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1. Introductory remarks

Disagreement is a pervasive phenomenon in our everyday lives. One of the most familiar sorts of disagreement in which we engage is disagreement concerning matters of gustatory taste, which I'll simply call *taste disagreement* in what follows.¹ The main question that I'll take up in this chapter is 'What is taste disagreement?' Given that taste disagreement is so utterly familiar, considering this question may cause us to experience a sense of complacency. I relish the flavour of espresso, while you find it oppressively bitter. You are enchanted by the unique, slippery mouthfeel of natto, while I can't stand to take one bite. We might express our incompatible views about these comestibles in conversation or we might not, but still, we are in disagreement about the flavours of espresso and natto. Moreover, the nature of our disagreement might seem rather obvious—I like the flavour of a particular food or drink and you don't, or vice versa. So why engage in a lengthy discussion of the nature of taste disagreement?

The main reason is that the apparent simplicity of taste disagreement is misleading. Going forward, we'll see that in fact, taste disagreement is a wonderfully complex phenomenon. This is just the sort of thing that we've come to expect from philosophical reflection—a revelation that what we thought was too simple to discuss is far more subtle than we could have imagined. Moreover, given that taste disagreement is so pervasive in our lives, the significance of its striking complexity is more than academic.

Another reason to think carefully about taste disagreement is that questions about its nature have been at the heart of contemporary debates about *taste discourse* for the past twenty years. Theorists interested in the semantics and pragmatics of taste discourse have appealed to considerations regarding taste disagreement to motivate their theories and to challenge rival theories. Accordingly, a proper understanding of the nature of taste disagreement will considerably improve our understanding of how these debates ought to play out.²

A third reason to concentrate on taste disagreement is that an appreciation of its nature will help to set up an informed comparison between taste disagreement and *other kinds* of disagreement, including aesthetic, moral, religious, scientific, and political disagreement. Comparing these kinds of disagreement will put us in a position to better understand how they arise in our lives, whether/why it is valuable to engage in them, and whether/how they ought to be resolved when they do arise. This is a project that promises not only intellectual satisfaction, but practically significant knowledge about ourselves and how we do and ought to relate to others in our overlapping communities.³

¹ While I'll focus here on disagreement about matters of gustatory taste, it should be straightforward to generalise the results of the discussion so that they also cover e.g. disagreement about which of two video games is more fun and disagreement about which of two post-rock bands is cooler.

² For helpful overviews of these debates, see Baghrarian and Carter (2020, § 5), Cappelen and Huvenes (2018), Kölbel (2008, 2015a, 2015b), López de Sa (2011), MacFarlane (2012), and Zeman (2020a).

³ For stimulating comparisons between various kinds of disagreement, see Eriksson (2016), Ferrari (2016, 2018), Kiviy (2015, esp. chs. 6 and 7), Stojanovic (2019), Pedersen (2020), and Pietroiusti (2020) and the sources cited therein.

In the remainder of the chapter, I'll be focusing on the following questions, which remain unsettled in the contemporary debates about taste disagreement:

- What *methods* should we use when thinking about the nature of taste disagreement?
- What are the *relata* of the relation of taste disagreement?
- What is the nature of the *relation* of taste disagreement itself?

Prior work on these questions has, I think, systematically overlooked a key point. This is that the second and third questions are *metaphysical*, rather than linguistic, questions. This point has a clear implication regarding the first question. Even if the second and third questions prove to have linguistic relevance, we should see whether we can use the methods of metaphysics to make headway on them.

I'll be addressing these three questions using a framework, the Canberra Plan, that has been influentially applied in other metaphysical contexts. This framework underscores certain platitudes about disagreement that enable us to determine what sort of relation we're hunting for when we aim to determine what taste disagreement is. Jumping ahead a bit, my contention will be that this relation is *preferential type-noncotenability*, where the preferences at issue concern matters of gustatory taste. After motivating and elaborating this account of taste disagreement, I'll close by saying a few words about how it can inform the existing debates about taste discourse, taste disagreement, and disagreement in general.

2. Canberra-planning disagreement

2.1. Platitudes about disagreement

We want to know what taste disagreement is. To acquire this knowledge, we first need to identify what we already know about disagreement, and we can then determine what more we can say about the particular nature of taste disagreement. More exactly, we can start by examining how our ordinary concept DISAGREEMENT—the concept that we deploy when identifying cases like those mentioned above as cases of disagreement—behaves.⁴ The way to really get going with this project is to *empirically* examine the behaviour of this concept using the methods of e.g. psychology and experimental philosophy.⁵ But before we do this empirical work, we need reasonable hypotheses to test, and this is where armchair conceptual analysis can earn its keep.

In generating these hypotheses, we should begin by asking ourselves: what are the *platitudes* about disagreement? Once we amass a body of platitudes about disagreement, we will be in a position to identify the functional role that the ordinary concept DISAGREEMENT plays in our cognitive lives. This functional role tells us what the world would be like if it contained disagreement. We will then be able to draw on our current evidence to determine whether disagreement in fact exists and if so, what it is like. This sort of approach was pioneered by advocates of the *Canberra Plan* such as Frank Jackson (1998) and David Lewis (1966, 1970, 1972, 1994).

⁴ I make no commitments about the nature of DISAGREEMENT, or concepts in general, beyond the commitment described below, that DISAGREEMENT is constituted by certain platitudes.

⁵ Cp. Wyatt (2018b) on the ordinary concept TRUTH. See also Jackson (1998, pp. 36-37), and cf. Wright (2021) on the “folk view” of faultless disagreement.

What is a platitude about disagreement? As we're using the term, a platitude needn't be an old saw. Rather, a platitude about x is a proposition that is constitutive of the ordinary concept of x . In more detail, this is what it takes for a proposition to be a platitude about disagreement:⁶

(Platitude) Proposition p is a platitude about disagreement iff p is a member of a set D of propositions such that: person A possesses the ordinary concept DISAGREEMENT iff A is disposed to accept each of the members p' of D (i) in the absence of supporting argumentation for p' and (ii) in the presence of a suitable prompt (e.g. a well-constructed vignette) that causes A to consider p' .

So which propositions are platitudes about disagreement? In light of my own experiences with disagreement as well as the knowledge that I have about academic work on the subject, I assign a reasonably high prior probability to the hypothesis that the propositions expressed by the following are among the platitudes about disagreement:⁷

Irreflexivity: For all persons A , matters m , and times t : it is not the case that A is in disagreement with A over m at t

Symmetry: For all persons A and B , matters m , and times t : if A is in disagreement with B over m at t , then B is in disagreement with A over m at t

Non-transitivity: It is not the case that (for all persons A , B , and C , matters m , and times t : if A is in disagreement with B over m at t and B is in disagreement with C over m at t , then A is in disagreement with C over m at t) and it is not the case that (for all persons A , B , and C , matters m , and times t : if A is in disagreement with B over m at t and B is in disagreement with C over m at t , then A is not in disagreement with C over m at t)

⁶ For discussion of how platitudes should be understood in the Canberra Plan, see Nolan (2009). If a platitude is fairly complex, such as Non-Transitivity below, then it may be necessary to use separate vignettes for each of its truth-functional components.

