Rejuvenating transatlantic strategic culture

Towards a new Atlanticism

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Introduction

In the midst of the Covid-19 pandemic new questions are being raised about how the transatlantic alliance can survive, adapt and evolve to meet the challenges of an increasingly turbulent century. NATO has initiated the NATO2030 process, a timely re-evaluation of its role in international affairs, and the European Union is implementing a range of new defence initiatives (EDF, PESCO, CARD) as well as developing a 'Strategic Compass', which aims to forge

a common threat perception across the EU membership. A renewed focus on strategic culture undergirds these new initiatives. In 2017, President Emmanuel Macron urged Europe to develop a common strategic culture underpinned by new capabilities.[2] More recently, HR/VP Josep Borrell has called for a "shared strategic culture and empathy to understand the different points of view" of EU member states,[3] and European Commission President Ursula von der Leyen said, "I believe we also need a PESCO in foreign policy – and a common strategic culture. There is no military short-cut to a sustainable order of peace."[4] In the 2020 Annual Report on CSDP, the European Parliament (EP) argued that, in order to achieve strategic autonomy, the EU needed to forge "a genuine strategic culture" by developing "adaptable, modular instruments which help bring strategic cultures closer together."[5]

Despite the declarative political will to build a more cohesive European strategic culture, there are some difficult questions to be answered. What is the current state of European strategic culture? What purposes will a new strategic culture serve? Will it translate into more effective political action in the field of security? And how will it be fostered and measured? The recent statements by EU leaders suggest different understandings of the concept. Throughout Europe's history, it has been a difficult task to develop a strategic culture from the top down in a complex and diverse continent.[6] If European strategic culture becomes more culturally distinct, and resultantly, different from the United States, this could adversely affect transatlantic relations. Despite a shared desire for enhanced European strategic autonomy, embedding cultural differences does not seem to

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2 M. Emmanuel Macron, President of France, Speech at the Sorbonne, September 29, 2017, http://international.blogs.ouest-france.fr/archive/2017/09/29/macron-sorbonne-verbatim-europe-18583.html.

3 European Parliament, Hearing with High Representative/Vice President designate Josep Borrell, October 7, 2019, https://www.europarl.europa.eu/news/en/press-room/20190926IPR62260/hearing-with-high-representative-vice-president-designate-josep-borrell.

4 Sumi Somaskanda, "Sounding the Alarm Bells", *Berlin Policy Journal*, February 16, 2018, https://berlinpolicyjournal.com/sounding-the-alarm-bells/

5 European Parliament, Annual report on the implementation of the Common Security and Defence Policy, (Rapporteur: Arnaud Danjean), 2020.

6 Asle Toje, *America, the EU and Strategic Culture: Renegotiating the Transatlantic Bargain* (London: Routledge, 2008).

be a constructive way to forge a closer alliance to meet the myriad challenges Europe and America will have to face together in the decades ahead.

In addressing these questions this chapter advances an argument for a transatlanticist strategic culture rather than a Eurocentric one. This would involve Europe working together with the US and Canada to embed common ideas, behaviours and practices within and between its defence and security establishments, and a conscious attempt to bridge ideational and behavioural divides that currently exist between the US and Europe. In outlining the benefits of such an approach, the chapter proceeds in three parts. The first part defines and introduces strategic culture as an analytical tool for understanding nation states, alliances and international organisations. The second part outlines some of the historical problems experienced in building a European strategic culture and makes the argument that a transatlantic strategic culture is both possible and preferable. The last section outlines how transatlantic strategic culture could be rejuvenated in a more concerted and collective way between the US and European allies, including through EU and NATO channels, military education, public diplomacy, and transatlantic strategic-cultural exchanges.

Why strategic culture matters

Strategic culture can be defined as the "sum total of ideals, conditional emotional responses, and patterns of habitual behaviour that members of the national strategic community have acquired through instruction or imitation and share with each other with regard to strategy."[7] Strategic culture scholarship emerged in the late 1970s as a response to the tendency to view Cold War foreign policy as a product of systemic structural characteristics (including the balance of power and material capabilities) and rational decision-making. These approaches failed to explain anomalies in how the great powers acted, including instances in which they seemed to act irrationally, and/or

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7   Jack L. Snyder, *The Soviet Strategic Culture: Implications for Nuclear Options, R-2154-AF* (Santa Monica, CA.: Rand Corporation, 1977), p. 9.

contrary to their national interests. In Vietnam, for example, a conflict that Europeans resisted becoming involved in, the long-held belief that America could win any war inhibited the US government from seeing the reality of their situation: that they were losing. In Cuba, in 1962, Khrushchev failed to recognise an idea and principle embedded in US political culture for centuries: the Monroe Doctrine; a deeply held aversion to any foreign involvement in the western hemisphere. Understanding strategic culture was therefore integral to avoiding crises, entangling conflicts and even nuclear war.

