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dc.contributor.authorvan Zyl, Liezl
dc.date.accessioned2010-07-01T23:17:12Z
dc.date.available2010-07-01T23:17:12Z
dc.date.issued2010
dc.identifier.citationvan Zyl, L. (2010). Motive and right action. Philosophia, 38(2), 405-415.en_NZ
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10289/4077
dc.description.abstractSome philosophers believe that a change in motive alone is sometimes sufficient to bring about a change in the deontic status (rightness or wrongness) of an action. I refer to this position as ‘weak motivism’, and distinguish it from ‘strong’ and ‘partial motivism’. I examine a number of cases where our intuitive judgements appear to support the weak motivist’s thesis, and argue that in each case an alternative explanation can be given for why a change in motive brings about (or, in some cases, appears to bring about) a change in deontic status.en_NZ
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherSpringeren_NZ
dc.relation.urihttp://www.springerlink.com/content/p7u82l75001ln420/en_NZ
dc.subjectmotiveen_NZ
dc.subjectmotivismen_NZ
dc.subjectright actionen_NZ
dc.subjectpermissibilityen_NZ
dc.subjectgood actionen_NZ
dc.subjectvirtue ethicsen_NZ
dc.titleMotive and right actionen_NZ
dc.typeJournal Articleen_NZ
dc.identifier.doi10.1007/s11406-009-9214-4en_NZ
dc.relation.isPartOfPhilosophiaen_NZ
pubs.begin-page405en_NZ
pubs.editionJuneen_NZ
pubs.elements-id35010
pubs.end-page415en_NZ
pubs.issue2en_NZ
pubs.volume38en_NZ


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