Knowing of no evidence to the contrary, I hypothesise here that there is a single ordinary concept DISAGREEMENT and that we can identify the platitudes that constitute it. It may be that there is actually more than one ordinary disagreement concept, but this is something that would have to be investigated empirically.

Also, for present purposes, we don't need to commit to any particular view about the nature of propositions. They can be regarded as Fregean, Russellian, pleonastic, act-theoretic, or what have you.

⁷ We could also consider diachronic versions of Irreflexivity, Symmetry, and Transitivity, but I'll stick with the synchronic versions here. For an interesting discussion of whether, upon reflection, we should accept Symmetry, see Rast (2016, § 3.3, 2018, §§ 3-5). For a discussion of the non-transitivity of both 'narrow' and 'wide' disagreement, see Rast (2016, p. 857).

I offer a schematic variant of the Mistake Principle in Wyatt (2021), whereas the Mistake Principle, as formulated here, is quantified. As far as I can see, these principles differ only formally. Of course, the reason for using a quantified principle here is that I've defined platitudes as being propositions and schemas don't express propositions.

Lastly, note that as I formulate it here, Symmetry bears on different issues than does Bondy (2020, § 3)'s discussion of the 'symmetry' of diachronic intrapersonal disagreement.

Disagreement Principle: For all persons A and B , matters m , and times t : A and B are in disagreement over m at t iff at t , A has a (doxastic or non-doxastic) attitude y about m and B has a (doxastic or non-doxastic) attitude z about m , and y and z are incompatible _{y,z} with one another

Mistake Principle: For all persons A and B and propositions p : if A believes p , then if A also believes that they are in disagreement with B as to whether p is true, then A believes that B has made a judgment about p that is mistaken.

Let me say a few words about how these platitudes are supposed to work. First of all, I've formulated them in terms of *persons* because I would hypothesise that in the first instance, we take persons to be the relata of the relation of disagreement. When we acquire the ordinary concept DISAGREEMENT, we presumably do so after observing or being told about cases in which two or more persons (e.g. family members or children in the schoolyard) are in disagreement with one another. As a result, we are led to think of *personal disagreement* as being the paradigm sort of disagreement. Later on, the concept becomes more abstract (and perhaps metaphorical) in that we also sometimes think of ourselves simply as disagreeing with what someone believes, what they said or assumed, or decisions that they made. Then, especially if we study some philosophy, we may come to think about disagreement even more abstractly, taking e.g. assertions, theories, plans, or propositions to disagree with one another.⁸

Additionally, I have formulated the platitudes so that they pertain not to the bare relation of disagreement, but to the relation of disagreement over matter m . This is because I would conjecture that even when we use the construction 'A disagrees with B,' what we have in mind is that there is some matter over which A and B are in disagreement, e.g. whether espresso is delicious, whether the effects of climate change will be disastrous, or whether Michael Jordan is the most talented basketball player of all time. We don't think of persons as simply being in disagreement—rather, we think of them as being in disagreement about some issue/matter/subject/topic. This is so even if, given the information that we have, we can't specify which matter that is (consider 'Susan, who knows both of them well, said that A and B are in disagreement. I'm not sure what they would disagree about, but she must be right').

Irreflexivity says that no person disagrees with themselves at a given time t . The hypothesis, then, is that if a possessor of the ordinary concept DISAGREEMENT were presented with a suitable prompt (e.g. a well-constructed vignette), they would probably be disinclined to say that a given person A disagrees with themselves at a particular time. We are all too familiar, of course, with cases in which someone has, at a particular time, incompatible desires about a certain course of action, e.g. proposing marriage to a wealthy, but emotionally exhausting, person or consuming a delicious, but rather unhealthy, food or drink. Yet we presumably wouldn't be inclined to say that in cases such as these, a person disagrees with themselves. Rather, we would simply say that they are conflicted, that they have incompatible desires.⁹

⁸ This developmental story should be evaluated empirically, and I know of no extant studies which aim to do so. However, it seems like a reasonable starting point. Moreover, it is clear that we do regularly speak of two or more persons being in disagreement with one another. Accordingly, even if it isn't the case that our initial concept of disagreement applies only to persons, it is clearly worthwhile to amass a list of platitudes about personal disagreement.

⁹ Some evidence in favour of this hypothesis is that a search of COCA (the Corpus of Contemporary American English) on 7 January 2021 yielded 13 entries for '[disagree] with myself/himself/herself/oneself' and 17,727 entries for '[disagree] with.' Similarly, a COCA search on 14 May 2021 yielded 12 entries for 'at odds with

What about someone with Dissociative Identity Disorder one of whose personalities believes that p and another of whose personalities believes that not- p ? Here, we might be more inclined to say that the person disagrees with themselves. However, I suspect that most of us would favour the verdict that while such a person doesn't disagree with themselves, one of their personalities disagrees with another of their personalities.¹⁰

With regard to Symmetry, perhaps the most important thing to say is that we may feel some initial resistance to Symmetry if we're not careful to distinguish disagreement as a *state* from disagreement as an *activity*.¹¹ If Henry believes that the earth is 6,000 years old and Stephen believes that the earth is 4.5 billion years old, then Henry is in a state of disagreement with Stephen and likewise, Stephen is in a state of disagreement with Henry. This is so even if neither Henry nor Stephen has ever discussed the other's views about the age of the earth. This and many other familiar cases speak in favour of Symmetry being a platitude about the state of disagreement.

It is, on the other hand, implausible to regard Symmetry as a platitude about the activity of *disagreeing*. If Henry is in the US and Stephen is in England, then Stephen might sit for an interview on the age of the earth during which the interviewer informs him about Henry's views. Stephen might then go on to explain at length why he takes Henry's views to be false, in which case he is engaged in the activity of disagreeing with Henry. However, if Henry is fast asleep while the interview is taking place, then he isn't simultaneously disagreeing with Stephen. Since they hold incompatible views about the age of the earth, they are simultaneously in disagreement about this issue, but they aren't simultaneously disagreeing about it. Thus, when we consider Symmetry, we must be sure to consider it as a platitude about disagreement, rather than disagreeing.