S **trategic culture also helps explain differences in threat perception among the allies.**

Fast forward to the post-Cold War era, and strategic culture can help to explain a number of issues that are pertinent to European and transatlantic security. The disagreement between the US and European states over the Iraq War (2003), for example, pointed to their broader behavioural and ideational differences.[8] These included a long-held American focus on war, power politics, punitive sanctions, and interventions (especially pertinent in the context of the George W. Bush presidency), and a preference in some European states (France and Germany in particular) for patient diplomacy, rules and regulations, as well as crisis management based on persuasion and incentives rather than the use of force.[9] Strategic culture also helps explain differences in threat perception among the allies. Nations view threats through cultural and historical lenses, coloured by previous social interactions with both friends and adversaries, and according to preconceived ideas. As recent research has highlighted, there are big differences in threat perception within Europe,[10] and indeed in the transatlantic area. According to the strategic culture approach, these differences result as much from ideas as from variations in geography and material capabilities.

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8 Robert Kagan, *Of Paradise and Power: America and Europe in the New World Order* (New York: Alfred J. Knopf, 2003).

9 Bernard E. Brown, "Are Americans from Mars, Europeans from Venus?", *American Foreign Policy Interests*, no. 24, 2002, pp. 481-89, p. 481.

10 Daniel Fiott, "Uncharted territory? Towards a common threat analysis and a Strategic Compass for EU security and defence", *EUISS Brief* no. 16, July 2020, https://www.iss.europa.eu/content/uncharted-territory-towards-common-threat-analysis-and-strategic-compass-eu-security-and.

The latest US cybersecurity strategy, for example, is based on the idea of "defending forward" through "persistent engagement" with US adversaries.[11] The US is committed to using offensive operations to disrupt adversaries beyond US borders, projecting power through cyberspace, and establishing a forward operating presence in adversary networks to deter cyber-attacks so that the US does not have to fight a cyber war 'at home'. If this sounds familiar, these types of ideas have been a constant feature of US defence policy throughout much of its history. In this sense, US cybersecurity strategy is not only a reaction to the cybersecurity threats at hand, but the confluence of a powerful stream of historical behaviours. The same could be said of the EU's approach to cyber. The EU's cybersecurity strategy is more defensive, more regulatory and legalistic, more oriented towards economic markets, based on resilience rather than deterrence and disruption, and much more normative, including encouraging responsible state behaviour. While some states in Europe are developing offensive capabilities, the overarching EU approach to cyber security is informed by and a product of history, political cultures and ideas and behaviours embedded in its institutions.

These examples show that strategic culture is more than just the way threats are perceived and includes the way actors behave. The antimilitarism that continues to exert a strong influence in German foreign policy, for example, is a result of a political culture accumulated over seven decades after World War II. This helps to explain the constancy of Germany's international behaviour in the post-Cold War era and how long-established patterns are not easy to change or disrupt. However, strategic culture can also form an exogenous context in which actors' interests are shaped. This approach suggests that international organisations such as the EU and NATO *can* and *do* create a political/cultural context that shapes their members' behaviours, beliefs (and even their interests). This aspect of how strategic cultures evolve is important because forging or instrumentalising strategic culture is exactly what European leaders are now proposing to do.

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11 Jeff Kosseff, "The Contours of 'Defend Forward' Under International Law," in Thomas Minárik, Slim Alatalu, Stefano Biondi et al (eds.) *2019 11th International Conference on Cyber Conflict: Silent Battle* (Tallin: NATO CCD COE Publications, 2019).

The US and Europe –
A world apart?

In recent references to European strategic culture, there has been a lack of attention to the seemingly obvious question: do we not have a strategic culture already? In fact, references to European strategic culture stretch back through much of Europe's post-Cold War history. In 2003, Javier Solana talked about the EU needing a European strategic culture that "fosters early, rapid, and when necessary, robust intervention".[12] This begs other questions: what has happened since then? If the new European leadership are arguing for a new strategic culture now, how will it be different from what Solana was proposing? What has happened to European strategic culture in the intervening years that makes such a change necessary?

