Show simple item record  

dc.contributor.authorvan Zyl, Liezl
dc.date.accessioned2009-04-06T22:35:42Z
dc.date.available2009-04-06T22:35:42Z
dc.date.issued2009
dc.identifier.citationVan Zyl, L. (2009). Accidental rightness. Philosophia, 39, 91-104.en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10289/2087
dc.description.abstractIn this paper I argue that the disagreement between modern moral philosophers and (some) virtue ethicists about whether motive affects rightness is a result of conceptual disagreement, and that when they develop a theory of ‘right action,’ the two parties respond to two very different questions. Whereas virtue ethicists tend to use ‘right’ as interchangeable with ‘good’ or ‘virtuous’ and as implying moral praise, modern moral philosophers use it as roughly equivalent to ‘in accordance with moral obligation.’ One implication of this is that the possibility of an act being right by accident does not pose a problem for consequentialism or deontology. A further implication is that it reveals a shortcoming in virtue ethics, namely that it does not—yet needs to—present an account of moral obligation.en
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherSpringer Netherlandsen_NZ
dc.relation.urihttp://www.springerlink.com/content/y20662q985n76273/?p=a6df6d35c155442da9fb44e8dc0cda11&pi=0en
dc.rightsThis is an author's accepted version of an article published in the journal: Philosophia. Copyright Springer Science + Business Media B.V. 2008. The original publication is available at www.springerlink.com.
dc.subjectaccidental rightnessen
dc.subjectgood(praiseworthy or virtuous) actionen
dc.subjectjusticeen
dc.subjectright actionen
dc.subjectmoral obligationen
dc.subjectvirtue ethicsen
dc.titleAccidental rightnessen
dc.typeJournal Articleen
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11406-008-9136-6en
dc.relation.isPartOfPhilosophiaen_NZ
pubs.begin-page91en_NZ
pubs.editionMarchen_NZ
pubs.elements-id33825
pubs.end-page104en_NZ
pubs.issue1en_NZ
pubs.volume37en_NZ


Files in this item

This item appears in the following Collection(s)

Show simple item record