values and beliefs "constitute true or false consciousness". That is, whether or not:

'an indoctrination programme has occurred palpably changing working-class values: or that the indoctrination process is incomplete, leaving indoctrinated values in conflict with "deviant" ones in the mind of the worker: and thirdly, in both cases we still have to be able to rank the rival sets of values in order of their "authenticity" to the worker if we are to decide which is the more "true" (425).

The questions concerning the learning of political values by the subordinate class are an attempt to

resolve the problem of legitimacy by determining the origins of 'true' and 'false' consciousness. The crucial test of the constraint model rests upon the demonstration that the 'dominant' cultural apparatus does or does not induce "false-consciousness" among the working-class sufficient to negate the growth of radical class-consciousness.

3. Parkin and Jessop on Hegemony

Parkin (1972) is interested in identifying the conditions which account for the political passivity of the working-classes in Western democracies.

"My underlying theme throughout is that this relationship (between dominant and subordinate classes) is essentially an exploitative one and as such confronts the dominant class with serious problems of social control" (1972: 9).

Evidence of exploitation lies in the observable existence of inequalities in education, work, and other life chances, experienced by large numbers of the 'disprivileged' in advanced industrial societies. Yet equally obvious is the fact that such inequities are met with acceptance and resignation by most. The reasons for this are two-fold. First, those who do not expect to be treated equally make a realistic adjustment to this condition. Secondly, there is the powerful influence of the dominant culture in legitimising the hierarchical social order. Both these factors are powerful constraints which are overlooked by 'consensus' theorists. Parkin argues that those who focus on the extent of normative consensus in stable democracies, do not make the "connection between the distribution of power and the legitimation of values" (81).

"All too often the assumption seems to be that common agreement on values betokens a kind of independent convergence in the moral outlook of different classes. But in fact, or course,

the extent to which values are legitimised in society is largely a function of institutional power. Values are much more likely to flow in a 'downward' than in an 'upward' direction" (81).

It follows that the distribution of institutional power (which includes 'cultural' power) will condition the distribution of political values. What is required then, is a model of 'cultural power' which can account for the various sources of values shaping the consciousness of the non-elite. Parkin introduces a model of three sources of values. He distinguishes between:

(1) the dominant value-system, "the social source of which is the major institutional order". This moral framework is the justification of social inequality, and inculcates both deferential and aspirational (Mann's term is economism) attitudes in the subordinate class. That is, the dominant reward-structure is accepted, and individuals are socialised to aspire to success within it;

(2) the subordinate value-system, which is a localised working-class community based moral framework, coexisting with the dominant value-system. This value-system provides for a "value-stretch" whereby dominant norms are reduced to the immediate realities of working-class expectations. It is 'accommodative' since it does not come into conflict with the dominant value-system; and:

(3) the radical value-system, which is a conflicting ideology in opposition to dominant values, based upon working-class identity, solidarity, and political activity.

"These three systems of meaning, each presenting social reality in a different light, are all to

be found within the subordinate class in varying degrees. Put in metaphorical terms, the overall meaning system of the subordinate class could be likened to a kind of 'reservoir' fed by three 'normative streams' each flowing from a different institutional source" (100).

The familiar congruence interpretation of such mixed civic cultures, is that widespread "deference" and "accommodation" in the subordinate class is evidence of consensual interests and effective representation. Parkin, however takes the view that deference is more likely to be understood in terms of the success of the dominant class in "imposing its own definitions of reality on less privileged groups". Jessop makes a similar judgement (1971: 19). He defines two "main structural variables" that condition support for the central value system in the non-elite:

"firstly, the location of the individual in terms of power and rewards: and secondly, the location of the individual in terms of latent and manifest contra-cultural communities or collectivities, or more generally, of isolation from central influence. Broadly speaking, if power and rewards are high, then commitment to central values will be high; but if power and rewards are low, commitment may not be low in that the powerless and exploited may accept dominance unless they have direct experience of deprivation and exploitation and the ability to develop and maintain a deviant value-system" (19).

This "ability to develop and maintain a deviant value-system" therefore depends upon the existence of institutional sources which are independent of the dominant culture. Thus for Parkin, de-radicalisation, or false-consciousness is not the consequence of affluence and the end of class interests, but rather the consequence of the decline or erosion of the institutional sources which support radical conceptions of social reality. Such sources have been shown to be based upon relatively isolated or 'defensive' subcultures (Parkin, 1967; Korpi, 1971). The social context of such radical subcultures may be rural isolation,

working-class urban communities, large industrial plants, union solidarity, and political organisations. The effect of the sub-cultural milieux is to shield workers' experience from the dominant culture and reinforce communication, identity and solidarity within their ranks (Jessop, 1971: 4).

However, since such social sources of deviance have been eroded as in the case of militant unions and Socialist working-class political parties, they have ceased to generate and support class consciousness. As they have become incorporated into the dominant institutional order, the working-class has increasingly scaled-down demands for revolutionary changes to relatively minor reforms within the welfare state (Parkin, 1972: 103-136). Parkin concludes that apart from certain meritocratic reforms enacted by both Social Democratic and Conservative parties in the post-war period, most industrialised nations of the West have shown no major trend towards a lessening of inequality. Therefore, it seems that working-class industrial and political movements have lost their militancy for other reasons.

In the first place, once in office, social democrat parties found their reform programmes severely curtailed by Business interests and the civil service (Miliband, 1969: Chapters 3-5). Increasingly, their leadership became Bourgeois. Further, in order to muster an electoral majority, under an electoral system with a high representation threshold, they were forced to appeal to middle-class supporters (Wertheimer, 1969).

These events combined to weaken working-class political organisation, the single most important agency of working-class radicalism in the post-war period. With the consequent decline in working-class militancy, both the dominant and subordinate cultures

became 'overpowering' providing "the framework of social meaning among the working-class" (Parkin, 1972: 100). The outcome, from the constraint point of view, is a growing non-representation of working-class interests, and within the subordinate political culture, the growth of a passive acceptance of or alienation from electoral politics (Hindess, 1971: 163-180; cf. Crewe, 1973: 52).

4. Working-class conservatism

The test of the congruence and constraint models of non-elite deference to elitist values in Britain and the United States can be made by controlling for observable conditions of inequality such as income distribution and welfare services. If the congruence model is correct, we would expect to find a positive association between affluence, embourgeoisment and conservative values. If on the other hand, it can be shown that it is the perception and social meanings attached to the experience of inequality which differentiates radicals from conservatives in the non-elite, then the constraint view becomes more plausible.

Setting aside most reservations about class definitions, research into working-class conservatism, has defined class by occupational, usually skilled and unskilled manual, categories. Contrary to the affluence thesis, working-class conservatives if anything have a lower average income than labour supporters (Nordlinger, 1967: 169-170; Mackenzie and Silver, 1968: 83-86). Moreover the assumption that embourgeoisment has produced a shift in party allegiance has been shown to be untrue in most industrial 'democracies' (Goldthorpe et.al., 1968: 73; Lipset, 1968: 222-245; Davies, 1970: 81-85; Rinehart, 1971; cf. Crewe, 1973). In a sense however this observation is misleading, for as Parkin (1972) has shown the so-called Socialist values of left-labour parties have become

more conservative over the post-war period. And as Lipset claims; "the loyalties once created for a mass left-wing party are rarely lost" (1968: 224). In which case the "conservative socialist" parties are themselves incorporated into the dominant value-system and cannot be considered as institutional sources of radical class-consciousness. Nevertheless, despite this major reservation we will define working-class conservatism and radicalism in terms of party support, if only for the obvious reason that if it were not for working-class "tories", parties of the 'left' would not necessarily be bound by a policy of parliamentary gradualism.

The bulk of research then, has shown that this form of deviance cannot be attributed to affluence or any other forms of observable social characteristic such as occupation, education, age, sex, and so. The most extensive research on such background characteristics has found that even when their effects are taken together, without a consideration of contextual factors such as religion, union membership, ethnicity, political perception and subjective class identification, they explain little (Rose, 1968; Mackenzie and Silver, 1968: 240-262; cf. Przeworski and Soares, 1971). It is clear that what is important in differentiating working-class tories from radicals is not the direct experience of economic inequality, but the way this experience is mediated by religion, reference groups and other institutional sources (See below Chapter Ten p. 199).

Hence, working-class tories have been classified into two groups whose support is drawn from different motives. The deferentials, are passive subjects in Almond and Verba's terms, in that they accept their low status as just, have a faith in elite rule and in traditional authority. The most common interpretation of the origins of this group is that they are primarily

older and female voters whose allegiance to the Conservative party was established during long periods of Conservative rule, particularly in times of national crisis (Rose, 1968: 130-138; Kavanagh, 1971: 347-360; Mackenzie and Silver, 1968: 261). They are a declining source of conservative support. By contrast a growing proportion of Tory voters appear to base their support on more pragmatic grounds, accepting elite rule as more effective and in their personal interests (Mackenzie and Silver, 1968: 259). Their perception of self-interest is mediated by dominant or subordinate, rather than radical values, which leads to satisfaction with their economic position (Nordlinger, 1967: 175); MIDDLE-class identification (Nordlinger, 1967: 172-175; Mackenzie and Silver, 1968: 162, 196-202; Rose, 1968: 152); distrust of labour party leadership (Nordlinger, 1967: 66-80) together with the tendency to be uninvolved with working-class solidarity organisations such as unions (Nordlinger, 1967: 179-209; cf. Mackenzie and Silver, 1968: 128-133; Rose, 1968: 146).

By contrast labour supporters can be classified as defensives who vote on pragmatic grounds or established party loyalty, and whose choice is reinforced by union membership, working-class identification, working-class residential area, celtic nationality, type and extent of schooling, etc. (Rose, 1968: 151; Jessop, 1971; Parkin, 1967; Nordlinger, 1967: 230-231; Mackenzie and Silver, 1968: 128-133); and loyalists or militants, a minority whose support is grounded in a strong socialist commitment (Mackenzie and Silver, 1968: 244).

There are at least two possible interpretations of this body of research. One is to adopt the congruence 'civic culture', model and to regard political deference and militant radicalism as a core of 'irrational' support which cancel out across party-

lines, leaving the vast majority of working-class citizens more or less secular, pragmatic, or 'rational' in their voting decisions. Nordlinger uses the term pre-democratic to describe political deference, and it is clear that Mackenzie and Silver regard the hard core of labour loyalists as similarly pre-democratic or 'inert', that is outside the 'civic culture' proper (257-258). The assumption underlying this interpretation is that the working-class as a whole shares a common acceptance of civic duty in which:

"voting is regarded as a duty, strong government and leadership is respected, the political system is generally seen as legitimate, and democracy is viewed as involving freedoms of speech and press together with the universal franchise rather than as involving direct popular participation in government" (Jessop, 1971: 6-7).

This civic consensus is uniformly distributed across both class and party lines, and no particular interest group is necessarily under-represented. Since the only major political cleavage is that based upon individual interests, and since both parties have been forced to appeal to both middle-; and working-class 'rational' voters, then the 'balance of disparities' or dual orientation within the working-class constitutes evidence of effective and fair representation (Nordlinger, 1967: 230).

Jessop confirms that passive and active orientations are "equally distributed on both sides of the major party cleavages in our society" (1971: 15) yet he does not make the assumption that the majority of 'pragmatic' supporters on each side of the party line have based their choice upon calculations of self-interest alone (14). There is in fact one major institutional source of conservative support which does not enter into the 'civic' culture interpretation. This is the extent to which socio-cultural deference,

comprising a set of traditional non-political values, symbolic attachments and beliefs, can and does act as a:

"constraining influence on voting behaviour - acting to reinforce or inhibit the activation of other factors predisposing the individual to vote Labour or Conservative - rather as directly determinative on its own" (1972: 5).

The constraint model therefore suggests that the dominant value-system is capable of acting as a pre-emptive constraint upon the determination of political interest, and hence the decision to vote Left or Right. That is, those who are disposed to support the Tories are reinforced by the hegemonic value-system, while those disposed to vote Labour are deterred by a conflict of values and interests. Parkin (1967) put the issue succinctly:

"In any capitalist society the parties of the right and center have a built-in advantage over the parties of the left, in so far as there tends inevitably to be a greater degree of congruence between the ideologies of the former and the central value-system of capitalism (282).

Thus the elite party has the advantage in appealing for non-elite support, especially as the counter-institutional sources of radicalism are on the wane. Instead of asking why some of the working-class support the elite party, it is more relevant to ask why they all don't (Parkin, 1967: 181; cf. Mackenzie and Silver, 1968: 246-262). Thus:

"Socialist voting in general can be regarded for analytic purposes as a symbolic act of defiance from the dominant values of British Capitalism society, whilst conservative voting may be thought of as a symbolic re-affirmation of such values" (Parkin, 1967: 182).

Jessops' research also demonstrates the predictive

utility of the constraint model (1971). In extending the concept of 'deference' to include a broad domain of traditional socio-cultural values, Jessop shows that it is strongly associated with conservative voting (1971: 11). He concludes however that while "socio-cultural commitments are important constraints on voting behaviour, the manner and modes of such constraint are by no means simple and clearcut" (cf. Kavanagh, 1971; Sharpe, 1971a).

The constraint model must therefore be developed to allow a more complete specification of the various institutional sources which condition the political values of the non-elite. This requires much more emphasis upon the role of cultural power in pre-conditioning the range of political choice and the formation of political interests. In particular it would allow for a comparison of the strength of hegemonic influences which inculcate an acceptance of the political order independently of its performance, and supposedly pragmatic shifts in support of competing parties over time, depending upon the long-term satisfaction of self-interests. After all, the ultimate question remains that of the legitimacy of democratic institutions, which by definition, must be representative of real interests - an issue which cannot be pre-judged by making the assumption that existing democratic regimes are not in the business of 'consumer' politics. As Kavanagh has stated:

"There is something of a hiatus in the development of the political culture approach. Though we are aware of the shortcomings of the major studies, we have not advanced beyond them. We know vastly more about the citizens' beliefs, attitudes and emotions about politics than we did a decade ago. We are also more aware of the complexity governing the interactions between these orientations and the actual working of the political system. Further elucidation of the relationships between the values and the performance of the system is the next challenge facing students of political culture" (1972: 68-69).

In conclusion it is clear that some of the defects of the congruence approach can be overcome by devising a more appropriate model of political culture incorporating elements of both congruence and constraint models. In Part Two the object is to construct such a model based upon Jessop (1972) as a framework for the analysis of political culture in New Zealand.

SIX:

A Summary Critique of Political Culture

1. Review of main Argument

In the first part of this thesis my purpose has been to approach the 'problem of Legitimacy' through a critique of the definition and application of the term 'political culture'. My argument has been that congruence theorists, deriving their assumptions and research interests from liberal democratic ideology, have evaded the issue of legitimacy by taking it for granted, and equating what they call 'democratic stability' with the legitimacy of the state. In developing this argument I reviewed the emergence of the concept 'political culture' in both the 'liberal' and 'Marxist' traditions of sociological thought from the 18th century to the present, in order to demonstrate the importance of normative presuppositions in each tradition. Pursuing the argument into post-war Social Science we find the persistence of ideological and utopian interests underlying the congruence and constraint approaches to the 'problem of legitimacy'. In the case of the former one can readily discern the connection between certain normative presuppositions concerning the working of 'liberal democracy', the rather restrictive approach to the problem of legitimacy as mere system stability, and consequent explanatory defects (cf. Pateman, 1971; Lehman, 1972).

The main objection to the use of the term 'political culture' in the congruence sense, was therefore, that it explained nothing, excepting the desire of congruence theorists to emphasise the importance

of society and culture as 'causes' of democratic "stability" to the exclusion of both the economy and the state (cf. Barry, 1970: 81-98; Gregor, 1968; Minogue, 1972; Rothman, 1971; Madian, 1969; Lehman, 1972).

Parsons as chief exemplar of this approach gives primacy to values only by ignoring or minimising the importance of other likely causal factors, in particular power and coercion (Barry, 1970: 77; Giddens, 1968; Jacobs, 1969). And whilst, as we shall see, it is possible to develop an explanation of democratic stability which specifies the place of values, congruence theorists fail to do so on two counts. The first is that values are not differentiated from other possible causes, but are taken to be a necessary condition of democratic stability. The second is that the question of their importance is reduced to that of; 'what values, how much, and held by what groups' are sufficient for democratic stability? (Almond and Verba, 1965: 3-10; Rose, 1969; Pye, 1972). Since no congruence theorist has successfully demonstrated that values are either a necessary or sufficient condition of democratic stability, we are left with 'political culture' as a 'stand-in' for other possible causes of stability including that which has been stressed by political theorists from the 18th century, if not before, namely: that the existence of an identity of interests between all powerful groups in society is both a necessary and sufficient condition of political stability. And since the qualifier 'democratic' requires that political power be equally distributed, this means that value consensus presupposes a consensus of interests. It follows that if powerful groups alone can effect political change or stability, then common interests and not common values are necessary for democratic stability. Without this condition of the common interest, ideas of universal justice, political

citizenship and social equality, would be so much dross in the state of chaos.

If, so far, the argument that congruence theory is sloppy social science, even though not all theorists in this tradition are "bad" social scientists, is accepted, then we must look elsewhere for an explanation of these obvious deficiencies. My view is that hidden assumptions (presuppositions, 'Background' or 'Domain assumptions', whatever term is preferred) predetermine the conception of what is problematic in empirical enquiry. This is by no means an original idea (see for example, Runciman, 1965b; Barry, 1970: 173-180; and in more general terms Stretton, 1972: Chapter 5). What I am suggesting, as part of my main argument, is that these presuppositions have rather more far-reaching consequences than is often supposed; that the hidden liberal assumptions embodied in congruence theory, take the legitimacy of liberal democratic regimes as a given, and by conceptual slight-of-hand convert the ethical problem of the nature of political authority, into an empirical problem of political stability or persistence. And given the presuppositions of modernisation theory (Parsons, 1971; Lipset, 1964; and Dahl, 1966: 361) the defence of indirect democracy (Lipset, 1963: Chapter 3; Nordlinger, 1967; Medding, 1969) and formal political rights (Bendix, 1966; Sharpe, 1973b) political stability readily becomes democratic stability.

If this line of reasoning is correct, then it should be possible to demonstrate the existence of similar presuppositions underlying the Marxist problematic. Indeed, until recently it could be claimed that Marxist theory simply replaced the liberal assumption of universal social justice with that of class conflict. Marx had in fact propounded the view that values were the product of material

interests, the central proposition of the theory of knowledge which overturned traditional epistemology. Political culture, for Marx, was the opposite of that claimed by Bourgeois theorists. It signified an attempt to impute general principles of order, social justice, and equality, to the State as representing the 'general will', when in fact in Marx view, the state acted on behalf of the ruling-class alone. Political culture in these terms become synonymous with 'false consciousness', a set of false ideas and values which, in conveying a distorted view of political reality, was instrumental in maintaining the political allegiance of the proletariat. But just as the liberal imputation of consensual values in support of democracy are taken to be sufficient grounds for its legitimacy, the classical Marxist view of false consciousness was equally defective as an explanation of democratic stability (Mann, 1970; Hamilton, 1972: Chapter 1 and 12; Barry, 1970: 97). There remained the problem of specifying the causal mechanism which created a value-consensus, free or constrained, in support of democracy.

These two opposed views of the role of ideas in serving political order point to rather important consequences in the modern world. If the modification of classic democratic theory (Runciman, 1965b; Sharpe, 1973b) is not to lead to its total abandonment, then it must be shown that the liberal assumptions of indirect democracy advanced by the elitists are, in practice, still compatible with popular consent. If however, it appears that the so-called supportive values or democracy are insignificant as sources of democratic stability, or are themselves the product of state persistence or propaganda, then mass support is clearly not sufficient grounds for the claim that democratic regimes are legitimate. The crucial test of these two normative traditions rests upon the existence of political freedom, a question begged by

both congruence and constraint theories. By political freedom I mean essentially, freedom of political choice, a term which needs to be defined more closely. Instead of the liberal assumption of 'rational-activist' man, contrasted with that of 'false-consciousness', we must consider whether or not freedom-of-choice is a condition which can be identified empirically. I believe this to be so.

As a general proposition I would say that the freedom-of-choice of an individual to act politically goes beyond the formal citizenship rights of elections, oppositions, information and so on (cf. Dahl, 1970: 11) to include the ability to first rationally assess the systems effectiveness; second, to be able to participate equally in political bargaining, and third, if the system is ineffective in the long-term, to be able to participate equally in changing it.

These conditions are no more or less than those held to be operative by congruence theorists, or in-operative by Marxists. I conclude this part of my argument with the point that neither congruence nor constraint theories to date have been successful in stating the problem of legitimacy in causal terms capable of empirical test. Nevertheless, some promising signs are evident (Mann, 1970; Darkin, 1966; 1972; Pateman, 1971; Jessop, 1972; Stacey and Green, 1971).

2. The Test of Legitimacy

If the legitimacy of the state can be defined as resting upon the freedom of individuals to test its effectiveness and if necessary to change it, we need some proof of personal freedom. It is not adequate to point to levels of political activity, since individual passivity can mean one of two things; that the system is effective or that it is not, and that the individual lacks the freedom and power to change it. Though it is possible to demonstrate that

certain social groups participate less in politics in the U. S. and Britain, one cannot say whether lack of power precedes or follows lack of participation (Pateman, 1971; Form and Huber, 1971; Rose, 1973; Sallach et.al, 1972; Sharpe, 1973a: 17-24). As Sharpe has said of the liberal view; "there are no bad effects in American politics that do not have good causes" (1973b: 155). The requirement of proof then becomes that of testing the three problems of legitimacy outlined at the beginning of Part One. Logically we need to know three things about political values - their nature; their distribution; and their origins.

As we have seen the description of the nature and extent of political beliefs carries with it implied explanations of origins. Parsons and Lipset describe attitudes in terms of pattern variables, but underlying these analytic devices one finds a set of historical generalisations - the evolutionary story. Similarly, Almond and Verba make implicit historical judgements about the nations whose political cultures they survey (see Runciman, 1965b). But not until the later work of Lipset, Nie et.al., and Inkeles, do we find any attempt to trace a causal pattern by actually measuring changes in attitudes relative to changes in socio-economic structure and social organisation. Yet even so, this work falls short of an adequate formulation of the role of values in contributing to democratic outcomes, since the capacity of the state to create democratic values is ignored (Barry, 1970: 88; Pateman, 1971). Similarly, the classification of political values by constraint theorists into 'consensual' or 'conflict' values (Mann, 1970), or dominant, subordinate and radical value-systems (Parkin, 1972) carries with it a theory of origins. This is usually some form of hegemony argument, whereby the dominant institutions representing the ruling-class have been successful in pacifying the working-class

(Miliband, 1969).

Thus one theory posits working-class satisfaction through gradual political and economic mobilisation (e.g. Dahl, 1966: 361), the evidence for which is the ostensibly widespread distribution of allegiant and supportive values within the working-class, developed as a result of the long-term effectiveness of democratic regimes (Lipset, 1969: Chapter 7). The other counters with the claim that the centralisation and homogenisation of institutions within complex industrial nations prevents the emergence of a radical working-class culture. The test of these two opposing viewpoints of working-class support in Anglo-American democracies must therefore be directed at showing what values exist in the social periphery, how they are distributed among different groups, and the manner in which they have developed. Some steps in this direction have been taken by constraint theorists in recent years, notably Jessop (1972) and Parkin (1972) who have sketched a general model of the institutional forces, both national and local which combine to shape political culture in the working-class. But explanation of this sort needs to be approached historically, since as Runciman puts it "history furnishes the explanation for correlations, not correlations for History" (1965b: 183). This task requires the analysis of the development of political culture particularly in the social periphery, together with the present-day social institutions which foster and maintain political attitudes (cf. Emy, 1972). We want to be able to ask and attempt to answer such questions as: why it is that a majority of electors in Liberal Democracies have learnt what can be termed an 'irrational' support for a system which in objective terms treats them unequally (Runciman, 1965b; Pateman, 1971: 298; Form and Huber, 1971; Sharpe, 1973b; Hamilton, 1972: Chapter 1; Rose, 1973: 485) leaves them largely unaware

of the actual workings of politics (Pateman, 1971: 297; Hennessy, 1970; Emy, 1972: 27-29), and discriminates against groups who cannot organise (Form and Huber, 1971; Sallach, et.al, 1972; Schattschneider, 1960: 34-35) or have experienced threats and punishments in the past (Pateman, 1971: 302; Apter, 1966: Introduction). Is it perhaps that traditional 'diffuse' values incorporated in the political culture, provide 'symbolic' rewards for disadvantaged groups in the periphery? Can it be, despite Lipset's claim that a system cannot remain legitimate unless effective in the long-term, that the modern state has, independently of its effectiveness, the means of reinforcing traditional socio-political deference through powerful appeals to national unity and the national interest? On the other hand, it is possible that allegiant groups in the periphery demonstrate an historical wisdom in support of a state which offers them some hope of long-term social advancement (cf. Kavanagh, 1971; Sharpe, 1973b). In a sentence, the test must show whether or not the deferential sections of the working-class have become middle-class, or simply think of themselves as middle-class.

3. A Case Study

A critique of the limitations of the 'political culture' approach to democratic stability and legitimacy is not complete without some suggestions for improvements. The direction in which improvement should be sought is in a specific test of both theory and method. In the first place the terms of a theory of the place of values in democracy should be clearly stated. This requires the selection of a particular state which can be defined as democratic, and stable, and in which it is possible to observe the institutional sources that shape values. New Zealand fits these requirements, being high among so-called stable

democracies, if not the most stable (Hurwitz, 1972). It has also been regarded as highly legitimate, in fact "locked into legitimacy" (Rose, 1969). It should be possible then, to develop a model of the historical process by which this 'legitimacy' came about, and in particular the role of the working-class in supporting the state. This would include tracing the various sources of political values and institutions, the subsequent development of the nation-building state as a dominant force in shaping cultural values, and accounting for the effect of socio-economic development and rising standards-of-living upon political values. Thus the three major variables which must be included in any explanation of the independent causal role of values can be specified and 'measured' over an historical period (cf. Horowitz, 1970). If, for example we find that for certain periods the effectiveness of the state in sustaining economic growth and opportunities for social mobility generates 'specific' support within the periphery, it is fair to assume that the state is legitimized by its own effectiveness. If on the other hand, it can be shown that under conditions of ineffectiveness, e.g. depression, peripheral groups continue to support the state we must seek an explanation elsewhere. Three sources of diffuse support may be involved; traditional support justified by experience; the threat of coercion or destitution; or the propagandist appeals of the state. The question of how it is possible to sort out the separate effects of these different sources of 'specific' and 'diffuse' support raises the problem of method. This however, will be met as it arises in later chapters. The second part of this thesis, then, is concerned with the development and testing of a model of political legitimation with specific reference to New Zealand.

PART TWO

The New Zealand Case

"This conception of history, therefore, rests on the exposition of the real process of production, starting out from the simple material production of life, and on to the comprehension of the form of intercourse connected with and created by this mode of production, i.e. of civil society in its various stages as the basis of all history, and also in its action as the State. From this starting point, it explains all the different theoretical productions and forms of consciousness, religion, philosophy, ethics etc., and traces their origins and growth, by which means the matter can of course be displayed as a whole (and consequently, also the reciprocal action of these various sides on one another.)"

Karl Marx

"For a class to be ripe for hegemony means that its interests and consciousness enable it to organise the whole of society in accordance with those interests. The crucial question in every class struggle is this: which class possesses this capacity and this consciousness at the decisive moment ? "

Georg Lukacs

SEVEN :

The Unmaking of the Working Class

1. A Model of Legitimacy

The second part of this thesis is devoted to the development and testing of a model of legitimacy derived from the analysis in the first part. The use of the term "model" should be cautious but unapologetic. One should not try to claim that it is much more than "an old-fashioned clothes-horse on which any old country could hang its wet clothes in some kind of order" (Crick, 1973). The model as it is sketched in Chapter Eight therefore provides only the bare outlines of a complex of forces which contribute to the shaping of political beliefs and values. Although the emphasis is always upon the 'politics' of the working-class (defined in Section 5 below) rather than stress exclusively 'class' terms or social relations, the model is based upon Shils (1961) concept of Centre and Periphery, and in particular Jessop's (1972) elaboration of this concept. The choice was made for the reason that Shils recognises the importance of values in sustaining the power of the "ruling class" which makes the concept well suited to the analysis of legitimacy and at the same time capable of incorporating both congruence and constraint models of the role of political culture. As Stolzman (1974) has put it:

"Shils, the wayward Parsonian... has neither clung stubbornly to his original brand of normative functionalism nor blindly jumped on the conflict bandwagon. Instead (he) has endeavoured to rescue the classical consensual view of society from its current state of disrepute by fusing it with tenets derived from the conflict framework" 2(3).

By summarising the consensual and conflict elements in Shils approach, we can readily see how representative his general framework is of both congruence and constraint models of political legitimation. In terms of interests, Shils sees society as unequal with the ruled dominated by the rulers. Consensus in-so-far as it is necessary need be shared only by those with power. Similarly, the ruled need only minimally recognise the legitimacy of the state so long as they accept their subordinate position. Yet, both rulers and ruled obey some transcendental law in affirming the central values of the society. The rulers "need to do what is right in accordance with some higher law" while the ruled need to "see order", their "position as meaningful" and deprivation just and necessary (1968: 15-16). Since Shils is sufficiently intelligent and realistic to know that subordinates do not in material terms alone consent to their subordinate status, he makes the traditional idealist leap to some transcendental power which will render the social system authoritative (Stoltzman, 1974).

Notwithstanding Shils clear conservatism in begging the problem of legitimacy (cf. Warner, 1973) in the hands of Jessop this defect in his general framework is corrected. The efforts of elites to legitimate their authority by manipulation of subjects interests and values can then be acknowledged and observed. Adapting the Shils-Jessop model then, I assume first, that values and information are disseminated from central and peripheral institutions which act as competitive pressures upon individuals. Second, with the rise of the nation state it is assumed that the dominance of central institutions over peripheral institutions will increase, reducing the influence of peripheral sources of political learning. Third, as well as centre and periphery, I define two distinct agencies of political learning, positional

and communicative (See Chapter Ten, Section One).

This sort of axiomatic treatment leads to a number of propositions concerning the relative influence of positional and communicative agencies in both the centre and periphery. For example, members of the social centre (elites) are likely to be exposed to the same set of centre values through both positional and communicative agencies. Within the marginal centre, however, strains will exist between the dominant 'utilitarian' centre values disseminated by communicative agencies and non-utilitarian values associated with certain religious, ideological or sub-cultural movements. Hence the rise of 'progressive' or middle-class radical movements in the Nineteenth century seeking to modify the Social Darwinist excesses of laissez faire capitalism. Similarly, the classic case of cross-pressuring in the working-class, between positional values of 'class' which arise out of common work, kinship or community experience, and the dominant communicative values of 'nation' and 'race' which emanate from the centre. This model makes it possible to interpret the likely sources of both consensual and conflicting values in the political culture, in particular as they effect the working-class.

To complicate matters the effect of past or historical influences transmitted across generations must be considered. For example the cultural 'traces' which persist in upwardly or downwardly mobile groups, and the working-class or middle-class 'traditions' which become relatively permanent fixtures in the political culture (See Chapter Nine). Similarly, within generations, the socialisation process is a combination of a number of positional and communicative influences such as neighbourhood, reference-groups, education and party support (See Chapter Ten). In general this model of the legitimisation process allows

us to take apart and put back together again much of the available knowledge of New Zealand social history, and of the contemporary social system.

Clearly however, an adequate model is one which must include all causally relevant factors in the development of New Zealand society. To apply and test such a model is probably beyond the resources of one individual, and certainly outside the scope of this thesis. I have therefore narrowed down the focus somewhat to the consideration of the inter-relations between the 'mainstream' political culture and 'working-class' political culture. In tracing this link it was necessary to write an interpretative essay on the historical impact of the state on political culture during the developmental phase, (Chapter Nine) before proceeding to an analysis of the contemporary political culture. The intention was that both the historical and the contemporary survey methodology would enable me to make equally necessary and valid tests of the legitimation model. One of the deficiencies of contemporary research into political culture is the absence of an historical perspective. For example, how far is it possible to understand the current nature and extent of working-class culture without some knowledge of the role of the state in imposing a dominant bourgeois culture upon the periphery? As it happens historians and political scientists or varying interests have contributed a number of partial explanations of the failure of working-class consciousness to emerge in the European-settled colonies. But lacking any theoretical framework these explanations are in one way or other deficient. Before embarking upon model-building and testing, it is necessary to examine these partial theories and their underlying perspectives, and to attempt the formulation of a more adequate general approach to the historical processes involved in the 'unmaking' of the New Zealand working-class.

2. Some Partial Explanations

In general there are three sorts of explanations offered by historians and political scientists to account for the failure of a working-class revolutionary consciousness in the British settled colonies. The first focuses upon values, the second on economic mobility, and the third on national integration. I propose to discuss them separately and then show how they can be understood as related aspects of the familiar congruence model of political legitimacy.

The values explanation is most commonly identified with Louis Hartz and the idea of cultural 'fragments' (1964). Hartz accounts for the historical development of European colonies in terms of a "mechanistic process" whereby cultural fragments are detached from the European parent culture and take on unique characteristics (1964: 5-6). The new fragment 'escapes' the 'whole' and becomes immobile or fixed in isolation, but at the same time is free to 'unfold' its own "interior development" (6). The time at which the fragment escapes determines its future outcome, since ^{it}_^ is able to develop without a 'past', that is without the contradictions or antagonisms of European society. According to Hartz, Australia (and by implication New Zealand) was settled late, by middle-class and labour radicals who took with them their new-won rights and democratic ideals. Having freed themselves of the 'past' and representing the most radical development of European ideology, there was nothing to prevent the emergence of a strong labour movement, the early success of a Labour Party, and experiments in state socialism (1964: 40-43). The radical fragment since it was uninhibited, constituted the European bourgeois revolution at its fullest extent, forestalling fatefully the emergence of a 'European' socialism. Australia, completed the bourgeois revolution by

escaping the past, but in doing so 'stifled the future' (1964: 6; Rosecrance, 1964: 300).

Holt has correctly pointed to the main weaknesses of this thesis. In the first place Hartz makes a false distinction between 'bourgeois' and 'radical' fragments. He identified 'radical' with socialist rhetoric and in contrast to U. S. conservatism (1973: 8). Hartz like many others was too impressed by the slogans of 'state socialism' in Australia to see the obvious connection between the radicalism he described, and the essentially conservative pursuit of bourgeois values of individual achievement. Clearly, Hartz had made the assumption that Labour movements and Governments were something other than bourgeois.

"Is it", Holt asks, "a matter of fundamental importance that in the United States socialistic reforms were introduced under a banner of saving capitalism, whereas elsewhere capitalism was saved by men who claimed to be socialists" (1973: 7).

For regardless of intention and ideology, the effect was the same. Nevertheless, despite this misattribution of 'class', Hartz's idea of the radical fragment foreclosing on the socialist options of the future is worth pursuing. But not without recognising the second flaw.

