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dc.contributor.authorvan Zyl, Liezl
dc.date.accessioned2011-11-28T03:06:29Z
dc.date.available2011-11-28T03:06:29Z
dc.date.issued2011
dc.identifier.citationvan Zyl, L. (2011). Discussion Note: What about ought? Response to practical intelligence and the virtues. Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy, September, 1-5.en_NZ
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10289/5930
dc.description.abstractAccording to a qualified-agent account of right action, an action is right iff it is what a virtuous agent would characteristically do in the circumstances (V).¹ A frequent objection to this account is that it gives the wrong result in cases where the agent faces a dilemma because of previous wrongdoing. Robert Johnson gives the example of the chronic liar who undertakes a series of remedial actions to improve his character. Commonsense tells us that he acts rightly (or does what he ought to do), but (V) denies this, for no virtuous agent will find herself in these circumstances. Johnson concludes from this that virtue ethics fails to make room for a genuine moral obligation to improve your character.²en_NZ
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherUniversity of Southern Californiaen_NZ
dc.relation.urihttp://jesp.org/articles/download/WhatAboutOught.pdfen_NZ
dc.rightsThis article has been published in Journal of Ethics & Social Philosophy. © 2011 Copyright Liezl van Zyl.en_NZ
dc.subjectPractical Intelligence and the Virtuesen_NZ
dc.titleWhat about ought? Response to practical intelligence and the virtuesen_NZ
dc.typeJournal Articleen_NZ
dc.relation.isPartOfJournal of Ethics & Social Philosophyen_NZ
pubs.begin-page1en_NZ
pubs.elements-id36701
pubs.end-page5en_NZ
pubs.volumeSeptemberen_NZ


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