The political economy of intrastate armed conflicts: The feasibility hypothesis in the case of Pakistan

Abstract

This thesis examines the structural conditions that make intrastate armed conflict feasible in Pakistan. While much of the existing literature attributes Pakistan’s internal conflicts to ideology, identity, or historical grievances, this study argues that such explanations account for the framing and mobilisation of conflict but fail to explain why violence clusters in specific regions despite similar grievances elsewhere, and why multiple groups with varied motivations operate from the same locations. Addressing this conceptual gap, the thesis employs the feasibility hypothesis as its theoretical lens, which posits that sustained rebellion becomes possible where it is operationally and economically viable. The central research question asks whether operational and economic feasibility better explains Pakistan’s conflict dynamics than ideational or grievance-based accounts. The study adopts a mixed-methods design. The quantitative analysis uses district-level cross-sectional data to test the statistical association of six independent variables (terrain ruggedness, road density, border proximity, human development, poverty, and natural resources) with conflict intensity. This is complemented by qualitative analysis of secondary literature, policy reports, and historical narratives to interpret and contextualise the empirical results. The findings confirm that rugged terrain, proximity to porous borders (especially with Afghanistan and Iran), and low human development are significantly associated with higher conflict intensity. By contrast, poverty and road density show weak or insignificant effects, while natural resources influence conflict primarily through enabling illicit economies. These results support the argument that intrastate armed conflict persists where structural conditions make rebellion operationally and economically feasible. Theoretically, the study localises and refines the feasibility hypothesis for sub-national analysis using improved operational proxies. Methodologically, it contributes through a mixed-methods framework linking quantitative modelling and contextual qualitative interpretation. Policy-wise, it recommends strengthening border management, improving local governance, and investing in human development to mitigate structural enablers of violence. The findings advance comparative research on the political economy of conflict by demonstrating how structural feasibility, rather than ideology alone, shapes the geography of rebellion in fragile states.