Populism and the Domestic-International Nexus:

The Cases of the United States and Brazil.

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Abstract

Populism has become an increasingly important feature of politics in recent decades due to a rapid wave of populist parties spreading across the world from Europe to the United States, and South America. This motivates and necessitates renewed attention into understanding populism's functions, origins and implications for international relations. In particular, as state identities reconstruct themselves in line with domestic political shifts (in this case leading to new populist identities), the importance of understanding the process of identity formation increases. To engage this issue, this research examines and utilises interrelated ideas and theories including identity formation, the role of social groups, group psychology and constructivist international relations theory. This thesis will examine whether identity politics influence domestic politics, and in extension empower populist movements. This will analyse how the state acts as an extension of the people that reside within it. It also provides scope to explain how domestic regimes and their changing identities inform international state behaviourby, firstly, looking at the effects of populism in recent years on the state of democracy globally and, second, through two case studies: the US (during the Trump administration), and Brazil (during the the Lula and Bolsonaro administrations). It will determine whether or not there were significant changes to US/Brazil foreign policy as a result of populism, and if so, how this affects international relations. In doing so, this research advances understanding of how domestic populism has had a significant influence on international behaviour. Additionally this research aims to continue and strengthen constructivist analysis by building on the existing academic literature through the understanding of psychological theories. Through it's analysis it finds that populism has weakened democracy globally and that there are significant similarities between the foreign policy of right-wing populist parties in different countries, and differences between these parties and the foreign policy pursued by left-wing populists. It also identifies state behaviours, in terms of foreign policy, that align with principles of group identity behaviours and identifies areas where future research is warrented.

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Introduction

Populism has become an increasingly important feature of politics throughout the decades. Its episodic rise and fall often captures academic interest and motivates significant research into understanding its functions and origins. Definitions of populism rarely find consensus among academics, but Kaltwasser notes that there are main groups of thought around defining populism. This includes populism defined as a pathology, populism as a part of democracy, and populism as a form of democratic ambivalence (Kaltwasser 2011, 186 -196). Mudde adds that despite this lack of clarity across academic interpretations, one aspect that is generally agreed on is that populism says something about the relationship between people and the elite (Mudde 2004, 543). Recent years have seen what appears to be a wave of populism spreading across the world from Europe to the United States, and South America. Hungary and Poland have become populist strongholds in Europe, which the European Union struggles to contain, and South America itself has been a region where populist leadership has thrived. However, it is the victory of Donald J. Trump in the 2016 United States presidential elections that jarred the Western world the most profoundly. Being seen as the poster boy of liberal democracy, the sudden election of Trump caused significant anxiety due to the fact it signified, as many scholars saw it, a worrying deterioration of liberal democratic values and raised questions around whether democratic backsliding would spread and become a permanent feature of international politics. Through analysing various dimensions of populism, many liberal-leaning scholars conclude that populism acts as a pathology and therefore should be regarded as a risk to liberal democracy (Kaltwasser 2011, 188). This thesis will attempt to follow a different intellectual path that will explore the idea that populism is in fact a type of identity politics. By understanding this, and the related psychology of groups and the politics of identity, we can attain a deeper understanding between populism and its relationship with democracy.

Identity formation and the role of social groups supports constructivist claims, as it implies that the state will act as an extension of the people that reside within it. The international relations theory of constructivism claims that the world is largely made up of social constructs and therefore the world is a product of what people make of it (Theys 2018). This

implies that the political world (domestic and international) also demonstrates the same principle. Alexander Wendt claims that the “self-help” nature of international politics(where states rely upon themselves, sometimes via military means) is a product of what state actors and states choose to make of it (Mercer 1995, 230). It is also through the same method that constructivists see the solution to the anarchic international system that lacks a supranational authority.There is significant evidence in the field of psychology that supports the theory that groups act as extensions of individuals as they form groups based on similarities in identity. Scholars claim that the self-concept of an individual acts as an indicator of their belonging to a group, and these identities can abstract themselves to the national or supranational (e.g., the European Union, the West) (Branscombe 2010, 255). Through the use of group psychology, its relationship to populism, and constructivist international relations theory that explains how domestic interactions inform international state behaviour, we will explore two case studies: the US (during the Trump administration), and Brazil (the Lula and Bolsonaro administrations) in order to build on the argument that domestic populism has significant influence on international state interactions.

Ultimately, this thesis aims to examine populism and its influence on the domestic-international nexus. A qualitative case study methodology is utilised drawing upon both primary and secondary sources, including journals, books, news articles and a number of research studies from Pew Research. The theoretical foundation to consider domestic-international nexus includes constructivist international relations theory and insights from Psychology.

Chapter 1 begins to establish the theoretical framework for the thesis. It analyses the fundamental psychology of groups and the formation of identities through the exploration of pertinent literature. Following this, an exploration of identity politics and its historical roots to more modern iterations will be examined and applied to Francis Fukuyama’s theories about modern identity politics and how groups dictate domestic political discourse and action, which consequently allows for the rise of populist discourse and ideas.

Chapter 2 continues to establish the theoretical framework. It explores constructivist international relations theory through the literature of some of its prominent scholars. This chapter will illustrate the strength of constructivist theory through its understanding of

culture, ideas, and ideology and then provide some analyses of international events that demonstrate constructivist principles. Psychological theories examining group identity will also be utilised to demonstrate constructivism in relation to its roots in human nature and interaction. Later in this chapter, the limitations and critiques of constructivism as an explanation of international relations will be addressed and discussed in relation to the ideas explored in this chapter.

Chapter 3 brings the discussion to populism. Populism will be explored through a number of scholarly considerations which have formed different definitions and evaluations of populism, the source of its conception and its effect on democracy. The two forms of populism, right-wing populism and left-wing populism, will be explored conceptually as they illustrate different populist principles and demonstrate the ideologically fluid nature of populism. Populism will then be discussed in relation to its connection to identity politics in the form of an axis, and what observations that can be made from correlating attitudes and behaviours that are present across the world today.

Chapter 4 will then introduce the two case studies of the United States and Brazil. The aforementioned analysis and theories will be observed and discussed in relation to the populist regimes of both states and the consequent changes to their foreign policy. The United States will be examined during the Trump era (2016 - 2021), and Brazil will be analysed throughout both the Lula da Silva (2003 - 2010) and Bolsonaro eras (2019 - present). The findings will discuss any observations and patterns that emerged throughout the case studies, and these will be analysed in relation to the theories explored earlier in the thesis.

In conclusion, this thesis argues that identity politics, particularly in its populist form, influences how states interact internationally due to its direct influence on foreign policy development and thus illustrates constructivist principles on the international stage. These findings highlight the importance of understanding psychological principles of identity formation and group dynamics as human psychology directly affects domestic sentiment which influences how a state will operate internationally according to constructivist theory. From the case studies we will observe significant changes to foreign policy after a populist regime comes into power, however, differences between left-wing and right-wing regimes

are observed. Essentially, although there is significant evidence to support the theory that populism, as a form of identity politics, illustrates constructivist principles, there are differences in its manifestation depending on where the regime stands on the political spectrum, and these differences should be explored in further research. Ultimately this research will examine whether populism, as a form of identity politics, influences the domestic-international nexus and in what ways does it do so.

Chapter 1: Identity Politics and Populism: A Conceptual Consideration

Introduction

This chapter will examine identity politics in historical and contemporary contexts in order to illustrate the use of identity politics as a strategy for mainstream parties. This will be used to understand the importance of understanding identity politics in a modern setting in order to navigate arising challenges that come with the increased importance of identity in modern society. It will explore the theories and literature on the formation of identity through concepts such as self-categorisation and social narcissism. Additionally, the formation of groups based on the individual's self-concept will also be examined. Dynamics between different identity groups will also be explained through Sheriff's "Robber's Cave Study " in order to provide this thesis with foundational knowledge that supports constructivist international relations theory. Through understanding how personal identity abstracts itself progressively into the state and sometimes to supranational level we will uncover the inextricable link between human nature and state behaviour.

The Origin and Modern Adoption of Modern Identity Politics

Politics in some parts of the world finds itself entrenched in a seemingly endless culture war between competing political ideologies. Disputes between the right and the left have intensified in recent years, particularly with former United States President Donald Trump's utilisation of identity politics to rally supporters behind his populist ideology resulting in a substantial increase in political polarisation in the United States from his victory in 2016 to today (Milman 2019). Furthermore, Trump is part of a broader global pattern of growing populism, and it is plausible that the utilisation of identity politics by right-wing political parties has influenced the unstable international political landscape we see today. The recent populist spin on identity politics has come from right-wing extremist groups across the world and has radicalised groups within major states such as the United States, Brazil, India, Hungary, the Philippines, and Poland. Identity groups behave almost as an anchor amid social chaos.

There is evidence that the populist right reflects in these countries a response, to some degree, to a political form of action from the left, particularly from a left-wing adaptation of Marxism. Francis Fukuyama makes this case in his 2018 book *Against Identity Politics: The New Tribalism and the Crisis of Democracy*. In it he looked at how as the twentieth century drew to a close, the political left (in the West), particularly those with strong Marxist beliefs or whose beliefs derived one time from Marxism, came to realise that communism was indeed failing (Fukuyama 2018, 99). The fall of the Soviet Union in 1991 and China's failed great leap forward meant there was little left to support the proliferation of traditional Marxism and its objectives of facilitating greater economic equality (Fukuyama 2018, 99). The latter had been a common objective of not just Marxists but for centre-left and left-wing parties (and their intellectual supporters) in the Western world (even though many sought to achieve it not through revolution but, rather, through forms of social-democratic governance). As such, the left reorganised parts of its identity and agenda; it adopted the identity politics we see today which prioritised the needs of minority groups. Critics of this restructuring argued that in doing this, the left had forsaken issues related to class struggles, poverty, and other issues that exacerbate economic inequality (Bernstein 2005, 52). This led to the feeling that the working class, especially among the majority population, had been left behind (Fukuyama 2018, 99 - 100).

The culture wars arguably replaced intense economic argumentation as the main focus of many left-wing parties and their intellectual supporters. Although this represents a departure from the more explicit support of the economic interests of the working class, the fundamental idea of a class struggle now centres around the struggles of different identity groups within the same country. If we are to examine the United States, these groups traditionally have been people of African American descent, Jews, immigrants, and LGBTQ+ communities but can include more. Different identity groups may also overlap due to the nature of how people self-identify. There are identity descriptors from different fields of academia, including psychology and political studies, and these are the most salient disciplines cited and used in this research. Parts of political science focuses on nationalism, electoral politics, group mobilisation and ethnic conflict, while psychology is interested in the internal/psychological processes in which identity and self-perception are developed, and how this influences both group and individual behaviours (Renwick Monroe, Hankin, and

Bukovchik Van Vechten 2000, 419). Both fields contain important insights for examining modern identity politics and they are drawn on throughout this thesis. Today, different groups are seemingly locked in ideological combat whether it be between socially identifying groups, such as minorities vs. majorities, or politically identifying groups, such as Republicans vs. Democrats.

Eric Hobsbawm, supported by sociologist Daniel Bell, argued in 1996 that the emergence of modern identity politics is a result of the social upheavals (as two new identity-political varients: the gay movement and the modern women's movement of the 1960s') over the last quarter century (Hobsbawm 1996, 39). Specifically, this upheaval has caused a breakdown of traditional authority structures and social units resulting in the increased emphasis in some nations on ethnicity (Hobsbawm 1996, 40). Hobsbawm argues that nation-based and class-based politics that arguably dominated the politics of the twentieth century, as a result of this significant shift, have been weakened, with individuals looking for groups to belong to in response to the uncertainty of a shifting reality where traditions, social norms, and values are in constant flux (Hobsbawm 1996, 40).

Identities can be framed in a number of ways. Liu and Hilton claim that it is through history (as it provides a symbolic reserve of material) that groups can create shared meaning through social representations (Liu and Hilton 2005, 542). Some collective identities are negatively defined through ideas of "us" (or an in-group) in opposition to "them" (out-group), specifically that the in-group exists purely because there is an out-group, but there is not necessarily much common ground between the members of the "us" group (Hobsbawm 1996, pg.41). Liu and Hilton note that it is not often that a group will choose to self-categorise and often it is enforced by an out-group (Liu and Hilton 2005, 545). Other identity groups are defined based on physical and ideological grounds and other characteristics, such as sexuality. Identity politics often emphasises a single identity characteristic, such as gender, race or sexuality, which acts as a major influence on an individual's politics (Hobsbawm 1996, 41). This assumption is in face of the reality that individuals possess many identities. For example, one person may be a man, Indian, of high economic status, a Sikh, a father, a councilman and so on, and each of these are arguably separate but also inter-related identities that cannot easily be devolved back to a singular identity. According to identity politics, one of these characteristics ideally would be the

primary decider of their voting behaviour and to some degree their social behaviour. Potentially, this individual would vote based on what supports his ethnic identity if that factor operationally is most salient to him, or potentially his economic status may affect how he votes. Importantly, Hobsbawm makes the argument that this form of political thinking does not come naturally to the average citizen. He argues that when inhabitants of the United States were asked to declare their ethnic origins, 54% refused or were unable to answer, and from this he makes the claim that identity politics is primarily a political idea - the source of which comes from an outside influence on the individual (Hobsbawm 1996, 41). Hobsbawm uses the example of a hypothetical Protestant German scholar, Pater, who came to the realisation that, in the face of Adolf Hitler's identity politics, he would have to emigrate since, by the Nazi definition of identity, he was classed as a Jew despite not having realised this himself (Hobsbawm 1996, 42); a new identity was forced on him. This example illustrates, not only the transience of identity but also how politics utilising identity creates this sense of political identity in individuals. A more contemporary example of this influence can be found in President Joe Biden's 2020 presidential election campaign. In an interview in May 2020, he made the bold statement that in regard to African Americans who were undecided on who to vote for (Biden or Trump), that they "aren't Black" if they did not vote for him (Glueck 2021).

Writing in *Foreign Affairs*, the notable political science scholar Francis Fukuyama advanced our understanding of modern identity politics, adding that a majority of twentieth century left-wing politics centred around workers, trade unions, redistribution policies, and welfare programs, while the right focused on minimising government size and developing the private sector. But since the end of the Cold War, we see a shift in emphasis towards politics focused on identity (Fukuyama 2018, 91). It may be this shift in direction that has shaped the modern identity politics that we observe today. Fukuyama argues that the form of identity politics that we see on the right today has actually been stimulated by the left's particular brand of identity politics, more specifically, its utilisation of a more complex political correctness (Fukuyama 2018, 90 - 115). In support of this claim, some scholars claim that if politics focuses advocating for marginalised groups, then dominant groups which control the state will increase their social regulation (Bernstein 2005, 50). If this is to be believed, then the right-wings emphasis on race may be a by-product of this shift. Feher notes that in drawing from the same identity politics, the political right has adopted language

of victimhood (Bernstein 2005, 50). This relates to the fact that rules of social engagement and what in the present day is considered appropriate has similarly gone through a myriad of changes. For example, one of its latest iterations include correct use of pronouns in order to show respect to intersex or transgender individuals. Other examples include denial of certain views as a show of bigotry. This could be the denial of systemic racism, the denial of class struggles (i.e. women), the refusal to accept new genders or gender norms, and refusing the need to accept responsibility for historical grievances such as slavery.

The narrowing criteria of what is considered acceptable language or socially acceptable behaviours, not only on a base social level but also in terms of what is acceptable within media and entertainment such as comedy and film, have also been altered to follow these new norms. Part of the appeal of Trump to these voters lies in his lack of adherence to these new rules and norms as Trump was an outspoken critic of political correctness (Weigel 2016). His blatant disregard for polite speech and his weaponising of the right to freedom of speech found him favour with a group of people who were disillusioned by the new changes.

The Psychology of Identity Politics and Groups

Psychology and, more specifically, the link between the psychology of groups and individual identity are important vectors to consider when analysing modern identity political discourse. Groups and how groups are formed on the basis of identity is a foundational framework through which we can understand identity politics (and populism) alongside its manifestation in international politics, which will be explored later in the thesis. The way groups behave and interact with other groups has been extensively analysed in psychological research, particularly when they are analysed as in-group and out-group interactions and behaviours. How groups handle perceived threats, whether physical or ideological, have corresponding behaviours that shed light not only on how ideologically defined groups interact, but also on how politics, notably in populist states such as the United States and Brazil, have become so polarised. As groups are one of the centre points of modern political discourse, understanding their psychological foundations is crucial to understanding how politics both operates domestically and internationally today.

The concept of identity and its development has been debated by great philosophers since ancient Greece, and today we see it become a centre point in political discussion as well, which makes it an important concept to understand if we are to understand modern politics. There are two ways to examine identity: the Aristotelian and the Lockean traditions. The former focuses on the human as a biological organism, which is; a more scientific view; and the latter argues identity as separate from biology. Instead, it is seen as a psychological entity (Renwick Monroe, Hankin, and Bukovchik Van Vechten 2000, 420). An important aspect of the Lockean view is how he defines the human consciousness that provides input into one's identity. He makes the argument that consciousness is made up of one's body, one's immaterial soul (if there is one), and one's personal experiences and actions (including thoughts) (Strawson 2014, 30). The last point is interesting to consider when examining how groups form. If our experiences form our own consciousness or identity, then, logically shared experiences and thoughts are driving factors in group identity. Renwick Monroe, Hankin and Bukovchik Van Vechten (2000, 421) describe social identity as a conglomeration of attributes and social categories of the self-concept that may be shared with others, thus illustrating similarity. They also state that this concept of social identity emerged out of the study of group behaviour "where identity is now taken to refer to that part of an individual's identity that is supplied by membership in a group or groups and is influenced by the values and emotions of that group" (Renwick Monroe, Hankin, and Bukovchik Van Vechten 2000, 421).