Non-Transitivity tells us that disagreement is neither transitive nor anti-transitive. This is very easy to see. Suppose that there is a disagreement in the kingdom as to who is the rightful successor to the throne. A believes that it is Elisabeth, B believes that it is Victoria, and C believes that it is Elisabeth. In this case, A is in disagreement with B as to who is the rightful successor, B is in disagreement with C as to who is the rightful successor, but A isn't in disagreement with C as to who is the rightful successor. This shows that disagreement isn't transitive. It might also be that A believes that Elisabeth is the rightful successor, B believes that Victoria is, and C believes that George is. In this case, A is in disagreement with B as to who is the rightful successor, B is in disagreement with C as to who is the rightful successor, and A is in disagreement with C as to who is the rightful successor. This shows that disagreement isn't anti-transitive.

Turning to the Disagreement Principle, this principle is meant to capture in highly general terms what we ordinarily take disagreement to be. In essence, it says that disagreement between A and B consists in an incompatibility between two attitudes that A and B respectively hold. Potential examples of these attitudes include beliefs, doubts, hopes, wishes, desires, and preferences.¹²

The reason that I've subscribed 'incompatible' in this principle is that I suspect that we are disposed to regard attitudes y and z as generating disagreement between A and B iff y and z are

myself/himself/herself/oneself' and 3,210 entries for 'at odds with.' Search results from the iWeb and GloWbE corpora were similar. Thanks to Charles Pigden for prompting the 'at odds with' searches.

¹⁰ For discussion of other cases related to synchronic intrapersonal disagreement, which bear directly on Irreflexivity, see Bondy (2020, §§ 4-9) and Coliva (2019, §§ 2-6).

¹¹ See Cappelen and Hawthorne (2009, pp. 60-61). See also Balcerak Jackson (2014, p. 33), Chalmers (2011, p. 518), Jenkins (2014, p. 13), Kinzel and Kusch (2018), MacFarlane (2014, § 6.1), Rott (2015), and Rowbottom (2018, § 5). For an importantly different contrast between 'disagreements' and 'disputes,' see Belleri (2014).

¹² For similar glosses on disagreement, see Baker (2014, p. 41), Dugas (2018, pp. 138, 146), Huvenes (2012, p. 178), Ridge (2013, pp. 55-6, 59-60, 2014, pp. 187, 189-190), Wright (2001, p. 53; 2006, p. 38), and Zeman (2020b).

incompatible in a sense that is specific to those attitudes. For instance, if y and z are preferences held by A and B , then I conjecture that we are disposed to regard y and z as generating disagreement between A and B iff y and z stand in an incompatibility relation R_1 . By contrast, if y and z are beliefs held by A and B , then I suspect that we are disposed to regard y and z as generating disagreement between A and B iff y and z stand in a distinct incompatibility relation R_2 . It may even be that there are *mixed cases*, e.g. a case in which I hope that the Texas Rangers will win the World Series and you believe that they won't, in which we take attitudes of *different kinds* to generate disagreement between their possessors. Anticipating that the relevant incompatibility relation might differ across these mixed cases, I've simply subscripted 'incompatible' with ' y , z '. We'll briefly return to these issues in § 5.

Lastly, I think that the plausibility of the Mistake Principle is nicely articulated by Mark Richard in these probing reflections on disagreement:

“[W]hen one is willing to ascribe truth or falsity to a particular claim p , one treats p and the claim that p is true as equivalent... Suppose I think that Beaufort is a better cheese than Tome, and you think the reverse... Then not only can I... say that Beaufort is better than Tome, I can... say that it's true that Beaufort is better than Tome. And of course if you think Tome is better than Beaufort and not vice versa I can also... say that you think that it's not the case that Beaufort is better than Tome. So I can... say that it's true that Beaufort is better than Tome though you think Beaufort isn't better than Tome. From which it surely follows that you're mistaken—after all, if you have a false belief, you are mistaken about something. *This line of reasoning is sound no matter what the object of dispute.*” (2008, p. 132, italics added)

As Richard points out, it seems quite clear that no matter which subject matter the proposition p is about, one will take another person to have made a mistaken judgment (e.g. formed a false belief or credal state) about this matter if one believes p and believes that one is in disagreement with that person as to whether p is true. The Mistake Principle, then, looks to mark out important connections between the ordinary concepts DISAGREEMENT, BELIEF, and MISTAKE.¹³

2.2. Ramsification

Now that we've identified at least some of the platitudes about disagreement, the next step is to use those platitudes to generate a *Ramsey sentence* for disagreement, which tells us what a world containing disagreement must be like. In essence, the Ramsey sentence for disagreement says that

¹³ The Mistake Principle raises important questions about two phenomena that have been discussed in contemporary debates about disagreement. The first is whether any disagreements, e.g. disagreements about matters of taste, can be *faultless*. At the end of the quoted paragraph, Richard draws the conclusion that “Faultless disagreement is possible—but such disagreement is not one to be evaluated in terms of truth.” This conclusion is meant to be at odds with contemporary relativists' accounts of faultless disagreement (e.g. that of Kölbel (2004a)). Boghossian (2011, § 2.1) develops this line of argument, concurring with Richard's conclusion. My own view, which I can't go into here, is that the considerations advanced by Richard, and thus the Mistake Principle, are fully compatible with the existence of doxastic disagreements that are faultless in the sense detailed by relativists.

The other phenomenon at issue here is what Crispin Wright (2012, p. 439) calls *parity*. In effect, this is the phenomenon wherein A recognises that their disagreement with B is faultless. The Mistake Principle does rule out parity in cases in which A both believes that p and believes that they disagree with B as to whether p is true. However, it allows for parity in other cases, e.g. ones in which A (implicitly) recognises that the nature of their disagreement with B is non-doxastic (given the arguments in §§ 3-4 below, taste disagreement is probably a case of this sort).

there is a relation x which has the features that are described in the platitudes about disagreement. In more detail, the semi-formal version of the Ramsey sentence for disagreement looks like this:

(Ramsey_D) There is an x such that: (x is a relation) and (for all persons A and all times t : it is not the case that A stands in x to A at t) and (for all persons A and B and all times t : if A stands in x to B at t , then B stands in x to A at t) and [it is not the case that (for all persons A , B , and C , matters m , and times t : if A stands in x to B over m at t and B stands in x to C over m at t , then A stands in x to C over m at t) and it is not the case that (for all persons A , B , and C , matters m , and times t : if A stands in x to B over m at t and B stands in x to C over m at t , then A does not stand in x to C over m at t)] and (for all persons A and B , matters m , and times t : A and B stand in x over matter m at t iff there is a y such that y is an attitude about m and A possesses y at t and there is a z such that z is an attitude about m and B possesses z at t and y and z are incompatible with one another) and (for all persons A and B and propositions p : if A believes p , then if A also believes that they stand in x to B as to whether p is true, then A believes that B has made a judgment about p that is mistaken).

