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dc.contributor.authorLegg, Catherine
dc.date.accessioned2014-03-06T20:15:17Z
dc.date.available2014-03-06T20:15:17Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.citationLegg, C. (2014). Charles Peirce's limit concept of truth. Philosophy Compass, 9(3), 204-213.en_NZ
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10289/8547
dc.description.abstractThis entry explores Charles Peirce's account of truth in terms of the end or ‘limit’ of inquiry. This account is distinct from – and arguably more objectivist than – views of truth found in other pragmatists such as James and Rorty. The roots of the account in mathematical concepts is explored, and it is defended from objections that it is (i) incoherent, (ii) in its faith in convergence, too realist and (iii) in its ‘internal realism’, not realist enough.en_NZ
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen_NZ
dc.publisherWileyen_NZ
dc.relation.urihttp://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.12114/abstracten_NZ
dc.subjectCharles Peirceen_NZ
dc.subjectPeirce
dc.subjecttruth
dc.subjectlimit
dc.subjectconvergence
dc.subjectpragmatism
dc.subjectrealism
dc.subjectredundancy theory of truth
dc.subjectcorrespondence theory of truth
dc.subjectcoherence theory of truth
dc.titleCharles Peirce's limit concept of truthen_NZ
dc.typeJournal Articleen_NZ
dc.identifier.doi10.1111/phc3.12114en_NZ


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