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dc.contributor.authorLegg, Catherine
dc.date.accessioned2009-09-10T04:45:39Z
dc.date.available2009-09-10T04:45:39Z
dc.date.issued2001-07
dc.identifier.citationLegg, C. (2001). Predication and the problem of universals. Philosophical Papers, 30(2), 117-143.en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10289/2918
dc.description.abstractThis paper contrasts the scholastic realists of David Armstrong and Charles Peirce. It is argued that the so-called 'problem of universals' is not a problem in pure ontology (concerning whether universals exist) as Armstrong construes it to be. Rather, it extends to issues concerning which predicates should be applied where, issues which Armstrong sets aside under the label of 'semantics', and which from a Peircean perspective encompass even the fundamentals of scientific methodology. It is argued that Peirce's scholastic realism not only presents a more nuanced ontology (distinguishing the existent front the real) but also provides more of a sense of why realism should be a position worth fighting for.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherPhilosophical Papersen_NZ
dc.relation.urihttp://www.ru.ac.za/philosophy/PhilosophicalPapersen
dc.subjectDavid Armstrongen
dc.subjectCharles Peirceen
dc.subjectontologyen
dc.subjectscholastic realismen
dc.subjectuniversals
dc.subjectreal generals
dc.titlePredication and the problem of universalsen
dc.typeJournal Articleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1080/05568640109485080en_NZ
dc.relation.isPartOfPhilosophical Papersen_NZ
pubs.begin-page117en_NZ
pubs.editionDecemberen_NZ
pubs.elements-id30135
pubs.end-page143en_NZ
pubs.issue2en_NZ
pubs.volume30en_NZ


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