If we were pursuing the metaphysics of disagreement as such, we would now turn to ask whether our current evidence indicates that there is in fact such a relation in the world that we inhabit. However, as we're primarily interested in the metaphysics of taste disagreement, our main questions in §§ 3 and 4 will be these:

- Is there a relation that makes (Ramsey_D) true whose relata pertain to matters of gustatory taste?
- If so, then when this relation obtains, does it obtain in virtue of any other, more fundamental relations, or is it the most fundamental relation of taste disagreement?

3. The nature of taste disagreement

3.1. Why taste disagreement is probably not doxastic

Over the past twenty years, philosophers of language and linguists have offered a massive and highly diverse array of hypotheses regarding the nature of taste disagreement.¹⁴ To make this set of hypotheses more manageable, we can sort it into two categories. On the one hand, we have hypotheses according to which taste disagreement involves a relation between *doxastic attitudes* such as beliefs. On the other hand, we have hypotheses according to which taste disagreement involves a

¹⁴ See Baker and Robson (2017), Barker (2010), Barker (2013), Beall (2006), Beddor (2019, § 4), Belleri (2010), Buekens (2009a, 2009b, 2011), Clapp (2015), Davis (2015), Díaz-Legaspe (2015, 2016), Egan (2014), Eriksson (2016), Gutzmann (2016), Hirvonen (2016), Hu (2020), Huvenes (2012, 2014), Kinzel and Kusch (2018), Kölbel (2002, ch. 4, 2004a), Lasersohn (2005, 2017), López de Sa (2007, 2008, 2010, 2015, §§ 2-3), MacFarlane (2014, pp. 134-135), Marques (2015), Marques and García-Carpintero (2014), Moltmann (2010, § 5.3), Parsons (2013), Pearson (2013, § 4.1), Plunkett and Sundell (2013), Richard (2008, ch. 5), Schafer (2011), Schaffer (2011, p. 219, cf. pp. 218-219, 219-220), Silk (2016, ch. 7), Smith (2010), Sundell (2011, 2016, 2017), Wyatt (2018a), Zakkou (2019 a, b), and Zouhar (2018).

My discussion in this section is adapted from the discussion in Wyatt (2021).

relation between *conative attitudes* such as preferences. A representative example of the former sort of hypothesis runs as follows:¹⁵

(TD_B) Persons *A* and *B* are in disagreement about a matter of gustatory taste *m* iff (i) *A* has a belief *b*₁ whose content is the proposition *p*₁, which is about *m*; (ii) *B* has a belief *b*₂ whose content is the proposition *p*₂, which is also about *m*; and (iii) it would be incoherent for *A* to adopt *b*₂ while retaining *b*₁ and *mutatis mutandis* for *B*.

(TD_B) is a very natural account of taste disagreement. Many paradigmatic cases of disagreement, such as the disagreement between Henry and Stephen that we considered in § 2.1, involve incompatible beliefs. It is natural to generalise from these paradigm cases, inferring that disagreement *as such* involves incompatible beliefs, and to then propose that taste disagreement must turn on the disputants' possession of incompatible gustatory beliefs.

Consider, for instance, how (TD_B) will represent the case involving natto that we described in § 1. You find natto delicious, but I find it disgusting. Accordingly, (TD_B) will represent you as believing the proposition that natto is delicious and it will represent me as believing the proposition that it is disgusting. It would seem to be incoherent for you to retain your belief while adopting mine, and the same goes for me, so (TD_B) entails that we disagree about whether natto is delicious or, on the other hand, disgusting. This entailment coincides with what will surely be a common intuition—that we do disagree in this case—so in this respect, (TD_B) looks to be in good shape.¹⁶ It also seems easy enough to adapt (TD_B) so that it identifies a relation whose relata pertain to matters of gustatory taste that makes (Ramsey_D) true. Thus, (TD_B) initially seems to be a promising account of the nature of taste disagreement.

(TD_B) runs into trouble, though, when we consider how it squares with a body of evidence from experimental philosophy and psychology that encompasses nine independent studies. A representative study was conducted by Florian Cova and Nicolas Pain (2012).¹⁷ Cova and Pain's main aim was to determine the extent to which their participants were *normativists* in their application of the aesthetic predicates 'is beautiful' and 'is ugly.' As Cova and Pain use the term, one is a normativist about a matter *m* to the extent that one believes that if one disagrees with another person *B* about *m*, then the judgment about *m* that *B* has made is mistaken. By way of comparison, they also examined the extent to which their participants were normativists about matters of gustatory taste, e.g. whether Brussels sprouts are disgusting or whether pasta with ketchup is delicious.

Using a 0-3 scale, they assigned a 'normativism score' to their participants. They found (*ibid.*, Figures 2 and 3) that the average normativism score with regard to matters of gustatory taste

¹⁵ For discussions of the notion expressed in clause (iii), see Kölbel (2004b), MacFarlane (2014, p. 121), and Plunkett and Sundell (2013, p. 11). Cp. also Bondy (2020, § 2), Coliva (2019, § 6), Dreier (2009, p. 106), and Zouhar (2018, § 4). For some illuminating suggestions regarding the notion of coherence at work here, see Worsnip (2018).

¹⁶ For evidence that this would be a common intuition, see Beebe (2014, Figure 1, pp. 172-176), Beebe, Qiaoan, Wysocki, and Endara (2015, Table 3, Figure 2), Beebe and Sackris (2016, Figure 1), Cova and Pain (2012), Foushee and Srinivasan (2017, Figure 2, pp. 383-384), Goodwin and Darley (2008, Tables 1 and 2, Figure 1, 2012, p. 252), Kuhn, Cheney, and Weinstock (2000, p. 318, Table 4), and Solt (2018, Figure 1). Regarding young children, cf. Foushee and Srinivasan (2017, Figures 4 and 5).

¹⁷ I also discuss Cova and Pain's findings in Wyatt (2018a, 2021), though the scope of my discussion here is broader.

was below 0.5 (and hence well below 1.5). Accordingly, Cova and Pain's findings indicate that when it comes to these matters, we don't tend to be normativists.¹⁸

To see the problem that these findings pose for (TD_B), we must consider them alongside the Mistake Principle. The Mistake Principle entails that if we tended to believe *absolute, gustatory propositions* such as the proposition that natto is delicious or the proposition that natto is disgusting, then we would tend to be normativists about the matters of gustatory taste that these propositions are about. For instance, it entails that if you and I tended to believe absolute, gustatory propositions, then we would probably be normativists about whether natto is delicious and also about whether it is disgusting. Cova and Pain's findings indicate, however, that we *don't* tend to be normativists about matters of gustatory taste. This, together with the conditional that is delivered by the Mistake Principle, sets up a *modus tollens*, the conclusion of which is that we don't tend to believe absolute, gustatory propositions.

