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dc.contributor.authorLegg, Catherine
dc.coverage.spatialHamilton, New Zealand
dc.date.accessioned2015-01-09T03:42:24Z
dc.date.available2014
dc.date.available2015-01-09T03:42:24Z
dc.date.issued2014
dc.identifier.citationLegg, C. (2014). Charles Peirce’s limit concept of truth. Presented at the 44th Annual Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia (PESA) Conference, November 22-25, 2014, Hamilton, New Zealand.en
dc.identifier.urihttps://hdl.handle.net/10289/9039
dc.description.abstractThis talk will present and explore Charles Peirce’s account of truth as “the opinion which is fated to be agreed to by all who investigate”. This account is arguably more objectivist than accounts of truth in terms of ‘usefulness’ found in other pragmatists such as William James and Richard Rorty. The account will be defended from three objections: i) Because it talks about a potentially infinite process of inquiry, it is incoherent. ii) Because it relies on a faith that inquirers will converge on one opinion if they inquire long and hard enough, it is too realist. iii) Because it defines truth as a kind of opinion, it is not realist enough.
dc.format.mimetypeapplication/pdf
dc.language.isoen
dc.source44th Annual Philosophy of Education Society of Australasia (PESA) Conference
dc.titleCharles Peirce's limit concept of truth
dc.typeConference Contribution
pubs.elements-id118056
pubs.finish-date2014-11-25
pubs.start-date2014-11-22


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