These processes are viewed by some on the continent as the antithesis of what the EU was set up to do – to preserve peace – and by others as unnecessarily duplicative of NATO.

Perhaps the first reason for a lack of progress has been a broad resistance to militarising and securitising the EU's role in the world. In other words, the EU has a culture, but it is not particularly strategic. As the EU seeks greater strategic autonomy, the ability to act militarily independent of the US and pursues a more robust role in security alongside NATO, this will necessarily involve new military capabilities (PESCO/EDF), increased defence-industrial investment, dedicated defence budgets (notably through EDF), and even its own military command. These processes are viewed by some on the continent as the antithesis of what the EU was set up to do – to preserve peace – and by others as unnecessarily duplicative of NATO. These historical dynamics help explain why there has been resistance to reforming CSDP to give it a more robust role in security

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12   Paul Cornish and Geoffrey Edwards, "The Strategic Culture of the European Union: A Progress Report, *International Affairs*, vol. 81, no. 4, Royal Institute of International Affairs, July 2005.

and why the EU Battlegroups have never been deployed.[13] As analysts have pointed out as far back as 2005, a European strategic culture without the requisite military capabilities to draw on, will ring hollow.[14]

Another aspect to clarify about European strategic culture is that it has sometimes been used to serve national interests rather than collective ones. Such an approach can of course erode solidarity. NATO historically has embodied multiple strategic cultures, but through consensus-based decision-making and inclusivity of smaller powers,[15] these cultural divides have been reconciled. In this context, there are already some recent attempts to establish a European strategic culture, but it is questionable whether they are a good fit for a more transatlantic or indeed Europe-wide agenda for security and defence. Perhaps the most prominent example is the European Intervention Initiative (EI2),[16] a grouping of 14 states[17] which aims to build a strategic culture on which military operations could be based.[18] While a strategic culture based on conducting more autonomous military operations is consistent with the EU's level of ambition in the EU Global Strategy, limiting European strategic culture to a purely operational approach would seem to be an overly narrow application of the concept. The initiative appears to be based around the idea of prioritising effectiveness over inclusiveness and remains outside both NATO and EU structures and by invitation only. If the initiative is a vehicle that mainly serves French priorities in the Sahel and the

> **A European strategic culture without the requisite military capabilities to draw on, will ring hollow.**

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13 Michael Vincent, "EU Battlegroups: The European 'army' that politicians can't agree how to use", *ABC News*, November 16, 2018, https://www.abc.net.au/news/2018-11-17/the-european-army-that-has-never-been-in-a-fight/10506466.

14 Op. Cit., "The Strategic Culture of the European Union: A Progress Report", p. 802.

15 *The Harmel Review* (1966) was perhaps the most famous example.

16 Christian Molling and Claudia Major, "Why Joining France's European Intervention Initiative is the Right Decision for Germany," Egmont Institute, June 15, 2018, http://www.egmontinstitute.be/why-joining-frances-european-intervention-initiative-is-the-right-decision-for-germany/#:~:text=Claudia%20Major%20is%20senior%20associate,franco%20german%20relations%20and%20Nato.

17 Belgium, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, Spain, the United Kingdom, Sweden, Italy, Romania.

18 It is useful to distinguish between strategic culture and military culture here. The latter refers to the values, ideas and behaviours developed in militaries themselves. Strategic culture is a bigger concept, involving nations, international organisations, and wider policymaking processes.

Mediterranean, then it is unlikely to overcome ideational and behavioural divides within Europe which are among the reasons why European strategic culture remains underdeveloped. These include differences over European integration itself, the extent of EU defence cooperation in light of NATO's role and prominence, the nature and scope of strategic/humanitarian interventions, the threat from and response to terrorism, and different ideas around sovereignty, borders, migration, and democracy promotion.[19]

> **The Strategic Compass initiative could lead to duplications and turf wars instead of aligning perceptions on security issues.**

The EU's recent Strategic Compass initiative may help bridge the gaps in threat perception that exist on the continent, but, as analysts have pointed out, its meaning remains unclear and it is driven by Brussels rather than the member states.[20] The relationship this process would have with existing EU security policies is also undetermined, and identifying and analysing threats is not the same as developing common positions and policies to address them. As others have argued, the Strategic Compass initiative could lead to duplications and turf wars instead of aligning perceptions on security issues.[21]

A bridge to the US?

