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      What Achilles did and the Tortoise wouldn't

      Legg, Catherine
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      What_Achilles_Did_and_the_Tortoise_Wouldnt-4.pdf
      Main paper, 223.2Kb
      WhatAchillesDidTortoiseWldnt(July12)JOINTSESSIONS3.ppt
      Presentation slides, 1.022Mb
      Link
       www.stirlingjointsession2012.co.uk
      Citation
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      Legg, C. (2012). What Achilles did and the Tortoise wouldn't. Paper presented at Open Sessions, Joint Sessions of the Mind and Aristotelian Societies (Stirling, Scotland July 6-8).
      Permanent Research Commons link: https://hdl.handle.net/10289/6534
      Abstract
      This paper offers an expressivist account of logical form, arguing that in order to fully understand it one must examine what valid arguments make us do (or: what Achilles does and the Tortoise doesn’t, in Carroll’s famed fable). It introduces Charles Peirce’s distinction between symbols, indices and icons as three different kinds of signification whereby the sign picks out its object by learned convention, by unmediated indication, and by resemblance respectively. It is then argued that logical form is represented by the third, iconic, kind of sign. It is noted that icons uniquely enjoy partial identity between sign and object, and argued that this holds the key to Carroll’s puzzle. Finally, from this examination of sign-types metaphysical morals are drawn: that the traditional foes metaphysical realism and conventionalism constitute a false dichotomy, and that reality contains intriguingly inference-binding structures.
      Date
      2012
      Type
      Conference Contribution
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      • Arts and Social Sciences Papers [1405]
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