Hartz's description of a "mechanistic process" of "interior development", which unfolds, which "develops without inhibition", which has "fateful consequences for future conservatism" (1964: 5-9), smacks of a single-factor determinism (Holt, 1973: 6). A fragment which "becomes a universal, sinking beneath the surface of thought to the level of an assumption" or which is "transformed into a new nationalism" (1964: 5) gives little room for any other causal process; in particular, the impact of

the frontier of opportunity and upward mobility, or the role of the state. According to Rosecrance, it was the radicalism of the Australian culture which took over the state as the 'instrument' of social opportunity (1964: 287-303) creating new frontiers (cf. Coleman, 1958: 235). Clearly, culture is regarded as the prime cause preceding both state intervention and national development. There are therefore two elements to the Hartz thesis corresponding to the paradox of the fragment, which might apply to the New Zealand case. The first, is that the radical fragment freed from European culture is able to complete the bourgeois revolution and by 'social osmosis' continually 'declass' the working-class. The second is the tendency for the fragment to constitute a universal assumption, an ideology of nationalism, culminating in a petit bourgeois 'immobilism' (1964: 1-2). Hartz's thesis then is open to both congruence and constraint interpretations, depending upon which element has the most impact on working-class consciousness.

A second partial explanation with considerable appeal is the idea of the Frontier. There are three aspects of the Frontier thesis. First, that which after Turner, stresses the general influence of the frontier upon the bourgeois ethos of individualism and liberty (Turner, 1962: 320; Garhard, 1959).

This conception of a frontier ethos however has given way in recent years to more economic and demographic interpretations, the safety-valve (Hofstadter, 1968a: 3-8; Shannon, 1968: 172-186; Thernstrom, 1969) and economic growth (Murphy and Zellner, 1968) theories in particular. In terms of its impact upon the working-class these three interpretations imply the possibility of both constraint and congruence effects. The ethos of the frontier generates a myth of freedom and self-reliance which becomes part of the national

consciousness; second, the labour safety-valve argument, that the idea of the rural frontier has to be extended to include the later urban frontiers of industry, commerce and education, since clearly the rural frontier had no direct impact upon the working-class in America (Thernstrom, 1969). Translated into New Zealand terms, there is all the more reason to stress the urban frontier as the mobility safety-valve, for not only the working-class but elements of the middle-class unable to get on the land (cf. Burt, 1957; Sharp, 1955). The third argument is more general, pointing to the effect of the frontier on economic expansion and capital investment, increasing aggregate wealth and living standards. The test of the frontier idea as an explanation of the failure of working-class consciousness lies therefore in three areas. First, did a belief in mobility (independent of actual mobility) help to integrate the working-class into the middle-class fold? Second, was there direct evidence of actual working-class upward-mobility in each occupational sphere? Third, how far has economic development and absolute rising incomes satisfied working-class interests? As we shall see a number of frontiers have opened and closed in New Zealand history, beginning with gold, and moving through land, industry, commerce and most recently to education (cf. Oliver, 1969). As each avenue of self-advancement closed a new one opened up, or partially so. The question remains, how far was the opening of frontiers by the state the product of radical democratic values (Coleman, 1958) and to what extent did the new frontiers generate and sustain radical democratic attitudes? And in the case of the working-class it needs to be shown how far upward mobility, rising standards of living, and the ethos of opportunity, contributed to undermining working-class consciousness and pacifying working-class discontent.

A third partial explanation of the absence of socialism is that which stresses the importance of national unity or integration. Karl Deutsch has developed a theory of national integration based upon an infrastructure of cultural communication.

"In the political and social struggles of the modern age, nationality then means an alignment of large numbers of individuals from the middle and lower classes, linked to regional centres and leading social groups by channels of social communication and economic intercourse, both indirectly from link to link and directly with the centre" (1953: 75).

According to Deutsch the factors which combine to break-down class divisions and integrate the working-class into the national community are: "fuller-opportunities, not merely in words but in substance" (that is to say, not merely the myth but the reality of frontiers), "a political and economic stake in the country, security and prestige", "social reforms" and "high wages" (1953: 73). When such conditions are met, the "ties of language, culture and tradition may thus outweigh the barriers of class" (1953: 72).

Although these conditions clearly need to be specified in order to demonstrate 'how much' of each is necessary or sufficient to enable 'nation' to over-come 'class', the theory is a one-way street going from economic development to social mobilisation to national identity. The possibility that nationalism may short-circuit this process, and spring up around the "words" rather than the "substance" of opportunity is overlooked. While the national integration theory clearly presupposes the existence of the 'frontier' of national development, it focuses upon the institutional infrastructure whereby a community is bound vertically from periphery to centre by communication links which cut across the horizontal lines of class identity. Here we have a useful model

of the Nation-building process in New Zealand and the emergence of the centralised state administrative apparatus. Again, it remains to be seen whether or not the state in consolidating a sense of nationality and community merely followed the frontier conditions; whether or not it was instrumental in eroding class-consciousness by intervention in the economy; and whether or not it was able to foster a sense of nationhood out of the myth rather than the reality of the frontier, the words rather than the substance of opportunity.

3. Congruence and Constraint Again

In summary these partial explanations need to be combined as a more comprehensive multi-factor explanation. Clearly the fragment thesis is insufficient in itself to explain working-class deference since it excludes the effect of upward mobility. But neither is the frontier theory sufficient, since it cannot account for working-class groups who, without evidence of upward mobility, remain conservative. And if the nationalism explanation is to be invoked to explain the deviant case of passive workers who are denied opportunity, then clearly it must be a nationalism based upon the appeal of words or myth. The essential weakness of all three partial explanations is in their inability to account for sources of 'conservatism' or 'deference' which arise other than out of the satisfaction of individual self-interest. The possibility of constraint or coercion is not invoked seriously as an explanation of the failure of working-class radicalism in the White-settled colonies for ideological rather than empirical reasons.

This is not surprising since historians and political scientists bound by the norms of 'liberal' scholarship are no more likely to find the issue of

legitimacy 'problematic' than are consensus sociologists. In fact, if we lump the three partial theories together we get an approximation of the congruence model complete with ideological attachments. What is the radical bourgeois fragment but the pattern-variables in another guise? The modern political culture both escaped and was diffused, either way by Hartz's 'interior development' or Parsons-Lipset's 'evolutionary differentiation', it remains the determinism of ideas. Or to put it in Almond and Verba's terms, the 'petit-bourgeois fragment' was a part of the Nineteenth century British 'civic' culture, and no doubt revealed a balance of citizen and subject orientations. Following this lead, we should be able to see how far it is possible to pursue a line of cultural determinism.

Next we can consider the frontier thesis in both its indirect and direct safety-valve versions. The creation of opportunities for upward mobility fits in with the congruence idea of affluence as a modernising influence. Similarly, an increasing standard of living, parallels the idea of embourgeoisment and the spread of secular political values. Here then is a second possible source of the New Zealand political culture. If, as Nordlinger claims, liberal democracies run on pluralists lines, represent all interest groups equally, then we should expect to find a balance of citizen and subject orientations on both sides of the party-line. The third and final aspect of the congruence model corresponds to Deutsch's idea of national integration. The linking of the periphery with the centre by channels of communication facilitates the growth of active civic orientations of citizens to the regime, and its input and output institutions. The important point however is that this national unity is seen as the result of a growing bond between a satisfied people with a 'stake' in the community. Deutsch's theory of national inte-

gration offers an excellent framework for the analysis of this possible origin of a national political culture.

But as we have seen, these partial explanations precisely because they are subsumed under the congruence model and its normative assumptions, do not take the legitimacy of the state in New Zealand to be problematic. The possibility of state hegemony (all the more curiously because of the prominence of Statism in New Zealand history) has not been invoked seriously as an explanation of the failure of working-class consciousness in New Zealand. In my view this represents the bias of Liberal Historiography in choosing to emphasise concepts of nationality, formal citizenship rights, equal opportunity and upward mobility, in preference to concepts of colonial dependence, social class, political inequality and restricted opportunity. The other 'face' of society, that of constraint, that of the 'universal assumption', the frontier ethos, and the 'opportunity of words' remains out of sight.

4. Sociology and History

While it is axiomatic that an adequate social science must include the study of history (Mills, 1961: 143-176; Barrington Moore, 1969: Part 3; Goldmann, 1969; Nisbet, 1969; Tilly, 1970; Lipset, 1968), much sociology and political science has misused and continues to misuse History (Clark, 1962: 238-242). Generally two charges can be made against social scientists, that their work is ahistorical or anti-historical (Hofstadter, 1968b: 12-13). The former simply means that history is ignored, and need not concern us here. Much more serious is the charge that history is deliberately falsified, oversimplified, or misunderstood. In particular this charge is levelled, rightly, at evolutionary, and other forms

of sociological grand-theory (See Birnbaum, 1971: 81-93; Nisbet, 1969: 251-267). As we have seen in the case of the congruence theorists, the misuse of history follows directly from the assumptions made about the nature of change. Whether functionalist or Marxist the emphasis is upon certain key forces or evolutionary principles which push all societies through a general sequence of events from 'traditional' to 'modern', 'feudal' to 'capitalist' and so on. Secondly, Bourgeois social science insists on treating nation states as the units of social analysis (Davis, 1971: 12-32). Attempts to discover the dynamics of 'national' development have then become lost among a haze of evolutionary universals, or a welter of middling-range concepts such as pattern-variables, fragments, frontiers, and nationalism. Indeed, Lipset in his recent discussion of the subject suggests that:

"If much of comparative history and sociology seeks to point out, and account for, variations among nations, this emphasis may also lead to highlighting the effects of common experiences and factors. Thus, in recent years, a number of studies have sought to specify the conditions facing "new" nations or other post-revolutionary societies which seek to establish legitimacy, to find a basis for national linguistic and value consensus, so as to have a stable national society which does not rest on force, or which will not come apart during the strains of major crises" (1968: 45).

Note the explicit model of the international system comprising both 'old' and 'new' nations. Despite the use of the term 'revolution', the emphasis upon common factors and national consensus betrays an evolutionary-comparative perspective. What is anti-historical about this treatment of the past, is the insistence that nation states are the proper unit of analysis and that each can be located in a pattern-variable grid, or similar ideal-typology, which then establishes its place

in the evolutionary sequence (Davis, 1971: 15-17; Gunder Frank, 1971).

It is significant then, that recent major advances in historiography, particularly in the West, should have come not from the normal process of academic revision, but from a shift in ideological perspective (Bernstein, 1969; Hobsbawm, 1972; Stedman Jones, 1972; McQueen, 1970). The foremost advocates of the return to 'classic social analysis' have almost without exception drawn upon aspects of Marxist social theory and method in order to reconstruct 'national' or 'international' history (Barrington Moore, 1969; Genovese, 1969; Stedman Jones, 1971; Davis, 1971; McQueen, 1970). An example of such an approach is offered by a group of Canadian scholars, one of whom has said:

"it is time to emphasize the historical, holistic, and comparative approach of classic social analysis in our studies of Canadian society" (Davis, 1971: 17)

since any explanation of 'national' development must be seen:

"in terms of capitalism evolving under unique domestic, geographic and international conditions - a perspective applicable to any (other) capitalist society with appropriate modifications in the components" (Davis, 1971: 21).

Of the White-settled nations, New Zealand is one of the few relatively untouched by this trend. Sinclair's (1966) article on New Zealand Historiography consists largely of a descriptive summary of changes in history-writing fashion, coming not from 'conflicting viewpoints within society' but from the 'progress of research itself' (1966: 178). It seems that orthodox history in New Zealand has remained under the influence of Reeves "Long Pink Cloud" (1966:

179) and that the 'current debates' up to the early sixties at least, did not disturb the unwritten assumptions of the Liberal Tradition. Two important works which appeared in the period Sinclair surveys did however foreshadow a confrontation of Liberal and Marxist Historiography. Writing in 1936 Beaglehole used the term 'capitalist democracy' to which he added the footnote:

"The introduction of this concept - justly, as I think - logically demands an analysis of capitalism in New Zealand. Such analysis is impossible within the scope of a general historical essay; but the student who carries it out will make an essential contribution to the understanding of the country. I do not suggest that the balance of economic and political forces in New Zealand is identical with that in, say, Great Britain; or that the voices of capitalism have ever locally been raised in unison - a theory on which the controversy over high exchange would certainly cast some doubt. Nor do I argue that for the purposes of political science the Dominion dairy-farmer is interchangeable with the European factory-worker" (1936: f.132).

Beaglehole never got around to the analysis of capitalism in New Zealand, nor did Willis Airey (1955) whose highly perceptive but compressed essay on New Zealand's foreign policy, social development and current world trends, outlined the brief for a Marxist Historiography of the future. Since then, Oliver alone, has shown some willingness to broach the issues and themes familiar abroad. In a number of papers (1964, 1969, 1971) Oliver adopts a conceptual as opposed to a narrative style (See Stedman Jones, 1972). The conceptual schema he outlines includes the explanatory items 'fragment', 'frontier' and 'network of social communication', and the themes of centre-periphery, class-conflict and reconciliation, and the growth of state bureaucracy. Nevertheless, Oliver's thrust is from the national centre to the local periphery, towards a revision of 'national'

history in terms of the diversity of regional responses to the centre (1971). Despite the borrowing of sociological concepts and methods, Oliver's framework of analysis remains within the consensus tradition, lacking the promise of a comparative methodology. Yet only by the adoption of such a general perspective of 'national development', of 'capitalism in New Zealand' can national history become meaningful. This is no more clear than in the debate over the meaning of social "class".

5. "Class" and "class consciousness"

In recent years historians and others have taken-up again the question of social class in New Zealand history (Sinclair, 1965, 1969, 197 ; McGee, 1969; Garrett, 1970; Oliver, 1969, 1971; Olssen, 1974; Bedggood, 1974). How far has this debate followed a predictable pattern? In the first place, with the exception of Airey (1955), no New Zealand historian has viewed social class in Marxist terms; that is, defining a proletariat in terms of the relations of production regardless of whether 'it' is conscious or not (See Lukacs, 1971; Dos Santos, 1970; Bertaux, 1972; Poulantzas, 1972, 1973). Following Reeves in the 'liberal tradition', they have rejected the necessary existence of a proletariat and rendered its appearance conditional upon evidence of so-called 'class-conflict'. Thus Sinclair (1965) discovers the existence of a proletariat in the 'conflict' of 1890, and Oliver (1969) failing to find a persistent or significant revolutionary class-consciousness, fails to find a working-class. Both misconceptions flow directly from the lack of an adequate analytic framework, itself the consequence of an established tradition reaching from the middle-class radicalism of the Nineteenth century, which subordinated 'class' to 'nation' (Hamer, 1963; Simpson, 1974) through Fabianism and Social Imperialism, which

identified the state as the embodiment of the general will (Airey, 1955; Sinclair, 1965: 100-104), to the current myth of a "classless" or "one-class" nation (cf. Stedman Jones, 1972; McQueen, 1973).

However, a limited interest in "class" as a periodic or incidental feature of New Zealand history has remained. Sinclair referred to the dispute of 1890 as class-conflict in order to show Reeves as being in the "vanguard of the Proleteriate" (1965: 306). But his use of the term "class" is misleading, since it is clear that he is referring to nothing more than a moderate trade-union movement with petit-bourgeois objectives. The 'class' reconciliation Sinclair attributes to Reeves is therefore at most a reduction in tension between a petit-bourgeois-oriented working-class and the capitalist class (Oliver, 1969). Even so, there is reason to believe that in fact Reeves did no more than seal a fate already determined by a victorious capitalist class (Airey, 1955; See Chapter Nine pp. 175-181).

Olssen in defence of Sinclair's use of the concept of 'class', has also taken as his definition of the working-class certain occupational categories (1974: 47). Here he follows Western political sociologists in defining class wholly in terms of external, objective and usually statistical criteria (cf. Hamilton, 1972: 188-238). Olssen then defines working-class consciousness as the ideas and interests of manual workers (45-46). As we would expect, the ideals and interests of the New Zealand working class, circa 1900, are found to be essentially petit-bourgeois, subordinate to the dominant meritocratic political culture of capitalism (48). Olssen explicitly sets out to define class in non-Marxist terms, and attributes the absence of a revolutionary class-consciousness to the absence of a large industrial work-force (1974: 53).

It is for this reason, to clarify the meaning of the term 'class', that McQueen (1972) uses the terms proletarian and petit-bourgeois, rather than militant and moderate, or reformist and revolutionary, to differentiate working-class consciousness from 'false-consciousness'. Proletarian consciousness signifies the Marxist conception of the working-class as conscious of its opposition to capitalism, as distinct from petit-bourgeois consciousness which includes both moderate and militant strategies of 'collaboration' with capitalism. Of New Zealand historians, Oliver (1969) alone is prepared to define class-consciousness in such terms, but only to make a non-Marxist observation that the absence of proletarian class-consciousness is evidence of the absence of a proletariat. He is right in demonstrating an absence of class-consciousness, though his explanation is probably wrong (See Chapter Nine, pp. 180-1), but one cannot infer the non-existence of 'class' from the absence of 'consciousness' (See Rinehart, 1972; Zloczower, 1972).

In my view, the rather slight debate over the meaning of the term 'class' in New Zealand history demonstrates the need for a cultural analysis (as well as the conventional socio-economic analysis) of centre and peripheral groups within the overall structure of international capitalism (Birnbaum, 1971: 94-129; cf. Baker, 1973). In the first place it is necessary to locate the New Zealand class structure in the context of the international class structure. In the second place, the multiple contributing causes of the failure of a genuine proletarian consciousness of any significance can only be understood as the product of 'total history', a dialectic involving the economy, ideas, and the 'nationalising' institutions of the state (cf. Petrus, 1971). In order to demonstrate these relations, three major institutional processes must be traced and un-

ravelled. The first concerns change in economic forces which affects the rate of objective exploitation, or the relative distribution of resources between centre and peripheral groups. The second concerns the cultural forces which shape the subjective perception of exploitation or inequality between centre and periphery. Here we can expect to find the clash between an emerging developmental ideology emanating from the centre, and the resistance of peripheral 'radical' perceptions of class and exchange relations. The third and most important strand, is the interventionist role of the 'nation-building state', which from the outset regulated conditions of economic and population growth, and rapidly established a bureaucratic command of the reward and opportunity structures.

The historical conjunctions of these three interwoven strands gives rise to discrepancies between 'objective' and 'subjective' inequality, which, in the developmental phase, led to social movements forcing the state to 'open' new frontiers of opportunity and legislate equality of access. Beyond a certain point (however imperceptible in time and place) the fusion of the dominant central institutions with the state apparatus, together with the fragmentation and isolation of peripheral institutions, succeeded in separating the consciousness of exploitation from the experience of it. From this point, the state came to exercise hegemonic control not only of the economy, but of the economic and social interests and values of its subjects.

EIGHT:

The Legitimation Process


1. Review

In this chapter I propose to draw together elements of both the congruence and constraint models of political culture in an attempt to derive a model of the process of political legitimation in New Zealand. The term "legitimation process" has been adopted to signify the primary focus upon the nature of support for a political regime, not to imply that support is necessarily evidence of a regime's legitimacy. It should be clear that the defects in the congruence model are largely the consequence of its failure to specify the nature and extent of value congruence as either a necessary or sufficient condition of political stability, and its inability to take account of the origins of supportive values. The typical conception of the causal process linking political culture with system stability is usually expressed as:

Socio-
economic ———→ social- ———→ values ———→ stability
development isation

Parsons, Almond and Verba, and Nordlinger, for example, do not allow for the possibility of reciprocal causal influence between regime and values over historical periods. This point has been made clear in the recent work of Lipset and Rokkan, who attempt to trace the cultural bases of support for European regimes back to the Eighteenth century (1967: 13). They explicitly include the role of


party-systems and electoral law as factors contributing to political culture. Hence:



In Lipset and Rokkan's schema however, the reciprocal effects of party-systems which incorporate constitutional values of opposition, periodic elections, and formal representation, severely restricts the capacity of the regime to influence political culture to the outputs of "formal" political institutions (1967: 1-6). The implicit assumption remains, that persistently non-effective political performance will in time forfeit any form of 'legitimacy' based upon diffuse support. Rose for example makes this assumption clear. He uses the term "authority" to mean the range of "relationships between regimes and the populations from which they seek obedience and allegiance" (1969: 604). Authority may be based upon mixtures of "compliance" and "support", where support is defined as "the enduring and diffuse basis of voluntary obedience to a regime's regulations" (604). In agreement with Lipset, he regards "diffuse support" to be crucial in a time of political crises (605). But, he points out this proposition lacks empirical substance, since research has so far failed to specify either the minimum level of mass support or compliance necessary to maintain a regime, or to differentiate between those particular groups or classes whose continued diffuse support is crucial for the regime. Nevertheless Rose makes the analytical claim that support and compliance are distinct forms of allegiance and that compliance may over a period of time

become "voluntary" support (619). It follows that under adverse conditions 'voluntary support' can also become reduced to compliance, but short of the exercise of political "coercion", Rose like Lipset equates the nature of support in Anglo-American democracies with regime legitimacy. Indeed his concern is mainly with the problems of "new states" and not those "regimes that are already fully legitimate" (612). And these include Britain, the United States, Sweden and New Zealand (608).

By contrast, the constraint theorists recognise that "diffuse support" may continue to exist independently of long-term political ineffectiveness, since under certain conditions the state has the capacity to induce diffuse support by means of propaganda and coercion. This means that the imputed existence of widespread allegiance in the Anglo-American systems does not necessarily confer legitimacy upon such regimes. Following Barry (1970: 90) we get:




In effect this is another way of expressing Easton's model of the political process which stresses the capacity of the system to generate its own diffuse support, independently of its performance in distributing specific rewards equitably. According to Barrington Moore:

"To maintain and transmit a value system, human beings are punched, bullied, sent to jail, thrown into concentration camps, cajoled, bribed, made into heroes, encouraged to read newspapers, stood up against the wall and shot, and sometimes even taught sociology" (1966: 486).

However, since the causal process has by now become extremely complex, the prospect of estimating the relative causal significance of values as a stabilising force has become that much more difficult (Barry, 1970: 95). Nevertheless, as Barry suggests;

"we need not write off a circular process like this as completely beyond the reach of empirical check" (1970: 95).

But to make matters even more complicated any model of the long-term development of political culture in states which have only recently (or are still in the process of modernisation) attained what are loosely described as the "favourable conditions" for democracy (Barry, 1970: 94), we have to take into account the intervention of the state in creating such favourable conditions. Thus, schematically, putting together the Lipset-Rokkan and the Barry formulae of the causal process, we get:



The New Zealand case clearly falls into this difficult category, since the task of establishing a national consensus around developmental goals has been facilitated by the states intervention in the economy and the imposition of a framework of conflict-resolution managed by a state administrative apparatus. In few

nations have debates over political ends been so rapidly and completely transformed into debates over administrative means. It is perhaps this fact which lead Rose to refer to New Zealand as a regime "locked-into" full legitimacy (Rose, 1969: 608).

Before any attempt can be made to apply this model to the development of political culture in New Zealand it is necessary to consider its terms and assumptions, together with the propositions derived from the model in more detail. In doing so, I rely heavily upon Jessop's (1972) recent exposition of Shils (1961) Centre-Periphery model of political order.

2. The Centre-Periphery Model

Jessop's purpose is to construct a "new" conceptual framework of the conditions of social order from the congruence, constraint and exchange models of the social system (1972: Chapter 3). The three key concepts in his framework are power, exchange and institutionalisation. These phenomena are analysed structurally in terms of their unequal distribution along a Centre-Periphery continuum. Jessop defines the centre as:

"the structural aspect of power (which) comprises those organisations, groups and individuals (whether incumbents of particular roles or status-sets which provide a special power potential) who exercise most 'power' in a given social system"

and the Periphery as comprising:

"those organisations, groups and individual role incumbents who exercise 'least' power in the society.." (1972: 55).

Such a definition clearly hinges upon a clear under-

standing of the nature of power. According to Jessop power is a:

"generic term for the ability of a given social actor (individual or collective) to constrain another actor (or actors) to do something that he (or they) would not otherwise do" (56).

Power can be exercised in a number of ways; by control over situations (social relations) or expectations, or through positive and negative sanctions. Such a definition allows for an analytical distinction between four power bases. Economic power is based upon the control of material rewards (inducements); that is the control of economic relations between different groups or classes in the productive process. Social power is based upon the control of status expectations (persuasions).

"Status attribution and its concomitant persuasion and influence, operate within a normative framework that defines the relative worth of different roles and collectivities" (67).

That is, social power pre-supposes an existing central value system which lays down normative expectations. Thirdly, political power is defined as control over direct negative sanctions (coercion). Fourthly and most important, cultural power involves the control over the "means of value creation, interpretation and maintenance" (68). Cultural power therefore establishes the ground rules and expectations which condition the effectiveness of material inducements and status-rewards in inherently unequal societies. Since peripheral groups subject to exploitation may reject inducements and status-rewards under certain conditions, social control rests upon a combination of political coercion and cultural dominance. As Jessop states, the role of cultural power, in pre-empting and pre-structuring the nature of conflict

over economic or status-rewards in advanced industrial societies, is increasingly important.

"The development of complex cultural 'technologies' thus combines with increasing power hierarchisation to create the possibility of a social order based upon ideological hegemony rather than physical coercion" (69).

However, such a conception of power and its various bases remains static unless the means by which power is exercised in the form of exchange relations between central and peripheral groups is considered. Exchange is defined as:

"The balance of rewards and costs for each participant in the interaction" (70).

The nature of exchange relationships can vary from extreme exploitation (of the periphery) through reciprocity (equality of income) to benefaction (positive income gains for the periphery). A generalised description of the exchange process between central and periphery groups is given:

"Exchanges between centre and periphery occur whatever the level of intersystemic differentiation. Any examination of these exchanges must avoid identifying a particular concrete group or class with either the centre or the periphery. Such an identification can be made only on empirical grounds after analytical delineation of the nature of centre and periphery. The centre can be defined in terms of its differential control over the production and distribution of resources and the periphery, in terms of its subjection to, and dependence on such control. The centre employs such control to acquire the inputs it needs not only from other systems but also from the peripheral members of its own system. Whereas the centre is motivated by the desire not only for rewards but also for control over the bases of power, the periphery is perforce motivated primarily by its desire for positive rewards and/or avoidance of sanctions. In exchange for its various contributions to the different power systems the periphery receives the product of the

relevant system. Thus the economic periphery is rewarded by goods and services (or their monetary equivalent); the political periphery is rewarded by the absence of coercion and by policy benefits; the social periphery is rewarded by contingent approval and benefits from the exercise of influence beyond and on behalf of the group; the cultural periphery is rewarded by a clear conscience and by integrity on the part of the centre. Cases of non-compliance are sanctioned correspondingly; the periphery is denied goods and services, is subjected to coercion, is derogated by centre and deferential periphery, and is subject to guilt and public admonitions" (72, 73).

Since much of the analysis of the conditions of exchange clearly rests upon an understanding of the values and norms laid down by the 'central value system', Jessop suggests that the analysis of value institutionalisation is crucial in the study of social order.

"Social order requires the commitment of all those with power to disrupt the system, and is thus dependent upon both consensus and institutional integration... culture content and culture structure are thus significant variables in the analysis of social order, reform and revolution" (78).

His term is 'cultural analysis' and corresponds to the emphasis upon empirical description of actual content and distribution of political beliefs found in both congruence and constraint approaches to political culture. One approach to cultural analysis is the familiar pattern-variable method. This means the analysis of the extent to which universalist, achievement and egalitarian values have become institutionalised into the 'central value system'. Jessop's term for this process is secularisation. Institutional integration means the development of a pervasively secular set of values in the central value system, while consensus refers to the "average level and intensity of commitment to different values" (78). Consistency refers to the 'logical coherence of an

individuals orientations, and complexity refers to the range and variety of beliefs in an individuals belief system. These four variables, suitably operationalised are offered as the axes of empirical cultural analysis.

For our purposes Jessop's model can be applied to the analysis of the conditions of political stability in a specific type of society. This type of society can be defined as one which is in a state of dynamic tension between Jessop's 'hierarchical-reciprocity' and 'hierarchical-exploitative' ideal types (91-97). It is best to conceive of Jessop's two ideal types as polar concepts which can be applied to the development of Western Industrial societies. I propose to follow through Jessop's analysis of the nature of these ideal types and then attempt to constitute an actual historically specific combined ideal-type which can be applied to New Zealand. Jessop defines the hierarchical-reciprocity type as:

"A type of society in which... there is power hierarchisation combined with reciprocity or even benefaction in exchange relationships. Under such a system the periphery would have its desire for rewards gratified and the centre would be able to maintain power. Manifestation of the contradictions inherent in any power relation will thus be minimised and dissent is likely to be non-radical and institutionalised. Disorder in such a society is likely to result from technological or other changes that produce exploitation and a cut in the periphery's rewards. More generally the emergence of contradictions between the forces and relations of production may generate deprivation at both centre and periphery and thus lead to more radical and hence less institutionalised dissent" (91-92).

The second ideal-type, the hierarchical-exploitative, is defined as a society where there is both:

"power hierarchisation and exploitation by the centre, but where there is a strong central

control over the expectations and commitments of the periphery so that it does not experience deprivation" (92).

Before developing this analysis further we must settle some assumptions about 'human nature'; that is the presumed motivations of individuals in seeking rewards and resisting exploitation. Jessop makes three assumptions here. First, that all individuals will have expectations of desirable rewards. Second, that for many individuals (especially in the periphery) there will be a 'short-fall' between such expectations and the opportunity to achieve them. Third, that perceived deprivation will lead to attempts to overcome the 'causes' of deprivation. These assumptions about human motivation are taken to hold across all types of society, however they are relative to culturally specific reward structures. They are a function of both 'objective' and 'subjective' aspects of exchange.

If we attempt to measure the dimensions of exchange as exploitative (for the periphery) reciprocal (equality) or beneficial (for the periphery) clearly, two major variables enter into the analysis of political stability. Firstly, the objective degree of exploitation, or the actual relative sharing of the national wealth between centre and periphery; and secondly, the subjective perception of exploitation, that is, the perception of relative inequality of income distribution between centre and periphery. These two concepts of exploitation are obviously contingent since changes in technology and the economy, and shifts in the relative shares of certain groups vis a vis other groups will affect perceptions of relative inequality. Where hegemonic influence is low, such objective changes will lead to perception of relative deprivation and expressions of discontent. Where the hegemonic system is strong, the state is able to manage such emergent conflict by first; pre-empting the definition

of the reward structure in anticipation of change, varying levels of expectations among different groups (via socialisation and education) and second; by

"mobilising many different types of sanction against dissent and thus punish non-compliance and reward conformity" (89).

Hence under conditions of hegemonic strength:

"The cultural centre is important not only for its impact on exploitation (pre-emption) but also for its regulation of the responses to deprivation (diversion)" (86).

Thus under objectively exploitative exchange conditions:

"The system will become disorderly and dissensual unless the emergent strong centre.. is able to establish an effective cultural hegemony and transform the system into a (hierarchical-exploitative) type of society. The latter depends for continuing order on the maintenance of an effective cultural system in which all members of society are socialised into acceptance of the central values and the dominant distribution of power and rewards. This ideological hegemony may be based on control over the cultural system by another centre or on a strong cultural centre powerful in its own right. It is essential that the institutionalised expectations and commitments be sufficiently flexible to prevent the emergence of deprivation and dissent when the flow of rewards varies; and also for such dissent as does develop to be channelled into harmless, non-radical directions. Such societies will become unstable where the cultural system is ineffective or power incongruency or marginal centre groups develop. The extent of radical change will then depend on the orientations and on the balance of power of contending groups" (92-93).

3. The Historical Context

The conception of two polar-types of society

which vary on the dimension of subjective awareness of objective exploitation, clearly need to be set into historical context. Since power and exchange refer to unequal relations between centre and peripheral groups, the nature of these groups and their characteristics needs to be defined in terms of economic change or changes in the forces and relations of production. Objective exploitation then, must be linked to specific historical conditions existing in the economy. Similarly, hegemony, or cultural power, refers to the capacity of a cultural elite (or a combination of elites fused or otherwise) to impose dominant definitions of rights and obligations upon the political community over time and in changing economic circumstances. Essentially then, we need a composite Centre-Periphery model which can account for changes during the industrialisation phase in the 'West' and allow us to differentiate the conditions which give rise to either of the two polar-types of society, or shifts from one type to the other. The fact that both presuppose a hierarchical authority structure is a consequence of a capitalist economy. The important distinction is between a legitimate hierarchy or authority structure (the pluralist democracy model) justified by universalistic or 'meritocratic' values, and a non-legitimate hierarchy which is exploitative, but nevertheless continues to be supported by the periphery because of the crucial role of cultural hegemony.

The complex conditions which differentiate the two forms of society during industrialisation have been set-out clearly in the Lipset-Rokkan model of political development (Lipset and Rokkan, 1967). The reciprocal (or meritocratic) form of society will tend to emerge if a number of "favourable" conditions are met. In summary these are: rapid and complete industrialisation which creates widespread opportunity for social mobility; the development of a centralised

party-system and bureaucracy which can give legitimate expression to all political interests through opposition and periodic elections; and the emergence of a modern political culture which incorporates a set of consensual values around developmental goals at the same time defining an equitable reward structure based upon universalism, achievement and equality. Given these "favourable" conditions (or some optimum combination of them), the universalist expectations in the cultural system are met in the exchange systems, so that reciprocal expectations are matched by the capacity of the economy to satisfy demands. If the economy is incapable of realising these expectations, the state may intervene to regulate economic costs and benefits and redistribute resources to ensure the realisation of equal opportunity. But any meritocratic system will degenerate into an exploitative system in the event of either an erosion of the relativities in the reward structure (as a consequence of technological change, unemployment, external market arrangements, deflationary policies, etc.) or a breakdown in equal opportunity for significant peripheral groups (discrimination in education, health, housing, social services, etc.).

It follows then, that if the developmental sequence failed to fully implement any of these three conditions of meritocratic equality, the resulting social system is to a degree exploitative. Since all three (socio-economic, cultural, and political) are reciprocal, the failure of any one will affect the others. Thus if industrialisation is too rapid or incomplete large sectors of the periphery will remain in traditional occupations and social statuses. As a consequence traditional values will resist the spread of modern values, and parochial political interests remain outside the party-system. If on the other hand the traditional political elite is able to accommodate to economic changes by co-opting newly mobilised peripheral groups into a party-system with

a high threshold of representation, then peripheral interests will remain unrepresented despite continued deference to elitist political values. This point is especially important in the case of New Zealand since its colonisation by Europeans was largely a consequence of the need for peripheral groups to escape the blocked-opportunity structure imposed by an elite-dominated state.

It is postulated that the independent causal role of values is much less important in the historical phase of development, it being mainly the outcome of structural or elite-sponsored constitutional change. Therefore, we might expect values to take on a significant stabilising role only after "modern" or "secular" values have become widely disseminated in the political culture and institutionalised in the dominant cultural system. A further proposition is that such cultural "domination" requires a concomitant centralisation of power bases and a fusion of centre groups. The centralisation of state power can therefore be stated as being a necessary condition of cultural hegemony where:


"there is an inequalitarian and exploitative system in which the periphery as well as the centre is committed to the central value-system" (Jessop, 1972: 127).

For the sake of convenience and clarity I have separated the causal model of political legitimation in New Zealand into two phases; the developmental and the hegemonic. The developmental phase can be taken as representing the historical period between the European colonisation of New Zealand to the advent of the Labour opposition after the First World War. The watershed is the full emergence of a party-system which meets the requirement of majority-power, for the first time allowing a working-class majority to achieve representation and enact "major structural changes in the national system" (Lipset and Rokkan,

1967: 27).

