Show simple item record  

dc.contributor.authorMarcos, Pedroen_NZ
dc.contributor.authorPrehn, Larsen_NZ
dc.contributor.authorLeal, Lucasen_NZ
dc.contributor.authorDainotti, Albertoen_NZ
dc.contributor.authorFeldmann, Anjaen_NZ
dc.contributor.authorBarcellos, Marinhoen_NZ
dc.coverage.spatialVirtual Event, USAen_NZ
dc.date.accessioned2021-03-17T00:14:14Z
dc.date.available2021-03-17T00:14:14Z
dc.date.issued2020en_NZ
dc.identifier.citationMarcos, P., Prehn, L., Leal, L., Dainotti, A., Feldmann, A., & Barcellos, M. (2020). AS-Path Prepending: There is no rose without a thorn. In Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC ’20) (pp. 506–520). New York, NY, USA: ACM. https://doi.org/10.1145/3419394.3423642en
dc.identifier.isbn9781450381383en_NZ
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10289/14183
dc.description.abstractInbound traffic engineering (ITE) - -the process of announcing routes to, e.g., maximize revenue or minimize congestion - -is an essential task for Autonomous Systems (ASes). AS Path Prepending (ASPP) is an easy to use and well-known ITE technique that routing manuals show as one of the first alternatives to influence other ASes' routing decisions. We observe that origin ASes currently prepend more than 25% of all IPv4 prefixes. ASPP consists of inflating the BGP AS path. Since the length of the AS path is the second tie-breaker in the BGP best path selection, ASPP can steer traffic to other routes. Despite being simple and easy to use, the appreciation of ASPP among operators and researchers is diverse. Some have questioned its need, effectiveness, and predictability, as well as voiced security concerns. Motivated by these mixed views, we revisit ASPP. Our longitudinal study shows that ASes widely deploy ASPP, and its utilization has slightly increased despite public statements against it. We surprisingly spot roughly 6k ASes originating at least one prefix with prepends that achieve no ITE goal. With active measurements, we show that ASPP effectiveness as an ITE tool depends on the AS location and the number of available upstreams; that ASPP security implications are practical; identify that more than 18% of the prepended prefixes contain unnecessary prepends that achieve no apparent goal other than amplifying existing routing security risks. We validate our findings in interviews with 20 network operators.en_NZ
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherACMen_NZ
dc.rights© 2020 Copyright held by the author(s). Publication rights licensed to ACM.
dc.sourceIMC '20en_NZ
dc.subjectcomputer scienceen_NZ
dc.subjectnetworksen_NZ
dc.subjectnetwork measurementen_NZ
dc.titleAS-Path Prepending: There is no rose without a thornen_NZ
dc.typeConference Contribution
dc.identifier.doi10.1145/3419394.3423642en_NZ
dc.relation.isPartOfProceedings of ACM SIGCOMM Internet Measurement Conference (IMC '20)en_NZ
pubs.begin-page506
pubs.elements-id258896
pubs.end-page520
pubs.finish-date2020-10-29en_NZ
pubs.place-of-publicationNew York, NY, USAen_NZ
pubs.publication-statusPublisheden_NZ
pubs.start-date2020-10-27en_NZ


Files in this item

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record