In short, Cova and Pain's findings (as well as all of the corroborating findings), when combined with the Mistake Principle, provide empirical evidence that (TD_B) misrepresents the nature of taste disagreement. This shortcoming of (TD_B) is psychological—(TD_B) represents us as having mental states about matters of gustatory taste which, according to our current body of evidence, we just don't tend to have. So while it seems clear that (TD_B) identifies a relation that makes (Ramsey_D) true, that relation doesn't seem to be the relation in which taste disagreement—or at least, the taste disagreement in which we actually tend to engage—consists.¹⁹ Moreover, given that (TD_B) is a representative doxastic account of taste disagreement, we have good reason to consider whether taste disagreement might involve a relation between conative, rather than doxastic, attitudes.

3.2. Taste disagreement as preferential noncotenability

It is easy to see that conative attitudes play significant roles in our gustatory behaviour. To take a simple example, suppose that you are eating at an Asian fusion restaurant and you are offered either natto or kimchi as a side dish. You quite like the flavour of natto, insofar as experiencing natto's flavour brings you a good deal of pleasure, whereas you don't much like the flavour of kimchi, insofar as experiencing kimchi's flavour brings you a good deal of displeasure. Accordingly, you have a stable preference to experience natto's flavour, all else being equal, rather than kimchi's flavour. Given that you have this preference and that as far as you know, all else (e.g. the price and

¹⁸ Cova and Pain's findings are corroborated by numerous additional studies. These include Beebe (2014, Figure 1, pp. 172-176), Beebe, Qiaoan, Wysocki, and Endara (2015, Table 3, Figure 2), Beebe and Sackris (2016, Figure 1), Cohen and Nichols (2010, Figures 1 and 2), Foushee and Srinivasan (2017, Figure 2, pp. 383-384), Goodwin and Darley (2008, Tables 1 and 2, Figure 1, 2012, p. 252), Kuhn, Cheney, and Weinstock (2000, p. 318, Table 4), and Solt (2018, Figure 1). See also Cova, Garcia, and Liao (2015, p. 930), Kuhn, Cheney, and Weinstock (2000, p. 323), and Nichols and Folds-Bennett (2003, Table 1, p. B28 and Table 2, p. B30). Regarding young children, cf. Foushee and Srinivasan (2017, Figures 4 and 5). For some suggestive remarks to the contrary, see Hirvonen (2016, § 3.1), and for some interesting wrinkles, see Kaiser and Rudin (2020).

¹⁹ This conclusion is a claim about the nature of the taste disagreement in which we *typically* engage. As such, it's compatible with the claim that it's *possible* to engage in taste disagreement of the sort that is identified by (TD_B). It's also compatible with the claim that we do *sometimes* engage in such doxastic taste disagreement (e.g. perhaps committed wine critics sometimes engage in this sort of taste disagreement). If it turns out that we do sometimes engage in such doxastic taste disagreement, then that is just grist for my mill, insofar as I am ultimately inclined to take a *pluralist* attitude towards taste disagreement (see my brief remarks in § 5).

freshness of the dishes and how well they will pair with your main dish) is equal, you choose the natto, rather than the kimchi. This case and countless other structurally similar cases are utterly familiar. Accordingly, it would be wise to consider whether taste disagreement may consist in a relation between preferences.

The \$64,000 question, though, is ‘which relation?’ One relation that is worth considering is the preferential analogue of the relation that is described in (TD_B). Say that A ’s preference p_A is *noncotenable* with B ’s preference p_B iff A could not coherently adopt p_B while retaining p_A , and *mutatis mutandis* for B . We might try to analyse taste disagreement as follows:

(TD_{NC}) Persons A and B are in disagreement about a matter of gustatory taste m iff A and B respectively have preferences about m that are noncotenable.

(TD_{NC}) is certainly an improvement over (TD_B), insofar as it isn’t disconfirmed by Cova and Pain’s findings. Moreover, it initially seems to capture what is going on in typical cases of taste disagreement. Return to the Asian fusion restaurant and suppose that I am also offered either natto or kimchi. I like the flavour of kimchi much more than the flavour of natto. As a result, I have a stable preference to experience kimchi’s flavour, rather than natto’s flavour, all else being equal. This leads me to order the kimchi, rather than the natto.²⁰

Given our respective preferences, it is natural to say that you and I are in disagreement with respect to whether natto or kimchi is gustatorily superior. We might be in agreement when it comes to all sorts of other issues regarding natto and kimchi—which has a slipperier mouthfeel, which tends to be saltier, which is more widely consumed in Japan, and which is better for digestive health. However, we are certainly in disagreement as to which of them has more gustatory value. It initially seems that (TD_{NC}) is able to explain why we are in taste disagreement about this matter, insofar as it would seem incoherent for you to adopt my preference while retaining yours, and *mutatis mutandis* for me.

This initial impression, however, is misleading. In fact, (TD_{NC}) entails that we *aren’t* in taste disagreement in this case. To see this, we need to reflect a bit more carefully on the contents of our respective preferences. We said that you have the preference to experience natto’s flavour, rather than kimchi’s flavour and that I have the preference to experience kimchi’s flavour, rather than natto’s flavour. But to describe our preferences in this way is to *underdescribe* them. More carefully, you prefer that *you* experience natto’s flavour, rather than kimchi’s flavour, whereas I prefer that *I* experience kimchi’s flavour, rather than natto’s flavour.

After all, the reason that you have your preference is that you like natto’s flavour and dislike kimchi’s flavour, and the reason that I have my preference is that I like kimchi’s flavour and dislike natto’s flavour. These individual affective experiences are what cause us to form our respective preferences. Moreover, as we’ve described this case, which is perfectly ordinary, I’m asked to decide what to order for myself and you’re asked to decide what to order for yourself. It’s natural to hypothesise, then, that the preference which causes you to place your order is a preference which pertains to your gustatory experiences, and likewise for me. For these reasons, we should regard our preferences as having what we might call *individualised contents*.²¹

²⁰ In what follows, I’ll mostly drop the ‘all else being equal’ qualifier when describing preferences, but it should still be mentally inserted.

²¹ It seems helpful to classify these contents as *de se*, though I lack the space to go into the implications of this classification.

Now that we've fully fleshed out the contents of our preferences, it is easy to see that they are actually *cotenable*: you could coherently adopt my preference while retaining yours, and *mutatis mutandis* for me. If you adopted my preference while retaining yours, then you would have the following two preferences:²²

p_{you} : the preference that, all else being equal, you experience natto's flavour, rather than kimchi's flavour

p_{me} : the preference that all else being equal, I experience kimchi's flavour, rather than natto's flavour.

