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dc.contributor.authorLegg, Catherine
dc.coverage.spatialConference held at University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand
dc.date.accessioned2015-01-09T02:10:58Z
dc.date.available2014
dc.date.available2015-01-09T02:10:58Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.citationLegg, C. (2014). Idealism operationalized: Charles Peirce’s theory of perception. Presented at the New Zealand Association of Philosophy Conference (NZAP), Conference held at University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand, 1-5 December, 2014.en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10289/9037
dc.description.abstractThis paper begins by outlining Hume's understanding of perception according to which ideas are copies of impressions, which are thought to constitute a foundational confrontation with reality. This understanding is contrasted with Peirce's theory of perception according to which percepts give rise to perceptual judgements, but perceptual judgements are not a copy but an index (or 'true symptom' - just as a weather-cock indicates the direction of the wind) of the percept. Percept and perceptual judgement are thereby able to mutually inform and correct one another in rich ways, as the perceiver develops mental habits of interpreting their surroundings.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.sourceNew Zealand Association of Philosophy Conference (NZAP)
dc.titleIdealism operationalized: Charles Peirce’s theory of perception
dc.typeConference Contribution
pubs.elements-id118061
pubs.finish-date2014-12-05
pubs.start-date2014-12-01


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