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NEW ZEALAND

INDEPENDENT NATION OR ACQUIESCENT ALLY?

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New Zealand is a small nation of predominantly Anglo-Saxon culture situated in a corner of the earth far distant from the land of its cultural forbears. Despite its distance from the centres of power during its relatively short life, New Zealand has been associated with the two greatest powers in the world in the past century and a half - first Britain, and during the latter half of the 20th century with the United States of America. With this strong association has gone the reflected glory of power and prestige that a great nation enjoys. New Zealanders have in the past felt that Britain's glory was their own, and justifiably so, as they had contributed both economically and with military manpower to the maintenance of that power.

In recent years, New Zealand has had to face the hard fact that Britain is no longer the power that she was. She can now only be classed as a middle-range power along with several others. And although New Zealand continues to be associated with one of the world's two greatest powers at this time, the United States, the indications are that she also faces a diminishing relative power combined with a reluctance or inability to effectively use the power that she enjoys to maintain her position. New Zealand's emotional and cultural ties with America have never been as strong as with Britain --in fact there has probably always been a residue of anti-American feeling which arises largely out of the Americans' boastfulness of their wealth, power and right to rule. (1)

Furthermore the right to demand protection from aggressors that we always felt we could claim from Britain, has never been transferred to America. For one thing, we have never contributed to the defence of America as we have to the defence of Britain; neither have we contributed economically through the production of meat and dairy produce for America

as we have for Britain. Any claim we make on the United States must therefore be on the basis of common interests and on the basis of reciprocity.

Faced with a rapidly changing world and the facts of a diminished expectation of automatic protection in the event of overt aggression New Zealand has had to reassess its position, although to a large extent it might be said that she has merely replaced a "mother" with a "big brother". New Zealand has largely failed to make as independent a stand as circumstances might have permitted, although many would argue that, for a nation as small as we are, an independent stance is not possible for practical reasons of defence, and our outlook will always be determined by the outlooks of the larger nations about us.

The aim of this dissertation then will be to outline the development of New Zealand's relationship with Britain and America, focusing chiefly on the post-war period, and looking particularly at the defensive alliances in which she has participated with them, and the reasons for these alliances. In the light of the world situation as it stands today, and as it appears to be moving in the foreseeable future, we will then discuss the alternatives to these alliances and the feasibility of the options open to us. Can New Zealand forge the independent path that some hope for, or must she continue to toe the line with one of the big powers? It is hoped that the following discussion will at least highlight the reasons why New Zealand hitherto has preferred the latter alternative, but also examine the feasibility of adopting the former.

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1. See W. H. Oliver: "The Story of New Zealand"

(London, Faber & Faber, 1960) p 207.

CHAPTER 1FIRST STEPS - THE CANBERRA PACT

The Second World War was a period during which New Zealand for a time was forced to recognise the fact that it was a Pacific nation, and not just an offshoot of Britain. In particular the fall of the British Naval Base at Singapore in 1942 and the acknowledged inability of Britain to come to New Zealand's defence in the Pacific brought their vulnerability to the minds of New Zealanders with full force.

Prior to the war, New Zealand's foreign relations were considered to be identical to Britain's and indeed any moves toward an independent stance were frowned upon. Angus Ross (1) quotes several commentators who note that New Zealanders always put their Imperial rather than their national status first. For example, Philip Nichols, seconded from the Foreign Office to the Prime Minister's Department in Wellington in 1928-30, in writing to Percy Koppel in the Foreign Office, mentioned that he could find no counterpart to the rampant spirit of nationalism he had encountered in Australia because, although intensely proud and fond of their own country, "New Zealanders think of New Zealand primarily as one of the countries which together make up the British Empire and only secondly as the autonomous community known as New Zealand and there is absolutely no demand for the outward trappings of autonomy". (2)

The official attitude of New Zealand toward Dominion Status in the years immediately after World War I was that the Dominions had not acquired for either international or constitutional purposes any form of independent status, although they were treated as independent for the special purpose of the League of Nations. Massey, in discussing the League of Nations, stated that he had never liked the arrangement which was made in connection with the League of Nations. "There was one

dangerous feature in it. I did not agree with everything that has been said, that in signing the Peace Treaty we had become independent nations".(3) New Zealand's attitude was thus different from those of the other Dominions - Canada, South Africa and The Irish Free State who were seeking greater autonomy, and whose efforts brought forth the Statute of Westminster.

Another indication of New Zealand's negative attitudes towards gaining autonomy from Britain mentioned by Ross is the continuing arrangement whereby the Governor-General was appointed on the advice of the U.K. government after consultation with the New Zealand Prime Minister and remained the agent of the British government as well as the personal representative of the monarch long after the other Dominions had decided that the only parties interested in the appointment of a Governor General were the King himself and the government of the Dominion concerned. New Zealand's attitude to those who were instrumental in loosening the Imperial ties continued to be critical and it was only in 1947 that the New Zealand Parliament ratified the Statute of Westminster. (4)

However, this was not to say that New Zealand could not and did not have an independent voice on matters that concerned her. Particularly after the New Zealand Labour Party came to power in 1935, for example, the idealistic stance taken by that Party toward the League of Nations lead New Zealand to diverge from Britain and the rest of the Commonwealth, and to independently voice her strong support for the principles of the League and any actions which would improve the League's ability to act out its intended role fully.

New Zealand's reluctance to achieve autonomy was reflected in her representation overseas, and the size of her governmental machinery for dealing with foreign affairs. Prior to World War II, the only overseas representation was the New Zealand Office in London, established in 1871,

and in charge of an Agent-General up to 1905, and a High Commissioner after that date. (5) It was only in 1926 that a beginning was made of setting up a Department of External Affairs. In that year a small Prime Minister's Department was established. This included an Imperial Affairs Section, which was to be the basis of the Department of External Affairs set up in 1943 to deal with the greatly expanded contacts between New Zealand and other nations. During the war, diplomatic posts were established in short order; in the U.S. in 1941, in Canada in 1942, in Australia in 1943, and in the Soviet Union in 1944.

Thus, events during World War II forced New Zealand leaders to actively develop an independent approach to their security problems. However it also seems clear that prior to World War II, there had been a growing awareness in New Zealand of the importance of our strategic position in the Pacific, and the need for alternative security arrangements. The Tokyo Agreement signed by Britain in July 1939, and the lack of vigour in opposing American claims to certain strategically situated Pacific islands had already given indication of Britain's declining ability to guarantee New Zealand's security in the event of her being involved in a European war. (6)

This awareness had led to early approaches to American leaders, and on being informed by the British of the unlikelihood of reinforcements being sent to the Far East if Japan went to war, Fraser took immediate steps towards the establishment of a diplomatic post in Washington. Walter Nash was appointed Minister to Washington on November 18, 1941. (7)

However, New Zealand attitudes towards the U.S. appear to have been divided. While appreciating the fact that the U.S. could be the only source of help in the event of Japanese aggression, New Zealand and Australian leaders were also mindful of American interest in widening its influence in the Pacific. America's interest in having hegemony in

the area is evidenced by its denial of reciprocal use of Pacific bases to Australia and New Zealand while claiming exclusive use of the Manus Island base.

The Canberra Pact, entered into by Australia and New Zealand in 1944 can be interpreted as a response on the part of Australia in particular, and New Zealand to the unwillingness of the U.S. to allow them a voice in decisions affecting the military effort in the Pacific, or a chance to influence post-war arrangements. New Zealand and Australian participation in policy making was in fact limited to representation on the Washington Pacific Council which also included representatives from the U.S., the U.K., Canada, China, and the Netherlands. This council was purely consultative, its importance for New Zealand being limited to its usefulness as a source of information about developments in the Pacific War and the opportunity it afforded of stating New Zealand's case in the presence of those in whose hands major decisions continued to rest. (8)

Evatt, the Australian Minister for External Affairs and the main force behind the Canberra Pact, was particularly incensed by Australia's omission from the Cairo conference of 1943 when Roosevelt, Churchill, and Chiang Kai-Shek made a pronouncement on the prosecution of the war in the Pacific and the restoration of territory seized by Japan, as he had only recently been overseas seeking recognition of Australia's right to be heard and consulted by the allies and had returned believing he had succeeded. (9)

Reese comments that the Australian and New Zealand governments had been troubled by increasing American domination of the Allied campaigns in the Pacific, and that after the immediate danger from the Japanese had passed, they turned again to the British Commonwealth as a needed counterweight to American control of policy and operations. (10) However,

U.S. determination to retain complete control of the Pacific campaigns resulted in Australia and New Zealand being allotted minor active roles in these campaigns.

Thus, the Canberra Pact as a whole, particularly the section on security and defence, was intended by Evatt as a declaration that Australia and New Zealand wished to have a say in post-war arrangements, clause 14 stating that the two governments regarded it as a matter of cardinal importance that they should both be associated not only in membership, but also in the planning and establishment of the general international organisation referred to in the Moscow Declaration of October 1943.

Clause 16 stating that they accepted "as a recognised principle of international practise that the construction and use, in time of war by any power of naval, military, or air installations, in any territory under the sovereignty or control of another power, does not, in itself, afford any basis for territorial claims or rights of sovereignty or control after the conclusion of hostilities" can also be seen as a clear rebuttal to unofficial statements in the U.S. advocating the continued use by American forces of naval and air bases constructed on Pacific Islands during the war.

It seems clear from accounts of the proceedings at the conference and beforehand that New Zealand had expected only a mutual exchange of ideas and had not envisaged entering into a treaty of the type that Evatt proposed. Despite this, the New Zealand delegation permitted the document to be drawn up and signed in treaty form, although the Prime Minister Peter Fraser took pains in a statement to Parliament to distinguish the pact as an inter-governmental agreement as distinct from a treaty which would have required ratification by the King.(11)

In his statement to Parliament Fraser put considerable effort into dispelling the idea that the pact was aimed at another country and in criticising the Chicago Tribune for misrepresenting the agreement as being directed against the U.S.A., he stated that "nothing could be more untrue; nothing more stupid". (12)

Again when visiting Washington in April of the same year, Fraser stressed that the security of the S. W. Pacific could only be achieved in co-operation with the U.S. and that the purposes of the agreement would be defeated if the Americans, or the British, felt it was directed against them. (13)

It should also be noted that Evatt, in answering criticisms of the anti-American character of the pact told the Commonwealth Parliament that "The agreement was not aimed against the U.S. Indeed, Australia owes a tremendous debt to America and we shall never forget it. But in the demarcation of post-war authority in the Pacific, it has always appeared to me that in the post-war period the U.S. interests will be predominantly in those islands, formerly Japanese, which lie north of the Equator". (14)

But despite Fraser's efforts to prevent it, New Zealand's first efforts at independent alliance making caused some unfavourable reactions on the part of the U.S., and actually resulted in an American decision not to use New Zealand air units in the operations against the Marshall and Caroline Islands. (15)

Although the reaction within Australia to Evatt's treaty making was also critical, the styles of the Australians and New Zealanders in their approach to the Canberra Pact appears to afford a fairly typical example of Australian and New Zealand approaches to international affairs and their respective attitudes toward nationhood and independence in general

- New Zealand has almost always taken a lower key, coming alive only occasionally as, for example, during Fraser's term of office.

