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dc.contributor.authorWyatt, Jeremyen_NZ
dc.coverage.spatialConference held on Zoom, hosted by Politehnica University of Bucharesten_NZ
dc.date.accessioned2023-10-05T22:57:20Z
dc.date.available2023-10-05T22:57:20Z
dc.date.issued2023-09-30en_NZ
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10289/16065
dc.description.abstractIn this talk, I'll aim to defend deflationism about the concept of truth from a prominent objection. The objection, due to Dorit Bar-On and Keith Simmons, is that deflationists cannot account for the fact that asserting a proposition involves presenting the proposition as being true. In responding to this objection, I will focus on the influential minimalist account of the concept of truth that has been developed by Paul Horwich. I will motivate an account of ‘presenting as true’ that has been recently proposed by Neri Marsili and then explain why it is fully compatible with minimalism.en_NZ
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherThe University of Waikato
dc.rights© 2023 The Author
dc.sourcePerspectives about Truth 2en_NZ
dc.titleTruth vanishes again: deflationism, assertion, and 'presenting as true'en_NZ
dc.typeConference Contribution
pubs.elements-id328950
pubs.finish-date2023-09-30en_NZ
pubs.publication-statusAccepteden_NZ
pubs.publisher-urlhttps://philevents.org/event/show/113698en_NZ
pubs.start-date2023-09-29en_NZ


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