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Truth vanishes again: deflationism, assertion, and 'presenting as true'

Abstract
In this talk, I'll aim to defend deflationism about the concept of truth from a prominent objection. The objection, due to Dorit Bar-On and Keith Simmons, is that deflationists cannot account for the fact that asserting a proposition involves presenting the proposition as being true. In responding to this objection, I will focus on the influential minimalist account of the concept of truth that has been developed by Paul Horwich. I will motivate an account of ‘presenting as true’ that has been recently proposed by Neri Marsili and then explain why it is fully compatible with minimalism.
Type
Conference Contribution
Type of thesis
Series
Citation
Date
2023-09-30
Publisher
The University of Waikato
Degree
Supervisors
Rights
© 2023 The Author