We can be faced with situations in which we act in accordance with the all-things-considered morally right course of action, and yet nevertheless experience an emotion of self-directed distress at the fact that we have so acted. Moreover, we have the intuition that this emotion is rational or appropriate. Literature is scattered with such examples, and they crop up not infrequently in life. The fact that agents experience justified distress in such situations has been taken as evidence that unavoidable moral wrongdoing is possible. However, if this is the case, then the compelling intuition that an all-things-considered morally right action cannot be wrong must be false. In this thesis, I offer a way of reconciling these two compelling intuitions that denies the possibility of unavoidable moral wrongdoing. I argue that existing attempts to dissolve this contradiction by arguing in favour of the possibility of unavoidable moral wrongdoing are unsatisfactory; and I contend that, by utilising Susan Wolf’s ideas on the “nameless virtue” (2001), developed in order to solve the problem of resultant moral luck, we can arrive at a more compelling method of dissolving the apparent contradiction. This solution is one that allows us to retain the intuition that a right act cannot also be wrong, while simultaneously allowing for the rationality of emotion of self-directed distress agents experience in situations of apparent unavoidable moral wrongdoing.