Understanding Group Dynamics

Multiple studies have been undertaken in order to understand group dynamics. One notable study was Sherif's "Robber's Cave Study" carried out in Oklahoma and headed by Muzafer Sherif in 1954. This study centred around a group of 22 boys split into two teams. In a controlled environment in a state park, they carried out a number of tasks and orchestrated interactions. The point of this experiment was to analyse how a group develops, enters into conflict with other groups, and reconciles said conflict. Care was taken to ensure there would be no other external influence outside of group dynamics. The boys were from similar backgrounds, had similar height, weight, and athletic ability, and had similar experience levels in camping. What was not controlled were aspects that may have been relevant, race, upbringing and family values or religion. Whether these uncontrolled variables would have provided different results is unclear, but this is still useful to keep in mind. What is

interesting about this study is that, initially, the two teams were unaware of each other's existence as they were brought to the park separately. This fact, paired with the surrounding environment (a nature park), provides us with an organic look of group interactions on a more base level. It was initially discovered that when given tasks to complete as teams, these groups quickly began to develop a sense of group identity, going as far as creating team names and codes of conduct for the group. After this identity was developed and these two groups came into contact with each other, their interactions were immediately tainted with distrust. For one group (named the Rattlers), their initial reaction to discovering the other group was to attempt to run off the other group and challenge them. Despite the other team (the Eagles) not initially reacting the same way (perhaps due to unforeseen depleted numbers), the next day they began using derogatory terms in reference to the Rattlers and requested to be put in competition with each other. After the two teams were pitted against each other in a series of games and tasks in which the other team's success was determined by the other team's failure, there was a notable deterioration in their interactions. Derogatory speech was commonplace, and inflammatory behaviour escalated to burning the other team’s flags and raiding each other’s cabins, which eventually required staff intervention as one team began hoarding rocks to throw at the other to discourage more raids.

The last phase of this experiment was aimed at finding how to resolve conflict between the two groups and essentially undo the rivalry caused by pitting the two teams against each other. The initial idea was to give the groups non-competitive activities to observe whether an act such as watching TV together could foster more positive interactions. This proved to be a false hope as the groups refused to mingle and reverted to engaging in hostile behaviours to demonstrate their dissatisfaction with the arrangement. The solution in the end was closely tied with what ignited the group rivalry. As Sherif soon discovered, just like how a negative interdependence was enough to create volatile intergroup dynamics, a more positive interdependence was key to fostering more harmonious group interactions. Giving the groups tasks like fixing the water supply to the camp and fixing a truck meant to deliver food supplies to the camp, both of which were essential to the survival of both teams, encouraged the two groups to put aside their differences for a while and encouraged higher levels of cooperation. Unsurprisingly, after being coerced into working together for a number of tasks, the two groups began to interact positively, and aggressive behaviour towards

each other diminished. As demonstrated in this experiment, Sherif's theory was that positive or negative group interactions or dynamics were reliant on whether the group perceived their success or downfall to be dependent on or threatened by the out-group and whether the goals of the in-group conflict with the goals of the out-group (Ispas 2013, 7 - 8). However, Ispas also notes that despite these variables indicating conflict rivalry and escalating aggressive behaviours, they were not what initially ignited the ingroup and outgroup dynamics; simply assigning them teams (identities) was the catalyst to rivalry in the first place (Ispas 2013, 8). In essence, this aspect of the experiment illustrates how when people have a designated identity (chosen by themselves or otherwise), there is a tendency to develop similar in-group and out-group behaviours based on this identity, and when given encouragement by an outside player, this can escalate into intergroup conflict and rivalries.

What is particularly salient about this experiment is how it illustrates in-group and out-group dynamics in modern identity politics. It is not difficult to see how the teams could represent different identity groups prominent in today's politics, whether they be racial, religious, immigrant or others such as LGBTQ+. What this study illustrates is that once identities of groups are formed, there is a natural human instinct towards rivalry and competition. In terms of identity politics, this may be competition for political favour or having their group's concerns be central to a political agenda. In a negative context, this potentially can mean these groups see their own group's success as being reliant on some kind of loss from the other group, or negative interdependence. If these identity groups follow the same patterns as the boys from the experiment, then arguably there is an increased risk for conflict and at a primal level, lowered natural instinct for cooperation. Now for argument's sake, let's say the media and politicians represent the staff in Sherif's experiment. They have the ability to sway the perceptions the groups have of each other. They can encourage and increase levels of rivalry and negative intergroup perception, whether it be to gain political success or to sell stories, but they also have the power to temper rivalry and encourage cooperation. These outside players may have a variety of motives behind facilitating this environment. They may even, in some cases, perceive themselves as a part of one of these groups and are acting in order to protect their in-group's beliefs and ideas or even the members of these groups themselves. A politician's goal, for example, is to persuade various societal groups to vote for them in elections. The media on the other hand, may have personal

vested interests in the outcomes of elections and of the subsequent policy making, or they may be sensationalising these issues in order to sell stories. Motives by individual or conglomerated actors can vary, and to understand the behaviours of these actors would require case-by-case analysis.

This research assumes politicians and media fulfil the role the staff played in the experiment, and by that logic they are also partially responsible for the polarisation and increased hostility between identity groups by encouraging negative in-group vs. out-group behaviours. In the same way, media and politicians have also shown incredible effectiveness in using national identity to change the in-group and out-group, from being a domestic issue to an international one. An example of this can be seen in the Biden administration. President Biden, and liberal media outlets in the United States that support the president, have increasingly sought to build on Trump's anti-China rhetoric, solidifying and deepening the bonds of the United States in-group in opposition to the Chinese out-group (Liptak 2021). It could be argued that the in-group and out-group strategy has worked in terms of reducing domestic unrest, particularly at a time where tensions are high due to internal pressures such as the COVID-19 pandemic, and the Black Live Matter movement which directs citizens focus on internal societal issues. One of the more notable uses of this was Hitler blaming various out-groups, particularly the Jewish population, for economic suffering and social ailments in post-World War 1 Germany. The purpose was to utilise this identity group to unify the German population and distract them from the true cause of economic woe. This strategy worked, and with the utlisation of the media (which became part of the Nazi propaganda machine), Hitler was able to use identity politics to facilitate out-group blame and rivalry. He painted Jewish economic success as the obstacle to Aryan German success. Although an extreme example, it is not difficult to draw parallels between the cave experiment and identity group dynamics both historical and modern. This suggests the rhetoric and behaviour of the Trump administration and the Biden administration may be to establish a consensus that creates a binding layer across United States society during a time of domestic instability and ideological tension between domestic groups within the country.

The Role of Tribalism and Social Narcissism

A related topic to identity politics and group psychology is tribalism, and there is a lot of crossover between these three topics in the academic literature. To understand tribalism and identity politics, we must first understand group psychology. Identity politics in modern society is a manifestation of these three forces (Tribalism, social narcissism and group psychology). While Sherif's experiment provides insight into the development of groups, and how internal and external parties can influence them, it does not necessarily illustrate how groups behave in different contexts and why. Sherif's experiment examined humans at a base, primal level and group behaviours and development, but it used boys who were only 11-years-old as the subjects. When we look at tribalism or group dynamics in the context of identity politics, we are mostly dealing with older and, generally, more educated subjects. We could argue that adults or at least a grouping of adults should be more aware of group bias or dynamics and therefore behave slightly differently to how the boys did. For example, perhaps a highly educated group of adults, placed in a boardroom, may not feel the need to create team names, or if they are put in immediate contact with another group without context, they may not feel the need to challenge them to a competition of some kind. Identity politics, however, still utilises the same practices of group formation, just based on aspects of identity akin to how the experiment operated in a context where in-group and out-group psychology emerged.

Arguably, different identities of these groups are enforced with their own code of conduct or understanding of beliefs and values that group members must adhere to in order to protect the dignity and integrity of the group. In the case of identity politics, these values are usually social/political ideologies. As political ideologies and systems sit along a spectrum, the emergence of hard-line groups that sit on the far left and far right, which we see in the United States today are a product of polarisation. Politics, especially when polarised, manifests as a kind of tribalism in itself, identity politics by extension, and is the encouragement of a kind of tribalism with the moderate middle being increasingly hollowed out or captive to the far left and the far right. In self-categorization theory, it is argued that there are different levels of self-categorization, and this is how groups can define themselves. An individual self-concept indicates their belonging to a greater group, and this group can appear to be differentiated by a number of categories. Different group identities manifest in different levels of self-concept abstraction, and this is particularly important as an individual's have specific ideas of what it means to be a part of a different socially

identifying group (Branscombe 2010, 255). This concept includes the different social identities that can be national and/or supranational (the European Union), NATO, Europe, the West, etc.), which illustrates the vast categories of group identity that can be produced by individuals (Branscombe 2010, 255). If groups produce in-group and out-group dynamics and interactions on a comparatively minute social level, and there is evidence to show group identities manifest on global scales such as the European Union or the West, then arguably some of the interactions we observe playing out on the international stage may be manifestations of this same group psychology.

When it comes to group dynamics and protection, social narcissism is another important aspect to factor in. Supporting the above points about protection of the group identity and ideals, psychologists also believe politically identifying groups exhibit social narcissism that influences groups' behaviours, specifically in the context of politics. A study by Peter Hatemi and Zoltan Fazekas shows there are equal levels of narcissism exhibited by both self-identified Democrats and Republicans, but the areas in which narcissism was expressed varied with the former being in exhibitionism and the latter being in entitlement (Hatemi and Fazekas 2018, 873). The importance of social narcissism (also known as collective narcissism) is how it affects in-group and out-group interactions and, by extension, political identity groups. A person's personal habits and thinking patterns may be reflected in how groups behave. Some scholars believe that there is a link between an individual's motivation to maintain a positive self-image (self-enhancement) and avoid negative self-perceptions (self-protection), and the protection of groups that the individual identifies with. Individuals process information in a biased way in order to flatter the self, and this has been identified by researchers to manifest in certain cognitive, behavioural and affective patterns aimed at maintaining a "positive illusion" (Hepper, Gramzow, and Sedikides 2010, 782). Self-enhancement and self-protection, although serving the same purpose, operationally manifest in different contexts. Self-enhancement operates routinely, almost as a base way of functioning, while self-protection activates situationally where there is a need to protect one's sense of self (Hepper, Gramzow, and Sedikides 2010, 782). Scholars have also proposed that these behaviours are indicative of a greater adaptive evolutionary function; however, further investigation into the motives of self-enhancement and self-protection would be needed to confirm the validity of this argument (Hepper, Gramzow, and Sedikides 2010, 782). Cognitive strategies employed by individuals to

regulate a positive illusion can be observed in the way people perceive themselves. Most people hold unrealistically positive views in areas such as their capabilities, positive vs. negative trait possession ratio, among other examples, and this positive self-perception can be extended to their views of relationships and groups associated with themselves (Hepper, Gramzow, and Sedikides 2010, 784). Additionally, people also hold the perception that they are less susceptible to bias. This may also manifest in valuing personal introspection about one's intentions behind their actions when concerning the self, but using only behaviour to judge others (Hepper, Gramzow, and Sedikides 2010, 784). People will perceive success, their own or their group's, with their own actions or contribution, while they will outsource the cause of any failure. This extends to how they receive positive and negative feedback; the former will be received positively, and the latter will be perceived through a critical lense (Hepper, Gramzow, and Sedikides 2010, 784 -785).

Along with cognitive strategies, behavioural strategies are also employed to enhance and protect the self. People will choose to interact and strengthen relationships with individuals that provide flattering information, for example positive feedback. They will also choose to associate with those most similar to themselves (Hepper, Gramzow, and Sedikides 2010, 785). Socially, people will draw attention to their positive traits rather than negative ones, but they will admit to negative traits if they are seen as inconsequential or non-threatening to their self-concept. These are known as "pockets of incompetence" (Hepper, Gramzow, and Sedikides 2010, 785). Additionally, before evaluative tasks, people may engage in behaviours that self-handicap or self-defeat. This could look like substance use or procrastination and will be used in order to have an external factor to blame failure on (Hepper, Gramzow, and Sedikides 2010, 786). These behaviours of self-enhancement and protection are salient within the discussion of this thesis because these individual behaviours may act as predictors of group behaviours. Hepper, Gramzow, and Sedikides (2010) indicate that related to these behaviours is the fact that individuals are eligible to derogate both individuals and groups that they do not belong to. Furthermore it is argued that the desire to self-enhance may play a part in stereotyping and prejudice, especially given that these behaviours simultaneously elevate one's self-view and worlds view while derogating those of other people and groups (Hepper, Gramzow, and Sedikides 2010, 786). If we argue that there is a link between individual and group behaviours, then exhibiting behaviours of self-enhancement and self-protection should also be observable. Some

findings from scholars may illustrate this link through the concept of identity fusion. This is a theory in which an individuals “fuses” with a group, and their social and personal identities become functionally equivalent (Swann Jr et al. 2009, pg.995). In this study by Swann Jr. (2009), there is a focus on how an individual’s self-conception becomes fused with that of a group (identity fusion) and can foster extremist group behaviours. What is particularly important to this thesis is not the extremist behavioural side of the argument (although this may link well to some areas of populism), but how the identity of an individual can be absorbed into that of a group's identity. Although this process of blurring the lines of personal identity and group identity is more common relationally (familial, friendships, etc.), it is not limited to these contexts and can be observed in collective identities (political, national) (Swann Jr. et al. 2009, 995).

Some studies argue that personal identities are made up of traits, and groups are formed on the basis of likeness of individuals based on these traits (physical, spiritual, mental, etc.) An individual's affiliation with such a group involves their self-concept being in line with the prototypical member of the group (Swann Jr. et al. 2009, 995 -996). Arguably, if there is strong evidence to support an individual's behaviours and traits being reflected or mimicked in group behaviours, then perhaps an individual's cognitive and behavioural patterns of self-protection and enhancement may also be a part of this process. This connection may further reinforce the findings of the cave experiment as to how groups interact and behave and how political and nationalist groups behave. This study of identity fusion confirms that an individual's relationship with the group, when having fused identities, involves the individual feeling that their personal outcomes and those of the group are equally important, and this motivates individuals to develop a responsibility to act on behalf of these groups (Swann Jr. et al. 2009, 996). The context of this study was on extremist groups, but arguably these same motivations may be present in other political group identities. Examples of these could be the involvement of protests such as Black Lives Matter, the Tea Party movement, the objection of certain conservative speakers on college campuses by liberal students, and groups such as Antifa. If it is true that an individual engages in self-enhancement and protection behaviours, and when such an individual fuses their identity with a group their identities become functionally equivalent, then it is logical to conclude that behaviours and interactions between groups mimic how individuals interact

on a one-on-one basis. Conclusively, the group's behaviours are an extension of the individual, and in examples such as the cave study, the group's behaviours.

Questions are often raised as to how voters split into groups, why polarisation develops so quickly, and why identity politics has been an increasingly observable trend, according to Fukuyama, throughout the ages. It would be too simple to argue that group identities form directly out of fear or hatred although they may be a part of it. Some psychologists argue it is because tribalism is an inextricable part of human nature (Clark et al. 2019, 587 - 588), and these political trends and patterns are simply an extension of this. In addition, identity politics emerges based on human nature and is either discouraged or encouraged by other factors such as politicians, economic anxiety and so on, which we will explore later. Previously in this chapter, we discussed the idea of the populism-identity politics axis, and how these two political ideas somewhat coalesce. Populism has surged in recent decades across the world and has inspired an influx of academic literature in order to understand it. Populism is understood by many to lie on the political right, but equally important and no less prominent is its manifestation on the political left. Understanding the extent of the similarities and differences between these two populist forms is important to understanding populism's functionality and flexibility.

Conclusion

Conceptions of identity and group identity are important in understanding the fundamental nature of human beings. As most of the world that exists is built up of social constructs, including the world of politics, understanding human interaction in the areas of an individual's self-concept and how this informs and predicts group behaviours is important to factor in when analysing how the political world operates. In an article pertaining to group psychology in the area of tribalism, the authors examine how in the political realm, winners (that represent groups) decide the allocation of resources and the priority of issues that can make or break a group's success (Clark et al. 2019, 588 - 589). This is also supported by Fukuyama who argues that one cause for the rise of populist ideas lies in the rural White majority in the United States. This stemmed from this group feeling their issues were being ignored in favour of those affecting minority groups in society (Fukuyama 2018, 95 - 96). This raises the stakes in the outcomes of politics because to win is to protect the group who represents your own identity. This chapter used psychology to build on scholars analysis of

modern identity politics and the major shifts that have occurred in politics throughout the years. As discussed earlier, groups act as an extension of an individual's identity and operate in a way that defends it. In the next chapter, this theory will be used to strengthen constructivist international relations theory.

