Argument-forms which turn invalid over infinite domains: Physicalism as supertask?
| dc.contributor.author | Legg, Catherine | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2009-06-18T22:29:54Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2009-06-18T22:29:54Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2008 | |
| dc.description.abstract | Argument-forms exist which are valid over finite but not infinite domains. Despite understanding of this by formal logicians, philosophers can be observed treating as valid arguments which are in fact invalid over infinite domains. In support of this claim I will first present an argument against the classical pragmatist theory of truth by Mark Johnston. Then, more ambitiously, I will suggest the fallacy lurks in certain arguments for physicalism taken for granted by many philosophers today. | en |
| dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
| dc.identifier.citation | Legg, C. (2008). Argument-forms which turn invalid over infinite domains: Physicalism as supertask? Contemporary Pragmatism, 5(1) 1-11. | en |
| dc.identifier.doi | 10.1163/18758185-90000078 | en_NZ |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10289/2200 | |
| dc.language.iso | en | |
| dc.publisher | Editions Rodopi BV | en_NZ |
| dc.relation.isPartOf | Contemporary Pragmatism | en_NZ |
| dc.relation.uri | http://www.rodopi.nl/senj.asp?SerieId=CP | en |
| dc.rights | This is an article published in the journal: Contemporary Pragmatism. Used with permission. Editions Rodopi © 2008. | en |
| dc.subject | argument-forms | en |
| dc.subject | Peirce | en |
| dc.subject | Mark Johnston | |
| dc.subject | pragmatism | |
| dc.subject | truth | |
| dc.subject | physicalism | |
| dc.subject | infinite domains | |
| dc.title | Argument-forms which turn invalid over infinite domains: Physicalism as supertask? | en |
| dc.type | Journal Article | en |
| dspace.entity.type | Publication | |
| pubs.begin-page | 1 | en_NZ |
| pubs.end-page | 11 | en_NZ |
| pubs.issue | 1 | en_NZ |
| pubs.volume | 5 | en_NZ |