Another example of the contrasting approaches to foreign affairs is afforded by the respective decisions of Australia to withdraw troops from the European theatre of war to the Pacific area, and of New Zealand to leave the troops in the Middle East. On the day Singapore fell, Curtin, the Australian Prime Minister had cabled to London that he wished Australian forces to serve in the Pacific Theatre. Two days later he requested the return of the 6th and 7th Divisions from the Middle East and despite heavy pressure from Churchill and Roosevelt to have the troops directed to Rangoon, the troops were in fact brought home. In contrast, the New Zealand government agreed with reluctance to New Zealand troops remaining in Egypt while an American division went to New Zealand and later in November accepted Churchill's argument that the departure of the Australian division made it more necessary for the New Zealand division to remain. (16)

Reese notes that this decision meant that New Zealand was committed for the remainder of the war to a divided role, reducing its capacity to play as significant a part as it would have liked in the Pacific, where increasing American domination of Allied campaigns became a source of anxiety to the Australian and New Zealand governments. (17)

Despite all efforts to the contrary, therefore, the war was a period characterised by a very minor role for New Zealand in decision making. The major nations had made it only too clear that power was the determining factor in the amount of influence that any nation could gain in the realm of policy making where the interests of the big powers were directly affected.

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1. A. Ross. "Reluctant Dominion or Dutiful Daughter? N.Z. and the Commonwealth in the Inter-War Years." *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies* Vol X No 1, March 1972.
  2. *ibid* p 29.
  3. *ibid* p 30.
  4. Consideration was given to ratification before this but was delayed for propaganda reasons. See K. Sinclair "N.Z. in the World since 1945". p 5.
  5. R. Kennaway. "N.Z. Foreign Policy 1951 -- 1971". (Wellington, Hicks Smith & Sons, 1972) p 13.
  6. See A. A. Cruikshank "Changing Perspectives of N.Z. Foreign Policy." *Pacific Affairs*. Vol XL No 1 & 2 Spring and Summer 1972. p 95.
  7. At the same time there was a public lack of awareness of danger in the Pacific. See B. K. Gordon "N.Z. Becomes a Pacific Power." (University of Chicago Press, 1960) p 132.
  8. A. Watt "Australian Foreign Policy 1938 - 1965." (Cambridge University Press, 1967) pp 65, 66.
  9. T. R. Reese "The Australia - N.Z. Agreement 1944 and the U.S." *Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies*. March 1966 Vol IV No 1. p 4.
  10. *ibid* p 3.
  11. See Document 3. "Australia - N.Z. Agreement". in "N.Z. Foreign Policy. Statements and Documents 1943 --- 1957." Ministry of Foreign Affairs 1972.
  12. *ibid* p 63.
  13. Introduction. *Statements and Documents*. p 17.
  14. Reese. *op cit* p 10.
  15. *ibid* p 11.
  16. *ibid* pp 22 - 24. See also Oliver *op cit* p 205.
  17. Reese *op cit* p 24.
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CHAPTER 2A NEW PACIFIC FOCUS - ANZUS

In spite of the major powers' dismissal of New Zealand as a nation of influence during wartime, the immediate post-war period was notable for the efforts of New Zealand, in particular the efforts of Prime Minister Peter Fraser, to play a greater part in world affairs than her small size would seem to justify. Fraser's efforts at the San Francisco Conference in fact resulted in some of his proposals on the concept of trusteeship being incorporated in the final document. However, all his efforts could not prevent the veto, with its damaging effects on the concept of collective security. In this connection, Professor Wood has commented that although the small powers did have influence over the final results of the conference, they could not budge the great powers once they had firmly made up their minds. (1)

By 1948, Fraser was stating that the predicted effects of the veto on world affairs had already come to pass: "It is not something to be pleased about - it is something to regret, to be very sad about, that the prophecies of the representative of New Zealand and of some of the other small nations, including Australia, in regard to the power of veto by one great power, have been more than realised." (2)

The rapidly developing cold-war situation and its apparent dangers of another world conflict brought defence planning to the fore once more. New Zealand's commitment in the event of another major war was still in the Middle East however. New Zealand's continuing willingness to regard her safety as dependent, to a large degree, upon the safety of Britain is evidenced by her acceptance, along with Australia and South Africa, of the invitation of the U.K., the U.S. and the French governments to

join with them and other interested governments in setting up an Allied Command Organisation in the Middle East. (3) The projected organisation, the Middle East Defence Organisation (M.E.D.O.) never got off the ground, but New Zealand had RNZAF units based in Cyprus from 1952.

The commitment to the Middle East remained until changed in 1955, when in a statement to Parliament on the 24 March, Prime Minister Holland said that in reply to his inquiring of the U.K. government how New Zealand could best help the U.K. in the light of the changed strategy brought about by the Hydrogen bomb, New Zealand was asked to revise its programme and switch its existing military commitments from the Middle East to the Pacific. This request had come after the advice at two previous Prime Minister's conferences had been that, because of problems in the Suez Canal area, the time was not ripe for making a shift. (4)

Despite this commitment to the Middle East area, events in S.E. Asia and China, particularly the activities of Communists in Burma and Malaya were increasingly drawing the attention of New Zealand back to the Pacific area. In the same speech in which he talked about the veto, Fraser was already describing communism as "that dark, turgid, dangerous flood." (5)

Developments in China were also to have profound effects on New Zealand - American relations. With the defeat of the Nationalists resulting in communist control over the major part of the Chinese mainland in 1949, together with the cold war situation in Europe, America was becoming increasingly anxious about the threat of Communism, and was looking for ways to counter the apparent threat.

New Zealand's and Australia's first preoccupation in the Pacific region was the unsettled Japanese Peace Treaty and their concern about

the possible re-emergence of a militant Japan. By 1950, however, American attitudes towards Japan had changed. Japan was seen as an important bulwark against Communism, and American plans were now for a "soft" peace treaty, with the intention of building up Japan economically and socially, in the same way as Germany was to be built up as an important bulwark against Communism in Europe.

Although New Zealand was concerned about the activities of communist guerillas in S.E. Asia her main concern, and the main concern of her citizens was with regard to Japan, which was still fresh in the minds of New Zealanders as an aggressor power and which had not yet been dealt with and punished as many thought she should be. Thus America's new attitude was seen as unacceptable to the general public by politicians in both New Zealand and Australia. This concern about being left vulnerable in the face of a Japan that could possibly at any time take up arms was to be the motivating force behind the search for new security guarantees on the part of both Australia and New Zealand although, as with the Canberra Pact, Australia was again to be the prime mover in this search.

In this case it was Percy Spender (since Knighted), the Australian Minister for External Affairs from 1949 to 1951, who was the individual most instrumental in making a pact between Australia, New Zealand and the U.S.A. a reality. In fact, Sir Percy claims that it was solely because of his efforts that ANZUS ever came about, and commentators at least do not deny his claim although finding his egoism hard to bear. (6)

His account of his efforts to bring about a security treaty can then give some insight into the three parties' attitudes to security and their reasons for entering into the pact.

It might be useful to begin with Spender's views on New Zealand's attitudes to a defence treaty in the Pacific. (7) In general, Doidge (the New Zealand Minister for External Affairs) felt that New Zealand's main obligation in the event of global war was in the Middle East, and was concerned that any commitments arising from participation in a Pacific security treaty might diminish her capacity to service her existing commitments. New Zealand still had strong affinities with the Commonwealth and with Europe and was reluctant to enter into any security commitments unless linked to the countries of the British Commonwealth and the NATO powers. This was to be an important factor, as Dulles, the American Secretary of State, was originally keen on including Japan and the Phillipines in a security arrangement. In the event, the U.S. was to enter into separate agreements with these countries after she had completed negotiations leading to ANZUS.

In the light of her existing commitments, New Zealand felt that a sufficient arrangement, and one without the pitfalls of a treaty, would be a presidential statement similar to that made in 1938 in respect of Canada, in which the President would declare the intention of the U.S. to assist New Zealand in the event of aggression against her.

However, after discussions with Spender prior to the four day conference with Dulles in Canberra, Doidge was ready to support Spender and was prepared to have a three cornered security arrangement between the U.S., Australia, and New Zealand.

Starke notes (8) that the three cornered treaty that eventuated was actually in line with New Zealand preferences for a small, tight regional security arrangement in contrast to a more general security treaty involving an association of a large number of countries, in which as a small power

her voice might fail to be heard. He also noted that this had been one of Fraser's grounds of objection in 1944 to Churchill's proposals for regional councils.

Although, as previously stated, Australian and New Zealand fears of a resurgent Japan were a major motive behind the search for a security pact with the U.S., Spender in fact emphatically denies that the ANZUS treaty was signed by the U.S. in exchange for Australia and New Zealand signing the Japanese Peace Treaty. It is clear that U.S. desires that Australia and New Zealand sign the peace treaty put them in a good bargaining position, but as Starke points out, and as Spender himself makes clear, Spender was initially interested in a Pacific Pact along the lines of the NATO pact long before it became clear that America was not going to insist on Japan's remaining unarmed.

It might be added that in opposition to Spender's denials J.W. Burton claims that during Dulles' visit to Australia in February 1951, Australia promised not to recognise China, not to support the current Asian-Middle East move sponsored by India to mediate in Korea, to agree to Japanese re-armament, and to conclude a double tax agreement, all in exchange for ANZUS, and that instructions were issued in writing to the Department of External Affairs not to connect the Pacific Pact with Japanese re-armament in any statements or publicity. (9)

Other important reasons why Spender was interested in a Pacific security pact were first - the lack of any consultative machinery whereby Australia and New Zealand could take part in decisions affecting regional security in the Pacific. This of course was one of the main grudges during wartime planning as has already been shown. Secondly, Spender felt the need for an organisation to counter the threat of Communism in S.E. Asia. After the outbreak of the Korean war, this was to be another important factor in determining U.S. interest in a security pact.

Spender himself then, saw the ANZUS treaty as something more than an alliance against Japan, but it is not so clear that Doidge saw it as anything more than this. In 1952, when High Commissioner for New Zealand in London, he stated that ANZUS was a reassurance given to these countries "in return" for their acceptance of the peace settlement. It is fairly clear that the adverse public reaction that was expected when New Zealand signed the Japanese Peace Treaty was foremost in the mind of Doidge and was a big factor in New Zealand's interest in a guarantee from the U.S. that it could be relied on in the event of a recurrence of Japanese aggression.

Unlike New Zealand's preference for a small treaty, it is also clear that Spender was originally prepared for a wider arrangement. In particular, in the early stages, Spender tried to interest Britain in a four sided arrangement, and was even at one stage prepared to consider a pact including Australia, New Zealand, the Phillipines, the U.S., Canada and certain countries on the West coast of South America.(10)

Britain, however, was completely uninterested at this stage in a Pacific pact. The reasons behind this lack of interest are not clear, although the lack of response to Spender's initiatives appears to arise largely out of their belief that nothing would come of them -- that America was definitely not interested in a pact of the type that Spender envisaged. When ANZUS became fact, it is clear that Opposition members in British Parliament felt that Britain should have been associated, and on Churchill's becoming Prime Minister he made endeavours to have Britain included in the Treaty. By this stage, however, the three parties had decided that ANZUS fulfilled its aims. A wider security pact- SEATO -- including Britain was to eventuate later. (11)

As far as U.S. interest in a Pacific pact goes, it appears that events in Asia in 1950 were ominous enough to cause America to take stock of its position and previous attitudes towards the Pacific area, and completely reassess them. In particular, the signing of the Thirty Year Treaty of Friendship, Alliance and Mutual Assistance by the Soviet Union and Communist China in February, the outbreak of fighting in Korea in June, and later, the entry of Chinese forces into the war were enough to give the U.S. cause for serious concern for its defence provisions in the Pacific.