It seems entirely coherent for you to have both p_{you} and p_{me} . After all, you can order natto at the restaurant while I order kimchi, and we can then happily dine together. More generally, you can go on choosing natto over kimchi while I go on choosing kimchi over natto.²³

But couldn't you encounter a problem if we're forced to *coordinate*? We might choose to dine out together and find that only two nearby restaurants are open—the Japanese restaurant where they serve natto and the Korean restaurant where they serve kimchi. Would your recognition of the fact that we can only dine out together at one of the restaurants force you to give up one of p_{you} or p_{me} , thereby revealing a tension between these preferences in at least some cases that require coordination?

Not at all. The reason is that in this situation, it *isn't* the case that all else is equal. You believe (indeed, you know) that we've chosen to dine out together and you also believe (indeed, you know) that we can only dine out together at either the Japanese or the Korean restaurant. Call the former belief b_d and call the latter belief b_{JK} . Moreover, call the set of preferences and beliefs that an individual has at a given time their *cognitive set*. Here is a way for you to coherently update your initial cognitive set $\{p_{you}, p_{me}, b_d, b_{JK}\}$:

- (i) Retain p_{you}, p_{me}, b_d and b_{JK}
- (ii) Acquire the belief b_n that it is not the case that in the present context, all else is equal
- (iii) Acquire the preference p_{coord} that all things considered, we dine at the Japanese restaurant, rather than the Korean restaurant.

You might update your cognitive set in this way because you remember that we encountered this situation not so long ago and that we agreed to dine at the Korean restaurant. This, you think, means that the fairest course of action would be for us to now dine at the Japanese restaurant instead. Of course, if you remembered that we decided back then to dine at the Korean restaurant, then instead of acquiring p_{coord} , you might instead acquire the preference p_{coord*} that all things considered, we dine at the Korean restaurant, rather than the Japanese restaurant. Either way of updating your cognitive set looks coherent, which shows that even in cases requiring coordination, it can be coherent for you to have both p_{you} and p_{me} .

The upshot, then, is that while (TD_{NC}) is more attractive than (TD_B), it doesn't give us a workable account of taste disagreement. If we're going to analyse taste disagreement in terms of conative attitudes, we'll have to do better than (TD_{NC}).

²² Of course, if you were to describe these preferences, you would uniformly replace 'you' with 'me/I' and vice versa.

²³ Cp. the problem for another sort of conative account of taste disagreement that is developed by both Bob Beddor (2019, p. 5) and Teresa Marques (2015, p. 6, 2016, p. 310).

3.3. Taste disagreement as preferential type-noncotenability

To improve upon (TD_{NC}), we should develop a way of understanding taste disagreement that reflects (TD_{NC})'s initial plausibility while also avoiding the pitfall into which it leads. We can do this by analysing taste disagreement in terms of a relation that is a close cousin of preferential noncotenability. First, where p_A is A 's preference that they do act a_1 , rather than act a_2 , let the *anonymised variant* p_A^N of p_A be the preference for doing a_1 , rather than a_2 . As the name suggests, the key difference between p_A and p_A^N is that p_A is a preference about what a particular person A does, whereas p_A^N isn't about any particular person. It is useful to think of p_A^N as telling us what *type* of preference p_A is: p_A is a preference for doing act a_1 , rather than act a_2 .²⁴

With the notion of an anonymised variant in hand, we can say that an arbitrary person C has p_A^N with respect to themselves iff C prefers that they do a_1 , rather than a_2 . For instance, suppose that p_A^N is the preference for earning an academic's salary while being happy, rather than earning a CEO's salary while being miserable. I have p_A^N with respect to myself, since I prefer that I earn an academic's salary while being happy, rather than earning a CEO's salary while being miserable.

Lastly, say that preferences p_A and p_B are *type-noncotenable* iff an arbitrary person C couldn't coherently have both p_A^N and p_B^N with respect to themselves. We now have an attractive analysis of taste disagreement that runs as follows:

(TD_{TNC}) Persons A and B are in disagreement about a matter of gustatory taste m iff A and B respectively have preferences about m that are type-noncotenable.

Like (TD_{NC}), (TD_{TNC}) avoids the empirical problem that besets (TD_B). But unlike (TD_{NC}), (TD_{TNC}) has the desirable consequence that you and I disagree about the comparative gustatory values of natto and kimchi in the case that we've been imagining. You have the preference p_{you} , whereas I have the preference p_{me} . The anonymised variant p_{you}^N of p_{you} is the preference to experience natto's flavour, rather than kimchi's flavour, all else being equal. The anonymised variant p_{me}^N of p_{me} is the preference to experience kimchi's flavour, rather than natto's flavour, all else being equal. If an arbitrary person C had both p_{you}^N and p_{me}^N with respect to themselves, then C would prefer:

- (i) That all else being equal, they experience natto's flavour, rather than kimchi's flavour and
- (ii) That all else being equal, they experience kimchi's flavour, rather than natto's flavour.

It seems right to say that this preference set (which would, of course, be a part of C 's overall cognitive set) is incoherent, which means that p_{you} and p_{me} are type-noncotenable. This means that according to (TD_{TNC}), we disagree about the comparative gustatory values of natto and kimchi, which is precisely the result that we want.

3.4. (TD_{TNC}) and the platitudes

²⁴ It would also be suitable to describe p_A^N as having the *generic content* that one do a_1 , rather than a_2 .

As I argued in § 3.2, my sense is that if we want to properly understand human gustatory psychology, then we'll need to do so in terms of non-anonymised preferences like p_A , rather than their anonymised variants. Nevertheless, p_A^N is a theoretical entity that can earn its keep elsewhere, in a promising theory of the nature of taste disagreement.

Despite its advantages over (TD_B) and (TD_{NC}) , a potential worry about (TD_{TNC}) still lingers.²⁵ (TD_{TNC}) represents a perfectly ordinary phenomenon, taste disagreement, as being rather complicated, insofar as it involves unfamiliar things like the anonymised variants of preferences and the relation of having such an anonymised variant with respect to oneself. This may cause us to wonder whether (TD_{TNC}) might suffer from the flaw of overintellectualisation.

However, as I mentioned at the start of this discussion, we shouldn't let the fact that taste disagreement is an ordinary phenomenon mislead us into thinking that its nature must be simple. Of course, we should begin by considering the simplest analyses of taste disagreement that we can devise, but if those analyses don't pass muster—as looks to be the case with (TD_B) and (TD_{NC}) —then we should be willing to entertain more complex analyses.

Another way of assuaging this worry is to appreciate that the relation of having type-noncotenable preferences, where the preferences at issue are gustatory, is (with one caveat to be discussed below) a disagreement relation according to our ordinary concept DISAGREEMENT. That is, where the relevant preferences are gustatory, the relation of having type-noncotenable preferences makes $(Ramsey_D)$ true. To see this, we can consider how this relation fares with respect to each of the platitudes about disagreement.²⁶

It's easy to see that (TD_{TNC}) secures the symmetry of taste disagreement by considering the natto case, or any other clear case of taste disagreement, as an arbitrary case.