Chapter 2: The Relationship between Domestic and International Politics: The Identity and Populist Factors

Introduction

This chapter explores constructivist international relations theory through a number of prominent scholars who have contributed to constructivist theory such as Alexander Wendt. Samuel Huntington's *Clash of Civilisations* underpinned some key ideas of constructivism from the point of view that states who share significant identity traits tend to gravitate towards each other. Huntington also emphasises the importance for states to form identity and the factors they use to achieve this. This research will then be related back to the theories explored in chapter one relating to identity formation and group identity before employing both contemporary and historical examples to support these ideas. The last section of this chapter acknowledges and discusses various critiques of constructivist theory, particularly those from scholars of realist international relations theory.

Domestic Sentiment and International Policy

What is Constructivism?

Constructivism is an integral international relations theory related to the core points of this thesis. Constructivism focuses on how people and their social interactions shape their identities and thus their politics. In extension of this, I will examine whether the behaviours at the international level are a product of the same dynamics. Constructivists argue that the world is largely made up of social constructs, and therefore the world ends up being a reflection of what people make of it and what meaning people attach to the material world (Theys 2018). This places it at odds with the material emphasis of realist international

relations scholars. Alexander Wendt, a prominent scholar of constructivism, emphasises that the competitive “self-help” culture of international politics is determined by what states and state actors choose to make of it, and not an intrinsic part of international politics (Mercer 1995, 230). This theory argues that identities are made, not a given, and are developed through social interactions with others, and this influences how states interact and define themselves (Mercer 1995, 230). Constructivists, in opposition to realists who argue that international politics is immutably structured as a “self-help” system, believe that international politics has the potential to develop into an “other-help” system where a state’s security is viewed as the responsibility of all (Mercer 1995, 230).

One related view of the world is Samuel P. Huntington’s *Clash of Civilisations* (albeit penned and published prior to Wendt formalising constructivism as an international relations theory), which theorises that civilisations and cultures have replaced traditional state identities and have become a driving force behind international politics after the Cold War. This concept is important because it illustrates the social/cultural influences on how states interact. Huntington argued that global politics was being redefined along cultural lines where countries and people are brought together or torn apart by cultural boundaries (ethnic, religious and civilisational) (Huntington 1996, 125). In the post-Cold War setting, Huntington argued that there was a departure from political leaders having the ability to change their states alignments’ based on their perceptions on matters of security, balances of power and ideological preferences to a system where cultural identities dictated a state’s antagonisms and chosen associations (Huntington 1996, 125). Huntington explained that during the 1990s’ there was a mass scramble for self-determination by states as former Yugoslavian states searched for individual identities in order to solidify their new freedom. And a number of other states, such as the United States, the United Kingdom, China, South Africa, and so on, also sought to develop and evolve identities (Huntington 1996, 125 - 126). Other implications of constructivist theory and general theories on emotion and international politics is the perspective that fear is a driving force of the security dilemma instead of traditional structural theories (like realism) and how this may shape how theorists and scholars understand state behaviour (Crawford 2000, 119).

Constructivist IR theory in international politics draws attention to states' threat perceptions and how threat perceptions differ based on which players are involved in an a particular

action or event. For example, if the United Kingdom announces that it is building up its nuclear weapons programs, the United States will feel less threatened than if a country the United States has antagonistic relations with, such as China or Russia, does the same. A contemporary example of this happening is the West's fear or reaction to North Korean nuclear weapon programs. In comparison to the reaction to Australia announcing its desire to develop nuclear powered submarines, North Korean nuclear weapons are regarded differently by Western nations: they are viewed as a threat. In another example, Russia's invasion of Ukraine has been perceived as a threat and a gross violation of liberal norms and values, whereas states such as China and India do not share the same threat perception. Additionally, although the United States spends a significant portion of its budget on the military and has historically exerted this military might overseas a number of times, this is not perceived as threatening to states such as New Zealand, Australia and the United Kingdom, but it is seen as a threat by states such as China, and Russia. It is safe to assume that the same states that do not perceive the United States to be a threat due to these actions have voiced concerns about the increasing Chinese military presence in the Indo-Pacific and have been vocal about the need to denuclearise the Korean peninsula. Constructivists would argue that the differing threat perceptions by various states to the same material capabilities is due to historical interactions between these states (and the presence or absence of alliances that, in turn, have followed from historical interactions), which is preceded usually by common interests and can extend into longer-term relations underpinned by a deeper level of social, economic, and cultural ties as - compared to a pattern of hostile relations between states that leads to a perception of threat. In essence, social relationships between states over time inform how states view their own identity and the identity they assign to other states (friend, partner, enemy, etc.), which in turn influences how they will behave in relation to each other. These historic interactions, or compatible political ideologies, and shared sentiment among state leaders and citizens inform the security dilemma and how the actions of other states are perceived.

Constructivism and Identity Groups

The previously discussed psychological underpinnings of identity politics in Chapter 1 can be related to constructivist theory because constructivists rely on arguments based on culture, ideas and social interactions. It is important to understand the individual's

self-concept and how this translates into group dynamics because constructivism in international relations acts as an extension of this theory. To understand these concepts, psychology becomes an indispensable tool in dissecting how these concepts interact and explain international politics. James Goldgeier claims that a significant issue with analysis of international politics, particularly in regard to explanations and predictions, is a failure of academics to take seriously the influence of psychology both on decision-making and in intergroup relations (Goldgeier 2007, 137). Goldgeier adds that IR theories, constructivism included, downplay the role of psychology in international relations and fail to address the psychological underpinnings of ideas, beliefs, perceptions and identity (Goldgeier 2007, 139). Just like how groups psychologically act as an extension of an individual's identity, I argue the state behaves as an extension of the domestic population's identity. Thus, state interactions that we observe may have their roots in group identity and the psychology of groups may be useful as a predictor of state behaviour. This is backed up by the theory of self-categorization, explored above, that suggests that an extension of an individual's self can abstract its way not only to the state level but also into the realm of super states, and global identities such as "the West".

While people find identity through blood relations, common beliefs, their faith, and family, Huntington argues that states find identity through ancestry, religion, language, values, and institutions while distancing themselves from those who do not share these (Huntington 1996, 126). This is not dissimilar to the previously explored group identity theories in psychology outlined in Chapter 1 where it was clear that people form groups through shared characteristics (many of which are related to the ones Huntington described) and demonstrate in-group vs. out-group rivalries or, in the case of civilisations, distancing behaviours. When comparing group psychology theories, there is strong correlation between how groups behave as an extension of an individual and their identities and how states behave as an extension of their people. States act in defence of the beliefs or codes of conduct that define them, which is reminiscent of behaviours of self-enhancement and self-protection that individuals may engage in, not only for themselves but also for the group that acts as an extension of their personal identity. As an example of the salience of identity, Huntington argued that the success of NATO is in part due to the common values and philosophy (excluding more recent developments in which states like Poland, Hungary and Turkey have slid towards more illiberal forms of governance) of the member states

(Huntington 1996, 131). This indicates that NATO's success and staying power after the collapse of the Soviet Union may not have been possible without these unifying identity-level characteristics of its member states. This aligns with the concept of group survival, which is dependent on cohesion between group members.

Constructivism in Action

One particular aspect of international politics that supports constructivist claims is alliances or partnerships. There are some relationships between states that have more or less remained consistent throughout history. Scholars such as Michael Barnett argue that common identity best explains alliance patterns (Desch 1998, 143). We can compare the relationships between Anglosphere states on one hand and the tenuous relationships the Anglosphere states have with culturally divergent states that, historically, they have had difficult relations with, such as Russia and China. The difference between these groupings is initially obvious - they have different language, political norms and values, culture and overall contrasting political ideologies. On one side, liberal democracies (including the Anglosphere nations) and authoritarian states (to varying degrees) on the other, a shared English language and Chinese and Russian, English cultural heritage (which has developed into multicultural societies) and Slavic and Sino cultures that are more homogenous. Anglosphere countries have a long-shared history of both British colonisation and consequent cooperation and non-threatening interactions. Cooperation and friendly relations appear to have prevailed despite there being relational hiccups or bumps. Anglosphere states have almost always been allies when it comes to conflicts such as World War 1 and World War 2. They have aided each other in humanitarian efforts and have a history of trade. Despite incidents such as the US suspending its military obligations to New Zealand through the ANZUS treaty in 1985 due to arguments over New Zealand's opposition to nuclear weapons, and it's refusal to join the invasion of Iraq in 2003, these states have managed to maintain friendly and cooperative relations. New Zealand does not fear attack, invasion or sanctions from the United States. This can be partly due to New Zealand rarely stepping out of line in terms of what is acceptable state behaviour in Washington DC's view (e.g., a military build-up or human rights violations); however, continued cooperation within areas of military and intelligence importance (Five eyes) implies that a level of trust exists despite previous relational obstacles.

In comparison, particular Anglosphere states such as the United States and the United Kingdom, and more recently Australia, have had tenuous relationships with both Russia and China mostly due to ideological differences (the constructivist argument), and despite attempts to smooth out these issues, they appear to be locked in a cycle that is propelled forward by decades of mistrust and competing values. This is despite the fact that, historically, there has been significant cooperation between these states in areas such as trade and during conflicts, such as World War 2. There have been numerous attempts by individual Anglosphere states to foster more positive relations with China and Russia, yet in the face of cultural or ideological differences, these attempts are quickly undone. For example, New Zealand, who has fostered a positive bilateral relationship with China in recent decades, has recently run into problems due to issues regarding China's actions in Hong Kong and human rights violations in Xinjiang (Craymer and Morrison 2021). Arguably, despite China being an important partner of New Zealand (in terms of trade, Beijing is more important than Anglosphere states to New Zealand's prosperity), New Zealand, although attempting to hedge its relations, often leans more to support anglosphere states on important issues. This could be partly due to ideological differences and language barriers, but what it illustrates is that these shared characteristics sometimes override arguably purely rational realist behaviours (preventing deterioration of relations with important trade partners) in order to preserve the identities and values of the group (the Anglosphere). It could be argued that historical negative interactions, perhaps, were more numerous than the positive ones, resulting in an inability (or lack of motivation) to reconcile differences; to constructivists, a history of negative interactions or positive interactions can affect future prospects for relations between states.

Constructivism also holds that value systems and ideologies play a role in predicting states' international behaviour. The question is whether the ideology of a state, or type of political system, is indicative of how a state will interact with other states. In short, there does appear to be a correlation between how states' domestic ideologies affect relations with other states. This is partly due to perceived threats. If a state finds another state's ideology or operational political system to be inherently threatening to its own, this will affect the level of trust and therefore potential for cooperation between the states. This is a concept observed by scholars when examining behaviours of liberal democracies towards one another. Despite liberalism espousing ideas of how economics, institutions and cooperative

behaviours can mitigate aggression from states (Meiser 2018), some scholars argue that liberal democracies themselves are prone to showing aggression towards states that do not share this ideology. Michael Desch makes the argument that for states such as the United States, it is its liberal ideology that compels the US to spread its values globally (Desch 2007/8, 8). Desch notes that if the war on terror, as an example, was not considered to pose an existential threat to the United States' way of life (a case George W. Bush made), then the United States would have responded more moderately (Desch 2007/8, 8). This is particularly pertinent when you think about the in-group and out-group psychology discussion in the previous section due to their claims about groups needed to ensure that aspects such as beliefs, and values are protected by the group to ensure the groups survival (arguably Desch's argument demonstrates this aspect of group psychology).

As previously discussed, group survival, particularly within the realm of politics and by extension identity politics, requires the safeguarding of the group's values, ideas, and rhetoric. To ensure the group's success, participants must buy into the ideas and boundaries of the group, not only to protect the group, but to safeguard their own values and belonging to the group. The state, in this example, is its own extension of the group/citizenry within it, and therefore its success often can be seen to be negatively codependent on another group's success or failure. For example, arguably China uses extreme censorship methods to prevent domestic values from being threatened by competing states. The citizens' faith in national values is valuable to internal cohesion and the continuance of the success of the state (survival of the group) but also creates an environment where state ideology and systems may be changed. Lack of exposure to competing ideologies arguably makes it less likely to facilitate a breakdown in unity.

Chinese communism is not the only area China feels it could be at risk; its authoritarian regime also may come under fire if domestic sentiment turns in favour of liberal democracy. Andreas Krieg explains that regimes come under threat in the event of the current regimes being unable to adequately satisfy the needs of the citizens, which causes said regime to lose legitimacy and subsequently motivates citizens to look for other options, opening the regime to criticism from its antagonists (Collins and Krieg 2019, 208). China's clinical utilisation of censorship and control over the arts and education ensure that citizens remain faithful to the government's values, or at least it ensures that antagonists are unable to gain

a footing. The same may also be said for the United States, although without the same level of censorship common in authoritarian states; evoking ideological patriotism has become a defining characteristic of United States politics. The United States has remained the world's poster boy for liberal democracy, but it has also demonstrated similar protective behaviours over its ideology. Domestic sentiment and patriotism revolve around the idea of the United States being a free country with high levels of freedoms and protections for its civilians. The US being a liberal democracy, also finds its ideology in conflict with states with more authoritarian regimes (as conceptualised by Desch), more notably China and Russia and various Middle eastern states, with whom historically, they have either had conflicts or tenuous relations. This is observable both historically and in the present day. Mao's China, the Soviet Union, and dictatorships in states such as Iraq not only historically paint a picture of the United States having volatile relationships with authoritarian regimes, but as the United States continues to struggle to warm relations with the same states (the Soviet Union, now Russia), arguably illustrates a pattern of behaviour when states have seemingly incompatible ideologies. Liberalism, in terms of international relations theory, observably struggles to interact peacefully with states that do not share the same political ideology. The United States' historical pattern of military intervention in authoritarian states can attest to this. Comparatively, it would seem authoritarian states also have tenuous relationships with states that differ ideologically.

Limitations of Constructivism

As with many broad theories, such as constructivism, there are scholars who critique them. Alexander Wendt himself has observed that constructivists generally have not been effective at accounting for the causal powers of anarchy, which is problematic when a realist perspective of anarchy justifies their lack of interest in the role of identities and interests. In order to make sure that constructivist thought is not subordinate to structural theories, this must be addressed (Wendt 1992, 394). Although they are numerous, perhaps one of the more salient critiques are those that come from realist international relations theorists. Realism and constructivism are often argued to be diametrically opposed to each other. Realism places the state as a principal actor in international relations and claims that the international state system is inherently anarchic due to the lack of a supranational authority and the nature of states themselves (considered to be expansionary and aggressive by

some realists), and therefore anarchy and its pernicious effects (that generate suspicion and military build-ups through the security dilemma) is an intrinsic and inescapable part of international politics (Antunes and Camisão 2018). Classical realists (Hobbes, Morgenthau, and Niebuhr) attribute power dynamics and the egoist nature of IR to human nature, whereas neorealists attribute it to the structure of the system - a system defined by anarchy and the constant cycle of balancing and counterbalancing (Wendt 1992, 395). Kenneth Waltz's work is important in marrying the two views and claims that anarchy is instead a permissive cause of war due to there not being anything to prevent it, and that conflict occurs because of human nature or the domestic politics of aggressor states (Wendt 1992, 395). Realists argue that states as unitary actors, have their own intrinsic needs such as security (defensive realists) and power, and a state's relative power determines its behaviour (Antunes and Camisão 2018). It is because of these needs that states often find themselves in conflict with each other as one state's need for security undermines that of other states, and a state desiring growth of power becomes a threat to other states. This criticism is not necessarily incorrect. There is a tendency to forget that some states pursue rational survival related objectives, such as acquiring resources, that could have significant impact on the economic prosperity of a state. The disputes in the South China Sea may be an example of this. It is also not always clear, regardless of whether cultural reasonings are put forward by politicians, that these are truthfully the reasons why they have decided on a particular course of action.

A contemporary example of this may be the seemingly sudden Ukraine conflict where Russia invaded the Ukraine in February 2022. Arguments that Putin put forward to justify the invasion included Ukraine having abhorrent neo-Nazi groups that needed to be extinguished (Troianovski 2022), explanations claiming that the Soviet Union's demise was a humanitarian disaster (Osborn and Ostroukh 2021), Kiev having great significance to Russian culture due to the similarities in language, ethnicity, and culture, and claims that Ukraine was not a real state (Perrigo 2022). In Putin's mind, Ukraine is an inseparable part of Russia. While all these explanations are significant and possible, there could also be more baseline interests. Absorbing Ukraine could save Russia from an impending population crash and add resources and industry that could boost the domestic economy. If we look at NATO's eastward expansion from the Russian perspective, enemy army bases being deliberately built on your doorstep and Ukraine seeking to join NATO are significant

security threats, and reacting to these threats would align with rational behaviour as per realist theory. Realistically, either a combination of these factors or all these factors to different degrees have influenced Russia's sudden invasion. Despite many realist scholars' claims that states' behaviours usually have rational underpinnings, even Waltz himself acknowledged that political leaders cannot be expected to always make calculated or rational decisions, and Hans Morgenthau (another prominent realist scholar) believed the concept of "irrational politics" is worth exploring (Crawford 2000, 118).

Some critiques from realists may argue that an issue with constructivist explanations is that they do not prioritise the role of power in their analysis, the importance states place on their own security and the role hard-power plays in ensuring it. Perhaps the perception in this argument is the issue. I argue that a state's need to securitise, for example, is born out of a human need for security. One could argue that responding to threats or trying to expand one's power or strength are primordial human behaviours. This idea revolves around the idea of human emotion. Neta C. Crawford describes the parallels between human and state behaviours as based on which emotions motivate state or domestic sentiment, nationalism as love/hate, and security seeking as fear and highlights the lack of attention in international relations studies that has been given to the study of emotions in IR (Crawford 2000, 116). Why else do humans build fences around their houses, and then states build borders? Why is economic security supremely important to the success and survival of both humans and states? Furthermore, why does economic success give states, individuals, and companies status and protection from outside threats? Even humans in their relationships with others need certain forms of security, whether this be via marriage, family, community or prenuptial agreements? What of power and competition? The natural world is defined by power hierarchies -similar to international politics. Military might, resources, and culture may all be indicators of status or power similar to how human societies operate. I argue, even if states have particular needs in order to survive international politics, why are they comparable to needs that societies have in order to survive if not because states are extensions of people and their groups. States themselves try to operate in conformity with the international community, form alliances, and have relations with each other based on shared interests and traits, which is the same as how individuals pursue groups that match their identity. Goldgeier points out that states interact with other states through their foreign policy, and these policies are formulated by the individuals and groups of the state and therefore are

susceptible to psychological theory and variables (Goldgeier 2007, 139). Logically, if this is the case, then there should be continuity between human behaviours or motivations domestically and the manifestation of these behaviours and needs internationally by states as the groups involved in orchestrating these interactions are influenced by domestic values, ideas and ideology.

Conclusion

Constructivism aims to build a bridge between domestic interactions and international behaviours of states by analysing patterns between the two. For example, when there is regime destabilisation, it increases the likelihood of interstate conflict and consequently increases overall international conflict (Gleditsch, Salehyan, and Schultz 2008, 502) and civil war or domestic conflicts substantially increase the likelihood of a state becoming engaged in militarised conflict with other states (Gleditsch, Salehyan, and Schultz 2008, 479). In the same way, identity politics plays its own role in international politics as states and their interactions can be predicted by the close or divergent alignment between their identities, along with historical interactions informing present interactions and interpretation of the other's identity in relation to oneself (as friend or foe). Populism, as its own brand of politics, by this logic, may also prove to have an influence on state behaviours which will be explored in Chapter 3 and also Chapter 4.

Chapter 3: Populism and the World

Introduction

Given the victory of Trump in the 2016 US presidential election on the back of populist politics, a good chunk of media and academic attention in the United States in recent years has focused on right-wing populism. A Google search of populist word terms leads predominantly to articles on right-wing studies, mostly pertaining to Trump and his allies and like-minded peers abroad. However, left-wing populism has been a major force internationally in recent decades, gaining major traction in South America and in parts of Europe (as well as in the US during Bernie Sanders' unsuccessful bids for the presidency). To deepen our understanding of populism as a whole and provide background context for the remainder of this thesis, this chapter will discuss and compare the two iterations of

populism. Right-wing populism received significant academic analysis, but the left-wing version has received comparatively less attention and analysis in recent years. This in part is due to fears that, in its pursuit of its goals and its focus on popular sovereignty, populism (arguably primarily on the right), by definition, excludes minorities (Kaltwasser 2011, 184 - 185). In this chapter, the varying definitions of populism will be explored, and then an examination and comparison of left- and right-wing variants of populism will follow. Additionally, populism's complex relationship with identity politics and democracy will be analysed in order to understand how these dynamics may affect global politics.

What is Populism?

Populism's definition is not always clear and is debated by scholars, but what remains consistent is its attention to the needs of majority groups within states and their usually (real or imagined) antagonistic relationship with other domestic groups. It has been variously argued that populism is a style of political communication, a political ideology, a political strategy or a project of political renewal (Noury and Noland 2020, 423). Mudde notes that despite two main interpretations of populism existing (the first that populism as a highly emotional and simplistic discourse aimed at the gut feelings of the people and second an opportunistic form of politics aimed at securing support from the people), that they do not get to the core of what is considered populism in the literature (Mudde 2004, 542 - 543). Some scholars condense its definition down to politics with an us vs. them world view (particularly for right-wing variants), where the "us" refers to the people who are defined in ethnic or communal terms and the "them" being defined as liberal elites, minority and/or immigrant groups, or the establishment (Berman 2020, 72 - 73).

There is often a particular focus on the idea of "the people". This concept, however, is debated among scholars as some claim that "people" is too ambiguous in nature and instead claim that the "heartland" is more accurate in relation to populist rhetoric (Deiwiks 2009, 2). Kaltwasser breaks populism down into different scholarly viewpoints: populism as a pathology, populism as an element of democracy, and populism of democratic ambivalence (minimal approach) (Kaltwasser 2011, 186 - 196). The pathology viewpoint focuses on how populism can undermine democratic values. Although populism and populists claim to be democratic in nature and make the case that the current government

has neglected its duties to democracy and the people, some scholars believe this form of democracy is illiberal in most cases and favours majority groups while ignoring the grievances of minorities (Berman 2020, 73). Kaltwasser notes that scholars or authors that are identifiably liberal are likely to hold the view of populism as threatening due to its disruptive nature that they perceive as transgressing individual rights and representative institutions, resulting in a “tyranny of the majority” (Kaltwasser 2011, 188). Part of this criticism also stems from populism's rejection of political representation and constitutionalism, which they see as a rejection of the same democratic values populism claims to be protecting (Kaltwasser 2011, 189). Additionally, Kaltwasser argues that those adhering to the liberal democratic principle base their views on populism on a normative idea of how democracies should function and can overlook that, in the participation of liberal democracy, people can participate in the refounding and updating of these norms and procedural rules however they see fit, and in this way populism demonstrates this principle (Kaltwasser 2011, 189). Böckenförde adds that as the very constitution that has underpinned the democratic character of states is itself a human construction, the concept of majority rule and rule of law, (in addition to the idea that people are the constitution creators who may at times transgress political order), is integral to the legitimacy of democracy itself (Kaltwasser 2011, 189). From this point of view, populism does not necessarily pose the same risk to democracy that scholars fear.

Scholars such as Margaret Canovan make the argument that populism is part of legitimate democratic functioning and therefore in pursuit of building a democratic order, there will always be some degree of populism (Kaltwasser 2011, 189 -192). Some scholars such as Tännsjö go so far as to claim that populism is the purest form of democracy, and the fundamental questions we ask are not to what extent is populism a threat to democracy, but to what extent is democracy populist (Kaltwasser 2011, 189). One flaw with this approach lies in the definition of populism that Mouffe and Laclau are working from. They use a definition that assume the existence of normative ideals of radical populism (e.g., racism, anti-immigration), and that emphasises social antagonism and tries to aggregate different demands (Kaltwasser 2011, 191). Given the understanding of the fluid nature of populism, these normative ideals are not always present which may weaken their theoretical argument.

The last approach given by Kaltwasser is the idea of populism as “democratic ambivalence” (also known as the minimalist approach). In comparison to the previous approaches, it is more modest and less normative. The ambivalence approach offers more minimal explanation of populism and comparatively makes less claims as to its effect, or lack of, on democracy (Kaltwasser 2011, 192). Kaltwasser notes that Kurt Weyland (proposed here as taking the ambivalence stance) rejects more common conceptions of the relationship between economic policies and socioeconomic structures and populism (Kaltwasser 2011, 193). Weyland’s approach centres around the premise of populism being a political strategy that seeks to mobilise heterogeneous majorities (those who identify as excluded) and establish direct relationships with the follower base, with comparatively lower levels of institutionalisation (Kaltwasser 2011, 193). With reference to past leaders in Latin America such as former President Alberto Fujimori of Peru (1990 - 2000) and former President Carlos Menem of Argentina (1989 - 1999), Weyland claims leaders like these utilise populism in order to establish economic neo-liberalism which in turn strengthens their populist leadership - as neo-liberal economic policies helped populist leaders to attack influential interest groups and actors, and helped them combat the severe financial crisis afflicting the region in the 1980s’(Kaltwasser 2011, 192; Weyland 1999, 384).

Some scholars observe that in recent decades there has been a growing separation between the political class and its base in Europe, and this vacuum is commonly filled by populism. In this regard, populism cannot be seen as anti-democratic per se but instead a new form of democracy (Kaltwasser 2011, 194). Mudde’s explanation of populism summarises typical minimalist views which characterise populism ‘‘[...] as a thin-centered ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogeneous and antagonistic camps, ‘the pure people’' versus ‘the corrupt elite’, and which argues that politics should be an expression of the volonté général (general will) of the people”(Kaltwasser 2011, 194 -195). It should be noted that due to the general nature of minimalist explanations, this approach does not limit itself to left- or right-wing populism and instead illustrates the general populist sentiment. To summarise the two trains of thought in minimalist theory, there is populism as a political strategy, as illustrated by Weyland, and populism as ideology (Mudde) (Kaltwasser 2011, 195). Despite these various definitions and the implications of populism being contested among scholars, there is consistency over the factors and circumstances that allow populism to flourish in a variety of contexts. Some

explanations credibly characterise populist iterations in different political systems and areas of the world, which will be examined in the coming sections.

Causes of Populism

In general, it is agreed by scholars that there are demand and supply causes of populism. This section first looks at the demand-side drivers and then the supply-side ones. Demand-side drivers of populism include economic grievances, sociocultural grievances, and the interaction between these two. Economic grievances can be a result of globalisation (which populists often strongly opposition, at least in rhetoric) and how this along with neoliberalism and technological changes have created an insecure economic environment for majorities in the working and middle classes while elevating urban dwellers and those who are highly educated (Berman 2020, 73). The result of this is higher income inequality and often loss of jobs for working/middle classes. This insecurity among rural, middle and working class citizens also extends to fears for future descendants. Lowered socioeconomic status leads to increased social ailments such as physical and mental health crises, substance abuse and addiction, and fundamentally broken communities, which ultimately shortens the life expectancy of those within them (Berman 2020, 73; Rodríguez-Pose, Lee, and Lipp 2021, 465). The trend of declining life expectancy was a rising issue in the United States ,(even prexisting even the COVID-19 pandemic), but has caused considerable distress among the working/middle classes. Domestically, these economic grievances create deeply divided societies with majority groups blaming out-groups (immigrants, minorities and foreigners) for their strife, but this is also observable internationally. As certain groups in the developed world lose out economically, groups in developing countries benefit as a result of manufacturing being out-sources to their nations, leading to blame being aimed at countries such as China, who has benefited from globalisation, and an in-flux of investment and manufacturing that was previously done in developed countries (Berman 2020, 74 - 75). Fears held by the working/middle class over an uncertain future, not only for themselves but for their future generations may be a contributing factor to populist support.

Social grievances lead to speculation that social changes such as mass immigrations, changes to traditional values systems, and an influx of women and minorities into the

workforce have generated support for populist parties and leaders (Berman 2020, 75). Just as economic explanations have their limitations, so do the social grievance claims. Berman claims that the weaknesses of social grievance explanations lie in the lack of empirical data to support the claim that racist or anti-immigration sentiment is causal in the success of populism (Berman 2020, 76). Specifically, studies find that the success of right-wing populist parties in general has no clear relationship with high levels of racist or anti-immigration sentiment within a state's population, states such as Sweden (who rank low in racist or anti-immigration sentiment), have a successful populist party (Sweden Democrats) (Berman 2020, 76). In comparison, on the opposite end of the scale, states such as Spain and Ireland rank highly on the same measures of racist or anti-immigration sentiment, yet they have not seen any significant support of populist parties (Berman 2020, 76). Interestingly, some scholars have noted that as the general rise of support for right-wing populist parties in Europe and the United States has increased over time, the racist and anti-immigration sentiments have actually decreased, which undermines the idea that social grievance alone causes support for right-wing populism (Berman 2020, 76).

It is because of explanatory shortcomings that scholars have begun to fuse economic and social grievances in order to find a more accurate and encompassing explanation. Inglehart and Norris argue that, although social grievances is a probable predictor of right-wing populist voting, increasingly salient is the erosion of traditional values and the related economic insecurities when determining the success of right-wing populism (Berman 2020, 77). Importantly, some political scientists claim that elements such as sentiments of anti-immigration, xenophobia, in-group vs. out-group tensions and so on tend to rise in the face of economic insecurity or resource scarcity (Berman 2020, 77). To put it succinctly, economic grievances fuel social grievances that may eventuate in a rise of support for populism.

Supply-side explanations shift the focus away from "the people" as an explanation to populist sentiment and, instead, focus on the institutions that may influence whether populist parties become popular. Scholars argue that it is the ineffectiveness and inability of governing institutions to respond to the needs of the people that leads to support for populist parties or parties who share similar anti-establishment rhetoric (Berman 2020, 78). Instead of social upheaval and economic strain being the root cause of populism, they

argue that it is institutions' lack of capacity to deal with these issues that causes populism to take off (Berman 2020, 78). Berman notes that corruption or decay of these institutions also increased the likelihood that the needs of the citizens could not be met, and it is this demand-side explanation that we are seeing increasingly in the United States, western Europe and other highly industrialised parts of the world (Berman 2020, 78). Some of the institutional failings that scholars examine includes issues such as gerrymandering and the failings of the Electoral College and the senate and so on, which often result in insufficient political outcomes and a political system that is sclerotic and little bipartisan cooperation between major parties (these issues are mostly specific to the United States), while other scholars examine the role that money plays in politics, more importantly how money sets agendas within politics and how money given to campaigns (in the United States), influences candidate selection (Berman 2020, 78 -79). A side effect of the influence of money in politics is who can be represented. If a prerequisite is large sums of money, it is discouraging for those of lower economic status to run for office, resulting in the wealthy class being overrepresented (Berman 2020, 179). Institutional shortcomings are relevant to populism because they create the environment needed for it to emerge and widen the divide between groups of political winners and losers (Berman 2020, 79).

Interestingly, the root of European institutional failure is identified as being more related to the function of the European Union (from the view of Europeanists) and, more precisely, the purview of policy making by the European Union (Berman 2020, 79). Essentially, this is problematic because the perceived interference of the European Union in domestic policy making not only limits decision-making power of national leaders (who are elected domestically – not elected by citizens in other EU nations or by elites in Brussels), not only for national governments but also limits the citizen’s ability to directly influence decision-making by their own national institutions. In regard to populist rhetoric, the European Union diverts power away from the people to the political elite (shifting power from the national political elites to the supranational). If this is the case then influence of supranational organisations undermines the fundamental values of democracy, generating unrest among civilian populations and arguably leading to support for populist groups and leaders. An example of how this may look is the rise of populist leadership in Hungary (2010) and Poland (2017) and their perceived anti-European Union (Aljazeera 2022) and anti-immigration (Schengen Visa Info News 2021) sentiments. This is backed up by Merkel

and Scholl who point out that a critical issue for populists in the 1990s' was the push for European Union integration leading to claims that Brussels was corrupt and took the power away from the people (Merkel and Scholl 2018, 30). Some scholars make the point that the European Union accession process in eastern Europe involved the European Union determining policy outcomes in a number of areas, and there was a significant lack of democratic participation from eastern European states in the process, many of which were constrained more by European Union limitations than by domestic ones (Berman 2020, 79 - 80). Another alleged issue with the European Union is its growing technocracy (with central banks being a prime example), which results in disjuncture between citizens' economic needs and the European Union's institutional response as again the needs of the citizens are superseded (Berman 2020, 80). Together, scholars claim that these elements create the fertile ground needed for the success of populism. As populism can be observed as adopting different political ideologies, the next sections will focus on understanding, in a general sense, how populism is formed when they sit on different ends of the political spectrum.

Forms of Populism

Right-Wing Populism

When discussing right-wing populism in particular, it is important to keep in mind that there are differences in how populism manifests. It is often the case that extremist forms of right-wing populism are some of the first impressions that come to mind during these discussions, but it must be acknowledged and kept in the present mind when examining the ideas from scholars that populism itself is not always extreme. Although some of the key values and ideas may be consistent, the application behind them will differ, depending on where a particular populist party may sit on the political spectrum (how far right, left, or how close to moderate). Populism in the form of former United States President Donald Trump's administration, India's Narrendra Modi, and Hungary's Viktor Orbán all have different focuses and policies, (although there is also some consistency in their policy choices as well) despite seemingly sharing the same underlying populist values.

Right-wing populist discourse is often characterised by notions of the nation, the people, and national sovereignty (these are usually based on the views of the ethnic majority)

(Noury and Noland 2020, 423). This definition of the people is most prevalent in right-wing populism, which is also known as neo-populism, and some scholars argue that these ethnic, cultural or “community of blood” definitions facilitate the development of right-wing populism’s notable racist undertones; however, it is also noted that drawing on particular social bases (usually the poor and working classes) is also a prevalent factor in left-wing populism (Deiwiks 2009, 2). The extreme right-wing populists’ most notable denominator is their exclusionist and ethno-nationalist stance that holds the belief that states should be exclusively occupied by natives and anything that is non-native (people, ideas or otherwise) are inherently a threat to the homogeneity of the state (Muis and Immerzeel 2017, 910). Less extreme forms may argue for preferential treatment of the native people and ideas and their concerns. Another defining factor of right-wing populism is its immigration views, which due to their nativist underpinnings, are usually outspoken against immigration. Interestingly in eastern Europe these views are significantly less important in comparison to western European populism which illustrates a stronger anti-immigration stance (Muis and Immerzeel 2017, 910).