Given the inherent and historical problems in developing a European strategic culture, could a more transatlantic-focused approach be possible, even in the context of seemingly unprecedented tensions between the US and Europe? An important point in favour of such an argument is that the strategic cultures of the EU and US have already coexisted and overlapped for decades and have led to sustained security cooperation. These underlying foundations have not disappeared

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19 For a comprehensive view see: Heiko Biehl, Bastian Giegerich and Alexandra Jonas (eds.) *Strategic Cultures in Europe Security and Defence Policies Across the Continent* (Springer, 2013).

20 Sven Biscop, "From Global Strategy to Strategic Compass: Where Is the EU Heading?", *Egmont Security Brief*, no. 121, December 2019, https://www.jstor.org/stable/pdf/resrep21401.pdf.

21 Nicole Koenig, "The EU's strategic compass for security and defence: Just another paper?", *Policy Paper*, Hertie School, Jacques Delors Centre, July 2020.

as a result of Trump's efforts to disrupt them. In fact, the idea of Atlanticism has helped hold the alliance together during the Trump administration. The bipartisan resolution introduced in the US House of Representatives prohibiting appropriation or use of funds to withdraw from NATO, and a resolution prohibiting withdrawal without the approval of two-thirds of the Senate, were prominent examples.[22] 87% of Republican and 94% of Democrat foreign policy leaders and experts supported either the increase or the maintenance of the US commitment to NATO.[23]

It is also crucial to note that strategic cultures are not monolithic national constructs that are inflexible and unable to adapt and change. One of the more important developments in strategic culture theory has been the development of a literature on strategic subcultures.[24] This work recognises there are different cultural streams within a country, not one monolithic set of behaviour and ideas. While there may be a great deal of concern and consternation in Europe due to the Trump presidency, a culturally informed reading of Trump's foreign policy suggests that it is not unprecedented, but symptomatic and reflective of deeper trends in American political culture, including wanting to be free of 'entangling alliances', US exceptionalism, and long-established Jacksonian[25] impulses in US foreign policy, including populism, white nationalism and the assertive defence of US interests.[26] Trump is representative of one subculture in US politics that does not always (or indeed often) dominate the political landscape. If former Vice President Biden secures the presidency in November 2020, there could be a swift change in US foreign and security policy. Biden has committed to healing the divide in the transatlantic alliance, implementing a new partnership for democracy, forging ahead with multilateral solutions to security issues, and being consciously and

22 Jordan Tama, Joshua Busby et al., "Congress has NATO's back, despite Trump's unilateralism", *Washington Post*, April 3, 2019, https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/2019/04/03/congress-has-natos-back-despite-trumps-unilateralism/

23 Ibid.

24 Alan Bloomfield, "Time to Move On: Reconceptualizing the Strategic Culture Debate", *Contemporary Security Policy,* vol. 33, no. 3, 2012, pp. 437–61.

25 Related to the policies of Andrew Jackson, 7th president of the United States.

26 Anna Dimitrova, "Trump's 'America First' Foreign Policy: The Resurgence of the Jacksonian Tradition?", *L'Europe en Formation*, no. 382, 2017, pp. 33-46.

purposively internationalist as opposed to isolationist and protectionist.[27] These ideas are not just the policies of a Democrat presidential candidate, but the reflection of a more Atlanticist subculture that includes many Republicans, and which also exists as a subculture in many European countries, and indeed in Canada.[28]

> **Crucially, countries that exhibit Atlanticism contribute more to NATO burden sharing.**

It may feel like Europe and the United States are far apart at the moment, but, if strategic culture is about how decision-makers or elites view and perceive strategic affairs (ideas), there is actually a great deal of convergence across the Atlantic. There is already an Atlanticist culture at play in Europe based on "a shared normative understanding of a Western-led international order; a belief in the importance of the US in European security; and a preference for NATO as a platform for coordinating force planning and operational deployment."[29] Crucially, countries that exhibit Atlanticism contribute more to NATO burden sharing.[30] Perhaps more importantly, US leadership has been essential to European peace and security for over a century. In Bosnia, Kosovo, in fighting the war on terror in Afghanistan, and more recently, in opposing Chinese expansion and Russian aggression, the US has been a galvanising influence as often as a divisive one. With the exception of President Trump, US presidents have invariably been committed to European integration and cooperation, and people-to-people links between communities on the two continents are as important and strong as any other factor of transatlantic politics.[31] This history suggests that the US, under a different administration,

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27 Joseph R. Biden, jnr, "Why America Must Lead Again: Rescuing US Foreign Policy After Trump," *Foreign Affairs,* March/April 2020, https://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/united-states/2020-01-23/why-america-must-lead-again.