4. The Developmental Phase

During this period it is possible to treat the three major developmental variables - economy, culture, and the state - as analytically distinct, in order to isolate the independent causal significance of political culture. The essential components of this phase can be expressed schematically:



Structural model of major components of
Developmental Phase: 1870 - 1920

The three major developmental variables are subjected to number of possible influences direct and indirect. Clearly the status of the colony as a British dependency played a major role in shaping the nature of the economy, culture, and the state. These diffusion factors set the early limits on the nation-building process, and continued to exert strong influence through the market, investment, and political and cultural ties. A second set of influences can be termed indigenous in the sense that local conditions required innovations in the economy, culture and the state. These may be direct influences flowing from the socio-economic structure, modifying values and influencing political stability (such as the causal process posited by congruence theorists) or indirect influences consisting of the reciprocal action of the state in managing the economy and reinforcing popular support (as posited by constraint

theorists). In order to separate out the three institutional sources which contributed to political stability during the developmental phase, it is necessary to treat economic (inducements), socio-cultural (persuasion and commitments) and political (coercion) influences as if they were autonomous variables. By thus "decomposing" a complex historical process it should be possible to make reasoned estimates of the relative significance of each, including political culture, in contributing to political stability. However, each of the three developmental variables consists of sub-variables which can be considered indices of the main variable. Such indices (or indicators) can be summed to provide measures of objective exploitation (economic development); subjective exploitation (socio-cultural development); and centralisation (political development).

The Economy. In the area of economic development we can specify objective exchange relations between actual central and peripheral groups arising out of a set of conditions to do with changing forces and relations of production. These conditions can be inferred from indices of:

(1) Population composition. Defined in terms of country of origin and occupational category.

(2) External resources and market relations. British investment and terms of trade.

(3) Local resources and markets. Availability of primary resources, manpower and local demand.

(4) Technological innovations. The application of new technology to extraction, processing and transportation of local resources.

These conditions in combination were largely responsible for determining the nature and rate of

economic development, consequent shifts in the occupational structure, manpower deployment and opportunities for economic mobility. The outcome of such conditions can be expressed as a variable rate of exploitation (relative inducements) of peripheral by central groups both foreign and domestic.

Society and Culture. The process of socio-cultural development allows us to derive a set of subjective exchange relations between central and peripheral groups which are partly a function of a diffused cultural tradition, and partly a function of the emergence of indigenous cultural attributes. Three variables are selected for consideration:

(1) Cultural composition of immigrant population defined by expressed beliefs and values, e.g. particularist "class-consciousness" versus universalist "citizenship" values.

(2) The degree of culture consensus across central and peripheral groups, on goals of national identity, national development and social justice.

(3) The degree of cultural conflict between central, and/or peripheral groups based upon interests of region, class, and other.

The consequence of these conditions is a variable distribution of perceptions of subjective exploitation, or inequality (persuasions and commitments).

The State. Interacting with both economic and socio-cultural development we have the growing institutionalisation of the central state. The product of this centralisation is the emergence of formalised exchange relations between central and peripheral groups in terms of the party-system and the administrative apparatus of Government. Three major indices can be isolated:

(1) The colonial Government. The role of colonial and Responsible Government in controlling economic power (land), political power (military intervention) established the model of a strong central state.

(2) Interventionist role of the state between 1870 and 1920 in regulating conditions for national development, distribution of resources, and major institutions in the opportunity structure (education, industrial relations, health and welfare).

(3) The establishment of a mass-party system based upon universal suffrage, elections and a representative parliament.

These conditions can be summed to provide a measure of growing state intervention in the economy, society and culture. The outcome of these activities was the strong emergence of a "nation building" ideology around the goals of economic opportunity and social justice. In the developmental phase this dominant ideology already showed characteristics of state hegemony. However, as can be demonstrated, allegiance was still contingent upon "specific support" for a strong and effective modernising state. The state was far from exercising a hegemonic control over subjective perception of exploitation in the name of a "modernising" ideology. The test can be applied by comparing the reactions of severely disadvantaged peripheral groups in periods of depression (high rate of exploitation) when state effectiveness was reduced. On a number of occasions a widespread withdrawal of "specific support" was sufficient to threaten political stability since the state was required to resort to the deliberate use of force to subdue expressions of radical dissent. We can thus state a number of propositions concerning the causal significance of political culture in maintaining political stability in the developmental phase.

5. Political Culture in the Developmental Phase

To recapitulate briefly, the discussion in

previous chapters has shown that the critical role of political culture defined as traditionalist, or deferential values, has been to act as a fund of "goodwill" in times of political crisis (low effectiveness and withdrawal of specific support). Under "favourable conditions" (economic development and reciprocity) supportive values are superfluous since interests are sufficient to maintain political stability. However, under "unfavourable conditions" (ineffectiveness and objective exploitation) diffuse support becomes a source of political allegiance; contingent upon:

(1) The extent of diffuse support in potentially powerful peripheral and marginal centre groups.

(2) The extent of active intervention of the state to induce compliance by propaganda or coercion.

In general we would expect that during the developmental phase, "favourable conditions" for the establishment of democratic institutions, combined with an effective central state apparatus to maximise the positive constraints of economic and social rewards, and minimised the necessity of negative political sanctions and cultural hegemony, in establishing the bases of the state's legitimacy in the social periphery. In times of crisis, we would expect that the extent of "diffuse support" among the deferential periphery was sufficient to limit the exercise of political force to a minimal degree.

Therefore, in the developmental phase we can postulate that:

(A) Under favourable conditions political support will be specific, based upon the effective performance of the state.

(B) Under unfavourable conditions the withdrawal of both "specific" and "diffuse" support in certain

peripheral groups will threaten political stability.

(C) Under conditions which threaten political stability, the existence of "diffuse support" in other "deferential" peripheral groups will be sufficient to contain dissatisfaction and the withdrawal of "diffuse support" to a low level of threat.

(D) Under conditions which threaten political stability, the state will resort to "sufficient" political force (propaganda and coercion) to suppress the disaffection of protesting groups.


(E) Under conditions where dissatisfaction is contained in peripheral minorities, "deferential support" becomes a necessary condition of "democratic stability" based upon the majoritarian principle.

6. The Hegemonic Phase

In the pre-hegemonic stage, by definition the subjective expectations of peripheral groups are still somewhat independent of, and resistant to, the dominant cultural apparatus. Such groups are capable of reacting to changes in the rate of exploitation and political performance with expressions of relative deprivation. In the hegemonic phase, however, the state spreads its influence over all other major institutional areas. The precise point at which the "state" ceases to act as the state in economic, social and cultural institutions is a matter of degree, and varies from society to society. Therefore, in any given social system, the extent of state hegemony can be determined only by an examination of the degree to which it controls expectations and commitments in the population. In the New Zealand case it is clear that the state very early assumed a major role in each of the major institutional areas, and by the 1920's had reached the point where the economy, society and culture were largely dependent upon state activity and legislation.

The shift towards state hegemony came as the result of historical processes set in motion early in the developmental phase. These processes consisted of an increasing centralisation of the four power bases into the state apparatus; the homogenisation of central elites into one monolithic interest-grouping; accompanying this integration at the centre was a differentiation of occupations and life-styles at the periphery; and a fragmentation of the social identity of periphery interest groups along vertical rather than horizontal cleavage lines.

In order to measure these processes it is necessary to operationalise the role of the state in the hegemonic phase. To begin, the relations of the state to the other major institutional areas can be expressed schematically:



The extent to which state intervention in these institutional areas has increased over the hegemonic phase can be measured by selecting indices in each area.

The Economy. Though ownership of the means of production, distribution and exchange has continued to remain largely in private hands, the state has

established a body of legislative controls over the management and distribution of financial and material resources in the economy.

1. Monetary controls.
2. Fiscal controls.
3. Public ownership of utilities and services.
4. Tariff and import controls.
5. State spending as percent. of GNP.
6. Subsidies to private sector as percent. of GNP. and total capital formation.
7. Percent. of public servants in labour force.

Similarly in the management of labour resources:

1. Industrial arbitration.
2. Minimum conditions and wages.
3. Immigration policy.
4. Income maintenance.

The extent to which the state has become involved in determining and fixing market and social relations between centre and peripheral groups in New Zealand has been widely recognised as a necessary consequence of a uniquely dependent economy. What is seldom noted however, is the manner in which such intervention has been accompanied by state controls of socio-cultural institutions responsible for the inculcation of economic motives and political values (cf. Oliver, 1971). Following Jessop (1972) and Poulantzas (1972) I draw a distinction between cultural institutions which control the means of value creation, interpretation, and maintenance; and social institutions which control the means by which values are learned and reinforced.

The Culture. Cultural institutions as defined here are mainly concerned with the recruitment and training of a "class" of intellectuals whose dual function it is to maintain the continuity of traditional values and innovate new values to meet the changing requirements of the hegemonic welfare state. The degree of state hegemony over the intelligensia can therefore

be represented by the degree of control over both sacred and secular values. State hegemony in the cultural sphere can be operationalised thus:

1. Control of tertiary institutions.
2. Control of standards and content of primary and secondary education.
3. Discouragement of alternative sources of value creation, interpretation and maintenance.
4. Training of professionals who become the opinion-leaders and legitimators of dominant values.

While the role of the state in the cultural apparatus is vital to hegemonic control, the effectiveness with which it can impose a set of objective social relations and subjective expectations of rewards in the periphery depends upon its exercise of "social" power. Following Jessop, "social power" is the means by which individuals are "persuaded" to accept a given social or status position. Therefore, state control of social institutions implies control over the access of individuals to the opportunity structure.

The Society. The opportunity-structure can be defined as the actual differential access of individuals to a given reward-structure consisting of "valued roles in the economic, political, social or cultural system" (Jessop, 1972: 65). It follows that all social institutions which have anything to do with social learning, and the classification, differentiation or recruitment of individuals to status-positions (valued roles) in society are means of controlling individuals life-chances. To the extent that the state by legislation, directly or indirectly, is involved in the allocation of individuals to status-positions, it assumes social power.

There are two important aspects of the exercise of social power: that which reinforces the value-

system by inculcating expectations of rewards or goals, and that which accommodates individuals to actual status-positions valued or not. Both of these functions are performed by a range of interlocking institutions which mediate expectations and values, establish value commitments, and enforce conformity to such commitments. The greater the involvement of the state in such institutions, the greater is its power to dominate the perceptions and motives of the periphery. The main institutions are:

1. Family.
2. Schooling.
3. Media.
4. Public Administration.
5. Social Welfare Services.
6. Work organisations.
7. Churches.
8. Law enforcement agencies.

7. Political Culture in the Hegemonic Phase

In the developmental phase it is postulated that "diffuse support" among the deferential periphery is a necessary condition of democratic stability since it is instrumental in containing the perception of objective inequality to relatively small dissident groups. The extent and origin of such diffuse support remains independent of the state and seems to constitute evidence of the causal significance of political culture in contributing to political stability. With the advent of the hegemonic state however, it is suggested that traditional diffuse support no longer provides an independent source of "voluntary obedience" to the state. The legitimation of political authority under such conditions does not therefore "flow" from political culture to the state, but rather is generated by the state through its hegemonic control of economic, social and cultural institutions.

We can therefore postulate that:

(A) The two associated processes - centralisation/homogeneity at the centre and differentiation/fragmentation in the periphery - will operate independently of the long-term effectiveness of the political system (variations in the objective rate of exploitation) to impose certain "standardised" reward expectations, and to "divert" and "contain" dissent in the periphery.

(B) As the centre's dominance spreads over the four institutional bases of power, its ability to impose a set of standardised expectations upon the periphery will increase.

(C) As the resistance of peripheral groups to central dominance is undermined by differentiation and fragmentation, their ability to perceive alternative definitions of reward expectations is reduced.

(D) As a consequence there is established a "vicious cycle" of hegemonic control of motives and expectations, which is perceived by the deferential periphery as:

"a Virtuous cycle of power and exchange processes that maintains the legitimacy, effectiveness, and stability" of the state (Jessop, 1972: 129).

In order to test the applicability of this model of the legitimation process to the New Zealand case it is necessary to adduce empirical evidence. This is the purpose of the remaining chapters.

NINE:

The Nation-Building State: 1870-1920

1. A European Outpost

Any attempt at historical reconstruction of the role of the State in national development must begin with the recognition of the over-riding fact of the imperial connection. The forces which caused the exodus of many of the middle-class to the European-settled colonies, were those which made Britain the leading industrial power in the Nineteenth century. Of the millions displaced by machinery and industrial capital nearly half migrated to the lands of 'white settlement'. Added to these impersonal forces of capitalist expansion were the dreams of those who sought to escape the oppression of the industrial society to the utopia of rural democracy (Sutch, 1966: 1-11). The white-settled British colonies were a natural consequence of imperialist expansion based upon cheap food and raw materials and the export of surplus capital (Barrett Brown, 1970: 83). The colonies came to be seen as a solution to the ills of industrialisation. Cecil Rhodes dramatised this belief:

"In order to save the 40 million inhabitants of the United Kingdom from a bloody civil war, we colonial statesmen must acquire new lands to settle the surplus population, to provide new markets for the goods produced by them in the factories and mines" (Quoted in Barrett Brown, 1970: 90).

The special relationship of the British-settled colonies to the imperial market was therefore a dual one; they relieved population pressure and simultaneously expanded the free-trade system. Despite

their reliance upon export prices, the terms of trade throughout the Nineteenth century were in their favour, and they were able to develop as privileged enclaves within the Empire. Throughout the developmental phase of the New Zealand colony, this special relationship largely determined the nature and rate of its social and economic development. Willis Airey has explained the reason for New Zealand's 'favoured development' well.

"All this is linked with Western domination of the world during the period of our growth. The conditions we have enjoyed were possible only on a frontier of European imperialist expansion by the export of men and capital. In getting access to the land we wrecked the Maoris' way of life and subordinated them to our superior technical power. From outside interference we have had security at small cost to ourselves, and our main markets have been the better because they were bolstered, for the time being, by imperialist exploitation of other peoples. Our achievement, in fact, rests partly on our sharing in a privileged, dominating position in relation to non-European peoples. Without this we could not, by the relatively peaceful, tolerant means we have used, have achieved our peculiar and happy position of an easy-going individualism and lack of sharp class division, combined with state-channelled welfare provisions" (1955: 19-20).

The colony, as Beaglehole has put it, was a gift from the 'upper middle-class to the lower middle-classes'. Both in terms of class origins and values the immigrant stock was overwhelmingly petit bourgeois. From the planned settlements of Wakefield, to the Greyite dream of a smallholders democracy, and even to last of the single-taxers, Fowlds, the driving force of colonisation was to escape the growing class-antagonism and population pressure of British industrial society (Sutch, 1966: 7-11; Young, 1961: 78; Newman, 1965: 393). Whatever their origins, the majority of immigrants were individuals of exceptional conviction and fortitude. Though history may be 'nothing but the activities of men in pursuit of their ends', few were capable of

pursuing their ends so single-mindedly. And for many, early experience in the gold fields and the shearing sheds only gave reinforcement to their rugged individualism (McQueen, 1970: 144-145). When this expectation of advancement met with frustration it generated a number of conflicts.

At this point it is clear that the threads of economic, cultural and political events are deeply interwoven in the history of the colony. At the risk of losing sight of the pattern some attempt must be made to follow the weave. Oliver (1973; 1969) has suggested that a characteristic "social pattern", or interplay of cultural, physical and political events became a regular occurrence in the colony. As imported values (or cultural baggage) met environmental constraints (blocked advancement) there emerged an innovative response which was a pragmatic blend of local inspiration and overseas example. The results however, were always adapted to local conditions and invariably required some form of state intervention. The state in the span of the developmental phase acted in three capacities - as policeman, as colonial landlord and as central bureaucracy. Each was the result of blocked economic opportunity and each was whether by military, legislative or administrative means, able to reopen old frontiers or to create new (cf. Oliver, 1969: 175).

2. Blocked Opportunity

In order to understand the ideological response to blocked-opportunity and the agrarian radicalism of the late Nineteenth century, it is necessary to trace the emergent forces and relations of production. The early economic history of the colony has been well documented (Condliffe, 1959; Simpkin, 1951). It is a story of false starts and impediments to progress. As the land was acquired and settled, wool became a

minor staple. Then in the early fifties the Australian gold rush created a near market for foodstuffs. A limited though shortlived prosperity ensued. In the sixties the discovery of gold in the colony opened up the first real frontier and brought a rapid influx of diggers, and capital. But by the late sixties with the end of gold, and available land securely locked-up by the landed oligarchy, there was no prospect of alternative employment or investment. The first crises in public confidence had arrived and there were growing demands that the government find a solution (Reeves, 1969a: 62; Beaglehole, 1936: 53; Condliffe, 1959: 120). The response, the so-called Vogel era, was one of mixed success. In ten years 20 million pounds was infused into the colonial economy chiefly for roads, bridges and the immigrant labour to build them. But the benefits of this 'development' fell to the squatter class that controlled the government. Even the brief ministry of Grey, whose rhetoric of close-settlement and manhood suffrage gained him the support of the landless, was ineffective in curbing the power of the oligarchy. His policy of buying-up Maori land for settlement backfired when he lost the support of the opportunist land speculators (Stone, 1967: 65-74). At no time during the Vogel era was there an attempt to actively implement a policy of close-settlement. Investment in public works lead to rampant speculation and a boom in land values. And, more seriously, the artificial prosperity floated on external loans together with the continuous inflow of assisted immigrants combined to create economic conditions which were to bring even more widespread frustration and hardship.

The most obvious mark of the period between 1870 and 1895 was the active role of the state in inducing short bursts of prosperity out of a generally stagnant colonial economy. The opening-up of the backblocks laid the foundations for a restructuring of the rural

economy, but this did not come until the turn of the century. Meanwhile, over the whole period of the 'long depression' the continuous ministry resisted pressure to extend the franchise and break-up the estates. It is clear in the light of the interpretation being presented here, that the depression, far from being a general slump for which the oligarchy was blameless (Sinclair, 1963: 107) was in fact the direct result of a deliberate policy of uneven development. What was uneven about development was that its benefits fell to the large-holders, speculators, banks and financiers. A great deal of public capital investment added to land values, both excluding the landless from the land and taxing them with an inequitable share of the national debt. So just as development was uneven in its benefits so was it uneven in its costly consequences. When the trough of the depression came in 1882, it had little effect upon the large-holders and financial interests, and actually created suitable conditions for the growth of manufacturing (Simpkin, 1951: 157). The real costs were those Reeves recognised; the exploitation of the skilled and unskilled workers, and the expropriation of the heavily mortgaged smallholders (Ash, 1962: 104). The former were exploited by a rising class of industrialists, while the latter lost their land to the banks and land companies (Sutch, 1966: 64; Simpkin, 1951: 163-164).

With the closing of the frontiers of land and credit, a superfluous immigrant population was left without prospects of advancement. Many left for Australia. Some, perhaps as many as 20,000 were settled in piecemeal schemes before 1892 (Condliffe, 1959: 122-128). The remainder were driven into employment in the expanding manufacturing industries or into unemployment. The expansion of industry was made possible by the fortuitous coincidence of several factors. The growth of a local market, and the cheap

labour afforded by the pool of unemployed, encouraged local manufacturers to compete in the imperial market. Wage rates fell by over a third. More significantly, per capita income fell by 15% between 1882 and 1895. The extent of increasing exploitation is revealed by the fact that this decline followed a decade during which real income had increased by 10% (Simpkin, 1951: 201). However per capita statistics of income under-rate the degree of hardship experienced by the male, female and child labour force (Sutch, 1966: 65-66). Sweated labour, unemployment, male desertion and political impotence all contributed to the destitution and demoralisation of the working-class.

By all the evidence, the period of the long depression was one of major economic reconstruction (Simpkin, 1951: 154-158; cf. Wilson, 1965). "Inconvenient as it was" it had proved "but a term in the regular progression of capitalist prosperity" (Beaglehole, 1936: 141). But the cost of this 'capitalist progression', "the inconvenience", was borne by the labour force. While it can be argued that the long-term benefits of industrial 'takeoff' has included improved living standards for the working-class, the initial impetus to manufacturing came from cheap labour. Similarly, the depression ruined many small-holders, allowing banks and finance companies to strengthen their hold on the land. That the colonial economy was developing behind tariff walls the familiar polarisation between capitalist and labouring classes giving rise to the beginnings of an equally familiar class antagonism, was revealed in the ideological currents of this period.

3. The Cultural Mainstream

The 'dialectic' of economic challenge and ideological response must be set against the cultural backdrop of European colonisation. In order to understand the

emerging shape of the New Zealand political Culture we must first consider the imported varieties of 'cultural baggage'. Located in the broad spectrum of Nineteenth century political ideology, the bulk of the British immigrants brought with them a hybrid political culture, a mixture of economic 'conservatism' and political 'radicalism'. These terms remain meaningless however unless translated into historical acts. What is meant by conservatism is that which both Beaglehole (1936) and Oliver (1964) have described as essentially a petit bourgeois individualism; a "mid nineteenth century liberalism, leaning on the impregnable rock of a just and decent propriety, (which) was the guarantee of an emergent conservatism far more deeply grounded" (Beaglehole, 1936: 132). But these core values of self-reliance and individual achievement were combined with the 'Chartist' belief in equal citizenship rights. Conservative ends were to be pursued by the most radical democratic constitutional means possible. What was radical about the pursuit of such ends was as much a feature of the conditions the settlers found in the colony as of the ideas they brought with them. As Oliver claims (1964: 19-24) the petit bourgeois ideology of individualism, stripped to its rudimentary core of traditional symbolic and institutional constraints, became capable of adaptation to any available means of creating new opportunities for economic advancement. Such a core set of values was to become the basis of the meritocratic mainstream political culture.

Pursuing this analysis we must ask whether or not these core values constituted a dominant centre culture from the outset, and the extent to which radical individualistic values were of primary importance in determining the economic and political outcome of national development. We have seen that both Hartz (1964: 42-44) and Lipset (1964: 248-273) stress the determining force of 'radical' beliefs of

equality coupled with those of collective action. How far then, can we use pattern-variable analysis to identify this mainstream? It seems that for several reasons apart from loose comparative generalisations of the Lipset-Hartz sort, the pattern-variable labels are of little use in describing the nature, extent and origins of political culture in New Zealand.

The most important objection, which in itself renders the pattern-variables meaningless, lies in the concept of the nation state as a unit of comparison. This requires that universalism, equality and the collectivity in particular, stop at national borders. How then do we treat the question of immigration into New Zealand when clearly 'aliens' were subject to a strong ethnocentric prejudice; similarly, the later manifestation of the 'imperial destiny', which subdivided the world along racist lines. Secondly, even within the so-called national borders, the modern values of the capitalist market, were the prerogative of first the landed oligarchy and urban capitalist, and then later the prosperous middle-class. Two large minority groups - the Maori and the working-class - were forced into 'defensive subcultures' and denied equal access to the free market (See below Section 5 & 6). Here we see once again the familiar lines of privilege which circumscribe the modern political culture of so-called rational-legal authority.

It follows that the use of the pattern-variables in historical analysis carries the risk of serious misconception in three areas. The first is the tendency to create an artificial 'universe' in which the forces of the traditional and modern are seen to work themselves out. The second is the evolutionary implication that modernising (usually European) values break-down rather than create traditional sub-cultures. The third is the causal determinism of values which take on an historical force independent of the rest

of the socio-political structure.

A more satisfactory alternative approach is to identify patterns of values and beliefs as they were associated with specific interest groups in the centre and periphery. These patterns demonstrate the continuous interplay between so-called core values and conflicting interests. They clearly undergo successive modification in reaction to changing economic and political forces, and in turn, impose new limits upon other institutions. We can then, in support of Barrington Moore (1969: 486) look for the critical dimension of economic power as it comes into contact with the political culture. Adopting Oliver's concept of a cultural mainstream, essentially conservative and pragmatic, we can argue that the emergence of radical or conservative forces on the fringe of this mainstream were continually modified and (or) incorporated by any combination of:

(1) The overwhelming dominance and pragmatism of the mainstream culture, which forced deviant political values into isolation (the fragment thesis embodying statism).

(2) The congruent forces of mobility and national integration (the frontier thesis embodying statism).

(3) The constraining forces (each or all) of the threat of unemployment, legal and physical coercion, and the symbolic and transvaluational appeals of national identity and unity (the constraint thesis of state hegemony).

In other words what we have is the concept of state Legitimacy based upon; first the diffuse support of the majority; second, the specific support of the majority; and third, the state-induced support based upon coercion and myth. Though all three types of

support are expected to be present in some degree in the periphery, as was hypothesised in the last chapter, it is the nature, extent and origin of working-class support of the state which is crucial for democratic stability. The first matter to be settled then is the relative dominance of the liberal mainstream culture at the point where a separate working-class consciousness was beginning to emerge. This was essentially a confrontation between an established colonial agrarian capitalism and a newly founded urban industrial capitalism. Since the prevailing agrarian radicalism was instrumental in modifying the nature and extent of working-class consciousness, its origins must be traced.

4. Middle-class Radicalism

As a response to the closed frontier over the period of the 'long depression' there had arisen a strong socio-political movement to unlock the land (Sinclair, 1965: 70-73). This movement embodied a number of core lower middle-class values, the characteristic pattern of radical agrarian social movements in the other European-settled colonies spanning the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth centuries (Lipset, 1950; McCrorie, 1971). It was in fact the natural consequence of a long history of British radicalism which stood for a return to the simple pre-industrial age, and the utopian rural democracy (Thompson, 1963: 759). Coming from an age when it was thought possible to overcome the evils of industrialism by settling workers on the land, it remained a powerful cultural force long after the old frontier had been closed and the new opened up on the urban front (See Simpson, 1974).

In New Zealand, agrarian capitalist aspirations grew rapidly among the urban middle-classes, the land-hungry settlers and the ambitious artisans, in response

to the ruling oligarchy's laissez-faire Social Darwinism, and had become the dominant ideological force by the late eighties (Newman, 1965: 43). The political culture of laissez-faire was that of the political economy, in which the state played a limited role as the agent of the ruling-class. Resistance to direct taxation, the tariff, universal education and suffrage was proof of a profound distrust of state intervention beyond the point of borrowing, investment and appropriation, limited activities which facilitated corruption, largesse and land speculation (Stone, 1967; 1973: 8-28; Young, 1961). The resistance to intervention continued to display itself in the mixed attitudes towards the state expressed in the 'new' conservatism of the prosperous dairy farming community in the early Twentieth century (Oliver, 1964: 27-28). By contrast, the frustrated middle-class radicals saw the state as the necessary agent of opportunity. From Grey's attempts to break up the estates to the Liberal government land and labour legislation, the state was the means by which the inequalities of laissez-faire would be removed and the rights of individuals to equal opportunity ensured. In the words of Stout:

"I assume that the State, as such, is an instrument for the political, economic and moral advance of the people constituting the community..." (1894: 42).

Not only were the means of opportunity to be created by the state, their maintenance and regulation was a matter of public administration. The legacy of 'colonial governmentality', a strong central state apparatus, had by 1890 become a weapon in the hands of the middle-class progressives. At the time of a rising working-class industrial movement, the mainstream middle-class radical political culture had become a political force. Clearly radical ideas were now backed by legal and if necessary physical constraints. What is important for our purpose is the impact of liberal Statism upon the

nascent labour movement (cf. Hamer, 1963). The dominance of the meritocratic mainstream had been legislated into existence, supported by a growing central apparatus of public administration (cf. Campbell, 1973). How far was working-class support for the liberal policy a matter of voluntary consent, and how far was it a matter of physical necessity?

5. The Labour Movement

In tracing the consequences of the mainstream political culture for the emerging labour movement, it is necessary also to account for the possible pacifying influence of economic prosperity, and the role of the state. Moreover the dominance and pragmatism of the mainstream culture was relative to the strength and unity of the peripheral sub-culture. The first element in the analysis must therefore be a consideration of the peripheral factors which account for the weakness of the labour movement. Right from the outset of union organisation in the colony, a number of factors inhibited the emergence of a militant labour movement. In the first place the lower working-class was not numerically strong since the majority of settlers were skilled artisans or yeomen (Sutch, 1966: 12). Secondly, manufacturing was not encouraged until the 1880's and even then remained dependent upon primary industry (Condliffe, 1959: 165-166). Thirdly, expansion took place mainly in the skilled trades such as clothing and light engineering (Simpkin, 1951: 63). As a consequence, unions were based upon crafts and functioned largely as friendly societies (Salmond, 1950: 24). Their objects were primarily to protect the interests of a given trade against both employers and other trades. They tended to breed a petty insularity and status rivalry and were invariably small and isolated. Where skilled unions resorted to strike action, it was in defence of existing wages and conditions (Salmond,

1950: 26). In general the 'old' unions of this period were committed to the maintenance of harmonious capitalist social relations, a deferential attitude which contributed to the moderation of the labour movement during the 'long depression' (Sutch, 1966: 62-63). Already we can see established a pattern of working-class conservatism, imbued with the 'accommodative', moderate and loyal attitudes characteristic of the Twentieth century labour force.

From about 1877 onwards however, for a number of reasons, the labour movement began to take on a different complexion. First, several large-scale mainly unskilled industries had been established, in particular extractive industries such as mining and flaxmilling, and transport requiring the services of watersiders, railwaymen and seamen. Second, the growing rate of exploitation due to the pool of unemployed and lack of protection caused widespread hardship. Third, the spread of a 'new unionism' internationally supported by utopian doctrines increased a sense of international worker solidarity (Sutch, 1966: 68-69; Merrett, 1969: 29-39). Fourth, the experience of the unemployed whose respectful protests brought no relief from continued immigration, sweating and free trade, led many to resort to collective organisation, or the 'combination' of workers against the combination of employers, as the only answer (Merrett, 1969: 32). In 1885 and 1886 the old craft unions and new industrial unions began to merge. By 1889 this movement had become an 'uprising' (Salmond, 1950: 40-49; Merrett, 1969: 35-39). The precipitating cause appears to have been the London Dockers strike which demonstrated the effectiveness of peaceful industrial action, evoking widespread sympathy in the colony. The outcome was the formation in 1890 of the Maritime Council, the first national federation of industrial unions (Merrett, 1969: 43).

Despite the currency of utopian ideas, especially

those of the radical progressives who called for land nationalisation or the single-tax (Newman, 1965: 120-156), the labour movement remained moderate in its objectives and in its actions (Merrett, 1969: 46-47). Likewise public sympathy with the cause of labour heightened by the sweating disclosures, seemed to imply an acceptance of the right of labour to organise and bargain collectively (Merrett, 1969: 38-39). The Council, though moderate in intent, had at its disposal a powerful weapon, the 'complete boycott' or general strike, with which they could conceivably dominate the labour market. The employers understood this threat of general strike better than did the council, and resolved to strike the "working man just as he was gathering his strength" (Olssen, 1974: 56). As Merrett has argued however, the Council realised what was at stake, the right of the employer to hire "free" labour and break the power of strike action, and for this reason decided to join battle (1969: 131-147).

Prior to 1890 the 'new' unionism had been reformist and moderate, concerned only with the defence of existing rights and privileges of workers against reductions to their standard of living. The significance of the 1890 Strike was simply to confirm this moderate philosophy and channel the remnants of class antagonism into the state arbitration apparatus (Merrett, 1969: 219; cf. Philipp, 1950). Though some of the petty loyalties and status differences which had divided the labour movement had been overcome in the eighties, the defeat was a major setback to the further development of a militant working-class consciousness (cf. Saville, 1967). The important factors working against the spread of militancy during the period of the uprising was not primarily the existence of deferential attitudes, or the prospect of upward mobility, but rather those of physical force and the threat of 'downward' mobility. The breaking of the unions demonstrated the historic vulnerability of the

working-class to an oversupply of labour (Thompson, 1968: Ch. 6; Saville, 1967).

Coming as it did, at the time it did, the defeat of 1890 was the natural consequence of colonial economic development. The capitalist class which had 'developed' the colony in its own interests by monopolising land and credit, had ensured in the end, by flooding the country with surplus immigrants, a victory over the nascent labour movement. Just as the moderate labour movement was beginning to discover its strength in unity and outgrow its traditional deference, it was divided again even more fatefully, by the threat of unemployment and destitution. The inevitable outcome was to leave the movement no alternative other than to establish a political alliance with the liberals (Merrett, 1969: 196-219). But the liberal-labour alliance was the product of more than industrial defeat. Though manhood suffrage in 1887 had formally enfranchised the working-class, the electoral law in principle and practice denied workers equal representation. The constitutional impediment of the Upper Chamber, and the country quota, together with the geographic concentration of the working-class, put the prospect of majority power in parliament out of reach. The cost of this merger to the labour movement has yet to be fully assessed.

Most New Zealand labour history is seen through the eyes of Reeves (Sinclair, 1965; Stone, 1963; cf. Oliver, 1969; and Olssen, 1974). The progressive labour policy of Reeves, though rejecting the established principles of contract and the 'free' labour market and thus appearing 'radical', just as surely denied the working-class the right to a separate class identity (Newman, 1965: 56-57). In his judgement the working-class as it had developed, was an historical aberration, the product of extreme laissez-faire, which could only be put right by the state's inter-

vention in the political economy (1969b: 69-85; Sinclair, 1965: 103). The state, acting in the general interest, would step between employers and workers, reconciling class conflict to the advantage of the whole community (1969b: 81). Reeves "visionary" style (Oliver, 1969: 166) had the effect of encouraging the working-class, already demoralised, to accept the Arbitration system as a means of improving their social position, and at the same time, antagonising employers who saw the system as a threat to their control of the labour market. As the real function of the Court became clear in the new century, these respective attitudes were to be reversed. Meanwhile the working-class was to be further incorporated into the "classless society" thus legislated into existence.

By 1900 when the Arbitration Courts decisions began to work against the unions, there had developed a strong habit of loyalty and submission to the Court in the large majority of the working-class (Irvine, 1937: 13; Roth, 1973: 25). Deferential values, together with the experience of hardship and industrial defeat, consolidated a conservative sub-culture already opposed to militancy or direct action. The relative improvement in the standard-of-living in these years also served to help confirm the workers faith in moderation, and to the myth of the state as the embodiment of the 'general will' (Sinclair, 1959: 188; Airey, 1955: 11-13). But from 1900, the marginal gains in real income experienced during the late nineties were reversed (Olssen, 1974; Roth, 1973: 24; Stone, 1963). It is clear then that the passivity of the majority of the work-force after 1900 cannot be attributed to material advancement, at least in the form of rising wages (Roth, 1973: 24).

The alternative explanation suggests that the loyalty of the moderates right up to and including the strikes of 1911 and 1913 was more the consequence

of fear of unemployment, or a mistaken faith in the state's benevolence. The institutional sources of the centre combined with the threat of physical destitution were thus overwhelming in shaping the political culture of the periphery. And just as surely, the militant sections of the labour force remained isolated and weak in the face of the conservative majority. The few institutional sources of independent working-class values that were able to resist the force of the centre, were of marginal importance, a fact made quite clear by the so-called 'revolt of the militant unions' between 1908 and 1913 (Irvine, 1937; cf. Stone, 1963). Nevertheless an examination of the failure of this 'revolt' affords a good test of the factors responsible for the final pacification of working-class consciousness.

The resurgence of union militancy was the result of a number of causes. First, it became clear that the Court was being used to both deny the worker a fair share of increased productivity, and any increased share of the national wealth through profit sharing (Irvine, 1937: 27). Second, the growth of the unskilled work-force, especially in mining and transport with high proportions of immigrant labour, fostered conditions favourable to working-class solidarity (Irvine, 1937: 70-78). Third, a number of so-called socialist agitators had arrived in New Zealand bearing the slogans of class-warfare (O'Farrell, 1959). Fourth, beginning with the Blackball strike in 1908, the militant unions were able to improve wages and conditions more effectively by direct action than by recourse to the Court (Irvine, 1937: 91-92). Between 1908 and 1911 then, as the success of strikes became recognised, many of the moderate unions were encouraged to deregister with the Court and to register under the Trade Union Act. However the movement away from the Court was countered by the Employers use of the provisions of the I.C. & A. Act to deregister striking unions and hire 'free' labour

to break the strikes. What is more important, the state increasingly used its resources of law and order to support the employers. The use of police to aid the strike-breakers at Waihi and special constables to enforce law and order in 1913, generated a wave of public sympathy for the strikers (Irvine, 1937: 126 *passim*). But this sympathy was of no avail against the combined power of the employers and the state, and the availability of 'free' labour (Irvine, 1937: 126 *passim*). Once again, a rise in working-class consciousness, accompanied by public sympathy, was met by the combination of 'free labour', the law, and this time the physical force of the state as well.

Of no period prior to 1913 can it be said that a revolutionary movement working for the overthrow of the capitalist state was the aim of more than a minute fraction of the labour movement. The militancy of 1890 and 1908-1913 consisted almost wholly of defensive action against wage-cuts, scabbing and interference with the right to withhold labour (Stone, 1963: 207). The failure of the labour movement to reach a stage of revolutionary class-consciousness was therefore partly a function of its moderation, the limited nature of its size, its late development, and its fragmentation (cf. Oliver, 1971; Olssen, 1974: 53). These factors all served to divide the working-class along a number of lines. The most important moderating effect was the proportionate size of the unskilled to skilled workforce. Only workers in intensive industry of an unskilled or semi-skilled nature, such as mining, flaxworking, or labouring, showed any real attachment to revolutionary aims, and they were in the minority (Irvine, 1937: 58-59). It seems then that class-conscious ideas were able to resist the appeals of the dominant culture under conditions of hardship where prospects for advancement were slight (cf. Lipset, 1963: 232-261; and Weber, 1964: 427-428).

But not all the unskilled unions became militant, since a second division running through the labour movement was that of geographic isolation and status isolation (Stewart, 1971: 58-60; Fitzgerald, 1971: 2-3). Hence the most militant miners of the west coast, the seamen and the watersiders in the cities all experienced some form of isolation from the 'mainstream' culture, allowing radical sub-cultural values to emerge. But in the small towns or provincial regions, similar occupational groups remained loyal to the Court. For example, though the wharf labourers at Wanganui shared much the same conditions as their counterparts in Auckland and Wellington, while their big-city colleagues were on strike in 1913, they were enjoying the company of their employers at a Harbour Board social function (Stewart, 1971: 60). However, not all members of the intensive, unskilled and isolated industries were militant. A third line of division separating the moderates from the militants, was fear of destitution. Those for whom the fear was greatest were married with families. Thus among the flax workers in the Manawatu, single-men from the camp at Tokomaru attacked a train carrying 'specials' in 1913, while the married men of Foxton called them 'reds' (Fitzgerald, 1971: 30-31).

It seems that though several factors combined to create alternative institutional sources capable of resisting the pressures of the dominant culture, these were the exception rather than the rule. The miners at Rununga for example remained the most militant group throughout the period from 1908 to 1918. But their numbers were gradually eroded down to a hard core of socialists by the threat of unemployment in 1908-1909, the apparent success of labour representation in parliament (Richardson, 1968: 43), and with the outbreak of war, by the conflicting loyalties of class and nation. The final factor in suppressing working-class consciousness came with the war, when

those who saw it as a continuation of capitalist exploitation ran the risk of being accused of disloyalty to the nation, or charged with sedition (Richardson, 1968: 67, 94; Gager, 1962: 33-36). We shall consider this question as part of the more general impact of nationalism upon the working-class.

If we are to test the congruence against the constraint theory of the failure of the lower working-class to develop a revolutionary consciousness, it seems that the evidence reviewed must favour the latter. The congruence explanation that working-class militancy never became a significant force either because the conditions favourable for the experience and recognition of actual exploitation were not present; or that on the other hand, 'social osmosis' removed the malcontents and skimmed-off the leadership of the working-class, is quite unable to account for what happened. First, there is no denying the existence of exploitation and its recognition by sections of the labour movement. Second, as Olssen claims, neither the land nor labour policy of the Liberals (and certainly that of the Reform government), significantly increased the opportunities for upward mobility out of the working-class onto the land, into skilled jobs in industry or white collar jobs in commerce (1974: 49-51).

The remaining element of the congruence argument, is to fall back upon the diffuse support of working-class conservatives, implying that the political system is legitimate because it is effective in the long-term. However, as I have shown, while deferential attitudes held by the majority of workers made their submission to state authority the more easy, and at all times limited the militant section of the labour movement to a small fraction, these attitudes had been conditioned by fear of unemployment in the past (Olssen, 1974: 55) and remained a permanent reminder

of the weakness and vulnerability of labour against the combined forces of capital and the state. It seems clear enough then, in terms of the propositions stated in Chapter Eight (page 154), that it was not the satisfactions of material advancement, nor the attitudes of the majority of working-class moderates which in themselves allowed the state to isolate and subdue the militant minority, but rather sheer physical necessity and the exercise of force.

What we have left of the congruence theory, as fragment, frontier or of national integration, is not that the few labour militants were converted into yeomen or shopkeepers (although some were kicked upstairs into the legislature) but that the words or symbols of prosperity became for the majority of workers more powerful sources of community identity, than did experience of the substance of inequality become the source of class solidarity. In face of the evidence of both objective exploitation, and of the subjective awareness of it, and of the inability of the working-class to increase its share of material wealth over this period, the failure of working-class consciousness must be attributed to a growing state hegemony, in effectively incorporating the bulk of the working-class into the mainstream meritocratic political culture, so isolating and neutralising the political force of the militants. Moreover, there were other symbolic or transvaluational appeals which compensated for the experience of hardship and exploitation, and which served to reinforce the meritocratic values of the mainstream culture. If the working-class could not be 'integrated' or 'nationalised' by mobility or a greater share of the national wealth, it could be drawn into the immobile equilibrium of 'nationalism'. Running parallel with the labour movement, and in competition with it, was a burgeoning nationalistic consciousness of 'one people', 'one race' and 'Britannia'.

6. The Components of Nationalism

There are two aspects of nationalism but which cannot be considered in isolation. There is the symbolic content, and the institutional infrastructure of national integration. The one requires the other. Following Deutsch (1953) and Oliver (1971) on the importance of a communications infrastructure we shall need to test the hypothesis that national integration is a cause rather than a consequence of economic development. In Oliver's view the state bureaucracy established two-way channels of communication from state centre to locality and back, informing the central administration of the opinions of electors (1971: 11). This premise of a two-way flow of influence however is based upon the assumption that the infrastructure of national integration is coextensive with the state bureaucracy (1971: 15 passim) and does not extend to include the other centralised institutions of education, labour relations, health, administration, the media and so on. If these quasi-state institutions are incorporated into the analysis, it is much more likely that the whole infrastructure played as important a role in shaping political opinion as in merely responding to it. How far then, and how soon did the centralised state apparatus constitute the lineaments of 'community' capable of penetrating the most remote backblock? The answer requires a review of the main components of nationalism.

McQueen has intimated of Australian nationalism, that it consisted largely of a territorial racism (1970: 42-55). Other Marxists have long pointed to the classic case of a working-class divided by racism (Hill, 1965; Bavan & Sweezy, 1968; Boggs, 1970). This, however is an indirect argument, which needs to be approached circumspectly. We have seen that the deferential subject values of the British 'civic

culture' are foremost an attachment to the symbols of a national culture (Jessop, 1971). These symbols are those of an exclusive 'in-group' the Anglo-Saxon race, and imply the derogation of any racial out-group not of Anglo-Saxon origin (Bolt, 1971: 206-223; Berger, 1970: 117-118; Neale, 1972: Chapter 6). The cultural identity of the majority of New Zealand immigrants was therefore reflected in their primary attachment to Britain, or some part of Britain (Beaglehole, 1954: 108). In considering the consequences of such national identification for the emergence of a 'New Zealand' nationalism, the first thread of evidence to be reviewed is the question of early European-Maori contact, the subsequent wars, and the way in which these experiences shaped attitudes towards the race 'within'.

Until recently most New Zealand historians have played-down the importance of racism as a factor in colonisation, by stressing the benignly paternalistic role of the British Government in the annexation (e.g. Beaglehole, 1954: 107; Sinclair, 1957: 28). What Wards (1968) has called the 'myth of moral suasion' is used to explain a host of events from the motives of the Crown in 'founding the colony on a just footing' (McLintock, 1958: 63), its attempts to 'mitigate, and if possible, to avert (the) disasters' of 'war and spoliation' (Sinclair, 1971: 126), to more tentative suggestions that the 'humanitarian imperial ideology at the time New Zealand was annexed seems the only factor distinguishing it from other settlement colonies' (Sinclair, 1971: 127). As Sinclair has himself admitted 'to emphasise the influence of ideology, to stress the power of hope, may be unfashionable', especially since one might add, the actual importance of ideology in the process of colonisation has been subject to some convincing criticism (Wards, 1968: 383-385; Ward, 1973: Chapter 22; 1971).

As Wards has suggested (1968: 22-37) the ideological interpretation has been based upon a misconception of the motives of the Crown. Sinclair may be quite justified in claiming that 'New Zealand was the only new settlement colony in the mid-century with no established settler opinion on natives to oppose that of the British government and the missions' (1971: 125), yet the issue hinges on the correct interpretation of the nature of this opinion. Though the Colonial Office had expressed a humanitarian concern to protect the 'natives' of New Zealand, when the time came, the Government acted in haste to forestall the French and to ensure possession (Wards, 1968: 23). It was also clear that underlying the professed humanitarianism of British attitudes, there was an equally or more compelling cynicism about the ability of the Maori to understand the meaning of 'sovereignty' (Wards, 1968: 28-30). In fact the predominant element of British policy was not its idealism but rather the 'European attitudes of racial or cultural superiority... and settler prejudices' which emasculated the idealism in practice (Ward, 1973: 39). The ambiguity of the moral suasion explanation of the consequences of early contact becomes explicable if we regard the moral dimension of policy as the ideological justification of expansionist interests (Wards, 1968: 28). This is not to impugn the motives of those concerned as being hypocritical, or self-seeking, it is more a question of the nature of ethnocentric thought. The fact remains that the real test of 'protectionism' in the light of the subsequent determination of both settlers and the colonial governments to the expansionist at home and abroad, lies in its failure to withstand the pressure of material interests.

The most obvious example came with the conflict over the land. The orthodox history tends to regard the wars as an expression of a purely economic principle of supply and demand (See Ward, 1967).

Racial overtones are taken to be secondary to economic motives. Indeed, if anything, the early separation of the Maori from their lands, improved race relations, since they could then be 'tolerated and ignored' (Sinclair, 1971: 123). While the lust for the land may have stood in the forefront, it is plain that the readiness to dispossess the Maori who refused to enter into 'European market relations and obligations', can be traced to attitudes of white superiority (Ward, 1971: 148). Clearly the civilising benevolence of the settlers reflected an ethnocentric assumption of racial superiority, which could not tolerate any move on the part of the Maori towards separatism, on the grounds that this would place them outside the necessary influence of British law and order (Ward, 1967: 170). Grey's attitude is exemplary of this (Ward, 1967: 162). British sovereignty as a justification for territorial aggrandisement? True, but nonetheless, racism. The consequence of these attitudes was the emergence of an institutional racism embedded in the administrative treatment of the Maori. As Ward has put it;

'In that the concept of "the rule of law" was prostituted and degraded in the pursuit of white supremacy and the acquisition of Maori land, in that the Maoris were denied a co-equal share in its administration, in that the courts became bureaucratic, formal, staffed by Pakehas enforcing Pakeha values, it inevitably lost the incipient support from the Maori community' (1971: 148).

Thus did the generalised distrust and fear of the recalcitrant Maoris driven into a defensive nationalism to protect the remnants of their land and culture, produce a self-fulfilling chain of events leading inexorably from the premise of racial superiority to the institutions of 'rational-legal' domination. Note the irony of these events in the light of claims that 'modern' egalitarian, universalistic and achievement values were introduced by European colonisation. To quote Ward once more:

"The colonisation of New Zealand, notwithstanding the Treaty of Waitangi and humanitarian idealism, was substantially an imperial subjugation of a native people, for the benefit of the conquering race in which the notions of white supremacy and racial prejudice, familiar in other examples of nineteenth-century imperialism, were very much in evidence" (1973: 308).

Like the 'liberty' grounded in property-rights of earlier centuries, these 'modern' values extended only as far as ethnocentrism would allow, and presupposed the right of conquest. In New Zealand then, as in other colonies, the 'barbarous' traditional culture of the non-Europeans was forced into a defensive particularism by early contact with a more forceful predatory particularism.

The reinterpretation of the meaning of 'racism' in the colonial setting is thus based upon an understanding of the subtleties of base motives rationalised as the myth of white supremacy, and sublimated in the idealism of the 'civilising mission' of British civil servants and missionaries (Ward, 1973: 28). In their consequences however, these myths were no less real than was the legacy of the 'Anglo-Maori' wars. When war came, the effects on 'pakeha society' were to 'harden' attitudes (Ward, 1973: 101) and to breed 'excitement and violence' (Ward, 1971: 164). The white communities were driven into self-righteous huddles, fed by stories of native savagery and immorality (cf. Neale, 1972: 132-142). The Northern settlements, the most heterogenous in composition - a mixture of English, Irish, Scots and others, felt moved by 'common cause'. The war provided a necessary external agent reinforcing social solidarity. The white working-class, caught-up in the common cause became enmeshed in vertical bonds of 'community' rather than in the horizontal affinity of class. These bonds became all the more strong, and took on a more distinctive 'national' complexion in

response to perceived threats from alien immigrants of Asian and Continental European extraction.

The first expressions of racial hostility towards alien immigrants goes back to the days of the Chinese diggers (Smithyman, 1971: 192). Again the settler reaction had both economic and moral strains, and cannot be explained away as a simple desire to reduce competition for jobs. According to Smithyman, the most important impulse producing hostility towards alien immigrants was racial insecurity and fear (1971: 11). The test between the 'economic' and 'racial' arguments would appear to be the existence of a time-lag between calls for banning Asian, and, British immigration. As we have seen the labour market was flooded with a surplus of labour in the seventies. Yet agitation to remedy this was for some time directed wholly at Asian and non-British immigrants. The justification used was the colonies' obligation to the poorer classes of the Homeland (Smithyman, 1971: 27), and the belief that 'free' immigration would bring 'refuse' and 'inferior classes' (28-29). The effect of this idea of racial purity, was to force the working-class to accept bourgeois racial attitudes as a measure of self-defence (45-46). The alien undesirables formed a significant 'outgroup' in reinforcing the racial identity of the 'ingroup' (69). Popular feeling in the seventies was sufficient to bring about a restrictive poll-tax on Chinese in 1881, an attempted asiatic restriction Bill in 1896, and later in 1899, the notorious 'Natal Act' discriminating against non-Europeans and other non-British 'undesirables' (Reeves, 1969b: 343). The high point of racism came with the surge of imperialist fervour in the nineties (Smithyman, 1971: 101-171). Beaglehole has expressed this nicely. As part of the spread of British imperialism in the eighties - the 'imperial revival':

"New Zealanders began to feel conscious not only of their Pacific mission, but of their fewness

in number; they passed from suspicion of a French peril in Tahiti and New Caledonia to suspicions of a German peril and a "Yellow Peril", concentrated on Chinese fruiterers and laundrymen in their midst; and by 1899 Seddon wanted to send an expeditionary force to take over Samoa, and somehow to incorporate the Cook Islands, Fiji, Tonga, and the Society Islands with New Zealand. In fact the administration of only the Cook Islands was taken over and an expeditionary force went not to Samoa but to South Africa" (1954: 112).

It is tempting to point to the link between the progressive ideology of the organic small-holders' state, the growth of racism in the eighties and nineties, and an emerging national identity. Certainly the point has been made with force for Australia (Yarwood, 1968: 3; McQueen, 1970: 21-100). Equally clearly, the makings of a 'white New Zealand' policy were given legislative expression by the Liberals with the full support or indifference of the working-class (Sinclair, 1965: 226-227; O'Connor, 1968: 53-58).

The symptomatic appeal of racism then was in the reinforcement of an emerging national identity across class-lines:

"The idea of New Zealand as an identifiable concept - of a land and a people - was confused by a lack of definitions, and by discreet pressures... the Pacific islands question blurred a New Zealand identity with British imperialism. Ideas of 'imperial unity', or a people joined by 'sentiment', gained currency in the late 1880's and 1890's, culminating in the declarations of empire on the occasion of the 1897 Jubilee" (Smithyman, 1971: 197).

Indeed, racism in the form of imperial sentiment was to reappear in the guise of militarism, jingoism, and later, anti-communism. The striking feature of this aggressive expression of anglo-centric or 'Britannic' nationalism (Cole, 1970: 44-45) was that it was shared by white settlers throughout the Empire. However, it was not a simple expression of a trans-

ported British nationalism, nor was it clear evidence of the stirrings of distinctive and separate national identities (Beaglehole, 1954: 112-113; Sinclair, 1955: 20-25; cf. Cole, 1970: 44; McQueen, 1970: 21-41).

Thus:

"if there is one country in the world in which the racial instinct is predominant, where the "pride of membership of the imperial race" was prevalent, it was New Zealand" (W. J. Napier, quoted in Cole, 1970: 48).

The importance of racial pride in this context is in its consequences for national unity, and therefore for the suppression of working-class consciousness. Especially since a natural outcome of this patriotism was to be the militarism of the period between the Boer War and the Great War.

The Boer War provided the first opportunity for the state to officially enact a national policy of imperialism commanding the loyalty of its citizens. The working-class reaction, in the absence of clear evidence, was probably swallowed up in the 'universal war spirit' (Sinclair, 1965: 282; McIver, 1972: 32-50; cf. Price, 1972: 233-242). McQueen has argued that the war served as a surrogate for the Australians fear of the Asian hordes (1970: 84), and New Zealand being similarly distant from the imperial centre was probably inspired in her war effort by a like sense of insecurity (cf. Page, 1970). However, the growing concern over matters of imperial and local defence in the years preceding the Great War, though seldom reaching jingoistic proportions (Gordon, 1960: 33), did exert strong pressure upon the militant union movement opposed to imperialism and militarism. This came at a time when the labour movement was having doubts about the arbitration system, and was being exposed to socialist ideas.

The first major issue to stir up opposition to

militarism was the Defence Act of 1909. The more militant unions such as the coal-miners, joined with middle-class organisations to oppose the compulsory military training of boys between the age of 17 and 20 (Weitzel, 1973). While the middle-class opposition was one of moral outrage against compulsion and the militaristic overtones of a territorial army, the Maoriland Worker put the socialist view. The whole issue of conscription was, it said, a diversionary tactic substituting an imaginary foreign enemy for the true enemy of the working-class "the exploiter and oppressor in one's own country" (Weitzel, 1973: 134). Defaulters however, were met with fines and military detention despite an absurd oversupply of trainees. Clearly, the act was enforced as a military discipline for those 'regular young anarchists!.. who were prepared to adopt any means to attain their end' (Weitzel, 1973: 146). No doubt the seeds of uncertainty which Beaglehole has described as a 'flight back into a more primitive colonialism' in the years immediately before the war, contributed to the authoritarian attitude of the Reform Government (1954: 113), an attitude hardened further by the repudiation of war as a form of capitalist oppression by the Unity Conference in 1913 (Gager, 1962: 7). In the months preceding the outbreak of war there were signs of a dramatic polarisation of attitudes between anti-militarist and patriotic groups (Weitzel, 1973: 147). Moreover, this division was one which ran right through the working-class.

There were a number of reasons why the militant labour movement could not capitalise on anti-militarist feeling. First, the most important factor was the continuing influence of the Liberal party in dividing the working-class constituency. The Liberal ideology of the "classless" state stood between many workers and their understanding of the international socialist

opposition to war (Gager, 1962: 11). Second, the socialist position was too extreme for the anti-militarist liberals. Third, the state had already begun to establish a legal framework making the support of imperialism and its consequence war, not a matter of free choice but a matter of lawful duty. And this first step towards state-enforced loyalty and national unity was only the beginning of the legal restraints justified by war. As Gager has put it:

"The state which had gained power and support by its experiments in labour and social legislation, was to use its power and popularity to subordinate almost every consideration of policy to the pursuit of military ends. It was to do this in spite of an almost unanimous outcry from labour, an outcry so unanimous as to be unprecedented. It was to arrest, prosecute and harass labour political leaders, while conceding a freedom so enlarged as to be tantamount to license to other sections of the community" (1962: 33).

He goes on to argue that the excessively repressive acts of the wartime government, especially the War Regulations Act of 1914, did much to arouse considerable antagonism to the war among the moderate working-class and middle-class liberals who, since ^{the} rise of the Liberals, had associated the state with the popular will (34-35). This opposition came to a head over the issue of Conscription. With a probable majority opposed to conscription (as in Australia, see Shaw, 1973) the labour movement had at last found an issue upon which it could stand united (Gager, 1962: 41).

Essentially the founding of the Labour Party in 1916 sprang from the same cultural sources as the Liberal victory of 1890. The moderate labour movement had been since the outbreak, 'neutral' on the war, certainly the Maoriland worker and Holland were isolated on the left fringe. But the war, like

opportunity, had to be egalitarian. Wealth had to be subject to conscription as were men. It was not 'fair' that the state should penalise the conscientious objector and partially finance the war by reductions in wages (Gager, 1962: 43). Around the issue of opposition to conscription, a latter-day populist or progressive movement had sprung up. Yet the war had stimulated similarly vocal opposition on the 'rightwing' as well. Though the wartime coalition had enacted powers capable of stifling all effective opposition, yet other forces were acting to divide the anti-war opposition. For example, the Protestant Political Association drove a wedge of sectarian discord between Catholics and Protestants. Those who had grown weary of the war or opposed it but did not wish "to associate themselves with the Labour Party and the working class" found a substitute in the Association (Gager, 1962: 50-56).

The labour movement then, since its adherence to arbitration and the concept of the Liberal state in 1890, had found itself increasingly bound by the constitutional aberrations of a Liberal state turned proto-fascist. The extent of wartime repressive legislation in New Zealand was unparalleled with the exception perhaps of the German system. As a consequence the anti-war opposition was pressured into moderation. From this period the Labour leadership found it necessary to modify its radicalism into a constitutional or parliamentary 'socialism', little more than a re-worked middle-class radicalism of the industrial age. The militant labour movement found itself isolated by the law, by charges of sedition and disloyalty, and the majority of moderates, which had been incorporated into the electoral structure with the establishment of the parliamentary labour party. These events were no more than the logical outcome of Nineteenth-century liberalism adapting to the social forces of industrialism. Airey has referred

to the dilemma of 'liberalism' confronting the class structure of industrial capitalism:

"Either it must move to a socialism grounded in recognition of class struggle or it must move towards Fascism, as it clearly did in the case of Bernard Bosanquet, the pupil of T. H. Green, idealising the State as the embodiment of a community that recognises no classes and within whose framework employer and employee are expected to live in a spirit of mutual co-operation, solving their "problems together on a higher plane, where the welfare of the national community and the State will be as a shining ideal to throw light on all their negotiations"... For there is the underlying belief that there is nothing beyond a liberal world in which capital and labour work together - or fight a continuously drawn battle - in sweet reasonableness. The problem is, under such conditions, to find the community. Who is outside the struggle of classes to form such a community and to provide the impartial state to mediate" (1955: 9-11).

It is precisely the dominant role of the state in imposing legal and coercive expressions of the mainstream political culture upon the working-class which was instrumental in creating such symbolic national 'community'. Beginning with the Anglo-Maori wars, and the role of the state as policeman, later incorporating the functions of landlord and protector of the racial stock, moving on to embody the general will mediating between antagonistic classes, to the ultimate high point of devotion to the empire, the state created both the components of nationalism and the institutional infrastructure for its legitimation. It remains but to review the overall impact of a growing state hegemony upon the political culture.

7. Social Sub-Imperialism

In order to explain the rise of the hegemonic state, to demonstrate when, how, and why it became an exclusive socio-cultural force, eliminating all

institutions of opposition short of major depression, we need to return to the idea of the imperial connection. Clearly, as I have shown, the state had become by the period of the Great War the crucial factor in the pacification of working-class consciousness. To what extent was this outcome in New Zealand determined by 'external' forces mediated by the imperial connection, compared with local and possibly unique 'challenges and responses'? In general the growing dominance of the state in New Zealand was part of a universal trend in the advanced industrial states. It was essentially a political response to the emerging working-class majority and its demands for political incorporation. This political response, which took place at different times and in varying degrees, has been referred to as social imperialism to signify the two major mechanisms involved in the attempt to solve the labour 'problem' by political adaptation (Semmel, 1960: 13-28).

Essentially, social imperialism consisted of ameliorating working-class discontent with working and living conditions by social reforms at home, and diverting or displacing discontent with the economic conditions of advanced capitalism by a policy of imperial expansion abroad (See Barratt Brown, 1972; Matthew, 1973: 150-194; Hamer, 1972: 263-290; Stretton, 1972: 73-140). It is a debatable point how far social imperialism satisfied working-class demands in the case of Britain, since imperialism carried with it material costs including loss of life in wars, unemployment due to the export of capital and distortion of colonial markets, and taxation (Barratt Brown, 1972: 80). Though material standards of working-class lives may not have been improved by either social reforms at home or the expansion of empire abroad, this is not part of the argument. What was important as a means of solving the labour problem, was the pacification of the militant labour movement, and this could have been accomplished by either the ideological

or symbolic appeals of 'one nation' at home and abroad, or the simple coopting of the labour leadership (after Lenin), or both of these. To take the high point of social imperialism, the Great War, the ideological gains seemed to outweigh the material costs to the labour movement. Though there was widespread opposition to the war, the leadership was pro-war (Clinton, 1970).

What distinguished social Sub-imperialism as it developed in New Zealand was its degree of radicalism, both in terms of its early origin and the extent of its fulfillment. In no other outpost of empire were both the mechanisms of social reform and the myth of imperial supremacy carried to a point approaching that of a Fascist solution to the labour problem (cf. Semmel, 1960: 234-262). Yet this impression seems explicable enough. If the material costs of expansion to the British working-class needed to be compensated for by the symbolic appeals of social imperialism, so much the more likely that the small, weak, labour movement in the colony should have been subjected to more extreme measures. Clearly the material costs of imperial expansion were more severe for the colonial workers, and the appeals of empire therefore, less sufficient. Thus in both labour and political relations, the state in New Zealand was required to impose more repressive legal and physical constraints upon the working class.

On the question of labour relations, industrial and social legislation beginning with the I. C. & A. Act has generally been interpreted as evidence of the evolutionary socialist modification of capitalist institutions (See Bedggood, 1974^a). As Airey points out however, the origins and consequences of this legislation were much more profound (1955). In the first place the measures in question were designed to provide a liberal rather than socialist solution to the labour problem. This meant legislating a

balance of power between the extreme 'tyranny of labour' and 'tyranny of capital' (11). In the second place, the effect was to regulate labour relations and stabilise capitalism at a point where the growth of the labour movement had become a threat to the capitalist state. According to Airey:

"The general tendency has been for the arbitration system to be extended from its essentially experimental beginning in a particular set of circumstances to a more all-embracing system within which all industrial activity must move, with wider effects on the whole life of the country... To regard the court as an expression of community interest is to identify the community with the preservation of employer class interests and the perpetuation of a profit-making and wage-worker relationship" (1955: 13-14).

The same interpretation can be directed at other aspects of the so-called welfare state. The increased collectivisation of health, education and welfare begun in the nineties, is justified in terms of state-guaranteed equality of opportunity. In principle a state-managed meritocracy is possible given a sufficient transfer of wealth. Yet in the case of New Zealand, as with other 'welfare states' this had not yet been demonstrated (See Bedggood, 1974⁹). What remains possible is that the expanding network of bureaucratic administration in health, education and welfare, can under conditions of continued exploitation, serve to accommodate individuals to an acceptance of 'objective' inequality (cf. Runciman, 1972: 384-399). Under the general rubric of social reform then, the state has extended its institutions of social control over a great range of social and cultural activities, establishing in the process a hegemonic control over the creation of ideas and interests (Bedggood, 1974⁹).

In terms of the Deutsch-Oliver approach to national integration, New Zealand became a 'single

society' at some point between the 1880's and 1920's (Oliver, 1971: 12) in which:

"every dairy farm, every sheep station, every market garden and orchard, every factory, every shop, every trade union, every lodge and friendly society, every professional association, every municipality, was in the process of being drawn into an intricate socio-administrative system which ends up by being just another way, and a very promising way, of saying, "New Zealand" (12).

But for Oliver the state absorbed, did not create, 'a prepackaged consensus on an increasing volume of concerns' (11). The growth of the central state and party-system was to provide opportunities and satisfy needs, rather than to maintain capitalist class relations and the reward structures of land, labour and capital (Oliver, 1969: 164-166).

The existence of Sub-imperialism over the period from 1870 to 1920, has generally been taken as evidence of an ambivalent sense of nationality (Sinclair, 1955: 47; Beaglehole, 1954) or of great expectations but minor achievements (Ross, 1964: 296) but to my knowledge not as evidence of social imperialism. Both Beaglehole and Ross refer to 'colonial imperialism' as a peculiar brand of imperialism limited to colonies, and which manifestly did not fit the 'Marxist-Lenist theory of imperialism as the outcome of monopoly and finance capitalism' (Ross, 1964: 290). But this is to limit the idea of imperialism to actual physical or territorial expansion, excluding the profound moral and ideological movement at the time. True, it was not the material advantages of imperialism in any direct, or Pacific, sense which had an effect upon the New Zealand working-class; these were indirect, the consequence of the colony's privileged station in the empire. What mattered was the growing sense of national identity cutting-across class affinity, regimenting consensus

under a militarist state.

At the end of the period we have been discussing, there had emerged a cultural consensus incorporating two dominant elements. The first was a set of core values, the familiar liberal populist meritocratic ideology of equal opportunity under state capitalism (See Simpson, 1974). The second was a concept of national identity which consisted of a number of beliefs or emotional accretions surrounding the root stock of racial purity. These values and beliefs comprised the New Zealand mainstream political culture. In the following chapters, we shall see how far they remain dominant in contemporary political culture, and how far they constitute a traditional, diffuse, and independent source of state legitimacy.

TEN:

Contemporary Political Culture

1. The Centre-Periphery Model and Survey Data

The purpose of this and following chapters is to survey the empirical data on the nature and origin of political attitudes in post-war New Zealand society, and to offer a partial test of the centre-periphery model of political legitimation. In the preceding chapter I have shown that in the developmental phase the central cultural apparatus took on an increasingly important role in the formation of political culture. The concomitant centralisation and homogenization of centre institutions meant that by the post-war period the state had consolidated its power to the point where, through its control of centre institutions, it was able to substantially constrain both the channels of political expression, and to some degree, political interests and values. The actual extent of state hegemony however, especially as it affects working-class political culture, is a matter for empirical enquiry, and calls for a careful examination of the whole cultural system in order to demonstrate the means and agencies by and through which state hegemony is implemented.

Following Parkin (1972) and Jessop (1972) I shall define the cultural system in terms of cultural power (See Chapter Eight, pp. 157-158). To the extent that one set of values becomes dominant over other sets of values, it is defined as the dominant value-system, or dominant culture. The lesser values may comprise either subordinate or radical sub-cultures. Values are expressed and translated into action through social

institutions which have developed for the purpose. The total range of these institutions can be referred to as the institutional matrix. Those which embody the dominant culture are termed centre institutions, while those which represent subcultures are termed peripheral institutions. Further, values and institutions are meaningless without people who can, for our purposes, be located in terms of their position within the institutional matrix. Since the range of institutions which the individual comes in contact with during his or her life-history vary considerably, I have made a distinction between those which comprise a social or physical milieu of primary social interaction, and those which transcend the immediate milieu and are widely shared independently of social position. The first type is called positional, since it implies social learning in specific social positions, and includes the familiar list of primary and secondary associations such as family, kinship networks, neighbourhood and work, certain aspects of schooling which reinforce local experience, church attendance, and other solidary organisations such as unions, social clubs and so on. The second type is communicative and includes, the organisation and content of education (representing dominant values), established religion, political parties (in Anglo-American systems), and other agencies of the centre culture such as the legal-system, some media, and government administration (the Public Service in New Zealand).

The situations in which individuals learn and modify their interests and values therefore comprise overlapping institutional sources both in time and space. In relatively advanced industrial societies such as New Zealand, where social and geographic mobility is high, the individuals life-history will consist of a succession of social locations within the institutional matrix. The consequence of this fact for theories of attitude formation and change

has been a tendency to view the individual as being exposed to institutional 'cross-pressures' which subject him or her to conflicts between old and new loyalties; statuses; class identities; or group affiliations and so on (Berelson et.al, 1966; Lipset, 1963: 203-216; Campbell et.al, 1964: 42-48; Segal, 1969; Horan, 1971; Eitzen, 1972). However, whichever explanation is offered to account for attitude formation or change, be it status-inconsistency, mobility, attitudinal imbalance, or acculturation, they are all special instances of a more general process of stratification dynamics (cf. Blalock, 1967), and can be subsumed under the centre-periphery model.

Thus, under the label of positional sources fall community or social interaction (Segal and Wildstrom, 1970; Putnam, 1967), reference groups (Merton, 1968; Goldthorpe et.al, 1968; Runciman, 1964, 1966, 1972), and socio-economic status or social class (Goldberg, 1966; Alford, 1963, 1967; Robinson, 1967; Rose, 1968; Sears, 1969; Lipset, 1963, 1969: Chapter 5; Thompson, 1970; McDonald, 1971a; Hamilton, 1972). The emphasis upon positional sources as the prime causes of political attitudes stems from the common assumption that it is mainly they which mediate economic interests and condition both the objective experience and subjective perception of inequality (e.g. Bedggood, 1970: Part 2). While the nature and intensity of social interaction may vary somewhat across class and other social groupings (Segal and Wildstrom, 1970; Berry, 1969) a further assumption is that positional sources continue to socialise, 'resocialise' or 'convert' individuals to the appropriate values wherever he or she may move within the social matrix. Thus, whether this experience is categorised as 'mobility', embourgeoisement, or status-inconsistency, it is expected that the outcome will be a sense of relative deprivation or satisfaction depending upon the existence of status discrimination and the subjective perception of in-

equality (Campbell et.al, 1964: 164-209; Runciman and Bagley, 1969; Runciman, 1970: 212-223; Allardt, 1970; Parkin, 1972: Chapter 2; Knoke, 1972: 31).

However, the link between positional sources, interests, and political attitudes, is not as direct as is sometimes supposed (cf. Sears, 1969: 324-353, 370-399). Whatever the particular effects of positional agencies in shaping basic values and beliefs, they are likely to be subordinate to the impact of communicative sources in two key areas. The first is the definition of a hierarchical reward or status-structure. The second is the specification of access to the opportunity structure. The effect of these values and beliefs as disseminated by communicative sources is to establish a relatively standardised set of expectations concerning both rewards and their availability. According to such communicative criteria, objective and subjective aspects of inequality become reduced to the isolated instances of individual 'success' or 'failure'. The consensual perception of inequality super-imposes an individualist or atomistic image of meritocratic competition over radical peripheral images of class or group conflict (cf. McClosky, 1964; Hamilton, 1972: 42-46).

In order to correct the positional bias of current political sociology, the centre-periphery model stresses two important dimensions of influence which must be measured. These are, first, the relative dominance of centre to peripheral institutions, and second the relative dominance of positional to communicative sources, as they both enter into the life-history of the individual. To demonstrate the utility of this approach I now propose to briefly review the more general findings of survey research in this area.

2. Empirical Correlates of Political Attitudes

Most studies concerned with describing the cor-

relates or explaining the causes of political attitudes have been rather simply methodologically. The number of independent variables considered is usually small, the data being static and individual rather than longitudinal and contextual (See Bedgood, 1970: Part 2; McDonald, 1971b). Few studies have been able to control for interactions among independent variables and suggest any causal sequence involved in attitude learning or change (e.g. Hamilton, 1972: Chapter 11; cf. Sears, 1969: 399-414). The supposed effects of variables are generally expressed as percentage differences or as measures of association, and seldom in terms of variance explained. As a consequence, much survey work in the area is more concerned with statistical significance than with explanatory power (Olsen and Tully, 1972). A review of existing research can therefore best be organised in terms of its adequacy in meeting the requirements of causal explanation (Blalock, 1964; Galtung, 1969).

For obvious reasons most survey research into political attitudes measures personal attributes at one point in time. In some cases it is possible to reconstruct indicators of the past from the data of the present, but in most cases longitudinal research consists of stringing together a series of static surveys rather than in tracing particular individuals through time. To summarise the main findings of research of this type, we can refer to a list of correlates which have been shown to be associated with the political attitudes of general samples of electors in the Western democracies. In rough order of importance they are: occupation, education, subjective class, party identification, ethnicity, and religion (Key, 1961; Campbell et.al, 1964: 184-249; Laulitch and Strong, 1968; Lipset, 1969: 159-176; Bedgood, 1970: Part 2; McDonald, 1971, 1972; Hamilton, 1972). Though each of these variables has some zero-order correlation with either voting preference or a measure

of domestic or foreign policy attitudes, little is known of their causal significance in relation to other measured and unmeasured variables (See Bedggood, 1970: Part 4 and 5; cf. Sears, 1969: 399-414).

A good example of the difficulties facing measurement at this level, is the interpretation of occupation as a possible cause of political interests and attitudes. In the past it has been the practice to accept the statistical division between manual and non-manual occupations as the criterion of working class. Yet little theoretical justification for this distinction exists in either Marxist or Functionalist theory. As Hamilton has recently argued, much of the commentary on working class mobility and embourgeoisement has been based upon this dubious assumption. In his view, in the U. S. at least, a more plausible cut-off point between working and middle classes is between the lower and upper middle-class (1972: 218). Nevertheless, using both the manual/non-manual and Hamilton's cut-off, we can review the relationship between occupation and political attitudes.

Campbell et.al. (1964) Key, (1961) and Hamilton (1972), all using Survey Research Data, have shown that over a period of nearly two decades, that occupational status is positively related to political liberalism (civil liberties) and economic conservatism (anti-welfare laissez faire). However, the effect of occupation is far from direct, being mediated by a number of factors which reinforce or counteract its effect. Some of these are what I have termed positional (for example Hamilton's (1972: 199) stress on the socio-cultural effects of religion and ethnicity counter-acting class effects in some circumstances, and strengthening them in others), but the most significant appear to be communicative, for example, issue saliency, political information, party identification, level of education, and the media (Campbell et.al, 1964; Key,

1961: 125-130; Hamilton, 1972: Chapter 5 and 11).

It seems then, that insofar as liberal or conservative attitudes are indicators of interests, the awareness of self or class-interest is mediated by a number of other factors, all of which become contributing causes of attitudes (Bedggood, 1970: 40-52). Given the importance of positional factors, especially occupation (and ethnicity in the U. S.) in shaping interests, it is assumed here that these findings on domestic issues demonstrates the importance of perception of subjective inequality (or relative deprivation) in shaping interests and their political expression (See Chapter Eight, pp. 146-149).

In second place to occupation as the most influential correlate of political attitudes is education (Almond and Verba, 1965: 315-324; Key, 1961: 339-340; Campbell et.al, 1964: 115-119; Laulitch and Strong, 1969: 136-148; Bedggood, 1970: 46-52, 119-134). How is education related to occupational status and subjective class? At zero-order level, education appears to act as a general measure of social position (Campbell et.al, 1964: 119). However, when associated socio-economic factors such as income and occupation are controlled, education is seen to have a 'liberalising' influence in economic as well as political and foreign policy issue areas (McClosky, 1967; Key, 1961: 339; Bedggood, 1970: 119-134; Hamilton, 1972: 212). The connection with subjective class identification is more complex. This is largely because formal education combines effects which are positional and communicative. While it is often argued that the main communicative effect of education is to induce anticipatory middle-class identification, Hamilton has shown that the content of education varies greatly (in the U. S.), and that increasing formal education has little effect upon party identification (and by implication class identification) (1972: 212-214). In summary, education has been shown to have an independent effect upon political

attitudes, but as yet too little attention has been paid to the content and quality of formal education to establish any reliable body of evidence (cf. Bedggood, 1974^b).

A third important correlate of political attitudes is subjective class identification. In fact the widely reported disparity between objective class attributes and subjective class identification has focused attention increasingly upon the social context, or the subjective meaning social interaction has for the perception of self-interest (Leggett, 1968; Leacock, 1967; Brooks, 1969; Hamilton, 1972: Chapter 2). This research has been concerned with the effect of individual movement or change of milieu upon party identification and political belief-systems, in particular that producing social mobility or status-inconsistency. I shall review this research briefly in order to show how far various cross-pressures do in fact contribute to attitude formation and change. Note the general assumption that party identification is an indicator of class identification. There are some studies however, which take some attitude measure as evidence of changing interests.

The importance of embourgeoisement for party preference and interests has been held for some time. Yet in both Britain and the U. S. this effect has been greatly overestimated. It is not a simple question of increasing income, or occupational status, but of established values and social context. Where a strong working-class commitment exists, and movement is into a similarly composed lower middle-class neighbourhood, change is minimal (Lockwood, 1966; Segal and Wildstrom, 1970; Abramson, 1973). Where workers are already conservative in anticipation of upward mobility, or move into distinctly upper middle-class environs, some shifting of attitudes is apparent (Goldthorpe et.al, 1968; Hamilton, 1972: 341-345;

Barber, 1970: Chapter 7). The process involved appears to support the view that attitude change (whether measured by voting preference, political, economic or foreign-policy attitudes) is a sum of past and present influences both positional and communicative. Segal and Wildstrom (1970) have shown that where new positional sources are stronger than those left behind, as is more typically the case with upwardly mobile working-class persons, some change will occur. Where, however, old attachments have been maintained, change is minimal. In his general review of the field, Barber (1970) concluded that mobility is merely a continuation of socialisation, and that it carries in the short term, no special effect. Hamilton, has also argued that the extent of social mobility between distinctive classes or statuses would have to be great before any major disruption in attitudes took place, and since (in the U. S.) most mobility is short-range, involving little need for drastic change, the causal importance of mobility up or down is marginal (1972: 316pp; See also Jackman, 1972a, 1972b; and Thompson, 1970). In summary then, the impact of mobility as such appears to be negligible. What is involved is the re-learning of some new attitudes as the result of changing patterns of association (Jackman, 1972a), kinship (Hazelrigg and Lopreato, 1972), the passage of time (Lopreato and Hazelrigg, 1970), the characteristics of the community of reception (Segal and Wildstrom, 1970), together with certain established commitments such as party identification (Barber, 1970) and high status expectations (Segal and Knoke, 1971). Certainly, there is no established trend which distinguishes the mobile from the non-mobile in either the U. S. or Britain (Barber, 1970; Abramson, 1972, 1973; Abramson and Books, 1971; Thompson, 1971a, 1971b; also Rinehart, 1971).

As with mobility, so with the phenomenon of status-

inconsistency. After two decades of controversial and contradictory findings, this concept has been subjected to convincing criticism. On theoretical grounds, it has been claimed that the concept has no logical basis, since it may refer to any number of dissimilar social and psychological processes (Dorian and Stockman, 1969; Box and Ford, 1969; Runciman and Bagley, 1969; Meyer and Hammond, 1971; Knoke, 1972). Others have argued that status-consistency is a special case of social mobility acculturation (Eitzen, 1970, 1972; Jackman, 1972a, 1972b). At the empirical level, though a number of replications of the original Lenski (1954) study have been made, the only statistically significant finding has been that high achievement/low ascription inconsistencies are more economically liberal and support left parties more frequently than do consistents (Hunt and Cushing, 1970; Segal, 1969; Segal and Knoke, 1971; Olsen and Tully, 1970; Broom and Jones, 1970). But even so, this effect though statistically significant, explains less than 2% of the attitudinal variance, a finding which Olsen and Tully (1972) describe as "valid but trivial" (cf. Jackson and Curtis, 1972; and Thompson, 1970). Again, as with mobility research, the widely held judgment is that the additive effects of status explain more attitudinal variance than do any interactive effects of inconsistency, cross-pressures or whatever, and that emphasis should now shift to the study of the socio-cultural mechanisms of acculturation, or in Segal's term the "networks of social interaction" which intervene between social position and political attitudes (Segal and Wildstrom, 1970).

Notwithstanding the generally slight effects of mobility and status-inconsistency upon the perception and awareness of economic issues, low-status in general is associated with relatively radical economic and conservative political attitudes. Whether these attitudes are primarily conditioned by positional or

communicative sources can best be left until the question of working-class authoritarianism is discussed (Chapter Eleven). Meanwhile, though the relationship between social position and political attitudes is extremely complex for persons of low-status, some attempt must be made to sketch out the likely influence of conflicting positional and communicative sources upon attitudes in the New Zealand population. For example, the positional sources of family, work, and neighbourhood reference-groups presupposes some common positional need or interest. Yet in shaping attitudes concerning needs and interests, positional sources (especially in the periphery) are in competition with communicative sources such as formal education, established religion, the state bureaucracy and party-system. Though ideally, the testing of such a model would require a highly sophisticated and complex research design, this is difficult if not impossible to accomplish on a large scale. Indeed the New Zealand research to be presented here, consists of small, static, individual-attribute-type surveys, and for this reason falls far short of a satisfactory source of data about the interaction of institutional sources in shaping attitudes over the life-history of individuals.

The rationale underlying the New Zealand surveys is that of "the best in the circumstances". It is assumed that it is possible to construct crude indices of learning situations by inferring a sequence of social positions from statistical representations of individual attributes such as education, occupation, income, religion, party affiliation, and so on. According to this assumption some estimate of an individuals position vis a vis the centre or periphery can be made on the basis of these attributes. The second assumption "in the circumstances" is that though these attributes are measured at one point in time, it may be possible to establish some idea of causal direction

on the basis of time-order. Here reliance is placed upon overseas research into the general time-sequence of agencies in political socialisation. Thus it is well established that early experience in the family and school lays down the basic beliefs concerning the nation and the authorities (Sears, 1969: 370 pp. provides a good review) and establishes a party-identification of fairly high resistance to change (Barber, 1970: 261). Subsequent changes in milieu, particularly mobility or extended formal education, may serve to modify or consolidate attitudes. While it is true that the complexity of this causal process cannot be further understood simply by making assumptions such as these, at the moment the best that can be expected is a crude and oversimplified modelling of the apparently major factors and influences upon the learning and changing of political attitudes. While the conclusions reached should therefore be considered as tentative only, they may nonetheless, bear upon the ultimate usefulness of the centre-periphery model advanced in this thesis, and suggest areas for future research.

3. The Dimensions of Belief-Systems

As with the exploration of the causes of political attitudes, the definition of that which is to be explained has been particularly deficient. There has been a tendency to simplify the measures of political attitudes either to the indicator of party preference, or to single or face-valid sets of questions about selected issues (See Bedggood, 1970: Part 1). This has been the consequence of an a priori or deductive approach based upon rather elitist expectations about the nature and content of political 'ideology' (Bedggood, 1972; Sears, 1969: 330). The most defective measure of ideology is that of party choice, a limitation noted by a number of writers (McClosky et.al, 1960; Converse, 1964; Jackman, 1972a;

Hamilton, 1972: 361). But only recently has the elitist conception of 'ideology' as the property of the rational few, been challenged. In part the problem has been that the concept itself signifies rational, coherent, consistent and stable patterns of ideas. The failure to locate such sets of attitudes in the mass populations was taken to mean that no coherent, consistent, stable and most important, rational ideas of any sort existed for the general public (Axelrod, 1967; Luttbeg, 1968; Sears, 1969: 330; Brown, 1970; Kirkpatrick, 1970; RePass, 1971; Bedggood, 1972; Pomper, 1972; Hamilton, 1972; Cobb, 1973).

Nevertheless, some conceptual framework is needed to interpret the nature and distribution of attitudes in a given political culture, and I have adopted the term belief-system in preference to ideology to describe the patterns of attitudes, values or beliefs held by individuals (Converse, 1964; Sartori, 1969; Cobb, 1973; cf. Bedggood, 1972; Wilker and Milbrath, 1970). There are a number of grounds for making the distinction. One is that ideology is a general term with a number of prior claims for special use. The best known is that of Mannheim (1960) who contrasts ideology with utopia in a specific sense to signify the link between knowledge and interests. The second is that the term continues to generate considerable debate in professional journals around issues somewhat removed from political culture (e.g. Sartori, 1969; Diggins, 1970; Mullins, 1972).

There is also a case for making a distinction between belief-system and political culture since the former can be used to describe empirically measurable patterns of attitudes for specific populations at specific times, while the latter term can be applied to abstract historical and comparative generalisations about shared beliefs without specific refer-

ence to place or time. That the dimensions of belief-systems do not necessarily correspond to analytical concepts of the components of political culture can be demonstrated by reference to Almond and Verba's typology of cultural orientations, the descriptive terms I have used in preceding chapters to describe the New Zealand political culture, and the dimensions of belief-systems established by survey research abroad.

Almond and Verba's orientation to the system (See Chapter Four, pp. 62) is most commonly the focus of political socialisation research, since it is assumed that cognitive and evaluative attachment to the symbols of national authority date from an early age (Jaros, 1973: 27-50; Almond and Verba, 1965: 299 pp.). However, surveys of adult attitudes in so-called Democratic systems have shown that there are variations in the distribution of allegiance to, and alienation from, the system (Prothro and Grigg, 1960; Stouffer, 1955; McClosky, 1964; Mann, 1970; Rose and Mossawir, 1967; Almond and Verba, 1965; Jackman, 1973). Corresponding to system-beliefs at the individual level are beliefs concerning efficacy and participation, which again are taken to be established in early life, but which vary considerably across populations (Rose and Mossawir, 1967; Form and Huber, 1971; Sharpe, 1973a; Western and Wilson, 1973). It is often assumed that both types of political orientation and their corresponding belief-systems are fundamental to a political culture and constitute the core components of individual citizenship and national identity (Almond and Verba, 1965) yet it is clear that they are by no means consensual nor allegiant. Thus the meritocratic mainstream political culture as it developed in New Zealand rapidly assimilated both aspects of the 'faith' in democracy - the belief in individual citizenship - and an allegiance to or trust in the state, the "system". It would not be safe to assume however, that there is,

or has ever been, an allegiant consensus concerning either the state's legitimacy or the individuals efficacy. Elements of apathy, cynicism, and alienation have persisted to this day.

The attitude domains that are of more interest here, are those which correspond to Almond and Verba's input and output orientations (See Chapter Four, pp. 62). The former have to do with the performance of particular governments and political parties, and are usually measured in the form of voting preference, partisan identification and so on (See Robinson et.al, 1969, for list and description of scales, etc.). Output orientations are related to decisions concerning issues, and have attracted the most research attention. Beliefs or attitudes directed at output issues, whether domestic, or foreign-policy have most commonly been measured on a liberalism-conservatism dimension (See Robinson et.al, 1969: Chapter 2 and 3; Campbell et.al, 1964; Bedgood, 1970). As techniques of attitude measurement have improved new dimensions and patterns of output attitudes have been recognised. One can now distinguish between political and economic liberalism and conservatism (Lipset, 1963: Chapter 4; Mitchell, 1968; Bedgood, 1970: Part 2; Hamilton, 1972: Chapter 3), allowing the recognition of patterns of attitudes formerly discounted as 'non-ideological' non-attitudes, which 'mix' conservative and liberal beliefs (Bedgood, 1970; 1972; Converse, 1970; Jackman, 1973). Similarly, in the foreign-policy issue-area, a tough-soft dimension has been found to cut across the traditional involvement-isolationism dimension (McClosky, 1967; Galtung, 1967; Patchen, 1970; Bedgood, 1970; 1972). There are thus at least three two-dimensional attitude domains which have been found to 'fit' the empirical patterns of 'output' attitudes in three issue-areas; political, economic and foreign-policy. How do these attitudinal dimensions translate into the terms of the New Zealand political

culture?

In the first place, the attitudinal dimension economic liberalism-conservatism represents the familiar antagonism between meritocratic, welfarist and egalitarian beliefs dominant in the New Zealand political culture, and the social Darwinist, anti-welfare, laissez faire conservatism of the right. Second, the dimension political liberalism-conservatism describes what can be loosely referred to as civil liberties, individual and minority rights on the liberal end, and authoritarian, punitive and militant attitudes towards minorities and individuals on the conservative end (again, both distinctive components of the New Zealand political culture). The foreign-policy dimension of involvement-isolationism has both tough and soft versions. The tough/involvement version corresponds to the militant, jingoistic foreign adventurism in defence of Empire and Commonwealth, while the soft/involvement version fits with the 'civilising' and 'humanitarian' wing of internationalism. Similarly, isolationist attitudes can be found in both pacifist and aggressive form.

At face-value at least, it seems that the patterns of values and beliefs identified in the emergent political culture in New Zealand, tap the same core values and beliefs as do the dimensions of belief-systems established by empirical research abroad. It remains to be shown how far similar attitudinal dimensions exist for the New Zealand population, and whether or not there is a 'goodness of fit' between contemporary belief-systems and the political culture as it has been described in preceding chapters. With this conceptual framework in mind, we can now consider the nature and extent of attitudes expressed by samples of the New Zealand population towards the 'system', citizenship, inputs and outputs.

4. The Survey Data: Attitudes

In this section the research which bears upon the nature and distribution of political belief-systems in the New Zealand population will be presented. Only the most satisfactory data will be discussed, other less reliable or more impressionistic data is reviewed elsewhere (Bedggood, 1974^b). The first study to be considered is the Victoria Election Survey (1963; See Appendix One for description of method and procedure). Among a number of attribute and attitude items the survey included twenty items on a range of social issues (See Appendix One for full description). The responses were then subject to factor analysis producing five rotated factors, three of which showed distinctive patterns, labelled authoritarianism, populism and individualism (See Codebook, 1970; Report, 1970; Brookes and Ashenden, 1967). A subsequent replication of this factor analysis produced the results shown in Tables 1 and 2. A total of 38% of the variance was accounted for by six factors, four of which (in rotated form) were considered worthy of discussion (Table 2, p. 217)

The first factor appears to represent an authoritarian (liberalism) dimension, loading items on law-and-order, civil liberties, and political minorities (items 2, 4, 7, 8, 10, 18). The second factor seems to tap a democratic centralism (populism) dimension, being concerned with equality, taxation, the public service bureaucracy, and parliamentary representation (items 14, 15, 16, 18, 20). The third factor can be labelled economic conservatism (liberalism) since it loads items on death duties, trade unions and the welfare state (items 3, 7, 12, 14). The fourth factor, individualism (collectivism) relates to items on laissez faire, the role of the state and individual rights (items 1, 5, 6, 9, 16).

<u>Unrotated Factors</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>
Gov't duty to guarantee jobs and decent standard of living for all				30	-30	50
Hanging should be brought back for some murders	42	40				
Reduce death duties	39	36				33
Membership of Communist party should be banned	59					
Gov't control food prices and rents	38	-46				
Fluoridation is an infringement of liberty	42				(-29)	
Unions too powerful	45	44				
Flogging for sex crimes	54	34	-30			
Big Business too powerful	50				-37	
N.Z. support China's admission to U N.		-42	46		(-28)	
Abolish state lotteries	35	-35		-48		
Welfare state gone too far	31	34	56			
More state aid for private schools	38			42	37	
Public servants too powerful	44		33			-33
N.Z. should not be ally of nuclear powers	54	(-29)				
Gov't should reduce wealth differences	48	-49				
Extend drinking hours			34	71		
Gov't should cut taxes	57					
Paraparumu a good airport					43	35
Local M.P. neglects his district	33	-30	33			-40

Table 1 Victoria attitude items showing loadings (above .30) on six unrotated factors. Variance explained: 1 15%; 2 15%; 3 6%; 4 1.5%; 5 0.2%; 6 0.04%)

<u>Rotated Factors</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>
Gov't duty to guaranteed jobs and decent standard of living for all				-66
Hanging should be brought back for some murders	60			
Reduce death duties			46	
Membership of Communist party should be banned	57			
Gov't control food and rents				-58
Fluoridation infringes liberty				-47
Trade unions are too powerful	-30		61	
Sex criminals should be flogged	71			
Big Business is too powerful				-56
N.Z. Support China to the U.N.	-57			
Abolish state lotteries			(29)	
Welfare state has gone too far			76	
More State Aid for private schools				
Public Servants are too powerful		-50	37	
N.Z. not ally with Nuclear powers		-34		-30
Gov't reduce wealth differences		-47		-39
Drinking hours extended				
Gov't should cut taxes	30	-44		
Paraparumu a good airport				
Local M.P. neglects his district		-71		

Table 2 Victoria attitude items showing loadings (above .30) on four of six rotated factors.

What is suggested by this study, is that these four patterns of attitudes represent a clustering of beliefs around four relatively independent dimensions. One cannot say however how far such beliefs are central to the political culture since the range of issues sampled is a small fraction of the total attitude domain. Moreover the technique of factor analysis does not necessarily guarantee a 'good fit' between patterns of attitudes extracted mathematically, and those patterns of beliefs which actually exist (Harmon, 1967; Rummel, 1967). Nevertheless, the data lends itself to validation by further research.

The second study to be considered can be entitled the Canterbury attitude survey (Bedggood, 1970; 1972). A number of domestic and foreign-policy items were used and the responses subjected to varimax rotation (See Appendix Two for description of method and procedure). The first three unrotated factors accounted for most of the variance, and since they loaded on both domestic and foreign-policy items they were labelled accordingly (See Table 3, p.219). The first is anticommunist/conservatism, consisting of a strong, militant anti-communism together with a domestic political and economic conservatism. The tough anti-communism included support of the U. S. in its fight against Communism; maintaining N. Z. soldiers overseas to stop communism; and commitment to N. Z.'s military alliances. On the domestic front we find a combination of authoritarian political attitudes such as the denial of rights to minorities, support for government secrecy and authority in time of war, together with economically conservative attitudes opposed to increased welfare spending, and to both trade union and 'big' business influence on government.

<u>Unrotated Factors</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>
<u>Items:</u>			
Minority Rights	-32		
Freedom of Opinion		-30	
Government heeds public opinion			
Government secrecy		-38	
Public consultation in time of war		42	
Reduce income tax			
National shipping line		30	
Trade union leader influence			
No Communists in public service	41		
State aid to private schools			31
Increase medical services			
Unemployment benefit			
Maori Housing			36
Big business influence			
Intervention in sports			
N.Z. influence others abroad			47
N.Z. non-involvement abroad		50	
N.Z. non-interference in internal pol.			
Support U.N.			36
N.Z.'s political independence			
Welfare of others N.Z. interest			31
Overseas interest groups		39	
N.Z. prevent conflict abroad			53
Competing immigrants		55	
China in U.N.	-46		
Co-operation with Russia	-33		
N.Z. soldiers abroad	54		
Russia and China tough enemies	44		
Defeat communism at all cost	48		
Help U.S.A. to prevent communism	66		
N.Z. in military alliances	54		
N.Z. military spending	-49	32	
Fight without question	51		
Stationing of nuclear warships	42		
Banning of nuclear weapons	-31		29
Unilateral disarmament	-37	36	
Foreign aid	-36		
Aid to communists	39		
Trade with China	-51		
Trade with South Africa	-28		
Communism a threat to the West	43		
Disarmament possible	62		

Table 3 Canterbury (1969) attitude items showing loadings on first three unrotated factors: 1 anti-communist/conservatism; 2 isolationist/populist; and 3 coexistence/liberal.

The second factor labelled isolationist/populist reveals a pattern of isolationist attitudes on foreign-policy items and mixed conservative and liberal domestic attitudes. The strongest foreign-policy attitudes were: opposition to N. Z. involvement abroad, to the stationing of U. S. nuclear warships in New Zealand, and immigrants who compete with N. Z. workers, together with support for cuts in defence expenditure. The populist mixture consists of a political conservatism (denial of minority rights), belief in popular democracy (support for public consultation in time of war, and the active role of public opinion), together with economic liberalism (more social services) and conservatism (cut back on taxes). This pattern approximates that found by Axelrod in the U. S. (Bedggood, 1972). The third factor, coexistence/liberalism, shows a connection between a pragmatic non-militant involvement abroad (N. Z. as international peace-keeper) and a strong economic liberalism at home (state aid, and Maori housing in particular).

Though the items and samples are not exactly comparable, the results of both the Victoria and Canterbury surveys suggest the existence of the main dimensions of political belief-systems found abroad, running along the three axes of conservatism-liberalism on economic and political matters, and along the tough-soft international 'ingroup-outgroup' dimension. Certainly, as far as the first two factors are concerned, the similarity between the Victoria authoritarian and populist factors and the Canterbury anti-communist/conservative and isolationist/populist factors is apparent. Further support for this observation is provided by a third study of a similar nature.

A postal survey, called here the Canterbury Follow-up (1970), was made in 1970 for the purpose

of increasing the number of items used in the 1969 survey, in order to construct attitude scales for further research (See Appendix Three for a description of method and procedure). The number of items was expanded from 44 to 84 separated into three areas; nationalism (including foreign-policy), domestic, and "psychological". The items in each area were then subjected to separate factor analysis. The results in the nationalism domain are presented in Tables 4 and 5 (a full listing of the attitude items is found in Appendix Three). The general patterns which emerged supported the claim that nationalist sentiment is expressed in a range of contents and styles. The first factor, explaining 20% of the variance, is the familiar militant anti-communist pattern which appears to cluster around a central belief - the struggle for national survival against international Communism. The second factor represents the pragmatic coexistence, or 'soft' option, encompassing military preparedness, an open door policy on trade, international cooperation, immigration and political communication. The third is a tough isolationism stressing non-involvement abroad, and stopping immigrants and overseas takeovers. The fourth factor has been labelled polynesian immigration as it combines support for polynesians and immigration together with some isolationist tendencies. The last two factors are not sufficiently clear to warrant consideration.

The interesting point about these styles of nationalism is that they share a common acceptance of government authority, in terms of 'going-along' with government decisions, or refraining from criticism of government during times of crisis. However, when the factors are rotated (Table 5) submission to government authority is reduced for the coexistence and isolationist factors.

<u>Unrotated Factors</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>
Not criticise Gov't in crises	39			38	-33		
Sitting for anthem not disrespectful to Queen	-30					-57	
Gov't right regardless	(28)	30	41	30		-45	
N.Z. flag not important	-42	-60					
Scoffing at army is disrespectful	56		31				
N.Z. support China to U.N.	-36	46	33				-31
N.Z. soldiers fight Communism abroad	77						
Defeat Communism at all costs	76	(-29)					
N.Z. remain in alliances	48	33					36
Gov't cut military spending	-55	-44					30
Fight for N.Z. regardless	57		31				
Increase trade with C. China	-45	55					
Peaceful coex. with Russia	-38	34			-35	34	
Russia-China tough enemies	70						
Help U.S. stop Communism	79						
Stopping Communism in S.E. Asia is for N.Z.'s defence	80						
N.Z. not get involved abroad	-32		44			31	
Stop competing immigrants		-51	53				
Don't sell national resources			51		49		
U.S. and Britain should disarm unilaterally	-54			31	-39		
Encourage visits by Asian leaders		58					51
Immigrants little value to N.Z.		-51	31	-51			
Polynesians have improved the city centres				66			
N.Z. wary of trusting Japanese	31	-52			33		

Table 4 Canterbury Follow-up (1970) showing unrotated factors of foreign-policy-nationalism-racism items 1-7 (Variance explained: 1 20%; 2 11%; 3 4%; 4 .8%).

<u>Factors</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>
Not criticise Gov't in crises	48						
Sitting for anthem not disrespectful to Queen						-74	
Gov't right regardless	49			54			
N.Z. flag not important	-38					-37	-43
Scoffing at army is disrespectful	70						
N.Z. support China to U.N.		68					
N.Z. soldiers fight Communism abroad	76						
Defeat Communism at all costs	67	-41					
N.Z. remain in alliances	50						40
Gov't, cut military spending	-39				-66		
Fight for N.Z. regardless	65					30	
Increase trade with C. China		78					
Peaceful coexistence with Russia		71			-31		
Russia-China tough enemies	41	-58					
Help U.S. stop Communism	68	-32					
Stopping Communism in S.E. Asia is for N.Z.'s defence	65	-33					
N.Z. not get involved abroad			33		-62		
Stop competing immigrants			67				-30
Don't sell national resources			76				
U.S. and Britain should disarm unilaterally					-69		
Encourage visits by Asian leaders							74
Immigrants little value to N.Z.			38	-37			-63
Polynesians have improved cities				73			
N.Z. wary of trusing Japanese	-46	32				45	-27

Table 5 Canterbury Follow-up (1970) items on foreign policy, nationalism and racism domain showing rotated factors 1 - 7.

It would appear that the addition of a number of items to the original foreign-policy list, to include those which refer to national symbols and attitudes on race and immigration, has done little to alter the patterns found earlier (Bedggood, 1970; 1972). If anything, the understanding of the attitudinal dimensions underlying the complex idea of 'nationalism' has been made more clear. A distinct similarity between the political attitudes measured in this survey, and the 'ingroup-outgroup' phenomenon found in the emergent nationalism of the Nineteenth century (Chapter Nine) is apparent.

The same procedure was followed with the domestic items. The unrotated factors are shown in Table 6 (See Appendix Three for full listing). I have named the first factor authoritarianism since it combines three distinct aspects of this belief-system. First, a political intolerance consisting of opposition to minorities, the banning of Communists in the public service and of Marxist ideas in the universities. Second, there is the opposition to further welfare spending and the introduction of price control. Third, there is a characteristic ambivalence towards state authority. On the one hand we find an idealised faith in democracy as representing the will of the majority, a trust in politicians, and a belief that freedom of expression and the popular control of government exists in New Zealand. On the other hand we find a submission to authority and government secrecy. Contrary to the prevailing loose usage of the term 'authoritarianism' to describe any form of intolerance, including that of democratic norms (See Hamilton, 1972: Chapter 11), I would prefer to use the term to signify an idealised and uncritical submission to authority, and the suppression of any form of threat to the status quo.

<u>Unrotated Factors</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>
Gov't increase medical services	-54		35			34
No increase in unemployment benefit	39		-43	41		-33
Permanent price control system	-33		30			
No more State Maori Housing	35			43		
State guaranteed jobs			38		30	
N.Z. a majoritarian democracy	66		19			
Democracy is best for all nations			46	34		
Democracy means pol. equality	31		58			
Democracies rely on strong men		-31	-42	-32	37	
Only intelligent should vote		-54		33		
Most politicians lie	-56	-37				
Most are pol. incompetent						30
Parties only care about winning	-42	-46		(29)		
Real power is behind scenes	-50	-42				
Most are powerless	-55	-35				
Labour & National different						
Anti-N.Z.'s restricted		-64			-35	
Gov't should prevent sporting contact with South Africa	-30		47			-33
Some people need to be told what to do		-47			33	
Nazi party not to be banned		39	-48			30
Minority rights to criticise	-32				35	
Gov't not employ communists	30	-57				-41
Lecturers shouldn't teach Marxism	48	-56				
Have to see apartheid to judge it		-40	-33			30
N.Z.'s have freedom of expression	42			33	35	
Pornography should be banned		-55				-31
Gov't should consult people before declaring war	-47			55		
Gov't secrecy necessary	54			-33		

Table 6 Canterbury Follow-up of items in domestic domain, showing unrotated factors 1 - 6 (Variance explained: 1 13%; 2 13%; 3 6%; 4 2%; 5 3%; 6 1%)

<u>Rotated Factors</u>	<u>1</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>6</u>	<u>7</u>	<u>8</u>	<u>9</u>	<u>10</u>
Medical Services	-46						-61			
Unemployment Benefit			-58				56			
Price Control								-82		
Maori Housing									-68	
Guarantee jobs							-76			
Majoritarian Democ.	48		-45							
Democracy is best				67						
Democracy is equality				77						
Demo's. is strong men		-39		-47		35				
Intelligent vote									-38	-48
Politicians lie	-79									
Most incompetent										-76
Parties to win	-65									-33
Power behind scenes	-57		35	-35						
Most are powerless	-47		40			38				
Lab/Nat. different		-36								
Anti-New Zealanders	-32	-31			-44				-36	
Prevent tours S.A.								77		
..told what to do										-63
Don't ban Nazis		43				63				
Minority criticism					81					
Ban communists		-75								
Don't teach Marxism	(28)	-57							-50	
Apartheid						69				
Freedom of express.			-81							
Ban pornography		-65								
Declare war	-54	44		36						
Gov't secrecy					-35			-65		

Table 7 Canterbury Follow-up of items in domestic domain showing rotated factors 1 - 10.

This point will be taken up at greater length in the next chapter.

The second factor consistently loads minority rights and civil liberties and is therefore labelled libertarian. It combines a belief in democratic freedoms and rights together with a rather extreme tolerance, or defence, of such rights in practice. That is, democracy is for all men and women even the stupid, and any point of view whether it be Communist, Marxist, Nazi or possibly pornographic, must be heard. This factor therefore seems to tap the political liberalism-conservatism dimension well. Whether or not it is more than 'liberty in abstract' (McClosky, 1964: 372) or 'verbal tolerance' (Jackman, 1973) remains to be seen. By contrast, the third factor is called equalitarianism since it puts the 'underdog' before any principle of political liberty. It favours increased welfare spending at home, and active state intervention to ban both Nazis and sporting contacts with South Africa. The remaining three factors suggest no clear pattern (to me), so any discussion of their content will be left until the section on attitude scale construction in the next chapter.

5. Belief-Systems and Political Culture

The review of the three attitude surveys and their findings suggests that certain empirical advances have been made in the analysis of the nature and distribution of political attitudes in New Zealand. We now have descriptions of patterns of attitudes over broad domains, representing samples that are sufficiently large and heterogenous to warrant some confidence in the reliability and validity of the findings. In particular the dimensions of belief-systems identified in research abroad seem to hold for the New Zealand population also, allowing some comparative general-

isations about the most important belief-systems. The most striking conclusion to be made is that the particular combinations of attitudes which cross-cut the traditional liberal-conservative dimensions for the general population in the United States, appear also in the form of authoritarian and populist belief-systems in New Zealand (Bedggood, 1972). These two belief-systems have some elements in common (in particular an intolerance of minorities and civil liberties) yet are distinctly disparate. The authoritarian is characterised by an acceptance of statism, and the ideal of democracy as the embodiment of the popular will. By implication he or she represents the conservative wing of the 'meritocratic mainstream', those elements who have succumbed to a national identity, the threat of the external enemy, of subversion within, and a satisfaction with the welfare status quo. By contrast, the populists reject statism in preference to popular control, yet wish (as have middle-class radicals throughout New Zealand history) to use the state to equalise wealth. The existence of these two belief-systems in the contemporary political culture would therefore seem to support the historical analysis of the emergence of political Culture. Nevertheless, the limitations and deficiencies of survey research and the tentative nature of such findings, should not be overlooked.

To begin, there are a number of sources of error which might affect the validity of attitude research (e.g. Phillips, 1971). The selection of items representing hypothetical attitude domains or belief-systems may be incomplete or biased. There are the usual problems associated with the survey technique concerning the reliability and accuracy of measurement. Then, even if some confidence can be placed in the data as valid and reliable indicants of personal beliefs and values, the samples are limited and unrepresentative of the New Zealand population. Clearly

there is room for improvement in the sampling and measurement of political attitudes, and in the description of belief-systems and their links with political culture.

There is however, an altogether different approach to validation, which is to look for the causal origin of existing attitude measures. Part of the problem of defining the nature of attitudes is in establishing their distribution across the social structure, and their possible causes. For example, is the authoritarian belief-system identified with any particular part of the social structure - centre or periphery? What institutional sources combine to produce authoritarian, populist or liberal-internationalist attitudes? How far are the effects of these institutional sources evidence of the working of the legitimation process outlined in Chapter Eight? In the next chapter we turn from the measurement of political attitudes alone to the exploration of their distribution and causes.

ELEVEN:

Authoritarianism- the Conservative Tradition ?

1. Introduction: Centre or Peripheral Belief-System?

Over the last two decades since the publication of "The Authoritarian Personality" (Adorno et.al, 1950) considerable controversy has centred upon the extent to which the political attitudes of the mass public (in particular the working-class) could be described as extremist, intolerant, ethnocentric, anti-democratic, or in one word, authoritarian (Lipset, 1959; See Brown, 1965; for review up to 1965 and Hamilton, 1972; for most recent review of this debate). Subsequent research has subjected both the psychodynamic assumptions and methodology of the original study to extensive criticism and shown that ethnocentric and intolerant attitudes were not directly related to social class, but were associated with rural background and poor education (Miller and Reissman, 1961; Lipsitz, 1965; Brown, 1965; Hamilton, 1966; Greenstein, 1969; Stacey and Green, 1971). Yet the judgement remains, that the working-class are proportionately more intolerant than the middle-class, regardless of the causes. Authoritarianism is still seen as a distinctly peripheral ideology or belief-system carrying with it the elitist connotations of "irrationality" (Hamilton, 1972: 400). Eysenck is perhaps the most forceful in expressing this point-of-view. By comparison with middle-class people:

"working-class people, in summary, are nationalistic, even jingoistic, xenophobic, anti-semitic, racist, inhumane, narrowly moralistic in sexual matters, and unconcerned with ethical or religious issues" (1971: 205).

The purpose of this chapter is then, to review briefly the evidence in favour of this assertion, and test it against the New Zealand data. That is, does authoritarianism constitute a peripheral belief-system reflecting particular working-class social or personality characteristics, or is it a centre belief-system which is held by individuals across class and occupational lines? If the former is the case then the evidence fits well with the congruence model of particularistic traditional attitudes found in peripheral subject sub-cultures. If the latter, the evidence gives support to the constraint model of working-class conservatism.

The most thorough attempt to test the Lipset thesis², has been that of Hamilton (1972: Chapter 11). Hamilton reviews the research evidence of the distribution of attitudes in two key issue-areas, political liberalism-conservatism (attitudes towards racial minorities and civil liberties) and the militant-peaceful or tough/soft dimension of foreign policy attitudes. Hamilton's argument is straightforward and can easily be summarised. There is no evidence of any conclusive sort which points to authoritarianism (as racist, anti-communist, or militant attitudes) as being a working-class phenomenon. On the contrary, authoritarian attitudes are associated with the working-class only because it over-represents other groups who are relatively authoritarian. These include persons living in rural or small-town environs (or who have moved from such environs into the urban working-class), the poorly educated, older persons, and those belonging to two large socio-cultural groupings - "Southern culture" and the "WASPS". Each of these groups are rather more authoritarian than other groups, e.g. urban dwellers, catholics, non-Southern, educated, and so on, and it is purely the result of elitist assumptions (believing the worst of the working-class) and

simple statistics which do not allow causal inferences, that has created the myth of "working-class authoritarianism".

Hamilton's analysis lends itself well to the centre-periphery model being advanced here. Working-class "authoritarians" can in fact be considered to be "conservatives" who share the prevailing economic conservatism (believing in the principle of economic equality but not wishing the state to do anything about it) and rather idealised commitment to democratic ideals in theory but not wishing to see them practiced. Hamilton's use of the concept of "pillar" readily translates into the communicative and positional agencies of the centre value-system transmitted through socio-cultural learning in the institutions of the centre. The dominant ethnic majority, the WASPS, in the U. S. parallel the anglo-philie middle-classes in the British colonies; their nativism is our imperialism. It would seem therefore, that the most satisfactory analysis of the concept of authoritarianism as a political belief-system in the U. S. lends support to this present analysis. We shall see that on a number of points, we can reach agreement with Hamilton.

2. The New Zealand data: Cross-tabulation

I propose to move step by step through an analysis of the survey findings of the correlates of authoritarianism. The analysis is designed to answer two questions. First, which social or personal attributes are associated with authoritarian attitudes, and what are the likely interactions among them? Second, of these attributes which, if any, contributes to 'explaining' the causes of authoritarian attitudes? These are not separate questions however, since interactions among variables helps to identify those that are in the running as possible causes.

Step One This stage consists of the correlation of the most prominent authoritarian items to emerge from the Victoria Replication factor authoritarianism (See p. 215) with several social position variables, together with an attempt to show the interaction of these variables with party affiliation. The three items with the highest loadings on this factor are taken to be representative of the belief-system for this purpose. They are; communists should be banned; sex criminals should be flogged; and that China should not get N. Z. support for admission to the U. N. Zero-order correlations with SP variables are shown in Table Eight.

	<u>Income</u>	<u>Educ- ation</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Occup- ation</u>	<u>Party</u>
Ban Communists (4)	.38	.42	-.30	.20	-.05
Flog sex criminals (8)	.29	.39	-.15	.23	.02
China to U.N. (10)	-.23	-.23	.04	-.09	.19

Table Eight: Zero-order Yule's Q between Authoritarian items and selected SP variables, with Party. Positive represents agreement against low values of variables (dichotomised) or Labour Support.

At this point interactions between the SP variables were not controlled for, but the possible interaction of Party Support was considered. First order correlations are shown in Table Nine. While the zero-order r 's show the authoritarian responses to the items to be related to low social position and increasing age, the effect of party affiliation seems to specify these links somewhat. Regardless of the level of education, or occupational status, National party affiliation increases the likelihood of an authoritarian response to item 4. The same effect is apparent for persons under 30 years of age. The effect of party affiliation for item 10 is striking (except

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for low status or middle age), Labour affiliation reducing the likelihood of an authoritarian response regardless of social position. The influence of party on item 8 is less clear, and the size of the correlations too small to warrant speculation on this point.

Communists should be banned	vs. Party	-.05
Education	Low	-.19
	High	-.26
Age	Low (under 30)	-.39
	High (50 or over)	-.05
Occupational Status	Low	-.17
	High	-.19
Flog sex criminals	vs. Party	.02
Education	Low	-.13
	High	-.06
Age	Under 30	-.11
	Over 50	.01
Occupational Status	Low	.14
	High	-.13
Admit China to U. N.	vs. Party	.19
Education	Low	.23
	High	.34
Age	Under 30	.44
	Over 50	.24
Occupational Status	Low	.02
	High	.37

Table Nine: 1st Order r's between Authoritarian items and Party Identification controlling education, age and occupational status.

Given the well established connection between social position and party affiliation in New Zealand (Robinson, 1967), these two variables seem to act as opposing forces in shaping authoritarian attitudes. Such an assertion however cannot stand without further analysis.

Step Two This step in the analysis uses the unrotated anti-communist factor scores (high and low) of the Canterbury 1969 study (Bedggood, 1970) as the

dependent variable and indicator of authoritarianism, and seeks to control for the interactions among SP variables. Zero-order r 's are found in Table Ten.

	<u>Educ- ation</u>	<u>Income</u>	<u>Occup- ation</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Sex</u>	<u>Urban- Rural</u>
A/C	-.52	.07	.15	.22	.03	.48

Table Ten: Zero-order r 's between high and low A/C factor scores and SP and attribute data.

It was suspected that a considerable amount of common variance was to be found in these variables (Bedggood, 1970: 23), so an attempt was made to sort out their separate effects on the A/C factor. It was assumed that education would explain away most of the zero-order relationships. Two procedures were used, the first consisted of controlling systematically for interactions between the four most important variables in an upside-down treelike fashion. The results are presented in a summary form in Table Eleven.

<u>U-R</u> (.48)	<u>Educ- ation</u> (-.52)	<u>Occup- ation</u> (.15)	<u>Age</u> (.22)	Zero			
				<u>1st Education</u>			
.46		-.09	.26	High			
.13		.25	.13	Low			
				<u>2nd Occupation</u>			
<u>HE/LO</u>	<u>HE/HO</u>	<u>LE/LO</u>	<u>LE/HO</u>				
AGE	AGE	AGE	AGE				
.37	.03	.11	.12				
				<u>3rd Age</u>			
<u>HE/LO</u>	<u>HE/LO</u>	<u>HE/HO</u>	<u>HE/HO</u>	<u>LE/LO</u>	<u>LE/LO</u>	<u>LE/HO</u>	<u>LE/HO</u>
Young	Old	Young	Old	Young	Old	Young	Old
U/R	U/R	U/R	U/R	U/R	U/R	U/R	U/R
.49	.49	.44	.47	.26	.03	.13	.01

Table Eleven: Controls for interactions between four SP variables and A/C factor scores.

The interpretation of the above table is best taken in stages. First, when education is controlled we find that for persons of low education (less than 2 years at secondary school), both age and urban-rural residence are reduced in their influence on A/C attitudes, while occupational status increases in importance. In other words for the poorly educated, being middle-aged or living in the country only slightly increases the chance of being anti-communist; while being of high occupational status greatly increases that chance. This combination of low education and high status is worth noting since it is a good test of the "class" nature of authoritarianism. For those with high education (more than 2 years at secondary school), status seems to have little effect, but increasing age and rural residence work against education as a force for tolerance. At the second level, with both education and occupational status controlled, age is reduced as a predictor except for the high education and low status group. Why older people in this category should be more intolerant any more than those in the low education and low status category is difficult to imagine. An observation by Hamilton (1972: 4/2) that the content of formal education was more intolerant in the past than it is now (in the U. S.) so that persons of that generation with considerable secondary education may be more intolerant than those without.

At the third level with age controlled as well, urban-rural residence (or some residual unknown variable(s)) still retains some influence in the high education group independently of occupational status and age. It is possible here however, that one is looking at variations in the quality of education across rural and urban areas as well as some undifferentiated "social climate" effect of community or neighbourhood. Nevertheless, it appears that for those with considerable secondary schooling

where they live effects their tolerance of communism. With this particular procedure however, appearances can be deceptive. The dichotomising of variables into high and low values, still leaves considerable variation uncontrolled in each of these high and low categories. For example it is known that Education and Occupational Status are correlated (about .32 in the Canterbury Survey) so that for the high status/high education group there are bound to be more persons with higher levels of education within the range 2 years secondary to University Degree, than there are in the low status/high education group. To attempt to control for this possibility a second procedure which matched the distributions within each dichotomised category was used. At this stage the Party Affiliation variable was added to the analysis (See Table Twelve).

<u>Matched for:</u>	<u>Educ-</u> <u>ation</u>	<u>Occup-</u> <u>ation</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Party</u>	<u>Variance</u> <u>of</u> <u>A/C</u>
Education	X	27%	30%	39%	39%
Occupation	06%	X	01%	02%	02%
Age	02%	01%	X	01%	01%
Urban-Rural	06%	05%	00%	01%	01%
Party	12%	16%	10%	X	10%

Table Twelve: Matching of background variables in order to determine approximate variance of high and low A/C scores explained by each.

Again, there is a limitation with this procedure when the sample size is small, namely the small number of cases in each cell when two or three variables are matched. Nevertheless, the results tend to support the analysis so far, that education, and party affiliation (followed by occupation, age, and rural-urban-residence) explain approximately 50% of the variance of high and low A/C scores. (This high contribution to variance is a function of leaving out

the subjects whose score on the A/C factor was neutral). We also have some idea how these variables interact. Education seems to show a curvilinear effect working strongly for tolerance at the higher levels. This is possibly an artifact of treating an ordinal scale, "years of education", as an interval scale, since it has been shown in the U. S. that the greatest impact of education is at the tertiary level. By contrast, party affiliation seems to work uniformly across social position to modify attitudes. Again, the lesser influences of age, occupational status and urban or rural residence act in certain situations to modify the effects of education and party affiliation. The next stage in the analysis is an attempt to confirm these observations² by returning to the Victoria data which is based upon a much larger sample and therefore allows more scope for multivariate controls.

Step Three Using the factor scores of the original Victoria Authoritarian factor (excluding the neutral scores in the middle) we can repeat Step Two beginning with the zero-order correlations between occupation, income, education, party support and age and the high and low factor scores (Table Thirteen).

	<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Income</u>	<u>Education</u>	<u>Party</u>	<u>Age</u>
<u>A scores</u>	-.24	-.40	-.45	.31	.55

Table Thirteen: Zero-order r's between Victoria A scores (high and low) and SP and attribute data. Age variable dichotomised into under 40's and over 55's.

At this level the relationship between social class and authoritarianism seems clear. Yet if the preceding analysis is any guide, income and occupational status have no marked independent effect on authoritarian attitudes but mask the more profound effect of education. What is more, both party affilia-

tion and age are non-class communicative and 'trace' sources which cut across social position. It is necessary in order to understand how these factors interact to control for their independent effects as much as possible. We can begin with the zero-order relationships and move progressively to higher orders of analysis (Table Fourteen).

<u>Occupation</u> (-.24)	<u>Income</u> (-.40)	<u>Education</u> (-.45)	<u>Party</u> (.31)				
						<u>Occupation</u>	
	-.34	-.55	.33			High	
	-.46	-.30	.36			Low	
<u>HO/HI</u>	<u>HO/LI</u>	<u>LO/HI</u>	<u>LO/LI</u>			<u>Income</u>	
Education	Education	Education	Education				
-.57	-.37	-.12	-.25				
						<u>Education</u>	
HO/HI	HO/HI	HO/LI	HO/LI	LO/HI	LO/HI	LO/LI	LO/LI
HE	LE	HE	LE	HE	LE	HE	HE
Party	Party	Party	Party	Party	Party	Party	Party
.40	.56	.40	.57	.54	.53	.59	.73

Table Fourteen: Controls for interactions between A scores (high and low) SP and communicative variables. Coefficients are Yules Q.

The above table strengthens the previous findings that education and party affiliation are more important contributors to authoritarian attitudes than are occupation or income. With occupation and income crudely controlled, education works consistently across all occupational and income categories to increase tolerance and liberalism. Party affiliation also works across social class to counter authoritarianism (Labour support) or to reinforce authoritarianism (National party support). The exact contributions of each of these variables cannot be determined by such a crude technique as can be illustrated by the attempt to see if income retains its relationship with authoritarianism for both high and low education groups. The difficulty is that the high and low education groups (less than or

more than 2 years of secondary schooling) contain enough variation to show up in earned income.

	<u>2 yrs. or more Secondary Education</u>				<u>Less than 2 yrs. Secondary Education</u>			
	<u>High Income</u>		<u>Low Income</u>		<u>High Income</u>		<u>Low Income</u>	
A	98	32%	92	51%	82	54%	155	71%
NA	210	68%	89	49%	70	46%	65	29%
	<u>308</u>		<u>181</u>		<u>152</u>		<u>220</u>	
	Q = -.38				Q = -.34			

Yet allowing for this possibility of uncontrolled variation in education, the relationship retains some strength, signifying the likelihood of an independent income effect.

In order to show the combined effects of education, party support and age as distinct from occupational class a further cross-tabulation was done. The results are presented in raw form to provide a graphical illustration of the relative importance of "class" versus "non-class" effects. Dividing the sample into working-class (unskilled, semi-skilled and skilled manual workers) and middle-class (clerical and sales workers, professionals, managers, and proprietors) we look at effects of education, party affiliation and age in order.

"Working-Class"

<u>Low Education</u>						<u>High Education</u>					
<u>Labour</u>			<u>National</u>			<u>Labour</u>			<u>National</u>		
A	91	57%	80	85%	.62	15	33%	31	66%	.61	
NA	69	43%	14	15%		32	67%	16	34%		
	<u>160</u>		<u>94</u>			<u>47</u>		<u>47</u>			
<u>Labour</u>			<u>National</u>			<u>Labour</u>			<u>National</u>		
	21/ 40	40/ 55	55+	21/ 40	40/ 55	55+		21/ 40	40/ 55	55+	
A	20	37	32	13	20	26		8	6	1	12 13 6
NA	26	22	21	5	5	4		19	11	2	11 3 2
	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>		<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	

"Middle-Class"

<u>Low Education</u>							<u>High Education</u>						
<u>Labour</u>				<u>National</u>			<u>Labour</u>				<u>National</u>		
A	33	47%	68	77%			21	25%	87	41%			
NA	38	53%	21	23%			62	75%	124	59%			
	<u>71</u>		<u>89</u>				<u>83</u>		<u>211</u>				
<u>Labour</u>			<u>National</u>				<u>Labour</u>			<u>National</u>			
	21/	40/	55+	21/	40/	55+		21/	40/	55+	21/	40/	55+
	40	55		40	55			40	55		40	55	
A	9	13	11	12	18	38		13	6	2	29	29	29
NA	14	17	7	5	15	8		36	22	4	66	40	18
	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>		<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

Table Fifteen: Interactions between education, party affiliation and age for "working" and "middle" classes.

The main observation to be made here is that the percentage differences within each "class" are much greater than those between "classes". Thus we find in both classes, the percentage 'gap' between the most and least authoritarian cell is 52%, while the gap

between working-class and middle-class authoritarians and non-authoritarians is only 8%. Although the numbers of observations are too small to provide clear evidence, the effect of age appears to survive both education and party controls. The percentage changes show a consistent pattern of age associated with authoritarianism across education and party lines, with the possible exception of the high education/labour group, two-thirds of whom, young and old, are non-authoritarian.

In order to check whether or not the age effect could be due to uncontrolled education variance, the high education/national group was further broken-down by education levels. A rough average of

<u>National</u>												
	<u>3 yrs.</u> <u>Secondary</u>			<u>4 yrs.</u> <u>Secondary</u>			<u>5 or more</u> <u>yrs.</u> <u>Secondary</u>			<u>Tertiary,</u> <u>Prof/Tech.</u>		
	<u>21/</u> <u>40</u>	<u>40/</u> <u>55</u>	<u>55 +</u>	<u>21/</u> <u>40</u>	<u>40/</u> <u>55</u>	<u>55 +</u>	<u>21/</u> <u>40</u>	<u>40/</u> <u>55</u>	<u>55 +</u>	<u>21/</u> <u>40</u>	<u>40/</u> <u>55</u>	<u>55 +</u>
A	8	11	10	5	5	5	7	4	5	9	9	7
NA	<u>11</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>5</u>	<u>3</u>	<u>10</u>	<u>4</u>	<u>2</u>	<u>29</u>	<u>26</u>	<u>11</u>

percentage changes in all groups shows 33% more authoritarianism in the over 55's compared with the under 40's. The remaining possibility is that this age difference may reflect changing standards in formal education. This is an unknown source of variation which cannot be tested with the present data.

To sum up the findings so far it is possible to describe the major independent variables which contribute in shaping attitudes in the authoritarian belief-system. The most authoritarian group is that which is poorly educated, over 55 years of age, affiliated to the National party, and earning a low

income. An individual with all of these characteristics would have better than an 80% chance of scoring authoritarian on this dimension. Conversely, the least authoritarian, are the well educated, young, Labour supporters, earning a high income. The remaining steps in the present analysis will consider the effects of media exposure and political knowledge upon attitudes on the anti-communist factor, and attempt to suggest possible causal mechanisms in the learning of authoritarian attitudes.

Step Four Since education is the most significant correlate of both authoritarianism (Victoria factor) and the anti-communist factor (Canterbury), it was postulated that exposure to political events and information, and level of political knowledge might specify the link between education and conservative attitudes. The Canterbury survey (1969) included measures of media exposure and political information which showed zero-order r's with the A/C factor presented in Table Sixteen.

	<u>Newspaper</u> <u>Exposure</u>	<u>T.V/Radio</u> <u>Exposure</u>	<u>Magazine</u> <u>Exposure</u>	<u>Current</u> <u>Affairs</u>	<u>Political</u> <u>Information</u>
A/C	.02	.15	-.19	-.15	-.34

Table Sixteen: Zero-order r's between media and information variables and the Canterbury A/C factor scores.

Apart from Newspaper exposure which has a negligible effect on A/C attitudes (at least in the way it was measured) the relationships are low and not particularly significant. However, by controlling for education, two interesting interactions were found. Table Seventeen presents the findings.

T.V. and Radio Exposure Index	vs. A/C	.15
Low Education		.12
High Education		.13
Magazine Exposure Index	vs. A/C	-.19
Low Education		-.24
High Education		.10
Current Affairs programme exposure	vs. A/C	-.15
Low Education		-.26
High Education		.08
Political Information score	vs. A/C	-.34
Low Education		-.31
High Education		-.35

Table Seventeen: Media and information scores vs. the A/C factor controlled for education.

Two points are worth noting here. The first is that T.V. and Radio exposure and political knowledge hold their relationship with the A/C factor for persons of both high and low education. The former marginally increases the chance of being anti-communist while the latter tends to counteract intolerance. The second is that Magazine and Current Affairs exposure works for tolerance in the low education group, having little influence among those with more than 2 years education. Although the attitude variance accounted for by the media and information variables is probably small, and may in fact be confounded with some other unknown source of variance such as age, these findings are consistent with the general pattern. We are now in the position to be able to interpret this general pattern in causal terms. The multi-variate analysis of the interactions between the main contributing factors has allowed us to formulate some expectations as to how authoritarian attitudes are learned and sustained. The final step is an attempt to test some of these expectations.

Step Five The second question to be answered in this analysis is that of the nature and strength of independent factors associated with authoritarian or

anti-communist attitudes. Before any variable can be a candidate for cause it must be shown at the very least to be independent of other known variables and contribute a significant amount of 'explained' variance in the dependent variable. In order to achieve this, the technique of multiple regression was used (See SPSS Handbook, 1970: 174-193). This technique has the advantage of combining a large number of variables and producing an elegant statement of the independent effect of each on the dependent variable which is important for the purposes of causal inference. The major disadvantage is that relationships are assumed to be linear when they may not be as is suspected in the case of education (See Blalock, 1970; Boyle, 1970). The first regression was done on the original Victoria data, using the authoritarianism factor scores (all values) as the dependent variable and including a number of social position and attribute variables as independent variables. A full description of all the variables can be found in Appendix One. The results are presented in the form of a summary table (Table Eighteen).

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Zero-order</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>Beta</u>	<u>Std Error of B</u>
04 Education <u>low</u>	.27	.11	.24	.015
10 PartyIdentification <u>Nat</u>	-.13	-.04	-.07	.030
02 Sex <u>female</u>	-.17	-.19	-.09	.063
03 Income <u>low</u>	.16	.06	.11	.020
15 Partisanship <u>National</u>	-.13	-.06	-.10	.025
21 VoteSaliance <u>high</u>	.08	.12	.30	.028
20 Efficacy <u>low</u>	-.002	-.16	-.38	.051
13 Religion <u>Catholic</u>	-.06	-.34	-.19	.074
14 ChurchAttendance <u>high</u>	.04	.18	.18	.041
06 Own/Rent <u>own</u>	.06	.11	.04	.071
08 Occupation <u>low</u>	-.15	-.02	-.04	.023
12 Vote <u>National</u>	-.12	-.19	-.08	.127
11 Wage/SelfEmployed <u>wage</u>	.02	.04	.05	.026
16 Leadership <u>low</u>	-.02	.02	.06	.019
22 CitizenDuty <u>high</u>	.01	.07	.17	.054
07 Age <u>young</u>	.002	-.007	-.01	.010
05 Migrant <u>non</u>	-.01	-.01	-.009	.041
09 Prestige <u>low</u>	-.15	-.00	-.01	.043

Multiple $r = .445$ r square = .198

Table Eighteen: Summary table of results of multiple regression of SP and attribute data against Victoria Authoritarianism factor scores. (Scores are 1 high authoritarian to 9 low authoritarian).

A preliminary interpretation of these findings does not reveal any large surprises concerning those variables already considered by cross-tabulation. Associated with authoritarianism we find the expected zero-order r 's with low education, national party, low income, and low occupation, though age appears to have lost its relationship. New values with moderate zero-order r 's are female sex and low occupational prestige. Some of these relationships disappear, while others emerge as significant with partial correlation. Using the Beta (or normalised regression) coefficients as the basis for ordering the contribution of each variable we get a pattern as follows. Of the SP or attribute variables we have low education, catholic, high church attendance, national party, low income and female values associated with authoritarianism. Of attitudinal or dispositional variables we have low efficacy combined with high voting salience and sense of citizen duty.

Making some necessarily risky assumptions about the time-order of SP, attribute and dispositional variables we can suggest a likely causal path from independent through intervening variables to authoritarianism. Since all variables added together account for only approximately 20% of the variance in the authoritarian factor there is little point attempting a complicated causal modelling. Rather it seems more useful to interpret likely causes in terms of the centre-periphery model. I shall attempt this after considering the second regression study.

The Hamilton Survey (1970) involved an attempt to sample larger areas of individual attributes and

dispositions in order to explain a larger amount of attitude variance. The derivation of attitude scales from factor scores provided by the Canterbury Follow-up survey is described in Appendix Three. These scales were then used as dependent variables for purposes of regression analysis using a number of SP, attribute and dispositional independent variables. (A description of these variables and the method and procedure of the Hamilton survey is given in Appendix Four). Since in this chapter we are looking for correlates and causes of authoritarianism, the attitudinal scales which are taken to represent distinct dimensions of the authoritarian belief-system will be considered in turn, beginning with militant-anticommunism (See Chapter Ten, pp. 22/). A summary table of the results of regression analysis with 15 independent variables on anti-communism appears below (Table Nineteen).

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Zero- Order</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>Beta</u>	<u>Std Error</u>
Community Involvement	.05	.12	.09	.066
Civil Liberties <u>low</u>	-.43	-.17	-.20	.048
Minority Rights <u>low</u>	-.24	-.15	-.10	.069
Individualism <u>low</u>	-.22	-.09	-.07	.063
Religious Convention <u>high</u>	.32	.21	.22	.050
Trust <u>low</u>	-.17	-.14	-.11	.061
Fatalism <u>low</u>	-.29	-.41	-.18	.110
Independence <u>low</u>	-.12	-.19	-.10	.093
Party Support <u>National</u>	.20	.27	.18	.073
Conflict <u>non</u>	-.06	-.10	-.04	.115
Age <u>old to young</u>	.03	-.29	-.19	.081
Occupation <u>low</u> (ReverseCode)	.16	.09	.05	.095
Income <u>low</u>	-.06	-.009	-.009	.054
Education <u>low</u>	-.26	-.17	-.19	.051
Social Class <u>low</u>	-.03	.03	.02	.078

Multiple r = .625 r square = .391

Table Nineteen: Summary table of results of multiple regression of SP, attribute and dispositional variables against militant anti-communism factor of Hamilton Survey.

At zero-order the familiar variables are present, low education, income and occupation. National support

is strong, though age appears only marginally related to anti-communism. There are a number of dispositional factors associated with anti-communism, lack of trust and personal autonomy (low individualism) combined with a belief in self-improvement (low fatalism) and religious conventionalism (a belief and faith in efficacy of the supernatural). There are also two attitude variables which indicate the link between anti-communism and domestic conservatism. Both civil liberties and minority rights are negatively associated with anti-communism. In terms of their independent contribution to the anti-communism factor (Beta coefficients) there appear to be three types of variables involved. First, the SP and attribute factors such as youth, low education, and national support, which suggest that the most anti-communist individuals have learned these attitudes in the post war period aided by identification with the conservative party and poor education. A second group, termed dispositional refers to core values expressed as personality characteristics, such as religious conventionalism, optimism, lack of trust and lack of independence. Whether these traits are formed before beliefs associated with anti-communism or not is a moot point and there seems to be little point in speculating about which causes which. The third set are like the dependent variable itself, attitude scales, civil liberties and minority rights. The assumption is that they are associated components of the authoritarian belief-system and can be investigated in their own right as such.

An associated dimension of nationalism (separated from the militant anti-communist factor by rotation) is that which loads the symbols of nationalism. Regression gave the following results.

<u>Variables</u>	<u>Zero-</u> <u>order</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>Beta</u>	<u>Std Error</u> <u>B</u>
Religious Convention	.23	.08	.16	.030
Low Civil Liberties	-.27	-.06	-.14	.028
High Racism	.17	.09	.14	.038
High Occupation	-.03	-.11	-.12	.055
Low Independence	-.16	-.11	-.12	.055
Middle-class Identifier	.05	.08	.10	.046
Older Age	.19	.05	.07	.051

Multiple $r = .436$ r squared = .190

Table Twenty: Results of regression of seven most significant independent variables against nationalism scale.

Here we find symbolic nationalism associated at the attitude level with political and racial intolerance, at the level of core values with religious convention and dependence, and if anything high rather than low social status. Even so, less than 20% of the attitude variance is explained leaving 80% caused by unknown or unmeasured sources. What is significant about the independent variables associated with both anti-communism and symbolic nationalism, is that none identify these manifestations of the authoritarian belief-system with the working-class. On the contrary the factors which appear to be most influential are communicative emanating from the social centre. If this is so, we should expect these results to be duplicated by multiple regression of the same variables against domestic authoritarian attitudes.

The first regression is against the civil liberties scale, the results of which are shown in Table Twenty-One.

<u>Variables</u>	<u>Zero-</u> <u>order</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>Beta</u>	<u>Std Error</u> <u>B</u>
High efficacy	.09	.16	.16	.056
High community involvement	-.04	.10	.07	.094
High minority rights	.25	.24	.15	.082
High individualism	.27	.28	.19	.073
Low equality	-.27	-.19	-.12	.079
Low racism	-.19	-.15	-.10	.075
Low religious convention	-.31	-.26	-.22	.059
Low trust	.08	-.05	-.03	.075
Low honesty	-.17	-.06	-.04	.080
Low optimism	.06	-.05	-.03	.090
High fatalism	.15	.13	.05	.135
High external control	.04	.21	.06	.167
Party support labour	-.23	-.31	-.23	.071
High independence	.08	.12	.05	.112
High conflict	.07	.13	.04	.136
Male sex	-.14	-.42	-.08	.261
Youth	-.23	-.25	-.14	.102
Big income	.11	.03	.03	.063
High education	.30	.15	.15	.058
Few children	.03	-.11	-.14	.046

Multiple $r = .638$ r squared = .407

Table Twenty-One: Results of regression of 20 background variables against the civil liberties scale.

Considering only those Beta coefficients which are approximately double or larger than the Std Error of B and reversing the signs, we get the following list. Of SP or attributes we get low education, national support and more than average number of children. Of dispositional variables we get religious convention, and high equality together with low individualism and low efficacy. At the level of attitude correlates we have low minority rights and high racism. Again, apart from party support and level of education it is difficult to impose a causal pattern on these variables. The same applies to the regression of variables associated with minority rights. The results appear in Table Twenty-Two.

<u>Variables</u>	<u>Zero-</u> <u>order</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>Beta</u>	<u>Std Error</u> <u>B</u>
High civil liberties	.25	.12	.20	.042
Low community involvement	-.05	-.15	-.17	.068
High on optimism	.23	.21	.20	.064
High on political discussion	.20	.10	.12	.046
High on org. membership	.14	.08	.13	.044
High individualism	.13	.04	.04	.055
High occupation	-.15	-.08	-.06	.081
High education	.16	.00	.00	.000

Multiple r = .466 r squared = .217

Table Twenty-Two: Regression of selected variables against the minority rights scale.

Again, taking only these variables with reasonable large Betas and reversing the signs we find opposition to minority rights to be associated with low civil liberties as we would expect, and rather contradictory values on community and political involvement. With so little variance explained and so few variables of clear meaning, this table adds little to our understanding of domestic authoritarianism. Nor however, does it present any surprises. With all the data 'in' so to speak, I can now proceed to draw some conclusions about the distribution and origins of the authoritarian belief-system in order to answer the question posed at the beginning of this chapter: is authoritarianism a centre or peripheral belief-system?

3. Conclusions

In Chapter Ten I defined the authoritarian belief-system as having three components. Some of the evidence presented in this chapter confirms this interpretation. First, in terms of input-output orientations we recognised a generalised political intolerance at home and abroad. Second, there is an opposition to increased welfare spending or further state intervention. Third, in the area of system/

self orientations there is the paradox of an idealised faith in equality and democratic rights combined with a submission to and dependence upon authority. If such a belief-system actually exists, it implies the existence also of corresponding "character" traits or core values which dispose individuals to hold such beliefs. In trying to test this possibility several measures of so-called personality or psychological constructs were introduced, revealing some interesting findings. Corresponding to idealism we find a high allegiance to democratic norms expressed as citizen duty, voting salience and a belief in equality. Associated with this is a strong religious value and a belief in self-advancement (optimism). By contrast corresponding with the concept of dependence there is low efficacy, lack of trust and low personal autonomy. On the basis of these findings it seems reasonable to conclude that any explanation of the distribution and origin of the authoritarian belief-system must also explain the existence of such a set of core values, or character syndrome. Is such a syndrome the product of working-class experience, or is it distributed throughout the social system?

At the descriptive level it is quite clear that authoritarian values and beliefs are not the monopoly of a working-class culture. Quite the reverse. Of all the major Social Position variables considered in this analysis, occupation is least related to authoritarianism. The same spurious effect noted by Hamilton is present however. At the level of zero-order correlation there is a distinct association of authoritarianism with the social periphery, although in no case was this particularly strong. But as progressive controls were made (by cross-tabulation and partial correlation) the spurious "class" nature of authoritarianism disappeared. Instead we find the following list of independent correlates in rough order of importance.

1. Low Education. If we leave aside the question of changing content in education, this factor suggests that intolerance and conservatism is the product of lack of formal education.

2. National party support. If we accept overseas findings about the importance of early established party identification, this factor may represent a strong independent influence in contributing to authoritarianism. It is worth noting that as the "Conservative" party it is heir to the Réform party and is the traditional carrier of the right-wing variant of the meritocratic mainstream political culture.

