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dc.contributor.authorLegg, Catherine
dc.date.accessioned2008-05-07T23:14:55Z
dc.date.available2008-05-07T23:14:55Z
dc.date.issued2001-06
dc.identifier.citationLegg, C. (2001). Naturalism and wonder: Peirce on the logic of Hume’s argument against miracles. Philosophia (28)1-4, 297-318.en_US
dc.identifier.issn1574-9274
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10289/773
dc.description.abstractHow should we proceed when confronted with a phenomenon (or evidence which points towards a phenomenon) which baffles us? The term "miracle" is a convenient term on which to hang this question. It has a religious meaning, and the arguments I will be discussing are applicable to the case of deciding, for example, whether to believe in the Judaeo-Christian God, based on the reports of miracles offered by the Bible. However, one can generalise from this case to deeper issues about our attitude to the apparently inexplicable. By the apparently inexplicable I mean that which contradicts our most well-confirmed beliefs. This general question is the theme of this paper.en_US
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherBar Ilan Universityen_NZ
dc.rightsThe original publication is available at www.springerlink.comen_US
dc.subjectabductionen_US
dc.subjectnaturalismen_US
dc.subjectmiraclesen_US
dc.subjectPeirce
dc.subjectHume
dc.titleNaturalism and wonder: Peirce on the logic of Hume’s argument against miraclesen_US
dc.typeJournal Articleen_US
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/BF02379782en_NZ
dc.relation.isPartOfPhilosophia: Philosophical Quarterly of Israelen_NZ
pubs.begin-page297en_NZ
pubs.editionJuneen_NZ
pubs.elements-id31433
pubs.end-page318en_NZ
pubs.issue1-4en_NZ
pubs.volume28en_NZ


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