The extent of the change is seen by comparing comments by Dean Acheson in January 1950, (12) that the line in the Pacific which the U.S.A. was prepared to defend did not extend south of the Phillipines and that there could be no question of any guarantee for other areas in the Pacific, with the fact that the ANZUS pact was actually completed and signed on the 1 September 1951, just twenty months later.

The change in views is made clear by the House Foreign Affairs Committee's unanimous endorsement of proposals for a mutual defense pact throughout the Pacific area patterned after the North Atlantic Treaty. (13) It is at this stage that Spender took advantage of the changed atmosphere to press his views on a treaty including Australia and New Zealand. Of great importance here were discussions that he had with President Truman and important U.S. Government officials, among them Acheson and Dulles in September 1950. It appears from Spender's account that these discussions, particularly the one with President Truman were crucial in setting the foundation for the treaty that was finally negotiated. By the end of Spender's visit it appears that Dulles was thinking along the lines of a chain of Pacific defence running from the Aleutians through Japan, the Phillipines to Australia and New Zealand. U.S. forces in Japan and the

Northern Pacific, a U.S. base in the Phillipines, and some acceptable security undertaking by the U.S. in relation to Australia and New Zealand would then make three spokes of a wheel, the centre of which would be the U.S.A. (14)

It is also likely that the importance that was now being attached to a quick conclusion to negotiations for a Japanese peace treaty was to have some bearing on a reassessment of American attitudes toward Australia and New Zealand at this time. Remarks made by Rusk on 15 November 1950 in Washington, that the U.S. Administration had become more receptive to the idea of a Pacific Security Pact, because this would overcome objections of Australia and other countries to Japanese re-armament under the proposed peace treaty, (15) support this view.

Negotiations which eventuated in a draft treaty in February 1951 between Spender, Doidge and Dulles in fact took place at a Canberra conference which was called primarily for the reason of discussing the terms of the Japanese Peace Treaty. Thus, whatever the motives of the three parties involved, the Japanese Peace Treaty and ANZUS were to be inextricably bound up one with another. From Spender's account, it appears that the draft treaty drawn up at this conference was in essence the same as the final treaty, which was not to be signed until 1 September 1951, immediately after the signing by America of the Mutual Defence Treaty with the Phillipines on 31 August 1951, and only a few days before the signing of the Japanese Peace Treaty on 8 September.

Statements made by Sir Carl Berendsen at the San Francisco Conference 6 September 1951, and by T.C. Webb in the New Zealand House of Representatives on 9 October 1951, (16) again give indications that New Zealand's primary concern and reason for participation in ANZUS was its apprehensions about

Japan's re-armament and capacity for future aggression and "that the fears that had been entertained in regard to a resurgence of Japanese militarism had now been met to a very great extent by the mutual security arrangement just recently concluded with the United States." (17)

It is interesting to note that Casey in Australia had made a similar comment at the time that the ANZUS pact was initialled on 12 July 1951, when reminding those who criticised his government's support of a Japanese peace treaty which permitted re-armament to read the treaty "in the light of the U.S. - Australia - New Zealand mutual security pact." (18)

Thus, it appears that, generally, the parties to ANZUS approached negotiations with considerable differences in their conceptions of what the pact was meant to achieve. For all parties, the Japanese Peace Treaty was a central factor in the need for ANZUS. For New Zealand in particular, a "soft" peace treaty meant that guarantees in case of future aggression would be reassuring. For Australia this was also the central factor, although it is clear that Spender's also envisaged some sort of agreement which would enable Australia to participate in decision making with the U.S. For the U.S., the principal aim was to provide a line of defence against Communism in Asia, and for Dulles the three agreements with Australia - New Zealand, the Phillipines, and with Japan, filled the bill admirably.

Although modelled on NATO, with many clauses identical, ANZUS as finally negotiated was considerably more flexible than NATO in that no elaborate **permanent** machinery was envisaged, but merely, under Article VII, a Council of Foreign Ministers to be able to meet at any time; (as it has turned out, once a year.)

An important change in wording in Article IV, however, meant that aggression on any partner would not automatically involve all other

parties but that "each party recognises that an armed attack in the Pacific Area on any of the parties would be dangerous to its own peace and safety and declares that it would act to meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes."

ANZUS then was final and conclusive evidence that New Zealand no longer considered Britain as its major ally in providing security in the Pacific region. Although remaining closely allied with Britain in defence matters, and during the Suez crisis in 1956 indicating that it still considered its ties with Britain stronger than ties with the U.S. by being one of the few nations standing with Britain over the matter, ANZUS was, and still remains, New Zealand's major security pact, and American attitudes toward Asia have largely determined New Zealand's view-point toward events in Asia.

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1. F. L. W. Wood: "N.Z. and the Big Powers." Sir Sydney Holland Memorial Lecture. The National Party, 1967. p 10.
2. Statements and Documents. opcit. Document 28. p 171.
3. J. D. B. Miller: "Britain and the Old Dominions." (London, Chatto and Windus, 1966) p 204.
4. Statements and Documents. op cit. Document 107. p 394.
5. Statements and Documents. op cit. Document 28. p 179.
6. See T. R. Reese's review of Spender's book "Exercises in Diplomacy" in the Journal of Commonwealth Political Studies. Vol IX No 1 March 1971. Also K. Sinclair: "N.Z. in the World since 1945." p 15.
7. Sir Percy Spender: "Exercises in Diplomacy." (Sydney University Press, 1969) pp 103--105.
8. J. G. Starke "The ANZUS Treaty Alliance" (Melbourne University Press, 1965) p 67.
9. J. W. Burton: "The Alternative" (Sydney, Morgan's Publications, 1954) p 91.
10. As stated by him in a press conference in America 13 September 1950.
11. For a full discussion of possible reasons for Britain remaining out of ANZUS see D. E. McHenry and R. N. Rosencrance "The 'Exclusion' of the U.K. from the ANZUS Pact". International Organisation Summer 1958. pp 320-9.
12. These comments were made during an address to the National Press Club, Washington, on 12 January Starke op cit p 28.
13. Starke op cit p 28.
14. Spender op cit p 66.
15. Starke op cit p 34.
16. Statements and Documents op cit Documents 58 & 61.
17. ibid p 285.
18. Quoted by David Sissons "Analysing ANZUS" in J. H. Moore (ed) "The American Alliance" (Cassell Australia, 1970) p 74.

CHAPTER 3FOLLOWING OUR MAJOR ALLIES INTO ASIA - SEATO

Deference to American views has been of great significance in New Zealand defence policy over the period that ANZUS has been in force. New Zealand has almost continuously officially viewed Communist China and the threat of Communism in S.E. Asia as the U.S. Government has interpreted it, and has completely followed the American approach of countering the threat. By following America in this matter, New Zealand has diverged markedly from the British approach, and has ignored the viewpoint of India which has continued to voice its criticism of the actions of the Western powers in Asia. The difference in the British and U.S. approaches is illustrated by the difference over the question of recognition of China. Britain recognised the Communist Regime on the 6 January 1950, and has continued to attempt to maintain relations with the Communists in spite of the fact that the Communists at first refused to establish diplomatic relations with Britain. Britain was also in favour of the Soviet proposal on 10 January 1950 that the Communist Chinese representative should replace the Nationalist on the Security Council, although refraining from voting in the face of the proposal's certain defeat. (1)

This policy of recognition followed from Britain's attitude that, in Leader of the Opposition, Churchill's words, "the reason for having diplomatic relations is not to confer a compliment, but to secure a convenience," (2) --that recognition was merely acknowledging political realities.

Medlicott also notes that there was little enthusiasm for Chiang Kai-Shek's regime in Labour circles in England, and "some tendency to regard Mao Tse-Tung's followers as progressive nationalist patriots rather than true Communists." (3)

Had New Zealand not been inhibited by consideration of the American views on the matter it would appear that she might have followed the British lead. In the light of the fact that until December 1972, New Zealand had refused to recognise the People's Republic of China as the government of Mainland China, and had officially been against the seating of Communist China in the U.N. until it was voted in by a majority, it is interesting to note the comments made by External Affairs Minister T.C. Webb in a speech to the New Zealand House of Representatives on 6 July 1954. (4) After speaking about the situation in Indo-China, he said "... I am satisfied that the view is widely held that the non-recognition and non-admission of Communist China is not only standing in the way of a lessening of international tension, it is tending to keep up international tension, and thus endangering world peace" and " I am bound to confess now that, in view of the part which China has played and is still playing through her Premier and Foreign Minister, Chou En-Lai, in relation to the Indo-China negotiations, I find it hard to deny China's right to be admitted to the U.N. Organisation. "

His main reason for advocating the entry of China into the U.N. was in his own words, "that by not admitting her into the U.N., we were tending to defeat our own purpose, tending to solidify that Communist bloc which ..... is threatening to gather so much of mankind into its tentacles" and "that if we were guided by logic and self-interest rather than by emotion, we would come round to the view that early consideration should be given to the question of admitting the People's Republic of China to the U.N. " (5)

However, Webb recognised that the strong views held in the U.S. presented a major difficulty that New Zealand had to face if an attempt

was made to bring China into the U.N. The fact that until the end of 1972, New Zealand had not recognised China, indicates that over the period since 1954, the strong views held by the U.S. have prevailed over New Zealand's logic and self-interest.

It is also of relevance to note some comments on the Indo-China situation made by Webb in the same speech. Although wishing to make clear that he felt that the Communists had taken advantage of the situation and were definitely involved, he said that "It has to be appreciated that one of the basic causes of the war in Indo-China is the aspiration of the local people for self-government" and that "we would do well to realise that one of the basic causes of the trouble in Indo-China is that there has been an upsurge of nationalism - a desire on the part of the people there to govern themselves." (6)

With regard to American plans for intervention in Indo-China during the early part of 1954, it is of interest to note the comments of Casey, the Australian Minister for External Affairs, that he had felt at the time that "such intervention would be wrong ... it would not have the backing of the U.N.. It would put us wrong with world opinion, particularly in Asia. It would probably embroil us with Communist China. It would wreck the Geneva conference..."(7)

Watt notes that Casey had felt that Australia should look for political settlement of the problem in Indo-China --- a negotiated settlement - recognising the realities of the situation. (8)

However, despite general opinion against such a step, America was, during the early part of 1954, becoming more intent on the idea of intervention to back up French forces in Indo-China. The failing cause of the French during 1954, leading up to their defeat at Dien Bien Phu on 7 May 1954, had caused the U.S. to seek the support of Britain for an Allied effort in Indo-China. However Britain was concerned that intervention might lead to escalation into general warfare which it feared would result

in the use of the Hydrogen bomb. Britain at this time was working hard for a negotiated settlement and was not prepared to jeopardise the chances of bringing both sides to the conference table by precipitately taking military action. Britain therefore prevailed upon the U.S. to wait until after the conference before proceeding with its intentions.

Eden's feelings on the matter are summed up in the following statement by him. "I did not believe that anything less than intervention on a Korean scale, if that, would have any effect on Indo-China. If there were such intervention, I could not tell where its consequences might stop."

