Charles Peirce's limit concept of truth
dc.contributor.author | Legg, Catherine | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2014-03-06T20:15:17Z | |
dc.date.available | 2014-03-06T20:15:17Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2014 | |
dc.description.abstract | This entry explores Charles Peirce's account of truth in terms of the end or ‘limit’ of inquiry. This account is distinct from – and arguably more objectivist than – views of truth found in other pragmatists such as James and Rorty. The roots of the account in mathematical concepts is explored, and it is defended from objections that it is (i) incoherent, (ii) in its faith in convergence, too realist and (iii) in its ‘internal realism’, not realist enough. | en_NZ |
dc.format.mimetype | application/pdf | |
dc.identifier.citation | Legg, C. (2014). Charles Peirce's limit concept of truth. Philosophy Compass, 9(3), 204-213. | en_NZ |
dc.identifier.doi | 10.1111/phc3.12114 | en_NZ |
dc.identifier.uri | https://hdl.handle.net/10289/8547 | |
dc.language.iso | en | en_NZ |
dc.publisher | Wiley | en_NZ |
dc.relation.uri | http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/phc3.12114/abstract | en_NZ |
dc.subject | Charles Peirce | en_NZ |
dc.subject | Peirce | |
dc.subject | truth | |
dc.subject | limit | |
dc.subject | convergence | |
dc.subject | pragmatism | |
dc.subject | realism | |
dc.subject | redundancy theory of truth | |
dc.subject | correspondence theory of truth | |
dc.subject | coherence theory of truth | |
dc.title | Charles Peirce's limit concept of truth | en_NZ |
dc.type | Journal Article | en_NZ |
Files
Original bundle
1 - 1 of 1
No Thumbnail Available
- Name:
- Truth-PhilCompass-UK(Oct13)-2.pdf
- Size:
- 241.42 KB
- Format:
- Adobe Portable Document Format
- Description:
License bundle
1 - 1 of 1
No Thumbnail Available
- Name:
- license.txt
- Size:
- 1.71 KB
- Format:
- Item-specific license agreed upon to submission
- Description: