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dc.contributor.authorLegg, Catherine
dc.date.accessioned2010-12-12T20:17:16Z
dc.date.available2010-12-12T20:17:16Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.citationLegg, C. (2012). The hardness of the iconic must: Can Peirce’s existential graphs assist modal epistemology?, 20(1), 1–24. http://doi.org/10.1093/philmat/nkr005en
dc.identifier.issn1744-6406
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10289/4872
dc.description.abstractCharles Peirce’s diagrammatic logic - the Existential Graphs - is presented as a tool for illuminating how we know necessity, in answer to Benacerraf’s famous challenge that most “semantics for mathematics” do not “fit an acceptable epistemology”. It is suggested that necessary reasoning is in essence a recognition that a certain structure has the structure that it has. This means that, contra Hume and his contemporary heirs, necessity is observable. One just needs to pay attention, not just to individual things but to how those things are related in larger structures, certain aspects of which force certain others to be a particular way.en_NZ
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.publisherOxford University Pressen_NZ
dc.subjectPeirceen_NZ
dc.subjectnecessityen_NZ
dc.subjectexistential graphsen_NZ
dc.subjectmodal epistemologyen_NZ
dc.subjectHumeen_NZ
dc.subjectBenacerrafen_NZ
dc.subject'hardness of the iconic must'en_NZ
dc.titleThe hardness of the iconic must: Can Peirce’s existential graphs assist modal epistemology?en_NZ
dc.typeJournal Articleen_NZ
dc.identifier.doi10.1093/philmat/nkr005
pubs.begin-page1
pubs.end-page24
pubs.issue1
pubs.volume20


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