Thus, although in general following America's policy of containment (9) in Asia, as evidenced by her actions in Malaya, Britain was concerned that America's intransigent attitude toward the Communists in China and S.E. Asia would perpetuate divisions in the area. Therefore, while she had supported America in the Korean war by placing British naval forces at the disposal of Truman, Britain now sought to bring about a political settlement in Indo-China at the Geneva conference called to discuss both the Korean and Indo-China situations.

British endeavours to bring about a negotiated settlement also arose out of hopes that Indo-China could be turned into a buffer zone between China in the north and Malaya, and its immediate neighbour Thailand, in the south. (10)

Britain's plan then was that as soon as a compromise settlement had been reached, a Western military organisation could be set up in S.E. Asia to bolster the non-Communist regimes in Laos, Cambodia, South Vietnam, Thailand and other states. Britain made it clear however, that this should be done in such a way as to secure at least the acquiescence of the Asian members of the Commonwealth. (11)

However, Britain's approach would have required some compromise on the

part of America which the latter was not prepared to contemplate. The U.S. did not endorse the settlement reached at Geneva for the reason that it did not wish to afford Chinese Communism any involuntary recognition - Dulles feared that acceptance of Eden's compromise would amount to "appeasement" of the Communists.

Britain had insisted that further action toward the establishment of a S.E. Asia Collective Defence Organisation should not be taken until after the Geneva conference.(12) Earlier, talks between Eden and Dulles in London during April had lead to an understanding that both nations were ready to take steps toward the establishment of a collective defence organisation in the region, but it was not until the end of June that the British decided to push ahead with planning for this. A joint communique issued in Washington by Eisenhower and Churchill at this time stated that the two governments had agreed to "hasten the planning of Asian defence against Communism and to set up an Anglo---American working party to consider the problem of security in the area." (13)

Up to this stage, America and Britain had been at odds over their respective conceptions of the type of organisation that this was to be. Eden was after a defensive alliance similar to NATO but was also interested in a non-aggression pact among the states in the area, both communist and non-communist. However, this concept was anathema to the U.S.(14) and Eden compromised on this aspect in return for Dulles' compromise on timing. Britain, however, was still interested in involving other Asian countries in the pact.

New Zealand was not at this stage involved in these discussions, but had earlier, in April and May, voiced its support of the British and American initiatives. On the assumption that the loss of S.E. Asia to Communism would pose a serious threat to the security of Australia and New Zealand, the New Zealand Government felt ready to accept its share of responsibility in a collective defence system.(15)

From Webb's statement in May, and a previous statement following the 1954 ANZUS Council meeting, it is clear that ANZUS was not considered to have been designed to deal with a situation such as that prevailing in Indo-China. In fact, because the U.K. and France were deeply involved and no consultative body existed in which discussion on the situation in S.E. Asia could take place, a five power agency had been established in 1952 to examine military aspects, with the U.S., U.K., France, Australia and New Zealand participating. This agency now lapsed with the move toward the projected Collective Defence Treaty.

It was only a short time after the end of the Geneva Conference - seven weeks - that the S.E. Asian Collective Defence Treaty was signed in Manila. In the event, although the Colombo powers, India, Ceylon, Pakistan, Burma and Indonesia, had been invited to attend, only Pakistan did so. The other nations, in particular India, felt that participation in such an organisation was contrary to their professed policy of non-alignment. Of the other Asian nations only Thailand and the Phillipines signed the treaty, and by protocol, Laos, Cambodia and South Vietnam were included in the area covered by the treaty. Malaya, being at the time a British Territory, was also included.

The absence of many of the Asian nations from the treaty was to give rise to the widespread criticism that it was just a white man's pact aimed at bolstering up the old colonial empire in S.E. Asia. In particular, the facts that the Phillipines were already closely associated with the U.S., and that one of the main reasons for Pakistan's participation was her hope of securing support in her dispute with India over Kashmir rather than an immediate interest in countering the threat of Communist aggression in S.E. Asia, tended to give substance to the criticisms.

The absence of many of the Asian nations has been a big limiting factor on the usefulness of SEATO, and has prevented the hopes originally

held for the organisation to be fulfilled. The Asian nations have refused to be drawn into what they consider to be the last stand of the colonialists in Asia, and SEATO has thus widened the gap between the Western powers and the non-aligned nations, rather than bringing them together as was originally envisaged.

Another consequence of the absence of the Asian Commonwealth countries was that the American rather than the British concept of SEATO was to predominate. Britain had been aiming at a general defence organisation involving all the non-Communist Asian countries and for this reason had insisted, along with Australia, New Zealand, France and Pakistan that SEATO be directed against aggression and external threat from any source. Except for Pakistan, this was done in an effort to attract India in particular. America on the other hand had wished it to be directed exclusively against Communist aggression. In the finish, a compromise was reached whereby the treaty was directed against aggression in general, and America added a declaration where it stated that its commitment was limited to Communist aggression.

In SEATO, New Zealand was once more closely and formally allied with Britain and America, but for the first time was committed to go to the aid of Asian nations with which it had hitherto <sup>not</sup> been associated. SEATO, in this sense was thus another major milestone in New Zealand's defence re-orientation.

However, although New Zealand participated in SEATO independently, the placement of its forces in the area under its commitments to SEATO was to be closely associated with its redeployment of forces, and its change of wartime commitment from the Middle East to S.E. Asia, and thus was directly connected with its continuing close association with Britain in defence matters.

At the time of the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Conference early in 1955, additional meetings on regional defence problems had taken place.

In particular it was noted that in regard to the defence of the Manila Treaty Area the security of Malaya was regarded as of vital importance by the U.K., Australia and New Zealand.(16) It was also at this time that New Zealand agreed to transfer to Malaya No 14 Fighter-Bomber Squadron that was at that time stationed on Cyprus and to send back the 41st Half Transport Squadron which had returned to New Zealand from Malaya in 1952. (17).It was after this, from the 23 to 25 February 1955 that the first meeting of the Council established by the S.E. Asia Collective Defence Treaty was held.

Thus, New Zealand's interest in the situation in S.E. Asia and concern about the danger that it envisaged in the event of all of S.E. Asia falling into Communist hands had impelled it to support a collective defence organisation for the region. New Zealand's interest in S.E. Asia was now directly connected with its interest and commitments in the event of a global war. Regional and Global commitments had become one. No longer would its old mutual obligations to Britain mean that it would be called upon to provide a military force for combat outside its own regional area.

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1. W. N. Medlicott "British Foreign Policy since Versailles 1919-1963".  
(Methuen, 1968) p 290.
  2. Quoted by N. Mansergh in "Survey of British Commonwealth Affairs  
1939-1952." (Cass, 1968) p 350.
  3. Medlicott op cit p 290.
  4. Statements and Documents op cit Document 92 pp 352,353.
  5. ibid p 355
  6. ibid pp 348, 349.
  7. Quoted Watt op cit p 146.
  8. ibid.
  9. Anthony Eden "Full Circle" p 102. Quoted Watt op cit p 148.
  10. D. MacLean "British Foreign Policy Since Suez" (Hodder & Stoughton,  
1970) p 317.
  11. ibid p 318.
  12. For an account of the conflict between British and American policy  
at this time see Charles O. Lerche "The U.S. Great Britain and  
SEATO, A Case of the Fait Accompli". Journal of Politics Vol 18 1956.
  13. Quoted Watt op cit p 150.
  14. Lerche op cit p 471.
  15. Statements and Documents op cit. Document 82 p 329 and  
Document 86 p 336.
  16. ibid Document 101. p 381
  17. ibid Document 102 p 382.
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CHAPTER 4CONTINUING BRITISH INFLUENCE - ANZAM

As mentioned in the previous chapter, the location of New Zealand forces in the S.E. Asia region, was by arrangement with Britain, rather than under its commitments to SEATO, the arrangement being formalised with the establishment on 1 April 1955 of the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve (C.S.R.), responsible to the three contributing governments, Australia, New Zealand and the U.K. New Zealand's association with British military planning for the area went well before this time however. Although discussions were not publicised, the governments of the three countries had agreed in 1949 to co-ordinate defence planning in an area known as ANZAM, which included the Australian and New Zealand homelands and the British territories in Malaya and Borneo, together with the adjacent sea areas.(1)

The deployment of the C.S.R. in Malaya was determined under these consultative arrangements.(2)

With Malayan independence in 1957, Britain entered into a defence agreement with Malaya, the British-Malayan Agreement on External Defence and Mutual Assistance, generally known as AMDA. Under this agreement, Britain guaranteed the security of Malaya in return for the right to maintain the Commonwealth Strategic Reserve in Malaya for the fulfilment of Commonwealth and international obligations. Neither Australia nor New Zealand entered into any separate formal agreements with Malaya on the question of their respective forces, but were instead associated with AMDA, the association being confirmed by an Exchange of Letters in 1959.

With independence, Malaya was no longer a part of British territory and thus did not come under the area covered by SEATO. Despite this, Malaya decided against entering into SEATO, and has since remained out of it. In fact, the Tunku Abdul Rahman described SEATO as "negative,

ineffective, outmoded and under the stigma of Western domination."(3)

This was to have some consequence, as under AMDA, permission from the Malayan government was required before the C.S.R. could be used outside Malaya. Hence during the Laotian crisis on 1962 C.S.R. forces were not allowed to move to Thailand without first regrouping in Singapore.

New Zealand's commitment to the C.S.R. was in the next decade to involve her forces in combat duties in Malaya (Malaysia) quite independent of her commitments to SEATO. Thus during the Emergency ending in 1960, New Zealand forces were involved in countering the Communist insurgency within Malaya, and during the Confrontation between Malaysia and Indonesia in 1963-64-65 ending in 1966, New Zealand had about 1400 men on duty in the area.(4)

ANZAM provided evidence of a continuing close identity of interests between New Zealand and Britain which remained until the late 1960s when Britain signified its intentions of withdrawing its military forces from areas East of Suez. Although this decision was reversed to some extent when the Conservatives returned to power, the general trend of Britain's disengagement from its commitments in S.E. Asia moved New Zealand and Australia to seek alternative arrangements for their forces in Malaysia. These initiatives resulted in a new arrangement between Malaysia, Singapore, the U.K., Australia and New Zealand replacing AMDA when it lapsed on November 1, 1971.

As previously, New Zealand and Australia have no formal treaty commitments under these new arrangements, but are bound by the contents of a communique issued following a conference of the five Defence Ministers in London in April 1971, under which the only public commitment is to

consult. The Australian, New Zealand and British forces committed under these arrangements form a joint force known as ANZUK.

Thus, despite the period during the Second World War when New Zealand along with Australia had to look elsewhere for protection, the post-war period has been notable for continuing close co-operation in defence matters between Britain, New Zealand and Australia, which has lasted through to the end of the 1960s. British entry into the Common Market and the consequent loosening of economic ties between Britain and New Zealand in particular which this has and will bring about will of course bring a reappraisal of this relationship. ANZUK is evidence of the change that is in process at the present time.

What is notable about the relationship between Britain and New Zealand and the commitment of forces to combat duty which this has entailed in the period after World War II, is that this relationship and commitment has been accepted with very little comment by all sectors of the New Zealand population. The relationship has indeed been considered quite natural.