28 Ronald D. Asmus and Alexandr Vondra, "The Origins of Atlanticism in Central and Eastern Europe", *Review of International Affairs*, vol. 18, no. 2, 2005.

29 Jordan Becker and Edmund J. Malesky, "The Continent or the 'Grand Large?' Strategic Culture and Operational Burden Sharing in NATO," *International Studies Quarterly*, vol. 61, no. 1 (2017): pp. 163-80.

30 Bryan Frizzelle, "What makes a reliable ally? a fresh perspective on NATO, strategic culture and collective defense," *War on Rocks*, January 19, 2018, https://warontherocks.com/2018/01/makes-reliable-ally-fresh-perspective-nato-strategic-culture-collective-defense/

31 Rachel Rizzo, "The Transatlantic Relationship: A Call to the Next Generation," Heinrich Boll Foundation, July 30, 2020, https://eu.boell.org/en/2020/07/30/transatlantic-relationship-call-next-generation.

could again play a decisive leadership role in building a stronger transatlantic strategic culture and overcoming some of the fragmentation and barriers inherent in Europe-centric approaches.

Transatlantic strategic culture: pitfalls and opportunities

How, then, do we rejuvenate and instrumentalise a common transatlantic strategic culture to better serve transatlantic defence and security? And what frameworks, mechanisms, and cultural milieu are best suited for the task?

The first pathway forward is to have serious and sustained discussions about the threats the alliance faces, with a view to building common threat perceptions. Issues to focus on must include China, Russia, terrorism, cyber threats, emerging technologies, climate and energy security, and the spaces and interconnections between them. NATO needs to lead this effort, especially as it has historically acted as an agent in strategic culture building, by emphasising collective defence of the transatlantic area over national defence (itself an anti-populist and anti-nationalist message), and through socialising new members to the norms, practices and ideas of the alliance.[32] Teaching and persuasion were an integral part of the NATO enlargement process, and helped to embed liberal democratic ideas and behaviours (the key elements of strategic culture) in the post-communist states.[33] NATO could be doing the same thing again.

More specifically, the NATO2030 process, and the mutual construction of a new Strategic Concept, are prime avenues through which this could be achieved. NATO2030 could take a strategic approach to developing a transatlantic strategic culture and assess where and how ideas about security currently diverge and converge. This could involve a deeper debate around the meaning of transatlantic solidarity

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32 Alexandra Gherciu, "Security Institutions as Agents of Socialization? NATO and the 'New Europe'", *International Organization,* vol. 59, no. 4, 2005, pp. 973-1012.

33 Ibid, p. 977.

and the virtues of alliances themselves and even be linked to the EU's Strategic Compass Initiative.[34] If EU-NATO cooperation is a serious process then working towards complementary strategic cultures through these mechanisms should also be possible.

The advent of new high-level strategic dialogues is also a promising avenue for forging common ideas and behaviour, including the EU-US High-Level Dialogue on China.[35] These should not be seen as a short-term solution but part of an ongoing process of strategic culture rejuvenation. At the non-governmental level, if a strategic culture is going to be built that helps to align ideas and behaviours, the network of defence universities and colleges throughout the transatlantic area are also a vehicle for change. The role education plays as an avenue for instrumentalising strategic culture is vital and these organisations have important effects, including shaping ideas and beliefs, as well as the practices of military officers, including interaction with non-military security actors.[36]

Public diplomacy gets less attention in transatlantic policy than it should, but it presents clear opportunities and advantages.

Recognising the challenges of building a strategic culture from the top down, there are also public diplomacy channels that could be used to extend and reinforce common ideas, behaviours and practices across the transatlantic space. Public diplomacy gets less attention in transatlantic policy than it should, but it presents clear opportunities and advantages, despite the pressure on the public diplomacy budgets and institutional capacities of the US Department of State, NATO's Public Diplomacy Division and the new European External Action Service public diplomacy unit. Identifying opinion formers and shapers at the national level, in academia, and civil society, who are positively disposed to NATO and the Atlantic alliance, has proved an effective way to promote the value of

34 Thierry Tardy, "The internal nature of the Alliance's cohesion", *NDC Policy Brief* no. 1, October 2018, http://www.ndc.nato.int/news/news.php?icode=1204.