3. Low Income. This is the only positional source linking authoritarianism with the periphery, but not exclusively so. One obvious line of interpretation is to link low income with a sense of relative deprivation producing hostility which then becomes expressed in intolerant or extremist views. This is the Lipset formula, yet there is only a slight suggestion that relative deprivation is any more strong in the working- than in the middle-class.

4. Catholic. The link with political intolerance and submission to authority would seem to be clear here.

5. Church attendance. This factor being independent of actual religious denomination shows some connection between strength of religious conviction and authoritarianism, a connection which was also found in the dispositional variable, religious convention.

6. Low current affairs information. Included here are low exposure to current affairs programmes on T.V. and radio and low exposure to magazines with political content; similarly, individuals who scored

low on a test of political knowledge. What is suggested by these findings is that like formal education, knowledge about the objects of political attitudes increases ones tolerance towards them.

7. Age. This is a difficult variable to interpret since it may "stand-in" for a number of other processes. The two most obvious, are changing standards in formal education, and the general "climate of opinion". The connection between older persons and Victoria authoritarianism, though small, holds for symbolic nationalism, but is reversed for anti-communism. Without further data to clear this matter up, my guess would be that age stands in for both increasing liberalism in formal education and in the 'climate of opinion', except in the case of anti-communist beliefs which, since they have only developed in the post-war period, are more likely to effect the post-war generations.

While none of these variables is directly associated with the social periphery, the small amount of attitude variance they explain is additional support for a non-class interpretation of the evidence. Even with the addition of certain dispositional variables, the total amount of attitude variance explained in this analysis is somewhere between 20% and 40% (allowing for distortions of curvilinear relationships in multiple regression). This leaves between 60% and 80% of the authoritarianism unexplained. The immediate implication is that the remaining variance is the product of external constraints, or the prevailing climate of opinion, rather than any identifiable structural characteristic or attribute, and/or the workings of other personality factors unmeasured in this research. Either way, this lends support to the concept of the authoritarian belief-system as representing a centre value-system, disseminated through centre communicative agencies across

all social classes. I would sum up my conception of the causal process by which the authoritarian belief-system is transmitted in this schematic form.




Table Twenty-Three: Schematic representation of possible causal process involved in shaping authoritarian attitudes.

The total picture is of a traditional centre value-system (right-wing meritocratic mainstream), well-established in the social periphery and maintained by cultural institutions of the centre, which works to legitimate political authority, nationalism, and conventional morality.

TWELVE :

Populism: the Radical Tradition ?

1. Introduction: A peripheral belief-system

The second major belief-system identified in Chapter Ten was termed populist to signify both the nature of its core values and its links with the "left-wing" of the meritocratic mainstream political culture. In this chapter I wish to attempt to answer two questions about the nature of this belief-system. First, if the authoritarian belief-system is the manifestation of the dominant conservative wing of the mainstream culture, institutionalised in the centre and spreading to the subordinate periphery, is the populist belief-system representative of the social periphery? If we consider the core values of this historical tradition, this would seem to be so. Middle-class radicalism in New Zealand has always been directed at the 'means' rather than 'ends' of equality. Those members of the social periphery whose access to opportunity was blocked saw populist democracy as the obvious means of achieving a radical redistribution of economic rewards (Chapter Nine, pp. 170-2; Simpson, 1974). This conception of populism as a radical petit-bourgeois political movement makes it possible to distinguish its economic and political demands from other middle-class extremist movements sometimes termed populist but better classified as 'authoritarian' (Allcock, 1971).

The second question is whether or not populism as a peripheral belief-system can be understood in terms of Parkin's (1972:81-82) distinction between radical and subordinate sub-cultures. Parkin obviously intended the term radical to imply the

existence of conflict over means rather than ends, not to imply working-class consciousness. And since, in New Zealand 'radicalism' has never been taken to mean a rejection of the 'reward-structure' but only of limited access to rewards, it is fair to conceive of the populist belief-system as continuing this radical tradition. If this is the case, we would expect the populist belief-system to draw upon institutional sources in the periphery, in opposition to the centre institutions which sustain the conservative values of individualism and achievement. If such a belief-system is well established in the periphery it suggests that under certain conditions, some peripheral groups are able to resist the appeals of "working-class conservatism". What is more, it implies the existence of a "rational" self-interest on the part of a section of the periphery, traditionally assumed to be "irrational" (Hamilton, 1972: 83). The most recent findings in the U. S. support this view.

Axelrod (1967) and Brown (1970) have shown that the American mass public does hold a coherent pattern of attitudes resembling Nineteenth century populism. The items in this weak cluster were a mixture of economic liberalism, political conservatism and isolationism. Though this measure is based upon only 16 items and used on a sample broken down by education, income and voting, this measure may very well mask the existence of distinct belief-systems in the periphery. Even so, Axelrod's interpretation of the nature of this pattern is questionable. There seems to be good reason to suppose that the 'conservative' elements, namely firing communists, cutting taxes, and avoiding foreign-involvement are all explicable in terms of self-interest, and are not evidence of working-class intolerance, bigotry and so on. The readiness to label the masses intolerant has obscured the quite 'rational' reasons for these responses in the periphery. In the first place we would expect

political conservatism to be related to racism, yet recent evidence has shown that a large section of the U. S. working-class is racially tolerant (Greeley, 1972). That there are also sections of the working-class that are anti-communist is also clear, but the two need not necessarily coexist. What is more, as Hamilton has argued, it is not surprising that workers should oppose civil liberties for alien or 'outgroup' minorities since this is a strong tradition which permeates the culture. In the second place, it is now generally acknowledged that demands for tax cuts by persons of low status amounts to a demand for redistribution; that one's own taxes be cut. In the third place, the isolationism of the periphery is not incompatible with self-interest. Hamilton argues that support for non-involvement and opposition to wars is connected with the post-war experience that wars cut into economic welfare and cost working-class lives (1972: 111-134). Evidence is mounting to show that working-class isolationism is moderate or 'tender', wishing to avoid foreign wars but once committed to war, keen to see an early and peaceful solution (Wright, 1972; Patchen, 1970).

It would seem that despite the prevailing assumptions about the nature of mass attitudes or non-attitudes, that there does exist a 'liberal' section of the working-class. It is made up of those groups who are most welfarist, most isolationist, but who are also relatively tolerant of racial minorities. They are typically exposed to the predominantly peripheral institutions as distinct from the "channels" of established socio-religious and political "pillars" through which centre institutions impose dominant conservative values (Hamilton, 1972: 316pp). Certainly this evidence suggests that large numbers of the ostensibly 'undemocratic' and 'irrational' working-class are capable of perceiving relative deprivation, and responding to foreign and domestic

issues in terms of 'rational' self-interest. It remains to be seen whether or not the same peripheral sub-culture is to be found in New Zealand.

2. The New Zealand data: Crosstabulation

In trying to establish the distribution of the populist belief-system in the population, and present arguments concerning its causal origins, I shall follow approximately the same procedure as that in the last chapter. First we will consider the results of crosstabulation in order to discern possible interactions between the correlates of populism, and then move on by steps to regression analysis.

Step One The items taken as representing the Victoria populist factor (Chapter Ten, p.2/5) are; public servants are too powerful; reduce differences in wealth, and cut taxes regardless. The democratic response is signified by disagreement with these items, the populist by agreement. Zero-order r 's are shown in Table Twenty-Four.

	<u>Income</u>	<u>Educ- ation</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Occup- ation</u>	<u>Party</u>
Public servants are too powerful	.09	.22	-.09	.13	-.05
Reduce differences in wealth	.47	.48	-.21	.46	.61
Cut taxes regardless	.33	.51	-.23	.37	.35

Table Twenty-Four Zero-order r 's between Victoria Populist (high and low) scores and SP and Party.

An obvious relationship with low social position on all SP variables is apparent. On the latter two items (redistributive) we find strong relationships with Labour support and persons over 50 years of age. Controlling for the interactions between party support and SP variables we get the following results.

<u>Public servants too powerful</u>		<u>vs. party</u>	-.05
Education	Low		-.06
	High		-.19
Age	Under 30		.14
	Over 50		-.10
Occupational Status	Low		.07
	High		-.16
<u>Reduce wealth differences</u>		<u>vs. party</u>	.61
Education	Low		.50
	High		.66
Age	Under 30		.56
	Over 50		.64
Occupational Status	Low		.43
	High		.65
<u>Cut taxes regardless</u>		<u>vs. party</u>	.35
Education	Low		.23
	High		.01
Age	Under 30		.22
	Over 50		.28
Occupational Status	Low		.45
	High		.18

Table Twenty-Five 1st order r's between populist items (high and low) and party support controlled for education, age and occupational status.

Although all three items load strongly on the populist factor it is clear that the question on public servants is only marginally associated with the social position and party support. By contrast the two items tapping equality of income and taxation are strongly related to both the social periphery and labour party support. What is more the chances of a populist response on these two items are greater when these two factors interact. Labour support plus high social position favours a reduction in wealth differences while labour support plus low social position favours cuts in taxes. This would suggest that those labour supporters in the periphery see tax cuts as a means of redistribution while those closer to the centre would prefer other means, or (since they are paying more tax) accept the principle of progressive taxation.

Without controls between SP variables the picture so far seems to be that domestic populism is a distinctly peripheral belief-system.

Step Two In the Canterbury 1969 Survey some 1st order controls of SP correlates of Isolationism/Populism were made. Further controls were made subsequently. Zero-order r's are presented in Table Twenty-Six.

	<u>C.P.</u>	<u>Income</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Occup-</u> <u>ation</u>	<u>Educ-</u> <u>ation</u>	<u>U/R</u>	<u>Party</u>
Iso/Pop.	-.85	-.36	.16	-.70	-.52	.43	-.80

Table Twenty-Six Zero-order r's between Isolationism/Populism factor scores (high and low) and the C.P. Index, SP variables, Age and Party support.

The strikingly strong correlation with the C.P. Index (see Appendix Two) demonstrates the apparently peripheral nature of this attitude factor. The high correlations with Occupation and Education also reflects this relationship, since both are components of the C.P. Index. Party support, however is not a component of the Index and yet may reflect the strong relationship between social position and Party Support. 1st level control of Social Position suggested that several factors retained some independent influence.

<u>C.P.</u>	<u>Income</u>	<u>Age</u>	<u>Occup- ation</u>	<u>Educ- ation</u>	<u>U/R</u>	<u>Party</u>
Low	-.12	-.05	-.77	-.43	.15	-.89
High	-.13	.04	-.20	-.35	.16	-.63

Table Twenty-Seven 1st level r's between SP variables, age and party support, and Isolationism/Populism.

Of the variables considered in this table, Income and Urban/Rural residence were excluded from further consideration. The others were subjected to 2nd and 3rd level controls. The results are presented in Table Twenty-Eight.

<u>Low Occupation</u>		<u>High Occupation</u>	
<u>Education</u>		<u>Education</u>	
-.30		-.30	
<u>Low Ed.</u>	<u>High Ed.</u>	<u>Low Ed.</u>	<u>High Ed.</u>
<u>Party</u>	<u>Party</u>	<u>Party</u>	<u>Party</u>
-.55	-.74	-.30	-.65
<u>Labour National</u>		<u>National</u>	<u>National</u>
<u>age</u>	<u>age</u>	<u>age</u>	<u>age</u>
-.09	.13	.49	.22
			.29

Table Twenty-Eight 2nd and 3rd level r's between SP variables, age, party and Isolationism/Populism (all scores).

The finding of importance here is that at each successive level of control, significant contributions

to the Isolationism/Populism factor are found. Education retains a moderate influence at both low and high occupation. With education crudely controlled, party support retains a strong relationship, especially for those of high education. It is clear that low occupation, low education and labour support are independent sources of attitudes in this belief-system. The effect of age is less apparent. Though the numbers of labour supporters were not sufficient for controls at this level, older national supporters tended to be more isolationist/populist. This point can be checked further in subsequent steps of the analysis. To sum up so far, it seems that the three most important variables related to the Isolationism/Populist factor, occupation, education and party support have independent and linear relationships with I/P scores. That is, each appears to have a constant effect across high and low values of the controlled variables. The strong link with both positional (occupation) and communicative (education and party) institutional sources of the social periphery seems clear. This interpretation can be tested further by returning to the Victoria Populist factor.

Step Three Using the factor scores of the original Victoria Populism Factor (excluding the neutral scores) we can repeat Step Two beginning with the zero-order correlations between occupation, education, party, and age, and the Populism factor scores (Table Twenty-Nine).

	<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Education</u>	<u>Party</u>	<u>Age</u>
I/P Scores	-.64	-.65	-.61	-.003

Table Twenty-Nine Zero-order r 's between Victoria I/P scores (high and low) and SP, age and party.

The strong relationships between occupation, education, party and the Canterbury I/P scores can be checked against the Victoria data by testing for the

possibility of common variance and interactions among these variables. The results of higher-order controls are presented below.

<u>Occupation</u>	<u>Education</u>	<u>Party</u>	<u>Age</u>	vs. <u>Populism</u>			
(-.64)	(-.65)	(-.61)	(-.003)				
				<u>Occupation</u>			
	-.67	-.63	.09	High			
	-.53	-.36	-.02	Low			
<u>HO/HE</u>	<u>HO/LE</u>	<u>LO/HE</u>	<u>LO/LE</u>	<u>Education</u>			
<u>party</u>	<u>party</u>	<u>party</u>	<u>party</u>				
-.73	-.35	-.52	-.40				
				<u>Party</u>			
<u>HO/HE</u>	<u>HO/HE</u>	<u>HO/LE</u>	<u>HO/LE</u>	<u>LO/HE</u>	<u>LO/HE</u>	<u>LO/LE</u>	<u>LO/LE</u>
<u>Lab.</u>	<u>Nat.</u>	<u>Lab.</u>	<u>Nat.</u>	<u>Lab.</u>	<u>Nat.</u>	<u>Lab.</u>	<u>Nat.</u>
<u>age</u>	<u>age</u>	<u>age</u>	<u>age</u>	<u>age</u>	<u>age</u>	<u>age</u>	<u>age</u>
.50	.11	-.04	.03	.30	.05	-.13	-.44

Table Thirty Controls of Occupation, Education and party for interactions and common variance, against high and low scores of Victoria Populism.

Within the limitations of the technique used to detect interactions and independent effects these findings confirm the interpretation of populism as a peripheral belief-system. Education retains a strong influence particularly for persons of high occupation. With both occupation and education crudely controlled, party support serves to differentiate attitudes on this belief-system. Labour party ideology which emphasises equalisation and redistribution of incomes reinforces populist responses on domestic economic issues. By contrast the National party ideology which stresses equality of opportunity and individual merit works against populism. Though the effect of age is masked at zero-order level, it seems to interact with education. For high education groups (particularly Labour supporters), youth is associated with non-populism, while for low education and low occupation

groups youth is associated with populism.

A possible interpretation of the link between education and age may be that the attitudes of the under 40's with more than 2 yrs. secondary schooling may reflect changes in the standards of formal education working against populist attitudes. On the other hand, younger persons of low education and low occupation may show attitudes and values which have been learned in the post-war welfare state era. This interpretation would account for the strong relationship between youth and populism in the poorly educated semi- and unskilled working-class conservatives (LO/LE/Nat). Anticipating the discussion on possible 'causes' of populism, we can suggest the existence of at least four independent institutional sources at work shaping populist attitudes. They are: manual occupation (combining skilled, semi- and unskilled occupations); less than 3 years formal secondary schooling; Labour party ideology and a post-war 'welfarism' climate of opinion. In turning now to multiple regression we can review further evidence bearing upon the possible 'causes' of populism.

Step Four The first regression was done on the Victoria data using the populist factor scores (all values) as dependent variable and a range of social position and attribute measures as independent variables. A full description of all the variables can be found in Appendix One. The results of the regression are presented in the form of a summary table.

<u>Variable</u>		<u>Zero-order</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>Beta</u>	<u>Std Error</u> <u>B</u>
Prestige	<u>Low</u>	.38	.11	.16	.02
Education	<u>Low</u>	-.36	-.09	-.20	.01
Vote	<u>Labour</u>	-.31	-.16	-.07	.11
Sex	<u>Female</u>	.20	.27	.12	.05
Partisanship	<u>Labour</u>	.29	-.06	-.10	.02
Religion	<u>Catholic</u>	.03	.28	.16	.06
Church attend.	<u>High</u>	-.03	-.13	-.13	.03
Income	<u>Low</u>	-.34	-.04	-.08	.01
Age	<u>Older</u>	.01	.01	.04	.01
Vote salience	<u>High</u>	-.10	-.09	-.22	.02
Efficacy	<u>Low</u>	.00	.08	.19	.04
Leadership	<u>Holyoake</u>	.02	.02	.05	.01
Party ident.	<u>Labour</u>	-.30	-.02	-.04	.02
Citizen duty	<u>Low</u>	-.01	.02	.06	.05
Wage/Self emply.	<u>Self</u>	.11	-.009	-.01	.02
Own/rent	<u>Rent</u>	.09	.01	.005	.06

Multiple $r = .542$ $r^2 = .294$

Table Thirty-One Summary Table of multiple regression of SP and attribute data against Victoria Populist factor scores (1 = low to 9 = high populist).

At zero-order level the expected relationships between low social position (low prestige, low income) low education, and labour support can be found. With interactions partialled out, we find these factors retaining their independent effect. Ranked in order by Beta coefficients we have; SP variables (low occupational prestige, low income) attribute variables (low education, catholic, high church attendance, and female) and dispositional variables (high vote salience, low efficacy, labour partisanship and identification, and a tendency to favour Holyoake over Nordmeyer). In interpreting the meaning of these findings it is important to emphasise both the similarities and differences between the correlates of populism and authoritarianism. The similarities are in three areas: education, religiousity and political self-orientation; the differences are in social position and party support. In causal terms the implications seem clear and will be discussed in the concluding section.

The second regression study was of the Hamilton data using several attitude dimensions as representing the populist belief-system and a range of SP and attribute variables, and dispositional and attitudinal measures. The attitude factor used to represent the foreign-policy and nationalism dimension of populism was Isolationism. A summary of the results of regression analysis is presented in Table Thirty-Two.

<u>Variable</u>	<u>Zero-order</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>Beta</u>	<u>Std Error</u> <u>B</u>
Commun. Invol.	.03	.13	.10	.10
Civil liberties	-.10	-.09	-.09	.06
Trust	-.09	-.09	-.06	.08
Independence	-.13	-.28	-.13	.12
Party support	-.04	-.09	-.05	.10
Conflict	-.02	.04	.01	.15
Organisations	-.06	-.08	-.08	.07
Age	.02	-.10	-.06	.11
Occupation	-.02	-.05	-.02	.12
Income	-.08	-.07	-.06	.07
Education	-.06	-.008	-.008	.07
Class	.08	.20	.11	.20
Children	-.01	-.03	-.03	.05

Multiple $r = .246$ $r^2 = .060$

Table Thirty-Two Summary table of results of multiple regression of SP, attribute and dispositional variables against Isolationism factor of Hamilton Survey.

As can readily be seen none of the variables run against Isolationism has a strong zero-order relationship, nor do the Beta coefficients exceed twice the Standard Error of B. Though all variables explain only 6% of Isolationism there is a suggestion that Isolationism is slightly related to low independence, middle-class identification, community involvement and opposition to civil liberties. No strong relationship with low social position or low education and party support found in the crosstabulation analysis is revealed here. There are two main reasons why this might be so. The first is that such relation-

ships exist, but have not shown up in multiple regression. This explanation seems unlikely given the results of other regression analyses. The second is that the dependent variable Isolationism is derived from a rotated factor which extracts the items loading on the foreign policy dimension from those in the domestic area. On the other hand the Isolationism/Populism factor used in crosstabulation is unrotated. If this latter explanation is true we should find the expected links between the social periphery and domestic issues related to populism. The domestic scale related to the dimension of economic conservatism-liberalism is that of welfarism (See Appendix Three). A summary table of the results of regression follows.

<u>Variable</u>	<u>B</u>	<u>Beta</u>	<u>Std Error</u> <u>B</u>
Minority rights	.05	.04	.07
Individualism	.09	.08	.06
Equality	.05	.04	.06
Race	-.19	-.16	.06
Alienation	.10	.11	.05
Religious convention	-.12	-.13	.05
Honesty	.09	.07	.06
Optimism	.14	.10	.07
Fatalism	.06	.02	.11
Anomy	.14	.07	.11
Independence	-.18	-.10	.09
Party support	-.34	-.25	.07
Discussion	-.07	-.06	.05
Sex	-.10	-.02	.23
Age	.38	.28	.08
Occupation	.07	.04	.10
Education	.05	.06	.05
Class	.04	.03	.07
Children	-.01	-.02	.03

Multiple r = .523 r squared = .273

Table Thirty-Three Summary table of results of regression of variables against rotated Welfarism factor.

Since this attitude scale measuring attitudes favourable to redistribution it is the closest approx-

imation of the Victoria Populist factor, yet the link with low social position and low education is not apparent. As for attributes, the strong connection with Labour support is present, and age is much stronger than in the Victoria data. The dispositional and attitude correlates are low racism and low religious conventionalism, together with a suggestion of alienation and optimism. Though the Hamilton measures of Foreign-policy and Domestic populism do not provide much support of the findings with the Victoria data, nor is the evidence disconfirming. Again, reasons for the observed differences may reside in methods and techniques used, or in real differences in either the samples or attitudes tapped. For example, the link between Victoria Populism and the social periphery may be strong by virtue of the rather drastic redistributive measures included in the factor, while the Hamilton welfarist factor being concerned with more moderate welfare measures such as job guarantees and increased medical and unemployment spending may tap the more widely distributed post-war welfarist 'climate of opinion'. Further speculation however, given the number of unknown sources of variation would be unjustified. Overall, there seems to be sufficient evidence to warrant the conclusion that persons who are strong 'populists' are disproportionately of low social status, low education, older, and labour party supporters. In terms of the centre-periphery model, one can interpret the populist belief-system as a radical peripheral political culture for reasons to be discussed in the next section.

3. Conclusions

In Chapter Ten the Populist belief-system was described as the radical arm of the meritocratic mainstream political culture. It has several components. The first is a desire for income redistribution or

the 'levelling' of the reward structure. The second, is antipathy towards a centralised state which does not respond to such demands, but support for state measures which do create new avenues for opportunity and equality. The third element is political and racial intolerance and the fourth is isolationism. Whether or not these four components do actually comprise one coherent populist belief-system has yet to be demonstrated conclusively, but further light can be shed on this question by the findings of the Hamilton survey. We find that the introduction of certain dispositional and attitudinal correlates of populism lends support to the view that populism is not a mixture of "liberal" and "conservative" beliefs, but rather is exclusively 'liberal' even 'radical'.

In the first place, no evidence of a pattern of economically liberal (welfarist) and politically or racially conservative (anti-communist or racist) attitudes was found. Regression against the Welfarist factor (factor 3, Table 7) showed no significant relationships between either opposition to political minorities or racism and welfarism. In the case of racial attitudes the reverse was the case, welfarism being distinctly associated with racial tolerance. On this evidence domestic populism is not only economically liberal, but much more politically and racially liberal than is the authoritarian belief-system, or the U. S. concept of populism. In the second place, though regression against the Isolationism factor revealed no statistically significant independent variables, the items in the factor itself cannot be interpreted as 'conservative', since they appear to tap a traditional concern among low status individuals to restrict economic competition and the lowering of living standards caused by immigration (particularly of aliens). Thus, insofar as Isolationism is linked with domestic populism (and the links are not well established in the present research) it

can be argued that it springs from the same populist concern for economic equality and social advancement. If this interpretation is correct, then contemporary populism as a belief-system would appear to represent a continuation of the 'radical tradition' in New Zealand history, a view which is further supported by the data on its distribution and origins.

If we consider the distribution of populist beliefs in terms of social position variables, individual attributes and dispositions, and related attitudes, several significant institutional sources emerge, some of which are common to both Authoritarianism and Populism, and some of which differentiate the two belief-systems. Those which are common to both are:

(1) Low Education. This is a general characteristic of the social periphery (46% of the Victoria Sample, and 59% of the Canterbury Sample has less than 3 years formal secondary education). It is both a positional (low education restricts access to opportunity structure) and communicative (education expands perspectives and breeds tolerance) source.

(2) Religiosity. The tendency for Catholics and regular churchgoers to be both more Authoritarian and Populist than those who are not suggests that it is a positional source of attitude learning and support. However, the effect of religiosity appears to be not that of determining attitude content, but the holding of attitudes as such. It is only the content of religious belief, i.e. religious convention versus secularism, that differentiates Authoritarians from Populists.

(3) Political Self-Orientation. Both Populists and Authoritarians share a high voting salience (commitment to vote for ones preferred party) together

with low efficacy (feelings of political ineffectiveness). This orientation is probably typical of the periphery, combining a commitment to a political party together with a realistic recognition of the limits of personal influence. However, within this particular conception of political role, there is the suggestion that Authoritarians resolve this discrepancy through deference, while Populists become alienated from the party-system unless it is capable of responding to their interests.

What I am suggesting then is that these three attributes (education) and dispositions (self-orientations and religiosity) operate independently of social positional factors, but that they are nevertheless disproportionately concentrated in the social periphery. Both belief-systems are in terms of actual distribution coexisting in the periphery, and must be differentiated by other institutional sources.

The main institutional sources of Populism consist of positional factors, individual attributes dispositions and related attitudes. In approximate order of importance they are as follows:

(1) Low occupational status. This relationship was shown to be strong when the sample was restricted to populists and non-populists (excluding the neutral scores). There seems to be a clear connection between low status and domestic populism confirming what is perhaps the best established finding of survey research.

(2) Labour party support. This relationship, while moderately strong in the regression studies, was exceptionally strong for high populists, signifying the link between the Labour tradition of equality and redistribution, and populist beliefs.

(3) Age. This effect is apparently indirect,

since there is nothing inherent in ageing which leads one to believe that individuals become more populist. The link between age and populism would appear to reflect both changing standards in formal education, and the changing "climate of opinion". For example, in the high occupational and education group (very low on populism) the younger persons are less populist, while for those working-class conservatives who have not had the benefit of prolonged formal education, younger persons are more populist. What this suggests is the operation of two opposing forces over the post-war period. One is the rise of general values and beliefs concerning the ideals and goals of the welfare state. The other is the process of formal education which is the main channel of upward mobility. The prevalence of welfare goals raise expectations of personal achievement, while formal education supplies the means of attaining these goals. Those without access to the means must therefore fall back upon populist attempts to force the state to open up the opportunity structure while those secure in their qualifications are meritocratic in outlook. This interpretation of the nature of welfare-state Populism parallels that of middle-class radicalism in the late Nineteenth and early Twentieth century.

(4) Populist dispositions. This term is offered to cover several weak or moderate relationships between dispositional variables and populism. They are; low religious conventionalism or secularism; low citizen duty; alienation and optimism. It is possible that we have here something of a personality syndrome corresponding to the authoritarian syndrome of 'deference'. Though voting salience is a measure of the strength of support for a given party, citizen duty is a commitment to the act of voting and the procedure of elections whether or not ones party is likely to be successful. Lack of a sense of citizen duty means that ones commitment to 'input' processes

is still based upon a particularist attachment to a party, not the norms of democracy. Similarly, lack of religious conventionalism amounts to a secular distrust in faith and religion as a force for good or evil. Alienation (See appendix three) is essentially a recognition of the existence of inequality of opportunity and before the law, while optimism is the hope that some change is possible in the future. Though none of these relationships are strong, they are suggestive of a pattern of dispositions associated with the 'subjective perception of inequality'. Such dispositions imply a recognition of self-interest which finds expression in the rejection of the status quo, and demands for further equalisation of opportunity via Labour party policy. Overall we can sketch a general schema of the institutional sources which combine to shape this 'radical' peripheral belief-system.




Table Thirty-Four Schematic representation of possible causal process involved in the shaping of populist attitudes.

This belief-system seems to be the product largely of positional and communicative sources in the periphery, together with the centre communicative values of the welfare ideology. The conjunction of peripheral and central institutional sources produces a conflict between beliefs in equality and the experience of inequality. The result is the existence of a radical periphery sub-culture sustained by the perception of self-interest and identification

with the Labour party ideology, and expressed as strong demands for further redistribution of wealth and a qualified acceptance of the state as a national authority.

4. The Legitimation Process

On the basis of the admittedly tentative evidence presented in the preceding chapters concerning the nature, distribution and origins of political beliefs in the New Zealand population, I propose to draw some conclusions about the process of political legitimation in New Zealand society. It is a widely held view, that, in Western societies characterised as Welfare-Capitalist or post-capitalist, or post-industrial, the maintenance of political order would not be possible if it were not for a general acceptance of political authority by persons of low status. The main problem exposed by both congruence and constraint theories of political systems has been to explain working-class "allegiance" to the state, either in terms of the satisfaction or denial of real interests. The explanations offered are either one: that low status persons are constrained by the dominant value-system, institutionalised in the centre, against their own self- or class-interests, or two: that the 'allegiance' of the majority of the working-class represents a satisfaction with the effectiveness of the state in equitably distributing opportunity and rewards.

Let us assume for purposes of argument that the two belief-systems discussed here correspond to those which in Parkin's schema are called dominant and radical. The Authoritarian belief-system is the product of the dominant value-system at one extreme, and the Populist belief-system the product of a radical working-class subculture at the other extreme. In the middle we can classify the intermediate attitudes

or non-attitudes as a subordinate belief-system. The characteristics of the dominant authoritarian belief-system located in the periphery match those of working-class conservatives in Britain. Authoritarians are conservative in that they support the conservative party, are committed to the rules of democracy and conventional morality, and in Almond and Verba's terms are allegiant. By contrast the radical populists support the social democrat party, are less committed to the citizenship norms of democracy and conventional morality. In Almond and Verba's terms they are more likely to be alienated than allegiant. The intermediate groups with mixed populist and authoritarian attitudes, no attitudes, or unmeasured attitudes probably lack strong belief-systems or a strong party attachment. They can be classified for the present as apathetic. Some estimate of the numbers involved in these three sub-cultures can be gained from the following table.

<u>Social Position</u>	<u>Low</u>			<u>Middle</u>			<u>High</u>		
<u>Anti-Communism</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>H</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>H</u>	<u>L</u>	<u>M</u>	<u>H</u>
<u>Isolationism</u> <u>L</u>	9 (2)	25 (17)	9 (5)	27 (13)	46 (27)	32 (26)	36 (17)	66 (43)	45 (18)
<u>M</u>	32 (7)	28 (19)	42 (24)	40 (19)	27 (16)	40 (32)	47 (22)	25 (16)	42 (17)
<u>H</u>	59 (13)	47 (32)	49 (28)	33 (16)	27 (16)	27 (22)	17 (8)	9 (6)	12 (5)
	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>	<u>100</u>

Table Thirty-Five Isolationism and Anti-Communism factor scores (Canterbury 1969) by Social Position.

It can be seen that two-thirds of the sample are neutral on either Authoritarianism or Populism or both. This means that the majority of the periphery exhibit mixed political attitudes which do not form exclusively Authoritarian or Populist belief-systems, but which

have components of each. Furthermore, of those persons at Low SP who are Authoritarian, nearly half are also Populist. How can we explain the coexistence and admixture of these beliefs and values? Returning to Parkin's metaphor of the 'meaning-systems' of the subordinate class as a 'reservoir' which is "fed by three major normative streams, each flowing from a different institutional source" (1972: 100) we can in terms of the Centre-Periphery model attempt some explanation of the forces which shape attitudes in the periphery.

First, take the link between belief-systems and social position. One of the major differentiating factors between dominant and radical values is occupational status. Though the Authoritarian belief-system penetrates the periphery through the communicative agencies of the centre, the chances of Authoritarian beliefs being mixed with or being replaced by Populist beliefs increases in the Periphery. This could be interpreted as evidence of 'working-class' interests finding expression in populist demands for collective political action. Conversely, working-class authoritarians while also poorly educated, are 'in' but not 'of' the working-class culture, and are tuned into the utilitarian individualistic values of the dominant culture, opposed to unions and to further equalisation of wealth. If this group of working-class conservatives is 'falsely conscious' while others are 'class-conscious' it is clearly not a question of a simple reaction to working-class experience. Party ideology is in fact a major differentiating factor between the two belief-systems. Although it is not possible to demonstrate conclusively that it is party ideology which generates class-consciousness rather than vice versa, this would seem to be the most likely causal mechanism. There are two grounds for this judgement. The first is that party identification has been recognised as the most important determining force in political learning over-

seas and there is no evidence that it is less important in New Zealand. Secondly, there is some justification for the claim that voting salience and degree of party support in the periphery is related to the intensity and consistency of belief-systems. The subordinate sub-culture is probably the result of lack of early attachment to party, and a general lack of concern or apathy towards politics. Obviously, further data on occupational history and family socialisation would be necessary to test the causal place of party identification.

Generally then, it can be taken that for persons in the periphery with little formal education, low political knowledge, lacking strong occupational interests and exposed to the dominant institutional sources, the balance of forces leads to an accommodative subordinate value-system, corresponding to Almond and Verba's subject orientation. There is a general consensus concerning democratic norms, political authority and the goals of the welfare state, yet a parallel indifference or apathy towards politics. Is this majority consensus grounds for the state's legitimacy? The answer would appear to be in the nature of support provided by Authoritarians and Populists. The allegiance of Authoritarians is a commitment to citizenship and national political authority over and beyond 'class' politics. Conversely, the Populists are politically engaged in a 'pre-modern' sense, of supporting party but not the institutions of state unreservedly. Where we have clear evidence of support of the state's legitimacy, in the case of Authoritarians, we have good grounds for suspecting the 'rationality' of their support. The conclusive test is to demonstrate that working-class conservatives have something to conserve and are in fact middle-class in achievement, or can be so, and not merely middle-class in aspiration. Where we have some evidence of a qualified support of the

state's authority, in the case of populists, the evidence points to the 'rationality' of class-interests challenging the existence of inequality.

As for the subordinate majority, what can be said of their allegiance? Unfortunately not very much. What can be said concerns the periphery as a whole. The limitation of class conflict by the moderate reformist policy of labour governments, and the institutionalisation of conflict along racial and national lines signifies the relative dominance of the centre over the periphery, of nation over class. The general consensus, or absence of class consciousness, in the periphery would therefore seem to be the consequence of the hegemonic influence of the main 'normative stream', the meritocratic mainstream political culture, in shaping political consciousness.

THIRTEEN :

The Hegemonic State

1. The Argument Recapitulated

The broad objective of this thesis as outlined in the Introduction is to empirically demonstrate the extent to which the mass citizenry (that is, the working-class) in New Zealand are allegiant to the state. This objective requires an approach to the problems of legitimacy on two levels. In Part One the pre-theoretical factors underlying the congruence and constraint models of legitimacy are examined. At this level the method employed can be loosely called the 'sociology of knowledge' (see Meszaros, 1972). In part Two I moved on to the more substantive level of developing a model which could generate testable propositions concerning the factors which have some bearing upon the legitimacy of state authority. The method employed at this level involved tracing first the interdependent historical forces contributing to political stability and legitimacy in the Nation-Building phase of development, and second, analysing the nature, extent and origins of contemporary political belief-systems. It is now possible to review the findings of this research in terms of their general validity, and to consider how far they allow a test (or partial test) of the legitimacy of the state in New Zealand.