In contrast, New Zealand's relationship with America, and the commitment of forces that this entailed, has been subjected to considerable criticism within New Zealand. A large proportion of this criticism has been in line with world wide criticism of America's action in Vietnam, and in line with criticism within America itself. One reason for this difference is that, as previously stated, New Zealanders have never felt that close cultural and historical affinity with America that has been the basis of the British-New Zealand relationship.

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1. Report of a study group of the R.L.I.A. Quoted in Watt op cit p 164.
  2. Watt op cit p 165.
  3. Quoted by H. S. Albinski in "Australian Policies and Attitudes Toward China." (Princeton University Press, 1965) p 210.
  4. R. M. Mullins: "New Zealand's Defence Policy". New Zealand Foreign Affairs Review. Vol 22 No 7 July 1972. p 18.
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CHAPTER 5.THE PRICE OF DEPENDENCE - EXTENDED INVOLVEMENT

Although no co-ordinated action on the part of all the SEATO powers has ever eventuated to date, it was under SEATO that America became militarily involved in Indo-China. It will be remembered that although South Vietnam was not a signatory to SEATO, it was included by Protocol in the area covered by SEATO, and SEATO also allowed, under Rusk's interpretation, that individual as well as collective action could be taken on the invitation or consent of the government concerned. This invitation or appeal to the U.S. government came at a time in the early 1960s when Communists had control of large areas of the country-side in South Vietnam, and the U.S. then decided to increase its military and economic aid to the Saigon government.

It was from the time of America's deeper involvement in Vietnam that pressure was brought to bear on the Australian and New Zealand governments to increase their assistance to Vietnam.(1) Because Vietnam was in the SEATO area, and not in the Pacific area covered by ANZUS, it was in accordance with commitments under SEATO that assistance by Australia and New Zealand was to be given. However, it is fairly clear that it was understood by all parties that the honouring of commitments under SEATO would further the cause of the honouring of commitments under ANZUS in the event of these commitments being invoked by any of the signatories.

It is interesting to note that during the period of involvement in Vietnam, Australian and New Zealand attitudes to the conflict differed not inconsiderably. This difference is seen not so much in the public statements of support for American involvement which are fairly similar,

but rather in the degree of willingness to back up statements of support with the committal of forces to the area. Beginning with a technical mission in 1962, New Zealand's commitment increased in 1964 when 25 army engineers were sent in a non-combatant role. In 1965 an artillery battery of 120 men was committed to combat duties and in 1967 an Infantry company was redeployed from Malaysia to Vietnam. This brought the level of New Zealand troops in Vietnam to about 550. On the other hand, Australia's commitment began in 1962 with a small number (thirty) of experts to provide instruction in jungle warfare and village defence. This number was later increased to 100, and six Caribou aircraft were also sent. In 1965, the government decided to commit a battalion of troops, and in 1966 the decision was made to increase the number of servicemen in South Vietnam to 4,500. In 1968 the Australian military commitment reached over 8000 men.(2)

Essentially, the difference in willingness to commit forces reflects the difference in the views of the respective governments toward Communism in Asia. With regard to attitudes toward Communism, the Australian government's views were very similar to the views of the U.S. government. Watt describes the Liberal-Country Party government under Sir Robert Menzies as strongly anti-communist in outlook, interpreting Chinese Communist policy as the most belligerent form of Communism.(3) The government also regarded the Chinese Communists as the main threat to the long-term stability of S.E. Asia.

New Zealand did support American and Australian action in Vietnam, as is evidenced by its commitment of troops, its public statements, and its unity with ANZUS partners. For example, the ANZUS Council of July 1964 stated in a communique that "It agreed that the defeat of this (communist) aggression is necessary not only to the security of S.E. Asia

and the S.W. Pacific but as a demonstration that Communist expansion by such tactics will not be allowed to succeed."(4)

However, New Zealand did not condemn Communism outright as a force that could not be negotiated with, or could not be dealt with in terms other than of military force. For example, in December 1965 Holyoake reaffirmed that New Zealand was in Vietnam because aggression had been committed, but in the same statement said that "we are not fighting Communism as an ideology (as one might oppose, say, existentialism as an ideology) but the fact of Communist Aggression. If -and I repeat if - the people of Vietnam freely choose Communism - of any variety - that would be their business."(5)

It can be taken from the sentiment expressed here that New Zealand would have supported the elections in Vietnam in 1956, which had been provided for in the Final Declaration added to the Geneva Cease-fire Agreement of 1954. These elections were to have been supervised by an International Control Commission consisting of Canada, India and Poland, and in all likelihood would have resulted in a bloodless victory for the Communists led by Ho Chi Minh. President Eisenhower's assessment of the situation was that he had "never talked or corresponded with a person knowledgeable in Indo-Chinese affairs who did not agree that, had elections been held ~~agref~~ the time of the fighting, possibly 80% of the population would have voted for the Communist Ho Chi Minh as their leader rather than Chief of State Bao Dai."(6)

However, these elections were never held, owing to the opposition of Ngo Dinh Diem's government in South Vietnam, supported by America, and the lack of pressure from the international community..(7) Whether Ho Chi Minh would have continued to retain a majority support after this date is a matter of conjecture. A commentary on Ho Chi Minh's land reform programme by Bernard Fall(8) indicates that many errors, admitted by both Ho Chi Minh and General Vo Nguyen Giap, were made in

the course of this programme, the arbitrary arrests and executions resulting in a "wave of disobedience and outright hatred for the Party cadres throughout the country."(9)

While support for Ho Chi Minh might have diminished, it is clear that support for Diem's government in the south was rapidly fading away, giving rise to a situation where the Viet Cong, supported by Hanoi, were gaining considerable ground.

While the U.S. was prepared to intervene militarily in this confused and constantly changing situation, it is fairly clear that New Zealand's assessment was that military intervention would have to be massive to have any effect, and even then would only buy time in which some stabilisation of the political situation in the South could be achieved.(10)

With these factors in mind, it would be a safe assumption that had it not been for its concern for its treaty alliance with America, New Zealand would in all probability have followed Britain's example and remained on the side-lines - that in political terms, New Zealand's despatch of a token force to Vietnam was seen as the minimum effort that was required in order to keep alive American protection under ANZUS.

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1. See T. R. Reese's analysis of Australia's and New Zealand's deepening involvement in Vietnam in T. R. Reese "Australia, New Zealand and the U.S.A.A Survey of International Relations 1941/1968." (Oxford University Press, 1969) Chapter 16.
  2. Watt: opcit pp 183-185 and Reese "Australia, New Zealand and the U.S" op cit p 305.
  3. Watt: op cit p 246.
  4. Quoted Reese op cit pp 309, 310.
  5. E.A.R. December 1965 p 16 Quoted Reese op cit pp 310, 312.
  6. D. Eisenhower "Mandate For Change" (London, Heineman,1963) p 372. Quoted Kennaway op cit p 70.
  7. Kennaway op cit p 71.
  8. "The Two Vietnams" Quoted in Watt op cit pp 348-350.
  9. Fall quoted by Watt op cit p 349.
  10. Mullins op cit pp 17, 18.
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CHAPTER 6.REASSESSING NEW ZEALAND INVOLVEMENT IN ASIA

In view of what has been said in earlier chapters, it can at this stage be asked whether the protection afforded New Zealand under ANZUS was worth the commitment of even a token force to the American effort in its highly controversial involvement in Vietnam, or whether in fact the premium we paid was too high for the value of the insurance.

While, as we have seen, New Zealand's main reason for taking part in ANZUS was her fear of a resurgence of Japanese militarism, ANZUS has instead involved New Zealand in the containment of Communism and in an anti-Chinese alliance, which has acted in a manner that, if Webb's views back in 1954 are anything to go by, is essentially in contradiction to New Zealand's assessment of China's role, and its assessment of the best way of dealing with the threat posed by China's apparently aggressive tendencies in Asia. New Zealand has acquiesced in the American approach to China, and has thus officially viewed China as a blatant aggressor in S.E. Asia. Though it would be foolish to ignore the fact that China is supporting the efforts of Communist forces in South Vietnam to push the Americans out, and is generally interested in supporting subversive movements throughout the world (1) it is also reasonably clear that China is not interested at this stage in direct military action against other nations except when it feels its own territorial integrity threatened, as in Korea, the Sino-Indian border dispute, or in the Sino-Soviet border clashes, and that China's posture is basically defensive.(2) In fact, China's approach to the use of military force gave rise to her unwillingness to support Hanoi when it adopted the Soviet strategy of using large combat units in South Vietnam rather than the strategy of small unit guerilla warfare combined with the growth of local political organizations.(3) It should also be noted that at the height of America's

involvement in Vietnam in the late 1960s, the Cultural Revolution had turned China's attention inward and its influence in Indo-China was probably fairly low.(4)

Overall, America's interpretation of Communism, and China's foreign policy, has prevented it from seeing China as anything but a dangerous foe, and has caused it to think of all of China's actions as dangerous to American safety. That this attitude has prevented it from seeing that China's actions are perfectly legitimate from its own point of view is illustrated by a commentary of the off-shore islands dispute in 1955, by Humphrey Trevelyan, the head of the British diplomatic mission in Peking at the time. (5) From the Chinese point of view, Taiwan and the islands were Chinese territory, and therefore, any attempts to recover them would be purely an internal police operation against a rebel. It was not an international question, and America was therefore interfering in an internal matter. Trevelyan states that to "liberate" Taiwan and thus complete the revolution was a serious aim of the new rulers, both because they considered it to be a part of Chinese territory unjustly withheld from them by foreign influence and because, as far as the British mission could judge, they genuinely feared a joint invasion of the mainland by American and Nationalist forces.(6)

Trevelyan also points out that the Chinese were convinced that in the end they would get Taiwan and the Chinese seat in the U.N., regarding both, with some justification, as their clear right and not as matters which could be the subject of a bargain.(7) The fact that the Chinese have stood firm and have already won the first of these objectives in the face of American opposition must indicate that America's unrealistic attitudes have done nothing but harm for America's standing in the international community.

This is an important factor for New Zealand, because America's

involvement in Vietnam, again unrealistic, has caused America's standing to be further weakened, and New Zealand has of course been associated with America as an object of the increasing worldwide disapprobation of American actions.

This effect is paradoxical, because it can be argued that America became involved in Vietnam essentially for moral reasons. American policy makers have continuously slated Communism as "bad", and considered capitalism and free-enterprise as "good". America's containment of Communism has therefore been an issue of the "forces of good" fighting the "forces of evil". Hence the unrealistic involvement in Vietnam. The forces of evil could not on any grounds be allowed an inch without putting up a fight. This approach contrasts markedly with the British pragmatic approach. The British have fought against Communism in places such as Malaya, essentially because to do so was to protect important British investments. These campaigns have been fought realistically and with effect. It is fair to assume, however, that had the British foreseen an involvement in Malaya as costly as the Vietnam involvement has been for America, or had judged the Communists to have had the support of a majority of the population, then they would in all probability have cut their losses and withdrawn, or would have attempted to negotiate with the new regime. The more pragmatic approach of the British has allowed them to recognise Communist China, and has prevented them becoming involved in Vietnam. The British are not committed to a crusade against Communism as such, and have thus been able to deal with Communist regimes more realistically than has America. (8)

This factor is an important one with respect to the strategic planning of smaller associated powers such as New Zealand, as a foreign policy dictated solely by the national interest is far more predictable and constant than a foreign policy formulated in moral terms. Moralists

tend to become discouraged when their good works are not appreciated by those whom they have been helping or do not in fact achieve the results desired. Perhaps this explains the isolationist trend evident in America today.

