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dc.contributor.authorLuckie, Matthew Johnen_NZ
dc.contributor.authorBeverly, Roberten_NZ
dc.coverage.spatialConference held Los Angeles, USAen_NZ
dc.date.accessioned2019-11-19T22:10:29Z
dc.date.available2017en_NZ
dc.date.available2019-11-19T22:10:29Z
dc.date.issued2017en_NZ
dc.identifier.citationLuckie, M. J., & Beverly, R. (2017). The impact of router outages on the AS-level internet. In Proceedings of the Conference of the ACM Special Interest Group on Data Communication (pp. 488–501). Conference held Los Angeles, USA: ACM. https://doi.org/10.1145/3098822.3098858en
dc.identifier.isbn978-1-4503-4653-5en_NZ
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10289/13169
dc.description.abstractWe propose and evaluate a new metric for understanding the dependence of the AS-level Internet on individual routers. Whereas prior work uses large volumes of reachability probes to infer outages, we design an efficient active probing technique that directly and unambiguously reveals router restarts. We use our technique to survey 149,560 routers across the Internet for 2.5 years. 59,175 of the surveyed routers (40%) experience at least one reboot, and we quantify the resulting impact of each router outage on global IPv4 and IPv6 BGP reachability. Our technique complements existing data and control plane outage analysis methods by providing a causal link from BGP reachability failures to the responsible router(s) and multi-homing configurations. While we found the Internet core to be largely robust, we identified specific routers that were single points of failure for the prefixes they advertised. In total, 2,385 routers -- 4.0% of the routers that restarted over the course of 2.5 years of probing -- were single points of failure for 3,396 IPv6 prefixes announced by 1,708 ASes. We inferred 59% of these routers were the customer-edge border router. 2,374 (70%) of the withdrawn prefixes were not covered by a less specific prefix, so 1,726 routers (2.9%) of those that restarted were single points of failure for at least one network. However, a covering route did not imply reachability during a router outage, as no previously-responsive address in a withdrawn more specific prefix responded during a one-week sample. We validate our reboot and single point of failure inference techniques with four networks, finding no false positive or false negative reboots, but find some false negatives in our single point of failure inferences.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherACMen_NZ
dc.rights© 2018 ACM. This is the author's accepted version.
dc.sourceSIGCOMM'17en_NZ
dc.subjectcomputer scienceen_NZ
dc.subjectBGPen_NZ
dc.subjectinternet reliabilityen_NZ
dc.subjectroutingen_NZ
dc.subjectsingle points of failureen_NZ
dc.titleThe impact of router outages on the AS-level interneten_NZ
dc.typeConference Contribution
dc.identifier.doi10.1145/3098822.3098858en_NZ
dc.relation.isPartOfProceedings of the Conference of the ACM Special Interest Group on Data Communicationen_NZ
pubs.begin-page488
pubs.elements-id200984
pubs.end-page501
pubs.finish-date2017-08-25en_NZ
pubs.start-date2017-08-21en_NZ


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