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      Making it explicit and clear: From ‘strong’ to ‘hyper-’ inferentialism in Brandom and Peirce

      Legg, Catherine
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      Legg Inferentialism.pdf
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      DOI
       10.1111/j.1467-9973.2008.00527.x
      Link
       www3.interscience.wiley.com
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      Legg, C. (2008). Making it explicit and clear: From ‘strong’ to ‘hyper-’ inferentialism in Brandom and Peirce. Metaphilosophy, 39(1), 105-123.
      Permanent Research Commons link: https://hdl.handle.net/10289/1815
      Abstract
      This article explores how Robert Brandom's original "inferentialist" philosophical framework should be positioned with respect to the classical pragmatist tradition. It is argued that Charles Peirce's original attack (in "Questions Concerning Certain Faculties Claimed for Man" and other early papers) on the use of "intuition" in nineteenth-century philosophy of mind is in fact a form of inferentialism, and thus an antecedent relatively unexplored by Brandom in his otherwise comprehensive and illuminating "tales of the mighty dead." However, whereas Brandom stops short at a merely "strong" inferentialism, which admits some non-inferential mental content (although it is parasitic on the inferential and can only be "inferentially articulated"), Peirce embraces a total, that is, "hyper-," inferentialism. Some consequences of this difference are explored, and Peirce's more thoroughgoing position is defended.
      Date
      2008
      Type
      Journal Article
      Publisher
      Blackwell Publishing
      Rights
      This is the author’s accepted version of an article published in the journal: Metaphilosophy. The definitive version is available at www.blackwell-synergy.com. Copyright 2008 The Author.
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      • Arts and Social Sciences Papers [1423]
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