It is also clear that a more pragmatic approach would call for the support of a regime with popular backing. Instead, America, by becoming involved in Vietnam for the simple reason of stopping Communism, has had to bolster up unpopular and generally corrupt regimes and this is another factor in its lack of success.

The fact that Hanoi has stood firm despite all that America could throw at it must also result in a tremendous loss of bargaining power for America in future disputes with smaller powers, although, if America is able to pull off a successfully negotiated peace settlement this effect will of course be diminished. It would be for this reason that China has continued to criticize Hanoi for its willingness to negotiate and has continued to refer to the virtues of protracted war. (9)

The factor of American prestige will be of importance for New Zealand in the event of future conflicts or threats which are of a type unlikely to involve the use of nuclear weapons. Particularly is this so as the final threat of nuclear weapons no longer has the weight that it once did for America, since both Russia and China are capable, or reaching the capability, of retaliating on behalf of an ally.

It is also important to recognise that despite America's long held view that all Communists were of the same brand, and its refusal to recognise the strong nationalist elements in the different Communist regimes, a situation where communist governments were in power in some of the S.E. Asian countries would not necessarily mean that these nations automatically came under Chinese domination. It is generally recognised that these countries wish to be independent from China as much as they

have wished to be independent of the old colonial regimes in the past. American action in Indo-China may in fact have had the totally opposite effect from that which it was meant to achieve, and rather than keep Vietnam from Chinese hegemony appears to be pushing North Vietnam and other Communist forces in the area into a position of dependence on China.

(10)  
 New Zealand's military involvement in Malaysia, arising out of its close association with Britain, is a different matter from the involvement in Vietnam, and can probably best be defended on the grounds that it was in fact effective - that the Communist insurgency was put down, and that a stable government has effectively ruled independently and popularly since Malaysia achieved independence. In the final round, however, one may ask whether indeed even this involvement achieved its aims, if these aims could be defined. Malaysia remains a state that is potentially subject to racial division and strife, and the fact that the large Chinese minority is discriminated against by the government must give reason to doubt the long-term stability of the country. Further, Malaysia is at present striving to organise an association of non-aligned states which includes both non-communist and communist governments (and even allows observer status to the Provisional Revolutionary Government of South Vietnam at its conferences)(11) a fact that must be very galling to the U.S., which has been fighting these very communist governments.

If New Zealand is to learn from the past, it must indeed sit back at this stage and assess what actually has been achieved by its efforts in the region. As far as the protection that ANZUS, the main motivating factor in our involvement in Vietnam, provides, a reasonably realistic appraisal of the situation in mainland Asia and S.E. Asia would lead to the view that no threat to New Zealand will be forthcoming from that direction in the foreseeable future, and New Zealand's past involvement in Vietnam is likely to result in negative returns.

What then does ANZUS protect us from? Japan and Indonesia are the two states in the region that could possibly be a threat to New Zealand. For the present, however, Indonesia, though potentially very wealthy, suffers from lack of cohesion and the difficulties inherent in a developing society, and is unlikely to develop the capability to sustain an attack upon either Australia or New Zealand, even if it was so inclined. The greatest danger possible from that direction would, in the event of a change in government, be an insurgency operation in Papua New Guinea, which would be an Australian rather than a New Zealand problem.

Japan, however, is rapidly reaching the position of being one of the more powerful nations in the world. It is now a strong economic competitor rated industrially third in the world in 1970, and is potentially a strong military power, though for the present, its forces maintain a "defensive" posture. Japan is thus very much in the position that Australia and New Zealand feared she would be when they balked at signing the Japanese Peace Treaty - the very position that ANZUS was designed to cover, at least from the New Zealand point of view.

It is on the assessment of Japan's future action that the value of ANZUS for New Zealand can be decided. At present, continuing good relations between Japan and New Zealand can be expected. Japan is becoming increasingly important economically to New Zealand with New Zealand looking to Japan as a market for the products that will in future be more difficult to sell on the European market. Japan is also an important market for our increasing exports of industrial products and raw materials.

Japan's trade is world-wide, and because its economy is so dependent on this trade it appears that trade and foreign investment would be the main area of potential trouble between Japan and its neighbours. While Japan is able to develop its foreign trade and investment in the way

that it has in the post-war period, and while the economy continues at its present rate of growth, there seems little reason for Japan to be a threat in a military sense. It is in the possibility of a reaction to Japan's growing economic power on the part of other states in the region that the potential for trouble lies. A threatened or actual closure of markets or raw materials to Japan on the part of these states might force Japan to consider action which it would not otherwise contemplate. A breakdown in trade would be so disruptive for Japan that it could quite possibly provoke an internal reaction demanding a more aggressive external posture.

What does this mean for New Zealand? While New Zealand itself is so dependent on trade to maintain its present standard of living, its aim will be to promote conditions of stability, and it is therefore unlikely ever to involve itself in a trade-war situation. The most likely states to be involved in such a situation would be the S.E. Asian states and Indonesia which would probably on balance have less to lose than Japan in an economic show-down.

What then is the likelihood that Japan would take military action to safeguard its economic interests in the region? At the present time, in the light of Japan's economic strength, any indication of a build-up of military strength would be very disquieting for all states in the region, in particular China, and would thus be the cause of a build-up of tension in the area. At the present, Japan's population is still anti-militaristic, although indications are that the younger generation is less inclined to retain the passive posture of the post-war period.(12) However the strong feelings against nuclear weapons within the Japanese population indicate that for the present, the acquisition of these is not being contemplated. While Japan continues

to renounce nuclear weapons, and if reports (13) are true that China has begun deployment of intermediate range missiles which could be targeted against such neighbours as Japan, any military action is unlikely to be contemplated by Japan and she will therefore continue to work at the build-up of good-will, and will be working at close economic co-operation with neighbouring states. It is of course also evident that America's guarantee of New Zealand's protection against Japan, which is necessarily implied in ANZUS, would prevent for a long time to come, Japan ever contemplating a move against New Zealand. Japan's acquisition of a nuclear option which could be developed very quickly into the capability of inflicting damage on the U.S., would however, reduce the credibility of America's guarantee drastically.

On current trends therefore, no immediate threat to New Zealand would appear to be forthcoming. Japan has not turned out to be the ogre that New Zealanders were fearful of back in the early 1950s, and the present and future power balance would seem to work in New Zealand's favour, although Japanese acquisition of nuclear weapons would alter the position considerably. New Zealand's position would therefore be enhanced as China grows in strength vis-a-vis Japan, although this view is totally at odds with America's past appraisal of the East Asian situation.

The protection afforded to New Zealand under ANZUS must therefore remain with regard to an undefined threat. Its value in the next two decades to New Zealand must be assessed on whether or not the restrictions on independent decision-making and an independent stance in international relations, which are a part of the American alliance, are on balance considered to be worth the sense of security that ANZUS gives New Zealand, as this appears to be the only benefit that New Zealand currently derives from the ANZUS alliance.

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1. See W. A. C. Adie "The Revolutionary Diplomatic Line of Mao Tse Tung." Paper delivered at New Zealand's first International China Conference. University of Waikato. May 1972.
  2. See N. Maxwell "India's China War." (London, Jonathan Cape, 1970) and A. Huck "The Security of China" (London, Chatto & Windus, 1970) pp 42, 43, 45.
  3. See R. O'Neill "Peking-Hanoi Relations in 1970." Contemporary China Paper No 2. (A.N.U. Press. Canberra, 1971) pp 2,3.
  4. *ibid.*
  5. H. Trevelyan "Worlds Apart." (London, MacMillan, 1971) Chapters 11, 12 pp 129-150.
  6. *ibid* p 130.
  7. *ibid* p 144.
  8. See the argument for "The Necessary Amorality of Foreign Affairs!" by A. Schlesinger. Harper's Magazine August 1971.
  9. O'Neill *op cit* p 24.
  10. O'Neill *op cit* pp 27, 28.
  11. The Third Non-aligned Summit Conference - Lusaka. Current Notes on International Affairs. Australian Department of External Affairs. October 1970 Vol 41, No 10.
  12. See "East Asia in the 1970s" R. N. Clough in "Asia and the Pacific in the 1970s ". B. Brown (ed) (A. H. & A.W. Reed 1971).
  13. Waikato Times 22 January 1973.
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CHAPTER 7DETERMINANTS OF CHANGE - A TURNING POINT FOR NEW ZEALAND?

We now come to the immediate present. In the late 1960s and early 1970s Britain's substantial withdrawal from East of Suez has forced a significant reappraisal of New Zealand's role in S.E. Asia, leading in the meantime to the ANZUK arrangement as already noted. This period has also been marked by the continued strong criticism of America's actions in Vietnam, and American attempts to withdraw its forces without completely abandoning the South Vietnamese government.

As New Zealand moves into 1973, the pressure of a significant change in its relationship with Britain and America, and the reassessment of both New Zealand's and Australia's role in S.E. Asia that this has brought about, make this an opportune time for looking at the alternatives available to us. The change in relationship is marked by three important events - Britain's entry into the E.E.C. on the 1 January 1973, New Zealand's withdrawal of all its troops from Vietnam in December 1972, and New Zealand's recognition of the People's Republic of China and severance of diplomatic ties with Taiwan in the same month.

The change is further marked by the possibility of Australia's withdrawal both from SEATO and ANZUK which would almost certainly also involve New Zealand's withdrawal from these organisations.

The first of these, Britain's entry into the E.E.C., long awaited and the cause of considerable anxiety and concern for New Zealand, is without a doubt the beginning of the end of New Zealand's special relationship with Britain, although New Zealand, unlike Australia, is reluctant to take steps to remove the last "trappings of colonialism" - legal and constitutional inferiority to the British judicial system. (1) The fact that many New Zealanders are now to be treated as any other world citizen with respect to entry into Britain, and the uncertainty about

special arrangements for our dairy produce in the E.E.C., are strong indications that at last we have been pushed out of the nest - that we are now on our own and will in future have to forage for ourselves.

At the same time, following the change of government at the November elections, New Zealand's withdrawal of all troops from Vietnam and recognition of Communist China perhaps indicate that New Zealand is going to try to go it on its own anyway, and is not going to abjectly seek a foster home in reaction to its abandonment. Australia's actions at this time, however, appear to have had a strong influence on New Zealand's behaviour, indicating that New Zealand is at least looking for help from a sister Dominion in similar circumstances in its bid to bravely face the world. In fact, Australia's and New Zealand's apparent decision to stand together at this time arises not only out of Britain's withdrawal and their own decisions to act more independently, but also from the important factor of America's attempts to extricate itself from the Asian mainland and its stated wishes that its allies take a greater share of their defence provisions upon themselves under the Nixon doctrine.

