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      Does virtue ethics allow us to make better judgments of the actions of others?

      van Zyl, Liezl
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      Does virtue ethics allow us to make better judgments of the actions of others.pdf
      Accepted version, 541.0Kb
      DOI
       10.1007/978-3-030-15860-6_8
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      van Zyl, L. (2019). Does virtue ethics allow us to make better judgments of the actions of others? In Virtue Ethics: Retrospect and Prospect (pp. 99–110). Cham, Switzerland: Springer. https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15860-6_8
      Permanent Research Commons link: https://hdl.handle.net/10289/13374
      Abstract
      Virtue ethics encourages us to judge the actions of others, not merely as right or wrong, but as virtuous (kind, courageous, just, compassionate, etc.) or vicious (cruel, cowardly, unjust, selfish, etc.). In doing so, however, we risk acting viciously ourselves. That is, our judgments of others can be unfair, unkind, insensitive, uncharitable, or hypocritical, even while being accurate. I argue that in order to make good judgments of the actions of others we should turn to virtue ethics for action guidance. That is, our primary aim should not be to make accurate judgments but to act virtuously when judging others.
      Date
      2019
      Type
      Chapter in Book
      Publisher
      Springer
      Rights
      This is a post-peer-review, pre-copyedited version of an article published in Virtue Ethics: Retrospect and Prospect. The final authenticated version is available online at: https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-15860-6_8
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      • Arts and Social Sciences Papers [1423]
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