35 US Secretary of State Michael Pompeo, "A New Transatlantic Dialogue", Speech at the German Marshall Fund's Brussels Forum, June 25, 2020, https://www.state.gov/a-new-transatlantic-dialogue/

36 Tamir Libel, "From the sociology of the (military) profession to the sociology of (security) expertise: The case of European national defence universities.," *Defence Studies*, vol. 19, no. 1, 2019, pp. 62-84.

Atlanticism before, not least through Atlantic associations and young leaders' fora.

Moving this process beyond conventional governmental channels will be important. Emerging Atlantic leaders could be travelling to the Trump supporters' heartlands to engage in dialogue with Americans – this could help break perceptions that

> **Russia and China are clearly fuelling anti-EU, US and NATO narratives.**

Europeans are elitist, technocrats and free riders, and facilitate a dialogue on how NATO has advanced security and protected their countries from very real threats. The process could be reciprocated, and instrumentalised in a new EU-NATO public diplomacy programme that is based on building allied solidarity beyond the halls of power of Brussel and Washington. The people who are most sceptical, and prone to accept free riding narratives, or depictions of NATO as an aggressive and militaristic organisation, need to be persuaded of its positive impact. Malicious narratives need to be countered from the bottom up, especially in an era of social media subversion. If anyone doubts the relevance of the internet in shaping ideas about NATO, then one only needs to look at the propaganda website, the Strategic Culture Foundation, to realise the importance of vigorous public diplomacy to defend how the alliance is framed by its adversaries. Russia and China are clearly fuelling anti-EU, US and NATO narratives, and in doing so are building and sustaining anti-Atlanticist subcultures within Europe.[37]

NATO's own institutions and affiliated bodies could also do more to align ideas and threat perceptions around security issues. There are the centres of excellence, which already host officials on secondment from across the transatlantic area, and which could be used more strategically to discuss areas of convergence and divergence between Europe and North America. NATO's Allied Command Transformation processes also constitute a potentially useful avenue. The Strategic Foresight Analysis process, which identifies threats to the alliance across a longer timeline to 2025, the Future Alliance Operations Process (FFAO) and NATO Defence Planning Process could

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37 Alliance for Securing Democracy, "Hamilton 2.0 Dashboard," 2020, https://securingdemocracy.gmfus.org/hamilton-dashboard/

be instrumentalised more strategically to build common ideas, in-cluding involving other institutions such as the EU.[38]

Finally, strategic culture building needs to go beyond national militaries, or operations, and include conversations with civil soci-ety, the tech and defence industries, and the general public. Strategy itself involves a broader range of actors and has moved beyond the use of military force and coercion. Strategic culture building must do the same.

Conclusion

To many supporters of the transatlantic alliance the future of trans-atlantic relations looks bleak. If President Trump wins another term in November 2020, we could be talking about the end of NATO. But it will not be the end of Atlanticism. A clear reading of history reveals there has been a tendency to characterise the alliance as in crisis throughout its existence, while ignoring dynamics that keep the al-liance strong, including its self-healing tendencies,[39] strong support for it across the Atlantic at both the elite and public levels, and the enduring strength and relevance of its members' common identity, values and interests.[40] This analysis has suggested that one pathway towards keeping the transatlantic partnership strong is to focus on instrumentalising an Atlanticist strategic culture. This is an ambi-tious task, and one prone to volatile electoral politics and the forces of populism and nationalism. But there is a path forward for the com-munity of people who believe the US, Canada and Europe can continue to shape the international environment in ways that will enhance our collective security and increase the levels of peace and prosperity in the international system.

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38 Murielle Delaporte, "NATO's Backstage: Working the "3 Cs" Rules at Allied Command Transformation", *Defense.info*, April 21, 2018, https://defense.info/featured-story/2018/04/natos-backstage-working-the-3-cs-rules-at-allied-command-transformation/

39 Wallace J. Thies, *Why NATO Endures* (Cambridge: Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009).

40 Joe Burton, *NATO's Durability in a Post-Cold War World* (New York: SUNY Press, 2018).