The circumstances surrounding this show of independence on the part of Australia and New Zealand together are reminiscent of the circumstances in 1944 when the Canberra Pact was negotiated - circumstances in which Britain's weakness and change in role has made her both unwilling and unable to guarantee protection, and in which American domination of decision - making has resulted in a reaction and an apparent attempt at throwing off of the yoke of an over-bearing ally. However, the strength of this reaction, and the effect that this will have within America is going to have greater consequences at this time than it did back in 1944. At that time, America was undoubtedly the strongest single nation on earth,

and we could afford to act a little independently in light of the reasonably strong cultural and social ties between us, in light of the fact that it was in America's interests to have allies in this part of the world, and in light of our hopes for a system of collective security. However, at this time, America is only one of two super-powers of about equal strength measured in terms of nuclear capability and influence throughout the world. According to reports at the beginning of 1973, China is also remarkably close to reaching super-power status. (2) Many other nations are reaching middle power capability, and both Japan and the E.E.C. promise to become extremely powerful economic rivals of America. There has been a change from a simple bi-polar world to a complex multi-polar situation resulting from this increase in the economic and military capabilities of individual nations. This factor, combined with the increase in inter-continental nuclear capability giving rise to a decrease in needs for strategic bases, may well be all adding to America's desire to withdraw from energy sapping commitments around the world.

For this reason, the steps that Australia and New Zealand take at this time either toward greater independence, or toward making the U.S. commitment under ANZUS more attractive in the face of its wish to modify its military commitments, will have important long--term effects on New Zealand's security. The Australian and New Zealand decision to strike an independent foreign policy stance at this time would seem to make the American guarantee less rather than more secure, particularly in the event of small-scale conflict between Australia and New Zealand and their neighbours in the S.E. Asian region.

A factor that would continue to secure the guarantee for the meantime would be Australia's and New Zealand's contribution to America's overall security. At present the N. W. Cape Communications Station is an important factor in America's nuclear presence in the area, but if

Australia was to push for control over the station, America might be encouraged to find alternative arrangements, as it did during 1946-1947 with respect to the Manus Island base when Evatt pushed for Australian control.

Overall, America is likely to be irritated by allies that do not wish to remain acquiescent, and while a unilateral renunciation of ANZUS is unlikely, it must be remembered that the guarantees under ANZUS are not automatic but that an attack upon any one of the three parties would be considered to be dangerous to all and that each would then meet the common danger in accordance with its constitutional processes.

Professor Wood has stated that he just does not believe that the Americans in the long run want their friends to be obedient yes-men(3) and while this may be true of individual policy makers, the pervasive and less rational influences of an American "public opinion" must be taken into account, particularly where, as in ANZUS, action would be dependent upon Congressional approval.

It would appear then that if Australia and New Zealand are interested in keeping ANZUS alive, and there is no indication that they are not, there will have to be some compliance with American wishes, and some softening of the independent line of both Whitlam and Kirk that resulted in the abrupt changes after the November 1972 elections. The decision of the two leaders to remain in SEATO for the meantime(4) may indicate that withdrawal from Vietnam and recognition of Communist China is as far as the departure from the American line can be expected to go. In fact, America's successful negotiation of a peace-settlement in Vietnam, and the consequent withdrawal of troops from S.E. Asia that would follow, would bring the interests of the three countries back into closer harmony. This realignment of interests would be further facilitated by American recognition of Communist China, although it is difficult to gauge the likelihood of this occurring, despite Nixon's visit to Peking.

It appears then, that Australia and New Zealand will continue to

depend upon the U.S. for security for some time to come and that the sense of security that ANZUS gives us is considered worth the curtailing of a fully independent voice in international affairs.

However, it is necessary to take heed of the fact that America may not always be able, or even willing, to extend its protective arms over this part of the S. W. Pacific. Professor MacIntyre quotes the English journalist Leonard Beaton who observes in a commentary on "The Super-power in Decline" that he detected, in 1969, a feeling in American leaders that "American power had receded and was likely to continue to recede..... the U.S., which alone had any real initiative on most world problems, was gradually losing its capacity to act."(5)

An observation such as this must create uneasiness in New Zealanders who see their foreign policy and security so dependent upon American guarantees. This uneasiness will be further heightened after consideration of the following argument by John Spanier: "Because no nation can be expected to risk its existence for an ally, the credibility of American pledges is at best uncertain. The fact that the Soviets could strike the U.S. and impose catastrophic damage means that, in the event of a specific challenge, areas formerly considered of "vital interest" to American security might be reduced to only "secondary interest", not worth defending at the cost of the nation and its comfortable way of life."(6)

Back in 1942, when Britain found itself unable to honour its guarantees, we had another powerful ally to turn to. When America finds itself unable to fulfill its commitments, in which direction will we then turn? This is a question that seems to be easily pushed aside at the present. It is a question that is so basically disturbing that people find it easier just to ignore it, or produce the standard reaction along the lines that "America is great and can never fall."

However, a nation never survived on wishful thinking, a failing to which New Zealanders seem regrettably prone. It is therefore more than just an academic exercise to discuss the alternatives to the American alliance available to New Zealand.

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1. See editorial, Waikato Times. 17 January 1973.
2. Waikato Times. January 10, 18, 22, 1973.
3. Wood: opcit p 14.
4. N.Z. Herald. 23 January 1973.
5. W. D. MacIntyre "Neutralism, Non-alignment and New Zealand."  
Liberal Studies Briefs. p 19.
6. J. W. Spanier "The Games Nations Play." (London, Nelson, 1972) p 216.

CHAPTER 8.ALTERNATIVES TO ALLIANCE

A basic premise of New Zealand's defence policy is, that without substantial external assistance, the defence of New Zealand against any determined attack is far beyond our means. (1) The cost of a defence force which could protect us, coupled with the fact that in an age of increasingly sophisticated equipment, such equipment must be imported with consequent drain on our overseas funds, support this premise.

New Zealand's security in the face of the loss of American protection would therefore depend either on New Zealand adopting a stance which would make it less likely to be considered a target by a potential aggressor, or on New Zealand finding assistance from some other source. Apart from Australia, the chance of finding assistance of any dependable nature from some other source of sufficient power to deter aggressors is for practical purposes nil. Accepting that our national philosophy remains as it is, there is just no other nation in the area with the social, cultural or psychological basis upon which such assistance of a lasting nature could be built.

We will therefore consider the alternatives to the alliance system with a view to determining which of these would be acceptable to a New Zealand public and serve the purpose of securing our national integrity. These alternatives fall into two basic categories: - non-alignment and neutrality. While these two terms are used very loosely, for the purpose of our discussion it will be accepted that the basic difference between the two stances is that, while both aim at non-attachment to any particular power bloc in time of peace, neutrality further involves the explicit intention of remaining on the sidelines in time of war. Non-alignment on the other hand does not necessarily involve the renunciation of war. The philosophy of non-alignment is best put by Nehru

in the following words: "If there is a big war, there is no particular reason why we should jump into it. Nevertheless it is a little difficult nowadays in world wars to be neutral.....we are not going to join a war if we can help it. We are going to join the side which is to our interest when the time comes to make the choice. There the matter ends."(2)

Non-alignment has further shades of meaning and could, for example , involve a state in a fairly sincere effort to reduce the chance of conflict between two power blocs by using its marginal power or political influence to effect in tipping, or threatening to tip, the power balance either one way or the other. An example of this position would be India during the Nehru era. Nehru's aim was basically to reduce the area of conflict between the American and Communist blocs by remaining friendly with both and attempting to enlarge the area of peace, "that is of countries which are not aligned to this group or that but which are friendly to both", (3) and thus reducing the chance of war. Peace is the basic aim of such a stance, a payoff in its own right for a weaker power.

On the other hand, non-alignment could involve a state in exploiting a balance of power situation to its own best advantage, in gaining benefits such as economic aid and military equipment on favourable terms. An example of this type of non-alignment would be some of the Arab states which have successfully benefited from Russia's desire to increase its influence in the Middle East, apparently without losing any of their own independence. Such a stance is well suited to a state in which the political culture gives the rewards to those who are most adept at the oftentimes lethal infighting and manoeuvring for power, and a state whose survival depends on such manoeuvring.

Both of these forms of non-alignment depend for their success upon the strategic situation of the state in question, and/or the importance

of the addition of their marginal power to one side or the other of the power balance, although during the cold-war it was political rather than military support that was sought after by the big powers.

Another shade of the non-alignment theme comes under the name of "positive neutralism", which usually contains a large element of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism(4) and which has therefore in the past been aimed largely at the white European colonial regimes.

It is sometimes argued that non-alignment was a derivative of the bipolar cold war situation, and is not applicable today. However, that such is not the case, is evidenced by the considerable number of states that class themselves as non-aligned today - more than sixty national delegations attended the Third Non-Aligned Summit Conference held in Lusaka in September 1970,(5) although it has been suggested that few of these actually pursue a policy of genuine non-alignment.(6)

That the stance of non-alignment is valid for a tri-polar or multi-polar world is also evidenced by the strategy of North Vietnam in successfully manoeuvring for aid from both Russia and China.(7)

From the forgoing then, non-alignment as a stance can be seen to be very much a derivative of the particular circumstances and strategic position of a nation at any point in time, and a derivative of the positions of the larger nations round about.

In deciding whether non-alignment can be considered as a serious alternative for New Zealand, several factors must be taken into consideration. Foremost among these is that in non-alignment (and in neutrality), a state tends to move to the mid-point between any two protagonists. For New Zealand this would mean a large shift in sympathy away from America toward either China or Russia as the case may be. It is hardly necessary to state that such a large shift would require a massive re-education of

the general public which would hardly happen overnight.

Whether this re-education could be undertaken at all would be unlikely in the case of non-alignment, because theoretically, such a stance would imply that at some future date, consideration might be given to entering a conflict against America. Neutrality, on the other hand, while demanding that New Zealand move away from the U.S. would at the same time involve renunciation of any intention of entering conflicts in the future, thus perhaps making the move more palatable.

Another factor is the question of whether non-alignment has any advantages over the American alliance in increasing New Zealand's security. A further consideration of the implications of non-alignment would show that this is not the case. First of all, it is doubtful whether New Zealand is now of any strategic importance to any big power, and therefore would probably be abandoned in preference to her protector risking nuclear retaliation in her defence.

Secondly, if help from other non-aligned states was expected to be forthcoming in the event of aggression, this would not in fact be the case, as is shown by Werner Levi in a discussion of Indian non-alignment.(8) As he points out, in the event of conflict between two nations, whether one of them be non-aligned or not, both protagonists become "aligned" and the rest of the non-aligned nations would tend to move to a new midpoint between the two positions -- no comfort to the nation in trouble.

Thirdly, non-alignment would call for involvement and association with other non-aligned nations to make New Zealand's voice more effective on the international scene. That such association would eventuate is unlikely in light of the fact that a number of the non-aligned nations that are at present working towards association of some form actually fall into the category of positive neutralists and their outlook is and has been hostile to the old colonial and "imperialist" powers and thus

anti-British and anti-American. These nations also appear to be changing emphasis and becoming more radical and are influencing the whole of the non-aligned movement to be more militant in its approach to the big powers - an overall attitude that would be unacceptable to New Zealand. (9)

At the same time, New Zealand's long association with British policies, coupled with its high standard of living, would make its acceptance by the non-aligned group equally unlikely. As Kochan puts it "...unlike the past, when it (the non-aligned movement) was portrayed as a desired alternative to East-West rivalry and could supposedly incorporate any country in any continent, it is increasingly evident that, as it stands, the movement is becoming the mouthpiece solely of the developing states of the Third World. As such, it offers no alternative choice, and holds no magnetism for the more industrialised countries of the world". (10)

On balance then, non-alignment as an alternative to alliance would seem to have no attraction to a nation with the freedom of choice that New Zealand has at present, and would have little chance of acceptance by a majority of the New Zealand voters.

