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dc.contributor.authorUlatowski, Josephen_NZ
dc.date.accessioned2022-02-14T02:37:32Z
dc.date.available2022-02-14T02:37:32Z
dc.date.issued2021en_NZ
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10289/14745
dc.description.abstractSuppose that: 1. an agent, S, is able to choose only one option, x or y; 2. S prefers neither x nor y in comparison to the other; and 3. S prefers having at least one of x or y to having none.1 Call this “the problem of Buridan’s Ass.” A theory of practical reasoning is supposed to tell us what to do. Which option, x or y, should S choose? Which theory of practical reasoning tells S to choose that option? While we are capable of overcoming the above situation, it seems that our choosing to act did not rely upon a theory of practical reasoning. In response to the puzzle above, I show how Davidson’s theory faces a pair of difficulties, which are the result of his overly weak conception of the role of intentions and plans in practical reasoning. On one hand, Davidson’s theory seems unable to accommodate the possibility of a future intention in the face of equally desirable future options, and, on the other hand, his theory cannot ensure that rational intentions are agglomerative. Upon further inspection, however, it appears that Davidson’s theory is not an overly weak conception since he does seem to rule out the role of plans in practical reasoning. But even including plans in practical reasoning, as Bratman’s theory of intention does, fails to solve the seemingly insoluble problem of equipollent preference.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoenen_NZ
dc.publisherAcademia.eduen_NZ
dc.titleFuture intentions, plans, and the problem of Buridan's Assen_NZ
dc.typeJournal Article
dc.identifier.doi10.20935/al1686en_NZ
dc.relation.isPartOfAcademia Lettersen_NZ
pubs.elements-id263092
pubs.publication-statusPublished onlineen_NZ


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