Clearly, whatever evidence is produced, it must provide a test of the adequacy of both the congruence and constraint models of legitimacy. Such a test is possible if we focus upon the concept of "crisis of legitimacy". During the industrialisation process in the "West", several such crises were experienced, amounting to a threat, by a large and hitherto allegiant group of subjects, to withdraw its

support of the state (Lipset, 1963: 77-96). The major crisis of liberal democracies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries was the threatened 'rebellion' of the working-class, the so-called "labour problem". Since the working-class was an absolute majority its political fate was of crucial importance for both congruence and constraint theorists. The critical test of these competing explanations lay in the evidence of the historic forces which shaped working-class values, interests and beliefs. In particular, the institutional sources that were responsible for the primacy of 'national' over 'class' consciousness.

As we have seen, the congruence approach is derived from the Weberian concept of the 'rationalisation' of industrial society. Where the industrial transition was gradual and complete (as in Britain), or rapid and complete (as in the U.S.), the bourgeois threat to traditional legitimacy was met by either a re-alignment of elites, or by a period of revolutionary change consolidated by charismatic authority and later routinised by constitutional procedures. In both Britain and the U.S. the transition to rational-legal authority is seen as the consequence of an orderly and gradual process of economic rationalisation accompanied by a transformation in the political culture from traditionalism to modernism. The fact that, under bourgeois hegemony, the bulk of the population does not make the full transition to modern values (that is, have not had formal religious rights implemented as practical legal, political and economic rights), is taken to be a necessary condition of political stability and successful 'modernisation'. Lipset makes this point clearly when he suggests that the majority must postpone immediate gratification in the interests of short-term political stability, and long-term economic and social welfare. That this

particular relativity of means to ends is seen to be justified historically is demonstrated by the congruence account of British colonisation.

Essentially, in the view of congruence theorists, European colonisation was an extension of the middle-class revolution in Europe. The British colonies in particular offered new frontiers of land and investment. Thus the lower middle- and upper working-class, accustomed to formal legal rights yet frustrated by a crystallised class structure, were able to realise the bourgeois revolutionary ideal of a property-owning democracy. Since economic opportunity facilitated political enfranchisement in the colonies, especially Australasia, colonisation was but a quick step in the "capitalist progression". In Harz' view, this radical bourgeois cultural diffusion ensured that the state would necessarily represent the will of the majority, and make new opportunities for social advancement available. This historical imperative was but the fateful consequence of the universalist drive of a secular and rational political culture which takes over the state, the economy and society, and which transforms class interests into an enveloping national interest.

In New Zealand's case then, we are to believe that the threat to legitimacy represented by the mass demands of the working-class never reached the point of being a crisis. (The working-class such as it was, was continually 'de-classed' by upward mobility, by state-guaranteed incomes, and by welfare provisions. Though a large section of the labour force, 'it' never became a conscious industrial or political force challenging the stability or legitimacy of the capitalist order. Since by such criteria, the congruence view that short-term inequality is justified by long-term political effectiveness, it follows that in the New Zealand case, the allegiance of the working-class to the state proves the point.

The conclusion of this argument is the claim that from colonisation to the post-war welfare state, the legitimacy of the capitalist order has remained unchallenged. Though there are areas of conflict within the overall political consensus about the goals of equality and welfare, these are confined to issues of 'means' rather than 'ends' (e.g. Mitchell, 1968a). What is more, it is taken for granted that those who express little interest in politics are not dissatisfied, but rather passively contented with the system. In Almond and Verba's terms they are allegiant subjects rather than apathetic or alienated subjects, whose dominant subject orientation is adequately 'balanced' by active citizens on either side of the party and class lines. For congruence theorists then, the New Zealand case is a clear example of the historic fulfillment of rational-legal domination, "locked into legitimacy".

While the congruence theorists take their view of the capitalist progression from Weber, constraint theorists look to Marx. Barrington Moore (1969) for example, does not regard the bourgeois 'revolution' in Britain as a peaceful and orderly transition. On the contrary, the legitimacy of the state was not a case of simple loyalty on the part of the disenfranchised masses, but ultimately rested upon the efficient use of state force. Similarly, Thompson's (1968) analysis of the origins of working-class consciousness shows that the existence of formal or symbolic equality was not enough to maintain the allegiance of workers to the state. In fact it tended to heighten awareness of the gap between formal rights and actual living conditions. It seems that the decisive factor in the industrial transition was not so much the adherence of the working-class to traditional values and customs, but the very real use of force by the hegemonic class.

The second area of disagreement concerns the role of the European-settled colonies. Certainly colonisation enlarged the opportunity for investment, markets and the under- or un-employed classes, yet it did so by creating a vast pool of cheap labour in Asia and Africa. And while the British bourgeois revolution was consolidated in Australia and New Zealand, this in itself was not sufficient to forestall the emergence of a working-class threat to legitimacy. In the first place there were the vicissitudes of the labour market, the threat of unemployment and privation. As well as these physical constraints there existed the powerful symbolic appeals I have summed-up in the phrase social sub-imperialism. In the constraint view, the 'fragment' becomes a 'people's state' acting in the name of the general will, a figment of bourgeois consciousness, which according to Airey pre-saged an authoritarian, anti-libertarian, proto-Fascist even, state. Second, the structural immobility of the working-class became obscured by state intervention in industrial relations, which far from equalising incomes, consolidated unequal class relations. Third, national integration, though ostensibly the outcome of universalistic values, became possible as the result of a particularistic anglo-centrism, a nationalism reinforced by appeals to race, culture and war.

Thus in the constraint view, the short-term pacification of the working-class was achieved by direct coercion on the part of employers and the state, while in the long-term, 'its' support was maintained by hegemonic institutions operating independently of the state's performance in realising the goals of equality and social welfare. Instead of using the concept 'civic culture' to signify a subject-participant balance of orientations, the constraint view puts much more emphasis

upon the causes of allegiance or compliance. We can however use Almond and Verba's distinction between allegiance, apathy and alienation. We therefore want to know what differentiates individuals with these three types of orientation in the periphery. It is not sufficient to say that the allegiants balance-out the apathetics or alienates in the periphery, we need to know why. The constraint interpretation is that the allegiance of working-class conservatives is not produced by the specific rewards of the system, but by diffuse appeals to traditional and national authority. Thus the only group in the periphery, which allows congruence theorists to talk of equal representation across party and class lines, is a conservative section of the working-class whose motives for allegiance are historically suspect. In summary, the constraint view argues that the crisis of capitalist legitimacy in early twentieth century New Zealand was avoided by a combination of force, fragmentation and fraud. We shall now consider how far the evidence bears out this interpretation.

2. The Evidence.

In Chapter Eight a number of propositions were advanced concerning the historical and contemporary forces which shaped and continue to shape the political beliefs of the periphery. We shall consider first evidence which bears on those specific to the developmental phase. Though these propositions are phrased in terms of "conditions which threaten political stability", it is clear that a system can be stable yet lack legitimacy. With this proviso in mind, we can see how they hold up. Proposition A is not tested, since at no time prior to the 1880's could it be said that 'favourable conditions' existed for the working-class. Right throughout this period it is assumed that working-class loyalty is based

upon either constraint, or experience/expectations of the systems long-term effectiveness. Proposition B is shown to be true for the period of the union 'uprising' leading to the Maritime Strike of 1890. The objective rate of exploitation was sufficiently great during the long depression to encourage the labour force to organise for its own protection. In this process the 'combination' of labour signified a withdrawal of specific support in the form of strike action against the power of the employers to hire free labour. It also marked a move away from the diffuse support of the laissez faire political economy. That this attempt at collective bargaining was but an early sign of a developing proletarian consciousness was evident in the reaction of both employers and politicians.

Proposition C refers to the isolation of the most advanced section of the working-class by the overwhelming deference of the majority of workers. Here we have the evidence of the 1880's and 1900's. In the period of the 'new' unionism the recognition that the 'Complete Boycott' was potentially a revolutionary weapon did not dawn on workers who wished only to preserve their standard of living and job security. In 1890 when the employers forced a showdown, the industrial movement was ill prepared. Similarly, the operation of the I.C.&A Act, though allowing workers some share of increased prosperity up to 1900, established habits of loyalty and deference to state authority which worked against the success of the Red Federation. In both periods the essential weakness of the most organised and militant section of the labour movement was the direct consequence of the conservatism of the majority.

Proposition D is axiomatic, the point is to determine what constitutes 'sufficient' force. The events between 1908 and 1919 bear upon this proposition. Over this period the militant labour

minority, already isolated from the passive majority, were subjected to a combination of physical and legal coercion (Waihi 1912; Wellington 1913, and repressive wartime measures), propaganda (activities of Protestant Reform Association, warmongering) and intense social pressures (charges of sedition and treason etc). Without a doubt these measures were sufficient to suppress the activities of the class-conscious vanguard. If we allow Propositions C and D to stand, then it follows that the conditions which limited working-class consciousness to small fragmented and isolated groups, were necessary for the maintenance of political stability (Proposition E). Hence, from the beginnings of the labour movement in the 1870's to the post-war years, the majority of the working-class was effectively incorporated into the dominant bourgeois state culture. The vital question of how far political stability was gained at the expense of the voluntary support of the working-class remains however.

While it is true to say that the working-class majority remained loyal to the state, the reasons for such loyalty are all important. The evidence presented in Chapter Nine points to a series of historical constraints stretching back into British working-class history. Unemployment, the traditional bane of the working-class, remained the most significant constraint in New Zealand. An already docile labour force then became subject to the machinery of compulsory state arbitration, a device which not only anaesthetized the perception of exploitation, but introduced the twentieth-century phenomenon of state capitalism. Even at this stage then, force as the main support of working-class allegiance was being substituted by bureaucratic institutions. The two defining characteristics of state hegemony can be found in rudimentary form. First, the intervention

of the state as a neutral party between social classes, successfully obscured the nature of class-conflict. Class interests became reconciled under the banner of "social reform" in industry, education and social welfare. In this way the subjective perception of inequality was rendered opaque. Second, those whose perception of inequality continued to create a potential for class conflict had their concerns diverted into substitute conflicts - against each other, other races or other nations.

One can conclude that congruence theory is correct up to a point. Certainly, the 'labour problem' did not constitute a real threat to state legitimacy in New Zealand, since it was never more than a minority 'aberration'. But when we examine the reasons for this, it is the constraint theory that works best. The working majority were not won-over by embourgeoisment, but were pacified mainly by a series of constraints extending from the threat of unemployment, through legal requirements and symbolic appeals to strong social pressures to conform. The causal importance of diffuse support as a basis of legitimacy is therefore spurious, since it rests upon experience of fear and deprivation. If one traces the historical sequence far enough back, the crucial "allegiance" of the working-class conservatives is less the product of long-term state effectiveness, than of long-term working-class memories. Thus the "allegiance" of the crucial conservative working-class resembles an involuntary compliance more than it does voluntary consent. If this is indeed the case, then it can be said that during the developmental phase the state maintained its stability by forfeiting 'its' claim to working-class allegiance. It remains to be proven conclusively that workers supported the state more for what they got out of it, than for what it did to them.

We now turn to the question of state legitimacy in the hegemonic phase. Looking at the propositions specific to this period, proposition A means by the phrase "standardised reward expectations", a consensus of beliefs concerning the distribution of wealth and the goals of the welfare state. The implication is that the social periphery comes to accept the meritocratic ideal of a hierarchy of rewards equally accessible to all. Should this consensus exist it corresponds to Almond and Verba's modern civic culture, predominantly universalist, achieving and egalitarian. The evidence presented in Chapter Ten shows that a consensus about political ends can be considered to exist in New Zealand. There appears to be a general support for the norms of democracy in principle, and acceptance of the party-system and a tolerance of opposition. Mitchell (1968a) also found a majority of his sample satisfied with government administration (outputs), though a minority expressed some discontent with government performance. This dissatisfaction with 'inputs' he termed populist since it was not directed at transforming political ends but at transforming governments. Certainly, the Victoria and Canterbury data point to a strong commitment to democratic ideals and to equality, which is held across party and class lines. This fact again raises the question of legitimacy. Does value-consensus on political ends constitute evidence of political legitimacy?

While the nation-building political consensus may have been established by the use of force, have successive generations of working-class individuals continued to support the state out of a habit of deference, or have the benefits of post-war affluence been sufficient grounds for working-class support? Proposition B posits that centralisation of the four bases of power furthers the formation of an induced consensus, while Proposition C points to the complementary effect of peripheral fragmentation upon

consensus formation. First, consider the evidence of a central consolidation of power under the aegis of the state.

The centralisation of the four bases of power had its origins in an electoral law which preserved high representation and majority-power thresholds. This fact required newly enfranchised peripheral groups to align with an existing centre party, producing the lib-lab alliance. Second, in order to become a majority party, the party representing the working-class was forced to seek the support of the middle-class. This centralising tendency of electoral politics was reinforced by the establishment of a powerful administrative branch of government. Between the years 1890 to 1938 the function of the state was to establish and maintain a national reward-structure. Monetary and fiscal controls were designed to ensure income security, stability and relativity. Added to this function was that of meeting the populist demands to implement equality of opportunity. In the post-war period the state has consolidated its grip upon the reward and opportunity structures. Indeed the provision of equal opportunity through education, full employment, and health and welfare services is the manifest goal of the welfare state. It can be argued therefore, as do congruence theorists, that the centralisation of state power is a necessary means of furthering economic growth and social equality. That in fact, the emergence of the welfare state has more than justified the subordination or 'disciplining' of the working-class during the early stages of national development.

This argument is sound provided it can be demonstrated that the goals of the welfare state have been realised in practice. This is a task that is well outside the scope of this thesis, though I have made an attempt to define an approach to this problem elsewhere (Bedggood, 1974a). So, in order to offer some partial test of Propositions B and C

we have to make a key assumption. This is that the allegiant, apathetic and alienated orientations to the political system described in earlier chapters, are found in groups that are equally deprived. If we make this assumption then the differences in political beliefs found in these groups reflect variations in their resistance to the hegemonic culture rather than differences in social position. If, on the other hand most authoritarians are found to be in middle-class occupations, and most populists in working-class occupations, then the congruence explanation fits well. The allegiant groups are simply responding to specific rewards, while the populists are for personal or cultural lag reasons, unable to make use of equal opportunity.

Fortunately the evidence in Chapters Eleven and Twelve allow us to make this assumption, and to argue that what distinguishes working-class authoritarians from populists is not social position, but other institutional sources that condition the perception of inequality. In the case of authoritarians, allegiance is the product of ignorance, passive or submissive personality characteristics, institutions that sustain traditional morality, and deference to the symbols of authority and the National party as the governing elite. In my view these 'causes' are similar to those which are associated with socio-cultural deference in the British working-class (Jessop, 1971). They are also those which have conditioned the components of the conservative cultural mainstream in the working-class in New Zealand history. Nationalism, racism, chauvinism, give way in the contemporary dominant belief-system to anti-communism. Opposition to civil liberties for minorities, moral and religious intolerance, and anti-union feeling remain. I would venture to suggest that just as the historical deference to authority was a 'reasonable' response to force and deprivation, so in the contemporary authoritarian belief-system, is deference the product of

inequality and insecurity generated by the 'social problems' of the welfare-capitalist state.

Since a clear majority of the New Zealand working-class is characterised by authoritarian attitudes, often combined or mixed with populist beliefs, I would conclude that propositions B and C hold to some extent. If we regard populism as the only peripheral belief-system capable of some resistance to the dominant culture, then it provides the only alternative definition of reward expectations. Even within this 'radical' belief-system the strongest pattern, welfarism, is directed only at short-circuiting the opportunity structure. A small minority only, the contemporary heirs of the socialist tradition, can be regarded as 'levellers'. If this is so, it would seem that Proposition D is also true. That the hegemonic state is able to control expectations and motives to the extent that real inequalities, or lack of equal opportunity, are perceived not as defects in the political system, but as evidence of personal failings.

New Zealanders then, appear to be remarkably agreed upon the legitimacy of the state's activities in the regulation of their lives. The goals of the welfare state advanced in the name of the "common good" have served to accommodate any major conflict of interest. There is no question that in part this rests upon some sharing of the benefits of economic growth and upward social mobility. But, equally clearly, it also rests upon the hegemonic influence of a dominant set of values and beliefs which mask the existence of continued inequality, and the barriers to equal opportunity. Which set of influences, congruence or constraint, has been more important in establishing the legitimacy of the state cannot be judged without further research into patterns of social mobility, and the link between political interests, institutional sources

that shape values and beliefs, and political responses. For the present it is necessary to make a judgement on the evidence as it stands, and in my view the evidence supports the constraint theory of a hegemonic state political culture. While it remains true, that the legitimation of state authority may reflect a genuine satisfaction with the performance of the system, nevertheless the dominant political culture, the meritocratic mainstream, continues to mask the sources of conflict within the system, forstalling the emergence of political conflict. Whatever the latent conflicts that may exist along the lines of class or race, they remain submerged beneath a pervasive bureaucratic machinery of conflict-resolution. It cannot be said therefore, that peripheral groups in New Zealand society are capable of making autonomous judgements about their self-interest free of the constraints of the hegemonic state.

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APPENDIX ONE.

VICTORIA ELECTION SURVEY : 1963.

This survey was conducted in 1963 by the Department of Political Science at Victoria University of Wellington. Information about social background, attitudes and political responses was collected. The sample consisted of respondents drawn from four urban electorates in Wellington and Palmerston North totalling 1,555. The items and variables which have been used in the present research are listed below. Data decks used in analysis were Deck 11 and Deck 55.

Background and attribute variables.

Col. 12	Sex.
14	Income.
15	Education.
16	Migrant (education in New Zealand)
17	Home owned or rented.
18	Age.
19	Occupation.
20	Occupational Prestige.
23	Party Identification.
24	Wages or Salary.
25	Vote.
26	Religion.
27	Church Attendance.

Indexes.

28	Partisanship.
29	Leader Support.
62	Political Efficacy.
63	Voting Salience.
64	Citizen Duty.

Attitude Factor Scores.

41	Authoritarianism
42	Populism.

The values of the Background and attribute variables are straightforward and have been identified in the text. The components of, and construction of indexes and factors are listed more fully here.

Partisanship Index. This index was derived from a factor analysis of patterns of responses to a number of questions on Labour and National party policy. It differentiates respondents along a scale from 1 (most Labour) to 9 (most National) and is therefore a much more sensitive measure of partisan preference than simple voting choice.

Leader Support Index. Constructed in the same way as above but differentiates respondents in terms of attributes and images of leadership from 1 (Nordmeyer) to 9 (Holyoake).

Political Efficacy. Factor scores based upon responses to the Survey Research Center items:

- People like me don't have any influence on what the Government does.
- Voting is the only way that people like me can have any influence on how the government runs things.
- Sometimes politics and government seem so complicated that a person like me can't really understand what's going on.
- The way people vote is the main influence on what the government does in this country.

Voting Salience. Constructed from responses to:

- There's so much agreement between Labour and National on policy questions that it doesn't really matter for which of them one votes nowadays.
- I don't think politicians care much what people like me think.

Citizen Duty.

- It isn't so important to vote when you know your party doesn't have any chance of winning.
- So many other people vote in a general election that it doesn't matter much whether I vote or not.
- If a person doesn't care how an election turns out, he shouldn't vote in it.
- A good many local elections aren't important enough to bother with.

Attitude Factor Scores. The items used to construct attitude indexes by factor analysis have been identified in short form in the text. The complete item wordings are given below.

The government has a definite duty to see that everybody has a job and a decent standard of living.

Hanging should be brought back in New Zealand for some murderers.

Death duties should be greatly reduced.

Belonging to the Communist Party should be made a criminal offence.

The government should control food prices and rents.

Adding fluoride to the water supply is an infringement of liberty.

The trade unions are getting dangerously powerful, and the government should keep a careful eye on them.

People guilty of serious sexual crimes should be flogged.

Big business monopolies aren't giving small businessmen and farmers a fair chance.

New Zealand should support the admission of Communist China to the United Nations.

Lotteries like the Golden Kiwi should be abolished, since it's wrong for the State to encourage gambling.

We've taken the welfare state too far; it's discouraging initiative and enterprise to a dangerous degree.

The State should provide more financial aid for church schools.

Public servants have got too much power and are exploiting the situation in their own interests.

New Zealand Shouldn't ally itself with any country which possess nuclear weapons.

The Government should aim to reduce differences of wealth in this country.

Provided drinking conditions are improved, drinking hours in New Zealand hotels should be extended.

The government ought to cut taxes, even if it means putting off some things that need to be done.

The local M.P. hasn't been looking after the interests of this district energetically enough.

APPENDIX TWO.

CANTERBURY SURVEY : 1969.

This survey was conducted by Stage 111 sociology students of Canterbury University in August, 1969. The sample was drawn from the Merivale census district of Christchurch city, and from Kaikoura County and County Town. completed interviews were obtained. Items and variables measured included background socio-economic data, political preference and information, and a number of attitude items.

Background and attribute variables.

age; sex; occupational status (Congalton-Havighurst); education; income; religion; urban or rural residence, and a composite Centre-Periphery Index; political party preference.

Indexes.

Political Information: based upon scores on a test of political knowledge.

Media Indexes. Several indexes were designed to measure exposure to newspapers, magazines, T.V. and radio.

Attitude Factor Scores. The attitude items are listed in shortened form in the test, the full wording of all items follows:

People in New Zealand have freedom to express their opinions (90%yes; 8.2% No)

Political groups and persons who do not have the interests of the country at heart should not be allowed the same rights and freedoms as everyone else. (48; 46)

The government should pay attention to public opinion all the time it is in office. (76%; 22%)

It is necessary that some decisions taken by the government be kept secret from the public.(70;27)

The government should always consult the people before it declares war on another country. (63; 31)

The Government should reduce taxes. (44; 40)

The government should set up a national shipping line. (33; 34)

The government should not let itself be influenced by trade union leaders. (56; 36)

The government should not employ men in the public service who admit to being communists. (56; 32)

We should increase state aid to private schools. (49; 45)

The government should expand its free medical services even if this means increased taxation. (37; 55)

The government should increase unemployment benefit. (11 ; 79)

The government should increase the money it spends on Maori housing. (45 ; 30)

The government should not let itself be influenced by big business interests. (64 ; 25)

The government should not prevent New Zealand sporting teams from competing in South Africa. (73 : 19)

Our country should endeavour to be more forceful in influencing others. (42 ; 39)

Our country would be much better off if we did not get involved in political problems in other parts of the world. (43 ; 49)

Our country should not interfere in the internal politics of another country. (81 ; 13)

New Zealand should give more money to United Nations peace-keeping work. (43 ; 37)

New Zealand should attempt to be politically independent of other countries. (70 ; 25)

It is the best interests of our country to be concerned with the welfare of other countries as well. (92 ; 6)

New Zealand should not make its natural resources available to overseas interest groups. (43 ; 45)

New Zealand should participate more actively to prevent conflict among other nations. (59 : 32)

Immigrants should not be permitted to come to our country if they compete with our own workers. (32 ; 64)

New Zealand should support the admission of Communist China to the United Nations. (50 ; 33)

Our cooperation with Russia is a step toward world peace. (67 ; 21)

New Zealand should keep soldiers in foreign countries to help these countries in their fight against communism. (49 ; 39)

The best way for the West to handle Russia and China is to treat them as tough enemies. (31 ; 57)

The West should take all steps to defeat communism even if it means a third world war. (24 ; 64)

We should do all we can in helping the U.S. to prevent the spread of communism. (71 ; 22)

New Zealand should remain in her military alliances. (84 ; 8)

The government should cut back its military spending. (25 ; 63)

We should be ready to fight without question for our country. (68 ; 29)

We should oppose the stationing of U.S. warships armed with nuclear missiles in New Zealand. (41;48)

New Zealand should work more actively for the banning of nuclear weapons. (72 ; 20)

The West should disarm even if Russia and China does not. (9 ; 83)

New Zealand should give more aid to developing countries. (75 ; 18)

New Zealand should increase its trade with China (41 ; 52)

New Zealand should continue its trade with South Africa. (73 ; 15)

New Zealand should expand its trade with under-developed Asian countries even if this means lower prices for its exports. (85 ; 8)

In your opinion is Chinese communism a danger to the West? (66 ; 26)

Making sure the communists do not succeed in South-East Asia is important to the defence of New Zealand. (63 ; 20)

Do you think total disarmament is possible? (75 ; 13)

APPENDIX THREE.

CANTERBURY FOLLOW-UP SURVEY : 1970.

The purpose of this survey was to expand the number of attitude items and construct scales tooallow the ready measurement of basic attitudes. A full listing of attitudes is given and the procedure of scale-construction described. The sample wasdrawn from the original Canterbury list, and of the 400 posted, a total of 114 usable questionnaires were obtained. Despite the low return rate, it was decided to procede with the analysis.

Foreign Policy-Nationalism-Race.

A person who criticises the government in a time of crisis could not be called a good citizen.

A person who doesn't stand for the national anthem is not necessarily showing disrespect for the Queen.

The New Zealand flag is not very important because it is only a symbol.

A New Zeaflander who scoffs at our armed forces is not showing proper respect for the country.

New Zealand should support the admission of Communist China to the United Nations.

N.Z. should keep soldiers in foreign count ries to help these countries in their fight against communism.

The West should take all steps to defeat communism even if it means a Third World War.

N.Z. should remain in her military alliances such as SEATO and ANZAS.

The government should cut back on military spending. We should be ready to fight for our country without question.

N.Z. should increase its trade with communist china. Our cooperation with Russia is a step toward world peace.

The best way for the West to handle Russia and China is to treat them as tough enemies.

We should do all we can in helping the U.S. to prevent the spread of communism.

Making sure the communists do not succeed in South-East Asia is important to the defence of N.Z.

Our country would be better off if it did not get involved in political problems in other parts of the world.

Immigrants should not be permitted to come into the country if they compete with our own workers.

N.Z. should not make its natural resources available to overseas interest groups.

The U.S. and Britain should disarm without waiting for Russia and China to do so.

Visits to N.Z. by Asian politicians and businessmen should be encouraged.

Immigrants have not added much of value to the N.Z. way of life.

The polynesian communities which have settled in the inner suburbs of our main cities have made them better and brighter places to live.

N.Z. should not be too keen on friendship with the Japanese after what happened in the last war.

Scales.

Anti-Communism. The scale was constructed from the four highest loading items with a range of responses from majority agree to majority disagree, in order to discriminate between degrees of anti-communist belief.

Making sure the Communists do not succeed in S.E. Asia is important to the defence of N.Z.
Loading .65; 86% in agreement.

We should be ready to fight for our country without question. Loading .65; 69% in agreement.

N.Z. should keep soldiers in foreign countries to help these countries in their fight against communism. Loading .76; 61% in agreement.

The West should take all steps to defeat communism even if it means a Third-World War.
loading .67; 36% in agreement.

An index was then constructed by summing the values (between 1 to 5 on Likert-type response, and converted into to a 0-9 scale.

Isolationism. The two highest loading items in Rotated Factor Three were used.

N.Z. should not make its natural resources available to overseas interest groups. Loading .76; 25% agree

Immigrants should not be permitted to come into the country if they compete with our own workers. Loading .67; 27% agree.

Nationalism. Only one item was used for this scale, the highest loading on Rotated Factor Six.

A person who doesn't stand for the national anthem is not necessarily showing disrespect for the Queen. Loading -.74; 32% disagree.

(The distribution of responses on the 1 to 5 range of values for respondents of the Hamilton Survey, 1970, was:

16	162	13	81	21
1	2	3	4.	5.
Strongly Agree.	Agree	D.K. or neutral	D/ agree	Strongly Disagree.)

Domestic items.

The government should increase its free medical services even if this means increased taxes.

The government should not increase unemployment benefits.

The government should introduce a permanent price control system.

The state is already spending enough on Maori Housing

The government should guarantee jobs for those who cannot find work.

N.Z. as a democracy is ruled by the will of the majority.

Democracy is the best form of government for all nations.

Democracy means that all men and women have equal power to make political decisions.

Most democratic governments have to rely on a few strong men to run the government.

People ought not to be allowed to vote if they cannot do so intelligently.

Most politicians don't really mean what they say.

Many people do not really understand politics and are not really competent to make political decisions.

Most political parties care only about winning elections.

The people with the real power in N.Z. operate behind the scenes and don't bother about elections or parliament.

Nothing an ordinary man or woman does has much effect on politics.

There is still a distinct difference between Labour and National parties in N.Z.

Political groups and persons who do not have the interests of the country at heart should not be allowed the same rights and freedoms as everyone else.

The government should prevent sporting teams from competing in South Africa.

Some people don't really know what is good for them and need to be told what to do.

The N.Z. Nazi party is not a threat to our way of life and therefore should not be banned.

Minority groups should be free to criticise the decisions of the majority.

The Government should not employ men in the public service who are known to be Communists.

Freedom does not give university lecturers the right to teach Marxist ideas to innocent students.

Only those who have been to South Africa are in a position to judge Apartheid.

People in N.Z. have the freedom to express their opinions.

Ponography threatens ^{the} moral standards of our children and should be eradicated.

The government should always consult the people before it gets involved in a war.

It is necessary that some decisions taken by the government be kept secret from the public.

Scales.

Political Efficacy.

N.Z. is a democracy ruled by the will of the majority. Loading .48; 74% agree.

Most politicians don't really mean what they say. Loading .76; 51% disagree.

The people with the real power in N.Z. operate behind the scenes and don't really bother about elections and parliament. Loading .57; 45% disagree.

Political parties care only about winning elections. Loading .65; 52% disagree.

Nothing the ordinary man or woman does has much effect on politics. Loading .47; 44% disagree.

Civil Liberties.

Pornography threatens the moral standards of our children and should be eradicated.

(loading, .65; 29% disagree.

The New Zealand Nazi party should not be banned.

loading, .43; 34% agree.

The government should not employ men or women in the public service who are known to be communists.

loading, .75; 36% disagree.

University lecturers should not have the right to teach Marxist ideas to innocent students.

loading, .57; 42% disagree.

Minority Rights.

Political groups and persons who do not have the interests of New Zealand at heart should not be allowed the same rights and freedoms as everyone else. loading, .44; 58% disagree.

Minority groups should be free to criticise the decisions of the majority. loading, .81; 95% agree.

Equality.

Democracy is the best form of government for all nations. loading .67; 74% agree.

Democracy means that all men and women have equal power to make political decisions.

loading .77; 66% agree.

Most democratic government have to rely on a few strong men to run the nation.

loading, .47; 19% disagree.

Welfarism.

The government should increase its free medical services even if this means increased taxes.

loading, .61; 42% agree.

The government should not increase unemployment benefits. 11% disagree; loading, .56.

The government should guarantee jobs for those who cannot find work. loading, .76; 36% agree.

Race.

The state is already spending enough on Maori Housing. loading .68; 29% disagree.

The government should prevent New Zealand sports teams from competing in South Africa.

loading, .77; 17% agree.

Psychological Items.

These days a person doesn't know who he can count on.

People will be honest with you as long as you are honest with them.

Ideas that have no useful practical applications are of little use to anyone.

There is not much chance that people will really do anything to make this country a better place to live in.

Public servants will help a person if he lets them know what his problems are.

There is hardly anyone lower than a person who does not feel a great love, gratitude and respect for his parents.

Success is more dependent upon luck than on real ability.

In spite of the fast pace of modern life, it is easy to have many close friends you can trust.

Every person should make a strong effort to improve his social position.

Nowadays a person should live pretty much for today and let tomorrow take care of itself.

The successful people in New Zealand are generally the most honest.

What youth needs most is strict discipline, rugged determination, and the will to fight for family and nation.

It is hard to decide who you can really trust these days.

The decisions of the courts are just as fair to the poor man as the wealthy man.

Obedience and respect for authority should be the very first requirement of a good citizen.

The best way to get along in the world is to make careful plans for the future.

In spite of what people say, the lot of the average man is getting worse.

Old people deserve more respect than they get these days.

Considering everything that is going on these days, things look bright for the younger generation.

There is little use in writing to politicians because they aren't really interested in the problems of the ordinary man.

When a person is worried about a problem it is best not to think about it but to keep busy with more cheerful things.

Everyman who is capable should get married and have a family,

There are so many ideas about what is right and wrong these days that it is hard to decide how to live your own life.

Many people would be a lot happier if they were not married,

Things are changing so fast these days that one doesn't know what to expect from day to day.

Religion in New Zealand has little influence on making our society a better place to live.

Most people don't realise how much their lives are controlled by others.

Every person should have faith in some supernatural power whose decisions he obeys without question.

If men work and think together they can build a good world without the help of religion.

Scales.

Alienation.

The decisions of the courts are just as fair to the poor man as the wealthy man.

loading, -.72; 49% disagree.

In spite of what people say the lot of the average man is getting worse.

loading, .64; 27% agree.

Considering everything that is happening these days things look bright for the younger generation.

loading, -.70; 45% disagree.

There is little use in writing to politicians because they are not really interested in the problems of the ordinary man.

loading, .61; 23% agree.

Religious Convention.

Religion in New Zealand has little influence on making our society a better place to live in.

loading, -.65; 58% disagree.

Every person should have faith in some supernatural power whose decisions he obeys without question.

loading, .74; 27% agree.

If men work and think together they can build a good world without the help of religion.

loading, -.88; 62% disagree.

Trust.

These days a person doesn't know who he can count on. loading, -.79; 52% disagree.

It is hard to decide who you can really trust these days. loading, -.73) 51% disagree.

Honesty

People will be honest with you as long as you are honest with them.

loading, -.73; 42% agree.

The successful people in New Zealand are generally the most honest.

loading, .64; 21% agree.

Optimism

There is not much chance that people will really do anything to make this country a better place to live in. Loading, -.76; 83% disagree

Ideas that have no practical application are of little use to anyone. Loading, -.55; 54% disagree

Fatalism.

Success is more dependent on luck than real ability,. loading, .79; 15% agree.

Every person should make a strong effort to improve his or her social position.

loading, -.48; 42% disagree.

Anomy.

There are so many ideas about what is right and wrong these days that it is hard to decide how best to live your own life.

loading, .90; 18% agree

External Control

Most people don't realise how much their lives are controlled by others.

loading, .84; 75% agree

APPENDIX FOUR.

HAMILTON SURVEY: 1970.

This survey was conducted by students in the department of sociology at the University of Waikato in 1970. Its purpose was to apply the scales derived from the Canterbury Follow-up survey to a larger and more representative sample, drawn from Hamilton city. A total of 296 usable questionnaires were obtained. Additional information concerning the distribution of the sample on the scales may be of some interest.

Anti-Communism.

22	22	43	28	37	42	60	33	8
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
<u>low</u>							<u>high</u>	

Isolationism.

28	71	18	26	15	62	24	31	13
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
<u>low</u>							<u>high</u>	

Nationalism (given in Appendix Three)

Political Efficacy.

15	42	44	42	44	32	22	24	25	8
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Civil Liberties.

26	40	38	41	35	32	33	22	22	14
0	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Minority Rights.

12	16	66	34	108	15	39	5.
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

Equality.

8	20	20	70	56	82	25	19
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

Welfarism.

27	68	25	40	51	44	31	12
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8

Race.

24	29	65	72	26	52	28
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Alienation.

13	34	24	43	31	53	36	34	24
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Religious Convention.

30	36	36	55	31	52	20	20	16
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9

Trust

30	81	43	38	20	78	10
1	2	3	4	5	6	7

Honesty.

36	70	51	53	27	58
1	2	3	4	5	6

Optimism.

42	48	75	32	84	14
1	2	3	4	5	6

Fatalism.

35	103	106	39	14
1	2	3	4	5