PRR groups (populist radical right), as defined by Mudde, are a combination of populism and authoritarianism. The authoritarian aspect of these groups focuses on law and order and traditional values that typically represent the people’s will; however, the links between empirical evidence and these claims in western Europe are tenuous (Muis and Immerzeel 2017, 911). Muis and Immerzeel argue that PRR movements appear to exist to challenge these authorities as opposed to becoming the authority (Muis and Immerzeel 2017, 911). In eastern Europe, it is particularly difficult for scholars to determine the parties that challenge the status quo from the political establishment partly due to discourse in eastern Europe being more radicalised than in western Europe (Muis and Immerzeel 2017, 911). Likewise, scholars find that parties such as Law and Justice in Poland and Fidesz (Hungary) are comparably more radical than their western European counterparts despite being more ideologically diverse than typical PRR parties (Muis and Immerzeel 2017, 911). Other than the well-researched right-wing populism in the United States, Europe has found itself centre stage in the rapid rise of populist leadership worldwide. Some scholars argue that the reason populism has become so prevalent in Europe (particularly right-wing variants) is due to the failure of European political parties in engaging with their citizens, which is illustrated

by significant declines in voter turnout, falling party membership, and notable increase in voter volatility (Kaltwasser 2011, 194).

Some scholars such as Mouffe and Laclau argue that one factor that gives rise to right-wing populism (particularly in Europe), is the incessant need for rational consensus (or sacralisation of consensus) and the advocating for a kind of politics that transcends left and right ideology, which also poses a significant threat to democracy (Kaltwasser 2011, 190). Significant shifts within social hierarchies and norms result in a reaction from those wishing to maintain these hierarchies, and this is particularly noticeable in right-wing populism where those counteracting are often those from predominantly White and male majorities (Berman 2020, 75) Another indicator of right-wing populism is its disdain for political elites, who are seen as corrupt and more interested in the values and goals of minority or foreign groups (Noury and Noland 2020, 423). An example of this criticism is the refugee backlash in Europe where populist groups (and their voters) rejected the open acceptance of refugees from states such as Syria as they flooded into Europe. This created a divide not only domestically in European Union states but for states particularly in the east of Europe, where there were increased tensions between a state's right to decide its immigration policies and the requirement to adhere to European Union values dictated to them by states such as France and Germany. From a constructivist point of view, states such as Germany and France (among others) may be perceived by right-wing populist parties in states such as Poland as a form of political elite who were more concerned with the interests of refugees than those of member states whose concerns should have been prioritised. In relation to mass immigration in Europe, it has been noted that this mass influx of people from non-Western and non-Christian states also raised fears about a future decline of both traditional European cultures and identities (Berman 2020, 75). In particular, this idea of the incompatibility of the outside cultures with traditional European values is not new; Turkey's persistent efforts to join the European Union were declined due to similar fears of cultural and religious incompatibility with Europe. General arguments centred around whether Turkey's culture was more consistent with the Middle East or Europe, and ultimately Turkey has never gained entry in the European Union. This rejection from the European Union arguably has populist undertones despite many of the states identifying as liberal democracies (or non-populist). These examples further illustrate the nativist element of right-wing populism, although some scholars argue that populism can align itself with a

myriad of ideologies. Populist parties on the right often utilise nativism; a cocktail of xenophobia and nationalism that is aimed at the grievances that they believe coincide with mass immigration and globalisation (other key sore points for right-wing populists) (Noury and Noland 2020, 423). Social grievance explanations of populist popularity have shown some correlation between individual views on socio cultural issues and a preference for right-wing populist politics particularly in the context of immigration and racial animas for Europe and the United States respectively (Berman 2020, 76). It is important to note that there are pitfalls in these theories. For example, there is a lack of empirical evidence that levels of racism and anti-immigration sentiment predict the success of right-wing populist groups (Berman 2020, 76).

Left-Wing Populism

A key characteristic that both right- and left-wing populist parties share is that they seek to represent the people and work against the corrupt elites, and unlike these elites, they fulfil the promises they make to the people (Otjes and Louwerse 2013, 60). It is in this respect scholars such as Otjes and Louwerse claim that populism is an ideology with “an empty heart” due to the fact it only concerns the relationship between the elite and the people. Populism therefore attaches itself to whatever political ideology it desires and is more the politics of getting elected than it is a politics or manual for governing (Otjes and Louwerse 2013, 60). As per this argument, left-wing populists differ from their right-wing variations with a focus on socioeconomic issues pertaining to the political elite favouring the business elite and abandoning the rights and concerns of the working class (Otjes and Louwerse 2013, 60 -61). Otjes and Louwerse note that despite right- and left-wing populist parties sharing anti-elite rhetoric and pro people ideals, usually there are significant differences in political ideology, putting them at opposite ends of the political spectrum (Otjes and Louwerse 2013, 62). This supports the metaphorical “empty heart” notion of populism as claimed by different scholars. Despite ideology playing a significant role in policy and voting behaviours in populist parties, there are still unifying populist beliefs that are shared that influence certain voting behaviours. As mentioned earlier, with right-wing populist parties such as Law and Justice in Poland, they are opposed to the transfer of decision-making to non-majority groups or supranational organisations such as the European Union (Aljazeera 2022) and this sentiment includes left-wing populists (Lazar 2021). Although some of the reasons for the distrust of the European Union vary between right- and left-wing populism,

both populist variations hold Eurosceptic views. Left wing parties in particular view the European Union as both elitist and capitalist and non-favourable for the working class, while comparatively right-wing populists are disgruntled by the challenge to their national sovereignty (Otjes and Louwerse 2013, 63). Conclusively, Otjes and Louwerser find left-wing and right-wing populists, despite sharing populist attitudes, are greatly affected by where they stand on the political spectrum and therefore display different behaviours depending on the values of their left or right political views (Otjes and Louwerse 2013, 63). These distinctions may include typical left-wing political views that fall in line with "economic, the green-alternative-libertarian" and the right-wing dimension of "traditional-authoritarian-nationalist" (Otjes and Louwerse 2013, 64).

A key difference between the left- and right-wing iterations of populism, as previously noted, is their core voter base. Scholars have noted that while right-wing populism appears more prevalent in the West, Latin America has shown a trend of left-wing populism: a kind of populism whose voter base is traditionally from the lower classes (a departure from right-wing populism's middle-class voters) (Kaltwasser 2011, 186). Former President Juan Domingo Perón of Argentina and former President Getúlio Dornelles Vargas of Brazil are examples of a fascist left-wing and arguably populist leadership in Latin America who targeted lower class and typically socialist or communist voters (Kaltwasser 2011, 186). Scholars such as Oxhorn and Germani recognise that the economic structure of Latin America is a likely influence behind populism's left-wing ideology as there is a small working class and a larger informal sector in comparison to North America or western Europe who typically have larger middle classes (Kaltwasser 2011, 187). A class structure like the ones typical in Latin America typically means there is higher societal inequality and heterogeneity, and Oxhorn claims this results in an inability for governments to respond to the concerns of the population due to the difficulty in finding an encompassing collective identity that could facilitate collective action. Inevitably this results in this particular brand of left-wing populism (Kaltwasser 2011, 187). Germani and Di Tella claim that this proliferation of Latin American populism is a result of a systemic failure to be inclusive to these popular masses whose aspirations and demands grew (Stavrakakis et al. 2016, 52). Due to the focus on working class majorities, Latin left-wing populism focuses on state-lead initiatives of economic development that promote redistribution to excluded sectors, while European right-wing iterations focus on a neoliberal economic programs (Kaltwasser 2011, 193). A significant

exemplar of this brand of Latin American populism is Chávez and his Chavista government (1999 -2013) in Venezuela. Chávez during his time as president advocated for a number of social reforms and systems targeting prevalent issues such as poverty, illiteracy, infrastructure and welfare (typically left-wing policies) (Stavrakakis et al. 2016, 52 -53). These initiatives aimed to address shortcomings of the previous liberal regime such as corruption and social exclusion of the lower classes while improving democratic participation (Stavrakakis et al. 2016, 53). Critics of the Chavista government point to the more illiberal aspects of this regime- ones that are common critiques of populist government, such as the subversion of checks and balances and institutions that characterise liberal democracies, and the undermining of the independence of the judiciary and political rights of opposing political parties (Stavrakakis et al. 2016, 53). The latter of which is supported by Carlos del la Torre who claims that most Latin American populist governments frame political competition in a warlike manner between them and their enemies (Kaltwasser 2011, 198).

Left-wing populism and its right-wing counterpart illustrate some of the arguments previously made by scholars in terms of how populism is defined. What becomes clear is that populism influences certain values of parties (left or right) and creates consistent themes of the people vs. corrupt elite (anti-establishment rhetoric) and the representation of a majority of excluded classes, and it runs into similar pitfalls of undermining democratic values. However, what also can be ascertained is that where these parties stand ideologically (left or right) not only predicts which populist values receive more attention but also targets different classes of people and focuses on different economic policies which supports some scholar's claims of populism being a political strategy or method. It also supports the notion that populism can both undermine democratic practices and emerge as a result of the failure of democratic practices. This relationship between attitudes towards democracy and populist rhetoric will be examined later in the chapter.

The Populism-Identity Politics Axis

When we take a closer look at the interactions between populism and identity politics, you find that one is never far from the other. Arguably, they exist along an axis together where they mutually feed one another. Although populism does not always exist where there is

identity politics, there does appear to be a stage when identity politics fuels and strengthens populist rhetoric. One theory put forward by Mueller is that populism is in fact a form of identity politics, but identity politics is not always populist in nature (Noury and Noland 2020, 423). The argument of populism being a form of identity politics illustrates there is at least a high level of interaction or similarity between both populism and identity politics. This is partly due to the sometimes nativist focus of populism, particularly illustrated on the right. The concept of the majority natives being disadvantaged or pushed aside in favour of minority groups requires a certain level of identity politics simply due to the emphasis it places on identity groups. Some scholars argue that many of the rising global trends, such as rejection of globalisation, distrust of elites, anti-immigration sentiment, rise of nationalism, rejection of super organisations (such as the European Union) and so on have been misidentified as populism, but in fact they are conceptually more aligned with a combination of identity politics and nativism (Noury and Noland 2020, 422). However, due to the degree of disagreement on clear definitions of populism, perhaps it is more constructive to look at how populism and identity politics interact on an axis. It is apparent that there is some substantial crossover between the two concepts in terms of indicators of their presence within politics or society, but as previously mentioned by Mueller, not all identity politics are populist in nature, which arguably means that there is some degree of separation. What is apparent is that although identity politics can herald populism, the presence of identity politics does not guarantee this progression. Populism itself does contain some level of identity politics due to the nature of populist rhetoric being based on in-group and out-group political competition (also based on the relationship between nativism and populism), which supports Mueller's argument on populism being an offshoot of identity politics, but because populism is not always present itself in societies where identity politics is prevalent, it is not entirely the same as identity politics and therefore can be examined as its own phenomena. I argue that this reasoning is why an axis is a more suitable structure that can be used to understand populism.

The Populism-Identity Politics Axis' Effect and Democracy

As previously discussed, there is some debate among scholars about the implications of populism. Many scholars see populism's presence as a threat to democracy or a form of pathology. Some argue populism is a political strategy or ideology, and others, such as Kaltwasser, argue that some forms of populism act as a corrective for democracy as it

forces political elites to rethink their political agendas and to consider the voices of those who do not feel represented (Kaltwasser 2011, 184 - 185).

In recent history aspects of liberal democracies have found themselves in a steady but slow state of deterioration not only in values but also in terms of favourable opinion of them held by the public as a political system. In particular, failure to address social and economic issues have damaged the belief and reputation of these systems and the institutions underpinning them. Fukuyama states that it is the global financial crisis of 2007-8 and the 2009 Euro crisis that delivered significant blows to the reputation of liberal democracy precisely because Europe and the United States stood at the apex of liberal democracy yet were perceived to have failed to successfully address the crises and therefore the faith of their citizens in the system and the political elite declined (Fukuyama 2018, 91). Some scholars believe that the financial crisis has led to political polarisation, as the middle and working classes shift to support extremist positions (Kaltwasser 2011, 186). These crises can herald a rise of populism that sometimes can take extremist forms due to its ideologically fluid nature. There has been a notable backslide away from democracy in countries such as Hungary (Freedom House n.d), Brazil (Freedom House n.d), Poland (Freedom House n.d), and the United States (Freedom House n.d., Csaky 2021). All of them, according to Freedom House have suffered declines in their respective levels of democracy. Freedom House reports that Hungary has undergone the largest recorded decline four years (plummeting down to the become a hybrid/transitional regime); Poland over the last five years has had a decline steeper than even Hungary's (Csaky 2021). We see levels of public dissatisfaction with democracy rise alongside a growth of support for authoritarian populist leaders. There are numerous reasons provided by scholars for this decline, and some of these explanations are not dissimilar to those that support the rise of populism. The question arises as to what this means for the international system as a whole and for the overall state of democracy.

The State of Democracy Today

Pew Research tells us is that globally there is a general dissatisfaction both with current political systems and democracy as a whole. This is occurring in many states that are traditionally seen as liberal democratic strongholds. One Pew Research study shows that citizens in advanced economies want significant changes to their political systems. Notably

the United States, Japan, Greece, France, Spain and Italy showed high dissatisfaction with the status quo and with their democracies' overall performance (Wike et al. 2021). A median of 56% of those polled from these countries that believe that their political system needs major reforms, and this is measured across political, economic and health care sectors (Wike et al. 2021). This study is backed up by another Pew Research study about democratic anxiety that illustrates the percentage of the public that believe their systems need an overhaul. Alarmingly, the polled public of Spain shows 54% believe the system needs complete reform, and 32% believe major changes need to be made, which means 86% of the public believe Spain's political system needs serious changes (Wike and Fetterolf 2021). South Korea, also ranks highly, had 46% desiring complete reform and 38% believing major changes were needed, with South Korea's total equalling 84% (Wike and Fetterolf 2021). Additionally, along with these high levels of dissatisfaction with democracy and domestic systems, there is also little belief that reform is possible. A median of 46% represents the percentage of those who believe major reform is needed but lack confidence in the possibility of doing so (Wike et al. 2021). Although these statistics are worrying, there are still citizens of some states satisfied with the state of their democracies. Namely, people in states such as Australia, New Zealand, the Netherlands, Sweden, Canada, and Singapore show little desire for significant reform (Wike et al. 2021). However, it should be noted that Singapore usually rates quite low in democratic criteria with Freedom House giving them 48/100 ranking overall, with 19/40 for political rights and 29/60 for civil liberties (Freedom House n.d). This prompts the question of whether they should have been included in this study for democratic satisfaction when they are only considered a partly free state and therefore barely qualify for a democracy. If we look at the score of 48/100 as a general test score, it would in most cases count as a fail result. If anything, one could argue that Singaporeans voted with satisfaction for a partial democracy, not a traditional liberal one. One aspect of people's dissatisfaction with their democracy is linked to economic dissatisfaction (another key indicator of populist support) with those who are dissatisfied with the economic situation consistently viewing their democracy unfavourably. Another aspect to note is how COVID-19 affects these results. Typically, those in developed economies who are dissatisfied with their government's management of the COVID-19 crisis also ranked their democracies' performance poorly. This is also mirrored in healthcare satisfaction in relation to COVID-19 (Wike et al. 2021).

Another Pew Research study concludes that across the globe there is a trend towards both growing dissatisfaction with democracy and a rise in anti-establishment leaders, movements, and parties, which challenge some of the fundamental tenets of liberal democracy (Wike, Silver, and Castillo 2019). The same study cites anger at political elites, economic malcontent, and anxiety over rapid social changes as having fuelled overall global discontent with liberal democratic practices and societies to the point institutions such as the Freedom House have noted significant global declines in democratic health (Wike, Silver, and Castillo 2019). There is also correlation between those who are unsatisfied with democracy and those who do not believe their fundamental rights are being respected. This is particularly the case for those who feel their rights to expression are not protected. Along with this, people feel that their politicians are uncaring and out of touch with the general public, and a general sentiment of corruption among politicians also coincides with this dissatisfaction. In matters of rapid social change, particularly among countries in Europe, there is a correlation between those who are either unhappy with immigration, and/or dislike the European Union and a favourable view of populist parties and leaders (Wike, Silver, and Castillo 2019). This, unsurprisingly, is also linked to overall dissatisfaction with democracy.

The Democratic Decline's Connection to Populism

As noted earlier, populism emerges in environments often where rapid social change is taking place, there is economic anxiety, and anger at elites. There seems to be a strong correlation between democratic dissatisfaction caused by these factors and the rise in popularity of populism. This leaves us with a "the chicken or the egg" scenario where it is difficult to determine whether populism is an instigator of democratic decline or whether it is reactionary to the deterioration of democracy or whether it is corrective for democracy. It may, to varying degrees, include all of them. Some scholars argue the relationship between populism and democracy is ambivalent in nature. Despite there being plenty of theoretical reasons to view populism as a threat to democratic values, some authors view it as influential to correct exclusiveness in democracy. Arguably this is particularly true if a state has high socioeconomic exclusiveness because then populism (strategically or ideologically) can pressure for inclusivity for disadvantaged groups (Kaltwasser 2011, 197). Kaltwasser argues that because a voter's preference changes in times of crisis (economic, modernisation, and mass immigration related), populism's rise is a result of macro-level

socioeconomic developments and therefore is reactionary to the malfunctioning of democratic rule (Kaltwasser 2011, 186).