Similarly, it's easy to see that (TD_{TNC}) secures the non-transitivity of taste disagreement. Consider the following case:

- You have the preference p_{you} that, all else being equal, you experience natto's flavour, rather than kimchi's flavour
- I have the preference p_{me} that all else being equal, I experience kimchi's flavour, rather than natto's flavour
- Susan has the preference p_{Susan} that all else being equal, she experiences natto's flavour, rather than kimchi's flavour.

(TD_{TNC}) entails that you and I are in disagreement about the comparative gustatory values of natto and kimchi and that I am in disagreement with Susan about the same. However, it's clear that you and Susan have *type-cotenable* preferences, which means that you aren't in disagreement with Susan about this matter. This shows that (TD_{TNC}) entails that taste disagreement isn't transitive.

Additionally, consider this case:

- You have the preference p_{you} that, all else being equal, you experience natto's flavour, rather than experiencing kimchi's flavour or experiencing the flavour of neither natto nor kimchi
- I have the preference p_{me} that all else being equal, I experience kimchi's flavour, rather than experiencing natto's flavour or experiencing the flavour of neither natto nor kimchi
- Susan has the preference p_{Susan} that all else being equal, she experiences neither natto's flavour nor kimchi's flavour, rather than experiencing the flavour of either.

²⁵ I defend (TD_{TNC}) against a range of additional objections in Wyatt (2021).

²⁶ If you're already happy with (TD_{TNC}) , then feel free to skip to the next section.

(TD_{TNC}) entails that you and I are in disagreement about the comparative gustatory values of natto and kimchi and that I am in disagreement with Susan about the same. I take kimchi to have more gustatory value than natto, whereas Susan doesn't take either to have more gustatory value than the other—she dislikes the flavour of both of them. (TD_{TNC}) also entails that you are in disagreement with Susan about the comparative gustatory values of natto and kimchi for a similar reason. This shows that (TD_{TNC}) entails that taste disagreement isn't anti-transitive, which means that (TD_{TNC}) entails that taste disagreement is non-transitive.

It's also straightforward to see that (TD_{TNC}) makes the Disagreement Principle true, when that principle is regarded as concerning taste disagreement. The relevant attitudes will of course be gustatory preferences and the incompatibility relation that is indexed to pairs of such preferences will be type-noncotenability.

In thinking about the Mistake Principle in this context, we should consider a formulation of this principle that pertains specifically to taste disagreement:

Mistake Principle_{TD}: For all persons A and B and propositions p concerning matters of gustatory taste: if A believes p , then if A also believes that they are in taste disagreement with B as to whether p is true, then A believes that B has made a judgment (e.g. formed a belief or a credal state) about p that is mistaken.

(TD_{TNC}) is meant to specify the nature of the taste disagreement in which we actually tend to stand, and it tells us that this disagreement is preferential, rather than doxastic. Accordingly, (TD_{TNC}) tells us that this sort of disagreement isn't disagreement about whether certain believed propositions are true or untrue. For this reason, (TD_{TNC}) delivers the result that the second embedded antecedent in Mistake Principle_{TD} (' A also believes that they are in taste disagreement with B as to whether p is true') comes out *false* in all actual, typical cases. This suffices to show that in all such cases, Mistake Principle_{TD} comes out true.²⁷

Turning lastly to Irreflexivity, we encounter a complication. This is simply that (TD_{TNC}) doesn't entail that taste disagreement is irreflexive. As I see it, there are three potential responses to this complication.

One strategy would be to argue that it is *impossible* for a person A at time t to have type-noncotenable preferences p_1 and p_2 pertaining to a matter of gustatory taste m . This strategy may work, but it doesn't look especially promising in light of what psychologists call *framing effects*.²⁸

Suppose that a diner A is presented with two menus that each contain descriptions of two dishes that are equally priced along with descriptions of several other dishes that are priced arbitrarily. Call the target dishes from Menu #1 d_1 and d_2 and call the target dishes from Menu #2 d_3 and d_4 . A is told to first make a choice between d_1 and d_2 and to then make a choice between d_3 and d_4 . Unbeknownst to A , $d_1 = d_4$ and $d_2 = d_3$. However, on Menu #1, d_1/d_4 is described in a vivid, engaging manner that is intended to elicit a high degree of attraction, whereas on Menu #2, d_1/d_4 's ingredients are listed out one-by-one in a matter-of-fact way, and the converse is true of d_2/d_3 . In effect, d_1/d_4 is framed positively on Menu #1 and neutrally on Menu #2, and the converse is true of

²⁷ What about possible, if atypical, cases, e.g. a case in which two committed wine critics are in *doxastic* taste disagreement about whether a 1997 Beaucastel Chateaufeuf du Pape is gustatorily superior to a 1996 Leroy Chambertin? (I owe this example to Barry Smith (2005, p. 86).) Here, Mistake Principle_{TD} presumably comes out true, though we would need a full account of doxastic taste disagreement to confirm this.

²⁸ See the sources discussed in Shafir (2016, § 28.1).

d_2/d_3 . It's plausible that because of this variable framing, A might have the following type-noncotenable preferences when she is selecting a dish from Menu #2 at time t :

- (i) That all else being equal, she experience the flavour of d_1 , rather than d_2
- (ii) That all else being equal, she experience the flavour of d_3 , rather than d_4 .

This suggests that it is actually possible for a person A at time t to have type-noncotenable preferences p_1 and p_2 pertaining to a matter of gustatory taste m . As a result, the strategy of securing irreflexivity by denying this possibility is questionable.

This sort of case might lead us to wonder about a second possible strategy: why shouldn't we say that it is actually possible for a person to be in taste disagreement with themselves at a particular time t , thereby *denying* Irreflexivity? Perhaps the best reason to not go this way is that we *can't*, unless we want to change the subject. I've hypothesised that according to our ordinary concept DISAGREEMENT, disagreement—including taste disagreement—is irreflexive. So if we say instead that taste disagreement is non-reflexive, then it would seem that we've opted, in effect, to discard our ordinary concept DISAGREEMENT in favour of an alternative concept DISAGREEMENT*. In doing so, we will have shifted from trying to identify the nature of disagreement to recommending that we change how we think about the structural features of disagreement. This recommendation may ultimately prove to have merit. However, changing the subject is a theoretical cost, and it seems unnecessary to bear it in this context.²⁹

To secure the irreflexivity of taste disagreement, thereby preserving Irreflexivity, I propose that we should build the irreflexivity of taste disagreement into (TD_{TNC}) as follows:

- (TD_{TNC}*) Persons A and B are in disagreement about a matter of gustatory taste m at t iff (i) $A \neq B$ and (ii) A and B respectively have preferences about m at t that are type-noncotenable

(TD_{TNC}*)'s structure differs slightly from that of prior accounts of taste disagreement such as (TD_B) and (TD_{NC}), but this just seems to be a fact about, not a problem with, (TD_{TNC}*). Moreover, if we endorse (TD_{TNC}*), then we avoid changing the subject, which is a significant benefit. We should also bear in mind that an advocate of (TD_B) or (TD_{NC}) will confront the very same dilemma that we're considering here: preserve Irreflexivity by modifying the initial structure of their account of taste disagreement or retain that initial structure at the cost of changing the subject. Accordingly, it's fair to predict that this dilemma arises for theories of taste disagreement generally, which means that it doesn't present a special challenge for (TD_{TNC}).