What then, of neutrality? The alternative here actually involves the choice of two stances, armed neutrality and unarmed neutrality. The latter alternative would in fact require that New Zealanders take the chance that no-one was ever likely to want to attack us, and by hiding away on our own, make ourselves as inconspicuous as possible -- hardly an alternative that a nation with an essentially war-like heritage would be able to adopt emotionally. As Hedley Bull has pointed out there is also the important factor that "military forces fulfil the function not merely of providing actual national security, but also of creating within

a country that sense of security that people have to have if they are to be able to get on with their other business."(11)

Armed neutrality is therefore the alternative that must be considered. As noted before, it is generally accepted that New Zealand would not be able to defend itself, or afford to defend itself, against a determined onslaught by an aggressor. A lift from the presently low (approx. 2% GNP) expenditure on defence, to a level of perhaps 5% GNP making New Zealand a more costly proposition for such an aggressor power, coupled with a stance which would make New Zealand less likely to be considered as a target, would serve to reduce this consideration as a serious obstacle.

It might be noted here that Sweden, one of the best examples of a nation that has successfully adopted neutrality, has one of the best equipped air-forces in relation to size of country and population in the world, and the mainstay of this airforce is a plane produced in Sweden itself. Sweden's approach to its defence provision is that Sweden shall be "so well prepared for war that it serves to maintain peace." The Swedish armed force must therefore have "such strength, composition and readiness that an attack on Sweden will demand such great resources, and take such a longtime, that the advantages to be gained from the attack cannot reasonably be deemed worth the effort involved."(12)

Whether New Zealand could present such a challenge on her own is possibly questionable. A neutral, armed, Australasia might, however, have the resources to present such a challenge. That such a stance would be in line with Australia's interests in the long term is suggested by Hedley Bull's recommendation that "For the 1980s Australia needs the capacity to defend itself and her interests, if necessary alone, against any power in the near neighbourhood. She needs also to consider having a capacity to exact a price from, and so provide a deterrent against, a

Great power or local power equipped and backed by a great power."

Further, that "Australia's long-term strategic interests indicate the need to develop local defence industry so as to be independent of overseas supply in time of need." (13)

However, the vulnerability of our shipping lifelines must be taken into consideration. Interference to them could be undertaken with far less cost than actually attempting to subjugate New Zealand by force, and would achieve the same result. It could be argued that, as the ships trading to New Zealand are mainly foreign owned, these foreign powers would not brook such interference. However, they might be unwilling to push the issue to the brink of nuclear war, particularly if New Zealand, being neutral, had lost the support of these foreign powers. New Zealand in such a position might be able to subsist, but a defence policy must of course be aimed at protecting a nation's standard of living and ability to maintain economic growth as well as simply protection from loss of sovereignty.

While this vulnerability could be reduced by an increase in our maritime defence forces, it will be obvious that any nation which was actually in the process of blockading New Zealand would have resources far beyond what New Zealand will be capable of matching, although Australia and New Zealand together would possibly provide a sufficient deterrent to prevent the move in the first place. Maritime vulnerability admittedly must remain a weak link in New Zealand's defence.

However, it can be suggested again that by adopting a strictly neutral stance, New Zealand would make it extremely unlikely that a nation would have any reason to undertake a move against her, particularly in an anti-imperialist age when any action aimed at interfering with a nation's integrity and sovereignty has been coming under increasing disapprobation in international forums.

The credibility of a stance of armed neutrality would then probably be the main determinant of the success of such a stance. Credibility

would of course require an end of military alliances with Britain and America - a renunciation of our part in ANZUS, SEATO And ANZUK. In the case of the latter two arrangements, New Zealand appears for the meantime to have decided to continue as at present, although neither of these pacts has the importance for New Zealand of the ANZUS pact, and it is quite likely that at least within a decade, these arrangements will have come to an end.

One of the reasons given in the past for non-consideration of a neutral stance has been that, rather than "enable us to act as moral umpires or universal mediators", renouncing a concern for others has "nothing very moral about" it; that "those without stature and without a readiness to act are rarely effective as mediators or anything else".(14)

Whether our participation in ANZUK in fact enables us to be more effective as mediators, or increases our stature, can be seriously questioned. As Michael Stenson puts it "The common assumption that we have a moral obligation to assist friendly Commonwealth countries which have asked us to stay also needs to be regarded with some scepticism..... One wonders whether the ANZAC politicians and diplomats, in this earnest desire to be accepted as "nice guys", are not being taken for a ride by the exceptionally sophisticated, worldly-wise leaders of Singapore and the rather disillusioned leaders of Malaysia?"(15)

Whether one agrees with this view or not, it is clear from official statements that the Malaysian government itself considers that the five-power defence arrangements are only a stop-gap measure until Neutralisation of the region can be achieved.(16)

SEATO and ANZUK will thus probably die a natural death, whether New Zealand continues its participation in the American alliance or not. Withdrawal from ANZUS, however, would signal a definite break with America over defence matters, and would at this time, serve to indicate the seriousness with which the alternative to the alliance was being

approached. Withdrawal at the present time, when the American alliance still provides us with a powerful deterrent for protection, would of course enhance the credibility of the move to neutrality. Waiting until such time as America is no longer able to guarantee protection would of course be too late - a neutral stance forced upon us by such circumstances would not have the same credibility. A decision to adopt neutrality at this stage would also give New Zealand the time to build up a reputation for reliability for non-participation in wars. While a tradition of neutrality would require some time to develop, the present world situation would provide as favourable circumstances as any to begin. This is important because "credibility of the continuity of a state's policy of neutrality is essential for maintaining its special status."(17)

Further methods of increasing credibility mentioned by Stourzh are firstly, building a reputation of participation in actions where neutral services in a specific context are needed, and in activities of a conciliatory or mediatory kind. Secondly, by being host to international conferences and permanent international organizations. Such activities would of course pay-off for New Zealand in the increased knowledge and experience gained from dealing with a wide range of overseas representatives on a regular basis, and the increased awareness of our neighbours on the part of our general public.

Being on our own, and without the sources of information that we at present have in Britain and America would also require that our overseas representation, and our governmental machinery within New Zealand for handling foreign affairs would have to be considerably enlarged. The paucity of our overseas representation even at present is indicated in an article on the E.E.C. by Dov Bing based on a first-hand appraisal.(18) In light of the importance of the E.E.C. market to our immediate future, it is disturbing that a number of high officials pointed out to him that they had hardly noticed any form of New Zealand representation in Brussels.

Elsewhere, the fact that "the immense job of keeping the vast apparatus of the E.E.C. commission under surveillance is handled by three men" is a position that has been described as "patently ridiculous."<sup>(19)</sup>

Adopting a neutral stance at this time would thus force New Zealand to develop its capacity for dealing with other nations independently and to devote a greater share of its resources to educating its citizens about, and developing their awareness of, the world around us. The danger is only too real that unless a self motivated move such as this is undertaken, New Zealanders will continue to go about their daily lives complacently as though they were in a world where the British and Americans could still enforce their will, failing to take into account the change in the world balance of power, and the need to actively and independently develop relations with our neighbours both large and small.

The amount at present being spent on overseas aid (20) is a measure of the lack of importance that is at present accorded to our overseas relations, and whether New Zealand remains in the American alliance or decides at some future time to adopt a neutral stance, it is obvious that a far greater effort is needed than is at present being expended.

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1. Air Commodore R. B. Bolt "N.Z.'s Defence Provision." Paper delivered at Otago University Extension Foreign Policy School. May 1972. p 1.
2. Quoted M. M. Rahman "The Politics of Non-alignment." (New Delhi, Associated, 1969) p 66.
3. *ibid* p 67.
4. M. Teichman "Australia - Armed and Neutral?" Victorian Fabian Society. Pamphlet 13. May 1966. p 6.
5. The Third Non-aligned Summit Conference - Lusaka. *op cit* p 521.
6. R. Kochan "Changing Emphasis in the Non-aligned Movement." *The World Today*. November 1972. p 502.
7. See O'Neill *op cit*.
8. W. Levi "Indian Neutralism Reconsidered." *Pacific Affairs* Vol XXXVII No 2 Summer 1964.
9. See Kochan *op cit*.
10. *ibid* p 508.
11. H. Bull "Australia's Defence Policy." Paper delivered at the Otago Foreign Policy School. May 1972. p 4.
12. Official Swedish Government statements quoted by N. Andren "National Security and International Solidarity - Swedish Foreign Policy after World War II." in "Sweden in the Sixties" I. Wizelius (ed) (Almqvist & Wiksell, 1967) p 79.
13. Bull *op cit* pp 19, 21.
14. K. Holyoake "A Defence Policy for N.Z." N.Z.I.I.A. Wellington. 1969.
15. M. Stenson "N.Z. and the Malay World." N.Z. I.I.A. Wellington, p 12. 1970 pp 12, 13.
16. *Malaysian Digest*. November 20 1971 Vol 4 No 18 p 8.
17. G. Stourzh "Some Reflections on Permanent Neutrality." in "Small States in International Relations." Schou & Bruntland (eds).
18. *Waikato Times* 11 October 1972.
19. *Waikato Times* 26 July 1972 p 28.
20. See the comments on our overseas aid expenditure by Professor Wood -- "N.Z. and the Big Powers." *op cit*.

CONCLUSION

In this dissertation, New Zealand's relationship with Britain and America, and the demands that have been made upon New Zealand in return for protection have been discussed, and it has been argued that this relationship is at the present time undergoing a profound change, deriving largely from the development of a complex multi-polar world system. It has been argued that, in light of the possibility of American protection becoming less certain as time goes on New Zealand might, by grasping the opportunity which favourable circumstances provide, adopt a neutral stance which would, on balance, seem to offer the best chances of keeping New Zealand out of future wars and at the same time offer a satisfying role for New Zealand in world affairs.

While neutrality, however credible, could never absolutely guarantee New Zealand's security it must also be recognised that the American alliance does not and cannot absolutely guarantee our security either. Neutrality would however keep New Zealand from involvement in wars to a far greater extent than has our participation in alliances. New Zealand's military involvement in S.E. Asia has been undertaken both because of our wish to secure American guarantees, and as a result of the policy of forward defence, but it must be seriously doubted whether in fact this policy has gained any long-lasting benefits or protection for New Zealand.

Neutrality, while increasing New Zealand's chances of remaining out of future wars would, at the same time, by doing away with the concern for remaining in America's good books, enable New Zealand to exercise a truly independent voice in international affairs, and make the sort of stand on behalf of small powers for which Peter Fraser became renowned.

However, the complacency of New Zealanders, and the habits of dependency deriving from the long and close association with Britain and the more recent association with America, coupled with an unwillingness to face up to the changes in our relationship with Britain, produce a force of inertia which would be a major stumbling block to any attempts to adopt

such a stance. Without strong leadership New Zealand would be unlikely to make the move. Even with strong leadership, the hurdles of increased defence expenditure, increased foreign affairs expenditure, and most of all the sense of being on our own, would be major obstacles to overcome. It is certain, however, that a decision to cut ourselves loose from America would give New Zealand a sense of controlling its own destiny - while finding ourselves (because of circumstances beyond our control) at some future point in time, without the protection upon which we have depended, would be very damaging psychologically to New Zealand.

Do we then, take control of our own destiny now, despite the costs that this would entail, or do we wait until force of circumstances has taken the luxury of choice away from us? Such is the sort of question that New Zealand's leaders should be facing up to today.

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