This view is problematic for scholars who view populism as a threat to democratic values as it implies that the issue lies with the execution of democracy rather than the rise of populist leadership. Certain European countries like Hungary and Poland exhibit this malaise. These states, as seen in the above Pew Research articles, have shown there is a correlation between economic dissatisfaction and highly unfavourable views of their democracy (Wike, Silver, and Castillo 2019). Importantly, Hungary and Poland's populations both overall have favourable views of populism (Wike, Silver, and Castillo 2019). Whether they are more satisfied with their current populist governments than with their previous democratic rule is not examined by this research, so it is unclear whether populism itself is perceived to fix democratic malaise. What the research does illustrate is that there is a connection between populism and democratic dissatisfaction. Poland has repeatedly cited dissatisfaction with the top down decision-making of the European Union and their views on both democracy and immigration that has led to friction between Poland and the European Union. Poland is accused of democratic backsliding after the election of populist leader Prime Minister Mateusz Morawiecki, while Poland accuses Germany of leading the European Union to becoming the "Fourth Reich" (van de Made 2021).

Populism's relationship with democracy is believed by many scholars to be antagonistic in nature. Waves of populism appear, in many cases, to undermine liberal democratic values and institutions. Despite scholars such as Fukuyama declaring that "end of history" occurred in 1991 with the collapse of the Soviet Union marking an end to ideological competition as Western liberal democracy emerged victorious (Berman 2020, 72). In recent decades there has been significant democratic backsliding across the world with even historically liberal democratic strongholds such as the United States and western Europe now facing waves of democratic deterioration (Berman 2020, 72). Modern democratic backsliding is distinct from historical iterations because modern democracies exhibit decay rather than quick collapses, and rather than the historical trend of this collapse being followed by the rise of a dictator, we witness populist leaders being democratically elected, which is seen by some scholars as a threat to democracy (Berman 2020, 72). This perceived threat is due to populist governments dismissing important liberal norms and values by showing disdain for free

speech and freedom of the press, seeking to reduce limits on their executive power, and not respecting the general separation of power or its checks and balances (Berman 2020, 73). This is supported by Pew Research that found that citizens who were dissatisfied with democracy in their country (and therefore likely to have a more positive view on populist parties) also believed that free speech was not protected in their country, at least to a satisfactory degree (Wike, Silver, and Castillo 2019). Some states that showed high levels of discontent were, unsurprisingly, Poland, Hungary, Brazil and the United States (as research was conducted in 2019). This evidence, again, does not necessarily prove populism eased this discontent but does show that those with populist governments either previously had concerns about free speech protection or have since developed them. More surprising was countries such as the Netherlands (76%), Sweden (69%), Germany (75%) and France (74%) showed significant dissatisfaction with the protection of free speech. This is particularly notable as these states are often revered as being staunchly democratic, but either they have always had these concerns or are beginning to develop them. Countries such as France and Sweden have also seen a rise of domestic support for right-wing populist parties. It could be assumed from this evidence that there may be a tenuous but causal link between fears over freedom of speech and the popularity of populists, but it could also illustrate that governments as a whole have failed, or have been perceived to have failed, to protect these rights across the globe, which has resulted in this decline in democratic values.

As claimed by Fukuyama in the previous chapter, left-wing parties' recent emphasis on a new identity politics is occurring at the same time rapidly changing social norms and ideas of political correctness are changing. In the context of the United States and Donald Trump’s brand of populism, his voters have indicated that fears for freedom of speech are a factor in deciding their voting behaviour (Ekins 2017). Based on Fukuyama's assertion, from a conservative perspective, the liberal left's political correctness or policing of language in favour of minorities may be perceived by right-wing voters to be in direct violation of this democratic principle of freedom of speech. The Cato Institute notes that 71% of people in the United States (including conservative, moderate and liberal) see political correctness as stifling important discussions and debate that are essential to society, while 28% (presumably extreme leaning individuals) believe that political correctness has helped in avoiding causing offence to others (Ekins 2017). Importantly, it is noted that 73% of

surveyed Republicans and 58% of surveyed Independents feel they must keep certain opinions to themselves while 47% of Democrats feel the same need to self-censor (Ekins 2017). In other words, a slight majority of Democrats do not feel a need to self-censor, while the majority of other groups of voters do. These issues of self-censorship or banning of offensive material has extended to the setting of college campuses. Of the surveyed individuals 65%, believed that students should be exposed to different perspectives despite the possibility that the perspectives may be found to be offensive, and 66% believed that, currently, colleges are not doing enough to ensure this (Ekins 2017). Despite this, there is a conflicting issue of whether students should be protected from offensive views and ideas that may negatively affect their learning environment with 66% of Democrats believing colleges are obligated to do this and 57% of Republicans believing this disagreeing (Ekins 2017). This leads into a related issue of a rising trend of disinviting or banning speakers that some groups of students find offensive. The names of notable people who have been disinvited include Ben Shapiro, Nicholas Dirks, Emily Wong and John Brennan among many more (Jackson 2016). FIRE (the foundation for individual rights in education) has noted that there has been a steady rise in disinvites of speakers due to student protest (Jackson 2016). These protests aimed at condemning and preventing speech that is considered offensive has concerned even former President Barack Obama who has voiced concerns over this style of activism, commenting, “we start sometimes creating what's called a 'circular firing squad', where you start shooting at your allies because one of them has strayed from purity on the issues,” adding, "If all you're doing is casting stones, you are probably not going to get that far." (BBC News 2019). Examples such as those in the United States speak to the fluidity of populism and its ability to ally itself with different principles and illustrate why there is debate in definitions of populism between scholars. Freedom of speech appears to be a concern of moderate voters in general, with Democrats showing a lesser degree of concern (Ekins 2017). There is still concern from democratic voters on issues such as free speech and democratic performance (implied from the high rates in European countries for democratic dissatisfaction), but given their comparative preference for political correctness and willingness to encourage more censorship, arguably there is more support to believe these issues are of more direct concern to conservative, moderate, and populist voter bases.

Conclusion

From this chapter we have defined both populism as a concept, and what differences can be observed based upon where a populist party sits on the political spectrum. Potential causes relating to supply and demand categories were also explored to determine what indicates both the success of a populist party or leader, and what conditions can predict the formations of populist parties. Just as there is a link between populism and identity politics, a similarly emerging correlation is observable between support for populism and democratic backsliding or deterioration. Populism's presence, though highly debated, appears to have a significant relationship to democratic deterioration, which is on an upwards trend globally. As populist parties have experienced success in recent years, within even the most staunchly democratic states, is it possible that as the number of states with populist leaders increases, there will be consequent change in terms of the ways states interact on the international stage with each other. This next chapter will analyse the case studies of the United States and Brazil and their respective populist regimes (Trump, da Silva, and Bolsonaro). The second part of the chapter will discuss findings and whether any patterns can be observed that are related to the theories of identity politics and constructivism outlined in previous chapters.

Chapter 4: Case Studies

Introduction

Building on the notion that populism is related to identity politics, and the assumption that populism can influence a state's external behaviours, and by extension, international politics, we will examine two case studies – the US and Brazil – to test this. The United States and Brazil make excellent case studies for a number of reasons. They both have had very recent or still existing populist leadership which makes these case studies relevant to modern studies of populism. Important to this research is that populism in the United States (under Trump) was of the right-wing variety, while populism in Brazil (under Lula da Silva) was of the left-wing. This gives us the opportunity to compare whether left-wing and right-wing populism leads to similar outcomes, and where there are differences. This chapter explores both states' recent histories with populism before analysing whether during their populist leadership, their international behaviours were influenced by their populist

rhetoric. The domestic political landscape and the reactionary nature of identity politics in the United States will also be analysed in the first case study whilst in addition to the Brazil case study, Lula da Silva's left-wing populism will be compared with Bolsonaro's right-wing variant which followed him. We will also analyse whether other forms of identity politics, including group psychology behaviours, are observable through their interactions with other states.

Populism and the United States

Reactionary Politics

The election of the right-wing populist leader Donald Trump in 2016 heralded the beginning of a new era in United States politics. His presidency was marred by accusations of racism and sexism among other blights on his reputation, making Trump's presidency the most controversial in modern United States history. Some scholars claim that racist pockets of the United States population were unhappy with an African American president (and sought to "erase" his memory from the white house by electing Trump) (Stein and Allcorn 2018, 236 - 237), and/or perceived Trump's rhetoric to be in support of the White majority who believe they are under threat from minority collusion (Knowles, Tropp, and Mogami 2022, 769 - 770) may have led to Trump's election; arguably a reactionary response to the evolution of political equality in the United States. This idea may be supported by some theories about populism that make racism-based arguments to explain the election of populist leaders. However, as discussed in previous chapters, this is characteristic of extreme right-wing populism, but these attitudes are not always present or highest of mind for those who vote for populists; there are multiple factors that drive support for populist parties and leaders. Additionally, if we recall Fukuyama's comments that right-wing populism mimics aspects of politics that of the left, then it could be argued that Trump's election was in fact a reflection and reaction to the upsurge of identity politics of the left. If we couple this with our understanding of populist rhetoric, and the idea of populism as a form of identity politics, there is an argument to be made of Trump's presidency being a reaction to Obama's. Obama's election drew international praise; highlighted by him winning the Nobel Peace Prize in 2009 (Jagland 2009), and some believed this to be a new era of the United States, one characterised by further progress towards equality in the United States (due to his status as the United States first African American president) and signalling the end of

United States' military interference overseas given Obama was sceptical of the 2003 invasion of Iraq and claimed he wanted to draw down US forces from Afghanistan. However, the subsequent election of Trump shattered whatever romantic ideas other nations had of US foreign policy, leaving the United States population and the international community bewildered (Smith 2016).

Identity politics arguably will always be a part of politics, simply based on the importance of the figurehead of the state. The figurehead is meant to represent the people and to serve them. This is why it is unsurprising that Obama's election received such a diverse range of reactions. Mark Ledwidge comments that some of the reasons for Obama's electoral success lie in the changing demographics and attitudes of the United States population, with a relative rise of non-White ethnic groups and a shift of attitudes towards race (a long-term effect of the 1960s' civil rights struggles), leading to a change in voter attitudes in the United States (Ledwidge 2014, 71). Ledwidge goes on to claim that Obama's election was in fact a soft power coup that promised reprieve from the turmoil left in the wake of the Bush administration (Ledwidge 2014, 72). If this is true, Obama's election arguably was a response to the previous administration, from his demographic to his moderate demeanour to his focus on social issues, he stood starkly against the previous administration and represented change that voters were looking for. Logically, then Trump's election may just be another reiteration of the same pattern.

Potentially, there are aspects of the Obama administration that created a reactionary force that allowed for a populist leader such as Trump to be elected. As mentioned above, some scholars believe this to be a manifestation of racism and desire for a "whiter" United States. This explanation, however, may not be completely adequate for a number of reasons. For example, Obama was re-elected for a second term is one such reason. If Obama's ethnicity was a determining factor in Trump's election, then would it not have been the same in the previous election where Obama found success? Surely a race-based argument is not strong enough to explain strong voter turnout for Trump. Also, Obama was noted as being a generally popular president, towards the end of his final term. Barack Obama enjoyed strong approval ratings despite the Democratic Party losing over one thousand seats in state legislatures, Governor's mansions, and Congress during his time in office and due to losses during mid-term elections (Kamarck 2018). This indicates the Democratic Party as a

whole was struggling to maintain support from voters, but the issue with his governance did not appear to be due to Obama as a person or political figure; the issue more likely aligned with the politics of the party itself. If Trump's election was purely race driven, it is worth examining why voters (specifically from the rustbelt states who were decisive in 2016) who previously voted Democrat and for Obama, went on to vote for Trump or for the Republican in the next election. It is more likely that voters were dissatisfied with the Democrats as a whole, and without Obama and his leadership personality, voters lost interest or faith in the party itself (this may also be due to Hilary Clinton being unpopular even among Democrat voters). It is also noted by David A. Hollinger that the press highlighted Obama's significant popularity with the White populations of the United States, and that some of Obama's greatest margins in the primary elections and caucuses were in states such as Idaho and Montana, both of which have large white majorities (Hollinger 2008, 1033). He also had notable popularity in some former confederate states. Also significant is his November election that saw him win Florida, Virginia, and North Carolina (Hollinger 2008, 1033).

Looking at the different discussions surrounding the identification of populism in previous chapters, we can argue that if populism is a by-product of the failure of liberal democratic institutions, then the criticism Obama received around the efficacy of his time in office offer additional insight into why a populist leader, such as Trump, would be elected. As discussed previously by Berman, racism is not necessarily always an accurate way to characterise populist voters, even on the right, which makes racism underwhelming in analytical value in the assumption that Trump's election was based on prejudice against Obama. It is plausible that other factors feed into support for populist candidates such as economic and socioeconomic grievances, and the perceived inefficacy of liberal institutions to meet citizens' needs. Trump's election itself came with its own surprises. Despite not winning the majority of Latin votes, he still outperformed candidates such as Romney. Hilary Clinton (who won the majority of the Latin vote) lost more than expected to Trump, and underperformed compared to Obama's previous support from the Latin community (Corral and Leal 2020, 1115 - 1117). In fact during the 2016 presidential election, the Republican Party's support from the Latin community did not drop despite Trump's anti-immigration remarks and comments about Mexican immigrants bringing drugs, crime and various other problems (Galbraith and Callister 2020, 91). This demonstrates that one aspect of why racism cannot being the only driver of voter support for Trump. This does not disprove that

racism may be influential for some who voted in favour of Trump, but it does imply that Trump voter support has a certain level of complexity.

If we continue with the assumption that each presidency is reactionary to the previous one, then the current Biden administration cannot be left out. As we swing from the more radical ideas and rhetoric of a populist Trump presidency, we then see a swing to Biden, a proclaimed moderate in theory and unsurprisingly a Democrat. Just as the citizens tired of Bush and turned to Obama's more moderate and left-wing ideals, which then swung in to a more hard-line get-things-done right-wing Trump, we consequently saw the voters turn away from this highly polarising rhetoric to another Democrat in Biden who promised reprieve from the unsavoury aspects of Trump's administration. This apparent cycle seems, in part, to confirm Fukuyama's theory about identity politics mimicking each other from left to right. It would seem that, despite Obama's adamant stance on avoiding being the president of Black America, his very identity has been utilised consistently, even post presidency, in identity-fuelled debates. The Democrats, fuelled by idealised notions of the strength of identity, may in part have contributed to the use of identity by Trump and the Republicans in order to place themselves in diametric opposition to the Democrats ideologically. This swing, however, arguably made Trump lose the next election to Biden. Biden essentially refused to run on the more virulent identity politics of the left, claiming instead to play for all sides (Sullivan 2020), so to speak, and beating Trump who lost supporters who potentially reactionarily voted for him in the face of a less desirable candidate in Clinton and in reaction to the lack of progress made during the Obama administration. Different forms of identity politics appear to win episodically as voters tire of its current usage by the government. This may be due to the more extreme leanings identity politics has moved towards in recent years, usually due to grievances that may rise or worsen over time.

Trump's Foreign Policy

Trump's foreign policy is interesting in its own right. Some scholars may argue that Trump, in terms of foreign policy, is a realist ("Trump and America's Foreign Policy Traditions" 2020, 72 - 73). Perhaps due to his preference for foreign policy which was ideologically ambivilent and transactional in nature (Steff 2020, 4). This may be partly the case; however, some scholars believe that Trump's political source remains Jacksonian in nature (therefore more

complex than simple realism), which is itself a tradition in United States politics (Rolf 2021, 662 - 663). Jacksonian rhetoric that encompasses populist and individualist ideals can be offered as a partial explanation to Trump's foreign policy choices. Key elements of Jacksonian thought lie in the belief that the government's job is to protect the rights, freedoms, and well-being (be it political, economic, or moral) of the people (usually identified as being folk, or the majority). In extension of this, foreign policy that is dictated by Jacksonian thought serves the purpose of protecting "the people" from outside threat (Clarke and Ricketts 2017, 369). What is interesting about these Jacksonian values is not only their relation to populism, which further demonstrates the link between domestic and foreign policy that we are examining, but also the idea that Jacksonian values reinforce in-group and out-group dynamics as policy makers must consider the benefit cost analysis of policies in regard to how it affects the people. The purpose of this analysis is not to argue whether Trump himself is a realist or Jacksonian but to analyse whether the foreign policies his administration employed reflected any populist rhetoric that characterised his presidency. Some allowance must be made in terms of the feasibility of some of the promises he made pre-election (e.g., building a wall that Mexico must pay for). Realistically this promise was unlikely to be achievable, resulting in a comparatively smaller scale fencing that was nothing like the expansive wall that was promised. The focus will be on whether certain principles of populism (e.g., anti-immigration) were reflected in the foreign policies that were implicated.