4. Digging deeper: paralysis inducement

We've seen thus far that (TD_{TNC}), which we might call the *type-noncotenability model* of taste disagreement, looks to fare rather well. However, we shouldn't be entirely satisfied with the model as it stands. This is because it involves a critical notion that we have yet to say much about: the notion of *coherence*. (TD_{TNC}) tells us that taste disagreement consists in the possession of type-noncotenable gustatory preferences. Preferences are type-noncotenable iff an arbitrary person C couldn't coherently have the preferences' anonymised variants with respect to themselves. But if C

²⁹ There may be good reasons to use an alternative, non-reflexive concept of disagreement in other theoretical contexts. See Bondy (2020, §§ 6-8) and Coliva (2019, §§ 2-6).

couldn't coherently have the relevant preferences' anonymised variants with respect to themselves, what would *explain* this fact?

One way to proceed here would be to regard this fact as *primitive*. Of course, it seems that explanations must bottom out somewhere. However, when offering explanations of the phenomena that we encounter, we should also try to push these explanations as deep as they can go. When it comes to taste disagreement, we can push the explanation that is offered in (TD_{TNC}) at least one level deeper.

To see how, return to the Asian fusion restaurant. It would be incoherent for an arbitrary person C to have the anonymised variants p_{you}^N and p_{me}^N of p_{you} and p_{me} with respect to themselves. Why would this be incoherent? A plausible explanation is that having p_{you}^N and p_{me}^N with respect to themselves would dispose C to pursue two courses of action both of which they cannot successfully pursue. If C were in a situation in which all else is equal and they asked to choose between natto and kimchi, they would be stuck. C would be disposed to choose an experience of natto's flavour over an experience of kimchi's flavour, all else being equal. They would also be disposed to choose an experience of kimchi's flavour over an experience of natto's flavour, all else being equal. Accordingly, C would experience a kind of *practical paralysis*, being unable to choose one of these courses of action rather than the other. In short, we can say that if p_A and p_B are type-noncotenable, then this is because their anonymised variants p_A^N and p_B^N are *paralysis-inducing*.³⁰

Our overall picture of taste disagreement, then, is this. Taste disagreement is preferential, rather than doxastic, in nature. Specifically, taste disagreement consists in the disputants' possession of type-noncotenable gustatory preferences. Moreover, if their preferences are type-noncotenable, then this type-noncotenableity is grounded in a fact about those preferences' anonymised variants—namely, that they are paralysis-inducing.³¹

[Insert FIG 8.1 here.]

5. Going forward: taste discourse and the nature of disagreement

To wrap up, I want to briefly indicate how the debates about taste discourse, taste disagreement, and disagreement in general might fruitfully proceed in light of what I've done here. The main takeaways from my discussion, I think, are these:

- Taste disagreement is a species of *disagreement*, so any account of taste disagreement must be sensitive to the features that disagreement has, according to our ordinary concept DISAGREEMENT
- The investigation of DISAGREEMENT must ultimately be empirical, not purely *a priori*
- Taste disagreement is, as far as we know, preferential, rather than doxastic, in nature
- The nature of taste disagreement is surprisingly complex, so we should be wary of naïve assumptions when developing theories of this (or any other sort of) disagreement.

³⁰ The notion of paralysis inducement is clearly connected to the notion of preclusion of joint satisfaction that is discussed by MacFarlane (2014, § 6.3) and has its origins in Stevenson (1963).

³¹ In Wyatt (2021), I discuss some further wrinkles that can be straightforwardly incorporated into this picture.

Regarding the linguistic debates about taste discourse, my main suggestion would be that we reassess the role that considerations about taste disagreement have played in these debates. Any argument that is premised on a doxastic account of taste disagreement like (TD_B) is bound to be problematic, so we should be on guard against such arguments.³² Additionally, we should seriously consider whether a preferential account of taste disagreement such as (TD_{TNC}) might be naturally combined with an *expressivist* account of taste discourse. Expressivism has been a relatively unpopular option thus far, but it may be time for its day in the sun.³³

Regarding broader discussions of disagreement, I would highlight one issue in particular. I've argued that taste disagreement is preferential in nature. But it seems obvious that some disagreement, e.g. scientific disagreement, does involve doxastic attitudes such as beliefs and credences. This should lead us to seriously consider going *pluralist* about disagreement. I think that the machinery of the Canberra Plan will enable us to precisely articulate this sort of pluralism, much as it has done in debates about truth, but the details will have to be worked out.³⁴

We have a long way to go in attempting to understand the nature of disagreement and the roles that it plays in our cognitive and social lives. My view is that the intricacy and cross-disciplinary relevance of this topic should be invigorating, motivating us to carry out the delicate empirical and conceptual work that remains to be done.³⁵

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³² The core argument of Kölbel (2004a) is a particularly influential argument of this sort. Cp. the critical remarks in Huvenes (2012).

³³ See Zouhar (2019) for a recent critique.

³⁴ I discuss disagreement pluralism at greater length in Wyatt (2021). For other useful discussions, see Baker (2014), Diaz-Legaspe (2015, 2016), Egan (2012, pp. 575-576, 2014, pp. 95-97), Eriksson (2016, § 8), Huvenes (2012, § 7), López de Sa (2015, § 2), MacFarlane (2014, ch. 6), Marques (2014), Marques and García-Carpintero (2014), Moruzzi (ms), Osorio and Villanueva (2019), Palmira (2017), Ridge (2013), and Sundell (2011, §§ 2 and 3). See also Davis (2015, n. 6), Stojanovic (2019, § 5), as well as Baker and Woods (2015, § III)'s helpful remarks on 'A-type' and 'B-type discordance.' For an overview of the relevant debates about truth, see Pedersen and Wright (2018).

³⁵ Thanks to Dan Zeman and to the members of the philosophy programme at the University of Otago for helpful feedback on this chapter.

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