An aspect of Trump's foreign policy being an extension of populist rhetoric is the pattern from Trump's foreign policy that involves securing advantages for the United States (not uncommon for a state's foreign policy). Trump pursued these foreign policy goals despite the damage it may cause to its relations with other states, which raised concerns that this would come at the expense of long term security for the United States (Steff 2020, 4). As a hegemonic power, the United States and its foreign policy often contained elements of benevolence towards friendly states that sometimes resulted in those states benefiting from an interaction or agreement significantly more than the United States itself. Perhaps these perceived asymmetries were tolerated in order for the United States to be able to call in favours later, or perhaps it is more likely that where the US may have lost some advantage, they gained in other areas.

One notable change in foreign policy in the United States government was its harder line on dealing with allies and allied organisations such as NATO. The United States had been paying a significant amount of GDP (4%) towards the security of its European allies in the form of NATO. Other NATO states agreed to contribute 2% of their own GDP to their own security -an agreement that has not been honoured since its conception in Cardiff in 2014 arguably due to the NATO allies not taking their own security seriously (Haaland Matlary 2019, 312). Haaland Matlary also mentions, that in many NATO states, defence is not always taken seriously unless they are one of the states that do war fighting such as France, the Netherlands, Poland, the United Kingdom and so on. And NATO states still expect the United States to take on the majority of the responsibility if ever needed (Haaland Matlary 2019, 312). In light of the asymmetrical contributions of NATO members, Trump accused NATO allies of taking advantage of the generosity of the United States and threatened to withdraw its contribution if other member states did not contribute their agreed amounts. Trump described NATO as a “relic” and stated that he would not mind if NATO broke up as it was economically disadvantageous to the United States (Clarke and Ricketts 2017, 371). Previous administrations ignored the member states' lack of adherence to the agreement between NATO states, but Trump took a harder line. Trump’s opposition to the current arrangement of NATO illustrates, yet again, how populists would view political elites (or out-groups) taking resources away from the people, and Trump's reaction represents a familiar populist response to this perceived injustice. The 4% of the United States’ GDP could be used domestically or towards the United States mainland defence, however the NATO allies refusal to pay their agreed amount aggravated existing resentment concerning the United States paying for NATO states' defence. This threat made by Trump also follows a pattern of Trump withdrawing from international obligations and agreements that do not prioritise the United States (an example being the Paris Agreement) or give them an acceptable advantage internationally. Trump often justified foreign policy decisions based on perceived disadvantages that the people of the United States would face if their boundaries were not enforced. Trump’s purely business mindset, so to speak, is indeed a realist viewpoint in regard to seeing state interactions in a more transactional nature, but it also reflected the populist sentiment of “the people” and the more nationalist dimension to populist rhetoric that is pervasive particularly in right-wing populism. In the Trump and populist worldview, decisions were implemented based on the idea of the defence of the “the people’s” interests and the prioritisation of these interests over those of other groups,

which is also a part of the in-group and out-group interactions discussed in previous chapters. It also reflects the theory of the state as an extension of domestic policy and sentiment. Although domestically populist policy favours majority identity groups, sometimes at the expense of the minority identities that also reside within the state, internationally this arguably motivates state leaders to consider their domestic population as the metaphorical majority, and other states (even allies) as the minority groupings whose interests are less imperative to defend. This foreign policy move from Trump irked NATO allies and strained relations, which is an issue previous administrations sought to avoid.

Another important vector of Trump's foreign policy that illustrates a correlation between domestic populism and foreign policy lies within his trade policy. Donald Trump notably ran the foreign policy side of his campaign criticising "foreign political elites" who pursued agendas that were detrimental to the well-being of the United States (Clarke and Ricketts 2017, 370). Despite his insistence on facilitating a free market focused neoliberalism domestically, his foreign policy rebuffed cooperative globalist neoliberalism characteristics of contemporary international politics, putting his policy at odds with the centrist elite (Gruszczynski and Lawrence 2019, 20). Gruszczynski and Lawrence explain that Trump's populist rhetoric presented neoliberal economic policies as projects of the political elite and therefore favoured global business interests over that of the domestic workers (Gruszczynski and Lawrence 2019, 25). In direct competition with these policies, Trump proposed economic policies that were more nationalist rather than cooperative in nature, resulting in the United States exercising its leverage in order to achieve more favourable outcomes for the interest of the United States, often to the detriment of other competitors (Gruszczynski and Lawrence 2019, 26). Trump often used phrases such as "unjust" or "one-sided" to describe the current trade system in order to justify his economic foreign policy (Gruszczynski and Lawrence 2019, 27). Pieces of his foreign policy that demonstrate this is his labelling of China as a money manipulator, with Trump often claiming that China's economic success was at the expense of everyone else's (particularly the United States). But these accusations were not only limited to China; as Mexico and Japan also were implicated by claims that negative interdependence existed in trade relations with both (Gruszczynski and Lawrence 2019, 27). In essence, Trump characterised the "openness" of the United States market as being taken advantage of by foreign states who retained "closed markets" creating an unequal access system (Gruszczynski and Lawrence 2019,

27). China was also accused of damaging intellectual property rights from United States companies and “stealing” trade secrets, which created a significant rift in relations between the two states (Gruszczynski and Lawrence 2019, 27). Trump’s foreign policy response to amend these inequalities were renegotiation of a number of existing trade agreements, renegotiation with the World Trade Organization (WTO) member states, and full termination of any agreements that he deemed to be damaging to US economic interests. The Trans-Pacific Partnership was one such agreement that the United States decided to pull out of. This was a free trade agreement that included countries throughout the Pacific rim and that made up 40% of the global economy (made of Australia, Brunei, Canada, Chile, Japan, Malaysia, Mexico, Peru, Singapore, New Zealand, and Vietnam) (Chatzky 2021). If the WTO or states involved in renegotiations refused Trump’s terms, then he threatened to pull the United States out of the agreements and organisations (Gruszczynski and Lawrence 2019, 28). Additionally, the imposing of tariffs or taxes on specific products from states that Trump believed ran on a considerable trade surplus with the United States was another strategy he employed to deal with the trade deficit the United States was running (Gruszczynski and Lawrence 2019, 29). This particular example also aligns with populist rhetoric pertaining to the people vs. the elite, and what Trump’s foreign policy demonstrates is that this aspect of populism is pervasive both domestically and internationally; it just rearranges and redefines both who the elite and the people are. This behaviour also supports typical in-group and out-group defence; domestically there is room for particular identity groups to be distinguished from the majority. These distinctions arguably arise out of a perceived need to compete for political support and policies that serve different groups which result in a negative dependency on each other to have their needs met by institutions that lack capability or will to serve varying identity groups. When transferred to an international stage these identity groups may become less important, and national identity takes precedence which consequently redefines who the in-group and the out-group are.

A pattern that emerges from the above analysis is one that indicates a slight withdrawal from some aspects of the international order (the anti-multilateral, and in some ways anti-globalist sentiments) and a lack of interest in the internal operations of states that do not directly implicate or affect the United States itself (for example,Trump did not show preference or otherwise for states that were or were not liberal democracies and did/did not respect human rights). Part of Trump’s infamy came from his lack of desire to actively

engage in the international community to cooperate on international initiatives to use military interventions. This behavioural pattern falls in line with Jacksonian (and therefore populist) world views that ultimately discourage the state from having substantial international presence, especially if it could put the state at a disadvantage through international interactions.

Trumpian Nationalists ultimately have three main aims from their foreign policy. First, they want the United States to be powerful with an extensive military reach, but domination of world events, broadly speaking, is unnecessary. In order to protect national interests, they need to be weighed up in relation to expenditure (American blood and treasure) to decide whether the means meet the ends, and the fate of the United States should always be the primary consideration when deciding foreign policy (Clarke and Ricketts 2017, 370 -371). The United States has a history of Jacksonian isolationism; notably, the United States showed reluctance in participating militarily in World War 2 (and World War 1), arguing that this was not the United States' war (until Japan bombed Pearl Harbour) (Clarke and Ricketts 2017, 369). More presently, the United States has been reluctant to influence or directly participate in the Ukraine-Russia conflict. Whether this is due to fears of escalation or a demonstration of traditional Jacksonian values, may still be argued. This reluctance to participate in particular world conflicts has been episodic throughout history for the United States. Perhaps there is a pervasive nature to Jacksonianism that sometimes prevails, particularly in the case of war and conflict, but as Jacksonianism arguably is a part of United States politics, perhaps its populist leanings are another aspect of United States politics that periodically rise when the conditions allow. The United States notably withdrew from the TPP (Trans-Pacific Partnership) and the Paris Agreement, citing reasons that these agreements did not benefit (and was not fair) to the United States or its citizens (McGrath 2020). This sentiment was demonstrated in Trump's willingness to withdraw from the WTO (mentioned above) as soon as conditions did not benefit the United States, regardless of how it affected its reputation or relations (The Guardian 2020). This "America first" approach that Trump was known for, aligns well with populist sentiment that encompasses similar ideas of everyone looking out for their own interests, which consequently emphasises more competition and less cooperation between states.

Trump's position on various matters in the Indo-Pacific also demonstrated unwillingness to provide allies with “hand outs”. Trump allowed relations with long standing allies such as Japan to drift, arguing that if allied states cannot afford to pay for continued United States military presence, then they should be prepared to defend themselves without United States aid. Trump cited that they are providing states like Japan with protection with no benefit to the United States, and they only rely on United States aid in event of threat instead of taking responsibility for their own defence (Clarke and Ricketts 2017, 371 -372). Critics of Trump’s attitudes towards allies such as Japan, and how his rhetoric encourages states such as Japan to acquire nuclear weapons, hold fears over the destabilisation of world order and the potential power vacuum that could be left if the United States withdraws its military presence from the rest of the world (Clarke and Ricketts 2017, 372). Importantly, the five main reasons Trump cited for his hard-line foreign policy approach were allies not paying their way, overextended resources, friends no longer depending on the United States, the lack of respect from rivals, and the lack of clear understanding of foreign policy goals (Clarke and Ricketts 2017, 372). These perceived weaknesses in United States foreign policy drove Trump's foreign policy direction with a renewed focus on “America first” committing to policies that benefited the United States and its people over all other factors (Clarke and Ricketts 2017, 372). The isolationist Jacksonian nature of Trump’s foreign policy appealed to his audience because of its populist dimensions. It reframed global politics into the same specifications of domestic political rhetoric, favouring the “folk” which in the case of foreign policy is citizens of the United States, and defending against threat from foreign political elites, which could be framed as anything from a state to an organisation or alliance. Populism domestically rejects catering to immigrants or minorities at the expense of the majority (or the people), and this same attitude is reflected in how the United States conducted its foreign policy throughout the Trump era.

Populism and Brazil

Brazil and South America as a whole exhibit their own brand of populism that, although still sharing familiar populist sentiments with Western populism, have at times demonstrated a different dimension and execution of populist government. Scholars claim that populism in South America emerges in oligarchic societies that have restricted the franchise where the few choose the destiny of the many, and as result there are extreme inequalities (del la

Torre 2018, 735). Additionally, the poor or the working class were seen as dangerous, uncouth, and an irrational threat to democracy and progress, resulting in their exploitation and exclusion from matters of political, economic, and cultural importance (del la Torre 2018, 735). South America's particular brand of populism promised to hold free elections, to instigate the incorporation of the working class and the poor, and to expand and defend national sovereignty (del la Torre 2018, 736). What makes Brazil an interesting case study is that Brazil, specifically, has experienced two significant populist governments in recent years: The first being Lula da Silva (a left-wing populist) and since 2019 Jair Bolsonaro (a right-wing populist). Both governments will be examined in order to cover relevant ground in Brazil's recent history that may further demonstrate the effect of populism on international politics.

Lula da Silva's Populism

Brazil's experience with populist governments is just as, if not more, extensive than the United States. Most people know about Brazil's populism the rhetoric and behaviour of Bolsonaro and his particular brand of right-wing authoritarian populism, but just as significant is his predecessor Lula da Silva who promoted his own brand of left-wing populism. In terms of foreign policy, an accurate characterisation of da Silva's intentions can be surmised by his minister of foreign affairs who stated that one of Brazil's skills was its ability to be friends with everyone (Stolle Paixão e Casarões and Barros Leal Farias 2021, 5). Some scholars claim that da Silva was a populist at "home" but that these populist values did not always translate into foreign policy, which stands in contrast to right-wing populism in Latin America that staunchly opposed the liberal international order and its values (Stolle Paixão e Casarões and Barros Leal Farias 2021, 8). If we understand populism through the idea of it being a "thin-veiled" ideology as expressed in Chapter 3, then it makes sense that there are differences between left-wing populism and its right-wing variant. It is because of these differences that Lula's foreign policy in comparison to Trump's, and later Bolsonaro's, seems relatively less extreme and in some ways less influenced by domestic populism. Lula da Silva's populism, being situated on the left, followed similar ideological patterns of left-wing politics.

Some have argued that Lula was not in fact a populist mostly due to his lack of anti-globalist, anti-multilateral, and nativist rhetoric, but there are specific aspects of Lula

and his presidency that create a sufficient argument for Lula to be labelled a populist leader. Lula's discourse centred around the need to reduce inequality and poverty, and despite essentially being populist in nature, he tried to avoid inciting antagonism between varying classes, going as far as to write a letter to the business community reassuring them of his commitment to the market economy, macroeconomic stability, promises to control inflation, and fiscal equilibrium (Grigera 2017, 449 -450). He was, however, a figurehead of the people, representing essentially an oppressed class that were being disadvantaged by the wealthier class of people. Whether his intentions were to be a leader of the people, and to represent a specific class and their rights, does not constitute a sufficient argument for him not being populist; the product of his leadership is what should be assessed. His politics revolved around refending people who are portrayed as elite. His rhetoric may not have been aggressive, but the roles utilised for his campaign are populist in nature. Perhaps some of the hesitancy to label him as populist comes from a propensity to attribute a form or immorality to populism instead of explicitly analysing its functionality. Scholars often use populism as an example of a threat to democracy or having inherent racist undertones, which makes it difficult to apply to cases such as Lula's. As explored in previous chapters, populism can be described as anything from a political strategy to a form of identity politics, which makes it applicable to milder cases of populism. Grigera notes that the more limited nature of the economic distributive policies employed by Lula makes "Lulism" appear as a less extreme neopopulism (Grigera 2017, 451).

Economic Policy

The most significant example of domestic policies employed by Lula focuses on the inner economic workings of Brazil. This is particularly salient as domestic economic policy often has an effect on trade, which has implications for the purpose of this research. One defining feature of populism in relation to foreign policy that was examined in the case study on Trump is the restructuring of priorities in regard to who are the beneficiaries of particular policy decisions. Brazil's economic policies which are linked to their foreign policy, sought to prioritise the needs of internal bourgeoisie and were further reinforced by Lula's predecessor and protégé Dilma Rousseff (Boito and Berringer 2014, 98). Boito and Berringer claim that much of Lula's foreign policy during his time as president was aimed at strengthening the internal grande bourgeoisie and that the activity of the state shifted with the whims and interests of this class (Boito and Berringer 2014, 102). This class fraction

had a number of significant interests in international policy in terms of economics. State support in pursuit of the establishment of new export markets were integral to these interests, and support for foreign investment was also a key interest. They required policies around state purchasing to focus on the prioritisation of their goods and services and, importantly, increased state protection of the domestic market (Boito and Berringer 2014, 102).

This influence of the bourgeoisie on foreign policy is important when considering some of the fundamental tenets of populism, which is nationalism and the protection of specific identity groups within the state. Lula may have been elected on promises to prioritise the working class and the poor, and although he did endeavour to remedy economic ailments, he was unable to ignore the interests of the more powerful classes in Brazil -partly because they were integral to the economic success of the state, and it was through economic health that he planned on pursuing greater economic equality. Protection of domestic markets, and the prioritisation of domestic goods and services in application may come at a cost to foreign entities and states who seek to trade with Brazil. These policies required the Lula administration to take a more nationalist stance in order to protect the interests of Brazil, which ultimately is populist in nature. It should be understood that aiming for advantageous trade and a certain level of protection of the domestic economy is common in economic policy in many states, but the values behind these policies are inherently populist. It is likely that due to Lula's milder use of left-wing populism, arguably more a political strategy than ideology, prevented his foreign policy from becoming as hardlined as Trump's and Bolsonaro's.

There was also an increased shift towards cooperation and interaction with two major groupings of states. South-south relations became increasingly prioritised during Lula's administration as well as a focus on the South American region and the generation of agreements and organisation with other developing states such as IBSA forum (India Brazil and South Africa), and interestingly the postponement of negotiations between Mercosur and the European Union (Boito and Berringer 2014, 102). The second grouping of states prioritised by Lula's administration was centre world powers. This, however, was for more pragmatic reasons as opposed to ideological. During this time, Brazil's foreign policy centred around monetary stabilisation. Brazil sought to attract investment and loans from

the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, which resulted in Brazil taking a more submissive role in international politics in order to achieve this (Boito and Berringer 2014, 102). Brazil focused on strengthening relations with the United States and Europe (imperialist states) and ratifying international protocols, such as the nuclear arms nonproliferation treaty among others (Boito and Berringer 2014, 102). This counterbalancing of different groups of states illustrates the multifaceted nature of international politics through the balancing of the ideological and the practical needs of a state. It is particularly salient to understand that Brazil, as a developing middle power, does not have the economic freedom and the status to make the same kinds of harsh policy decisions that a state like the United State's did under Trump, and it is constrained by its comparative restriction, which affects how administrations, such as Lula's, conduct and develop their foreign policy.

The foreign policy of Lula's administration showed a significant shift towards states that Brazil perceived as having similar and significant identity features, and the prioritisation of regions was not dissimilar to foreign policy of other populist regimes, such as Bolsonaro's or Trump's. Populism domestically generates a focus on identity, and this translates into foreign policy; however, it may also be argued that all politics must prioritise particular groups, and it is not necessarily always populist in nature. In line with this argument, there is still the element of selection process that illustrates which groups' interests will be prioritised and defended and which characteristics will be chosen when a state such as Brazil decides which relations to gravitate towards. It is because of this selection process that identity politics becomes a part of both domestic and international politics, and consequently a populist state will use this particular brand of identity politics to lead its decision-making.

Bolsonaro's Campaign

Jair Bolsonaro's rise to power, as a result of the impeachment of the previous leader Dilma Rousseff, has garnered international criticism for his authoritarian style leadership (Human Rights Watch 2021). Bolsonaro's administration has been characterised by radical far-right, populist, religion-infused rhetoric that resulted in the explicit rejection of the basic tenets of the liberal international order of multiculturalism, multilateralism and regionalism, which were originally core features of Brazilian foreign policy (Stolle Paixão e Casarões and Barros Leal Farias 2021, 1). As discussed in previous chapters, populism, in terms of its

ideology, can find its home within any political ideology. Therefore there are disparities or lack of consistency between iterations of populism based on where the figurehead or party sits on the political spectrum, which is why we are examining both Bolsonaro and da Silva. Certain tenets of Bolsonaro's political rhetoric may be a result of his far-right standing rather than populism. For example, Bolsonaro's "fight" against Marxism does not have a proven relationship with populism, but it is a characteristic of right-wing politics. Additionally, the infusions of religion into his policy making and rhetoric are more likely a result of right-wing politics (although this is not necessarily the case), as opposed to being driven by populism. Bolsonaro ran in 2018 after his greatest rival, Lula da Silva, was jailed over corruption charges. He ran an anti-working party, anti-establishment campaign, which in an increasingly radicalised Brazil following a large investigation into political corruption that resulted in public outrage, found him success (Stolle Paixão e Casarões and Barros Leal Farias 2021, 7). Known as "the Trump of the tropics" due to the similarity of campaign style and rhetoric, Bolsonaro is a classic example of radical far-right populism. His rhetoric and values (nationalist, xenophobic, pro-majority) somewhat mimicked those of Trump as they were nationalist, xenophobic, and pro-majority -but they were also characterised by Bolsonaro's own additions of authoritarianism and a return to traditional Christian values (Stolle Paixão e Casarões and Barros Leal Farias 2021, 7). Bolsonaro's administration is not unlike that of other right-wing populist movements, not only Trump but also European counterparts in Poland and Hungary who carry similar values that align with traditional right-wing populism.

Bolsonaro's Foreign Policy

In line with Trump's overall populist-themed foreign policy, Bolsonaro also celebrated Brazil's own form of isolationism, arguing that being a pariah was better than being part of a group of self-interested globalists (Stolle Paixão e Casarões and Barros Leal Farias 2021, 2). This view also supports another populist sentiment demonstrated in Trump's foreign policy, which is the portrayal of globalists, or global political entities, as the elite and the nation state as the people. Although the changing of administration often heralds changes in foreign policy due to the shifting of interests and focuses, these changes in Brazil's foreign policy are significant due to their abrupt departure from traditional Brazilian values and strategies in foreign policy, indicating there is a more radical reason for these changes (Stolle Paixão e Casarões and Barros Leal Farias 2021, 2). Specifically, the changes in

attitudes toward liberal international order values (international cooperation, coalition building, and multilateralism in particular) were significant as Brazil had traditionally adhered to them in order to leverage power within the system, but it had rejected them with the changing of the administration (Stolle Paixão e Casarões and Barros Leal Farias 2021, 2). In fact, up until Bolsonaro's presidency, one of Brazil's most consistent characteristics of their foreign policy was their dedication to multilateral institutions and international cooperation, which Brazil felt would help them build up its international power (Stolle Paixão e Casarões and Barros Leal Farias 2021, 5). Some scholars argue Bolsonaro has attempted to rework Brazil's national identity into one that is nationalist, conservative, and anti-globalist and includes Christianity as the state's founding faith, which Bolsonaro wished to reinforce (Stolle Paixão e Casarões and Barros Leal Farias 2021, 3). Scholars note that much of this new national identity reflected who Bolsonaro is and what he believes, and in this way he has merged both existing historical identity tenets with his own (Stolle Paixão e Casarões and Barros Leal Farias 2021, 3). Scholars also claim that it is these values that put Bolsonaro and Brazil's new identity at odds with the liberal international order and resulted in this rejection and criticism of the organisation (Stolle Paixão e Casarões and Barros Leal Farias 2021, 3). This rejection of these values from right-wing populist administrations is unsurprising as scholars observe that this form of populism often targets the way liberal states choose to operate international relations and policy through the mobilisation of claims related to ethno-nationalism, religious and civilisational claims (Stolle Paixão e Casarões and Barros Leal Farias 2021, 4).

As previously stated, before Bolsonaro's presidency, Brazil had pursued multilateral foreign policy, but as Bolsonaro's ideology changed Brazil's national identity, observable shifts in their foreign policy followed. Scholars claim that, previously, Brazil pursued relations with like-minded states, ones of similar power levels and ideology, but this has changed with the new administration. Bolsonaro, along with his claims of wilful pariahship, mentioned a desire to only cooperate with states that aligned with Brazilian values. This indicates a shift in international allies, from Brazil's cooperation with other middle powers and developing countries, who like Brazil alone could not impose their will globally, but could cooperate and influence states of similar international standing (Stolle Paixão e Casarões and Barros Leal Farias 2021, 5), to choosing to comparative isolation with a few ideological allies such as Trump who Bolsonaro praised for his anti-multilateral foreign policy (Stolle Paixão e

Casarões and Barros Leal Farias 2021, 6). Stolle Paixão e Casarões and Barros Leal Farias specifically cite constructivist theory as the reasoning behind this abrupt departure from traditional Brazilian foreign policy, arguing that it is precisely this rebuilding of Brazil's identity that resulted in the new Brazil we see today, which is characterised by antagonism towards the liberal international order, anti-globalist, anti-multilateral, and anti-communist sentiment (Stolle Paixão e Casarões and Barros Leal Farias 2021, 7). To support this, in light of Trump's moves to remove the United States from global organisations and agreements that Trump deemed disadvantageous to the people of the United States, Bolsonaro began to make his own decisions regarding Brazil's international policy. One issue that was particularly crucial was Bolsonaro's impact on Brazil's environment. Environmentalists accused Bolsonaro of allowing the increase of deforestation of the rainforest which is five times larger than 2021 (Rannard 2022). MapBiomas (an environmental platform) revealed that Bolsonaro ignored 97% of monthly deforestation warnings that were issued by the National Institute of Space Research (INPE) since 2019 (Sefton 2022). Other foreign policy decisions included the withdrawal of Brazil from the Global Compact for Migration and turning their back on the rights of the Palestinian people, going as far as to moving the Israeli Embassy to Jerusalem (Stolle Paixão e Casarões and Barros Leal Farias 2021, 13). In line with his anti-multilateral sentiment, Bolsonaro increased criticism of the United Nations (UN) calling it a "useless institution" that was run by communists, promising to leave the UN if he was elected (Stolle Paixão e Casarões and Barros Leal Farias 2021, 13). Additionally, this rejection of multilateral values also included contemporary issues such as gender and sexual orientation, global health, and climate change and resulted in Bolsonaro aligning himself with authoritarian monarchies and religious fundamentalists at the Human Rights Council in order to contest expressions that did not align ideologically with Bolsonaro's views (Garcia 2019).

Findings

From the case studies, there appears to be correlation between right-wing variants of populism and their international behaviour, embodying certain isolationist values such as anti-multilateralism and often framing international institutions and organisations as representative of political elites, justifying their rejection of them. Interestingly, left-wing political variants, at least in the case of Lula in Brazil, although demonstrated some

influence from populist rhetoric, did not follow the same extreme foreign policy patterns. Even domestically, as discussed above, Lula's administration was significantly more tempered and milder in comparison to the right-wing variants we discussed. Furthermore research into why these disparities between populism exist may be necessary in order to fully understand the reasons behind this. What is consistent is that these states gravitate towards states that are similar ideologically. An example of this may be in Lula da Silva's "friends with everybody" sentiment, which despite certain shortcomings characteristic of Brazilian foreign policy, maintains relatively healthy levels of liberal values that resulted in their significant presence internationally and Brazil's willingness to cooperate on important issues and facilitate friendly relations. This contrasts heavily with Bolsonaro's isolationist and anti-liberal international order approach, which saw him only show cooperation with states he believed were like-minded such as Trump's United States. Particularly in the case of Bolsonaro's "friendship" with Trump, and specifically how Trump for Bolsonaro was almost an exception to the isolation rule, illustrates that the familiar in-group formation that can be characterised by a number of different factors. In this case, it is more likely these factors were political ideology in terms of right-wing politics and the populist nature of their regimes. Even if this was not enough to necessarily form a true alliance, they enabled certain levels of acceptance and respect that were not offered to administrations where they differed. Bolsonaro's religious beliefs not only influenced his domestic politics but also motivated cooperation between Brazil and other Christian-affiliated states such as Hungary and Poland with whom Brazil worked with on a number of freedom of religion-based initiatives (both European countries are also right-wing populist states) (Stolle Paixão e Casarões and Barros Leal Farias 2021, 16). An affinity between states who are similar in terms of political ideologies and systems is an observable trend throughout history. As discussed in Chapter 1, despite various historical highs and lows, there are states with similar identity features that maintain strong connections with each other over what may be more advantageous alliances or relationships. There is also a trend of authoritarian states forming friendships with each other even if ideologically they are not always aligned. Some examples of this are the Axis powers during World War 2 and the deepening friendship of Russia and China in recent years. Divides both in values and culture are even seen in the split between western and eastern European countries who, although often at odds with each other (Poland, Hungary etc.), will ally themselves in the face of a perceived out-group whose identity is even less compatible with their own (presently Russia). Along these lines,

other aspects of group psychology come into play, particularly in in-group and out-group interactions.

Domestic populism displays high levels of negative group interdependence and often records high levels of intergroup aggression or tensions that laid the foundations for populism in all examples in the case studies. In populist regimes such as the ones mentioned in the above case studies, there appeared to be competition between ethnic majorities and ethnic minorities (also immigrants), such as was the case in Trump's United States. They can manifest along traditional ethnic and religious lines (this can extend to intolerance for minorities both ethnic and religious and lifestyles that oppose traditional religion such as those of the LGBTQ community) such as demonstrated in Bolsonaro's Brazil, as well as more traditionally Marxist group orientations such as da Silva's pro-working class, anti-bourgeois ideology.

The domestic ideologies, as explored above, also dictated with whom the states prioritised in their foreign policies. Da Silva followed more traditional liberal lines and interacted with mostly liberal democratic or aspiring liberal democratic states. Da Silva's Brazil also gravitated towards states that had shared characteristics, such as status as middle powers, and other developing states who perceived their international power to be comparatively lacking relative to other liberal states such as the United Kingdom, the United States, and France. Bolsonaro and Trump also showed particular affinity towards more like-minded states as mentioned above but followed a more similar pattern of neo-isolationism, which is why they differ from their left-wing populist counterparts. It is possible that perhaps populism, as an indicator foreign policy trends, may be heavily impacted by where a populist party sits on the political spectrum. In order to understand it fully, there will need to be further analysis on more populist states and analysis on the different variants in terms of where they stand on the political spectrum. What is clear is that there is a connection between domestic and international interactions and that states, when placed on the international stage, embody the values and beliefs that are held domestically and operate accordingly. This dictates on some level who they choose to interact with, who they choose to trade with, to what level certain friendships are pursued, and which states whose actions they may condemn.

It should be noted, however, that ideology cannot be the only factor that is used to analyse motivations and intentions behind a state's actions internationally. We explored in this research how multiple variables contribute to international political outcomes. There are highly rational motivations for certain actions or alliances, and there are limitations to constructivist theory due to it's lack of analysis of state power dynamics. These case studies are able to generate further understanding of the psychology of identity groupings (in this case populist identities), and how this can be used in order to establish predictable patterns in foreign policy that may help predict potential behaviours from states. International events such as wars often can only be accurately examined through a variety of variables and theories. The research in this thesis has sought to advance our understanding through the strengthening of one of them -constructivism.

Conclusion

What can be observed from this research is that different forms of identity politics (in the case of this research, populism) can have significant influence on a state's foreign policy and therefore changes of identity, do influence the domestic-international nexus. Along the lines of Fukuyama in Chapter 1, domestic identity politics creates reactive identity politics on the right, which in turn leads to a rise in populist leaders and ideas, and according to constructivist theory this should be observable internationally. Chapter 1 set the foundation for understanding how identity groups act as extensions of individuals and their values and ideas. It also indicated that it is natural in certain contexts for groups to initially compete, and in political contexts this can cause significant domestic unrest as these groups battle for political influence. I argue that to avoid significant swings in political leadership or directions, politicians and parties must learn to balance the needs and desires of multiple identity groups. Arguably, in the past, they have not been successful at achieving this due to the sometimes violent swings from democratic to populist leadership. When parties take a more "all in" approach to identity politics, they foster the belief that the only issues and concerns that will be assessed and responded to are those of the identity groups they claim to represent. This cultivates an unhealthy intergroup environment where competition is heightened, and negative interdependence becomes the norm, resulting in increasingly polarised social/political groups within states. If political leadership is able to manage the needs of different identity groups more effectively, perhaps by increasing the focus on general needs (e.g.,economic grievances, harm from substance abuse, job security) instead of the esoteric needs of particular groups (although these should still be addressed and responded to), then negative interdependence may be lessened; polarisation may decrease, and increased cooperation may be possible.

Chapter 2 connected these ideas of identity and group formation to the state level to demonstrate constructivist principles. Through constructivist theory and Samuel Hungtington's *Clash of Civilisations*, it examined the similarities between how individuals and states both seek to build their own identities and how they operate (as an individual, group, and state) to defend these identities in the face of opposition. If a state acts on behalf of its population and their values and ideas, then this is observable in how a state behaves

towards other states. Examples of relationships between states with similar identities vs. states with diverging or opposing identities illustrate in-group vs. out-group dynamics which could end in friendship or hostility depending on the circumstances of these identity clashes.

Chapter 3 examined the relationships groups have with populism and how populism is built on identity politics and thus can be considered an iteration of identity politics. Working with this premise, the natural intergroup hostility can be understood through negative intergroup dependency. Populism not only illustrates psychological models of intergroup relations but also motivates these same intergroup behaviours on an international level, thus becoming integral in understanding and predicting a state's foreign policy. Populism, whether intended or not, encourages the return to identity groups and therefore can encourage this same kind of thinking internationally. From the case studies in chapter 4, we found to varying degrees -that there was not only a reactive nature to populism (as claimed by Fukuyama), where once used by one party it is then mirrored on the opposite side -but also support to see that particular views related to populism could indicate not only which states a populist administration chose to have relations with but also which organisations and agreements that the populist state prioritised or abandoned. States often chose to show preference for building relations with states that they had shared characteristics with over those that they did not. This was exemplified in the case studies that showed that right-wing populists tend to favour other right-wing populists while choosing to abandon or aggravate relations with states and organisations that they saw as a threat to their ideology. Left-wing politics such as Lula da Silva's Brazil showed milder behaviours but still preferred friendships with states more similarly aligned in ideology or relative power status. All case studies of populism were preceded by significant social upheaval and dissent between different identity groups for a variety of reasons.

Some limitations to this study, as previously discussed, lie in the need for further research to be done to definitively establish more patterns between domestic and international populism. This is especially true in the case of left-wing populism, which, as it differs from right-wing variants in the case studies of this thesis, required further comparative analysis to other left-wing populist states and parties. Another limitation that needs to be considered is that no single theory of international relations theory alone can explain and account for all international state behaviours. In particular, certain warlike behaviours or aggression cannot

always be accounted for by constructivism. States have multiple interests at any one time, and different behaviours may require applying a different (or multiple) schools of thought to fully understand them, and this may need to be done on a case-by-case basis (this thesis, due to word limitations, was unable to do this). The analysis done in this thesis also highlights potential further research avenues not only in regard to the effect of identity politics on international relations but also in building on our academic understanding of populism. Through further research and better understanding of both group psychology and populism perhaps more effective political strategies can be developed to counteract the negative side effects of identity politics and preserve the health of democracy internationally.

Ultimately this research found that identity politics does have significant influence both on domestic politics, and by influencing foreign policy international relations. In extension of this, populism (as a form of identity politics), has a significant influence both on democracy and on how states choose to interact internationally.

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